[J-32-2019] [MO: Wecht, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

THADDEUS BARTKOWSKI, III AND 

CRYSTAL ANNE CRAWFORD,

Appellees

v.

KENNETH RAMONDO AND THERESECECILIA RAMONDO,

Appellants

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 60 MAP 2018

Appeal from the Order of the Superior 

Court at Nos. 432 EDA 2017 and 521 

EDA 2017 dated January 22, 2018, 

Reconsideration denied March 22, 

2018, Affirming in part and Vacating in 

part the Judgment of the Chester 

County Court of Common Pleas, Civil 

Division, at No. 15-05842 entered 

January 27, 2017 and Remanding.

ARGUED: April 11, 2019

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: October 31, 2019

Nearly two hundred years ago, in a case involving principles similar to those 

implicated in this case, this Court noted:

The right of way from necessity, over the land of another, is 

always of strict necessity, and this necessity must not be 

created by the party claiming the right of way. It never exists 

where a man can get to his property through his own land. 

That a road through his neighbours [sic] would be a better 

road, more convenient or less expensive is not to the purpose; 

that the passage through his own land is too steep or two [sic] 

narrow does not alter the case. It is only where there is no 

way through his own land, that the right of way over the land 

of another can exist.

M’Donald v. Lindall, 3 Rawle 492, 495 (1827) (emphasis in original).

The M’Donald court appears to have settled upon a narrow definition of “strict 

necessity,” namely, that impossibility is the sole basis upon which relief may be granted. 
[J-32-2019] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2

As expressed by one commentator, “[t]he application of a strict necessity standard 

requires the claimant to prove that without the way of necessity, there would be no way 

to get to the alleged dominant tract and it would therefore be rendered useless.” 11

Jeffrey R. Sang, AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 601, § 6 (2019).

I respectfully disagree with the majority that “[t]o require a party to prove 

impossibility of alternative access is to stretch ‘strict necessity’ beyond its intended 

meaning.” Majority Op. at 15. Because the focus is on meaning, it is instructive to 

consider the dictionary definitions of the terms involved. Merriam-Webster defines “strict,” 

in relevant part, as “inflexibly maintained or adhered to.” Strict Definition, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http:/dictionary/strict (last visited September 3, 2019). It defines 

“necessity,” in relevant part, as “the quality or state of being necessary.” Necessity 

Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http:/dictionary/strict (last visited September 3, 2019). 

It defines “necessary,” in relevant part, as “absolutely needed: REQUIRED.” Necessary 

Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http:/dictionary/strict (last visited September 3, 2019). 

Accordingly, I believe it is appropriate to require anyone who seeks an easement by 

necessity to establish that no alternative exists. This approach has been adopted by 

other jurisdictions. See, Charles A. Murray Trust v. Futrell, 840 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2013) (rejecting the application of the reasonable-necessity standard for easements 

by necessity, and holding that “the strict necessity standard . . . remains the law in 

Michigan today.”); Gacki v. Bartels, 859 N.E.2d 1178, 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[T]he 

plaintiff must show that there were and are no alternative means of access to his 

property.”); Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 491 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (“[A] requirement 

of strict necessity has traditionally applied to easements or ways of necessity). Strict 

necessity has generally been defined as absolute necessity as where property is 

landlocked or otherwise inaccessible.”); Tiller v. Hinton, 482 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Oh. 1985) 
[J-32-2019] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 3

(no easement of necessity where “there is an alternative outlet to a public way even 

though it is less convenient or more expensive.”).

I am concerned that the approach adopted by the majority will have the effect of 

unreasonably compromising the rights of the proposed servient estate despite the 

majority’s recognition of “the sanctity of property rights.” Majority Op. at 20. We must be 

cognizant of the fact that “[p]roperty rights have been described as the rights to ‘possess, 

use and dispose of [property].’” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 

U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[‘t]he power to exclude has 

traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of 

property rights.’” Id. (citation omitted). A third party who tramples on these rights by 

asserting an entitlement to use his neighbor’s land against his neighbor’s wishes should 

be required to establish that it is impossible for him to access his property otherwise.

Applying these principles to the instant matter, I would affirm the order of the 

Superior Court. As the trial court noted:

The property owned by the Ramondos is not landlocked. 

Although the creation of a new driveway or access point for 

the Ramondos may be inconvenient and costly for them, the 

property does not fit the requirement of strict necessity that 

must be present for a finding of an easement by necessity. 

Furthermore, although the Ramondos believe that approval 

from the Township to relocate the driveway may be difficult, 

the evidence did not demonstrate impossibility and thus 

necessity.

Trial Court Decision 9/19/16, at 18.

The Superior Court recognized that “because a new driveway is possible, even if 

difficult and expensive, the trial court properly denied the Ramondos’ claim for an 
[J-32-2019] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 4

easement by necessity.” Bartkowski v. Ramondo, Nos. 432 & 521 EDA 2017, 

unpublished memorandum at 13 (Pa. Super. filed January 22, 2018).1

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Donohue joins this dissenting opinion.

 

1 The record establishes that title to the Barkowski and Ramondo properties was held by 

a common grantor. It is also clear that the unity of title was severed when the common 

grantor subdivided the land in 1967. As recognized by the majority, “the only factual 

dispute before the court concerned whether the Ramondo driveway’s encroachment upon 

the Bartkowski pole was “necessary in order for the [Ramondos] to use [their] land, with 

the necessity existing both at the time of the severance of title and at the time of the 

exercise of the easement.” Majority Op., at 14 (citing Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv., Inc., 

94 A.3d 1057, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2014). The record contains no evidence whether the 

physical characteristics of the land in question are the same as existed at the time of 

severance. Furthermore, the Ramondos’ argument in favor of a finding of necessity relies 

on their expert’s opinion regarding “the amount of regulatory relief and permitting needed 

to install a driveway on the Ramondos’ property.” Report of Daniel E. Molloy, PE, 6/22/16 

at 3. Given the dearth of record evidence regarding state and local regulations at the time 

of the subdivision in 1967, and the importance of the current regulations in Mr. Malloy’s 

opinion, the conclusion that the alleged necessity existed at the time of the severance is 

not supported by the record.