alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 88 (Friday, May 8, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 21623]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10805]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1612]


Grant of Authority for Subzone Status; STIHL Incorporated 
(Outdoor Power Products Manufacturing); Virginia Beach, VA

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of June 
18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade Zones Board 
(the Board) adopts the following Order:
    Whereas, the Foreign-Trade Zones Act provides for ``* * * the 
establishment * * * of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the 
United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for 
other purposes,'' and authorizes the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to grant 
qualified corporations the privilege of establishing foreign-trade 
zones in or adjacent to U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of 
entry;
    Whereas, the Board's regulations (15 CFR Part 400) provide for the 
establishment of special-purpose subzones when existing zone facilities 
cannot serve the specific use involved, and when the activity results 
in a significant public benefit and is in the public interest;
    Whereas, the Virginia Port Authority, grantee of Foreign-Trade Zone 
20, has made application to the Board for authority to establish a 
special-purpose subzone at the outdoor power products manufacturing and 
distribution facilities of STIHL Incorporated, located in Virginia 
Beach, Virginia (FTZ Docket 56-2008, filed 10/3/08);
    Whereas, notice inviting public comment was given in the Federal 
Register (73 FR 60677-60678, 10/14/08); and,
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds the requirements of the FTZ Act and the 
Board's regulations are satisfied, and that approval of the application 
is in the public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby grants authority for subzone 
status for activity related to outdoor power product manufacturing at 
the facilities of STIHL Incorporated, located in Virginia Beach, 
Virginia (Subzone 20E), as described in the application and Federal 
Register notice, and subject to the FTZ Act and the Board's 
regulations, including Section 400.28.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 24th day of April 2009.
Ronald K. Lorentzen,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, 
Alternate Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
    Attest:
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-10805 Filed 5-7-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
 TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 Gil Boosidan, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) of Suspect Detection Systems Inc. (the “Company”), certifies, under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in that Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and  results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date: January 13, 2011
 /s/ Gil Boosidan
 Name:  Gil Boosidan
 Title:    Chief Executive Officer
 (Principal Executive Officer)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Department of the Navy

# AGENCY:

Department of the Navy, DoD.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Department of the Navy hereby gives notice of its intent to grant to First Line Technology, L.L.C. located at 3656 Centerview Drive, Suite 4, Chantilly, Virginia 20151, a revocable, nonassignable, exclusive license throughout the United States (U.S.), the Government-owned inventions described in U.S. Patent No. 7,064,241: Chemical and Biological Decontaminating Solution Using Peracids and Germinants in Microemulsions, Process and Product Thereof issued June 20, 2006, Navy Case No. 84,658//U.S. Patent No. 7,185,594: Aqueous Based Chemical and Biological Warfare Decontaminating System for Extreme Temperature Applications issued May 18, 2010, Navy Case No. 97,750//U.S. Patent No. 7,829,520: Aqueous Based Chemical and Biological Warfare Decontaminating System for Extreme Temperature Applications” issued November 9, 2010, Navy Case No. 100,367.

# DATES:

Anyone wishing to object to the grant of this license must file written objections along with supporting evidence, if any, not later than January 31, 2015.

# ADDRESSES:

Written objections are to be filed with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), Attention Lorraine Harting, Code 00T1, 17632 Dahlgren Road, Suite 201, Dahlgren, VA 22448-5154.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Lorraine Harting, 540-653-2680,                         *lorraine.harting@navy.mil,*                         NSWCDD, 17632 Dahlgren Road, Suite 201, Dahlgren, VA 22448-5154.                    

Authority:35 U.S.C. 207, 37 CFR part 404.

Dated: January 12, 2015.

N. A. Hagerty-Ford,

Commander, Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 2015-00684 Filed 1-16-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3810-FF-P
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 13, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-41542

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JUAN CARLOS POSADAS-MENDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-02-CR-211-ALL

--------------------

Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Carlos Posadas-Mendez appeals his sentence for his

guilty-plea conviction of being found in the United States

without permission after having been deported. He argues that

his prior state conviction for misdemeanor assault for which he

was sentenced to one year of imprisonment was not an aggravated

felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) of the 2001 Sentencing

Guidelines and that the increase of his offense level by eight

was thus error. 
No. 02-41542

-2-

Posadas-Mendez acknowledges that a state conviction for

a crime deemed a misdemeanor under state law could still fall

within the definition of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) as a crime of

violence punishable by at least one year of imprisonment and thus

be considered an aggravated felony under the pre-2001 version of

§ 2L1.2. See United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167-

68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2377 (2002). He contends

that, because the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines added a definition

for misdemeanor in the notes to § 2L1.2, that section is now

ambiguous as to whether his prior conviction was a misdemeanor or

an aggravated felony and that the rule of lenity should apply.

The comments to § 2L1.2 in the 2001 Guidelines state

that, for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), the definition of

aggravated felony in § 1101(a)(43) applies. See § 2L1.2,

comment.(n.2). There was thus no change in the Sentencing

Guidelines as to what constitutes an aggravated felony under §

2L1.2. Posadas-Mendez’s state conviction for assault for which

he was sentenced to one year of imprisonment is an aggravated

felony under the current version of § 2L1.2. See Urias-Escobar,

281 F.3d at 167-68.

AFFIRMED.
#### Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc.

Case below: 177 N.C. App. 290

No. 299P06

Def's (Forsyth Memorial Hosp.) Motion for Temporary Stay (COA04-1415)

Allowed 10/30/06
March 6, 1952

Hon. Sam #. Davis OpinionNo. V-1415 Mstrict Attorney Houston 2, Texas Re: Authority of the commissioners’ court to expend county funds to pay expenses for members of the county juveniledepartment to attend a national conference of juvenileagenDear Sir: ties.

You have reauested an ovinlon of this office with regard to the authority- for the expenzes of members of the county partment
. . .while attending State meetings of Institutes or Conventions, direct bearing on juvenileproblems. payment of juveniledeor National which have a

It was held in Attorney General’s Opinion 0-810 (1939) thatArticle 3899,V.C.S., providing for payment of “all reasonable expensesnecessary in the proper and legal conduct” of various district and county officesdid not include expenses incurredby the various officers in attending their respective officers’ conventions. In this opinion it was said:

?ie are unable to find any statutory authority authorizing the commissioners’ court to pay the expenses of the above named officers to their respective officers’ conventions, and though reasonable in amount, under the statutes referred to, such expenses would not under the authorities cited be ‘necessaryin the proper and legal conduct of their respective offices.’ This opinionhas been repeatedly followed in subsequent opinionswhich hold that a county cannot, in the absence of statutoryauthority,pay the expenses incurred by an officerwhile attending a ~~~~e,;"'~;27"5t~~4~~n'OO-~~gti O-2117 (1940),O-4483 o-6920’(1946),and v-?% (1948 1943), O-6599 (194'j),Hon. Sam W. Davis, page 2 (V-1415)

In Attorney General's Opinion O-5275 (1943), a question almost Identical to that presented in your inquirywas asked by the county auditor of Tarrant county. It was thereheld that the commissioners' court ofTarrant County was not authorized to expend county funds for the purpose of paying expenses of the members of the Tarrant County juveniledepartment in attendingnational conventions of juvenile agencies. This holdingwas based upon a lack of statutory authority for such an expenditure.

The statute involved in Opinion O-5275was Article 5142b,V.C.S. The statutehere involved is Article 5142a,V.C.S., but we are unable to find any difference in statutory languagewhich would permit the payment of such expenses to members of the probation department of Harris County. It is therefore our opinion that Opinion O-5275 is applicable to your question.
In view of the foregoing,we agree with your conclusion that the commissioners' courthas no authority to defray the expenses ofmembers of the probation department of Harris County in attending national conventions of juvenileagencies.
SUMMARY The Legislaturehas not granted the commissioners'court ofHarris County the authority to defray expenses of the probation department of Harris County in attending national conventions of juvenileagencies.
Yours very truly,
APPROVZD:
J. C. Davis, Jr. CountyAffairs Mvlsion PRICE DARIIEL Attorney General

E. Jacobson ReviewingAssistant Charles D. Mathews First Assistant By&eeF Assistant

JR:mh
From: The District Court of the 11th Judicial District. County of Flathead.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, *6vs. ABEL GONZALES, Defendant,

*5CAUSE NO. DC-98-082A *6DECISION

On November 6,1998, the defendant was sentenced to the following: Count. T: Forty (40) years in the Montana State Prison for the offense of Robbery, a felony; Count II: Forty (40) years in the Montana State Prison for the offense of Robbery, a felony; Count III: Forty (40) years in the Montana State Prison; Count IV: Forty (40) years in the Montana State Prison, for the offense of Robbery, a felony; and Count V: Forty (40) years in the Montana State Prison, with all time suspended, for the offense of Aggravated Burglary, a felony. The sentences imposed in Counts II and III are to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the sentence in Count I. The Sentences imposed for Counts IV and V are to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentences imposed for Counts I, II and III.

On February 12,2009, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Eric Olson. The state was represented by Tara Fugina.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 12th day of February, 2009.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2009.

Chairperson, Hon. Stewart Stadler, Member, Hon. Blair Jones and Member, Richard Simonton.
Exhibit 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AFP Imaging Corporation
(the "Company") for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003 (the "Report"), I,
David Vozick, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
          15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of
          the Company.




                   /s/ David Vozick
           --------------------------------
                      David Vozick
                Chairman of the Board
           (Co-Principal Executive Officer)
                       May 14, 2003


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to AFP Imaging Corporation and will be retained by AFP Imaging
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.

                                       18
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-03-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-01-2000
<CASH>                                      26,242,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,580,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   500,000
<INVENTORY>                                 16,640,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            55,249,000
<PP&E>                                      48,611,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              39,460,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              66,185,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       46,583,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                   131,064,000
<OTHER-SE>                               (117,086,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                66,185,000
<SALES>                                     93,326,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            93,326,000
<CGS>                                       54,565,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               54,565,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            11,993,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             722,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              7,840,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   370,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          7,470,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 7,470,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                     0.35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.32


</TABLE>
# ORIGINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA PR 24-0005

IN RE MOTION OF ASHLEY C. MELWANI FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

# F:Lar- 7- 3 JUN 1 1 2024 Bowen Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana ORDER

Ashley C. Melwani has moved for admission to the Bar of the State of Montana pursuant to RuleVofthe Rules for Admission,Admission onMotion. TheBarAdmissions Administrator ofthe State Bar ofMontana has informed the Court that the Commission on Character and Fitness has certified that Melwani hasprovidedthe necessary documentation and has satisfied the requirements prerequisite to admission on motion under Rule V. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon payment of any application fees and completion of any other processing requirements as set forth by the Bar Admissions Administrator, Ashley C. Melwani may be sworn in to the practice of law in the State of Montana. Arrangements for swearing in may be madeby contactingthe office ofthe Clerk ofthe Montana Supreme Court. The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to Petitioner and to the State Bar ofMontana. L

t "..., DATED this day ofJune, 2024.
ChiefJustice 06/11/2024

Case Number: PR 24-0005
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THEODORE PITTMAN, JR.

No. 694P05

ORDER

The Attorney General’s petition for discretionary review is allowed, pursuant to our general supervisory authority under Article IV, Section 12 of the Constitution of North Carolina, for the limited purpose of (1) vacating that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion ordering remand to the trial court for resentencing and (2) remanding to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of *State v. Timothy Earl Blackwell,*361 N.C. 41, - S.E.2d- (2006). The Court of Appeals opinion remains undisturbed in all other respects.

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 19th day of December, 2006.

s/Timmons-Goodson. J. For the Court
#### Charles M. CASSELL, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Doctor JAGUST; Doctor Michalas, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-6796.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 4, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 18, 2006.

*442Charles M. Cassell, III, Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Charles Cassell, III, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion for “a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction” in his civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The portion of the order denying a temporary restraining order is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss that aspect of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the district court’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000). With respect to the district court’s denial of Cassell’s motion for a preliminary injunction,* we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court. *Cassell v. Jagust,*No. 5:06-cM)3025-BO (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2006). We also deny all of Cassell’s pending motions for general relief in this court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.*

*

 The district court’s written order denied only Cassell's motion for a temporary restraining order. However, the district court’s docket sheet indicates the court denied both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Cassell appealed from both denials.