1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 16a0133p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

U

NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v

.

M ARK C. S AWYER , Defendant-Appellant

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 15-5181

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville. No. 2:11-cr-00082—J. Ronnie Greer, District Judge. Argued: March 8, 2016 Decided and Filed: June 3, 2016 Before: BOGGS, GIBBONS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL
ARGUED: Francis L. Lloyd, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF FRANCIS L. LLO YD, JR., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Ma tthew T. Morris, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Francis L. Lloyd, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF FRANCIS L. LLOYD, JR., Knoxv ille, Tennessee, Ashley Meredith Lowe, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Matthew T. Morris, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. 

### >No. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 2

_________________ OPINION

_________________ JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In 2006, Mark Sawyer and four co-defendants formed A&E Salvage and purchased the salvage rights to a former industrial site in eastern Tennessee in order to demolish the buildings on site and obtain salvageable material. Despite the presence of large amounts of regulated asbest os-containing material (RACM), A&E Salvage knowingly failed to comply with the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for asbestos. The Environmental Prot ection Agency (EPA) eventually intervened and cleaned up the site, pursuant to its po wer under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER CLA) at a total cost of over $16 million. Sawyer eventually pled guilty to one count of c onspiring to violate the Cl ean Air Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371. The district court sentenced Sawyer to a 60-month prison term and held Sawyer and his co-defendants jointly and severally liable fo r $10,388,576.71 in restitution to the EPA. Sawyer challenges his sentence and the district court’s re stitution award. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.
Sawyer, along with four co-defendants, formed A&E Salvage for the purpose of recovering salvageable materials, such as copper, steel, and aluminum, from the site of the former Liberty Fibers rayon plant in Hamblen County, Tenne ssee. The site occupied approximately 300 acres and contained multiple build ings, a water treatment facility, as well as extensive above ground piping. Demo lition at the site began in October 2006. The defendants’ business records show that A&E Salvage intended to salvage materials within seven buildings on site and then demolish them. At the time A&E Salvage purchased the salvage rights, many of the buildings on site contained RACM, such as pipe-wrap, boiler insula tion, roofing materials, and floor tiles. Sawyer and hi s co-defendants were aware thatthe site contained RACM, and much of the RACM on site was marked with red dots.No. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 3

Despite the presence of RACM, the defendant s’ salvage and demolition activities failed to comply with the NESHAP st andards governing the handling and disposal of asbestos. Among other violations, laborers at the site were not provided with the proper safety equipment such as respirators or protective suits. Some workers we re asked to “remove fr iable asbestos without adequately wetting it,” as required by the NESHAP , while others were made to seal and pack inadequately wetted asbestos fo r disposal. CA6 R.9, PSR at 6.
On August 8, 2008, the EPA and A&E Salvage entered into a consent agreement whereby A&E Salvage agreed to correct the asbestos violations and comply with the NESHAP during its future removal and demolition activities. On March 10, 2009, the EPA terminated the consent agreement and issued an immediate comp liance order to A&E Salvage, Sawyer, and the other defendants. The order stat ed that all individuals were to cease any activity on the site. Three weeks later, on March 31, 2009, federal agents searched the site, seized documents, and took samples of RACM. The investigators estimat ed that nearly all 3 00 acres of commercial property were contaminated with asbestos. Thereafter, the EPA, exercising its power under CERCLA, cleaned up the site, at a total cost of $16,265,418.
In 2011, a grand jury indicted Sawyer and hi s co-defendants for cons piring to violate the Clean Air Act and defraud the government, in violat ion of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The indictment also charged four substantive counts of Clean Air Act violations. Three year s after the indictment, 1 Sawyer pled guilty to one count of conspiring to violate the Clean Air Ac t, 18 U.S.C. § 371. As part of his plea agreement, Sawy er explicitly waived his right to appeal a sentence within the guidelines range. He only retained the right to appeal any sentence of imprisonment above the guidelines range.
On October 14, 2014, the probation office file d its presentence investigation report (PSR), which calculated a guide line sentencing range of 87 to 108 months. The statutory maximum for offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 371 is 60 months, and because the low end of Sawyer’s range was above the statutory maximum, his eff ective range was 60 months . The district court ultimately sentenced Sawyer to a 60-month term of imprisonment.

1 All of Sawyer’s co-defendants pled gu ilty more than a year before Sawyer.No. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 4

On the issue of restitution, the PSR stated that “the final cost for the clean-up at the Site was $16,265,418” but that “an exact amount in relati on to requested restitution is not known.” CA6 R.9, PSR at 18. The PSR also specified “[it] is believed that [information supporting the government’s restitution claim] will be provided to the Court prior to the sentencing of the defendants.” Id.
On October 31, 2014, three weeks before th e sentencing hearing, the United States submitted notice that it sought restitution in the amount of $10,688,576.71, a subset of the total cleanup costs. The final amount requested did not in clude indirect costs suchas attorney’s fees and other administrative costs and associated trav el costs. Attached to its claim, the United States included a spreadsheet known as a SCORPI OS report, which itemized the costs the EPA incurred to pay contractors w ho undertook the bulk of the clea nup. The report also included direct costs associated with EPA personnel managing the cleanup, which were itemized by individual employees. The govern ment further argued that restitution was mandatory in this case, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. On Novemb er 10, 2014, Sawyer filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss the restitution claim, which set forth his objections to the adequacy of the SCORPIOS report to sup port a restitution award.
On November 19 and 20, 2014, the district co urt held a sentencing hearing. The court heard the testimony of Karen Buer ki, an on-scene coordinator fo r the EPA, who described the EPA’s cleanup efforts and corroborated the costs in the SCORPIOS report. In particular, she testified that the government wa s only seeking its direct costs for cleaning up the site, and not indirect costs like attorney’s fees. On the subject of other hazardous materials found on site, Buerki estimated that the EPA incurred approximately $300,000 cleaning up and removing materials that did not contain asbestos. The government also presented testimony from multiple laborers involved in A&E Salvage’ s operations who testified to Sawy er’s role in the conspiracy and to the unsafe conditions on site.
After two more days of argum ent in January 2015, the court en tered an order finding that restitution was mandatory in this case, pursuant to § 3663A, and finding that the government had established that it was entitle d to $10,388,576.71. The court found the SCORPIOS report to be a reliable indicator of the EPA’s dire ct costs, and it credited Buerki ’s testimony. In arriving at theNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 5

final restitution amount, the court subtracted $300,000 from the government’s requested amount based on Buerki’s testimony that the EPA expende d that amount removing hazardous substances other than asbestos.
Following this order, the district court ente red judgment against Sa wyer, sentencing him to 60 months in prison and ordered him and hi s co-defendants, jointl y and severally, to pay $10,388,576.71 in restitution to the EPA.

II.

This court reviews de novo whether a defendant is appealin g an issue within the scope of an appellate waiver. United States v. Toth , 668 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2012).
Sawyer claims that his 60-month sentence is substantively unreasonable, arguing that it was unreasonable for the district court to senten ce him, an individual w ith no criminal history who pled guilty, to the statutory maximum prison term , particularly in light of the fact that his co-defendants were sentenced to lesser terms. Sawyer concedes, however, as he must, that he “waived his right to appeal from a sentence not above the sentencing guideline range . . . [and that] his term of imprisonment of 60 months was . . . within the advisory Guidelines range.” CA6 R. 16, Appellant Br. at 27. “I t is well settled that a defendant may waive any right, even a constitutional right, by means of a plea agreement.” Toth , 668 F.3d at 377 (quoting United States v. Calderon , 388 F.3d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 2004)). This court construes waivers such as Sawyer’s to be binding, and by appealing an issue “that [he] stipulated to and agreed not to contest [Sawyer] is attempting to void the plea agreement.” United States v. Bazzi , 94 F.3d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1996). When a criminal defenda nt attempts to appeal an issue within the scope of an appellate waiver provi sion, “[o]nly challenges to the validity of the waiver itself will be entertained on appeal.” Toth , 668 F.3d at 377. Given Sawyer’s concessions and the fact that he does not dispute that he en tered his plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, we decline to review the reasonablene ss of his sentence.No. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 6

III.
Restitution orders are subject to a bifurcated standard of review. “Whether a restitution order is permitted under the law is subject to de novo review,” United States v. Elson , 577 F.3d 713, 720 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Johnson , 440 F.3d 832, 849 (6th Cir. 2006)), whereas “the amount of restitution ordered is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard,” Johnson , 440 F.3d at 849 (quoting United States v. Wood , 364 F.3d 704, 714 (6th Cir. 2004)).

A.
Sawyer first takes issue with the district court’s determination that restitution was mandatory in this case pursuant to the Mandato ry Victim’s Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The MVRA, which amended the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, “requires a defendant to pay re stitution to identifiable victims who have suffered either physical injuries or pecuniary losses as a result of certain criminal offenses.” United States v. Vandeberg , 201 F.3d 805, 812 (6th Cir. 2000). “Specifically, restitution is mandatory—regardless of a defendant’s financial situation—when a defendant is convicted of a crime of violence, an offense against property, or an offense related to tampering with consumer products.” Id. ; see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)

. In this case, the district court determined that Sawyer’s conviction for conspiracy to violat e the Clean Air Act was an “offense against property.”
Sawyer contends that the EPA cannot be a vic tim an offense against property because the agency does not have a possessory interest in the asbestos-contaminated land. The question raised by Sawyer’s appeal appears to be one of first impression in this circuit: Whether a federal governmental agency forced to expend funds to remedy the harm caused by a criminal offense can be properly deemed a victim of an “offe nse against property” under § 3663A(c) when the government has no possessory interest in the land?
As an initial matter, while “[t]he MVRA does not define ‘offense against property’” United States v. Luis , 765 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), it is clear that o ffenses that result in the contamination of property with a dangerous or an apparently dangerous subs tance typically qualify for restitution under § 3663A. For example, in United States v. Quillen , the defendantNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 7

mailed envelopes that appeared to contain anthrax to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. 335 F.3d 219, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). The paro le board enlisted a county hazmat team to decontaminate its mailroom at a cost of more than $4,000. Id . The district court awarded mandatory restitution to the Parole Board unde r the MVRA, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 220–21. In finding that restitution was mandatoryunder the MVRA, the c ourt “agree[d] with those courts that hold clean-up or repair costs may be ordered under the MVRA.” Id. at 226. In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit determined that the MVRA provided statut ory authority to order restitution to a motel owner for cl ean-up costs he incurred remedia ting a motel room in which the defendant had cooked methamphetamine. United States v. Brock-Davis , 504 F.3d 991, 994, 996–98 (9th Cir. 2007). Based on the reasoning in these cases, Sawy er’s offense of conviction, which resulted in the asbestos contamination of n early 300 acres of land, certainly qualifies as an “offense against property” with in the meaning of § 3663A.
What is equally clear from the case law is that a government agency can be a victim to whom restitution is owed, regard less of whether it has a possesso ry interest in the affected property. In United States v. Phillips , the defendant was convicted of violating and conspiring to violate the Clean Water Act. 367 F.3d 846, 849 (9 th Cir. 2004). The offense of conviction resulted in the discharge of pollutants—sediment and mine tailings—into na vigable waters of the United States running through private property. Id. at 850–51. The EPA expended significant funds cleaning up the discharge, pursu ant to its authority under CERCLA. Id. at 852–53. The court determined that the “district court must include any reliable CERCL A-related expenses” in calculating whether the offense of conviction required substantial expenditures, and it also found that the EPA’s “site investigation costs may be recoverable through restitution orders. . . . if [the costs] are not routinely incurred prosecuting criminal cases but instead are a ‘direct and foreseeable result’ of the Government’s mitiga tion of the damage [the defendant] caused.” Id. at 857, 862–64. Similarly, in United States v. Overholt , the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiracy to violate various environmental statutes, including the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Resource Conser vation and Recovery Ac t. 307 F.3d 1231, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2002). The conspiracy resulted in, am ong other things, the unauthorized disposal of petroleum-impacted wastewater into disposal wells and into above-ground oil-storage tanks on private property. Id. at 1235, 1237. The defendant was ultimate ly ordered to pay restitution toNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 8

the Coast Guard in the amount of $1,265,078, the co sts “of removing the storage tanks from the . . . property and cleaning up the area.” Id. at 1253. The Tenth Circ uit affirmed, reasoning that although the Coast Guard’s losses were sole ly economic, “[p]urely financial losses have been recognized as proper subjects of res titution under both 18 U.S.C. § 3663 and § 3663A.” Id. at 1254.
Sawyer has a rebuttal to this line of cases. He correctly points out that in cases ordering restitution to government agencies enlisted to cl ean up property the agencies do not own, courts have not definitively answered whether rest itution was authorized under § 3663 or § 3663A. See Phillips , 367 F.3d 846; Overholt , 307 F.3d 1231. Sawyer further notes that in cases where restitution has been ordered pursuant to § 3663A for an offense against property, the party recovering remediation costs has had an identifiable property inte rest in the affected property. See Brock-Davis , 504 F.3d at 996–98 (motel owner was awar ded restitution for co sts incurred to clean one of his motel rooms); United States v. Barton , 366 F.3d 1160, 1164–67 (10th Cir. 2004) (restitution was ordered to the government pursuant to MVRA after defendant set fire to federal forest); Quillen , 335 F.3d at 225–26 (Pennsylvania Parole Board was awarded restitution for costs to decontaminate its own mail room). In a ddition to the relevant cas e law, Sawyer relies heavily on the text of § 3663A(b)(1), which specifi es the proper methods for restoring property or its value following a crime that “result[s] in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a
victim of the offense.” CA6 R. 16, Appellant Br. at 12–14. Sawyer reads the relevant case law and this section of the statute to define what constitutes a qualifying “offense against property,” contending that § 3663A(b)(1) implies a requirement that the victim have a possessory interest in the affected property.
Sawyer’s position suffers from several problem s. First, § 3663A(b) prescribes the ways in which a court should craft an order of restitution; it does not purport to define an “offense against property.” See Luis , 765 F.3d at 1065–66. Second, as other courts have made clear, § 3663A(c)(1)(B) aims to compensate victims of certain crimes, not only for physical injuries but also for solely economic harm. Overholt , 307 F.3d at 1254. Finally, and most importantly, the exact language on which Sawyer relies in the MVRA as requiring a victim to have a possessoryNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 9

interest in the affected prope rty also appears in the VWPA. 2 Were a possessory interest required or implied by the statutory language Sawyer relies on, the courts in Overholt and inPhillips would not have ordered restituti on to the Coast Guard and the EPA respectively for their cleanup efforts. In Overholt , the court ordered restitution for cleanup costs even though “the Coast Guard’s loss was not as an owner of the Peko property. Its loss was a purely financial one; the property it lost was money.” 307 F.3d at 1254. Likewise, in Phillips , the court found that the EPA’s investigation costs, a subset of its clea nup and remediation costs, were recoverable under the restitution statutes, even though the polluted waters were on private property. 367 F.3d at 862–63; see also United States v. W. Indies Transp., Inc. , 127 F.3d 299, 315 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s award of restitution to th e Coast Guard based on the costs required to clean the environmental damage caused by defendants’ conduct).

The Tenth Circuit in Overholt pondered the same reading of the restitution statutes that Sawyer urges here and it reject ed such an interpretation: Perhaps . . . [the] restituti on statutes could be read to say that when there is physical damage to property, the only permissible restitution is payment to the property owner of the amount calculate d in accordance with that language, regardless of any financia l loss to another victim w ho was not an owner of the property. But that perverse reading of the st atute is certainly not “clear or obvious under current law.” If it were, we question whether th e Third Circuit would have upheld an order of restitution under th e VWPA requiring the defendants to pay the Coast Guard’s cost of cleaning up their pollution of navigable waters. 307 F.3d at 1254 (citing W. Indies Transp. , 127 F.3d at 315). Overholt ’s reasoning is compelling, and we rely on it to re ject Sawyer’s argument that a party without a possessory interest in the damaged property cannot be a victim under the MVRA.
The district court properly concluded th at restitution was mandatory under § 3663A because Sawyer’s offense of conviction is a qua lifying “offense against property” and the EPA is an identifiable victim of that offense.

2 “[I]n the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1); see also § 3663(b)(1) (same).No. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 10

B.
Sawyer next claims that the government fa iled to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that all of the EPA’s losses were dir ectly and proximately caused by his offense of conviction.
As an initial matter, because the district court correctly de termined that restitution was appropriate in this case, we review the cour t’s determination regarding the amount of the government’s losses for anabuse of discretion. Elson , 577 F.3d at 725; United States v. Bogart , 576 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2009).
Whether restitution is mandatory or permissive, the government must establish that actual losses to a victim were directly and proximate ly caused by the offense of conviction. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(2), 3663A(a)(2). When th ere is a dispute as to the am ount of restitution, this proof must be “resolved by the court by th e preponderance of the evidence.” Id. § 3664(e); see also United States v. Batti , 631 F.3d 371, 378 (6th Ci r. 2011). Although a dist rict court need not make specific factual findings incalculating restitution, the information underlying an award must have “sufficient indicia of reliabi lity to support its pr obable accuracy.” United States v. Jackson-Randolph , 282 F.3d 369, 386 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Herrera , 928 F.2d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 1991)). In this case, the SCORPIOS report showed that the EPA incurred a total of $16,567,541.65 in CERCLA costs. The government sought restitution for a portion of those costs, $10,688,576.71, the total CERCLA costs minus indirect costs—attorney’s fees, overhead, or other administrative costs. The district court ultimately ordered $10,388,576.71 in restitution, subtracting $300,000 from the government’s requested amount based on testimony that the EPA removed other mate rials besides asbestos at a cost of $300,000. In fashioning its award, the district court cred ited Karen Buerki’s testimony as reliable and it adopted the SCORPIOS re port, save the $300,000.
Sawyer raises several objections to the amount of restitution imposed. Initially, he relies

on Paroline v. United States , 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014), a case invol ving restitution to victims of child pornography. There, he points out, the Court stated that it is a “bedrock principle that restitution should reflect th e consequences of the defendant’s own conduct.” Id. at 1725. TheNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 11

court went on to hold that “a court applying § 2259 should order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant’s re lative role in the causal process that unde rlies the victim’s general losses.” Id. at 1727. Sawyer urges the panel to im port this reasoning to the restitution award in his case. He suggests that th e district court er red in assessing the totallosses attributed to the conspiracy jointly and severally against hi m and his co-defendants rather than assessing an amount keyed to his specific role in the conspiracy.
Sawyer’s reliance on Paroline is misplaced. There, the C ourt distinguished the hundreds or even thousands of perpetra tors of child pornography w ho “ha[ve] no contact with the overwhelming majority of the [other] offenders ” from “a set of wrongdoers acting in concert” such as a “‘gang of ruffians’ [tha t] collectively beats a person.” Id. at 1724–25

. The Court went on to express uncertainty about “whe ther it could ever be sensible to embrace the fiction that this victim’s entire losses were the ‘proximate result’ of a single possessor’s offense.” Id. at 1725 (internal citation omitted). Unlike the isolated and more passive crimes of the defendant countenanced in Paroline , Sawyer’s conviction for conspiracy necessarily implies his concerted action with others. And this is not a case where Sa wyer agreed to play a minor role in a larger scheme. Rather, he fully participated in th e fundamental aspects of A&E Salvage’s unlawful conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act. Paroline ’s concerns about the legal and administrative sensibility of adopting joint and several liabil ity in child-pornography crimes simply do not translate to a case involving a finite conspiracy with five defendants who were acting in concert.
“[U]nder the MVRA, if someone is convicted of a conspiracy, the court can order restitution for damage resulting from any conduct that was part of the c onspiracy and not just from specific conduct that met the overt act re quirement of the conspiracy conviction.” Elson , 577 F.3d at 723 (citation and inte rnal quotation marks omitted). Section 3664(h) specifically empowers district courts to make individual defendants liable for all of the losses caused by multi-defendant crimes, and we have consistently affirmed such decisions in the conspiracy
context. See United States v. Rozin , 664 F.3d 1052, 1066 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[U]pon finding Rozin guilty of conspiracy . . . the district court coul d hold Rozin jointly and severally liable for the entire restitution amount . . . .”); United States v. Williams , 612 F.3d 500, 513 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[B]y participating in a conspiracy to comm it healthcare fraud, W illiams bore the risk ofNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 12

becoming financially responsible for the entire amount of the c onspiracy victims’ losses.”); see also Bogart , 576 F.3d at 576. Accordingly, it was not error for the court to hold Sawyer jointly and severally liable for the entire $10,688,576.71.
Sawyer next contends that the SCORPI OS report submitted by the government was insufficient to establish the govern ment’s losses in this case. He cites a plethora of cases, although none from this circuit, which sugge st that summary accounting tables, like the SCORPIOS report, are insuffi cient standing alone to s upport a restitution award. See United States v. Waknine , 543 F.3d 546, 557 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court erred by relying exclusively on the one-page loss summaries provided by the victims and in not requiring more detailed explanations of the losses each victim suffered.”); United States v. Hartstein , 500 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Summary tables of a ccounting data that are based on evidence not before the court, and that a party has challeng ed as inaccurate, are notsufficient to support a court’s factual findings.”); United States v. Menza , 137 F.3d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must provide the district c ourt with more than just the general invoices . . . ostensibly identifying the amount of their losses. The go vernment must provide sufficient explanations (supported by evidence refl ected in the record) as to how these invoiced losses directly relate to Menza’s criminal c onduct involved in his underlying convictions.”).
In light of these cases, perhaps it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely solely on the SCORPIOS report, but the report was not the only information underlying the restitution claim. Buerki, an on-site supervisor for the EPA, testified at great length on the first day of the sentencing hearing a bout the SCORPIOS report. The district court credited her testimony and found that it substantiated the costs detailed in the report. Sawyer attacks her testimony on the basis that she had no personal knowledge of th e site prior to her arrival in 2011. He maintains th at nothing in the record establis hes that all of the asbestos remediation costs were attributable to A&E Salv age’s conspiracy, and su ggests, without offering any proof, that some of the EPA’s costs could have been the result of conditions preexisting A&E Salvage’s activities. While Buerki herself lacked personal knowledge of the site prior to 2011, ample evidence in the record rebuts Sawyer’s position, in cluding the following: a timeline and chart of a Tennessee Department of Envi ronment and Conservation asbestos inspectorNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 13

detailing A&E Salvage’s demolition of buildings on the site during 2007, aerial photos of the site pre- and post-demolition, individual reports from workers who worked at the site before and during A&E Salvage’s activities, A&E Salvage’s own records of the de molition, and forty-seven pages of interview notes from people involved in or who witnessed the demolition and salvage operations performed by A&E Salvage.
Given the ample reliable evidence in th e record establishing that A&E Salvage’s activities on the site di rectly caused the asbestos contaminat ion, which the EPA then cleaned up, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to award the government all of its claimed costs minus the $300,000 in costs that Buerki te stified were spent clean ing up other hazardous materials on the site. 3

C.
Sawyer also finds error in the district court’s failure to submit the restitution claim to a jury. In Apprendi v. New Jersey , the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Fi ve years later, this court grappled with Apprendi in the context of restitut ion awards and found that “[a] though restitution is considered punishment . . . we have nevertheless held that restitution orders are not affected by the Supreme

3 In similar cases, other courts of appeals have found that cleanup costs are directly attributable to and proximately caused by offenses th at contaminated property. In Quillen , the Tenth Circuit found that “[b]ut for [defendant’s mailing of powder-filled envelopes], the Pa role Board would not have incurred an actual loss of $4,026.55, the cost of decontaminating a room believed to be tainted by a deadly substance.” 335 F.3d at 225–26. The court next found that the “itemi zed invoices” submitted by the compan y that performed the decontamination established that the Parole Board’s expense “was an actua l loss directly resulting from [the defendant’s] conduct.” Id. at 226. In Brock-Davis , the victim of a conspiracy to manufactur e methamphetamine requested the costs to remediate the victim’s motel room, includi ng replacement costs for ruin ed furniture. 504 F.3d at 995. In addition to a victim statement, the victim also testified at the res titution hearing that the “victim statement accurately reflected what items were required to be disposed of” and the court noted that “[t]here was no impeachment of [the victim’s] credibility or any evidence that specific furnishing were no t necessary replacements.” Id. at 1002. The court distinguished the case from Menza , noting that the victim statement along with the victim’s testimony met the government’s burden of proof. Id. Finally, in Barton , the government sought $14.7 million in restitution after defendant burned a forest on federal lands. 366 F.3d at 1162, 1166–67. The government asserted that the amount it requested “was derived from the monies spent by the Forest Service following extinguishment of the fire in revegetating the forest to prevent erosion in the aftermath of the fire.” Id. at 1167. It further claimed that such revegetation costs were an “easily ascertained proxy for the ‘l oss’ sustained by the Forest Service as a result of [the defendant’s] crimes.” Id. The court ultimately approved this proxy approach, noting that “revegetation can be viewed as an effort to repair the forest and would not have occurred absent the fire.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).No. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 14

Court’s ruling in [ Apprendi ] because the restitution statutes do not specify a statutory maximum.” United States v. Sosebee , 419 F.3d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 2005). Sawyer contends that the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of Apprendi ’s reasoning to criminal fines in Southern Union Co. v. United States , 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), effectively overrules Sosebee

. Sawyer’s reliance on Southern Union , however, is unavailing. As Sawyer readily admits, Southern Union “did not address the issue of fact-findi ng concerning restit ution obligations.” CA6 R.16, Appellant Br. at 26. What is more, Southern Union did nothing to call into question the key reasoning at the heart of Sosebee , namely that the restitut ion statutes do not specify maximum awards. See United States v. Churn , 800 F.3d 768, 781–82 (6th Cir. 2015). In Churn , this court determined that Sosebee remains controlling authority, that “ Apprendi does not apply to the MVRA,” and that Southern Union did not cast doubt its conclusi ons because the statute at issue in that case “had a defi ned statutory daily maximum.” Id . at 782. In light of Sosebee and Churn , the district court was not required to submit the rest itution claim to a jury.

D.

1.
Sawyer attacks the restitution award on various other grounds. First, he contends that the district court should have dismissed the rest itution claim because 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) imposes “specific procedural requirements to be met befo re a restitution obligation will be imposed.” CA6 R.16, Appellant Br. at 9. Although his argu ments are underdeveloped, Sawyer essentially asserts that § 3664(a) and Fede ral Rule of Criminal Proce dure 32 combine to require the probation office to include details sufficient to support a restitution award in the PSR, something the probation office failed to do here. Section 3664(a) states that “[f]o r orders of restitution under this title, the court shall or der the probation officer to obtain and include in its presentence report, or in a separate report , as the court may direct, information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fash ioning a restitution order” (emphasis added). Section 3664(c) makes Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 applic able to restitution orders. That rule in turn provides that “[i]f the law permits restitution, th e probation officer must conduct an investigationNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 15

and submit a report that contains sufficient information for the court to order restit ution.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1)(B).
Where Sawyer’s argument for a strict proce dural requirement emanates from, however, is unclear, given § 3664(a)’s text, which allows c ourts to order “a separate report” containing information sufficient to support a restitution or der. Moreover, in a similar case involving conspiracy to violate the Clean Water Act, the Ninth Circuit or dered restitution for cleanup costs despite the fact that the pres entence report “recommended restituti on in an unspecified amount,” and instead “recommended that the district c ourt make a factual finding on the appropriate amount of restitution.” Phillips , 367 F.3d at 853. Sawyer cites no case from this or any other court holding that restitution can be ordered onl y when the PSR contains information sufficient to support a restitution order. We decline to create such a ru le in this case.

2.
Sawyer also raises due-process concerns about the government’s disclosures in this case. He contends that the government’s disclosure of the SCORPIOS report some three weeks before sentencing was too late to provide him adequate notice and opportunity to respond.
Like the previous claim, this claim is me ritless. Sawyer was on notice that restitution would be a contested issue “fro m practically the outset of this case.” R. 307, Sentencing Tr., Page ID 2008–09. As the trial judge noted at the sentencing hearing, “it has been known for many, many, many months that this court was ultimately going to have to make some factual determinations about restitution in this case.” Id. at 2009. Further, on October 8, 2014, more than forty days prior to the sentencing hearing, the trial cour t held a status conference concerning, among other things, Sawyer’s motion regarding restitution.
In regards to the information underlying th e restitution claim, Sawyer had ample opportunity to review and respond to the doc uments and witness testimony provided by the government. He received the detailed SCORPIOS report on October 31, 2014, approximately three weeks before the November 19th and 20th restitution hearing. Sawy er filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss the clai m for restitution on November, 10, 2014, which addressed at some length the invoice submitted by the government. At the hearing, Sawyer, asNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 16

well as his co-defendants, also had the opportunityto present their own witnesses and to crossexamine the witnesses the government called in s upport of its restitution claim. Perhaps most importantly, as the trial court pointed out at the hearing, “after bei ng provided the documents, [Sawyer] never made a specific request of the government to provide a dditional detail or to provide other documents or to interview witne sses; never sought intervention by the court to require the government to produce additional detail.” Id. at 2009.
Following the November 19th and 20th, 2014, re stitution hearing, Sawyer was entitled to and did file objections to the PSR in the form of a supplemental sentencing memorandum. He was even granted an extension of time until December 11, 2014, to file his objections. Sawyer’s written objections to the PSR ultimately included fi ve pages objecting to restitution in this case, including objections to the government’s SCORPIOS report and the government’s witness testimony at the hearing.
In sum, Sawyer was on ample notice of the gov ernment’s claim for restitution and of the documents, information, and testimony underlyi ng that claim, and he was given every opportunity and adequate time to respond to the government’s evidence both during and following the sentencing hearing.

3.
Finally, Sawyer points out that the United St ates has an alternat ive means of seeking compensation for the costs it incurred cleaning up th e former industrial site: a civil cost-recovery action under CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Based on nothing more than th e existence of this alternative, Sawyer contends thatthe district court abused its di scretion in orderi ng restitution in his criminal case. The trial judge noted at the sentencing hearing that he knew “of absolutely no authority for the court to require a victim in a criminal case othe rwise entitled to restitution to seek damages through a civil case rather than th rough restitution. . . . [T]hat argument is supported by simply no authority th at this court is aware of.” Id. at 2006–07. On appeal, Sawyer has not corrected this problem. He provides no cas e law to support his cont ention that a district court abuses its discretion when it orders restitution to the government in a criminal case whenNo. 15-5181 United States v. Sawyer Page 17

the government has a civil recovery mechanism at its disposal, and we decline to create such a rule.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sawye r’s 60-month sentence and the district court’s restitution award.