Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 11, 2015 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01143-CV 

KAIZER SHERIFF, Appellant 

V. 

SHEHNAZ MOOSA, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 380-54072-2011 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Fillmore 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

Kaizer Sheriff appeals the trial court’s final decree of divorce. In five issues, Sheriff 

argues the trial court erred in failing to confirm a foreign judgment; violated his due process and 

due course of law rights by denying registration of the foreign judgment without holding a 

hearing and denying enforcement of the parties’ premarital agreement without holding a full trial 

on the merits; abused its discretion by failing to uphold and enforce the premarital agreement; 

and failing to include an enforceable possession schedule for the parties’ child. We affirm the 

trial court’s judgment. 

 Sheriff and Shehnaz Moosa were married in 2004 and had one child, A.K.S. On August 

12, 2012, Moosa filed her original petition for divorce alleging Sheriff had a “history or pattern 

of committing family violence during the two-year period preceding the date” of the petition. 
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The petition requested the court to determine whether there was a risk of international abduction 

of A.K.S. and to take measures necessary to protect A.K.S. 

On August 24, 2011, Sheriff filed his original counterpetition for divorce seeking, among 

other things, to be “designated as the conservator who has the exclusive right to designate the 

primary residence of” A.K.S. Sheriff alleged he was a domiciliary of Texas for the preceding 

six-month period and a resident of Collin County for the preceding ninety-day period. Sheriff 

alleged he and Moosa had entered into a prenuptial agreement defining their rights to their 

property and requested the court to confirm and enforce the agreement. The prenuptial 

agreement was attached as an exhibit. The agreement provided that all property and assets of 

each party would remain that party’s sole personal property. The agreement further provided 

that the parties agreed to get married under the Muslim Personal Marriage Laws that govern 

Muslim marriages in India, to conduct the marriage according to the Muslim Shia Ismaili 

traditions, and to get married by the “nikha” ceremony. 

 On September 7, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing at which Moosa testified 

Sheriff straddled her and punched her in the face with a closed fist in October 2009, slapped 

Moosa while she was holding her daughter on Memorial Day 2010, and threatened to take 

Moosa’s daughter away from her on “multiple occasions.” Moosa testified she feared being 

alone with Sheriff and feared A.K.S. being alone with him because she feared Sheriff would take 

A.K.S. away from her. Moosa testified Sheriff has property in India, and she was concerned 

about him having control of A.K.S.’s passport. 

 Moosa testified she signed the prenuptial agreement in August 2004. She was not 

represented by an attorney at the time. Moosa testified her marriage to Sheriff was an arranged 

marriage, and Sheriff said he wasn’t going to get married unless the prenuptial agreement had 

been signed. Sheriff said he got the prenuptial agreement “off the Internet,” and he gave Moosa 
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“a few minutes to look over it.” Moosa testified she did not think the prenuptial agreement was 

fair, she did not think it adequately provided her with information regarding Sheriff’s assets and 

liabilities, she had no opportunity to obtain disclosure of Sheriff’s assets and liabilities, and 

Sheriff did not ask her for copies of her assets and liabilities. 

 Moosa testified she makes $56,860 yearly, and Sheriff makes approximately $120,000, 

but they each paid half of their monthly bills, including the mortgage on the marital residence. 

Moosa testified that, despite the terms of the prenuptial agreement, she needed child support, 

temporary spousal support, and assistance for attorney’s fees. Moosa testified Sheriff had been 

alone with A.K.S. three times, had never been overnight with A.K.S. alone, and had only asked 

to see A.K.S. six times since the divorce was filed. Moosa requested that the court appoint a 

parenting facilitator to help Sheriff and Moosa “learn how to co-parent together.” 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court named Sheriff and Moosa joint managing 

conservators of A.K.S., with Moosa having physical custody and Sheriff having standard 

visitation. Concerning the prenuptial agreement, the trial court stated, “my personal view at the 

moment is the pre-nup is against public policy. It attempts to change the laws of the State of 

Texas and I don’t think it can do that.” 

 On December 14, 2011, the trial court entered temporary orders prohibiting either Sheriff 

or Moosa from removing A.K.S. from the jurisdiction and ordering A.K.S.’s passport to be 

turned over to Moosa’s attorney for safe-keeping. The temporary orders set out a visitation 

schedule, ordered Sheriff to pay $1500 per month in child support and $3000 for interim 

attorney’s fees, and made provisions for A.K.S.’s health care. Sheriff also received temporary 

exclusive use of the marital residence. 

 On February 8, 2012, Sheriff filed a petition to register a foreign judgment. The “foreign 

judgment” was a letter from an “advocate high court” in India purporting to memorialize 
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Sheriff’s pronouncement of “Talaq,” thereby dissolving his marriage with Moosa. The letter 

stated Sheriff acted in accordance with the prenuptial agreement between the parties and its 

provision that the parties were married in accordance with Muslim Personal Marriage Laws. 

Also attached to the petition was an “opinion” from “Advocate Neelofar Akhtar” purporting to 

make a distribution of property and custody determination. In a supporting affidavit, Sheriff 

represented, among other things, that he was “a bonafide domiciliary of the State of Maharashtra, 

India,” and therefore A.K.S. was “also a domicile [sic] of India.” 

 On February 17, 2012, Moosa filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, 

objection to registration of foreign order, and motion for additional temporary orders and 

injunctive relief. Moosa argued the “foreign order” Sheriff sought to register was registered 

more than six months after Moosa filed her original divorce petition and more than five months 

after the trial court ruled on temporary orders in the divorce. Moosa requested that the trial court 

strike Sheriff’s attempt at registering the foreign order. Moosa also requested that Sheriff be 

enjoined from certain acts, including instituting any action in any other county, state, or nation in 

an attempt to obtain orders concerning the marriage relationship of the parties. That same day, 

the trial court entered an order restraining Sheriff from the enumerated acts, enjoining Sheriff 

and his family from exercising any periods of possession or access to A.K.S. until the validity of 

the foreign order could be determined. 

 On March 9, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing at which Moosa’s counsel stated he 

was “taken aback” when he learned Sheriff had filed or initiated an Indian divorce. Counsel 

characterized Sheriff’s actions as an attempt to not only reverse the trial court’s rulings in 

temporary orders hearings in September and October but also to “declare the marriage over by 

divorce deed,” reverse all the custody and child support arrangements, and allow Sheriff and his 

father to do whatever they wanted with A.K.S. Sheriff’s counsel responded that Sheriff had “a 
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right to allege that there’s a foreign decree and ask the law in Texas to recognize that decree and 

give full faith and credit to it.” Sheriff testified at the hearing that he registered the Indian 

“decree” because the prenuptial agreement said he and Moosa were married under Muslim law, 

and he “sought a divorce through the officials of [his] faith in India.” Sheriff testified he stood 

by his “comments in the affidavit attached to [his] foreign filing.” At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. 

 The trial court continued to enter temporary orders. On October 25, 2012, Sheriff filed a 

“notice of determination of law of foreign country” asking the trial court to take notice of the 

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act; the “Divorce Certificate from Chief 

Judge Mumbai, India”; the Opinion of Neelofar Akhtar; and the “Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 

Application Act 1937.” 

 On November 12, 2012, Moosa filed her first amended petition for divorce in which she 

sought to be appointed sole managing conservator of A.K.S. and requested the appointment of a 

parenting facilitator. Moosa also requested appropriate orders on the basis of prior findings that 

there was a risk of international abduction of A.K.S. by Sheriff. Moosa asked that she be 

appointed temporary sole managing conservator of A.K.S. and that Sheriff be enjoined from 

removing A.K.S. beyond a geographic area identified by the court. 

 On November 28, 2012, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing at which Sheriff’s 

attorney stated Sheriff was “still in India” caring for his sick father. Sheriff’s counsel orally 

requested a continuance and argued the trial could not proceed without Sheriff being present. 

Moosa’s counsel alleged Sheriff was in India “because he voluntarily flew to India when he was 

court ordered to surrender his passports because the judge in May” determined that might “best 

address his abduction issue.” Moosa’s counsel noted Sheriff had initiated a foreign divorce in 

India “six months after this case started” and argued Sheriff was in India because he was subject 
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to a motion for enforcement for failing to pay six months’ child support. Moosa’s counsel stated 

Sheriff had also stopped making payments on the marital residence and allowed the residence to 

go into foreclosure before the trial court appointed a receiver to sell the residence. The trial court 

asked whether Sheriff’s counsel wanted to “urge [his] pretrial motions” or “rest on the 

pleadings,” and counsel stated he would “rest on the pleadings.” The trial court then denied 

Sheriff’s motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement, motion to dismiss due to mootness, motion 

to recover property taxes, motion for recovering attorney’s fees, and motion for sanctions. After 

additional arguments, the trial court granted Moosa’s motion to compel production of Sheriff’s 

financial documents. 

 On December 10, 2012, the trial court conducted a trial before the court. Moosa again 

testified that Sheriff verbally and physically abused her during the marriage. Moosa testified she 

believed Sheriff went to India to avoid paying child support. At the conclusion of trial, the trial 

court granted the divorce and named Moosa the sole managing conservator of A.K.S. with the 

exclusive right to determine A.K.S.’s residency, consent to medical treatment and make 

educational decisions with no geographic restrictions. Sheriff was awarded supervised 

possession and ordered to pay child support. Moosa was awarded sixty percent of the 

community estate, and Sheriff was awarded forty percent. Moosa was appointed receiver over 

the community accounts, and Sheriff was ordered to pay her $17,100 in attorney’s fees. On May 

16, 2013, the trial court entered the final divorce decree, and this appeal followed. 

In his first issue, Sheriff argues the trial court erred in failing to confirm the foreign 

judgment “pursuant to statutory mandate that the order shall be confirmed where the party 

opposing the registration fails to request a hearing within 20 days of notice of the registration.” 

Sheriff relies on family code sections 152.305, relating to registration of out-of-state custody 

determinations, and 159.606, relating to interstate family support, in arguing Moosa had to 
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request a hearing within twenty days of receiving notice of the “foreign judgment.” See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.305(d); 159.606(a) (West 2014) (person seeking to contest validity of 

child custody determination or registration of support order issued by court of another state must 

request hearing within 20 days after service of notice of the determination or registration). 

Sheriff argues Moosa did not request a hearing within twenty days and therefore the “foreign 

judgment” “should have been confirmed by operation of law.” 

The record shows Sheriff filed a petition to register a foreign judgment on February 8, 

2012. On February 17, 2012, Moosa filed a pleading which, among other things, objected to the 

registration of the “purported ‘orders’” under both chapters 152 and 159 of the family code and 

requested “a hearing on same within 20 days of” receipt of notice of the registration, which was 

February 16, 2012. Because the record shows Moosa did request a hearing within twenty days of 

receiving notice of the “foreign judgment,” we conclude Sheriff’s first issue lacks merit. 

In his second issue, Sheriff argues the trial court’s denial of registration of the foreign 

judgment without conducting a hearing violated his due process and due course of law rights. In 

making this argument, Sheriff refers to the May 29, 2013 order denying his registration of a 

foreign judgment because the court previously rendered a divorce on December 10, 2012. The 

order refers to a January 22, 2013 trial on the registration issue, and Sheriff argues this trial was 

canceled, thus depriving him of his right to a hearing. Sheriff’s argument ignores the fact that 

the “foreign judgment” continued to be an issue throughout the divorce proceedings. 

Specifically, the “foreign judgment” and its reason for being were discussed at length at the 

hearing on March 9, 2012. Because the record shows the trial court conducted a hearing on 

Sheriff’s motion to register the “foreign judgment,” we conclude his second issue lacks merit. 

In his third issue, Sheriff argues the trial court violated his due process and due course of 

law rights by denying enforcement of the prenuptial agreement during a pretrial conference and 
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without holding a full trial on the merits, depriving him of a meaningful right to be heard. In his 

fourth issue, Sheriff argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to uphold and enforce 

the presumptively valid prenuptial agreement. 

Premarital agreements are presumed to be enforceable. Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 

734, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (citing Grossman v. Grossman, 799 

S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)). To rebut that presumption, the 

party seeking to avoid enforcement must prove either that: she signed the agreement 

involuntarily; or the agreement was unconscionable when signed and the agreement failed to 

fairly and reasonably disclose the “property and financial obligations of the other party.” See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §4.006(a) (West 2006); see also Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 739. In reviewing 

whether the agreement is conscionable, courts have considered factors such as the maturity of the 

parties, their educational levels and business backgrounds, their experiences with prior 

marriages, their respective ages, and whether there were motivations to protect children. See 

Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 741. “Because disclosure forms the second prong of the test to rebut the 

presumption of enforceability, lack of disclosure is material only if the premarital agreement is 

unconscionable.” Id. at 743; see also Fazakerly v. Fazakerly, 996 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 1999, pet. denied) (“The issue of unconscionability must be decided by the trial court as 

a matter of law before the disclosure questions are addressed.”). 

Moosa testified she was not represented by an attorney at the time she signed the 

prenuptial agreement in August 2004. Moosa testified her marriage to Sheriff was an arranged 

marriage, and Sheriff said he wasn’t going to get married unless the prenuptial agreement had 

been signed. Sheriff said he got the prenuptial agreement “off the Internet,” and he gave Moosa 

“a few minutes to look over it.” Moosa testified she did not think the prenuptial agreement was 

fair, she did not think it adequately provided her with information regarding Sheriff’s assets and 
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liabilities, she had no opportunity to obtain disclosure of Sheriff’s assets and liabilities, and 

Sheriff did not ask her for copies of her assets and liabilities. The trial court stated the prenuptial 

agreement attempts to change the laws of the State of Texas. Based on this record, we conclude 

the trial court did not err in refusing to enforce the prenuptial agreement because it was 

unconscionable and Moosa was not provided any disclosure of Sheriff’s property or financial 

obligations. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §4.006(a) (West 2006); see also Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 

739. We overrule Sheriff’s third and fourth issues. 

In his fifth issue, Sheriff argues the trial court’s failure to include an enforceable 

possession schedule in the divorce decree violates his constitutional rights with respect to his 

child and renders the decree void. Specifically, Sheriff complains of the following provisions in 

the divorce decree: 

Possession and Access 

1. Mutual Agreement or Specified Terms for Possession 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that KAIZER SHERIFF shall 

have supervised possession of the child at any and all times mutually agreed to 

between him and SHEHNAZ MOOSA in advance, and in the absence of mutual 

agreement, IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that KAIZER SHERIFF shall 

have possession of the child under the specified terms set out below in this 

Possession Order. 

2. Supervised Possession with Stair-Stepping Procedures 

The Court finds that Respondent has remained intentionally removed from the 

subject child. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent shall have supervised 

possession of and access to the subject child for a period of no less than eight (8) 

months, which Respondent must exercise prior to receiving any unsupervised 

periods of possession. All supervision shall be directed at the discretion of 

Petitioner. Additionally, prior to any unsupervised periods of possession, the 

parties shall retain a parenting facilitator to oversee the terms and conditions of 

“stair-stepping” Respondent’s periods of possession from a supervised possession 

schedule to an unsupervised possession schedule, culminating with a Standard 

Possession Schedule, which shall be installed at such time as the parenting 

facilitator reports that Respondent is 1) not a flight risk, and 2) has complied and 

cooperated with all the terms and conditions of the parenting facilitator’s efforts 

to monitor and facilitate the “stair-stepping” schedule. 
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Sheriff argues these provisions exceed the authority of the trial court and give Moosa the 

absolute discretion to determine when, where, and if Sheriff may have possession of A.K.S. 

Sheriff argues the order amounts to an effective denial of Sheriff’s right to visitation. 

Trial courts have wide discretion to determine a child's best interest, including issues of 

custody, control, possession and visitation. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 

1982); Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ 

denied). This is because the trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor and 

personalities of the parties and witnesses and to evaluate credibility, influences, and other forces 

that are not discernible from a cold record. In re Herd, 537 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); In re T––, 715 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no 

writ); In re J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). Appellate 

courts will reverse a trial court’s determination of conservatorship only if a review of the entire 

record reveals the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 

611, 616 (Tex. 2007); Patterson v. Brist, 236 S.W.3d 238, 23940 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2006, pet dism’d). A trial court does not abuse its discretion “as long as some evidence of 

a substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision.” In re W.M., 

172 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Further, the evidence is viewed in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, and every legal presumption is indulged in 

favor of its judgment. Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706. 

Here, Moosa testified Sheriff threatened to take A.K.S. away from Moosa on “multiple 

occasions.” Moosa testified Sheriff had been alone with A.K.S. three times, had never been 

overnight with A.K.S. alone, and had only asked to see A.K.S. six times since the divorce was 

filed. Moosa testified she believed Sheriff went to India to avoid paying child support. Based on 

this testimony and the evidence of the risk Sheriff might abduct A.K.S. and flee to India if he had 
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unsupervised possession, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Sheriff to have 

supervised possession at Moosa’s discretion. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616; Holley, 864 

S.W.2d at 706. We overrule Sheriff’s fifth issue. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

131143F.P05 

 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

KAIZER SHERIFF, Appellant 

No. 05-13-01143-CV V. 

SHEHNAZ MOOSA, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 380-54072-2011. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Lang-Miers and Fillmore 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee SHEHNAZ MOOSA recover her costs of this appeal from 

appellant KAIZER SHERIFF. 

Judgment entered August 11, 2015.