Opinion issued May 9, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-00652-CR

———————————

JOWEL SINGLETON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 23rd District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 66948

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant, Jowel Singleton, guilty of the offense of aggravated 

robbery1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for eleven years and a $200 

 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon 2011).
2

fine. In one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support his conviction. 

We affirm.

Background

 Farooq Ahmed testified that he worked as a cashier at the Fastop 

convenience store in Clute, Texas for four years and was working the night of 

November 30, 2011 when he was robbed. He explained that two men wearing ski 

masks came into the store with handguns around 10:00 to 10:30 p.m. and said 

“give me money.” Ahmed used a trash can as cover, hoping that he would not be 

shot. He noted that one gun had a “white” or “silver” color and the other had a 

“reddish” color. One of the men hit the perfume case and knocked it over when he 

opened the cash register and took all the money and some lottery scratch-off tickets 

that were found outside. Ahmed told responding police officers that the men were 

about 5’5” to 5’8” tall and of “skinny weight.” Although he could not tell the 

men’s race, he knew that they were men from the sound of their voices. 

Clute Police Department (“CPD”) Officer S. O’Sullivan testified that on 

November 30, 2011, he was dispatched to the Fastop convenience store. A Fastop 

employee named Byron Dunlap told O’Sullivan at the scene that he was going to 

get a cellular telephone in the back when he heard a screaming noise. He returned

to the front of the store and saw two men wearing ski masks and gloves, one 
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wearing a white t-shirt and the other wearing a black t-shirt and with a handgun

and the other with a “red gun.” O’Sullivan saw items thrown on the counter, an

open cash register that was empty, and, between the doorway and the cash register, 

a knife, which he later determined belonged to the store. O’Sullivan transported 

Dunlap and Ahmed to a police station and took their statements. O’Sullivan 

explained that police detectives eventually determined that appellant and another 

man, Timothy Robinson, were suspects and arrested them on December 8, 2011.

CPD Detective Scotty Harris testified that he was dispatched to the Fastop 

convenience store on November 30, 2011, and, once there, he took photographs of 

the crime scene. Also, he was eventually able to obtain a video tape from the 

store’s security cameras. Harris explained that he arrested a man named Louis 

Norris on December 3, 2011, after seeing him break into a car at the Sherwood 

Forest Apartment complex. Harris later took from Norris a statement in which he 

provided information about the Fastop convenience store robbery. Harris 

explained that he believed Norris because he had information that had not been 

released to the public, and Norris was not promised anything in return for the 

information. Norris identified appellant in a photographic lineup as a party to the 

robbery. Harris explained that he did not obtain a search warrant for appellant’s 

residence to look for the guns used in the robbery because appellant did not have a 

permanent residence. Harris noted that it was possible that Norris was involved in 
4

the robbery since he had information that the public did not have, and he and the 

man that Norris identified as working with him burglarizing vehicles fit the general 

description given by the witnesses. He also acknowledged that Norris had asked to 

speak to him, and it was possible that his motive for doing so was to try to “get a 

deal.” And he noted that because the punishment for aggravated robbery is

confinement for five to ninety-nine years, Norris would not want to be caught and 

this could constitute a motive to lie and say that someone else committed the 

robbery. However, Norris was never a suspect in the Fastop convenience store 

robbery. 

Norris testified that he was not offered anything in exchange for his 

testimony against appellant and he still had an open case against him for burglary 

of a motor vehicle. Norris explained that at about 7:30 p.m. on March 30, 2011, a 

few days before he was arrested, he was at his mother’s apartment at Brighton 

Manor when appellant and Robinson came by. The men smoked synthetic 

marijuana together, and appellant and Robinson asked Norris to rob the Fastop 

convenience store with them later that night. They showed Norris an “orange flare 

gun” and a “silver .25” handgun that they planned to use. Norris initially agreed to 

participate, and appellant and Robinson said that they would come back for him. 

Later that night, after 10:00 p.m., he heard a knock on his window and saw 

appellant and Robinson through the window blind. Norris ignored the knock and 
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stayed in his bed because he had changed his mind and did not want to participate 

in the robbery. Norris explained that he did not leave the apartment that night and 

would not be able to get in and out because only his mother had a key and she 

knew he was in the apartment that night.

Norris was asked on direct examination whether he had seen Robinson the 

next day, the day after the robbery. Norris testified that he saw Robinson who told 

Norris that he and appellant had robbed the store, but had only gotten a “hundred 

and something dollars” from one cash register. On cross-examination and on redirect examination, Norris clarified that he had talked to both appellant and 

Robinson the day after the robbery. He noted that any inconsistencies between his 

testimony and his written statement to Detective Harris did not mean that his 

statement to Harris was incorrect simply because “a couple of details were left 

out.” And he explained that when he was arrested and gave his statement to 

Harris, that he was “drunk” and had “just came from a party,” “but [he knew] what 

happened.” Norris also explained that he could only have obtained the details about 

the robbery from appellant and Robinson, they were not enemies, and he had no 

reason to “lie” about them. Norris also noted that the man who was involved with 

him in the motor-vehicle burglaries is Hispanic, short, and weighs over 200 

pounds; thus, he did not fit the description of either of the Fastop robbers. 
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Norris’s mother, Tina Cooper, testified that he lived with her at the Brighton 

Manor apartments on November 30, 2011. She was the only person with a key to 

the apartment door and made sure that everyone was in her apartment before she 

went to bed at 10:30 p.m. after watching the television news. Cooper explained

that she did not at any time in November, awaken to find the door or any windows 

to her apartment unlocked. And she noted that the bedroom doors in the apartment 

were not closed until she went to bed at 10:30 p.m. Thus, she “knew” that Norris 

was in his room until that time. She explained that Norris has a t-shirt, but not a 

black t-shirt, has only jeans, not dark pants, and does not own a “hoodie” or a ski 

mask. The only gloves in her apartment were gloves with white dots that she used 

for work. And she has never seen Norris with weapons in her apartment. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support his conviction because the State’s witnesses had “no credibility,” the 

strength of the evidence “was tenuous at best,” and, even when considered in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, “this jury could not be said to have been 

rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant asserts 

that the State’s star witness, Louis Norris, was “an admitted snitch and a thief,” 

who was “intoxicated, [had] limited memory, [was] drunk at that time [and had] 
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smoked synthetic, fake weed,” while the State’s other witness “could not 

accurately recall anything.” 

We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788–89

(1979)). Evidence is legally insufficient when the “only proper verdict” is 

acquittal. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982). Our 

role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of 

fact’s finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In doing so, 

we give deference to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts 

in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts.

Id. We defer to the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence unless the 

resolution is not rational. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). However, our duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented 

actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense 

of which he is accused. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.
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Circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct evidence in 

establishing the guilt of an actor, and it alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. 

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The term “inference” 

means, 

In the law of evidence, a truth or proposition drawn from another 

which is supposed or admitted to be true. A process of reasoning by 

which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a 

logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already 

proved. . . .

Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

700 (5th ed. 1979)). For a jury to infer a fact, “it must be able to deduce that fact 

as a logical consequence from other proven facts.” Id.

A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing 

theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, he intentionally or 

knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2011). A person commits the 

offense of aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and uses or exhibits a deadly 

weapon. Id. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2011). A firearm is considered a deadly 

weapon. Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2012). Theft is the unlawful 

appropriation of property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. Id. 

§ 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2012).
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Jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, 

and the weight to be given the witness’s testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623 

S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Jaggers v. State, 125 

S.W.3d 661, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). And, they may 

choose to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness’s testimony. See Davis v. 

State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 

Likewise, “reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive 

province of the jury.” Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) 

(quoting Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). 

Here, Ahmed testified that the two men who robbed him at the Fastop 

convenience store used two handguns, one that was “reddish” in color, and the 

other one “silver.” Because the robbers wore ski masks and gloves, he was only 

able to identify them as males because of their voices, and he told police officers

that they were between 5’5” and 5’8” tall, “skinny,” and weighed around 160 to 

165 pounds.

Norris positively identified appellant in a photographic lineup as one of the 

men who planned the robbery and had asked Norris to participate in the robbery.

And he corroborated the eye-witness testimony concerning appellant’s height and 

weight. Specifically, Norris testified that appellant and Robinson had come to his 

mother’s apartment on the night of the robbery, asked him to participate in the 
10

robbery, and showed him the guns that they planned to use, including an orange 

flare gun and a silver .25 handgun. Norris explained that both appellant and 

Robinson had come back for him later that night, and although he looked through 

the blind and saw them both, he ignored their knock on his window because he had 

changed his mind about participating in the robbery. And, although Norris, in his 

testimony on direct examination disclosed only the fact that he saw and spoke with 

Robinson on the day after the robbery, he clarified on cross-examination and 

redirect examination that he actually saw both appellant and Robinson, who both 

told him that they had committed the robbery. Norris explained that although his 

statement to Detective Harris might be inconsistent, “[he knew] what happened”

even though he might have “left out” some details. Moreover, he stated that both 

appellant and Robinson admitted to having robbed the store. As fact finder, the 

jury was entitled to resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we defer to that 

resolution. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. And Detective Harris testified that 

Norris gave him information about the robbery that had not been released to the 

public. Moreover, Norris’s description of the guns that appellant and Robinson 

had showed to him and planned to use in the robbery was similar to Ahmed’s 

description of the weapons that were actually used in the robbery. 

Although each piece of evidence may lack strength when considered “in 

isolation, the consistency of the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn 
11

therefrom, provide the girders to strengthen the evidence” and support the jury’s 

finding of the elements of the offense. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The bottom line is that from the evidence presented, 

including the facts that appellant and Robinson asked Norris to commit the robbery 

with them, they came to his apartment to get him as planned, the robbery was 

committed as planned, and both appellant and Robinson admitted to Norris the 

next day that they had robbed the store, the jury could have reasonably found that 

appellant committed the robbery with Robinson.

Viewing the evidence in the light more favorable to the jury’s findings, the 

testimony of Norris, Ahmed, and Detective Harris supports an inference that 

appellant participated in the robbery of the Fastop convenience store. Accordingly, 

we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

Terry Jennings

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.

Do not publish. TEX. R. CIV. P. 47.2(b).