alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 89 (Monday, May 11, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 21830]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10918]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,684]


Convergys, Cincinnati, OH; Notice of Termination of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on February 26, 2009 in response to a 
worker petition filed on behalf of the workers of Convergys, 
Cincinnati, Ohio.
    The petitioners requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 20th day of April 2009.
Richard Church,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-10918 Filed 5-8-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 8, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00747

- CV

Marcelo GALVAN Jr. and Analicia R. Galvan

,

Appellants

v.

Cl edson Macedo de CARVALHO and Kristina Carvalho,

Appellees

From the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CVH001835

- D1

Honorable Jose A. Lopez, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

To date, appellant s Marcelo Galvan Jr. and Analicia R. Galvan ha ve failed to pay the applicable filing fee in this appeal. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 provides,

A party who is not excused by statute or these rules from paying costs

must pay

— at the time an item is presented for filing

— whatever fees are required by statute or Supreme Court order. The appellate court may enforce this rule by any order that is just.

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 5.

We, therefore, ORDER appellant s
, no later than ten (10) days of the date of this order, to either (1) pay the applicable filing fee in this appeal or (2) provide written proof to this court that they are excused by statute or these rules from paying the filing fee. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 20.1 (providing that party who qualifies as indigent under Rule 20 may proceed without advance payment of costs). If appellant s fail to respond within the time provided, this appeal will be

dismissed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(c).Additionally

, appellants ’ docketing statement, which was due on October

26, 2018, has not been filed. We ORDER appellants, no later than fourteen (14) days of the date of this order to file a docketing statement.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 8th day of November, 2 018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
```

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 92 (Thursday, May 14, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22807-22808]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-11211]

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DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

Clinical Science Research and Development Service; Cooperative 
Studies Scientific Evaluation Committee; Notice of Meeting

    The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives notice under Public 
Law 92-463 (Federal Advisory Committee Act) that a meeting of the 
Clinical Science Research and Development Service Cooperative Studies 
Scientific Evaluation Committee will be held on June 26, 2009, at The 
Ritz-Carlton, 1150 22nd Street, NW., Washington, DC. The meeting is 
scheduled to begin at 8 a.m. and end at 4 p.m.
    The Committee advises the Chief Research and Development Officer 
through the Director of the Clinical Science Research and Development 
Service on the relevance and feasibility of proposed projects and the 
scientific validity and propriety of technical details, including 
protection of human subjects.
    The session will be open to the public for approximately 30 minutes 
at the start of the meeting for the discussion of administrative 
matters and the general status of the program. The remaining portion of 
the meeting will be closed to the public for the Committee's review, 
discussion and evaluation of research and development applications.
    During the closed portion of the meeting, discussions and 
recommendations will deal with qualifications of personnel conducting 
the studies, staff and consultant critiques of research proposals and 
similar documents and the medical records of patients who are study 
subjects, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. As provided by section 10(d) 
of Public Law 92-463, as amended, closing portions of this meeting is 
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6) and (c)(9)(B).
    Those who plan to attend should contact Dr. Grant Huang, Deputy 
Director, Cooperative Studies Program (125), Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 810 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20420, at (202) 461-
1700.

    Dated: May 6, 2009.

[[Page 22808]]

    By Direction of the Secretary:
E. Philip Riggin,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. E9-11211 Filed 5-13-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8320-01-P
```
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



                  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Global Gold
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30,
2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I,
Drury J. Gallagher, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

                  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.


 Dated: November 12, 2004


                                          By: /s/ Drury J. Gallagher
                                              ---------------------------------
                                               Drury J. Gallagher
                                               Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
                                               and Treasurer
#### Overcash v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res.

Case below: 179 N.C. App. 697

No. 591P06

Petitioner’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA05-1342)

Denied 01/25/07

Edmunds, J., Recused
#### Medlock *v.*Miller, executor.

1. Where a witness in testifying actually used the word “advancement,” there was no error in instructing the jury to inquire in what sense, taking into consideration all the testimony of the witness, he used this word, that is, as to whether he meant to testify that a payment referred to was an advancement by a deceased person in its technical sense, or simply a payment upon a debtdue by that person or by her deceased husband.

2. The action being against an executor, the plaintiff was not a com- • petent witness to testify as to transactions between himself and ' the testatrix in her lifetime, involved in the present action.

•3. Other questions attempted to be made in the motion for a new trial are not presented in such manner that they can be considered by this court.

4. The verdict was fully warranted by the evidence, and there was no error in refusing to grant a new trial. *Judgment affirmed.*

July 30, 1894.

Appeal. Before Judge Hutchins. Gwinnett superior court. September term, 1893.

*653Medloek cited Miller, executor of Sarah Bagwell, to show cause why he did not pay plaintiff a legacy of $200 bequeathed to him in her will. Defendant pleaded that the legacy had been adeemed by payment to plaintiff' before the death of testatrix. The verdict was for the defendant, and plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was overruled. The will was dated March 11, 1886. Testatrix died in February, 1888, and the will was probated in that month. Defendant introduced two receipts from plaintiff to Holt, the general agent of testatrix, one dated December 3, Í886, for $55 “on the amount of money due me from Sarah Bagwell the other dated November 2, 18.87, for $145 “ due me from Sarah Bagwell.” Plaintiff' was Mrs. Bagwell’s nephew, lived in Carroll county, and was at her house in Gwinnett county when these payments were made. He contended that they were received by him in settlement of indebtedness by ■open account due him by Mrs. Bagwell or her deceased husband, and not in payment of what she gave him in her will; and there was testimony by plaintiff' and his wife in support of this contention, she testifying that nothing was said at the time the money was paid. It appeared that Mrs. Bagwell’s husband died inl881. He ■owned a large estate and was not insolvent. She also was perfectly solvent, held a large estate, and usually paid debts before they were due; and a debt against •either one of them could have been collected at any time. After his death, her agent for four or five years never heard of any claim or debt due plaintiff'. She told Holt to pay plaintiff the money represented by the receipts. Holt testified that on paying it, he told plaintiff' that she had told him (Holt) to turn it over to plaintiff' as an advancement. Nothing was said about it being in lieu of a legacy, and Holt did not then know that her will contained a bequest to plaintiff'.

, The substantial grounds for a new trial are sufficiently indicated by the head-notes.

*654C. H. Brand, for plaintiff.

T. M. Peeples, for defendant.
Exhibit 35
                                  ----------


                      COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                             OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                    ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                  CWMBS, INC.
                   CHL MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH TRUST 2007-HY1
              MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-HY1


         The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an
officer of Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP (the "Master Servicer"), and does hereby further certify pursuant
to Section 3.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned
Series (the "Agreement") that:

(i) A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer
has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material
respects throughout such calendar year.




/s/ Craig Baingo                                  Dated: March 14, 2008
-----------------

Craig Baingo
Executive Vice President, Finance
#### Sukhchain SINGH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-70993.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 19, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 24, 2006.

*809Hardeep Singh Rai, George T. Heridis, Esq., Rai *&*Associates, PC, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, Kelly Alexandre Zusman, United States Attorney Office, Portland, OR, for Respondent.

Before: BRUNETTI, O’SCANNLAIN, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sukhchain Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

Substantial evidence supports the Id’s and BIA’s adverse credibility finding based on an inconsistency between petitioner’s application and testimony regarding his first arrest, an implausibility regarding his fear of persecution, and his failure to provide easily available corroborating evidence. *See Chebehoub v. INS,*257 F.3d 1038, 1043-45; *see also Sidhu v. INS,*220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that if the IJ has a reason to question the alien’s credibility, and the alien fails to produce easily available corroborating evidence, then the adverse credibility finding will withstand appellate review).

Because petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was eligible for asylum, it follows that he did not satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Fatah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

Petitioner also failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion by denying his motion to remand to pursue CAT relief. *See Movsisian v. Ashcroft,*395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2005). Because petitioner failed to establish prima facie eligibility for CAT relief, or provide any evidence that he would be at risk of suffering torture if returned to India, the BIA’s denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion. *See Ordonez v. INS,*345 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied).

*810The voluntary departure period is stayed pursuant to *Desta v. Ashcroft,*365 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir.2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 91 (Wednesday, May 13, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22549-22550]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-11136]


=======================================================================
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


A De Novo Corporation to do Business Under Section 25A of the 
Federal Reserve Act

    An application has been submitted for the Board's approval of the 
organization of a corporation to do business under section 25A of the 
Federal Reserve Act (``Edge Corporation'') 12 U.S.C. Sec. 611 et seq. 
The factors that are to be considered in acting on the application are 
set forth in the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 211.5).
    The application listed below is available for immediate inspection 
at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The application also will be 
available for

[[Page 22550]]

inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Any comment on an 
application that requests a hearing must include a statement of why a 
written presentation would not suffice in lieu of a hearing, identify 
specifically any questions of fact that are in dispute, ans summarize 
the evidence that would be presented at a hearing.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding this application must be 
received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of 
Governors not later than May 28, 2009.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Ivan Hurwitz, Bank 
Applications Officer) 33 Liberty Street, New York, New York 10045-0001:
    1. The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland, Dublin, 
Ireland; to establish a de novo Edge Corporation, Bank of Ireland 
Foreign Exchange Corporation, Orlando, Florida, pursuant to Section 25A 
of the Federal Reserve Act and Section 211.5(b) of Regulation K.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 8, 2009.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E9-11136 Filed 5-12-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
EX-31 Sarbanes-Oxley Certification.


  I, Diane Courtney, certify that:

  1.I have reviewed the report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
    required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
    Form 10-K of Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities Trust, Series
    2007-1 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
    whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
    to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
    light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
    covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

  4.I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
    servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews
    conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in
    this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
    in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
    their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material
    respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
    for ABS and their related attestation reports on assessment of
    compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required
    to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of
    Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been
    included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in
    this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such
    reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
    information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: ABN
    AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. as Servicer and IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. as
    Servicer.

    Dated:   March 26, 2008


    /s/ Diane Courtney
    Signature

    Vice President
    (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the master
    servicer)
#### In the Matter of Myasia C., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[973 NYS2d 17]

Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Mary E. Bednar, J.), entered on or about May 23, 2012, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-finding determination that she committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of menacing in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and placed her on probation for a period of 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The record supports the court’s determination that, notwithstanding an identification procedure suppressed by the court, each of the witnesses at issue had an independent source for his or her identification of appellant *(see Neil v Biggers,*409 US 188, 199-200 [1972]; *People v Williams,*222 AD2d 149 [1st Dept 1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 1072 [1996]). Each witness had an ample opportunity to see appellant during the altercation, which occurred over three to four minutes in a well-lit building. *412Furthermore, although the witnesses did not know appellant by name, they had not only seen her on numerous prior occasions, but were familiar with her as the result of earlier instances of threatening behavior.

The court properly denied that portion of appellant’s suppression motion that sought a hearing under *Dunaway v New York (442*US 200 [1979]) concerning the legality of the arrest that resulted in her identification by the witnesses. The allegations in appellant’s moving papers, when considered in the context of the information provided to appellant, were insufficient to create a factual dispute requiring a hearing *(see People v Mendoza,*82 NY2d 415 [1993]). Appellant was on notice that the factual predicate for her arrest was an incident of alleged menacing and possession of a knife that had occurred several days before the arrest. Appellant did not specifically deny those allegations or assert any other basis for suppression *(see People v Jones,*95 NY2d 721, 728-729 [2001]). Concur — Friedman, J.P., Moskowitz, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Anthony Decarlos HARRIS, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 08-4785.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 20, 2009.

Decided: May 13, 2009.

*215Mitchell G. Styers, Banzet, Thompson & Styers, PLLC, Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Decarlos Harris pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Harris was sentenced to fifty-seven months of imprisonment and now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising one issue but stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Harris was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. We affirm.

In the *Anders*brief, counsel questions whether Harris’ sentence was substantively unreasonable. A sentence is reviewed for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *see also United States v. Seay,*553 F.3d 732, 742 (4th Cir.2009). The appellate court must first determine whether the district court committed any “significant procedural error,” *Gall,*128 S.Ct. at 597, and then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, applying a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range. *United States v. Evans,*526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 476, 172 L.Ed.2d 341 (2008); *see also Gall,*128 S.Ct. at 597; *Rita v. United States,*551 U.S. 338, 345-59, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-69, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentence).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find that the district court committed no procedural error in calculating the sentence. Furthermore, we find that the district court’s within-guidelines sentence is reasonable.

In accordance with *Anders,*we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Harris’ conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Harris, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Harris requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Harris.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*