UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4974

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

FLETCHER JUNIOR MCINTYRE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00419-WO-2) 

Submitted: July 11, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Fletcher Junior McIntyre pled guilty pursuant to a 

plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine 

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2006 & 

Supp. 2013) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court 

calculated McIntyre’s Guidelines range under the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual (2011) at sixty to seventy-one months’ 

imprisonment and sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the 

district court reversibly erred in accepting McIntyre’s guilty 

plea and abused its discretion in imposing sentence. McIntyre

was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, 

but he has not done so. The Government declined to file a 

brief. We affirm. 

Because McIntyre did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11 hearing is reviewed for plain error only. United States v. 

Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524–26 (4th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate 

plain error, a defendant must show: (1) there was error; (2) the 

error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial 

rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 

In the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to 
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establish that a plain error affected his substantial rights by 

showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled 

guilty but for the Rule 11 omission. United States v. 

Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Our review of the transcripts of the guilty plea and 

sentencing hearings leads us to conclude that the district court 

substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting 

McIntyre’s guilty plea and that the court’s omission did not 

affect McIntyre’s substantial rights. Critically, the 

transcripts reveal that the district ensured the plea was

supported by an independent basis in fact and that McIntyre

entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding 

of the consequences. United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 

116, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we discern no plain 

error in the district court’s acceptance of McIntyre’s guilty 

plea. 

Turning to McIntyre’s sentence, we review it for 

reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). 

This review entails appellate consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we 

consider whether the district court properly calculated the 

defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an 
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opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, selected a sentence based on 

clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explained the selected 

sentence. Id. at 49–51. If the sentence is free of 

“significant procedural error,” we review it for substantive 

reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the 

circumstances.” Id. at 51. If the sentence is within the 

properly calculated Guidelines range, we apply a presumption on 

appeal that the sentence is substantively reasonable. 

United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir.

2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant 

shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against 

the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

In this case, the district court correctly calculated 

and considered the advisory Guidelines range and heard argument 

from counsel and allocution from McIntyre. The court explained 

that the within-Guideline sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment 

was warranted in light of the nature and circumstances of

McIntyre’s offense and his history and characteristics. Neither 

counsel nor McIntyre offers any grounds to rebut the presumption 

on appeal that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively 
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reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in sentencing McIntyre. 

Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed 

the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious 

issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

judgment. This court requires that counsel inform McIntyre, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If McIntyre requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on McIntyre. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED