No. 01-460 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2002 MT 108 

CITY OF GREAT FALLS, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, LORI 

EKANGER, and MONTANA STATE HOSPITAL 

WARM SPRINGS, RANDY VETTER, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Cascade, 

Honorable Julie Macek, Judge Presiding 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Tony Lucas (argued), Assistant City Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Michelle J. Maltese (argued), Special Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

 Heard: January 10, 2002 

Submitted: January 15, 2002 

 Decided: May 23, 2002 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
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Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 The City of Great Falls (Great Falls) appeals from the Eighth 

Judicial District Court’s denial of its motion for declaratory 

judgment. We reverse. 

¶2 The following issue is raised on appeal: 

¶3 May a municipal court commit a criminal defendant if it 

determines that the defendant suffers from a mental disease or 

defect and lacks the fitness to proceed to trial? 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶4 Following a disturbance in a bar on September 21, 1999, D.A. 

was charged with violation of § 45-8-101, MCA, disorderly conduct, 

and § 45-5-201, MCA, misdemeanor assault against a police officer. 

 Upon the State’s motion, the Great Falls Municipal Court 

(Municipal Court) ordered D.A. to attend a mental health evaluation 

conducted by Dr. Mark H. Johnson. D.A. attended the evaluation, 

and Dr. Johnson issued a report concluding that D.A. suffered from 

a serious mental illness which would substantially interfere with 

his capacity to proceed to trial. Dr. Johnson recommended 

psychiatric evaluation and treatment for D.A.’s illness, and he 

stated that with successful treatment there was a reasonable chance 

that D.A. could be restored to competence. 

¶5 The Municipal Court held a hearing regarding D.A.’s fitness to 

proceed. Based on Dr. Johnson’s evaluation and the hearing 

testimony, the Municipal Court found D.A. incompetent to stand 

trial. On August 3, 2000, it ordered D.A. committed to the custody 

Comment [COMMENT1]: Report 

p. 6 
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of the Director of the Department of Public Health and Human 

Services (DPHHS) to be placed in an appropriate institution. 

¶6 The Directors of DPHHS and Montana State Hospital Warm Springs 

refused to comply with the Municipal Court’s order. Great Falls 

filed a Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus in District 

Court seeking enforcement of the Municipal Court’s August 3, 2000, 

commitment order. 

¶7 In the meantime, D.A. remained at large in Great Falls and was 

charged in District Court with a subsequent felony offense. The 

District Court found D.A. unfit to proceed to trial on this 

offense and ordered D.A.’s commitment to the custody of the 

Director of DPHHS to be placed in an appropriate institution for as 

long as his unfitness endured. As a result of D.A.’s commitment, 

the District Court in the mandamus action determined that Great 

Falls’ request for relief had been granted, and it vacated further 

mandamus proceedings. 

¶8 Great Falls then filed a motion for declaratory judgment in 

District Court. It requested a determination that a municipal 

court judge has the authority under Montana law to place a 

defendant charged with a criminal offense in municipal court in an 

appropriate institution of DPHHS in order to cure a defendant’s 

unfitness to stand trial. In response, DPHHS filed a cross motion 

for declaratory judgment maintaining that a municipal court judge 

lacks the authority to commit unfit defendants to DPHHS. In an 

order dated April 19, 2001, the District Court agreed that 
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municipal courts lack such authority under Montana law. Great 

Falls appeals. 
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 DISCUSSION 

¶9 May a municipal court commit a criminal defendant if it 

determines that the defendant suffers from a mental disease or 

defect and lacks the fitness to proceed to trial? 

¶10 Our standard of review pertaining to a district court’s 

conclusions of law, in rendering a declaratory judgment, is to 

determine if the court’s interpretation of the law is correct. 

Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 

2000 MT 153, ¶ 12, 300 Mont. 123, ¶12, 2 P.3d 834, ¶ 12. 

¶11 The District Court and the parties agree that the Due Process 

Clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions prohibit 

convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is incapacitated 

due to a mental disease or defect. They also agree that 

prosecutors and the courts have an ethical and legal obligation to 

ensure the protection of a criminal defendant’s constitutional 

rights. Yet, the District Court and the parties disagree as to 

whether municipal courts have the authority to commit a criminal 

defendant suffering from a mental disease or defect to DPHHS. 

¶12 The District Court’s April 19, 2001, order and the parties’ 

appellate arguments pit two statutes against one another. Great 

Falls relies upon § 3-6-104, MCA, in support of its position that a 

municipal court has the same authority as a district court to 

commit a criminal defendant who is unfit to proceed to trial. 

Section 3-6-104(1), MCA, states that, except as otherwise provided, 

“the municipal court shall have in matters within its jurisdiction 

all the powers and duties of district judges in like cases.” 
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¶13 The District Court and DPHHS, however, focus on § 46-14-

202(1), MCA, regarding the examination of a criminal defendant when 

mental disease or defect is an issue. This statute provides that 

“[i]f the defendant or the defendant’s counsel files a written 

motion requesting an examination or if the issue of the defendant’s 

fitness to proceed is raised by the district court, prosecution, or 

defense counsel, the district court shall appoint at least one 

qualified psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist . . .” 

Section 46-14-202(1), MCA (emphasis added). 

¶14 As a result, the District Court held, and DPHHS now argues, 

that only district courts can commit a criminal defendant who is 

unfit to proceed to trial since the term “district court” is 

specifically used in § 46-14-202(1), MCA. The District Court 

reasoned that “because the municipal court judge does not have 

jurisdiction over competency matters, the municipal court judge 

does not have the same powers and duties as a district court judge 

when commitment of a criminal defendant appears warranted.” 

¶15 The District Court then presented two options to the municipal 

court in dealing with cases involving mental incapacity: a 

municipal court prosecutor may (1) bind the fitness issues over to 

the district court for a competency determination; or (2) suspend 

the criminal proceedings, refer the case to the county attorney’s 

office for civil commitment, and recommence prosecution when a 

defendant has been determined competent to proceed. On appeal, 

DPHHS and Great Falls disagree as to whether these are viable 

options. 
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¶16 In interpreting a statute, we first look to the plain meaning 

of the words it contains. Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 2002 MT 8, 

¶ 20, 308 Mont. 111, ¶ 20, 39 P.3d 697, ¶ 20 (citation omitted). 

Moreover, this Court is required to simply ascertain and declare 

what is in terms or in substance found in the statute, neither 

inserting what has been omitted nor omitting what has been 

inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. Bearing this in mind, we conclude 

that the District Court incorrectly interpreted § 3-6-104(1), MCA, 

in this case. 

¶17 A plain reading of § 3-6-104(1), MCA, provides that municipal 

courts shall have in matters within its jurisdiction all the powers 

and duties of district judges in like cases. Municipal courts have 

jurisdiction over select criminal cases. Section 3-6-103, MCA 

(municipal court jurisdiction generally); § 3-10-303, MCA 

(coordinate jurisdiction with justices’ courts over misdemeanors 

punishable by a fine less than $500 or imprisonment for less than 

six months); § 3-11-103, MCA (exclusive jurisdiction over 

violations of city ordinances). These criminal cases are, 

unquestionably, matters within the jurisdiction of municipal 

courts. Accordingly, under § 3-6-104(1), MCA, municipal courts are 

vested with all the powers and duties of district judges in these 

cases–including the power and the duty to commit mentally 

incapacitated criminal defendants to DPHHS pursuant to the 

procedures and requirements set forth in Title 46, MCA. This 

stands to reason since a municipal court judge, like a district 

court judge, must be an attorney. Section 3-6-202, MCA. In 
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addition, municipal courts are courts of record, and if there is a 

question as to the municipal court’s commitment of a criminal 

defendant, the issue may be appealed to the District Court under § 

3-5-303, MCA. 

¶18 Moreover, the District Court’s options for municipal courts in 

mental disease and defect cases are not wholly viable. As set 

forth above, municipal courts have exclusive and coordinate 

jurisdiction over select misdemeanor criminal cases. District 

courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in these cases. Section 3-

5-302(1)(d), MCA. As such, it is both unnecessary pursuant to § 3-

6-104(1), MCA, as well as imprudent, to send a competency 

determination to a district court lacking subject matter 

jurisdiction over the underlying charge. 

¶19 Furthermore, involuntary civil commitment in the district 

court may not be a viable solution if a criminal defendant, while 

meeting the standard of criminal commitment articulated in § 46-14-

103, MCA (whether the defendant, as a result of mental disease or 

defect, is unable to understand the proceedings against him or 

assist in his defense), does not at the same time meet the more 

stringent standard for involuntary civil commitment under § 53-21-

126(4), MCA (whether an individual, because of a mental disorder 

and through an act or omission, caused self-injury or injury to 

others or an imminent threat of injury). 

¶20 We therefore hold that a municipal court may commit a criminal 

defendant if it determines, in accordance with Montana law, that 

the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect and lacks the 
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fitness to proceed to trial. To conclude otherwise would 

contravene the plain language of § 3-6-104(1), MCA. 

¶21 We reverse. 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 
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We concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ JIM RICE