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STATE OF MISSOURI, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SD36197 

 ) 

JAMES CHRISTOPHER BALES, ) Filed: January 14, 2020 

 ) 

 Defendant-Respondent. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY 

Honorable John D. Beger 

REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS 

The State (“Prosecutor”) appeals from an order quashing a search warrant and 

suppressing evidence1 in a prosecution for first-degree domestic assault, second-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, and abuse or neglect of a child. See sections 565.072, 

568.050 and 568.060. In two points, Prosecutor claims the search warrant adequately 

described the item to be seized, and, even if it did not, the good-faith exception to exclusion 

should apply. Because the search warrant was valid on its face, we reverse the trial court’s 

order and need not reach Prosecutor’s second point. 

 

1

 Section 547.200.1(3) authorizes the State to appeal an order that suppresses evidence in a criminal case. 

Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to RSMo 2016. 
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Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

We will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress only if it is clearly 

erroneous. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. banc 2012). 

Any ruling “on a motion to suppress must be supported by substantial 

evidence.” State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Mo. banc 2011). This 

Court reviews the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom favorably to the 

circuit court’s ruling and disregards contrary evidence and inferences. Id. at 

631-32. Whether a search is “permissible and whether the exclusionary rule 

applies to the evidence seized” are questions of law reviewed de novo. Id. at 

632. 

State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Mo. banc 2018). 

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures against 

‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ and provides that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” Id. at 189 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. 

IV).2 A search warrant is invalid if it is not supported by probable cause, or “[i]f it does not 

describe the person, place, or thing to be searched or the property, article, material, 

substance, or person to be seized with sufficient certainty.” Id. (quoting section 

542.276.10(5)). “[A] search warrant is required to search the contents of a cell phone unless 

an exception to the warrant requirement exists[.]” State v. Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 605, 610 

(Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (internal citation omitted). 

When analyzing a challenge to a warrant’s description of the property to be 

searched, this court must determine if the property has been described with 

sufficient particularity to allow the officer executing the warrant to locate and 

identify the property with reasonable effort and if a reasonable probability 

exists that another property might mistakenly be searched. State v. 

Cummings, 714 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Mo.App.S.D.1986); see also U.S. v. Kelly,

772 F.3d 1072, 1081 (7th Cir.2014). A search warrant must “[i]dentify the 

place ... which is to be searched, in sufficient detail and particularity that the 

 

2

 “[T]he Missouri Constitution provides coextensive protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 189. 
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officer executing the warrant can readily ascertain ... what he or she is to 

search[.]” Section 542.276.6(5). If the place to be searched is not described 

with sufficient certainty, the resulting warrant will be deemed invalid. 

Section 542.276.10(5). 

State v. Hardy, 497 S.W.3d 836, 838 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016). “We review whether the 

issuing judge’s determination was clearly erroneous by looking at the four corners of the 

search warrant application and supporting affidavits.” State v. Norman, 133 S.W.3d 151, 

159 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004). 

Background 

On April 26, 2019, James Christopher Bales (“Defendant”) was charged with one 

count of first-degree domestic assault, two counts of abuse or neglect of a child, and two 

counts of first-degree endangering the welfare of a child based upon allegations that he 

caused serious physical injuries to a twenty-two-month-old child. Detective Thomas Fenton 

(“Detective Fenton”) interviewed Defendant at his home about those allegations. During the 

interview, Defendant handed Detective Fenton his Samsung cell phone to show the detective 

a video Defendant had taken on the phone of the child sitting on the floor and banging his 

head. 

A couple of days later, Defendant came to the interview room with his attorney to 

speak with Detective Fenton again. Defendant showed Detective Fenton the video of the 

child again on the same phone. After that meeting, Detective Fenton applied for and 

received a search warrant for Defendant’s cell phone (“search warrant 1”). The application 

sought a warrant to search: 

Phone messages, text messages, social media networks, Instagram photos, 

Facebook messages, passwords to the device, global positioning system 

coordinates, emails, phone logs, SIM cards, photo galleries, voicemails, or 

any other evidence pertaining to the crime kept in the following described 

places, in the County aforesaid, to wit: 
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A cell phone located at 13251 Highway O Dixon, in Pulaski County 

Missouri. This cell phone is described as a black in colored [sic] Samsung 

with a black case cell phone number 573-855-6174 belonging to [Defendant]. 

Based upon this application, a judge issued search warrant 1, which authorized law 

enforcement to search “[a] cell phone at, 13251 Highway O Dixon, in Pulaski County 

Missouri. This cell phone is described as Black Samsung with black case.” 

Defendant later came to the interview room for yet a third time. Approximately 15 

minutes into that meeting, Defendant again looked for the video of the child on his cell 

phone. At that point, Detective Fenton served search warrant 1 on Defendant’s attorney and 

seized that black, Samsung cell phone from Defendant. 

During their subsequent search of the cell phone, officers discovered what they 

believed to be evidence of additional criminal activity. Based upon that discovery, they 

applied for -- and received -- a second search warrant (“search warrant 2”) that authorized an 

additional search of Defendant’s cell phone. 

Defendant filed a MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT, ORDER RETURN OF CELL 

PHONE AND ALL ITEMS OBTAINED/RECEIVED/COPIED FROM CELL PHONE (the 

“Motion to Quash”).3 The Motion to Quash argued that the phrase “Black Samsung with 

black case” did not adequately describe the thing to be seized. The request for relief was 

that the trial court quash search warrant 1 and order the return of the cell phone and all data 

obtained from it to Defendant. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash and ordered that 

all evidence seized pursuant to search warrants 1 and 2 be suppressed. 

 

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 The trial court treated the Motion to Quash as a motion to suppress. For simplicity, we will refer to the 

motion as a Motion to Quash. 
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Analysis 

Point 1 ‒ Inadequate Description 

Point 1 claims the trial court erred in quashing search warrant 1 and suppressing the 

evidence obtained from the cell phone because search warrant 1 was facially valid in that it 

was issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause and adequately described the item to 

be seized with sufficient particularity. We agree. 

The trial court stated its rationale for quashing the search in its Memorandum 

granting the Motion to Quash. 

Defendant relies on Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (S.Ct 2004) for the 

proposition the warrant of April 4, 2019 does not “particularly describe the 

things to be seized.” The Court notes Black Samsung Cell phones in Black 

Cases are Numerous if not ubiquitous. (The undersigned has one.) The 

Court does find [search warrant 1] of April 4, 2019 fails to adequately 

describe the thing to be seized and “was so facially deficient the executing 

officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid.” United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897 at 923 (S.Ct. 1984). [Search warrant 1] of April 4, 2019 is 

quashed. To the extent [search warrant 2] issued May 28, 2019 was 

dependent on the quashed warrant, it is the “fruit of the poisonous tree[”] and 

must be quashed as well. 

Prosecutor argues that the scope of search warrant 1 was only one item: a black 

Samsung cell phone, and “[i]t is difficult to imagine how [Detective Fenton] could have 

been more descriptive without first seizing the phone from [Defendant] to check for serial 

numbers or a specific model number.” Defendant argues that the language “Black Samsung 

with black case” does not “particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or 

things to be seized[,]” in that the warrant failed to include the phone number of the cell 

phone that law enforcement sought to search. 

The description in search warrant 1 provided sufficient detail to allow officers to 

locate and identify the item of property to be searched – here, a black cell phone located in a 
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particular residence – with reasonable effort and without a reasonable probability that other 

items of property would be mistakenly searched. See Hardy, 497 S.W.3d at 840. 

Although the primary issue in State v. Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205 (Mo. App. W.D. 

2019), was the permissible breadth of a cell phone search conducted by law enforcement, 

the search warrant at issue provided for the seizure of “[a]ll cell phones” located in the 

defendant’s apartment. Id. at 216. The description of the item to be seized here was more 

specific than the one approved in Johnson over claims that the warrant was “not supported 

by probable cause, was not sufficiently particular, was overbroad, and was stale when the 

search of the phone was executed.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Search warrant 1 adequately described the cell phone to be seized. Point 1 is 

granted, and the trial court’s order quashing search warrant 1 and suppressing the evidence 

from search warrants 1 and 2 is reversed.4

 The trial court is directed to vacate its July 1, 

2019 memorandum and order granting the Motion to Quash and enter instead an order 

denying that motion. 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

DANIEL E. SCOTT, P.J. – CONCURS 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCURS 

 

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 The trial court excluded the evidence from search warrant 2 as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Because no 

violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred, that doctrine is inapplicable to this case. State v. Esmerovic, 544 

S.W.3d 695, 697-98 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). Having found the warrant valid on its face, we do not reach 

Prosecutor’s alternative request for relief. See State v. Pattie, 42 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001).