1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

State of New Jersey v. Reinaldo Fuentes (A-18-12) (070729)

Argued September 9, 2013 -- Decided January 7, 2014

PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court reviews a sentencing court’s application of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b).

On July 1, 2009, police were summoned to a New Brunswick apartment which defendant Reinaldo Fuentes 

shared with Adrian Bentazos. Officers found Bentazos lying on a bed in a rear bedroom, with his pants open and his 

genitals exposed. Bentazos had suffered two stab wounds in his abdomen and multiple head contusions. In the 

apartment, officers found a bloodstained knife, a damaged and bloodstained car stereo amplifier, and a small amount 

of cocaine. Police traced Bentazos’s cellphone to Fuentes, who subsequently confessed to killing Bentazos.

Fuentes was indicted for first-degree murder, third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, 

fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance. 

He pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter. During his plea hearing, Fuentes explained that he was

awakened by Bentazos, who grabbed his neck and threatened to rape him. When Fuentes stood to defend himself, 

Bentazos grabbed a knife. Fuentes repeatedly struck Bentazos with the amplifier, wrested the knife away from him, 

and stabbed him twice. Fuentes knew Bentazos needed medical attention, but did not seek assistance. He agreed 

that he acted recklessly and with extreme indifference to human life, admitted that he had acted out of “extreme 

annoyance,” and acknowledged that his actions threatened and caused Bentazos’s death.

The trial court sentenced Fuentes to a twenty-year prison term subject to an eighty-five percent parole 

ineligibility period and a five-year period of parole supervision. Applying the aggravating factors found in N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a) and mitigating factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b), the court found aggravating factor nine, “[t]he need for 

deterring the defendant and others from violating the law,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and assigned it “substantial 

weight.” It found three mitigating factors, including factor eight, “[t]he defendant's conduct was the result of 

circumstances unlikely to recur,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), to which it assigned “moderate weight.” The court 

concluded that, although Fuentes’s imprisonment would impose a hardship on his family, the multiple mitigating 

factors were substantially outweighed by the strength of the sole aggravating factor. Nine days later, the court held a 

second sentencing hearing in order to state its finding with respect to an additional factor, aggravating factor one, 

“[t]he nature and circumstance of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including whether or not it was 

committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), which it had inadvertently 

omitted from the first hearing. The court accorded moderate to significant weight to the factor, finding that Fuentes 

used excessive force by stabbing and beating Bentazos beyond the level necessary for self-defense. The court 

reiterated its earlier findings and did not amend the sentence. 

Fuentes appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial court impermissibly double-counted an 

element of the offense of aggravated manslaughter in finding aggravating factor one, relied on facts inconsistent 

with the basis of Fuentes’s guilty plea, gave improper weight to aggravating factor nine, and improperly balanced 

the aggravating and mitigating factors. The Appellate Division rejected Fuentes’s arguments and affirmed his 

sentence. The Court granted Fuentes’s petition for certification. 212 N.J. 431 (2012).

HELD: Because the trial court did not adequately explain its findings with respect to the aggravating factors, or its 

balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), the matter is remanded 

for resentencing. 
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1. Sentencing determinations are accorded deference, and a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that 

of the trial court. When determining the appropriate sentence within the applicable statutory range, the trial court 

must identify whether any of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)’s aggravating factors or N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)’s mitigating factors 

apply. Each factor found by the court must be supported by competent, reasonably credible evidence, and the court 

must balance the aggravating and mitigating factors. The balancing process is case-specific, requiring the court to 

qualitatively assess and assign the appropriate weight to each factor. The court must provide a clear and detailed 

statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence, including the factual basis supporting its findings with 

respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors. This is necessary for effective appellate review. (pp. 13-18)

2. Aggravating factor one requires that the court consider “[t]he nature and circumstance of the offense, and the role 

of the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.” 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). The trial court must review the severity of the crime and assess the degree to which the 

safety of others was threatened. In doing so, the court must take care to avoid double-counting facts that establish 

elements of the relevant offense. In order to convict a defendant of aggravated manslaughter, the State must prove 

that the victim died due to the defendant’s reckless conduct under circumstances manifesting an extreme 

indifference to human life. Thus, a trial court applying aggravating factor one must provide an analysis sufficient to 

ensure reviewing courts that its application of the factor was not based on evidence necessary to prove the elements 

of aggravated manslaughter, such as the victim’s death. Additionally, the court’s assessment of the nature and 

circumstances of the offense must fairly reflect the record before it. (pp. 19-23) 

3. Here, the trial court did not provide an adequate explanation of its reasons for applying aggravating factor one. It 

failed to discuss the circumstances of the offense or to identify the supporting facts in the record distinct from those 

necessary to prove elements of the offense. Since application of the factor was not supported by competent and 

credible evidence, Fuentes must be resentenced. On remand, the court may apply aggravating factor one only if it is 

supported by credible evidence. The court must provide a detailed explanation of its findings with respect to this 

and any other factor applied. (p. 24)

4. Aggravating factor nine invokes “[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law.” 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). This requires the trial court to assess the risk of recidivism, as well as evaluate the 

defendant in light of his or her criminal history. The factor’s deterrence component incorporates two related but 

distinct concepts: the sentence’s general deterrent effect on the public and its specific deterrent effect on the 

defendant. The latter is the primary focus of aggravating factor nine. (pp. 25-26)

5. Here, the question of specific deterrence is complicated by the trial court’s finding of mitigating factor eight, 

which requires the court to conclude that the offense at issue was “the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.” 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Although case law reveals that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight rarely 

apply in the same sentencing, they are not inherently incompatible. In exceptional cases, even where the record 

shows that the offense arose under circumstances unlikely to recur, a defendant could nonetheless pose of a risk of 

recidivism warranting specific deterrence. Similarly, a finding of mitigating factor seven, lack of a criminal record, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), also does not negate a finding of aggravating factor nine. Here, as with aggravating factor 

one, the trial court’s reasons for applying aggravating factor nine are insufficiently explained. If, on resentencing, 

the court determines that this factor applies, it must address both general and specific deterrence. If it also finds 

mitigating factor eight, it must explain how it reconciles those two findings. Finally, the court should explain in 

greater detail its assessment of the weight assigned to each aggravating and mitigating factor, and its balancing of 

those factors as they apply to Fuentes. (pp. 26-29)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, defendant’s sentence is VACATED, and the 

matter is REMANDED to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the Court’s opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and ALBIN, and JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ

(temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) did 

not participate.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-18 September Term 2012

070729

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

REINALDO FUENTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued September 9, 2013 – Decided January 7, 2014

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Rochelle M.A. Watson, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, argued the cause for 

appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney).

Joie D. Piderit, Acting Assistant Prosecutor 

Special Deputy Attorney General argued the 

cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, 

Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, 

attorney; Ms. Piderit and Brian D. Gillet, 

Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, the Court reviews a sentencing judge’s 

application of the aggravating and mitigating factors prescribed 

in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). Defendant Reinaldo Fuentes

admitted to killing his roommate, Adrian Bentazos, in an 

altercation that he claimed was precipitated by Bentazos’

attempt to sexually assault him while defendant was sleeping. 
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In accordance with his plea agreement with the State, defendant 

pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(c), and 

the other charges pending against him were dismissed. 

Consistent with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced 

to a twenty-year term of incarceration. The sentencing court 

initially found only one statutory aggravating factor, the need 

to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)

(aggravating factor nine). It applied three mitigating factors:

the absence of a prior record of delinquency or criminal 

activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) (mitigating factor seven); that 

defendant’s conduct was a result of circumstances unlikely to 

recur, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) (mitigating factor eight); and 

that the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive 

hardship to himself or his dependents, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11)

(mitigating factor eleven). The court found that the single 

aggravating factor substantially outweighed the mitigating 

factors. In a supplemental sentencing hearing, the court 

amended its findings to add a second aggravating factor, the

nature and circumstances of the offense and the role of the 

actor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) (aggravating factor one), but did 

not alter defendant’s sentence. The Appellate Division 

affirmed.

We reverse, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand this 

matter for resentencing. We hold that the sentencing court did 
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not adequately explain its findings with respect to aggravating 

factors one and nine, or its balancing of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). We 

do not constrain the sentencing court from finding any statutory 

aggravating or mitigating factor on resentencing. We caution, 

however, that an application of aggravating factor one must be 

premised upon factors independent of the elements of the crime

and firmly grounded in the record. Further, any determination 

that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight are 

applicable to the same case should be specifically explained in 

the court’s statement of reasons. To achieve the Legislature’s 

goal of avoiding sentencing disparity, and to ensure fair and 

effective appellate review, sentences imposed pursuant to plea 

agreements must be thoroughly explained on the record at the 

sentencing hearing.

I.

At approximately 10:30 a.m. on July 1, 2009, New Brunswick 

police were dispatched to an apartment that had been shared by 

defendant, then twenty years old, and Bentazos. They were 

summoned by Bentazos’ friend, who stated that when he arrived at 

the apartment to help Bentazos move his belongings out of the 

residence, he found Bentazos in a bedroom, unresponsive. The 

responding officers found the body of a man later identified as 

Bentazos lying face up on a bed in a rear bedroom. Although he 
4

was fully clothed, his pants were unbuttoned and his zipper was 

pulled down, exposing his genitals. The officers noted that 

Bentazos had two stab wounds to his abdomen and multiple head 

contusions. A search of the apartment revealed a broken and 

bloodstained knife, a damaged and bloodstained car stereo 

amplifier and a broken mirror, as well as a small amount of 

packaged cocaine. 

After investigating the scene, the New Brunswick police 

traced the victim’s cellphone, which was not found at the crime 

scene, to an address later identified as the home of defendant’s 

girlfriend. There, Bentazos’ friend spotted defendant and 

identified him to the officers as the victim’s roommate. Police 

called the victim’s cellphone, which rang in defendant’s shirt 

pocket. The officers approached defendant and told him that 

they needed to speak with him about a homicide investigation. 

Defendant agreed to speak with the police, was transported to 

police headquarters and was advised of his rights pursuant to 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

694 (1966). He subsequently confessed to police that he had 

killed Bentazos. 

The medical examiner’s autopsy of Bentazos revealed 

evidence of blunt and sharp force traumatic injuries to the 

victim’s head, and stab wounds to his neck, back and abdomen. 

The autopsy determined the cause of death to be homicide.
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II.

Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), third-degree possession of a weapon for 

an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), fourth-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), and third-degree 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

10(a)(1). The grand jury found as an aggravating factor that 

defendant committed the offense “in an outrageously or wantonly 

vile, horrible, or inhuman manner in that it involved torture, 

depravity of the mind, or an aggravated assault on the victim,” 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) (incorrectly cited in the indictment 

as N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(4)(c)). 

On July 2, 2010, defendant agreed to plead guilty to firstdegree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), pursuant to 

a plea agreement negotiated by his counsel and the State. In 

accordance with the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss 

all other charges and to recommend a twenty-three year sentence. 

Despite his stated intention to plead guilty, defendant did not 

provide an adequate factual basis for his plea at his initial 

plea hearing on July 2, 2010. There, defendant admitted to 

inflicting the injuries that caused Bentazos’ death in a fight 

on July 1, 2009, and to striking Bentazos with an amplifier 

after Bentazos threatened to kill him with a knife, but did not 

expressly acknowledge stabbing the victim. Defendant agreed 
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that his conduct was reckless and that it demonstrated an 

extreme indifference to the value of human life, but he 

suggested that he had not exceeded the reasonable bounds of 

self-defense and did not consider himself guilty. Defense 

counsel acknowledged that defendant failed to provide an 

adequate factual basis for his guilty plea, and the court did 

not accept the plea during the first plea hearing.

On July 27, 2010, the trial court held a second plea 

hearing. This time, defendant provided a factual basis for his 

guilty plea that satisfied the court. He stated that in the 

early morning of July 1, 2009, he was awakened by Bentazos, 

whose pants were pulled down. According to defendant, Bentazos

grabbed defendant’s neck and threatened to rape him. Defendant 

told the court that when he stood up to defend himself, Bentazos

grabbed a knife, so defendant struck Bentazos repeatedly and 

excessively with an amplifier, wrested the knife away from 

Bentazos and used it to stab him twice. Defendant admitted that 

he was aware that Bentazos was clearly in need of medical 

attention, but that he did not call police or an ambulance. 

Responding to his counsel’s questions, defendant agreed that he 

had acted recklessly and with extreme indifference to human 

life, that he had not acted in self-defense but “out of extreme 

annoyance,” and that his actions both threatened and caused the 

victim’s death. After acknowledging his understanding of the 
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plea form, his sentencing exposure and the immigration 

consequences of his plea, defendant pled guilty to aggravated 

manslaughter.

Following his plea, defendant gave a presentence interview 

in the presence of his counsel. During the interview, which was 

summarized in the presentence report that was part of the 

sentencing record, defendant substantially repeated the account 

of his offense that he had provided to the court at his second 

plea hearing. He placed greater emphasis, however, on the 

conduct by the victim that, by defendant’s account, prompted the 

attack. Defendant stated that he was sleeping when Bentazos, 

whom he had considered to be “like a brother,” woke him up and 

grabbed him by the throat. He said that Bentazos’ pants were 

unzipped and lowered to the knees, and that Bentazos attempted 

to sexually assault him. According to defendant, he resisted 

Bentazos’ advances, and then Bentazos grabbed a knife and 

threatened to kill him. Defendant said that he took the car 

stereo amplifier and hit Bentazos several times with it. He 

said that he then took the knife from Bentazos, who was dazed 

and bloody, and stabbed him twice in the abdomen, at which point 

Bentazos fell onto the bed. 

On October 12, 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to 

twenty years’ imprisonment subject to the eighty-five percent 

parole ineligibility period prescribed by the No Early Release 
8

Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, with a five-year period of 

parole supervision as well as statutory fines and penalties. 

The court noted the statutory sentencing range of ten to thirty 

years for the first-degree offense of aggravated manslaughter. 

It acknowledged that defendant had no juvenile adjudications, 

prior arrests or adult criminal history, and that he had a oneyear-old daughter. The sentencing court commented, however, on 

the defendant’s admission that he had both struck the victim 

with an amplifier and stabbed him several times.

Applying the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a) and (b), the trial court found a single aggravating factor, 

aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and assigned it 

“substantial weight.” The court identified three mitigating 

factors. It accorded “substantial weight” to mitigating factor 

seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), and “moderate weight” to 

mitigating factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Finally, the 

trial court found mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(11), but did not identify the weight given to that factor. 

It did, however, acknowledge defendant’s status as the father of 

a young child, and the consequent hardship to defendant’s 

family. The trial court determined that although the mitigating 

factors outnumbered the single aggravating factor, they were

substantially outweighed by the strength of the aggravating 

factor. Noting the presumption of reasonableness afforded to a 
9

negotiated plea, the trial court found the sentence to be within 

the statutory range and consistent with the law and the 

interests of justice.

Nine days later, the trial court held a second sentencing 

hearing to state its finding with respect to an additional 

factor, aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), which it 

had intended to address in the first hearing, but had 

inadvertently omitted. The court noted that the nature of the 

offense should not be used to support an application of 

aggravating factor one, but that defendant’s role and the nature 

of his attack could be considered in the sentencing. The court 

accorded moderate to significant weight to aggravating factor 

one. It found that defendant had repeatedly stabbed the victim 

and had continued to beat the victim “well beyond any selfdefense suggested.” The court characterized the defendant as 

using excessive force. It then reiterated its findings as to 

aggravating factor nine and mitigating factors seven, eight and 

eleven, and did not amend defendant’s twenty-year sentence.

Defendant appealed his sentence. He argued that the trial 

court’s finding as to aggravating factor one entailed 

impermissible “double-counting” of an element of the offense of 

aggravated manslaughter, that the court’s recitation of the 

details of the attack was inconsistent with the factual basis of 

defendant’s guilty plea, that the trial court gave improper 
10

weight to aggravating factor nine, and that the court had 

improperly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). The State countered that the 

court’s findings with respect to aggravating factors one and 

nine were fully supported by the record, and that the finding as 

to aggravating factor one did not involve impermissible doublecounting of the elements of aggravated manslaughter. The 

Appellate Division rejected defendant’s arguments, and affirmed 

his sentence by an order dated April 17, 2012.

We granted defendant’s petition for certification. State 

v. Fuentes, 212 N.J. 431 (2012).

III.

Defendant argues that the trial court should not have 

applied aggravating factor one, that it improperly weighed

aggravating factor nine and that it improperly balanced the 

aggravating and mitigating factors. He contends that 

aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), should not apply

to his case because his offense, prompted by an attempted sexual 

assault, was not among the most serious offenses in its class. 

He also claims that aggravating factor one could not apply

because a jury could have convicted him of passion provocation 

manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2), had the case been tried. 

Defendant disputes the trial court’s conclusion that, because he

repeatedly struck and stabbed the victim instead of using only 
11

the measure of force necessary to defend himself, aggravating 

factor one was implicated in this case. Defendant also asserts

that the trial court predicated its finding of aggravating 

factor one, in part, on the fact that the victim died, 

notwithstanding the fact that the death of the victim is an 

element of aggravated manslaughter.

Defendant contends that the trial court found two statutory 

factors that are incompatible: aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(9), which may only be given substantial weight if 

there is a need for specific deterrence of defendant himself, 

and mitigating factor eight, requiring a finding that 

defendant’s conduct was “the result of circumstances unlikely to 

recur,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Defendant further argues that,

in light of his lack of a criminal record, the court’s 

application of mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), 

contravenes its conclusion that there is a need for deterrence 

in this case. Finally, defendant contests the trial court’s 

balancing of the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) factors, given the 

number of aggravating and mitigating factors found by the court 

and the weight accorded to each factor.

The State argues that the trial court properly considered 

each of the statutory factors, and that it appropriately 

balanced them in accordance with 2C:44-1(a) and (b). It

characterizes the trial court’s application of aggravating 
12

factor one as consistent with the grand jury’s finding of an 

aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) when it 

indicted defendant. The State cites crime scene photographs, 

which do not appear to have been part of the record before the 

sentencing court, as well as other evidence, to show that 

defendant’s offense was particularly brutal. It dismisses the 

significance of defendant’s self-defense justification as a 

factor in sentencing, arguing that defendant received the 

benefit of that justification when the charge was amended from 

first-degree murder to aggravated manslaughter by virtue of the 

plea agreement, and that defendant admitted to recklessly 

causing the victim’s death under circumstances “manifesting 

extreme indifference to human life.” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). 

The State counters defendant’s assertion that the death of the 

victim, an element of defendant’s offense, was improperly 

double-counted in the court’s application of aggravating factor 

one. It argues that the cruel nature of defendant’s attack, not 

its fatal result, prompted the sentencing court’s finding with 

respect to this factor.

The State further argues that the sentencing court’s 

finding as to aggravating factor nine was properly premised on a 

need for specific, as well as general, deterrence. It contends 

that defendant needs to be specifically deterred from reacting 

violently to an unwanted sexual advance. The State argues that 
13

the need for public safety and deterrence increases 

proportionately with the seriousness of the offense, and 

accordingly the first-degree offense of aggravated manslaughter 

requires substantial deterrence. It argues that the court’s 

balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, which 

generated a sentence in the middle of the statutory range for 

this first-degree crime, was proper.

IV.

Appellate courts review sentencing determinations in 

accordance with a deferential standard. The reviewing court 

must not substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing 

court. State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989). The 

appellate court must affirm the sentence unless (1) the 

sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and 

mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based 

upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) “the 

application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes 

the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial 

conscience.” State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). When 

the trial court fails to provide a qualitative analysis of the 

relevant sentencing factors on the record, an appellate court 

may remand for resentencing. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363

(1987). An appellate court may also remand for resentencing if 

the trial court considers an aggravating factor that is 
14

inappropriate to a particular defendant or to the offense at 

issue. State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621, 628 (1990). 

A sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement is presumed 

to be reasonable because a defendant voluntarily “[waived] . . .

his right to a trial in return for the reduction or dismissal of 

certain charges, recommendations as to sentence and the like.” 

State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App. Div. 1980); see 

also State v. Spinks, 66 N.J. 568, 573 (1975) (stating that “an 

appellate court should ordinarily defer to the presumed 

reasonableness of a bargained sentence”). Even a sentence 

recommended as part of a plea agreement, however, may be vacated 

if it does not comport with the sentencing provisions of our 

Code of Criminal Justice. See State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 292

(1987) (noting that sentencing standards “apply as well to 

sentences that result from guilty pleas, including those guilty 

pleas that are entered as part of a plea agreement”).

In devising the sentencing scheme set forth in the Code, 

the Legislature’s “‘dominant, if not paramount, goal . . . [was]

uniformity in sentencing.’” State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485 

(2005) (quoting State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 352 (2000)). 

To minimize sentencing disparity, the drafters of our Code 

replaced “the unfettered sentencing discretion of prior law with 

a structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and 

more equal sentences.” Ibid. (quoting Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at
15

345) (internal quotations omitted). The framers of the Code 

sought to “establish uniformity by both structuring and 

standardizing the sentencing courts’ discretion.” State v. 

Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400 (1989).

To that end, the Code, our case law and the court rules

prescribe a careful and deliberate analysis before a sentence is 

imposed. The foundation of that analysis is a thorough 

understanding of the defendant and the offense. Although a

court sentencing a defendant based upon a guilty plea must be 

careful not to impose a sentence for an offense beyond the scope 

of the plea, it is not limited only to the factual admissions 

that comprise the basis for the plea. Sainz, supra, 107 N.J. at

293. Instead, “[a]t sentencing there should be presented ‘the 

fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 

characteristics.’” State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167, 176 (1979)

(quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S. Ct.

1079, 1083, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 1342 (1949)); accord Natale, supra, 

184 N.J. at 472. The court evaluates “a range of information 

unconstrained by evidential considerations.” State v. Randolph, 

210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012) (citing Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 

486). Thus, the sentencing court gathers information necessary 

to assess the defendant’s history and characteristics, and to 

understand the nature and circumstances of his or her crime.
16

To minimize disparity, a sentencing court exercises its 

discretion in the structured setting prescribed by the Code. 

Our statutes provide a “‘general framework to guide judicial 

discretion in imposing sentences’ to ensure that similarly 

situated defendants [do] not receive dissimilar sentences.” 

Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 485 (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J.

369, 375 (1984)). When an ordinary term of incarceration is 

warranted, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) prescribes statutory ranges for 

that term based upon the degree of the offense: ten to twenty 

years for a first-degree crime, five to ten years for a seconddegree crime, three to five years for a third-degree crime, and 

up to eighteen months for a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6(a)(1)-(4).

As it determines a defendant’s term of incarceration within 

the statutory range for each degree of offense, the sentencing 

court must first identify whether any of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)’s 

thirteen aggravating factors and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)’s thirteen

mitigating factors apply. Each factor found by the trial court 

to be relevant must be supported by “competent, reasonably 

credible evidence.” Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 363. The court 

must then balance the relevant aggravating factors and 

mitigating factors. The sentencing court does more than 

quantitatively compare the number of pertinent aggravating 

factors with the number of applicable mitigating factors; the 
17

relevant factors are qualitatively assessed and assigned 

appropriate weight in a case-specific balancing process. Kruse, 

supra, 105 N.J. at 363; State v. Denmon, 347 N.J. Super. 457, 

467-68 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 41 (2002). 

Having balanced the relevant factors, the sentencing court 

does not set the term of incarceration in accordance with an 

“inflexible rule.” Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 488. Instead, 

one “reasonable” approach for sentencing judges is to use “the 

middle of the sentencing range as a logical starting point for 

the balancing process.” Ibid. So, for example, “if the 

aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise, the 

midpoint will be an appropriate sentence.” Ibid. Moreover, 

“reason suggests that when the mitigating factors preponderate, 

sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when 

the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward 

the higher end of the range.” Ibid.

At the time of sentencing, the court must “state reasons 

for imposing such sentence including . . . the factual basis

supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating 

factors affecting sentence.” R. 3:21-4(g); see also N.J.S.A.

2C:43-2(e) (requiring sentencing court to provide statement on 

record of “factual basis supporting its findings of particular 

aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence”). A clear 

explanation “of the balancing of aggravating and mitigating 
18

factors with regard to imposition of sentences and periods of 

parole ineligibility is particularly important.” State v. 

Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 565-66 (1989) (citing State v. Baylass, 

114 N.J. 169, 173-74 (1989); Kruse, supra, 105 N.J. at 359-60). 

That explanation should thoroughly address the factors at issue. 

As this Court has noted, “[a]lthough our case law does not 

require that trial courts explicitly reject every mitigating 

factor argued to the court,” such a practice is encouraged, as 

it “not only ensures consideration of every factor but also 

demonstrates to defendants and the public that all arguments 

have been evaluated fairly.” State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 

609 (2010).

A careful statement of reasons also facilitates appellate 

review. The trial court’s explanation of its reasoning “is 

important for meaningful appellate review of any criminal 

sentence challenged for excessiveness,” because the appellate 

court “is expected to assess the aggravating and mitigating 

factors to determine whether they ‘were based upon competent 

credible evidence in the record.’” Id. at 608 (quoting Roth, 

supra, 95 N.J. at 364). A clear and detailed statement of 

reasons is thus a crucial component of the process conducted by 

the sentencing court, and a prerequisite to effective appellate 

review.

V.
19

This appeal centers upon the trial court’s application of 

two of the statutory factors, aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(1), and aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). We consider each in turn.

Aggravating factor one requires the trial court to consider 

“[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of 

the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in 

an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.” N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(1). When applying this factor, “the sentencing court 

reviews the severity of the defendant’s crime, ‘the single most 

important factor in the sentencing process,’ assessing the 

degree to which defendant’s conduct has threatened the safety of 

its direct victims and the public.” State v. Lawless, 214 N.J.

594, 609 (2013) (quoting Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 379). As the 

Court has held, “[t]he paramount reason we focus on the severity 

of the crime is to assure the protection of the public and the 

deterrence of others. The higher the degree of the crime, the 

greater the public need for protection and the more need for 

deterrence.” State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996). 

When it assesses whether a defendant’s conduct was 

especially “heinous, cruel, or depraved,” a sentencing court

must scrupulously avoid “double-counting” facts that establish 

the elements of the relevant offense. See State v. Yarbough, 
20

100 N.J. 627, 645 (1985); Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 353. As 

this Court observed:

[In Yarbough], we recognized that facts that 

established elements of a crime for which a 

defendant is being sentenced should not be 

considered as aggravating circumstances in 

determining that sentence. We reasoned that 

the Legislature had already considered the 

elements of an offense in the gradation of a 

crime. If we held otherwise, every offense 

arguably would implicate aggravating factors 

merely by its commission, thereby eroding 

the basis for the gradation of offenses and 

the distinction between elements and 

aggravating circumstances. In the same 

manner, double-counting of elements of the 

offenses as aggravating factors would be 

likely to interfere with the Code’s 

dedication to uniformity in sentencing.

[Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 353 (internal 

citation omitted).]

In appropriate cases, a sentencing court may justify the 

application of aggravating factor one, without double-counting, 

by reference to the extraordinary brutality involved in an 

offense. See O’Donnell, supra, 117 N.J. at 217. In O’Donnell, 

supra, the Court held that “cruel” conduct may give rise to an 

aggravating factor in a manslaughter sentencing when the 

defendant intended “‘to inflict pain, harm and suffering – in 

addition to intending death.’” Id. at 217-18 (quoting State v. 

Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 208 (1987)); see also State v. Soto, 340 

N.J. Super. 47, 54-55, 71-72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 

N.J. 209 (2001) (affirming application of aggravating factor one 
21

when trial court noted protracted suffering inflicted and brutal 

killing of victim); State v. Mara, 253 N.J. Super. 204, 214 

(App. Div. 1992) (affirming sentencing court’s finding that 

aggravating factor one applied when, in aggravated assault case,

“the serious injuries were far in excess of that required to 

satisfy” statutory elements). A sentencing court may consider 

“aggravating facts showing that [a] defendant’s behavior 

extended to the extreme reaches of the prohibited behavior.” 

State v. Henry, 418 N.J. Super. 481, 493 (Law Div. 2010) (citing 

State v. Taylor, 226 N.J. Super. 441, 453 (App. Div. 1988)).

In the present aggravated manslaughter case, the State was 

required to prove that “[t]he actor recklessly cause[d] death 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human 

life.” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). Thus, the sentencing court’s 

application of aggravating factor one must be based on factors 

other than the death of the victim and the circumstances 

essential to support a finding that the defendant has acted with 

extreme indifference to human life. Such a finding requires a 

nuanced analysis of the defendant’s offense, clearly explained

so that an appellate court may be certain that the sentencing 

court has refrained from double-counting the elements of the 

offense. As the Appellate Division held in State v. Briggs,

effective appellate review cannot be achieved when there is

uncertainty “whether the court meant that [the defendant’s 
22

killing of the victim] was unusually brutal or cruel in nature.” 

349 N.J. Super. 496, 505 (App. Div. 2002). As the panel noted, 

“[i]f the court meant that the aggravating factor was applicable 

because a death resulted from defendant’s conduct, it erred in 

applying the factor, since the death of the victim cannot be 

double counted as an aggravating factor in a manslaughter case.” 

Ibid. (citing Towey, supra, 244 N.J. Super. at 593 (“Both the 

victim’s death and the recklessness of defendant’s conduct were 

elements of the offense to which defendant pled guilty and, 

thus, should not have been considered as aggravating factors in 

imposing the base term.”)). 

The sentencing court must not only ensure that facts 

necessary to establish the elements of the defendant’s offense 

are not double-counted for purposes of sentencing, but that its 

assessment of the “nature and circumstances of the offense” 

fairly reflects the record before it. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). 

In Jarbath, supra, this Court considered the application of 

aggravating factor one in the setting of a second-degree 

manslaughter case arising from the death of the defendant’s 

infant son. 114 N.J. at 398. It concluded that the trial 

court’s application of aggravating factor one “conflict[ed] with 

[its] acceptance of [the defendant’s] version that she dropped 

the child accidentally,” and that the State’s proffer of a 

different version of the death on appeal did not justify the 
23

sentencing court’s reliance on this factor. Id. at 404. Any 

determination that the defendant’s conduct was “especially 

heinous, cruel, [or] depraved” must be fully grounded in the 

record before the sentencing court. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).

These principles do not necessarily bar the application of 

aggravating factor one to this or any other defendant convicted 

of aggravated manslaughter. In some settings, a court may 

identify competent, reasonably credible evidence that the 

defendant’s offense was “committed in an especially heinous, 

cruel, or depraved manner,” or that the evidence otherwise 

justifies application of aggravating factor one, without doublecounting the elements of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). 

It is for the sentencing court to determine on remand whether 

this is such a case.

Moreover, a finding of aggravating factor one is not 

precluded because defendant could have been convicted of passion 

provocation manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2), had he been 

tried. Given defendant’s guilty plea, no factfinder has 

determined whether the evidence warrants a conviction for 

passion provocation manslaughter, so defendant’s argument is 

premised upon speculation. The possibility that a jury could 

have convicted defendant of passion provocation manslaughter in 

a hypothetical trial does not preclude application of 

aggravating factor one to defendant.
24

In this case, the court failed to adequately explain its 

application of aggravating factor one to defendant. Its 

supplemental statement of reasons disclosed only that 

aggravating factor one was given moderate to significant weight, 

that defendant stabbed the victim several times and continued to 

beat him well beyond what was necessary for self-defense, and 

that defendant used excessive force. The court neither 

discussed in detail the circumstances of the offense nor 

identified the facts in the record -- distinct from the facts 

necessary to prove the elements of aggravated manslaughter –-

that supported its finding. 

Because the application of factor one was not supported by 

competent and credible evidence in the record, defendant must be 

resentenced. On remand, the sentencing court may apply 

aggravating factor one only if there is credible evidence in the 

record to support the finding. In its statement of reasons, the 

court should provide a detailed explanation of its findings with 

respect to this and any other factor applied.

1

 

1 Contrary to the State’s position, the grand jury’s application 

of the aggravating factor set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) 

does not govern the sentencing court’s consideration of 

aggravating factor one. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) requires a 

determination that “[t]he murder was outrageously or wantonly 

vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity 

of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim.” If a jury 

convicts a defendant at trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or 

(2) and finds that one of the aggravating factors prescribed in

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4) applies, the sentencing court must 
25

VI.

Aggravating factor nine invokes “[t]he need for deterring 

the defendant and others from violating the law.” N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(9). The sentencing court’s determination is a 

“qualitative assessment” of the risk of recidivism, but “also 

involve[s] determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a 

criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about 

the individual in light of his or her history.” State v. 

Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006). “Deterrence has been 

repeatedly identified in all facets of the criminal justice 

system as one of the most important factors in sentencing,” and 

“is the key to the proper understanding of protecting the 

public.” Megargel, supra, 143 N.J. at 501 (citing State in the 

Interest of C.A.H. and B.A.R., 89 N.J. 326, 334 (1982)).

“[D]emands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion 

 

sentence the defendant to a term of life imprisonment without 

parole. This case was never tried, and no such determination 

was made. Moreover, nothing in the statutory text or 

legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) suggests that 

sentencing courts should rely upon grand jury findings regarding 

the N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4) aggravating factors in balancing the 

aggravating and mitigating factors for purposes of sentencing. 

Not only is the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) 

distinct from that of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c), but the record 

before the sentencing court is necessarily different from that 

considered by a grand jury, including the presentence report 

prepared in accordance with Rule 3:21-2. See Randolph, supra,

210 N.J. at 348 (2012). Accordingly, the grand jury’s finding 

of an aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) does 

not compel the sentencing court to apply N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). 

Moreover, the grand jury record is not before us.
26

to the gravity and harmfulness of the offense.” C.A.H., supra, 

89 N.J. at 337.

For purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), deterrence

incorporates two “interrelated but distinguishable concepts,” 

the sentence’s “general deterrent effect on the public [and] its 

personal deterrent effect on the defendant.” Jarbath, supra, 

114 N.J. at 405 (citing C.A.H., supra, 89 N.J. at 334-45). In 

the absence of a finding of a need for specific deterrence,

general deterrence “has relatively insignificant penal value.”

Ibid. (citing State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 520 (1989)). In 

weighing the applicability of aggravating factor nine, the 

sentencing court accordingly focuses on the need to deter the 

individual defendant “from violating the law.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). 

In this case, the question of specific deterrence is 

complicated by the trial court’s finding of mitigating factor 

eight, which requires the sentencing court to conclude that the 

offense at issue was “the result of circumstances unlikely to 

recur.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Defendant contends that a 

sentencing court may never apply aggravating factor nine and 

mitigating factor eight in the same case, or, in the 

alternative, that a sentencing court may never give substantial 

weight to aggravating factor nine when mitigating factor eight 

is also being applied. 
27

Because N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1’s statutory language does not 

suggest, and we have never held, that aggravating factor nine 

and mitigating factor eight are inherently incompatible, we do 

not adopt such an inflexible rule. Although the cases cited by 

defendant, State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2009), 

certif. denied, 201 N.J. 156 (2010), Briggs, supra, 349 N.J. 

Super. 496, and State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 

1996), illustrate that aggravating factor nine and mitigating 

factor eight rarely apply in the same sentencing, they do not 

hold that the two factors are irreconcilable. In L.V., supra, 

the Appellate Division panel found no “overwhelming need to 

deter” the mentally disabled defendant, who gave birth after 

being sexually assaulted by her father and then threw the infant 

out the window at her father’s direction. 410 N.J. Super. at 

111 (emphasis omitted). Reasoning that the defendant was 

unlikely to “find herself in the same situation again,” the 

court discounted specific deterrence in sentencing the 

defendant. Ibid. Briggs, supra, in which the defendant stabbed 

her former husband during an argument while both were 

intoxicated, similarly involved an offender deemed by the court 

to be unlikely to offend again. 349 N.J. Super. at 498-99, 505. 

When remanding for resentencing, the panel in Powell, supra, 

noted that specific deterrence was not a consideration because 
28

the “defendant was unlikely to commit another crime.” 294 N.J. 

Super. at 567.

In exceptional cases, even if the record demonstrates that 

the offense at issue arose in circumstances unlikely to recur, 

thus supporting a finding as to mitigating factor eight, a 

defendant could nonetheless pose a risk of recidivism, requiring

specific deterrence within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). While such a case will be rare, we decline to hold

that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight can 

never apply in the same sentencing. 

We also decline to find that aggravating factor nine is 

inappropriate in a case in which the defendant had no prior 

record, and the sentencing court accordingly applies mitigating 

factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). Neither the statutory 

language nor the case law suggest that a sentencing court can 

find a need for deterrence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) only 

when the defendant has a prior criminal record.

As with aggravating factor one, the sentencing court’s 

reasons for applying aggravating factor nine are insufficiently 

explained, and the application of this factor is not supported 

by competent and credible evidence in the record. If the court 

determines when it resentences defendant that aggravating factor 

nine applies, it should address both general and specific 

deterrence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). If it finds both 
29

aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight, the 

sentencing court should explain how it reconciles those two 

findings. Finally, the court should explain in greater detail 

its assessment of the weight assigned to each aggravating and 

mitigating factor, and its balancing of those statutory factors 

as they apply to defendant. To avoid disparity in sentencing as 

the Legislature intended, to facilitate fair and effective 

appellate review, and to ensure that the defendant, the State 

and the public understand the reasons for the sentence, a trial 

court should explain its analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1’s 

aggravating and mitigating factors with care and precision.

VII.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, 

defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to

the trial court for resentencing, consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and ALBIN, and 

JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE 

PATTERSON’s opinion. JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) did not 

participate.
30

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-18 SEPTEMBER TERM 2012

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

REINALDO FUENTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

DECIDED January 7, 2014

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice Patterson

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST

REVERSE/

VACATE/

REMAND

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a) X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) ----------------------- --------------------

TOTALS 5