[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-13904

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cr-80228-RLR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

TIMOTHY JARRED PAIGE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(August 11, 2020)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Timothy Paige pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana and oxycodone with 

the intent to distribute them, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 

crime, and possessing a firearm and ammunition after being convicted of a felony. 

Paige argues on appeal that (1) he did not waive his appellate rights knowingly and 

voluntarily; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Paige pleaded guilty, with a written plea agreement, to one count of possession 

with intent to distribute marijuana and oxycodone, possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm and ammunition 

by a convicted felon. Paige agreed to “waive[] all rights . . . to appeal any sentence 

imposed” unless the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, the district court 

imposed an upward departure or variance, or the government appealed. 

At the start of his plea hearing, Paige was reluctant to go through with 

pleading guilty. The district court told Paige he had three options: he could plead 

guilty; the court could schedule a trial date; or he could talk some more with his 

attorney. Paige chose to speak with his attorney, and the district court reset the 

hearing for later in the day. After the recess, Paige said he was ready to plead guilty 

but that he was dissatisfied with his attorney. The district court then referred Paige 

and his attorney to a magistrate judge for an inquiry into the representation. 

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Paige told the magistrate judge that his lawyer was good at what he did and 

that he could not speak badly about his lawyer’s performance but that he was 

dissatisfied he had not received positive results in his case. Paige agreed that his 

attorney had discussed the government’s witnesses and evidence with him and had 

also conducted discovery on his behalf. Paige’s attorney had discussed multiple 

defenses with him, investigated potential defense witnesses, talked through 

strategies, and answered his questions. Paige’s attorney responded to any issues 

Paige raised and had filed a motion to suppress on Paige’s behalf. The magistrate 

judge gave Paige and his counsel some time to discuss the plea between themselves. 

Paige then told the magistrate judge that he was ready to plead guilty and would do 

so in front of the district judge. 

Back before the district court for the third time that day, Paige said he had

enough time to think about the plea agreement and discuss it with his attorney. He 

told the court that he had read the agreement and discussed it with his attorney before 

he signed it. He said he understood all its terms. At the court’s direction, the 

government explained the terms to Paige, including one of the “most significant 

provisions” of the agreement: the sentence-appeal waiver. 

Paige told the court that he did not understand the government’s explanation 

of the appeal waiver, so the district court broke it down for him. The court said 

Paige had a right to appeal his sentence under certain statutes, but, because of his 

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negotiations with the government, he was giving up the right to appeal the sentence 

the district court imposed. The court also explained the exceptions to the waiver, 

including the government’s ability to appeal the sentence. Paige himself gave a 

summary: “So, if I waive my rights, [the government] still ha[s] theirs?” The court 

agreed but added that if the government appealed the sentence, so could Paige. The 

district court went on to give Paige examples in which the waiver would and would 

not apply. Paige said he understood everything the court described and did not have 

any other questions about the waiver. He testified that no one had forced him to 

agree to the waiver and that he agreed to the waiver knowingly and voluntarily and

fully understood its terms.

The government also explained the other “significant provision[]” of the plea 

agreement—that Paige and the government agreed to recommend that the district 

court vary downward to a twenty-year sentence if Paige qualified as a career 

offender. Paige asked the district court about this provision. The court explained 

that the plea agreement called for Paige and the government jointly to recommend a 

twenty-year sentence but that the district court was not bound by that 

recommendation. 

Further, the district court identified the charges Paige would plead to and the

rights he was giving up. The court also went over the maximum sentence. In 

response to the court’s questions, Paige said he was not coerced to enter the plea. 

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Although Paige expressed some hesitancy given the potential sentence he faced, he

ultimately waived his right to trial and pleaded guilty. The district court accepted 

Paige’s plea. 

Two months later, Paige filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 

a month after that filed a counseled motion (with new counsel) to withdraw or vacate 

his guilty plea. The district court denied the pro se motion and adopted the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to deny the counseled motion. The 

district court applied the four Buckles factors. See United States v. Buckles, 843 

F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988). For the first factor, the court found that Paige had 

the close assistance of counsel who discussed the case with him, advised him of his 

options, and filed a motion to suppress. For the second factor, the district court found 

that Paige knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and its 

sentence-appeal waiver given the extensive plea colloquy, Paige’s informed 

questions about the plea agreement and waiver, and the district court’s responses to 

those questions. The third factor also weighed against Paige because he moved to 

vacate his plea only after the probation office issued its presentence investigation 

report and two addenda, in an apparent attempt to avoid a potentially unfavorable 

sentence. Fourth, the district court found that allowing Paige to withdraw his plea 

would not prejudice the government. After denying the motion to withdraw, the 

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district court sentenced Paige below the joint recommendation to 191 months’ 

imprisonment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the validity of a sentence-appeal waiver de novo. United States v. 

Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). And we review the denial of a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brehm, 

442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006).

DISCUSSION

We assume, without deciding, that the appeal waiver is invalid, so we don’t 

reach that issue. As to the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Paige argues that the 

district court abused its discretion by denying the motion. 

After the district court accepts a plea, but before sentencing, the defendant 

may withdraw a guilty plea if he “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the 

withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). A defendant has no absolute right to 

withdraw a guilty plea prior to imposition of a sentence. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 471. 

To determine whether a defendant has shown a “fair and just reason” for 

withdrawing his guilty plea, the district court should “consider the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the plea.” Id. at 471–72. In doing so, the district court 

should weigh the following four factors: “(1) whether close assistance of counsel 

was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial 

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resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced 

if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Id. at 472 (citation omitted). 

If the defendant cannot satisfy the first two factors, we have said that the district 

court need not give “considerable weight” or “particular attention” to the remaining 

factors. United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987). 

There is a strong presumption that statements made during a plea colloquy are true. 

Id. at 800 n.8.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion under the Buckles factors. 

First, as the district court found, Paige had the close assistance of counsel. Paige 

said that he had discussed the plea with his attorney. Paige told the court that his 

lawyer had discussed the government’s evidence with him, conducted discovery, 

and explored defenses. Paige’s counsel responded to his questions and had even 

filed a motion to suppress. Paige, multiple times, said that he was satisfied with his 

lawyer. Still, the district court gave Paige additional time to consult with his attorney 

before accepting the plea. 

Second, the extensive plea colloquy made clear that Paige pleaded guilty 

knowingly and voluntarily. The district court discussed the terms of the plea 

agreement, the charges against Paige, the rights he would waive, and the potential 

consequences of his plea. Paige repeatedly told the district court that he wanted to 

plead guilty and that no one had forced him to enter the plea. The district court 

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stressed that Paige was the only one who could decide whether to plead guilty or not. 

Paige also informed the district court several times that he understood all of the terms 

of the plea agreement. Where Paige did not understand something in the agreement, 

he asked informed questions, including about the appeal waiver, the career offender 

determination, and the counts he would be pleading to. The district court gave 

thorough answers, provided examples of when the appeal waiver would apply and 

how the career offender determination would be made, and made sure that it 

addressed all of the points Paige raised. 

Paige argues that his counsel inaccurately stated before the magistrate judge 

that, despite the parties’ agreement to recommend a twenty-year sentence, he could 

argue for a further downward variance at sentencing. But Paige does not argue that 

his attorney’s representation affected his decision to plead guilty. See United States 

v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that to succeed on a motion to 

withdraw a plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quoting Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). And any error was cured when the government 

and district court explained that the joint recommendation of the twenty-year 

sentence was a binding part of the agreement. See id. (affirming denial of a motion 

to withdraw plea, despite the defendant’s argument that his counsel gave him 

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erroneous advice concerning his sentence, because “it [was] clear from the transcript 

of the plea hearing” that the magistrate judge warned the defendant that he could not 

rely on counsel’s prediction of a sentence; that the crime had a different mandatory 

minimum than what counsel had told the defendant; and that the court could deviate 

from any sentence estimate given to the defendant). Paige was told by the district 

court that he and the government would jointly recommend a twenty-year sentence, 

and Paige said he understood and still wanted to plead guilty. 

Because the first two Buckles factors weigh so heavily against Paige, we do

not give “particular attention” to the remaining factors. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 

F.2d at 801. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Paige’s request 

to withdraw his plea, so we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

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