Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 13, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00271-CR

JESSE CASTANEDA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 412th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 77579-CR

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found Appellant Jesse Castaneda guilty on two counts of indecency 

with a child by exposure and assessed punishment at four years’ confinement. See 

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). On appeal, Appellant asserts that (1) the 

evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty findings, and (2) the trial 

court abused its discretion in limiting the testimony from Appellant’s expert. For

the reasons below, we affirm.
2

BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested in October 2015 and indicted on two counts of 

indecency with a child by exposure. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial in March 

2022. We summarize as follows the relevant witness testimony from trial. 

Complainant

Complainant was 12 years old at the time of trial. She testified regarding an 

incident that occurred with Appellant in September 2015, when she was five years 

old. According to Complainant, at that time she, her two brothers, her mother

(“Mother”), and Appellant lived together in their home. Complainant said the 

family shared a bed in the bedroom.

On the day in question, Complainant said she was sleeping and woke up to 

Appellant carrying her into the living room. Complainant recalled that Appellant 

laid her down on the sofa and “started like taking [her] clothes off,” including her 

underwear. Complainant said Appellant also took his shirt off. Complainant said 

she was lying naked on her stomach when Appellant began “sitting on [her] back.”

According to Complainant, Appellant remained sitting on her for “a couple

minutes” before Mother came in the room. Complainant said Mother “started 

yelling at [Appellant] and then she grabbed me.” Complainant recalled that 

Appellant and Mother were yelling at each other while Mother helped her put her 

clothes back on. Complainant also remembered Appellant putting his clothes on 

before “walking out the door.”

Complainant said she “went to see the nurse” later that same day. 

Complainant said Appellant did not spend the night at the family’s house after the 

incident. 
3

Officer Hill

Officer Hill was the second witness to testify at trial. According to Officer 

Hill, he was dispatched to an early-morning call at Mother’s house on September 

26, 2015. Officer Hill said he made contact with Mother and Complainant at 9:30

a.m. and learned that the incident with Appellant had occurred at approximately 

7:00 a.m. Officer Hill said Mother told him what had occurred and explained that 

Appellant was Complainant’s stepfather. 

According to Officer Hill, Mother also gave him a clear Ziploc bag 

containing the clothes she put on Complainant after the incident with Appellant, 

specifically, a shirt and underwear. 

Officer Hill said Appellant was not at the scene when he arrived. According 

to Officer Hill, he was told Appellant had gone to work. Officer Hill recalled that

Mother took Complainant to Texas Children’s Hospital for a sexual assault 

examination.

Officer Morrison

On September 26, 2015, Officer Morrison was dispatched to the hospital to 

talk to Mother and Complainant about the reported incident with Appellant. 

Officer Morrison also contacted the Children’s Advisory Center to schedule an 

interview for Complainant later that same day. Discussing Complainant’s 

interview, Officer Morrison recalled that Complainant was “unable to put into 

words” what had happened with Appellant. However, Complainant was able to 

say that Appellant “had picked her up out of her bed from her mom and taken her 

to the couch. She talked about [how] her mom had come in screaming at him and 

that mom had called the cops.” According to Officer Morrison, Complainant also 

used dolls to describe the incident and “used them to show that the boy doll was on 
4

top of the girl doll.”

Officer Morrison said the clothing Officer Hill collected from Mother was

sent for DNA processing. Officer Morrison also said that Appellant consented to 

provide a DNA sample that also was sent for processing. 

Amanda Domer

Amanda Domer is a forensic scientist employed at the Texas Department of 

Public Safety Crime Lab in Houston. According to Domer, evidence from 

Appellant’s case was submitted for screening in 2016 and tested in November 

2017.

With respect to Complainant’s clothing, Domer “perform[ed] a chemical test 

that can identify possible semen.” Domer said a “strong positive” was identified 

on Complainant’s shirt and a “weak positive” was identified on Complainant’s 

underwear. Domer said these portions of Complainant’s clothing were submitted 

for further DNA testing. 

Domer also tested the samples collected during Complainant’s sexual assault 

exam. Domer said semen was not detected on Complainant’s vaginal or oral

swabs. 

Jessica Ehmann

Jessica Ehmann is a supervisor in the DNA section of the Texas Department 

of Public Safety Crime Lab in Houston. According to Ehmann, her work includes 

“compar[ing] those DNA profiles from the evidence to DNA profiles from known 

individuals in a case.”

With respect to the semen identified on Complainant’s underwear, Ehmann 

testified that the “DNA profile is interpreted as originating from a single 

individual.” According to Ehmann, the probability of obtaining this profile if the 
5

DNA came from Appellant was 52.8 sextillion times more likely than the 

probability of obtaining the profile if the DNA came from an unrelated, unknown

individual. 

For the semen identified on Complainant’s shirt, the DNA profile also was 

attributed to a single individual. Ehmann stated that obtaining this DNA profile is 

876 septillion times more likely if the DNA came from Appellant than if the DNA 

came from an unknown, unrelated individual. 

Officer Cox

Officer Cox testified regarding the data recovered from Appellant’s Apple 

iPhone. Officer Cox said Appellant voluntarily turned his phone over to law 

enforcement in October 2016, approximately one year after the underlying 

incident.

Officer Cox testified about two messages received on Appellant’s phone 

from a number listed as a contact for Mother. In these messages, Mother 

purportedly admitted to setting Appellant up with respect to the charged offense.1 

1 The first message stated as follows:

It’s me, [Mother], your soon to be ex-wife. I have to tell you something. I’m 

sorry for setting you up. I had to. I know you were probably going to try to take 

the kids from me. And you were right. I was going to leave your sorry ass when 

you bought that truck for me. I hate you so much and I want you to die. I haven’t 

been happy in a long time. I have been thinking [of] ways to set you up so I’ve 

been a lot searching [sic]. So I came up with this plan. And they bought it. 

When you were getting ready for work I text my dad and told him. I tricked 

[Complainant] to think that you picked her up when I did. I took her underwear 

off. I made her think that you were on top of her. It was hard to trick a 5-year-old 

but she believed everything I told her. I told her if she didn’t do what I told her 

she wouldn’t go to school no more. So when you left for work at 7:30 I have 

already told my aunt and uncle. They told me to call the cops so I had to think 

fast so that’s why [I] called them at 9:30. I didn’t know this would have been all 

day. But all that was worth it. You will never see these kids and you will go to

prison and I will be out and laughing at you. I have been talking to different guys. 

Also coming to [the] house while you are at work. I hate you, [Appellant]. I 
6

These messages were sent in October 2015, shortly after the incident with 

Complainant occurred.

Officer Cox testified that these messages seemed inconsistent with other 

messages from Mother that were found on Appellant’s phone and did not have the 

same “tone.” According to Officer Cox, other messages from Mother were not of 

the same length nor did they begin with Mother “introduc[ing] herself” to 

Appellant. Officer Cox also stated that “the grammatical errors in these [two] 

messages are not consistent with other messages” from Mother. Officer Cox noted 

that there was “never any response” to these messages and agreed that it was “as if 

they were never acknowledged by anyone.” 

Continuing on, Officer Cox testified about the possibility of manipulating 

cell phone data, including text messages:

Q. And is it — in your experience do you even necessarily need 

access to somebody’s physical phone to be able to manipulate 

data?

A. No.

Q. Okay. And what are ways that you can do that without 

physically having the device?

always have. And the only reason I am texting you this is because I want to hurt 

[you] so bad. I can’t believe you called the cops last year when I pushed you 

down the stairs. That’s another reason I set you up. Because if you go to jail they 

drop the warrant. Don’t worry about showing this text message because by [the]

time you read your message your phone will be reset and turned off. I just want 

you to know why I did it. I lost my first two kids. I won’t lose these kids. So 

[Appellant], again, I set your fucking ass up really good. Your very smart wife, 

[Mother]. You didn’t think I could come up with this. I hope you die in prison 

before my uncle does. He want[s] to kill you. So does everyone else and [I] can’t 

believe they let you out. But it’s okay. You’re going back because they will 

never believe you. They don’t care how clean your background is. They are 

going to hang you. Just remember, I put you there, [Appellant].

The content of the second text message is substantially similar to the first message.
7

A. One option that comes to mind easily would be with Apple 

devices specifically. Apple has tried to get everything 

grouped together so with their iMessage utility you can have 

multiple Apple devices that can all receive the same text 

messages and things like that. So if I have an iPad or a Mac 

computer as well as an iPhone, all those devices can be 

registered together and can receive and send text messages. 

Q. And with that said, can that make it difficult to determine who 

is sending what at times?

A. Possibly, yes.

According to Officer Cox, Appellant’s phone showed that it also had access to an 

email account belonging to Mother. With respect to the two messages purportedly 

from Mother that took blame for setting up Appellant, Officer Cox agreed that 

there was “no way to tell” who authored them.

Mother

According to Mother, she was married to Appellant for five years and they 

have two children together. Mother said she and Appellant divorced in 2017. 

On the day in question, Mother recalled that she “was sleeping and [] heard 

moaning.” Mother said she “thought it was [Appellant] looking at porn” because 

he “tended to do that a lot.” Mother said she got out of the bed and “walked 

towards where [she] was hearing the sounds from.”

Mother said she walked into the living room and saw Complainant on the 

sofa on her back, with Appellant on top of her “between her legs.” Mother said 

that both Complainant and Appellant were naked and recalled that Complainant 

looked scared. When Appellant saw Mother, Mother said Appellant immediately

got off Complainant and “said that he was sorry and it wouldn’t happen again.” 

According to Mother, Appellant also “begged [her] not to call the police.”

Mother said she helped Complainant put on her clothes, which were on the 
8

floor near the sofa. Mother also recalled that Appellant left the home. Mother said 

she called the police and, when Officer Hill arrived, she gave him the clothes she

had put on Complainant after the incident. When questioned further about 

Complainant’s clothes, Mother said she used her bare hands to pick up the clothes 

and place them in a plastic bag. Mother said, after the incident, she took 

Complainant to the hospital for a medical exam and to the Children’s Advisory 

Center for an interview.

Mother said she has not lived with Appellant since the incident occurred but 

acknowledged that she has stayed in contact with him about their sons. Mother 

said she did not send Appellant the two text messages that admitted to setting him 

up with respect to the charged offense.

Dr. Spence

Appellant called Dr. Spence as an expert witness on forensic DNA analysis. 

During his testimony, Dr. Spence reiterated that Complainant’s clothing was 

collected by Mother after the incident occurred. According to Dr. Spence, it was 

“concerning” that Mother collected the evidence with her bare hands because

“[y]ou get your own DNA onto the items or you could potentially transfer your 

DNA or somebody else’s DNA that’s on your hands onto those items.” 

Dr. Spence also was concerned that Mother placed Complainant’s clothing 

in a plastic bag. Dr. Spence testified that moisture in a plastic bag can cause the 

DNA on clothing to break down.

On cross-examination, Dr. Spence stated that he did not have any issues with 

the DNA analyses done on the evidence nor the “results [and] interpretations” that 

they yielded. Dr. Spence also testified that he had “no way of knowing” if the 

manner that the evidence was collected affected the results. 
9

Appellant 

At the time of the incident, Appellant said he lived at the house with Mother, 

their two sons, and Complainant. Appellant described the night before the incident

as “normal.” Appellant said he got home from work after 6:00 p.m. and “relaxed, 

took a shower, [and] watched a little bit of TV.” Appellant said he and Mother 

stayed up after the children, went to bed, and had sex. 

Appellant said he woke up the next morning at approximately 6:00 a.m., got 

ready for work, and left shortly after 7:00 a.m. Admitted into evidence was 

Appellant’s time-card showing that he arrived at work at 8:15 a.m. Appellant said 

he worked the full day and went home at 5:00 p.m. Appellant recalled that Mother 

and the children arrived home after he did and described everything as “normal.”

According to Appellant, later in the week Mother started acting “different”

and Appellant suspected she was “back online dating again.” Appellant said 

Mother told him there was a warrant out for his arrest and she moved out of the 

home. Appellant said he “had no idea what was going on.” Several days later, 

Appellant voluntarily turned himself in at the police department.

Appellant said Mother sent him the text messages in which she admitted to 

setting him up regarding the incident with Complainant. Appellant acknowledged

that it took him over a year from the date the messages were received to turn his 

phone over to law enforcement.

Conclusion of Trial

After the close of evidence, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict 

finding Appellant guilty of two counts of indecency with a child by exposure. See 

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). The jury assessed punishment at four years’

confinement. Appellant timely appealed. 
10

ANALYSIS

Appellant raises two issues on appeal and asserts:

1. the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty

findings; and

2. the trial court erred by limiting Dr. Spence’s expert testimony.

We consider these issues separately, beginning with Appellant’s evidentiary 

sufficiency challenge.

I. Evidentiary Sufficiency

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational 

factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). Although we consider all the evidence 

presented at trial, we do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence 

or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Espino-Cruz v. State, 586 

S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). A factfinder 

may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and the factfinder may 

accept or reject any part of a witness’s testimony. Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 

572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We defer to the factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in 

the evidence, weighing of the testimony, and drawing of reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). 

A person commits indecency with a child by exposure if, with intent to 

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, he (1) exposes any part of his 
11

genitals, knowing the child is present, or (2) causes the child to expose any part of 

the child’s genitals. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). Here, the two counts 

submitted in the charge asked the jury to make separate findings for each of these 

two types of exposure. Because the jury returned a “guilty” finding on both 

counts, we consider the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to each type of 

exposure.

The term “expose” is not defined by statute, so we apply the term consistent 

with its general meaning. See Warner v. State, 257 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008) (“[A] term not defined by the legislature may be understood by its 

meaning in ordinary usage.”); see also Cantu v. State, 604 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). For purposes of this statute, courts

have defined exposure to mean “‘[t]o deprive of concealment; to disclose or 

unmask something criminal, shameful, or the like.’” Cantu, 604 S.W.3d at 593 

(quoting Balfour v. State, 993 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. 

ref’d)). 

This statute does not require the State to prove that the child complainant 

saw any part of the accused’s genitals; rather, “the offense of indecency with a 

child by exposure is complete once the defendant unlawfully exposes himself in 

the required circumstances.” Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). The child need only be in the accused’s presence for the offense to be 

effectuated — the child does not have to be aware of the exposure. Id. 

B. Application

Here, legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that Appellant, 

with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, (1) exposed any 

part of his genitals, knowing Complainant was present, or (2) caused Complainant 

to expose any part of her genitals. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). 
12

Complainant and Mother offered substantially similar testimony regarding 

the incident with Appellant. According to Complainant, she was sleeping when 

she awoke to Appellant carrying her into the living room. Complainant said 

Appellant removed her clothes, removed his shirt, and sat on her back while she 

was lying naked on the sofa. Mother testified that she walked into the living room 

and saw both Appellant and Complainant naked, with Complainant on her back 

and Appellant on top of her “between her legs.” Mother also said she heard 

Appellant “moaning” before she walked in the living room and initially thought he

was “looking at porn.” Officer Morrison also said Complainant used dolls to 

describe the incident and put “the boy doll [] on top of the girl doll.” 

Appellant points out that Mother’s and Complainant’s testimony differed on 

one point: whether Complainant was on her back or on her stomach when Mother 

walked into the living room. But it was within the jury’s province to resolve this 

conflict in the testimony. See Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. Moreover, regardless of 

which version the jury believed, the remaining testimony is consistent on the facts 

necessary to support the jury’s guilty findings. 

Testifying about the DNA evidence collected in the case, Domer said semen 

was identified on Complainant’s shirt and underwear — both of which were on the 

floor near the sofa during the incident with Appellant. With respect to the semen 

identified on Complainant’s underwear, Ehmann testified that the probability of 

obtaining this particular profile if the DNA came from Appellant was 52.8 

sextillion times more likely than the probability of obtaining the profile if the DNA 

came from an unrelated, unknown individual. For the semen identified on 

Complainant’s shirt, Ehmann stated that obtaining this DNA profile is 876 

septillion times more likely if the DNA came from Appellant than if the DNA 

came from an unknown, unrelated individual. This evidence, combined with the
13

other testimony (including Mother’s testimony that Appellant was naked and on 

top of Complainant), supports the inference that Appellant exposed his genitals 

during the incident with Complainant. 

Appellant testified that Mother set him up with respect to the charged 

offense and text messages were admitted into evidence to substantiate this 

allegation. But this evidence was not undisputed. Mother testified that she did not 

send the messages and Officer Cox testified that (1) the messages were not 

consistent with other messages from Mother, and (2) it was possible to manipulate

cell phone data, including text messages. Considering this evidence as a whole, 

the jury reasonably could have concluded that Mother did not set Appellant up 

with respect to the incident with Complainant. See Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572.

In sum, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s 

guilty findings, we conclude a rational factfinder could have found the elements of 

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746; see also 

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2). We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

II. Expert Testimony

In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in limiting the 

testimony of Dr. Spence, his expert witness on forensic DNA analysis.

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as an 

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 

form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 

determine a fact in issue. Tex. R. Evid. 702. Accordingly, before admitting expert 

testimony under Rule 702, the trial court must be satisfied that three conditions 
14

have been met: (1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is 

an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony

will actually assist the factfinder in deciding the case. Rodgers v. State, 205 

S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Dixon v. State, 244 S.W.3d 472, 478 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). “The proponent of the expert

testimony bears the burden of proving the expert’s qualifications.” Dixon, 244 

S.W.3d at 478. 

We employ an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing both the trial 

court’s determination of a witness’s qualifications as an expert and the trial court’s 

decision to exclude expert testimony. Ellison v. State, 201 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006); Jacob v. State, 587 S.W.3d 122, 132 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent a 

clear abuse of discretion. Ellison, 201 S.W.3d at 723; Jacob, 587 S.W.3d at 132. 

“Under this standard, we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it falls within the 

zone of reasonable disagreement.” Jacob, 587 S.W.3d at 132.

B. Evidence

Outside of the jury’s presence, the trial court permitted counsel to question 

Dr. Spence. On direct exam, Dr. Spence testified that he has a bachelor’s and 

master’s degree in microbiology. Dr. Spence said he earned a PhD in molecular 

biology and focused his post-doctoral work on DNA analysis. Dr. Spence said he 

intended to testify on issues related to the collection and handling of evidence, as 

well as “some issues with items that could have been collected and weren’t 

collected.” 

On cross-examination, Dr. Spence agreed that his testimony “would revolve 

around how the crime scene or parties involved with this could have been 
15

processed differently” by the police. Specifically, Dr. Spence testified that police 

should have collected Appellant’s underwear or a penile swab to test for evidence 

of Complainant’s DNA. In addition, Dr. Spence said police should have collected 

DNA samples from other places within the family’s home. Dr. Spence said this 

biological evidence should have been collected “very promptly” after officers 

responded to the scene. According to Dr. Spence, by failing to collect this 

evidence the police left “a hole in the crime scene collection.” 

The State also elicited testimony from Dr. Spence regarding his 

qualifications to opine on the quality of evidence collection in the case. Dr. 

Spence testified that: (1) he has never been to or worked a crime scene; (2) in the 

past decade, he has not “communicated directly with anybody in law enforcement 

[on] how to process a crime scene”; (3) he is not a police officer; and (4) he has not 

taken any courses on crime scene investigation. 

Following this testimony, the trial court ruled that Dr. Spence could testify 

on “DNA, the items that were actually collected, the DNA testings of those items, 

and the results of those items.” The trial court ruled that Dr. Spence could not 

testify on “what the police could have collected, if something was collected what it 

would have shown, and anything of that nature.” In sum, the trial court stated that

Dr. Spence was not permitted to “testify as to what the police should have done.” 

C. Application 

On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

limiting Dr. Spence’s testimony. We disagree. 

As the testimony outlined above shows, Dr. Spence sought to testify on the

quality of the evidence collected in the case and what else police could have done 

to secure additional biological evidence. However, Dr. Spence did not have any 
16

experience, education, or training with respect to crime scene investigation or 

police procedures for evidence collection. See Tex. R. Evid. 702. Accordingly,

Appellant failed to meet his burden to establish Dr. Spence’s qualifications with 

respect to the proffered testimony. See Dixon, 244 S.W.3d at 478. The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Spence’s testimony on this point. See 

Ellison, 201 S.W.3d at 723; Jacob, 587 S.W.3d at 132.

We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Meagan Hassan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant. 

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).