alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Miguel Angel SOTO-VALENZUELA, a.k.a. Alejandro Lopez a.k.a. Alejandro Lopez-Valdez, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 05-10659.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 23, 2006.

*792Albert L. Kleiner Fax, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Hortencia Delgadillo, Esq., Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Miguel Angel Soto-Valenzuela appeals from the 63-month sentence imposed following his conviction for illegal reentry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We dismiss.

By its terms, the appeal waiver encompasses the grounds of this appeal, and there is no evidence that the appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. *See United States v. Jeronimo,*398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.2005). We reject Soto-Valenzuela’s contention that the government waived the appeal waiver as a defense by failing to file a motion to dismiss the appeal.

Soto-Valenzuela also contends that this appeal is not barred because the district court made a statement at sentencing suggesting a limited right to appeal on the particular issue of the sentencing enhancement. However, a district court’s oral statements regarding appellate rights can overcome a written appeal waiver only when made contemporaneously with the defendant’s plea. *See United States v. Lopez-Armenta,*400 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.2005). In this case, the district court’s statements at sentencing were made nearly five months after Soto-Valenzuela had entered his guilty plea, and therefore cannot serve as a basis to override an otherwise valid appeal waiver. *See id.*

We dismiss in light of the valid appeal waiver. *See Jeronimo,*398 F.3d at 1153.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1 John T. Bo yd, C hief Ju stice (R et.), Se ven th C ourt o f App eals , sitting by ass ignm ent. Tex. Gov’ t Code

An n. §7 5.00 2(a)(1 ) (Ve rnon Su pp. 2 004 ). NO. 07-04-0313-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL E AUGUST 10, 2004

______________________________ SHERYL D. ATWOOD,

Appellant
v. THE STA

TE OF TEX

AS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2002-478,973; HON. DRUE FARMER, PRESIDING

_______________________________ ABATEMENT AND RE MAND

_______________________________ Before QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. 1 Appellant

Sheryl D. Atwood appeals from a judgment convicting her of driving while intoxicated. The repo rt er’s record is due in this cause. An ex tension of the applicable deadline was sought by the court reporter. To justify the extensio n, the court reporter represented that appellant has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay for the record. Nothing of record shows that appellant is indi gent and entitled to a free record.2

Accordingly, we now abate this appeal and remand the cause to the Co unty Court at Law No. 2 of Lubb ock Coun ty (trial court) for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court shall i mmediatel y cause n oti ce of a hearin g to be g iven and , thereaft er, condu ct a hearing to determi ne the fo llowing : 1. wheth er appel lant des ires to p rosecute the appe al; 2. wheth er appel lant is i ndigent; and, 3. whether the appellant is entitled to appo inted counsel and a free appellate record. The trial court shall cause the hearing to be transcribed. So too shall it 1) execute findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the foregoing issues, 2) cause to be developed
a supplemental clerk’s record containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law and all orders it mayissue as a result of its hearing on this matter, and 3) cause to be developed
a supplemental reporter’s record transcribing the evidence and arguments presented at the aforementioned hearing. Should it be determined that ap pellantwishes to prosec ute the appeal, is indi gent, and is entitled to an appointed attorney but has none, then thetrial co urt shall appoint counsel, unless appellant knowingly and voluntarily wa ives counsel. Furthermore, the name, address, and phone number of any counsel appointed by the trial court to repres ent appe llant sh all be i ncluded in the s upplemen tal recor d. The trial cou rt shall also file bot h supple mental re cords wi th the cl erk of thi s court on or beforeSeptember 9, 2004. S hould fu rther t ime be needed by the trial court to perform these tasks, then it must be re quested b efore Sep tember 9, 2004. It is so ordere d. Per C uriam Do not p ublish.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley A. SLUPKOWSKI, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 08-7675.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 27, 2009.

Decided: May 12, 2009.

*209Stanley A. Slupkowski, Appellant Pro Se. David T. Huband, Bureau of Prisons, Butner, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Stanley A. Slupkowski seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to compel. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Slupkowski seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4019 

To require persons seeking approval for a liquefied natural gas facility to 

identify employees and agents engaged in activities to persuade communities of the benefits of the approval. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2006 

Mrs. BOXER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To require persons seeking approval for a liquefied natural 

gas facility to identify employees and agents engaged 

in activities to persuade communities of the benefits of 

the approval. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. IDENTIFICATION OF PROPONENTS OF AP4 PROVAL OF LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS FACILI5 TIES. 

6 (a) LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FACILITIES REQUIR7 ING FERC APPROVAL.—The Federal Energy Regulatory 

8 Commission shall— 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

•S 4019 IS

1 (1) require an applicant for approval, by the 

2 Commission under the Natural Gas Act (15 U.S.C. 

3 717 et seq.), of the siting, construction, expansion, 

4 or operation of a liquefied natural gas facility to 

5 identify each of the employees and agents of the ap6 plicant that are engaged, directly or indirectly, in ac7 tivities to persuade communities of the benefits of 

8 the approval; and 

9 (2) maintain a publicly available database list10 ing the names of the employees and agents. 

11 (b) OFF-SHORE LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS FACILI12 TIES.—The Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary 

13 of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating 

14 shall— 

15 (1) require an applicant for approval, by the ap16 propriate Secretary under the Deepwater Port Act 

17 of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), of the siting, con18 struction, expansion, or operation of a liquefied nat19 ural gas facility to identify each of the employees 

20 and agents of the applicant that are engaged, di21 rectly or indirectly, in activities to persuade commu22 nities of the benefits of the approval; and 

23 (2) maintain a publicly available database list24 ing the names of the employees and agents. 

Æ 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
#### Katharine Allison, Appellant, v William B. Allison, Respondent.

Submitted May 26, 2009;

decided June 30, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
Document Headings

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                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
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                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

          - [Disaster Declaration #11724 and #11725]

# AGENCY:

U.S. Small Business Administration.

# ACTION:

Amendment 3.

# SUMMARY:

This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Georgia (FEMA-1833-DR), dated 04/23/2009.

*Incident:*                         Severe Storms, Flooding, Tornadoes and Straight-line Winds.                    

*Incident Period:*                         03/26/2009 through 04/13/2009.                    

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         05/07/2009.                    

*Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         06/22/2009.                    

*Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         01/23/2010.                    

# ADDRESSES:

Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance,U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of the President's major disaster declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of Georgia, dated 04/23/2009, is hereby amended to include the following areas as adversely affected by the disaster.

*Primary Counties:*                     Brantley,                 

Lee, McIntosh, Seminole.

All other information in the original declaration remains unchanged.
      ( print page 22765)    
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

James E. Rivera,

Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.

[FR Doc. E9-11296 Filed 5-13-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### Antonio RAMOS-VALENZUELA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-73270.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 15, 2009.*

Filed May 19, 2009.

Murray D. Hilts, Esq., Law Offices of Murray Hilts, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.

Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Diego, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, lia C. Deiss, USSF-Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

*595Before: SCHROEDER and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and MARSHALL,** District Judge.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Petitioner Antonio Ramos petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) finding that Ramos is removable as an aggravated felon and is ineligible for an INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), waiver. Ramos also petitions for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.

In dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Ramos’s prior petitions for review, Nos. OB-73335 & 04-74002, this court necessarily found that Ramos’s conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 constituted an aggravated felony. This determination is binding, and Ramos is precluded from re-litigating this issue. *See Nunes v. Ashcroft,*375 F.3d 805, 809-10 (9th Cir.2004). Although issue preclusion may not apply where a petitioner can “identify a change in controlling law,” *see id.*at 808, Ramos’s reliance on *United States v. Corona-Sanchez,*291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc), is misplaced. *Corona-Sanchez*was decided *prior*to this court’s dismissal of his previous petitions, and thus cannot qualify as a “change in controlling law.”

Ramos’s contention that the waiver provision of INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), violates the Equal Protection Clause is foreclosed by *Taniguchi v. Schultz,*which held “that a rational basis does exist for denying the § 212(h) waiver to aggravated felon LPRs but not to other aliens.” 303 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir.2002).

DENIED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### In re Terrence Arnez DANIELS, Petitioner.

No. 06-6999.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 22, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 18, 2006.

Terrence Arnez Daniels, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

*443PER CURIAM:

Terrence Arnez Daniels petitions for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking an evidentiary hearing to consider his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and unconstitutional sentencing enhancements. A writ of error coram nobis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) can be used to vacate a conviction when there is a fundamental error resulting in conviction, and no other means of relief is available. *See United States v. Morgan,*346 U.S. 502, 509-11, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954); *United States v. Mandel,*862 F.2d 1067, 1074-75 (4th Cir.1988). *But see Carlisle v. United States,*517 U.S. 416, 429, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) (noting “it is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where a writ of coram nobis would be necessary or appropriate.”). The remedy is also limited to petitioners who are no longer in custody pursuant to their conviction. *See Carlisle,*517 U.S. at 429, 116 S.Ct. 1460.

Our review of the petition leads us to conclude that Daniels failed to establish that his conviction is invalid, or that he is no longer in custody pursuant to his conviction, and he is therefore not entitled to coram nobis relief. Accordingly, we grant Daniels’ motion to proceed in forma pau-peris, grant his motion to file an oversized brief, and deny the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Lubbe, Appellant.

[871 NYS2d 87]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene R. Silverman, J., at hearing; Daniel E FitzGerald, J., at plea and sentence), rendered November 2, 2006, convicting defendant of possessing a sexual performance by a child, and sentencing him to a conditional discharge, unanimously affirmed. The matter is remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings pursuant to CEL 460.50 (5) relating to the stay of execution of judgment.

All of defendant’s suppression arguments are unpreserved *(see e.g. People v Martin,*50 NY2d 1029 [1980]), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits. The court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his computer. After learning from defendant’s companion that she had discovered child pornography on his computer, the police were entitled to remain in defendant’s apartment while they obtained a warrant, even though he withdrew his consent to their presence and asked them to leave *(see People v Arnau,*58 NY2d 27, 36-37 [1982]; *Segura v United States,*468 US 796, 810 [1984]). The ensuing warrant was based on probable cause *(see People v Bigelow,*66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; *Spinelli v United States,*393 US 410 [1969]; *Aguilar v Texas,*378 US 108 [1964]), and was sufficiently specific to satisfy constitutional requirements. Concur—Saxe, J.E, Nardelli, Buckley, Moskowitz and Renwick, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 35.2**

 

**WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.**

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATEANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

 

            I, Barbara Campbell, an authorized officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (the “Administrative Agent”), dohereby certify to WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. (the “Depositor”) and Washington Mutual Bank (the “Servicer”), pursuant to the Amended and Restated Administrative Agent Agreement dated as of February 1, 2005 (the“Servicing Agreement”) by and between the Servicer, and theAdministrative Agent the following with respect to WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WAMU Series 2007-HY4 Trust for the 2007 fiscal year  (the “RelevantYear”): 

1.                  A review of the activities of the AdministrativeAgent during the Relevant Year and of performance under the Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision.

 

2.                  To the best of my knowledge, based on such review,the Administrative Agent has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Relevant Year.

 

Dated as of March 1, 2008.

 

| /s/ Barbara Campbell Name:  Barbara Campbell Title:    First Vice President |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | 1. | Such      Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending June 30, 2010,      fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K for      the period ending June 30, 2010, fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      China Advanced Construction Materials Group,  Inc. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      September 28, 2010                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                              |
| /s/Jeremy      Goodwin                                            |
| Jeremy      GoodwinPrincipal      Financial and AccountingOfficer |

----
**
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**Certification Required by Rule 13a-14(b) or**

**Rule 15d-14(b) and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Permian Basin Royalty Trust (the “Trust”) on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended June 30, 2020, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, not in its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies pursuantto 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge: 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust. 

 
  SIMMONS BANK, TRUSTEE FOR PERMIAN BASIN ROYALTY TRUSTDate: August 10, 2020  By: /s/ RON E. HOOPER   Ron E. Hooper,   
SVP Royalty Trust Management

SimmonsBank

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Permian Basin Royalty Trust andwill be retained by Permian Basin Royalty Trust and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 
**
#### PRINTING SERVICES OF GREENSBORO, INC. v. AMERICAN CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

No. 599A06

(Filed 4 May 2007)

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 180 N.C. App. 70, 637 S.E.2d 230 (2006), affirming in part and reversing in part and remanding a judgment entered 8 November 2005 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 April 2007.

*Robertson, Medlin & Blocker, PLLC, by Stephen E. Robertson, for plaintiff-appellee.*

*The Wescott Law Firm P.C., by Lynanne B. Wescott, for defendant-appellant.*

*Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor General; Gary R. Govert, Special Deputy Attorney General; and M. Lynne Weaver and Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorneys General, for Attorney General Roy Cooper, amicus curiae.*

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
<SEQUENCE>13

                                  EXHIBIT 32.a


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Regent Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, David A. Nelson, in my capacity as Chief Executive Officer and Principal
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


                                        /S/ DAVID A. NELSON
                                        -------------------
Date: September 13, 2005
                                        David A. Nelson,
                                        Chief Executive Officer and Principal
                                        Accounting Officer