1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 09 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s yllab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s yll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s DO E ET AL
. v . REED, WASHIN GTON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 09–5 59. Ar g u ed Apr il 28, 201 0—Dec i ded Ju n e24, 201 0 The Washingt on Constitutio nallows c i tize ns to c h alleng e sta t e law s b y

referendum. To initia te areferendum, proponents mus tfile a pet i

tion with the sec r e tar yof state thatcontains va lid s i gna t ures of reg

ister e d Washi n gt on v o ter s equal to or exceeding four pe rcent of th e vot e s ca stfor the office of Governo r at the l a st gubernatorial election

. A valid submi ssion requires not only a sig n atu r e, bu t also th e sig n er ’ s address and t h e co unty in which he is regi s t ered to vote.

In Ma y 2 0 0 9 , Wa s h ingt on Governo rChristine Gregoire signed into law Senate Bi ll 56 88, which expandedthe rights and re sponsib ilit ie s of state-registered domestic part ners, including same-s ex domestic pa rtners

. Th a ts a me month, Pr otect Marriage Washington, oneof the petitioner s her e , was or g a nized as a “ S ta te Politic a lCommit t ee” for the purpose of collecting the peti tionsi g n atu r es n e c e ssar yto plac e a r e fer e n du m c h allen gin g SB 568 8 onth e ballot. If th e r e fer e n d u m made it onto the ballot, Pr otec t Ma rria g e Wa s h ingt on pla nned t oen c o u r ag e v o ter sto r ejec tSB 5688. Pr otec t M a r r i ag e Wash in gt onsub

mittedthe pe t i tion with mo r ethan 13 7,0 00 sig n atu r es to th e sec r e t a ry of s t a t e, a n d a f t e r con d uct i ng t h ev e rifica t i on a n d ca nva s s i ng process required by stat e la w, the sec r e tar ydeter m ined that the peti

tionc o n t ain e dsu ffic i en t sig n atu r es to qu alifyth e r e fer e n d u m(R–7 1) forthe bal lot. Respondent i n terv eno r s invoked the Washington Pub

licRec o r d s Ac t (PRA) to o b t a in c o pies of t h e petition, whic h c o ntained th e sig n er s’ n a mes an d addr e sses.

Th e R–71 pe t i tionspon sor an d c e r t ainsi g n er s filed a c o mplain t and a mo tion f o r injunctive relief in Federa l District Cour t, seeking to enjoin the public release of the peti tion. C o unt I alleg e s that the P RA “is unconstitut ional as app lie d to re fer e ndum peti tions,” a n d Count II2 DOE v. REED Sy llabu s alleges that t h e PRA “is unconstitutional as appl ied to the Referen

du m 71 peti ti onbec a u s e th er e is a r e ason able pr obab il ityth at th e signatories .

. . will be subjected to threats, harassmen t, and repri

sal s .” Deter m iningthat the PRA bu rdened core political speech, the Dis t rict Court held tha tpla i ntiffs were lik ely to succeed on the merits of Cou n tI an dgr an ted apr elimin ar y injunction preventing release of the s i gna t ory i n forma t ion. R e viewing o n ly Count I, the Ni nth Circuit held tha t pla i ntiffs were unlikely to suc c e ed on theirc l aim that th e PRA is unconstitut ional a s applied to referendum petitions in gen

eral, and therefore re versed. Held: Disc losur eof r e fer e ndum petitions does not as a g e ner a l matter

v i olate th e Fir s t Amen dmen t

. Pp. 4–13.

(a) Because plaintiffs’ Count I cl ai m an d t h e r e lief th at wou l d fol

low—a ninj unct i on b a rring t h e s e cret a ry of s t at e from relea s ing ref

er endum petitions to th e pub lic—rea ch b e yond t h epa rt icula rci rcum stan c e s of th ese plain t iff s , t h eymu st sati sfyth is Cou r t’ s stan dar d s for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach. See Un ited S t atesv. Stevens , 559 U

. S. ___, ___

. P p . 4–5.

(b ) The com p e lled dis c los u re of s i gna t ory inform a t ion on referen

dum peti tions is subjec tto r e v i ewunderthe Fir s t Ame n dment. In most ca ses, th e individual’s signat ure will express th e view that the law subjec t to the petition should be overturned. Even if the signer is agnostic as to the merits of t h e underly ing law, his signat ure still ex

presses the po litical view th at the questio nshould be co nsidered “by the whole electorate.” Meye rv. Gran t , 486 U. S. 4 14, 4 21. Ine i th er case, the expression of a political view implicates a First Amendmen t right

.

Petition sig n in gr e main s ex pr essiv e even when it has le gal effect i n the electoral p r ocess. But that d oes not mean thatthe elec tor a l c o n tex tis ir r e lev a nt to the nat u r eof this Cour t’ s Fir s t Am endment r e view. S t a t es have s i gnifica n tflex ibili ty in implementi ng their own v o tin gsy stems. To th e ex ten ta r e gu latio nco ncerns thelegal effect of a par t ic ulara c tiv i tyin thatpr oc e ss, th e g o v e r n men tis affor d ed su b

stanti alla titu de to enfor c et h at r e g u lation

. Al so per t ine n t is the fac t that the PRA is not a pr oh ibition on speech, but a d i sclos urere quir ement tha tm a ybur d en “the ab ili tyto speak, but [do e s] ‘not pre

vent a n yone from s p ea king. ’ ” Citi zens Unitedv. Federal Election Comm’ n , 558 U. S. ___, ___. This Co urt has reviewed First Amend

m e ntcha llenges t o dis c los u re req u irements in the electoral context u n d eran “ex a c t in gsc ru tin y”stan dar d , r e qu ir in g “a ‘ s u b stan tia lr e la

tion’ between the disclosure requ irement and a ‘sufficie n tly impor

t a nt ’ governm e nt a lint e res t

. ” Id ., at ___. To withstand this scrutiny, “the str e ngth of the g o v e r n mental inter e st must r e flec t the ser i ous n e ss of th e ac t u al bu r d enon Fir s t Amendm ent r i gh ts.” Dav i s v. Fe d

-3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Sy llabu s eral Election Comm’n , 554 U. S. ___, ___. P p . 5–7.

(c) The State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral pr oc ess su ffic e s to defeat th e ar g u men tth at th e PRA is u n c on stitu

tional with r e spec t to r e fer e ndum pe tition s in general. That interes t is par t ic ular lystr o ngwith r e spec t to effor t s to r oot out fr aud. But the State’s int e rest is not limited to c o mb atingfr aud; it ex tends to ef

for t s to fer r e t out inv a lid sig n atur es c a u s ed n o t byfr au d bu t bysim

ple mist ake, s u c has du plic ate sig n at ures or signatures of individuals who ar e not regi ster ed to v o te in th e State

. Th e State’ s in ter e st als o ex tends mor eg e ner a llyto promotin gtr an spar en c yan d a c c o un tabili ty in the electora l process.

Plaintiff s c o ntend that di sc losur eis not s u ffic i entlyr e l a ted to th e interest of protecting the integrit y of the electoral process to with

stand Fir s t A m endment sc r u tiny

. Th ey a r gue that disclosure is n o t neces s a ry b e ca us e t h e s e cret a ry of s t at e is a l rea dy cha r g e d wit hveri

fy ingand c a nv assingthe na mes on a peti t i on, a mea s ur e’ s adv o c a tes a n d opponents ca n ob s e rvetha tproces s , a n y citizen ca n cha llenge the s e cret a ry’s a c t i ons in court , a n d crim i na l pena lt ies redu ce t h e da nger of fraud in the petition process. But the sec r e tar y ’ s v e rific a tion an d canvassing will not catch all the inva lid sig n atures, and public disclo

s u re ca n help cure t h e i n a d eq ua cies of t h e s e cret a ry’s p r oces s . Dis

closure also helps prevent difficult-t o-detect fraud such as outright for g eryan d “bait an d switc h ” fr au d, in wh i c hanin div i dual sig n s th e petition b a sedon a misr epresentat ion of the underly ing issue. And disclosure promotes tr an sp a r en cyan d accou n t ab ili ty in the electoral pr oc ess to anex ten toth e rmeasu r es c a n n o t. Pp. 8–10.

(d) Plaintiffs’ main objec t io n is that “the str e ngth of th e g o v e r n mental inter e s t” does not “r eflec tth e serio u sness of the actual burden on Fir s t Ame n dment r i gh ts.” Davis , su pra , at ___. According to plaintiff s , the objective of those s eeking di sclosure is no t to prevent fr au d, bu t to pu blic ly identi fy signatories an d broadcasttheir politi

cal views on th e subject of the petiti on. P l aintiffs allege , for example, that several groups plan to post the peti ti ons in searchable form on the Internet, and then encourage othe rc i tizens to seek o u t R– 71 peti

tionsig n er s. Th at, plain t iffs ar g u e, woul d subjec t them to thr e at s , h a r a ssmen t, a n d r e pr isals.

The pr oblem forplaintiffs is that theirarg u ment r e sts almos ten tirely on the specific harm that wo uld a t tend the dis c los u re of infor

mation on the R–7 1 peti tion. But the question before the Court at this s t age of t h e litigat ion i s whether dis c losure of referendum peti

tions in g e ne r a l v i olate s t h e Fir s t A m e n dment. Fac e d with the Sta t e’ s unr ebutted ar g u ments that onlymodest bur d ens attend the disclosure of a typical peti tio n , pl aintiffs’ b r oad challengeto the PRA mu st be r ejec t ed. Bu t u p h o l d in gth e PRA ag ain s t a br oa d-basedc h al

-4 DOE v. REED Sy llabu s lenge does notforeclos e s u cces s on pla i ntiffs ’ na rrower cha llenge in Count II, whic h is pending b e fore the Dis t rict Court. S e e Buckleyv. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 74. Pp. 1 0–1 3. 586 F. 3d 67 1, affir m ed.

R OBERTS , C. J., delivered theopinion of the Cour t, in whic h K ENNEDY , G IN SB U R G , B REYER , ALITO , an d S OTOMAYO R , JJ., joined. B REYER , J., an d ALITO , J

. , filed conc ur ring op inions

. S OTO MAYOR , J., filed a concu rrin g opinion, in which S TEVENS an d G IN SB U R G , JJ., joined. S TEVENS , J., filed a nopinion co n c ur ringin pa r ta n d con c ur ri ng inthe j u d g ment, in w h ic h B REYER , J., joined. S CALIA , J., filed an opinion co ncurri ng in the judg

ment. T HOMAS , J., filed a dissenting opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] C HIEF J U S TICE R OBER TSdelivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Washington allows its citizens to challenge state laws by referendum. Roughly four percent of Was h

ington voters must sign a peti tion to place such a referen

dum on th e ballot. That petiti on, which by law mu st include the names and addresses of the signers, is then submitted to the government for verification and canvass

ing, to ens u re that only lawful signatures are counted. The Washington Public Records Act (P RA) authorizes private pa r t ies to obtain copies of governmentdocuments, and the State construes the P RA to cover submitted refer

endum petitions. This case arises out of a state law extending certai n benefits to same-sex couples, and a correspon ding refere n dum petition to put th at law to apopular vo te. Respon

dent intervenors invok e d the PRA to obtain copies of the petition, with the names and a d dresses of the signer s. Certain pet i tion signers and the p e tition sponsor objected, arguing th at such pu blic disclosure would violate their rights unde rthe First Amendment.2 DOE v. REED Opinion of theCourt The course of this litigation, however, has f r amed the legal question before u s more broadly. The issue at this stage of thecase is notwhethe r disclosure of this particu

lar petition would v i olate the First Ame n dment, b u t whether disclosure of refere ndum petition s in gener a l would do so. We conclude that such disclosure does not a s a general matter violate the Fir s t Amendment, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. W e leave it to th e lower courts to consider in the first instance the signers’ more focused claim concerning disclosure of the information on this particu lar petition, which is pend

ing before the District Court. I The Washington Constitution reserves to the people the power to reject any bill, with a few limited exceptions not relevant here, through the re ferendum process. Wash

. Const., Art. II, §1(b). To in itiate a referendum, proponents must file a petition wi th the secr etary of sta t e that con

tains valid signatures of registered Washington vote rs equal to or exceeding four percent of the votes cast for the office of Governor at the last gubernatorial election. §§1(b), (d). A valid submission requires not only a signa

ture, but also the signer’s address and the county in which he is registered to vote. Wash. Rev. Code §29A.72.130 (2008). In May 2009, Washington Govern or Christin e Gregoire signed into law Senate Bill 5688 , which “expand[ed] the rights and responsibi lities” of s t ate-registered domestic partners, in cluding sa me-sex domestic partne r s. 586 F. 3d 671, 675 (CA9 2009). That same month, Protect Marriage Washington, one of the petitioners here, was organized as a “State Po litical Committee” for the purpose of collecting the petition signatures necessary to place a re ferendum on the ballot, which wo uld give th e voters th emselves an opportunity to vote on SB 5688. App. 8–9. If the referen

-3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt dum made it onto the ballot, Protect Mar r iage Washington planned to encourage voters to reject SB 5688. Id ., at 7, 9. On July 25, 2009, Protect Marriage Washington submit

ted to the secretary o f state a petition containing over 137,000 signatures. See 586 F. 3d, at 675; Brief for Re

spondent Washington Families St anding Together 6. T h e secretary of state then began the verification and canvas s ing process, as requiredby Wash ington law, to ensure that only legal signatures were counted. Wash. Rev. Code §29A.72.230. Some 120,000 valid signatures were re

quired to place the referendum on the ballot. Sam Reed, Washington Secreta ry of State, C e rtification of Referen

dum 71 (Sept. 2, 2009). The secretary of s t ate determine d that the petition conta i ned a sufficient number of vali d signatures, and the referendum (R–71) appeared on the November 2009 ballot. The voter s approved SB 5688 by a margin of 53% to 47%. The PRA, Wash. Rev. Code §42.56.001 et s e q ., makes all “public records” available for pub lic inspecti on and cop y ing. §42.56.070(1) (2008). The Act defines “[p]ublic re

cord” as “a ny writing containi ng information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency.” §42.56.010( 2). Wash in gton takes the position that refer

endum petitions are “p ublic records.” Brief for Respon

dent Reed 5. By Au gust 20, 2009, the secretary had received requests for copies of the R–71 petition froman individual and fou r entities, in cluding Washington Coalition forOpen Gov

ernment (WCOG) and Washington Families Standing Together (WFST), two of the resp ondents her e . 586 F. 3 d , at 675. Two entities, WhoSigned.org and Kn owThyNeighbor.org, issued a joint press releasestating their intention to post the n a mes of the R–71 petition signer s online, in asearchable format. Se e App. 11; 586 F. 3d, a t4 DOE v. REED Opinion of theCourt 675. The referendum petition sponsorand certain signers filed a complaint and a motion for a prelimina r y injunctio n in the United States District Co urt for the Western Dis

trict of Wa shington, seeking to enjoin the secretary o f state from publicly releasin g any documents that woul d reveal the names and contact information of the R–7 1 petition signers. Ap p. 4. CountI of the comp laint alleges that “[ t]he Public Reco rds Act is unconstitutional as ap

plied to referendum petitions.” Id ., at 16. Count II of th e complaint alleges that “[t]he Public Records Act is uncon

stitutional as applied to the Referendum 71 petition b e cause there is a reasonable pr obability that the signatories of the Refer e ndum 71 p e tition w ill be subjected to threats, harassment, and repris als.” Id., a t17. Determining that the PRA burdened core political speech, the District Cour t held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on th e merits of Count I an d gran ted them a pre liminary injunction on that count, enjoining release of the information on the petition. 6 61 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1205–1206 (WD Wash. 2009). The United States Co urt of Appe als for the Ninth Cir

cuit reversed. Reviewing only Count I of the complaint, the Court of Appeals h e ld that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claim that the PRA is uncons t itutional as applied to referendum petitions generally. It therefore reversed the DistrictCourt’s gr ant of the preliminary injunction. 586 F. 3d, at 681. We granted certiorari. 55 8 U. S. ___ (2010). II It is important at the outset to d e fine thesc ope of the challenge b e fore us. As noted, Count I of the complain t contends that the PRA “violates the First Amendment as applied to referendum petitions.” App. 16. Count II as

serts that the PRA “is unconstitu t ional as applied to the5 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt Referendum 71 petiti on.” Id., at 17. The District Co urt decision was based so le ly on Count I; the Court of Appeals decision reversing the Dis trict C o urt was similarly lim

ited. 586 F. 3d, at 6 76, n. 6. Neither co urt addressed Count II. The parties disagree about whether Count I is properly viewed as afacial or as -applied ch allenge. Compare Repl y Brief for Petitioners 8(“Count I expressly made an a s applied challenge”), with Brief for Respondent Reed 1 (“This is a f a cial challenge to Was h ington’s Public Records Act”). It obviously has characterist ics of both: The claim is “as applied” in the sens e that itdoes not seek to strike th e PRA in all i t s applications, but on l yto the extent it covers referendum petitions. The claim is “facial” in that it is no t limited to plaintiffs’ particula r cas e , but challenges appli

cation of the law more broadly to all referendum petitions. The label is not what matters. The important point is that plainti ffs’ claim a n d the relief that woul d follow—an injunction barring the secretary of state “fr o m making referendum petitions available t o the public,” App. 1 6 (Complaint Count I)—r each beyond the partic u lar circum

stances of these plainti ffs. They must therefore satisfy our standards for a facial c hallenge to the extent of that reach. See UnitedSta t esv. Stevens , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 10). III A The compelled disclosure of signatory information on referendum petitions is subje ct to review un der the Fi r s t Amendment. An individual expresses a view o na political matter wh en he signs a petition under Washington’s referendum procedure. In most cases, the individual’s signature will express the view that the law subject to the petition should be overturned. Eve nif the signer is agnos

tic as to th e merits of the underl ying law, h i s signatur e6 DOE v. REED Opinion of theCourt still expres ses the poli tical vi ew that the question shou ld be consider ed “by the whole elect o rate.” Meyer v. Grant , 486 U. S. 4 14, 421 (1988). In eith er case, the expression of a political view implicates a First Amendment right. The State, having “cho[sen] to tap the energy and the legiti

mizing power of the democratic p r ocess, . . . must accor d the participants in that process the First Amendment rights thatattach to their roles.” Republican Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U. S. 765, 788(2002) (int ernal quota

tion marks and ellipsis omitted). Respondents counter that signing a petition is a legally operative legislative a ct and therefore “does not involv e any significant expressive elem ent.” Brief for Responden t Reed 31. Itis true thatsigning a r e ferendum petition may ultimately have the legal conseq uence of r e quiring the secretary of state to place the referendum on the ballot. But we do not see how addings u ch legal effect to an e x pressive activity somehow depr iv es that activity of its expressive component, tak i ng it outside the scope of the First Ame n dment. Respondents themselves implicitly recognize t hat the sig nature expr esses a particular vie w point, arguing that one purpose se rved by disclosure is t o allow the public to engage signers in a debateon the mer

its of theu n derlying law. See, e. g . , id., at 45; Brief for Respondent WCOG 49; Brief for Respondent WFST 58. Petition signing remains expressive even when it has legal effect in the electoral proc ess. But that is not to say that the electoral conte x t is irrelev ant to the n a ture of our First Amendment review. We allow States significant flexibility i nimplemen ting their own voting s y stems. See Burdickv. Takushi , 50 4 U. S. 428, 433–434 (1 992). To th e extent a reg u lation concerns the legal effect of a particular activityin that p r ocess, the gove rnment wil lbe afforded substantial latitude to enforce that regulation. Also perti

nent to our analysis is the fact th at the PRA is not a pro

hibition on speech, but instead a disclosurerequirement

.7 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt “[D]isclosure requirem e nts may burden the ability to speak , but they .

. . do not prevent anyone from speak i ng.” Citizen sUn itedv. Fed e ral Ele c tionComm’n , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have a series o f precedents considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral co ntext. The s e precedents have reviewed such challenges under wha thas been termed “e xacting scru

tiny.” See, e.g. , Buckl e yv. Va le o , 424 U. S. 1, 64 (1976) ( per cur i a m ) (“Since NAACP v. Alabama[357 U. S. 449 (1958),] we have required that the subordinating interests of the State [offered t o justify compelled disclosure] sur

vive exacti ng scrutiny”); Citizen sUnited , supra , at _

__ (slip op., a t51) (“The Court has subjected [disclosure] requirements to ‘exacting scruti ny’ ” (quoti ng Buckley , supra , at 64 )); Davisv. Fe de ral E lec t i on C o mm’ n , 554 U. S.

___, _ __ (20 08) (slip op., at 18) (governmental interest in disclosure “ ‘must survive exacti ng scrutin y ’ ” (quotin g Buckley , su pra , at 64)); Buckley v. Ame r ica nConsti tu

tional Law Foundation, Inc., 52 5 U. S. 182, 204 (19 99) ( ACLF ) (fi nding thatdisclosure rules “fail[ed] exactin g scrutiny” (i nternal quotation marks omitted)). That standard “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important ’ government al interest.” Citizen sUnited , supra , at ___ (slip op., at51) (quoting Buckley , supra , at 64, 66). T o withstandt h is scrutiny , “the st rength of the g o vernmental interest must reflect th e seriousness of the actual burden on First Am endment rights.” Davis , sup ra , at ___ (slip op. , at 18) (citing Buckl e y , supra , at 68, 71). 1

——————

1 J US TI CE S CALIA doubts whetherpetition sig n ingis ent i tled to any First Amendment protecti on at al l. Po st , a t1 (opinion conc ur ringin ju dg men t). His skept i c i sm is ba sed on the v i ew that petition sig n ing has “legal eff e cts” in the l e gislat ive process, while other aspects o f political p a rti c ipation—with respect to which wehave held there is a8 DOE v. REED Opinion of theCourt B Respondents assert two interests to justify the burdens of compelle d disclosure under the PRA on First Amend

ment rights: (1) preserving the integrity of the elector a l process by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and fostering govern ment trans parency an d accounta b il

ity; and (2) providing i n formation to the electorate about who supports the petition. See, e.g. , Brief for Respondent Reed 39–42, 44–45. Because we determine that the State’s inte rest in preserving the i n tegrityof the electoral process suffices to def e at the argument that the PRA i s unconstitutional with respect to referendum petitions in general, we need not , and do not, address the State’s “informational” interest. The State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process is un doubtedly important. “States allow

ing ballot i n itiatives have considerable leewa yto protect the integrity and reliability of th e initiative process, a s they have with respec t to election processes generally.” ACLF , 525 U. S., at 191. The Sta t e’s interest is particu

larly strong with respect to e fforts to root out fraud, whic h not only m a y produce fraudulent outcomes, but has a systemic eff e ct as well: It “dri ves h o nest citizens out of th e democratic process and breeds distrust of our govern

ment.” Purcell v. Go nzalez , 549 U. S. 1, 4 (2006) ( per curiam ); see also Crawfordv. Marion County Election Bd. , 553 U. S. 1 81, 196 (20 08) (opinion of S TEVENS , J.). Th e

—————— First Amendment interest, see supra , at 5–7—do n o t. See post , at 3–4 , an d n

. 3. Th at lin e is n o t as sh ar p as J US TI CE S CALIA would have it; he himself recognizes “the existence of a Fir s t Amendm ent inter e st in vot i ng,” post , a t6 , w h i c ho f c o u r s ea l s oc a nh av el e g a le f f e c t

. T h e distinction bec o mes even fuz z ier givent h a tonly som e petition sig n ing has legal effect, and any such legal effec tattac h es onlywell afterthe expres s ive a c tof s i gnin g, if the sec r e tar y deter m ines that the petition sati sfie s th e r e qu ir emen ts f o r inclusion on the ballo t. See post , at 3. Petitions tha tdo not qualifyforthe ba llotof cou r s eca rry no lega l effect

.9 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt threat of fr aud in this context is not merely hypothetica l ; respondents and their amici cite a number of cases of petition-related fraud across the country to support the point. See Brief for Re spondent Reed 43; Brief for State o f Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae22–24

. But the Sta t e’s interest in preserving electoral integri t y is not limited to combating fraud

. That interest extends to efforts to ferret out inv a lid signatures caused not by frau d but by simple mistake, such as duplicate signatures o r signatures of individua l s who are not registered to vote i n the State. See Brief fo r Respondent Reed 42. That inter

est also ext e nds more generally to promoting transparen c y and accountability in the electoral process , which the State argues is “esse ntial to the proper functioning of a democracy.” Id., at 39. Plaintiffs contend that the disclosure requirements of the PRA a r e not “sufficiently related” to th e interest of protecting the integrity of the elec toral process. Brief for Petitioners 51. They argue that disclosure is not neces

sary becaus e the secretary of s t ate is already charged with verifying a n d canvass i ng the names on a p e tition, advo

cates and opponents of a measure can observ e that proc

ess, and any citizen can challenge the secretary’s action s in court. See Wash. Rev. Code §§29A.72.230, 29A.72.240. They also stress thatexisting cr iminal penalties reduce the danger of fraud in the petition process. See Brief for Petitioners 50; §§29A.8 4.210, 29A.84.230, 29A.84.250. But the secretary’s verification an d canvassing will no t catch all invalid signatures: The job is large and difficult (the secretary ordinar ily checks “only 3 to 5% of sign a tures,” Brie f for Respondent WFS T54), and the secretar y can mak e mistak es, too, s ee Brie f for Respo n dent Reed 42. Public disclosure can help cure the inadequacies of the verification and canvas sing process. Disclosure also helps prevent cer t ain types of petition fraud otherwise difficult to detect, such as out r ight forger y10 DOE v. REED Opinion of theCourt and “bait a n d switch” fraud, inwhich anind i vidual sign s the petit i onbased on amisrepr e se ntation of t h e und erly

ing is sue. See Brief f o r Resp ond e nt WFST 9–11, 53–5 4; cf. Brief for Massachusetts Gayand Lesbian Political Caucus et al. a s Amic i Curiae18–22 (deta i ling “bait an d switch” fraud in a pet i tion driv e in Mass ach u setts). Th e signer is i nthe bestposit i onto det e ct these types of fraud, andpublic dis c losur e can bring the issu e to th e signer’s att e ntion. Public disclosure thus helps ensure that the o n ly signa

tures counted are those that should be, and that the onl y referenda placed on the ballot are those that ga rne r enough valid signature s . Pub lic disclosure al so promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent other measures cannot. In light of the foregoing, we reject plaintiffs’ argumentand conclude that publi c disclosure of referendum peti tions in general is substan

tially related to the important int e rest of pre s erving the integrity of the electoral process. 2 C Plaintiffs’ more significant objection is that “the strength of the gover n mentalinterest” does not “reflect the serious n ess of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Davis , 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (citi n g Buckley , 424 U. S., at 68, 71); see, e.g. , Brief for Petitioners 12–13, 30. According to plaintiffs, the objective of those seeking disclosure of the R–71 petition is not to preven t fraud, but to publicly identifythose who had validly signed and to broadcast the signers’ political views on the subject of the petition. Plaintiffs a llege, for example, that severa l

——————

2 J US TI CE T HOMA S ’s contrary asse ssment of the relationship between t h e dis c los u re of refe rendu mpet i t i ons generally and the State’s inter

ests in this c a se is base don his det e rm ina t ion t h a ts t ricts crut i ny applie s, post , at 5 (di ssen t i n gopin ion) , ra ther than th e standard of review t h a tw ehave co nc lud e d is appropriate, see supra , at 7.11 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt groups planto post the petitions in searchable form on the Internet, and then encourage ot her citizens to seek out the R–71 signers. See App. 11; Brief for Petitioners 8, 46–47. Plaintiffs explain that once on the Internet, the petition signers’ names and addresses “can be combined with publicly available ph one numbers and maps,” in what will effectively become a blueprin t for harassment and intimi

dation. Id ., at 46. To support thei r claim that they will be subject to reprisals, plainti ffs cite examples from th e history of asimilar proposition in California, see, e.g. , id ., at 2–6, 31– 32, and from the experience of on e of the pet i

tion sponsors in this case, see App. 9. I nre la te d c o n t e x ts , we h a v e e x plai ne d t h a t tho s e resi st ing di sc los u r e ca n pr evail under the First Amend

ment if t h ey can show“a reasonable pr obability that the co mpe lle d dis c l o sure [o f pe rso n al i n fo rmation] will sub

j e c tt h em to th re a t s, h a r a ssm ent , o rre pr isa l s f r o m ei

th er G o v e r n m e n t of f i c i a l s orpr iv at e p a rt i e s . ” Bu c k l e y , supra , at 7 4 ; see a l so Citizens U n ite d , 558 U. S., at ___ (s lip op ., at52 ). T h e qu estion b e for e u s , h o wev e r, is n o t whet her PRA disc losure v i ol ates the First Ame n dment with r e spect to those who si gn edt h e R– 71 p e ti tio n , or o t h e r p a r t ic u l a r l ycont r o ve rsi a l p e ti tio n s . T h e que s tio n in st ea d is whet h e r su ch d i scl o su re in g e n e ral vi ol at es the First A m endment rights of those who sign refe re n d u m pe ti tion s. The problem for plaintiffs is that their argu ment rests almost entirely on the specific har m they say would atten d disclosure of the information on the R–71 petition, or on similarly controversial ones. See, e.g. , Brief for Petitioners 10, 26–29, 46, 56. Bu t typical referendum petitions “con

cern tax policy, revenue, budget, or other state law issues.” Brief for Respondent WFST 36 (listing referenda); see als o App. 26 (stating that in recent years the State has re

ceived PRA requests for petiti ons supporting initiatives concerning limiting motor ve hicle charges ; governme nt12 DOE v. REED Opinion of theCourt regulation of private property; energy reso urce use by certain electric utilities; long-term care services for the elderly and persons with disabilities; and st ate, county, and city revenue); id ., at 26–27 (sta ting tha tinthe past 20 years, referendum measures that have qualified for th e ballot inthe State concerned land-use regula tion; unem

ployment insurance; ch arter public schools; and insurance coverage and benefits). Vote rs care about such issues, some quite deeply—butthere is no reason to assume that any burdens imposed by disclo sure of typica l referendum petitions would be remotely like th e burdens plaintiffs fear in this case. Plainti ffs h a ve offer e dlittle in r e spon se. They have provided us scant evid ence or argu ment bey o nd the bur

dens th ey a ssert disclosure wou l d impos e on R–71 petition signers orthe s i gne r s of othersim ilarly controversi a l petitions. Indeed, what littl e plainti ffs d o off e r with respect to typical petition s inWash ingt on hurts, not helps : Seve ral other petiti ons inthe State “have bee n subject to r e lease in recent ye ars,” plaintiffs t e ll us, Brief for Petitioners 50, but appare ntlythat relea s e has c o m e without inc i dent. Cf. Citizens United, supra , at _ __ ( s l i p op., at 55) ( “ Citizens U n ited has b een di sclosi ng its donor s for years a n d has iden tified no in stance of h a rassme n t or r e t a l i a ti o n”)

. Faced withthe State’s unrebutted arguments that only modest burdens attend the disc losure of a typ i cal petition, we must reject plaintiffs’ broad challenge to t h e PRA. In doing so, we note—as we have in other election law disclo

sure cases—that uph o lding the law against a broad-based challenge does not foreclose a litigant’s success in a nar

rower one. See Buckley , supr a , at 74 (“minor parties” ma y be exempt from disclosure requirements if th ey can sho w “a reasonable probability that the compelled di sclosure of a party’s co ntributors’ names w ill subject the mto threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Governm e nt officials13 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of theCourt or private parties”); Citizens Unite d, supra , at ___ (slip op ., at 54) (disclosure “would be unconstitutional as applied to an organiza tion if there were a reasonable probability tha t the group’s members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were discl o sed” (citing McConnell v. Fede ral Elec tion Comm’n , 540 U. S. 93, 198 (2003)). The secretary of state ack n owledges th at plaintiffs may press the narrower challenge in Count II of their complaint in proceedings pending b e fore the District Cour t. B r ief for Respondent Reed 17. * * * We conclude that discl o sure under the PRA would not violate the First Amendment wi threspect to referendum petitions ingeneral an d therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
B REYER , J ., concu rrin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] J USTICE B RE YE R , concu rring. In circumstances where, as here, “a law sign ificantl y implicates competing constitutionally protect e d interests in complex ways,” the Court bala n ces interests. Nixon v. Shrink Mis s ouri Gove rnment PA C, 528 U. S. 377, 402 (2000) (B RE YER , J., con c urring). “And in practice that ha s meant aski ng whether the statu t e burdens any one such interest ina mannerout of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon the others.” Ibid. A s Ir e a dt h e i r opinions, th is is wh at both the Court and J U S TICE S TEVE NS do

. See an te , at 7 (opinion of the Co urt); post , a t 2 (S TEVEN S , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And for the reasons s t ated in those opini o n s (as well as many of th e reasons discussed by J U S TI CE S OTOMAYO R), I would uphold th e statute challenged in this case. With this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court a n d J USTIC E S TEVE NS ’ opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] J USTICE ALI T O , concurring. The Court holds that the disclosur e under the Washing

ton Public Records Act(PRA), Wash. Rev. Code §42.56.001 et seq . (200 8), of the n a mes and a d dresses of persons who sign referendum petitions d oes not as a general matter violate the First Amendment, ante , at 13, and I agree with that concl u sion. Many refere ndum peti tions concern relatively uncontrovers ial matters, see ante , a t11–12, an d plaintiffs have provide dno reason to think th at disclosure of signatory information in those contexts would signifi

cantly chill the willingness of vo ters to sign. Plaintiffs’ facial challe nge therefore must fail. See ante , at 2, 5. Nonetheles s, facially validdisclosure requirements can impose heavy burde ns on First Amendment rights in individual cases. Acknowledgin g that reality, we have long held that speakers can obtai nas-applied exemptions from disclosure requirements if they can show “a reason

able probab ility that the compell e d disclosure of [personal information] will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from eitherGovernment officials or private parties.” Buckleyv. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 7 4(1976) (p er curiam); see also Citizens Unitedv. F e de ral El ec tio n Comm’n , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) ( s lip op., at 52); McCon

nell v. Fed eral Elec tio n Comm’n , 540 U. S. 93, 197–198 (2003); Brownv. Soci alist Worke rs ’74 Cam p aign Com m .2 DOE v. REED
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g (Ohio) , 459 U. S. 87, 93 (1982). Because compelled disclo

sure can “burden the ability to speak,” Citizens Unite d , supra , at ___ (sl i p op., at 51), an d “seriously infringe o n privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment,” Buckl e y , supra , at 64, the as-applied exem p tion plays acritical role in safeguarding Fi rst Amendme n t rights. I The possibi lity of prevailing in anas-appliedchallenge provides adequate protection for First Amendment rights only if (1) speak e rs can obtain the exemption sufficiently far in advance to avoid chilling protected speech and (2) the showing necessary to obtai nthe exemption is not overly burdensome. Wi th resp ect to the first requirement, the as-applied exemption beco mes prac ticallyworthless if speakers ca nnot obtain the exemption quicklyand well in advance of speaking. To avoid the possibilit y that a di s closure requirement might chill the willingness of voters to sign a re ferendum petition (and thus burde n a circula

tor’s ability to coll ect the necessarynumber of signatures, cf. Meyer v. Gr ant , 486 U. S. 414, 423 (1988)), voters mus t have some assurance at the time when they are p re sented with the p e titionthat their names and identifying infor

mation will not be released to the public. The only way a circulator c an provide such assurance, however, is if th e circulator h a s sought and obtained an as-applied exemp

tion from the disclosure re quirement well before circu lat

ing the petition. Otherwise, the best the circulator could do would be to tell voters that a nexemption might be obtained at some point in the future. Suchspeculation would often be insuff icient to alleviate voters’ concerns about the possibility of being subjected to threats, har

assment, or reprisals. Cf. Ci tizen sUnited , supra , at __

_ (slip op., a t5–6) (T HOMAS , J., c o ncurring in part and dissenting in part).3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g Additionally, speakers must be able to obtain an as

applied exemption without clearing a high evidentiary hurdle. We acknowledged as much in Buckle y , where we noted that “unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden” on speech. 424 U. S., at 7 4

. Recognizingthat spea kers “mustbe allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair considera

tion of their claim,” we emphasized that speakers “need show only a reasonabl e probability” that disclosure will lead to thre ats, harassment, or re prisals. Ibid

. (emphas is added). We stated that spea kers could relyon a wid e arrayof ev idence to meet that standard, i n cluding “s pe cific evidence of past or present harassment of [group] members,” “harassment directed a g ainst the organization itself,” or a “pattern of threat s or specific manifestations of public hostility.” Ibid

. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , w e a l s o m a d e c l e a r that “[n]ew [groups] that have n o history upon which to draw may b e able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holdin g similar views.” Ibid

. From its in ception, therefore, the as applied exemption has not impos e d onerous burdens of proof on sp eakers who fear tha t disclosure might lead to harassment or intimidation. II In light of those principles, the plaintiffs in this case have a strong argume nt that the PRA violates the First Amendment as applied to the Referendum 71 petition. A Consider first the burdens on plaintiffs’ First Amend

ment rights. The widespread harassment and intimida

tion suffered by supporters of California’s Proposition 8 provides strong support for an as-a pplied exemption in the present case. Se e Buckley , supra , at 74 (exp laining tha t speakers seeking as-applied relief from a disclosure re

-4 DOE v. REED
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g quirement can rely on “evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holdin g similar views”). Pro p osition 8 amended the California Constitution to provid e that “[o] nly marria g e between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California, ” Cal. Const., Art. I, §7. 5 , and plaintiffs subm itted to the DistrictCo urt substa ntial evidence of the harassment suffered by Proposition 8 supporters, see Declaration of Scott F. Bi eniek in No. C:09–5456 (WD Wash .), Exhs. 12, 13. Members of this Court ha ve also noted that haras s ment. See Hollingsworthv. Perry , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (per curiam)(sli p op., at 2– 3); Citizen sUnited , 55 8 U. S., at ___ (slip op. , at 2–3) (opinion of T HOMAS , J.). Indeed, if the evidence relating to Proposition 8is n o t sufficient to obtain an as-applied exemption in this case, one may wo nder whether thatvehi cle provides any mean ingful protection for the Fi rst Amendment rights of per

sons who c i rculate and sign referendum and initiative petitions. What is more, when plaintiffs return to t h e Distric t Court, they will have the opportunity to develop eviden ce of intimidation and harassment of Referendum 71 sup

porters—anopportunit ythat was pretermitte d because of the DistrictCourt’s dec i sion to gra n t a preliminary injunc

tion on count 1 of plai ntiffs’ complaint. See 661 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 12 05–1206 (WD Wash. 20 09); Tr. of Oral Arg. 40– 41. For example, plaintiffs allege that the campaign manager for one of the plaintiff groups received threaten

ing e-mails and phone calls, and that the th reats were so severe that the manager filed a complaint with the local sheriff and had his children sleep in an interior room of his home. App. 9–10. B The inadeq uacy of the State’s interests in c o mpelling public disclosure of referendum signatory information5 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g further con f irms that courts should be generous in grant

ing as-applied relief in this context. See Bu ckl e y , supr a , a t 71 (recognizing that the weak ness of the Sta t e’s interests in an individual case can require exempting speakers from compelled di sclosure); Brown , 459 U. S., at 92–93 (same). As the Court notes, respondents rely on two interests to justify compelled disclosure inthis context: (1) providin g information to voters aboutwho supports areferendum petition; and (2) preserving the integrityof the referen

dum process by detecti ng fraudulent and mistaken signa

tures. Ante , at 8. 1 In my view, respondents’ asserted informational interest will not inany case be suff icient to trump the Fi rst Amendment rights of signers and circulators who face a threat of harassment. Responde nts maintain that publicl y disclosing the names and address e s of referendum signa

tories prov ides the voting pub lic with “i nsight int o whether support for holding a vote comes predominantly from parti cular interest groups, political or religious or

ganizations, or other group[s] of ci tizens,” and thus allows voters to draw inferences abou twhether they should support or oppose the referend um. Brief for Respondent Washington Families Standing To gether 58; s ee also Brief for Respon dent Reed 46–48. Additionally, respondents argue that disclosure “allows Washington vot e rs to enga ge in discussi on of referr ed measures with persons whose acts secured the election and suspension of st ate law.” Id ., at 45; see a l so Brief for Respondent Washington Families Standing Together 58. The implications of a ccepting su ch an argu ment are breathtakin g . Were we to acce pt respond e nts’ asserted information a l interest, the Stat e would be free to require petition signers to disclose a ll kin d s of demographic infor

mation, including the signer’s race, religion, political6 DOE v. REED
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g affiliation, sexual orientation, ethnic background, and interest-gro up memberships. Requiring such disclosures, however, runs headfir s t into a h a lf century of our cas e law, which firmly establishes thatindividuals have a right to privacy of belief an d association. See Rumsfeldv. Fo

rum for Academic andInstitution a l Rights, I n c. , 547 U. S. 47, 69 (200 6); Brown , supra , at 9 1 ; Buckley , 424 U. S., at 64; DeGr egoryv. Attorney Gener a lof N. H. , 3 83 U. S. 825, 829 (1966); Gibsonv. Florida L e gisl ativ e Investi ga t ion Comm. , 37 2 U. S. 539, 544 (1963) ; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pa tte rs on , 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958). Indeed, the State’s informational i n terest paints such a chilling pi c ture of the role of government in our lives that at or al argument the Washin gton attorn ey general balked whe n confronted with the logical im plications of accepting such an argument, conceding that the State could not require petition sign ers to disc lose th eir religion or ethnicity. T r . of Oral Arg. 37, 56. Respondents’ informational in terest is no more legiti

mate when viewed as a means of providing the public with information needed to locate and contact sup p orters of a referendum. In the name of pursuing such an interest, the State would be free to require petition signers to disclo se any information that would more easily enab le memb ers of the votin gpublicto contactthe mand eng a ge them i n discussion, including telephone numbers, e-mail a d

dresses, and Internet aliases. Once again, permitting the governmentto require speakers to disclose su ch informa

tion runs against the current of our associational privacy cases. But more import ant, when speakers are faced wit h a reasonab le probabili ty of harassment or i n timidation, the State no longer has anyinterest in enabling the public to locate and contact suppo rters of a particular measure— for in that instance, disclosu re becomes a m e ans of facili

tating harassment that imperm issibly chills the exercis e of First Am endment rights.7 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g In this case , two groups proposed to place on the Inter

net the names and addresses of all those who signed Ref

erendum 71, and it is alleged that their express aim was to encourage “uncomfortable conversation[s].” 661 F. Supp. 2d, at 1199 (internal quotation marks omitted). If this informationis posted on the Internet, then anyone with access to a computer could comp ile a wealth of information about all of those persons, including in many cases all of the following: the na mes of their spouses and neighbors, their telephone numbers, dire ctions to their homes, pic

tures of their homes, information about their homes (suc h as size, type of construction, purch ase price, and mortga g e amount), in formation ab out any motor vehicles that the y own, any c o urt case in which th ey were pa rties, any in

formation posted on a s o cial networking site, and newspa

per articles in which their names appeared (including such things as wedding announcements, obituaries, and articles in local pa pers about their children’s school and athletic activities). The potential t hat su ch information could b e used for harassment is vast. 2 Respondents also main tain that th e State has an inter

est in preserving the integrity of the referendum proce s s and that public disclosure furthers that inte rest by help

ing the Sta t e detect fraudulent and mistake nsignature s . I agree with the Court that pr eserving the integrity of the referendum process constitu tes a sufficiently importan t state interest. Ante , at 8. But I h a rbor serious doubts a s to whether public disclosure of signatory information serves that interest in a way tha talways “ r eflect[s] the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Da visv. Feder a l Elec tion Comm’n , 554 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) ( s lip op., at 18). First , the realities of Washington law undermine the State’s a r gument that public dis c losure is necessary to8 DOE v. REED
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g ensure the integrity of the re ferendum process. The State of Washingt on first authorized voter initiatives via consti

tutional am endment in1912, andthe following year th e Washington Legislature passed a statute specifying th e particulars of the referendum process. See State ex rel

. Casev. Sup erior Ct. forThurston Cty. , 81 Wa sh. 623, 62 8, 143 P. 461, 462 (1914). Si gnificantly, Washington’s laws pertaining to initiatives and re ferenda did not then and do not now authorize the public dis c losure of signatory in

formation. See Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.010 et seq
. ; 1 9 13 Wash. Laws. pp. 418–437. Instead, the pub lic disclosu re requiremen tstems from the PRA, which wa s enacted i n 1972 and which requ ires the pu blic disclosure of state documents generally, not referendum docu ments specifi

cally. See Wash. Rev. Code §42.5 6 .001 et seq
. Indeed, if anything, Washington’s referenda and initiative laws suggest tha tsignatory information should remain confi

dential: Outside observ ers are pe rmitted to observe the secretary o f state’s ve rification and canvass i ng process only “so long as the ymake no record of th e names, ad

dresses, or other information on the petitions or related records dur i ng the veri fication process,” §29A.72.230 , and the State is required to destroy all those petitions that fai l to qualify for the ballot, §29A.72.200. Second , the State fails to come to grips wit hthe fac t that public disclosure of re ferendum signatory information is a relatively recent p r acticein Washington. Prior to the adoption of the PRA i n1972, th e Washington attorney general took the view that re fere ndum petiti ons were not subject to public disclosure. See Op. Wash. Atty. Gen. 55– 57 No. 274, pp. 1–2 (May 28, 1956), online at http://www.atg.wa. gov/AGOOpinio ns/opinion. a spx?sectio n =topic&id=10488 (all Internet materials as visited Ju ne 17, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (de

claring that public disclosure of in itiative petitions would be “contrar yto public policy” and would runc o ntraryto “ a9 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g tendency o nthe part of the legislature to reg a rd the sig n ing of an initiative petition as a matter concerning only the individ ual signers exceptin so far as necessary t o safeguard against abuses of the privilege”). Indeed, the secretary o f state rep r esents on his Web site that e v e n after the P RA was en acted, “va r ious Secretary of Sta t e administrations took th e position, from 1973 to 1998, tha t the personal information onpetition sheets were NOT subject to d i sclosure.” B. Zylstra, The Disclosure History of Petition Sheets (Sept. 17, 2009), online a t http://blogs.sos.wa.gov/FromOurCorner/index.php/2009/09/ the-disclosure-history-of-petition-sheets/. Although th e secretary of state apparently changed this policy in the late 1990’s, it appears that the secretary di d not relea s e anyinitiative petitions until 2006. Ibid

. And to date, th e secretary h a s released only a handful of petitions. Ibid

. ; App. 26. That history substantially undermines the State’s ass e rtion that public disclosure is necessary to ensure the integrity of t h e referendum process. For nearly a century, Washington’s referendum process operated— and appare ntly operated successfully—witho ut the public disclosure of signatory information

. The State has failed to explain how circum s tances have changed so dramati

cally in recent years that public disclosure is now required. Third , the e x periences of other Sta t es demonstrates that publicly disclosing the names and identifying information of referendum signatories is not necessary to protect against fraud and mistake. To give but one exampl e, California has had more initiatives on the ballot than any other State save Oregon. See Initiative and Referendum Institute, Initiative Use, p. 1 (Feb. 2009 ), online a t http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20Initiative%20Use %2 0%281904=2008%29.pdf. Nonetheless, California law explicitly protects the privacy of initiative and referendum signatories. See Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §18650 (West 2003);10 DOE v. REED
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §6253.5 (West 2008)

. It is th us entirely possible for a State to ke ep signatory informati o n private and maintain a referendum and initiative process free from fraud. Finally , Washington could easil yand cheaply employ alternative mechanisms for protecting against fraud and mistake that would be far more protective of circulator s ’ and signers’ First Amendment rights. For example, the Washington attorney general represented to us at oral argument t hat “the S e cretary of State’s fir s t step after receiving su bmitted pet i tions is to take them to his archiv

ing section and to have them digitized.” Tr. of Oral Arg

. 30. With a digitized li st, it should be relatively easy for the secreta ry to chec k for duplicat e signatures on a refer

endum petition. And given that the secretary maintains a “centralized , uniform, interactive c o mputerized statewide voter regist ration list that contains the name and registr a tion inform ation of every registered voter in the state , ” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §29A.08.125(1) (West Supp. 2010 ), the secretar ycould use a computer program to cross-check the names and addresses onthe petition with the name s and addres ses on the voter regist ration roles, thus ensur

ing the accu racy and le gitimacy of each signature. Additionally, using the digi tized version of the referen

dum petition, the Stat e could set up a simple system for Washington citizens to check whether their names have been fraudulently signed to a petition. For example, o n his Web site, the secr etary maintains an interface that allows voters to confirm thei r voter registrat i on informa

tion simply by inputtin gtheir nam e and date of birth. See http://wei.s ecstate.wa. g ov/osos/VoterVault/Pa ges/MyVote.a spx. Presumably the secretarycould setup a similar interface for referendu mpetitions. Indeed, the process would seem to be all the more sim p le given th at Washing

ton requires a “unique identifier [t o] be assign ed to each registered voter in the s t ate.” §29A.08.125(4).11 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g * * * As-applied challenges to disclosure requirements play a critical role in protecting First A m endment freedoms. To give speech the bre a thing room it ne eds to fl ouri sh, prompt judi cial remedies must be available well bef o re th e relevant speech occurs and the b u rden of proof must b e low. In this case—both through an alogy and through thei r own experi ences—plaintiffs have a strong ca se that they are entitled to as-applied relief, a n d they will be able to pursue such relief before the Distr i ct Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)

S OTOMAYOR , J

. , con c u rrin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , with whom J USTICE S T EVEN San d J USTICE G IN S B UR Gjoin, concurri ng. I write sep a rately to emphasize apoint impl icit in the opinion of the Court and the concurrin gopinions of J USTICE S T EVEN S , J US TICE S CALIA , and J USTICE B REYE R : In assessin gthe countervailing in terests at s t ake in this case, we must be min d ful of the chara cter of initiatives and referenda. These mechanisms of direct democracy a r e not compelled by the Federal Constitution. It is instead up to the people of each State, acting in their sovereign capacity, to decide whether andhow to permit legislation by popular action. S t a t es enjoy “c onsiderable leeway” to choose the subjects that are eligib le for plac ement on th e ballot and t o specify the requirem e nts for obt a ining ballot access (e.g. , the number of signatures required, the tim e for submission, and the method of verification). Buckleyv. American Constitutio n al Law Fo undation, Inc. , 525 U. S. 182, 191 (1 999). As th e Court pro p erly recognizes, each of these struc t ural decisions “i nevitably affects —at least to some degree—the individual’s righ t” to speak about politi

cal issues and “to associate withothers for political ends.” Andersonv. Celeb rezze , 460 U. S. 780, 788 (1983). For instance, requiring petition sign ers to be registered voters or to use their real names no doubt limits the ability or willingness of s o me in dividuals to undertake the expres

-2 DOE v. REED S OTOMAYOR , J

. , con c u rrin g sive act of signing a petition. Regulations of this nature, however, stand “a step remo ved from the communicative aspect of petitioning,” and the ability of States to impos e them can scarcely be doubted. Buckley , 525 U. S., at 2 1 5 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent

ing in part); see also McIntyrev. Ohio Elec tions Comm’n , 514 U. S. 3 34, 345 (1995) (contras t ing measures to “control the mechanics of the electoral process” with the “regula

t i o no f p u r e s p e e c h” )

. I ti s b yn om e a n s n e c e s s a r yf o r a State to prove that su ch “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” are narrowly ta ilored to its interests. Ande r son , 460 U. S., at 788. The Court today confirms that the State of W a shington’s decision to make referendum petition signatures available for public inspection falls squarely within the realm of permissibleelection-rel ated regulations. Cf. Buckley , 52 5 U. S., at 2 00 (describing a state law requiring petition circulators to submit affidavits containing their names and addres ses as “exemplif[ying] the type of regulation” that Sta t es may adopt). Public disclosure of the identity of petition signers, which is the rule in the overwhelming majority of States that use init iatives and referenda, advances S t ates’ vital interests in “[p]reserving the integ

rity of the electoral process, pr eventing co rruption, a n d sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democrac yfor th e wise conduct of gover n ment.” F i rstN a t
. Ba n kof Bo s t onv. Bellotti , 4 35 U. S. 76 5, 788–789 (1 978) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also CitizensUni t edv. Fede ral E lec tion Comm’n , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2 010) (slip op., at 55) (“[T]ranspa rency enables the el ectorate to ma ke informed decisions and give pro p er weight to different speakers and messages”); Brief for Respondent Washington Families Standing Together 34 (reportingthat only on e State ex

empts initiative and referendum petitions from public disclosure). In a society “in whi c h the citizenr y is the final3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)

S OTOMAYOR , J

. , con c u rrin g judge of the proper conduct of public busines s,” openness in the democratic proc ess is of “critical importance.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U. S. 469, 495 (1975); s ee also post , at 4 (S CALIA , J., concurri ng in judgment) (noting that “[t]he public natu r e of federal lawmakin g is constitu

tionally required”). On the other side of t h e ledger, I view the burden of public disclosure on s p eech and association a l rights as minimal in this context

. As this C o urt has observed with respect to campaign-fi nance regulations, “disclosure re

quirements .

. . ‘do not prevent a n yone from speaking.’ ” Citizen sUn ited , 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 51). When it comes to initiatives and referenda, the impact of public disclosure on expressive interests is even m o re attenuated. While camp aign-finance disclosure injects the government into what would otherwise have been private political activity, th e process of legisl ating by referendum is inher

ently public

. To qualify a referendum for th e ballot, citi

zens are required to sign a petitio nand suppl yidentifyin g information to the St ate. The act of sign ing typi call y occurs in p ublic, and the circulators who collect and sub

mit signatures ordinarily ow e signers noguarantee of confidentiality. For persons with the “civic courage” to participate in this proc ess, post , at 10 (opinion of S CALI A , J.), the St ate’s decision to make accessible what th e y voluntarily place in t h e public s p here shou ld not deter them from engaging in the expressive act of petition sign

ing. Disclo sure of the identity of petition signers, mor e over, in no way directly im pairs the ability of anyone to speakand associate fo r political ends eitherpublicly or privately. Given the r e lative weight of the i n terests at stake an d the traditionally public nature of initiative and referen

dum processes, the Court righ tl y rejects petitioners’ con

stitutional challenge t o the State of Washingt on’s petition disclosure regulations. These same considerations also4 DOE v. REED S OTOMAYOR , J

. , con c u rrin g mean that any party attempting to challenge particul a r applications of the State’s regulations will b e ar a heavy burden. Even when a referendum involves a particularly controversial subject and somepetition signers fear har

assment from nonstat e actors, a State’s imp o rtant inter

ests in “protect[ing] the in tegrity and reliability of the initiative process” remain undi m inished, and the State retains significant discretion in advancing tho s e interests

. Buckley , 52 5 U. S., at 191. Likewise, because the expres

sive interes t s implicated by th e act of petition signing are always modest, I findit difficultto see h o w any incre

mental disincentive to sign a petit i on would ti p the consti

tutional ba lance. Ca se-spe cific relief may be available when a State selectively applies a facially neutral petition disclosure rule in a m anner that discriminates based on the content of referenda or the viewpoint of p e tition sign

ers, or in the rare circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonabl e probability of serious and wide spread har

assment that the State is unwilling or unab le to contro l. Cf. NAA C P

v. Al abam a ex rel. P a tterson , 3 57 U. S. 44 9 (1958). Allowing case-specific invalidation u n der a more forgiving s t andard wou l d unduly diminish the substantial breathing room States are afforded to adopt and imple

ment reasonable, non d iscriminatory measures like th e disclosure requirementnow atissue. Ac cord ingly, cour t s presented with an as-applied challenge to a regulation authorizing the disclosure of referendum petitions should be deeply skeptical of any assertion that the Constitution, which embraces political trans parency, compels States to conceal the identity of persons who seek to participate in lawmaking through astate-created referendum process

. With this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] J USTICE S T EVEN S , wit hwhom J USTICE B RE YE Rjoins, concurring i npart and concurring i nthe judgm e nt. This is not a hard case. It is not about a restriction on voting or o nspeech and does not involve a classic disclo

sure requirement. Rather, the c a se concerns a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disc losing information already in the State’s possession that, it has been alleged, might one day indirectly bur den petition signatories. The bur

den imposed by Washington’s application of the Public Records Ac t (PRA) to referend um petitions in the vast majority, if not all, its a pplications is not substantial. And the State has given a more than adequate justification f o r its choice. For a number of reasons, the application of the PRA to referendum petitions does not substantially burden a n y individual’s expression. First, it is not “a regulation of pure speech.” McIntyrev. Ohio Elec tions Co mm’n , 514 U. S. 334, 345 (1995); cf. Uni t edSta t esv. O’B rien , 39 1 U. S. 367, 3 77 (1968). It does not prohibit expression, n o r does it require that an y person si gning apet i tion disclose or say anything at all. See McIntyre , 514 U. S. 334. Nor does the State’s disclosure alter th e content of a speaker’s message. See id. , at 34 2–343. Second, any effect on speech that disclosure might have is minimal. The PRA does n o t nec e ssarily ma ke it more2 DOE v. REED Opinion of S TEVENS , J. difficult to circulate or obtainsign atures on apetition, se e Buckleyv. American Constitu tional Law Foundation, Inc. , 525 U. S. 1 82, 193–196 (1999); Me ye r v. Grant , 486 U. S. 414, 422–4 23 (1988), or to comm unicate one’s views gen

erally. Regardless of whether someone signs a referendum petition, that person remains free to say anything to any

one at an y time. If disclosure indirectly burdens a speaker, “the amount of speech covered” is small—only a single, narrow message conveying one fact in one place , Wa tchto w erBible & Trac t Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stra tton , 536 U. S. 150, 165 (200 2); cf. Cox v. New Ham p shire , 312 U. S. 569 (1941). And while the d e mocratic act of casting a ballot or signing apetition d oes s e rve an expressive purpose, the act does not involve any “interac

tive communication,” Meyer , 486 U. S., at 422, and is “not principally” a method of “individual expressionof political sentiment,” Timmonsv. Twin Cities Ar ea Ne w Par t y , 5 20 U. S. 351, 3 73 (1997) (S TEVEN S , J., dissenting); cf. O’ Brien , 391 U. S., at 377. 1 Weighed against the possible burden on constitutional rights are the State’s justifications for its r u le. In thi s case, the State has posited a perfectly adequa te justifica

tion: an interest in det e rring and detecting p e tition fraud. 2 Given the pedigree of this intere st and of si milar regula

tions, the State need not produce concrete evidence that the PRA is the best way to prevent fraud. See Cra wfordv.

——————

1 Alth ou gha “p et it ion”i sa c l a s s i cme an s o f po l it i c a l exp r es si on , th e type of p e t i ti o nat i ssu e in this c a se i sno tmer e lya doc u men ton whi c h peo p le ar e exp r es sin g th eirvi ew s bu t r a th e ris a st a t e-c r e at e d foru m wi th a p ar tic u l arf u n c tion : sor t i n g th o s e issu es that h aveenough public sup p or t to w ar r ant li mi te d s p ac e on a r e fer e ndum b al l o t

. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent , 4 54 U

. S. 26 3, 2 78 (1 9 8 1 ) ( S TEVE N S , J ., concurring in j u dgment).

2 Wash in gt ona l so poin ts ou t th at its di sc losu r epolicy informs voters ab o utwho s u pport s t h e pa rt icula rrefere n d um . Ince rt a i n elect i on-la w contexts, this informationa l ration ale ( a mong others) may provide a bas is for regulation; in this case, th ere is no need to look beyond the State’s quite o b vious antifr a u d inter e st.3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. Marion County Election Bd. , 553 U. S. 181, 191–200 (2008) (opinion of S TEVENS , J.) (discussing voting fraud); Nixonv. Shrink Missou r i Governm e nt PAC, 52 8 U. S. 377, 391 (2000) (“The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judg

ments will vary up or down wi th the novelty and plausibil

ity of the justification raised”); see also Timmons , 520 U. S., at 37 5 (S TEVENS , J., dissenting) (rejecti ng “imagin a tive [and] theoretical” justific ation supported only by “bare assertion”). 3And there is m o re than enoughevidence t o support th e State’s election-integrity justifi c ation. See ante , at 8–1 0 (opinion of the Court). There remains the issu e of petitio n ers’ as-applied chal

lenge. As a matter of law, the C o urt is corr ect to keep open the possibility tha tin particular instances in which a policy such as the PRA burdens ex pression “b y the public enmity attending publicity,” Bro w nv. Soc i alis tW o rk ers ’74 Cam p aign Comm. (Ohio) , 45 9 U. S. 87, 98 (1982), speakers may have a winni ng constitutional claim.
“ ‘[F] rom ti me to time throughout history,’ ” persecute d groups have been ab l e “ ‘to critic i ze oppressive practice s

——————

3 There is no re ason to think that our ordinary presumpti o n that the politic albr an c h es ar e bett ersu ited th a nc o u r ts to weigha polic y ’ s ben e fits an d b u r d en s is in ap plic able in thi s case. The d e gree to which we deferto ajudg ment bythe poli t i ca l b r a n ches m u s tva ry up a n d down with the degr ee to whic h that judg ment r e flec ts c o nsider ed, public-mindeddecisionmaki ng. Thus, wh ena law appear s to h av ebeen adopted witho u t reasoned consideration, see, e.g. , Salazarv. Buono , 559 U. S. ___, ___–___ (201 0) (S TEVENS , J., dis s e nting) ( s lip op., at 22– 2 3 ) , for dis crim i na t o ry purpos es , s ee, e.g. , Batesv. Li ttle Rock , 361 U. S

. 516, 51 7–5 18, 52 4– 525 (1 96 0), orto en tr e n c hpolitic al major i t i es, se e, e.g. , Vi ethv. Jub elirer , 5 41 U. S. 26 7, 317 –3 19, 32 4–3 26, 3 32– 3 3 3 (200 4) (S TEVE NS , J., dissenting), weareless willing to defer to the institut ional strengths of the legi slature. That one may call into question the p r ocess used to create a law is not a reason t o“disregar[d]” “sufficiently strong,” “valid[,] neut ral justifications ” fo r an otherwise “nondisc r i minator y” polic y . Crawford , 553 U. S., at 20 4. Bu t i ti s a reason to examine more carefully th e justifications for that mea s ure.4 DOE v. REED Opinion of S TEVENS , J. and laws either anonymously or n o t at all.’ ” McIntyre , 51 4 U. S., at 34 2. 4 In my view, this is unlikely to occur in cases involving the PRA. Any burden on speec h that petitio n ers posit is speculative as well as indirect. For an as-applied chal

lenge to a law such a s the PRA to succeed, there would have to be a significant threat of harassment directed a t those who sign the pe tition that cannot be mitigated b y law enforcement meas ures. 5Moreover, the character o f the law challenged ina referend um does n o t, in itself , affect the analysis. Debates abou ttax policy and regula

tion of pri v ate property can be come just as heated as debates about domestic partners h ips. And as a general matter, it is very difficult to showthat by later disclosin g the names of petition signatories, individuals will be less willing to s i gn petitions. Just as we have inthe past, I would demand strong evidence before concluding that a n indirect and speculative chain of events imposes a sub

-

——————

4 J US TI CE S CALIA conceives of the issue as a r i gh t to an on y m ou s speech. See, e. g . , po st, a t1 (opinion conc u rring i nj u dg ment). But our decision in McIn t yr e posited no such f r eewheelin gr i gh t. The Constitu

tion protects “freedom of speech.” Amdt. 1; see alsoMcIn t yre , 514 U. S., at 336 (“The question presented is wh ether [a] .

. . statute that prohib

its the di stribution of anonymous ca mpa i g nliter atu r e is a ‘ l aw . . . abridging thefreedom of speech’ withi nthe meaningof the Firs t Amendment”). That freedo mcan be bu rden ed bya law th at ex poses th e speakert ofin e s, as m u c has it c a nbe bu r d en ed bya law th at ex poses a spe a kerto h a r a ssmen t, c h an ges the co ntent of his speech, or prejudices oth e rs agai nst hi s me ssage. See id. , at34 2. Th e r i gh t, howeve r, is th e righ tt os p ea k, no t the righ t to speak without being fined or the ri ght to speak anonymously.

5 A rare case m a y also arise i nwhich the le vel of threat t oany indi

v i du al is n o t q u ite so h i ghbu t a St ate’ s di sc losu r ew o u l d su bst a n t ia ll y limit a gr ou p’ sabili tyto “g ar n e rth e n u m berof sig n atu r es n e c e ssar yto plac e [a] matt eron the ballot,” ther eby“limiting[its] ab ili tyto make th e mat t erth e foc u s of sta t e w ide disc u ssio n . ” Meye rv. Gran t, 486 U. S

. 414, 42 3 (19 8 8 )

.5 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. stantial burden on speech. 6A sta t ute “is not to be upset upon hypothetical and unreal po ssibilities, if it would be good upon the facts as they are.” Pullman Co. v. Knott , 235 U. S. 23, 26 (1914). * * * Accordin gly , I concur with the o p inion of the Court t o the extent that it is not inconsist e nt with my own, and I concur in th e judgment.

——————

6 See , e.g ., Batesv. Little Roc k , 36 1 U. S., a t52 1– 522, 52 3–5 24; Buck

leyv. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 6 9 –72 (19 76) (per curiam ); Brownv. Sociali s t Work ers ’7 4

Cam paign Com m . (Ohio) , 459 U. S. 87, 98– 10 1 (19 8 2 ); Buckleyv. A m erican Con s titutional Law Foun dation, Inc

. , 525 U. S. 182, 19 7– 19 8 (199 9)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] J USTICE S CALIA , concu rring in the judgment. Plaintiffs claim the Fir s t Amendm ent, as appl ied to the States thro ugh the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the State of Washington to releas e tothe public signed refer

endum petitions, which they submitted to t h e State in order to suspend operation of a law and put i t to a popular vote. I doubt whether signing a petition t hat has the effect of suspending a law fits within “the freedom of speech” at all. But even if, as the Court concl u des, ante , at 5, it does, a long history of prac t i ce shows that the Fir s t Amendment does not prohibit public disclosure. I We should not repeat and extend the mistake of McIn

tyrev. Oh io Election sComm’n , 514 U. S. 334 (1995 ). There, withneither tex t ual suppor t nor prece d ents requir

ing the result, the Co urt invalidated a form of election regulation that had been widely used by the States since the end of the 19th century. Id. , at 371 (S CALIA , J., dis

senting). The Court he ld that an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign l i terature v i o lated the First and Fou rteenth Am endments. Mrs. McIntyre sought a general ri ght to “spe ak” anony

mously about a referendum. He re, plaintiffs go one step further—they seeka general right to partic i pate anony

-2 DOE v. REED S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment mously in the referendum itself. 1 Referendum petitions are subject to public di sclosu re under the Public Records Act (PRA), Wash. Rev. Code §42.56.001 et seq. , which requires government agencies to “make available f o r public inspection and copying all pu blic records, ” subjectto certain exemptions not relevant here. §42.56.07 0(1) (2008). Plaintiffs contend that disclosure of the names, and other personal information included on th e petitions, of those who tookthis legislative action violates their First Amendment right to an onymity. Today’s opinion acknowledges such a right, finding tha t it can be de nied here only because of the State’s interest in “preservingthe integrity of the electoral process,” ante , at 8. In my view this i s not a ma tter forjud i cial interest

balancing. Our Natio n ’s longstanding tradi tions of legis

lating and voting in public refute the claim that the First Amendment ac cords a right to an onymity in the perform

ance of an act with governmentaleffect. “A government al practice th at has become ge neral throughout the United

——————

1 Plaintiffs see mto disavowreliance on McInty r ev. Oh io Ele c t i on s Comm’ n , 514U. S. 334(1 995), see Rep l yBr ief forPetition er s 1 2

. Certainly, there are differences between McInty r ea n d t h is ca s e . Mr s . McInt yr e wa sreq u ired t odi s c los eher ident i t yhers elf, b ypla c ing he r name on her handbill. Here, plainti ffs d onot object t osigning their names to the r e fer e ndum petition, wh ere it can presumabl y be observed by later signe r s; they challenge onlythe l a terdisc lo sur eof that infor

mation byth e St ate. Bu t b o thc a ses ar e abou tpu b licd i sc losu r e , an d bothin v o lv e a c l aim to an on y m ity unde rthe First Amendment. If anything, the line plaintiff s seek to draw—which seeksa sort of partial anonymity—is stranger still.

J US TI CE S TEVENS qu ibbles wi thth e sh or th an d I use, and tries to rein in McInty r e ’s holding, by saying that it di d not c r e ate a“r ight to spea k anonymously,” ante , a t4 , n. 4(opinion con c ur ring i npa r ta n d conc ur ring i nj u dgm e nt). But McIntyreused the same sh orthand. See 514 U. S., at 35 7 (“[t]h e r i gh t to r e mainan o n y m ou s”); id. , at 342 (“[t]h e freedom to publish anonymously”); see also ibid. (“anau th or ’ s dec i sion to remain anonymous

. . . i s an as pect of the freedom of speech pro

tec t ed bythe Fir s t Amendm ent”).3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment States, and particularl y one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presum ption of constitutionality.” McIntyre, supr a , at 375 (S CALI A , J., dissenting). A When a Washington voter signs a referendum petition subject to the PRA, he is acting as a legislator. The Wash

ington Constitution vests “[t]he legislative authority” of the State in the legislature, but “the people reserve to themselves the power . . . to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of a n y bill, act, or law pass ed by the legis l ature.” Art. 2, §1. This “referendum” power of popular legislation is exercised by submitting a petition, in accordance with certai nspecifications, to the Washington secretary of state withvalid signatures of registered vot

ers in number equal to or exceeding four pe rcent of th e votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. §1(b); Wash. Rev. Code §29A.72.100, 130, 140, 1 50, 160 (2008). The filing of a referen d um petition that satisfies thes e requirements has two legal effects: (1) It r e quires the secretary t o place the measure r e ferred to the people on the ballot at the next g e neral election; and (2) it suspends operation of the measu r e, causing it only to h ave effect 3 0 days after it is appro v ed duringthat electi on. Art. 2 , §1(d). See Brief for Respondent Sam Reed, Secretary of State of Wa shington 2–6. A voter who signs areferendum petition is therefore e x ercising legislative power because his signature, somewhat like a vo te for or against a bill in the legislat ure, seeks t o affect the legal force of the meas

ure at issue. 2

——————

2 The Cour t notes that “only som epetition signing has legal effect.” Ante , at 8, n . 1. Th at is tr ue. So me petitions maynev e rbe submitte d to the secretary; they are irreleva nt here, since they will never be subjec t to the PRA. But s o me pe ti tions thatar e sub m ittedto the s e cret a ry m a y la ck t h e requ is it e num b e r of s i gna t ures . Evena s t o4 DOE v. REED S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment Plaintiffs point to no precedent fr om this Court holdin g that legislating is protected by t h e First Amendment. 3 Nor do the yidentify historical evidence demonstrating that “the freedom of sp eech” the First Amendment codified encompassed a right to legislat e without public disclosure. This should come as no surprise; the exercise of lawmak

ing power in the United States has traditionally been public. The public nature of federal lawmaking is constitution

ally required. Articl e I, §5, cl. 3 requires Congress to legislate in public: “Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and fromtime totime publishthe same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment requir e Secrecy; an d the Yeas and Nays o f the Members of either House on a n y question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Prese n t, be entered on the J o urnal.” 4St ate constitu

-

—————— those, the petition signer has exercised his portionof the legisl ativ e pow e rwh enhe sig n s th e petition , mu c hlike a legi sla t o rw h o c a sts a los i ng vote.

3 The Court quotes Republican Party of Mi nn. v. Whit e , 536 U. S. 765 , 788 ( 200 2), wh ic hstated t h at a S t a t e “ h av in g‘c h o [sen] to tap th e ener gyand the legi timiz i ngpowerof the democ r a ticpr oc ess, . . . must ac c o r dthe pa r t ic ipants in that pr oc ess t h e Fir s t A m e n dment r i gh ts that at tac hto theirr o les.’ ” Ante , a t6

. Th a tis correct , b u titis noton point. Whit einvolved a p rohibition o nspeak i ng as a c o n d ition of run n ing for j u dicia loffice. I do no t su g g e st th ata St ate c o u l d r e qu ir e legi sla t or s (orth e c i tizen

- legi slator s who participate in a referendum) to giv eup Fi r s t Amend m e n t r i gh ts unconnec t ed with theirac t o f legislating. The electioneering di sc losu r ec a ses th e Cou r t c i tes, ante , at 7, are likewise not on po int, since they involve disclosure requirements applied to pol i t ical speech, not legisla t ive action.

4 The except ionfor “ s uch Part s as m a y int h eir J u dgmentreq u ire S e crecy” wa s a s s u redly notdes i gned t operm ita n onym ous vot i ng. It refers t odet a ils whos e dis c los u re would t h rea t en a nim port a n tna t i onal int e res t

. The s i m i la r cla u s e in t h e Articles of Confederation created an exception to the j o urna l r e q u irem ent for parts of the proceedings “r elatingto tr eaties, alli anc e s orm ili tary operations, as in [Congress’s] j u dgm e ntreq u ire s e cres y .” Art

. IX. The Constitution’s requirement is broader, but its object is obvi ously the same.5 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment tions enact e d around the time of th e founding had similar provisions. See, e.g. , Ky. Const., Art. I, §20 (1792); Ga

. Const., Art. I, §15 (179 8). The desirability of public ac

countability was obvious. “[A]s to the votes of representa

tives and s e nators in Congress, no man has yet been bold enough to vindicate a secret or ballot vote, as either more safe or more wise, more promotive of independence in the members, or more ben e ficial to their constitu ents.” 1 J. Story, Com m entaries on the Constitution §841, p. 5 9 1 (4th ed. 1873). Moreover, even when the people askedCongress for legislative changes—by exerci sing their constitutional right “to petitionthe Government for a redress of griev

ances,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 1—they did so publicly. The petition was read aloud in Congre ss. Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 639, 726 (200 2). The pet i

tioner’s name (when large groups were not involved), his request, and what a cti on Congress had takenon the peti

tion were c o nsistently recorded inthe House and Senat e Journals. See, e.g. , Journal of the Senate, June 18, 1790, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 63; Journal of the Hou s e of Repre

sentatives, Nov. 24, 18 20, 16th Cong., 2d Ses s ., 32. Eve n when the people exercised legi slative power directly, they did so not anonymously, but openly in town hall meetings. See generally J. Zim m erman, The New England Town Meeting (1999). Petitioning the gover n ment andparticipa ting in th e traditional town meeting were precursors of the modern initiative a n d referendum. Thoseinnovation s were mod

eled after similar devices used by the Swiss d e mocracy in the 1800’s, and were first used in the United States b y South Dako ta in 1898. See S. Piot t, Giving Voters a Voic e 1–3, 16 (2003). The most influent ial advocate of the initia

tive and referendum in the Unite dStates an alogized the Swiss prac tice to the town meeting, because both “re

quired open conduct of political affairs and free expression6 DOE v. REED S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment of opinions. ” Id., at 5 (discussing J. W. Sullivan, Direct Legislation by the Citizenshi p through the Initiative and Referendum (1892)). Plaintiffs’ argument im plies that the public nature of these practices, so longs t anding an d unquestion e d, violated the freedo mof speech. There is no historical support for s u ch a claim. B Legislating was not the only governmental act that wa s public in America. Vo ting was pu blic until 1888 when the States began to adopt the Australian secret ballot. See Bursonv. Freem an , 5 04 U. S. 19 1, 203 (1992) (plurality opinion). We have acknowledg ed the existence of a First Amendment interest i nvoting, see, e.g. , Bur d ickv. Taku

shi , 504 U. S. 428 (199 2), but we have never said that it includes the right to vote anonymously. The history of voting in the United States com p letely undermines th at claim. Initially, the Colonies mostly continued the Englis h traditions of voting by a show of h ands or by voice— viva vocevoting. Burson , supra , at 20 0; E. Evans, A History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States 1–6 (1917) (Evans). One s c holar described the viva vocesys tem as follows:

“ ‘The electi on judges, who were magistrates , sat upon a bench with their clerk s before them. Where practi

cable, it wa s customar y for the ca ndidates to be pre

sent in person, and to occupy a seat at the side of the judges. As the voter appeared, his name was called out in alou dvoice. Th e judges in quired, “John Jones (or Smith), for whom do yo u vote?”—for gove rnor, or whatever was the office to be filled. He replied by proclaiming the name of his favorite. Then the clerk s enrolled the vote, and the judges announced it as en

rolled. The representative of the candidate for whom he voted arose, bowed, and than ked him aloud; and7 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment his partisans often applauded.’ ” Id. , at 5 (quoting J. Wise, Th e End of An Era 55–56 (1899)). See also R. Dink in, A Study of Elections in t h e Original Thirteen States, 1776– 1789, p. 101 (1982) (Dinkin). Although there was variation, the election offi cial would ordinarily compile a poll with the name and residence of each voter, and the n a me of the candidate for whom he voted. See C. Bishop, H i story of Elections inthe American Colonies 1 60–64 (189 3) (Bishop); P. Argersinger, Struc

ture, Proce ss, and Party: Essays in American Political History 47 (1992) (Argersinger). To prevent fraud, th e Colonies inRhode Island, New York, and New Jerse y adopted the English ru le that “cop i es of the poll must be delivered on demand to persons who were willing to pay a reasonable charge for the labor of writing the m .” Bishop 186. Some colonies a l lowed candidates to demand a copy of the poll, ibid. , and required the legislature to examine the poll in a contested election, id. , at 188–18 9. Thus, a s in this case, the government not only publicly collected identifying information about who voted a n d for whi c h candidate, it also disclosed t hat information to the public. Any suggestion that vi va voce voting infringed the ac

cepted understanding of the pre-existing freedom of speech to which the First Ame n dment’s t e xt refers is refuted by the fact th at several state constitutions that required or authorized viva vocevoting also explicitly guaranteed the freedo mof speech. See, e. g . , Ky. Cons t., Art. X, §7, Art. VI, §16 (1799); Ill. Const., Art. VIII, §22, Art. I, §28 (1818). Surely one con s titutional provision did not render the other invalid. Of course the practice of viva vocevoting was graduall y replaced with the pa per ballot, which wa s thought to reduce fraud and undue influence. See Evans 1–6; Dinkin 101–106. There is n o indication that the shift resulted from a su dden realiz ation that public voting infringed8 DOE v. REED S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment voters’ free dom of speech, and the manner in which it occurredsuggests the c o ntrary. St ates adopted the pa per ballot at different times, and some States changed meth

ods multiple times. New York’s 1777 Con s titution, fo r example, explicitly provided for the State to switch be

tween methods. Art. VI. Kentu c ky’s 1792 Constitution required paper ballots, Art. III, §2 , but its 17 99 Constitu

tion required viva voce voting, Art. VI, §16. T h e different voting methods simply refle cted di fferent views about how democracy should function. One scholar described Vir

ginia’s and Kentucky’s steadfast use of viva vocevoti ng through th e Civil War as follows: “[I]n the appeal to un

flinching manliness atthe polls these two states insisted still that e v ery voter should show at the hustings the courage of his personal convicti on.” Schouler, Evolution of the American Voter, 2 The American Histo r ical Review 665, 671 (1 897). See a l so id. , at 6 66–667 (“In Virginia and the other s t ates in clo s e affiliation with her this oral ex

pression was vaunted as the privilege of the free-born voter, to sh ow the faith that was in him by an outspoken announcement of his ca ndidate”). The new paper ballots did not make voting a n onymous. See Evans 10 (“[T]he ballot was not secret”) ; Ar gersing e r 48 (“Certai n ly there were no legal provisions to ensure secrecy”). I n itially, many Sta t es d i d not regul a te the form of the paper ballot. See Evans 10; Argers inger 48–49. Taking a dvantage of this, political parties began printin g ballots with their candidates’ names on them. They used brightly colored paper and ot her distinctive markings so that the bal lots could be recognized from a distance, mak

ing the votes public. See Burs on , supra , at 200–201; Evans 10–1 1. Abuse o f these unofficial paper ballots wa s rampant. The polling place had become an “open auction place” where votes could be fr eely bough tor coerced. Burson , su pra , a t202. Employers threatened employees. Partywor k ers keptvot e rs fromthe other party away from9 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment the ballot box. Ballot peddlers paid voters and then watched them place the ballot in the box. See L. Fredman, The Austra lian Ballot: The Sto r y of an American Reform 22–29 (1968); Argersi n ger 48–50. Thus, although some state courts said that voting b y ballot was meant to be more secret than the public act of viva vocevoting; a n d although some state constitutional requirements of ballot voting were held to guarantee ballot secrecy, thus prohib

iting the numbering of ballots for voteridentification purposes, see Williamsv. Stein , 3 8Ind. 89 (1 871); Brisbi n v. Cleary , 26 Minn. 1 07, 1 N. W. 825 (1879) ; in genera l, voting by ballot was by no means secret. Mo st importan t of all for present purposes, I am aware of no assertion of ballot secrecy that relied on fe deral or state c o nstitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. It was precisely discon tent over the nons ecret nature of ballot voting, and the abuses that produced, which led to the States’ adoption of the Australian secret ballot. New York and Massachusetts began that move ment in 1888, and almost 90 percent of the States had followed suit b y 1896. Burs on , 504 U. S., at 203– 205. But I am aware of no contention that the Australian system wa s required by the First A m endment (or the stat e counterparts). Tha t would have been utterly implausible, since the inhabitants of the Colonies, the States, and the United States had found public voting entirely compatible with “the freedom of speech” for several centuries.

* * * The long history of public legislat ing and voting contra

dicts plainti ffs’ claim th at disc losure of petition signatures having legislative effect violates the First Ame n dment. As I said in McIntyre , “[w]here the meaning of a constitu

tional text ( s uch as ‘the freed om of speech’) is unclear, the widespread and long-accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of what fundam ental belief s10 DOE v. REED S CALIA , J ., co n c ur ringin j u d g ment it was intended to ensh rine.” 514 U. S., at 378 (dissentin g opinion). J u st as the century-old practice of States’ pro

hibiting anonymous electioneerin g was sufficient for me to reject the First Amendment claim to anonym i ty in McIn

tyre , the m any-centuri es-old pra ctices of publ ic legislatin g and voting are sufficient for meto reject plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs raise concerns that the disclosure of petition signatures may lead to threats and intimidation. Of course nothing preve n ts the people of Washington fro m keeping petition signatures secret to avoid that—just a s nothing prevented the States from moving to the secret ballot. Butthere is no constitutional basis for this Cour t to impose that course upon the States—or to insist (as today’s opinion does) that it can only be avoided by the demonstration of a “sufficiently important g o vernmental interest,” ante , at 7 (internal quotation ma rks omitted). And it may even be a bad idea to k eep petition signatures secret. There are law s against threats and intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people have traditionally been willing to pay for self

governance. Requirin gpeople to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, wi thout whic h democracy i s doomed. For my par t , I do not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Suprem e Court, ca m paigns anonymously ( M cIntyre)and even exercises the direct democrac yof initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and protected fro mthe accountability of criticism. T h is does notresemble th e Home of the Brave._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 09–5 59 JOHN DOE #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. SAM REE D, WASHIN G T ON SEC R E TARY OF STAT E, ET AL
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e24, 2010 ] J USTICE T HOMA S , dissenting. Just as “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electora l processes is essentia l to the functioning of our participa

tory democr acy,” Pu rcel l v. Gonzalez , 549 U. S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curi am ) , so too is citizen participationin those proc

esses, which necessari ly entails political speech and asso

ciation under the First Amendment. In my view, com

pelled disc losure of signed referendum an d initiative petitions 1 under the Washington Public Records Act (PRA), Was h . Rev. Code §42.56.00 1, et seq. (2 008), severely burdens those rights and chills citizen participation in the referendum process. Given those burdens, I would hold that Washington’s decision to subject all referendum petitions to public disc losureis u n constitutional because there will always be a less restrictive means by which Washington can vindicate its st ate dinterest i npreservin g the integrity of its referendum process. I respectfully dissent.

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1 Gene ra lly s p ea king, in areferendum , vot e rs a pprove or rej e cta nAct alr e adypasse d byth e legi slatu r e. Inanin itiativ e , v o ter s adopt o r rej e cta nent i rely new la w, eit h er a s t atu t e ora c o n s tit u tion al a m en d

ment. S ee T. Cronin, Dir e ct Demo cracy: The Politics of Initi a t ive, Refer e n d u m , a n d Rec a ll 2 (1989).2 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g I This case c o ncerns the interaction of two distinct sets of Washington statutes. The first se t, codified in Washing

ton’s Election Code, regulate s the referendum and initia

tive process. These statutes require, among other things, that referendum signers write the i r names and address e s on petitionsheets, a n d mandate that this information be disclosed to Washington’s secretary of s t ate for canvass

ing and verification. See, e.g., § § 29A.72.130, 29A.72.230 (2008). Petitioners do not contend that these requ ire

ments violate their First Amendment rights; that is, the y do not argue that the Constitution allows them to support a referendum measure withou t disclosing their names to the S t at e . The secondset of statutes—the PRA—is not a referen

dum or election regulation. Rather, the PRA require s disclosure of all nonexempt “publicrecords” u p on request by any person. See §§42.56.010( 2), 42.56.07 0. Washin g ton has concluded that signed referendum petitions are “public reco rds” subjec tto disclosure under th e PRA, and has “routin ely disclosed petitions in response to public records requests.” Brief for Respondent Reed 5–6. Petitioners do not chal lenge the c o nstitutionality of the PRA gen e rally

. They contend o n ly that Washington vio

lates their First Amendment right s by constr uing the PRA to applyto signed ref e rendum p e titions. S ee Brief for Petitioners 35–39. As the Court no tes, the parties dispute whether this challenge is best con c eived as afacial chal

lenge or an as-applied challenge. See ante , at 5. In my view, the C o urt cor r ect l y conclude s that petit i oners must “satisfy our standards for a facial challenge” because their claim, and the relief that they se ek, “reach beyond” the i r “particular circumstan ces.” Ibid. We typically disfavor facial challenges. See Washin gton Sta t e Gran gev. Was h ing t on S t at e Re p ublic an P a r t y , 552 U. S. 442, 449 (2008). They “often rest on speculation, ”3 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g can lead courts unnecessarily to anticipate constitutional questions or formulate broad constitutional ru les, and ma y prevent gov e rnmental officers from implementing laws “in a manner consistent with the Con s titution.” Id. , at 450– 451. For those reason s, we rejected in Wash ington S t a t e Gran ge political partie s ’ pre-enforcement facial challenge to a Washington initiative that allowed candidates in a primary election to self-des ignate their political party preference on the primary election ballot. See id., at 458– 459. Because the ch allenge wa s a pre-enf o rcement one, Washington “had no op portunity t o implement” the initia

tive, id. , at 450, so the political parties’ argu ments that it violated their association rights all depended “on th e possibility that voters will be conf used as to the meanin g of the party-preference designation,” id. , at 454. More

over, a facial challen g e was inappropriate because th e regulation did “not onits face im pose a severe burden o n political parties’ associational rights.” Id. , at 444. Those cons iderations point in th e opposit e direction here. Washington’s c o nstruction of the PRA “on its f a ce impose[s] asevere bur den,” ibid. —compelled disclosure of privacy in political associationprotected by the First Amendment, see infra , at 4–5—onall referendum signers. And Washington has had several “opportuni t[ies] to im

plement” the PRA’s d i sclosure requirements with respe c t to initiative petitions. Washin gtonState Gran ge, supr a, at 450. Indeed, Washington admits that “[a]ll petitions for initiatives, referendum, recall, an d candidate nomination are public r e cords subject to disclosure.” Brie f for Respon

dent Reed 59; see a l so App. 26 (listing six completed re

quests for disclosure of signed i n itiative petitions sinc e 2006). Wa shington thus has elim inated any “possibility” that referendum petition signers “will be confused as to” how the State will respond to a request under the PRA to disclose th eir names and addres ses. Wash ington St at e Gran ge , 55 2 U. S., at 4 54.4 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g Accordin gly , I would consider petitioners’ facial chal

lenge here. For purposes of thisca se, I will as sume that to prevail, petitioners must satisfy o u r most ri gorous stan

dard, and s h ow that th ere is “ ‘no set of circu mstances .

. . under which the’ ” PRA could be constitutionally applied to a referendum or initiat i ve petition, “ i.e. , that the [PRA] is unconstitutional inall of its ap plications,” id., at 44 9 (quoting Unit e dSt at esv. Sal e rno , 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987)). II A The Court correctlyco ncludes that “an indi vidual ex

presses” a “political view” bysigning a referendum peti

tion. Ante , at 5. The Court also rightly rejects the bas e less argument that su ch expre ssi ve activit y falls “outside the scope of the First Amendment” merely bec ause “it has legal effect in the electoral process.” Ante , a t 6. Yet, the Court does not ack n owledge th e full constitutional impli

cations of these conclu sions. The expressive political activity of signing a re ferendum petition is a paradig m atic example of “the practice of persons sh aring common views banding together to achieve a common end.” Citiz e ns Against Rent Con

trol/Coali ti on for Fair Housing v. Berke ley , 454 U. S. 290, 294 (1981). A referendum supported by only one person’s signature is a nullity; it will never be placed on the ballot

. The Doe petitioners recognized as much when they—an d more than 120,000 oth e r Washingtonians, see ante , at 3 — joined with petitioner Protect Marriage Washington, “a state political action committee” organized under §42.17.040, to effect Protect Marria g e Washington’s “major purpose” of collecting enough valid signatures to place Referendum 71 on the general ele ction ballot. App. to Pe t. for Cert. 2 9a. For th ese re asons , signing areferendum petition amounts to “ ‘political as sociation’ ” protected b y5 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g the First Amendment. Citizen sAgainst Rent Control , supra , at 2 95 (quoting Buckleyv. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam)). This Court has long recognized the “vital re lationship between” political as sociation “and privacy i none’s a s s o ciations,” NAACP v. Al abama ex r e l. Pa tterso n , 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1 958), and h e ld that “[t]he Constitu tion protects against the compelled disclosure of politicalassociations and beliefs ,” Bro w nv. Socialis t Workers ’74 Camp aig n Comm. (Ohio) , 459 U. S. 87, 91 (1982). This constitutional protection “ yield[s] only to a subordinating i n terest of the State that i s compellin g, and then only if there is a sub

stantial relation between the information sought and a n overriding and compelling state interest.” Id. , at 91–92 (internal q u otation m a rks, citati ons, and b r ackets om it

ted). Thus, unlike the Court, I read our precedents to require application of strict sc ruti ny to laws that compe l disclosure of protecte d First A m endment association. Buckleyv. American Constitu tional Law Foundation, Inc. , 525 U. S. 1 82, 206, 212 (1999) (ACLF)(T HO MAS , J., con

curring in judgment). Under that standard, a disclosure requirement passes constitutional muster only if it is narrowly t a ilored— i.e. , the least restrictive means—to serve a compelling state interest. See id. , at 206. B Washington’s application of the PRA to a referendum petition does not surviv e strict scru tiny. 1 Washington first contends that it has a compelling interest in “transpare ncy and accountability,” which i t claims encompasses s e veral subordinate interests: pre

serving the integrity of its election process, preventing corruption, deterring fraud, andcorrectin gmistakes by the secreta ry of sta t e or by pe tition signers. See Brief for6 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g Respondent Reed 40–42; 57–59. It is true that a State h a s a substantial interest in regu

lating its referendum and init iative processe s “to protect the[ir] integrity and reliabil i ty.” ACLF , 525 U. S., at 19 1. But Washington points to no precedent fro mthis Court recognizing “correcting errors ” as a distinct compellin g interest that could support di scl o sure regulations. And our cases strongly sug g e st that p r eventing cor r uption and deterring fraud bear l e ss weight in this particular elec

toral context: the signature-gathe r ing stage of a referen

dum or initiative drive. The Court has twice o b served tha t
“ ‘the ris k of fraud or corru ption, or the appearance thereof, is more remot e at the pe tition stage of an in iti a tive than a tthe time of balloting.’ ” Id

. , at 203 (quoting Meyer v. Grant , 486 U. S. 414, 427 (1988)). Similarly, because “[r]eferenda are held on is sues, not candidates for public offic e ,” the “risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections sim p ly is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.” First Na t. Ba nk of Boston v. Bellotti , 4 35 U. S. 765, 790 (1978) (citations omitted). We should not abandon those principles mer e ly because Washington and its a m ici can point to a mere eight in

stances of initiative-related fraud, see Brief for Respon

dent Reed 42; Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Cu ri ae 22–24, among the 8 09 initiative measures placed on state ballots in this country be tween 1988 and 200 8, see Initiative and Referendum Institute, Initiative Use 2 (Feb. 20 09), onlin e at http://www.iandri nstitute.org/ IRI%20Initiative%20Us e %20(1904-2008).pdf (as visited June 21, 2010, and ava ilable in Clerk of Court’s case file). If anything, these meager figures reinforce the conclusion that the risks of fraud or corrupti o n in the initiative and referendum process are remote and thereby undermine Washington’s claim that those two interests should be considered compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny. Thus, I am not persuaded that Washington’s i n terest in7 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g protecting the integrity and reliability of its referendum process, as the State has defined t hat interest, is compel

ling. But I need not answer tha tquestion here. Eve n assuming the interest is compellin g, on-demand disclosure of a referendum petition to any person under the PRA is “a blunderbuss approach” to furthering that interest, Colo

rado Repu blican F e d eral Camp aign Com m . v. Fed e ral Elec tion Comm’n , 518 U. S. 604, 642 (1996) (T HOMAS , J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (interna l quotation marks omitted), not the least rest rictive mean s of doing so. The events that prompted petitioners’ com

plaint in this case demonstrate as much. As Washington explained during oral argument, after the secreta ry of s t ate receives signed refer e ndum peti

tions, his “first step .

. . is to take them to his archiving s e c t i o na n dt o h av e t h e md i gi t i z e d

. A s s o o na s t h e y ’ r e digitized, they’re available on di sk s for anyone who re

quests them” under the PRA. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. In this case, two organizations announ ced their intention t o obtain the digitized n a mes and addresses of referendu m signers and post the m“online, in a searchable format.” Ante , at 3. There is n o apparent reason w h y Washin gton must broadly disclose referendum signers’ names and addresses in this manner to vindicate the interest that it invokes here. Was h ington—which is in possessi on of that infor

mation because of referendum reg u lations that petitioners do not challenge, see supra , at 2—could put the names an d addresses of referendum signers into a similar electronic database that state employees could search without sub

jecting the name and address of each signer to wholesa l e public disclosure. The secre tary co uld electronically cross

reference the referend um dat abase against the “statewide voter regist ration list” contai ned in Washingt on’s “state

-8 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g wide voter registra tion database,” §29A.08.651(1), 2to ensure that each referendum signer meets Washington’s residency and voterregis tra tion requirements, see §29A.72.130. Doing so presu m ably would drastica lly reduce or el iminate pos s ible errors or mistak es that Wash

ington arg u es the secretar y mightmak e , see Brief f o r Respondent Reed 42, since it would allow the secretary to verify virtually all of the signatures instead o f the mere “3 to 5%” he “ordinarily checks,” ante , at 9 (internal quota

tion marks omitted). 3 An electronic referendum database would also enable the secretar yto determ ine wh ether multiple entries corre

spond to a single r e gistered v o ter, thereby detectin g whether a voter had signed the petition more than once

. In addition, the datab a se would protect vict ims of “for

gery” or “ ‘b ait and switch’ fraud.” Ibid

. In Washington, “a unique ide n tifier is a ssigned to each legall y registered voter in th e state.” §29A.08.651(4). Washington could create a Web site, linked to the electronicreferendum database, where a voter concerned that his na me had been fraudulently signed could conduct a search using his unique iden tifier to ens u re that his name was absent from the database—without requiring disclosure of the names and addres ses of all the voluntary, legitimate signers. Washington admits that creating t h is sort of electronic referendum database “could be do ne.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 1

. Implementing such asystem would not place a heavy burden on Washington; “the Secretary of State’s staff”

——————

2 Under Washington law, this “compu ter i z e d lis t mus ts e rv e as the sin gle sy stem forstor in gand main ta in ing the official list of registered v o ter s thr o ughout the state” and “mu s tconta i n the na me a n d regis t ra tion informati o n of every legally regi stered voter in the state.” Wash. Rev

. Code §§29A.08.6 51( 2)–( 3) (200 8).

3 See §29A.7 2.230 (per m i tt i n gth e sec r e t a r yof state t ov e r i fyan d c a n v ass r e fer e n d u mpetiti on s u s in gap pr ov ed stat is tic a l sam p lin g methods).9 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g already uses an “electronic vote r registration database” in its “verification process.” Id. , at 50. Washington nevertheless contends that its citi zens must “have access to public records .

. . to independently evalu

ate whether the Secretary p r oper ly determined to certify or not to certify a referendumto the ballot.” Brief for Respondent Reed 41. “[W]ithout the acces s to signed petitions that the PRA provid es,” Washington argues, its “citizens co uld not fulfill their role as the final judge o f public business.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitte d). But Washington’s Election Code al ready gives Washing

ton voters access to referend um petition data. Under §29A.72.230, “[t]he verification and canvass of signatures on the [referendum] petition may be observed by persons representing the advocates and op ponents of th e proposed measure so long as th ey make n o record of the names , addresses, or other information on the petiti ons or related records exc e pt upon” c o urt order. Each side is entitled to at least two such observers, although the secretar ymay increase that number if, in his opinion, doing so would not “cause und ue delay ordisruptionof the verification pro c ess.” Ibid. Washington does not explain whythis existing access, which petit i oners do not challe nge here, is insufficient to permit its citizens to oversee the verification process un

der §29A.72.230, or to deci de i n telligently whether to pursue a court challenge under §29A.72.240. Moreover, if Washington had implemented the more narrowly tailored electronic referendum databas e discussed above, observers could seethe secretary of state’s employees examine th e data using exactly the same techniques they would use if the data we re released to them under the PRA. Obtaini n g a digitized list to navigate on their own computer would not allow an observer to learn any additional information. Washington law also contains sev e ral other measures that preserve the integrity of the referen d um process.10 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g First, it is acrime in W a shington t o forge a si gnature on a referendum petition, or to knowin gly sign on e more than once. See §29A.84.230. Second, referendum supporte rs must gather a large number of valid sign atures—fou r percent of t h e votes cast for Gove rnor in the immediately preceding gubernatorial el ection—to place a referendum petition on the ballot. §29A.72.150. Third, Washington’s required referendum petition fo rm limits each petition to a single subject. See §29A.72.130. Fourth, alarge, plainEnglish wa rning must appear at the top of the referendum petition, alerting signers to the law’s requir e ments. S ee §29A.72.140. Fifth, W a shington prescribes the text of th e declaration that a circulator must submit al ong with the signed petition sh eets. See §29A.72.130. Sixth, Washing

ton prescri bes verification and ca nvassing methods. See §29A.72.230. The Court’s dismissive treatment of those provisions, see ante, at 9, is perplexing, given the analysis that the Court endorsed in ACLF

. There, the Court held that two disclosure requirements govern ing Colorado’s initiative process were unconstitutional, see 525 U. S., at 186–187, specifically finding tha tthey were “not wa rra nted by the state interests (administrativeefficiency, frau d detection, informing voters) alleg e d to justify” them, and emphasiz

ing that its “judgmen t [wa]s informed by other means Colorado employs to accomplish its regulatory purposes. ” Id. , at 192. The entir e last section of the C o urt’s opinion detailed those “less problemati c m e asures” by which Colo

rado “can and d[id] meet” its “substantial interests in regulating the ballot-initiative pr ocess.” Id. , at 204 (em

phasis added). With one exception—a law deeming an initiative void if the ci rculator vio l ated any law applicable to the circul a tion process—those Colorado laws correspond exactly to t h e Washingt on regulatory requirements listed above. See id., at 205. Including the observer provision, §29A.72.230, and the provision permitting court review of11 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g the secretary’s decision to certi fy (or not to certify) a refer

endum petition, §29A. 72.240, Wa shington thus appears to provide eve nmore of the “less problematic measures” than Colorado did to “prot e ct the int e grity of t h e initiative process,” AC LF , supra, at 204, a n d I see no reason wh y Washington’s identical provisions should not “inform” the analysis here. It is readily apparent that Washington can vindicate its stated interest in “transparency and accountability” through a number of more narrowly tailored means than wholesale public disclosure. Accordingly, this interest cannot justify applying the P RA to a referendum petition. 2 Washington also contends that it has a compelling interest in “providing relev ant information to Washington voters,” and that on-d emand disclosure to the public is a narrowly ta ilored means of furthering that int e rest. Brief for Respondent Reed 44. This argument i s easily dis

patched, since this Court has already rejecte d it in a simi

lar context. In McIntyrev. Ohio Elec tions Co mm’n , 514 U. S. 334 (1995), the Court held that anOhio law prohibiting anonymous political pamphleting violated the First Amendment. One of the interes t s Ohio had invok e d to justify thatlaw was identical to Washington’s here: the “interest in providing the electorate with re levant infor

mation.” Id. , at 348. The Cou rt called that interest “plainly insufficient to supp ort the constitutionality of [Ohio’s] disclosure requirement.” Id. , at 349. “The simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant in

formation does not j u stify a state requirement that a writer ma ke statemen ts or disclosures she would other

wise omit.” Id. , at 348. “Don’t un derestimate the common man,” we a dvised. Id. , at 348, n. 11 (internal quotation marks omit ted).12 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g “People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anony

mous. They know i tis anonymous. They can evalu

ate its anonymity along with its message. . . . And then, once they have done so, itis for them t o decide what is ‘responsible,’ whatis valuable, and what is truth.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitte d). See also Bellotti , 435 U. S., at 77 7 (“The inh e rent worthof the speech in terms of its capacit y for informing the publ ic does not depend upon the identity of its source”). This observation applies equally to referendum meas

ures. People are intelli gent enough to evaluate the merits of a referendum witho u t kno w ing who suppor ted it. Thu s , just as this informational interest did not jus t ify the Ohi o law in McIntyre , it do es not justify applying the PRA to referendum petitions. C The foregoing analysis applies in every case involvin g disclosure of a referendum measure’s supporters, as it must for p e titioners’ facial challenge to succeed. Se e Washin gtonState Gr ange , 552 U. S., at 449 (quotin g Salerno , 48 1 U. S., at 745). Was h ington does not argue that the strength of its transparency and accountability interest rises or fall s based on th e topicof a referendum. Nor would such an argument be convincing. We have n o basis to assume that W a shington’s interest in maintainin g the integrit y of its referendum pro c ess is high for a char

ter-school referendum but low for an unemployment in

surance referendum, or that a lib rary or land-use referen

dum is more likely to be a target of fraud or corrupti o n than a referendum on insurance coverage and benefit s . See ante , at 11–12. Th e strength of Washingt on’s interest remains constant acro ss all types of referendum measures. So too does the strength of a signe r ’s First Amendment interest. T h e First A m endment rights at is sue here are13 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g association a l rights, and a long, unbroken line of this Court’s precedents holds thatprivacy of as sociation is protected u n der the First Amend m ent. See supra , at 4–5. The loss of association a l privacy that comes with disclos

ing referendum petitions to the general public under the PRA consti tutes the same harm as to each signer of each referendum, regardless of the topic

. To be sur e , a referen

dum signer may be m o re willing t o disclos e t o the gener a l public his political as sociation with persons signing cer

tain referendum meas ures than his associat ion with oth

ers. But that choice belongs to the voter; the State may not make it for him by ascribing a lower level of Fir s t Amendment protec tion to an associational interest th at some think a voter may be (o r sh ould be) m o re willing to disclose. Cf. Rosenber gerv. Re ct or and Vis i t o rsof Univ. of Va. , 515 U. S. 819, 828 (1995) (“In the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may no t favor one speak e r over another”). Finally, the less restrictive means available to vindicate Washington’s transparency and accountability interest can be employed for all referendum measures, regardles s of topic. T h ere is noth ing measu r e-specific about an elec

tronic da tabase or additional observers. And the forgery prohibition and other existing requirements in Washing

ton law th at help “p r o tect the i n tegrityof the initiative process,” ACLF , 525 U. S., at 204, apply equally to a l l referendum measures. Because the strength of Washingt on’s interest in trans

parency an d a signer’s indivi dual First Amen dment inter

est in privacy of political association remain constant across all referendum topics, and because less restrictiv e means to protect the i n tegrityof the referendum proces s are not topic specific, I would hold that on-demand publi c disclosure of referendum petitions under th e PRA is n o t narrowly ta ilored fo r any referendum.14 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g III Significant practical problems willresult fromrequiring as-applied challenges to protect referendum signers’ con

stitutional rights. A The Court’s approach will “re quire substantial litigation over an extended time” before a potential signer of any referendum will learn whether, if he signs a referendum, his associat ional privacy right will remain inta ct. Citizen s United v. Federal El ection Com m ’n , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 9). And the te nacious litigant’s rewa rd for trying to protect his Fi rst Amendment rights? An “interpretive process [that] it self would create an inevit a ble, pervasive, and serious ri sk of chilling protected speech pending the drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end, would themselves be q u estionable.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 9–10). The large number of such fine and q u estionable distinctions in these ty pes of cases reinforces my view th at as-applied challenges provide no more than “a hollow assurance” that referendum signers’ First Amendmen t rights will be protected. Id. , at __ (slip op., at 5) (T HOMAS , J., concurri ng in part and dissenting in part). Consider just a few examples. In Washin gton, a referendum s p onsor mu st file the proposed referendum with the s e cretary of state before collecting signatures. See §29A.72.010. May the sponsor seek an injunction against disclosure through an a s applied challenge before filin g the proposed measure, or simultaneously with its filing? Becaus e signature

gathering will not have started, the sponsor will not be able to pres ent any evidence spec ific to signers or potential signers of that pa rti c ular ref erend u m showing “a reason

able probab ility that the compell e d disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from eitherGovernment officials or private15 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g parties.” Ante , at 11 (internal qu otation marks omitted). Thus, to su cceed at that stage of litigation, plaintiffs mu st point to (at least) one other instance of harassment arisin g from a similar referend um. Th e Court has ne ver held th at such evidence would be acceptable; but if it is, that neces

sarily means that some signers, at some point, will h ave suffered actual “threa t s, harassment, and reprisals” for engaging in protected F i rst Amend m ent activi ty. If the sponsor must wait at least until signature

gathering has startedon his referendum to file an as

applied challenge, it is still unc lear what sort of evidence of “threats, harassment, or reprisals” directe d towa rd his supporters would satisfy the Cour t’s standar d

. How man y instances of “threats, harassment or reprisals” must a signer endure before a court may grant rel i ef on an as applied challenge? And how dispersed throughout the group of the necessa ry 120,000 signers, s ee ante , at 3, must these threats be? More importantly, the Court’s sta n dard does not appea r to require actual“threats, harassment, or reprisals,” but merely a “ ‘ reasonabl e probability ’ ” that disclosure of the signers’ na mes and a d dresses wi ll lead to such acti vity. Ante , at 11 (emphasis added). What sort of evidence su f

fices to satisfy this ap parent ly m o re relaxed, though pe r haps more elusive, standard? Does one instance of actual harassment directed toward one signer mean that the “reasonable probability” require ment is met? And again, how widespread must this “reasonable pr obability” be? The Court does not an swer any of these ques t ions, leaving a vacuum to be f ill ed on a case-by-case basis. This will, n o doubt, result in the “drawing of” arbitrary and “question

able” “fine distinctions” by even the most well-intention e d district or c i rcuit judge

. Citizens United , 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9–10).16 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g B In addition, as I have previously explained, the state of technology today creates at least someprobability that signers of every referendum w ill be subjected to threats, harassment, or reprisals if their personal information is disclosed. “ ‘[T]he a dvent of the Internet’ e nables” rapid disseminati o n of “ ‘the information needed’ to” threaten or harass every referendum signer. Id., at __ _ (s lip op., at 6) (opinion of T HOMAS , J.). “Thus, ‘disclosure permits citi

zens . . . to react to the speech of [their political opponents] in a proper’—or undeniably improper —‘wa y’ long before a plaintiff could prevail on an as-applied challen g e.” Ibid. The Court apparently disagrees, asserting th at “there i s no reason to assume that any bu rdens imposed by discl o sure of typical referendum petitions would be remotely like the burdens plaintiffs fear in this case.” Ante , a t12

. That concl u sion rests on the pre m ise that some referen

dum measures are so benign that the fact of public dis

closure will not chill protected Fi rst Amendment activity. I am not convinced tha tthis premise is correct. The historical evidence sh ows that the referendum and initiative process first gained popularity as a means of “provid[ing] an occasional safe ty valve for i n terests th at failed to get a fair hearing in the legislatures.” T. Cronin, Direct Dem o cracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 59 (1989). Unsurprisingly, such interests tended to be controversial by na ture. Ea rly examples include “the single tax, prohibition, women’s suffrage, prolabor legislation, and the gra d uated income tax.” Id

. , at 58. And proponents of initiative measures tended to include politically marginalized groups s u ch as the “Farmer’s Alliance” in rural state s ; “[t]housands of labor federations, notably th e miners”; and “the Women’s Suf

frage Association,” which “saw the initiative and referen

dum as a possible new means to overcome” re peated failed attempts i nstate legislatures to secure for women theCite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010) 17
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g right to vot e . Id. , at 50–51. These characteristics of initiative and referendum drives pers ist today. Consider, for example, the goal o f increasing ethics in government—a seemin gly laudable and unobjectionable goal. So th ought some citizens of Utah, who, frustrated with the s t a t e legislature’s failure to pass ethics laws commensurate with their preferences, filed a “21- page initiative target[ing] legislative conduct with a bro a d array o f reforms that would significantly change how business gets done on Utah’s Capitol Hi ll.” McKitri ck, Suit De mands Sec r ecy forE t hics Petiti on Signers, Sal tLake Trib une, Apr. 1 5 , 2010, p. A4 (hereinaf

ter Salt Lake Tribune). But Utah law provides that “[i]nitiative packets,” which contain the na mes and a d

dresses (and, in some cases, birthdates) of petition signers, “are publiconce they are delivered to the c o unty cler ks” for verification and canv assing. Utah Code Ann. §20A–7

– 206(7) (2009 Lexis Supp. Pamphlet). The attorn eys sponsoring that in itiative moved for a n injunction to prevent disclosure of the initiative packe t s under §20A–7–206(7) because, they claimed, “ ‘[t]he [state ] Republican Party has said it will target our folks.’ ” Salt Lake Tribu n e, at A4. Ac cordin g to these attorneys, a facially benign initiative may well result in political retri

bution and retaliation in a Sta t e where Republicans cur

rently hold the offices of Governo r , Lieutenant Governo r , attorney general, sta t e treasurer, state au ditor, and a supermajority in both the Utah House of Representatives (71%) and the Utah Se nate (72%), see State Yellow Book: Who’s Who in the Executive and Legislative Branches o f the 50 Sta t e Govern ments 650–651, 1292–1294 (Spring 2010), as well as four of the five seats in the State’s dele

gation to the United States Congress, see GPO, 2009–2010 Official Congressional Directory, 111th Cong., pp. 299, 307 (2009). The difficulty in predicting which referendum measures18 DOE v. REED
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g will prove controversial—combi n ed with Washington’s default position that signed referendum petitions will be disclosed o n -demand, thereby allowing anyone to place this information on th e Internet f o r broad dis s emination— raises the s i gnificant probability that today’s decision wil l “inhibit the exercise of legi timate First Amen dment activ

ity” with r e spect to referendum and initiative petitions. Colorado Republican, 518 U. S., at 634 (T HOMA S , J., con

curring in j u dgment a n d dissenting in part). “[D]isclos ure requiremen t s enable private citizens and elected officials to implement political strategies specifi cally calculatedto curtail cam p aign-relat ed activit y and preven t the lawfu l , peaceful ex ercise of Fi rst Amendment rights.” Citizen s United , 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (T HOMAS , J., con

curring in part and dissenting in part). Our cases have long recognized this reality; 4as the Court recently reiter

ated, the First Amend m ent does not require “case-by-cas e determinations” if “ar c h etypic al” First Amen dment righ ts “would be chilled i nth e meantime.” Id., at

_ __ (sl i p op., at 12). This chill i nprotected First Ame n dment activity harms others besides the dissuaded signer. We have already expressed deep skepticism about restrictions that “mak[e] it less likel y that” a referendum “will garner the number of signatures necessaryto place the matter on the ballot ,

——————

4 See, e. g., NAA C P

v. Alab a m a ex rel. Pat t erso n , 357 U. S. 449, 46 2 (195 8) (noting the “hardly .

. . no vel perce ption that co mpelled di sclo

sur eof affili at ion with gr oups eng a g e d inadv o c a c yma yc o nstitute” a n “effective .

. . restraint on freedom of associ ation”); Batesv. Little Rock , 361 U. S. 51 6, 523 (19 60) (“ Fr eedoms su c has” th e “fr eedom of assoc i a tion for the purpose of advancing ideas an d air i n ggr iev a n c es” ar e “pr o tec t ed not onlyag ainst heavy - handedfr ontal attac k , but also fr om being stifle d b ymore subtle government interference”); see al so id. , at 5 2 8(Bla ck a n d Dougla s , J J

. , conc urri ng) (“ Firs t Am endm entright s a r e bey o n dabr idg m en t eith erb ylegi slat ion tha tdirect ly res t ra ins t h eir exercis eor b ys u ppres s i on or impa irment through h a ra s s ment, hu

mili ation, or ex posurebygov ernm e nt” (emphasis adde d)).19 Cite as: 56 1 U

. S. ____ (2010)
T HOMAS , J. , dissen t in g thus limiting [the] ability to make the matter the focus o f statewide discussion.” Meyer , 48 6 U. S., at 423. Such restrictions “inevitabl[y] .

. . reduc[e] the total quantum of speech on a public issue.” Ibid. T h e v e r yp u b l i ct h a tt h e PRA is su pposed to serve is th us harmed by the way Washington implement s that statute here. * * * Petitioners do not ar gue that the Constitution gives supporters of referendum peti tions a righ t to act withou t anyone k n owing their identities. Thus, Washington’s requiremen t s that referendumsupporters sign thei r names andaddresses to a referendum petition, and th a t this inform ation be di sclosed to th e State for canvassin g and verifica tion, see Wash. Rev. Code §29A.72.230, are not at issue. And, petitioners do no t contend that Washin g ton’s citizens may neverobtain access to referendum data. Thus, Washington’s rules allowing access to at least two representative observers from each side, see ibid. , and authorizing courts to review th e secretary of state’s verifi

cation and canvassing decision if those observers are dissatisfiedwith the secretary’s decision, see §29A.72.240, are also notin question

. The Court is asked to assess the c o nstitutionality of the PRA only with regard t o referendum petitions. The ques

tion before us is whether all signers of all referendum petitions must resort to “substantial litigation over an extended time,” Citize ns United , supra , at __ _ (slip op., at 9), to prev ent Washington from trenching o ntheir pro

tected FirstAmendment rights by subjecting their refer

endum-petition signatures to on-demand public disclosure. In my view, they need not.