IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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m 00-60301

Summary Calendar

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FIDELIA ALEXANDER, ETC., ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

CLINTON ALEXANDER

AND

BENEFICIARIES OF THE BEBE ALEXANDER FAMILY TRUST,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

UNION PLANTERS BANK,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(2:98-CV-128-B-B)

_________________________

September 15, 2000

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and

DENNIS, Circuit Judges. 

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the

(continued...)
2

Clinton Alexander, pro se, appeals, for herself and as next-friend of her sister, Fidelia Alexander, a summary judgment declaring that a

previoussettlement agreement releases defendant Union Planters Bank fromany liability for

the matters being litigated in this suit. We affirm, concluding that the district court

correctly held that the language of the

settlement agreement unambiguously governs

these issues, that there is no evidence of fraud

or inequitable conduct, and that there was

adequate consideration to form a valid

contract.

I.

Fidelia and Clinton Alexander were

beneficiaries under the Bebe H. Alexander

Family Trust, created by the will of their

grandfather. His daughter, Bebe, and Clinton

and Fidelia were beneficiaries.

Most of the payments from the trust were

made to Bebe, but Fidelia and Clinton then

requested that payments be made to them.

The will provided that the bank as trustee, at

its discretion, could make payments for such

purposes. After considering Fidelia and Clinton’s request, the bank denied them any

payments, instead choosing to continue to pay

the majority of the income to Bebe. 

II.

Fidelia and Clinton, pro se,sued the bank in

state court, accusing it of various violations of

its duty as trustee, including failing to sell the

farm in 1980 when land prices were at a peak

and violating the trust’s terms by paying most

of the income to Bebe. Fidelia and Clinton

then dismissed so they could refile in another

county. 

Before plaintiffs refiled, the bank sued in

yet a third county, seeking to resign astrustee,

to have the rights of the beneficiaries of the

trust determined, and to be discharged from

further obligations under the trust. On the

date of trial, the parties entered into a

settlement agreement stating, inter alia, that

“all claims now existing or alleged to exist

among the parties in this case are released and

discharged . . . .”

Fidelia and Clinton then filed the instant

suit, seeking damages from the bank for

breaches of fiduciary duties and fraudulent behavior with respect to the administration ofthe

trust. They claim that the term “parties” in the

1996 settlement referred only to the

beneficiaries of the trust and not to the bank,

even though the bank was the plaintiff in that

case. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that the

bank interpreted the term “parties” to include

it means there was no meeting of the minds.

The bank disagrees, reasoning that the plain

language of the settlement releases it from all

liability that existed to Fidelia and Clinton as of

the time of the settlement.

III.

We review a summary judgment de novo.

See Rivers v. Central & S.W. Corp., 186 F.3d

681, 682 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court

correctly determined that the language of the

settlement unambiguously released all parties

to that suit from any liability that existed

among them at that time. It is hard to imagine

how a global settlement could be much more

plainlyworded than “all claims now existing or

alleged to exist among the parties in this case

are released and discharged . . . .” This

unambiguous language precludes us from

going beyond the written words of the

*

(...continued)

limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.
3

settlement and delving into parole evidence of

what the partiesintended when they signed the

agreement. See Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So. 2d

236, 241 (Miss. 1991). 

Any party represented by competent

counsel should have realized that this

agreement would be interpreted to release the

bank from all liability. It is undisputed,

however, that Clinton and Fidelia Alexander

made an honest mistake in thinking that the

settlement agreement did not include the

bank.1 Unfortunately for them, no matter how

sincere their mistaken belief was that the

agreement did not release the bank from

liability, “[a] unilateral mistake will not be the

basis for upsetting a settlement unless there is

some evidence of fraud, duress, overreaching,

etc.” Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,

519 So. 2d 436, 438 (Miss. 1988). 

Although plaintiffs allege “sheer chicanery”

and “bad faith and trickery” on the part of the

bank’s attorney, we find no evidence of fraud

in the record. Indeed, the record shows that

the settlement was negotiated by the lawyers

for the two divided camps of beneficiaries, and

there is no record ofthe attorney’s making any

representations at all as to the meaning of the

settlement terms to either Clinton and Fidelia

or their attorneys. 

The bank’s attorney was present in the

courtroom and did sign the agreement, but

there is no evidence whatsoever offraud on his

part. Plaintiffs’ argument that he is guilty of

bad faith and trickery is instead made in

response to histaking the position that the settlement agreementSSwhich he signed in

settlement of the case in which his client was

the plaintiffSSapplied to his client.

Plaintiffs contend that the settlement could

not include the bank because they were

“specific in theirinstructionsthat no settlement

agreement should bar their eventual claim

against Union Planters for damages.”

Therefore, they argue, any interpretation of

“parties” that includes Union Planters Bank is

either erroneous or trickery. 

Plaintiffs, however, have failed to allege to

whom, if anyone, other than their attorneys,

they gave these specific instructions. They

further do not allege that the bank was aware

of their desire to reserve the right to sue the

bank for breach of its duties as trustee, or that

the bank or its attorneys ever communicated

anything to them about the meaning of the

agreement. Therefore, the fact that the

settlement agreement stated that it released all

“partiesin the case” cannot lead to recission of

1 The undisputed evidence is that the sisters

were both too ill to be in the courtroom and

therefore had to have their attorneys relay the

settlement negotiations to them in a separate room.

Thus, the fact that theymay have become confused

as to the exact wording and intent of the settlement

issomewhat understandable. More remarkable are

the af_fidavits from the sisters’ attorneys in which

they seem to trumpet their own shortcomings.

They state that when Wright signed the settlement

agreement, they both believed that it did not release

the Bank from any liability. They further state in

their affidavitsSSwhich are identically

wordedSSthat theBank should have communicated

more plainly that the settlement agreement released

it from liability. 

Had the ailing sisters been negotiating for

them_selves we might consider the question of

whether the Bank should have explained each element of the settlement agreement to them. But

where, as here, clients are represented by

supposedly competent counsel, we reject any

argument that opposing counsel has a duty to make

sure that each unambiguous part of an agreement

is subjectively understood by both lawyer and

client. 
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the contract on grounds that plaintiffs were

fraudulently induced to make a unilateral

mistake.

Plaintiffs alternatively aver that there was

no consideration given by the bank in

exchange for its release from liability. They

argue that the bank agreed to do no more than

fulfill its pre-existing duties as trustee, which

cannot amount to consideration given in

exchange for a promise to release it from

liability. Plaintiffs do not recognize, however,

that the bank dropped its suit seeking court

approval to resign as trustee and to be discharged from further obligations under the

trust. This consideration was sufficient to

form a valid contract.

AFFIRMED.