SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

309 

CA 12-01766 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF ARBITRATION BETWEEN 

ONTARIO COUNTY AND ONTARIO COUNTY SHERIFF, 

PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, 

 

AND MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ONTARIO COUNTY SHERIFF’S UNIT 7850-01, 

CSEA, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

JOHN W. PARK, COUNTY ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (WENDY R. WELCH OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS. 

CHAMBERLAIN, D’AMANDA, OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD, LLP, ROCHESTER

(ROBERT G. MCCARTHY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Ontario County

(William F. Kocher, A.J.), entered June 22, 2012 in a proceeding

pursuant to CPLR article 75. The order denied the petition to stay

arbitration and granted respondent’s cross motion to compel

arbitration. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioners commenced this proceeding to stay

arbitration (see CPLR 7503 [b]), and respondent “cross-moved” to

compel arbitration with respect to grievances allegedly involving a

provision of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) (see

CPLR 7503 [a]). Pursuant to the CBA, disputes over the meaning or

application of that agreement were required to be submitted first

through a grievance process, but could thereafter be submitted to

arbitration if the employee was “not satisfied” with the result

obtained through that process. Respondent filed grievances on behalf

of two correction officers whose request for a shift exchange was

denied. Respondent asserted that the denial “[v]iolated or

[i]nvolved” section 3.11 of the CBA, which provides that “time

exchanged between employees shall not be done if it results in a

requirement . . . that overtime be paid,” and respondent requested

that the shift exchanges be allowed. The grievances also involved the

application of a Shift Swapping Policy, which was not contained in the

CBA, between respondent and petitioner Ontario County that outlined

the specific procedures an employee must follow when exchanging a

shift with a fellow employee. The Shift Swapping Policy states with
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CA 12-01766 

respect to shift swapping on holidays that the person working the

holiday receives the holiday pay “[t]o be consistent with contract

language.” The grievances were denied, and respondent informed

petitioners of its intent to seek arbitration. As noted, petitioners

filed a petition to stay arbitration, and respondent “cross-moved” to

compel arbitration. Supreme Court denied the petition and granted the

cross motion, and we affirm. 

“A grievance may be submitted to arbitration only where the

parties agree to arbitrate that kind of dispute, and where it is

lawful for them to do so” (Matter of City of Johnstown [Johnstown

Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 NY2d 273, 278; see Matter of Bd. of Educ.

of Watertown City Sch. Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d 132,

137-142). Here, the parties do not challenge the lawfulness of

arbitrating the instant dispute and, instead, petitioners contend that

there is no valid agreement to arbitrate the grievances at issue

inasmuch as the CBA did not contemplate shift exchanges. We reject

that contention. 

In determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the

dispute at issue, “[o]ur review . . . is limited to the language of

the grievance and the demand for arbitration, as well as to the

reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom” (Matter of Niagara

Frontier Transp. Auth. v Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. Superior

Officers Assn., 71 AD3d 1389, 1390, lv denied 14 NY3d 712). “Where,

as here, there is a broad arbitration clause and a ‘reasonable

relationship’ between the subject matter of the dispute and the

general subject matter of the parties’ [CBA], the court ‘should rule

the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more

exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive

provisions of the [CBA], and whether the subject matter of the dispute

fits within them’ ” (Matter of Van Scoy [Holder], 265 AD2d 806, 807-

808, quoting Matter of Bd. of Educ. of Watertown City Sch. Dist., 93

NY2d at 143; see Matter of Town of Cheektowaga [Cheektowaga Police

Club, Inc.], 59 AD3d 993, 994). We therefore conclude that the court

properly determined that the parties agreed to arbitrate the instant

dispute. In light of our determination, we do not address

petitioners’ remaining contentions.

Entered: May 3, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court