alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Certification of Chief Executive Officer





In connection with the Annual Report of Team Nation Holdings Corporation, (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Dennis R. Duffy, Chief Executive Officer certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





April 8, 2011





/s/ Dennis R. Duffy


Dennis R. Duffy


CEO
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bull Run Corporation (the Company)
on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarterly period ended November 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the
Report), the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his individual knowledge and
belief:

(1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated: January 14, 2004

/s/ ROBERT S. PRATHER, JR.
Robert S. Prather, Jr.
President and Chief Executive Officer
EX-35.1
(logo)GMAC Mortgage

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

GMAC Mortgage, LLC

CMLTIO7AMC2

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of GMAC Mortgage, LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer") pursuant to the applicable servicing agreement, does hereby
certify that:

1.      A review of the Servicer's activities during the period covered by the
Issuing Entity's report on Form 10-K and of the Servicer's performance under
the applicable servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2.      To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement in
all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this
17th day of March 2008.


By: /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
Name: Anthony N. Renzi
Title: Executive Vice President


GMAC Mortgage, LLC
1100 Virginia Drive
Ft. Washington, PA 19034
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0475

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH ALTON HAFLICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including June 30, 2021, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 25 2021

05/25/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0475
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-5890

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus KEVIN M. BAUMGARDNER, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-95-3) Submitted: July 30, 1996 Decided: September 11, 1996 Before HALL, HAMILTON, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kevin D. Mills, MILLS & SCALES, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William D. Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Lisa Grimes Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Kevin M. Baumgardner appeals from the district court's imposition of his sentence for bank robbery. Specifically, he contends: (1) that the district court committed clear error when it refused to grant his request for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) that as a matter of law passing a note to a teller containing the statement, "I have a knife," is insufficient to justify a three-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). We affirm. Addressing Baumgardner's first claim, we note that a denial ofa motion for departure is not reviewable on appeal unless the district court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to depart. United States v. Darby , 37 F.3d 1059, 1068 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 3787 (U.S. May 1, 1995) (No. 94-7778). In the present case, the district court acknowledged that in some factual situations a downward departure for the reason requested might be warranted, but found that the facts were notpresent in Baumgardner's case. Given this understanding of authority, this court cannot review the district court's refusal to depart. Turning to Baumgardner's remaining claim, we note that the district court's application of the § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) enhancement was based on its finding that Baumgardner did in fact possess a knife. Thus, we review for clear error. See United States v. Jones , 31 F.3d 1304, 1315 (4th Cir. 1994) (providing standard of review for factual findings in Sentencing Guidelines application issues).3Finding none, we affirm the district court's three-point enhancement. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cubic Energy, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, as C.E.O., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: May 16, 2011

 
| Signature: | /s/   Calvin A. Wallen, III   |   |
|------------|------------------------------------|--------|
|       | Calvin A. Wallen, III, C.E.O. |   |

 

----
EX-33.8
Report on Assessment of Compliance

with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria


1. The undersigned authorized officer of LandAmerica Tax and Flood Services,
Inc. (the "Company") is responsible for assessing the Company's compliance with
the applicable servicing criteria as defined in 17 CFR Part 229 Section
1122(d)(4)(xi) and 1122(d)(4)(xii) (the "Regulation AB Servicing Criteria") for
residential and commercial mortgage backed securities for which the Company
served as third-party property tax payment provider on the underlying collateral
(the "Platform"). Except as set forth in the preceding sentence, the servicing
criteria set forth in 17 CFR Part 229 Section 1122(d) are not applicable to the
activities the Company performed with respect to the Platform.

2. The Company used the criteria in 17 CFR Part 229 Section 1122(d) to assess
the compliance with the applicable Regulation AB Servicing Criteria.

3. Under one of the services offered by the Company, some customers may elect to
remit tax payments directly to tax agencies without having the Company remit
those property tax payments through our tax payment service. We refer to these
customers as "non-outsourced servicer customers." With respect to these
non-outsourced customers and the services the Company delivered pursuant to the
servicing criteria set forth in 17 CFR Part 229 Section 1122(d)(4)(xi), the
Company's assertion is strictly limited to its processing of tax payments
submitted through the Company's tax payment service.

4. With respect to servicing criteria set forth in 17 CFR Part 229 Section
1122(d)(4)(xii), the Company's assertion is strictly limited to its processing
of property tax penalty payments. The Company has determined that its servicer
customers may also have access to systems that enable those servicers to process
penalties through obligor escrow accounts. Management's assessment of compliance
does not relate to the actual or potential activities of other parties with
access to obligor escrow accounts.

5. Based on such assessment, management believes that, as of and for the year
ended December 31, 2007, the Company has complied in all material respects with
the Regulation AB Servicing Criteria related to the servicing of the Platform
taken as a whole.

6. The registered public accounting firm of Grant Thornton, LLP, has issued an
attestation report on the Company's assessment of compliance with the Regulation
AB Servicing Criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2007.

Date: February 6, 2008

LandAmerica Tax and Flood Services, Inc.

By: /s/ Robert Ige
Name: Robert Ige
Its:  Executive Vice President
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary

# ACTION:

Notice of Public Meeting.

# SUMMARY:

This notice announces the forthcoming public meeting of the Code Committee.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

William A. DeCicco, Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 450 E Street NW., Washington, DC 20442-0001, telephone (202) 761-1448.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Code Committee was established by Article 146(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 946(a), to be held at the Courthouse of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 450 E Street NW., Washington, DC 20442-0001, at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, March 3, 2015. The agenda for this meeting will include consideration of proposed changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, and other matters relating to the operation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice throughout the Armed Forces.

Dated: January 14, 2015.

Aaron Siegel,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 2015-00829 Filed 1-20-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7098

WILLIAM ALLEN LEGG, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ARCHIE C. GEE, Warden; DOCTOR TOMASINO; DOCTOR GRAIG; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DICKUS; NURSE CAMPFIELD; NURSE GRAY; THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA98-895-DKC) Submitted: December 17, 1998 Decided: January 6, 1999 Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William Allen Legg, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty days within which to file in the district court notices of appeal fromjudgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The district court entered its order on April 3, 1998; Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on July 23, 1998, which is beyond the thirty-day appeal period. Appellant’s failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leavesthis court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4013 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4013

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the resources 
eligible for the renewable energy credit to kinetic hydropower, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 29, 2006

 Mr. Smith (for himself and Mr. Wyden) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the resources 
eligible for the renewable energy credit to kinetic hydropower, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPANSION OF RESOURCES ELIGIBLE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDIT 
              TO KINETIC HYDROPOWER.

    (a) In General.--Section 45(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (defining qualified energy resources) is amended by striking 
``and'' at the end of subparagraph (G), by striking the period at the 
end of subparagraph (H) and inserting ``, and'', and by adding at the 
end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(I) kinetic hydropower.''.
    (b) Definition of Resources.--Section 45(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
            ``(10) Kinetic hydropower.--The term `kinetic hydropower' 
        means any of the following:
                    ``(A) Ocean free flowing water derived from flows 
                from tidal currents, ocean currents, waves, or estuary 
                currents.
                    ``(B) Ocean thermal energy.
                    ``(C) Free flowing water in rivers, lakes, man made 
                channels, or streams.''.
    (c) Facilities.--Section 45(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to qualified facilities) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new paragraph:
            ``(11) Kinetic hydropower facility.--In the case of a 
        facility using kinetic hydropower to produce electricity, the 
        term `qualified facility' means any facility owned by the 
        taxpayer which is originally placed in service after the date 
        of the enactment of this paragraph and before January 1, 2010. 
        Such term shall not include a facility which includes 
        impoundment structures.''.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT KINNEY WAYNE C OM PTON, Pe titione r - Appe lla nt, v. KEVIN C HAPPELL, W arde n, R

e sponde n t - Appe lle e . No. 09-56946

D.C . No. 2:06-c v-02811-GW M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia Ge orge H. W

u, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d August 6, 2013 ** B e fore : HUG, FAR

R IS, an d LEAVY C irc uit Judge s. Kinne y W ayne C om

pton a ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt de ny ing his 28 U.S.C . § 2254 ha

be a s pe tition. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 2253. W e re vie wde novo, Ybarra v . Mc Danie l , 656 F.3d 984, 989 (9th C ir. 2011), a nd we a ffirm . 

# FIL ED AUG 22 2013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).C om

pton c onte nds tha

t the tria l c ourt’ s a dm ission into ev ide nc e of the de c e a se d vic tim ’ s out-of-c ourt sta te m e nts to polic e viola

t e d C om pton’ s Sixth Am e ndm e nt right to c onfronta tion. As to the

c rim e sc e ne and e m e rge nc y room sta te m e nts, thesta

te c ourt did not unre a sona bly a pply c l e arly e sta

blishe d Supre m e C ourt la w in de ny ing C om

pton’ s c la im s . S

e e 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d)(1). C raw ford v
. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), le ft am biguous the

sc ope and m e a

ning of the te rm s “ te stim onia l” an d “ inte rrogation,” and the re we re m at e ria l diffe re n c e s be twe e n the c irc um sta

n c e s in C raw ford and thosepre s e nte d he re . As to the sta te m e nts m a de by C om

pton five da

y s a fte r the shooting, adm ission of those sta te m e nts wa s ha

rm le s s. Se e Bre c ht v . Abramson , 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). AFFIRM E D.
#### Mixon *v.*Warren *et al.,*administrators.

Although the evidence in behalf of the defendant’s theory of payment was slight, it was sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and the court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs.

August 20, 1894.

*Judgment reversed,.*

Complaint on note. Before Judge Smith. Wilcox superior court. September term, 1893.

The administrators of Thomas Warren, deceased, sued W. J. Mixon on a promissory note for $137.50 dated October 23, 1887, due January 1, 1892, and reciting that it is for the purchase money of “ 130 acres of lot of land number eight in the first district of Wilcox county.” Defendant pleaded payment, and alleged that the year of maturity was by clerical error written 1892 when it should be 1890. lie introduced three other notes from himself to Thomas Warren, each for the same amount as the one sued on, bearing the same date, and due respectively on January 1, 1888, 1889 and 1891. The first recites that it is for the purchase money of “ lot of land No. eighty containing 130,” in the first district of Wilcox county. Each of the other two recites that it is for the purchase money of “one hundred and thirty acres of lot of land No. eight,” in said district and county. On the back of the last was: “$73.92. Deceived on the within note seventy-three dollars and ninety-two cents, this Jan’y 24th, 1891.” James M. Mixon testified that lie wrote the note sued on, and was present when the contract between Thomas Warren and W. J. Mixon was made, no one else being present but himself and the parties to the contract. The consideration of the note sued was land purchased by the defendant from Warren, for which defendant gave $50 in cash and his notes for the balance. Witness did not remember the amount of the notes; thought three notes were given, but was not *689■sure. Being shown the three notes above mentioned, he testified that he wrote them, and they were a part of this same transaction. Defendant did not give more than these three notes, together with the one sued on. According to the recollection of witness, these notes so given were to fall due one each year, and the first one fell due in 1888; so that they should have fallen due in 1888, 1889, 1890 and 1891, and the note sued was to be due in 1890. Warren died in November, 1891. Not more than six months before his death he stated, in conversation with witness, that defendant was an honest, hard-working man, that defendant did not then owe him very much, and that defendant had paid him nearly all that he had been due for the purchase money of the land Warren had sold him. John Warren testified that he made the entry of credit on the note due in 1891, hy authority of Thomas Warren ; did not remember the circumstances of making the entry; did not know how many notes were given to Thomas Warren hy defendant; there must have been five, but did not know. Was not present when notes were given, and never heard Thomas Warren or any •one say how many notes there were.

Hal Lawson, for plaintiff in error.

The court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-01-00440-CR

Robert James Cuzze, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. CR-00-519, HONORABLE CHARLES R. RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDING

PER CURIAM

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated assault. Sentence was

imposed on April 10, 2001. There was a timely motion for new trial. The deadline for perfecting

appeal was therefore July 9, 2001. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(2). Notice of appeal was filed on

July 19, 2001. No extension of time for filing notice of appeal was requested. See Tex. R. App. P.

26.3. There is no indication that notice of appeal was properly mailed to the district clerk within the

time prescribed by rule 26.2(a). See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b). Under the circumstances, we lack

jurisdiction to dispose of the purported appeal in any manner other than by dismissing it for want of

jurisdiction. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App.1998);Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d

519, 522-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
2

The appeal is dismissed.

Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Yeakel and Patterson

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: August 30, 2001

Do Not Publish