2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-24-2010

Mary Byrne v. Monmouth County

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-2045

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Recommended Citation

"Mary Byrne v. Monmouth County" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1659.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1659
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

 

No. 08-2045

 

MARY BETH BYRNE, 

 Appellant.

v.

MONMOUTH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE FACILITIES;

 ILENE VANDUYNE; ROBYN SNYDER; JOHN DOES 1 TO 5

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. C. 3-06-cv-05184)

District Judge: Hon. Joel A. Pisano

 

Argued on July 15, 2009

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed March 24, 2010 )

John P. Brennan, Jr., Esquire (Argued)

912 Wall Road

Spring Lake Heights, NJ 07762

Counsel for Appellant Mary Beth Byrne
2

Douglas J. Kovats, Esquire (Argued)

Daniel R. Roberts, Esquire

Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton

130 Maple Avenue, Building 8

Red Bank, NJ 07701

Counsel for Appellee Monmouth County Department of Health

Care Facilities

John A. Camassa, Esquire

Ronald S. Yuro, Esquire (Argued)

Connell, Connell, Camassa & Yuro, P. C. 

2517 Highway 35

Building L - Suite 201

Manasquan, NJ 08736

Counsel for Appellee Robyn Snyder

Linda G. Jones, Esquire (Argued)

Cleary, Alfieri & Jones

5 Ravine Drive

P. O. Box 533

Matawan, NJ 07747

Counsel for Appellee Ilene Van Duyne

 

O P I N I O N

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Mary Beth Byrne appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of her former employer, Monmouth County Department of Health Care Facilities,

and her former supervisors, Ilene Van Duyne and Robyn Snyder, on her claims arising
 Ms. Byrne has apparently abandoned her discrimination, harassment, and retaliation 1

claims for purposes of this appeal. In any event, we agree with the District Court that she

failed to raise a material factual dispute with respect to these theories, as well.

3

under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the New Jersey

Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq. We exercise plenary review,

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Byrne. Farrell v. Planters

Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). We assume the parties’ familiarity with

the factual and procedural history, which we describe only as necessary to explain our

decision. We will affirm.

As an initial matter, Ms. Byrne’s certification—which she cites as the only source

of material factual disputes—fails to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(e). An opponent of summary judgment cannot rely upon unsupported

assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions to create a disputed issue. See

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (“The object of [Rule 56(e)] is not to

replace conclusory allegations of the complaint . . . with conclusory allegations of an

affidavit.”). Ms. Byrne’s certification was unsworn and was not supported by any of the

documentation or factual testimony gathered during the discovery process. Summary

judgment was thus appropriate for this reason alone.

Even were we to consider Ms. Byrne’s certification, however, she has not made a

prima facie case of failure to accommodate under the statutes. It is undisputed that 1
 To the extent Ms. Byrne wanted to be able to leave work frequently without advance

2

notice—in violation of County policy—so that she could see her doctors, such an

accommodation was not requested, and if it had been requested, it would have been

unreasonable as a matter of law.

4

Defendants met all but one accommodation recommended by Ms. Byrne’s physicians. 

Defendants permitted Ms. Byrne to have a self-paced workload, to make personal phone

calls during her breaks, to move about freely in her workplace to prevent leg cramping,

and to be absent from work, in accordance with county policy, to visit her doctors.2

Defendants provided close supervision of Ms. Byrne and provided further instructions

and confirmation as necessary. The only recommended accommodation not followed was

a request for longer or more frequent breaks, an accommodation that was unreasonable

given the County’s contractual obligations to its employees. Despite Defendants’ (and

the Court’s) repeated requests, Ms. Byrne has never suggested what further specific

accommodations would have permitted her to perform the functions of her job. Put

simply, there was nothing more Defendants reasonably could have done. See Taylor v.

Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.