FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT OCT 5 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1078 3

____ ____ ___ D. C. Docket N o. 06-00050 -CV -MCR ARTHUR D. RUTHERFORD, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us JAM ES MCDONOUGH, CHARLIE CRI ST, D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- O n Appe al f

ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- (O ct obe r 5, 200 6) ON REM AN D F ROM THE UNITE D STATES SUPREME COURT Be fo re CA RN E S, H U L L and W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. CAR NE S, Circuit Judge: T he S upr em e Co urt va cate d our pr ior de ci sio n, Ru the rf

or d v. Cr osby (R uth er fo rd I ), 438 F . 3d 1 087 (1 1thCi r. 200 6) , and r em an de d th is c as e to u s f or furthe r co nsi de ratio n inli ght of that C ourt’ s de ci sio n inH ill v. Mc D onou gh, 5472

U . S. ___ , 126 S . Ct . 209 6 ( 2006 ). S ee Ru the rf or d v. Mc D onou gh, 126 S . Ct . 291 5 (2 00 6) . A. T w en ty y ears a go this m onth A rthur Ru the rf or d w as c onvi ct ed

and se nte nc ed to de ath f

or the br uta l m ur de r of S te lla S al m on, asix ty -thr ee y ear old w ido w . R

uth er fo rd v. Cr osby , 385 F . 3d 1 300, 130 2–05 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . D ur ing the past two decades the validity of his convictio n and sentence has been litigated an d uph el d t hr ou gh ou t t he st at e an d fe de ral co ur t s y st em s. Se e id . at 1 30 6. On N ove m be r 29, 200 5, the G ove rn or of F lor ida sig ne d ade ath w ar

rant s ettin g Ru the rf or d’ s e xe cu tio n f

or the pe ri od o f January

30 – F eb ru ar y 6, 200 6. T he w ar rant r ec ite d th at

the w ar de n ha d c hose n 6: 00 p . m on T ue sday , January

31, 200 6 as th e ti m e an d d at e o f ex ecu ti on . A t 7: 00 p . m . on F ri day , January 27, 200 6 R

uth er fo rd f ile d th e unde rl y ing 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 l aw sui t t o c ha lle nge the thr ee -dru g pr oto co l F lor ida ha s be enusi ng since 2000 to carr

y out execution s by

lethal inje ction. Rutherford’ s lawsuit cam e two m onth s after

his execution date had been set, and just two w eek day s before his schedu led execution. See Rutherford I, 438 F.3d at 1090 n .2. T he district co urt di sm iss ed

Ru the rf or d’ s c om pla int and d en ie d hi s m oti on f

or stay of ex ec uti on o n January

28. T w o day s late r, w e af fi rm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio nOn that same da y we a lso denied an a

pplication for lea

ve to file a

succe ssive petition and 1 for a stay that Rutherford ha d filed the da y befor e. In re: Rutherf

ord, 437 F .3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2006). 3 an d de nie d R

uth er fo rd ’ s m oti on f

or astay . I d. a t 10 89–9 2. A t 5: 40 p . m . th e 1 next day , which was the scheduled date of the execution, the S uprem e Court gr an te d astay

of e xe cu tio n pe ndi ng d isp osi tio n of the c er tio rari pe tit ion Rutherford had filed ear lier that day . Rutherford v. C rosby , 546 U. S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1191 (2006). O n June 19, 200 6 th e Su

pr em e Co urt gr an te d c er

tio rari , va cate d our Ru the rf or d I de ci sio n, and r em an de d f or f urthe r co nsi de ratio n inli ght of H ill v. McDo no ug h, 1 26 S. Ct. 2 09 6 (2 00 6) , whi ch ha d b een de ci de d i n t he in te rim. R u t h e r f o r dv . M c D o n o u g h , 1 2 6 S . C t . 2 9 1 5 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . B y l e t t e r d a t e dth a ts a me d a y, the Suprem e Court Cler

k form ally

notified our Clerk of the order and of the fact that purs uant t o S upr em e Co urt R ule 45 the S upr em e Co urt’ s j udgm en t or m an da te would not is sue in the m atter f or at least tw enty -five m ore day s, and that issuance of it w oul d be f

urthe r de lay ed

if ati m el y pe tit ionf or r eh eari ng w er e fi le d inthe Su pr em e Co urt. N one the le ss, be ca use w e w an te d to m ove a lon g our co nsi de ratio n of the m atter, without waiting for the officia l j udgm ent or m andate we instructed the attorney s on Ju ne 30 to su pplem entally brief the question of what this Court sh ou lddo in li gh t o f th e Hil l d eci si on when th is cas e o ffi ci al ly got ba ckbe fo re u s.4

T he sc he dul e w e se t pr ovi de d th at Ru the rf or d’ s op en ing br ie f w oul d be due within 20 day s from

June 30, the date of our instructions ; the State’ s answer brief w oul d be due w ith in 1 4 day s f ro m r ec ei pt o f Ru the rf

or d’ s; and h e the n w oul d have 7 day s f ro m r ec ei pt o f the S ta te ’ s br ie f to f ile ar ep ly . R

uth er fo rd f ile d hi s op en ing brief on the last possi ble day under the schedule; the State filed its answer brief se ve ral da y s ea rly; an d R ut he rfo rddi d n ot fil e h is rep ly brie f whe n i t was du e. Instead, the day

Rutherford’ s reply

brief w as due we rec eived a m otion for a thi rty -d ay e xte nsi on. O ne of

the r ea sons his a tto rn ey

gave f or ne ed ing the ex te nsi on w as that sh e ha d take n an e igh t- day va catio n inthe m ids t of

the br ie fi ng sc he dul e. W e de nie d he r re que st f or a30- day e xte nsi on b ut g av e he r one of tw en ty -thr ee day s, w hic h r es ult ed in he r ha vin g atot al of

thi rty day s f ro m r ec ei pt of the State’ s brief to file R utherford’ s reply

brief. Rutherford’ s attorney wa ited unt il the la st d ay

of that e xte nde d pe ri od t o f ile the br ie f, w hic h r es ult ed in co m ple tio n of the sup ple m en ta l br ie fi ng b ei ng d el ay ed unt il Se pte m

be r 1. ( Inthe m eanti m e, w e ha d r ec ei ve d th e j udgm en t or m an da te of

the S upr em e Co urt onJul y 24 .) On Se ptem

ber 22, 2006, the G overnor of the State of Florida rescheduled Ru th erfo rd ’s exe cu ti on forth e p eri odfro m Octo be r 16 th ro ug h Oct ob er 2 3, 2 00 6. Indoi ng s o th e G ove rn or not ed that the w ar de n ha d c hose n O ct obe r 18 at 6: 005

p. m . a s th e spe ci fi c da te and t im e fo r the e xe cu tio n. N o on e inf orm ed thi s C ourt or its Clerk of that developm ent until Septem ber 25, which is the date that Rutherford filed a m andam

us petitio n in the Suprem e Court and provided ou r Cler k’ s Of fice w ithac opy

of it . T he m an da m

us p et iti on a ske d th e Su

pr em e Co urt t o expe dit iou sly

or de r thi s C ourt t o r em an d th is c as e to the dis tr ic t c ourt. T he r eque st cam e de spi te the f

ac t tha t R uth er fo rd ha d ne ve r as ke d th is C ourt t o e xpe dit e its co nsi de ratio n of

the c as e an d hi s own a tto rn ey ha d de lay ed

the c om ple tio n of br ie fi ng and s ubm iss ionof the c as e to u s f

or de ci sio n. A m ong oth er

thi ngs, the m an dam us p et iti on s he f

ile d a cc use s th is C ourt of “ sit [t ing ] upo n ac ap ita l c as e rem anded to it,” and charges that “ [t] he Ele venth Circuit and the Florida Attorney Ge neral have been the architects of the tra p being set to ensnare Mr . R utherford.” T he m an da m

us p et iti on d oe s no t di sc los e that the a tto rn ey w ho p en ne d th ose al le gatio ns t ook a va catio n duri ng the br ie fi ng s ch ed ule , le ad ing to a de lay

in su bm is si on of t he cas e to us forde ci si on . Inany e ve nt, the c as e ha vin g be ensub m itt ed to us f or de ci sio n, w e tur

n to a di sc us si on of t he is su es pre se nt edby the Supr em e Co ur t’s re m an d.

B.6

T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed on tw o gr ound s R

uth er fo rd ’ s 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 law sui t c ha lle ngi ng F lor ida ’ s th re e- dr ug l etha l i nj ec tio n pr oto co l. O ne gr ound w as that our ci rc uit

lawa t the ti m e re qui re d th at thi s ty pe of c ha lle nge be br ough t in a 28 U . S. C. § 22 54 p ro ce ed ing and c om ply w iththe r es tr ic tio ns o n se co nd o r suc ce ssi ve ha

be as pe tit ion s se t ou t i n § 2 244( b) . S ee H ill v. Cr osby , 437 F . 3d 1084 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) , r ev ’ d su b no m . , H ill v. Mc D onou gh, 126 S . Ct . 209 6 (2 006) ; R obi nsonv. Cr osby , 358 F . 3d 1 281, 128 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . B ec au se Ru the rf or d c oul d no t m ee t the r equir em en ts f or f ili ng a se co nd o r suc ce ssi ve habe as pe tit ion , w e af

fi rm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t di sm iss ing his a ct ionon that basis. Rutherford I , 438 F. 3d at 108 9. T hat basis for our decision is no lon ger va li d i n l ig ht of t he Supr em e Co ur t’s Hi ll de ci si on . Ther e w as, how ever, a second ground for the dism issal. T he district court al so d ism iss ed

Ru the rf or d’ s law sui t onthe a lte rn at ive gr ound that he c oul d and shou ld h av e br ough t i t e ar lie r. R uth er fo rd I , a t 11 01–0 3 ( ap pe ndi x c ont ai nin g district court opin ion). A fter discussing th at ground at som e length, w e af firm ed on the ba sis of

it , a s w el l. I d. a t 10 90–9 3. W e w ill not r ep eat he re a ll that w e sa id the re . S uf

fi ce it to say that, a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt f ound , Ru the rf

or d di d unnecessarily

delay bringing this claim . He deliberately wa ited unti l the last few day s be fo re his e xe cu tio n to f ile w ha t he c oul d have f

ile d m an y m onths, if

not7

y ears , e ar lie r. H e co uld

have br ough t the c la im

in ple nty of ti m e to p er

m it fu ll co nsi de ratio n of

it w ith out any ne ed to stay the e xe cu tio n or de r that w as f ina lly en te redin th e cas e. Id . W e expla ine d inour

pr ior opi nio n th at

be ca use of the a lte rn at ive hol din g Ru the rf or d w oul d lo se e ve n if

the S upr em e Co urt i n H ill kno ck ed the f ir st p ro p out of our de ci sio n, w hic h is e xa ct ly w ha t i t di d. R

uth er fo rd I , a t 10 93 ( “ [E ] ve n if the S upr em e Co urt de ci de s inthe H ill c as e to o ve rt ur n our H ill and R obi nson de ci sio ns and h old s th at

thi s ty pe of c la im is co gni za

ble in a § 19 83 p ro ce ed ing , Rutherford still will not be entitled to any equitable relief bec ause of the district co urt' s in de pe nde ntl y

a de quate a lte rn at ive gr ound f or dis m iss ing his c om

pla int , which w e ar e af

firm ing in this op inion . Ne ither of the two questions on which certiorar i wa s granted in Hill touch on that alternative ground.”). W e ar e as co nv in cedof t ha t co nc lu si on no w as we wer e th en , if n ot m or e so . N oth ing in the S upr em e Co urt’ s H ill opi nio n c onf lic ts w ithour

c onc lus ion about ho w the e quitabl e principles play out in th is case, and there is m uch in that opin ion to suppo rt our conclusion . Part I II of the Hill opinio n recognizes that

“ [b ] oththe S ta te and the vic tim s of c ri m e ha ve an im

portant i nte re st i n th e tim el y en fo rc em en t of

ase nte nc e, ” an d th e opi nio n st at es that no thi ng a bout the H ill de ci sio n sh oul d be r ea d to dim ini sh tha t i nte re st o r pr ev en t f ed er al c ourts f

ro m8

pr ote ct ing it . 126 S . Ct . a t 21 04. T he S upr em e Co urt r ei te rate d inH ill w ha t i t sa id in Nelson v. Cam

pbell, 541 U. S. 637, 649– 50, 124 S. C t. 2117, 2125– 26 (2004 ), ab out astay of e xe cu tio n be ing an e qui ta ble r em edy , not

a va ila ble a s am atte r of ri ght , and a

bout howf ed er al c ourts c onsi de ri ng g ranti ng a stay m ust be “ se nsi tiv e to the S ta te ’ s stro ng i nte re st i n e nf or ci ng i ts c ri m ina l j udgm en ts w ith out und ue int er fe re nc e fr om

the f ed er al c ourts. ” H ill , 126 S . Ct . a t 21 04. I t a lso ins tr uc te d us that “ [a ] c ourt c onsi de ri ng a stay m ust a lso appl y

‘ a str ong equit ab le pr es um pti on against the grant of a stay wher e a c laim

could have been broug ht at such a tim e as to a llo wc onsi de ratio n of the m er its w ith out

r equir ing e ntr

y of astay . ’ ” I d. (quotin g Nelson, 541 U. S. at 650, 124 S. C t. at 2126 ). At the tim e the H ill decision wa s announ ced, a num ber of f ederal c ourts had ex er ci se d th ei r equit ab le pow er s to dis m iss thi s ty pe of law sui t ongr ound s th at

the claim about the lethal injection procedures and protocol was too speculativ e or had be enf ile d to o late . H ill , 126 S . Ct . a t 21 04 ( ci tin g H ic ks v . T af t, 431 F . 3d 9 16 ( 6th Cir. 2005 ); White v. Johnso n, 429 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005); Boy d v. Bec k, 404 F. Su pp. 2d 8 79 ( E . D . N . C. 200 5) ). Whil e not pa ssi ng o n th e de ci sio ns i n th ose part ic ular ca se s, the S upr em e Co urt di d po int to the m and c onc lud e that the pr obl em the y a ddr es se d is sig nif

ic an t, a s w oul d be the pr obl em of pie ce m ea l or r e p e t i t i v e l i t i g a t i o n i n th i s typ e o f c a s e . H i l l , 1 2 6 S . C t . a t2 1 0 4 . T h e S up r e me9

Co urt f la t ou t sa id i n it s H ill opi nio n th at : “ T he f ed er al c ourts c anand s houl d pr ote ct S ta te s f ro m dil at or y or spe cu la tiv e sui ts. ” Id . I f that m eans anythi ng, it m eans tha t w e m

ust a ff irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of Ru the rf or d’ s § 1 983 com plaint on the alternative ground that he is no t entitled to equ itable relief be ca use he de lay ed

unn ec es sari ly

in br ing ing the c la im , de lib er at el y w ai tin g un til the F ri day

nig ht b ef or e the sc he dul ed

e xe cu tio n onT ue sday

to fi le , kno w ing f

ull w el l tha t the dis co ve ry , e vid en tiary he ar ing , and d ec isi on o n th e m er its that he de m an ds co ul d n ot po ss ib ly be acc om pl is he d i n t ha t s ho rt p eri odof t im e. O ur de ci sio n to a ff

irm in thi s c as e is s uppo rt ed , if not c om pe lle d, by the decision of anoth er panel of this Court in the Hill ca se on rem and. I n that case, unlik e this one, the district court had not reached the issue of whether, if there w er e j ur isd ic tio n to c onsi de r the le tha l i nj ec tio n c la im , r el ie f shou ld b e de nie d on equit ab le gr ound s be ca

use of the de lay in br ing ing it . T he c as e w as r em an de d to the dis tr ic t c ourt f

or c onsi de ratio n of

that i ssu e. H ill v. Mc D onou gh, ___ F . 3d

___, N o. 06- 1062 1, 200 6 W L 247 2727 , a t *1 ( 11th C ir . Aug. 29, 200 6) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt onr em an d inH ill r ea ch ed the sam e de ci sio n th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt i n the present case had r eached originally , which is that th e re lief sought in the § 1983 pr oc ee din g w as barr ed on e qui ta ble gr ound s, and d ism iss ed the c om pla int on t h at b as i s . S ee Hi l l v . M cD o n o u g h , _ _ _ F. 3 d_ _ _ , No . 0 6 -1 4 9 2 7 , 2 0 0 6 WL10

2641 659, a t *1 ( 11th C ir . S ep t. 15, 200 6) . O n a ppe al , thi s C ourt e ff

ec tiv el y af fi rm ed that de ci sio n, tr eatin g H ill ’ s m oti on f or astay of e xe cu tio n a s ar eque st for prelim inary

injunctive relief

and deny ing it. Id. In doing s o, w e stated that

“ w e dis pose of

H ill ’ s m oti on b y

de ny ing his r eque st f

or an in j unc tio n ba se d up on ou r in de pe nd en t an al y si s o f th e eq ui ti es .” Id . at * 2. Inthe c our se of

doi ng s o, w e re fe rr ed

to “ the c le ar

ind ic at ionf

ro m the Su pr em e Co urt i n th is c as e that w e m ay de ny H ill ’ s r eque st i f the e qui tie s de m an d that r es ult . ” I d. W e expla ine d th at f ar f ro m havin g th e equit ie s onhis sid e, “ H ill was th e arc hi te ctof t he ve ry trap fr om

whi ch he no w see ks rel ie f.” Id . Wha t we said about Hill applies with full force to Rutherford. W e pointed ou t that Hill had fi le d “ his § 19 83 c om

pla int f our day s be fo re his pr ev iou sly sc he dul ed

e xe cu tio n da te of January 24, 200 6. ” Id . L ike w ise , Ru the rf or d f ile d hi s § 1 983 co m

pla int fo urda y s b efo re h is sch edul edex ecu ti on da te of J an ua ry 31 , 20 06 . W e poi nte d ou t i n H ill that the pe tit ion er ha d f ile d hi s § 1 983 co m

pla int

“ j ust a ft er the F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt r ej ec te d hi s a ppl ic at ionf

or pos t- co nvi ct ion re lie f on, a m ong oth er

gr ound s, his c ha lle nge to the F lor ida le tha l i nj ec tio n p r o t o c o l . ” I d . Li k e w i s e , R u t h e r f o r df i l e dh i s § 1 9 8 3 c o mp l a i n tju s ta f t e r ( a c tu a l l y, the sam e day ) the F lor ida S upr em e Co urt a ff

irm ed the de nia l of

his r eque st f

or post -c onvi ct ionr el ie f on this gr ound a m ong oth er s. A s w e expla ine d inH ill ,11

“ as se rt ionof

e sse nti al ly

the sam e le tha l i nj ec tio n c ha lle nge in the F lor ida c ourts re ve al s th at

he w as aw ar e of

the gr ound s f

or the c la im m uc h e ar lie r than th e da te on whic h he a ct

ua lly f ile d hi s § 1 983 ac tio n inf ed er al dis tr ic t c ourt. ” I d. T he sam e is true here . A nd tha t i s no t a ll. W e al so e xpl ai ne d inour la st H ill opi nio n th at : [W ] e ne ed

not r el y on tha t i nf

er en ce a lon e to d et er

m ine that H ill unr ea sona

bly de lay ed in fi lin g hi s f

ed er al c om

pla int . T he F lor ida Su pr em e Co urt c onsi de re d ac ha lle nge to the F lor ida le tha l i nj ec tio n pr oto co ls o n si m ilar gr ound s a s e ar ly a s 20 00. S im s v. S ta te , 754 S o. 2d 6 57, 666 -6 8 ( Fl a. 200 0) . A lth oughit is unc le ar

f ro m the pr oc ed ur al his tor

y w he the r H ill a ddr es se d th e Si m s pr ec ed en t i n hi s post -c onvi ct ionpr oc ee din gs a ft er 200 0, the f

ac t r em ai ns tha t, dur ing the pendency

of his various collateral challenges, F lorida had considered the sam e ty

pe of claim

upon which H ill now seeks relief. Inli ght of thi s c ont ex t, H ill c an not

c la im that i t w as im

poss ibl e fo r him to initiate his feder al suit any ear lier. Id. ( footnot e om itted). A gain, the sam e is true here . To the extent that Rutherford contends he should be excused for not filing his claim before the Lancet

art ic le it12

is b as ed upo n w as pub lis he d, e xa ct ly the sam e co uld

have be ensa id i n th e H ill case. Besides, as we explained in ou r earlier dec ision in this case, the Lancet ar tic le w as pub lis he d inApr il 2005 nin e m onths b ef or e Ru the rf

or d f ile d hi s co m pla int . Ru the rf

or d I , 438 F . 3d at 10 92. T his Co urt c onc lud ed in the la st H ill opi nio n th at

“ [i ] n li ght

of [ pe tit ion er ’ s] a ct ion s inthi s c as e, w hic h c anonl y be described as dilatory , w e j oin ou r sister cir cuits in declini ng to allo w f urther lit igatio n of

a§ 19 83 c as e fi le d e sse nti al ly on the e ve of

e xe cu tio n. ” H ill , 200 6 W L 26 41 65 9, at *3 . T he dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th is c as e an d th e H ill c as e is tha t no r em an d to the dis tr ic t c ourt i s ne ce ssary to se e howthe dis tr ic t c ourt w ill de ci de the e qui ta ble issues raised by

the last m inute nature of the filing, because the district court has al re ady de ci de d th ose iss ue s inthi s c as e. I t di d so by statin g a s an a lte rn at ive ba sis fo r dis m iss ing Ru the rf

or d’ s § 1 983 co m

pla int that he w as not

e qui ta bly e nti tle d to relief. Rutherford I , at 1102 –03 (append ix containi ng dis trict court opinio n). Ru the rf or d c ont en ds tha t w e ough t no t pay any a tte nti on t o th at

a lte rn at ive hold ing, because the district court concluded in th e sam e order that it lac ked j urisdictio n to address the claim . He cites a half dozen decision s hold ing th at if a co ur t l ack s s ub

ject m at te r juri sd ic ti on itlac ks th e p owe r to de ci de a cl ai m . Of co ur se that’ s tr

ue . B ut the pr obl em

w ithRu the rf

or d’ s arg um en t i s th at

the13

Su pr em e Co urt, w hic h tr ad iti ona lly ha s th e la st w or d inthe se m atte rs , ha s no w em phatic al ly he ld tha t di str ic t c ourts d o have j ur isd ic tio n to e nte rt ai n th is c la im in a § 19 83 p ro ce ed ing e ve n w he re the pla int if f pr ev iou sly

ha d li tig at ed

a§ 22 54 petition . Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102. T he Suprem e Court’ s Hill decision reduces Ru the rf or d’ s arg um en t t o th is p ro posi tio n: a dis tr ic t c ourt whic h e rr one ousl y co nc lud es that i t l ac ks j ur isd ic tio n do es la ck j ur isd ic tio n e ve n if

it doe s no t r ea lly la ck j ur isd ic tio n. T ha t pr opos iti on i s no t on ly c ontrary to co m m on s en se but

a lso is f or ec los ed by c ir cu it pr ec ed en t. S ee M. H . D . v. W es tm ins te r Sc hool s, 172 F . 3d 797, 802 n. 12 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( if adis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss es a lte rn at ive ly on the m erits and for lac k of subject m atter j urisdictio n, w e m ay aff irm on the m erits afte r co nc lud ing that the re w as j ur isd ic tio n) ; se e al so I FC I nte rc onsu ltant, A G v. Sa fe guard

I nt’ l P ar tne rs , 438 F . 3d 2 98 ( 3d C ir . 200 6) ( sam e) ; T ow n S tor es , I nc . v. E qua l E m plo ym en t O ppor

tun ity Co m m ’ n, 708 F . 2d 9 20, 923 ( 4thCi r. 198 3) (“ Having concluded that th e district court err ed in dism issin g the action for a lac k of juri sd ic ti on , we no w m

us t turn t o arev ie w of i ts alt ern at iv e h ol di ng . . . .”). Ru the rf or d a lso arg ue s th at

the w el l- es ta

bli she d e qui ta

ble pr inc ipl es the district court applied in this case, and which the Suprem e Court stressed in Part III of it s H ill opi nio n, 126 S . Ct . a t 21 04, have no r el ev an ce he re be ca use he is s ee k i n g p er m an en ti n

ju n ct i v e r el i ef

o n th e mer i t s , n o ta s t ay o f e x ec u t i o n . We14

rej ected that contention in our prior opinio n, “ agree[ ing] w ith the Fifth Circuit that the last-m inute rules of the Suprem e Court in Ne lson andGom ez [ v. U nited States Dist. Court for N . D ist. O f Ca l., 503 U.S . 653, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992)] ‘ we re de cl ar ed by the Co urt i n th e co nte xt o f la st- m inu te § 19 83 m ethod of e xe cu tio n ch al le nge s a s w el l a s la st- m inu te stay r eque sts . T he pr inc ipl es e nunc ia te d by the [S upr em e] Co urt are e qua lly appl ic ab le to al l ty

pe s of e qui ta ble r el ie f, inc lud ing perm anent injunctions, soug ht by inm ates fac ing imm inent execution .’ ” Ru the rf or d I , 438 F . 3d at 10 92 n . 3 ( quot ing Whit e v. Joh nson , 429 F . 3d 5 72, 5 7 3

– 7 4 ( 5 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ) . S o f a r a s we c a n f

i n d , n o c i r c u i th a s h e l dt o th e c o n t r a ry. A nd i t i s w el l t o r em em

be r that i n H ill the S upr em e Co urt sp oke of f ed er al c ourts invo king equitable power not m erely to deny stay s, but “ to dism iss sui ts they saw as spe cu la tiv e or

f ile d to o late in the day , ” an d a lso to ad dr es s pr obl em s of

“pie ce m ea l l iti ga tio n. ” H ill , 126 S . Ct . a t 21 04. Inhis sup ple m en ta l br ie fs Ru the rf or d in sis ts tha t the c ir cum stanc es have ch an ge d si nc e the dis tr ic t c ourt r ule d be ca use a t the ti m e he f

ile d th ose br ie fs his ex ecu ti on ha d n ot be en res ch edul ed . The p ro bl em wit h t ha t ap pr oa ch is two -fo ld . Fi rs t, w e ar e not

sittin g a s ac ourt of

f ir st r es ort, de ci din g w ha t w oul d be the pr ope r re sul t i f Ru the rf

or d ha d j ust

f ile d w ithus h is § 198 3 c om pla int and associated m otion s. W e ar e re viewing the decision o f the district court, which was15

entered less than seventy -two hours before the date on which the execution was initiallyscheduled. Se cond, the Gover nor of Florida has now re scheduled Rutherford’ s execution and a stay of execution would be necessary for Rutherf

ord to see k a ndob ta in th e fi na l re li ef h e se ek s. W e have carefully

considered the views of our dissenting colleague but are unable to agree w ith them . Beca use the La nc et ar

tic le w as pub lis he d onApr il 16, 2005 , the dis se nti ng o pin ion , in its f ir st f ootnot e, c onc ed es that “ the f ac tua l ba sis for Rutherf

ord’ s claim

m ay have been known to him in April of 2005,” which was m or e than ni ne m onths b ef or e he f ile d th is c la im . I t w as , the dis se nti ng o pin ion insis ts, “ the legal basis for his claim [that] wa s not available un til January 2006 .” Id . Bu t n on e o f th e la w app li cab le to th is cla im ch an ge d i n J an ua ry

20 06 . Whil e the S upr em e Co urt di d gr an t c er tio rari in the H ill c as e on J anuary 25, 200 6, a gr an t of c er tio rari doe s no t c hange the law . S ee Ri tte r v. T hig pe n, 828 F . 2d 6 62, 665– 66 (11th Cir. 1987 ); T hom as v. W ainwright, 788 F. 2d 68 4, 689 (11th Cir. 1986 ). Whe n R

uth er fo rd f ina lly f ile d hi s c la im

on F ri day

nig ht, January

27, 200 6, to stop his schedul ed execution on Tuesday , January 31, the lawin this circuit was th e sa m e as itha d b een du rin g t he en ti re t im e h e was wit hh ol di ng th atcla im . Ci rc uit lawdid not c hange unt il the S upr em e Co urt i ssu ed it s H ill de ci sio n onJun e16

12, 200 6. T ha t de ci sio n c an not e xpl ai n or

e xc use Ru the rf

or d’ s late f

ili ng b ec au se itwas n ot is su edun ti l fo uran d aha lf m on th s af te r he ha d fi le d. N or c anw e ag re e w iththe dis se nti ng o pin ion ’ s a tte m pte d di sti nc tio n of

the Hill ca se from

this on e. T he two ca ses, a s we have alrea dy point ed out, are m aterially

identical insofar as the fac ts relating to the equit able considerations are co nc er ne d. E ve n th oughH ill and R uth er fo rd both f ile d th e sam e cl ai m challenging the sam e lethal inj ection protocol in the sam e state the sam e num ber of day s before their scheduled executions, w hich wer e to occur j ust on e w eek apart, the dissenti ng op inion say s the two cases are m aterially differ ent. T hey

are differe nt, in its view, because by persuading th e Suprem e Court to grant certiorari in his case, while Rutherford laid back, H ill broug ht about a “ fundam ental[] ch an ge [] ” in “ the le ga l l an dsc ap e” ; R uth er fo rd did not . T he ide a is tha t be ca use Hill paved the way

for Rutherf

ord, it is okay

to execute H ill but n ot Rutherford. It cannot be the law, and it certainly is not equi table, to tre at a litigant who does nothin g un til the re is anind ic at ionthe lawm ay be c hange d m or e favor ab ly than one who actually

brings abou t that change in the law. T reating Rutherford m ore favor ab ly than H ill w oul d turnthe inc en tiv es ups ide down and b e an ythi ng b ut equi tabl e. We a l s o d i s ag re e w i t h th e d i s s en t i n g o p i n i o n ’s cr i t i qu e o f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s17

tr eatm en t of

the e qui ta

ble c onsi de ratio ns i ssu e. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t “ onl y analy ze[] this iss ue as an af terthough t,” but carefully considered the applicable law and facts and entere d an alternative holdin g that the relief sought would b e denied on e qui ta ble gr ound s. S ee Ru the rf or d I , 438 F . 3d at 11 02–0 3 ( ap pe ndi x co nta ini ng the dis tr ic t c ourt op ini on) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d c onsi de r the spe ci fi c facts of this particular c ase, the central one of which is that Ruth erfor d had unnecessarily

delay ed in bringin g his claim and at the district court level he had

“ offer ed no reason for his delay in bringin g a § 1983 action until j ust day s before hi s s ch edul edex ecu ti on .” Id . at 1 10 2. Th e d is tri ctco ur t d idap pl y th e p ro pe r la w, s ee i d . a t1 1 0 2

– 0 3 , c i t i n g an dqu o t i n g fr o m th e s ame p ar t s o f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s G om ez and N el son opi nio ns tha t the S upr em e Co urt i tse lf dis cu sse d f

av or ab ly in Part I II of the H ill de ci sio n, 126 S . Ct . a t 21 04. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sc uss ionof t h e r el ev an tl aw wa s n o m o re “ an af t er t h o u g h t ” t h an th e S up re m e C o u rt ’s di sc us si on of i t was in Hil l. Sp eakin g of

the e ff ec t of f ed er al c ourt l iti ga tio n onstate de ath se nte nc es , twenty -three y ears a go Jud ge Godbold of this Court sagely observed that “ [e] ach de la y , forit s s pa n, i s a c omm ut at io n o f a d eat h s en te nc e to on e o f im pr is on m en t.” T hom psonv. W ai nw ri ght , 714 F . 2d 1 495, 150 6 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) . B y hol din g hi s cl ai m ba ck unt il the re w as not

e noug h ti m e to h av e it ad j udi cate d w ith out

astay ofL ast wee k Rutherford f iled an application for a stay of execution pendingour dec ision 2 in this appeal. We deny

that application as moot.

18 ex ec uti on, Ru the rf

or d us ed w ha t the n- Jus tic e Re hnqu ist c al le d th e “ hy dr au lic pr es sur e” of

ala st- m inu te f

ili ng, E vans v . Be nne tt, 440 U . S. 130 1, 130 7, 99 S . Ct . 1481 , 1485 (1979) (Rehnquis t, C ircuit Justice), to obtain a feder al court im posed ei gh t m on th co m

m ut at io n o f hi s d eat h s en te nc e. He is no t en ti tl edto an ot he r on e. Be ca use w e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of Ru the rf or d’ s § 1 983 co m pla int on e qui ta ble gr ound s, w e ne ed

not a ddr es s th e ad dit ion al de fe nse s of co llate ra l e sto ppe l and f

ai lur e to e xhaust

a dm ini str at ive r em ed ie s, a s r equir ed by the Prison Litigation Reform Ac t, 42 U .S .C. § 1997 e(a) , which the State has asserted as alter

native bases for aff

irm ance. AFFIR MED. 219

W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng: It is now clear that Rutherford is entitled to challenge the m ethod bywhich Fl or id a se ek s t o e xe cu te hi m by pres en ti ng hi s cl ai m

un de r 28 U.S.C. § 1 98 3. See Hil l v. McDo no ug h, 547 U . S. ___ _, 126 S . Ct . 209 6, 210 1–04 , 165 L . E d. 2d 4 4 (2 006) . T he S upr em e Co urt r em an de d R uth er fo rd ’ s c as e ba ck

to us f or re co nsi de ratio n inli ght

of it s de ci sio n in H

ill . R uth er

ford v . M cD onough , 126 S. Ct . 291 5, 165 L . E d. 2d 9 14 ( 2006 ) (m em . ). P ur suant t o th e re m an d, the m aj or ity ag re es w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a lte rn at ive r uli ng tha t R

uth er fo rd ’ s § 1 983 cl ai m sh ou ldno t b e h eardbe cau se he sh ou ldha ve bro ug ht itearl ie r. I di sa gr ee. I continu e to believe, a s I noted in m y ear lier dissent, that the district court abused its discretion b y

concludin g that even if Rutherford’ s § 198 3 claim we re co gn iz ab le , hi s d el ay

in bri ng in g t he cla im

pre cl ud edequi tabl e rel ie f. R uth er ford v. Cr osby , 438 F . 3d 1 087, 109 7–98 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) ( W ils on, J. , dis se nti ng) (hereinaf ter R uth er ford I ). B ec au se the f

ac tua l ba sis f

or Ru the rf or d’ s c la im

onl y rece ntly cam e to light andbecause the legal basis for his claim wa s not in place unt il six day s be fo re his sc he dul ed e xe cu tio n, he did

not unn ec es sari ly

de lay inThe majority asser ts that Rutherford wa s awa re of the fa ctual grounds for his c laim as 1 ear ly as 2000 whe n the state of F lorida instituted lethal injection as a method of e x ecution. That y ear , the Flor ida Supreme Court e valuated the constitutionalit y of F lorida’s letha l injection protocols. Se eSim s v . S

tate , 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000) . The pe titioner in Sims , howeve r, cente red his ar gument on the pain and suf fer ing that could occur

if execution proce dures we re not followed. Id. at 668. In this case, Rutherf ord alleg es that eve n if ca rried out a s planned, the execution methods constitute cruel a nd unusual punishment. Rutherford ba ses his claim on rec ent re sear ch published in a medic al journal de tailing the e ffe cts of the c hemicals in lethal injection. SeeL eonidas G. K oniaris, et al., InadequateAnaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Exe cution , 365 T HE LAN C E T 1412 (Apr. 16, 2005) . This resea rch indicates that inmates may fee l the su ff e ri ngof su ff oc atio n, the burn ingthr ou g h th e ve ins , a nd the pa in o f a

he art atta c k d ue to inadequate ana esthesia. Id. Thoug h the fa ctual basis for Rutherford’ s claim may

have be en known to him in April of 2005, the leg al basis for his c laim was not ava ilable until J anuar y 2006. 20 br ing ing his § 19 83 a ct ion . 1 T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n th at Ru the rf or d un re as ona

bly de lay ed the fil in g o f hi s cl ai m

was, i n e ss en ce, an alt ern at iv e b as is fordi sm is si ng hi s ca se . T he re w as no s em

blanc e of apr ope r dis cu ssi on o r ba lanc ing of the e qui tie s of Ru the rf or d’ s c la im . T he c ourt di d no t a ppl y the appr opr ia te standard f or astay or inj unc tio n un de r § 19 83. C onsp ic uous ly abse nt f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r is any discussi on of the following four factors: (1) whether there is a subs tantial likeliho od of success on th e m erits; (2) whether the requested action is necessary to prevent irrepara

ble injury ; (3) whether the threatened inj ury outweighs the harm the stay or inj unc tio n w oul d in fl ic t up on the non -m ovant; and ( 4) w he the r the req ue st edact io n wo ul d s erv e th e p ub li c in te res t. Se e Se ige l v . L ep ore , 234 F . 3d 1163 , 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (per c uriam ). T he district court obv iousl y did no t feel the ne ed to co nsi de r the se f

our f ac tor s be ca

use it be lie ve d th at

Ru the rf or d’ s “ cl ai m21

an d r eque st f

or r el ie f [w a] s th e func tio na l e qui va le nt o f a suc ce ssi ve ha be as c or pus petition .” R uth er

ford I , 438 F. 3d at 110 2 (reprinting dist rict court order as ap p e n d i x ) . We h a v e l e a rn e df r o m H ill that tha t be lie f w as inc or re ct . 126 S. Ct. at 21 01 –0 4. W ithou t we ighin g the four factors, the district court erroneously concluded that R uth er fo rd unn ec es sari ly

de lay ed in br ing ing his c la im , and thus de em ed a stay ina ppr opr ia te . A“ str ong equit ab le pr es um pti on a ga ins t the gr an t of astay ” is ap pr opr ia te onl y

w he n “ a cl ai m

c oul d have be enbr ough t at su chati m e as to al low consideration o f the m erits w ithou t the requiring of a stay .” Ne lso n v . Ca m pbe ll , 541 U.S . 637, 650, 124 S. Ct. 2117 , 2126, 158 L. Ed. 2d 924 (2004). H ere, there w oul d have be enli ttl e poi nt i n R uth er fo rd br ing ing his c la im

any e ar lie r than he did . P ri or

to the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n in H ill , our pr ec ed en t i n Robinson v. Cr osby , 358 F. 3d 12 81 (11th Cir. 2004 ), w oul d have r equir ed adis tr ic t c ourt t o tre atRu th erfo rd ’s § 1 98 3 c la im as a su cces si ve habe as co rp us pe ti ti on . Se e id. at 1284 . T hus, ba se d onour pr ior pr ec ed en t whic h ha s no wbe enove rr ule d, the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have be enc or re ct to sum m ar ily dis m iss it

f or la ck of juri sd ic ti on . Se e id. It

w as not unt il the S upr em e Co urt’ s gr an t of c er tio rari in H

ill that Rutherford had reason to believe that his claim would be heard. Rutherford filed his § 19 83 claim

on January

27, 2006, two day s after

the Suprem e Court22

gr an te d c er

tio rari in H

ill . I se e nothin g inthe r ec or d to sug ge st, a s th e m aj or ity opi ne s, that R

uth er fo rd “ de lib er at el y

w ai te d” to fi le his c la im

day s be fo re his sc he dul ed e xe cu tio n. T hus, the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n inappl y ing a

“ s t ro n g eq u i t ab l e p re s u m p t i o n ” a g ai n s ta s t ay. F u rt h er m o re , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s o rd ero n l y an al yzed th i s i s s u e a s an af t er t h o u g h to n th e p re m i s e t h at th e c o u rt ’s fi rs t gr ound

w oul d be uph el d. T he m aj or ity

a ff irm s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of Ru the rf or d’ s § 1 983 action in an effort to “protect states from dilatory or speculative suits.” H

ill , 126 S. Ct . a t 21 04. T he m aj or ity c onc lud es that a

r em an d is unn ec es sary

be ca use the district court already

determ ined that Rutherford’ s suit was dilatory . I do not read H ill as giving license to the lower federa l courts “ to overlookall other co nsi de ratio ns tha t are c al le d f or in equity , w hic h, a ft er

a ll, sho uld

be ar ec our se to pr inc ipl es of

j ust ic e an d f

ai rn es s to c or

re ct or sup ple m en t the lawa s a

ppl ie d to particular cir cum stances.” B row n v . L iv ing sto n , 457 F . 3d 3 90, 392 ( 5thCi r. 200 6) (D ennis , J. , dis se nti ng) . R athe r, “ equity in ca se s of

thi s natur e re qui re s c ourts t o co nsi de r the part ic ular ci rc um stanc es of e ac h c as e an d to e xa m ine the m f or w he the r or

not the c ha lle nge ha s be enbr ough t di la tor ily or f or im pr ope r pur

pose s .

. . , and, if not, whether it shou ld be allowed to proceed. ” Id . T he district court di d n ot co ns id er Ru th erfo rd ’s par ti cu la r ci rcu m st an ces .23

T he m aj or ity

a lso arg ue s th at

it s de ci sio n to a ff

irm is co m pe lle d by the result in the H

ill cas e o n re m an d. H

ill v . M cD onough , No . 0 6 -1 4 9 2 7 , 2 0 0 6 WL 2641 659, (11th Cir. S ept. 15, 2006 ). H ill filed his § 1 983 claim four day s before his e xe cu tio n w ithf

ull kno w le dge that un de r thi s C ir cu it’ s pr ec ed en t, his c la im wou ldbe di sm is se d a s a s uc ces si ve habe as pe ti ti on . Se e R obi nson , 358 F. 3d at 1284 . I n f

ac t, the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed H ill ’ s c la im

outri ght f or la ck of j urisdictio n, holding that Hill’ s action was the f unction al equivalent of a successive petitio n for a writ of habeas corpus filed w ithou t leave and, thus, ran afo ul of 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 44 (b ). H ill v . Cr osby , No . 4 : 0 6 -C V- 0 3 2 -S PM , 2 0 0 6 WL 1675 85, a t *2 –3 (N . D . F la . Jan. 21, 200 6) . F oll ow ing our pr ec ed en t i n R obi nson , 358 F. 3d 1 28, andI

n re Prov en zano , 21 5 F .3d12 33 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ), we sum m ar ily a ff irm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt and d en ie d H ill ’ s a ppl ic at ionf

or astay of his ex ecu ti on pe nd in g app eal . H ill v . Cr osby , 437 F . 3d 1 084, 108 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) (p ercu ri am). A g ai n s tth e o d d s , t h e U .S . S up re m e C o u rt g ra n t edce rt i o ra ri i n Hi l l ’s cas e. H ill v . Cr osby , 546 U . S. __, 126 S . Ct . 118 9, 119 0, 163 L . E d. 2d 1 144 (2006) (m em .) . H ill ’ s c as e is m at er ia lly

dif fe re nt f ro m Ru the rf or d’ s. H ill f

ile d ahig hly spe cu la tiv e sui t a s ala st d itc h e ff ort t o st al l hi s e xe cu tio n. N oth ing in our c ir cu it pr ec ed en t, or

S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t, pr ovi de d aba sis f or a§ 19 83 c ha lle nge to24

H ill ’ s m ethod of

e xe cu tio n. O n th e oth er

hand, w he n R

uth er fo rd f ile d hi s § 1 983 cl ai m , the le ga l l an dsc ap e ha d f undam en ta lly

c hange d. Agr an t of

c er tio rari by the Suprem e Court, obvio usly , does not change our Circuit law , but it does call that lawint o qu es tio n. O nly

a ft er the S upr em e Co urt’ s gr an t of c er tio rari in H

ill , w hic h pr es en te d th e sam e iss ue s R uth er fo rd f ac ed , did Ru the rf or d have r ea son to be lie ve that hi s c la im

w oul d be he ar d. T he m aj or ity sug ge sts that i t “ cannot

be the la w” th atRu th erfo rdco ul d b en efi t fr om pre ced en t es tabl is he d b y Hil l’s ef fo rts . A ga in, I dis ag re e. L iti gants be ne fi t f ro m the e ff orts o f pr ior

li tig an ts who s ha

pe the lawe ve ry

day . T ha t i s pr ec ise ly

w hy the S upr em e Co urt r em an de d th is c as e ba ckto us forreco ns id erat io n –be cau se Hil l fo rg edne w pre ced en t. Nothing in the rec ord sugg ests that Rutherford filed his claim solely in an atte m pt t o de lay

his im pe ndi ng e xe cu tio n. I n f

ac t, the r ec or d c om

pe ls the opp osi te conclusio n. S ince Rutherford f iled his § 1 983 claim , he has vigo rously pursued that c la im and urg ed

the c ourts at a ll sta ge s to giv e him an e vid en tiary

he ar ing on the m erits. For exam

ple, Rutherf

ord urged us to rem and his case to the dist rict co urt po st- H

ill f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs o n th e m er its de spi te the f ac t tha t no de ath w ar rant w as pe ndi ng and h is e xe cu tio n w as not im m ine nt. F urthe rm or e, onc e his se co nd d eath w ar

rant h ad be ensig ne d and h is e xe cu tio n date se t, he pe tit ion ed the U . S. S upr em e Co urt f

or aw ri t of m an da m us i n an e ff

ort t o c om

pe l us to re m an d25

his c as e to the dis tr ic t c ourt f or ahe ar ing . T he se c ir cum stanc es c ontra dic t the m aj ority ’ s assertion that his § 1983 claim is m erely as a delay

tactic and instead de m onstrate that R

uth er fo rd ha s so ught

and c ont inu es to se ek

af ull and f ai r he ar ing on the m er its of

his c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge to Fl or ida ’ s le tha l i nj ec tio n p ro t o co l . I a m

s i m p l y n o tp er s u ad edb y t h e v i ew o f t h e majo ri t y t h at Ru t h er fo rd ’s sol e int en t i s to buy

m or e tim e on d eath r ow , r athe r than to f or ce the S ta te to ex ecu te hi m

in co m pl ia nc e wit h t he Co ns ti tu ti on . Ce rt ai nly , the S ta te and i ts v ic tim s have an “ im portant i nte re st i n th e tim el y en fo rc em en t of

ase nte nc e, ” but

thi s in te re st m

ust be ba lanc ed

a ga ins t the co nst itu tio na l r igh t of

ade ath r owinm at e to b e ex ec ute d inam an ne r co nsi ste nt with the requirem ents of the Constit ution . Rece nt develop m ents in m edical re se ar chhave c al le d in to que sti on the de gr ee of pa in and s uf

fe ri ng c au se d by

the m et ho d o f le th al in

jecti on so m e st at es , in cl ud in g F lo rid a, us e. See Leon id as G. Kon ia ris et a l., In ade quate A naesth es ia i n L et hal I nje ct ion for

E xe cu tio n , 365 T HE L AN CET 1412 (Apr. 16, 2005 ). T o date, m ost lower courts have avoided square ly a ddr es sin g w he the r ex ec uti on b y thi s th re e- dr

ug p ro toc ol v iol at es the Eig ht h Am en dm en t, t hu s p rev en ti ng rev ie w by th e Uni te d S ta te s Su pr em e Co ur t. Se e, e . g. , H

ill , 200 6 W L 264 1659 ; R obi nson , 358 F. 3d 1 281; B row n v . Craw ford , 408 F. 3d 1 027 (8 th C ir . 200 5) ( pe r curi am); B ie ghl er v . Sta te , 839 N . E . 2d 6 91A cour t in the Northern D istrict of California is cur rently hear ing e x pert testimony 2 re g ard inga

c ha lle ng e to C a lif

or nia ’s le tha l in

je c tio n p ro toc ols , whic h a re mate ri a lly

sim ila r t o F lor ida ’s pr oc e dure s. Mo ra le s v . W oo dfo rd, No. C-06-219-JF-RS (N.D. Cal. 2006). Ruther ford deser ves the same opportunity . Consequently , Iwould g rant Rutherf ord’s Application for a Stay of Exe c uti on , p e rm itt inghim to r e tur n to the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r a he ari ngon

the me ri ts o f h is § 1983 claim. 26 (In d. 2 00 5) . B ut s eeW

alk er v . J ohns on , No . 1 : 0 5 -C V- 9 3 4 CM H TR J , 2 0 0 6 WL 2619 857 (E. D. Va . S ept. 11, 2006 ) (dism issin g inm ate’ s § 198 3 claim which re lied on risks o f deviation from execution proto col). Ru the rf or d do es not

c ha lle nge the va lid ity

of his se nte nc e, r athe r the m ethod in whic h th e St at e se ek s to c ar ry it out . R uth er fo rd ’ s c ha lle nge , e ve n if suc ce ssf ul, doe s no t f or ec los e his e xe cu tio n. H e w ill be put to de ath f

or his c ri m e. B ut, be ca use Ru the rf

or d pr es en ts a

le git im at e cl ai m

that the le tha l i nj ec tio n pr oto co l that aw ai ts h im

m ay c onst itu te c ru el and unusu al pun ish m en t, w hic h th e E igh th A m en dm en t f

or bid s, and b ec au se the dis tr ic t c ourt f ai le d to e nga ge in a fu ll an d proper analy sis of the equities in Rutherford’ s case, I w ouldrever se the district c o u rt ’s d e c i s i o n an dr e man df o r ah e a r i n g o n th e me r i t s o f h i s § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m. 2