alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of William Riley, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[871 NYS2d 475]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner, a prison inmate, was charged in a misbehavior report with assaulting staff, engaging in violent conduct, refusing a direct order and violating frisk procedures. At the conclusion of the ensuing tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of all charges. The administrative affirmance of that determination prompted petitioner to commence this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking annulment.

We initially note that Supreme Court improperly transferred the matter to this Court inasmuch as the petition does not appear to raise a question of substantial evidence *(see Matter of Burgess v Selsky,*50 AD3d 1347, 1348 [2008]). Nevertheless, we will retain jurisdiction and address the merits of the petition in the interest of judicial economy *(see id.).*

With respect to petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of adequate employee assistance, it is wholly unsubstantiated by the record *(see Matter of Martinez v Selsky,*53 AD3d 989 [2008]). In particular, although petitioner claims that he was denied the right to call witnesses, it is clear from the record that he had the opportunity to call more witnesses at the hearing and declined. Thus, the alleged inadequacies in petitioner’s proof did not flow from any incompetence of his employee assistant. Likewise, there is no record support for petitioner’s assertion that the Hearing Officer was biased, nor is there any indication that the determination in issue flowed from any alleged bias *(see Matter of Purcell v McKoy,*54 AD3d 1113, 1114 [2008]). To *977the extent not specifically addressed herein, petitioner’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be unavailing.

Peters, J.P, Spain, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ.j concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
#### Moore *et al. v.*Peacock, administrator.

All rents and profits arising out of homestead lands, except those consumed whilst the homestead estate is on foot, belong to the owner of the realty out of which the homestead was carved. After minor beneficiaries have arrived at majority, they cannot maintain an action against one who wrongfully excluded them from the possession during their minority and took the rents and profits for his own use. Their right as beneficiaries having become extinct by lapse of time, they have no" claim as beneficiaries, and consequently no title, legal or equitable, on which they can recover. *Judgment affirmed.*

April 23, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

Complaint. Before Judge Smith. Dodge superior court. March term, 1893.

On August 3, 1891, the children of Elizabeth Jane Moore and B. T. Moore filed their petition against Peacock as administrator of Rozar, alleging an indebtedness *524of $1,400. On demurrer for want of a cause of action, the petition was dismissed. It shows that on July 21, 1875, lot of land 123 in the 19th district of Dodge county was set apart as a homestead to Elizabeth Jane Moore, now deceased, who was then living in a state of separation from her husband, and plaintiffs being then minors. They have reached their majority within the last four years. They were the beneficiaries of the homestead, and were entitled to the enjoyment of the same, and the profits, possession, use and occupation thereof, but were wrongfully deprived thereof by Hozar during his lifetime and during the fourteen years 1876-1889, he receiving the profits of the land for said time of the value of $100 per year, which his administrator, the defendant, refuses to pay.

DeLacy & Bishop, for plaintiffs.

E. A. Smith, for defendant.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AFP Imaging Corporation
(the "Company") for the quarter ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report"), I Donald
Rabinovitch, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
          15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.






/s/__Donald Rabinovitch_______
Donald Rabinovitch
President
(Co-Principal Executive Officer)
February 13, 2004


                                       22
#### Ivey, administrator, *v.*Griffin *et al.*

•One who as owner redeems land sold for taxes within the time limited hy law, acquires no title to the land by reason of the act of redemption or of a conveyance made to him founded upon and recognizing his right to redeem. In contests with strangers to such conveyance, he cannot establish the fact of ownership merely hy introducing this conveyance together with evidence of the tax sale and the authority to sell. *Judgment affirmed.*

August 20, 1894.

*690Equitable petition. Before Judge Fish. Wilcox superior court. September term, 1893.

Hinton *&*Cutts, Hal Lawson and J. H. Martin, for plaintiff.

D. M. Roberts and E. H. Williams, for defendant.

The administrator of Horne sued Griffin *et al.*for damages to the timber on land lot 128 in the first district of Wilcox county, to enjoin further trespassing thereon, etc. A nonsuit was granted. The evidence showed, that-the land was a wild lot, and was regularly sold and conveyed, June 4, 1878, by the sheriff, under an execution legally issued against it for State and county tax, to Reid and Tomberlin as purchasers at the sale. The deed contained the proper recitals, and was duly recorded. It bore a transfer for value received, from the grantees to Horne, dated May 19,1879. Plaintiff introduced also a deed to the lot from Reid and Tomberlin to Horne, reciting the purchase by the grantors at the sheriff’s sale; that Horne, the owner of the lot, came within twelve months and paid to the grantors the amount for which they bought at sheriff’s sale, with interest at 20 per cent., and cost, and therefore, in consideration of the premises, the grantors remised and relinquished to Horne, his heirs, etc., all the right, title and interest they might have had under the sheriff’s deed had not the land been redeemed under the law. There was further testimony not material here, as to acts of defendant in cutting timber and working turpentine.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Joseph G. Szymaszek, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

Submitted February 17, 2009;

decided April 2, 2009

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that relator has been released on postrelease supervision and, therefore, his liberty is no longer restrained to such a degree as to entitle him to the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus *(see People ex rel. Wilder v Markley,*26 NY2d 648 [1970]). Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that relator has been released on postrelease supervision and, therefore, his liberty is no longer restrained to such a degree as to entitle him to the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus *(see People ex rel. Wilder v Markley,*26 NY2d 648 [1970]).
Exhibit 32.1    Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350     I, Tony N. Frudakis, President and Treasurer of Skyview Holdings Corp. (the Corporation), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, to my knowledge that:  1.  the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2.  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.   Skyview Holdings Corp.Date: April 8, 2011By:/s/ Tony N. FrudakisTony N. FrudakisPresident and Treasurer
(Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer, and Principal Accounting Officer)
664 A.2d 936

#### IN THE MATTER OF SHIRLEY LORRAINE WATERS, A/K/A SHIRLEY WATERS-CATO, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

October 5, 1995.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed a report with the Court on August 4, 1995, concluding that SHIRLEY LORRAINE WATERS, a/k/a SHIRLEY WATERS-CATO, of ORANGE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1977, and who was thereafter temporarily suspended from the practice of law by Order of this Court dated April 4,1995, and who remains suspended at this time, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year retroactive to April 4, 1995, for violations of *RPC*1.1(a) and (b) (gross neglect and pattern of neglect), *RPC*4.1(a)(1) and (2) (knowingly making a false statement and failing to disclose a necessary material fact), *RPC*8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with the ethics authorities), *RPC*8.4(c) (misrepresentation), and *RPC*8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice);

And the Disciplinary Review Board further concluding that respondent should (1) be evaluated by a psychiatrist during the term of suspension to determine whether respondent requires therapy; (2) receive any therapy found warranted; (3) submit psychiatric proof of her fitness to practice law prior to reinstatement; and (4) practice under the supervision of a practicing attorney for a period of two years;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that SHIRLEY LORRAINE WATERS, a/k/a SHIRLEY WATERS-CATO, is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, the suspension to be retroactive to April 4, 1995, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

*473ORDERED that respondent be evaluated by a psychiatrist approved by the Office of Attorney Ethics to determine whether therapy is required, and that respondent receive therapy if it is found to be warranted; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent submit psychiatric proof of her fitness to practice law prior to applying for reinstatement; and it is further

ORDERED that on reinstatement, respondent practice under the supervision of a practicing attorney approved by the Office of Attorney Ethics for a period of two years, and until further Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of her suspension and that she comply with *Rule*1:20-20; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **3 -**  **8017**

ANDREW CHIEN , P laintiff

- Appellant ,

v. LECLAIRRYAN; WILLIAM K. GROGAN & ASSOCIATES; WILLIAM K. GROGAN , Defendants

- Appellee s , and
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY , Defendant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Liam O’Grady , District Judge. ( 1 :1 3

- cv - 0 0 993

- LO

- IDD )

Submitted : April 17, 2014 Decided: April 21, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Andrew Chien , Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Michael Rainsbury, LECLAIR RYAN, PC, Roanoke, Virginia , for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Andrew Chien appeals the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against LeClair Ryan and William K. Grogan & Associates for the reasons stated by the district court. Chien v. Chesterfield Cty. , No. 1:13

- cv - 00993

- LO

- IDD (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 6, entered Nov. 7, 2013)
. We affi rm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against William Grogan in his capacity as a Commissioner in Chancery on alternative grounds. See MM ex rel. DM v. School Dist. of Greenville Cnty. , 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002). While Grogan was a stat e actor, he is entitled to judicial immunity for actions taken within the scope of his official duties. See Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) (defining factors used to determine whether an action is a judicial act)

. We deny Chien’s motion to ex pedite this decision. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6295

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHANE DOUGLAS SICHTING,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Anderson. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (8:16-cr-00181-BHH-1)

Submitted: September 9, 2021 Decided: September 14, 2021

Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shane Douglas Sichting, Appellant Pro Se. Justin William Holloway, Assistant United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Shane Douglas Sichting appeals the district court’s orders denying his 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motions for compassionate release and denying reconsideration. We 

review a district court’s order granting or denying a compassionate release motion for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021). We have 

reviewed the record and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. The court 

denied Sichting’s motions after discussing the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and 

sufficiently explained the reasons for the denial. See United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 

188-91 (4th Cir. 2021) (discussing amount of explanation required for denial of 

straightforward compassionate release motion). We therefore affirm the district court’s 

orders. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### In the Matter of John D. Justice, Appellant, v George B. Alexander, as Chairman of the New York State Division of Parole, Respondent.

Submitted January 26, 2009;

decided March 31, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
Exhibit
32.2








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AFP Imaging Corporation
(the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Donald Rabinovitch,
Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
















/s/
      Donald RabinovitchDonald
      RabinovitchPresidentCo-Chief
      Executive Officer





Date:
November 19, 2008








29
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

April 1, 2009 

p0325 

Order 

 

April 1, 2009 

136636 

ERIC C. FROHRIEP, and all others 

similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v SC: 136636 

 COA: 273426 

Ingham CC: 06-000430-NZ 

MICHAEL P. FLANAGAN, JEREMY M. 

HUGHES, and FRANK P. CILOSKI, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

By order of October 27, 2008, the application for leave to appeal the April 29, 

2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in 

Odom v Wayne Co (Docket No. 133433). On order of the Court, the case having been 

decided on December 30, 2008, 482 Mich 459 (2008), the application is again considered 

and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in 

part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we REMAND this case to the Ingham 

Circuit Court for further proceedings in light of the Odom decision. We agree with the 

Court of Appeals that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, but do not agree that the plaintiffs failed to state claims for the 

remaining intentional torts. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the burden of 

proof with regard to the qualified governmental immunity applicable to the defendants 

Hughes and Ciloski under Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 

NW2d 641 (1984), lay with the plaintiffs, rather than with the defendants. See Odom, 

supra.
wells logo
              
              Commercial
      Mortgage
                Servicing
                MAC
      A0357-030
                P.O.
      Box 4036
                1320
      Willow Pass Rd., Suite 300
                Concord,
      CA 94520
                800
      986-9711





ANNUAL
STATEMENT AS TO COMPLIANCE


OFFICER’S
CERTIFICATE











Re:
ML-CFC Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-6, Commercial Mortgage


Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2007-6.




In
accordance with Section 3.13 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, (the
“Agreement”) dated April 1, 2007 executed by and between Merrill Lynch Mortgage
Investors, Inc. (as “Depositor”), Wachovia Bank, National Association (as
"Master Servicer No. 1"), Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (as “Master
Servicer No. 2"),  LNR Partners, Inc. (as “Special Servicer”), and
LaSalle Bank National Association, (as “Trustee"), as authorized officer
of  Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, I certify that (i) a
review of the activities of  Master Servicer No. 2 during the
preceding calendar year and of its performance under this Agreement has been
made under my supervision and (ii) to the best of my knowledge, based on such
review,  Master Servicer No. 2 has fulfilled all its obligations under
this Agreement in all material respects throughout such year.




Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association


“Master
Servicer No. 2”






/s/ Briggs A.
Hawley






Briggs A.
Hawley


Vice
President


Wells
Fargo Bank National Association


Commercial Mortgage
Servicing






March
2008 764
#### Frank Irvin MOPPINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas CAREY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 08-15220.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 2009.*

Filed May 21, 2009.

Frank Irvin Moppins, Vacaville, CA, pro se.

Kasey E. Jones, AGCA-Offiee of the California Attorney' General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: PREGERSON, CANBY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Frank Irvin Moppins appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Moppins contends that he is entitled to statutory tolling during the pendency of a state habeas petition filed in superior court; and to equitable tolling based upon the misconduct of his attorney. Moppins *600has failed to show that the state habeas petition referred to provides a proper basis for statutory tolling, or that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him from timely filing. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); *Welch v. Carey,*350 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.2003); *Spitsyn v. Moore,*345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003).

We construe the uncertified issues raised in Moppins’s opening brief as a motion to expand the certificate of appeal-ability, and we deny the motion. *See*9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); *see also Hiivala v. Wood,*195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 35.1

HomEq Servicing


                              ANNUAL CERTIFICATION


      Re:   Securitized Asset Backed Receivables, LLC Trust, Series 2007-NC2
            (the "Trust"), issued pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing
            Agreement, dated as of 02/01/2007 (the "Pooling and Servicing
            Agreement"), by and among Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC,
            as depositor (the "Depositor"), Deutsche Bank National Trust
            Company, as trustee (the "Trustee"), and Barclays Capital Real
            Estate Inc. d/b/a HomEq Servicing, as servicer (the "Servicer").

I, Arthur Q. Lyon, Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of the
HomEq Servicing Division of Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc. d/b/a HomEq
Servicing, hereby certify to the Depositor and the Trustee and their officers,
directors, and affiliates, pursuant to Section 3.22 of the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement, that:

         A review of the activities of the Servicer for the Calendar year ending
         December 31, 2007, and to the best of my knowledge, based on such
         review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the
         Pooling and Servicing Agreement in all material respects, except as
         noted below.

         Foreclosure was not initiated in accordance with the timeframes
         established by its servicing agreements and the servicing criteria set
         forth in 1122(d)(4)(vii) of Regulation AB and therefore represents an
         instance of material noncompliance.


Date:   March 13, 2008


/s/ Arthur Q. Lyon
---------------------
Arthur Q. Lyon
Executive Vice President and CEO
HomEq Servicing Division
Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc.


Barclays Officer's Certificate
Securitized Asset Backed Receivables, LLC Trust, Series 2007-NC2