[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-12397

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-20558-WJZ

GDG ACQUISITIONS LLC, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

GOVERNMENT OF BELIZE, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 28, 2017)

Before MARCUS, ANDERSON, and GINSBURG,

* Circuit Judges.

 * Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg, United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia 

Circuit, sitting by designation.

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MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

This is the second time a contract dispute arising out of the lease of 

telecommunications equipment by the plaintiff GDG Acquisitions, LLC (“GDG”),

to the defendant Government of Belize (“Government”), has reached our Court. In 

Round One, the district court dismissed GDG’s complaint on the grounds of forum 

non conveniens and international comity; we vacated and remanded for the district 

court to consider the enforceability of the contract’s forum-selection clause and its 

significance to the forum non conveniens analysis. Now, in Round Two, the 

Government appeals the district court’s subsequent denial of its motion to dismiss.

After thorough review, we conclude that the Government waived its 

sovereign immunity. The Government of Belize claims that the express waiver of 

sovereign immunity contained in the contract was ineffectual because its Minister 

of Budget Management, who negotiated and signed the contract on its behalf, 

lacked the authority to waive sovereign immunity. But despite the Minister’s 

claimed lack of authority to bind Belize, the Government ratified Fonseca’s actions 

by fully performing its contract obligations during the lease term and paying

approximately $13.5 million in forty separate payments over a period of nearly six 

years and spanning two different administrations. This conduct can be explained 

only on the understanding that the Government intended to be bound to the 

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contract. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Government’s 

motion to dismiss. 

I.

A.

On February 10, 2012, GDG sued the Government of Belize in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking some $10 million 

in unpaid rent, with the amount growing each month. The complaint and the 

declarations submitted to the district court alleged these basic facts. As Minister of 

Budget Management, Investment, and Home Affairs,

1 one of Ralph Fonseca’s 

tasks was to maximize the Government’s return on its expenditures of tax revenue 

funds. To do so, Fonseca entered into complex negotiations with a Belizean 

company, International Telecommunications, Ltd. (“Intelco”), in order to reduce 

the Government’s expenditures for telecommunications equipment and services. 

Intelco was owned and operated by Glenn D. Godfrey, a former Attorney General 

of Belize. Fonseca and Godfrey met several times in Miami to negotiate a lease of 

telecommunications equipment from Intelco to the Government. They ultimately 

closed a deal in Miami on December 18, 2002. The deal was governed by a 

Master Lease Agreement (MLA), which was negotiated in Miami and signed in 

 1 This title was later changed to Minister of Finance and Home Affairs.

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Washington, D.C., by Godfrey on behalf of Intelco and by Fonseca purportedly on 

behalf of the Government of Belize.

All rents due under the MLA were evidenced by promissory notes delivered 

by the Government to Intelco; the financing was supported by the International 

Bank of Miami. The same day they signed the MLA, the parties signed a first 

lease schedule and promissory note for $6,748,189.20, to be paid in twenty 

quarterly payments of $337,409.46 each. That five-year lease was scheduled to 

end on December 18, 2007, with the final payment being due on that date. On 

August 27, 2003, the parties agreed to a second lease of additional 

telecommunications equipment pursuant to a second lease schedule and promissory 

note, also in the amount of $6,748,189.20, again to be paid in twenty quarterly

payments of $337,409.46 each. The second five-year lease was scheduled to end 

on August 27, 2008; the final payment was due on that date. After entering into 

the agreement, Intelco assigned the payments to the International Bank of Miami in 

exchange for a single upfront cash payment from the bank of $10 million for the 

two leases.

Three provisions in the MLA are essential to the resolution of this appeal. 

First, the Master Lease Agreement contained a provision stating that the 

Government waived its sovereign immunity:

Lessee acknowledges that the activities contemplated by this Master Lease 

and each Lease Schedule are commercial in nature rather than governmental 

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or public, and therefore acknowledges and agrees that it is not entitled to any 

right of immunity or defense on the grounds of sovereignty or otherwise 

with respect to any such action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this 

Master Lease or any Lease Schedule. Lessee hereby expressly and 

irrevocably waives any such right of immunity or defense which now or 

hereafter may exist or claim thereto which may now or hereafter exist in 

respect of the Master Lease or any Lease Schedule and its obligations arising 

thereunder, and agrees not to assert any such right or claim in any such 

action or proceeding, whether in the United States of America or elsewhere. 

Lessee hereby expressly and irrevocably waives any defense or claim it may 

have to delay, hinder or stop the enforcement of this Master Lease or any 

Lease Schedule based directly or indirectly upon the Act of State Doctrine. 

Neither Lessee nor any of its property enjoys any right of immunity from 

suit, setoff, judgment, execution on a judgment or attachment prior to 

judgment or in aid of execution in respect of its obligations under this 

Master Lease or any Lease Schedule.

Second, the MLA included a forum-selection clause:

Lessee hereby waives any special rights or immunities which it may enjoy 

under the laws of Belize, and agrees and abides that its rights and obligations 

under this Master Lease or any Lease Schedule shall be determined 

exclusively in accordance with the governing laws of the State of Florida, 

irrespective of conflict of laws principles. Lessee irrevocably submits to the 

exclusive jurisdiction of any of the federal and state courts in the State of 

Florida in any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to the Master 

Lease or any Lease Schedule, and Lessee hereby irrevocably agrees that all 

claims in respect of such action or proceeding may be heard and determined 

in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Florida.

Finally, the MLA contained a waiver of objections to venue or to claims of an 

inconvenient forum:

Lessee hereby irrevocably waives any objection which it may now or 

hereafter have to the laying of venue of any suit, action or proceeding arising 

out of or relating to the Master Lease or any Lease Schedule and hereby 

further irrevocably waives any claim that any such suit, action or proceeding 

brought in any such court has been brought in an inconvenient forum. 

Lessee specifically acknowledges that Miami-Dade County, Florida is a 

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proper venue for the Lessor to bring suit against Lessee pursuant to the 

Master Lease or any Lease Schedule.

Another provision in the MLA governed the termination or expiration of the 

leases. Early termination of the leases required 120 days’ written notice of the 

Government’s intent to return the equipment. The failure to give notice triggered 

an automatic extension of the applicable lease schedule on a month-to-month basis 

for a period not to exceed twelve months. At the end of the term, the Government

was required to return the equipment to Intelco; if it did not do so, it was obliged to 

continue making payments in an amount equal to the average monthly rent during 

the lease term.

The Government of Belize made forty (quarterly) rental payments for the 

terms of the two leases, totaling nearly $13.5 million. The complaint alleged that 

Belize never evinced any intent to return the equipment during either the lease 

terms or the automatic renewal terms, but it continued to possess and use the 

equipment after the termination of the lease periods. The Government has not 

made any additional lease payments since 2008.

B.

On January 26, 2012, Godfrey created GDG Acquisitions, LLC, as a Florida 

limited liability company; its principal place of business was in Houston, Texas. 

Shortly thereafter, Intelco assigned all of its assets to GDG, including its interest in 

the Belize agreements. Soon after GDG’s complaint had been filed, the

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Government moved to dismiss, offering three reasons: the lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction because of foreign sovereign immunity; forum non conveniens; and

international comity. On March 28, 2013, the district court granted the 

Government’s motion citing forum non conveniens and international comity; it did 

not address the defense of foreign sovereign immunity.

On April 22, 2014, a panel of this Court vacated the dismissal and remanded 

the case. GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 

2014). We vacated the forum non conveniens determination in light of the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for 

the W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013), which instructed the district court to 

give “controlling weight” to a valid forum-selection clause when conducting a 

forum non conveniens analysis “in all but the most exceptional cases.” Id. at 581 

(quotation omitted). Because “[a] binding forum-selection clause requires the 

court to find that the forum non conveniens private factors entirely favor the 

selected forum,” GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1029, the panel remanded the case

to the district court with instructions to “determine the enforceability of the forumselection clause and its significance to the forum non conveniens analysis.” Id. at 

1034. The panel also vacated the district court’s dismissal because of international 

comity, concluding that retrospective international comity did not apply without a 

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judgment from a foreign court and that this case did not fall within the narrow 

sphere of prospective international comity. Id.

On remand, after supplemental briefing and argument, the district court 

denied the Government’s motion to dismiss. The court determined that it first had 

to decide whether the forum-selection clause was binding and enforceable. This in 

turn required answering whether Fonseca had the authority to waive the 

Government’s sovereign immunity. As the district court framed the question: “If 

Minister Fonseca possessed the requisite authority to bind the Government of 

Belize, then both the sovereign immunity waiver and the forum selection clause are 

likely valid and enforceable. If he did not possess said authority, then they are 

not.”

To answer that question, the trial court turned to this Court’s precedent in 

Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 

1999), which had held that courts should start with the assumption “that an 

ambassador possesses the authority to appear before them and waive sovereign 

immunity absent compelling evidence making it ‘obvious’ that he or she does not.” 

Id. at 1299. Over the Government’s objection, the district court applied this 

presumption to Minister Fonseca and, relying on declarations filed by both parties, 

concluded that “the Government of Belize ha[d] not met its burden and shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the FSIA’s waiver exception [did] not apply.” 

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No extraordinary circumstances were found and no compelling evidence existed in 

the record suggesting that Fonseca lacked the authority to waive the Government’s 

sovereign immunity. Thus, the district court held that the waiver exception was 

satisfied and that Belize could be sued in a United States court. Turning to the 

forum-selection clause, the district court concluded that the clause was enforceable

because Fonseca had the authority to bind the Government. The court observed 

that, after Atlantic Marine, it was compelled to find that the private factors of the 

forum non conveniens analysis favored adjudication in the preselected forum, and,

therefore, it denied the Government’s motion to dismiss.

The Government now appeals from that decision.

II.

“It is well-settled that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over interlocutory 

orders denying claims of immunity under the FSIA.” Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 

F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2009). We review de novo a district court’s 

determination of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 

(FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, codified as amended in various sections 

of Title 28. Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1289. “We may set aside the district court’s 

factual determinations, however, only if they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1290. 

“To determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA exists, a court 

looks at the plaintiff’s allegations and any undisputed facts that the parties have put 

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forward.” Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI, LLC v. Dominican Republic, 788 

F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015).

Like the district court, we are a court of limited jurisdiction; our power to act 

“is determined by Congress ‘in the exact degrees and character which to Congress 

may seem proper for the public good.’” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess 

Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989) (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 

How.) 236, 245 (1845)). Through the FSIA, Congress has given the district courts 

original jurisdiction over “any nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . . as to 

any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not 

entitled to immunity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Indeed, “Congress[ ] inten[ded] that

the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our

courts.” Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. at 434; see also Republic of Argentina 

v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992) (“The [FSIA] establishes a 

comprehensive framework for determining whether a court in this country, state or 

federal, may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state.”).

Under the FSIA, it is also well established that “a foreign state is 

presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.” Saudi 

Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993). To overcome the presumption, the 

plaintiff must “produc[e] evidence that ‘the conduct which forms the basis of [the]

complaint falls within one of the statutorily defined exceptions.’” Butler, 579 F.3d 

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at 1312–13 (quoting S & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2000)). “Whether the plaintiff has satisfied his burden of 

production in this regard is determined by looking at ‘the allegations in the 

complaint [and] the undisputed facts, if any, placed before the court by the 

parties.’” Id. at 1313 (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 

71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008)) (alteration in original). If the plaintiff “has asserted facts 

suggesting that an exception to foreign sovereign immunity exists, the party 

arguing for immunity . . . bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the exception does not apply.” Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1290.

In this case, therefore, the burden of production rested with GDG to 

establish that an exception to the FSIA existed. GDG satisfied its burden by 

asserting facts in its complaint suggesting that the waiver exception to the FSIA 

applied because the Government had waived sovereign immunity in the Master 

Lease Agreement. The statute’s waiver exception says that:

(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 

United States or of the States in any case --

(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly 

or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver 

which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance 

with the terms of the waiver.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). “[A]s a general rule, explicit waivers of sovereign 

immunity are narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign and are not enlarged 

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beyond what the language requires.” Architectural Ingenieria, 788 F.3d at 1338

(quotations omitted).2

After GDG asserted facts establishing that an exception applied, the burden 

of going forward shifted to the Government of Belize to show, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that the waiver exception did not apply. See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 

1290. The Government has not carried its burden because this record 

overwhelmingly demonstrates that it ratified the Master Lease Agreement and the 

waiver of sovereign immunity.

A.

In determining whether there was a waiver, the district court applied the

Aquamar presumption that ambassadors have the authority to waive sovereign 

immunity absent compelling evidence to the contrary. The court found “no 

evidence in the record that makes it ‘obvious’ that Minister Fonseca lacked the 

authority to waive Belize’s sovereign immunity.” Thus, it concluded that “the 

Government of Belize authorized the sovereign immunity waiver contained within 

the Master Lease Agreement.” On appeal, both parties explicate Aquamar at 

considerable length. The Government claims that Aquamar applies only to cases 

involving ambassadors and that, if applied to cases involving governmental 

 2 The original complaint also alleged that the commercial-activity exception, found in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605(a)(2), applied to this case, but the district court never addressed that issue and neither 

party argued it here. Thus, only the waiver exception is before us.

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ministers other than ambassadors, it should require, at a minimum, a showing of 

actual authority as prescribed by the foreign state’s laws. GDG responds that 

Aquamar contains the correct standard and that the presumption of authority to 

waive immunity was properly applied.

We think the presumption created by the Court in Aquamar is inapplicable 

in this case. Aquamar addressed an ambassador’s authority to waive sovereign 

immunity in pending litigation. See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1293. Based on

Congress’s “indicat[ion] that courts should look to international law when 

interpreting the FSIA’s terms,” the panel examined various sources of customary 

international law and concluded that “a sovereign’s chief diplomatic representative 

to a foreign nation possesses an extraordinary role and powers.” Id. at 1294–95. 

This conclusion was bolstered because “[i]nternational courts traditionally have 

assumed that an ambassador’s powers include the authority to present his or her 

country’s position before foreign tribunals.” Id. at 1296. The panel also noted that

many federal courts acknowledge the presumption. See id. at 1297 (citing cases). 

Thus, the Court held that, “under the FSIA, courts should assume that an 

ambassador possesses the authority to appear before them and waive sovereign 

immunity absent compelling evidence making it ‘obvious’ that he or she does not.” 

Id. at 1299.

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Aquamar cannot provide the answer because this case does not involve the 

acts of an ambassador. In Aquamar, we emphasized the unique qualities and 

powers of an ambassador. An ambassador “performs several important functions 

on behalf of the state” he represents, including “‘representing the sending State in 

the receiving State[,] protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending 

State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law,’ and 

‘act[ing] as representative of the sending State to any international organization.’” 

Id. at 1295–96 (quoting Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 3, 5(3), 

Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95) (citation omitted). But the 

province and function of an ambassador is profoundly different from the powers 

and responsibilities normally associated with a budget minister. Customary norms 

of international law do not as a general rule recognize a Minister of Budget 

Management as having such “broad powers to bind the countr[y] [he or she]

represent[s]” or as being able to “speak for his or her country.” Id. at 1296–97. 

Thus, we have no occasion to apply the Aquamar presumption.

B.

“Just as federal courts apply a federal standard to determinations of the 

scope of an express waiver, and of the existence of an implied waiver, we apply 

federal law to the question of whether a waiver has been effected by one with the 

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authority to do so.” Id. at 1294 (citations omitted).3 The FSIA does not specify 

what kind of authority -- actual or apparent -- is required to waive sovereign

immunity. We need not answer that question because both parties agree that actual 

authority is the proper standard against which to measure the conduct of the 

Government of Belize and its ministers.

Whether Fonseca had the authority to act on behalf of the Government is a 

question of agency. In an agency relationship, “[t]he ‘principal’ is ‘[t]he one for 

whom action is to be taken,’ and the ‘agent’ is ‘[t]he one who is to act.’” United 

States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(2)–(3)) (citation omitted). In this case, the 

parties characterize Fonseca as the agent acting for the sovereign as the principal. 

The record establishes that Fonseca signed the MLA, the promissory notes, and the 

lease schedules on behalf of the Government of Belize. Those documents say that 

the agreement, notes, and lease schedules were entered into by “the Government of 

 3 We offer no view on the wisdom or efficacy of using foreign law to illuminate the meaning of 

waiver because we need not use foreign law to arrive at an answer in this case. While Aquamar

warns of the dangers of using foreign law, it does so only in dicta. See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 

1297–98. Indeed, none of the three out-of-circuit cases cited by the Government of Belize in 

support of foreign law requires the use of foreign law in making the authority determination. In 

Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 400–02 (4th Cir. 2004), the Fourth Circuit looked 

to declarations and governmental decrees filed in the district court but nowhere said that it was 

required to look to foreign law. In both Dale v. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d 425, 429–30 (5th Cir. 

2006), and Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1997), the courts

remanded the cases for an authority analysis without mentioning the use of foreign law.

However, in a second, unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit did analyze foreign law but again 

did not say that it was required to do so. See Phaneuf v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 18 F. App’x 648, 

650–51 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Belize, through the Ministry of Budget Management” and, after a change in title, 

by “the Government of Belize, through the Ministry of Finance and Home 

Affairs.”

We have already held that “[w]hen applying agency principles to federal 

statutes, ‘the Restatement [ ] of Agency . . . is a useful beginning point for a 

discussion of general agency principles.’” Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 

F.3d 1228, 1245 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 

U.S. 742, 755 (1998)). According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency, “[a]n 

agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal 

consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with 

the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to 

act.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01 (2006).

In this case, however, we need not decide whether Fonseca had actual 

authority to enter into the MLA because the Government subsequently ratified his 

actions and, therefore, agreed to be bound by them as if they were done with actual 

authority. While “[o]nly interactions that are within the scope of an agency 

relationship affect the principal’s legal position,” id. at § 1.01 cmt. c, the principal 

may also ratify his agent’s unauthorized actions, thus becoming bound by their 

legal consequences. See id. at § 4.01 & cmt. b. In this way, the principal 

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subsequently places its imprimatur on the agent’s unauthorized acts, converting 

them into the acts of the principal.

The Restatement defines “ratification” as “the affirmance of a prior act done 

by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual 

authority.” Id. at § 4.01(1). Generally, “[a] person may ratify an act if the actor 

acted or purported to act as an agent on the person’s behalf,” id. at § 4.03 -- that is, 

if the ratifier was the principal for whom the agent acted or purported to act. The 

ratifier thus must have existed at the time of the act and must have had the capacity 

to have legal relations and to act as a principal at the time of ratification. See id. at 

§§ 4.01(3)(b), 4.04(1) & cmt. b. If the principal subsequently ratifies his agent’s 

act, “the legal consequence is that the [principal’s] legal relations are affected as 

they would have been had the actor been an agent acting with actual authority at 

the time of the act.” Id. at § 4.01 cmt. b; see also id. (“A principal’s ratification 

confirms or validates an agent’s right to have acted as the agent did.”); id. at 

§ 4.02(1) (“[R]atification retroactively creates the effects of actual authority.”). 

Thus, if Fonseca’s acts were ratified by the Government, then his actions are given 

effect as if he had acted with actual authority.

Under the Restatement, “[a] person ratifies an act by (a) manifesting assent 

that the act shall affect the person’s legal relations, or (b) conduct that justifies a 

reasonable assumption that the person so consents.” Id. at § 4.01. For example, a 

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“person may ratify [an] act through conduct justifiable only on the assumption that 

the person consents to be bound by the act’s legal consequences.” Id. at § 4.01 

cmt. d. That is, if the principal engages in conduct that could be explained only by 

the principal’s agreement to be bound by the agent’s act, then the principal has 

ratified that act.

The undisputed and unambiguous facts found in the record indicate that the 

Government made forty payments of $337,409.46 each in accordance with the 

lease schedules for the entirety of the two concurrent five-year leases, which 

collectively spanned five years and eight months (from December 18, 2002, to 

August 27, 2008) and amounted to the sum of approximately $13.5 million. The 

payments continued even after a change of administration in the Government of 

Belize in February 2008. The Government’s conduct in making the payments as 

required by the MLA, the promissory notes, and the lease schedules can be 

understood only on the assumption that the Government repeatedly consented to be 

bound by the MLA -- indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any other reason why the 

Government would have willingly made regular payments totaling nearly $13.5 

million.

The Government does not deny that it made these payments. Throughout 

the district court proceedings, the Government and its declarants acknowledged 

that “[p]ayments were made to the International Bank of Miami,” that the 

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Government’s obligations to the International Bank of Miami as required by the 

promissory notes were “fully paid,” that “it is undisputed that the bank has been 

paid off already,” and that “payments were made by [the Government] to the 

International Bank of Miami for services provided by Intelco.” Those concessions 

were repeated in the Government’s opening brief on appeal, in which the 

Government acknowledged that the “amounts were paid through the end of the 

term in each Lease Schedule, totaling $6,748,189.20 under each.” And the fact of 

the payments was again acknowledged during oral argument:

Court: Did the Government of Belize appropriate the money each year to 

make payments to satisfy the terms of the MLA and were not the funds 

made by the Government? You can tell me yes, but it doesn’t matter, but I 

want to know an answer to that question.

Government of Belize: The answer is yes.

As the record conclusively establishes, the payments were made.

Proof of payment was entered into the record in the form of four payment 

warrants filed as exhibits to GDG’s response to the Government’s motion to 

dismiss. These payment warrants were on official Ministry of Finance letterhead 

and were sent from Hugh McSweaney, Financial Secretary, to Sydney Campbell, 

Governor of the Central Bank of Belize. Three of the sample payment warrants 

noted that “the Government of Belize agreed to pay all Rent Payments under the 

lease to Intelco’s account at the International Bank of Miami,” and all of the 

warrants specified that they were for rent payments due to Intelco.

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Still another form of conduct that may yield consent by ratification inheres 

in the retention of benefits generated by the agent’s act. See Restatement (Third) 

of Agency at § 4.01 cmt. g (“A person may ratify an act under subsection (2)(b) by 

receiving or retaining benefits it generates if the person has knowledge of material 

facts and no independent claim to the benefit.”) (citation omitted). Thus, a 

principal’s retention of benefits realized as a result of his agent’s unauthorized 

actions likewise suggests that although the agent might initially have acted without 

authority, the principal has approved the act and wishes to be bound by it. In this 

case, again, it is undisputed that the Government retained the telecommunications 

equipment for the duration of the two leases and, indeed, that the Government still 

has not returned the equipment to GDG. The Government retained its benefits 

under the MLA and, in doing so, consented to be bound to the legal consequences 

of the agreement. Again, neither the act of retaining the telecommunications 

equipment for nearly six years nor the act of making payments can be understood

absent the assumption that the Government intended to be bound by the agreement. 

On this record, then, there is no need to inquire into Belizean law. Quite simply, 

the Government of Belize consented to and affirmed Fonseca’s actions by 

ratification; the explicit waiver of sovereign immunity contained within the Master 

Lease Agreement is, therefore, binding and enforceable.

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C.

The Government of Belize nevertheless says that ratification fell short in this 

case. Belize argues that “an agreement that is void ab initio cannot be enforced 

against a sovereign under a ‘ratification’ theory” because subsequent payments 

cannot create actual authority that did not exist at the time of the actions. This

argument misapprehends the nature of ratification. As we have noted, the doctrine 

of ratification starts with the assumption that the agent did not have actual

authority at the time he acted. See McDonald v. Hamilton Elec., Inc. of Fla., 666 

F.2d 509, 514 (11th Cir. 1982) (“A principal can ratify the unauthorized act of an 

agent purportedly done on behalf of the principal either expressly or by implication 

through conduct that is inconsistent with an intention to repudiate the unauthorized 

act.”) (emphasis added). It is precisely on account of the principal’s subsequent 

consent that the prior unauthorized act “is given effect as if done by an agent acting 

with actual authority.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01(1). Thus, it is of no 

moment that Fonseca may have acted without actual authority at the time he 

entered into the agreement.

Belize also claims that the payments under the MLA ratified only the 

MLA’s payment obligations and not its waiver of sovereign immunity. An 

application of the Restatement (Third) of Agency again squarely forecloses this

argument. Section 4.01(3) of the Restatement says that ratification cannot occur 

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unless “the ratification encompasses the act in its entirety as stated in § 4.07.” 

Section 4.07 in turn states that “[a] ratification is not effective unless it 

encompasses the entirety of an act, contract, or other single transaction.” Id. at

§ 4.07 (emphasis added). This does not mean that a principal must expressly state 

that he is ratifying the entire transaction for ratification to be effective, because

“[a] person may not, by ratifying an act, obtain its economic benefits without 

bearing the legal consequences that accompany the act.” Id. at § 4.07 cmt. b. 

Two illustrations inform our handling of this dispute:

3. Acting without actual or apparent authority, A purports to sell a yacht 

owned by P, the “Acis,” to T for $100,000. A then sells a second yacht, the 

“Galatea,” also owned by P, to T for $75,000. On hearing the facts, P faxes 

T: “You may keep Acis but Galatea went too cheaply.” P has ratified the 

sale of Acis but not Galatea.

4. Same facts as Illustration 3 except that, as P knows, A purported to sell 

Acis to T using a written contract form containing an arbitration clause. P’s 

ratification of A’s sale of Acis binds P to the arbitration clause.

Id. at § 4.07 cmt. c, illus. 3–4. In this case, the Government of Belize made 

payments pursuant to and retained the benefits of an agreement that also included a 

waiver of sovereign immunity and a forum-selection clause. The payment 

warrants themselves expressly noted that the payments were for rents due under 

the lease, indicating that the payments were made with knowledge of the contract. 

The Government accepted both the benefits (telecommunications equipment) and 

the burdens (payments) of the contract. The Government’s ratification of the 

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payment obligation binds it to the rest of the contract, just as P’s acceptance of 

$100,000 for Acis also bound him to the arbitration clause in the example cited 

above.

Finally, the Government tries to avoid the consequences of the Master Lease 

Agreement by claiming that the payments made under the MLA were 

unauthorized. As support, the Government relies on a case drawn from the 

Caribbean Court of Justice (Belize’s highest court), BCB Holdings Ltd. v. 

Attorney General of Belize, [2013] CCJ 5 (AJ). In that case, the Minister of 

Finance and the Attorney General of Belize apparently had entered into an 

agreement with two private companies to create an alternative corporate tax regime 

for those companies that contravened Belizean tax laws. After a change in 

administration, the Government disavowed the contract. Arbitration resulted in a 

judgment for the companies, but the Caribbean Court of Justice declined to enforce 

the award as being against public policy.

The Government’s argument fails for at least three reasons. First, as we’ve 

already detailed, foreign law does not provide the guiding principles for

interpreting American laws. See Aquamar, 179 F.3d at 1294. This case requires 

us to interpret the waiver exception of the FSIA -- an American statute. In 

determining whether Fonseca had the authority to waive sovereign immunity, we 

need only look to the Restatement and to American principles of agency. We need 

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not consult a foreign case in applying American principles of ratification to the 

Government’s conduct.

In the second place, the Government’s argument that the payments 

themselves were unauthorized was raised only for the first time in oral argument 

and has thus been waived. This Court “will not address a claim that has been 

abandoned on appeal or one that is being raised for the first time on appeal, 

without any special conditions.” Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 

F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004). The Government referenced the BCB Holdings

case in district court, but in support of three different points: first, that “an 

agreement entered into by a governmental minister without actual authority is 

invalid and unenforceable in its entirety -- including any and all provisions 

contained within the agreement”; second, that “an agreement that is void ab initio

cannot be enforced against a foreign sovereign under a ‘ratification’ theory”; and 

finally, that the MLA is not enforceable under a theory of unjust enrichment.4

 In 

district court, the Government never argued that the payments themselves were 

made without authorization; it cannot assert that argument for the first time here.

 4 Moreover, regardless of whether the Caribbean Court of Justice’s opinion supports these 

arguments, they lack merit in this case. Again, ratification starts from the premise that the initial 

act was done without authorization. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01 & cmt. b. The 

principal’s acceptance of the benefits and burdens of the contract also binds the principal to the 

contract’s other clauses. See id. at § 4.07 & cmt. g. And finally, GDG has never asserted that 

the MLA should be enforced under an unjust enrichment theory.

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Finally, even if we were to consider BCB Holdings, the outcome would not 

change. BCB Holdings examined a wholly different contract between wholly 

different parties in a wholly different setting. The opinion employed no discussion 

of ratification and we can discern no reason to rely on the Caribbean Court of 

Justice’s decision that the enforcement of one arbitration agreement was against 

public policy to invalidate an entirely different agreement.

5

The long and short of it is that the Government ratified Fonseca’s actions 

through its repeated payments of large sums of money over many years and by its 

retention of the telecommunications equipment. It thereby ratified the waiver of 

sovereign immunity contained in the same agreement.

III.

The Government of Belize also says that the district court should have 

dismissed the case for forum non conveniens. Again, we are unpersuaded. We 

review a district court’s forum non conveniens analysis for abuse of discretion. 

Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 578 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Under that standard, “we must affirm unless we find that the district court has 

made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).

 5 Moreover, we would have to weigh the Caribbean Court of Justice’s decision against an 

unpublished decision from the D.C. Circuit enforcing that same arbitration agreement in federal 

court. See BCB Holdings Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 650 F. App’x 17, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Belize 

has failed to justify the use of the public policy exception in this case.”). 

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To obtain the dismissal of a case for forum non conveniens, the moving 

party must show that “(1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public 

and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate 

his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” Leon 

v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). In considering these 

factors, the reviewing court “must evaluate both the convenience of the parties and 

various public-interest considerations,” and it must then “decide whether, on 

balance, a transfer would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and 

otherwise promote the interest of justice.” Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 

(quotation omitted).

“The calculus changes, however, when the parties’ contract contains a valid 

forum-selection clause, which represents the parties’ agreement as to the most 

proper forum.” Id. (quotation omitted). So long as the contract and the clause are 

binding and enforceable, “a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the 

forum specified in that clause.” Id. This is because “[w]hen parties agree to a 

forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as 

inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their 

pursuit of the litigation.” Id. at 582. The reviewing court thus “must deem the 

private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum”; the 

court “should not consider arguments about the parties’ private interests.” Id. And 

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“[b]ecause [the public-interest] factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion, the 

practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual 

cases.” Id. Thus, dismissal for forum non conveniens would be permissible in this 

case only if “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the 

parties” were present. Id. at 581.

The Government does not challenge the merits of the district court’s forum 

non conveniens analysis, nor does it argue that extraordinary circumstances are 

present to support a forum non conveniens dismissal. It offers only that “[t]he 

District Court erred in allowing Aquamar to dictate whether Fonseca possessed 

authority to bind [the Government] to the forum selection clause,” and that local 

law should have been considered in the forum non conveniens analysis. The 

Government is correct that the Aquamar presumption does not apply but, as we 

have explained, in this case the district court nevertheless properly concluded that 

Belize was bound by the MLA. Because Fonseca possessed the actual authority to 

act through the Government’s ratification of the MLA, the forum-selection clause 

was binding. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

We AFFIRM the denial of the Government’s motion to dismiss.

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