alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 35.2**

 

**WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.**

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATEANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

            I, Barbara Campbell, an authorized officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (the “Administrative Agent”), dohereby certify to WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. (the “Depositor”) and Washington Mutual Bank (the “Servicer”), pursuant to the Amended and Restated Administrative Agent Agreement dated as of February 1, 2005 (the“Servicing Agreement”) by and between the Servicer, and the Administrative Agent the following with respect to Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series 2007-2 Trust for the 2007 fiscal year  (the “RelevantYear”): 

1.                  A review of the activities of the AdministrativeAgent during the Relevant Year and of performance under the Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2.                  To the best of my knowledge, based on such review,the Administrative Agent has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Relevant Year, except that, during the month of April, 2007, the Administrative Agent failed to report the amounts payable to eachoutstanding class of exchangeable certificates in accordance with Section 4.02(b)(A)(6) of the applicable pooling and servicing agreement.  Instead the Administrative Agent reported the aggregate distribution amount for all exchangeable certificates.  OnMay 17, 2007, the Administrative Agent issued a revised distribution report to the trustee which reflected the actual principal balances for each class of exchangeable certificates on the distribution report and the associated distribution amount for suchclass.  WMMSC has amended its procedures to reflect that future distribution reports will reflect the actual outstanding principal balances for each class of exchangeable certificates and future distribution calculations will be made for each outstanding classof exchangeable certificates in accordance with the principal amount outstanding.

Dated as of March 1, 2008.

 
| /s/ Barbara CampbellName:  Barbara CampbellTitle:    First Vice President |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### Eudy v. Michelin N. Am., Inc.

Case below: 182 N.C. App. — (17 April 2007)

No. 285P07

1. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA06-902)

2. Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed 06/20/07 Stay Dissolved 06/27/07

2. Denied 06/27/07

3. Denied 06/27/07
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 13 (Thursday, January 22, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 4032]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-1134]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER09-498-000]


Vickers Power, LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial Market-Based 
Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 Authorization

January 13, 2009.
    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of 
Vickers Power, LLC's application for market-based rate authority, with 
an accompanying rate tariff, noting that such application includes a 
request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR Part 34, of future 
issuances of securities and assumptions of liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 
385.214). Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a 
copy of that document on the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with 
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18 
CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability, is February 2, 2009.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet 
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an 
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the 
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the 
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 
14 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First St., NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above-referenced proceeding are accessible in 
the Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in 
the above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link 
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail notification 
when a document is added to a subscribed dockets(s). For assistance 
with any FERC Online service, please e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#71373423323e1f1d181f14220401011e030531171403125f161e07"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="eea8abbcada1808287808bbd9b9e9e819c9aae888b9c8dc0898198">[email protected]</span></a>, 
or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-1134 Filed 1-21-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-17-00168- CV
Appellan t, CM A Consultin g Service s // Cross Appellant, Texas Health and Human Servic es Com m ission
v. Appellee, Texas Health and H um an Services Com m ission // Cross-A ppellee, CMA C onsu lting S ervic es

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 53RD J UDICIAL DI STRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 6-0 0233 1, H ONO RAB LE SCO TT H . JENK INS, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O PI N I O N
The parties have filed a joint motion to dismiss their respe ctive appea ls in this cause number. Acc ording ly , we g rant the motion and dismiss the appea ls. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a) (1).

__________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Jus tice Be fore Chief Justice Rose, Pemberton, a nd Goodwin; J ustice Pemberton not par ticipating Dismissed on J oint Moti on Filed: Nove mber 28, 2018
EXHIBIT 35.2

                    SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)

                               GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC

                RALI SERIES 2007-QH3 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of GMAC Mortgage,  LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer")  pursuant to the applicable  servicing  agreement,  does hereby
certify that:

1. A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during  the  period  covered  by the
Issuing Entity's report on Form 10-K and of the Servicer's performance under the
applicable servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled
all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing agreement in all material
respects  throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 24th
day of March 2008.


By:   /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      Name:   Anthony N. Renzi
      Title:   Executive Vice President
Exhibit 33.1.3

 

[Letterhead of Wells Fargo Bank, NA]

 

 

ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA 

Corporate Trust Services division of Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (the "Company") is responsible for assessing compliance with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Company has determined that the servicing criteria are applicable in regards to the servicing platform as of and for the period as follows: 

Platform: Publicly-issued *(i.e.,*transaction-level reporting required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential mortgage-backed securities and commercial mortgage-backed securities issued on or after January 1,2006 for which the Company provides document custody services, excluding any publicly issued transactions issued by any government sponsored entity (the "Platform"). 

Applicable Servicing Criteria: The servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d)(I)(iv), 1122{d)(4)(i) and 

 

I 122(d)(4)(ii), in regard to the activities performed by the Company with respect to the Platform (the 

"Applicable Servicing Criteria"). Management of the Company has determined that all other servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) are not applicable to the Platform. 

Period: As of and for the twelve months ended December 31,2007 (the "Period"). 

With respect to the Platform and the Period, the Company provides the following assessment of compliance with respect to the Applicable Servicing Criteria: 

1. The Company is responsible for assessing its compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria. 

2. The Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria. In performing this assessment, the Company used the criteria set forth by the Securities and Exchange Commission in paragraph (d) of Item 1 122 of Regulation AB. 

3. Based on such assessment, as of and for the Period, the Company has complied, in all material respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria. 

KPMG LLP, a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report with respect to the Company's assessment of compliance as of and for the Period. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 

|   | By: */s/Shari Gillund*  |
|--------|------------------------------|

lts: Senior Vice President 

Dated: February 29, 2008
#### Mitchell *et al. v.*Andrews.

1. Where there was evidence both for and against the truth of a plea of justification, the jury should find against the plea unless it is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. An instruction to this effect is the same, in substance, as directing the jury that in *612order to uphold the plea they must be reasonably satisfied that it is true.

2. Where there would be no moral right to sue out legal process without probable cause, it was not error to instruct the jury that there would be no right to do it without such cause, and a plea of j ustification being filed, the burden of proof as to the right would be on the defendant.

3. There was no error in charging the jury on the subject of damages; nor, as against the defendants below, was any charge complained of erroneous.

4. A suggestion of the non-residence of one of the codefendants in the county in which the suit is located, no question having been raised on the jurisdiction until after verdict, and both defendants having appeared and pleaded, is idle and unfounded as a ground for a new trial. *Judgment affirmed.*

June 30, 1894.

Action for damages. Before Judge Westmoreland. City court of Atlanta. November term, 1898.

R. J. Jordan, for plaintiff in error.

W. J. Albert, *contra.*

Manley as agent of Mrs. Mitchell sued ’out a warrant to dispossess Andrews of certain premises in Hampton, Henry county. In the present suit Andrews alleged that said action was wrongful and malicious. The case came to this court (92 *Ga.*629). It was again tried, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff'. Defendants’ motion for a new trial was overruled. The motion alleges, that the court erred in charging the jury that, under the plea of justification, the law casts upon the defendants “ the burden of showing that they had the right to procure said warrant to dispossess the plaintiff; and this they must do to your reasonable satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Also, in charging in the language of the code, §3066, and the first sentence of §3067. Also, that defendant Manley resided in Henry county, and only did what he was authorized to do ; and hence the city court of Atlanta had no jurisdiction of him. There was no plea to the jurisdiction.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Global Gold Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Robert A. Garrison, the
President, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated: June 8, 2004


                                        By: /s/ Robert A. Garrison
                                            ----------------------------------
                                            Robert A. Garrison
                                            President, Chief Operating Officer
                                            and Chief Financial Officer
#### Brumby *v.*Rickoff.

1. According to the act of October 25th, *1889,*which declares that all affidavits that are the foundation of legal proceedings shall be amendable to the same extent as ordinary declarations, an affidavit to obtain an attachment, and alleging the ground of attachment to be that the debtor is “ about to remove without the limits of the State,” is amendable by adding to these terms the words “ and county,” so as to make it read, *“*without the limits of the State and county.” When so amended on oath, whether the amendment be sworn to orally or in writing, the affidavit should be construed as expressing what was originally intended by the affiant, and thus construed is sufficient. There was consequently no error in overruling the *certiorari*as to points made touching the affidavit.

2. The ground of the attachment having been duly traversed as provided for in section 3312 of the code, the defendant was entitled to introduce evidence to sustain his traverse, and the presiding justice erred in holding that it was too late to do this after the defendant had replevied the property attached. With respect to this element of the case, the superior court erred in not sustaining the *certiorari. Judgment reversed..*

March 26, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

*Certiorari.*Before Judge Henry. Bloyd superior •court. March term, 1893.

Attachment was sued out on the ground that the defendant was “about to remove without the limits of the State.” Levy was made, and the defendant replevied the property. He also filed a traverse, alleging that he was not about to remove without the limits of the county. At the trial he moved to dismiss the attachment, for the reason that the ground therefor was not one of those laid down in the code. The motion was *430overruled, and the plaintiff was allowed to amend by adding the words “ and county ” after the word “ State.” The plaintiff proved that the defendant owed him the amount for which the attachment was sued out, but made no proof of the fact stated as the ground of attachment ; whereupon defendant moved to dismiss the the case as by nonsuit. The motion was overruled, and the court also refused to allow defendant to introduce evidence to sustain the traverse, holding that the ground of attachment could not be traversed after the property attached had been replevied. Judgment for the plaintiff was rendered; and by *certiorari*defendant assigned each of the foregoing rulings as error. The *certiorari*was overruled, and defendant excepted.

W. S. Rowell, by R. T. Fouché, for plaintiff in error.

G. A. H. Harris, *contra.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank Calaway WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-10437.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 18, 2006.

Alan Hechtkopf, Attorney, Larry J. Wszalek, Esq., Brian D. Galle, Esq., Mark T. Odulio, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michele R. Moretti, Esq., Lake Butler, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: T.G. NELSON, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Frank Calaway Williams appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and 27-month sentence imposed for two counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation and presentation of false and fraudulent income tax returns for tax year 2000, in violation of 26 U. S.C. § 7206(2).

Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel for Williams has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, and a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Because our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 82-83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), indicates that Williams knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and was sentenced within the terms of the plea agreement, we enforce the waiver and dismiss the appeal. *See United States v. Nguyen,*235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered knowingly and voluntarily); *see also United States v. Cardenas,*405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the changes in sentencing law imposed by *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
##### 



Exhibit 99.2 Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63
of Title 18 of the United States Code I, William R. Fatt, the chief executive officer of Fairmont Hotels &
Resorts Inc. (the Corporation), certify that (i) the report on Form 6-K for
the month of July, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation. /s/ William R. FattWilliam R. FattJuly 26, 2004
    Chief Executive Officer
#### State v. Mowery

Case below: 184 N.C. App. — (3 July 2007)

No. 367P07

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA06-947)

Denied 10/11/07
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANTTO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Stone TanChina Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), the undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge:

 

(1) TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and result of operations of the Company for the periodcertified.

 

 

Signed on this 19th day of March, 2008

 

 
|   | /s/ Richard Tan                                                                  |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Richard Tan                                                                      |
|   | Chief Executive Officer  (Principal Executive, Accounting and Financial Officer) |

 

 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carl Squitieri, Appellant.

Submitted August 17, 2009;

decided August 27, 2009

Reported below, 60 AD3d 1208.

Motion for an extension of the time within which to apply for permission to appeal pursuant to CPL 460.20 granted and motion papers treated as a timely CPL 460.20 application.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Salvador PEREZ-CUEVAS, also known as Jose Gonzalez-Hernandez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-41380.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Oct. 25, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Laura Fletcher Leavitt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

*674Salvador Perez-Cuevas (Perez) appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for being found in the United States after previous deportation. *See 8*U.S.C. § 1326. Perez argues that the district court erred by imposing a 16-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based upon his Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. As Perez concedes, his argument is foreclosed. *See United States v. Valdez-Maltos,*443 F.3d 910, 911 (5th Cir.2006), *cert. denied,*2006 WL 2094539 (U.S. Oct.2, 2006) (No. 06-5473); *United States v. Garcia-Mendez,*420 F.3d 454, 455-57 (5th Cir.2005), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1398, 164 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006).

Perez also challenges, in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than as elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. This issue is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Perez contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi,*we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Perez properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *Almendarez-Torres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *674published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.