Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 13, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 22429 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) None. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

May 4, 2009. 

Peter A. White, 

Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–10953 Filed 5–12–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27747; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–CE–030–AD; Amendment 

39–15904; AD 2009–10–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Cessna 

Aircraft Company 150 and 152 Series 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for Cessna 

Aircraft Company (Cessna) 150 and 152 

series airplanes. This AD requires you to 

either install a placard prohibiting spins 

and other acrobatic maneuvers in the 

airplane or to replace the rudder stop, 

rudder stop bumper, and attachment 

hardware with a new rudder stop 

modification kit and replace the safety 

wire with jamnuts. This AD results from 

follow-on investigations of two 

accidents where the rudder was found 

in the over-travel position with the stop 

plate hooked over the stop bolt heads. 

While neither of the accident aircraft 

met type design, investigations revealed 

that aircraft in full conformity with type 

design can exceed the travel limits set 

by the rudder stops. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent the rudder from traveling 

past the normal travel limit. Operation 

in this non-certificated control position 

is unacceptable and could cause 

undesirable consequences, such as 

contact between the rudder and the 

elevator. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective on 

June 17, 2009. 

On June 17, 2009, the Director of the 

Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in this AD. 

ADDRESSES: To get the service 

information identified in this AD, 

contact Cessna Aircraft Company, 

Product Support, P.O. Box 7706, 

Wichita, KS 67277; telephone: (316) 

517–5800; fax: (316) 517–7271; Internet: 

http://www.cessna.com. 

To view the AD docket, go to U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590, or on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. The docket 

number is FAA–2007–27747; 

Directorate Identifier 2007–CE–030–AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ann 

Johnson, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 

1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Wichita, 

Kansas 67209; telephone: (316) 946– 

4105; fax: (316) 946–4107. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On April 10, 2007, we issued a 

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to 

include an AD that would apply to 

certain Cessna Aircraft Company 

(Cessna) 150 and 152 series airplanes. 

This proposal was published in the 

Federal Register as a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) on April 16, 2007 

(72 FR 18925). The NPRM proposed to 

require replacement of the rudder stop, 

rudder stop bumper, and attachment 

hardware with a new rudder stop 

modification kit and replacement of the 

safety wire with jamnuts. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in developing 

this AD. The following presents the 

comments received on the proposal and 

FAA’s response to each comment: 

Comment Issue No. 1: SAIB Instead of 

NPRM 

Joseph Morales, Gary Iverson, Sr., Al 

Roesner, Gerald D. Clark, Al Dyer, Neal 

Trullson, McBride Aircraft Group, 

Matthew M. Gosslein, Samuel K. 

McCauley, Robert E. Hackman from the 

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 

(AOPA), and Tom Carr from the Cessna 

Pilots Association (CPA) comment that 

the FAA should withdraw the NPRM 

and issue a special airworthiness 

information bulletin (SAIB). The 

commenters state that if the aircraft is 

properly maintained and rigged, then no 

problems exist; problems should easily 

be detected visually during routine 

maintenance; and a rudder system that 

is built and installed correctly is 

virtually impossible to jam. The 

commenters state adequate regulations 

and requirements are in place to assure 

the inspection of the rudder system is 

completed during annual or 100-hour 

inspections in 14 CFR part 43, 

Appendix D and in the Cessna service 

publication. In addition, the 

commenters point out the following: 

• Two service difficulty reports were 

found but none for a jammed rudder. 

• In the Ohio accident, the rudder 

stop was installed inverted, and the 

functionality of the stop configuration 

was compromised. 

• If you remove the right rudder 

return spring and disconnect the right 

rudder control cable, then the left 

locked rudder event from the Canadian 

accident could be duplicated. 

• The two accident airplanes were 

not airworthy prior to flight. 

The commenters further state that 

requiring replacement of the rudder 

stop, rudder stop bumper, attachment 

hardware, and substituting safety wire 

with jamnuts is an overreaction. The 

commenters request that the FAA 

withdraw the NPRM and issue an SAIB 

since the problem is with a very limited 

number of airplanes, specifically the 

Cessna Model 152, and improper 

maintenance was cited as the cause of 

the two previously mentioned 

accidents. The commenters state the 

airplanes have flown for 51 years and 

thousands of hours with no previous 

problems, and installing the original 

equipment manufacturer (OEM) kit on 

17,090 domestic airplanes would put 

the airplanes at risk. 

We do not agree that this action 

should be an SAIB instead of an AD. 

While the two accident aircraft were not 

airworthy, the issue that needs to be 

corrected is a design issue, not a 

maintenance issue. Follow-on 

investigations did reveal that rudders on 

aircraft in full conformity with type 

design can exceed the travel limits set 

by the rudder stops. Operation in this 

non-certificated control position is 

unacceptable and could cause 

undesirable consequences. Markings on 

one accident aircraft correspond with 

previous contact between the rudder 

and elevator, and similar markings were 

noted on several in-service airplanes. 

We will change the final rule AD to 

provide another option in lieu of the 

actions in the proposed AD. For the new 

option, the limitations section in the 

airplane flight manual (AFM) and the 

pilots operating handbook (POH) must 

be changed to prohibit acrobatics. A 

placard would be displayed on the 

instrument panel in clear view of the 

pilot with the words ‘‘INTENTIONAL 

SPINS AND OTHER ACROBATIC/ 

AEROBATIC MANEUVERS 

PROHIBITED PER AD 2009–10–09.’’ 

We retain as an option the actions 

complying with the service information 

as specified in the proposed AD. After 

such action is done, the specified 

22430 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 13, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

operational limitations in the added 

option (if utilized) may be removed. 

We are changing the final rule AD 

action by adding language to address the 

option of the operational limitations. 

Comment Issue No. 2: How Is Change 

Justified 

Cessna Aircraft Company states that 

the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) recommendation of 

mandating by AD the installation of the 

Cessna service kit would not have 

prevented the accidents. Cessna states 

that they have no data that indicates a 

flight or ground procedure can deflect 

the rudder stop to a position where the 

stop is behind the bolt. From the dirt in 

the accident photograph, Cessna 

believes forces generated in the accident 

moved the rudder relative to the rudder 

stop, and that is how it hooked behind 

the stop. Cessna states that in the 

Canadian accident the rudder was 

possibly pushed over the stop by 

hydrodynamic or inertia forces. Cessna 

notes that if both rudder pedals were 

pressed simultaneously, then the rudder 

stop would slip below the stop bolts and 

contact the fuselage skin without any 

tendency to jam; larger stops and bolts 

minimize this tendency. A Cessna 

service bulletin was issued in 2001 to 

address this concern. Cessna has no 

objection to adoption of an AD 

mandating installation of the service kit. 

We agree with Cessna that the rudder 

stop can slip below the stop bolts and 

contact the fuselage skin but will not 

jam. This slippage below the stop bolt 

is not acceptable, and we agree that the 

Cessna kits will prevent this from 

occurring. In addition (and more central 

to this AD), installing the kits will 

prevent the rudder from exceeding its 

travel limits, which will prevent contact 

between the rudder and the elevator. 

One of the options for addressing the 

unsafe condition in this AD is the 

installation of such kits. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action based on this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 3: Cost Is Excessive 

Joseph Morales, Al Roesner, Gerald D. 

Clark, and Al Dyer comment that the 

expenses stated in the Cessna service 

bulletin and in the NPRM are excessive. 

We disagree. We received an 

estimated parts cost of $90 (as of 

January 2009) from the manufacturer 

with 4 hours of labor. At $80 per hour, 

the total cost to install a kit would be 

about $410 per airplane. The added 

operation limitation option, as 

described in Comment Issue No. 1, 

would permit compliance with the AD 

with minimal cost. Since we expect 

most operators will comply by simply 

installing the placard, the cost to the 

entire fleet would be greatly reduced. 

We are not changing the final rule AD 

action based on this comment. 

Comment Issue No. 4: Rush to Judgment 

Joseph Morales comments that the 

FAA rushed to judgment taking AD 

action for a condition that could be 

discovered during routine maintenance 

by the operator or mechanic. The 

commenter believes that the amount of 

actual accidents because of this 

condition proves this point. 

We agree that some problems with the 

rudder system can be determined 

visually during routine maintenance. 

However, the issue that needs to be 

corrected is a design issue, not a 

maintenance issue. We disagree that this 

is a rush to judgment. By installing the 

kits, aircraft performing acrobatics/ 

aerobatics will be protected from the 

rudder exceeding its travel limits. 

Operation in this non-certificated 

control position is unacceptable and 

could cause undesirable consequences, 

such as rudder and elevator contact. 

Since the NPRM was published, even 

more thought was given to this AD by 

giving non-acrobatic/aerobatic operators 

the option of installing a placard, 

prohibiting acrobatic/aerobatics instead 

of installing the modification kit. We are 

not changing the final rule AD action 

based on this comment. 

Conclusion 

We have carefully reviewed the 

available data and determined that air 

safety and the public interest require 

adopting the AD as proposed except for 

the changes previously discussed and 

minor editorial corrections. We have 

determined that these minor 

corrections: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 

17,090 airplanes in the U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

insert the operational limitation: 

Labor cost Parts cost Total cost per 

airplane 

Total cost on 

U.S. operators 

1 work-hour × $80 per hour = $80 ..................................................................... Not applicable ......................... $80 $1,367,200 

We estimate the following costs to do 

the modification: 

Labor cost Parts cost Total cost per 

airplane 

Total cost on 

U.S. operators 

4 work-hours × $80 per hour = $320 .......................................................................................... $90 $410 $7,006,900 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106 describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this AD. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 13, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 22431 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a summary of the costs 

to comply with this AD (and other 

information as included in the 

Regulatory Evaluation) and placed it in 

the AD Docket. You may get a copy of 

this summary by sending a request to us 

at the address listed under ADDRESSES. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2007–27747; 

Directorate Identifier 2007–CE–030– 

AD’’ in your request. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. FAA amends § 39.13 by adding a 

new AD to read as follows: 

2009–10–09 Cessna Aircraft Company: 

Amendment 39–15904; Docket No. 

FAA–2007–27747; Directorate Identifier 

2007–CE–030–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective on June 17, 

2009. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to the following 

airplane models and serial numbers that are 

certificated in any category: 

Models Serial Nos. 

(1) 150F ...... 15061533 through 15064532. 

(2) 150G ...... 15064533 through 15064969 

and 15064971 through 

15067198. 

(3) 150H ...... 15067199 through 15069308 

and 649. 

(4) 150J ....... 15069309 through 15071128. 

(5) 150K ...... 15071129 through 15072003. 

(6) 150L ....... 15072004 through 15075781. 

(7) 150M ...... 15075782 through 15079405. 

(8) A150K .... A1500001 through A1500226. 

(9) A150L .... A1500227 through A1500432 

and A1500434 through 

A1500523. 

(10) A150M A1500524 through A1500734 

and 15064970. 

Models Serial Nos. 

(11) F150F .. F150–0001 through F150– 

0067. 

(12) F150G .. F150–0068 through F150– 

0219. 

(13) F150H .. F150–0220 through F150– 

0389. 

(14) F150J ... F150–0390 through F150– 

0529. 

(15) F150K .. F15000530 through 

F15000658. 

(16) F150L .. F15000659 through 

F15001143. 

(17) F150M F15001144 through 

F15001428. 

(18) FA150K FA1500001 through 

FA1500081. 

(19) FA150L FA1500082 through 

FA1500261. 

(20) FA150M FA1500262 through 

FA1500336. 

(21) 152 ....... 15279406 through 15286033. 

(22) A152 .... A1520735 through A1521049, 

A1500433, and 681. 

(23) F152 .... F15201429 through 

F15201980. 

(24) FA152 .. FA1520337 through 

FA1520425. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) Aircraft in full conformity with type 

design can exceed the travel limits set by the 

rudder stops. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent the rudder from traveling past the 

normal travel limit. Operation in this noncertificated control position is unacceptable 

and could cause undesirable consequences, 

such as contact between the rudder and the 

elevator. 

Compliance 

(e) To address this problem, you must do 

either the actions in option 1 or option 2 of 

this AD, unless already done: 

Action Compliance Procedures 

Option 1: For all airplanes that do not have 

modification kits part number (P/N) SK152– 

25A or P/N SK152–24A installed, do the following: 

(i) Insert the following text into the Limitations section of the FAA-approved airplane flight manual (AFM), and pilots 

operating handbook (POH): ‘‘INTENTIONAL SPINS AND OTHER ACROBATIC/AEROBATIC MANEUVERS 

PROHIBITED PER AD 2009–10–09.’’ 

NOTE: THIS AD DOES NOT PROHIBIT 

PERFORMING INTENTIONAL 

STALLS.’’.

Within the next 100 hours time-in-service (TIS) 

after June 17, 2009 (the effective date of 

this AD), or within the next 12 months after 

June 17, 2009 (the effective date of this 

AD), whichever occurs first.

A person authorized to perform maintenance 

as specified in 14 CFR section 43.3 of the 

Federal Aviation Administration Regulations 

(14 CFR 43.3) is required to make the AFM 

and POH changes, fabricate the placard required in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this AD, and 

make an entry into the aircraft logbook 

showing compliance with the portion of the 

AD per compliance with 14 CFR 43.9. 

(ii) Fabricate a placard (using at least 1/8- 

inch letters) with the following words 

and install the placard on the instrument 

panel within the pilot’s clear view: ‘‘INTENTIONAL SPINS AND OTHER ACROBATIC/AEROBATIC MANEUVERS 

PROHIBITED PER AD 2009–10–09.’’ 

(iii) The AFM and POH limitations in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of the AD and the placard 

in paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this AD may be 

removed after either paragraph (e)(2)(i) 

or paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this AD is 

done. 

22432 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 13, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

Action Compliance Procedures 

(2) Option 2: Install a rudder stop modification 

kit: 

(i) For airplanes with a forged bulkhead: 

(A) Replace the rudder stops, rudder 

stop bumpers, and attachment 

hardware with the new rudder stop 

modification kit P/N SK152–25A; 

and 

Within the next 100 hours TIS June 17, 2009 

(the effective date of this AD), or within the 

next 12 months after June 17, 2009 (the effective date of this AD), whichever occurs 

first.

Follow Cessna Aircraft Company Service Bulletin SEB01–1, dated January 22, 2001; 

and, as applicable, either Cessna Aircraft 

Company Service Kit SK152–25A, Revision 

A, dated February 9, 2001, or Cessna Aircraft Company Service Kit SK152–24A, Revision A, dated March 9, 2001. 

(B) Replace safety wire with jamnuts 

(ii) For airplanes with a sheet metal bulkhead: 

(A) Replace the rudder stops, rudder 

stop bumpers, and attachment 

hardware with the new rudder stop 

modification kit P/N SK152–24A; 

and 

(B) Replace safety wire with jamnuts 

(f) Kit P/Ns SK152–24 and SK152–25, 

which are listed in SEB01–1, were 

superseded by kit P/Ns SK152–24A and 

SK152–25A. Cessna has not revised the 

service bulletin to reflect the new P/Ns. The 

kit P/Ns SK 152–24 and SK152–25 would 

automatically be filled with P/Ns SK152–24A 

and SK152–25A, respectively. 

(1) The P/N SK 152–24 kit does not address 

the unsafe condition because the nutplate in 

the kit can not be used due to rivet spacing 

on the aft bulkhead. In addition, a note was 

added to kit P/N SK152–24A stating ‘‘some 

airplanes in this serial range may have a 

forged bulkhead installed after leaving the 

factory. Service Kit SK152–25A or later 

revision must be used to modify these 

airplanes.’’ The kit P/N SK152–25 does not 

address the unsafe condition because there 

was an error in a washer P/N. This error was 

corrected in the kit P/N SK152–25A kit. 

Therefore, kit P/Ns SK152–24 and SK152–25 

are not allowed for installation for this AD. 

(2) If you previously had a kit P/N SK152– 

24 or SK152–25 installed and you choose to 

use the kit installation option, the kit P/N 

SK152–24A or SK152–25A, as applicable, 

must be installed. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g) The Manager, FAA, ATTN: Ann 

Johnson, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Wichita 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport 

Road, Room 100, Wichita, Kansas 67209; 

telephone: (316) 946–4105; fax: (316) 946– 

4107, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any 

approved AMOC on any airplane to which 

the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight 

Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking 

a PI, your local FSDO. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(h) If you choose to comply with this AD 

using paragraph (e)(2) of this AD, you must 

use Cessna Aircraft Company Service 

Bulletin SEB01–1, dated January 22, 2001; 

and, as applicable, either Cessna Aircraft 

Company Service Kit SK152–25A, Revision 

A, dated February 9, 2001; or Cessna Aircraft 

Company Service Kit SK152–24A, Revision 

A, dated March 9, 2001, to do the actions 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Cessna Aircraft Company, 

Product Support, P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, KS 

67277; telephone: (316) 517–5800; fax: (316) 

517–7271; Internet: http://www.cessna.com. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Central Region, Office of the Regional 

Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 

64106; or at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 5, 

2009. 

Kim Smith, 

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–11029 Filed 5–12–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0428; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–053–AD; Amendment 

39–15900; AD 2009–10–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 and 440) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

A number of Flap Actuators with P/N [part 

number] 601R93101–21 and 601R93101–25 

were identified as having pinion gears that 

did not have acceptable certificates of 

conformance from the supplier. This 

condition could result in flap failure. * * * 

Endurance testing conducted at Eaton 

Aerospace with representative 

discrepant gears predicted a 3,000 flight 

cycle life limit for the affected actuators. 

Fleet leaders with suspect installed 

actuators are rapidly approaching this 

threshold. Failure of the flap actuator 

pinion gear set could cause the right or 

left inboard panel to disconnect, which 

could result in flap asymmetry and