Filed 3/11/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DENNIS K. HAUCK,

Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL L. RIEHL,

Respondent. B247351

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BF030864)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David S. Cunningham, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Dennis K. Hauck, in pro. per., for Appellant. Michael L. Riehl, in pr o. per., for Respondent.2 A five-year-old child lives with he r mother, Brook Bennett-Hauck, and her stepfather, Dennis Hauck (“stepfather”). Her father, Michael Riehl (“father”), has visitation rights. After a confrontation betw een the two men while father was picking up the child for a visit, father sought an injunction against stepfather pursuant to the provisions of the California Domestic Violence Prevention Act, Family Code 1 section 6200 et seq. (“DVPA”). Stepfather maintained th at the superior court had no jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction, since he and father did not have one of the re lationships specified by the DVPA. The court agreed that the two men alone did not share a specified relationship, but found that step father’s inclusion of the child in the petition as a person to be protected provided the necessary nexus to confer jurisdiction on the court. We disagree, and so reverse the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Initially, an action was filed to determine the paternity of the minor child. Father was the petitioner in that case, and mother th e respondent. Stepfa ther, who was married to mother, was involuntarily joined in the paternity case as a “Claimant.” On August 8, 2012, father filed a “Request for Dome stic Violence Restraining Order.” In it he requested a “stay away” or der, pursuant to which stepfather would be ordered to stay away from father, his home, job, vehicle and “the children’s school or child care.” It also included a request that stepfather stay away from the minor child’s

home 2 and that he be ordered not to do any of the following to father or to the minor child: “Harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or ot herwise), hit, stalk, molest, destroy personal pr operty, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance or block

1 All further statutory references are to th e Family Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 The court later removed, with the concu rrence of father, the stay away order and harassment provisions of the temporary restra ining order (“TRO”) in regard to the minor child. It was admitted by father that the mi nor child lived with mo ther and stepfather, and that there were no allegations that father ever abused the minor child.3 movements.” Furthermore, he sought an orde r that stepfather not “contact [him] either directly or indirectly, in any way, includi ng, but not limited to, by telephone, mail or email or other electronic means.” The c ourt issued a TRO against stepfather. On August 30, 2012 , the court denied stepfather’s motion to dissolve the TRO and to dismiss the case, which request was br ought on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction under the DVPA to hear the case, since father was not a protected person

under section 6211. On September 20, 2012, the court co nducted a hearing on the merits. Stepfather argued that because he and father were never spou ses, cohabitants, in a dating relationship, children of a party subject to the Uniform Parentage Act, or related by consanguinity or affinity, father does not qua lify for a restraining order under the DVPA. Father contended that he and stepfather we re related by consanguinity and affinity, as they were in-laws, of a sort. The trial cour t rejected the contention. The court noted, however, that father had sought protection for his minor child in his application for the restraining order, and the child is a person de scribed by section 6211. The court reasoned that, “under the law revision commission comment s, the genesis of the domestic violence protection act was expanded to include protec tion of a child, and it was unequivocal that that would include protection of the child. [¶] And once we ge t into an allegation that is seeking protection of the child, I think it then does create the relationship . . . .” The court acknowledged that the circ umstance of the instant case “ doesn’t fit neatly into the express provisions,” but stated, “when I look at the law revision commission comments and the notion that seeking protection for the child was certainly an intent behind this statute, there is an allegation in the declaration that seeks to also include the child. . . . [¶] There is clearly a relationship to that child by virtue of marriage with the [mother]. I

think this is one of those instances where th e legislative intent would have allowed the court based on judicial economy because it woul d be elevating form over substance. . . .4 [¶] So I do think that this type of acti on is intended under the law revision commission comments, and that will be the court’s ruling. . . .” 3 Consequently, the court granted father’s request and issued a permanent injunction against stepfather, which was to remain in effect for five ye ars. That order provides as

follows: (1) Stepfather is prohibited from engagi ng in any kind of personal contact with the person of father; (2) Stepfather must stay at least 100 yards away from father’s person, home, office, school, and vehicle; (3) Stepfather must not harass, strike, th reaten, assault, hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal prope rty, disturb the peace, keep unde r surveillance, or block father’s

movements; (4) Stepfather must stay at least 100 yards away from the minor child’s school or day care; (5) Stepfather is prohibited from owning a gun or other firearm, or ammunition;

and (6) Father is allowed to make a record ing of any incidents that may incur in the

future for use in enfo rcing the injunction. Stepfather timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The sole issue on appeal concerns the interpretation of the statutory language of

the DVPA. The construction a nd application of a statute is a matter of law which this court reviews de novo. ( Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) “The rules governing statutory construction are well se ttled. We begin w ith the fundamental

3 Contrary to the court’s statement, ther e were no allegations in the petition of any act of abuse as defined in section 6203 ag ainst the minor child. The only order sought which referenced the child was a “stay-aw ay” from the child’s school, where custody exchanges for visitation purposes occurred.5 premise that the objective of statutory inte rpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] ‘In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its “plain meaning.’” [Citations.] Although we may properly rely on extrinsic aids, we should first turn to the wo rds of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” ( Ibid .)

DISCUSSION 4 Section 6301 provides that a protective order may be granted under the DVPA “to any person described in Section 6211, including a minor . . . .” The persons described in

section 6211 include: “(a) A spouse or former spouse. “(b) A cohabitant or former coha bitant as defined in Section 6209. “(c) A person with whom the responde nt is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship. “(d) A person with whom the responden t has had a child, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child of the female parent under the Uniform Parentage Act. “(e) A child of a party or a child wh o is the subject of an action under the Uniform Parentage Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child to be protected. “(f) Any other person related by consan guinity or affinity, within the second degree.” (§ 6211.)

4 Father asserts that stepfa ther is in contempt of court and that, pursuant to Knackstedt v. Superior Court (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 727, this appeal should be dismissed. The record reflects th at while a contempt citation was issued on September 21, 2012, it was recalled on February 22, 2013, the same day stepfather filed his Notice of Appeal. We therefore deny father’s dismissal request.6 The trial court properly found that father is not a “person” listed in section 6211.

While father contended in the trial court th at there is “affinity” between himself and stepfather as “they are akin to in-laws,” the statutory definiti on of affinity does not permit father’s creative expansion of the concept. 5 Indeed, father abandons this argument on appeal. Instead, father points to s ection 6211, subdivision (e) whic h, he posits, “states that domestic violence is abuse perpetrated against a child of a party. [Father] alleged in his moving papers and in open court that he was not just requestin g protection under the DVPA for himself, but also for his child.” Th e trial court grounded its decision to issue the restraining order on this notion of protection of the child from abuse, even though no evidence of stepfather’s a buse of the child was pres ented to the court. The court correctly noted that if a minor child is “abused” as defined in section 6203, he or she is a protected person pursu ant to section 6211, subdivision (e), and therefore authorized to bring an action unde r the DVPA. A petition can be brought by a parent as the natural guardian of a minor child, by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, or perhaps in conjunctio n with the parent’s own claim, if the petitioning party were himself a protected person under section 6211 . But, in the present case father did not bring the action on behalf of the minor child, was not a protected person under section

6211 and did not make any allegations in his petiti on of any “abuse” which stepfather committed against the minor child. The only abuse alleged and testified to by father was abuse directed at him by stepfather while the child was not present. 6 Moreover, even if

5 Section 6205 defines affin ity as follows: “‘Affinity .’ When applied to the marriage relation, signifies the connection ex isting in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and th e blood relatives of the other.”

6 In his declaration in support of a prot ective order, father described as “previous abuse” a single instance when the minor child wa s present: “Late last year, . . . [d]uring [a] custody transition, . . . . [stepfather] sarcastic ally stated to me that he wanted to thank me for joining him as a party to this litiga tion because that means ‘I now have one-third custody rights to [the minor].’ He clapped hi s hands together in mock applause and again7 father had brought the petition on behalf of th e child, the court would be authorized to issue an order restraining stepfather’s intera ctions with the child, not with father. In short, because father was not a protected pe rson under the DVPA, the trial court was not authorized to grant him the pr otective order here at issue.

Father maintains that even if the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the protective order, the error was harmless beca use stepfather presen ted no evidence to counter the allegations of father’s applicati on. We must disagree. If the court lacked jurisdiction under the DVPA, it did not have the power to issue any DVPA orders, no

matter what evidence was or wa s not presented by the par ties to the action. (See Valenta v. Regents of University of California (1991) 231 Cal.App.3rd 1465, 1470, fn. 2 [“It is axiomatic that a judgment entered by a court which lacked jurisdicti on is void and must be reversed”].) Father’s obvious remedy is to file a civil harassm ent action under Civil

Code section 527.6.

said, ‘Thank you.’ Though his statement was absurd, it is insi ght into what I believe is [his] deluded and irrational thi nking.” This conduct does not constitute abuse against the child as that term is defined in section 6203, which provides: “For purposes of this act, ‘abuse’ means any of the following: [¶] (a ) Intentionally or recklessly to cause or attempt to cause bodily injury. [¶] (b) Se xual assault. [¶] (c) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of immine nt serious bodily injury to that person or to another. [¶] (d) To engage in any beha vior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.”8 DISPOSITION

The order is reversed and the case is remanded to the tria l court, which is directed to dissolve the injuncti on and dismiss the case.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MINK, J. *

We concur:

MOSK, ACTING P. J.

KRIEGLER, J.

* Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.