Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Marylin Pierre, AG No. 42, September 

Term, 2021. 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTION — REPRIMAND

The Court issued a reprimand to an attorney who (1) made a knowing and intentional 

misrepresentation that impugned the integrity of sitting judges during an election campaign 

and (2) made a knowing and intentional misrepresentation by omission of information on 

an out-of-state bar application. The attorney’s conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules 

of Professional Conduct 8.2(a) (Judicial and Legal Officials) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d)

(Misconduct), as well as New York Disciplinary Rules 1-101 (Maintaining Integrity and 

Competence of the Legal Profession), and 1-102 (Misconduct).
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CV-21-001655

Argued: February 2, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

MARYLAND*

AG No. 42

September Term, 2021

 ______________________________________

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND

v.

MARYLIN PIERRE

______________________________________ 

Fader, C.J.,

Watts,

Hotten,

Booth,

Biran,

Eaves,

Battaglia, Lynne, A. (Senior 

Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Fader, C.J.

Battaglia, J., concurs.

Watts, J., concurs and dissents.

______________________________________

Filed: August 16, 2023

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 

amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court 

of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 
This Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland proceeding concerns the alleged 

professional misconduct of Marylin Pierre, the respondent and a member of the Bar of this 

State. It also concerns an overlay of factors that significantly complicates our review of 

Ms. Pierre’s alleged violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 

(“MARPC”). That overlay arises from the circumstances in which the investigation of Ms. 

Pierre began and the absence of provisions in our rules to guide investigations arising in 

such circumstances.

The core allegations against Ms. Pierre arose from accusations made in an August 

2020 campaign email. The email was sent by the campaign manager for a slate of four 

sitting judges against whom Ms. Pierre was running for a seat on the Circuit Court for 

Montgomery County. Sent just over two months before election day, the email was 

directed to Montgomery County attorneys and identified an “Urgent Need for Action.” 

The email alleged, among other things, that Ms. Pierre’s campaign had made false 

statements about the sitting judges, that Ms. Pierre had misstated her professional 

qualifications, and that she had engaged in unprofessional conduct in connection with a 

lawsuit more than two decades earlier. 

Among the recipients of the campaign email was then-Bar Counsel. In the absence 

of any rules or procedures governing the investigation of allegations of misconduct arising 

in the midst of a judicial election, Bar Counsel immediately opened an investigation,

informed the sitting judges’ campaign manager of the existence of the investigation, and 

sought additional information. Soon thereafter, less than two months before the election, 

Bar Counsel sent Ms. Pierre a letter summarizing many of the allegations leveled by her 
2

rivals’ campaign and insisted that Ms. Pierre respond to them in writing, in many cases by 

explaining and justifying statements made by her or her campaign, within two weeks. 

The judicial electoral context in which the MARPC violations at the heart of this 

matter arose, combined with the timing of the investigation, presents two challenges for 

our review of those violations. First, any case in which alleged violations arise from speech 

that is related to an election or that is critical of judges presents First Amendment concerns. 

This case involves both. Second, the initiation of an investigation into an attorney 

challenging a slate of sitting judges at a sensitive point in the campaign gives rise to a risk 

that the investigation will be perceived as an attempt to interfere in the election to favor the 

sitting judges. In that circumstance, absent a need to proceed expeditiously, the good faith 

of Bar Counsel—which is something we do not question here—may be insufficient to 

avoid undermining public confidence in the integrity of the attorney disciplinary process. 

Both of those challenges play prominently in our review of the charges against Ms. Pierre 

and our consideration of the appropriate sanction.

After completing its investigation, the Commission, acting through Bar Counsel,

filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial action in which it alleged that Ms. Pierre

violated the MARPC and the New York Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary 

Rules (“NYDR”) as a result of her: (1) misleading or false statements about the sitting 

judges in her 2020 campaign materials; (2) willful misrepresentations about her 

background on her 1999 Application for Admission to the Bar of New York (“New York 

Bar Application”); (3) willful misrepresentations about her background and career 

experience on her applications for various judgeships in Montgomery County between 
3

2012 and 2017; and (4) false statements under oath and failure to timely respond to Bar 

Counsel’s investigatory demands. The Commission asserted that Ms. Pierre’s conduct 

violated MARPC 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) (Rule 19-308.1), MARPC 

8.2 (Judicial and Legal Officials) (Rule 19-308.2), MARPC 8.4 (Misconduct) (Rule 

19-308.4),

1 NYDR 1-101 (Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession), 

and NYDR 1-102 (Misconduct).

2

The assigned hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Pierre

had violated each MARPC and NYDR alleged, although the hearing judge rejected several 

of the grounds on which Bar Counsel had relied for those violations. The hearing judge 

also determined the existence of seven aggravating and four mitigating factors.

Bar Counsel filed no exceptions. Ms. Pierre filed exceptions that, in effect,

challenge all of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that were 

adverse to her. We sustain many of Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings 

of fact but overrule those exceptions concerning two false statements she made about the 

sitting judges and a misrepresentation on her New York Bar Application. We sustain 

Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that she violated MARPC 

1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, 

which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules, 

were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, 

Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior 

opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering 

of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22) and as identified in the paragraph to 

which this footnote is appended. 

2 The Commission charged Ms. Pierre under the NYDR that were in place in 1999, 

which was the year Ms. Pierre engaged in the conduct alleged to have violated those rules. 
4

8.1(a) and (b) and 8.4(b). We overrule her exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions 

of law that she violated MARPC 8.2(a), MARPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and NYDR 1-101 and 

1-102.

Bar Counsel recommended the sanction of disbarment, while Ms. Pierre 

recommended imposing no sanction. Given the overlay of circumstances mentioned 

above, and without intending to diminish the seriousness of the misconduct in which 

Ms. Pierre engaged, we will issue a reprimand.

BACKGROUND

A. Context

The 2020 election for four seats on the Circuit Court for Montgomery County is the 

context underlying both the initiation of the investigation that resulted in this proceeding 

and several of the alleged violations. We therefore begin by discussing four considerations 

arising from that context that are important to our analysis. 

First, any investigation into a candidate for elected office that is undertaken at a 

sensitive point in the electoral process presents risks that should be avoided or minimized 

to the extent possible.3 Few things in our form of government rise to the level of 

importance of the State’s interest in promoting faith in the integrity of the electoral process 

by which citizens choose their elected officials. Any perception that a government actor 

has attempted to exert undue influence on the outcome of an election risks undermining 

3 Our comments and analysis throughout this opinion are confined to the activities 

of the Commission and Bar Counsel, and specifically are not intended to encompass the 

activities of entities whose responsibilities include oversight of the electoral process. 
5

that faith. Government investigations of candidates for office during the heat of a 

campaign—especially, but not only, if they become a matter of public knowledge before 

the election—risk either: (1) an appearance of an attempt to exert influence on the election; 

or (2) actually affecting the outcome, whether intended or not.4

To avoid the potentially corrosive or otherwise unintended effects that could 

accompany the pursuit of an investigation during the heat of an election, future 

investigations by Bar Counsel into alleged misconduct by a candidate in a judicial election 

should generally be postponed until after the election unless: (1) doing so would put an 

individual or the public at risk from past or potential future misconduct that is within the 

purview of the Commission and that could be avoided by prompt investigation; or 

(2) prompt investigation is necessary to preserve evidence. In either case, Bar Counsel 

should generally confine pre-election activities to what is necessary to satisfy the exigency. 

Although our own rules do not yet contain such guidance,5 other investigative agencies 

4 See, e.g., Dennis Halcoussis, Anton D. Lowenberg & G. Michael Phillips, An 

Empirical Test of the Comey Effect on the 2016 Presidential Election, 101 Soc. Sci. Q.

161, 168-69 (2020) (concluding that “[a]nnouncements by the FBI regarding investigations 

of Clinton’s emails . . . did appear to have an effect” on the candidates’ electoral chances); 

Nathaniel Rakich, How Trump’s Indictment Could Affect the 2024 Election, 

FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 31, 2023), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-indictment2024-election/ (last accessed July 26, 2023), archived at https://perma.cc/QY37-5NDE. 

5 Following the issuance of this opinion, we will refer to the Standing Committee 

on the Rules of Practice and Procedure consideration of adopting a rule establishing 

procedures for addressing alleged misconduct violations that arise during the pendency of 

election campaigns generally and campaigns for judicial offices specifically.
6

have recognized in rule or practice that such investigations should be delayed, postponed,

or at least not disclosed during the run-up to an election.6 

The sensitivity of the timing of such investigations is recognized in memoranda 

distributed to employees of the United States Department of Justice. In a 2022 

memorandum, Attorney General Merrick Garland stated that all Department employees 

“must be particularly sensitive to safeguarding the Department’s reputation for fairness, 

neutrality, and nonpartisanship.”7 For that reason, the Attorney General directed that any 

6 For example, Michigan Rules governing judicial disciplinary procedures state that 

“[i]f a request for investigation is filed less than 90 days before an election in which the 

respondent is a candidate” and is not frivolous, the investigating commission “shall 

postpone its investigation until after the election” unless two-thirds of the commission 

members determine “the public interest and the interests of justice require otherwise.” 

Mich. Ct. R. 9.220(C). On the federal level, the United States Department of Justice has 

an unwritten but widely acknowledged general practice of delaying public disclosure of 

investigative steps related to electoral matters or a candidate for office within 60 days of a 

primary or general election. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Inspector Gen., A Review 

of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in 

Advance of the 2016 Election 16-18 (2018) (“[T]here is a general admonition that politics 

should play no role in investigative decisions, and that taking investigative steps to impact 

an election is inconsistent with the Department’s mission and violates the principles of 

federal prosecution.”); Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 8-9 (Richard C. Pilger 

ed., 8th ed. 2017) (discussing Department of Justice procedure when investigating an 

individual in relation to election fraud, noting that “any criminal investigation by the 

Department must be conducted in a way that minimizes the likelihood that the investigation 

itself may become a factor in the election. . . . Accordingly, it is the general policy of the 

Department not to conduct overt investigations . . . until after the outcome of the election 

allegedly affected by the fraud is certified.”).

7 Election Year Sensitivities Memorandum from the Attorney General to All 

Department of Justice Employees (May 25, 2022), available at 

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22089098-attorney-general-memorandumelection-year-sensitivities, archived at https://perma.cc/P9VR-QD98. The 2022 

memorandum is substantially similar in relevant part to a 2012 memorandum from 

Attorney General Eric Holder. See, e.g., Election Year Sensitivities Memorandum from the 

Attorney General to All Department of Justice Employees (Mar. 9, 2012), available at 
7

employee facing “an issue, or the appearance of an issue, regarding the timing of 

statements, investigative steps, charges, or other actions near the time of a primary or 

general election [should] contact the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division . . . 

for further guidance.”

8

 In February 2020, then-Attorney General William Barr similarly 

warned of the need to “be sensitive to safeguarding the Department’s reputation for 

fairness, neutrality, and nonpartisanship,” and imposed special requirements for the 

opening of any investigation into a candidate for federal office.

9

 His memorandum 

announcing the requirements recognized that

[i]n certain cases, the existence of a federal criminal or counterintelligence investigation, if it becomes known to the public, may have 

unintended effects on our elections. For this reason, the Department has 

long recognized that it must exercise particular care regarding sensitive 

investigations and prosecutions that relate to political candidates, 

campaigns, and other politically sensitive individuals and 

organizations—especially in an election year.[10]

Second, election-related speech is at the very heart of the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

11

 This 

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-election-yearsensitivities.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7PP2-TN8X. 

8

Id.

9 Additional Requirements for the Opening of Certain Sensitive Investigations (Feb. 

5, 2020), available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20200624/110836/HHRG-116-

JU00-20200624-SD009-U19.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/553S-B85D.

10 Id.

11 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: 

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]” Article 40 of the 

Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in relevant part: “[T]hat every citizen of the State 

ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish [that citizen’s] sentiments on all subjects, 

being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.”
8

Court has acknowledged that “‘speech about the qualifications of candidates for public 

office,’ including judicial candidates, is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.’” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stanalonis, 445 Md. 129, 140 (2015) (quoting Republican 

Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002)). Such political speech is entitled to 

“the highest level of First Amendment protection.” Stanalonis, 445 Md. at 141; see also 

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995) (“Discussion of public 

issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the 

system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the 

broadest protection to such political expression[.]” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 

14-15 (1976)). 

Third, speech that is critical of judges is also subject to robust free speech protection. 

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 265-68 (2014). As a result, for 

such speech to be actionable as a violation of the MARPC, it must meet the high standard 

set forth by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 

279-80 (1964), which is to say that it must be false and must have been made either 

knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Frost, 437 Md. at 

263. 

Fourth, given Bar Counsel’s close association with the Judiciary, special 

considerations apply to investigations by Bar Counsel into the conduct of a candidate in a 

judicial election during the pendency of the election. This Court is ultimately responsible 

for the regulation of the practice of law in the State. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Clevenger, 459 Md. 481, 492 (2018) (“Our power to issue rules concerning practice and 
9

procedure in Maryland courts derives from the Maryland Constitution, and the General 

Assembly has recognized our broad authority to regulate the practice of law[.]” (citations 

omitted)). In furtherance of that responsibility, we, by Rule, have established the Attorney 

Grievance Commission and the position of Bar Counsel. The Commission, established by 

Rule 19-702, is comprised of 12 members, including nine attorneys and three nonattorneys, all appointed by this Court for three-year terms and subject to removal by this 

Court at any time. Md. Rule 19-702(a), (b), (f). Among other duties, the Commission 

appoints Bar Counsel, subject to approval from this Court; supervises Bar Counsel’s 

activities; authorizes Bar Counsel’s employment of attorneys, investigators, and other staff; 

approves or rejects Bar Counsel’s recommendations concerning actions to take after 

investigating complaints, including dismissal, reprimand, or the filing of a petition for 

disciplinary or remedial action; and prepares an annual budget for the disciplinary fund 

subject to this Court’s approval. Md. Rule 19-702(h). 

The position of Bar Counsel is established by Rule 19-703. Bar Counsel is 

appointed by the Commission, subject to this Court’s approval, and serves at the pleasure 

of the Commission. Md. Rule 19-703(a). Among other duties, Bar Counsel is charged 

with investigating professional misconduct or incapacity by attorneys in the State; filing 

statements of charges and prosecuting all disciplinary and remedial proceedings; filing 

petitions for disciplinary and remedial actions in the Commission’s name; monitoring and 

enforcing compliance with this Court’s disciplinary and remedial orders; and initiating, 

intervening in, and prosecuting actions to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law. 

Md. Rule 19-703(b). 
10

The roles and activities of the Commission and Bar Counsel with respect to all 

aspects of attorney discipline investigations, proceedings, and dispositions are further 

established by Rules promulgated by this Court. See Md. Rules 19-701–19-752. Although 

the Commission and Bar Counsel, by design, function independently of this Court, they 

play a critical role in carrying out our responsibility to regulate the legal profession in 

Maryland by, as set forth in the Commission’s mission statement, “protecting the public 

and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession.”12 The Commission’s and Bar 

Counsel’s close connection to the Judiciary advise caution in taking actions against a 

candidate who is challenging sitting judges to avoid the possibility that members of the 

public may perceive such actions as motivated by a desire to support the sitting judges.13

With that context, we turn to the facts of the matter before us.

B. Procedural History

In the November 2020 general election, five candidates were vying for four seats on 

the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Four of the candidates, Judges Bibi Berry, 

David Boynton, Christopher Fogleman, and Michael McAuliffe, were sitting judges who 

had been appointed by Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr. following their formal vetting and 

nomination by the Montgomery County Judicial Nominating Commission. Exec. Order. 

12 See Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, Administrative and Procedural 

Guidelines, Updated Nov. 23, 2021, available at: 

https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/attygrievance/docs/administrativ

eprocedures.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/6UXZ-EWEE.

13 In discussing the need to avoid the possibility that members of the public may 

perceive an investigation or charges pursued by Bar Counsel as improperly motivated, we 

do not mean to suggest that the actions of Bar Counsel in this case were improperly 

motivated. 
11

No. 01.01.2019.05. The four sitting judges were running together as a unified slate, with 

a campaign chaired by J. Stephen McAuliffe III. One of the challengers was Ms. Pierre, 

who had been unsuccessful in several attempts at making it through the nominating 

commission and was attempting to win a seat by direct election, as permitted by the 

Maryland Constitution. Md. Const. art. IV, §§ 3, 5.

On August 28, 2020, just over two months before the November 3 election, 

Mr. McAuliffe sent a campaign email to attorneys in Montgomery County with the subject 

line, “Lawyers and the Urgent Need for Action.” The email had a picture of the four sitting 

judges, referenced an earlier email promoting the qualifications of the sitting judges and 

the rigorous process by which they were selected, and provided “some facts about the 

challenger, Ms. Marylin Pierre.” Mr. McAuliffe provided some factual information to 

refute claims that Ms. Pierre had made about bias in the judicial selection process and 

diversity on the bench, and then made a series of allegations against Ms. Pierre under the 

headings “Deliberately Inflating Her Qualifications” and “Unprofessional Conduct as an 

Attorney.” Among the allegations were that Ms. Pierre (1) had claimed to have courtroom 

experience that she did not have, (2) had made several statements during the campaign that 

were “untrue and misleading to voters,” and (3) in the mid-1990s, had evaded service of 

process in a case and was taken into custody on a body attachment when she did not appear 

in court. 

One of the recipients of Mr. McAuliffe’s email was Bar Counsel, who received it as 

a member of the Montgomery County Bar Association. Mr. McAuliffe’s email was sent 

at 3:48pm on Friday, August 28. At 4:47pm, Bar Counsel replied. Bar Counsel
12

(1) informed Mr. McAuliffe that she had opened an investigation to determine whether 

Ms. Pierre had violated any rules of professional conduct, (2) asked Mr. McAuliffe to 

provide “any information or documentation in [his] possession that support[ed] any 

allegation that Ms. Pierre made false or misleading statements,” and (3) asked him to 

identify individuals with personal knowledge of the allegations in his email. Bar Counsel 

informed Mr. McAuliffe that the investigation was confidential and asked that he maintain 

that confidentiality. 

Mr. McAuliffe responded 30 minutes later thanking Bar Counsel for the email 

response “and for opening an investigation.” He agreed to maintain the confidentiality of 

the investigation, but asked if he could inform the individual sitting judges about it, and 

offered to discuss the matter by phone. Subsequent correspondence references a telephone 

conversation that evening. 

On Monday, August 31, the next business day, Mr. McAuliffe responded by 

providing the information Bar Counsel had requested. 

On September 7, less than two months before the election, Bar Counsel sent 

Ms. Pierre a letter stating that a complaint had been docketed in Bar Counsel’s name based 

on Mr. McAuliffe’s email and that “an investigation will be conducted[.]” In the letter, 

Bar Counsel asked that Ms. Pierre respond in writing to 12 different inquiries and provide 

documentation to support her responses. For example, after identifying two statements 

Ms. Pierre allegedly made about the consequences of voting for the sitting judges, Bar 

Counsel wrote: 
13

Please provide all information and documentation to support your 

statement that any firm would control “Justice” in the Circuit Court for 

Montgomery County. Please also state whether your tweets should be 

read as an accusation that the sitting judges are, or will be, in violation of 

Rule 18-102.4(b) or (c).

And after identifying tweets by Ms. Pierre sent in the aftermath of the death of George 

Floyd, Bar Counsel wrote:

Please state with specificity what you contend the public could expect to 

“hear” from sitting judges regarding the death of George Floyd and 

associated proceedings that would not violate Rule 18-102.10.

and:

If you contend that an arrestee can be “presumed of committing murder”

and that the burden of proof is on a criminal defendant to “prove that they 

are not guilty of contributory negligence and involuntary manslaughter”

are accurate statements of the law, please provide all authority to support 

your position.

Bar Counsel requested a response by September 21. 

Ms. Pierre put her malpractice carrier, CNA, on notice of the investigation. CNA 

opened a claim file on September 15, 2020 identifying “J McAuliffe III” as the claimant 

against Ms. Pierre. Ms. Pierre did not respond to Bar Counsel’s letter by September 21. 

When Bar Counsel followed up the next day, Ms. Pierre requested additional time to see if 

her carrier would retain counsel for her. In several subsequent email exchanges, Bar 

Counsel continued to request a response to the original letter, while Ms. Pierre said she 

was still waiting for an answer from CNA and did not want to respond without an attorney. 

Bar Counsel also sought dates to take Ms. Pierre’s statement under oath, to which 

Ms. Pierre did not respond. Ms. Pierre, through counsel (not retained by CNA), ultimately 
14

responded to Bar Counsel’s September 7 letter on December 4 and sat for a statement under 

oath on December 18. 

In November 2021, after completing the investigation, Bar Counsel filed a petition 

for disciplinary or remedial action. A four-day hearing was scheduled to begin in April 

2022. However, this Court granted Ms. Pierre’s emergency motion to stay the proceedings 

to consider questions related to discovery disputes and the effect of recent changes to the 

Rules. We lifted the stay on May 11, 2022 after changes to Rule 19-726 rendered the 

discovery issue moot. After a four-day merits hearing in September 2022, the hearing 

judge issued a written opinion containing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

C. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact

The hearing judge’s findings of fact address five categories of alleged misconduct 

by Ms. Pierre: (1) misrepresentations about sitting judges; (2) misrepresentations about 

her own experience; (3) misrepresentations about events that transpired in a lawsuit against 

her in the mid-1990s; (4) misrepresentations about her employment in the early 1990s at a 

company called Network Engineering, Inc.; and (5) her misrepresentations to Bar Counsel 

and failure to cooperate with the investigation. We address each category in turn.

1. Misrepresentations About Sitting Judges

The Commission alleged misconduct associated with three statements Ms. Pierre 

made about sitting judges during the campaign.

First, on May 20, 2020, Ms. Pierre’s campaign Twitter account posted:

Also there are some sitting judges who are only English speakers send 

people to jail because they could not speak English and discriminate 
15

against people based on skin color, country of origins, religious 

backgrounds or sexual orientations. Moco is cosmopolitan & need more!

At the hearing, Ms. Pierre acknowledged that the statement was false. She testified that 

the impetus for the tweet was her mistaken recollection of Child in Need of Assistance 

(“CINA”) hearings in 2004 and 2005 during which she had misremembered a circuit court 

judge threatening her client with contempt if the client did not learn English. In fact, the 

judge—who was no longer an active judge at the time of the tweet—had ordered 

Ms. Pierre’s non-English speaking client to attend English class as part of a reunification 

plan, and the judge did not threaten or take any disciplinary action when the client failed 

to attend the class. Ms. Pierre also argued that she did not send out the tweet, although she 

acknowledged that her campaign did and that she supplied the information on which it was 

based. The hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre authorized the tweet, that it was false, and 

that Ms. Pierre knew it was false or acted with reckless disregard at the time.

Second, on May 23, 2020, Ms. Pierre’s campaign Twitter account posted:

The Sitting Judges are somewhat diverse in that they are black, Asian, 

gay, and straight, and men and women. But they are not really diverse. 

They are an in-group. Most of them have worked at the same law firm, 

go to the same church, and are related by marriage.

At the hearing, Mr. McAuliffe testified based on personal knowledge that the statement 

that “[m]ost” of the sitting judges worked at the same law firm, went to the same church, 

and were related by marriage was false, both as to the four sitting judges running for 

reelection and as to the bench as a whole. As with the first tweet, Ms. Pierre claimed that 

she had not posted it herself. Unlike with the first tweet, Ms. Pierre asserted that this 

statement was an accurate reflection of her opinion or belief. The only support she 
16

identified for the statement was: (1) a claim that a member of the bar told her that four 

judges on the bench attended the same church; and (2) that she had overheard someone else 

say that one of the sitting judges was related by marriage to another.14 The hearing judge 

found that Ms. Pierre was responsible for the tweet, that it was false, and that Ms. Pierre 

acted with reckless disregard at the time.

14 Ms. Pierre also introduced an exhibit at the hearing, Respondent’s Exhibit P, 

which purported to show connections by law firm or familial relationship among current 

and former members of the bench from Montgomery County. Exhibit P identified:

• Two judges as having worked at Miles & Stockbridge, Rachel McGuckian and 

Rosalyn Tang. However, although both were judges at the time of the 2022 

hearing, neither had been appointed at the time of the campaign tweet and only one 

was ever on the circuit court. 

• Three judges and the spouses of two other judges as having worked at Debelius, 

Clifford, Debelius, Crawford & Bonifant. However, of the three judges, one (John 

Debelius) had retired from the circuit court in 2017 and a second (Gary Crawford), 

who was never a circuit court judge, retired from the District Court of Maryland in 

2011. 

• Two judges as having worked at Paley Rothman. However, only one of those 

judges had been appointed at the time Ms. Pierre sent her tweet. The other, 

Kathleen Dumais, was not appointed until December 2021. 

• Two judges as having worked for the law firm Ethridge, Quinn, Kemp, McAuliffe, 

Rowan & Hartinger. However, one of those judges, again Judge Dumais, was not 

appointed until December 2021. 

• Eight judges as “Related.” However, the only purported relationship identified 

among active judges on the circuit court bench was between Judges Christopher 

Fogleman and John Maloney, who the exhibit claimed were “[r]elated by marriage 

per sources at Judge Fogleman’s investiture.”

Exhibit P thus (1) did not identify a single law firm in common between even two 

active judges at the time of Ms. Pierre’s tweet, and (2) identified, based on an anonymous 

source, only one familial relationship between two sitting judges. (Information about the 

dates of service of the judges mentioned above can be found on the Maryland Manual Online, available at https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/html/mmtoc.html.
17

Third, Ms. Pierre’s campaign made several references to a statement Judge Berry 

had made at a campaign forum. During the forum, Judge Berry was asked about a study 

that identified high incarceration rates of Black men in the State. Judge Berry responded:

What we do, is there are a lot of correctional options other than 

incarceration. We’re not incarcerating people who are non-violent 

offenders for long periods of time or anything like that. There is home 

detention, there’s inpatient residential treatment, there’s problem solving 

courts, there’s work release or weekend incarceration. There are a lot of 

things you can do. So, we’re not . . . certainly, I understand that it is an 

issue, but it’s not as much of an issue as being portrayed by the other two 

candidates[15]. . . .

Ms. Pierre attended the forum. Her campaign later sent a text message to prospective voters 

that read, “When a sitting judge says ‘it’s not much of an issue’ that Black males are jailed 

at a higher rate in MD it’s clear we need Marylin Pierre, who understands restorative 

justice.” Her campaign made similar statements elsewhere, including after Mr. McAuliffe 

emailed her complaining that her use of the quote was out of context and misleading. In 

some of those statements, she corrected her omission of the word “as” from the quoted 

language; in at least one other, she did not. 

At the hearing, Ms. Pierre acknowledged that her use of the quote without including

“as” before “much” was incorrect but said that was what she had heard and that the 

inaccuracy was an oversight. Noting that Ms. Pierre had republished the statement after 

15 “[T]he other two candidates” appears to be a reference to Ms. Pierre and a second 

challenger, Thomas P. Johnson, III, whose name was not on the ballot but who was running 

as a write-in candidate. See Official 2020 Presidential General Election results for 

Montgomery County (last updated Dec. 4, 2020) available at: 

https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2020/results/general/gen_results_2020_4_by_co

unty_16-1.html, archived at https://perma.cc/NER7-8PAH.
18

being informed that it was inaccurate, the hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre had 

knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the substance of the quote. 

2. Misrepresentations About Ms. Pierre’s Experience

The Commission also alleged that Ms. Pierre knowingly and intentionally 

misrepresented her legal experience in her campaign statements and in her answers to 

questionnaires submitted in connection with her eight applications for a judgeship. 

a. Campaign Statements

The Commission cited two instances from the campaign in which it alleged that 

Ms. Pierre had misled voters about her experience and qualifications. First, in a campaign 

text to Montgomery County voters, Ms. Pierre stated that she has practiced “civil and 

criminal law in Maryland’s trial and appellate courts.” Interpreting that statement as a 

representation that she had practiced civil law in both trial and appellate courts, and 

criminal law in both trial and appellate courts, the Commission asserted that it was a 

knowing and intentional misrepresentation because Ms. Pierre had never represented a 

client in a criminal matter in an appellate court. Second, during a candidate forum, 

Ms. Pierre stated that she had “represented clients in hundreds of cases in state and federal 

trial and appellate courts, [and that] some of [her] cases have established precedents in the 

State of Maryland and are regularly cited by courts in other states.” The Commission 

contended that the statement was a knowing and intentional misrepresentation because 

Ms. Pierre had not represented a client in a federal appellate court and had not represented 

a client in a Maryland appellate court that had resulted in a reported opinion.
19

The hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre’s statements were “essentially true” 

because Ms. Pierre had practiced both civil and criminal law, had practiced in both trial 

and appellate courts, had practiced in both federal and state courts, had represented clients 

in hundreds of cases, and had handled cases at the trial level that had later resulted in 

reported appellate opinions. The hearing judge declined to “undertake the parsing and/or 

dissection [of Ms. Pierre’s words] required to accept [the Commission’s] analysis on this 

issue.”

b. Judicial Questionnaires

The Commission also alleged that Ms. Pierre misrepresented the scope of her legal 

experience in each of the eight questionnaires she submitted in applying for judgeships 

between March 2012 and August 2017.16 In each of those questionnaires, Question 16 

asked applicants, with respect to each of five subparts, about their experience “[w]ith 

respect to the last five years.” The Commission alleged that Ms. Pierre’s answers were 

false and misleading. With respect to the entirety of Question 16, instead of confining her 

responses to information about the most recent five years, Ms. Pierre included her entire 

career. She testified that she had misread Question 16 when completing the first 

16 Applicants for a judicial vacancy are required to submit a confidential personal 

data questionnaire that asks for detailed information about an applicant’s personal history, 

education, law practice, business and civic involvement, any disciplinary history either as 

a party in a legal matter or in professional life, and other questions relevant to an application 

for a judicial vacancy. See Maryland Courts, How to Apply for a Judicial Vacancy, 

https://www.courts.state.md.us/judgeselect/judgeappl (last visited August 10, 2023), 

archived at https://perma.cc/VM5X-UPNG. 
20

questionnaire in 2012, and then simply updated the information on subsequent 

questionnaires to add additional experience.

The Commission also alleged that Ms. Pierre made further false representations 

concerning her experience in response to subparts (b), (c), (d), and (e) of Question 16 on 

all eight questionnaires. In subpart (b), applicants were asked what percentage of their 

appearances were in specified types of courts. Ms. Pierre’s answers, which varied across

the eight questionnaires, ranged from 0-3% of matters in federal court, 0-5% in state 

appellate court, 55-70% in state circuit court, 10-30% in the District Court of Maryland, 

and 10-20% in other courts. The hearing judge determined that a correct response in each 

case would have been that more than 99% of her cases were in state circuit courts, and so 

found that Ms. Pierre’s answers were false. However, given the “wildly inconsistent” 

responses, and observing that Ms. Pierre had in the past represented clients in appellate

cases and federal cases, the hearing judge concluded that if Ms. Pierre had intended to 

mislead, her answers “would not have been so carelessly inconsistent.” On that basis, the 

hearing judge determined that her misrepresentations were not knowing and intentional.

In subpart (c), applicants were asked to identify the percentage of their litigation 

that was civil or criminal. In her first three questionnaires, Ms. Pierre responded that 75% 

of her cases were civil. That percentage went up to 85% in the next three questionnaires 

and 90% in the final two. The hearing judge found those answers to be false because the 

correct response on every questionnaire would have been that her practice was more than 

99% civil. However, based on the same rationale applied to the subpart (b) responses, the 
21

hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre’s misrepresentations were not knowing and 

intentional.

In subpart (d), applicants were asked to identify “the number of cases [the applicant] 

tried to verdict or judgment (rather than settled)” and whether the applicant was “sole 

counsel, chief counsel, or associate counsel.” In her first questionnaire, Ms. Pierre 

responded that she had “tried over five hundred cases to verdict or judgment.” In her 

second questionnaire, that response went down to “over 430,” and then progressively 

increased back to “over 500” by her final questionnaire. At the hearing, Ms. Pierre testified

that she thought the question encompassed any cases in which a judge had issued any

decision, including if an agreement by the parties to settle resulted in a dismissal of the 

case by the court. She further testified that she provided what she believed to be a 

conservative estimate of such cases, albeit for her entire career rather than just the most 

recent five years. The hearing judge rejected that explanation, finding that an experienced 

attorney like Ms. Pierre could not misunderstand the meaning of “tried to verdict or 

judgment” and that it was inconceivable that she had tried that many cases to verdict or 

judgment. On that basis, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre’s responses were 

knowingly and intentionally false “for the purpose of bolstering her judicial applications.”

In subpart (e), applicants were asked to identify the percentage of their cases that 

involved jury trials. In her first three questionnaires, Ms. Pierre responded 5%. In her last 

five questionnaires, she responded 1%. Finding that Ms. Pierre had handled only two jury 

trials in her entire career, both before 1996, the hearing judge concluded that her responses 

were false. The hearing judge further found that Ms. Pierre’s responses were knowing and 
22

intentional misrepresentations because the judge “[could ]not accept that [Ms. Pierre] did 

not recall that she had had only two jury trials throughout her career[.]” 

3. Misrepresentations Concerning a Student Loan Case and 

Associated Failure to Appear, Body Attachment, and 

Detention

The Commission alleged that Ms. Pierre made knowing and intentional 

misrepresentations in her questionnaire responses and in her 1999 New York Bar 

Application regarding a student loan case against her in the mid-1990s. The underlying 

facts concern a lawsuit filed in November 1993 by the New York State Higher Education 

Services Corporation (“N.Y. Higher Education”) against Ms. Pierre in the Circuit Court 

for Montgomery County. In the lawsuit, N.Y. Higher Education alleged that Ms. Pierre 

had defaulted on promissory notes associated with her student loans. After Ms. Pierre 

defaulted on payments owed pursuant to a settlement payment plan and the court entered 

a judgment against her, she failed to appear in court in response to a show cause order. The 

court issued a writ of body attachment, and Ms. Pierre was taken into custody by the sheriff. 

Ms. Pierre testified that she had failed to appear due to a personal tragedy. She posted bail 

and was released the same day. On March 25, 2004, N.Y. Higher Education filed a line of 

satisfaction. 

a. Ms. Pierre’s Judicial Applications

The Commission alleged that in her responses to questions on seven of her eight 

judicial questionnaires, Ms. Pierre knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose facts 

concerning her failure to respond to the show cause order, the issuance of the writ of body 

attachment, and her detention by the sheriff. First, Question 28 called upon applicants to 
23

disclose whether they had “ever been arrested, charged, or held by federal, state, or other 

law enforcement authorities for violation of any federal law or regulation, state law or 

regulation, or county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance.” On her first 

questionnaire, from 2012, Ms. Pierre responded that a body attachment had been filed 

against her for nonpayment of her student loans and that she had been detained on July 1, 

1996. She did not disclose the incident in response to Question 28 on the subsequent seven 

questionnaires. The hearing judge accepted Ms. Pierre’s testimony that, after the first 

questionnaire, she interpreted Question 28 to relate only to criminal proceedings. Finding 

that interpretation to be reasonable, the hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre’s failure to 

disclose was not a knowing and intentional misrepresentation.

Second, Question 29 called upon applicants to “[g]ive particulars of any litigation, 

including divorce, in which you personally are now or previously have been either a 

plaintiff or defendant. For each, list the dates, the names of the moving parties, the number 

of the case, the court, and the grounds for the litigation.” In all eight questionnaires, 

Ms. Pierre disclosed: “New York State Higher Education filed a suit for nonpayment of 

student loans against me on November 16, 1993. I was able to pay them off and they filed 

a Line of Satisfaction on March 25, 2004.” The hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre’s 

response to Question 29 was “sufficient” and so not a knowing and intentional 

misrepresentation.

Question 32 asked if there was “any other information concerning [her] background 

that might be considered detrimental or that otherwise should be taken into consideration 

by the Commission[.]” On each of the eight questionnaires, Ms. Pierre answered no. With 
24

respect to the seven questionnaires after the first, the hearing judge found that, because 

Ms. Pierre did not disclose “her failure to appear, the Show Cause Order and the Body 

Attachment in the Higher Education case in response to Questions 28 or 29, . . . she was 

required to disclose the detrimental information in response to Question 32[.]” The hearing 

judge did not identify the basis for the implicit conclusion that Ms. Pierre understood that 

the incident, which had occurred in 1996 and which she blamed on a personal tragedy, 

would be considered detrimental to her fitness for the bench in 2013 through 2017. 

b. Ms. Pierre’s New York Bar Application

The Commission also alleged that Ms. Pierre made knowing and intentional 

misrepresentations by providing incomplete information about the student loan case in 

response to Questions 16 and 17(b) on her New York Bar Application. Question 16 asked, 

in relevant part, whether Ms. Pierre had “ever been arrested, taken into custody, charged 

with, indicted, convicted or tried for, or pleaded guilty to, the commission of any felony or 

misdemeanor or the violation of any law or ordinance, except traffic or parking 

violations[.]” Ms. Pierre answered no. As with Question 28 on the judicial questionnaires, 

the hearing judge accepted Ms. Pierre’s testimony that she believed the question applied 

only to criminal proceedings. The hearing judge found that interpretation reasonable.

Question 17(b) asked whether Ms. Pierre had “ever failed to answer any ticket, 

summons or other legal process served upon [her] at any time” and “[i]f so, was any 

warrant, subpoena or further process issued against [her] as a result of [her] failure to 

respond to such legal process?” Ms. Pierre answered “yes,” identified the student loan 

case, and explained that she had a court date related to nonpayment of student loans for 
25

which she was sent a summons and did not appear because she was hospitalized and forgot. 

She further stated: “A summons was sent to my house and I answered it to the Court’s 

satisfaction. No further action was taken on the summons since I have made arrangements 

to pay the student loan.” The hearing judge concluded that response was a knowing and 

intentional “misrepresent[ation] by omission that the court issued a writ of body attachment 

for her failure to appear in response to a show cause order, and that she was detained and 

brought to court by the Sheriff and charged.” Having made that finding, the hearing judge 

also “f[ound] that [Ms. Pierre] falsely swore that her answers were complete and truthful 

when she signed the Bar Application[.]”

4. Misrepresentations About Ms. Pierre’s Employment with 

Network Engineering

The Commission alleged that Ms. Pierre had made knowing and intentional 

misrepresentations in her judicial applications and during a statement under oath in 

December 2020 about her prior employment in the late 1990s with Network Engineering. 

Question 14 on each of the eight judicial questionnaires asked for a chronological 

description of the applicant’s “law practice and experience after . . . graduation from law 

school[.]” As part of her description, Ms. Pierre included that she had served as “corporate 

counsel” for Network Engineering from December 1997 through August 1999. She 

testified to the accuracy of that information during her statement under oath made in 

December 2020. 

At the hearing, Ms. Pierre again testified that the information about her employment 

with Network Engineering was accurate. In response to a question about why she had not 
26

disclosed that position on her 1999 New York Bar Application in response to a question 

asking the applicant to identify any “law firm, law department or legal institution” in which 

she had worked, Ms. Pierre testified that the position had not been part of a law firm, law 

department, or legal institution. The hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre’s testimony was 

not credible because Ms. Pierre “was unable to describe, with any detail, any legal work 

she claims to have performed as ‘corporate counsel’” and because the judge believed 

Ms. Pierre should and would have disclosed that role on her New York Bar Application if 

it were correct. On that basis, the hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre knowingly and 

intentionally misrepresented her position with Network Engineering on her judicial 

applications and in her statement under oath. 

5. Misrepresentations to Bar Counsel and Failure to Cooperate 

with Investigation

The Commission alleged that Ms. Pierre failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s 

investigation. As discussed above, Bar Counsel initiated correspondence with Ms. Pierre 

on September 7, 2020, less than two months before the election. Bar Counsel’s five-page 

letter set forth 12 numbered paragraphs: (1) nine paragraphs identified statements or 

categories of statements made by Ms. Pierre or her campaign and asked that she explain or 

substantiate the basis for the statements; (2) one paragraph inquired whether during a 

particular online campaign forum Ms. Pierre had been asked whether she had ever been 

taken into custody and what her answer was; (3) one paragraph asked whether she had 

disclosed information about her evasion of service, the writ of body attachment, and her 

detention as part of the student loan litigation on her judicial questionnaires; and (4) the 
27

final paragraph asked for documentation of five endorsements she claimed to have 

received. The letter asked that Ms. Pierre provide the information and documentation by 

September 21. When Ms. Pierre did not meet that deadline, Bar Counsel sent follow-up 

requests on September 22 (requesting a response by September 29), October 4 (requesting 

a response by October 9), October 16 (requesting a response), and November 6 and 9 

(requesting that Ms. Pierre provide dates to make a statement under oath).

From September 23 through November 9, Ms. Pierre corresponded with Bar 

Counsel to seek more time to obtain counsel, which she was initially hoping would be 

provided by her malpractice carrier, CNA. On November 9, Ms. Pierre informed Bar 

Counsel that CNA had denied her request and that she was in the process of obtaining other 

representation. On November 19, not having received dates from Ms. Pierre, Bar Counsel 

scheduled a statement under oath for December 18 and emailed Ms. Pierre a copy of a 

subpoena.

On December 4, Ms. Pierre, through counsel, responded substantively to the 

inquiries contained in Bar Counsel’s September 7 letter. She also sat for the statement 

under oath on December 18. At the hearing, Ms. Pierre testified that she spoke with CNA 

several times while awaiting its response and that she learned that CNA was denying 

coverage on November 2, which was the day before the election. The hearing judge, 

observing that Ms. Pierre had sent Bar Counsel an email on November 6 stating that she 

was still waiting to hear from CNA, found Ms. Pierre’s testimony to not be credible. The 

hearing judge further found that Ms. Pierre “knowingly and intentionally delayed 

responding to Bar Counsel’s requests for information without excuse.”
28

D. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre violated:

• MARPC 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), when 

she: (1) “unequivocally testified falsely during her statement under oath 

on December 18, 2020 that she worked as general counsel for Network 

Engineering”; (2) signed her New York Bar Application in March of 1999 

attesting to its accuracy; and (3) “failed to timely respond to Bar 

Counsel’s requests for information made on September 7, 2020, 

September 22, 2020, and October 4, 2020[,] and when she failed to 

provide available dates for her statement under oath.”

• MARPC 8.2(a) and (b) (Judicial and Legal Officials), when she made 

statements that “were either knowingly false or made with reckless 

disregard as to their truth or falsity” and “were made for the specific 

purpose of misleading voters about both [her] credentials and the 

qualifications and integrity of the sitting judges.”

• MARPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct), when she violated other 

rules of professional conduct and when she “knowingly and intentionally 

testified falsely,” “chose to misrepresent her qualifications for her 

personal gain” on both her judgeship applications and in her campaign 

materials, and “made numerous misrepresentations by omission” by not 

disclosing certain details of her 1996 court case.

• NYDR 1-101 (Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal 

Profession), when she failed to disclose on her New York Bar Application 

the details of her 1996 student loan case, including that “the court issued 

a writ of body attachment for her failure to appear in response to a show 

cause order, that she was detained and brought to court by the Sheriff[,]

and that she was required to post a bond.”

• NYDR 1-102 (Misconduct), “when she falsely swore that her answers 

were complete and truthful when she signed the [New York] Bar 

Application[.]” 

DISCUSSION

I. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT

“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline 

proceedings and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance 
29

Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 584 (2022). “The hearing judge’s findings of fact are 

left undisturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous or either party successfully 

excepts to them.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fineblum, 473 Md. 272, 289 (2021) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 286 (2019)). 

Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions. Having reviewed the record thoroughly, 

we find no error in the hearing judge’s findings of fact that favored Ms. Pierre and so will 

not disturb them. Ms. Pierre filed a lengthy document that we interpret as excepting to all 

of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that were adverse to her. 

Because Ms. Pierre does not tie most of her exceptions directly to specific findings of fact, 

we will address them generally as they relate to the five categories of misconduct set forth 

above.

A. Misrepresentations About Sitting Judges

1. Background Legal Principles

As noted at the outset of this opinion, several aspects of the context in which this 

matter has arisen will prove critical to our resolution of Ms. Pierre’s exceptions and our 

consideration of appropriate discipline for the violations we sustain. We therefore begin 

with a discussion of background legal principles that help define the standards that apply 

to the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions.

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stanalonis, 445 Md. 129 (2015), we discussed 

the significance of the election context in assessing claims of violations of the MARPC. 

We explained that the election context was important for three reasons. “First, as the 

[United States] Supreme Court has observed, ‘speech about the qualifications of candidates 
30

for public office,’ including judicial candidates, is ‘at the core of our First Amendment 

freedoms.’” Id. at 140 (quoting Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 

774 (2002)). Such speech “is core political speech and has the highest level of First 

Amendment protection.” Stanalonis, 445 Md. at 140-41. “Second, the election context is 

significant as there inevitably is some imprecision in language used during the heat of a 

political campaign.” Id. at 141. Short timeframes in which to respond, “limited time to 

vet language,” and a natural preference for “a short and snappy one-liner” over lengthier 

explanations with more context are features of elections that courts must take into account 

in assessing whether statements violate the MARPC. Id. at 141-42. Third, because 

MARPC 8.2(a) also regulates statements made about “public legal officers,” including the 

Attorney General and State’s Attorneys, “whatever we hold [with respect to judicial 

campaigns] will also control what a lawyer may say about a candidate for election” to those 

other offices. Id. at 142.

This matter involves not just an election contest, but an election for a judicial 

position, which adds important context of its own. MARPC 8.2(a) provides: “An attorney 

shall not make a statement that the attorney knows to be false or with reckless disregard as 

to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory 

officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or 

legal office.” As we have noted, “the purpose of [MARPC] 8.2(a) is not to protect judges, 

judicial officers, or public legal officials from unkind or undeserved criticisms. Rather, 

[MARPC] 8.2(a) protects the integrity of the judicial system, and the public’s confidence 

therein[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 263 (2014); see MARPC 
31

8.2 cmt. 1 (“Assessments by attorneys are relied on in evaluating the professional or 

personal fitness of individuals being considered for election or appointment to judicial 

office and to public legal offices . . . . [F]alse statements by an attorney can unfairly 

undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.”). 

To ensure that enforcement of MARPC 8.2(a) does not infringe on core speech 

rights, a high standard is embedded within that rule, which encompasses only speech that 

is false and made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth or 

falsity. As we observed in Stanalonis, “[i]n the First Amendment context, ‘reckless 

disregard for truth or falsity’ evokes the subjective test for civil liability for defamation of 

a public figure set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).” 445 Md. 

at 143. Under that test, “reckless disregard” demands more than just a conclusion that a 

reasonable person would have refrained from making the comment or performed additional 

investigation. That standard demands that the plaintiff produce “sufficient evidence to 

permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of 

[the defendant’s] publication.”17 Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 

(1968)). Nonetheless, as we highlighted in Stanalonis: “Every Maryland attorney takes 

an oath to act ‘fairly and honorably.’ Those who seek judicial office must resist the 

temptation to advance at the risk of violating that pledge.” 445 Md. at 149 (footnote 

omitted). 

17 As we observed in Stanalonis, there is disagreement among the states concerning 

whether an objective or subjective test should apply in attorney discipline cases. 445 Md. 

at 143. As in that case, we need not resolve that disagreement here because it would not 

be dispositive as to the statements at issue.
32

One additional point bears on our assessment of Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the 

hearing judge’s findings of fact. As she correctly points out, in assessing both whether a 

statement is false and whether the speaker had knowledge of its falsity or acted with 

reckless disregard thereof, there is an important distinction between statements of fact and 

statements of opinion. “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. 

. . . But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional 

lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and 

wide-open’ debate on public issues.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 

(1974) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). Although statements of opinion are generally 

not subject to being proven false, statements of fact are. Moreover, statements of opinion, 

even those widely viewed as erroneous or unfair, are both less likely to mislead and more 

valuable to protect in the service of free and open public discourse than are false statements 

of fact. See id. It is therefore false statements of fact that are the subject of MARPC 8.2(a) 

and analogous provisions in other states. See, e.g., Matter of Callaghan, 796 S.E.2d 604, 

628 (W. Va. 2017) (finding judicial candidate’s materially false statements on campaign 

flyer impugning opponent were not protected by First Amendment and violated rules of 

professional conduct); In re O’Toole, 24 N.E.3d 1114, 1126 (Ohio 2014) (“Lies do not 

contribute to a robust political atmosphere, and ‘demonstrable falsehoods are not protected 

by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.’” (quoting Brown v. 

Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982))); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Mich. 2000) 

(finding canon of judicial conduct restricting false or misleading public communications 
33

by judicial candidates unconstitutionally overbroad before narrowing it to prohibit only 

“knowingly or recklessly using forms of public communication that are false”). 

2. The Statements at Issue

The hearing judge concluded that clear and convincing evidence established that 

three different campaign statements made by Ms. Pierre were false and that Ms. Pierre 

either knew they were false or made them with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. 

We address each in turn.

First, with respect to the tweet that “some sitting judges who are only English 

speakers send people to jail because they could not speak English,” Ms. Pierre conceded 

before the hearing judge that the statement is false, and the record establishes that it is. 

Ms. Pierre contends, however, that her campaign’s tweet was not knowingly and 

intentionally misleading, or made with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, because 

it was based on her mis-recollection of a proceeding in which a judge had ordered her client 

to take English classes as part of a CINA reunification plan. She also suggests that her 

tweet was protected as a statement of opinion, rather than fact. We find no clear error in 

the hearing judge’s findings. First, even if Ms. Pierre’s recollection about the single 

incident were accurate, it would have provided no support for her campaign’s tweet. 

Second, other than that mistaken recollection, Ms. Pierre offered no basis at all for the 

tweet. Third, a statement that judges send people to jail because they do not speak English 

is a statement of fact, subject to demonstrable verification, not a statement of opinion. 

Whether viewed through an objective or subjective lens, the record supports the hearing 

judge’s finding that Ms. Pierre, at a minimum, acted with reckless disregard for the truth 
34

or falsity of her statement at the time she made it. We therefore overrule Ms. Pierre’s 

exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact concerning her campaign’s tweet about 

judges sending people to jail for not speaking English.

Second, with respect to the tweet that “[m]ost” of the sitting judges “have worked 

at the same law firm, go to the same church, and are related by marriage,” Ms. Pierre 

excepts to all of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. We overrule those exceptions. 

Ms. Pierre first contends that the statement is one of opinion, which she sincerely held, 

rather than one of fact. In making that argument, Ms. Pierre recasts the statement as a 

general allegation that the sitting judges are not diverse and are all part of “an in-group.” 

Notably, however, the same tweet includes two other sentences that state exactly that—

that the sitting judges “are not really diverse” and “are an in-group.” Those sentences were 

not the basis for either the Commission’s charges or the hearing judge’s findings. A

statement that “[m]ost” sitting judges have worked at the same law firm is a statement of 

fact subject to objective verification. The same is true of statements that “[m]ost” sitting 

judges go to the same church and are related by marriage. At trial, Mr. McAuliffe testified 

from personal knowledge that all three contentions were false, and Ms. Pierre did not 

provide evidence that any of them were true. 

Ms. Pierre also argues that the hearing judge erred in finding that she knew the 

statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity at the time 

they were made. We disagree. At the hearing, Ms. Pierre identified the sole bases for her 

purported belief that her statement was true at the time she made it as: (1) having overheard 

an anonymous source state that two active judges and one retired judge were related by 
35

marriage; and (2) having been told by a member of the bar that four (out of 23) active 

judges attend the same church. Ms. Pierre also contends that she identified a sufficient 

number of relationships among the active judges to provide general support for her belief 

that her statement was true. However, the comments on which she relies, even if true, 

would not come close to supporting her statement, and the general support she purports to 

have identified in her Exhibit P is sufficiently deficient, see discussion above at note 14, 

that it lends significantly more weight to the Commission than to her. 

We therefore overrule Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual 

findings that Ms. Pierre’s tweet about most sitting judges working at the same law firm, 

attending the same church, and being related (1) were false, and (2) were made knowing 

they were false or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. 

Finally, Ms. Pierre also excepts to all of the hearing judge’s findings concerning her 

several campaign statements about an answer Judge Berry gave at a candidate forum

attended by Ms. Pierre. At that forum, when asked about a study identifying a high rate of 

incarceration of Black men in Maryland, Judge Berry provided an answer that discussed 

various alternatives to incarceration and concluded: “I understand that it is an issue, but 

it’s not as much of an issue as being portrayed by [the other two candidates.]” See 

discussion above at 19. The first statement with which the Commission takes issue, which 

is representative of the others, is an October 20, 2020 text message stating:

Hi [voter], this election matters. When a sitting judge says “it’s not much 

of an issue” that Black males are jailed at a higher rate in MD it’s clear 

we need Marylin Pierre, who understands restorative justice. Can we 

count on your support? 
36

Mr. McAuliffe objected to Ms. Pierre’s message on the grounds that it took Judge Berry’s 

statement out of context and because it omitted the word “as” before “much,” which he 

contended changed its meaning. Ms. Pierre took that statement down and posted a different 

one that included the “as,” although in only one of two places where the quote appeared. 

Mr. McAuliffe again objected and demanded that the post be removed, stating: “Your 

adding the word ‘as’ to the portion of the quote . . . does not correct the intentionally 

misleading nature of your post but only serves to prove that your actions are deliberate 

misrepresentations.” The hearing judge found that Ms. Pierre’s campaign used other 

versions of the quote three more times, once including the “as,” once not, and a third time 

shortening the quote to only “much of an issue.”

At the hearing, Ms. Pierre testified that she had believed her initial quote was 

accurate based on what she heard Judge Berry say. She also testified that the omission of 

“as” in the subsequent statements was inadvertent. However, the hearing judge found that 

even if that were true, Ms. Pierre 

had a responsibility to completely and accurately correct her campaign 

literature once notified of her error on October 12, 2020. Instead, she 

republished the incomplete, misleading quote on October 13th, 17th, 23rd 

and 31st. The court finds that she knowingly and intentionally 

misrepresented the substance of Judge Berry’s quote and repeatedly 

attributed the incomplete, misleading quote to Judge Berry. 

The hearing judge thus concluded that, more than the omission of the word “as”—which 

was not missing from all the communications identified—Ms. Pierre violated the MARPC 

by failing to provide “complete[] and accurate[]” context for the statement.
37

Ms. Pierre excepts to the hearing judge’s findings concerning these communications 

on the grounds, among other things, that her omission of the word “as” did not change the 

context of the quote because her point was that the sitting judges were not taking seriously 

the high rate of incarceration of Black males in Maryland; that Ms. Pierre, by contrast, was 

a candidate “who understands restorative justice”; and that voters should therefore choose 

her. 

In this case, the protection afforded by the First Amendment for this core political 

speech is not overcome. The comments at issue attempted to draw a distinction between 

Ms. Pierre and her opponents on an issue of significant public importance. Ms. Pierre’s 

statements conveyed a message that she believed one of her opponents was minimizing the 

importance of that issue. That Ms. Pierre did not endeavor to provide full context for a 

statement she attributed to her opponent and did not get the quote completely accurate is 

neither commendable nor, in the context of an election, exceptional. The issue, however, 

is whether it is sanctionable as misconduct under the MARPC. As noted, “imprecision in 

language” is an inevitable feature of campaign speech. Stanalonis, 445 Md. at 141. The 

question before us is not whether the words within the quotation marks were a full and 

accurate transcript of that portion of Judge Berry’s remarks. In some of the quotes they 

were and in some they were not. Nor is the question whether Ms. Pierre provided sufficient 

context around the quoted language to convey Judge Berry’s point as Judge Berry 

originally made it. Ms. Pierre did not. The relevant question, instead, is whether, 

understanding the circumstances and the nature of campaign speech and the First 

Amendment interests that protect it, there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
38

campaign statements at issue were knowingly and intentionally false or misleading. We 

do not find evidence in the record to meet that high standard. We therefore sustain 

Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact concerning the statement 

attributed to Judge Berry.

B. Misrepresentations About Ms. Pierre’s Experience

Ms. Pierre excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that she knowingly and 

intentionally misrepresented her legal experience for the purpose of bolstering her judicial 

applications in her responses to Question 16(d) and (e). As discussed above, the hearing 

judge concluded that Ms. Pierre did not knowingly and intentionally misrepresent her legal 

experience in responding to two other subparts of Question 16, subparts (b) and (c). The 

hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre’s responses to those questions were so “wildly 

inconsistent” that she could not have had the intent to mislead. However, the hearing judge 

reached a different conclusion with respect to Ms. Pierre’s answers to subparts (d) and (e). 

Bar Counsel did not except to the hearing judge’s findings with respect to subparts 

(b) and (c) of Question 16. Those findings are compelling. The inconsistency among 

responses from questionnaire to questionnaire, as well as the inconsistency between the 

responses and other information contained in the questionnaires about Ms. Pierre’s 

practice, is much more consistent with sloppiness and inattentiveness than with a deliberate 

effort to mislead. 

Ms. Pierre contends that her responses to subparts (d) and (e) share the same 

characteristics as her responses to subparts (b) and (c) and, for the same reasons, there is 

not clear and convincing evidence of a knowing and intentional effort to mislead. We 
39

agree. In her responses to subpart (d), Ms. Pierre stated in her first questionnaire that she 

had handled “over five hundred” cases to trial or verdict. The number then went down to 

430 in the next questionnaire before eventually climbing back to 500. And although the 

question called only for a list of cases handled to trial or verdict within the past five years, 

Ms. Pierre’s responses, as the hearing judge found, could not possibly have been accurate 

across that timeframe. Similarly, in her initial responses to subpart (e), Ms. Pierre 

identified that 5% of her cases had involved jury trials, but later reduced that, all at once, 

to 1%. In both cases, the information provided by Ms. Pierre was inconsistent across 

questionnaires and inconsistent with other information contained in the questionnaires

about her experience. The logic underlying the hearing judge’s findings concerning 

subparts (b) and (c) compels the same result with respect to subparts (d) and (e). We 

therefore sustain Ms. Pierre’s exceptions with respect to the hearing judge’s findings 

concerning Question 16(d) and (e) of her judicial questionnaires.

C. Misrepresentations Concerning Student Loan Case

We turn next to Ms. Pierre’s lack of disclosure that, in connection with the student 

loan litigation in the mid-1990s, she had failed to respond to a show cause order and was 

subsequently detained on a body attachment. For different reasons, the hearing judge found 

that Ms. Pierre’s failure to disclose that information in response to Questions 28 and 29 on 

seven of her eight judicial applications did not constitute knowing and intentional

misrepresentations. Bar Counsel did not except to that finding, and we agree that it is 

supported by the record. In addition to the reasons identified by the hearing judge, 

Ms. Pierre disclosed the issuance of the body attachment and her subsequent detention in 
40

response to Question 28 on her first judicial questionnaire, submitted in March 2012. She 

could not reasonably have believed that information would not still be within the 

knowledge of, and fully accessible to, the members of the same judicial nominating 

commission when she submitted her next questionnaire the following year or, indeed, any 

of her subsequent questionnaires.

18

The hearing judge reached a different conclusion with respect to Question 32, a 

catchall question that asked if there was “any other information concerning [the 

applicant’s] background that might be considered detrimental or that otherwise should be 

taken into consideration by the Commission[.]” The hearing judge found that because 

Ms. Pierre did not disclose “her failure to appear, the Show Cause Order and the Body 

Attachment in the Higher Education case in response to Questions 28 or 29 [in her last 

seven questionnaires], . . . she was required to disclose the detrimental information in 

response to Question 32[.]” For three reasons, we conclude that the record does not contain 

clear and convincing evidence to support the hearing judge’s finding. 

18 Ms. Pierre’s first five judicial applications, spanning dates from March 5, 2012 

through September 26, 2014, were filed during the second term of Governor Martin 

O’Malley. According to the Maryland Manual, 11 of the 13 members of the Trial Courts

Judicial Nominating Commission for Montgomery County were the same from at least 

August 9, 2011 through July 21, 2014. See Maryland Manual On-Line, 2011, Trial Courts 

Nominating Commissions (Aug. 9, 2011) available 

at: http://2011.mdmanual.msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/html/22jnomt.htm

l (identifying members of the 11th Commission District as of August 9, 2011), archived at 

https://perma.cc/2FVB-5782; Maryland Manual On-Line, 2014, Trial Courts Nominating 

Commissions (July 21, 2014) available 

at: http://2014.mdmanual.msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/html/22jnomt.html

(identifying members of the Commission as of July 21, 2014), archived at

https://perma.cc/L2N6-BK5G.
41

First, implicit in that finding is a determination that Ms. Pierre would necessarily 

have viewed her brief detention on a body attachment approximately two decades earlier, 

as part of student loan litigation that was fully resolved approximately one decade earlier, 

as something “detrimental” to her fitness for the judgeships she was seeking. Unlike 

Questions 28 and 29, Question 32 is subjective, requiring applicants to reach conclusions 

as to whether aspects of their background “might be considered detrimental” or “should be 

taken into consideration by the Commission.” The hearing judge did not cite any basis in 

the record to conclude that Ms. Pierre viewed that information as detrimental to her fitness 

for judicial office. To the contrary, Ms. Pierre explained that the circumstances that led to 

the body attachment and her detention were attributable to a personal tragedy she endured 

at the time. Given the subjectivity of Question 32 and the lack of any evidence to the 

contrary, the record does not support a conclusion by clear and convincing evidence that 

Ms. Pierre viewed those matters as detrimental to her candidacy.

Second, as noted above, Ms. Pierre disclosed the body attachment and detention in 

her answer to Question 28 on her first judicial questionnaire, which she submitted in March 

2012. Her second was submitted in October 2013, and she submitted six more through 

August 2017. After her disclosure in the first questionnaire, she could not reasonably have 

believed that failing to mention it in her second and subsequent questionnaires would keep 

knowledge of it from the members of the very same judicial nominating commission.

Third, as the hearing judge noted, Ms. Pierre disclosed the student loan case itself

on the seven questionnaires at issue in response to Question 29. A simple check of 

Judiciary Case Search reveals that the court issued a body attachment and delivered it to 
42

the sheriff on June 21, 1996, that the sheriff’s return was filed on July 1, 1996, that 

Ms. Pierre appeared in court that day with a public defender, that the court set a $500 bond, 

and that Ms. Pierre paid it on July 10, 1996. See Maryland Judiciary, Case Search, 

https://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/. Knowing that the judicial nominating 

commission was investigating her background based on the information provided in the 

questionnaire, her identification of the litigation in response to Question 29 is inconsistent 

with the finding that her failure to disclose easily uncovered details about it in response to 

Question 32 constituted a knowing and intentional misrepresentation by omission. 

For all those reasons, we conclude that the record cannot support the finding, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Pierre’s responses to Question 32 on her judicial 

questionnaires constituted knowing and intentional misrepresentations by omission. 

Accordingly, we sustain Ms. Pierre’s exception to that finding.

The hearing judge also found that Ms. Pierre made knowing and intentional

misrepresentations by omission when she provided incomplete information about her 

student loan case in her response to Question 17(b) on her application for the New York 

Bar. That question asked whether Ms. Pierre had “ever failed to answer any ticket, 

summons or other legal process served upon [her] at any time” and “[i]f so, was any 

warrant, subpoena or further process issued against [her] as a result of [her] failure to 

respond to such legal process?” Ms. Pierre’s answer identified the case and acknowledged 

that she had failed to appear in response to a summons. She further stated: “A summons 

was sent to my house and I answered it to the Court’s satisfaction. No further action was 

taken on the summons since I have made arrangements to pay the student loan.” The 
43

hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre knowingly and intentionally provided a misleading 

response to Question 17(b). Ms. Pierre excepts to that finding.

Question 17(b) and Ms. Pierre’s response to it are different from Question 32 on the 

judicial questionnaires and Ms. Pierre’s responses to it in two critical respects. First, unlike 

the subjective nature of Question 32, Question 17(b) called for the disclosure of specific, 

factual information: whether “any warrant, subpoena or further process issued against” 

Ms. Pierre after she failed to respond to the show cause order. Such process had issued, 

and Ms. Pierre failed to identify it. Second, in responding to Question 17(b), Ms. Pierre 

made the affirmatively misleading statements that a summons was merely “sent” to her 

house, she addressed it satisfactorily, and “[n]o further action was taken on the 

summons[.]” Those statements constitute an affirmative, false representation that 

Ms. Pierre’s receipt of a summons at her house ended the matter. As a result, the record 

contains sufficient support for the hearing judge’s finding, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that Ms. Pierre’s answer to Question 17(b) contained a knowing and intentional 

misrepresentation by omission. We therefore overrule Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to that 

finding as well as the hearing judge’s associated finding that, based on her answer to 

Question 17(b), Ms. Pierre falsely swore that her answers were complete and truthful when 

she signed her New York Bar Application. 

D. Misrepresentations About Ms. Pierre’s Employment with 

Network Engineering

Ms. Pierre excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that she knowingly and 

intentionally misrepresented that she had been employed as corporate counsel for Network 
44

Engineering on her judicial questionnaires and in her statement under oath. Among other 

things, Ms. Pierre contends that Bar Counsel did not introduce any evidence that she was 

not employed as corporate counsel for Network Engineering. We agree. Ms. Pierre 

testified that she was corporate counsel for Network Engineering. No other evidence was 

introduced on the subject. Although the hearing judge was not convinced by Ms. Pierre’s 

answers, that alone is insufficient to carry the Commission’s burden of proving by clear 

and convincing evidence that Ms. Pierre made a knowing and intentional 

misrepresentation. See Md. Rule 19-727(c); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 480 

Md. 319, 352-53 (2022). We therefore sustain Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing 

judge’s findings concerning Ms. Pierre’s representations about her employment with 

Network Engineering.

E. Misrepresentations to Bar Counsel and Failure to Cooperate with 

Investigation

Ms. Pierre also excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that she failed to cooperate 

during the initial stages of Bar Counsel’s investigation and made misrepresentations to Bar 

Counsel concerning her efforts to secure counsel. Ms. Pierre contends that she did not see 

Bar Counsel’s initial email, responded to later correspondence and remained in contact 

with Bar Counsel as she was waiting for information from her malpractice carrier, and 

ultimately answered Bar Counsel’s questions in writing and in her statement under oath. 

We find it impossible to separate the circumstances of Ms. Pierre’s delay in 

responding to Bar Counsel’s inquiry from the circumstances under which the inquiry 

began. As noted, on September 7, 2020, less than two months before election day, Bar 
45

Counsel forwarded Ms. Pierre an email from the campaign manager of Ms. Pierre’s four 

opponents that made numerous accusations against her. Bar Counsel demanded that 

Ms. Pierre provide a written defense of multiple statements she had made in the course of 

the campaign, along with other matters. Ms. Pierre failed to respond by the September 21 

deadline, and then sought extensions to see if her malpractice carrier would provide her 

with a defense. She eventually responded, through counsel, on December 4, and then sat 

for her examination under oath on December 18.

Although the hearing judge resolved a factual issue against Ms. Pierre concerning 

the timing of when she heard back from her insurance carrier, the larger issue is that the 

investigation should not have occurred when it did. No exigent circumstances existed that 

demanded an immediate investigation. No client interests were at stake. And there is no 

suggestion anywhere in the record that Bar Counsel’s investigation would have been 

prejudiced by waiting until November 4 or later to initiate it. Bar Counsel points out that 

Bar Counsel’s office did not disclose the investigation publicly before the election, which 

we agree is significant. However, Ms. Pierre’s perception is also significant, as is the 

perception of the public when the facts of the investigation became public. Here, those 

facts included the initiation of an investigation by Bar Counsel as an immediate response 

to a campaign email that expressly solicited urgent action from the legal community. In 

the waning weeks of the election, Ms. Pierre, the target of the investigation, was asked to 

divert attention from her campaign to justify, in writing and with supporting 

documentation, several of her campaign statements. 
46

To be clear, we do not question Bar Counsel’s motives here. Nonetheless, the risk 

that an impartial observer might question those motives was not worth whatever marginal 

value might have been perceived to lie in proceeding on the chosen timeline. Ensuring that 

the fairness and neutrality of investigations is not reasonably subject to question is crucial 

to preserving the integrity of the attorney disciplinary process. Given these very unusual 

circumstances, we sustain Ms. Pierre’s exception to the finding that Ms. Pierre “knowingly 

and intentionally delayed responding to Bar Counsel’s request for information without 

excuse.”

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

We assess the hearing judge’s legal conclusions without deference. Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632, 658 (2022); Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1). The 

hearing judge concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Pierre violated 

MARPC 8.1(a) and (b), 8.2(a) and (b), 8.4(a)-(d), and NYDR 1-101 and 1-102. Upon our 

independent analysis, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that 

Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.2(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) and NYDR 1-101 and 1-102. 

A. MARPC 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)

The hearing judge’s conclusions that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.1(a) and (b) 

were based on findings of fact concerning her lack of cooperation with Bar Counsel’s 

investigation. Because we sustained Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to those findings of fact, we 

also sustain her exceptions to the conclusions that she violated MARPC 8.1(a) and (b).
47

B. MARPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal Officials)

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.2(a) and (b) when 

she authorized campaign tweets about the sitting judges knowing they were false or with 

reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity for her personal benefit. MARPC 8.2(a) 

provides:

An attorney shall not make a statement that the attorney knows to be false 

or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the 

qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal 

officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal 

office.

“In this and in other jurisdictions, the rule is well settled that an attorney who engages in 

making false, scandalous or other improper attacks upon a judicial officer is subject to 

discipline.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 265 (2014) (quoting In re 

Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1986)); see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McClain, 

406 Md. 1, 15-16, 18 (2008) (finding that attorney violated Rule 8.2(a) when the attorney 

asserted in a brief that a judge was motivated by personal bias); Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. DeMaio, 379 Md. 571, 585 (2004) (finding that attorney violated Rule 8.2(a) 

when the attorney made “false, spurious and inflammatory representations and allegations 

with respect to” the Chief Judge and Clerk of the Appellate Court of Maryland). To 

constitute a violation of MARPC 8.2(a), “three things must be proven by clear and 

convincing evidence: (1) that the lawyer made a false statement; (2) that the statement 

concerned the qualifications or integrity of a judge or a candidate for judicial office; and 

(3) that the lawyer made the statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
48

disregard as to its truth or falsity.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stanalonis, 445 Md. 

129, 139 (2015).

We sustained the hearing judge’s findings of fact that Ms. Pierre made two false 

statements knowing they were false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity: 

(1) that some sitting judges “send people to jail because they could not speak English”; and 

(2) that “most” of the sitting judges worked at the same law firm, attend the same church, 

and are related. The hearing judge concluded that both of those statements also impugned 

the integrity of the sitting judges and so satisfied the third criteria for a violation of MARPC 

8.2(a). Ms. Pierre excepts to both conclusions. 

With respect to the first statement, Ms. Pierre argues that the statement did not 

impugn the integrity or qualifications of the sitting judges because she did not name anyone 

specifically. We disagree. Ms. Pierre’s statement was made in the course of an election 

campaign in which she was running against a slate of four sitting judges on a bench of 23 

active judges. The statement—made using the present tense, that “some” among that 

relatively small group of judges illegally send people to jail because they cannot speak 

English—impugned the integrity of the bench. See Frost, 437 Md. at 260-62 (finding a 

violation of MARPC 8.2(a) where attorney made statements accusing judges of corruption, 

including collusion to commit an illegal arrest); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Hermina, 379 Md. 503, 520-21 (2004) (finding MARPC 8.2 violation when attorney 

accused trial judge of having ex parte communications with opposing counsel). 

We reach a different conclusion concerning the second statement, which the hearing 

judge found impugned the integrity of the sitting judges because “it implies that the judges 
49

were appointed, not based on their qualifications and merit, but rather based upon where 

they worked, where they worship, and to whom they are married.” The hearing judge thus 

found that Ms. Pierre “clearly intended to malign and misrepresent the relationships 

between the judges.” The support for the hearing judge’s conclusion is the language of the 

tweet, which is:

The Sitting Judges are somewhat diverse in that they are black, Asian, 

gay, and straight, and men and women. But they are not really diverse. 

They are an in-group. Most of them have worked at the same law firm, 

go to the same church, and are related by marriage.

Keeping in mind that we are addressing core political speech entitled to the highest level 

of First Amendment protection, Federal Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 1650 

(2022), and that the purpose of our inquiry is not to protect judges “from unkind or 

undeserved criticisms,” but to “protect[] the integrity of the judicial system, and the 

public’s confidence therein,” Frost, 437 Md. at 263, we do not agree that Ms. Pierre’s 

statement impugned the qualifications or the integrity of the sitting judges. The message 

expressed in the tweet is not that any sitting judge is unqualified or lacks integrity. Instead, 

the message is that they are not sufficiently diverse from each other. The facts Ms. Pierre 

asserts to prove that point are false, but that does not alter the character of the point. And 

although the hearing judge found that the tweet contains an implicit criticism of the basis 

on which the judges were appointed, such an implication is insufficient to provide clear 

and convincing evidence given the level of protection afforded to campaign speech under 

the First Amendment. 
50

We therefore overrule Ms. Pierre’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

she violated MARPC 8.2(a), but only with respect to her campaign’s tweet stating that 

some sitting judges send people to jail for not speaking English.

The hearing judge also concluded that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.2(b), which

provides, in relevant part:

A candidate for a judicial office:

(1) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to the office and act in a manner 

consistent with the impartiality, independence and integrity of the 

judiciary; 

. . . 

(3) shall not knowingly misrepresent his or her identity or qualifications, 

the identity or qualifications of an opponent, or any other fact[.]

The hearing judge’s conclusions that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.2(b)(1) and (3) were 

premised on Ms. Pierre’s various statements addressing the quote attributed to Judge Berry. 

Because we have sustained Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the findings of fact concerning those 

statements, we also sustain her exceptions to the conclusions of law premised on those 

findings. We therefore conclude that Ms. Pierre did not violate MARPC 8.2(b).

C. MARPC 8.4 (Misconduct)

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.4(a), (b), (c), and 

(d). MARPC 8.4 provides:

It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do 

so through the acts of another; 
51

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s 

honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation; [or]

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]

1. MARPC 8.4(a)

“An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) when ‘[the attorney] violates any other Rule 

under the MARPC.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parris, 482 Md. 574, 597 (2023) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179, 214 (2020)). Ms. Pierre 

violated MARPC 8.4(a) because, as discussed, she violated MARPC 8.2(a). 

2. MARPC 8.4(b)

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.4(b) by committing 

perjury when she: (1) testified falsely during her statement under oath about her delay in 

responding to Bar Counsel’s letters and her prior employment with Network Engineering; 

and (2) signed her New York Bar Application under oath. We sustained Ms. Pierre’s 

exceptions concerning the findings of fact supporting the 8.4(b) violation related to her 

statement under oath. As a result, we conclude that Ms. Pierre did not violate 8.4(b) based 

on that statement. 

Although we overruled Ms. Pierre’s exceptions concerning her New York Bar 

Application, that conduct is properly subject to New York’s disciplinary rules, not those of 

Maryland. MARPC 8.5(b) (Rule 19-308.5) provides:

Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this State, 

the rule of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
52

(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the 

rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the 

tribunal provide otherwise; and

(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the 

attorney’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct 

is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied 

to the conduct. An attorney shall not be subject to discipline if the 

attorney’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the 

attorney reasonably believes the predominant effect of the attorney’s 

conduct will occur.

See generally Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tatung, 476 Md. 45, 72-81 (2021) (providing 

a detailed discussion of MARPC 8.5(b)). New York’s disciplinary rules at least arguably 

apply to Ms. Pierre’s New York Bar Application pursuant to subpart (1) of MARPC 8.5(b),

because her application was submitted to and was pending before the New York Supreme 

Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. See Tatung, 476 Md. at 72 n.29 (observing 

that the MARPC defines “tribunal” as including, but not being limited to, a court). Even 

if not, the “predominant effect of the conduct” occurred in New York, where Ms. Pierre 

was seeking admission to the bar, not in Maryland.19 See id. at 79-81 (discussing 

19 Ms. Pierre signed her New York Bar Application in Prince George’s County, 

Maryland. However, under MARPC 8.5(b)(2), the rules of the jurisdiction in which the 

conduct occurred are applied unless “the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different 

jurisdiction.” In the context of a bar application, the predominant effect of

misrepresentations contained in it is felt in the state to which the application is submitted. 

In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Malone, 477 Md. 225 (2022), we examined the 

respondent’s misconduct related to false and misleading statements made in connection 

with his application to the Texas Bar under the MARPC. However, we observed that 

Mr. Malone had waived any potential claim for relief based on MARPC 8.5(b) by failing 

to raise any objection on that ground. Id. at 290 n.23. Here, given that Ms. Pierre’s 

signature under oath on the New York Bar Application is the only remaining source of a 

potential MARPC 8.4(b) violation, and the Commission otherwise correctly charged 

conduct in connection with the New York Bar Application under that State’s disciplinary 

rules, we elect to raise the choice of law issue related to MARPC 8.4(b) ourselves. See
53

application of the “predominant effect” test). As a result, MARPC 8.4(b) is not applicable 

to Ms. Pierre’s conduct in swearing under oath, at the conclusion of her New York Bar 

Application, that she had “read the foregoing questions and ha[d] fully, truthfully and 

accurately answered the same.” We therefore sustain Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing 

judge’s conclusion that she violated MARPC 8.4(b).

3. MARPC 8.4(c)

“As used in this Rule, a misrepresentation is made when the attorney knows the 

statement is false, and cannot be the product of mistake, misunderstanding, or 

inadvertency.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Taniform, 482 Md. 272, 315 (2022) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 698 (2013)). An attorney 

violates Rule 8.4(c) by knowingly and intentionally making a false statement or by making 

an intentionally misleading statement or misrepresentation by omission. Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Vasiliades, 475 Md. 520, 557-58 (2021). The hearing judge 

concluded that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.4(c) repeatedly. Although we have sustained 

Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings underpinning many of those 

violations, we overruled her exception concerning her statement that sitting judges send 

people to jail for not speaking English. On the basis of that statement only, we conclude 

that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.4(c). 

Bailey v. State, 464 Md. 685, 698 (2019) (“In rare instances, pursuant to Maryland Rule 

8-131(a), we may exercise our discretion to review an unpreserved issue.”); see also Ray

v. State, 435 Md. 1, 22 (2013) (stating that Rule 8-131(a) “clearly authorizes an appellate 

court to address an unpreserved issue”).
54

4. MARPC 8.4(d)

“Generally, a lawyer violates M[A]RPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct would 

negatively impact the perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the 

public.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 510 (2022) (quoting 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Slate, 457 Md. 610, 645 (2018)). Clear and convincing 

evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.4(d). 

We agree with the hearing judge that knowledge that a lawyer had falsely, and very 

publicly, accused judges of unlawfully sending people to jail for not speaking English 

would negatively affect a reasonable member of the public’s perception of the legal 

profession. See Frost, 437 Md. at 265 (“[A] public, false and malicious attack on a judicial 

officer . . . may bring discredit upon the administration of justice amongst citizens who 

have no way of determining the truth of the charges.” (quoting In re Evans, 801 F.2d at 

707)). We overrule Ms. Pierre’s exception to that conclusion of law.

D. NYDR 1-101 (Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal 

Profession)

NYDR 1-101(a), as of the date Ms. Pierre submitted her 1999 New York Bar 

Application, provided:

A lawyer is subject to discipline if the lawyer has made a materially false 

statement in, or has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact 

requested in connection with, the lawyer’s application for admission to 

the bar.

Consistent with this Court’s application of the analogous MARPC provisions, the Supreme 

Court Appellate Divisions of New York have emphasized that “[c]andor and the voluntary 

revelation of negative information by an applicant are the cornerstones upon which is built 
55

the character and fitness investigation of an applicant for admission to the New York State 

Bar.” Matter of Avolio, 186 N.Y.S.3d 858, 859 (App. Div. 2023) (per curiam). “[A] 

material misrepresentation or omission in an applicant’s admission application deprives 

the Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness . . . of all the information it might find 

relevant in assessing the applicant’s candidacy, and lack of candor ultimately effects an 

admission upon false pretenses[.]” Matter of DeMaria, 62 N.Y.S.3d 226, 228 (App. Div. 

2017) (per curiam). “Whatever the importance of any one question or answer or item of 

information, the overriding consideration is disclosure and truthfulness.” Matter of 

Steinberg, 528 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (App. Div. 1988) (per curiam).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Pierre violated NYDR 1-101 when she 

provided knowingly false and misleading information in response to Question 17(b). We

overruled Ms. Pierre’s exception to the hearing judge’s findings concerning the response 

to Question 17(b). Based on those findings, we agree that clear and convincing evidence 

supports the conclusion that Ms. Pierre violated NYDR 1-101 by providing incomplete and 

intentionally misleading information about the July 1, 1996 incident in which she was 

detained on a body attachment, brought to court by the sheriff, and required to post a bond

to obtain her release. See Matter of Avolio, 186 N.Y.S.3d at 860 (finding that attorney who 

failed to disclose an arrest that occurred after attorney submitted application but before 

admitted demonstrated a lack of candor and cautioning that “even a careless mistake in 

failing to make required disclosures in the admission process—as opposed to a failure 

based on a deceptive or fraudulent motive—warrants the need for a public disciplinary 

sanction”); Matter of DeMaria, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 227-29 (finding attorney made material 
56

misrepresentation on application when he indicated that he was seeking admission in a 

foreign jurisdiction but failed to disclose his admission had been denied); Matter of

Olivarius, 941 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (App. Div. 2012) (per curiam) (“[The attorney] clearly 

fell woefully short of submitting an application for admission that properly and with candor 

supplied all requested information. The application submitted by respondent had the effect 

of deflecting appropriate inquiry by this Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness rather 

than apprising it of relevant potential character and fitness concerns.”); Matter of Wood, 

767 N.Y.S.2d 286, 286 (App. Div. 2003) (per curiam) (“We reiterate that candor and the 

voluntary revelation of negative information by an applicant for admission are the 

cornerstones upon which is built the character and fitness investigation.” (citation 

omitted)).

E. NYDR 1-102 (Misconduct)

NYDR 1-102, as of the date Ms. Pierre submitted her New York Bar Application, 

provided:

a. A lawyer or law firm shall not:

1. Violate a Disciplinary Rule.

. . . 

4. Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation.

5. Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

. . . 

8. Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 

fitness to practice law.
57

The hearing judge concluded that the same “facts that support violations of NYDR 

1-101(a) also support violations of NYDR 1-102(a)(1), (4), (5) and (8).” According to the 

hearing judge, Ms. Pierre also “violated NYDR 1-102(a)(1), (4), (5) and (8) [because] she 

falsely swore that her answers were complete and truthful when she signed the Bar 

Application” under oath and stated that she had “fully, truthfully and accurately answered 

the same.”20 We agree that Ms. Pierre’s knowingly false and misleading response to 

Question 17(b) constitutes clear and convincing evidence of a violation of NYDR 1-

102(a)(1), (4), (5), and (8), for reasons previously discussed.

In sum, we conclude that Ms. Pierre violated MARPC 8.2(a), MARPC 8.4(a), (c), 

and (d), and NYDR 1-101 and 1-102(a)(1), (4), (5), and (8). 

III. SANCTION

“As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney discipline proceedings is not to

punish the attorney but to protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging in

misconduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culberson, 483 Md. 294, 324 (2023). “[W]e 

seek to impose sanctions that are ‘commensurate with the nature and gravity of the 

violations and the intent with which they were committed,’ while considering the unique 

circumstances of each case and any aggravating or mitigating factors.” Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Kaufman, 466 Md. 404, 428 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Williams, 446 Md. 355, 376 (2016)).

20 The Commission did not charge Ms. Pierre with a violation of NYDR 1-102(a)(3), 

the analogue to MARPC 8.4(b), which prohibits an attorney from “[e]ngag[ing] in illegal 

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a

lawyer.” 
58

A. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Aggravating factors “militate in favor of a more severe sanction.” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 608 (2022) (quoting Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 233 (2020)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Malone, 482 Md. 82, 120 (2022) (providing a list of recognized aggravating factors). The 

hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence the existence of seven aggravating 

factors, including that Ms. Pierre: (1) “had a dishonest or selfish motive”; (2) obstructed 

the attorney discipline proceeding; (3) “engaged in illegal conduct when she testified 

falsely under oath and when she signed her New York Bar Application under oath”; 

(4) engaged in a pattern of misconduct; (5) committed multiple violations of the MARPC; 

(6) “made misrepresentations to Bar Counsel”; and (7) has substantial experience in the 

practice of law, having been admitted to practice law in 1992.

Ms. Pierre excepted to each factor other than experience in the practice of law, 

stating that Bar Counsel failed to produce clear and convincing evidence to sustain those 

factors. Of her experience in the practice of law, Ms. Pierre noted that this case is not about 

her law practice and therefore that aggravating factor should carry little weight. We 

conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports three aggravating factors: (1) a 

dishonest or selfish motive; (2) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (3) illegal 

conduct.

First, clear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Pierre 

demonstrated a selfish motive when she falsely stated that sitting judges send people to jail

for not speaking English to bolster her campaign against the sitting judges and in her false
59

and misleading response to Question 17(b) on her New York Bar Application in her attempt 

to gain admission to the New York Bar. Second, Ms. Pierre has substantial experience in 

the practice of law, although that was not true at the time of her New York Bar Application. 

Although Ms. Pierre is correct that her violations do not relate to her legal practice, her 

level of experience is nonetheless relevant to expectations of her conduct. Third, 

Ms. Pierre engaged in illegal conduct when she signed her New York Bar Application 

under oath and attested that she had “fully, truthfully and accurately” answered the 

questions in the application.

Clear and convincing evidence does not support the other aggravating factors found 

by the hearing judge. First, because we sustained Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the findings 

related to her initial delay in responding to Bar Counsel, we do not find the aggravating 

factor of bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process. Second, because we have 

sustained violations based on only one statement made in 2020 and one response on her 

New York Bar Application, and those two incidents are entirely unrelated, Ms. Pierre did 

not engage in “a pattern of misconduct.” Third, although Ms. Pierre violated multiple 

provisions of the MARPC, they were all based on a single statement. Fourth, because we 

sustained Ms. Pierre’s exceptions to the findings related to her statement under oath to Bar 

Counsel, clear and convincing evidence does not support the aggravating factor of 

submission of false evidence or statements during the attorney disciplinary process.

“[T]he existence of mitigating factors tends to lessen or reduce the sanction an 

attorney may face.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 472 Md. 491, 548 (2021)

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 365 (2020)); see also
60

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. 180, 242 (2023) (providing a list of 

recognized mitigating factors). The hearing judge found by a preponderance of the 

evidence the existence of four mitigating factors: (1) no prior record of attorney discipline; 

(2) Ms. Pierre “generally enjoys a good reputation as a zealous advocate for her clients in 

CINA and juvenile matters” and “is of generally good character, despite certain lapses in 

judgment in her pursuit of a judgeship”; (3) “it is more likely than not that [Ms. Pierre’s]

expressed remorse is sincere”; and (4) repetition of the misconduct is unlikely. Bar 

Counsel did not except to any of these findings and the record supports the hearing judge’s 

findings. 

Ms. Pierre excepted to the hearing judge not finding: (1) the absence of a dishonest 

or selfish motive; (2) good faith efforts to rectify any misconduct; (3) full and free 

disclosure to the disciplinary board; (4) a cooperative attitude towards the proceedings; and 

(5) delay in the disciplinary proceedings for violations related to her student loan case from 

nearly 30 years ago. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we find no error in the 

hearing judge’s determinations with respect to any of those mitigating factors. 

B. The Sanction

The Commission recommends that Ms. Pierre be disbarred. In making that 

recommendation, the Commission “focuses on [Ms. Pierre’s] misconduct associated with 

her 1999 New York bar application and the eight [Judicial] Questionnaires she filed . . . 

between March 2012 and August 2017.” Ms. Pierre recommends that the Court impose no 

sanction. 
61

In determining an appropriate sanction, we are mindful of the context in which this 

case has arisen, as discussed above at length. Because of the unusual context, we do not 

find our dispositions rendered in other matters to be useful in identifying an appropriate 

sanction here. Considering all relevant factors, we conclude that a reprimand is the 

appropriate sanction. Although Ms. Pierre’s violations, especially in connection with her 

New York Bar Application, would call for a more severe sanction under different 

circumstances, we cannot ignore the circumstances present here. We acknowledge that our 

rules do not contain any guidelines for how to handle allegations of misconduct by lawyers 

involved in elections generally or in judicial elections specifically.21 In the absence of such 

guidelines, we do not assign fault for the path taken here. However, in determining an 

appropriate sanction, we cannot ignore that path and its potential implications for the public 

perception of the integrity of the attorney disciplinary process.

We also cannot ignore that Ms. Pierre engaged in serious misconduct. She falsely 

accused sitting judges of sending people to jail for not speaking English, and she provided 

a false and misleading response to a question on her New York Bar Application that 

omitted important information expressly covered by the question. She also engaged in 

other conduct that, even if it has not resulted in sustained violations of the MARPC, is 

troublesome. To be clear, similar conduct in different circumstances may result in much 

21 As identified in footnote 5, to provide guidance in the future, we will refer to our 

Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure consideration of adopting a 

rule establishing procedures for addressing alleged misconduct violations that arise during 

the pendency of election campaigns generally and campaigns for judicial offices 

specifically.
62

different outcomes than we reach today with respect to both violations and sanction. 

Nothing in this opinion should be viewed as approving of the conduct underlying the 

charges brought.

The unusual circumstances presented in this matter dictate its outcome. Cf. Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Jackson, 477 Md. 174, 218-19, 225 (2022) (imposing no sanction 

because of “unique facts” of case); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pinkney, 311 Md. 137, 

141-43 (1987) (imposing only a 90-day sanction despite finding numerous disciplinary 

violations because of the “highly unusual circumstances” of the case). Accordingly, we 

impose a reprimand.

IT IS SO ORDERED; PETITIONER 

AND RESPONDENT SHALL 

EVENLY SPLIT ALL COSTS AS 

TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS 

COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF 

ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT 

TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d). 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CV-21-001655

Argued: February 2, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND*

AG No. 42

September Term, 2021

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND

v.

MARYLIN PIERRE

Fader, C.J.

Watts

Hotten

Booth

Biran

Eaves

Battaglia, Lynne A.

(Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Concurring Opinion by Battaglia, J.

Filed: August 16, 2023

*At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 

amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court 

of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
I write separately to concur. I agree with the majority in its thorough analysis of the 

rule violations and the determination of sanction of Ms. Pierre. 

I briefly write separately to underscore that the “context” of the case created by Bar 

Counsel, addressed so eloquently by the majority as well as the dissent, is deeply regretful 

to me as reflecting poor judgment by an individual in whom the Court invested the 

authority to investigate and enforce the rules governing our profession. As a former United 

States Attorney, I believe that those who enforce our norms must do so by exercising 

judgment that is unassailable. 

In the present situation, the initiation of an investigation by Bar Counsel of an 

attorney running for office during an election, on a “moment’s notice” on the basis of an 

email and a conversation with an avowed antagonist to Ms. Pierre in the campaign process, 

does not reflect “good judgment.” My disquietude with the acts of Bar Counsel certainly 

encompasses all that which has been identified by the majority and discussed with more 

specificity by the dissent, but I need only emphasize that the decision to pursue an 

investigation, especially during the course of an election, should have been undertaken with 

greater deliberateness and prudence. 

The rapidity by which Bar Counsel reacted was not only not justified under the 

circumstances, as the majority notes, but undermined the legitimacy of Bar Counsel’s 

endeavor. I write separately to underscore that there were other choices in terms of timing 

and demeanor that should have been exercised by Bar Counsel. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND*

AG No. 42

September Term, 2021

______________________________________

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND

v.

MARYLIN PIERRE

______________________________________

Fader, C.J.

Watts

Hotten

Booth

Biran

Eaves

Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior 

Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J.

______________________________________

Filed: August 16, 2023

*At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 

amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court 

of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CV-21-001655

Argued: February 2, 2023
Respectfully, I concur and dissent. I substantially agree with the majority opinion 

and its thorough analysis and resolution of the violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules 

of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) at stake in this case. In particular, I agree that 

Marylin Pierre, Respondent, violated MARPC 8.2(a) by making statements with reckless 

disregard for their truth or falsity about Judges of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County 

sending people to jail because they do not speak English. See Maj. Slip Op. at 33-34, 48. 

I write separately to provide my views because of the extraordinary circumstances involved 

in the investigation and handling of this matter. In light of those circumstances, I would

have gone a step further than the majority opinion, which determines a reprimand to be the 

appropriate sanction, see Maj. Slip Op. at 60-62—I would have dismissed the case and 

imposed no sanction.

Due to the extraordinary circumstances of the case discussed at length in the 

majority opinion, as in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jackson, 477 Md. 174, 269 A.3d 

252 (2022), and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Singh, 483 Md. 417, 292 A.3d 818 (2023) 

(per curiam), I would conclude that no sanction is appropriate in this case. It is not possible 

to separate the circumstances of the investigation, which should not have been initiated and 

conducted in the manner that it was, from the imposition of a sanction. Like the 

respondents in Jackson and Singh, Ms. Pierre was the subject of a lengthy investigation by 

Bar Counsel that resulted in most of the charges in the petition for disciplinary or remedial 

action (“PDRA”) not being sustained. As in both Jackson and Singh, the violations 

determined did not involve harm to any client. See Jackson, 477 Md. at 181-82, 223-24, 

269 A.3d at 256-57, 281-82; Singh, 483 Md. at 421-22, 292 A.3d at 821. And, like the 
- 2 -

respondent in Singh, Ms. Pierre was subject to an intense, wide-ranging investigation. See

Singh, 483 Md. at 420, 292 A.3d at 820.

More importantly, this case has additional extraordinary circumstances that were 

not present in Jackson or Singh. This case arose in the context of alleged violations of the 

MARPC concerning speech related to a judicial election and presented First Amendment 

concerns, and the manner in which the investigation was initiated and conducted gave rise 

to the risk that it could have been seen as an attempt to interfere in a judicial election in 

favor of sitting judges. None of the casesin which we have previously found that a sanction 

was not appropriate and dismissed have involved investigations that had the potential to so 

severely undermine the integrity of the attorney disciplinary process. None of the cases in 

which we have previously found that a sanction was not appropriate and dismissed resulted 

in recommendations from this Court for new Maryland Rules because of Bar Counsel’s 

investigation. In this case, Bar Counsel pursued a 14-month-long investigation of Ms. 

Pierre1(which Bar Counsel had the discretion not to initiate), after not having filed a 

complaint and under circumstances that risked giving rise to the perception that the 

investigation was undertaken to influence a contested judicial election and caused this 

Court to recommend the development of a new Rule pertaining to Bar Counsel’s 

investigation of candidates during elections. These are extraordinary circumstances not 

1The investigation began on August 28, 2020, less than an hour after Bar Counsel 

received an email from the campaign chairperson for sitting judges in a judicial election 

and ended at the time the PDRA was filed on November 18, 2021.
- 3 -

present in any other case that this Court has had before it and negate the propriety of 

imposing a sanction.

In this case, because of the investigation, the Majority makes a thoughtful 

recommendation (which I agree with) concerning the need for a Rule governing Bar 

Counsel’s investigation of candidates for judicial office and in elections in general. See

Maj. Slip Op. at 4-10 & n.5. The majority opinion’s suggestion is warranted and will 

undoubtedly enhance fairness in the disciplinary process. The majority opinion points out 

that no Maryland Rule concerns an investigation by Bar Counsel of a candidate in a judicial 

election, or requires Bar Counsel to delay such an investigation until after a judicial 

election. See Maj. Slip Op. at 1. To be sure, Maryland Rule 19-711 does not contain such 

a provision. There is no election-related counterpart to Maryland Rule 19-711(b)(5), which 

allows Bar Counsel, with the approval of the Attorney Grievance Commission, to defer 

action on a complaint where “a civil or criminal action involving material allegations 

against the attorney substantially similar or related to those alleged in the complaint is 

pending in any court of record in the United States, or” where “substantially similar or 

related allegations presently are under investigation by a law enforcement, regulatory, or 

disciplinary agency[.]” 

In this case, though, it is of no moment that no Maryland Rule required Bar Counsel 

to defer action on a complaint until after a judicial election, given that there was no 

complaint filed against Ms. Pierre by anyone in the first place—rather, Bar Counsel 

initiated an investigation of Ms. Pierre on her own (in response to campaign literature), 

without a complaint from anyone. In other words, Bar Counsel did not receive a complaint, 
- 4 -

which would have ordinarily required an inquiry. Bar Counsel acted completely 

independently in initiating an investigation based on a campaign email. Maryland Rule 

19-711(b) dictates how Bar Counsel must respond to a complaint. Maryland Rule 19-

711(b)(1) states that “Bar Counsel shall make an inquiry concerning every complaint that 

is not facially frivolous, unfounded, or duplicative.” Under Maryland Rule 19-711, in the 

absence of a complaint, Bar Counsel was not required to open an investigation of Ms. Pierre

approximately 2 months before the election and Bar Counsel had the discretion not to do 

so. 

The unique facts of this case make it readily apparent that the circumstances under 

which Bar Counsel initiated and pursued the investigation gave rise to—irrespective of Bar 

Counsel’s motivations—at a minimum, the risk that members of the public could perceive 

that the investigation was undertaken to influence the election in favor of the sitting judges, 

i.e., the appearance of a conflict of interest for the Office of Bar Counsel and Bar Counsel. 

A reasonable member of the public could easily have perceived that, without having 

received a complaint or even a request for an investigation, Bar Counsel opened an 

investigation on her own initiative approximately 2 months before an upcoming judicial 

election and risked potentially intervening in the election in a manner that benefitted the 

sitting judges. In this case—regardless of any motivations on Bar Counsel’s part—it easily 

could have been perceived that the Office of Bar Counsel’s resources were deployed in a 

manner that could have been seen as intervening in a judicial election in a way that helped 

the sitting judges. This is an extraordinary circumstance that undermines public confidence 

in any sanction imposed in the case and on its own warrants the dismissal of the case.
- 5 -

Another extraordinary circumstance in the case is that the record reflects that Ms. 

Pierre received no notice of Bar Counsel’s investigation of her New York Bar application 

prior to the filing of the PDRA and was deprived of an opportunity to provide a response 

to this aspect of investigation for consideration by the Attorney Grievance Commission 

prior to its authorization of the PDRA. Maryland Rule 19-711(c)(1) states that “Bar 

Counsel shall notify the attorney who is the subject of the complaint that Bar Counsel is 

undertaking an investigation to determine whether the attorney has engaged in professional 

misconduct” and that “[t]he notice . . . shall include . . . the general nature of the 

professional misconduct . . . under investigation.”2 Bar Counsel notified Ms. Pierre of the 

investigation in a letter dated September 7, 2020. The letter identified 12 items related to 

alleged misconduct but did not contain any information concerning Ms. Pierre having made 

a false statement by act or omission on her New York Bar application. Although Bar 

Counsel mentioned Ms. Pierre’s judicial questionnaires and questioned her disclosure of 

the circuit court’s issuance of a writ of body attachment in the questionnaires, the 

September 7, 2020 letter gave Ms. Pierre no notice that her 1999 New York Bar application 

was the subject of investigation. 

Apart from Bar Counsel’s September 7, 2020 letter, the record does not contain any 

other notice of alleged misconduct under investigation that Bar Counsel sent to Ms. Pierre 

2The only exceptions to this requirement are that “Bar Counsel need not give notice 

of investigation to an attorney if, with the approval of the Commission, Bar Counsel 

proceeds under” Maryland Rule 19-737 (Reciprocal Discipline or Inactive Status), 

Maryland Rule 19-738 (Discipline on Conviction of Crime), or Maryland Rule 19-739

(Transfer to Disability Inactive Status). Md. R. 19-711(c)(2). These exceptions do not 

apply here.
- 6 -

or her counsel before filing the PDRA. As a result, in his December 4, 2020 response to 

Bar Counsel’s September 7, 2020 letter, Ms. Pierre’s counsel was unable to address the 

omission of information about the body attachment from her New York Bar application. 

Additionally, when Ms. Pierre provided a statement under oath for Bar Counsel on 

December 18, 2020, Ms. Pierre had no notice that Bar Counsel was investigating whether 

she made false statements on her New York Bar application. The lack of notice to Ms. 

Pierre on the topic of her New York Bar application is an extraordinary deviation from the 

process afforded attorneys in disciplinary cases under the Maryland Rules and undercuts 

the validity of the imposition of a sanction for the violation—even the issuance of a 

reprimand.

After a thoughtful and well-written explanation of the unusual circumstances of the 

investigation and appropriately instructing that “[t]he Commission’s and Bar Counsel’s 

close connection to the Judiciary advise caution in taking actions against a candidate who 

is challenging sitting judges to avoid the possibility that members of the public may 

perceive such actions as motivated by a desire to support the sitting judges[,]” the Majority 

elects to impose the sanction of a reprimand. Maj. Slip. Op. at 10. This case involves an 

overlay of extraordinary circumstances, see Maj. Slip Op. at 1, however, and too many

questions remain unanswered as to Bar Counsel’s investigation and use of the Maryland 

Rules to permit the imposition of a sanction. These questions include, but are not limited 

to: 

1. What occurred during the less than one hour between Bar Counsel receiving 

the campaign email and opening the investigation?
- 7 -

2. Why did Bar Counsel not file a complaint against Ms. Pierre pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 19-711(a)? 

3. Why did Bar Counsel fail to notify Ms. Pierre pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-

711(c)(1) that she was under investigation for having made false statements 

on her New York Bar application? 

4. Why did Bar Counsel cite Maryland Rule 19-711(d) and advise Ms. Pierre 

in the September 7, 2020 letter notifying her of the investigation that she had 

until September 21, 2020, to respond, that she had only 10 days to request an 

extension, and that ordinarily no extension would be granted for more than 

10 days without good cause? 

5. Did the investigation comply with Maryland Rule 19-707’s requirement of 

confidentiality? Was it reasonably necessary for Bar Counsel to disclose the 

existence of the investigation to the campaign chairperson or to the sitting 

judges and did the existence of the investigation become more widely known 

before the PDRA was filed? 

6. Why did Bar Counsel respond to a discovery request from Ms. Pierre by 

stating that Bar Counsel had “initiated a complaint” when no complaint had 

been filed? Was Bar Counsel’s response to the request for admissions 

accurate and fair to opposing counsel?

7. What were the circumstances of Bar Counsel’s involvement in the discovery 

dispute that necessitated this Court granting Ms. Pierre’s emergency motion 

to stay and subsequently approving amendments to Maryland Rule 19-726, 

which rendered the dispute moot?

8. Is MARPC 1.7(a)(2), which provides in relevant part that an attorney shall 

not represent a client if there is a significant risk that the representation of a

client will be materially limited by a personal interest of the attorney,

implicated based on the extraordinary circumstances of the investigation?

3

3At various points in its opinion, the Majority states “we do not question Bar 

Counsel’s motives[,]” “we do not mean to suggest that the actions of Bar Counsel in this 

case were improperly motivated[,]” and that it does not question “the good faith” of Bar 

Counsel. Maj. Slip. Op. at 46, 10 n.13, 2. Undoubtedly, these comments were made in an 

effort to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the attorney discipline process and in 

the imposition of a sanction in this case. My fear is that such statements, though well 

intended, under the circumstances of this case, may have the exact opposite effect. 
- 8 -

On the other side of the ledger, although Ms. Pierre violated the MARPC, the 

misconduct that she engaged in is unlikely to be repeated and involved no harm to any 

client. The conduct in one instance occurred during Ms. Pierre’s candidacy in a judicial

election and, by its nature, is conduct that is unlikely to recur and, in the second instance, 

the conduct occurred decades ago and is also unlikely to be repeated. Although Ms. 

Pierre’s campaign tweet about sending people to jail for not speaking English was false,

was not written as a statement of opinion, and was made, at a minimum, with reckless 

disregard for its truth or falsity, this case involved no complaint from any client and Ms. 

Pierre has no prior disciplinary history. In addition, Ms. Pierre candidly admitted at the 

disciplinary hearing that the campaign statement was false. 

As to Ms. Pierre having made a false statement by omission on her New York Bar 

application by not disclosing the existence of the show cause order and body attachment, 

this conduct occurred approximately 24 years ago, in 1999. The hearing judge found that 

In her exceptions, Ms. Pierre raised numerous questions about Bar Counsel’s 

motives and good faith. For instance, Ms. Pierre asserted that “Bar Counsel’s approach 

would protect the power of incumbents while increasing her own authority to punish their 

rivals” and that this Court’s ruling had the potential to “give one of its most powerful 

officials free reign to take sides in contested elections and punish the opposition.” In 

determining whether Ms. Pierre violated the charged MARPC, it is not necessary for this 

Court to reach any conclusions as to Bar Counsel’s motives. And, motivation and good 

faith, or the lack thereof, like intent, are often difficult for a hearing judge or trial court to 

assess, even after extensive fact-finding proceedings, which have not occurred here. In 

this case, the better course of action to ensure public confidence in the investigation and 

sanction imposed would be for the Court to refer the matter to the Attorney Grievance 

Commission for the appointment of special counsel pursuant to Maryland Rule 19-

702(h)(6) to investigate the circumstances of the investigation and issue a report as to its 

compliance with the Maryland Rules or for the Court under its inherent supervisory 

authority to appoint special counsel to do the same.
- 9 -

Ms. Pierre “generally enjoys a good reputation as a zealous advocate for her clients in 

CINA and juvenile matters[,]” and “is of generally good character[.]” It is not possible to 

know whether the Attorney Grievance Commission would have even authorized charging 

this conduct in the PDRA had Ms. Pierre been given notice of this part of the investigation 

and an opportunity to respond. In light of the circumstances of this case—that the case 

does not involve any client harm, that Ms. Pierre generally enjoys a good reputation with 

respect to her work, and that the conduct at issue is unlikely to be repeated—it cannot be 

said that sanctioning Ms. Pierre is necessary to protect the public. It must not be forgotten 

that the purpose of the imposition of a sanction in an attorney discipline case is to protect 

the public, not punish the attorney. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wescott, 483 

Md. 111, 127, 290 A.3d 1014, 1023 (2023).

Given the extraordinary circumstances of the case, which exceed those of Jackson

and Singh, and which gave rise to the risk that members of the public could potentially 

conclude that an investigation was undertaken in an attempt to interfere with a judicial 

election and that this necessitated a recommendation for rulemaking (which I join), I would 

exercise the Court’s discretion to conclude that no sanction is appropriate. These

circumstances, along with numerous unresolved questions about the investigation, serve to 

undermine confidence in the integrity of any sanction imposed in the case, and sanctioning

Ms. Pierre is not necessary to protect the public.

For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur and dissent.
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here: 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/42a21agcn.pdf

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/42a21agcn2.pdf