DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ANDREW SOCOL,

Appellant,

v.

KELLI SOCOL,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-3565

[March 4, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Nicholas Lopane, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE 16-

003509.

Colleen E. Huott of Huott Law, Boca Raton, for appellant.

Jonathan Z. Schiller of Brinkley Morgan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

The former husband appeals from the trial court’s supplemental final 

judgment modifying parental responsibility, time sharing, child support, 

and other relief. The former husband argues the trial court erred in five

respects: (1) by awarding the former wife’s attorney’s fees accruing from 

the date on which she filed her modification petition through trial, rather 

than from a stipulated date through trial; (2) by awarding retroactive child 

support to the former wife accruing from the date when the former 

husband ceased his settlement-based timesharing, rather than from a

later date when the former wife filed her modification petition; (3) by 

modifying the parties’ shared parental responsibility to the former wife’s 

sole parental responsibility with ultimate decision-making regarding the 

minor child, but without the required statutory finding that shared 

parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child; (4) by modifying 

the parties’ shared parental responsibility to the former wife’s sole parental 

responsibility without competent substantial evidence supporting a 

substantial, material, and unanticipated change of circumstances; and (5) 

by awarding the former wife’s forensic accountant’s fees in full without 

competent substantial evidence to support such fees.
2

The second, fourth, and fifth arguments lack merit, and thus we affirm 

on those arguments without further discussion.

On the first and third arguments, we reverse and explain those errors

in turn below.

The Trial Court Erred in Not Following the Parties’ Stipulation

Regarding the Former Wife’s Attorney’s Fees

At trial, the parties stipulated the former husband had paid all of the 

former wife’s attorney’s fees incurred from the date on which she filed her 

modification petition through July 18, 2017. The parties further 

stipulated the only remaining attorney’s fees issue for the trial court’s 

consideration was whether the former wife was entitled to recover her 

attorney’s fees incurred from July 18, 2017 through trial. The parties 

stipulated those fees amounted to 38.9 hours at a $400 hourly rate.

However, in the supplemental final judgment, the trial court ordered 

the former husband to pay an amount representing the former wife’s 

attorney’s fees incurred from the date on which she filed her modification 

petition through trial. In other words, the trial court awarded the former 

wife a “double recovery” of attorney’s fees incurred from the date on which 

she filed her modification petition through July 18, 2017.

The former wife concedes the “double recovery” of her attorney’s fees 

conflicts with the parties’ stipulation. However, the former wife argues we 

should remand this case so the trial court can clarify whether, on its own 

volition, it exercised its discretion to award the former wife additional 

attorney’s fees based on the former husband’s litigation conduct and/or

the results obtained in the former wife’s favor.

We disagree with the former wife’s argument. As we held in Yeakle v. 

Yeakle, 12 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009):

A stipulation properly entered into and relating to a matter 

upon which it is appropriate to stipulate is binding upon the 

parties and upon the Court. The court must not disturb the 

stipulation unless found to be ambiguous or in need of 

clarification, modification or interpretation.

Id. at 885-86 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 

Lift v. Lift, 1 So. 3d 259, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Because appropriately 

made stipulations entered into by the parties are generally binding on the 

court as well as on the parties, the court erred in failing to follow them.”).
3

Here, the parties’ stipulation regarding the former wife’s attorney’s fees 

appears to have been properly entered into and relates to a matter upon 

which it was appropriate to stipulate. The parties’ stipulation does not 

appear to be ambiguous or in need of clarification, modification or 

interpretation. Thus, the trial court erred in not following the stipulation.

We remand for the trial court to amend the supplemental final 

judgment to award the former wife’s attorney’s fees in the amount of 38.9 

hours at a $400 hourly rate, totaling $15,560. This ministerial action does 

not require a further hearing.

The Trial Court Erred in Modifying the Parties’ Shared Parental 

Responsibility to the Former Wife’s Sole Parental Responsibility 

Without the Required Statutory Finding that

Shared Parental Responsibility Would be Detrimental to the Child

Section 61.13(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2018), states, in pertinent part, 

“The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be 

shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental 

responsibility would be detrimental to the child.” (emphasis added).

Interpreting section 61.13(2)(c)2.’s plain language in Aranda v. Padilla, 

216 So. 3d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), we have held:

The award of sole parental responsibility in the absence of [a 

finding that shared parental responsibility would be 

detrimental to the child] is reversible error.

Id. at 653. We further have held the finding of whether shared parental 

responsibility would be detrimental to the child “may be made either on 

the record or in the final judgment.” Lightsey v. Davis, 267 So. 3d 12, 14 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

Here, neither the trial record nor the supplemental final judgment 

contains the required finding. Instead, the trial court explained in the 

supplemental final judgment that it was awarding the former wife sole 

parental responsibility based on a determination of, in the trial court’s 

words, “the best interests of the child by evaluating all of the factors 

affecting the welfare and interests of the minor child and the 

circumstances unique to [the] family, including, but not limited to all of 

the factors enumerated in § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2018).”
4

The trial court was correct to utilize “the best interests of the child” 

standard according to sections 61.13(2)(c) and (3). However, as we held in

Aranda, “utilizing the best interest of the child standard does not obviate 

the necessity of a specific finding [under section 61.13(2)(c)2.] that shared 

parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child before awarding 

sole parental responsibility to a parent.” 216 So. 3d at 653 (citation

omitted).

The former wife argues that despite the trial court’s lack of specific 

finding under section 61.13(2)(c)2., we should affirm because “the 

combined effect of the trial court’s many findings regarding the Former 

Husband’s long-standing failure to communicate and cooperate with the 

Former Wife on matters related to the minor child’s welfare equates to a 

finding that shared parental responsibility is detrimental to [the minor 

child].”

While we understand the former wife’s argument, our duty is to apply 

the law as written. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Glanville, 252 So. 3d 1120, 

1127 (Fla. 2018) (“As with any matter involving an issue of statutory 

interpretation, courts must first look to the actual language of the statute 

and examine the statute’s plain meaning.”) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Section 61.13(2)(c)2. requires a court to order that 

parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents “unless 

the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to 

the child.” (emphasis added). No such finding was made.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the 

issue of whether to modify the parties’ shared parental responsibility to 

the former wife’s sole parental responsibility in light of the statutory 

requirement to determine whether shared parental responsibility would be 

detrimental to the child. The trial court may, in its discretion, either take 

additional evidence or rule on the record presently available. Aranda, 216 

So. 3d at 653.

If the trial court finds that shared parental responsibility would be 

detrimental to the child and that the former wife should be awarded sole 

parental responsibility with ultimate decision-making regarding the minor 

child, then the trial court shall amend the supplemental final judgment to 

expressly include that finding. To avoid any disruption in the child’s 

current custody and supervision until the trial court decides this issue, 

the parties shall maintain the status quo as provided in the trial court’s 

supplemental final judgment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
5

LEVINE, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.