alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3976 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3976

   To provide a mechanism for the determination on the merits of the 
   claims of claimants who met the class criteria in a civil action 
relating to racial discrimination by the Department of Agriculture but 
                  who were denied that determination.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 28, 2006

Mr. Allen (for himself and Mr. Grassley) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide a mechanism for the determination on the merits of the 
   claims of claimants who met the class criteria in a civil action 
relating to racial discrimination by the Department of Agriculture but 
                  who were denied that determination.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Pigford Claims Remedy Act of 2006''.

SEC. 2. DETERMINATION ON MERITS OF PIGFORD CLAIMS.

    (a) In General.--Any Pigford claimant who has not previously 
obtained a determination on the merits of a Pigford claim may, in a 
civil action, obtain that determination.
    (b) Intent of Congress as to Remedial Nature of Section.--It is the 
intent of Congress that this section be liberally construed so as to 
effectuate its remedial purpose of giving a full determination on the 
merits for each Pigford claim denied that determination.
    (c) Definitions.--In this Act--
            (1) the term ``Pigford claimant'' means an individual who 
        previously submitted a late-filing request under section 5(g) 
        of the consent decree in the case of Pigford v. Glickman, 
        approved by the United States District Court for the District 
        of Columbia on April 14, 1999; and
            (2) the term ``Pigford claim'' means a discrimination 
        complaint, as defined by section 1(h) of that consent decree 
        and documented under section 5(b) of that consent decree.
                                 <all>
```
#### Moshe Dayan AITCH, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Denise Lechele MAYBIN; Anetra Lashun Smith; Tuwana Williams, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 08-7835.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 23, 2009.

Decided: April 30, 2009.

*282Moshe Dayan Aitch, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Moshe Dayan Aitch appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2006). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Aitch that failure to file timely specific objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Aitch failed to file specific objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. *Wright v. Collins,*766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir.1985); *see also Thomas v. Arn,*474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Aitch has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
|   | (1)      | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and |
|--------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2)      | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the date and for the periods indicated. |
|--------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: May 31, 2011                                                               |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                        |
| /s/ Dean R. Marks                                                                |
| Dean R. MarksPresident and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Dreyden, Appellant.

Submitted August 17, 2009;

decided August 27, 2009

Reported below, 23 Misc 3d 34.

*733Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Steven Banks, Esq., the Legal Aid Society, 199 Water Street, New York, NY 10038 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
#### In the Matter of Sheila A. Griffin, Respondent, v Lamont A. Barton, Jr., Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 883]

— Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (John J. Rivoli, J.H.O.), entered February 21, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8. The order, among other things, directed respondent to stay away from petitioner.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Present — Scudder, EJ., Peradotto, Carni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed July 5, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00602-CR 

JEREMY GRAY HECKFORD, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CR2100639 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Garcia 

Before the Court is appellant’s June 29, 2022 motion to dismiss the appeal. 

The motion complies with rule 42.2(a). TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). We grant the motion 

and dismiss this appeal. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

220602F.U05 

 

/Dennise Garcia/ 

DENNISE GARCIA 

JUSTICE 
 –2– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JEREMY GRAY HECKFORD, 

Appellant 

No. 05-22-00602-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law No. 1, Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CR2100639. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. 

Justices Molberg and Reichek 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal. 

Judgment entered July 5, 2022
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-1304

___________

Taye Sillga, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

v. * of Minnesota.

*

Fairview University Medical Center, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 18, 2001

Filed: October 26, 2001

___________

Before BYE, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In August 1999, Taye Sillga filed this action against his former employer,

Fairview University Medical Center, alleging sexual harassment and wrongful

termination. In the sixteen months that followed, Sillga did not respond to or initiate

any discovery. He also twice refused opposing counsel’s offer to dismiss without

prejudice and waive the statute of limitations if the case was refiled within 60 days.

 In August 2000, Sillga's attorney withdrew, citing Sillga's uncooperative behavior

as the reason for withdrawal. In September 2000, Fairview moved to dismiss with

prejudice. The district court ordered that unless Sillga found a new lawyer or
-2-

addressed the merits of the motion to dismiss, the motion would be granted. When

Sillga failed to comply and instead requested another extension of 60 days, the district

court dismissed the case with prejudice. 

On appeal, Sillga contends the district court committed clear error in finding

he failed to prosecute his case and disregarded court orders. See Rodgers v. Curators

of the University of Missouri, 135 F.3d 1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998). In support of this

contention, Sillga has submitted a motion to supplement the record with his affidavit

describing his former attorney's allegedly neglectful conduct. Because Sillga knew

of his attorney's conduct during the district court proceedings but did not make his

concerns part of the record, the interests of justice do not require us to grant Sillga’s

motion to supplement the record. See Miller v. Benson, 51 F.3d 166, 168 (8th Cir.

1995). Further, Sillga argues the district court abused its discretion in deciding that

dismissal with prejudice was the appropriate sanction. See Rodgers, 135 F.3d at

1219. Given Sillga’s failure to prosecute his lawsuit or comply with the district

court's orders, we conclude the court acted within its discretion when dismissing

Sillga's case with prejudice.

We thus affirm the decision of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Ilene Katz, Appellant, v Chandranath Sen, M.D., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[974 NYS2d 410]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered June 5, 2012, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendants Chandranath Sen, MD, and Peter Costantino, MD (defendants), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was improperly diagnosed with a small tumor, or microadenoma, in her pituitary gland and underwent surgery that turned out to have been unnecessary because there was no tumor found. She alleged that defendant Sen had doubts concerning the positive finding of the MRI, but did not advise her of those concerns and proceeded to perform the surgery with defendant Cosantino.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants met their prima facie burden by submitting the affirmation of a medical expert who opined, inter alia, that they did not deviate from good medical practice in their treatment of plaintiff and properly relied on the MRI and MRI report, and that Dr. Sen properly explained to plaintiff the risks and benefits of surgery and “obtained informed consent as to the treatment options available for the pituitary microadenoma,” after advising her that she could wait and observe/monitor the tumor *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; *Balzola v Giese,*107 AD3d 587 [1st Dept 2013]).

In opposition, plaintiff articulated a claim, not separately pleaded in her complaint, that defendants did not obtain informed consent because they did not disclose that Dr. Sen had reservations about whether or not a tumor actually existed, and that she would not have consented to the surgery had she known that there might not be a tumor shown on her MRI films. Assuming the complaint adequately pleaded lack of informed consent, plaintiffs opposition to the motion was insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether defendants’ disclosure of “the risks, benefits and alternatives to the procedure or treatment” departed from what “a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed,” since “[e]xpert medical testimony is required to prove the insufficiency of the information disclosed to the plaintiff” *(Orphan v Pilnik,*15 NY3d 907, 908 [2010]; *Leighton*
      *439
      *v Lowenberg,*103 AD3d 530 [1st Dept 2013]; CPLR 4401-a). Absent any expert opinion supporting plaintiffs assertion that defendants were required to disclose any reservations or doubts to her, summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly granted *(see Gardner v Wider,*32 AD3d 728 [1st Dept 2006]). Moreover, defendants’ expert, in reply to plaintiff’s expanded lack of informed consent theory, opined unequivocally that it would have not been within the standard of care to advise plaintiff of the possibility that no tumor was present, because there was no basis for such a finding prior to surgery. Concur— Tom, J.P, Andrias, Friedman, Freedman and Clark, JJ. [Prior Case History: 35 Misc 3d 1236(A), 2012 NY Slip Op 51025(U).]
EX-35.2
(logo) GMAC Mortgage



SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

GMAC Mortgage, LLC

SEMT 2007-1



The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of GMAC Mortgage, LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer") pursuant to the applicable servicing agreement, does hereby
certify that:

1. A review of the Servicer's activities during the period covered by the
Issuing Entity's report on Form 10-K and of the Servicer's performance under
the applicable servicing agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable servicing agreement in
all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this
17th day of March 2008.



By: /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
Name: Anthony N. Renzi
Title: Executive Vice President



GMAC Mortgage, LLC
1100 Virginia Drive
Ft. Washington, PA 19034
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alden Ferguson, Appellant.

[872 NYS2d 187]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme *866Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), rendered August 17, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present for the second day of voir dire after being warned of the consequences of his refusal to return to the courtroom in accordance with the standards enunciated in *People v Parker*(57 NY2d 136, 140-141 [1982]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly completed jury selection in his absence (see *People v Severino,*44 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2007]; *People v Rosas,*34 AD3d 605 [2006]; *People v Ciccarello,*276 AD2d 637, 637 [2000]; *People v Myers,*215 AD2d 595, 596 [1995]).

The defendant’s contention that his adjudication as a persistent violent felony offender violated his right to a jury trial is unpreserved for appellate review (see *People v Rosen,*96 NY2d 329, 335 [2001]; *People v David B.,*14 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). In any event, as the defendant’s sentence was enhanced solely based upon his recidivism (see Penal Law § 70.08 [1] [a]), he was not entitled to a jury trial to determine the facts underlying his prior felony convictions (see *People v Myers,*33 AD3d 822, 822-823 [2006]; *People v Highsmith,*21 AD3d 1037, 1038-1039 [2005]). Mastro, J.P, Florio, Balkin and Eng, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 18, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-20388 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ROBERT GREEN, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-01-CR-512-1

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Robert Green, Jr., has moved for leave to withdraw from this appeal and has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Green was advised of the motion and served with a copy of counsel’s brief, but has not filed a response to the motion. Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Green waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for an upward departure from the guidelineNo. 03-20388 -2- sentencing range. The record reflects that Green’s guilty plea and waiver were knowing and voluntary, and the district court did not depart upward in sentencing Green. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Reserve System

The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and § 225.41 of the Board’s Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank holding company. The factors that are considered in acting on the notices are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).

The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for inspection at the office of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for that notice or to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must be received not later than May 28, 2009.

**A. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City**                     (Todd Offenbacker, Assistant Vice President) 1 Memorial Drive, Kansas City, Missouri 64198-0001:                

*1. William B. Vollbracht, individually, and as managing member of The GDO Partnership and Vollbracht Properties, LLC; and as controlling shareholder of Land Title Guarantee Company, and Land Title Insurance Corporation, all of Denver, Colorado; and as a member of a family group acting in concert consisting of Leslie D. Vollbracht, Carole E. Earle, Judith L. Freehling Trust, The GDO Partnership, Land Title Guarantee Company, Land Title Insurance Corporation, and Vollbracht Properties, LLC, all of Denver, Colorado; Dana L. Vollbracht, Castle Rock, Colorado; Alison Vollbracht Winfield, and Kirby Franklin Winfield III Trust, both of Seattle, Washington*; to retain control of Alpine Banks of Colorado, and thereby indirectly retain control of Alpine Bank, both of Glenwood Springs, Colorado.                

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 8, 2009.

Robert deV. Frierson,

Deputy Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. E9-11134 Filed 5-12-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
EX-35.7
(logo) LaSalle Bank

LaSalle Bank N.A.
135 South LaSalle Street
Suite 1625
Chicago, IL 60603

Global Securities and Trust Services


Annual Statement of Compliance

VIA: EMAIL

Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.
214 North Tryon Street, NCI-027-22-03
Charlotte, North Carolina 28255

Re: Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-1


Reference is made to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the "Agreement")
dated as of February 1, 2007, among Banc of America Commercial Mortgage Inc.,
as Depositor, Bank of America, National Association, as Master Servicer, LNR
Partners, Inc., as Special Servicer, and LaSalle Bank National Association, as
Trustee and REMIC Administrator.

I, Barbara L. Marik, a Senior Vice President of LaSalle Bank National
Association, as Trustee and REMIC Administrator hereby certify that:

(1) A review of the activities of the Trustee and REMIC Administrator during
the preceding calendar year and of the performance of the Trustee and REMIC
Administrator under the Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

(2) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Trustee and REMIC
Administrator have fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all
material respects throughout such year or a portion thereof.


Date: 02/27/08


LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee and REMIC Administrator

/s/ Barbara L. Marik
Barbara L. Marik
Senior Vice President
JOHN L. HILL Attorney General 

# The Attorney ~Generalof Texas

October 5, 197-a kg. ‘Q-A
Honorable Patrick J. Ridley Bell County Attorney P. 0. Box474 Belton, Texas 76513 Opinion No. II- 1252 Re: Applicability of the Texas Speedy Trial Act to juvenile cases. Dear Mr.Ridley: You have requested an opinion on whether the Texas Speedy Trial Act applies tojuvenile cases commenced under Title 3of the Texas Family Code. Your question islimited to the guarantees ofthis statute and does not extend to any constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Speedy Trial Act covers criminal actions which proceed by way of indictment, information, or complaint. Code Crim. Proc. art. 32A.02. A juvenile case under Title 3 is civil in nature and therefore is not a criminal action which would fall within the coverage of the Speedy Trial Act. An order entered in ajuvenile proceeding isexpressly not aconviction ofa crime nor may the order result ln the juvenile’s incarceration in apenal institution. Family Code .S 51.13. The action is not commenced with an indictment, complaint, or information but rather with a petition. Family Code S53.04. The rules of civil procedure control, Family Code section 51.17,even though the burden of proof is the same as that applied in criminal cases. Family Code S54.03(f). Appeal lies to the Courts of Civil Appeal and the Supreme Court. Family Code S56.01. The public has limited access to the juvenile court proceedings and records. Family Code SS51.14,51.16,54.08. It is our opinion that proceedings in juvenile court are not “criminal actions” and need not comply with provisions of the Speedy Trial Act. See, s Carrillo v.State, 480S.W.2d 812(Tex. 1972). SUMMARY The Speedy Trial Act does not extend tojuvenile court proceedings conducted under Title 3 of the Texas Family Code.

P- 4971Honorable Patrick J. Ridley - Page 2 (H-1252)

General of Texas

APPROVED:

Opinion Committee

P. 4972
Exhibit 32.3



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AFP Imaging Corporation
(the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2003, (the "Report"), I
Elise Nissen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







________/s/_____________
Elise Nissen,
Chief Financial Officer
November 13, 2003


                                       19