Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed February 15, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00884-CR

ANGEL DEBOTTIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 412th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 92795-CR

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N

After appellant Angel Debottis pleaded guilty to two counts of intoxication 

manslaughter, a jury assessed her punishment at fifteen years’ confinement for

each count. She challenges the judgment in two issues. Appellant argues that the 

trial court reversibly erred in admitting (1) appellant’s post-Miranda statements

and (2) a toxicology report included in appellant’s medical records. After 

reviewing the record and legal authority, we overrule both issues and affirm the 

trial court’s judgment.
2

Background

Appellant consumed several alcoholic beverages and then crashed her car 

into another vehicle, killing the other vehicle’s two occupants. Alvin Police 

Department Officers Matthew Jrab and John Flores responded to the scene. 

Emergency personnel treated appellant in the back of an ambulance. Appellant 

admitted to having four alcoholic beverages before driving her car. 

While appellant was in the ambulance, Officer Flores told her that she was 

in custody for suspicion of intoxication manslaughter and read appellant her

Miranda rights,

1

including her right to remain silent. She chose to remain silent. 

The ambulance transported appellant to a nearby hospital. Officer Jrab 

accompanied appellant to the hospital and stayed with her for several hours, to 

“make sure that she didn’t try to flee or anything like that.”

Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of intoxication manslaughter, and the 

case proceeded to a punishment trial by jury. During trial, the court admitted, 

among other things, video footage from the officers’ body-worn cameras and 

appellant’s medical records from the hospital.

The jury assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement in the penitentiary 

for a term of fifteen years for each count. The trial court signed a judgment in 

accordance with the jury’s verdict, ordering that the sentence for count two would

run consecutively with the sentence for count one. 

Appellant timely appealed.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

Analysis

A. Admission of Post-Miranda Statements

In her first issue, appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of certain 

post-Miranda statements. The State introduced evidence that, while in the 

hospital, appellant was “flirtatious” with Officer Jrab, was concerned about the 

location of her debit card so she could post bond, “giggl[ed] and laugh[ed],” and 

said that she believed her life was over. According to appellant, the State relied on 

this evidence to suggest that appellant was unconcerned for the victims and

“selfish, recalcitrant, and lacking in remorse,” which probably led the jury to assess 

a more severe punishment than it would have without this evidence. Appellant 

complains that the State’s use of this evidence to imply a lack of remorse violated 

her right to remain silent, which she invoked when advised of her Miranda rights 

while in the ambulance.

To safeguard a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, law enforcement officials must inform a person in custody before 

questioning that she has the right to remain silent and that any statement she makes 

may be used against her in court. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Ramos v. State, 245 

S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Trial comments on a defendant’s 

decision to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings violate due process and 

infringe on the right against self-incrimination. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 

U.S. 284, 295 (1986); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 356 (Tex. Crim. App.

1995) (commenting on a defendant’s post-arrest silence is akin to commenting on 

his failure to testify at trial because it attempts to raise an inference of guilt arising 

from the invocation of a constitutional right). Generally, a comment on a 

defendant’s lack of remorse is an impermissible reference to the defendant’s failure 

to testify (or otherwise remain silent) because only the defendant can testify as to 
4

her own remorse. Swallow v. State, 829 S.W.2d 223, 225-26 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992); Dickinson v. State, 685 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

The State responds that the record shows no Miranda violation because the 

hospital conversations at issue did not stem from a custodial “interrogation,” and 

because an accused’s volunteered statements following Miranda warnings are 

admissible, even if the statements were made while in custody. The State cites 

Pugh v. State, 624 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 

521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and Crawford v. State, 648 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.)), for the proposition that when a suspect 

invokes her right to remain silent but then initiates “small talk” with law 

enforcement, she “waives her Fifth Amendment rights, and its protections fall

away.”

We will presume without deciding that the challenged portions of 

appellant’s post-Miranda conversations with Officers Jrab and Flores in the 

hospital, together with testimony that appellant did not inquire about the victims, 

amounted to an impermissible comment on appellant’s silence as a lack of remorse 

and was erroneously admitted. Admission of evidence in violation of appellant’s 

Fifth Amendment right to remain silent would be constitutional error, see Ramos, 

245 S.W.3d at 419, which we review under the constitutional harmless-error 

standard. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). Under this standard, we must conclude that 

the error was harmful unless we determine “beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.” Id. Factors we consider 

include “the nature of the error (e.g., erroneous admission or exclusion of 

evidence, objectionable jury argument, etc.), whether it was emphasized by the 

State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely 
5

have assigned to it in the course of its deliberations.” Snowden v. State, 353 

S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Appellant cites portions of Officer Flores’s testimony to support her 

contention that the State’s repeatedly emphasized her lack of remorse:

Q. Okay. Now you’ve been there 20 plus minutes. Correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Has she asked you about the victims at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. Asked you if anybody is doing all right that was out on scene?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did she ask about her debit card?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did she ask about her debit card a couple of times?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And was it after it couldn’t be located it appears that she first 

showed signs of emotion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And did you hear her make some comment about how she 

wasn’t going to be able to bail out of jail tonight because she didn’t

have her debit card?

A. It was intelligible [sic] to me at the time. I couldn’t understand.

Q. Were you able to hear it now?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. So that was when she showed emotion. Not about the two 

deceased people. Correct?

A. That’s correct, sir.

. . .

Q. And to you what does her main concern appear to be at this point 

in time?
6

A. Undergarments.

Q. Okay. Her underwear?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Not the condition of [] anybody or anybody’s family members. 

Correct?

A. No, sir.

Q. But retrieving her underwear. Correct?

A. Yes, sir.

This brief testimony came during a longer examination of Officer Flores, 

who was one of fifteen prosecution witnesses (in addition to four defense 

witnesses). Appellant also points to the officers’ body-cam videos, but it is unclear 

from the record how much of the videos were played to the jury. Based on our 

review of the exhibits, the periodic small talk between appellant and Officer Jrab, 

which was punctuated by long periods of silence, comprised at most fifteen to 

twenty minutes of a two-and-a-half-hour-long video of Officer Jrab’s presence at 

the hospital.

2

 The video of Officer Flores’s twenty-minute presence at the hospital

included the questions from appellant regarding the whereabouts of her debit card 

and underwear. Again, these interactions with appellant were only a few minutes 

long. Notably, the State did not refer to Officer Flores’s testimony, or either

2 The prosecutor and Officer Jrab had the following exchange:

Q. So the video is for the jury to see and they can see the entirety of the video. Is 

that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. But the last -- and it’s not quite 30 minutes. It’s a little under 30 minutes -- is 

where a conversation takes place between you and the Defendant. Is that correct?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Okay. Prior to that there is not a whole lot of talking going on. It’s just you in 

the room watching her on the hospital bed. Is that right?

A. Correct. Yes, ma’am.
7

officer’s body-cam video, during closing argument. We do not find that the State 

placed meaningful emphasis on appellant’s post-incident lack of remorse during 

the trial.3 This factor weighs against a finding of harm.

Next, we consider the probable implications of the presumed error and the 

weight the jury would likely have assigned to the evidence at issue during its 

deliberations. Appellant argues that the erroneous admission of the body-cam 

footage and the officers’ related testimony probably led the jury to sentence

appellant “more harshly.” Appellant cites “substantial” mitigating factors that she 

claims would have lessened appellant’s sentence but for the erroneous admission 

of the challenged evidence—her youth, evidence of post-offense rehabilitation, 

strong family and community support, acceptance of responsibility, apparent 

trauma from childhood separation from the nuclear family, and lack of criminal 

history.

The record does not support appellant’s claim that the challenged evidence 

probably led the jury to sentence appellant more harshly than it otherwise would 

have had the evidence been excluded. The implications of admitting the 

challenged evidence are not likely to have had a significant impact when 

considering the record as a whole. Appellant effectively neutralized the potential 

negative impact of the evidence during her cross-examination of the State’s 

3 Appellant also relies on a portion of Officer Jrab’s testimony in which the State asked, 

“You stated earlier that you didn’t think that her behavior at the hospital was inappropriate. But 

giggling and laughing after killing two people, three and a half hours after killing those two 

people, is that appropriate behavior?” Officer Jrab answered, “No, ma’am.” This testimony, 

however, was in response to defense counsel’s question asking Officer Jrab, “In your 

conversation with her at the hospital was there anything about her demeanor that seems

inappropriate?” Officer Jrab answered, “No.” Because defense counsel, not the prosecutor, 

opened this line of questioning, and because the cited testimony was so fleeting, we cannot say

that the State emphasized appellant’s supposed lack of remorse during Officer Jrab’s testimony. 

See Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (directing reviewing courts to 

consider the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with 

other evidence in the case).
8

witnesses and by presenting controverting testimony during her case-in-chief. For 

example, on cross-examination, Officer Jrab acknowledged that appellant, while in 

the ambulance, showed concern for others and asked more than once whether she 

had hurt anyone. When appellant overheard on the police radio that two people 

were killed, Officer Jrab saw appellant begin crying. Appellant also called four 

witnesses during her case-in-chief, each of whom testified regarding her remorse 

and her acceptance of responsibility. Additionally, during closing arguments, 

appellant’s attorney asserted that “[h]er very first statement [to police] is taking 

responsibility for this.” Her attorney also posited to the jury that appellant pleaded

guilty knowing she was going to prison and that she had not “earned” community 

supervision.

Moreover, there was substantial evidence countering the mitigating evidence 

produced by appellant, on which the jury likely placed great weight in assessing

the sentences. The most significant piece of evidence was the video of the accident 

itself, which clearly captured the speed of appellant’s vehicle and the violent nature

of the impact. Such videos are often the “most compelling evidence.” Johnson v.

State, No. 14-93-00367-CR, 1994 WL 622048, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Nov. 10, 1994, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); accord Diamond

Offshore Servs. Ltd. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Tex. 2018) (“A video can 

be the single most compelling piece of evidence in a case, captivating the jury’s 

attention like no other evidence could.”). The video showed appellant driving “off 

the road” at sixty-five miles per hour, and seemingly without braking, headlong 

into the driver’s side of the victims’ car, which was stopped and waiting to turn 

into the roadway. The force of the impact killed the two occupants almost 

instantly and propelled their car into a power pole, which in turn caused a
9

transformer to “explode.” Emergency responders had to use the “jaws of life” to 

access the victims’ car and retrieve their bodies.

Similarly, during closing arguments, the State emphasized the conscious

choice appellant made to drink and drive, despite being a bartender who 

“understands that people who are intoxicated shouldn’t operate motor vehicles,”

and the enormous impact of the crime on the family of the victims, a fifty-fiveyear-old mother and her son who was months shy of his twenty-first birthday. The

State referred to the testimony from appellant’s father, Jim, who testified on 

appellant’s behalf. Jim testified that appellant felt like “the victims’ family is, you 

know, out for blood” and that appellant blamed the district attorney’s office for 

being too vindictive against her. 

The permissible punishment is between two and twenty years’ confinement

and a fine of not more than $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.33 (seconddegree felony punishment), 49.08(b) (intoxication manslaughter is a second-degree 

felony). The jury assessed punishment of fifteen years’ confinement for each

count and did not assess a general fine under section 12.33 for either count.4 The

jury also found that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon for each count. 

Thus, although the sentences were on the higher end of the statutory range, the jury 

did not assess the maximum allowable.

5

 

4 We note that defense counsel explained to the jury that appellant would be eligible for 

community supervision (which he had previously said she had not “earned”) if they sentenced

appellant to confinement for two to ten years. The written judgment includes a $100 fine under 

Code of Criminal Procedure article 102.0185.

5 During the sentencing hearing, the court granted the State’s motion to stack these two

sentences. The judgment accordingly orders that the punishment for count two would run 

consecutively with the punishment for count one. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.08(a). 

Appellant does not challenge this aspect of the judgment.
10

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that the jury likely did 

not give the brief evidence of appellant’s post-Miranda conversations with the

officers significant weight and instead focused, as the prosecutor urged, on the 

severity of the acts constituting the offense and “the tragedy [the victims’] family 

has had to endure and will endure for the rest of their lives.” We determine beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the error, if any, did not contribute to the jury’s assessment 

of punishment. See, e.g., Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 825-26; Fenn v. State, No. 01-

10-00383-CR, 2011 WL 2651914, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 7,

2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (assuming prosecutor’s 

comment on defendant’s silence was error, error did not contribute to conviction or 

punishment).

We overrule appellant’s first issue.

B. Admission of Medical Records

In her second issue, appellant complains about the admission of a lab report 

showing that her blood alcohol content two hours after the crash was 0.254. Based 

on that test result, a nurse who treated appellant testified that appellant was 

suffering from acute alcohol toxicity on the night of the crash.

6 Appellant contends 

that the lab report is inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. She also asserts what we 

construe as a Confrontation Clause argument. We review a trial court’s ruling on 

the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Wells v. State, 611 

S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). A trial court abuses its discretion when 

its decision lies outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id.

Hearsay is a written or oral statement, other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of 

6 A witness testified without objection that the “legal level of intoxication [for drivers]” is 

0.08. See Tex. Pen. Code § 49.01(2)(b).
11

the matter asserted; and as such, hearsay is inadmissible evidence unless expressly 

excepted or excluded from this general rule by statute or the rules of evidence. See

Tex. R. Evid. 801(a), (d), 802. “If the out-of-court statement is relevant only if the

trier of fact believes that the statement was both truthful and accurate, then the 

statement is hearsay.” Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 290 n.101 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010) (internal quotation omitted); Jones v. State, 466 S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). A statement about a statement offered 

for the truth of the matter asserted is considered hearsay within hearsay.

At trial, defense counsel timely asserted a double hearsay objection to the 

entirety of appellant’s medical records, which consisted of 127 pages. When an 

exhibit encompasses multiple statements, only some of which are inadmissible 

hearsay, an objecting party must identify the specific statements that are 

objectionable to preserve any error for appellate review. See, e.g., Whitaker v. 

State, 286 S.W.3d 355, 368-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (global hearsay objection 

to audiotapes insufficient to preserve error as to specific statements made within 

recording); Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (global 

hearsay objection to entire packet of documents insufficient to preserve error as to 

specific subset of documents within packet); Hernandez v. State, 599 S.W.2d 614, 

617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh’g) (when evidence is admitted, a part of 

which is admissible and a part of which is not, it is incumbent on the party 

objecting to the admissibility of the evidence to specifically point out what part is 

inadmissible to preserve the alleged error). Other than the single page of the lab 

report containing appellant’s toxicology test results, appellant did not direct the 

trial court to any other purported double hearsay within the medical records. Thus,

we confine our evaluation of appellant’s double hearsay argument to the lab report 

page that appellant specifically identified. To the extent that appellant complains 
12

about the admission of any other portions of the medical records, we conclude that 

she did not preserve her appellate complaint because her objection was not 

sufficiently specific. See Martin v. State, 151 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding error not preserved when counsel did not

specifically object to embedded hearsay); see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

When hearsay contains hearsay, the rules of evidence require that each part 

of the combined statements be within an exception to the hearsay rule. Tex. R. 

Evid. 805; Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 485-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The 

lab report page was included in the totality of the medical records admitted into 

evidence. These records were accompanied by a business records affidavit 

consistent with the hearsay exception contained in Rule 803(6). Appellant does 

not dispute that the medical records fall within the business records exception to 

the hearsay rule. 

As to the specific lab report page containing appellant’s blood alcohol test 

result, the State argues that page is admissible under the hearsay exception for 

statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). Under 

this exception, a hearsay statement is not excluded if it: “(A) is made for—and is 

reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical 

history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general 

cause.” Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). For this exception to apply, the proponent must 

show that (1) the out-of-court declarant was aware that the statements were made 

for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, and that proper diagnosis or 

treatment depended upon the veracity of the statements, and (2) the statements are 

pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, that is, it was reasonable for the care provider 

to rely on the statements in diagnosing or treating the declarant. Taylor v. State, 

268 S.W.3d 571, 588-89, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Jackson v. State, No. 14-19-
13

00365-CR, 2020 WL 6326373, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 

2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

The record demonstrates that appellant was transported to the hospital after 

receiving several injuries during the crash. The medical records reflect the hospital 

staff’s diagnosis and treatment, which included a diagnosis that appellant was 

suffering from acute alcohol toxicity. The State called as a witness the emergency 

room nurse who treated appellant on the night of the incident. She explained that 

an analysis of appellant’s blood alcohol content was pertinent to the doctor’s 

diagnosis of acute alcohol toxicity. The toxicology report containing appellant’s 

blood alcohol level specifically stated that the testing results “should be used for 

medical purposes only.” We hold that the blood test performed at the hospital by 

hospital staff was conducted for medical diagnosis or treatment, and the test results 

were admissible under Rule 803(4). See Garza v. State, No. 13-19-00472-CR, 

2021 WL 822301, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 4, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in overruling appellant’s hearsay within hearsay objection to the lab 

report.

Appellant appears to raise an additional challenge to the lab report’s 

admissibility. Appellant contends that the witness called by the State “could not 

lay a proper foundation, as she: i) could not testify that the lab was properly

accredited at the time the testing was conducted; ii) lacked the training and

professional credentials to understand or interpret the test results; and iii) was not 

involved in the testing process at the lab.” This argument implicates the 

Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Russell v. State, No. 14-15-00036-CR, 2016 WL 

1402943, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 7, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (“As is clear from these excerpts, the objection 
14

appellant made to the blood analysis evidence was that he had not had an 

opportunity to confront the nurse who had drawn the blood from whom the ‘whole 

foundation’ of the ‘blood itself’ was coming. This objection may be construed as a 

Confrontation Clause objection and perhaps that the proper foundation had not 

been laid to the admission of the blood.”). 

The single sentence quoted above from appellant’s brief constitutes the

entirety of appellant’s Confrontation Clause argument. Appellant cites no law 

regarding the Confrontation Clause, nor does she substantively explain that the 

admission of the toxicology report violated her constitutional rights. Our briefing 

rules require an appellant’s brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the 

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Tex. R. 

App. P. 38.1(i). Appellant’s Confrontation Clause contention does not comply 

with this rule, and therefore we do not address the merit of appellant’s argument. 

See Cain v. State, 501 S.W.3d 172, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.)

(“To the extent Cain’s appeal intends to claim a Confrontation Clause violation, it 

is overruled as insufficiently briefed.”); accord also Dewitt v. State, 651 S.W.3d 

669, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (“Because hearsay and 

the Confrontation Clause are separate grounds to object to the admission of 

evidence, we conclude appellant has waived his hearsay complaint due to failure to 

properly brief the issue.”).

In any event, we note in closing that any error in the admission of the lab 

report was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Not only did appellant plead 

guilty to intoxication manslaughter, but ample evidence of appellant’s intoxication 

was introduced beyond the toxicology results. Officers Jrab and Flores testified 

that, when in the back of the ambulance, appellant admitted consuming four 

alcoholic beverages before driving and admitted sitting in her car for twenty
15

minutes before leaving her point of origin “in order to sober up.” Officer Flores

testified that he could “smell alcohol on [appellant].” The jury also watched video 

of the accident, which, as described above, showed the forceful collision between 

appellant’s car and the victims’ car. We conclude that any error in the admission 

of the toxicology results did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. See Blackwell 

v. State, No. 03-03-00337-CR, 2005 WL 548245, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 

10, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

We overrule appellant’s second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Kevin Jewell

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson. (Spain, J., dissenting)

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).