2022 IL App (4th) 210700-U 

NO. 4-21-0700 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

BRADLEY WEBSTER SIMMONS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

)

) 

)

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

McLean County 

No. 20CF444 

Honorable 

William G. Workman, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding that (1) the evidence at the discharge 

hearing was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not 

not guilty of the charged offenses and (2) the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to 

consider defendant’s contentions of error concerning the trial court’s finding of 

unfitness. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Bradley Webster Simmons, was charged with unlawful possession of 

a weapon by a felon, unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a felon, and obstructing a 

peace officer. The trial court found defendant unfit to stand trial and placed him in the custody of 

the Department of Human Services (DHS) for treatment. Defendant failed to attain fitness, and a 

discharge hearing was held. The trial court found defendant not not guilty of the charged 

offenses and remanded him to the custody of DHS for further treatment.

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

June 27, 2022

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
- 2 - 

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the State presented insufficient evidence at the 

discharge hearing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not not guilty of the charged 

offenses; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in finding him unfit to stand trial where it relied 

solely on a report that failed to explain how he was unfit and failed to ensure his presence at the 

fitness hearing or properly waive his absence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying defendant 

his right to a jury determination of his fitness. We affirm. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 On June 1, 2020, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by 

a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)), unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a 

felon (id.), and obstructing a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)). The public defender was appointed to 

represent defendant.

¶ 6 On June 19, 2020, the matter was set for a preliminary hearing. Defendant refused 

to leave his cell to attend the hearing via closed circuit television, and the matter was continued. 

¶ 7 On June 25, 2020, defendant, acting pro se, filed an “Emergency Injunctive 

Medical Request for Medicine” requesting that the trial court direct the jail to prescribe him 

“ ‘nascent iodine.’ ” He stated he needed this medication to “maintain optimal fitness for trial.”

During the pendency of the proceedings, defendant, again acting pro se, filed several other 

documents requesting that he receive “nascent iodine” in jail.

¶ 8 On June 26, 2020, defense counsel and the State appeared for a status hearing. 

Defendant was not present. The trial court stated it had been advised by court security that 

defendant again refused to leave his cell. Defense counsel asserted he had spoken to defendant a 

couple weeks prior to the hearing and another assistant public defender had also spoken with 

defendant. Defense counsel asserted that the public defender’s office had a bona fide doubt as to 
- 3 - 

defendant’s fitness to stand trial. Defense counsel filed a written petition that day requesting that 

the court appoint an expert to determine defendant’s fitness. 

¶ 9 The trial court granted defense counsel’s petition and entered an order appointing 

Dr. Terry Killian to examine defendant and determine his fitness to stand trial. The trial court 

noted that, at the first hearing, jail officials could not move defendant from his cell to the room 

for closed circuit hearings without jeopardizing defendant’s safety and the safety of corrections 

officers. The court stated defendant again refused to leave his cell and had filed a document in 

which he “allude[d] to mental health issues.”

¶ 10 On July 28, 2020, Dr. Killian filed his report. In the report, Killian stated he 

attempted to interview defendant in his cell at the jail but defendant sat behind a half wall in his 

cell and would not speak to Killian. After several unsuccessful attempts to speak to defendant, 

Killian just observed defendant in his cell. Killian then interviewed other inmates at the jail, 

periodically checking on defendant to observe him. Killian spoke with an inmate services 

assistant coordinator at the jail who told him that defendant was delusional, as he believed his 

blood was poisoned by “some sort of metal.” She told Killian this had been a “consistent theme” 

during defendant’s many prior incarcerations at the jail. She also said defendant had been found 

unfit five years earlier in Champaign County and was sent to a treatment center. However, 

Killian did not have any records regarding that case or defendant’s treatment.

¶ 11 Killian diagnosed defendant with “probable schizophrenia,” though he noted he 

did not have “a lot of information on which to base a diagnosis.” Killian opined, within a 

reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, that defendant was not fit to stand trial “on the basis 

of his apparently severe psychotic illness which appears to render him incapable of rationally 
- 4 - 

assisting in his own defense.” Killian found defendant could likely be restored to fitness within 

one year with a course of antipsychotic medication. 

¶ 12 On August 3, 2020, a fitness hearing was held. Defendant was not present in the 

courtroom. The trial court indicated defendant had refused to leave his cell to appear via closed 

circuit television. The court stated it intended to proceed with the fitness hearing without 

defendant’s presence, and defense counsel stated he had no objection. The court indicated it had 

reviewed Dr. Killian’s report. The parties stipulated that the only evidence to be presented was 

the contents of the report. The court found defendant unfit to stand trial based upon the parties’ 

stipulation to the contents of the report and the court’s own review of the report. The court found 

a substantial possibility existed that defendant would be able to attain fitness within a year if 

provided a course of treatment. The court placed defendant in the custody of DHS in an inpatient 

secure setting.

¶ 13 On September 30, 2020, defendant filed several letters in a pro se capacity. In one 

of the letters, defendant argued the trial court improperly found him unfit when he was not 

present at the fitness hearing. Defendant asserted he had the right to attend all fitness hearings. In 

another letter, defendant requested that a guardian ad litem be appointed to argue for 

(1) defendant’s fitness for trial, (2) a jury determination of defendant’s fitness, (3) a second 

psychological evaluation performed by a specified individual, and (4) “the point that [defendant] 

is capable of answering the court’s questions.” Defendant subsequently retained private counsel. 

¶ 14 The court held two 90-day review hearings on the fitness determination. At each 

hearing, the court found defendant remained unfit based on reports submitted by DHS indicating 

defendant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and remained unfit. Defendant did not attend 

the hearings, but his counsel was present. 
- 5 - 

¶ 15 On August 3, 2021, a letter from a hospital administrator at DHS was filed. The

letter stated DHS personnel believed there was not a substantial probability that defendant would 

attain fitness within one year from his admission. A progress report attached to the letter stated 

defendant’s symptoms of psychosis hindered his ability to attain fitness. The report stated he was 

noncompliant with prescribed treatment and was on court-ordered medication. The report 

indicated defendant had knowledge of basic court proceedings and an understanding of the 

charges but lacked the capacity to assist in his own defense. The report stated defendant might be 

able to attain fitness “within an extended time frame.” 

¶ 16 The trial court held a discharge hearing on October 26, 2021. Prior to the hearing, 

the court considered a DHS progress report dated October 13, 2021, that was submitted by the 

parties. The report indicated defendant remained unfit to stand trial but stated he might attain 

fitness within an extended period of time. The court found defendant remained unfit to stand trial 

at that time. The court also took judicial notice of defendant’s 2018 felony conviction for 

aggravated battery. 

¶ 17 The State presented the testimony of Detective Bryan Hanner. Hanner testified he 

was working as a patrol deputy on May 29, 2020, at 9:45 a.m. At that time, he proceeded to

Route 66 near Lexington, Illinois, after officers had received reports of a potentially armed 

trespasser on the railway line. Hanner was driving a marked squad car. While Hanner was 

driving to that area, a motorist flagged him down and told him there was a man standing in the 

road with a rifle in his hands near the Brandt agricultural facility. 

¶ 18 Hanner proceeded to the area and saw an individual standing in the road holding a 

long, narrow object in his hands. The individual was near the intersection of Route 66 and 

Orange Street. Hanner described the person in the road as a “larger-built male” who was wearing 
- 6 - 

dark clothing. Hanner could not identify the man’s race because of the distance. Hanner could 

not discern what the man was holding, but he assumed it was a long gun or rifle case based on 

his conversation with the motorist. 

¶ 19 Hanner then stopped his vehicle, turned his emergency lights on, and exited the

squad car armed with a shotgun. He stopped his car a long distance from the man because he 

believed the man was armed with a long gun, which would be able to engage him at a much 

greater distance than a handgun. Hanner began shouting commands at the individual, telling him 

to get down on his knees and put his hands up. Hanner could tell the man heard him because 

“[h]e was starting to move, look for a way out.” The interstate highway was on one side of the 

road. The man ran in the opposite direction of the interstate toward the Brandt facility. He was 

still holding what looked like a long gun as he ran away.

¶ 20 Hanner reported over his radio that a subject in dark clothing was running away 

from him on foot in the direction of the Brandt facility. Hanner subsequently spoke with Brandt 

employees, who told him they had seen a large, white male wearing a camouflage jacket and a 

green backpack and carrying a tan rifle case.

¶ 21 Hanner testified police units began spreading out in the area. Hanner and another 

officer first searched culverts, ditches, outbuildings, and vehicles in the area around the Brandt 

facility. Other units did the same thing in their search areas. The units then established a 

“perimeter,” which Hanner described as “a pocket cordoned around an area to contain any 

subjects that might be in it until those areas [could] be cleared and that person located.” An 

individual was eventually located within the perimeter created by the officers. Hanner 

recognized the individual, later identified in court as defendant, from prior contacts. Defendant 
- 7 - 

was wearing tan pants and a plaid shirt and appeared to be dirty and disheveled. He was not 

carrying anything when he was apprehended.

¶ 22 Hanner testified that when he initially saw the man in the road, he was not able to 

recognize him as defendant. Hanner estimated that officers apprehended defendant

approximately 80 to 90 minutes after he initially saw the man in the road. Defense counsel asked 

Hanner if at any point he saw the “individual [he was] looking for” wearing a camouflage jacket 

or a green backpack and Hanner said he had not. 

¶ 23 Hanner identified a map of the area where the incident occurred, which was 

introduced into evidence. The map depicted the intersection of Route 66 and Orange Street, 

where Hanner initially saw the man in the road. The map showed several buildings directly east 

and south of the intersection, which Hanner stated was the Brandt facility. The map also showed 

an open area to the east of the Brandt facility and a water treatment plant to the east of the open 

area. There was a building further south, which Hanner testified was part of Martin Sullivan 

Implement.

¶ 24 Detective Aaron King testified that he assisted officers in an area search on the 

morning of the incident. King was advised that the officers were searching for a white male who 

was approximately 20 to 30 years old, wearing a camouflage jacket, and carrying a tan gun case. 

The officers were notified that a Martin Sullivan employee had observed a man in a field to the 

east of the Martin Sullivan facility walking south toward Lexington. King drove to the area and 

observed a white male walking south. Several officers ran toward the man yelling for him to 

stop. He looked at them and then turned and ran to the south. King drove closer to the man and 

told him to stop. After running another five to ten seconds, the individual stopped, got on his 

hands and knees, and put his hands on his head. He said, “ ‘Why are you guys chasing me[?] I 
- 8 - 

am just going for a walk.’ ” The man was not wearing a camouflage jacket. King did not observe 

him carrying or throwing anything. King identified defendant as the man he chased on the 

morning of the incident.

¶ 25 Trooper Benjamin Reichard testified that he participated in an area search north of 

Lexington at approximately 11:35 a.m. on the morning of the incident. He located a tan rifle case 

containing a bolt-action .22-caliber rifle. He found the rifle case in a grassy area between the 

Brandt facility and a water treatment plant. The area was north of the Martin Sullivan facility. 

Reichard identified photographs of the rifle and rifle case, which were admitted into evidence. 

Reichard indicated the photographs accurately depicted the location where the rifle case was 

found and how the rifle and rifle case appeared on the day of the incident. The photographs 

showed the rifle case was located in an open, grassy field. Some buildings were visible in the 

background. 

¶ 26 Jason Simmons, a McLean County deputy sheriff, testified that he responded to 

an area north of Lexington at approximately 9:45 a.m. on the day of the incident. Officers had 

received a report of a trespasser on a train. The trespasser was described as a white male wearing

a backpack and carrying a long gun case. Deputy Simmons met with a railroad employee who 

told him the man was wearing a camouflage jacket and a backpack.

¶ 27 Deputy Simmons learned Hanner had confronted an individual, and he proceeded 

to Hanner’s location. Deputy Simmons began looking for the subject. As more officers arrived, a 

perimeter was established. A suspect was eventually located and taken into custody. Officers 

searched the area and found a backpack at one location and a rifle and rifle case at another 

location. Deputy Simmons took photographs of the backpack and gave Reichard the camera he 
- 9 - 

had been using so Reichard could take pictures of the rifle case. The rifle case was 

approximately 50 to 75 yards away from the backpack. 

¶ 28 The photographs of the backpack showed that it was recovered in an open, grassy 

area. Deputy Simmons testified that buildings comprising the Brandt facility appeared in the 

background of the photographs. The same buildings were also present in the photographs of the 

rifle case. Other photographs were taken later at the sheriff’s office and depicted the contents of 

the backpack. The backpack contained rounds of .22-caliber ammunition. Deputy Simmons 

testified the rifle recovered from the field was a Marlin bolt-action .22-caliber rifle. There was a 

spent shell casing in the bolt face, which indicated a round had been fired but not ejected. 

¶ 29 Deputy Simmons testified he did not see defendant wearing a camouflage shirt

nor did he see him with a backpack or rifle case. He believed defendant was wearing a plaid 

shirt. To Deputy Simmons’s knowledge, officers never recovered a camouflage jacket. He did 

not see defendant near the location where the backpack and rifle were found, and he did not 

observe defendant throwing away items at any point. Deputy Simmons testified it was not 

uncommon for people to shed layers of clothing when running from the police. 

¶ 30 A second map of the area was introduced into evidence. Deputy Simmons marked 

on the map where the subject was first seen at the intersection of Route 66 and Orange Street. He 

then marked where the rifle case was found, which was in an open area to the southeast of the 

intersection where the subject was initially seen. He marked where the backpack was recovered, 

which was in an open area south of where the rifle case was found. Deputy Simmons marked the 

location where the Martin Sullivan employees saw a man walking, which was in an open area 

southeast of the location where the backpack was recovered. He also marked where defendant 
- 10 - 

was apprehended, which was in an open area to the southeast of the location where the Martin 

Sullivan employees observed a man walking.

¶ 31 The trial court found defendant not not guilty of all charges and remanded him to 

the custody of DHS for further treatment. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that 

the evidence at the discharge hearing failed to prove him not not guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. On November 24, 2021, the trial court denied the motion.

¶ 32 On November 30, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal indicating he was 

appealing the judgment of the trial court entered on November 23, 2021. Defendant was later 

permitted to file an amended notice of appeal, which clarified that he was appealing the order 

entered on November 24, 2021. The amended notice of appeal stated that the nature of the order 

appealed from was the finding of not not guilty and the denial of the motion to reconsider.

¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 34 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 35 On appeal, defendant argues the State presented insufficient evidence at the 

discharge hearing to prove him not not guilty of the charged offenses. Specifically, defendant 

argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the person Detective Hanner initially 

observed standing in the middle of the road. Defendant contends the evidence only established 

that he was found nearby some 80 to 90 minutes later. 

¶ 36 If the court finds there is not a substantial probability that a defendant charged 

with a felony will attain fitness within one year, the defendant or the State may request a 

discharge hearing. 725 ILCS 5/104-17(e), 104-23 (West 2020). The purpose of a discharge 

hearing is to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, and the parties may introduce evidence 

relevant to the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime. Id. § 104-25. “If the evidence does not 
- 11 - 

prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the court shall enter a judgment of 

acquittal.” Id. § 104-25(b). If the defendant is not acquitted following the discharge hearing, the 

defendant may be remanded for an extended period of treatment. Id. § 104-25(d). 

¶ 37 “[A] discharge hearing under section 104-25 is an ‘innocence only’ hearing.” 

People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 480 (2006). It is not a proceeding to determine guilt, as “[t]he 

question of guilt is to be deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial.” People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 

2d 533, 543 (1983). “A discharge hearing simply enables an unfit defendant to have the charges 

dismissed if the State does not have the evidence to prove he committed the charged offenses 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Waid, 221 Ill. 2d at 480. “Although a court’s determination at a 

discharge hearing that the State has proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does 

not constitute a technical determination of guilt, the standard of proof is the same as that required 

for a criminal conviction.” People v. Williams, 312 Ill. App. 3d 232, 234 (2000).

¶ 38 When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 

(1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “A criminal conviction will not 

be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates 

a reasonable doubt of the defendant'’s guilt.” Id.

¶ 39 “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided 

that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime 

charged.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2000). “The trier of fact need not *** be satisfied 

beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. It is sufficient if all of 
- 12 - 

the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the 

defendant’s guilt.” Id. “A trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow 

normally from the evidence before it, nor must the trier of fact search out all possible 

explanations consistent with innocence, and raise those explanations to a level of reasonable 

doubt.” In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60.

¶ 40 To prove a defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon or 

unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a felon, the State must establish the defendant

(1) knowingly possessed any firearm or firearm ammunition and (2) has been convicted of a 

felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2020). To prove a defendant guilty of obstructing a peace 

officer, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed the performance 

of an authorized act by someone the defendant knew to be a peace officer. Id. § 31-1(a).

¶ 41 In the instant case, the evidence at the discharge hearing was sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the charged offenses. Defendant does not 

dispute that the State introduced evidence that defendant had previously been convicted of a 

felony. Defendant also admits the evidence was sufficient to establish that the person Hanner

initially saw in the road possessed a firearm and ammunition and knowingly obstructed an act of 

a police officer. He contests only whether the evidence established that he was the person 

observed by Hanner. 

¶ 42 We find, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational 

trier of fact could find there was sufficient circumstantial evidence establishing defendant was 

the person Hanner initially observed standing in the road. Officers testified they had received 

reports of a white male in the area wearing a camouflage jacket and a backpack and carrying a 

long gun case. Hanner testified that while he was driving to investigate a potentially armed 
- 13 - 

trespasser on a railway line, a motorist informed Hanner he had observed a man with a rifle 

standing in the middle of the road. Hanner continued driving and subsequently observed a man 

standing in the middle of the road holding a long, narrow object. Hanner turned on his 

emergency lights and yelled at the man to get down. The man’s reaction indicated he heard 

Hanner. The man then fled. 

¶ 43 Deputy Simmons and Hanner testified that a perimeter was established around the 

area after the man ran from Hanner. Hanner explained that the purpose of the perimeter was to 

contain subjects inside it. Defendant was subsequently found within the perimeter in a grassy 

field to the south and east of the location where Hanner saw the man in the road. Defendant 

initially ran from the officers when he was located in the field, which may be viewed as evidence 

of consciousness of guilt. People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (2001) (holding that a trier 

of fact may consider flight as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt). A rifle, rifle 

case, and backpack containing ammunition were found between the location where Hanner 

initially saw the man in the road and the location where defendant was apprehended. Maps and 

photographs of the area where the incident occurred that were introduced into evidence showed 

the area was not densely populated. Rather, it was a semi-rural area containing a few businesses 

with open spaces in between them. The photographs of the backpack and the rifle showed the 

area where these items were found was an open grassy field with a few industrial buildings in the 

vicinity. 

¶ 44 From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that defendant 

fled from the area of his initial encounter with Hanner, dropping items he was wearing or 

carrying during his flight, and ended up in the area where he was later apprehended. Indeed, the 

locations of the recovered backpack and rifle case, as identified on the map in evidence, reflect a 
- 14 - 

fairly direct path between the area of Hanner’s initial encounter with the man in the road and the 

area of defendant’s capture. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding 

of not not guilty of the charged offenses. 

¶ 45 We reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61 (1990), and 

People v. Tates, 2016 IL App (1st) 140619, ¶ 29. Defendant cites Reid and Tates for the 

proposition that it was not enough for the State to “connect” defendant to the scene or show his 

brief flight from the officers prior to his arrest. The court in Reid held that “a defendant’s 

presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled with his or her flight from the scene, is not 

enough to prove accountability.” Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 61. The Tates court held the defendant’s 

mere presence at the scene, even coupled with flight, was insufficient evidence to establish that 

he constructively possessed contraband. Tates, 2016 IL App (1st) 140619, ¶ 29. The instant case 

involves neither accountability nor constructive possession. Rather, this case involves 

circumstantial evidence of actual possession. Defendant admits the evidence was sufficient to 

show the man Hanner observed in the middle of the road possessed a firearm, firearm 

ammunition, and obstructed an authorized act of a police officer. As we have discussed, the 

circumstantial evidence in this case was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that this 

person was defendant. See supra ¶¶ 43-44. 

¶ 46 We also reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Dowaliby, 221 Ill. App. 3d 788 

(1991), in support of his position that the State’s evidence was insufficient because it failed to 

prove defendant was the only person with the opportunity to commit the crime. In Dowaliby, the 

appellate court held the defendant’s conviction for the murder of his daughter could not be 

sustained based solely on evidence that he had the opportunity to commit the offense because he 

and his wife were the only adults in the house on the night the victim disappeared. Id. at 797. The 
- 15 - 

court found the defendant’s wife acting alone, his mother, and a potential intruder also had the 

opportunity to commit the offense. Id. at 797-99. The Dowaliby court held that “[o]pportunity 

alone *** is not sufficient to sustain a conviction unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that no one else had the opportunity to commit the crime.” Id. at 797. The State’s 

remaining evidence in Dowaliby was similarly underwhelming. Id. at 800. The Dowaliby court 

concluded the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to directly or indirectly link the 

defendant with the murder. Id. at 801. 

¶ 47 Here, unlike in Dowaliby, there was sufficient evidence linking defendant with 

the offense. The evidence at the trial showed officers established a perimeter around the area 

where Hanner observed the man in the road in order to contain any subjects within the perimeter. 

The officers found defendant walking through a field inside that perimeter 80 to 90 minutes after 

Hanner encountered the man in the road. A rifle and backpack were found in between the 

location where the man in the road was seen and the location where defendant was later found.

¶ 48 B. Fitness Hearing

¶ 49 Defendant raises several issues concerning his fitness hearing. Defendant argues 

the trial court abused its discretion in finding him unfit to stand trial because it relied solely on 

Dr. Killian’s report, which failed to adequately explain how defendant was unfit. Defendant also 

argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding him unfit because it failed to ensure his 

presence at the fitness hearing. Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying him his 

right to a jury determination of his fitness.

¶ 50 Though not raised by the parties, we must examine whether we have jurisdiction 

to consider defendant’s challenge to his fitness hearing in this appeal. See People v. Smith, 228 
- 16 - 

Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008) (“A reviewing court has an independent duty to consider issues of 

jurisdiction, regardless of whether either party has raised them.”).

¶ 51 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. July 1, 2017), “the notice of

appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final

judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 

days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” The filing of the notice of appeal is

jurisdictional. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). Accordingly, “[o]ur 

subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the filing of a notice of appeal within the time prescribed 

by Rule 606(b).” People v. Coleman, 2017 IL App (4th) 160770, ¶ 15; see also People v. 

Kellerman, 342 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1023 (2003) (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is 

necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over a criminal matter.”).

¶ 52 An order finding a defendant unfit to stand trial is a final, appealable order. 725 

ILCS 5/104-16(e) (West 2020) (“An order finding the defendant unfit is a final order for 

purposes of appeal by the State or the defendant.”); Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(e) (eff. July 1, 2017) (“The 

defendant or the State may appeal to the Appellate Court from an order holding the defendant 

unfit to stand trial or be sentenced.”).

¶ 53 In the instant case, defendant did not file a timely notice of appeal following the 

trial court’s order finding him unfit to stand trial, which was entered on August 3, 2020. 

Defendant’s notice of appeal filed on November 30, 2021, identified only the order finding him 

not not guilty following the discharge hearing as the order being appealed. The time for 

appealing the order finding defendant unfit had long passed at that point. At oral argument, 

defendant conceded his appeal of the court’s unfitness finding was untimely. Accordingly, we 
- 17 - 

find that we lack jurisdiction to review the propriety of the trial court’s finding of unfitness

because defendant failed to properly perfect an appeal of that order pursuant to Rule 606. 

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 56 Affirmed.