UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4694

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DAVID EZEL SIMPSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Lacy H. Thornburg, 

District Judge. (5:02-cr-00043-LHT-1) 

Submitted: April 9, 2009 Decided: April 21, 2009 

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, Rahwa 

Gebre-Egziabher, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, 

INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. 

Shappert, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 David Ezel Simpson appeals his thirty-six month 

sentence imposed on revocation of his supervised release. We 

affirm. 

 On appeal, Simpson argues that the sentence imposed is 

plainly unreasonable because the district court erred by failing 

to explain adequately its reasons for imposing the sentence. 

Simpson does not challenge the district court’s decision to 

revoke his supervised release or its guidelines calculations. 

The Government responds that the district court’s sentence is 

not unreasonable. 

 In United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th 

Cir. 2005), we held that “revocation sentences should be 

reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly unreasonable’ 

with regard to those [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors applicable to 

supervised release revocation sentences.” Although the district 

court must consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and the 

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006), “the court ultimately 

has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose 

a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). A sentencing court must provide a sufficient 

explanation of the sentence to allow effective review of its 

reasonableness on appeal. See United States v. Moulden, 478 

2 
3 

F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (probation revocation). However, 

the court need not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every 

subsection.” Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 

339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006)). 

 Our review of the record in this case convinces us 

that the district court’s reasons for its sentencing decision 

are sufficiently apparent from the record. We conclude that the 

sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. 

See United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(applying Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007), in 

reviewing a sentence to determine if it is plainly 

unreasonable). 

 Simpson also asks the court to revisit our holding in 

Crudup and instead find that a reasonableness inquiry applies to 

revocation sentences. However, even if we were inclined to do 

so, a panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of a 

prior panel. See United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 234 

(4th Cir. 2009). 

 We therefore affirm Simpson’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED