[Cite as State v. Blair, 2013-Ohio-646.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-12-14 

 v. 

MEAGAN BLAIR, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Marion Municipal Court 

Trial Court No. TRC 1106722 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: February 25, 2013 

 

APPEARANCES: 

J.C. Ratliff and Jeff Ratliff for Appellant 

Steven E. Chaffin for Appellee 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Meagan Blair (“Blair”), appeals the March 8, 

2012 judgment of the Marion Municipal Court journalizing her conviction by a 

jury for operation of a vehicle while under the influence (“OVI”), in violation of 

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and operation of a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 

concentration in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), and suspending her driver’s 

license for one year. 

{¶2} On September 5, 2011, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Trooper Tawanna 

Young was on patrol when she observed the 2004 Honda driven by Blair and 

noticed that the rear license plate light on the vehicle was not illuminated. 

Trooper Young followed Blair and signaled for her to pull over her vehicle. Blair 

was travelling with a friend in the passenger seat. 

{¶3} Trooper Young approached Blair, informed her of the reason for the 

stop, and asked Blair for her driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. 

Trooper Young asked Blair to exit the vehicle and directed her to the back of the 

car so that she could show Blair that her license plate light was inoperable. Blair’s 

car was already turned off, so Trooper Young requested Blair start her car. Blair 

indicated that the passenger had the keys, however the passenger was unable to 

locate the keys to start the car. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶4} Trooper Young asked Blair to sit in her cruiser while she checked 

Blair’s driving record. Blair complied with the request, was patted down, and then 

sat in the front seat of the cruiser. At this time, Blair explained to Trooper Young 

that she had been asleep for almost two hours when she received a phone call from 

the passenger at 2:00 a.m. requesting Blair pick her up from a bar in Marion. 

During this conversation, Trooper Young observed a strong odor of alcoholic 

beverage emanating from Blair’s breath. Trooper Young asked Blair if she had 

anything to drink that night. Blair admitted to consuming two drinks between 10 

p.m. and midnight. 

{¶5} Trooper Young then proceeded to conduct a Horizontal Gaze 

Nystagmus test (“HGN”) on Blair and observed six out of six clues indicating 

Blair to be impaired. Next, Trooper Young had Blair recite the alphabet starting at 

the letter “D” and ending at the letter “W.” Blair was unable to complete this task 

due to skipping the letters between “P” and “W.” Trooper Young then conducted 

additional field sobriety tests. Specifically, Trooper Young asked Blair to 

complete the walk-and-turn test and observed two out of eight clues indicating 

impairment. Trooper Young also had Blair complete the one-leg-stand test, which 

Blair completed correctly with no clues of impairment. Based on the strong odor 

of alcoholic beverage emanating from Blair’s breath, her admission to consuming 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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two alcoholic beverages, and her performance on the field sobriety tests, Trooper 

Young determined Blair to be impaired and placed her under arrest for OVI. 

{¶6} After being transported to the Multi-County Jail, Blair agreed to 

submit to a chemical test measuring the concentration of alcohol in her breath. 

Trooper Young read Blair the BMV form 2255 and administered the test. The 

first test indicated that an invalid sample was obtained and failed to produce a 

reading. Sergeant Hunter, Trooper Young’s supervisor who was also present at 

the jail, administered the second test to Blair at Trooper Young’s request, after the 

requisite twenty-minute observation period. This time a valid sample was 

obtained and the test produced a result of .106 of one gram by weight of alcohol 

per two hundred ten liters of breath, indicating that the concentration of alcohol 

detected in Blair’s breath exceeded the legal limit. 

{¶7} Blair was charged with OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), 

operation of a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, in violation of R.C. 

4511.19(A)(1)(d), failure to wear a seat belt, in violation of R.C. 4513.263(B)(1), 

and failure to illuminate the rear license plate, in violation of R.C. 4513.05. Blair 

entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. 

{¶8} On October 14, 2011, Blair filed a motion to suppress alleging that 

Trooper Young lacked probable cause and/or reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

stop her for a license plate light violation, that Trooper Young did not acquire 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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probable cause and/or reasonable, articulable suspicion to further detain her to 

administer the field sobriety tests, and that Trooper Young lacked probable cause 

to subsequently arrest her for OVI. Blair also claimed that the field sobriety tests 

were not conducted in accordance with NHTSA standards, and challenged the 

results of the breathalyzer, alleging the test was not administered in accordance 

with the Ohio Department of Health Rules and Regulations. 

{¶9} On December 22, 2011, a hearing was held on Blair’s motion to 

suppress. The video of the stop was introduced as evidence as well as the 

testimony of Trooper Young, Sergeant Hunter, and Blair. On December 23, 2011, 

the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling the motion. The jury trial was 

set for March 7, 2012. 

{¶10} On March 6, 2012, the day before trial, Blair filed a subpoena duces 

tecum requesting Trooper Young produce for use at trial copies of her call log and 

copies of her computer log from the date of Blair’s arrest. Blair also filed a 

subpoena duces tecum requesting the Keeper of Records and/or Office Manager at 

Ralls Automotive to produce for the use at trial the invoice reflecting service 

performed on Blair’s car the day after her arrest. The prosecution subsequently 

filed a motion to quash. The same day, the trial court granted the prosecution’s 

motion finding compliance with the subpoenas to be unreasonable and oppressive. 

See Crim.R. 17(C). 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶11} The next day, the jury trial commenced as scheduled and the jury 

heard evidence pertaining to two counts: OVI and operating a vehicle with a 

prohibited alcohol concentration. Trooper Young and Sergeant Hunter testified 

for the prosecution and Blair testified in her defense. The video of the stop was 

also admitted for the jury to review. The jury found Blair guilty on both counts 

before it and the prosecution elected for Blair to be sentenced on the OVI 

conviction. The prosecution subsequently dismissed the seat belt violation. The 

trial court found Blair not guilty of the rear license plate light violation. 

{¶12} On March 8, 2012, the trial court sentenced Blair to ninety days in 

jail with eighty-four days suspended and imposed a fine of $1,000 with $100 

suspended. The trial court also suspended Blair’s driver’s license for one year 

beginning on March 8, 2012 and expiring March 8, 2013. 

{¶13} Blair now appeals, asserting the following assignments of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS AS (1) THE STOP WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE OR A REASONABLE 

AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THE DEFENDANT HAD 

COMMITTED A TRAFFIC VIOLATION; (2) THE OFFICER 

DID NOT POSSESS A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE 

SUSPICION JUSTIFYING THE CONTINUED DETENTION 

OF THE DEFENDANT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE 

INITIAL STOP; (3) THE OFFICER DID NOT POSSESS A 

REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 

JUSTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FIELD 

SOBRIETY TESTS; (4) THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND 
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CHEMICAL TESTS WERE NOT DONE IN SUBSTANTIAL 

COMPLIANCE WITH NHTSA OR ITS EQUIVALENT AND 

THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH RULES AND 

REGULATIONS; AND (5) THE OFFICER DID NOT 

POSSESS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE 

DEFENDANT. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT’S 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO CONFRONT THE 

WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE AGAINST HER, HER RIGHT 

TO COMPULSORY PROCESS, HER RIGHT TO PRESENT A 

MEANINGFUL DEFENSE, HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 

OF LAW, AND HER RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS 

GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE 

OHIO CONSTITUTION, SECTION 16, ARTICLE I OF THE 

OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT 

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN THE TRIAL 

COURT SUSPENDED HER OPERATOR’S LICENSE FOR 

ONE (1) YEAR WITHOUT CREDITING DEFENDANT FOR 

THE ALS SUSPENSION [SIC] IMPOSED ON HER AT THE 

TIME OF HER ARREST. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶14} In her first assignment of error, Blair argues that the trial court erred 

in overruling her motion to suppress. Blair asserts five specific grounds to support 

her contention. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶15} Initially, we note that appellate review of a decision on a motion to 

suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Bressler, 3d 

Dist. No. 15–05–13, 2006–Ohio–611. At a suppression hearing, the trial court 

assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual 

questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 

545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, 

an appellate court must uphold the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 

314 (1995). We must defer to “the trial court’s findings of fact and rely on its 

ability to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses,” and then independently review 

whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard. State v. Anderson, 100 

Ohio App.3d 688, 691 (4th Dist. 1995). 

{¶16} At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing 

that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the 

warrant requirement, Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two 

of the syllabus; State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and that it meets 

Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio 

St.3d 295, 297 (1999). 

{¶17} Blair first contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to 

suppress because Trooper Young lacked probable cause and/or reasonable, 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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articulable suspicion justifying the stop of her vehicle. At the suppression hearing, 

Trooper Young testified that she effectuated the traffic stop because the rear 

license plate area of Blair’s vehicle was not illuminated, which is a traffic 

violation. 

{¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[w]here a police officer 

stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was 

occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the 

stop * * *.” City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, syllabus (1996), 

following United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir.1993). 

{¶19} Trooper Young charged Blair with a traffic violation, in violation of 

R.C. 4513.05, which specifically provides as follows: 

(A) Every motor vehicle, trackless trolley, trailer, semitrailer, 

pole trailer, or vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a train 

of vehicles shall be equipped with at least one tail light mounted 

on the rear which, when lighted, shall emit a red light visible 

from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear, provided that in 

the case of a train of vehicles only the tail light on the rearmost 

vehicle need be visible from the distance specified. 

Either a tail light or a separate light shall be so constructed and 

placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration 

plate, when such registration plate is required, and render it 

legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. Any tail light, 

together with any separate light for illuminating the rear 

registration plate, shall be so wired as to be lighted whenever the 

headlights or auxiliary driving lights are lighted, except where 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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separate lighting systems are provided for trailers for the 

purpose of illuminating such registration plate. 

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of a minor 

misdemeanor. 

{¶20} On appeal, Blair contends that the video recorded by the dashboard 

camera in Trooper Young’s cruiser demonstrates that Blair’s rear license plate was 

“visibly illuminated” and therefore did not give Trooper Young a basis to make 

the stop. (Blair’s Brief at 8). This video evidence was played during the 

suppression hearing and was admitted as evidence for the trial court’s review. Our 

review of this evidence reveals that it is not discernible from the video whether or 

not Blair’s license plate was “visibly illuminated” prior to Trooper Young 

effectuating the stop. Therefore, the video does not unequivocally demonstrate 

that Blair’s rear license plate was illuminated in compliance with R.C. 4513.05 as 

Blair contends. 

{¶21} On the contrary, at the suppression hearing, Trooper Young testified 

that she was approximately a block away from Blair’s vehicle when she first 

observed that Blair’s rear license plate was not illuminated and then made the 

decision to follow Blair. Trooper Young further explained that she had a clear and 

unobstructed view of Blair’s vehicle and had “no doubt” in her mind that the light 

was out. (Supp. Hrg. at 32). Trooper Young testified that she specifically 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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conducted the traffic stop based on her observation that the rear license plate of 

Blair’s vehicle was not illuminated. 

{¶22} Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, we find 

that the factual determination by the trial court that Blair’s rear license plate was 

not illuminated prior to the stop was supported by competent, credible evidence. 

Accordingly, we find no error with the determination by the trial court that 

Trooper Young possessed both probable cause and/or reasonable, articulable 

suspicion to stop Blair on the basis that a traffic violation had occurred. 

{¶23} Next, in her second and third grounds for contending the trial court 

erred in overruling her motion to suppress, Blair argues that her continued 

detention exceeded the scope and duration of the stop, and that Trooper Young did 

not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests. The 

prosecution contends that Trooper Young had reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that Blair was engaged in criminal activity—i.e., OVI—that would justify her 

continued detention and the administration of the field sobriety tests. 

{¶24} When conducting a stop of a motor vehicle for a traffic violation, an 

“officer may detain an automobile for a time sufficient to investigate the 

reasonable, articulable suspicion for which the vehicle was initially stopped.” 

State v. Smith, 117 Ohio App.3d 278, 285 (1st Dist. 1996). However, the duration 

of the stop “is limited to ‘effectuate the purpose for which the initial stop was 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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made.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 (4th Dist. 1994), 

citing United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 (1975); State v. Chatton, 

11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1994). “Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic 

violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a 

ticket or a warning.” Smith at 285, citing State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130 

(2d Dist. 1998). This time period also includes the period of time sufficient to run 

a computer check on the driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates. See

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). 

{¶25} The detention of a stopped driver may continue beyond the time 

frame necessary to conduct the stop for purposes of the traffic violation when 

“additional facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion [of criminal activity] beyond that which prompted the initial stop[.]” 

Smith at 285, citing State v. Myers, 63 Ohio App.3d 765, 771 (2d Dist. 1990); 

Venham at 655. Reasonable articulable suspicion exists when there are “ ‘specific 

and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 

facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.’ ” State v. Stephenson, 3d Dist. No. 14-04-

08, 2004-Ohio-5102, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 (1988). 

{¶26} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Young testified that when she 

initially approached Blair’s vehicle, she detected an odor of alcoholic beverage but 

could not pinpoint whether the odor was coming from Blair or the passenger. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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After Blair was unable to find her keys to turn on the vehicle, Trooper Young 

asked Blair to sit in the front seat of her cruiser while she ran a computer check of 

Blair’s driving record. Trooper Young explained that she asked Blair to sit in the 

cruiser so that she could ascertain whether the odor of alcoholic beverage she 

initially smelled was coming from Blair or the passenger. Trooper Young testified 

that Blair willingly complied with the request and was not under arrest at this 

point. The video of the stop corroborates Trooper Young’s testimony in this 

regard. Moreover, Trooper Young testified that Blair would not have had to sit in 

the cruiser if she objected. 1

{¶27} Trooper Young testified that while she was running a check of 

Blair’s driving record in the cruiser, she detected a strong odor of alcoholic 

beverage on Blair’s breath. See State v. Marshall, 2d Dist. No. 2001CA35, 2001-

Ohio-7081 (holding that a strong odor of alcohol alone is sufficient to provide an 

officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior). Trooper Young testified 

that the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coupled with Blair’s admission to 

consuming alcohol earlier that night led her to make the decision to administer the 

 

1

 On appeal, Blair cites State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 2011-Ohio-149 to claim that Trooper Young’s 

pat down of her for weapons prior to sitting in the cruiser violated her Fourth Amendment rights. In 

Lozada, the Supreme Court held that “that during a routine traffic stop, it is unreasonable for an officer to 

search the driver for weapons before placing him or her in a patrol car, if the sole reason for placing the 

driver in the patrol car during the investigation is for the convenience of the officer.” However, in this 

case, Trooper Young testified that one of the reasons she asked Blair to sit in the cruiser was to discern 

whether the odor of alcoholic beverage she smelled at the inception of the stop came from Blair or the 

passenger. Thus, Trooper Young’s detention of Blair in her cruiser was not solely for officer convenience 

as in Lozada. Moreover, Blair failed to raise this issue regarding the pat down at the motion to suppress 

hearing, so even assuming arguendo that the pat down was improper the issue is now waived. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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HGN test on Blair. After Blair’s performance of the HGN test indicated six out of 

six clues of impairment, Trooper Young proceeded to administer the additional 

field sobriety tests of the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests. 

{¶28} The trial court noted on the record that the following facts 

contributed to its decision to find that Trooper Young had acquired the requisite 

reasonable, articulable suspicion to prolong the initial stop for a traffic violation in 

order to further detain Blair for investigatory purposes to administer the field 

sobriety tests. 

There was reasonable articulable suspicion to detain and further 

investigate based on the odor coming from the car. Then there 

was an odor noted when the driver was separated from the car 

and its passenger. Thereafter there was an admission of alcohol 

use. Also included in the totality of the circumstances was the 

loss of the keys and the inability to turn the car on to look at the 

license plate. This also includes the time of day. 

(Hrg. Dec. 22, 2012 at 138-39). 

{¶29} Based on evidence in the record, we conclude that Trooper Young 

encountered additional facts to give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of 

criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop. We further 

conclude that Trooper Young’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that Blair was 

driving while impaired justified the prolonged detention to administer the field 

sobriety tests. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court’s decision to 

overrule Blair’s motion to suppress on this basis. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶30} As the final two grounds for contending that the trial court erred in 

overruling her motion to suppress, Blair argues that the field sobriety tests and the 

chemical breath test were not administered in substantial compliance with the 

applicable guidelines, and therefore the results from these tests should have been 

suppressed. Blair further contends that without the field sobriety test results 

Trooper Young did not possess probable cause to arrest her. 

{¶31} In order for the results of field sobriety tests to be admissible, the 

state is not required to show strict compliance with testing standards, but must 

instead demonstrate that the officer substantially complied with NHTSA 

standards. R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b); State v. Clark, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-10-039, 

2010-Ohio-4567, ¶ 11. “A determination of whether the facts satisfy the 

substantial compliance standard is made on a case-by-case basis.” State v. Fink, 

12th Dist. Nos. CA2008-10-118, CA2008-10-119, 2009-Ohio-3538, ¶ 26. The 

state may demonstrate what the NHTSA standards are through competent 

testimony and/or by introducing the applicable portions of the NHTSA manual. 

State v. Boczar, 113 Ohio St.3d, 2007-Ohio-1251, at ¶ 28. 

{¶32} At the suppression hearing and on appeal, Blair does not identify any 

specific error with Trooper Young’s administration of the field sobriety tests, in 

light of NHTSA or other applicable guidelines, but nevertheless argues 

suppression of the test results is warranted. However, Trooper Young’s testimony 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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indicates that she performed the field sobriety tests in accordance with the 

appropriate standards. In particular, Trooper Young testified that she received 

NHTSA and ADAP training and testified to her training regarding the method of 

administration and the clues she must observe while conducting the tests. 

{¶33} Even assuming arguendo that we find that Trooper Young did not 

substantially comply with NHTSA or other applicable standards—which would 

require the results of the tests to be excluded—her testimony regarding the Blair’s 

performance on nonscientific field sobriety tests is admissible under Evid.R. 701 

and can support a finding of probable cause to arrest under the totality of the 

circumstances analysis. See State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37, ¶ 

14-15. Notwithstanding this fact, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion 

that the prosecution met its burden in demonstrating that Trooper Young’s 

administration of the field sobriety tests substantially complied with NHTSA 

standards. Furthermore, we also conclude that the trial court did not err in 

determining that Trooper Young acquired the requisite probable cause to arrest 

Blair for OVI. 

{¶34} Next, Blair challenges the admissibility of the results from the breath 

analysis test and asserts that the prosecution failed to demonstrate the test was 

conducted in substantial compliance with the regulations prescribed by the 

Director of the Ohio Department of Health. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶35} In seeking to suppress the results of a breath analysis test, the 

defendant must set forth an adequate basis for the motion. State v. Shindler, 70 

Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 1994-Ohio-452. The motion must state the “ * * * legal and 

factual bases with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and court on 

notice as to the issues contested.” Id; Crim.R. 47. Once an adequate basis for the 

motion has been established, the prosecution then bears the burden of proof to 

demonstrate substantial compliance with the Ohio Department of Health 

regulations. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 220 (1988). If the prosecution 

demonstrates substantial compliance, the burden of proof then shifts to the 

defendant to overcome the presumption of admissibility and demonstrate that he 

or she was prejudiced by anything less than strict compliance. State v. Burnside, 

100 Ohio St.3d at 157. 

{¶36} The extent of the prosecution’s burden to show substantial 

compliance varies with the degree of specificity of the violation alleged by the 

defendant. “When a defendant’s motion to suppress raises only general claims, 

along with the Ohio Administrative Code sections, the burden imposed on the 

state is fairly slight.” State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 851 (2000). 

Specifically, when a motion fails to allege a fact-specific way in which a violation 

has occurred, the state need only offer basic testimony evidencing compliance 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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with the code section. State v. Bissaillon, 2d Dist. No. 06–CA–130, 2007-Ohio2349, ¶ 15. 

{¶37} Here, Blair’s motion to suppress asserted only general claims, along 

with the Ohio Administrative Code sections, and failed to allege a fact-specific 

basis that a violation had occurred. Therefore, the prosecution’s burden to 

demonstrate substantial compliance with the Ohio Department of Health 

regulations was “fairly slight.” 

{¶38} Sergeant Hunter of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified during 

the suppression hearing on the issue of substantial compliance. Specifically, he 

testified that he is certified as a senior operator of the BAC DataMaster and that he 

is qualified to perform calibration checks of the DataMaster. The prosecution 

admitted into evidence Sergeant Hunter’s certificate from the Ohio Board of 

Health which demonstrated that he was certified to operate the DataMaster on the 

date of Blair’s test. The prosecution also presented evidence, including the 

instrument check forms, which demonstrated that an instrument check of the 

machine used to test Blair was performed on September 4, 2011, the day before 

Blair’s test, and that another check was performed on September 11, 2011. 

Sergeant Hunter testified that both instrument checks were performed by qualified 

senior operators and that the forms indicated that the machine was functioning 

properly and that all the Ohio Department of Health regulations were met. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶39} Sergeant Hunter also testified regarding his administration of the 

breath test to Blair. Specifically, he testified that he waited until the twentyminute observation period was complete. He testified that he followed the 

appropriate procedure for running the machine, and explained to Blair how to 

blow into the machine and that he would tell her when to stop. Sergeant Hunter 

testified that he obtained a sufficient sample from Blair and that the test result 

indicated Blair’s breath contained a concentration of alcohol of .106. 

{¶40} On appeal, Blair now attempts to make arguments regarding the issue 

of substantial compliance that she failed to articulate at the suppression hearing. 

In addition, the record demonstrates that Blair failed to present any evidence 

rebutting the prosecution’s showing that Sergeant Hunter administered the test in 

substantial compliance with the regulations prescribed by the Director of the 

Department of Health, let alone demonstrating that she was prejudiced by anything 

less than strict compliance. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s 

conclusion that the prosecution met its burden in showing that Blair’s breath test 

was administered in substantial compliance with the Ohio Department of Health 

regulations. 

{¶41} For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not 

err in overruling Blair’s motion to suppress. Therefore, Blair’s first assignment of 

error is overruled. 
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Second Assignment of Error

{¶42} In her second assignment of error, Blair argues that the trial court 

violated her constitutional right of confrontation, right to compulsory process, 

right to present a meaningful defense, right to due process, and right to a fair trial. 

Blair’s contentions under this assignment of error can be distilled into three main 

points. 

{¶43} First, Blair argues that the trial court erred when it granted the 

prosecution’s motion to quash, prohibiting her from subpoenaing the production of 

certain documents for trial. On the day before trial, Blair filed two subpoenas 

duces tecum: (1) requesting Trooper Young to bring “a copy of her call log to and 

from dispatch from the start of her shift on September 5, 2011, LHP 11 09 05 000 

865, and a copy of her computer log (running license plate information and 

driver’s license information) from the same shift on September 5, 2011;” and (2) 

requesting the Keeper of Records and/or Office Manager at Ralls Automotive to 

bring “a copy of or the original invoice for Megan Blair * * * for service to her 

2004 Honda Civic on September 6, 2011, Customer ID 2263.” (Docs. 21, 22, 23, 

24). The prosecution subsequently filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The 

same day, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion providing the following 

reason: “Criminal Rule 17(C) reads that a court may quash a subpoena if 

compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. Considering that the trial is 
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scheduled to commence in less than 24 hours, this Court finds Defendant’s 

subpoenas to be unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore, they are quashed.” 

(JE, Mar. 6, 2012). 

{¶44} Under Crim.R. 17(C), a subpoena may be used to command a person 

to produce in court books, papers, documents, and other objects. However, the 

court upon motion of a party may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance 

would be unreasonable or oppressive. Crim.R. 17(C). Generally, an appellate 

court applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s 

decision to quash a subpoena. State v. Wasmus, 10th Dist. No. 94APA07–1013 

(Apr. 27, 1995); State v. Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602, 2009–Ohio–3906, ¶ 37 

(8th Dist). 

{¶45} At the outset we note that Blair never established the relevance of 

Trooper Young’s logbooks to her defense or how her defense would be hindered 

by the exclusion of this evidence. The record demonstrates that before filing this 

subpoena, Blair’s counsel failed to make a discovery demand regarding Trooper 

Young’s logbooks, despite having over six months to do so. Nevertheless, for 

reasons not apparent in the record, Blair’s counsel chose to spring this request on 

the prosecution less than twenty-four hours before trial, thereby depriving the 

prosecution of adequate notice to prepare for trial the following day without 

requesting a continuance. Notably, had Blair used the proper vehicle to request 
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this evidence through a discovery demand, the trial court still retained discretion to 

strike this last minute request as untimely pursuant Crim.R 16(M).2

 

{¶46} The second subpoena duces tecum filed by Blair the day before trial 

requested the records keeper from Ralls Automotive to bring an invoice from 

Blair’s service visit to a mechanic there the day after her arrest for OVI. Blair’s 

counsel attempted to admit this invoice into evidence at the suppression hearing 

over the prosecution’s objection that the document was not provided in discovery 

and that the document was hearsay. The trial court sustained the prosecution’s 

objection on both grounds and excluded the evidence, but allowed Blair’s counsel 

to proffer the exhibit using Blair’s testimony. Blair testified that she took her car 

to the mechanic the next day and no repairs to her rear license plate light were 

needed. 

{¶47} It is obvious from Blair’s proffered testimony that she was 

attempting to use this invoice to argue that her license plate light was operable at 

the time Trooper Young effectuated the traffic stop. However, this invoice from 

the day after the arrest was irrelevant to resolving the issue of whether Trooper 

Young had probable cause at the time she stopped Blair. Furthermore, Blair’s 

 

2

 Criminal Rule 16(M) states as follow: “Time of motions. A defendant shall make his demand for 

discovery within twenty-one days after arraignment or seven days before the date of trial, whichever is 

earlier, or at such reasonable time later as the court may permit. A party’s motion to compel compliance 

with this rule shall be made no later than seven days prior to trial, or three days after the opposing party 

provides discovery, whichever is later. The motion shall include all relief sought under this rule. A 

subsequent motion may be made only upon showing of cause why such motion would be in the interest of 

justice.” 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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subpoena duces tecum was a last minute attempt to bypass the trial court’s ruling 

regarding the admissibility of this evidence at the suppression hearing. 

Notwithstanding the trial court’s ruling to quash the subpoena, Blair was still able 

to present testimony similar to that which she gave at the suppression hearing 

regarding her visit to the mechanic the day after her arrest. We also note that the 

trial took place approximately six months from the date Blair claimed to have 

visited the mechanic regarding her rear license plate light. The record is devoid of 

any indication that Blair disclosed this invoice in reciprocal discovery to the 

prosecution despite having possession of this document throughout the course of 

the entire court proceedings. 

{¶48} Accordingly, for all the reasons stated we find no abuse of discretion 

in the trial court’s decision to grant the prosecution’s motion to quash Blair’s 

subpoenas. 

{¶49} Next, Blair contends that the trial court committed reversible error 

when it prevented her from presenting certain evidence at the suppression hearing 

and at trial. Blair also claims the trial court prohibited her from cross-examining 

the prosecution’s witnesses regarding her specific breathalyzer test results at the 

suppression hearing and at trial. The prosecution contends that Blair’s counsel 

was merely making a veiled attempt to generally attack the reliability and validity 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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of the breath testing instrument and to relitigate settled substantial compliance 

issues at trial. 

{¶50} Initially, we note that while the accused may not challenge the 

general accuracy of a legislatively determined testing instrument, he may 

challenge the accuracy of his specific test result. Columbus v. Day, 24 Ohio 

App.3d 173, 174 (1985). Thus, the accused may attempt to show that something 

went wrong with his test and consequently, the result was at variance with what 

the approved testing procedure should have produced. Id. Additionally, the 

accused may attack the test results pursuant to the rules of evidence and may also 

use expert testimony regarding the weight to be given to the evidence. See

generally State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 1995-Ohio-32 and State v. Vega, 12 

Ohio St.3d 185 (1984). 

{¶51} However, this issue is separate from the matter of whether the 

prosecution proved the breath test was performed in substantial compliance with 

the regulations of the Director of the Department of Health. The Supreme Court 

of Ohio has held the following regarding the admissibility of substantial 

compliance issues at trial. 

Crim.R. 12(C)(3) and Traf.R. 11(B)(2) provide that “[m]otions 

to suppress evidence * * * on the ground that it was illegally 

obtained” must be raised before trial. We have expressly held 

that Crim.R. 12(C)(3) (then (B)(3)) requires a pretrial 

suppression hearing in a[n] [OVI] prosecution to determine the 

admissibility of alcohol-content test results claimed to have been 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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illegally obtained based on noncompliance with the director’s 

rules governing the maintenance and operation of testing 

devices. If a defendant does not move for suppression prior to 

trial, he or she “may not object to the admissibility of the test 

results at trial on those grounds.” 

* * * 

In summary, a challenge asserting that test results were not 

obtained in compliance with the director’s rules must be raised 

by a defendant prior to trial by way of a pretrial motion to 

suppress. Failure to file such a motion constitutes a waiver, so 

that a defendant may not force the state to lay a foundation for 

the admissibility of the test results at trial: issues concerning 

compliance with the director’s rules may not be raised for the 

first time at trial to challenge admissibility. Moreover, finality 

attaches to a ruling on a motion to suppress. Accordingly, the 

ruling of substantial compliance by the court at a pretrial 

suppression hearing prevails at trial, and a defendant may not 

raise, at trial, a challenge to the admissibility of test results based 

on the assertion that the state failed to comply with the 

director’s rules in obtaining them. 

State v Edwards, 107 Ohio St.3d 169, 2005-Ohio-6180, ¶¶ 11-12 (internal 

citations omitted). As previously discussed in our resolution of the first 

assignment of error, Blair failed to articulate any specific factual basis alleging 

Sergeant Hunter failed to comply with the Ohio Department of Health regulations 

at the suppression hearing. This lack of particularity triggered a “fairly slight” 

burden on the prosecution to demonstrate that substantial compliance with the 

Ohio Department of Health regulations was met. In reviewing the transcript from 

the trial proceedings, the instances complained of by Blair regarding the trial 

court’s limiting of her cross-examination were simply attempts by Blair’s counsel 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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to relitigate substantial compliance issues at trial that she failed to articulate at the 

suppression hearing. See Edwards at ¶ 20 (stating that compliance with Ohio 

Department of Health regulations “is not a jury question and is to be decided by 

the court prior to trial”). We further note that the trial court permitted Blair’s 

counsel to question Trooper Young outside the presence of the jury to determine 

whether Blair’s counsel intended to raise in front of the jury the prohibited issue of 

substantial compliance rather than raising the permissible issue of attacking the 

specific test result in her case. After listening to the questions prepared by Blair’s 

counsel, the trial court determined that the questions attempted to relitigate the 

issue of substantial compliance and were inappropriate for the jury. Thus, we find 

no error with the trial court’s ruling limiting defense counsel’s cross examination 

in this regard. 

{¶52} The other issue complained of by Blair in this assignment of error 

focuses on the trial court’s ruling excluding certain exhibits relating to the “invalid 

sample test ticket” at the suppression hearing and at trial. This evidence relates to 

the first breath test administered to Blair by Trooper Young which produced an 

invalid result. The record demonstrates that the trial court excluded this evidence 

at the suppression hearing and at trial because Blair’s counsel in both instances 

failed to lay a proper foundation for the evidence to be admitted as an exhibit. 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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{¶53} However, the trial court permitted Blair to question both Trooper 

Young and Sergeant Hunter about the invalid test result at the suppression hearing 

and at trial. Trooper Young testified that during her administration of the test 

Blair failed to continually breathe into the machine as instructed, but instead 

breathed and stopped, breathed and stopped, until the machine clicked off as 

invalid. Even though Trooper Young maintained at trial that the invalid sample 

was caused by Blair improperly blowing, Blair’s counsel elicited testimony from 

Sergeant Hunter who read from the DataMaster Operator’s Manual that an 

“invalid sample” indicates that the machine detected a substance in the mouth of 

the subject blown into the instrument, and that if the subject did not blow hard 

enough into the instrument, an “incomplete sample” or a “refusal” would be 

indicated. However, Sergeant Hunter also testified that the invalid test sample 

from Trooper Young’s administration of the first test did not affect the validity of 

the breath sample he obtained from Blair in the second test which demonstrated 

that the concentration of alcohol in her breath exceeded the legal limit. 

{¶54} It is apparent from the record that Blair intended to introduce the 

invalid sample test ticket to insinuate that the breathalyzer machine used to test her 

was somehow malfunctioning because it produced an invalid sample test ticket 

during Trooper Young’s administration of the test. Blair’s counsel was able to 

convey this argument to the jury without the invalid test sample being admitted 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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into evidence. Thus, even if the exhibits were excluded in error, Blair’s defense 

was not hindered because the jury was still able to hear evidence relating to the 

invalid sample and weigh the credibility of that evidence accordingly. 

{¶55} Blair’s final arguments under this assignment of error pertain to her 

allegations that the trial court erred in excluding certain exhibits at trial. Some of 

the exhibits regarding the invalid test sample, test ticket,` Trooper Young’s 

logbooks, and the mechanic’s invoice have already been addressed. The 

remaining exhibits Blair sought to introduce were Trooper Young’s narrative 

report and a list of medications for migraines and allergies that Blair took on the 

day of her arrest. Initially, we note that Trooper Young’s narrative report was 

admitted without objection at the suppression hearing. However, Blair’s counsel 

failed to lay a proper foundation to allow the exhibit to be admitted at trial. 

{¶56} With regard to the list of medications, at the suppression hearing, 

Blair’s counsel attempted to admit this list into evidence over the prosecution’s 

objection that the exhibit was never disclosed in discovery. Blair’s counsel 

conceded on the record that she never shared the exhibit with the prosecutor prior 

to the hearing. The trial court sustained the prosecution’s objection and excluded 

the exhibit from evidence. However, at both the suppression hearing and at trial, 

Blair testified to the medications she takes on a daily basis as part of her defense 

and that she took those medications on the date of her arrest. Therefore, the 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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factfinder was able to discern the relevance of this evidence and weigh it 

accordingly. 

{¶57} For all the reasons previously discussed, we find no error with the 

conclusions of the trial court to admit or to exclude the evidence raised in this 

assignment of error, and we further find that Blair suffered no violations of her 

constitutional rights as alleged. Blair’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

Third Assignment of Error

{¶58} In her third assignment of error, Blair argues that the trial court erred 

when it imposed a one-year license suspension of her driver’s license without 

giving her credit for the ninety-day Administrative License Suspension (“ALS”) 

she received as a consequence of the concentration of alcohol in her breath testing 

above the legal limit. Specifically, Blair alleges that the trial court’s failure to 

credit her for the ninety days transformed the ALS from remedial to punitive in 

nature as multiple punishments for the same offense, and therefore violated the 

Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. 

{¶59} It is well settled that “an ALS imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, 

and a criminal [OVI] prosecution for violation of R.C. 4511.19 arising out of the 

same arrest constitute separate proceedings for double jeopardy purposes.” State 

v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 438, 1996-Ohio-299. However, “an 

administrative license suspension imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191 ceases to be 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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remedial and becomes punitive in nature to the extent the suspension continues 

subsequent to adjudication and sentencing for violation of R.C. 4511.19.” Id., 

paragraph three of syllabus. 

{¶60} Here, Blair’s ALS was an automatic consequence of the breath test 

results indicating that the concentration of alcohol in her breath exceeded the legal 

limit. See R.C. 4511.191(C)(1). Because this was Blair’s first offense, the 

duration of her ALS was three months and went into effect at the time she tested 

over the legal limit. See R.C. 4510.02; R.C. 4511.191 (C)(1)(a). The trial court 

imposed the one-year license suspension as a part of Blair’s sentence stemming 

from her conviction for OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). This occurred 

over six months after her ALS went into effect. Thus, Blair’s ALS was complete 

nearly three months prior to the trial court imposing the judicial license suspension 

for her OVI conviction. Therefore, because Blair’s ALS did not continue 

subsequent to the adjudication and sentencing for her violation of R.C. 4511.19 

[OVI], the ALS did not become punitive in nature as Blair now contends. 

{¶61} Moreover, we note that although it is within a trial court’s discretion 

to credit the time completed under an ALS against a judicial suspension of a 

person’s driver’s license, Blair fails to direct us to any authority mandating that the 

trial court do so. We further note that for a first time OVI offense, the trial court 

was permitted to suspend Blair’s driver’s license for any period of time between 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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six months and three years. See R.C. 4510.02. The trial court’s imposition of a 

one-year license suspension in this case was well within the statutorily prescribed 

limits. Accordingly, Blair’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶62} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Marion Municipal Court 

is affirmed. 

 Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur. 

/jlr 

ROGERS, J., Concurring Separately. 

{¶63} While I concur with the result reached by the majority, I write 

separately to address the second assignment of error and the trial court’s actions as 

to the two subpoenas duces tecum. 

{¶64} First and foremost, the trial court was only presented with one 

motion to quash. The State moved to quash Appellant’s subpoena directed to 

Trooper Young and directing her to bring with her to trial her call log and her 

computer log. The State alleged that these records had been provided in discovery 

or were not relevant. Nowhere in its motion did the State allege that the requests 

for production were unreasonable and oppressive. Yet that was the basis stated by 
Case No. 9-12-14 

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the trial court to substantiate its ruling. There are no facts in the record that would 

substantiate the trial court’s finding. Further, since the request was limited to one 

Trooper and the day in question, the finding itself seems unreasonable and 

arbitrary. Therefore, I would find error in the granting of the State’s motion to 

quash. 

{¶65} Second, there was no filing of any motion to quash the subpoena 

directed to Ralls Automotive. Therefore, there was no reason for the trial court to 

address that issue, let alone any evidence to substantiate a finding that such a 

request for production was unreasonable and oppressive. Again, I would find 

error by the trial court. 

{¶66} However, Appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to her 

case from the erroneous ruling of the trial court. As noted by the majority, 

Appellant failed to make any showing as to what relevant evidence would have 

been gleaned from the logs, and Appellant testified as to the same matters that 

might have been demonstrated by the records from Ralls Automotive. Therefore, I 

would find the errors to be harmless in this case.