Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A04-1612-CC-2956 | May 23, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kevin G. Kerr 

Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP 

Valparaiso, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Clay M. Patton 

Osan & Patton, LLP 

Valparaiso, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA 

Lori A. Devereaux, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

Homeowners’ Association of 

Hunters Ridge Estates, Inc., 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

May 23, 2017 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

64A04-1612-CC-2956 

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Roger V. Bradford, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

64D01-1409-CC-8463 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
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Case Summary 

[1] Lori Devereaux owned two lots in a subdivision that were subject to restrictive 

covenants. After several years, she stopped mowing the grass and paying the 

annual dues, and the homeowners association paid to have her grass mowed. 

The homeowners association later sued her. When the homeowners 

association sought to introduce evidence of the mowing fees at trial, Devereaux 

objected on grounds that the homeowners association did not plead a claim for 

mowing fees in the complaint. The trial court overruled her objection and 

admitted the evidence. It later entered judgment in favor of the homeowners 

association for both unpaid annual dues and mowing fees. Devereaux now 

appeals. Because the complaint did not put Devereaux on notice that the 

homeowners association was seeking mowing fees and Devereaux objected to 

evidence of the mowing fees at trial, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s 

judgment awarding mowing fees to the homeowners association. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] Hunters Ridge Estates is a subdivision in Westville. Devereaux, a homebuilder, 

purchased two lots in the subdivision—Lots 61 and 62—in 1999. The lots were 

subject to restrictive covenants. Section IX, which governs landscaping, 

provides that lawns are to be reasonably maintained and that grass is to be 

mowed no higher than three inches. It also provides that “[w]ithin 5 days 

notice to a lot owner of a vacant lot not being maintained the . . . 

[Homeowners] Association shall employ a firm to mow &/or clear the lot and 
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the lot owner shall be responsible for the cost of same,” including collection 

fees. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 72. In addition, Section XXV, which governs 

the Homeowners Association, provides that the Association “shall impose and 

collect annual assessments for the maintenance and improvements of park areas 

and/or other ‘common areas’ and for the provision of any security services . . . 

.” Id. at 73. Initially, the annual assessment was set at $125 per lot; however, 

the restrictive covenants have been amended several times to increase this 

amount. Failure to pay the annual assessment is considered a violation of the 

restrictive covenants, subject to interest and attorney’s fees. 

[3] Devereaux paid the annual assessments and maintained the lots until 2008. In 

March 2012, the Association sent Devereaux a letter asking her to mow the 

grass on Lots 61 and 62 on or before Friday, April 13, 2012, in accordance with 

Section IX of the restrictive covenants. According to the letter, if Devereaux 

did not mow the grass, then the Association would have the grass mowed at her 

expense at a cost of “$100.00 for each individual mowing.” Id. at 92. 

[4] In October 2014, the Homeowners Association filed suit against Devereaux. 

The complaint contains the following allegations: 

4. The primary purpose of the Association is to insure high 

standards of maintenance and operation of all property and real 

estate in the Subdivision and to maintain and promote the 

desired character of the Subdivision. 

* * * * * 
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8. Under its[] Restrictive Covenants, the Association has the 

power to impose and collect annual assessments on each lot 

within the Subdivision. . . . 

9. Devereaux has not paid any assessments on Lot 61 or Lot 62 

from 2008 thru 2014. 

10. As of September 1, 2014, the total balance owed and past due 

to the Association from Devereaux for the unpaid assessments on 

Lot 61 and Lot 62 is [$15,581.90], not including interest, 

attorney’s fees and other costs of collection. 

Id. at 14-15. 

[5] A pretrial conference was held on August 11, 2016.1 At this conference, the 

parties filed their witness lists, exhibit lists, and contentions. The Association’s 

contentions included the following: 

9. Under its[] Restrictive Covenants, the Association has the 

power to impose and collect annual assessments, late fees, 

mowing fees and interest on each lot within the Subdivision. 

* * * * * 

11. Devereaux has not paid any assessments, late fees, mowing 

fees or interest on Lot 61 or Lot 62 from 2008 through the 

present. 

 

1

 At this time, Devereaux was no longer the owner of the lots, as they were sold at a tax sale in 2015. 
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12. Anticipating no payments prior to the Bench Trial, as of 

September 1, 2016, the total balance owed and past due to the 

Association from Devereaux on Lot 61 and Lot 62 for unpaid 

assessments, late fees, mowing fees and interest will be 

[$20,825.62], not including attorney’s fees and other costs of 

collection. 

Id. at 39-40 (emphases added). The Association’s exhibits included two 

documents titled “Outstanding Dues & Assessments,” one for each lot. These 

documents listed the unpaid annual assessments/late fees and mowing 

fees/interest from 2008 to 2016. 

[6] The next month, a bench trial was held. When the Association moved to admit 

the “Outstanding Dues & Assessments”—Exhibits 10 and 11—defense counsel 

objected as follows: 

Your Honor, we object to the issues of the mowing costs and 

expenses. The complaint in this matter alleges unpaid 

assessments and dues in paragraph 8 arising out of Article 25 of 

the covenants. Mowing fees . . . arise out of Article 9, and there 

was no claim for any mowing fees that were owed in the 

complaint. And as this matter has not been properly pled, we 

would object to consideration of any evidence for mowing fees. 

Tr. p. 14. The trial court admitted Exhibits 10 and 11 over objection. During 

closing argument, defense counsel briefly reiterated his argument that “there 

was no claim in the complaint arising from mowing fees.” Id. at 45. The court 

took the case under advisement and later issued a written order entering 

judgment in favor of the Association for $17,882.56—$10,605.80 of which was 
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for mowing fees/interest from 2012 to 2015—plus $6,434.00 in attorney’s fees, 

for a total judgment of $24,316.56. 

[7] Devereaux now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[8] Devereaux raises two issues concerning mowing fees, one of which we find 

dispositive. That is, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting evidence of the mowing fees because the Association did not plead a 

claim for mowing fees in its complaint. As a notice-pleading state, Indiana 

requires that pleadings contain (1) “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and (2) “a demand for relief.” Ind. 

Trial Rule 8(A). In practice, this liberal standard merely requires that a 

“complaint . . . put the defendant on notice concerning why it is potentially 

liable and what it stands to lose.” KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 2017 WL 1435907, at 

*5 (Ind. Apr. 24, 2017) (quotation omitted). Although the complaint does not 

need to state all elements of a cause of action, it must set forth the operative 

facts necessary to set forth an actionable claim. State v. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 

898 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied. 

[9] The Association does not dispute Devereaux’s claim that it did not expressly set 

forth a claim for mowing fees in its complaint. Indeed, the complaint alleges 

that the Association has the power to impose and collect “annual assessments” 

and that Devereaux has not “paid any assessments on Lot 61 or Lot 62 from 
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2008 thru 2014.” There is no mention of mowing fees or Section IX, which 

allows the Association to recover mowing fees, in the complaint. 

[10] Nevertheless, the Association claims that it put Devereaux on notice that it was 

seeking mowing fees for the following three reasons: (1) it attached the 

restrictive covenants to the complaint, and Section IX allows the Association to 

recover mowing fees; (2) the amount of damages requested in the complaint—

nearly $16,000—should have tipped off Devereaux that it was seeking more 

than just unpaid annual assessments; and (3) its contentions and exhibits, filed 

about a month before trial, list mowing fees. We reject each of these reasons. 

[11] First, the Association argues that attaching the restrictive covenants to the 

complaint put Devereaux on notice that it was seeking mowing fees. Notably, 

the covenants and their amendments are sixteen pages long, and Section IX is a 

mere paragraph long. Devereaux was not required to sift through all the 

covenants to hypothesize every possible claim she might be liable for. 

[12] Second, the Association argues that Devereaux, “a builder and former 

attorney,” should have known that its request for nearly $16,000 (not including 

interest and attorney’s fees) included “fees for more than the annual dues.” 

Appellee’s Br. pp. 12-13. But this argument highlights the flaw in the 

Association’s complaint. Just because $16,000 might be larger than the unpaid 

dues does not mean that mowing fees are necessarily included, as opposed to 

something else. As Devereaux points out, “The fact that a complaint seeks 
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excessive damages does not mean that there are numerous unpled claims which 

the defendant must figure out.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8. 

[13] Last, the Association argues that its contentions and exhibits, filed about a 

month before trial, allege that Devereaux owes mowing fees. But these 

documents cannot, after the fact, correct any deficiencies in the complaint. If 

the Association wanted to add a claim for mowing fees, then it should have 

sought to amend the complaint. See Ind. Trial Rule 15(A). But it did not do 

this. Instead, when the Association sought to introduce evidence of the 

mowing fees at trial, Devereaux properly objected on grounds that the mowing 

fees were not pled in the complaint. See Mercantile Nat’l Bank of Ind. v. First 

Builders of Ind., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ind. 2002) (“There are generally two 

factors to be considered when addressing whether a party has impliedly 

consented to a non-pleaded issue at trial. The first is whether the opposing 

party had notice of the issue; the second, whether the opposing party objected 

to the issue being litigated at trial.”), reh’g denied; see also T.R. 15(B). Although 

the trial court overruled Devereaux’s objection, no attempt was made at this 

point to amend the complaint. Because the Association did not plead a claim 

for mowing fees in its complaint and Devereaux objected to evidence of the 

mowing fees at trial, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment 
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awarding mowing fees/interest to the Association ($10,605.80) and remand for 

entry of a revised judgment.2

 

[14] Reversed in part and remanded. 

Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur. 

 

2

 Devereaux argues that the award of attorney’s fee should be reduced to reflect only work that was done on 

the claim for unpaid annual assessments. The trial court should address this issue on remand.