United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 21, 2018*

Decided February 21, 2018

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐3886

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW YORK,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15‐CR‐00189‐001

Tanya Walton Pratt,

Judge.

O R D E R

Matthew York pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a felony conviction,

see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. In calculating

his sentence, the district court found that York’s three prior convictions for Indiana

burglary qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, requiring a

minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). York appealed,

arguing that Indiana burglary does not qualify as a violent felony because, he contends,

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the issues have

been authoritatively decided. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16‐3886    Page 2

it is broader than the generic definition of burglary referred to in the ACCA. But we

recently rejected his argument in United States v. Perry, 862 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2017),

petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 2, 2017) (17‐6681), so we affirm.

The ACCA defines a “violent felony,” in relevant part, as a felony “that...is

burglary.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The term “burglary” in this context refers to “generic”

burglary, which the Supreme Court has defined as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry

into, or remaining in, a building or other structure with intent to commit a crime.”

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). Indiana law defines basic burglary in

nearly identical terms: “break[ing] and enter[ing] the building or structure of another

person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it.” IND. CODE § 35‐43‐2‐1. (Indiana

punishes burglaries more severely if additional factors are present, such as burglaries of

dwellings, those that result in injuries, or those that involve deadly weapons. See id.)

In Perry, this court applied the categorical approach to evaluating statutes, Mathis

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016), and determined that basic Indiana burglary

does not “sweep[] more broadly” than generic burglary. Perry, 862 F.3d at 622–23

(quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013)). Because the offenses

categorically matched each other, we deemed basic Indiana burglary convictions valid

predicate offenses under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 624. We then relied on Perry in

United States v. Foster, —F.3d—, No. 17‐1703, 2017 WL 6168600 (7th Cir. 2017), to rule

that when an Indiana burglary conviction involves an additional factor, such as a

deadly weapon, see IND. CODE § 35‐43‐2‐1 (1986), it also qualifies as a violent felony. We

explained that the conviction required the same elements, plus a narrowing aggravating

element, as the Indiana burglary statute examined in Perry.

York pleaded guilty to illegal possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1), and his

three prior convictions for Indiana burglary necessarily qualify as violent felonies under

this court’s precedent. His arguments characterizing the Indiana burglary statute as

overbroad have been rejected in Perry and Foster. And we are not persuaded that any

reason exists for revisiting our holding in either case.

AFFIRMED