alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



(NORTEL LOGO)
    
    Exhibit 10.69
    
    (LOGO)
 CONFIDENTIAL  SPECIAL HANDLING
  
    1.
    
    Section 2 of the Letter Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the
following:
 2.
    
    Effective as of the close of business on September 9, 2005, your duties as
Chief Legal Officer of the Corporation shall cease. All previous external
responsibilities which you had will be assumed by other persons designated by the
Corporation, including any participation in industry or other associations representing
the Corporation. Prior thereto, you will cease to be an officer and/or director of the
Corporation and any of the Corporations subsidiaries and affiliates and you will sign
such documents as may be reasonably required to record these resignations. You will
continue to have access to your office to close out your personal and business affairs
as needed until and including September 30, 2005. Your employment relationship with
the Corporation shall cease at the end of the Salary Continuation Period (as that term
is defined in Section 4(a) below).; and
 2.
    
    Section 4(a) of the Letter Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the
following:
 4(a).
    
    pay you the sum of US$43,833 per month, converted to Canadian currency, in the same
manner as you were paid immediately prior to September 9, 2005, less appropriate
deductions, commencing on September 10, 2005 and terminating on September 9, 2007




---



##### 



Mr. Nicholas J. DeRoma
December 20, 2005
Page 2
    
    (LOGO)
 (Salary Continuation Period), provided that the Corporation shall pay any
such monthly payments then outstanding in a lump sum, which lump sum, less
appropriate deductions, will be paid to you on or before March 15, 2006; in the
event of your death prior to the conclusion of the Salary Continuation Period, the
Salary Continuation payments set forth in this section 4.(a), the Vacation Benefit set forth in section 4.(b) below and the Incentive Award set forth
in section 4.(c) below will be made to your spouse, and the event of her death, to
your estate;.
        By:       /s/ William J. Donovan
    
    /s/ William J. LaSalleWilliam J. LaSalleGeneral Counsel  Operations/s/ Nicholas J. DeRomaNicholas J. DeRomaDec 20, 2005Date
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of: DENNIS LABARRE

PIKE; KATHRYN LORETTA PIKE,

 Debtors,

DENNIS LABARRE PIKE; KATHRYN

LORETTA PIKE,

 Plaintiffs/

 Appellants,

 v.

JAMES J. JOSEPH, as trustee for the

estate of Dennis & Kathryn Pike,

 Defendant/

 Appellee.

No. 09-56266

D.C. No. 8:07-cv-01185-DOC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 4, 2010

Pasadena, California

FILED

MAR 03 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
The Honorable Robert Clive Jones, U.S. District Judge for the District **

of Nevada, sitting by designation.

2

Before: RAWLINSON and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District

Judge.** 

Appellants Dennis and Kathryn Pike appeal the district court’s order

affirming the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of their action seeking a declaratory

judgment. The district court properly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of

Appellants’ action seeking declaratory relief because their claim was barred by

issue preclusion. See Alonso v. Summerville (In re Summerville), 361 B.R. 133,

143-44 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2007) (describing issue preclusion). In the declaratory

relief action, Appellants sought a determination that Dennis Pike’s post-petition

contribution of wages to satisfy trust deeds on their residence and post-petition

work performed by Dennis Pike entitled Appellants to an equity interest in the real

property. 

However, earlier in the bankruptcy proceedings, Appellants brought an

unsuccessful motion for allowance of an administrative claim predicated on exactly

the same facts. Issue preclusion barred the declaratory relief action because the

identical issue, based on the same facts, was decided in resolving the

administrative claim. See Frankfort Digital Servs. Ltd. v. Kistler (In re
Because we affirm the district court’s judgment on the basis of issue 1

preclusion, there is no need to address the other issues raised by the parties.

3

Reynoso), 477 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that issue preclusion bars

relitigation of issues that have been adjudicated in an earlier proceeding).

AFFIRMED.1
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 522 

For the relief of Obain Attouoman. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 3, 2005 

Mr. KERRY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Obain Attouoman. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR OBAIN 

4 ATTOUOMAN. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

6 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act, Obain Attouoman shall be eligible for issuance of an 

8 immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an 

9 alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon fil10 ing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under 

11 section 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to 

12 lawful permanent resident. 
2 

•S 522 IS

1 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Obain Attouoman 

2 enters the United States before the filing deadline speci3 fied in subsection (c), he shall be considered to have en4 tered and remained lawfully and shall, if otherwise eligible, 

5 be eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of 

6 the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of the 

7 enactment of this Act. 

8 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

9 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap10 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica11 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

12 within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

13 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

14 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res15 idence to Obain Attouoman, the Secretary of State shall 

16 instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, during the cur17 rent or next following fiscal year, the total number of im18 migrant visas that are made available to natives of the 

19 country of the alien’s birth under section 203(a) of the 

20 Immigration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the 

21 total number of immigrant visas that are made available 

22 to natives of the country of the alien’s birth under section 

23 202(e) of such Act. 

24 (e) DENIAL OF PREFERENTIAL IMMIGRATION

25 TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN RELATIVES.—The natural 
3 

•S 522 IS

1 parents, brothers, and sisters of Obain Attouoman shall 

2 not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any right, 

3 privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality 

4 Act. 

Æ
#### 104 West 27th St. Realty, Inc., Respondent, v Young Jae Lim, Appellant.

[973 NYS2d 596]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered September 10, 2012, which granted plaintiffs motion to strike defendant’s affirmative defenses and for summary judgment in the amount of $402,952.22, based on a written guaranty making defendant personally liable for certain unpaid rent, and directed a hearing to determine the reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded to plaintiff, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

On or about September 21, 1994, defendant entered into a personal guaranty with plaintiff landlord, agreeing to pay any unpaid rent pursuant to a lease between plaintiff and nonparty tenant prior to tenant surrendering the “premises.” Although *552the “premises” of the original lease was the second, floor only, the guaranty also contained a provision stating: “If the Lease is modified by agreement between Landlord [plaintiff] and Tenant, the obligations hereunder of the Guarantor shall extend and apply with respect to the Lease, as modified.” On or about December 4, 2002, plaintiff and tenant entered into an extension and modification agreement, combining the tenant’s first-floor lease, including part of the basement, with the second floor lease, and deeming it “one lease for the [newly defined] demised premises,” which included the first floor, a portion of the basement and the second floor. All provisions of the first-floor lease and the second-floor lease remained in full force and effect, except as modified. On or about January 30, 2006, tenant entered into an amended and partial surrender of lease agreement, by which the tenant surrendered the second floor of the premises. This agreement expressly defined the “original lease” as including both the first-floor lease and the second-floor lease.

The motion court properly found that tenant’s surrender of the second floor did not extinguish the guaranty, as the second-floor lease had been modified to include the first-floor lease. Such modification fell within the guaranty, and extended and applied defendant’s guaranty obligations to the new modified lease (see *Davimos v Halle,*60 AD3d 576, 577 [1st Dept 2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 713 [2009], citing *Banque Worms v Andre Café.,*183 AD2d 494 [1st Dept 1992]; *see also White Rose Food v Saleh,*292 AD2d 377, 378 [2d Dept 2002], *affd*99 NY2d 589 [2003]). Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Tom, Saxe, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 31, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-50771 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff - Appellee

v. ANTHONY TYRONE PERKINS Defendant - Appellant

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-03-CR-72-ALL-SS

-------------------- Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Anthony Tyrone Perkins appeals his jury conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Perkins first contends that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed the original indictment without prejudice for violations of the Speedy Trial Act. The district court properly considered the statutory factors of 18 U.S.C.No. 03-50771 -2- § 3162(a)(2), and its supporting factual findings were not clearly in error. See United States v. Taylor , 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1988). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the original indictment without prejudice and in permitting reindictment. See United States v. Blevins , 142 F.3d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 1998). Perkins also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally extends federal power to reach firearm possession that does not substantially affect interstate commerce. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent, and he raises it to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549 (1995) did not invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Rawls , 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, evidence that the firearm Perkins possessed was not manufactured in Texas is sufficient to maintain a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction. See United States v. Daugherty , 264 F.3d 513, 518 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 471 

To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for human embryonic 

stem cell research. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 28, 2005 

Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. HATCH, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. 

SMITH, and Mr. KENNEDY) introduced the following bill; which was read 

twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 

Pensions 

A BILL

To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for 

human embryonic stem cell research.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stem Cell Research 

5 Enhancement Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH. 

7 Part H of title IV of the Public Health Service Act 

8 (42 U.S.C. 289 et seq.) is amended by inserting after sec9 tion 498C the following: 
2

•S 471 IS

1 ‘‘SEC. 498D. HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH. 

2 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro3 vision of law (including any regulation or guidance), the 

4 Secretary shall conduct and support research that utilizes 

5 human embryonic stem cells in accordance with this sec6 tion (regardless of the date on which the stem cells were 

7 derived from a human embryo) . 

8 ‘‘(b) ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS.—Human embryonic 

9 stem cells shall be eligible for use in any research con10 ducted or supported by the Secretary if the cells meet each 

11 of the following: 

12 ‘‘(1) The stem cells were derived from human 

13 embryos that have been donated from in vitro fer14 tilization clinics, were created for the purposes of 

15 fertility treatment, and were in excess of the clinical 

16 need of the individuals seeking such treatment. 

17 ‘‘(2) Prior to the consideration of embryo dona18 tion and through consultation with the individuals 

19 seeking fertility treatment, it was determined that 

20 the embryos would never be implanted in a woman 

21 and would otherwise be discarded. 

22 ‘‘(3) The individuals seeking fertility treatment 

23 donated the embryos with written informed consent 

24 and without receiving any financial or other induce25 ments to make the donation. 
3

•S 471 IS

1 ‘‘(c) GUIDELINES.—Not later than 60 days after the 

2 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in 

3 consultation with the Director of NIH, shall issue final 

4 guidelines to carry out this section. 

5 ‘‘(d) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—The Secretary 

6 shall annually prepare and submit to the appropriate com7 mittees of the Congress a report describing the activities 

8 carried out under this section during the preceding fiscal 

9 year, and including a description of whether and to what 

10 extent research under subsection (a) has been conducted 

11 in accordance with this section.’’.

Æ
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

BRANDON THOMPSON,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 213 WAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 14th day of December, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 20-11371

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00136-VMC-AEP-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONDE YARRELL,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(December 16, 2020)

Before LAGOA, BRASHER and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

USCA11 Case: 20-11371 Date Filed: 12/16/2020 Page: 1 of 2
2

Stephen Langs, counsel for Ronde Yarrell in this direct criminal appeal, has 

moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of 

the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the 

appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no 

arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and

Yarrell’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 20-11371 Date Filed: 12/16/2020 Page: 2 of 2
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian MCLUCAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50316.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 2009.*

Filed May 26, 2009.

Michael J. Raphael, Esq., Carole C. Peterson, Esq., USLA—Office of the U.S. Attorney Criminal Division, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

William C. Melcher, Esq., Melcher Mel-cher & Melcher Trillium Towers Center, Woodland Hills, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: PREGERSON, CANBY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Brian McLucas appeals from the district court’s order determining that it would not have imposed a materially different sentence following a limited remand pursuant *623to *United States v. Ameline,*409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005)(en banc). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we remand.

The government asserts that this appeal is barred by McLucas’s appeal waiver. We conclude that the government has waived the waiver by requesting the *Ameline*remand. *See United States v. Garcia-Lopez,*309 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.2002).

McLucas contends that the district court failed to comply with our mandate under *Ameline*because it did not obtain the written views of counsel regarding resentenc-ing under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines before it issued its order responding to our remand. We remand because it is not apparent from this record that counsel had a meaningful opportunity to submit their written views on this issue. *See United States v. Montgomery,*462 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.2006) (“The court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate”).

We do not reach McLucas’s remaining contention.

REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mitchell Texidor, Appellant.

[961 NYS2d 920]

—Judgment of resentence, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael J. Obus, J.), rendered June 3, 2010, resentencing defendant to an aggregate term of 14 years, with five years’ postrelease supervision, unanimously affirmed.

The resentencing proceeding imposing a term of postrelease supervision was neither barred by double jeopardy nor otherwise unlawful *(see People v Lingle,*16 NY3d 621 [2011]). We have no authority to revisit defendant’s prison sentence on this appeal *(,see id.*at 635).

Concur—Andrias, J.E, Moskowitz, Freedman, Manzanet-Daniels and Feinman, JJ.
C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

I N TH E I NTE RE S T OF SARAH J ANE RI DEOUT, ACHI L D. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 09 -0 01 41 -C V

Appea l from 109th District Court of Winkler County , Texas (TC # 15,590)

M EM OR

AN DU MOP IN ION This appea l is before the Court on its own moti on fo r deter mination whether the appea l should be dismiss ed for want of prose cution. Findingthat Appellant has not filed a brief or a motion fo r e xten sio n o f t ime , w e dis mis s th e a pp e a l. Appellant filed notice of appe al on May 4, 2009 and the c lerk’s r ecor d was filed on J une 1, 2009. Appellant’s brief was there fore due to be filed on J uly 1, 2009. Appellant has not filed a brief or a motion for e x tension of time. On J uly 16, 2009, the Clerk of the Court sent a letter notify ing Appellant that neither

a brie f nor a motion for extension of time in which to file the brief ha d been filed. The le tter fur

ther a dvised Appellant o f th e C o u rt ’s i ntent to dismi ss the appea l for wa nt of prosec ution unless, within ten day s of t he noti ce, Appellant responded showinggrounds to continue the appe al. No re sponse has be en re ceive d. This Court possesses the authority to dismi s s an ap peal f

or wa nt of prosec ution when the appellant ha s failed to file his brie f in the time pr escribed, and g ives no rea sonable e x planation for such fa ilure. T EX .R.A PP .P . 3 8. 8(a )( 1) ; El izo nd o v . Ci ty of S an An ton io , 975 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1998, no wr i t). We have g iven notice of our intent to do so, reque sted aresponse if a re asonable basis for f ailure to file the brief e x ists, and have r ece ived none. Acc ording ly , we dismiss the appeal for want of prosec ution pursuant to T EX .R.A PP .P. 38.8(a)( 1) and 42.3(c)

. November

24, 2009 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice B e f o r e C h e w , C

. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ.
Exhibit 10.1


Amendment No. 3 to
 Employment Agreement



This Amendment No. 3 shall modify the
terms of the Employment Agreement (“Agreement”) dated June 30, 2005
(the “Effective Date”), between Intelligroup, Inc. (the
“Company”) and Vikram Gulati (the
“Executive”).    Except as expressly set forth below
all other terms and conditions in the Agreement remain in full force and
effect.



1.     “ Section 2.  Term of the Agreement” of the Agreement is hereby amended by replacing “twenty-four (24) months” with “thrity-six (36) months.”


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed the Amendment as of June 8, 2007.

	
  
/s/ Vikram Gulati

  	
  
 
  	
  
 
  	
  
/s/ Alok Bajpai
  
	
  
  	
  
 
  	
  
 
  	
  
  
	
  
    Executive - Vikram Gulati
  	
  
 
  	
  
  
  	
  
Company
  
	 
	  
	  
	  

	
   
 	
  
 
  	
  
 
  	
  
Alok Bajpai_______________________________
  
	 
	  
	 Name:
	  

	
  
 
  	
  
 
  	
  
Title:
  	
  
CFO and Treasurer
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

RAMOND GOMEZ A/K/A

RAMON GOMEZ,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee. 

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-12-00044-CR

Appeal from

355th District Court

of Hood County, Texas

(TC # CR12001)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was error in the 

judgment. We therefore modify the judgment for Counts 1, 2, and 3 to reflect that punishment 

was assessed by the trial court and not the jury. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial 

court as so modified. This decision shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 15TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2014.

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice 

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

193.1 

KA 14-01407 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, DEJOSEPH, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

DERRICK L. HALL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (JOSEPH G. FRAZIER OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

NIAGARA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Sara S.

Farkas, J.), rendered March 27, 2013. The appeal was held by this

Court by order entered April 29, 2016, decision was reserved and the

matter was remitted to Niagara County Court for further proceedings

(138 AD3d 1407). 

Now, upon reading and filing the stipulation of discontinuance

signed by the attorneys for the parties on December 9, 2016, with

attached affidavit sworn to on November 21, 2016 by defendant,

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed 

upon stipulation.

Entered: February 3, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court