PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-1294

_____________

GLORIA SANTIAGO, 

 Appellant

v.

WARMINSTER TOWNSHIP; POLICE CHIEF MICHAEL 

MURPHY; CHRISTOPHER SPRINGFIELD, (RETIRED 

DEPUTY CHIEF); LT. JAMES DONNOLLY, III; POLICE 

OFFICER FREDERICK KUTZER; POLICE OFFICER 

JON OGBORN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS POLICE 

OFFICER FOR CBSRT/WARWICK TOWNSHIP C/O 

WARWICK TOWNSHIP C/O WARWICK POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; DETECTIVE WAYNE JONES, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS POLICE OFFICER FOR 

CBRST/DOYLESTOWN BOROUGH C/O DOYLESTOWN 

BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT; TIM MURPHY, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS POLICE OFFICER FOR 

CBSRT

 

_______________
2

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 08-cv-02202)

District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell

_______________

Argued

October 6, 2010

Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and ALDISERT, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: December 14, 2010)

_______________

David F. McComb [ARGUED]

Zarwin, Baum, DeVito, Kaplan, Schaer & Toddy

1818 Market Street – 13th Fl.

Philadelphia, PA 19103

David H. Oh

Law Offices of David H. Oh

5811 Thomas Avenue

Philadelphia, PA 19143

 Counsel for Appellant

Andrew J. Bellwoar [ARGUED]

Eric M. Brown

Susan L. DiGiacomo

Siana, Bellwoar & McAndrew

941 Pottstown Pike - #200

Chester Springs, PA 19425

 Counsel for Warminster Township
3

Christopher P. Boyle, Sr. [ARGUED]

John P. Gonzales

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin

620 Freedom Business Center - #300

King of Prussia, PA 19406

 Counsel for Michael Murphy, Christopher Springfield,

 James Donnolly, Frederick Kutzer, Jon Ogborn,

 Wayne Jones and Tim Murphy

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

 Gloria Santiago appeals from an order of the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

dismissing her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Warminster Township (“Warminster” or the “Township”) and 

three of its senior police officers, including the police chief. 

Santiago claims that she suffered a heart attack after being 

subjected to excessive force during a raid on her home. Her 

claims against the officers who conducted the raid were 

earlier dismissed as untimely, and she has not appealed that 

order. We thus consider only her claims against the three 

senior officers, who she alleges planned or acquiesced in the 

use of excessive force, and against the Township, which she 

alleges is liable for the police chief’s plan because he is a 

final policymaker for the Township. 

We conclude that, under the pleading standard set forth 

by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
4

U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. 1937

(2009), Santiago has failed to plead sufficient factual matter 

to give rise to a plausible claim for relief against the senior 

police officers. Her claim against Warminster also must fail

because Santiago has failed to plausibly plead that the police 

chief’s conduct caused her any injury. Accordingly, we will 

affirm.

I. Background1

On the morning of May 13, 2006, Warminster 

conducted a “surround and call out” operation at the home of 

Santiago, a sixty-year-old resident of Warminster. The 

purpose of the operation was to apprehend Steve Miranda, 

one of Santiago’s grandsons.

A. Warminster Conducts the “Surround and Call 

Out” Operation

2

 1 The background information in this section is taken 

from Santiago’s Third Amended Complaint and is set forth as 

if true.

2 The arrest warrant for Steve Miranda also named two 

other individuals, though the record does not state whether 

they were expected to be found at Santiago’s home. 

 The operation was carried out 

by the members of “Alpha Team,” a unit of the Central Bucks 

Special Response Team (“CBSRT”). The CBSRT is a multijurisdictional police agency consisting of officers 

representing eighteen municipalities, including Warminster. 

The members of Alpha Team were Detective Wayne Jones 

and Officers Jon Ogborn, Frederick Kutzer, and Tim Murphy. 

While only Officer Kutzer was employed directly by 
5

Warminster, all outside personnel and equipment were placed 

under the temporary control of Warminster for purposes of 

the May 13th operation. 

At the commencement of the operation, the occupants 

of Santiago’s home were awakened by police using a public 

address system. Santiago and her daughter, Gloria Cotte, 

looked through a window to see an armored vehicle and 

officers wearing combat uniforms and carrying automatic 

weapons. Upon seeing Cotte looking through the window, 

one of the officers asked her who else was in the house, to 

which she responded “just my family ... this is the Santiago 

family.” (Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 35.) The officer then 

ordered everyone to exit the house one at a time. 

Santiago was the first to come out and was 

commanded, at gun point, to raise her hands and walk toward 

the officers. When she did not raise her hands as high as an 

officer wanted, she was ordered to raise them higher or else 

be shot. When Santiago reached the officers, Officer Ogborn 

conducted a pat down search, which revealed no weapons but, 

humiliating though it was for Santiago, included touching her 

breasts and crotch. He then restrained her hands behind her 

back with a plastic zip-tie and seated her on the ground next 

to the police vehicle. Santiago was frightened and 

complained of chest pain. 

After Santiago left the house, she was followed by 

Steve Miranda and Jonathan Miranda (her two grandsons), 

Herminia Miranda (her granddaughter), and Cotte (her 

daughter). Her two grandsons were patted down, handcuffed, 

and seated on the ground near Santiago. Her daughter and 
6

granddaughter were patted down but not handcuffed or 

seated. 

Even after the police had arrested Steve Miranda – the 

only occupant for whom they had a warrant – Santiago 

remained seated and restrained. The officers instructed her 

and Cotte to sign a consent form allowing a search of the 

home. Santiago, who speaks no English and cannot read or 

write, did not sign and, of course, could not have unless they 

unbound her hands. Cotte, who later said she “felt coerced,” 

did sign. 

Santiago sat with her hands tied for approximately 

thirty minutes as her home was searched. Throughout that 

time, she was unable to interfere, was not a flight risk, and 

presented no danger. She continued to complain of pain and 

eventually told Jonathan Miranda that she felt pain in her 

heart. Jonathan Miranda told the officers that his 

grandmother was having a heart attack, and an ambulance 

was summoned to take her to the hospital. 

B. Santiago’s Complaints are Filed and Dismissed

On May12, 2008 – one day before the expiration of 

the statute of limitations – Santiago filed her initial complaint 

in the District Court, citing constitutional violations and state 

law tort claims and naming Warminster, Warminster’s police 

department, John Doe police officers, and CBSRT as 

defendants. For reasons not pertinent here, the bulk of that 

complaint was dismissed, including all counts against the 

Warminster police department (because it was not a separate 

legal entity from Warminster) and CBSRT (for insufficient 

service of process), and, after a series of amended complaints 
7

and further dismissals, the operative pleading left in the case 

is Santiago’s Third Amended Complaint. That complaint is 

framed in two counts: (1) a §§ 1983 and 1988 claim against 

Warminster and the individual defendants for violation of the 

Fourth Amendment; and (2) state law claims against the 

individual defendants for assault, battery, false arrest, false 

imprisonment, and harm resulting from a state created danger. 

Unlike earlier versions of the complaint, the Third Amended 

Complaint replaced “John Does” with the names of the 

officers on the scene, identifying Detective Jones and Officers 

Ogborn, Kutzer, and Murphy. The Third Amended 

Complaint also added, for the first time, allegations against 

three Warminster police officers claimed to have been 

involved in planning and supervising the operation: Chief of 

Police Michael Murphy, Lieutenant Christopher Springfield,

and Lieutenant James Donnelly, III (collectively, the 

“Supervising Officers”). 

The entirety of the allegations against the Supervising 

Officers were contained in three paragraphs:

Chief Michael Murphy is Police Chief of 

Warminster Township Police Department. 

Chief Murphy is a founding member and 

director of the CBSRT. Although Chief 

Murphy was not present at the scene on May 

13, 2006, he ordered and approved the plan to 

execute the arrest warrants. This early morning 

“surround and call out” operation specifically 

sought to have all occupants exit the Plaintiff’s 

home, one at a time, with hands raised under 

threat of fire, patted down for weapons, and 

then handcuffed until the home had been 
8

cleared and searched. Chief Murphy violated 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in that this 

plan used excessive force in restraining 

Plaintiff, a non-target occupant who presented 

no threat or risk, for a lengthy period of time 

and used coercion in obtaining her consent to 

search the premises. 

Christopher Springfield was a police officer 

with Warminster Township Police Department. 

On May 13, 2006, he held the rank of 

Lieutenant and was in [sic] placed in charge of 

the “surround and call out” operation by Chief 

Murphy. Lt. Springfield was responsible for all 

assets including the CBSRT and Warminster 

Township Police Officers. Lt. Springfield 

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in 

that he permitted the use of excessive force in 

restraining Plaintiff, a non-target occupant who 

presented no threat or risk, for a lengthy period 

of time and used coercion in obtaining her 

consent to search the premises.

Lt. James Donnelly is an officer with the 

Warminster Township Police Department. On 

May 13, 2006, he was also the Tactical Team 

Leader of CBSRT. Chief Murphy ordered Lt. 

Donnelly to plan and help execute an early 

morning “surround and call out” operation 

which sought to have all occupants exit the 

Plaintiff’s home, one at a time, with hands 

raised under threat of fire, patted down for 

weapons, and then handcuffed until the home 
9

had been cleared and searched. Lt. Donnelly 

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in 

that this plan used excessive force in restraining 

Plaintiff, a non-target occupant who presented 

no threat or risk, for a lengthy period of time, 

and used coercion in obtaining her consent to 

search the premises. As Tactical Team Leader 

of CBSRT, Lt. Donnelly was responsible for the 

actions of Alpha Team.

(Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21-23.)

Both Warminster and the individual defendants moved 

to dismiss and on December 23, 2009, the District Court 

issued an opinion granting the motion. First, the Court

dismissed the claims against the officers of Alpha Team as 

barred by the statute of limitations.3

 3 Because the individual officers were not identified by 

name until after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the 

Court held that the claims against them would survive only if, 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), the amended 

claims related back to the filing date of the original 

complaint. That required the individual officers to have had 

notice of the suit within 120 days of the filing of the original 

complaint. The Court found that there was no evidence that 

the members of Alpha Team had such notice. The Court 

went on to hold, however, that notice could be imputed to the 

Supervising Officers based on their “identity of interest” with 

Warminster’s police department. Consequently, it dismissed 

only the claims against the officers of Alpha Team under the 

statute of limitations.

 Next, the Court
10

dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims against the 

Supervising Officers because it held that Santiago had alleged 

only respondeat superior liability as to them but that

government officials cannot be liable for constitutional 

violations on that basis. The Court then dismissed the claim 

against Warminster because Santiago had not alleged that 

Chief Murphy was a “final policymaker,” which is a 

necessary element of the claim Santiago attempted to assert 

against the Township. Finally, because it had dismissed all of 

Santiago’s federal claims, the Court declined to exercise 

pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed

them, without prejudice. Santiago’s timely appeal to us 

followed.

II. Discussion4

On appeal, Santiago argues that the District Court 

erred by dismissing the claims against the Supervising 

Officers and Warminster. Our review of the District Court’s 

decision to grant the motions to dismiss is plenary. Fowler v. 

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). We

take as true all the factual allegations of the Third Amended 

Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 

from them, Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 

n. 27 (2010), but we disregard legal conclusions and “recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949. “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain 

 4 The District Court had jurisdiction over Santiago’s 

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
11

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 262 

n.27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949). “‘A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id.

A. Santiago’s Claims Against the Supervising 

Officers

We address first the dismissal of Santiago’s claims 

against the Supervising Officers. The District Court 

dismissed those claims because it held that Santiago had not 

pled any basis of liability in the Supervising Officers’ own 

acts but, instead, had alleged only a theory of respondeat 

superior liability, which cannot serve as the basis of a claim 

for constitutional violations. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1948 

(“Government officials may not be held liable for the 

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory 

of respondeat superior.”). While we conclude that the Third 

Amended Complaint can be read as alleging liability based on 

the Supervising Officers’ own acts, we will nevertheless 

affirm the District Court’s ruling because those allegations 

fail to meet the pleading requirements set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.

1. The Nature of Santiago’s Claims

Liability based on respondeat superior arises “solely 

on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee 

relationship,” regardless of whether the employer had any 

part in causing harm. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New 

York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Contrary to the District 
12

Court’s view, that is not the theory Santiago advances. 

Instead, Santiago’s allegations appear to invoke a theory of 

liability under which “a supervisor may be personally 

liable ... if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s 

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in 

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ 

violations.”5

 5 At oral argument, the Supervising Officers asserted

that a supervisory liability claim was unavailable to Santiago 

because that claim had been dismissed from an earlier version 

of the complaint. That assertion is not only inconsistent with 

the briefing, in which the Supervising Officers described 

supervisory liability as Santiago’s “only claim[] against the 

Appellees” (Appellee’s Reply Brief at 24), it also evidences a 

misunderstanding of the record and our precedents. 

 A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile 

While a claim of “failure to train and supervise” was 

asserted in and dismissed from Santiago’s Second Amended 

Complaint, that claim was brought only against Warminster, 

and its dismissal does not foreclose the claims brought against 

the Supervising Officers. Furthermore, as we have noted 

elsewhere, “[t]here are two theories of supervisory liability,” 

one under which supervisors can be liable if they “established 

and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly 

caused [the] constitutional harm,” and another under which 

they can be liable if they “participated in violating plaintiff’s 

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person[s] in 

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] 

subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne 

Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(second alteration in original). The claim against Warminster 

that was dismissed from the Second Amended Complaint 

pertained only to the first theory of supervisory liability, 
13

Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Specifically, 

Santiago alleges that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly 

developed a plan that “sought to have all occupants exit the 

Plaintiff’s home, one at a time, with hands raised under threat 

of fire, patted down for weapons, and then handcuffed until 

the home had been cleared and searched.” (Third Am. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 21, 23.) The claim is thus that, through the 

creation and authorization of the plan, Chief Murphy and Lt. 

Donnelly “directed others to violate [Santiago’s rights].” 

A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. The related allegation that Lt. 

Springfield, as the person in charge of the operation,

“permitted the use of excessive force” appears to be a claim 

that Lt. Springfield “acquiesced in his subordinates’ 

violations.”6

 

while the claim at issue against the Supervising Officers 

pertains primarily to the second. Accordingly, the dismissal 

of the “failure to train and supervise” claim against 

Warminster is not of significance to our review of the present 

supervisory liability claim against the Supervising Officers.

6 At oral argument, Santiago stated that, like Lt. 

Springfield, Lt. Donnelly’s liability was also based on 

acquiescence, rather than on having directed the use of force. 

The Third Amended Complaint, however, states that Lt. 

Donnelly is liable because he helped plan the operation and 

“the plan used excessive force,” whereas it states that Lt. 

Springfield was liable because “he permitted the use of

excessive force.” Thus, we read the allegations as claiming 

that Lt. Donnelly, like Chief Murphy, directed others to use 

excessive force, whereas Lt. Springfield acquiesced in the use 

of force. The distinction is not ultimately important, 

however, as the claims fail either way. 

 A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. Consequently, although 
14

the Third Amended Complaint seeks a species of supervisory 

liability, it is not respondeat superior liability.

2. The Sufficiency of Santiago’s Pleadings

That Santiago has alleged supervisory liability claims 

does not mean that she has supported those allegations with 

“‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 

262 n.27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949), as is required by 

the seminal Supreme Court decisions in Iqbal and Twombly. 

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the 

pleading regime established by those cases, a court must take 

three steps: First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements 

a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 

1947. 7

 7 Iqbal describes the process as only a “two-pronged 

approach.” 129 S. Ct.. at 1950. It preceded that description, 

however, by noting that it is often necessary to “begin by 

taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a 

claim.” Id. at 1947. Thus, we view Iqbal as outlining three 

steps.

 Second, the court should identify allegations that, 

“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled 

to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where 

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 

assume their veracity and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.
15

a) The elements of Santiago’s 

claims

Our initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements 

[Santiago] must plead” in order to state a claim of § 1983 

liability. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1947-48 (identifying “[t]he 

factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation” in order to 

determine what “the plaintiff must plead and prove”). 

To state a claim of supervisory liability against Chief 

Murphy and Lt. Donnelly, at least of the kind that it appears 

Santiago is advancing, she must plead that they “directed 

others to violate [her rights],” A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. Of 

course, Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly could only be liable if 

the people they supposedly directed to violate her rights 

actually did so; otherwise, “the fact that [Chief Murphy and 

Lt. Donnelly] might have [directed] the use of constitutionally 

excessive force is quite beside the point.” City of Los Angeles 

v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Thus, any claim that 

supervisors directed others to violate constitutional rights

necessarily includes as an element an actual violation at the 

hands of subordinates. In addition, a plaintiff must allege a 

causal connection between the supervisor’s direction and that 

violation, or, in other words, proximate causation.

Proximate causation is established where the 

supervisor gave directions that the supervisor “knew or 

should reasonably have known would cause others to deprive 

the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Conner v. Reinhard, 

847 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Snell v. Tunnell, 

920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990). Particularly after Iqbal, 

the connection between the supervisor’s directions and the 

constitutional deprivation must be sufficient to “demonstrate 
16

a ‘plausible nexus’ or ‘affirmative link’ between the 

[directions] and the specific deprivation of constitutional 

rights at issue.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 

2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Therefore, to state her claim against Chief Murphy and Lt. 

Donnelly, Santiago needs to have pled facts plausibly 

demonstrating that they directed Alpha Team to conduct the 

operation in a manner that they “knew or should reasonably 

have known would cause [Alpha Team] to deprive [Santiago] 

of her constitutional rights.” Conner, 847 F.2d at 397.

As to her claim against Lt. Springfield, Santiago must 

allege facts making it plausible that “he had knowledge of 

[Alpha Team’s use of excessive force during the raid]” and 

“acquiesced in [Alpha Team’s] violations.”8

 8 Numerous courts, including this one, have expressed 

uncertainty as to the viability and scope of supervisory 

liability after Iqbal. See, e.g., Bayer v. Monroe, 577 F.3d 

186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in [Iqbal], it is uncertain whether proof of 

such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would provide 

a sufficient basis for holding [defendant] liable with respect to 

plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.”); Dodds v. 

Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting the 

“important questions about the continuing vitality of 

supervisory liability under § 1983 after the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal”); Parish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 

993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s recent 

pronouncement in Iqbal may further restrict the incidents in 

which the ‘failure to supervise’ will result in liability.”). 

Because we hold that Santiago’s pleadings fail even under our 

A.M., 372 F.3d 

at 586. 
17

b) The allegations that are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth

Having identified the elements of Santiago’s claims, 

Iqbal directs that the next step is to identify allegations that, 

“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled 

to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1950. In 

other words, “[we] must accept all of the complaint’s wellpleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal 

conclusions.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. We also disregard 

“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” and 

“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. 

at 1949. 

Santiago alleges that the plan developed and 

authorized by Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly “specifically 

sought to have all occupants exit the Plaintiff’s home, one at a 

time, with hands raised under threat of fire, patted down for 

weapons, and then handcuffed until the home had been 

cleared and searched.” Because this is nothing more than a 

recitation of what Santiago says the Alpha Team members did

to her, it amounts to a conclusory assertion that what 

happened at the scene was ordered by the supervisors. While 

the allegations regarding Alpha Team’s conduct are factual

and more than merely the recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action, the allegation of supervisory liability is, in essence, 

that “Murphy and Donnelly told Alpha team to do what they 

 

existing supervisory liability test, we need not decide whether 

Iqbal requires us to narrow the scope of that test. 
18

did” and is thus a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

[supervisory liability] claim,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1951 

(internal quotation marks omitted) – namely that Chief 

Murphy and Lt. Donnelly directed others in the violation of 

Santiago’s rights. Saying that Chief Murphy and Lt. 

Donnelly “specifically sought” to have happen what allegedly 

happened does not alter the fundamentally conclusory 

character of the allegation. 9

Our conclusion in this regard is dictated by the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal. The plaintiff’s claim in 

that case required proving that the defendants, Attorney 

General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, had 

“adopted a policy because of, not merely in spite of, its 

adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 129 S. Ct.. at 

1951. The Court disregarded allegations that “petitioners 

knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to 

subject [respondent] to harsh conditions of confinement as a 

matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, 

and/or national origin” and that “Ashcroft was the principal 

 9 We recognize that Santiago’s allegations against 

Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly are not precisely of the “they 

said to do it” variety because there are some distinctions 

between what Santiago alleges happened and what Santiago 

alleges was ordered. In particular, Santiago alleges that the 

Supervising Officers ordered everyone to be handcuffed but 

that certain occupants were not actually handcuffed. 

Nonetheless, the breadth and conclusory nature of Santiago’s 

allegations are such that they appear to us to be, in practical 

effect, indistinguishable from purely “they said to do it” 

allegations. 
19

architect of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was 

instrumental in adopting and executing it.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court called those 

allegations “nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a constitutional discrimination claim.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court emphasized 

that the claims required dismissal not because they were 

fanciful, but because they were conclusory. Id. Likewise, in 

this case where Santiago is required to prove that the 

Supervising Officers directed others to use excessive force, an 

allegation that the plan “specifically sought” that use of force 

is nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a supervisory liability claim and hence is not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. The same is true for Santiago’s 

allegation that Lt. Springfield “permitted the use of excessive 

force,” which is nothing more than a conclusory statement 

that he acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations. 

In short, Santiago’s allegations are “naked 

assertion[s]” that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly directed 

Alpha Team to conduct the operation in the allegedly 

excessive manner that they did and that Lt. Springfield 

acquiesced in Alpha Team’s acts. As mere restatements of 

the elements of her supervisory liability claims, they are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth. However, it is crucial to 

recognize that our determination that these particular 

allegations do not deserve an assumption of truth does not 

end the analysis. It may still be that Santiago’s supervisory 

liability claims are plausible in light of the non-conclusory 

factual allegations in the complaint. We therefore turn to 

those allegations to determine whether the claims are 

plausible.
20

c) The plausibility of Santiago’s 

claims

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949.Other than 

the conclusory allegations just discussed, the remaining 

allegations regarding the Supervising Officers are as follows: 

Chief Michael Murphy is Police Chief of 

Warminster Township Police Department. 

Chief Murphy is a founding member and 

director of the CBSRT. Although Chief 

Murphy was not present at the scene on May 

13, 2006, he ordered and approved the plan to 

execute the arrest warrants. ...

Christopher Springfield was a police officer 

with Warminster Township Police Department. 

On May 13, 2006, he held the rank of 

Lieutenant and was in placed in [sic] charge of 

the “surround and call out” operation by Chief 

Murphy. Lt. Springfield was responsible for all 

assets including the CBSRT and Warminster 

Township Police Officers. ...

Lt. James Donnelly is an officer with the 

Warminster Township Police Department. On 

May 13, 2006, he was also the Tactical Team 

Leader of CBSRT. Chief Murphy ordered Lt. 

Donnelly to plan and help execute an early 

morning “surround and call out” operation ... . 
21

As Tactical Team Leader of CBSRT, Lt. 

Donnelly was responsible for the actions of 

Alpha Team. ... 

(Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21-23.)

For purposes of analyzing the motions to dismiss, we 

take those factual allegations as true and also accept as 

accurate the factual allegations regarding Alpha Team’s 

execution of the operation. In summary, the allegations 

against Alpha Team are that the officers ordered everyone to 

exit the house one at a time; that Santiago exited first under 

threat of fire; that Santiago was patted down in a demeaning 

fashion, found to be unarmed, and subsequently handcuffed; 

that the remaining occupants of the home then exited, some of 

whom were handcuffed while others were not; that Santiago’s 

daughter was coerced into consenting to a search of the home; 

and that Santiago was left restrained for thirty minutes while 

her home was searched, during which time she had a heart 

attack.

The question then becomes whether those allegations

make it plausible that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly

directed Alpha Team to conduct the operation in a manner 

that they “knew or should reasonably have known would 

cause [Alpha Team] to deprive [Santiago] of her 

constitutional rights,” Conner, 847 F.2d at 397, or that Lt. 

Springfield “had knowledge [that Alpha Team was using 

excessive force during the raid]” and “acquiesced in [Alpha 

Team’s] violations.” A.M., 372 F.3d at 586.
22

(1) The plausibility of the 

claims against Chief 

Murphy and Lt. Donnelly

First, with respect to Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly, 

we consider whether the fact that they planned the operation

coupled with the fact that the operation resulted in excessive 

force against Santiago makes it plausible that the plan called 

for the use of excessive force. We conclude that it does not. 

Santiago has only alleged that excessive force was used 

against her. The complaint does not allege that any other 

occupant was threatened with fire. It specifically states that 

the other women were not handcuffed. It does allege that the 

two grandsons were handcuffed, but one of them was the 

subject of the arrest warrant and there are no allegations 

stating whether the other was found to be armed or a risk of 

flight. Consequently, there is no basis in the complaint to 

conclude that excessive force was used on anyone except 

Santiago. Even if someone else had been subjected to 

excessive force, it is clear that the occupants were not being 

treated uniformly. Thus, Santiago’s allegations undercut the 

notion of a plan for all occupants to be threatened with fire 

and handcuffed. While it is possible that there was such a 

plan, and that Alpha Team simply chose not to follow it, 

“possibility” is no longer the touchstone for pleading 

sufficiency after Twombly and Iqbal. Plausibility is what 

matters. Allegations that are “merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability” or show the “mere possibility of 

misconduct” are not enough. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.. at 1949-50

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, given the disparate 

treatment of the occupants of the home, one plausible 

explanation is that the officers simply used their own 

discretion in determining how to treat each occupant. In 
23

contrast with that “obvious alternative explanation” for the 

allegedly excessive use of force, the inference that the force 

was planned is not plausible. Id. at 1951-52 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).

Where, as here, an operation results in the use of 

allegedly excessive force against only one of several people, 

that use of force does not, by itself, give rise to a plausible 

claim for supervisory liability against those who planned the 

operation. To hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff to 

pursue a supervisory liability claim anytime a planned 

operation resulted in excessive force, merely by describing 

the force used and appending the phrase “and the Chief told 

them to do it.” Iqbal requires more.

(2) The plausibility of the 

claim against Lt. 

Springfield

We next ask whether the allegation that Lt. Springfield 

was placed in charge of the operation, coupled with what 

happened during the operation, makes it plausible that Lt. 

Springfield knew of and acquiesced in the use of excessive 

force against Santiago. Again, we conclude that it does not. 

The complaint implies but does not allege that Lt. Springfield 

was present during the operation. Assuming he was present, 

however, the complaint still does not aver that he knew of the 

allegedly excessive force, nor does it give rise to the 

reasonable inference that he was aware of the level of force 

used against one individual. See McKenna v. City of 

Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3rd Cir. 2009) (holding that 

a supervisor’s presence “in the vicinity of the arrest at some 

point after [plaintiff] was handcuffed ... is not a legally 
24

sufficient evidentiary basis” to find knowledge and 

acquiescence). Consequently, the allegations are insufficient 

to “nudge [Santiago’s] claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

In sum, while Santiago’s complaint contains sufficient 

allegations to show that the Supervising Officers planned and 

supervised the operation and that, during the operation, Alpha 

Team used arguably excessive force, her allegations do 

nothing more than assert the element of liability that the 

Supervising Officers specifically called for or acquiesced in 

that use of force. As a result, her allegations may “get[] the 

complaint close to stating a claim, but without further factual 

enhancement [they] stop[] short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). Because the Third Amended Complaint 

does not give rise to a plausible claim for relief against the 

Supervising Officers, the District Court did not err in 

dismissing the claims against them.10

 10 The Third Amended Complaint was filed after the 

close of discovery. Consequently, there is no reason to 

believe that Santiago’s conclusory allegations were simply 

the result of the relevant evidence being in the hands of the 

defendants. Under Iqbal, however, the result would be the 

same even had no discovery been completed. We recognize 

that plaintiffs may face challenges in drafting claims despite 

an information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants. 

Given that reality, reasonable minds may take issue with 

Iqbal and urge a different balance between ensuring, on the 

one hand, access to the courts so that victims are able to 

obtain recompense and, on the other, ensuring that 
25

B. Santiago’s Claim Against Warminster

We now turn to the dismissal of Santiago’s claim 

against Warminster. The District Court dismissed that claim 

because Santiago had failed to allege that Chief Murphy was 

a final policymaker, which, under Monell, was necessary to 

the survival of her claim against the Township. Santiago 

offers two arguments for why the dismissal was improper. 

First, she argues that, while she may not have used the words 

“final policymaker,” “the factual averments of the complaint 

are more than sufficient to show that Chief Murphy was the 

‘final policymaker’ with respect to the tactical decisions made 

here.” (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 23.) Second, she argues 

that the District Court applied the wrong standard –

considering whether Chief Murphy was a final policymaker 

as a factual question instead of a legal one, as required under 

Supreme Court precedent. Not only are those arguments 

inconsistent, they miss the point. The dispositive point is 

that, whether or not Chief Murphy is a final policymaker, 

Santiago has failed to plead facts showing that his plan 

caused her injury.

 

municipalities and police officers are not unnecessarily 

subjected to the burdens of litigation. See Arthur R. Miller, 

From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2010) 

(arguing that Twombly and Iqbal give “too much attention to 

claims ... of expense and possible abuse and too little on 

citizen access, a level litigation playing field, and the other 

values of civil litigation”). The Supreme Court has struck the 

balance, however, and we abide by it.
26

Under Monell, for municipal liability to attach, any 

injury must be inflicted by “execution of a government’s 

policy or custom.” 436 U.S. at 694. Drawing all factual 

inferences in favor of Santiago, as is required at this juncture, 

we nevertheless cannot conclude that the Third Amended 

Complaint alleges municipal liability. The complaint does 

not allege that Chief Murphy had policymaking authority,11

 11 While Santiago is correct that, whether Chief 

Murphy is a final policymaker is ultimately a legal rather than 

a factual question, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

112, 124 (1988), that does not relieve her of the obligation to 

plead in some fashion that he had final policy making 

authority, as that is a key element of a Monell claim. In any 

event, as a matter of Pennsylvania state law, a township 

Police Chief is not a final policymaker. See 53 PA. STAT.

ANN. § 66902 (vesting authority over the “organization and 

supervision” of township police officers with the township 

board of supervisors); Hicks v. Warminster Township, No. 

Civ. A. 00-2895, 2001 WL 1159750, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 26, 

2001) (“In such townships, all of the policymaking power, 

including over the local police force, is vested in the town 

supervisors.”). Moreover, the Supreme Court has forbidden 

courts from “assuming that municipal policymaking authority 

lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports 

to put it.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125 n.1, 126. 

nor does it allege what action he took that could fairly be said 

to be policy. The allegation that Chief Murphy ordered a plan 

to execute arrest warrants does not imply the existence of an 

official policy in violation of Santiago’s constitutional rights. 

See McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 

2009) (a claimant “must identify a custom or policy, and 
27

specify what exactly that custom or policy was”); see also 

McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 685 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 

plaintiff must first allege that a defendant is a final 

policymaker. Only then can a court proceed to the next 

question of whether the single act or single decision of that 

defendant constituted municipal policy.”) More to the point, 

though, we have already held that Santiago’s pleadings fail to 

plausibly allege that Chief Murphy directed others to violate 

her rights. Thus, even if Chief Murphy were a final policy 

maker and his plan were deemed to be official Warminster 

policy, Santiago has failed to properly plead that the plan was 

the source of her injury. Therefore, she has not shown that 

her injury was inflicted by “execution of [Warminster’s] 

policy or custom,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and she has no 

claim against the Township.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 

Court’s order dismissing Santiago’s claims.