IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1552

Filed April 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF C.F., C.D., and N.H.,

Minor Children,

A.H., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Romonda Belcher,

Judge.

A mother appeals a dispositional order denying modification of placement 

in a child-welfare case. AFFIRMED.

Teresa M. Pope of Pope Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Jami J. Hagemeier of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and 

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

“Biological ties are not the only ties that are important.” That’s how the State 

summarized its argument for leaving six-year-old C.F., four-year-old C.D., and 

one-year-old N.H. in the care of Melesa, a woman the children view as their aunt.1 

Their mother, Alishia, asked the juvenile court to order placement of the children 

with their maternal grandmother rather than fictive kin. The juvenile court declined,

and Alishia appeals. Like the juvenile court, we find disrupting the children’s 

placement is not in their best interests. So we thus affirm the denial of the motion 

to modify.2

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The juvenile court adjudicated C.F., C.D., and N.H. as children in need of 

assistance (CINA) in March 2023. The court approved a request from the 

department to remove them from parental custody one month later. Alishia and 

N.H.’s father, Robert, had a history of substance use, and the department believed 

that Robert was physically abusing Alishia. The court found that domestic violence 

in the home posed a safety concern for the children. Alishia also had a no-contact 

order against Brandon, C.D.’s father. Joshua, who was identified as C.F.’s father 

in the CINA petition, also assaulted Alishia in C.F.’s presence, resulting in a 

1 Our record includes various spellings for the placement’s name. But this is the 

spelling used in reports from the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services.

2 We generally review child-welfare proceedings de novo. In re J.C., 857 

N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). Under that standard, we assess the facts and the 

law; then “we adjudicate rights anew.” Id. But when the issue requires statutory 

interpretation, we review for correction of legal error. Id. As always, our primary 

concern is the children’s best interests. Id.
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founded child abuse assessment in 2017. After removal, the department placed 

the children with Melesa, Joshua’s sister. 

In May 2023, the State notified the court that, although Joshua’s name was 

on C.F.’s birth certificate, he is not the biological father. Instead, C.F.’s biological 

father was Edward, as confirmed by a 2018 paternity test. The State amended its 

CINA petition to name Edward as a party to the action. 

Meanwhile, the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) met with the children at 

Melesa’s home. The GAL’s report referred to that placement as fictive kin and 

described Melesa’s home as “the least restrictive environment” for the children. 

The case plan noted that Melesa was “meeting all of the children’s needs and 

engaged in services recommended by the department.” The GAL echoed that 

sentiment in her July 2023 report: “The children are thriving in their current 

placement and are very comfortable with their current caretakers.”

By summer Alishia believed she was ready to resume custody. She moved 

to modify placement, noting her no-contact order with Robert, her work with a 

domestic-violence advocate, and her participation in substance-use treatment. In 

the alternative, Alishia asked the court to place the children with their maternal 

grandmother, Michelle. 

At a dispositional hearing on the motion, Michelle testified to her close 

relationship with the children. She highlighted that she cared for the two older 

children in 2020; that placement lasted for nearly a year. She also cared for all 

three children for about a week in October 2022 when the department implemented 

a safety plan. But she acknowledged having “minimal contact” with the children 

when they returned to the care of Alishia and Robert. Michelle said she decided 
4

to “step back” and let Alishia “live her life and if the kids need anything, I’m always 

there for them. I’m just a phone call away.” And even after the department placed 

the children with Melesa, it still allowed Michelle to supervise visits with Alishia and 

provide transportation for the children. 

Department case manager Callie Kueck offered a different perspective. 

She testified that it was in the children’s best interests to stay in their current 

placement. Kueck told the court that C.F. had “a significant bond” with Melesa and 

“has reported to professionals that he feels safe with her.” Kueck expressed less 

confidence about placing the children with Michelle: “There have been ongoing 

concerns regarding the interactions supervised by grandma, that there are people 

present that have not been approved by the department, there are also ongoing 

concerns of inappropriate conversations still occurring.” 

At the close of the hearing, Alishia’s counsel described Joshua as C.F.’s 

“legal father” because his name is on the child’s birth certificate. Yet counsel 

argued that Joshua’s sister, Melesa, is not a relative placement because she is

unrelated to C.D. or N.H. Counsel advocated to modify placement to their 

grandmother under Iowa Code section 232.102(1)(a) (2023), which prioritizes 

adult relatives over fictive kin. Both the State and GAL resisted. The State argued:

[Y]ou can’t ask a four-year-old or a baby, do you think this woman is 

your aunt, I mean, this is what I’m assuming [C.F.] calls [Melesa], 

that’s his aunt. The children feel comfortable there. The children are 

doing well there. They are in placement with their siblings and 

moving them is going to be difficult for them.

The court denied Alishia’s motion to modify placement in September 2023. 

It left “temporary legal custody with the department for purposes of foster care 
5

placement with relative for [C.F.] and suitable others for [N.H.] and [C.D.].” Alishia 

appeals.

3

 

II. Analysis

In her petition on appeal, Alishia raises two telescoping issues. First, she 

claims the court erred in finding that Melesa was C.F.’s relative, as defined in Iowa 

Code section 232.2(56). Second, she argues that because Melesa was only fictive 

kin, as defined in section 232.2(22), the court erred in failing to order placement 

with the children’s maternal grandmother under section 232.102(1)(a). That code 

section outlines the hierarchy for placement of children removed from their parents.

After a dispositional hearing, the court may enter an order 

transferring the legal custody of the child to a parent of the child. If 

the court finds that custody with either of the child’s parents is not in 

the child’s best interests, the child’s custody shall be transferred to 

the department for placement of the child in any of the following 

categories in the following order of priority:

(1) An adult relative of the child including but not limited to 

adult siblings and parents of siblings.

(2) A fictive kin.

(3) Any other suitable placement identified by the child's 

relatives.

(4) An individual licensed to provide foster care pursuant to 

chapter 237. If the child is placed with a licensed foster care 

provider, the department shall assign decision-making authority to 

the foster care provider for the purpose of applying the reasonable 

and prudent parent standard during the child’s placement.

(5) A group care facility, shelter care facility, or other 

residential treatment facility.

3 The GAL filed a response to the petition on appeal, which the State joined. No 

other parties weighed in on the appeal. Attorneys for Joshua and Brandon resisted 

the motion to modify placement at the hearing. Counsel for Robert supported the 

motion, asserting that it was “very concerning” to him that N.H. was with “a 

stranger.” Counsel for C.F.’s biological father, Edward, advised the court that his 

client no longer wished to be a party in the case. 
6

Iowa Code § 232.102(1)(a). If the juvenile court identifies categories (2) 

through (5) as the preferred placement for a child, it must make a specific finding 

that placement with an adult relative is not in the child’s best interests. Id. 

§ 232.102(1)(c).

In response to Alishia’s petition, the GAL contends there was clear and 

convincing evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that 

Melesa was C.F.’s relative. As a back-up, the GAL urges that even if the court 

wrongly decided that C.F. was in a relative’s care, the court did not err in refusing 

to disrupt the children’s placement with fictive kin.

We start with the relative-versus-fictive-kin distinction. 

“Relative” means an individual related to a child within the 

fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, by marriage, or through 

adoption. For purposes of subchapters III and IV [governing CINA 

and termination of parental rights], “relative” includes the parent of a 

sibling of the child if the sibling’s parent’s parental rights were not 

previously terminated in relation to the child.

Id. § 232.2(56).

As cross-referenced in that definition of relative, 

“Parent” means a biological or adoptive mother or father of a 

child; or a father whose paternity has been established by one of the 

methods enumerated in section 252A.3, subsection 10, or by 

operation of law due to the established father’s marriage to the 

mother at the time of conception, birth, or at any time during the 

period between conception and birth of the child. 

Id. § 232.2(45). “‘Fictive kin’ means an adult person who is not a relative of a child 

but who has an emotionally positive significant relationship with the child or the 

child’s family.” Id. § 232.2(22).

Alishia maintains that the statutory definition of relative “does not 

encompass the current placement.” Joshua is not C.F.’s biological father and was 
7

not married to Alishia at the time of C.F.’s conception or birth. From there, Alishia 

reasons that Melesa is not C.F.’s relative. Alishia acknowledges that Joshua is 

named as the father on C.F.’s birth certificate.

4

 But, in her view, that fact does not 

mean that his sister is related to C.F. by blood, marriage, or adoption. She insists 

that Melesa is “more appropriately defined as fictive kin.”

In response, the GAL asserts that Joshua has generally been called C.F.’s 

father throughout the CINA case and, by extension, C.F.’s “Aunt Melesa” was an 

adult relative given notice of the removal under Iowa Code section 232.84. The 

GAL also accuses Alishia of objecting to identifying Melesa as C.F.’s aunt to 

“manipulate” the language in section 232.102(1)(a) which gives relatives priority 

over fictive kin. What the GAL does not do is address how Melesa fits the statutory 

definition of relative in section 232.2(56). Perhaps because she does not. 

That definition requires an individual to be related to the child within the 

fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,5 by marriage, or through adoption. Id.

§ 232.2(56). As Alishia asserts, Melesa did not meet any of those three criteria. 

She is not a blood relative of C.F., nor is her spouse a blood relative of the child. 

4 The GAL argues that Alishia did not contest Joshua’s status as C.F.’s legal father 

in the CINA proceedings, so has not preserved error on that issue for appeal. At 

the hearing, that issue was raised by Joshua’s attorney, who argued, “[I]f you’re 

on the birth certificate, filed a paternity affidavit, then you’re the father. So that’s 

what my client’s done . . .” And Alishia’s counsel described Melesa as “the sister 

of the legal father.” But we do not read Alishia’s petition on appeal as disputing 

Joshua’s status as legal father. Rather, she does not recognize his status as 

pulling his sister within the definition of relative. 

5 Our court has defined consanguinity as “kinship; blood relationship; the 

connection or relation of persons descended from the same stock or common 

ancestor.” In re J.C., No. 03-0949, 2003 WL 22345729, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 15, 2003) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 375 (rev. 4th ed.1968)). Affinity 

means “the relationship which one spouse has because of the marriage to blood 

relatives of the other.” State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1981).
8

She is not related to C.F. by marriage or adoption. Although Melesa was a blood 

relative of Joshua, who is arguably C.F.’s legal father, the statutory definition does 

not reach that relationship. We cannot expand the definition of relative to include 

the sister of a legal father if the text of the statute shows it was not the legislature’s 

intent to do so. See J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 502. We thus find the juvenile court erred 

in finding Melesa was C.F.’s relative.

But that finding is not the end of our analysis. It just puts C.F. in the same 

posture as his half siblings. On this record, we find Melesa was fictive kin to all 

three children. She was not their relative but had “an emotionally positive 

significant relationship” with them and their family. Iowa Code § 232.2(22). Even 

if she was not fictive kin but only an “other suitable placement identified by the 

child’s relatives” under section 232.102(1)(a), our measure of the children’s best 

interests would be no different. See id. § 232.102(1)(c). 

Which brings us to the best interests of C.F., C.D. and N.H. In compliance 

with section 232.102(1)(c), the juvenile court made a specific finding that changing 

placement to the maternal grandmother’s home was not in the children’s best 

interests and provided reasons for its finding. The court acknowledged the 

grandmother’s prior and ongoing involvement with the children and her willingness 

to have them again placed in her care. But the court observed that Alishia and her 

mother “have had a strained relationship” and highlighted the department’s 

concerns about Michelle’s inability to set appropriate boundaries with her daughter. 

The court also noted: “The department has raised concerns with the threat of 

violence by an adult brother who was reportedly present while the maternal 

grandmother was supervising the children.” Beyond those concerns, the court 
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emphasized that “a disruption in placement” undermined the children’s best 

interests because they were bonded to Melesa. Finally, the court addressed the 

sibling bond, finding that separating the children [is] not in their best interests.

In our de novo review of best interests, we reach the same conclusion as 

the juvenile court. In affirming the juvenile court’s ruling, we do not disparage 

Michelle’s commitment to her grandchildren. Nor do we underestimate the value 

of maintaining family ties for children who cannot be safely in their parents’ 

custody. See generally Leonard Edwards, Relative Placement: The Best Answer

for Our Foster Care System, 69 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 55, 58 (2018) (noting relative 

placement is now considered best practice and often minimizes trauma). But 

based on this record, we are persuaded by the GAL’s compelling argument against 

disrupting the current placement:

These three children have witnessed a lot of domestic violence, 

experienced their caretakers’ extreme emotional dysregulation, been 

exposed to dangerous substances . . . , been subjected to 

inappropriate discipline, been neglected and have been coached to 

not to tell people what is happening in the family home. Separating 

these children would only cause unnecessary additional trauma.

Bottom line, it is not in these children’s best interests to be moved to their 

grandmother’s home for now. We affirm the juvenile court’s denial of Alishia’s 

motion to modify placement.

AFFIRMED.