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Filed 6/26/24 P. v. Byrd CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LEONARD BYRD,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A169474

 (Solano County Super. Ct. No. 

FCR247165)

Leonard Byrd appeals after the trial court resentenced him 

pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.

1 His appointed counsel

on appeal filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our 

independent review of the record, citing People v. Wende (1979) 

25 Cal.3d 436. Wende does not apply to a defendant’s appeal 

from the denial of postconviction relief. (People v. Delgadillo

(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221-222, 226-227, 231 (Delgadillo).) 

However, we have exercised our discretion to independently 

review the record (id. at p. 232), and we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

A.

Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, former subdivision 

(b), required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
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enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant 

had served a prior prison term and not remained free of custody 

for at least five years. (§ 667.5, former subd. (b), as amended by 

Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 

375, 379–380 (Burgess).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 

No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 by limiting 

the enhancement to only prior prison terms served for sexually 

violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; Burgess, at pp. 379-

380.) 

As a result of later legislation, section 1172.75 now 

invalidates all other prior prison term enhancements—imposed

under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), before January 1, 

2020 (§ 1172.75, subd. (a))—and provides a mechanism for courts 

to resentence defendants serving terms which include such 

enhancements. (Id., subds. (b)-(d); People v. Carter (2023) 97 

Cal.App.5th 960, 966; Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.) 

In doing so, courts “shall apply . . . any other changes in law that 

reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to 

eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of 

sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “By its plain terms, section 

1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial 

court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe

(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)

B.

In 2007, Byrd was serving a prison term at the California 

Medical Facility, in Vacaville. When he was scheduled to attend

a vocational class, Byrd entered the office next door to the 

classroom—where a staff member was working. When asked 

why he was there, Byrd falsely stated that he had been sent by 

the ward lieutenant and produced a stamped work card. The 

staff member pulled up a chair and motioned for Byrd to have a 

seat to start working. Byrd then went behind her, grabbed her 
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around the throat with his right arm, and choked her. He only 

released her when the staff member pushed her personal alarm. 

In exchange for dismissal of two other charged counts and 

imposition of the low term (doubled), Byrd pled no contest to

battery of a non-confined person by a prisoner (§ 4501.5) and

admitted this was a serious felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(1)). He 

also admitted serving three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former 

subd. (b)) and that he had suffered two prior serious felony 

convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a strike prior (§ 667, subds. 

(b)—(i)). The parties stipulated to a 17-year aggregate sentence 

under the plea agreement, calculated as follows: the low term of 

two years, doubled to four years due to Byrd’s strike prior; a

consecutive five-year term for each of the prior serious felony

conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and three 

consecutive terms of one year for the three prior prison term 

enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). In 2007, the trial court 

accepted and imposed the stipulated sentence (consecutive to an 

indeterminate life term Byrd was already serving for a separate 

offense).

In 2022, the trial court received notice from the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that Byrd qualified 

for relief under former section 1171.1, which is now section 

1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3; Renumbered by Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 12.) The court appointed counsel to represent 

Byrd and defense counsel filed a “Petition to Resentence and 

Strike Legally Invalid Enhancements,” pursuant to section 

1172.75. In a supplemental brief, Byrd argued that a full 

resentencing was required. He asked the court to strike not only 

his prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)), 

but also the two five-year prior serious felony conviction 

enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) pursuant to section 1385. He 

also asked that his sentence be imposed concurrent to the life 

sentence he was already serving. 
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The People conceded that, even though his sentence was 

originally stipulated as part of a plea bargain, Byrd was entitled 

to a full resentencing and that the court had discretion to strike 

the five-year prior serious felony enhancements. (§§ 1172.75, 

subds. (c), (d), 1385; People v. Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 

964, 977; People v. Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 398-400.) 

But the People argued that a consecutive sentence remained 

mandatory under section 4501.5 and that dismissal of the two 

five-year enhancements was not in the interests of justice and 

would endanger public safety. 

The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced Byrd. 

Pursuant to section 1172.75, it struck the three one-year 

enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision 

(b). The court acknowledged that it had discretion to strike the 

prior serious felony enhancements. However, based on its 

findings that doing so would endanger public safety and conflict 

with the interests of justice, the court left the remainder of Byrd’s 

sentence intact, and sentenced him to 14 years in state prison. 

As mandated by section 4501.5, the sentence was imposed 

consecutively to the term Byrd was already serving. 

DISCUSSION

Byrd was advised by his appellate counsel of the right to 

file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the 

opening brief. But after more than 30 days, we have received no 

letter or brief from Byrd. Because the instant appeal is from an 

order denying postjudgment relief rather than a first appeal as of 

right from a criminal conviction, we are not required to 

undertake an independent review of the record in search of 

arguable issues. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) 

Nonetheless, because Byrd’s counsel failed to mention Delgadillo,

or that Byrd could abandon his appeal by failing to file a 

supplemental brief (id. at p. 233), we have conducted a 

discretionary independent review of the record. (Id. at pp. 226, 
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232.) After independently reviewing the record, we conclude

there are no arguable errors that would result in a disposition 

more favorable to Byrd.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s resentencing order, dated December 20, 

2023, is affirmed.

BURNS, J. 

WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.

CHOU, J.

P. v. Byrd (A169474)