United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted April 2, 2021*

Decided April 16, 2021 

Before 

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3048 

KEDRON JONES, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN BALDWIN, et al. 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 16-CV-3143 

Colin S. Bruce, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Kedron Jones, a state inmate, sued prison administrators, alleging that they were 

deliberately indifferent to problems with the toilet in his cell. Jones filed his complaint 

pro se and moved the court to recruit pro bono counsel for him. The court denied the 

motion, instructing Jones to resubmit it with information the court needed in order to 

rule. Jones never did, but at the final pretrial conference, he again asked the court to 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-3048 Page 2 

recruit an attorney for him. The court demurred based on the scarcity of volunteer 

lawyers and its willingness to assist Jones with the procedural aspects of the trial. Jones 

lost his case at trial. On appeal, he challenges only the decisions not to recruit counsel. 

We see no abuse of discretion, so we affirm. 

Jones alleged that he suffered from “cross-flushing” in his cell at Western Illinois 

Correctional Center. When the toilet in the neighboring cell flushed, human waste 

flowed into his toilet and occasionally overflowed. Jones had only shampoo or body 

wash—not disinfectant—to clean the mess. Jones filed a grievance, which was denied at 

all levels, and he wrote letters to the prison’s higher-ranking officials. The prison’s 

engineer came to check on his toilet but, according to Jones, the problem persisted. 

Jones turned to federal court. He sued several prison administrators under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his living conditions 

and that, by failing to fix the plumbing system, they subjected him to cruel and unusual 

punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. He also filed a motion to recruit counsel. 

When entering its “merit review” order, the district court (then-Chief Judge 

Shadid) denied the motion with leave to renew after Jones demonstrated reasonable 

efforts to find a lawyer on his own. Although Jones had listed three law firms that he 

had contacted, the court instructed Jones to attach any responses from attorneys 

denying his requests for representation. The court further instructed him to provide 

information about his educational background, job history, and litigation experience. 

The parties conducted discovery, and Jones’s claim withstood a motion for 

summary judgment. Soon after, the court consolidated Jones’s case with another 

inmate’s suit that raised similar claims. A lawyer had been recruited to represent that 

inmate, so the court asked him to represent Jones, too. Counsel withdrew less than a 

year later, however, referring to a conflict of interest with the other inmate and a 

breakdown of the attorney-client relationship with Jones. The cases were severed, and 

Jones proceeded to trial pro se. 

At the final pretrial conference, the district court (now Judge Bruce) explained 

trial procedure to Jones, including the jury selection process and how to make an 

opening statement and select witnesses. At the end of the conference, Jones asked if the 

court could recruit a lawyer to assist him so he didn’t “make too many mistakes” 

because he had “never done a trial before.” The judge explained that the court’s pro 

bono resources were extremely limited—less than a half dozen attorneys willing to 
No. 19-3048 Page 3 

“occasionally” assist for every 400 requests—so he could not enlist a second attorney to 

represent Jones. The judge said he would help Jones whenever he got “stuck” 

procedurally. Jones quickly acquiesced and assured the court that he understood. 

At trial, Jones summarized the facts of his case during his opening statement. The 

district court guided him through examining witnesses, including the defendants and 

fellow inmates who had also experienced cross-flushing, and helped Jones lay the 

foundation for and admit exhibits. The court admitted evidence and allowed lines of 

questioning over the defendants’ objections, giving Jones “leeway” and “indulging ... 

Jones in a lot of ways” it would not have if Jones were represented. The court 

repeatedly reminded Jones of the elements he had to prove in order to win his case. 

After Jones rested, the court entered a directed verdict for four defendants: They 

had all testified that they had no knowledge of the toilet problem, and Jones had offered 

no evidence to the contrary. Then, during the defendants’ case in chief, the warden (the 

only remaining defendant) testified that, after he received Jones’s letter and grievance, 

he sent a facility engineer to check on Jones’s toilet. The engineer reported back that it 

was working properly, the warden said, so he believed the issue had been resolved. The 

engineer’s testimony corroborated this story. After closing arguments, the jury returned 

a verdict for the warden. 

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erroneously denied his motions to 

recruit counsel because, without previous experience, he was “severely prejudiced” at 

trial. In particular, he contends, the case came down to a “swearing contest” in which he 

needed an advocate to develop his story and undercut the defendants’. 

District courts have the discretion to recruit volunteer lawyers to represent 

indigent clients in civil lawsuits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 

653 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). When presented with a motion to recruit counsel, the 

district court must ask whether the litigant made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel 

on his own and whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff appears competent 

to litigate it himself. Id. at 654. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision lacks 

any support in the record or when the decision is clearly arbitrary or based on 

erroneous findings of fact or conclusions of law. Id. at 658. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying either motion to recruit 

counsel. In denying the first, the court explained that Jones had not provided enough 

information about either Pruitt factor. Although he said he had contacted three law 
No. 19-3048 Page 4 

firms, he did not say when he did or whether they responded. The court also had no 

information about Jones’s competence to litigate a case, so it reasonably asked him for 

details about his education, work history, and past litigation. See Machicote v. 

Roethlisberger, 969 F.3d 822, 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2020) (denial of motion not abuse of 

discretion when litigant had not shown he tried to find a lawyer himself); Pruitt, 503 

F.3d at 655 (plaintiff's “literacy, communication skills, educational level, and litigation 

experience” and “intellectual capacity and psychological history” relevant to 

competence). 

In denying the second, oral, motion, the district court did not expressly revisit 

the two Pruitt inquiries, but it was not required to. The court had already addressed one 

motion, and Jones never provided the information missing from his first request. 

See Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2018). Still, the district court 

acknowledged, appropriately, that the case was entering into a more complex stage of 

litigation, see Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938–39 (7th Cir. 2018), and assured Jones that 

it would offer procedural help along the way. This was responsive to Jones’s only 

reason for wanting counsel—unfamiliarity with the process. Further, it was reasonable 

for the court to refer to the scarcity of pro bono attorneys in denying the motion. 

See McCaa v. Hamilton, 959 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Had the district court abused its discretion, we still would not reverse the 

judgment because Jones was not prejudiced at trial. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659. With the 

judge’s help, Jones examined witnesses, admitted exhibits, and presented coherent 

arguments to the jury. Jones lost not because there was a “swearing contest” but 

because he lacked evidence of any defendant’s deliberate indifference to his living 

conditions. See Tidwell v. Hicks, 791 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding no prejudice 

where pro se litigant “offer[ed] no reason to think that new counsel ... might have 

turned up evidence that would have affected the outcome of the case”). Jones could not 

refute four defendants’ testimony that each was unaware his toilet was broken, nor did 

he undermine the warden’s and engineer’s testimonies that the warden requested an 

inspection and the engineer reported the toilet was functioning properly. Jones does not 

explain how a lawyer could have made up for these evidentiary deficits or otherwise 

brought about a different verdict. 

Jones also argues that the district court should have automatically recruited 

replacement counsel after the lawyer in the consolidated case withdrew. The court had 

no such obligation. The first judge’s effort to recruit a volunteer lawyer did not 
No. 19-3048 Page 5 

indefinitely commit the district court to securing counsel for Jones. See Wilborn v. Ealey, 

881 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018). 

AFFIRMED