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. S. v . Dar de n ; U. S. v . Ar c h e r ; U. S. v . Vi l l e g a s ; U. S. v . W i l l i a ms
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT

_______________________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: Dec ember

12, 2007 Dec ided: August 15, 2008) Docke t Nos. 06-4567-c r, 06-4821- cr, 07- 0025-cr , 07-2664-c r(L ), 07-2869- cr( XAP)

_______________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee ,

v. No. 06-4567-c r J OEL DARDEN, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Ap pe lla

nt, v. No. 06-4821-c r RA L PH A RCH ER, Def endant- Apellee
. UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Ap pe lla nt, v. No. 07-0025-c r PED RO A. VI L L EG AS, a lso kn ow n a s F e da Vi lle g a s, Def endant- Appellee ;The Honor able John F. Kee nan of the United States District Court for the Southern * District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 2 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellant-Cross-A ppellee, v. Nos. 07-2664-c r(L ), 07-2869- cr( XAP) AN DR E WI L L I AM S, Def endant- Appellee -Crosss-Appe llant.

Be fore : CARDAMONE and POOL ER, Circuit J udg es, and KEENAN, D istrict J udg e. *

_______________________________ These f our appe als, hea

rd in tandem a

nd consolidated for

dispositi on, raise the same leg al qu e sti on : w he the r a

pr ior c onvic tio n f

or a Ne w Y or k d ru g of fe ns e c an s e rv e a s a

pr e dic a te “ser ious drug offe nse” unde r the Ar med Care er Criminal Ac t (“ACCA”) wher e Ne w York’ s Rockefe ller druglaws pre scribed a maxi mum sentence of at lea st ten y ear s for the of fense at the time it was committed, but where N ew Yor k non-re troac tively

amende d the Rockef

eller dr ug laws , p ri or

to t he fe de ra l se nte nc ingin t he se c a se s, to r e du c e the ma ximumse nte nc e fo r t he same offe nse conduc t to less than ten y ear s. We conclude that, under the pla in terms of the ACCA, we
mus t lo ok to t he c ur re nt s e nte nc inglaws of

the state to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he dr ugof fe ns e is “ser ious.” We further

conclude that under c urre nt New Yor k law, the maximum s entenc e presc ribed for

these off enses is less than ten year s.

MI CHAEL

A. MARI

NACCI O, Culleton, Marinac cio & Fog lia, Whit e Plains, NY, for Def endant- Appellant Joel Dar den.3 J OHN M. B URKE, B rookly n, NY, for

Def endant- Appellee Ralph Arche r. L L OYD EPSTEI

N, Epstein & Weil, New York, N Y, for Def endant- Appellee Pedro Villeg as. STEVEN M. STATSI

NGER, Fe dera l Defe nders of New Yo rk , Inc ., Ap pe a ls B ur e a u, Ne w Y or

k, NY , f or De fe nd antAp pe lle e -C ro ss- Ap pe lla

nt And re Willi ams. PARVI N MOYNE, A ssistant United St ates Attorne y (Peter A. No rl ing , E va

n C. Willi ams, Jame s P. L oo nam, E liza be th A. L atif, and D iane Guja

rati, Assistant United States Attorney s, on the brief

s) for Rosly

nn R. Mauskopf, United States Attorney

for the E astern D istrict of NewYork, a nd for Micha el J . Gar cia, United States A ttorney for the Southern District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, NY, for Appellee in No. 06-4567, for Appellants in Nos. 07-0025, 06-4821, and f

or Appe llant-Cross-Appellee in Nos. 07- 2664, 07-2869.

POOL ER, Circuit J udg e: The Ar med Care er Criminal Ac t (ACCA) mandate s a fifte en y ear minimum sentenc e for anyone convic ted of be ing a felon in possession of a f irea rm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) , who “ha s three pr evious convictions . . . for a violent felony

or a se rious drugoffe nse, or both.” 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (e )( 1) . Se c tio n 9 24 (e )( 2) (A )( ii) de fi ne s a “ se ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e ,” in r e le va

nt p art , as “a n offe nse under

state law . . . f

or which a

maxi mum term of imprisonment of ten y ear s or more is pre scribed by

law.” 18 U .S.C. § 924(e)(2) (A)( ii). These f our appe als, hea

rd in tandem and consolidate d for disposition, raise the same leg al question: whether a prior c onviction for a New Y ork drugoffe nse ca n serve as a pr edicate “se rious drugoffe nse” unde r the ACCA, whe re New Y ork’s Rocke feller

druglaws pre scribed a

maxi mum sentence of at lea st ten y ear s for theI t is not clear what J udg e Johnson m eant by applying a

thirty month enhance ment for the 2 ACCA. The ACCA cre ates a mandatory

minimum sentenc e, not an e nhance ment. We need not parse the meaningof the imposed sente nce, how ever , beca use we hold that the ACCA mandatory minimum does not apply

and vac ate the se ntence .

4 offe nse at the time it was c ommitt ed, but wher e Ne w York non- retroa ctively amende d the Rockefe ller druglaws, prior to the f eder al sentenc ing in these case s, to reduce the maxim um sentenc e for

the same of

fense conduct to less than ten year s.

BACK GR OUND DardenJ oel Dar den wa s arr ested on F ebrua ry 23, 2000, for possessinga handgun and
ammunit ion . D ard e n p le a de d guil ty to p os se ssi nga

fi re arm a ft e r h avin g be e n p re vio us ly convicted of

an off ense punishable by

more than one y ear

imprisonment, in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). It is undisput ed that Da rden ha d been pr eviously convicted of

the following fe lon ie s: 1. Dec ember

1989: a Class B Ne w York f elony of cr iminal sale of a c ontrolled substance in the third de g ree , in violation of New Yor k Penal L aw § 220.39. 2
. D e c e mb e r

1 9 8 9 : anA C C A p r e d i c a t e v i o l e n tf e l o n y. 3
. S e p t e mb e r

1 9 9 7 : anA C C A p r e d i c a t e v i o l e n tf e l o n y. Dar den wa s sentence d on Septermber 29, 2006. At sentenc ing, the g overnme nt argued that these thre e prior c onvictions subjected Da rden to the f

ifteen year

mandatory

minimum sentenc e of the ACCA, in Section 924(e). The sole dispute was whe ther Da rden’ s conviction for the Class B Ne w York dr ug felony was a conviction for a

serious drugoffe nse. In an ora l decision, Judge Johnson determined that the ACCA enha nceme nt applied, without expl aining the ba sis fo r h is r

uli ng . Jud g e John so n s e nte nc e d D ard e n to 18 0 mo nth s f or the un de rl yingof

fe ns e to run consec utively

with a thirty

month sentence for the A CCA enhance ment, five y ear s 2
su pe rv ise d r e le a se , a

nd a $1 00 sp e c ia l a sse ssm e nt.Arc her a lso had a youthful offe nder a djudication in September 1991, whic h, if counted, 3 would constitute an ACCA predic ate violent fe lony . Followingthe district court, we need not decide whether

Arc her’ s youthful adjudication wa s a pre dicate of fense beca

use Arc her’ s status as a ca ree r off ender wholly turns on whether

his two New Yor

k Class C convictions were c onvic tio ns fo r s e ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e s. 5 Archer Ralph Arche r wa s arr ested on May 14, 2004, for possessinga handgun. Arc her ple aded g uilty to possessing a

firea rm afte r havingbeen pr eviously convicted of

an off ense punishable by more than one y ear

imprisonment, in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) . I t is undisput ed that Ar c he r h a d b e e n p re vio us ly c onvic te d o f t

he fo llo wi ngfe lon ie s: 1. November

1991: an ACCA predic ate se rious drugoffe nse. 2. Fe bruar

y 1995: a Class C New Yor k felony of attempted c riminal sale of a controlled substanc e in the third De g ree , in violation of N.Y. Penal L aw § 220.16(1) ( “Ne w York Class C attempted drugsale fe lony ”). 3
. M ar c h1 9 9 5 : a

N e wY o r k C l a s s C a t t e mp t e d

dr u g s a l e f e l o n y. 3 Arc her w as sentenc ed on August 25, 2006. At sentencing , the g overnme nt argued that these four prior convic tions subjected Arc her to the f ifteen year

mandatory

minimum sentenc e of the ACCA, in Section 924(e). T he sole dispute wa s whether Arc her’ s convictions for the N ew Yo rk Cla ss C a tte mpt e d d

ru g sa le s w e re c on vic tio ns fo r s e ri ou s d ru g of fe ns e s. Judg e Ho lw e ll deter mined that the ACCA enhanc ement did not apply , explaining in a wr itten decision that “the de fi nit ion of ‘s e ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e ’ i n th e AC CAis p ro pe rl y int e rp re te d a s d ir e c tin g the c ourt to look at the maxim um term of imprisonment curr ently presc ribed by

state law,” which he deter mined to be less than ten y ear s for the N ew Yor k Class C attempted drug sales. United State s v . A rc he r, 46 1 F . Su pp . 2 d 2 13 , 2 21 (S .D .N .Y . 2 00 6) . Jud g e Ho lw e ll s e nte nc e d A rc he r t o 10 5 mo nth s in

pr iso n, thr e e y e ars of

su pe rv ise d r e le a se , a

nd a $1 00 sp e c ia l a sse ssm e nt.6

Villegas Pedro Villeg as wa s arr ested on Nove mber 17, 2005, for possessing a

handgun. Villeg as ple a de d guil ty

to p os se ssi nga

fi re arm a ft e r h avin g be e n p re vio us ly c on vic te d o f a

n o ff e ns e punis ha ble by mor e tha n o ne y e ar i mpr iso nme nt, in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g )( 1) . It is
un dis pute d th a t V ill e g a s h a d p re vio us ly be e n c on vic te d o f t

he fo llo wi ngfe lon ie s: 1
. D e c e mb e r

1 9 8 7 : a N e w Y o r k C l a s s C a t t e mp t e d

dr u g s a l e f e l o n y. 2
. F e b r

u ar y 1 9 9 3 : anA C C A p r e d i c a t e v i o l e n tf e l o n y. 3. November

1997: an ACCA predic ate se rious drugoffe nse. Villeg as wa s sentence d on Dec ember 5, 2006. The Gove rnment ar g ued that these three prior convic tions subjected Villeg as to the fifte en year mandatory

minimum sentenc e of the ACCA, in Section 924(e). The sole dispute was whe ther Villeg as’s c onviction for the Ne w York Class C attempted drugsale wa s a convic tion for a se rious drugoffe nse. In an ora l decision, J udg e Amon dete rmined that the ACCA enha nceme nt did not apply , explaining that, under the
ru le of le nit y , th e ma ximumse nte nc e pr e sc ri be d b y c ur re nt N e w Y or

k la w f or Vi lle g a s’ Cla ss C dr ugfe lony is l e ss t ha n te n y e ars . Jud g e Am on se nte nc e d V ill e g a s to nin e ty -s ix mon ths in pr iso n, thr e e y e ars of

su pe rv ise d r e le a se , a

nd a $1 00 sp e c ia l a sse ssm e nt. W illiams An dr e Willi ams w a s arr e ste d o n M ay 6, 20 06 , f

or po sse ssi nga

ha nd g un . Wil liams ple a de d guil ty

to p os se ssi nga

fi re arm a ft e r h avin g be e n p re vio us ly c on vic te d o f a

n o ff e ns e punis ha ble by mor e tha n o ne y e ar i mpr iso nme nt, in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g )( 1) , a nd to po sse ssi nga

fi re a rm wi th t he se ri a l numbe rs ob lit e rate d, in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( k) . It is
un dis pute d th a t Will iams h a d b e e n p re vio us ly c on vic te d o f t

he fo llo wi ngfe lon ie s: 1
. J un e 1 9 9 0 : a

N e wY o r k C l a s s C a t t e mp t e d

dr u g s a l e f e l o n y. 2
. A u g u s t1 9 9 3 : anA C C A p r e d i c a t e v i o l e n tf e l o n y. 3. August 1993: an ACCA predicate violent felony
.7

Wil liams was sentenc ed on May 18, 2007. At sentenc ing, the g overnme nt argued that these thre e prior c onvictions subjected Willi ams to the fiftee n y ear mandatory

minimum sentenc e of the ACCA, in Section 924(e) . The sole dispute wa s whether Wil liams’ conviction for the Ne w Y o rkC l as s C at t em p t eddru g s al e w as a c o n v i ct i o nfo r as er i o u s dru g o ff en s e. J u d ge Gleeson de termined that the A CCA enhance ment did not apply , havingexplained in a preliminary

written dec ision that the plain meaning of the ACCA compe ls the conclusion that Wil liams’ conviction for the New Y ork Class C drug felony was not a c onviction for a se rious drugoffe nse. United States v. Willi ams, 462 F. Supp. 2d 342 (E.D .N.Y. 2006). Judge Gleeson sentenc ed Willi ams to eig hty -four months in prison, t hree y ear s of supervise d rele ase, a nd a $200 specia l assessment. 2004 Rock

efeller Drug Law Reform Act In 2004, afte r a pr otrac ted and ve ry public debate , see People v. Denton, 793 N.Y.S.2d 886, 891 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2005), re v’d on other grounds by 839 N.Y.S.2d 120 (App. Div. 2d Dep’ t 2007), NewYork pa ssed the Rocke feller DrugL aw Ref

orm Act (“ Reform Ac t”), whic h signif ic antl y low e re d th e ma ximumte rm s o f i mpriso nme nt p re sc ri be d f or c e rt a in d ru g of fe ns e s, including Class B and Class C felony drugoffe nses. See N.Y . Penal L aw § 70.70 ( McKinney 2004); 2004 N.Y. L aws Ch. 738 § 36 (e ffe ctive Jan. 13, 2005). The Ref orm Act did not amend the statutory

definitions or classifica

tions of the underly

ing of fense s. Ex cept f

or a te chnica l amendment in 1995, see 1995 N.Y. L aws Ch. 75, § 7, the def inition and classification of the statut or y of fe ns e s h a s n ot b e e n a lte re d s inc e the se de fe nd ants we re c on vic te d in state c ourt . Un de r t he Roc ke fe lle r d

ru g -s e nte nc inglaws in p la c e a t th e tim e of the de fe nd ants ’ s tate convictions, a maximum term of at least ten y ear s imprisonment was presc ribed by New Y ork8

law for Class B and Class C drugoffe nses. See N.Y . Penal L aw § 70.00( 2). Unde r the c urre nt sentenc ing la

ws introduced by

the Refor m Act, the maximum term of imprisonment pre scribed by law for the Class C drug offe nses committed by Arc her, V illega s and Will iams, and for the Cla ss B dr

ugof fe ns e c omm itt e d b y

so me on e , s uc h a s D ard e n, wi th n o p ri or dr ugfe lon ie s, is l e ss than ten y ear s. See N.Y. Pena l L aw §§ 70.70( 4)(b) (ii) (providingthat maxi mum sentence for Class C drug f

elony committed by

someone in worst c riminal history class is nine y ear s) and 70 .7 0( 2) (a )( i) (p ro vid ingthat maximumse nte nc e fo r C la ss B dr ugfe lony c omm itt e d b y

fi rs t- tim e fe lony dr ugof fe nd e r i s n ine y e ars ). Th e Re fo rm Ac t, h ow e ve r, did

no t be c ome e ff

e c tiv e un til J anuar y 13, 2005, and the c urre nt sentencinglaws do not apply to crimes committed bef ore the eff ective da te. See People v. U tsey , 7 N.Y.3d 398, 401 (2006)
. Thus , if the de fe nd ants we re to e ng a g e in t he same c on du c t to da

y , th e ir of fe ns e s w ou ld
car ry a maximum term of less than te n y ear s. Howeve r, bec ause the Reform Ac t is not retroa ctive, if the de fenda nts were somehow sentenc ed today for the spe cific, pr e-Ref

orm-Ac t conduct that led to their

prior convic tions, the defenda nts would be subject to a maximum t erm of at lea st ten y ear s. DI SCU SSIO N Th e AC CAde fi ne s a

“ se ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e ,” in r e le va

nt p art , a s “ an o ff

e ns e un de r S tate law . . . for

which a max imum term of imprisonment of ten y ear s or more is pre scribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (A)( ii). The sole issue c onsolidated for disposition on appea l is whether a prior state c onviction was a c onviction for a “ serious drugoffe nse” w ithin the meaning of the ACCA, where state law pr escr ibed a maximum s entenc e of at least ten y ear s for the of fense at the time of the state c onviction but state law, prior to fe dera l sentencing , prospec tively reduc ed theWe d o n ot a dd re ss t he qu e sti on

of ho w t o tr e a t a

state law, e na c te d a ft e r t

he state 4 conviction but prior to fe dera l sentencing , that incre ases the pe nalty for a drugcrime. This mig ht raise e x post facto c oncer ns, which we have no oc casion to consider . Cf. United States v. Ke igue , 3 18 F .3 d 4 37 , 4 42 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) ( “ Th e Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s e xplic itl y mand a te that a court use the version of the Guidelines in eff ect on the date of the de fenda nt’s sentenc ing. T he exception to this rule a

rises whe n the ver sion of the Guidelines in ef fec t at the time of sentenc ing is more ‘seve re,’ than the ver sion in effe ct when the offe nse wa s committed. I n such ca ses, there is an ex post facto problem and the ear lier Guidelines should be a pplied.” (inter

nal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 9 ma ximumse nte nc e to l e ss t ha n te n y e ars fo r t

he same of

fe ns e c on du c t. Th is i s a

n is su e of fi rs t 4 impression in our circ uit. Bec ause the issue turns solely on an interpr etation of a

fede ral statute,
our re view is de novo. See , e.g ., United States v. King , 325 F.3d 110, 113 ( 2d Cir. 2003). In order to resolve this issue, we must first dec ide whethe r to apply the state’s c urre nt sentenc ing la

ws or the state ’s sentenc ing la ws in place at the time of the state conviction. B e c a us e we c on c lud e that th e AC CAdir e c ts c ourt s to a pp ly the state ’s c ur

re nt s e nte nc inglaws , we must next decide whe ther the max imum term curre ntly presc ribed by

New Y ork state law

for th e s e o f f e n s e s i s a tl e a s tt e nye ar s . U n d e r th e R e f o r mA c t , th e s e o f

f e n s e s ar e p un i s h a

b l e b y a maxi mum term of less than ten year s. A complication ar ises, howeve r, bec ause due to a prospec tive eff

ective- date c lause in the Ref orm Act, Ne w York c ontinues to permit the imposit ion of a maximum term g reater than te n y ear s for off enses c ommitt ed bef

ore the Reform Act’s e ffe ctive date
. I. Curre nt State Law We f ir st a dd re ss whe the r, in d e te rm ini ngthe ma ximumte rm that is pr e sc ri be d b y

state law for an off ense, w e should examine curr ent state lawor the state la w in place at the time of the state c onvic tio n. F oll ow inge ve ry c ourt to r e a c h th e iss ue , w e c on c lud e tha t se nte nc ingc ourt sIn Dar den, Judge Johnson concluded that the c onviction was for a ser ious drug offe nse, 5 but did not ex plain the basis of this conclusion. I t is therefor e uncle ar whether J udg e Johnson deter mined that prior state la

w applied or

that curr ent state lawapplied, but the maximum term presc ribed by

curr ent state lawis more than ten y ear s. In Hammons, J udg e Tra g er c oncluded that a pre- Reform-A ct conviction for a Ne w York 6 Class C drug f

elony was not a c onviction for a se rious drugoffe nse. No a ppeal wa s taken fr om that decision. 10 should ex amine cur

rent state la

w. See United States v. Morton, 17 F .3d 911, 915 (6th Cir. 5 19 94 ); Uni tedS tat es v . Ha mm on s, 43 8 F. S up p. 2d12 5, 12 8 (E .D. N.Y . 2 00 6); Arch er, 4 61 F. 6 Supp. 2d at 219; W illiams, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 345; cf. United States v. Hinojosa, 349 F .3d 200, 205 (5th Cir.2003) (a

pplying c urre nt state law, but not dec iding whe ther c urre nt or past state law g overns) . Our re ason is simple: the ACCA’s definition of a “se rious drugoffe nse” use s the pr e se nt t e ns e in r e fe rr ingto t he a pp lic a ble state law. I f C on g re ss h a d w ante d s e nte nc ingc ourt s to examine the state law in plac e at the time of the state c onviction, it could have ea sily so provided by defininga “se rious drugoffe nse” a s “an of fense under state law . . . for which a max imum term of imprisonment of ten year s was pre scribed by law at the time of

conviction.” Rathe r than choosingthis course, Cong ress e nacte d the ACCA, which re fer s to the max imum sentence that “is presc ribed” by

state law. The prese nt tense sig nals that sentenc ing c ourts should ex amine the state’s c urre nt sentencingscheme . See Hammons, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (“The prese nt tense of the ver b ‘is’ denote s that the curr ent sentenc ing struc ture is re levant, rather than the sentenc e that was pre scribed by

law at the time of

the ea rlier c rime.”) ; Wi lliams, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (“The re is no ling uistic or . . . logic al basis for r eadingthe statute to embra ce those state drug convictions for which a maximum t erm of imprisonment of te n y ear s or more w as pre scribed by law . . . . In short, ‘is’ mea ns ‘is,’ not ‘is or wa s . . . .’”)
.There was no sug g estion in Rodriquez t hat the re levant maximum terms had be en 7 amende d since the state conviction; thus, the Rodriquez Court had no occa sion to consider whether , afte r an inter

veningamendment, the state’s cur rent or pr ior law should be c onsulted. All of the def

endants c ommitt ed the f

elon-in-possession off

ense pr ior to the ena ctment 8 of the Ref orm Act but all of them we re se ntence d in fede ral c ourt subsequent to the Ref orm Act’s eff ective da te. The A CCA directs cour ts to ex amine the maximum t erm “ that is” presc ribed by state law. Courts make this assessment at the time of fe dera l sentencing . The pre sent tense of the statute thus dictates that c ourts should ex amine the state law in place at the time of the f eder al 11 Moreove r, this plain rea ding of the statute is confirme d by the statute’s purpose
. Con g re ss c ou ld h ave de fi ne d a “ se ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e ” in a

any numbe r o f w ay s: C on g re ss c ou ld h av e d ef i n edth e s er i o u s n es s o f adru g o ff en s e i nt erm s o f t h e w ei gh tan d ty p e o f t h e d ru gs involved; Congre ss could have de fined the se riousness of a drugoffe nse in terms of the a ctual state sentenc e imposed on the pa rticular de fenda

nt. Rather, Cong ress de fined the se riousness of
a dr ugof fe ns e in t e rm s o f t

he ma ximumse nte nc e that is pr e sc ri be d b y state law. As the Sup re me Court rec ently

explained, the purpose of this definition is to defe r to the sentenc ing policy of
eac h state as the me asure of the ser iousness of the drugoffe nse. In § 924(e) (2)( A)(ii), Cong ress c hose to rely on the ‘maximum term of imprisonment . . . presc ribed’ by

state law a s the measur e of the seriousness of state offe nses involving the manu fa c tur e , d istri butio n, or po sse ssi on

of ill e g a l dr ug s. Con g re ss p re suma

bly thought–not without rea son–that if state lawmakers pr ovide that a c rime is punishable by 10 y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt, the lawm ake rs mus t r e g ard the c ri me a s ‘ se ri ou s, ’ a

nd Con g re ss c ho se to d e fe r t o th e state lawm ake rs ’ j ud g me nt. Un ite d St a te s v . Ro dr iqu e z, 1 28 S.Ct . 1 78 3, 17 90 (2 00 8) ; se e Mo rt on , 1 7 F .3 d at 91 5 ( “ What is 7 evident . . . is that section 924(e )(2) (A)( ii), by looking to state se ntencinglaw, leaves the standa rd by which to judg e the se riousness of a state drugconviction to the policy of the state.” ). In light of this statutory

purpose, it was e minently rea sonable for

Congr ess to defe r to the state lawm ake r’ s c ur

re nt j ud g me nt r a the r t

ha n to the state lawm ake r’ s d isc ard e d ju dg me nt. Thus , a conside ration of the statutory purpose c onfirms our plain re adingof the statute’ s tex t: judges
s h o u l d ex am i n e t h e s t at e l aw i np l ac e a tth e t i m e o f t h e f ed er al s en t en ci n g. 8sentenc ing, not the state law in plac e at the time whe n the fe dera l offense was c ommitt ed. See

Morton, 17 F.3d at 915 (applying state law in plac e at time of f eder al sentenc ing) ; cf. Ke igue , 318 F.3d at 442 (“The SentencingGuidelines explicitl y mandate that a cour

t use the ver sion of the Guidelines in ef

fec t on the date of

the def endant’ s sentencing .”). The Morton Court explained that under the amende d Tenne ssee statute, the defe ndant’s 9 offe nse conduc t “has be en re classified f rom a Class B to a Class C felony ,” which c arr ies a lowe r sentenc e. 17 F .3d at 914. In an unpublished dec ision, a Tennesse e appe llate cour t expl ained that when a person c ommitt ed a Class B offe nse prior to this statute’s ef fec tive date, whic h was rec lassified to a less ser ious Class C offe nse bef ore his sente ncing , “the tria l court had the a u th o r it y to im p o s e c la s s B f

e lo n y s e n te n c e s f

o r th e c o n v ic ti o n s . ” Wi ll ia ms v . St a te , 2 0 0 4 WL 948370, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2004). I f this is corre ct, then the Te nnessee statute is not retroa ctive in the re levant sense
. 12 II. Non-Retr oactivity We next addre ss whether , under c urre nt New Yor k law, the maximum s entenc e presc ribed for

the def endants’ of

fense s is at least ten y ear s. The diffic ulty is that New Yor

k’s
curr ent law is not retr oactive. T here are two appar ently conflictingdecisions on this issue in our sis te r c ir c uit s. In Morton, the Six th Circuit reasone d that it was “e vident” that “se ction 924(e) (2)( A)(ii), by looking to state se ntencinglaw, lea ves the standa

rd by which to judg e the se riousness of a state drugconviction to the policy of the state.” 17 F.3d at 915. Accor dingly , beca use, at the time of fede ral sente ncing , “the State of Tenne ssee did not consider [t he def endant’ s drug offe nse] . . . serious enoug h to impose a ten-year sentenc e,” the Court concluded that the defe ndants’ prior c onviction was not a ser ious drug offe nse. I d. The Morton Court did not expli citly discuss whether

the amende d state statute wa s made re troac tive, but the Court noted that, as in this case, the state statute had a n expli cit, prospec tive eff ective date. I d. at 914. 9 In Hinojosa, the F ifth Circuit attempted to distinguish Morton on the g round that the amende d state statute re levant to Hinojosa’s c onviction, which re duced the maxi mum term ofAs discussed above , all four district cour ts in our circuit that explained their dec isions 10 on this iss ue held that, notwithstanding the non-re troac tivity of the Ref

orm Act, the max imum se nte nc e pr os c ri be d b y

c ur re nt N e w Y or

k la w f or the of fe ns e s at is su e in t

he pr e se nt c a se is l e ss tha n te n y e ars . Th e c ho ic e mig ht a lso tur n o n a c on sti tut ion a l pr ob le m po te nti a lly c re a te d b y

the fi rs t 11 method of fr aming the question. In New Y ork, a de fenda nt sentence d today

who committed the offe nse prior to January

13, 2005, is subject to a hig her max imum term than someone who committed the identical off ense a fter that date. In this way , the fa ct that the off ense w as committed prior to J anuar y 13, 2005, is a fac t used to increa se the maximum term of imprisonment. However , under the Appre ndi line of ca ses, “[o]t her tha n the fa ct of a

prior conviction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and prove d beyond a re asonable doubt.” Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The difficulty is that, beca

use the Ne w York pe nal law does not criminalize the timing of the offe nse, the timing of these off enses wa s not submit ted to a jur y , a nd pr ov e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. T hu s, if

a state c ourt

we re to s e nte nc e the se de fe nd ants tod ay , it

is n ot c le ar whe the r t

he state c ourt

c ou ld, c on sis te nt w iththe Sixth Amendment, take acc ount of the timing of the ir offe nses to incre ase the ir maxi mum term, g iven 13 imprisonment to less than ten y ear s, was not made r etroa ctive. 349 F .3d at 205. Relying on the
no n- re tr oa c tiv ity

of the ame nd e d s tate statut e , th e Hi no jos a Court he ld t hat th e pr ior

state
c onvic tio n w a s f

or a se ri ou s d ru g of fe ns e be c a

us e if the de fe nd ant “ we re se nte nc e d b y the state court for those crimes toda

y , he would still be subject to a maximum term of at least ten y ear s.” I d. 10 There are two way s of fra ming the r eleva

nt question: First, it mi g ht be aske d, following the Hinojosa Court, what maximum term is presc ribed by curr ent state lawfor someone who
c omm itt e d th e of

fe ns e c on du c t on theda te thede fe nd an t c om mi tte d th e off

e ns e . Second, it might be aske d what maximum term is presc ribed by curr ent state lawfor the of fense conduct, without reg ard to the date on which the de fenda nt happene d to commit the offense . The c hoice be tween these two methods of f

ramingthe question turns on whethe r the date of the c ommissi on of the of fe ns e is p ro pe rl y

re g ard e d a s p art

of the “ of fe ns e . . . f

or wh ic h” the ma ximumte rm is presc ribed by

law. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2)( A)(ii). 11that th is f

a c t w a s n ot s ub mitte d to the jur y or ne c e ssa ri ly ma de pa rt of the ir c on vic tio ns . T his problem did not arise in Rodriquez bec ause that case dealt with the fa ct of a prior convic tion, which fa lls withi n the Appre ndi exception. By contra st, the Supreme Court has ne ver c reated a Sixth A me ndme nt e xce pti on fo r u sin g the fa c t of

of fe ns e -t imi ngto i nc re a se a ma ximumte rm . When this case wa s briefe d and ar g ued, the pa rties re lied heavily

on Taylor v. United 12 States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). In Rodriquez, the Supreme Court saw “ no connec tion . . . between the issue in Taylor (the mea ning of the term ‘bur g lary ’ in § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii)) a nd the issue her e (the mea ning of the phra se ‘maximum t erm of imprisonment . . . pre scribed by law’ unde r § 924(e) (2)( A)(ii)) .” 128 S.Ct. at 1790. I n holding that a n “off ense” simply

means the violation of the g ov e rn ingstatut e , th e Rod ri qu e z Court

a pp e are d to re

je c t Ro dr iqu e z’s argume nt t hat, under Ta ylor and c ommon usag e, an “ offe nse” is “g ener ally . . . understood to desc ribe the e le me nts c on sti tut inga

c ri me .” I d. a t 17 88 . I f t

he statut or

y te rm “ of fe ns e ” we re int e rp re te d to mean the e lements constituting a c rime, and the “maximum term” r efe rre d to the maxi mum term pr e sc ri be d f

or so me on e wh o c omm itt e d th e ba sic of fe ns e e le me nts , th e de fe nd ants in t his c a se would cer tainly preva il because there can be no sug g estion that the timing of the illeg al drug conduct, nowhe re me ntioned in the g overningpenal law , is an eleme nt of the drugoffe nses under New Y ork law. A s will be discussed below, the Rodrique z C ourt’s def inition of “offe nse,” int e rp re te d in

lig ht o f t he AC CA ’s purp os e , yie lds sim ila r r e su lts : c on du c t th a t in c re a se s a maxi mum term of imprisonment is part of the “ offe nse” to whic h the “maximum t erm” is tied only if the state view s that conduct a s bear ing on the seriousness of the offe nse. 14 Th e Sup re me Court ’s re c e nt R od ri qu e z de c isi on , w hic h a dd re sse d th e same de fi nit ion in the ACCA of a “ serious drugoffe nse,” c auses us to examine the issue a bit more c losely . The k e y s t a tu t o r y t e r m s ar e “ o f

f e n s e , ” “ l aw ” an d

“ m a x i mu mt e r

m . ” R o dr i qu e z , 1 2 8 S
. C t . a t1 7 8 7
. In Rodriquez, the Supreme Court explained that an “of fense ” simply

means the violation of the g overningcriminal statute. 128 S.Ct. at 1787. Her e, the Ne w York statutes de fining the 12 offe nse conduc t, and setting out the felony classifications, have not bee n meaning fully amende d since the state convictions. Thus, Dar den’s r eleva nt “offe nse” is havingsold a controlled substance, of

a statutorily

specifie d weig ht and ty

pe cla ss, in violation of New York Pena l L aw § 22 0. 39 ; A rc he r’ s, Willi ams’ and Vi lle g a s’ re le va

nt o ff e ns e s a re havin g a tte mpt e d to se ll controlled substanc es, of a statutorily

specifie d weig ht and ty

pe cla ss, in violation of New York15

P en al L aw § 2 2 0
. 1 6 (1 ). T h e “ l aw ” i s th e s t at e l aw th at p re s cr i b es th e ap p l i cab l e s en t en ci n g ra n ge for the of fense and the “ maxi mum term” is the maxim um sentence that can be imposed for the offe nse. Rodriquez, 128 S.Ct . at 1787-88. In Rodriquez, the question was whethe r the “ maxi mum term of imprisonment” for the purp os e s o f § 92 4( e )( 2) (A )( ii) is d e te rm ine d w ithor wi tho ut r e fe re nc e to r e c idi vis t
e nh anc e me nts . I d. a t 17 87 . T he state se nte nc inglaw p re sc ri be d a ma ximumte rm

of fi ve y e ars ’ imprisonment for a f

irst-time violator of the drug -traf fickingstatute but a maxim um term of ten y ear s’ imprisonment for a subse quent violator of the sa me drug -traf

fickingstatute. I d. at 1786- 87. The Court held that the inc rea sed maxim um term applica ble to rec idivist s was the maximum te rm pr e sc ri be d f

or the of fe ns e by state law. I d. a t 17 88 . T he de fe nd ant h a d a rgue d, in e ff

e c t, that th e state law p un ish e d tw o d if fe re nt o ff e ns e s: the state punis he d th e dr ug -t ra ff ic kin g of fe ns e by a maximum term of f

ive y ear s and the state punishe d the offe nder’ s status as a re cidivist by an additional maxi mum term of five year s. I d. Thus, the def endant a rgued, the maximum t erm presc ribed by

law for the drug -traf

fickingoffe nse wa s only

five y ear s. I d. Simi larly , the defe ndant, dra

wing on the ACCA definition’s purpose of defe rringto state lawmake rs’ judg ment about the ser iousness of a dr ug -traf fickingoffe nse, ar g ued that the incr ease d maxi mum term applicable to rec idivist s should not be used to measure the seriousne ss of the drug -traf ficking offe nse bec ause the defe ndants’ status as a rec idivist has no bea

ring on the seriousne ss of the dr ug -t ra ff ic kin g of fe ns e . I d. a t 17 89 . T he Court re je c te d th is a

rgume nt o n th e g ro un d th a t it “re st[ ed] on the err oneous proposition that a def endant’ s prior re cord of

convictions has no bear ing on the seriousness of a n offe nse.” I d. As the Court explained, “an of fense committed by
a re peat of

fende r is often thoug ht to reflec t gr eate r culpa bility and thus to merit g reater punishment.” I d.On the one ha nd, the Rodriquez Court stated that a re cidivist offense is a n “ag g ravated 13 offe nse,” sug g esting that rec idivism is part of the ( ag g ravated) off ense. I d. On the other

hand, the Rodriquez Court stated that “[t] he ‘of fense ’ in ea ch of the drug -deliver y case s was a violation of [Revised Code of Washington] §§ 69.50.401(a)( ii)-(iv).” I d. at 1787-88. The ref ere nced Was hin g ton

statut e , w hic h d e fi ne s th e dr ug -t ra ff ic kin g c ri me , ma

ke s n o me nti on

of re c idi vis m, sug g esting that rec idivism is not part of the off ense. 16 Mo re br oa dly , th e Cou

rt re je c te d th e pr e mis e , c omm on to b oth argume nts , th a t r e c idi vis t statutes punish something other than the off

ense of conviction. I f [the defe ndant] were c orre ct that a de fenda nt’s rec ord of pr ior convictions has no bear ing on the seriousness of a n offe nse, then it would follow that any incre ased punishment imposed under a r ecidivist provision would not be based on the of fense of conviction but on something e lse–presuma bly the def endant’ s prior cr imes or the defe ndant' s “status as a r ecidivist.” B ut we have square ly reje cted this understa

nding of rec idivism statutes. . . . [T] his Court consistently has sustained re peat- offe nder la ws as penalizing only

the last offe nse committed by the def endant. When a de fenda

nt is given a highe r s e nte nc e un de r a

re c idi vis m st a tut e . . . 1 00 % o f t he punis hme nt i s f

or the of fe ns e of convic tion. None is for the pr ior convictions or the de fenda nt's “ status as a re cidivist.” The sente nce is a

stiffene d penalty

for the latest crime, whic h is considere d to be an ag g ravated offe nse bec ause [it is] a re petitive one. I d. at 1789 (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted; third alteration in orig inal). I t is not clea r whe ther the Court c onsidered the defe ndant’s re cidivism to be part of the of fense of conviction. What is clear is that the Court dete rmined that whe n a state pr escr ibes a hig her

13 maxi mum term based on the r ecidivist nature of the offe nse, “100% of the punishment is for the offe nse of c onviction.” I d. (empha sis added). We d o n ot r e a d th is d isc us sio n a s d ic ta . B oth the te xt an d th e purp os e of the AC CA definition of a “ serious drugoffe nse” r equire an ana ly sis of whether an enha nced max imum term is for the drug -traf

fickingoffe nse of c onviction. The ACCA define s a “se rious drugoffe nse” a s a drug -traf

ficking“off

ense . . . f or which a

maxi mum term of imprisonment of ten y ear s or more is p re sc ri be d b y

law. ” 18 U. S.C. 92 4( e )( 2) (A )( ii) . T hu s, the AC CA ’s te xt re qu ir e s a deter mination of whether

an enha nced max imum term is punis hment for the dr ug -traf ficking17

offe nse. Simil arly , and per haps more importa

nt, the purpose of

the ACCA definition is to “defe r to state lawmake rs’ judg ment” of the seriousness of a drugoffe nse, Rodriquez, 128 S.Ct . at 1790, as expressed in the state ’s cur rent sente ncinglaws. I f a state deter mines that a drug -traf

ficking offe nse merits less than ten year s’ maxim um imprisonment, but permits t he imposition of a highe r maxim um sentence in an individual case for tec hnical re asons that have no bear ing on the state ’s c ur

re nt v ie w o f t

he se ri ou sn e ss o f t

he of fe ns e , it wo uld fr us tr a te the purp os e of

the AC CA to conclude that the drug -traf fickingoffe nse is a ser ious one. Cf. Be g ay v. United States, 128 S.Ct . 1581, 1587 (2008) ( interpre ting the A CCA’s para llel definition of a “violent f elony” as “viewe d in terms of the Ac t’s basic purpose s”). Acc ording ly , following the Rodriquez Court, we conc lude that conduc t that increa ses the maxi mum term of imprisonment is part of the “ offe nse of c onviction,” to which the “ maxi mum term” is tied for

purposes of the ACCA, only if the conduc t, in the state’s view, be ars on the

“ se ri ou sn e ss o f [the ] of

fe ns e .” Rod

ri qu e z, 1 28 S.Ct . at 17 89 . T he qu e sti on , at bo tto m, i s whether , in punishing the e arlier timed nature of

the offe nse more se vere ly , the state is meting out ext ra punishment for

the drug -traf

fickingoffe nse of c onviction. As the Rodriquez Court ex plained, ther e is no question that a subseque nt drug -traf ficking offe nse is a “mor e ser ious” drug -traf fickingoffe nse than a

first drug -traf

fickingoffe nse, which the state view s as dese rving“g reater punishment.” See id. at 1789. Our que stion is whether, under N ew Yor

k law, the f

act that a drugoffe nse wa s committed before J anuar y 13, 2005, makes the offe nse “more serious” tha n an off ense c ommitt ed af

ter that da te. To be sure , there are some crimes that are more or le ss serious depe nding on the timing of the offe nse conduc t. See, e.g ., United States v. Mortimer, 52 F .3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “fa ilure to reg ister for a milit ary draf t may be a mor e ser ious offense punished more18

ha rs hly duri nga tim e of wa r t ha n in pe a c e tim e ” ). B ut a

dr ugc ri me is n ot p la

us ibl y in t his cate g ory . The Ref

orm Act, a

nd its legislative history , amply confirm that Ne w York doe s not view drugcrimes c ommitt ed bef ore January

13, 2005, as “more serious” tha n drugcrimes
c omm itt e d a ft e r t

hat date . Rathe r, the no n- re tr oa c tiv ity pr ov isi on

wa s a lmo st s ur e ly

e na c te d to combat proble ms of retroa ctive administration. See Ha mmons, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (“Were the statut e ma de fu lly

re tr oa c tiv e to a ll c la sse s o f f e lon ie s, imp le me nti ngthi s p ro vis ion to possibly thousands of ca ses would be a n enormous burde n on the state c ourt sy stem.”). To beg in, unlike the expli cit statutory rec idivism enhanc ement at issue in Rodriquez, the Reform Ac t does not contain an e x plicit enhance ment for dr ug crimes c ommitt ed bef

ore January 13, 2005. Rather, the only indication in the Reform Ac t that drug crimes c ommitt ed bef ore the eff ective da te would re main subject to the hig her max imum terms is found in the Reform Act’s eff ective- date c lause. Except for the linge ring eff ects c reated by

this effe ctive-date clause , the Rockefe ller drugsentenc ing la ws wer e re peale d entirely
. Second, the leg islative history of the Ref

orm Act amply

confirms that the pur

pose of the Re fo rm Ac t w a s to re pla c e the ha rs h Ro c ke fe lle r s e nte nc inglaws wi th m or e a pp ro pr iate sentenc ing la

ws, not to recognize a new c lass of drugoffe nses that wer e less ser ious beca use they
we re c omm itt e d a ft e r t

he statut e ’s e ff

e c tiv e date . T he le g isl a tiv e sp on so rs of the Ne w Y or

k b ill , in a sec tion described a s “justification” for the sentenc ing r eductions, desc ribed the Rocke feller dr uglaws a s p ro vid ing“ ino rd inate ly ha rs h p un ish me nt f

or low le ve l no n- vio le nt d

ru g of fe nd e rs ”
as we ll as misdirecting public funds for the incar cer ation of these of fende rs. See Ne w York Sponsors Memorandum, Ch. 738 (2004) ( “Ne w York’ s ‘Rockef eller D rugL aws’ ha

ve bee n the
su bje c t of int e ns e c ri tic ism

fo r m any y e ars . T he c ur

re nt l aws pr ov ide ino rd inate ly ha rs h punishment for low leve l non-violent drugoffe nders, wa rehouse offe nders in state pr ison who19

c ou ld m or e pr od

uc tiv e ly be pla c e d into e ff

e c tiv e dr ugtr e a tme nt p ro g ra

ms a nd wa ste va lua

ble state tax doll ars whic h could be use d more e ffe ctively to provide drugtreatment to addicts and harsh punishment to violent criminals.”). T he g overnor , in calling for the le g islation, ex presse d a simil ar c ateg orica l rejec tion of the harshne ss of the Rockef eller se ntencinglaws. See G overnor ’s State of the State Addr ess deliver ed January 7, 2004, 2004 McKinney ' s Session L aw Ne ws of N.Y., No. 1, at A-14 (Apr . 2004) (“ The Rocke feller DrugL aws a llow non-violent drugoffe nders to be more se vere ly

punished than ra

pists. W e nee d to chang e that. L et’s re form these antiquated l aw s th i s y ea r. ”)
. T h e c o n s i s t en tv i ew o f t h es e s t at e l aw m ak er s wa s th at th e R o ck ef el l er dru gsentenc ing la

ws wer e too seve re, the n as now. I f t he re is a ny do ub t th a t th e Re fo rm

Ac t r e fl e c te d a

c a te g or ic a l r e

je c tio n o f t

he ha rs hn e ss of the Rocke feller

sentenc ing la

ws, no matter whe n the under lying of fense s occur

red, this doubt is dispelled by

the Refor m Act’s inclusion of unique se ntencingreduc tions for those sentenc ed
un de r t he dis c ard e d, “ ino rd inate ly ha rs h” Roc ke fe lle r l aws . Pr iso ne rs c on vic te d und e r t he old laws fo r C la ss B and

Cla ss C dr

ugfe lon ie s w e re g ra

nte d uniq ue , e xpand e d o pp or

tun iti e s to qu a lif y fo r s e nte nc ingre du c tio ns that su bs tanti a lly

low e re d th e ir

se nte nc e s ( fr om u

p to on e -s ixth to, in some instances, one- third of the sente nce imposed) and to obtain ea rly termination of parole . See N.Y. L aws Ch. 738, §§ 7, 8, 30 (2004); Utse y , 7 N.Y.3d at 403 ( noting that the statut e inc lud e s “ ame lio rativ e pr ov isi on s d e sig ne d to a ff or d d ist inc t se nte nc ingre lie f t o defe ndants who committed their cr imes prior to its effe ctive date ”). This c onfirms that, in the state’s view , the new policy of lower ed sente nces should be ma de ava ilable to ever y one convicted of

these drugoffe nses, no matter when the of fense s were committed. In s um, “ the re is n o r e a so n to be lie ve tha t th e no nr e tr oa c tiv ity

of the Re fo rm

Ac t r e fl e c ts a state le g islative view that pre -Refor m Act drugfelonies we re c ateg orica lly more ser ious than20

tho se takin g pla c e a ft e r i t w a s e na c te d. ” Willi ams, 46 2 F . Su pp . 2 d at 34 7; s e e a lso Ha mmo ns , 43 8 F . Su pp . 2 d at 12 9- 30 . A c c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e tim ingof the of fe ns e c on du c t is not part of the of

fense of convic tion to which the maxi mum term is tied for purposes of the ACCA. There is a final re ason why we do not conside r the state’ s non-re troac tivity decision signif ic ant i n th is c on te xt. T he Sup re me Court re c e ntl y e xpla ine d th a t th e de c isi on wh e the r t o make a newly rec og nized lega l rig ht retroa ctive is normally a re medial dec ision that should not be conf used with an a ssessment of the tempora l scope of the leg al rig ht. See Danf orth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008) (“What we a re a ctually

deter mining whe n we a ssess the ‘re troac tivity ’ of a

new r ule is not the temporal scope of a ne wly announce d rig ht, but whether a violation of the rig ht that occur red pr ior to the announc ement of the new r ule will entitle a criminal def

endant to the r elief soug ht.”). Similarly here , the Refor

m Act re flec ts the state’s
curr ent normative judg ment about the ser iousness of these of fense s and this normative judg ment plainly applies to past cr imes as well as ne w cr imes. The state’ s decision not to make its curr ent sentenc ing la

ws retr oactive–but r ather

to redre ss the inequities cre ated by the state’s “inordinate ly

harsh” sentenc ing la

ws throug h other ameliorative provisions–is a re medial decision, which ha s no bear ing on the state’s c urre nt view that drugcrimes of this nature, no matter whe n committed, merit less than a ten year maxi mum sentence . Be cause the ACCA instructs courts to defe r to state lawmakers’ curr ent judg ment about the seriousne ss of an off

ense a s expressed in their cur rent sente ncinglaws, we defe r to New York’s c urre nt judgment that these offe nses merit less than a ten y ear maxi mum sentence . See Wil liams, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (“F or first time C drugfelons, the ‘ New L aw’ presc ribes a f ive and one- half y ear

maxi mum. That is the max imum sentence that is now prescr ibed by New Y orkDa rd e n a lso c ha lle ng e s th e re a so na ble ne ss o f h is s e nte nc e . B e c a us e we va c a te his 14 sentenc e, we have no oc casion to rule on the rea sonablene ss of a sente nce not yet imposed. Wil liams’ reque st to defer briefingon his cross-a

ppeal is g rante d and the c lerk’s of fice 15 is directed to se t a brief

ing sc hedule f

or his cross-a

ppeal. 21 law. That a dwindling c lass of off ender s may

still be subjec t to sentencingunder the ‘Old L aw’ does not alter the fac t that it is the old law.” ( internal c itation omit ted)); Ha mmons, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (“ By

loweringthe sentenc es in ce rtain instance s and providingother for ms of amelioration, the State broug ht alrea dy pronounce d sentenc es more in line with its prese nt view of the ser iousness of the cr imes. This policy decision by

the State–not the mecha

nical re sult of applying the curr ent sentenc ing struc ture to Hammons’ past crimes-- is what should determine, for f eder al law pur

poses, whethe r ACCA should apply .”).

CO NC LU SION The ACCA, interpr eted in lig ht of its purpose, leave s no ambig uity : the maxi mum
se nte nc e tha

t “ is p re sc ri be d” by

state law f

or the se of fe ns e s is le ss t

ha n te n y e ars . H ow e ve r, if any ambig uity

rema ined, there beingno contra ry leg islative history , see A rche r, 461 F . Supp. 2d
a t 21 9 n . 4 , a

nd the re be inga

str on g argume nt t o inte rp re t th e statut e in t he wa y we do , w e wo uld apply the rule of

lenity to rea ch the same conc lusion. S ee United States v. R.L .C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992) ( “We do not think any ambig uity

survives. I f any

did, however , we would c hoose the construction yielding the shorter se ntence by restingon the vene rable rule of le nity rooted in the instinctive distaste ag ainst men languishing in prison unless the law maker has cle arly

said they should.” (interna l citation omitt ed))
. For the fore g oing r easons, Da rden’ s sentence is vacated and the matter is rema nded; 14 Ar c he r’ s and

Vi lle g a s’ s se nte nc e s are a ff ir me d; a nd Willi ams’ s se nte nc e is a ff ir me d in pa rt . 15