IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee 

v. 

CHANDA HUOR, also known as Kevin Thorn, 

 Defendant - Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas 

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. 

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Chanda Huor was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under 

the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). His sentence 

included a prison term followed by ten years of supervised release during which 

he would be subject to various conditions. His appeal challenges five of the 

conditions imposed. We find the district court acted within its discretion by

imposing a special condition requiring Huor to undergo sex offender treatment 

but abused its discretion by imposing a special condition prohibiting purchase, 

possession, or use of sexually stimulating materials. The district court also 

erred, as a matter of law, by imposing a special condition requiring the 

defendant to “follow all other lifestyle restrictions . . . imposed by the 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 10, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2 

therapist.” Further, the judgment must be reformed to omit a special condition 

prohibiting Huor from “residing or going to places” frequented by minors 

without permission from his probation officer because that special condition 

was not pronounced orally at sentencing. Similarly, the judgment must be 

reformed to omit a “standard” sex offender treatment condition that largely 

overlaps with, but materially differs from, the similar “special” condition that 

was orally pronounced at sentencing and included separately in the written 

judgment. 

In light of our rulings, only the treatment condition will stand. The 

defendant also challenges a discrete aspect of this condition, which provides: 

“After an initial evaluation if the doctor finds that treatment isn’t necessary 

and the defendant is not a danger, the Court will amend and abate this special 

condition of supervised release.” Because the district court retained its power 

to sentence the defendant and did not improperly delegate it to the doctor, we 

uphold this aspect of the treatment condition. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In 1998, at the age of 16, defendant Chanda Huor pleaded guilty to 

raping a four-year-old girl. In addition to a lengthy prison sentence, he was 

required to register as a sex offender for life. Huor got out of prison in 2005. 

Since then, he has updated his registration several times but not with the 

diligence required by law; he has multiple failure-to-register convictions. 

Huor updated his registration with the Virginia State Police in early 

2013. In March of that year, he moved to San Antonio, Texas and did not 

update his registration. When the deadline to do so passed, a warrant for 

Huor’s arrest issued out of Virginia. U.S. Marshals eventually tracked him to 

Texas, where he had moved to be with a girlfriend. After the relationship 

ended, he lived with a woman named Crystal Quesada and her eight-year-old 

son for nearly a year. Marshals contacted Quesada and learned that she knew 

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3 

Huor as Kevin Thorn. They did not find Huor until several days later. When 

they did, he was living with a new girlfriend and her two young daughters. 

This third girlfriend, Rosemary Valdez, was unaware that Huor was a 

convicted sex offender and also knew him as Kevin. Huor was at Valdez’s 

residence when the Marshals arrived and was arrested without incident. 

Huor was charged in a one-count indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2250(a) as a person required to register under SORNA who had traveled in 

interstate commerce and knowingly failed to register or update his 

registration. He pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced Huor to 24 

months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. Much of the 

sentencing hearing concerned the propriety of sentencing conditions, 

particularly the requirement that Huor undergo sex offender treatment and 

the ban on sexually stimulating materials. The district court acknowledged 

that Huor had not committed any sex offenses since being released from prison 

and had indeed shown no “propensity at least in the last ten years . . . to 

reengage in the kind of behavior that put him where -- where he is today.” 

Huor’s counsel objected to the sex offender treatment condition. The 

district court explained that it was imposing the special condition primarily 

because Huor had lied to two different women, earned a place in those women’s 

homes by the deceit, and thereby placed himself under the same roof as small 

children. This combination of events, a scenario SORNA is specifically 

designed to prevent, satisfied the district court that Huor required continuing 

sex offender treatment. In response to Huor’s objection, however, the district 

court agreed that such treatment may be unnecessary and qualified the special 

condition as follows: “I’m going to amend that condition, at this time, to require 

that he undergo at least an initial evaluation, and if the psychiatrist or 

psychologist believes that under the circumstances a -- further treatment is 

not necessary, then I will amend and abate the condition.” This “initial 

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evaluation qualification” is challenged on appeal along with the special 

condition itself.

Huor’s counsel also objected to the special condition prohibiting sexually 

stimulating materials. When Huor’s counsel noted the absence of any link to 

pornography in Huor’s case, the district court replied, “No, he didn’t have child 

pornography. He just raped a four year old.” The district court also relied on 

evidence heard in prior cases that sexually stimulating materials contribute to 

recidivism in pedophiles. The special condition, however, was amended and 

made subject to the initial evaluation qualification. 

Other conditions imposed at sentencing provoked no objection. Pertinent 

here, Huor’s counsel did not object to a condition requiring Huor to “follow all 

other lifestyle restrictions or treatment requirements approved by the 

therapist, psychiatrist, or psychologist and continue those restrictions as they 

pertain to avoiding risk situations throughout the course of his supervision.” 

And the written judgment, when handed down, included another special 

condition to which Huor’s counsel had no opportunity to object—a special 

condition prohibiting Huor from “residing or going to places” frequented by 

minors without permission from his probation officer. The written judgment 

also included, as “Standard Condition 14,” sex offender treatment largely 

redundant of the sex offender treatment separately imposed as a special 

condition but lacking the “initial evaluation qualification.” Huor timely 

appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review and Essential Law 

When challenged on appeal, conditions of supervised release are reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Morin, 832 F.3d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 

2016).

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[S]uch conditions must be reasonably related to one of the 

following statutory factors: (i) the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (ii) the 

need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (iii) the 

need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 

and (iv) the need to provide the defendant with needed training, 

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 

manner. 

United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1)–(2)). 

Supervised release conditions must be “reasonably related to any of the 

four factors” and “cannot involve a ‘greater deprivation of liberty than is 

reasonably necessary’ to achieve the statutory goals.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 2001)). Sentencing courts have an 

obligation to explain why each special condition has been imposed. Id.

To the extent Huor challenges conditions to which he did not object at 

sentencing, we review only for plain error. See id. at 448. To satisfy this 

standard of review, Huor “must show ‘(1) an error (2) that is clear or obvious, 

(3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. 

Mendoza-Velasquez, Case No. 16-40194, 2017 WL 414363, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 

30, 2017) (quoting United States v. Nava, 762 F.3d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 2014)). 

He bears the burden as to each of these four questions, and carrying that 

burden “is difficult, as it should be.” Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 

U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009)).

B. The “Treatment Condition” 

Huor’s first challenge is to the treatment condition. He argues that 

treatment is “unnecessary” and not supported by findings reasonably related 

to the § 3553(a) factors. We disagree. The district court adequately articulated 

why the treatment condition is reasonably related to the nature and 

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circumstances of Huor’s crime, the need to protect the public from further 

crimes, and the need to provide Huor with treatment. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1)–(2). 

The district court explained: “the reason for the imposition . . . is his 

false—and lying to these women and resulting in his placing himself within a 

home with small children.” The district court was concerned because Huor’s 

failure to register led to precisely the risk of harm that SORNA is designed to 

prevent—a convicted sex offender living in a home with small children under 

a false name and without informing the children’s mother of his past. Huor 

previously raped a small child and has since violated SORNA with the 

consequence (and perhaps purpose) of embedding himself into the household 

of a woman with small children. The district court determined, based on this 

specific conduct, that sex offender treatment was warranted, and this 

determination was not an abuse of discretion. 

Huor also challenges, on appeal, the initial evaluation qualification, 

which provides that “[a]fter an initial evaluation if the doctor finds that 

treatment isn’t necessary and the defendant is not a danger, the Court will 

amend and abate this special condition of supervised release.” There being no 

objection at sentencing to this aspect of the special condition, our review is for 

plain error. 

It is proper for a court to decide that “the manner and means” by which 

a condition of supervised release is implemented may be determined by a 

probation officer or therapist. Morin, 832 F.3d at 516–17. A court may not, 

however, delegate the duty of determining whether a condition will be imposed 

at all. See id. at 518. Rather, the court must “retain and exercise ultimate 

responsibility” for that sentencing decision. Id. (quoting United States v. 

Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted)). Thus, 

for example, giving a therapist power to impose “lifestyle restrictions” on a 

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defendant “[w]ithout the supervision of the district court” represents a 

violation, but there is no violation if the district court retains a supervisory 

role. See id. 

In Morin, we rejected a special condition that required the defendant to 

“follow all other lifestyle restrictions or treatment requirements imposed by the 

therapist, and continue those restrictions as they pertain to avoiding risk 

situations throughout the course of supervision.” Id. at 515–17 (emphasis 

added). In United States v. Lomas, the challenged special condition required 

the defendant “to participate in a mental health program as deemed necessary 

and approved by the probation officer,” and we vacated and remanded for 

clarification, instructing that if the district “court intends to leave the issue of 

the defendant’s participation in therapy to the discretion of the probation 

officer, such a condition would constitute an impermissible delegation of 

judicial authority and should not be included.” 643 F. App’x 319, 324–25 (5th 

Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Lomas was recently followed in a 

published opinion, United States v. Franklin, 838 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2016). In 

all three cases, we focused on the wording of the condition in determining its 

propriety. Morin, 832 F.3d at 517 (reviewing the condition “as presently 

constructed”); Lomas, 643 F.App’x at 322 (focusing on the “wording” of the 

special condition at issue); Franklin, 838 F.3d at 567 (same).

Huor’s arguments largely ignore the actual wording of the written 

judgment, imbuing the reviewing doctor with sentencing power not reflected 

in the judgment. Thus, Huor argues that “the conditions take effect, by default, 

if a doctor finds that treatment is necessary,” that the “conditions take effect 

even if the doctor is undecided about the necessity for treatment,” that the 

“conditions abate only upon a finding that treatment is unnecessary,” and that 

“[e]ither way, it is the doctor who has the power to decide whether Huor will 

be subject to” the special conditions. Not so. 

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It is the district court that “will amend and abate this special condition 

of supervised release” if a “doctor finds that treatment isn’t necessary and the 

defendant is not a danger.” Thus, the district court has retained ultimate 

supervisory power as required by Morin, 832 F.3d at 518; see also Mickelson, 

433 F.3d at 1056 (“Conditions delegating limited authority to non judicial 

officials . . . are permissible so long as the delegating judicial officer retains 

and exercises ultimate responsibility.”). It is the district court that does the 

sentencing, and that is all Article III requires. 

While the judgment’s wording rightly preserves the judiciary’s power to 

impose the sentence, its if/then structure creates the concerning impression 

that the judge may act as an automaton upon receiving the findings of the 

doctor. “[P]reserving the judiciary’s exclusive authority to impose sentences 

is an area in which it is important for courts to be vigilant.” Morin, 832 F.3d 

at 518. We have held that the district court committed no improper delegation 

precisely because it did not delegate the power to sentence. We emphasize that 

the district court must retain that power in a meaningful way. “[I]n every 

delegation, the court must retain the right to review findings and to exercise 

ultimate authority for resolving the case or controversy.” United States v. 

Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995). The judge’s role must not be reduced 

to the clerical; the doctor’s role must not be elevated to the judicial. Under our 

reading of the special condition, the doctor makes findings on the necessity of 

treatment and danger of the defendant, and the judge retains the authority 

and responsibility to review the doctor’s findings and to adjust the sentence if, 

in its considered view, the findings so merit. See id. (“It has long been 

recognized that courts may utilize masters and commissioners in connection 

with factfinding, and the Supreme Court has affirmed Congress’ delegation of 

factfinding functions to an administrative agency.”). 

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C. The “Sexually Stimulating Materials Condition” 

Huor also challenges the sexually stimulating materials condition

requiring the defendant to “refrain from purchasing, possessing, or using any 

sexually stimulating or sexually oriented materials including but not limited 

to written, audio and visual depictions, such as, pornographic books, 

magazines, photographs, films, videos, DVDs, computer programs, or any 

other media for portrayal of the same.” Relying primarily on Salazar, he 

contends that the record does not support a prohibition of sexually stimulating 

materials. 

Our analysis starts with the reasons given by the district court and 

analysis of their relationship to the § 3553(a) factors. As mentioned previously, 

the district court imposed the sexually stimulating material condition because 

Huor previously raped a small child and because, from evidence presented in 

prior cases, the district court was concerned that sexually stimulating 

materials may contribute to recidivism in pedophiles. The first of these 

reasons bears an inadequate relationship to the statutory factors. The second 

reason reflects a failure to tailor the special condition to the individual 

defendant and is unsupported by the record. 

The sexually stimulating materials condition was imposed, in part, 

because Huor “raped a four-year-old.” This rationale relates to the first 

§ 3553(a) factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant. “[A] special condition that is not related 

to the crime of conviction will nevertheless be upheld as long as it is justified 

by a defendant’s criminal history,” and it is therefore proper to consider Huor’s 

1998 rape conviction. Salazar, 743 F.3d at 452. Under Salazar, however, that 

“singular and now-remote sexual offense” does not justify a ten-year sexually 

stimulating materials condition. See id. 

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Like Huor, the defendant in Salazar had been convicted of one sexrelated offense years prior—a conviction that subjected him to SORNA’s 

registration requirements. Id. at 447. And like Huor, the conviction leading 

to imposition of supervised release and the concomitant sexually stimulating 

materials condition was failure to register. Id. As here, “[n]othing in Salazar’s 

history suggest[ed] that sexually stimulating materials fueled his past crimes,” 

and there was no evidence that Salazar was “a repeat offender of sex crimes or 

that access to pornographic materials contributed to his original offense.” Id.

at 452. Indeed, Huor was only 16 at the time of his crime, and the only evidence 

regarding its catalyst is that he was himself the victim of a similar crime when 

he was 5 years old. Neither the past offense, nor the new conviction, nor the 

two of them considered in tandem, “justify the imposition of this restriction.” 

Id.; see also United States v. Windless, 719 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2013).1 

The district court explained the second reason for imposing a sexually 

stimulating materials condition: based on testimony heard in other cases, 

“exposure to sexually explicit materials for these kinds of individuals can in 

fact result in an acceleration of [the] process” toward recidivism. This rationale 

can be classified as deterrence, protection of the public, and therapeutic—the 

final three § 3553(a) factors. Nonetheless, on this record, imposition of the 

special condition fails to pass muster. 

“[S]pecial conditions must be tailored to the individual defendant and 

may not be based on boilerplate conditions imposed as a matter of course in a 

 

1 Windless was decided on the grounds that the challenged condition of supervised 

release involved a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary to achieve 

the statutory aims. 719 F.3d at 422. Salazar did not reach that question, instead finding the 

challenged condition not reasonably related to any of the four factors. See 743 F.3d at 451. 

While Huor has argued both points, our decision rests on the relationship between the 

condition and the statutory factors. Windless took a different analytical approach but is 

illuminating nonetheless. 

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particular district.” United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 

2015) (per curiam). Thus, district courts are required “to set forth factual 

findings to justify special probation conditions.” Salazar, 743 F.3d at 451 

(quoting United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Factual 

findings made in support of a sentencing determination must be supported by 

a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 372 

(5th Cir. 1993). This includes factual determinations justifying conditions of 

supervised release. See Windless, 719 F.3d at 420.

Early in the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it did not 

“know whether [Huor] would be classified as a pedophile or not.” Nonetheless, 

it went on to discuss how “[t]hey’re notoriously hard to treat and have a pretty 

high recidivism rate from all the testimony I’ve heard over the many years 

from psychiatrists and psychologists and those who treat sex offenders.” The 

district court returned to this topic when justifying the sexually stimulating 

materials condition: 

I’ve -- over the years, I’ve heard testimony from psychiatrists and 

psychologists, I can’t even begin to tell you how many times, about 

how these individuals who have these predilections, it’s very 

difficult to treat them. There’s a very high recidivism rate, and 

that exposure to sexually explicit materials for these kinds of 

individuals can in fact result in an acceleration of that process. 

The district court’s approach is not the “tailored,” individualized 

approach required by the law. See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 276. Rather, the 

district court based his sentencing decisions on evidence heard in other cases—

evidence with uncertain relevance to Huor. In short, the district court 

sentenced Huor as a pedophile after acknowledging uncertainty regarding 

whether Huor actually is a pedophile. This was error. The factual basis 

supporting the special condition was not supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Windless, 719 F.3d at 420. Indeed, the district court 

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acknowledged that many of the facts it considered most important in imposing 

the sexually stimulating materials condition—whether Huor would be 

classified as a pedophile, whether Huor was “regressing,” whether viewing 

pornography would contribute to his risk of recidivism—were unknown at the 

sentencing hearing. Conditions of supervised release must be “narrowly 

tailored” and supported by the record. United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 403 

(5th Cir. 2015). The sexually stimulating materials condition is neither and 

cannot stand. 

The government’s meager defense of the sexually stimulating materials 

condition only confirms our ruling. The government distinguishes Salazar 

primarily on the basis that Salazar “concluded that the district court erred by 

not explaining how the supervised release condition was reasonably related to 

the goals of supervised release,” whereas here “the district court identified and 

explained its reasons for imposing the special conditions and how they related 

to the goals of supervised release.” An explanation is necessary, but it is not 

sufficient. Thus, Salazar did more than vacate and remand for lack of an 

explanation; it also found that the record could not support imposition of the 

sexually stimulating materials condition. See 743 F.3d at 452–53. Here, the 

district court gave reasons, but they were inadequate under Salazar and other 

cases, and our review of the record yields “insufficient evidence of a reasonable 

relationship between the condition and the statutory factors.” Id. at 453.

The government also points out that, unlike Salazar, Huor previously 

violated the terms of his parole by viewing pornography. Thus, this case is 

closer than Salazar: it cannot be said of Huor (as it was of Salazar) that there 

is “no indication in the record [of] an unhealthy relationship with such 

materials” and no evidence that he “ever used pornography.” Id. at 452. 

Nonetheless, a defendant’s right to possess and view sexually stimulating 

materials is not defeated by evidence that the defendant has in fact viewed 

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sexually stimulating materials. While it is worrisome that Huor violated the 

terms of his parole to view such material, it remains “hard to imagine how 

preventing [Huor] from accessing sexually stimulating materials would 

prevent future criminal conduct.” See id. Conditions of supervised release 

must serve the purposes of § 3553(a) and may not merely represent stumbling 

blocks. 

The district court did not mention Huor’s past pornography-related 

parole violation as a basis for imposing the sexually stimulating materials 

condition, and this is not a case where “clear evidence in the record” allows us 

to conclude that the condition “was reasonably necessary.” See Caravayo, 809 

F.3d at 276. On remand, the district court is free to consider the past parole 

violation in view of the § 3553(a) factors when deciding whether to re-impose 

the special condition. 

The government’s remaining arguments in support of the sexually 

stimulating material condition are generic and lack merit. The government 

contends that “given Appellant’s designation as a ‘violent sex offender’ and the 

court’s desire to deter him from this conduct in the future, the condition 

prohibiting him from access to sexually stimulating material was not an abuse 

of discretion.” Similarly, it argues that “because Appellant had committed a 

crime that was sexual in nature it was reasonable for the district court to 

restrict Appellant’s access to sexually stimulating material in an effort to 

prevent future crimes or aid in his rehabilitation.” These blanket arguments 

were rejected in Salazar, see 743 F.3d at 450–51, and are inconsistent with the 

individualized approach the law requires, see Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 276.

The primary case upon which the government relies, United States v. 

McGee, 559 F.App’x 323 (5th Cir. 2014), is unpublished and distinguishable. 

In a footnote, McGee acknowledged that Salazar involved “a similar special 

condition imposed in a SORNA failure-to-register case” but nonetheless found 

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the condition warranted. Id. at 330 n.33. The difference, we explained, was 

that the defendant McGee had a “significant criminal history involving several 

sexual assaults and his pattern for quickly reoffending following release.” Id. 

Huor’s offense was grave and disturbing, but it is the “singular and now-remote 

sexual offense” of Salazar rather than the multiple offenses of McGee. Salazar

is far more similar to this case than is McGee. See also United States v. Prieto, 

801 F.3d 547, 552–53 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (discussing Salazar and 

McGee). Other cases cited by the government fare no better. The government 

points us to United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 

But Ellis involves a defendant who was tried and convicted for possession of 

child pornography. 720 F.3d 220 at 223. Unlike the defendant in Ellis and 

just like the defendant in Salazar, “[n]othing in [Huor’s] history suggests that 

sexually stimulating materials fueled his past crimes” and there is no evidence 

“that access to pornographic materials contributed to his original offense.”2 

Salazar, 743 F.3d at 452. Finally, the government cites United States v. 

Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149 (2009). That case involved the plain error standard 

of review and a defendant with a “lengthy history” of crime including multiple 

violent sex offenses. Id. at 151, 154. It does not aid the government. 

D. Delegation and Plain Error 

We return to Article III’s prohibition on the delegation of core judicial 

functions. According to Huor, the district court erred by imposing a special 

condition requiring the defendant to “follow all other lifestyle restrictions or 

treatment requirements imposed by the therapist, and continue those 

restrictions as they pertain to avoiding risk situations throughout the course 

of supervision.” Because he did not object to this condition at sentencing, our 

review is for plain error. 

 

2 In Prieto, as here, we distinguished both McGee and Ellis. See 801 F.3d at 552–53.

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 The challenged condition is identical to the condition found 

impermissible in Morin. Accordingly, there is error, and it is plain. See Morin, 

832 F.3d at 518; see also United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 423 

(5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[W]here the law is unsettled at the time of trial but 

settled by the time of appeal, the ‘plainness’ of the error should be judged by 

the law at the time of appeal.”). Further, under Prieto, we “easily conclude that 

the district court’s error affected [Huor’s] substantial rights” because “[h]ad 

the error not occurred, [Huor] would not have been subjected to the 

unwarranted special condition.” 801 F.3d at 553. Morin also establishes the 

requisite effect on Huor’s substantial rights. See 832 F.3d at 517 (explaining 

that the condition “extends to a therapist the authority to impose, without 

court review, independent conditions of supervised release that might extend 

beyond the period of supervised release and that could serve as the basis for 

violations of the terms of supervised release separate and apart from noncompliance with the treatment program”). 

The only remaining question is “whether the error affects ‘the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ such that the appellate 

court should exercise its discretion to correct the error.” Escalante-Reyes, 689 

F.3d at 425 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. at 1429). Here we 

confront a judgment that cedes the judiciary’s exclusive sentencing power to a 

therapist. Such an error necessarily “undermines the integrity of the judicial 

proceedings.” United States v. Renteria-Martinez, Case No. 16-50033, 2017 WL 

465299, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017).

Given the error’s stark impact on the fairness, integrity, and public 

reputation of judicial proceedings, we will exercise our discretion to correct it. 

In doing so, we are not alone. See United States v. Pitts, Case No. 15-50850, 

2016 WL 6832953 (5th Cir. Nov. 18, 2016) (per curiam) (correcting, on plain 

error review, an identical error involving the same special condition); see also 

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United States v. Alaniz, Case No. 16-40321, 2016 WL 7187378, at *2 (5th Cir. 

Dec. 9, 2016) (per curiam) (“Because such an error involves ‘core judicial 

functions,’ see Franklin, 838 F.3d at 568, we find the exercise of this court’s 

discretion to correct the error is warranted under these circumstances.”). 

E. Conflicts Between the Oral Pronouncement 

at Sentencing and the Written Judgment 

The written judgment includes a special condition prohibiting Huor from 

“residing or going to places” frequented by minors without permission from his 

probation officer. This condition was not announced at sentencing. 

Defendants have a constitutional right to be present at their sentencing, and 

the government concedes that the judgment must be reformed to conform to 

the oral sentence. United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001)

(per curiam) (“[W]hen there is a conflict between a written sentence and an 

oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls.”). 

The same body of law governs Huor’s next argument, that Standard 

Condition 14 conflicts with the oral sentencing. As a general rule, standard 

conditions need not be orally pronounced. See United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 

352 F.3d 934, 936 (5th Cir. 2003). This rule, however, does not resolve the 

issue. Huor’s argument is not premised on the notion that the standard 

condition was unannounced and therefore necessarily conflictual with all that 

was pronounced. See, e.g., Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942 (“The district court’s 

failure to mention mandatory drug treatment in its oral pronouncement 

constitutes a conflict, not an ambiguity.”). Huor’s argument is that Standard 

Condition 14 conflicts with the sex offender treatment as pronounced (and 

“amend[ed]”) at sentencing. In Huor’s view, this is not a case where “[t]he 

written judgment simply clarifie[s] the meaning of that sentence by specifying 

what the supervision [is meant] to entail.’” Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 938 

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363, 365 

 Case: 15-50174 Document: 00513906326 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/10/2017
No. 15-50174

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(5th Cir. 2002)). Rather, this is a case where the written judgment muddles 

the picture. We agree with Huor. The special conditions are nearly redundant 

but not quite identical, and only the orally pronounced condition should be part 

of the written judgment. 

The Government argues that if the conditions are read together, there is 

no conflict because the sex offender treatment required by Standard Condition 

14 is necessarily contingent on the initial evaluation qualification included in 

the special treatment condition. This argument would prevail if we perceived 

ambiguity rather than conflict. See United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 

381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“If . . . the difference between the [the oral pronouncement 

and the written judgment] is only an ambiguity, we look to the sentencing 

court's intent to determine the sentence.”). Here, however, the asserted 

ambiguity is created by nothing more than a simple conflict: one condition 

imposes sex offender therapy subject to the initial evaluation qualification; one 

condition flatly imposes sex offender therapy. Only the first of these two 

conditions was pronounced at oral sentencing, and only it may remain. The 

judgment must be reformed to conform to the oral pronouncement, and 

Standard Condition 14 must be excised. See Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942.

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND for resentencing. The treatment 

condition stands, but all other challenged conditions are VACATED. The 

district court may reconsider imposing the sexually stimulating materials 

condition in light of this opinion. 

 Case: 15-50174 Document: 00513906326 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/10/2017