In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-22-00255-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law

Hood County, Texas

Trial Court No. 53683

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

STEVEN WESLEY BARKER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Steven Wesley Barker appeals his conviction for driving while his 

license was invalid (DWLI) and with a prior conviction for the same. See Tex. Transp. 

Code Ann. §§ 521.021, .457(a)(2), (f)(1). His sole issue on appeal is the sufficiency of 

the evidence to prove that his license was invalid at the time of the offense. Barker 

claims that because his license revocation took effect a certain number of days after

the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) mailed him notice of the revocation,

the State was required to offer evidence—or more accurately, required to offer more

evidence than it did—to show if and when the notice of revocation was sent to 

Barker. We disagree and, after modifying the judgment to correct a clerical error, we

will affirm.

I. Standard of Review

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found 

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2017). The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight, determines its 

credibility, and draws reasonable inferences from it. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

art. 38.04; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 

914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “[T]he trier of fact may use common sense and apply 

common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs when 
3

drawing inferences from the evidence.” See Garcia v. State, No. PD-0679-21, 2023 WL 

151989, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (quoting Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 

625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any 

conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution as 

long as the inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative force. 

Dunham v. State, No. PD-0831-18, 2023 WL 151346, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 

2023); Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

The essential elements of DWLI are (1) operating a motor vehicle (2) on a 

highway (3) during a period in which the person’s driver’s license or privilege is 

suspended or revoked under a law of this State. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 

§ 521.457(a)(2). Barker’s appeal focuses on the final element—whether his license 

was suspended or revoked at the time of his arrest. 

II. DWLI Statutes

The State presented evidence that Barker’s license was revoked under Texas 

Transportation Code Chapter 521, Subchapter O. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 

§§ 521.341–.351 (2012)1(Subchapter O). 

1Because Barker’s license was revoked in 2012, we apply the DPS revocation

statutes in effect at that time. Citations to the 2012 provisions are indicated with a

parenthetical notation of the year. However, the relevant portions of the 2012 

revocation statutes are substantially similar to those currently in effect. Compare Tex. 

Transp. Code Ann. § 521.344(e), (g), (g-1), with id. at § 521.344(e), (g) (2012).
4

Within that Subchapter, Section 521.344 provides for the suspension of a 

driver’s license if the driver is convicted of certain intoxication-related offenses. Id.

§ 521.344(a), (b) (2012). And “[a]fter the date has passed, according to [DPS] records, 

for successful completion of the educational program designed to rehabilitate persons 

who operated motor vehicles while intoxicated, the director [of DPS] shall revoke the 

license of a person who does not successfully complete the program or, if the person 

is a resident without a license to operate a motor vehicle in this state, shall issue an 

order prohibiting the person from obtaining a license.” Id. § 521.344(e) (2012). DPS 

is required to “promptly send notice of [the] revocation or prohibition order . . . by 

first class mail to the person at the person’s most recent address as shown in the 

records of [DPS].”

2

 Id. § 521.344(g) (2012). The revocation “takes effect on the 30th 

day after the date the notice is mailed” and it “remains in effect until [DPS] receives 

notice of successful completion of the educational program.” Id.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Because Barker’s Subchapter O license revocation took effect 30 days after

DPS mailed him notice,

3 Barker claims that, (1) to prove DWLI, the State was 

2The current statute also authorizes notice to be sent via “e-mail if the person 

has provided an e-mail address to [DPS] and has elected to receive notice 

electronically.” Id. § 521.344(g)(2). But the e-mail provision was added in 2017 and 

was not in effect at the time of Barker’s suspension. See Act of May 24, 2017, 85th 

Leg., R.S., ch. 1079, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4225, 4225–28 (effective Sept. 1, 2017)

3

In his brief, Barker applies Subchapter N rather than Subchapter O, so he 

argues that the revocation took effect 45 days after DPS mailed his notification letter. 
5

required to show if and when it mailed him notice and that (2) it failed to offer

sufficient evidence of those facts. 

A. We need not decide whether evidence of notice was required. 

First, Barker claims that, to prove DWLI, the State was required to offer 

evidence “to show if or when the notice of suspension was sent to Barker.” To 

support this contention, Barker heavily relies upon our sister court’s opinion in White 

v. State. 458 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.). The State points out, 

though, that White’s holding has been rejected by other courts of appeals. See Cantu v.

State, No. 07-17-00446-CR, 2019 WL 1285295, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 

20, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

In White v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that, “in order to show 

that a suspension period was in effect at the time of the alleged violation, the State 

must proffer competent evidence that it provided notice of the suspension to the 

licensee as required by [Chapter 521, Subchapter N].”

4

 458 S.W.3d at 192; see Mondy v.

See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.295(b), .297(a) (2012). Because Subchapter O—

not Subchapter N—applies to the case, we construe Barker’s argument broadly and 

extend its logic to Subchapter O. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9.

4

In White, the driver was arrested on November 6, 2012, and the State offered a 

copy of the driver’s license return—the officer’s in-car “computer report received in 

response to a computer inquiry regarding the status of a driver’s license”—which 

showed three suspensions, two of which began on October 29, 2012, and the third of 

which began on November 5, 2012. White, 458 S.W.3d at 189–90 & n.2. White 

refuted this evidence, though, by providing a copy of the order of suspension, which 

was dated November 8, 2012. Id. at 190. White testified that he had received the 

order on November 11 and knew of no other suspensions. Id. The applicable 
6

State, No. 06-16-00100-CR, 2017 WL 359786, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 24, 

2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting and applying 

White when driver testified he had no knowledge of suspension). The Amarillo Court 

of Appeals “agree[d] with the court in White that [the mailing of a notice] is one way 

to prove a period of suspension,” but it declined to “construe [S]ection 521.457 [i.e., 

the DWLI statute] as requiring proof of a period of suspension only by evidence of 

the mailing of a notice” and instead “conclude[d] that [a] certified abstract of [the]

driving record indicating that [the driver’s] license was suspended [wa]s sufficient 

evidence to support [a] conviction for DWLI.” Cantu, 2019 WL 1285295, at *2–3. 

We need not weigh in on this split for two reasons.

First, White and Cantu discuss the application of Subchapter N of Chapter 521, 

and Barker’s license was revoked under Subchapter O. See id.; White, 458 S.W.3d at

191–93; compare Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.291–.320 (Subchapter N), with id. 

§§ 521.341–.351 (Subchapter O). Although the relevant portions of Subchapter N

and Subchapter O contain similar language—both requiring DPS to mail notification

of a suspension or revocation, and both tying the effective date of the suspension or 

license-suspension statute provided that the suspension “t[ook] effect on the 40th day 

after the date the person [wa]s considered to have received notice of the suspension 

or revocation under Section 521.295(b),” i.e., five days after the notice was mailed by 

DPS. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.295(b), .297(a) (2012); see White, 458 S.W.3d at

191–93. The only evidence of the license suspension came from the arresting

officer’s testimony and the license return, neither of which provided any indication 

that an earlier notice of suspension had been mailed to White. White, 458 S.W.3d at

193. 
7

revocation to the date of mailing, compare Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 521.295, .297(a),

with id. § 521.344(g-1)—Barker’s brief does not compare the two statutes or enunciate

any reason why we should extend White’s non-binding Subchapter N holding to this 

Subchapter O case.5

5Although the two Court of Criminal Appeals cases relied upon in White—

Smith and Podany—would be binding on us if they were applicable, they are not. See 

generally Podany v. State, 358 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); Smith v. State, 324 

S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959). Smith and Podany discussed the predecessor to 

Subchapter N—Article 6687b, Section 22—and both cases relied on a now-irrelevant 

certified-mail statute, Article 29c. See Act of May 22, 1957, 55th Leg., R.S. ch. 424, 

§ 1, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 1266 (effective June 6, 1957) [hereinafter Art. 29c] (then

codified at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stats. Ann. art. 29c); Act of Apr. 14, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., 

ch. 173, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 245, 252–53 (effective Apr. 23, 1941), amended by Act of

July 16, 1959, 56th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 41, § 1, 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 161, 161–63

(effective Aug. 5, 1959) [hereinafter, Art. 6687b, § 22] (enacting and amending Tex. 

Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6687b, § 22; repealed and recodified 1995); see also Act of May

1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 165, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1025, 1563–68 (recodifying 

transportation statutes).

Article 6687b, Section 22 authorized DPS to suspend a driver’s license after a 

hearing, and the driver was entitled to 10 days’ notice of the hearing. Art. 6687b, 

§ 22(a). “Notice by registered mail . . . constitute[d] service,” id., but under Article

29c, “certified mail with return receipt requested [could be used] in lieu of registered 

mail” and would “have the same legal effect as if sent by registered mail, provided receipt 

for such certified mail [wa]s validated by official post office postmark.” Art. 29c (emphasis 

added). 

In Smith, the driver had no actual notice of the hearing or suspension until he 

was charged with DWLI. 324 S.W.2d at 207. Notice of the hearing was attempted by 

certified mail, but the post office did not validate receipt; instead, the post office 

marked the notification letter as unclaimed. Id. at 208. Moreover, even after the 

hearing, “the record show[ed] that appellant was not notified that [DPS]

had . . . ordered his operator’s license suspended.” Id. Notice of the suspension was 

mailed to the driver’s address, but the letter was returned to DPS, and “[s]o far as 

th[e] record reveal[ed], th[e] letter was not sent by registered mail or by certified mail.” 
8

And second, even if we were to extend White to this case, it would not be

dispositive. White, Cantu, Barker, and the State all agree that evidence of mailing a

statutory notice is at least one method of proving that a license has been revoked, and 

here, the State chose to present such evidence—whether it was required to do so or 

not. See Cantu, 2019 WL 1285295, at *2–3; White, 458 S.W.3d at 191–93. 

Id. Because the driver was not provided with notice of the hearing or suspension, the 

court reversed his conviction. Id.

In Podany, DPS again relied on certified mail (as a substitute for registered mail)

to send notice of the license suspension, but again the post office marked the certified 

letter as unclaimed rather than “validat[ing]” receipt “by official post office 

postmark.” 358 S.W.2d at 119. The driver had no actual notice of the suspension

prior to his DWLI. Id. And the driver had retained possession of his driver’s license

even though the relevant statutory provisions required DPS to confiscate the

suspended license. Id. at 118–19. Citing Smith, the court reversed the DWLI 

conviction, id., noting that the legislature required official validation of receipt for 

certified mail to “have the same legal effect as if sent by registered mail,” id. at 120 

(overruling motion for rehearing). 

Smith and Podany thus turned on the statutory validation requirements for 

DPS’s use of certified mail, and the records in those cases affirmatively demonstrated

that (1) DPS had not provided notice in compliance with the relevant statutes and 

(2) the drivers lacked actual notice. See Podany, 358 S.W.2d at 118–19; Smith, 324 

S.W.2d at 207–08; cf. Simmons v. State, 443 S.W.2d 852, 853–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)

(quoting Podany’s discussion of Article 29c and reversing DWLI conviction when DPS

sent notice of hearing via certified mail and notice was returned to sender). 

But by 2012, when Barker’s license was revoked, DPS was no longer required

to send Subchapter N or Subchapter O revocation notices via registered mail or 

validated certified mail. Instead, DPS was required to send notification of a 

suspension or revocation via first-class mail. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 

§§ 521.295(a), .344(g) (2012); Act of May 30, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1409, § 2, 1999 

Tex. Gen. Laws 4758, 4758 (amending Section 521.344, Subchapter O to provide for 

notice via first-class mail); Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1117, § 1, 1999

Tex. Gen. Laws 3988, 3989 (amending Section 521.295, Subchapter N to provide for

notice via first-class mail). Thus, Smith and Podany do not control.
9

B. The State offered sufficient evidence of Barker’s license revocation, 

including evidence that it mailed Barker a Subchapter O notice.

The State was required to prove that, at the time of Barker’s offense—April 25, 

2022—his license had been suspended or revoked under a law of this State. Tex. 

Transp. Code Ann. § 521.457(a)(2). The State chose to prove this by, among other 

things, offering multiple pieces of evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Barker had been provided a Subchapter O notice of revocation more 

than a decade before his 2022 offense.

First, the State offered a certified copy of Barker’s driving record.

6

 See

Stautzenberger v. State, 232 S.W.3d 323, 326–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, 

no pet.) (holding evidence of DWLI sufficient when State offered certified driving 

record); cf. White, 458 S.W.3d at 193 (holding evidence insufficient when driving 

record came in the form of a “license return printed out from [the arresting officer’s]

in-car computer”). The driving record is divided into sections, including (1) an 

“Event History” section, which “displays information relating to convictions, crash 

involvement, safety courses completed, out-of-state surrendered license history and 

education program certificates”; (2) an “Enforcement Action History” section, which

states that it “displays enforcement actions that may affect a person’s eligibility to 

6Much of the driving record is printed in all capital letters, as are portions of the 

certified notification letter discussed below. To improve readability, we have altered 

the capitalization of all-capitals excerpts by capitalizing only the first letter of each 

word. 
10

drive” with “[a]dditional information pertaining to any event related to the 

enforcement action . . . in the Event Section”; and (3) a “Status Information” section,

which “reflects a person’s eligibility to drive at the time th[e] document was 

requested” in July 2022.

The “Status Information” section summarizes Barker’s “Driver Eligibility” by 

stating that he is “Not Eligible” to drive. Barker’s “Event History” provides 

background for his ineligible status by showing that he was convicted of driving while 

intoxicated in June 2011, that his sentence was probated, and that a “DWI Education 

Program [was] Required.” This conviction is listed as “Event 8” in Barker’s “Event 

History,” and it is cross-referenced in the “Enforcement Action History.”

Specifically, the “Enforcement Action History,” referencing “Event 8,” shows

that Barker’s license was revoked in February 2012:

ACTION 19 ACTIVE REVOKED - FAILURE TO 

COMPLETE DWI

EDUCATION PROGRAM

Begin Date: 02/18/2012 End Date: INDEFINITE

Notice Date: 01/21/2012

State: TX

Related Event(s): EVENT 8

Notably, “Action 19” is marked as “Active” while the other 23 enforcement 

actions listed in Barker’s driving record are marked as “Expired” or “Lifted.” The

“Active” notation is contextualized by the “Indefinite” end date of Barker’s “Action
11

19” revocation, and both notations corroborate Barker’s “Status Information” that he 

is “Not Eligible” to drive. 

Moreover, the “Notice Date” listed on Barker’s certified driving record reflects

that he was provided notice of his revocation on “1/21/2012,” more than ten years

before his April 2022 offense. Cf. White, 458 S.W.3d at 193 (holding evidence 

insufficient when license return contained no evidence that the notice of suspension

had been mailed). The jury was even provided a certified copy of the 2012 letter 

notifying Barker of the revocation. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.344(g) (2012). 

This notice is entitled “Notice of Revocation,” it is addressed to Barker, and it bears 

the “Notice Date” listed on Barker’s driving record—January 21, 2012. Cf. White, 458 

S.W.3d at 193 (holding evidence insufficient when DPS notification was dated two 

days after offense). The letter informs Barker that his “driver[’s] license . . . will be 

revoked because [he] failed to complete an Education Program that was duly imposed 

as a condition of probation[,]” that unless he “request[s] a hearing, [his] license will be 

revoked indefinitely effective 02/18/2012,” and that “[t]o prevent or lift the 

revocation[, DPS] must receive proof that the Education Program was completed.” 

[Emphasis omitted.] At the bottom of the notification letter, it lists DPS’s “Statutory 

Authority” as “Texas Transportation Code Section 521.344; 522.089,” confirming that 

the letter is intended to be the “prompt[]” notice required under Section 521.344 of 

Subchapter O. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.344(g) (2012).
12

Although Barker questions whether this letter was ever placed in the mail, the 

certified copy of the letter, “Notice Date” notation, and DPS record of an “Active”

revocation are all evidence that it was, as is Barker’s admission that he received actual 

notice that his license was invalid. See White, 458 S.W.3d at 193–94 (acknowledging 

that the dated notification from DPS was “evidence showing a notice of suspension 

was mailed to White regarding the August 28 conviction” but holding evidence 

insufficient when notice was dated and received after commission of DWLI). But cf. 

Mondy, 2017 WL 359786, at *2 (holding evidence of notice insufficient when 

notification letters were offered into evidence but driver testified that he did not 

receive them). The arresting officer testified that, when he walked up to Barker’s 

vehicle to speak with him, Barker “told him that [his license] was suspended.”

7

 Cf. 

White, 458 S.W.3d at 190, 193–94 (holding evidence insufficient when evidence 

showed, among other things, that driver was not aware of his suspension). The 

officer confirmed this information by entering Barker’s name and date of birth in his

computer system, where he saw that Barker’s driving record reflected an active license

revocation since 2012. See Sutton v. State, No. 12-19-00210-CR, 2020 WL 1697434, at 

*4–5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 8, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

7The jury was also provided with documentation showing Barker’s conviction 

for DWLI in 2013, which had been enhanced by yet another DWLI conviction in 

August 2012. Barker pleaded nolo contendere to the 2013 DWLI. But that DWLI 

conviction was based on a different license suspension or revocation than the “Action

19” revocation discussed here.
13

publication) (holding evidence of DWLI sufficient when State offered certified driving 

record showing indefinite suspension and testimony from arresting officer that license 

was suspended).

Given this evidence—the certified driving record reflecting that Barker was 

“Ineligible” to drive due to an “Active” and “Indefinite” revocation, the “Notice 

Date” entry on the driving record, the certified copy of the notification letter bearing 

the same date, the arresting officer’s testimony that Barker’s license had been revoked,

and Barker’s admission that he knew his license was invalid—a reasonable jury could 

have inferred that DPS mailed Barker notice of his revocation on or about January 21, 

2012 and that the “Indefinite” revocation—which took effect on “the 30th day after 

the date the notice [wa]s mailed,”

8 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.344(g) (2012)—

began more than a decade before Barker committed his DWLI in April 2022.

We overrule Barker’s sole issue. 

8Barker emphasizes that the February 18, 2012 “Begin Date” listed on his

driving record was the 28th day after the “Notice Date” even though, under 

Subchapter O, the revocation did not take effect until “the 30th day after the date the 

notice [wa]s mailed.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.344(g) (2012). But a reasonable

jury could have taken this discrepancy into account in assessing the credibility of the 

driving record; the jury was not required to throw out the exhibit in its entirety. Cf.

Garcia, 2023 WL 151989, at *4 (reiterating that “[t]he jury acts as the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and may choose to believe all, some, or none of the 

testimony presented”). Moreover, Barker was not arrested on the 28th or 29th day 

after the notice was mailed—he was arrested more than ten years later. Cf. White, 458 

S.W.3d at 189–90, 193 (holding evidence insufficient when DPS notification was in 

close proximity to and dated two days after offense).
14

IV. Reformation 

But on our own motion, we reform the judgment to correct a clerical error. 

“We have the power to sua sponte correct and reform the trial court’s 

judgment ‘to make the record speak the truth’ when we have the necessary data and 

information to do so.” Criado v. State, No. 02-21-00104-CR, 2022 WL 2071791, at *4 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (quoting Munguia v. State, 636 S.W.3d 750, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d)); see Arent v. State, No. 02-20-00023-CR, 2020 WL 

6326151, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (“We may modify a trial court’s judgment to correct errors 

that contradict the record.”). Here, a jury determined Barker’s punishment, but the 

judgment erroneously states that the trial court “fixed” and “assessed” Barker’s

punishment.

9

[Capitalization altered.] We reform the judgment to reflect that the 

jury—not the trial court—“fixed” and “assessed” Barker’s punishment. 

[Capitalization altered.]

9The judgment is entitled “JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF GUILTY 

PUNISHMENT FIXED BY COURT” and it contains an entry reiterating,

“PUNISHMENT ASSESSED BY: COURT.”
15

V. Conclusion

Having overruled Barker’s sole issue and reformed the judgment to correct a 

clerical error, we affirm the judgment as modified. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a), (b). 

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 16, 2023