UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4706

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COLLINS KUSI SAKYI,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-4635

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COLLINS KUSI SAKYI,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:06-cr-00405-LMB-1)

Submitted: March 30, 2012 Decided: August 14, 2012

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
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Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

John L. Machado, LAW OFFICE OF JOHN MACHADO, Washington, DC, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Thomas J. 

Krepp, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Collins Kusi Sakyi 

pleaded guilty to drug offenses, aiding and abetting failure to 

appear, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to cause flight 

to avoid prosecution. The district court sentenced him to a 

total term of imprisonment of 320 months. In these consolidated 

appeals, Sakyi argues that the district court erred when it 

denied his suppression motion, improperly enhanced his sentence 

based on his role as a supervisor or manager, and failed to 

adjust his criminal history category upon vacating and 

reentering his conviction. He also asserts that the Government 

breached the plea agreement. The Government seeks to enforce 

the appellate waiver provision of the plea agreement. We 

dismiss in part, affirm in part, and remand.

Sakyi argues that the Government violated the 

provision of the plea agreement prohibiting the use of 

information he provided to enhance his sentence when the 

Government referenced at the sentencing hearing a selfincriminating statement Sakyi made during plea negotiations. 

“It is settled that a defendant alleging the Government’s breach 

of a plea agreement bears the burden of establishing that breach 

by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Snow, 234 

F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000); see United States v. Cohen, 459 

F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e will not enforce an 
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otherwise valid appeal waiver against a defendant if the 

government breached the plea agreement containing that 

waiver.”). Because Sakyi did not raise this claim in the 

district court, we review it for plain error. See Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2009) (discussing 

standard). To prevail under this standard, Sakyi must show not 

only that the Government plainly breached the plea agreement, 

but also that he was prejudiced by the error and that “the 

breach was so obvious and substantial that failure to notice and 

correct it [would affect] the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. 

McQueen, 108 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

With these standards in mind, our review of the record 

leads us to conclude that Sakyi has failed to establish the 

Government breached the plea agreement. It is clear that the 

Government obtained the challenged information through an

independent source, as Sakyi repeated his boasts about the 

percentage of heroin he trafficked from Africa to coconspirators who, in turn, recounted them to investigators. 

Sakyi is entitled to no relief on this claim.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive 

his appellate rights. United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 

627 (4th Cir. 2010). A waiver will preclude an appeal of “a 
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specific issue if . . . the waiver is valid and . . . the issue 

being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United 

States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). The 

question of whether a defendant validly waived his right to 

appeal is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. 

Manigan, 592 F.3d at 626.

“An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant 

knowingly and intelligently agreed [to waive the right to 

appeal].” Id. at 627. To determine whether a waiver is knowing 

and intelligent, we examine “the totality of the circumstances.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “An important factor in 

such an evaluation is whether the district court sufficiently 

explained the waiver to the defendant during the Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy.” Id.; see United States v. 

Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005).

We note that the district court fully complied with 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Sakyi does not challenge the validity of 

the waiver, and the record reveals that the district court 

reviewed the waiver in some detail. The district court 

explained that, by pleading guilty, Sakyi was waiving his right 

to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion 

and, additionally, the appellate wavier provision would prevent 

him from appealing his convictions or sentence. Moreover, in 

its brief, the Government sought to enforce the waiver. 
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Accordingly, we decline to review the denial of Sakyi’s motion 

to suppress or the application of the leadership and recency 

sentencing enhancements.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal of the denial of 

Sakyi’s suppression motion and the application of the challenged 

sentencing enhancements based upon Sakyi’s valid waiver of 

appellate rights. We affirm the judgment of the district court 

with respect to Sakyi’s contention that the Government breached 

the terms of the plea agreement. We remand to the district 

court with instructions for the court to correct the judgment, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36, to reflect that the statute of 

conviction for aiding and abetting the failure to appear (Count 

13) is 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1). Finally, as Sakyi is represented 

by counsel, we deny Sakyi’s motion to file a pro se supplemental 

brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED IN PART,

AFFIRMED IN PART,

AND REMANDED