2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
12-23-2004 

# S oppick v . W C onshoho ck

e n P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 04-1972

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
" S opp ick v . W C on sho hocke n " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 35. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/35NOT PRE CEDENT IAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________ No. 04-1972

____________ JOS EPH G. SOPP ICK ; J ANET S OPPI CK; JEA NETTE MCCULLOUGH; ASHL EY M CCU LLOU GH, Both by an through their parents and na tu ra l g ua rd ia ns , J os ep h G. an d J an et Sop pi ck ; J OANNA H. SOPP ICK , Ap pellan ts v. BORO UGH O F WEST CO NSHOH OCKEN ; BOROUG H COU NCIL OF WE ST CONSHOHOC KEN; ZONI NG HEARI NG BOARD OF WEST CON SHOHOCKE N; WILLIAM K EIL; ROBERT LIVINGSTON ; GEORGE CA RPENTER; JOSEPH PIGNOLI, Mayo r of West Conshohoc ken; BORO UGH O F WEST CON SHOH OCK EN PO LICE DE PART MEN T; JOSEPH G . CLAYB ORN E, Chief of P ol ic e; STEPHEN WALKER, Pol ic e Off ic er ; P ATRICI A B. BARR, Bor oug h Cou nci l P re si den t; JOSEP HINE S. SCHARFF; JOHN COOPER; MICHA EL PEZZAN O; PETER W. VIVIAN; JOSEPH L. COSTELLO; JOSEPH P. PI GNOLI , J R. ; P IE RO A. SASS U; J EFF REY WEI LER; Z. RAYMOND SOKOLOWSK I; ROBERT JOHNSTON, P.E. ; J AMES CARPENTER; CHARLES M CH UG H; G EO RG E D OU GH ER TY ; ER IC S M ITH ; RO N P IGN OL I; CHARLES MAY; MI CHAEL DE LUCCA; CARMELLA D ELUCCA; IRE NE

PULTORAK; IRENE YAKONI CK

____________ App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt For th e Ea stern D istrict of P enns ylvania D.C. No.: 03- cv-00890 Distric t Judg e: Ho nora ble E dm und V. L udw ig

____________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a) December 13, 2004 Be for e: N YG AA RD , RO SE NN , and BE CK ER , Circuit Judges1 Because thi s appeal s eeks onlyto res urrect § 1983 clai ms against

the Borough and gov ernm ent ap pellee s, we do n ot eva luate a ny claim s aga inst co- appe llees w ho ar e priva te citi zens – viz. Eileen Yakonic k, Michael DeLucca, or Carmell a DeLucca. 2 (Fil ed: December 23, 2004)

____________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

____________ ROSENN , Circ uit J udge. Josep h and Jane t Sop pick a nd th eir dau ghters Joan na S opp ick, Jea nette McCollough, and AshleyMcCollough (“the Soppi cks”) br ought sui t agai nst the Borough of West Conshohocken et al. (“the Bo rough” ), 1 assert ing viol ations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) and relat ed state law clai ms arisi ng from a “stop work” order the Borough issued to halt renovati ons on the Soppi cks’ home. The Dis tri ct Court di smissed t he Soppicks’ c omplaint

for being t

ime-barred and for fai lure to state a clai m. The Soppicks moved for, but

were denied, reconsi derati on of the di smissal . The Soppicks appeal the Dis trict C our t’s di sm issal of th eir co mp laint
. The Distric t Cou rt had ju risdiction over the S opp icks’ § 198 3 claim s purs uant to 28 U .S.C . §§ 1 331 and 134 3. See Garvin v. Ci ty of Phila. , 354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). I n additi on, the Distri ct Court ha d supplementa l jurisdi ction ove r thei r state la w claim s un der 28 U .S.C . § 13 67. Id. We have juris dicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I. In 19 96, the Sop picks obtain ed a b uilding perm it from the B orou gh to reno vate their home. Construc tion began in 1998 and continued into 1999. On April, 23, 1999,3

the B oro ugh , citin g its b uild ing cod e, issu ed a “sto p w ork ” or der halti ng t he r eno vatio ns. The Soppicks cont end that the order

was issued i n retal iati on for their publi c accusations of misconduct

by the Mayor. To pr ove the i lli cit nature of t he “stop work” or der, t

he Soppicks re quested to view thei r permit file but their reques ts were deni ed. On June 8, 199 9, th e B oro ugh Co unc il con duc ted a hea ring and uph eld th e “s top wo rk” ord er. Since that ti me, the Soppi cks have been unabl e to complete renovations and alle gedlyhave been subj ect t o additi onal Borough ret aliation. In particular, t he Soppicks conte nd th at the B orou gh f ailed to prop erly investig ate a se ries of claim s wh ere the fam ily fell v ictim , inclu din g, inter alia , a cla im th at the So ppi cks ’ da ugh ter w as ra ped
. II. On F ebruary 13, 200 3, the Sop picks filed suit in the U nited States D istrict Court for the Eas tern Dis tri ct of Pennsy lvania assert ing § 1983 claims for vi olati ons of the Sop picks ’ right to e qual p rotectio n and due p roces s. The com plaint a lso asse rted state law clai ms for: i mpairment of cont ractua l obli gations , breac h of impli ed contra ct, breach of quasi-contract, torti ous interference with existi ng and prospective contractual rel ations, fraud ulent a nd n eglige nt mis repres entatio n, estop pel, civil c onsp iracy, and pend ant state clai ms (defined a s fail ure to pr operlyinvestigate a seri es of inci dents i nvolving t he So ppi cks as v ictim s). After appel lees moved t o dismis s the complaint for fail ure to s tate a clai m, the2 Counts I through V did not i nclude anyclai ms, but mere ly set forth the

fac tual b ack gro und of th e ca se. T her efo re, th e fir st cla im is num ber ed “ Co unt VI .”

3 Count VIII ass erted § 1983 vi olati ons of the right to be free fr om state l aws impairi ng contrac tual relations. However, we do not address Count VIII becaus e it was not rais ed on ap peal. 4 Sop pi ck s f

il ed an ame nde d c omp la in t a ss erti ng l ar ge ly th e s ame cl ai ms. Cou ntVI 2 asserted § 1983 equal pr otection viol ations based on: t he April 23, 1999, “st op work” order, appell ees’ fai lure to properl y i nvesti gate co- plaint iff JoAnna Soppick’ s complaint of being raped on August 6, 2000, and the fi ling of c harges agai nst Mr. Soppi ck in 1999 for “fa lsific ation of d ocu me nts.” Count VII asser

ted § 1983 due proc ess viol ations based on: t he Borough’s May 23, 1999, f

ailure to produce documents regarding t he Soppicks’ permit, the Borough Council’s June 8, 1999, affirmance of the “stop work” order, and the Borough’s alle ged interference w ith the issuing of p ermits. The rem aining cou nts, except C ount V III, 3 were state law claim s. On M arch 9, 2004, the Dist rict Court dis missed the Soppicks’ § 1983 clai ms for being ti me-barred and for failure to s tate a clai m. In addi tion, the Court reject ed sup plem enta l juris dicti on o ver the s tate la w c laim s pu rsua nt to 28 U .S.C . § 13 67( c)(3 ). The Soppicks moved for r econsider ation of the Dist rict Court’s order to di smiss on t he ground that

the Court i ncorrectly determi ned the accr ual dat e for each of t

heir § 1983 clai ms. The District Court denied the Soppicks’ motion t o reconsi der. Whil e the moti on5

for recon sideration w as pend ing, the Sop picks timely appealed the District Cou rt’s dism issal of their co mp laint. W e exe rcise p lenary rev iew o f a dism issal ord er pu rsuan t to Fed eral R ule o f C ivil P roc edu re 1 2(b )(6). An gstad t v. M idd-W est Sc h. D ist. , 377 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 200 4). III. The parties agree that a two-year limit ations period applies to the Soppicks’ § 1983 clai ms. The parties di sagree, however, as to when the two-y ear li mitations period bega n to ru n on each claim . The Sop picks aver th at the sta tute of limitation s perio d did not begin to run on thes e clai ms untilJune 9, 2004, when the Zoning Hearing Boar d of Wes t C ons hoh oc ke n s us ta in ed th e “ st op w ork” or de r. We di sa gr ee . U nde r f ed er al la w, which governs the accrualof § 1983 clai ms, a § 1983 cause of acti on begins t o accrue wh en the plaintiff kno ws, o r has re ason to kn ow , of the injury on w hich th e actio n is bas ed. Montgomery v. DeSimone , 159 F.3 d 12 0, 12 6 (3 d C ir. 19 98)
. The Soppicks knew, or ha d reason t o know, that the inj ury stemming from the “sto p w ork ” or der occ urre d on the d ate it w as re ceiv ed – Ap ril 23 , 199 9. See Sam eric Corp. of Del. , Inc. v. City of Phi la. , 142 F.3d 582, 559-600 (3d Cir . 1998) ( cause of action based upon improper

denial of a demolition permit accrued when the per

mit appl ication was denied, de spit e the pendency of state court proceedings c halle nging the de signation upon which the deni al was premis ed). Ther efore, the st atute of limi tati ons for the “stop work” clai m expired two years late r on April 23, 2001, wel l before the Soppicks ’ fil ed6

their com plain t on Feb rua ry 13, 2 003
. The Soppicks knew, or ha d reason t o know, that the inj ury stemming from the Borough’s fai lure to investigate occurred on or around August 6, 2000, when the Borough’s fai lure to investigate became apparent . Therefore, the stat ute of l imit ations for the fa ilure-to-in vestiga te claim expire d, at the la test, by the en d of 200 2. Th is wa s we ll bef ore the S opp icks filed their com plain t on Feb rua ry 13, 2 003
. Lastly , the Soppicks knew, or had reason t o know, that the inj ury stemming from the fi ling of unl awful charges a gainst Mr. Soppick occurred when the charges were fil ed in 1999. Ther efore, the st atute of limi tati ons expir ed on thei r clai m after 2001. Again, this w as w ell be for e the So ppi cks filed their com plain t on Feb rua ry 13, 2 003
. In addition to t

he equal pr otection viol ations , the Soppicks al lege three dif ferent due p roces s violatio ns: the B orou gh’s M ay 23, 19 99, fa ilure to p rodu ce do cum ents regardi ng the Soppicks ’ permit , the Borough Council’s June 8, 1999, affirmance of the “stop work” order, and the Borough’s interference with the issuing of building permits
. Applyi ng the accrual st andard art iculated in DeSimone , 159 F.3d at 126, the Soppicks knew, or

had reason t o know, of the basi s for their fa ilure-to- produce cl aim on May 23, 1999, the dat e thei r document re quest was deni ed. Thus, the st atute of limitation s exp ired tw o years late r on M ay 23, 20 01, w ell bef ore the Sop picks filed th eir complaint

on February13, 2003. The Soppicks knew, or ha d reason t o know, of thei r inj ury from the affi rmance of7

the “stop work” order on June 8, 1999, t he date the Borough upheld the “stop work” ord er. See Sam eric C orp o f D el. , 142 F.3d at 559-600. There fore, t

he stat ute of limitation s exp ired tw o years late r on Ju ne 8, 2 001 , well b efore the S opp icks file d their complaint

on February13, 2003. Finall y, the Soppicks knew, or had rea son to know, of t heir i njurystemming from the Borough’s interference wit h permits on June 8, 1999, the dat e the “stop work” order
was u pheld by the B orough Cou ncil. The statute of lim itations thus expired tw o years later on June 8, 200 1, aga in, we ll befo re the S opp icks file d their c om plaint. Bec ause the S opp icks’ c om plaint w as filed on F ebru ary 13, 20 03, co nside rably beyond t he two-y ear st atute of limi tati ons for each § 1983 cl aim, the complaint is timebarred unl ess the limi tati ons peri od is t olled by eithe r the “c ontinui ng violat ion” doctrine or by the pendencyof related st ate court li tigat ion. However, neithe r is a vailable. “The continui ng violat

ions doct rine i s an ‘equi table excepti on to the t imelyfili ng requirement.’ ” Co we ll v. Palm er To wn ship , 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting West v. Phil a. Elec. Co. , 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995)). Where a defendant’ s conduct is part of a continuing pr acti ce, an act ion is deemed timel y pr ovided the last act evid enc ing the c ont inu ing pra ctice falls wit hin the li mita tion s pe riod
. Id. To establ ish a “conti nuing viol ation, ” the pl ainti ff must demonstr ate that: ( 1) there was at le ast one violat ion duri ng the st atutor

y period; and ( 2) that

the defendant ’s actions were “more t han the occurrence of i solated or spora dic act s of int entiona l dis crimination. ” West , 45 F.3d4 Given the Soppic ks’ inabili ty to est ablis h any cons tit utionalviolat

ion duri ng the stat utoryperiod, we need not reach t he second requirement of the “conti nuing viol ation” doctrin e – tha t appe llees’ co ndu ct is “m ore tha n the o ccurre nce o f isolate d or sp orad ic acts. ” West , 45 F .3d at 7 55; see Do Littl e Corp. v. Brist ol , No
. Ci v. A. 01

- 23 44 , 20 02 WL 323 459 47, * 6 (E .D. P a. Ju ne 1 9, 20 02)
. 8 at 75 4-5 5. The Soppicks attempt t o revive t heir time-barred clai ms by ar guing that the Borough’s conduct , inc luding t he “stop work” or der, failure-to- investigate , fil ing of charges aga inst

Mr. Soppick for “f

alsi fication of documents ,” fai lure- to-pr oduce, improper af

firmance of t

he “stop work” or der, and i nterfe rence with permits , was an “ongoing pattern of mi sconduct” t hat compri sed a “continuing vi olati on.” However, the Soppicks ar e unable t o establ ish the firs t requi rement of a “c ontinui ng violat ion” – that any of t he all eged viol ations occurred wit hin the two-year

limi tati ons peri od. The complaint

in thi s acti on was filed on Febr uary 13, 2003. Thus, any vi olati on of § 1983
oc cu rrin g be fo re Feb ru ary 13, 200 1, is out si de th e l im it atio ns pe ri od and t im e- ba rr ed . A s noted, each act oc curred before February13, 2001. Therefore, each clai m is ti me-barred. 4
Having determined that the Borough’s acts fa il to comprise a “ continui ng violatio n,” the final in quiry is w hethe r the S opp icks’ p endin g state c ourt litiga tion tolls the statu te of lim itations. It d oes n ot. Under Pennsyl vania concept s of tol ling, which gov ern her e, see Vernau v. Vic' s Market, I nc. , 896 F .2d 43 , 45 (3 d C ir.1990 ) (“state tolling p rinciple s are g enera lly to be use d by a fe deral c ourt w hen it is a pplying a state9

limi tati ons peri od”), t

he commencement of a rel ated sui t in s tate court does not tol l the
run nin g of a Pe nns ylvan ia sta tute o f lim itatio ns a gain st a f ede ral ca use of a ction
. Amm lung v. Ci ty of Chester , 494 F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1974) (ci ting Falsetti v. Local Uni on No . 2 026 , Un ited Mi ne Wor ker s of Am. , 355 F.2d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1966) (the running of a s tate stat

ute of l imit ations against an acti on in feder al court is not toll ed by commencement of unsuccess ful sui t in s tate court) ). There fore, a lthough t he Soppicks dili gently

object ed to the “stop work” or der thr ough the Borough Council , the pendency of a ny rela ted s tate c our t litiga tion doe s no t toll th e sta tute o f lim itatio ns. Cf. Elli s v. Dyson , 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) ( it i s not neces saryto exhaust state law judi cial remedies be fore bri nging an action under § 1983)
. Moreov er, the i ssuance of the “stop work” order gave rise to an independent cause of a ction that s hou ld h ave bee n pu rsue d as suc h. See Sam eric C orp. o f D el. , 142 F.3d at 599-600 (hol ding that

the “continuing vi olati ons” doctrine coul d not be appl ied to revive a time -barre d claim invo lving a perm it denia l beca use th e den ial of th e perm it gave rise to an independent

cause of action and shoul d have been pursue d accordi ngly ). Becausethe “stop wo rk” cla im w as no t indep ende ntly pursu ed be fore A pril 23, 2 001 , it expired with the r unn ing of th e tw o-yea r statu te of limita tion s. Having establ ished t

hat nei ther t

he “conti nuing viol ation” doctri ne nor pending state court l iti gation tolls the st atute of limi tati ons, there is nothing to reli eve the Soppi cks of the bar

generat ed by t

he stat ute of l imit ations . As such, their complaint

is time-barred.10 IV. For the fo rego ing rea sons , the jud gm ent of the D istrict C ourt w ill be affirmed. Co sts ta xed aga inst th e ap pella nts.