alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cesar BENITEZ-ARZATE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-4277.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 29, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 16, 2006.

*428Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Rita R. Valdrini, Acting United States Attorney, Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Cesar Benitez-Arzate pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal he alleges that his guilty plea is invalid because his interpreter was not certified under the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1827-28 (West 1994 & Supp.2006). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Benitez-Arzate did not object to the non-certification of his Spanish interpreter. Indeed, Benitez-Arzate chose to use the services of the very interpreter of whom he now complains in lieu of the court-certified interpreter originally provided to him by the court and used at his arraignment. We find no plain error in the district court’s decision to allow Benitez-Ar-zate to use the services of the interpreter obtained by his defense counsel. *United States v. Paz,*981 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1992) (providing review standard for claim of an uncertified interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act); *United States v. Gonzales,*339 F.3d 725, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2003) (same).

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### FERNANDEZ INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Onstar Corporation, and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Defendants-Ap-pellees.

No. 2008-1533.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 5, 2009.

Kara L. Szpondowski, Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, of Chicago, IL, argued for *909plaintiff-appellant. With her on the brief were Paul K. Vickrey, and Patrick F. Solon.

Craig D. Leavell, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, of Chicago, IL, argued for defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were John T. Hickey, Jr., Tiffany P. Cunningham, Edward M. Siegel, and Christopher M. Kaiser.

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, RADER, GAJARSA, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

Judgment

PER CURIAM.

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### In the Matter of Elijah J. and Another, Children Alleged to be Neglected. Yvonda M., Appellant; Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

[963 NYS2d 77]

Order of fact-finding, Family Court, Bronx County (Jane Pearl, J.), entered on or about January 18, 2012, which, after a hearing, found that respondent mother had neglected the subject children, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from orders of disposition, same court and Judge, entered on or about April 9, 2012, unanimously dismissed as abandoned, without costs.

*450A preponderance of the evidence supports the findings of neglect *(see*Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]). Family Court properly found that the subject children’s physical, mental or emotional condition is in imminent danger of becoming impaired, since the mother left the children, then ages 4 and 15, with their 21-year-old brother for over a week without sufficient food, shelter, or clothing *(see*Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [A]; *Matter of Lah De W. [Takisha W.],*78 AD3d 523, 523-524 [1st Dept 2010]).

The Family Court also properly found neglect based on the mother’s regular misuse of marijuana *(see*Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; *Matter of Keoni Daquan A. [Brandon W.—April AJ,*91 AD3d 414, 415 [1st Dept 2012]). The mother’s entry into a drug treatment program after the relevant statutory time period is unavailing *(see Matter of Messiah C. [Láveme CJ,*95 AD3d 449, 450 [1st Dept 2012]). Under the circumstances, petitioner agency was not required to prove actual or imminent impairment to the children *(see Matter of Keoni,*91 AD3d at 415).

There is no basis to disturb the court’s credibility determinations *{see Matter of Irene O.,*38 NY2d 776, 777 [1975]).

Concur— Tom, J.E, Andrias, Saxe, Abdus-Salaam and Gische, JJ.
Exhibit 32

                                  CERTIFICATION





Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,  Robert A. Doak,  President,  CEO,  and  Acting  Chief  Financial  Officer of
Mountains West Exploration, Inc. (the "Company"), certify that:

1. The  Quarterly  Report on Form  10QSB of the  Company  for the  period  ended
September 30, 2001 as filed with the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

         Dated:  July 7, 2004           Officer:   Robert A. Doak

                                        Name:       /s/ Robert A. Doak
                                                    ----------------------------
                                        Position:  President, CEO
if it is endorsed in blank. . . ."); NRS 104.3205(2) ("When endorsed in

blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone . . . ." (emphasis added))'; see also Edelstein, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 48, 286 P.3d at 261 ("If the note is payable to bearer, that 'indicates that the person in possession of the promise or order is entitled to payment." (quoting Leyva, 127 Nev. at 478, 255 P.3d at 1280)).

Thus, by demonstrating that it was in possession of appellants' note that was endorsed in blank by appellants' original lender, CAM Mortgage established that the note had been properly negotiated and that CAM Mortgage was entitled to enforce it. This was a legal conclusion that was properly reached by the district court and that rendered an evidentiary hearing regarding additional supporting documentation unnecessary. As such, the district court was within its discretion in denying appellants' petition for judicial review without holding an evidentiary hearing. See FMR 21(2) (2013) (providing the district court with the discretion to determine the extent to which an evidentiary hearing is necessary). Accordingly, we

ORDER the jud

f 

## t of the district court AFFIRMED.

Saitta

Gibbons 

# P ia&t. J. Pickering

'In other words, a second or third blank endorsement is unnecessary. To the extent that appellants suggest that the FMP Rules impose requirements beyond those in the Uniform Commercial Code, we reject this suggestion.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2
(0) 1947A 

### ecc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge M. Nelson Segel, Settlement Judge James S. Kent Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas Aldridge Pite, LLP Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 194m e
#### Mark Cox, Respondent, v Cecelia Sisti, as Executrix of Michael Sisti, Deceased, et al., Appellants.

[971 NYS2d 876]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated April 23, 2012, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

On December 5, 2007, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when *669he was struck by the defendants’ vehicle as he was crossing a street within a crosswalk. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiffs spine and to the plaintiffs elbows and right knee did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Staff v Yshua,*59 AD3d 614 [2009]), and that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/ 180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Karpinos v Cora,*89 AD3d 994, 995 [2011]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Resek v Morreale,*74 AD3d 1043 [2010]; *Raleigh v Ram,*60 AD3d 747, 747-748 [2009]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants’ remaining contention. Dillon, J.P., Lott, Austin and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-04-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-04-1999
<CASH>                                      13,939,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               11,489,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   500,000
<INVENTORY>                                 10,509,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,108,000
<PP&E>                                     141,556,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             109,429,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              68,523,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       33,495,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                   128,470,000
<OTHER-SE>                               (104,017,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                68,523,000
<SALES>                                     54,407,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            54,407,000
<CGS>                                       42,306,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               42,306,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,242,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             751,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (6,390,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (6,390,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (6,390,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.32)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3851 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3851

   To provide for the extension of preliminary permit periods by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for certain hydroelectric projects 
                        in the State of Alaska.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 6, 2006

 Ms. Murkowski introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide for the extension of preliminary permit periods by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for certain hydroelectric projects 
                        in the State of Alaska.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PRELIMINARY PERMIT PERIODS.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal 
        Energy Regulatory Commission.
            (2) Thomas bay project.--The term ``Thomas Bay project'' 
        means--
                    (A) the hydroelectric project of the Commission at 
                Cascade Creek, Alaska, preliminary permit number 12495, 
                dated October 8, 2004;
                    (B) the hydroelectric project of the Commission at 
                Ruth Lake, Alaska, preliminary permit number 12619, 
                dated February 23, 2006; and
                    (C) the hydroelectric project of the Commission at 
                Scenery Lake, Alaska, preliminary permit number 12621, 
                dated February 23, 2006.
    (b) Extension.--Notwithstanding section 5 of the Federal Power Act 
(16 U.S.C. 798) or any other provision of law (including regulations), 
on receipt of a request from the preliminary permit holder of a Thomas 
Bay project and after providing reasonable notice, the Commission may 
extend the period of the preliminary permit for the Thomas Bay project 
for not more than 2 consecutive 3-year periods following the expiration 
of the initial preliminary permit for the Thomas Bay project, in 
accordance with applicable procedures of the Commission.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 99.2







CERTIFICATIONS



I, Jay W. Downs, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Diatect International Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared; b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function); a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control.

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether of not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



Date: November 14 2003

/S/Jay W. Downs

Principal Executive Officer

Principal Financial Officer
Order filed October 16, 2014

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 14

- 00716

- CV

____________ SANDRA GALAVIZ , Appellant

V. JUAN GALAVIZ, Appellee

On Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 3

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1050339



### O R D E R
The notice of appeal in this case was filed August 28, 2014. To date, the filing fee of $19 5.00 has not been paid. The trial court sustained the contest to appellant’s affidavit of indigence. See Tex. R. App. P

. 20.1. Th erefore, the court issues the following order.
Appellant is ordered to pay the filing fee in the amount of $1 9 5.00 to the

c lerk of this court on or before October 30, 2014. See Tex. R. App. P. 5. Ifappellant fails to timely pay the filing fee in accorda nce with this order, the appeal

will be dismissed.

PER CURIAM
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frank J. Povoski, Jr., Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 210]

Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, from an order of the Ontario County Court (Craig J. Doran, J.), dated October 14, 2011. The order denied the motion of defendant to set aside his sentence pursuant to CPL 440.20.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by granting the motion in part and directing that all sentences shall run concurrently and as modified the order is affirmed.

*1351Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 seeking to set aside the sentence imposed with respect to his conviction of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [2] [a]), forgery in the second degree (§ 170.10 [1]), and assault in the second degree (§ 120.05 [6]). County Court directed that the sentence on the robbery count shall run consecutively to the sentence imposed on the forgery count, and that those sentences shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the assault count.

We note at the outset that the court erred in denying the motion on the ground that defendant could have raised this issue on his direct appeal. Mandatory denial of a motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 is required only when the issue “was previously determined on the merits upon an appeal from the judgment or sentence” (CPL 440.20 [2]), which in this case it was not *(People v Povoski,*55 AD3d 1221, 1221-1222 [2008], *lv denied*11 NY3d 929 [2009]). The court erred in conflating the provisions of CPL 440.10 with those of CPL 440.20. The procedural bar set forth in CPL 440.10 (2) (c) “applies only to motions made pursuant to section 440.10, and it is undisputed that the instant motion was made pursuant to section 440.20” *(People v McCants,*15 AD3d 892, 893 [2005]).

We agree with defendant that the consecutive sentences for the robbery and forgery counts are illegal under the facts of this case. The indictment and charge to the jury set forth that either count could serve as the predicate for the count of felony assault, and thus the predicate counts must run concurrently with the count of felony assault *(see People v Parks,*95 NY2d 811, 814-815 [2000]; *People v Davis,*68 AD3d 1653, 1655 [2009], *lv denied*14 NY3d 839 [2010]; *People v Ahedo,*229 AD2d 588, 589-590 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 964 [1996]). The sentences imposed on the counts of robbery and forgery must therefore also run concurrently *(see People v Dickens,*269 AD2d 463, 464 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 852 [2000]; *see also Parks,*95 NY2d at 814-815). We therefore modify the order by granting the motion in part and directing all sentences to run concurrently *(see People v Lemon,*38 AD3d 1298, 1299 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 846 [2007], *lv denied on reconsideration*9 NY3d 962 [2007]; *People, v Parton,*26 AD3d 868, 870 [2006], *lv denied*7 NY3d 760 [2006]; *see generally People v LaSalle,*95 NY2d 827, 829 [2000]). Present — Centra, J.E, Fahey, Garni, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
#### Reynolds *v.*Dunlap & Wortham *et al.*

Upon the facts in evidence, the court did not err in refusing the injunction prayed for.

June 11, 1894.

Petition for injunction, etc. Before Judge Bartlett. Bibb county. Pebruary 6, 1894.

R. D. Smith, for plaintiff.

L. D. Moore, for defendants.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### In the Matter of Virginia Parkhouse, Appellant, v Scott M. Stringer, as Borough President of Manhattan, et al., Respondents.

Submitted July 20, 2009;

decided September 8, 2009

Reported below, 55 AD3d 1.

Motion for reargument denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements *[see*12 NY3d 660 (2009)].

Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.