IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 1, 2024

NEHAD S. ABDELNABI v. STEVEN WAYNE SWORD, JUDGE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 3-240-22 Deborah C. Stevens, Judge

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No. E2023-00557-COA-R3-CV

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The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss on the ground of judicial immunity. 

Discerning no error, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court 

Affirmed and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT

and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Nehad Sobhi Abdelnabi, Only, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor 

General, and Joseph P. Ahillen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Steven 

Wayne Sword.

OPINION

I. Background 

The relevant facts are not disputed. Appellant Nehad Sobhi Abdelnabi was 

convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially 

aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault. State v. Abdelnabi, No. 

E2017-00237-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3148003, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2018),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018). He was sentenced to incarceration for a total of 

17 years at 100 percent release eligibility. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 

conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. Id. In January 

2019, Mr. Abdelnabi, through counsel, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on 

a number of grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. Abdelnabi v. State, No. 

04/26/2024
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E2020-01270-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 500394, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 2022). 

However, the petition was neither verified under oath by Mr. Abdelnabi nor certified by 

counsel. Id. The State filed an answer in February 2019 but did not object to the lack of 

verification. Id. at *3. By agreement of the parties, the matter was continued to September 

19, 2019. Id. On September 11, 2019, Mr. Abdelnabi filed a first-amended post-conviction 

petition that incorporated his original petition and added a claim of juror misconduct. Id.

Like his original petition, Mr. Abdelnabi’s first-amended petition was not verified under 

oath nor certified by counsel, and the State did not object to the lack of verification. Id.

The matter was set for hearing on November 21, 2019. Id. On the morning of the 

November hearing, Mr. Abdelnabi filed a second-amended petition that was verified under 

oath. Id. The second-amended petition incorporated the two prior petitions and 

additionally alleged that “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea 

offer from the Assistant District Attorney General of ten years as a Range I Offender.” Id.

A verification under oath dated September 17, 2019 was attached to the second-amended 

petition. Id.

Following the November 21, 2019 hearing, the post-conviction court entered an 

order that, in relevant part, dismissed, as untimely, Mr. Abdelnabi’s second-amended 

petition that included the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure 

to convey a plea offer. Id. at *9. Mr. Abdelnabi appealed and asserted, as relevant here, 

that good cause excused the delay in filing the second-amended petition. Id. Following a 

de novo review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed denial of Mr. Abdelnabi’s petitions 

for post-conviction relief. Id. at *18. In relevant part, the Court of Criminal Appeals held

that the late-filed second amended petition was not excused by good cause under the PostConviction Procedure Act. Id. at *12. On August 3, 2022, the Tennessee Supreme Court 

denied Mr. Abdelnabi’s application for permission to appeal.

On August 18, 2022, acting pro se, Mr. Abdelnabi filed a civil action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“trial court”). In his 

complaint, Mr. Abdelnabi alleged that the trial judge in the post-conviction proceeding, 

Appellee Steven Wayne Sword (“Judge Sword”), violated Mr. Abdelnabi’s right to 

procedural due process by dismissing his second-amended post-conviction petition. He 

asserted that Judge Sword “exceeded his authority and denied [Mr. Abdelnabi] a 

meaningful opportunity to have his claim heard that counsel failed to communicate a plea 

offer from the prosecution for a ten-year sentence as a Range one offender[.]” Mr. 

Abdelnabi sought “injunctive relief vacating the order dismissing the 2nd amended petition 

and remanding” to the post-conviction court for further proceedings. He also asked the 

trial court to reinstate the State’s offer regarding a plea agreement.

On October 7, 2022, Judge Sword filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 

12.02(6) motion to dismiss. In his motion, Judge Sword asserted that he acted within his 

jurisdiction as a criminal court judge and had absolute judicial immunity from Mr. 

Abdelnabi’s claims. He further asserted that Mr. Abdelnabi was not awarded relief in his 
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post-conviction case and, accordingly, could not challenge the constitutionality of the 

proceedings. Judge Sword also asserted that Mr. Abdelnabi’s claims were barred by the 

applicable one-year statute of limitations.

On November 17, 2022, Mr. Abdelnabi filed a response in opposition to Judge 

Sword’s motion to dismiss. Therein, Mr. Abdelnabi asserted that he was not seeking

monetary damages only declaratory and prospective injunctive relief; as such, he asserted 

that judicial immunity did not bar his action. He also argued that his constitutional claims 

were not barred because, although he had not been awarded post-conviction relief, he was

seeking injunctive relief not damages. Mr. Abdelnabi further asserted that his action was 

not barred by the one-year statute of limitations because he sought only declaratory and 

prospective injunctive relief. In the alternative, he argued that the statute of limitations did 

not begin to run until August 2022, when the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his 

application for permission to appeal.

On December 9, 2022, Judge Sword filed an amended motion to dismiss, wherein

he asserted that Mr. Abdelnabi’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity 

because it sought retroactive relief, i.e., an injunction vacating the November 2019 order 

of dismissal, and did not address an ongoing constitutional violation. Judge Sword further 

asserted that Mr. Abdelnabi had no claim against him in his individual capacity, and 

judicial immunity barred claims against him in his official capacity. Judge Sword 

maintained that Mr. Abdelnabi’s § 1983 claim for unconstitutional conviction was barred

regardless of the relief sought because he was not awarded relief in the post-conviction 

proceedings. He argued that Mr. Abdelnabi essentially sought to overturn the Court of 

Criminal Appeals’ ruling affirming dismissal of the second-amended petition. 

On February 24, 2023, Mr. Abdelnabi filed a response in opposition to Judge 

Sword’s amended motion to dismiss, wherein he reiterated the arguments made in his 

November 2022 response. Mr. Abdelnabi asserted that “Judge Sword[] cherry-picked 

which ‘grievances’ would be heard and denied a hearing on what is arguably [Mr. 

Abdelnabi’s] strongest issue[.]” He argued that, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 

1-3-121, his action for declaratory or injunctive relief was not barred by the doctrine of 

sovereign immunity. He further asserted that his claim for “prospective” injunctive relief

was not barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and argued that, “acting under color of 

law and in complete absence of jurisdiction,” Judge Sword denied him a “meaningful 

hearing[.]” By order of March 31, 2023, the trial court held, as a matter of law, that Mr. 

Abdelnabi’s complaint sought retrospective relief. The court dismissed the matter on the 

ground of absolute judicial immunity, and Mr. Abdelnabi filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II. Issue

The issue presented for our review, as we restate it, is whether the trial court erred 

in dismissing Mr. Abdelnabi’s action as barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

III. Standard of Review

It is well-settled that a motion to dismiss tests “‘only the legal sufficiency of the 

compliant, not the strength of the plaintiff’s proof or evidence.’” Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. 

v. City of Memphis, 620 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tenn. 2021) (quoting Webb v. Nashville Area 

Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011)). When considering a 

motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether the allegations of the complaint, 

if considered true, constitute a cause of action as a matter of law. Id. (citation omitted). 

The trial court “‘must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to 

be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Id. (quoting Tigg 

v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Trau-Med of Am., Inc. 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002))) (additional citations omitted). It 

should grant the motion “‘only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 

in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.’” Id. (quoting Crews v. 

Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tenn. 2002)) (additional citations 

omitted). On appeal, we must also regard the allegations of the complaint as true. Elvis 

Presley Enter., 620 S.W.3d at 323 (citation omitted). A trial court’s decision to grant or 

deny a motion to dismiss is a matter of law that we review de novo with no presumption of 

correctness. Robinson v. City of Clarksville, 673 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023). 

IV. Analysis

“[A] judge is immune from civil liability for bona fide acts done in the exercise of 

his [or her] judicial function while acting within the limits of his [or her] jurisdiction.” 

Harris v. Witt, 552 S.W.2d 85, 85 (Tenn. 1977) (citing Heath v. Cornelius, 511 S.W.2d 

683 (Tenn. 1974); Webb v. Fisher, 109 Tenn. 701, 72 S.W. 110 (Tenn. 1902)) (additional 

citation omitted). Judicial immunity is not impacted by the correctness of the judge’s 

decisions or the “motive behind the acts.” Heath, 511 S.W.2d at 684. 

Contrary to Mr. Abdelnabi’s assertions, Judge Sword clearly acted within his 

jurisdiction when he dismissed Mr. Abdelnabi’s second-amended post-conviction petition 

as untimely, and his ruling was upheld on appeal. In his § 1983 action, Mr. Abdelnabi 

sought “an injunction” against dismissal of his second-amended petition on the ground that 

the ruling denied him procedural due process. Mr. Abdelnabi relies on Pullian v. Allen, 

466 U.S. 522 (1984) for the proposition that his action is not barred by the doctrine of 

judicial immunity because it is not one for damages but for “prospective” injunctive relief.1

 

1 With respect to a § 1983 claim for monetary damages, this Court has held:
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In Pullian, the petitioners brought a § 1983 action against a Virginia magistrate and 

argued that the magistrate’s “practice of imposing bail on persons arrested for nonjailable

offenses under Virginia law and of incarcerating those persons if they could not meet the 

bail was unconstitutional.” Pullian, 466 U.S. at 524-25. The federal district court agreed 

with petitioners and enjoined the practice. Id. at 525. The district court also granted the 

petitioners’ requests for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 526-27. The magistrate appealed 

and argued that, as a judicial officer, she was immune from an award of attorney’s fees. 

Id. at 527. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that “a 

judicial officer is not immune from an award of attorney’s fees in an action in which 

prospective relief properly is awarded against her.” Id. On appeal, the United States 

Supreme Court first addressed “the more fundamental question, that is, whether a judicial 

officer acting in her judicial capacity should be immune from prospective injunctive relief.” 

Id. at 528. The Pullian Court determined that “. . . Congress intended § 1983 to be an 

independent protection for federal rights[.]” Id. at 541. The Court “[found] nothing to 

suggest that Congress intended to expand the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity 

to insulate state judges completely from federal collateral review.” Id. The Court 

“conclude[d] that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a 

judicial officer acting in [his or] her judicial capacity[]” in a § 1983 action. Id. at 541-42. 

The Court observed that

[t]he limitations already imposed by the requirements for obtaining equitable 

relief against any defendant—a showing of an inadequate remedy at law and 

of a serious risk of irreparable harm—severely curtail the risk that judges 

will be harassed and their independence compromised by the threat of having 

to defend themselves against suits by disgruntled litigants.

Id. at 537-38. Courts addressing Pullian have emphasized that, although the doctrine of 

judicial immunity does not bar an action for declaratory relief that is “purely prospective,” 

the “courts have consistently prohibited plaintiffs from seeking declarations that [a judge’s] 

‘prior conduct violated federal law[.]’” Kelsey v. Clark, No. 22-22, 2023 WL 1980307, at 

*1 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 2023) (emphasis in original) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 

65, 73 (1985)).

 

Judges sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have absolute immunity for acts within the judicial 

role. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). If the Court has 

jurisdiction and the judge is discharging his legal duties, the doctrine of judicial immunity 

applies. See Kurz v. State of Michigan, 548 F.2d 172, 174 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 

U.S. 972, 98 S.Ct. 526, 54 L.Ed.2d 462, reh’g denied 434 U.S. 1089, 98 S.Ct. 1289, 55 

L.Ed.2d 796 (1978). See also Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1233 (7th Cir.1980), 

cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 601, 66 L.Ed.2d 491 (1980); Birch v. Mazander,

678 F.2d 754, 755 (8th Cir.1982); Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1983).

Cashion v. State, No. 01A01-9903-BC-00174, 1999 WL 722634, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1999).
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As the trial court noted, “prospective” describes something that may happen in the 

future. See State v. Thomas, No. W2019-01202-SC-R11-CD, –S.W.3d –, 2024 WL 

979852, at *13 (Tenn. 2024) (abrogating the accomplice-corroboration rule prospectively 

“to all trials commencing after the date of the mandate[]” and not “retroactively to change 

the holding in this case and other pending cases that have not yet reached final judgment.”); 

see State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22, 43 n.9 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Rhodes v. Lauderdale 

Cnty., Tenn., 2012 WL 4434722 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (§ 1983 action awarding 

plaintiffs monetary damages and granting injunctive relief prohibiting future “48-hour 

holds” in jail without probable cause and requiring sheriff to maintain records of all persons 

admitted to county jail)); see further Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1997) 

(quoting John Danforth, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society’s 

Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1491, 1523 

(1981) (defining a prospective contract as a “relationship[] expected to mature into [a]

contract[]” in the future and holding claim for interference with prospective economic 

advantage not recognized in Tennessee)), overruled by Trau-Med of America, Inc. v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 2002). 

Unlike the petitioners in Pullian, Mr. Abdelnabi does not seek to enjoin Judge 

Sword from any future, i.e., “prospective,” act or practice. Additionally, he neither

challenges the constitutionality of the statutory post-conviction procedures nor prays for 

an injunction against future application of those procedures. Rather, he asks this Court to 

vacate—or “enjoin” enforcement of—Judge Sword’s order dismissing his untimely 

second-amended petition on the basis that dismissal violated his right to due process.

Section 1983 “‘provides ‘a method for vindicating . . . rights elsewhere conferred.’” 

Robinson v. City of Clarksville, 673 S.W.3d 556, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023), perm. app.

denied (Tenn. May 10, 2023) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 

807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 

2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979))). In the post-conviction setting, “[d]ue process requires only 

that a petitioner be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner.” Reid v. State, 197 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tenn. 2006). 

Furthermore, “the post-conviction court must determine whether the petition has been 

timely filed and whether any claims for relief have been waived or previously determined.” 

Nichols v. State, No. E2018-00626-CCA-R3-PD, 2019 WL 5079357, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Oct. 10, 2019) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(b), (f)). As noted above, Judge 

Sword clearly acted within his jurisdiction when he determined that Mr. Abdelnabi’s 

second-amended petition was untimely filed without good cause. Further, although 

couched as a § 1983 claim, Mr. Abdelnabi essentially argues that Judge Sword erred in 

finding that the untimely filing was not excused by good cause. That issue was addressed 

by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. 

Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the issue further. On de novo review, 

we agree with the trial court that Mr. Abdelnabi’s claim was not one for prospective 

injunctive relief as contemplated in Pullian. Judge Sword acted within his jurisdiction and 
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provided Mr. Abdelnabi post-conviction due process. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial 

immunity bars Mr. Abdelnabi’s action.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Mr. 

Abdelnabi’s § 1983 action. The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be 

necessary and are consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the 

Appellant, Nehad Sobhi Abdelnabi, for which execution may issue if necessary.

s/ Kenny Armstrong 

KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE