UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4419

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

LOUIS VINCENT BROWN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District 

Judge. (2:07-cr-00422-PMD-l) 

Submitted: April 8, 2009 Decided: April 27, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished by per curiam opinion. 

Joshua S. Kendrick, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Louis Vincent Brown pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2006) (Count One), use of a firearm in furtherance 

of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (Count Two),* and being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2) (2006) (Count Three), and was sentenced to a total of 

262 months in prison. Brown timely appealed. 

 Counsel for Brown filed a brief in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there 

are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether 

the district court properly accepted Brown’s guilty pleas and 

sentenced Brown as a career offender. Brown filed a pro se 

brief arguing (l) the Government breached the plea agreement 

when it argued for a career offender sentence enhancement, (2) 

Brown was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and (3) 

the district court erred in sentencing Brown as a career 

offender. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

 *

 Brown entered a guilty plea to Count Two pursuant to North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 

2 
I. 

 Counsel first questions whether the district court 

properly accepted Brown’s guilty pleas. Our careful review of 

the record convinces us the district court complied with the 

mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Further, the court ensured 

that Brown entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily, 

including his Alford plea to Count Two, and that the pleas were 

supported by an independent factual basis. United States v. 

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). 

II. 

 Counsel next questions whether the district court 

properly designated Brown as a career offender, noting that 

Brown’s predicate offenses were imposed under South Carolina’s 

Youthful Offender Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 29-19-10 to -160 (2005 

Cum. Supp.). However, counsel concedes the district court 

properly determined that Brown’s state convictions were adult 

convictions, for which Brown received and served an adult 

sentence. We agree that the convictions under the state 

Youthful Offender Act were properly considered in designating 

Brown a career offender. See USSG §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2 cmt. n.1; cf. 

United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. 2002) (remanding 

for a determination of whether Mason received adult sentence of 

over one year and one month). 

3 
4 

 In his pro se brief, Brown argues that he was denied 

his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 

when counsel advised him to plead guilty in the absence of a 

factual basis to support the plea to Count Two. As we have 

found an adequate factual basis for the Alford plea, it is 

apparent on the current record that this claim lacks merit. We 

have examined Brown’s other pro se claims and find them 

similarly without merit. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Brown requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Brown. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED