[Cite as State v. Fields , 2020-Ohio-5538.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. MALCOLM FIELDS Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-19 Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-826 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 4th day of December, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . JOHN M. LINTZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0097715, Assistant Prosecuting At torney, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 50 East Columbia Stree t, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JON PAUL RION, Atty. Reg. No. 0067020 and CATHERINE BREAULT, At ty. Reg. No. 0098433, 130 West Second Street, Suite 2150, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . DONOVAN, J.-2- {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Malcolm Fields appeals his conviction for o perating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI), in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(b) (three or more prior offenses), a felony of th e fourth degree. Fields filed a timely notice of appeal on April 16, 2020. {¶ 2} The incident which formed the basis for Fields’s conviction occ urred in the early morning hours of October 20, 2019, when Officer James Joh nson was patrolling in the area of Limestone Street in Springfield, Ohio, and he obser ved a black Honda Civic parked in the road, not moving. Officer Johnson testified that he pulled up alongside the vehicle and observed a male, later identified as Fields, sittin g in the driver’s seat with his head down. After approximately one minute, the driver of the v ehicle woke up and started driving northbound on Limestone Street. Officer Johnso n followed the vehicle. {¶ 3} Shortly thereafter, Officer Johnson observed Fields run a red l ight as he turned from Limestone Street onto Leffels Lane. Johnson testif ied that Fields quickly turned into the parking lot of a BP gas station located at the corner of South Limestone Street and Leffels Lane without using a turn signal. Fields th en pulled the vehicle up to a gas pump. At this point, Officer Johnson activated his overh ead lights and initiated a traffic stop. {¶ 4} As soon as the Civic came to a stop next to the gas pump, Field s opened the driver’s side door of the vehicle. Officer Johnson testified t hat he instructed Fields to close the door, but Fields refused, asking in a loud voice why he was being stopped. Officer Johnson requested backup and, after a short time, Offic er Justin Lowe arrived at the scene. Once Officer Lowe arrived, he and Officer Johnson a pproached the Civic and observed Fields slumped over in the driver’s seat. Officer Joh nson testified that he made-3- contact with Fields and requested his driver’s license. Fields refused. Johnson then requested Fields’s name and date of birth but, again, Fields re fused the request. {¶ 5} While interacting with Fields, Officer Johnson observed that hi s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Johnson also noticed that Fields smelled strongly of alcohol and that Fields’s speech was slurred. Officer Johnson testified tha t, based upon his experience and training, he believed that Fields was intoxicate d. {¶ 6} At this point, Fields was advised that he was under arrest, and he was ordered to exit the vehicle. Officer Johnson testified that he initially intended to arrest Fields on a charge of obstruction. Fields refused to exit the vehicle, and Officer Lowe testified that he observed Fields attempt to reach under the dr iver’s seat of the vehicle. Officer Johnson testified that, at this point, he and Officer L owe had to forcibly remove Fields from the vehicle. As the officers tried to place him in the rear of a cruiser, they noticed that Fields was unstable on his feet and very aggressiv e. Johnson testified that he again noticed the strong odor of alcohol emanating from Fiel ds while Fields was yelling at the officers prior to being placed in the cruiser. Immediat ely after placing Fields in the cruiser, Officer Johnson informed him of his Miranda rights. We note that, during crossexamination, Johnson testified that it was only after Fields wa s under arrest that he noticed the strong odor of alcohol coming from Fields. Officer Johnson, who is an African-American, testified that Fields referred to him using r acial slurs. {¶ 7} After being transported to the Clark County Jail, Fields refuse d to provide a breath sample or to comply with any other testing. Additionall y, Fields refused to sign the BMV 2255 form (related to chemical testing) after being rea d the form by the officers. {¶ 8} On December 16, 2019, Fields was charged with two counts of OVI . Fields-4- was arraigned on January 3, 2020, and the trial court released him on his own recognizance. On January 30, 2020, Fields filed a motion to su ppress, and the trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion on February 14, 2020. Before the hearing was held, however, Fields withdrew his motion to suppress. {¶ 9} The case proceeded to a jury trial on February 26, 2020. Fiel ds was found guilty of the charged offenses, and the trial court ordered a p resentence investigation report (PSI). On March 16, 2020, the trial court merged the two OVI counts 1 and ordered Fields to serve 120 days in prison in addition to another 30 mo nths of incarceration pursuant to the repeat offender provisions of R.C. 4511.19(G)(1 )(d)(i). After sentencing, Fields filed motions to the stay his sentence pending the outco me of his appeal with the trial court and with this Court; both motions were denied. {¶ 10} Fields now appeals from his conviction. {¶ 11} Fields’s first assignment of error is as follows: MR. FIELDS WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY TRIAL COUNSEL’S WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. {¶ 12} In his first assignment, Fields contends that he received ineff ective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney withdrew his moti on to suppress from consideration by the trial court prior to the scheduled hearing on that motion. {¶ 13} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the two prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

1 The State elected to proceed to sentencing on Count II of the i ndictment, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(b).-5- 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court o f Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Pursuant to those c ases, trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her con duct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Strickland at 688. “To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be demonstrated that trial counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his erro rs were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, th e result of the trial would have been different. Id . Hindsight is not permitted to distort the assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel's perspective at the time, and a debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Mitchell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21957, 2008- Ohio-493, ¶ 31. {¶ 14} A defendant is not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when counsel chooses, for strategic reasons, not to pursue every possible ta ctic. State v. Brown , 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 319, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988). The test for a cla im of ineffective assistance of counsel is not whether counsel pursued every poss ible defense; the test is whether the defense chosen was objectively reasonable. Strickland at 688. A reviewing court may not second-guess decisions of counsel which can be co nsidered matters of strategy. State v. Smith , 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). Debatable strategi c and tactical decisions may not form the basis of a claim for in effective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks as if a better strateg y had been available. State v. Cook , 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992).

{¶ 15} In State v. Caldwell , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-76, 2015-Ohio-2551, we-6- stated the following: “ ‘[F]ailure to file a suppression motion does not constitute p er se ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Madrigal , 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000), quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). Likewise, withdraw al of a motion to suppress does not “constitute per se ineffective assi stance of counsel.” State v. Stringer , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-04-095, 2013- Ohio-988, ¶ 14, citing State v. Dominguez , 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2011- 09-010, 2012-Ohio-4542, ¶ 20. “Instead, the decision to withdraw a motion to suppress ‘const itutes ineffective assistance of counsel only when the record establis hes that the motion would have been successful.’ ” Id ., quoting Dominguez at ¶ 20, which in turn, cites State v. Robinson , 108 Ohio App.3d 428, 433, 670 N.E.2d 1077 (3d Dist.1996). Accord State v. Spencer , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-579, 2004-Ohio-4102, ¶ 23. “Filing a motion to suppre ss is not without risks, and the fact that counsel filed a motion for lea ve to file the motion to suppress, and later w ithdrew that motion, is compelli ng evidence of a tactical decision.” Madrigal at 389. Caldwell at ¶ 43-44. {¶ 16} The record in this case is devoid of any evidence indicating t hat Fields’s motion to suppress would have succeeded. Fields initially argu es that his motion to suppress would have been successful because the officers had no lawful cause to detain him. However, the record establishes that Officer Johnson had a reasonable suspicion-7- that Fields was intoxicated because of his slurred speech, the strong odor of alcohol emanating from him, and his bloodshot, glassy eyes. Furthermor e, the record establishes that Fields completely refused to cooperate with th e officers, and when told to exit the vehicle, he “furtively” attempted to reach under th e seat. Based upon the foregoing, the officers had ample reason to lawfully detain Fie lds. {¶ 17} Fields also argues that his motion to suppress would have been successful because the officers failed to properly administer field sobrie ty tests. This argument fails because the record establishes that Fields refused to participa te in any tests and had to be forcibly removed from the vehicle and placed in the rear of a police cruiser. Fields also argues that any statements he made to the police were obta ined unconstitutionally, but the record establishes that Officer Johnson informed Fields of his Miranda rights immediately after he was arrested and placed in the rear of the cruiser. {¶ 18} Fields further argues that his arrest for obstruction was witho ut probable cause. Officer Johnson testified that he initially sought to a rrest Fields for obstruction, but Fields was ultimately arrested for OVI after he was forcibl y removed from the vehicle, based upon the officer’s observations and Fields’s conduct and overall demeanor. More importantly, Fields did not raise this argument in his motion t o suppress before the trial
court. {¶ 19} Lastly, Fields argues that the motion to suppress would have be en successful because the police did not have probable cause to ar rest him for OVI. "Probable cause" supporting an arrest exists where the facts an d circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they have reasonably trust worthy information are sufficient in themselves to cause a person of reasonable cautio n to believe that an offense-8- has been or is being committed. State v. Davis , 2017-Ohio-5613, 94 N.E.3d 194, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.), citing Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 175-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). {¶ 20} As previously discussed, the officers pointed to a significant number of factors that indicated to them that Fields was intoxicated; spe cifically, he was slumped over in the vehicle, his speech was slurred, there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from him, and he had bloodshot, glassy eyes. Furthermore, Fiel ds completely refused to cooperate with the officers and was unstable on his feet whe n they moved him to the police cruiser. {¶ 21} The record in the case before us is devoid of any evidence indi cating that Fields’s motion to suppress would have succeeded. Therefore, w e cannot find that his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing the motion to sup press in what could very well have been a tactical decision. {¶ 22} Fields’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 23} Fields’s second assignment of error is as follows: THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO. {¶ 24} In his second assignment, Fields argues that his conviction for OVI was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the State failed to adduce sufficient-9- evidence to support his conviction of that offense. {¶ 25} This Court has previously noted: When a conviction is challenged as being against the weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, wei gh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credib ility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage o f justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In a manifest

weight analysis, the credibility of the witnesses and the weigh t to be given to their testimony are primarily for the trier of facts to reso lve. State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). “Because the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the witnes ses, the cautious exercise of discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence require s that a substantial deference be extended to the factfinder's determina tions of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to cred it the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar compet ence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witnesses.” State v. Lawson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 477684, *5 (Aug. 22, 1997). This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the issue of witness credibility unless it is patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way. State v. Bradley , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 97-CA-03, 1997 WL-10- 691510 (Oct. 24, 1997). * * * State v. Nelson , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2014-CA-7, 2015-Ohio-113, ¶ 29. {¶ 26} Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court has previ ously stated: “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the St ate has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter o f law.” State v. Wilson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkin s, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). When reviewing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction, “the relevant inquiry is whether any rational finder of fact, a fter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have f ound the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doub t.” State v. Dennis , 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A guilty verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless, “reasona ble minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” Id

. State v. Wilson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27001, 2016-Ohio-7329, ¶ 6. {¶ 27} R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) states that “[n]o person shall operate an y vehicle, streetcar, or trackle ss trolley within this state, if, at the t ime of the operation, * * * [t]he person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.” R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(b) further provides that a person who has been pr eviously convicted of OVI within 20 years shall not operate a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs and shall not, upon being asked by a law enforcement officer to sub mit to a chemical test or-11- tests and being advised by the officer of the consequences of r efusal or submission to the test or tests, refuse to submit to the test or tests. {¶ 28} Accordingly, to establish the violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(b ), the State was required to prove (in addition to the prior conviction) tha t Fields had operated a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol and that he had refused to submit to a chemical test. Here, Fields argues that that his OVI convictio ns were against the manifest weight of the evidence and not supported by sufficient evidence because no field sobriety tests were performed and no breathalyzer test wa s administered. Fields also argues that Officer Johnson’s trial testimony was not cred ible and was inconsistent with his police report. Finally, Fields argues that, because t he video of Officer Johnson’s cruiser camera did not have audio, there was insufficient evide nce that his speech was slurred or that he was yelling and otherwise acting in a drunke n manner. {¶ 29} Officer Johnson testified that he observed a black Honda Civic parked in the road, not moving; Johnson pulled alongside the vehicle and observed Fields in the driver’s seat with his head down. After following him for a sh ort time, Officer Johnson observed Fields run a red light. Johnson also testified that F ields quickly turned into the parking lot of a gas station without using a turn signal and pu lled the vehicle up to a gas pump. At this point, Officer Johnson activated his overhead li ghts and initiated a traffic stop. {¶ 30} As soon as the Civic came to a stop next to the gas pump, Field s opened the driver’s side door of the vehicle. Officer Johnson testifi ed that he instructed Fields to close the door, but Fields refused, asking in a loud voice why he was being stopped. Johnson requested backup, and Officer Lowe arrived at the scene soon thereafter. Once-12- Officer Lowe arrived, he and Officer Johnson approached the Civ ic and observed Fields slumped over in the driver’s seat. Officer Johnson then asked for a driver’s license and other identifying information, which Fields refused to give. {¶ 31} While interacting with Fields, Officer Johnson observed that hi s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Johnson also noticed that Fields smelled strongly of alcohol and his speech was slurred. Officer Johnson testified that, based u pon his experience and training, he believed that Fields was intoxicated. At this poi nt, Fields was advised that he was under arrest and was ordered to exit the vehicle, which he refused do. Officer Lowe testified that he observed Fields attempt to reach under t he driver’s seat of the vehicle. Officer Johnson testified that, at this point, he and Officer Lowe had to forcibly remove Fields from the vehicle. As the officers placed him in the rear of a cruiser, they noticed that Fields was unstable on his feet and very aggressiv e. Officer Johnson testified that he again noticed the strong odor of alcohol eman ating from Fields while Fields was yelling at the officers prior to being placed in the cruiser. Finally, upon being transported to the Clark County Jail, Fields refused to submit a breath sample or comply with any other testing and refused to sign the BMV 2255 form (r elated to chemical testing) after being read the form by the officers. In other words, two police officers testified to numerous physical and behavioral indications of intoxication, i ncluding the odor of an alcoholic beverage, slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, argumentativeness, and unsteady gait. The jury “as finder of fact, may believe all, p art, or none of a witness's testimony,’ ” and it was entitled to believe the officers’ test imony. State v. Flores-Lopez , 2017-Ohio-690, 85 N.E.3d 534, ¶ 63 (2d Dist.). {¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a rational finder o f fact, after-13- viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, co uld have found that Fields was guilty of OVI. Additionally, having reviewed the entire re cord, we c annot conc lude that the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manif est miscarriage of justice. The jury clearly credited the testimony of the State's witnesses, a nd we defer to its assessment of credibility. Therefore, we conclude that Fields’s convictio ns were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and were supported by sufficien t evidence. {¶ 33} Fields’s second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 34} Fields’s third and final assignment of error is as follows: THE JUDGEMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE RECORD DOES NOT CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY SUPPORT THE APPELLANT’S SENTENCE. {¶ 35} In his final assignment, Fields contends that the sentence impo sed by the trial court was not clearly and convincingly supported by the r ecord. We disagree. {¶ 36} As this Court has noted: When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply the standard of review found in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), not an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may in crease, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it “clearly and convincingly” finds e ither (1) that the record does not support certain specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law. “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence wi thin the-14- authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to ma ke any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum * * * sentenc es.” State v. King , 2013-Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, a trial court must consider the statutory criteria that apply to every felony offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Leopard , 194 Ohio App.3d 500, 2011-Ohio-3864, 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Di st.), citing State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38. * * * R.C. 2929.12(B) sets forth nine factors indicating th at an offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense, whereas R.C. 2929.12(C) sets forth four factors indicating that an offender's conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. Similarly, R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) each lists five factors that trial courts are to consider regarding an offender being more or less likely to commit future crimes. Although statutory maximum sentences do not require any of the findings specified in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), the Ohio Supreme Cour t has found it appropriate “for appellate courts to review those sentences that are imposed solely after consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929. 11 and 2929.12 under a standard that is equally deferential to the sen tencing court. That is, an appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence t hat is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.” Marcum at ¶ 23.-15- State v. Roberts , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2018-CA-27, 2019-Ohio-49, ¶ 6-8. {¶ 37} R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(i) applies to offenders who have prior OV I offenses. It authorizes the trial court to impose an additional definite prison term of six to 30 months and/or community control, on top of any mandatory prison senten ce; the mandatory sentence is either 60 days or 120 days in prison for a fourth-d egree felony offense based on three or four prior convictions within six years or one to f ive years for a fourth-degree felony offense based on five or more prior convictions within 2 0 years. The specific statutory language of R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(i) states in pertin ent part: If the court imposes a mandatory prison term, notwithstanding d ivision (A)(4) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code, it also may sent ence the offender to a definite prison term that shall be not less than six months and not more than thirty months and the prison terms shall be impos ed as described in division (G)(2) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code. * * * {¶ 38} Fields does not argue that his sentence is contrary to law. Ra ther, he argues that the record does not support the sentence imposed by the trial court. As previously stated, Fields was ordered to serve 120 days in pris on in addition to another 30 months of incarceration. {¶ 39} Initially, we note that this case represents Fields’s fifth OVI conviction since 2010. Fields contends that this is his first felony conviction , however his PSI indicated that he was convicted of possession of drugs in Clark C.P. No. 05-CR-0577 and received two years of community control, a $2,000 fine, and a six-month driver’s license suspension. The court’s docket and the fine of $2,000 in that case indicate that it was indeed a felony conviction. (Pursuant to R.C. 2929.28(A)(2)(a) (i), the maximum fine for-16- a misdemeanor of the first degree is $1,000.) {¶ 40} Finally, it is clear from the record before us that the trial c ourt crafted Fields’s sentence based upon his PSI and the pertinent statutory factors , namely those enumerated in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. While it did not expre ss its reasoning on the record at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated its re asoning in the judgment entry: In State v. Miller , 2d Dist. Clark No. 09CA28, 2010-Ohio-2138, at ¶ 43, we held that a sentence is not improper merely because the trial c ourt does not mention either R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 at the sentencing hearin g. We noted that the trial court, in its journal entry, stated that i t had considered “the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and p resentence report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes of sent encing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11, and [had] balanced the serio usness and recidivism factors [under] Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.1 2.” Id

. We further stated that “[b]ecause a trial court speaks only thr ough its journal entries, [a] sentence is not contrary to law merely because the trial court failed to cite either statute during the sentencing hearing.” Id ., citing State v. Cave , 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-6, 2010-Ohio-1237, ¶ 10. “Furthermo re, even if there is no specific mention of those statutes in the r ecord, ‘it is presumed that the trial court gave proper consideration to thos e statutes.’ ” Id ., quoting State v. Kalish , 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, at n .4. State v. Yarbrough , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-67, 2015-Ohio-1672, ¶ 9. {¶ 41} It is within the discretion of the individual judge “to determi ne the weight to-17- assign a particular statutory factor.” State v. Arnett , 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). When making such judgments, the sentencing court “ is not required to divorce itself from all personal experiences and make [its] dec ision in a vacuum.” Id . at 215-216, quoting State v. Cook , 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 529, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992). In this case, the trial court considered the statutory factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, and the individual sentences were within the statutory ranges f or those offenses. Additionally, pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(A), a trial court “has d iscretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles o f sentencing” set forth in R.C. 2929.11. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s rationa le for sentencing Fields to 120 days in prison in addition to another 30 months of incarcer ation was not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. {¶ 42} Fields’s third assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 43} All of Fields’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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TUCKER, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.

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