23254 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 

RIN 3150–AI10 

[NRC–2008–0122] 

Enhancements to Emergency 

Preparedness Regulations 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or Commission) is 

proposing to amend certain emergency 

preparedness (EP) requirements in its 

regulations that govern domestic 

licensing of production and utilization 

facilities. A conforming provision 

would also be added in the regulations 

that govern licenses, certifications, and 

approvals for new nuclear power plants. 

The proposed amendments would 

codify certain voluntary protective 

measures contained in NRC Bulletin 

2005–02, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Actions for Security-Based 

Events,’’ and other generically 

applicable requirements similar to those 

previously imposed by Commission 

orders. They would also amend other 

licensee emergency plan requirements 

based on a comprehensive review of the 

NRC’s EP regulations and guidance. The 

proposed requirements would enhance 

the ability of licensees in preparing to 

take and taking certain emergency 

preparedness and protective measures 

in the event of a radiological emergency; 

address, in part, security issues 

identified after the terrorist events of 

September 11, 2001; clarify regulations 

to effect consistent emergency plan 

implementation among licensees; and 

modify certain EP requirements to be 

more effective and efficient. 

DATES: Submit comments on the 

proposed rule by August 3, 2009. 

Submit comments on the information 

collection aspects of this proposed rule 

by June 17, 2009. Comments received 

after the above dates will be considered 

if it is practical to do so, but assurance 

of consideration cannot be given to 

comments received after these dates. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Comments submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be made available 

for public inspection. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

[NRC–2008–0122]. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, 

telephone (301) 492–3668; e-mail 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

E-mail comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive a reply e-mail confirming 

that we have received your comments, 

contact us directly at (301) 415–1677. 

Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 

492–3446. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this document 

using the following methods: 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR): 

The public may examine and have 

copied for a fee publicly available 

documents at the NRC’s PDR, Public 

File Area O–1F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS): 

Publicly available documents created or 

received at the NRC are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, 

the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 

which provides text and image files of 

NRC’s public documents. If you do not 

have access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

or (301) 415–4737, or by e-mail to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Lauren Quin ̃ ones, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415– 

2007, e-mail Lauren.Quinones@nrc.gov; 

or Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear 

Security and Incident Response, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone 

(301) 415–2966, e-mail 

Don.Tailleart@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

II. Discussion 

III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the 

Proposed Rule 

IV. Specific Request for Comments 

V. Section-by-Section Analysis 

VI. Guidance 

VII. Criminal Penalties 

VIII. Agreement State Compatibility 

IX. Availability of Documents 

X. Plain Language 

XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental 

Impact: Availability 

XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 

XIV. Regulatory Analysis: Availability 

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

XVI. Backfit Analysis 

I. Background 

After the terrorist events of September 

11, 2001, the NRC determined that it 

was necessary to require certain 

modifications of EP programs for 

operating power reactor licensees to 

ensure continued adequate protection of 

public health and safety. These 

modifications were issued to licensees 

by NRC Order EA–02–026, ‘‘Order for 

Interim Safeguards and Security 

Compensatory Measures,’’ (Order EA– 

02–026), dated February 25, 2002. Order 

EA–02–026 was issued to the license 

holders of the 104 commercial nuclear 

power reactors in the United States. 

This order required licensees to 

implement interim compensatory 

measures (ICMs) for the post-September 

11, 2001, threat environment and take 

actions such as: 

(1) Review security and emergency 

plans to maximize compatibility 

between the plans; 

(2) Assess the adequacy of staffing 

plans at emergency response facilities, 

and for licensees with an onsite 

emergency operations facility (EOF), 

identify alternative facilities capable of 

supporting emergency response; 

(3) Develop plans, procedures and 

training regarding notification 

(including non-emergency response 

organization (ERO) employees), 

activation, and coordination between 

the site and offsite response 

organizations (OROs); 

(4) Conduct a review of staffing to 

ensure that collateral duties are not 

assigned to responders that would 

prevent effective emergency response; 

and 

(5) Implement site-specific emergency 

action levels (EALs) to provide an 

anticipatory response to a credible 

threat. 

Following the issuance of Order EA–02– 

026, the NRC conducted inspections of 

licensee EP programs and held meetings 

with nuclear power industry 

representatives to discuss the inspection 

results and the modifications licensees 

had made to their EP programs. 

Also following the terrorist events of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC evaluated 

the EP planning basis for nuclear power 

reactors given the changed threat 

environment. In SECY–03–0165, 

‘‘Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor 

Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis 


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Adequacy in the Post-9/11 Threat 

Environment,’’ issued on September 22, 

2003 (not publicly available), the NRC 

staff reported to the Commission that 

the EP planning basis remained valid, 

including scope and timing issues. 

However, the NRC staff also recognized 

that security events differ from accident 

events due to the planned action to 

maximize damage and loss of life and 

that the EP response to such events also 

differed. The NRC staff noted several EP 

issues that required further action to 

better respond to the post-September 11, 

2001, threat environment. 

On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff 

briefed the Commission on EP program 

initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC 

staff informed the Commission of its 

intent to conduct a comprehensive 

review of EP regulations and guidance. 

On February 25, 2005, in response to the 

Commission’s staff requirements 

memorandum (SRM), SRM–M041214B, 

‘‘Briefing on Emergency Preparedness 

Program Initiatives, 1 p.m., Tuesday, 

December 14, 2004, Commissioners’ 

Conference Room, One White Flint 

North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to 

Public Attendance),’’ dated December 

20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the 

Commission with a schedule of 

activities for the completion of the 

comprehensive review. The NRC staff, 

through SECY–05–0010, 

‘‘Recommended Enhancements of 

Emergency Preparedness and Response 

at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/11 

Environment,’’ issued on January 10, 

2005 (not publicly available), requested 

Commission approval of the NRC staff’s 

recommendations for enhancing, 

through new guidance documents, EP in 

the post-September 11, 2001, threat 

environment. In its SRM to SECY–05– 

0010, dated May 4, 2005 (not publicly 

available), the Commission directed the 

staff to provide the results of a 

comprehensive review of EP regulations 

and guidance. The SRM to SECY–05– 

0010 also approved the staff’s 

recommendation to proceed with 

enhancements to EP issues as described 

in SECY–05–0010. As a result, the NRC 

staff issued Bulletin 2005–02 (BL–05– 

02), ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Actions for Security-Based 

Events,’’ dated July 18, 2005, which 

recommended enhancements that 

licensees could integrate into EP 

programs at power reactors. BL–05–02 

also sought to obtain information from 

licensees on their actions taken to 

implement Order EA–02–026 and to 

modify their EP programs to adjust to 

the current threat environment. Based 

on the results of the post BL–05–02 

inspections, meetings with members of 

the nuclear power industry, and 

licensees’ responses to BL–05–02, the 

NRC determined that licensees were 

implementing strategies to satisfy Order 

EA–02–026 and enhance their programs 

to address the changed threat 

environment. 

As directed by the Commission SRMs 

discussed above, the NRC staff 

conducted a comprehensive review of 

the EP regulatory structure, including 

reviews of regulations and guidance 

documents. As part of this review, the 

NRC staff met with internal and external 

stakeholders through several public 

meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss 

the elements of the EP review and plans 

to update EP regulations and guidance. 

Section III of this document provides a 

list of the public and other stakeholder 

meetings. 

On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff 

provided the results of its review to the 

Commission in SECY–06–0200, 

‘‘Results of the Review of Emergency 

Preparedness Regulations and 

Guidance’’. In that paper, the NRC staff 

discussed the activities it had 

conducted to complete the review and 

provided its recommendation to pursue 

rulemaking for enhancements to the EP 

program. The NRC staff explained that 

the comprehensive review of the EP 

program identified several areas where 

the implementation of EP regulations 

and guidance, recent technological 

advances, and lessons learned from 

actual events, drills, and exercises had 

revealed to the NRC areas for potential 

improvement and increased clarity for 

the EP program. The staff divided the 

potential enhancements into two 

categories: hostile action-based EP 

issues and other EP issues. The NRC 

staff evaluated each issue and assigned 

it a priority of high, medium, or low 

based on an analysis of the issue’s 

relationship to reactor safety, physical 

security, EP, NRC strategic goals of 

openness and effectiveness, and 

stakeholder impact. 

The NRC staff’s outreach efforts, data 

gathering, research, and analysis led to 

the identification of 12 issues with a 

high priority, including six security EP 

issues and six non-security EP issues. In 

SECY–06–0200, the staff presented a 

framework for the potential 

enhancements to the EP regulations and 

guidance to address these issues, 

including steps for implementation, 

prioritization, and resource estimates. 

Based on its review, the NRC staff 

recommended that the Commission 

approve rulemaking as the most 

effective and efficient means to ensure 

that the high priority EP issues were 

resolved with an opportunity for 

participation by all interested 

stakeholders. 

In its SRM to SECY–06–0200, dated 

January 8, 2007, the Commission 

approved the NRC staff’s 

recommendation to pursue rulemaking 

and guidance changes for enhancements 

to the EP program. On April 17, 2007, 

the staff provided its rulemaking plan to 

the Commission via a memorandum. 

During the development of the plan, the 

NRC staff assessed the issues identified 

in SECY–06–0200 and discussed the 

feasibility of conducting rulemaking and 

updating guidance on all issues. The 

staff determined that the best course of 

action was to conduct rulemaking on 

the 12 issues identified in SECY–06– 

0200 as having a high priority, and to 

reassess the remaining issues at a later 

date. The decision to conduct 

rulemaking on the highest priority 

issues would allow a more timely 

rulemaking effort to occur and would 

enable the staff to more completely 

assess the remaining lower priority 

issues. Due to the similarities between 

two issues known in the rulemaking 

plan as ‘‘collateral duties’’ and ‘‘shift 

staffing and augmentation,’’ these issues 

have been partially combined in this 

proposed rule. The NRC is considering 

non-rulemaking options for some of the 

elements of shift staffing and is also 

requesting stakeholder comments in 

Section V of this document. 

Additionally, the Commission directed 

the NRC staff in SRM–M060502, ‘‘Staff 

Requirements—Briefing on Status of 

Emergency Planning Activities, (Two 

sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, 

May 2, 2006, Commissioners’ 

Conference Room, One White Flint 

North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to 

public attendance),’’ dated June 29, 

2006, to coordinate with the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop 

emergency planning exercise scenarios 

that would ensure that EP drills and 

exercises were challenging and did not 

precondition participant responses. This 

direction was incorporated into the 

rulemaking issue regarding the conduct 

of hostile action drills and exercises 

because it was so closely related. 

In an effort to conduct a rulemaking 

that is transparent and open to 

stakeholder participation, the NRC 

engaged stakeholders through various 

means during the development of this 

proposed rule. The NRC discussed the 

proposed improvements to the EP 

regulations and guidance at several 

conferences with key stakeholders 

present including the 2007 Regulatory 

Information Conference and the 2008 

National Radiological Emergency 

Preparedness Conference. These 


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meetings are discussed more fully in 

Section III of this document. 

The NRC posted draft rule language 

on the e-rulemaking Web site, http:// 

www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 

2008, and solicited stakeholder 

comments. The NRC considered the 

comments received on the draft rule 

language in the process of developing 

the proposed rule. This is discussed 

further in Section IV of this document. 

The NRC continued the use of public 

meetings as a method to foster open 

communication with stakeholders when 

it held public meetings on March 5, 

2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 

5, 2008 meeting, the NRC staff discussed 

the draft preliminary rule language for 

the rulemaking on enhancements to 

emergency preparedness regulations 

and guidance and answered 

stakeholders’ questions on the rule 

language. At the July 8, 2008 meeting, 

the NRC staff discussed the public 

comments on the draft preliminary rule 

language and answered stakeholders’ 

questions on how these comments may 

be addressed in the proposed rule. 

II. Discussion 

The proposed amendments would 

require 10 CFR Part 50 licensees that are 

currently subject to the EP 

requirements, and applicants for 

operating licenses under Part 50 or 

combined licenses under Part 52 that 

would be subject to the proposed EP 

requirements to ensure that their EP 

programs meet the amended EP 

requirements. The proposed 

amendments would similarly apply to 

applicants for construction permits 

under Part 50 with respect to their 

discussion of preliminary plans for 

coping with emergencies 

(§ 50.34(a)(10)), and to applicants for 

early site permits under Part 52 that 

choose to propose either major features 

of an, or a complete and integrated, 

emergency plan (§ 52.17(b)(2)). 

The 16 planning standards in 

§ 50.47(b) apply to both onsite and 

offsite plans because, in making its 

licensing decision, the NRC looks at the 

application (or the licensee’s activities 

in the case of existing facilities), the 

current State and local government 

emergency plans, and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) recommendation, which is 

based on the content of the State and 

local plans. FEMA’s regulations in 44 

CFR Part 350 also contain these 16 

planning standards, which are used to 

make its recommendation on the 

adequacy of the plans and capability of 

the State and local governments to 

implement them; however, FEMA’s 

regulations address only offsite (State 

and local government) plans. The 

changes that are proposed by the NRC 

in this rulemaking are designed to affect 

the onsite plans, not the offsite plans. 

The proposed changes have been 

written in a way that is expected to limit 

the chance of unintended impacts on 

FEMA regulations. 

An effective EP program decreases the 

likelihood of an initiating event at a 

nuclear power reactor proceeding to a 

severe accident. EP cannot affect the 

probability of the initiating event, but a 

high level of EP increases the 

probability of accident mitigation if the 

initiating event proceeds beyond the 

need for initial operator actions. As a 

defense-in-depth measure, emergency 

response is not normally quantified in 

probabilistic risk assessments. However, 

the level of EP does affect the outcome 

of an accident in that the accident may 

be mitigated by the actions of the ERO 

or in the worst case, consequences to 

the public are reduced through the 

effective use of protective actions. 

Enhancements to the level of EP in this 

manner enhance protection of public 

health and safety through improvements 

in the response to unlikely initiating 

events that could lead to severe 

accidents without mitigative response. 

The discussion of the proposed 

amendments is divided into two 

sections: Section II.A for securityrelated EP issues and Section II.B for 

non-security-related EP issues. The 

security-related issues are topics that 

address subjects similar to certain 

requirements in Order EA–02–026 and 

the guidance in BL–05–02. The nonsecurity related issues are high priority 

items that resulted from the 

comprehensive review of EP regulations 

and guidance. 

A. Security-Related Issues 

The NRC is proposing amendments to 

enhance its EP regulations by clearly 

addressing EP actions for a hostile 

action event. Some of these proposed 

changes are based on requirements in 

Order EA–02–026 that was issued to 

ensure adequate protection of the public 

health and safety and common defense 

and security. After the issuance of Order 

EA–02–026, however, the Commission 

took several additional steps to ensure 

adequate protection of the public health 

and safety and common defense and 

security, including the issuance of 

Order EA–02–261, ‘‘Access 

Authorization Order,’’ issued January 7, 

2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643); 

Order EA–03–039, ‘‘Security Personnel 

Training and Qualification 

Requirements (Training) Order,’’ issued 

April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 

24514); Order EA–03–086, ‘‘Revised 

Design Basis Threat Order,’’ issued 

April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 

24517); the Design Basis Threat (DBT) 

final rule (March 19, 2007; 72 FR 

12705); and the Power Reactor Security 

Requirements final rule (March 27, 

2009; 74 FR 13926). As a result of these 

adequate protection requirements, the 

Commission has determined that the 

proposed EP changes that are based on 

the requirements of Order EA–02–026 

would no longer be necessary to ensure 

adequate protection during a hostile 

action event. Therefore, because the 

existing regulatory structure ensures 

adequate protection of the public health 

and safety and common defense and 

security, the NRC has determined that, 

in the current threat environment, the 

following proposed amendments would 

not be necessary to ensure adequate 

protection during a hostile action event. 

These amendments are considered 

enhancements to the current EP 

regulations. However, these 

enhancements would result in a 

substantial increase in emergency 

preparedness and the protection of 

public health and safety. 

1. On-Shift Multiple Responsibilities 

The NRC is concerned that on-shift 

ERO personnel who are assigned to 

emergency plan implementation 

functions may have multiple 

responsibilities that would prevent 

timely performance of their assigned 

emergency plan tasks. The requirements 

for on-shift responsibilities are 

addressed in § 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.A. Currently, 

these regulations do not specifically 

require that on-shift personnel assigned 

to emergency plan implementation must 

be able to implement the plan 

effectively without having competing 

responsibilities that could prevent them 

from performing their primary 

emergency plan tasks. NRC regulations 

and guidance concerning licensee EROs 

are general in nature to allow some 

flexibility in the number of on-shift staff 

required for response to emergency 

events. This sometimes has resulted in 

the inadequate completion of emergency 

functions required during an emergency 

event. The NRC issued Information 

Notice (IN) 91–77, ‘‘Shift Staffing at 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated November 

26, 1991, to alert licensees to problems 

that could arise from insufficient onshift staff for emergency response. The 

IN highlighted the following two events: 

• A fire at one plant in April 1991 

resulted in the licensee’s failure to 

notify some key emergency response 

personnel (communication function). 

The need to staff the fire brigade and 

perform numerous response actions 


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required by the event resulted in a 

heavy workload for the shift staff. 

• A fire, loss of offsite power, and 

reactor trip at another plant in June 

1991 resulted in difficulties in 

classifying the event, notifying required 

personnel, implementing emergency 

operating procedures, and staffing the 

fire brigade. Insufficient staff 

contributed to the licensee’s failure to 

make a timely Notification of Unusual 

Event. 

The NRC issued IN 93–81, 

‘‘Implementation of Engineering 

Expertise On-Shift,’’ dated October 12, 

1993, to alert licensees of ineffective 

implementation of the requirement to 

provide adequate engineering expertise 

on shift. Each nuclear power plant is 

required to have a shift technical 

advisor (STA) on shift to provide 

engineering and accident assessment 

expertise. However, some licensees had 

assigned additional response duties to 

STAs, such as communicator or fire 

brigade member, which could result in 

overburdening the control room staff 

during an emergency event. One 

licensee had assigned the STA as fire 

brigade leader which could hinder the 

STA from performing the primary duty 

of providing accident assessment and 

engineering expertise. 

After issuance of IN 91–77, event 

follow-up inspections indicated that 

challenges involving shift staffing and 

task allocation continued. The NRC 

initiated a study in 1995 to assess the 

adequacy of shift staffing for emergency 

response. The NRC published IN 95–48, 

‘‘Results of Shift Staffing Study,’’ dated 

October 10, 1995, which cited several 

observations of inadequate staffing and 

also concluded that there could be a 

large workload for radiological support 

personnel during emergencies. Data was 

collected on the adequacy of nuclear 

power plant staffing practices for 

performing response activities during 

two accident scenarios, which were (1) 

a fire leading to reactor trip with 

complications, and (2) either a control 

room fire leading to evacuation and 

remote shutdown or a station blackout. 

Items of interest included the following: 

• Licensees surveyed did not use a 

systematic process for establishing sitespecific shift staffing levels. 

• Licensees surveyed frequently 

assigned additional plant-specific tasks 

that were not specified by regulation to 

be performed by licensed and nonlicensed operators during an event. 

• Five of the seven licensees surveyed 

used licensed personnel to staff the fire 

brigade. 

• Procedures varied significantly 

concerning licensed and non-licensed 

personnel staffing levels, and the 

number of non-licensed operators used 

on the night-shift varied greatly. 

• Radiation protection and chemistry 

technicians of all the licensees surveyed 

had a high workload during the 

scenarios. 

Multiple NRC inspection findings also 

indicate the need for regulatory clarity 

in the assignment of multiple 

responsibilities to on-shift ERO 

personnel. For example, in February 

2003, one licensee revised its emergency 

plan to delete one of three 

communicators and assigned the 

communicator function to the STA as an 

additional duty. As previously stated, 

the primary emergency plan duty of the 

STA is to provide engineering and 

accident assessment expertise. The NRC 

determined that this emergency plan 

change was an inappropriate reduction 

in on-shift staff and assessed the change 

as a decrease in effectiveness of the 

emergency plan in violation of 

§ 50.54(q). In April 2005, another 

licensee revised its emergency plan to 

allow the assignment of the on-shift 

health physics technician (HP Tech) as 

the interim operations support center 

coordinator, a 30-minute augmented 

ERO responder. The HP Tech had 

assigned emergency plan tasks 

including in-plant surveys, in-plant 

protective actions, and rescue/first aid. 

The NRC determined that this 

emergency plan change was an 

inappropriate assignment of 

augmentation staff duties to an on-shift 

responder and assessed the change as a 

decrease in effectiveness of the 

emergency plan in violation of 

§ 50.54(q). 

These findings demonstrated the need 

for amended regulations to explicitly 

limit on-shift ERO response duties to 

ensure that these emergency responders 

do not become overburdened during an 

emergency event. Assigning additional 

duties, such as fire brigade member 

could result in on-shift responders being 

overburdened, resulting in inadequate 

or untimely response. 

The ICMs in Order EA–02–026 

addressed on-shift staff responsibilities 

by requiring licensees to ensure that a 

sufficient number of on-shift personnel 

are available for integrated security plan 

and emergency plan implementation. 

Prior to issuance of the order, some 

licensees were utilizing security 

personnel to implement the emergency 

plan when many of these responders 

would likely not be available due to a 

hostile action. 

The NRC considered several options 

to resolve this issue. One option was to 

take no action, but this alternative 

would not subject new nuclear power 

reactor licensees to Order EA–02–026’s 

requirement of an assessment to ensure 

adequate staff for integrated security 

plan and emergency plan 

implementation. Additionally, the shift 

staffing study referenced in IN 95–48 

found that the licensees surveyed did 

not use a systematic process for 

establishing shift staffing levels and 

additional tasks, not required by 

regulation, were assigned to the licensed 

and non-licensed operators. This 

practice could result in operators being 

overburdened during an emergency. A 

second option was to allow licensees to 

use a voluntary program to ensure 

adequate shift staffing. However, many 

licensees have requested NRC 

permission to reduce on-shift staffing 

levels and the NRC expects this practice 

to continue. This could increase the risk 

of over-burdening on-shift responders 

and result in inadequate or untimely 

response. Therefore, both of these 

options were considered unacceptable. 

Instead, the NRC is proposing to revise 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A. to 

address this issue, as discussed in 

Section V of this document. 

2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile 

Action Events 

Section 50.47(b)(4) currently 

stipulates that emergency plans must 

include a standard emergency 

classification and action level scheme. 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., 

currently specifies that emergency plans 

shall include EALs that are to be used 

as criteria for determining the need for 

notification of State and local agencies, 

and participation of those agencies in 

emergency response. However, NRC 

regulations do not require EALs for 

hostile action events and do not address 

the issue of anticipatory response to 

hostile action events. Although Order 

EA–02–026 and BL–05–02 addressed 

these issues, those improvements to the 

EAL requirements to address hostile 

action events are only in orders and 

guidance. Thus, the NRC cannot ensure 

consistent and effective implementation 

of these enhancements among existing 

and future licensees. 

Order EA–02–026 required the 

declaration of at least an Unusual Event 

in response to a credible hostile action 

threat. In 2005, the NRC issued BL–05– 

02, which provided EAL enhancement 

examples for hostile action events up to 

the General Emergency level. BL–05–02 

provided examples of EALs for all three 

EAL methodologies that could be 

implemented immediately without prior 

NRC approval (i.e., NUREG–0654/ 

FEMA–REP–1, ‘‘Criteria for Preparation 

and Evaluation of Radiological 

Emergency Response Plans and 

Preparedness in Support of Nuclear 


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Power Plants,’’ NUMARC/NESP–007, 

‘‘Methodology for Development of 

Emergency Action Levels,’’ and Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) 99–01, 

‘‘Methodology for Development of 

Emergency Action Levels’’). It also 

pointed out that because of 

improvements in Federal agencies’ 

information-sharing and assessment 

capabilities, hostile action emergency 

declarations can be accomplished in a 

more anticipatory manner, based on a 

credible threat, than the current method 

of making declarations for accidental 

events. This would enable earlier 

implementation of emergency response 

actions. 

Although all licensees have 

implemented both the credible threat 

EAL required by Order EA–02–026 and 

the EAL enhancements specified in BL– 

05–02, there is no requirement to 

maintain the enhancements identified 

in the bulletin. This could result in 

inconsistent EAL implementation 

among licensees for response to hostile 

action events. Also, future licensees 

would not be required to include these 

enhancements in their emergency plans. 

This rulemaking would serve to 

establish consistent EALs across the 

nuclear power industry for hostile 

action events. The ICMs and BL–05–02 

provided enhancements to EAL schemes 

which would allow event declarations 

to be accomplished in a more 

anticipatory manner. This is of the 

utmost importance because EALs are 

used as criteria for determining the need 

for notification and participation of 

State and local agencies. The NRC 

believes that these enhancements to the 

EAL requirements addressing hostile 

action events should be codified by 

revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.B., as discussed in Section V of this 

document. 

The NRC considered other options to 

attempt to resolve these issues, such as 

taking no action or allowing voluntary 

action by licensees. These options were 

rejected since there would continue to 

be no regulatory requirement for current 

or future licensees to incorporate EALs 

for hostile action events in their 

emergency plans, nor would there be a 

consistent minimum level of 

implementation that the NRC had 

determined to be adequate. 

3. Emergency Response Organization 

(ERO) Augmentation and Alternative 

Facilities 

Currently, § 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.E. require 

licensees to have the capability to 

augment the on-shift staff within a short 

period of time after the declaration of an 

emergency to assist in mitigation 

activities. To accomplish this, ERO 

members typically staff an onsite 

Technical Support Center (TSC) which 

relieves the Control Room (CR) of 

emergency response duties and allows 

CR staff to focus on reactor safety. ERO 

members also staff an onsite Operational 

Support Center (OSC) to provide an 

assembly area for damage repair teams. 

Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, 

usually located in close proximity to the 

plant, to function as the center for 

evaluation and coordination activities 

related to the emergency and the focal 

point of information provided to 

Federal, State, and local authorities 

involved in the response. 

However, the regulations at 

§ 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.E. do not require licensees to 

identify alternative facilities to support 

ERO augmentation during hostile action 

events. During a hostile action event, 

ERO members would likely not have 

access to the onsite emergency response 

facilities, or the EOF if it is located 

within the licensee’s owner-controlled 

area. Nevertheless these events still 

warrant timely ERO augmentation so 

responders can travel quickly to the site. 

Order EA–02–026 required that 

licensees assess the adequacy of staffing 

plans at emergency response facilities 

during a hostile action event, assuming 

the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and 

identify alternative facilities capable of 

supporting event response. These 

facilities would function as staging areas 

for augmentation staff until the site was 

secured, which would minimize delays 

in overall site response by permitting 

ERO assembly without exposing 

responders to the danger of hostile 

action. NRC inspections to evaluate the 

effectiveness of the implementation of 

the ICMs revealed variations in the 

identification and staffing of alternative 

emergency response facilities. 

BL–05–02 described how alternative 

locations for onsite emergency response 

facilities support EP functions during a 

hostile action event. It stated that the 

ERO is expected to be staged in a 

manner that supports rapid response to 

limit or mitigate site damage or the 

potential for an offsite radiological 

release. It also pointed out that some 

licensees have chosen not to activate 

elements of the ERO during a hostile 

action event until the site was secured. 

However, the NRC considers it prudent 

to fully activate ERO members for offnormal working hour hostile action 

events to promptly staff alternative 

facilities, in order to minimize delays in 

overall site response. Even during 

normal working hours, licensees should 

consider deployment of onsite ERO 

personnel to an alternative facility near 

the site during a hostile action event. 

To resolve this issue, the NRC 

considered taking no regulatory action 

or continuing the voluntary 

implementation currently in place as a 

result of BL–05–02 and the guidance 

endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue 

Summary (RIS) 2006–12, ‘‘Endorsement 

of Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance 

‘Enhancements to Emergency 

Preparedness Programs for Hostile 

Action,’ ’’ dated July 19, 2006. If no 

action were taken, there would continue 

to be no explicit regulatory requirement 

regarding the actions necessary during 

hostile action events for the ERO to staff 

an alternative facility. ERO members 

would likely not have access to the site 

during a hostile action event, but timely 

augmentation would still be necessary 

for adequate response. Taking no 

regulatory action may result in 

inconsistent implementation of ERO 

augmentation guidelines, and less 

effective overall site response. The NRC 

also considered using a voluntary 

program; however, voluntary programs, 

such as those developed per the NEI 

guidance endorsed by RIS 2006–12, do 

not provide a consistent, NRC-approved 

means for addressing needed 

enhancements for hostile action events. 

The use of voluntary programs does not 

ensure long-term continuity of the 

enhancements for both licensees and 

applicants. Thus, the NRC believes that 

the ICM requirement and the 

enhancement examples described in 

BL–05–02 concerning ERO 

augmentation to alternative facilities 

during hostile action events should be 

codified in Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.E. to maximize the effectiveness of 

the site response. These proposed 

changes are discussed in Section V of 

this document. 

4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite 

Response Organizations During Hostile 

Action Events 

The NRC believes that a unique 

challenge posed by a hostile action 

event at a nuclear power plant is the 

increased demand on local law 

enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that are 

expected to implement portions of ORO 

emergency plans, as well as respond to 

the plant. Currently, § 50.47(b)(1) and 

Appendix E to Part 50 do not explicitly 

require licensees to coordinate with 

OROs to ensure that personnel are 

available to carry out preplanned 

actions, such as traffic control and route 

alerting by LLEAs, during a hostile 

action event directed at the plant. 

Licensees are required to identify 

ORO support for emergency response as 

well as demonstrate that various ORO 


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capabilities exist through biennial 

evaluated exercises. Licensees and 

OROs have successfully demonstrated 

these capabilities for many years. 

However, the NRC recognized that 

hostile action events may challenge 

OROs in ways unforeseen at the time 

the current regulations were developed. 

For example, local law enforcement 

personnel may be assigned both 

evacuation plan and armed response 

duties during a hostile action event. The 

NRC acknowledged this challenge when 

it issued Order EA–02–026 and 

included provisions that licensees 

address coordination with OROs for 

hostile action events. Specifically, the 

order required that licensees develop 

plans, procedures, and training 

regarding coordination between the site 

and OROs and directed licensees to 

review emergency plans to ensure 

sufficient numbers of personnel would 

be available in a hostile action event. 

The NRC subsequently became aware 

through inspections and 

communications with licensees that 

ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure 

sufficient numbers of personnel would 

be available to respond during a hostile 

action event. The NRC communicated 

this need to licensees and OROs through 

RIS 2004–15, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness 

Issues: Post-9/11,’’ dated October 18, 

2004, which provided information on 

EP issues based on NRC staff 

observations from the EP component of 

force-on-force (FOF) exercises and 

lessons learned from the telephonic 

walk-through drills conducted with all 

power reactor sites between August and 

October 2005. In addition, DHS initiated 

the Comprehensive Review Program 

that conducted a review of site and ORO 

response to hostile action at every 

nuclear plant site. This review often 

identified a gap in ORO resource 

planning. Based on these findings and 

lessons learned from hostile action pilot 

program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this 

document), the NRC believes there is 

inconsistent implementation among 

licensees concerning effective 

coordination with OROs to ensure that 

adequate resources are available to 

respond to a hostile action event at a 

nuclear power plant. 

Licensees and the supporting OROs 

have taken various actions to respond to 

this issue, but criteria for determining 

the adequacy of the licensee and ORO 

actions have not been established. The 

NRC considered encouraging industry to 

develop and implement a voluntary 

program; however, voluntary programs 

do not provide a consistent, NRCapproved means for addressing the 

needed enhancements in the postSeptember 11, 2001, threat 

environment. The NRC believes that a 

voluntary approach would not ensure 

consistent industry-wide 

implementation of the ICM 

requirements and there would be no 

requirement for new licensees to 

incorporate the changes into their 

emergency plans. 

The NRC is proposing to revise Part 

50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. to 

require licensees to ensure that ORO 

personnel assigned emergency plan 

implementation duties would be 

available to do so during hostile action 

events. These proposed changes are 

discussed in Section V of this 

document. 

5. Protection for Onsite Personnel 

NRC regulations at § 50.47(b)(10) and 

Appendix E to Part 50 do not currently 

require specific emergency plan 

provisions to protect onsite emergency 

responders, and other onsite personnel, 

in emergencies resulting from hostile 

action events at nuclear power plants. 

Licensees are required to provide 

radiological protection for emergency 

workers and the public in the plume 

exposure pathway emergency planning 

zone (EPZ), including actions such as 

warning of an emergency, providing for 

evacuation and accountability of 

individuals, and providing for 

protective clothing and/or radioprotective drugs. Many of these 

personnel are required by the site 

emergency plan that the licensee must 

follow and maintain. The emergency 

plan requires responders with specific 

assignments to be available on-shift 24 

hours a day to minimize the impact of 

radiological emergencies and provide 

for the protection of public health and 

safety. However, in analyses performed 

after the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, the NRC staff determined that 

a lack of protection for emergency 

responders who are expected to 

implement the emergency plan could 

result in the loss of those responders 

and thus an inability to effectively 

implement the emergency plan. 

The normal response actions for 

personnel protection, such as site 

evacuation, site assembly and 

accountability, and activation of onsite 

emergency response facilities, may not 

be appropriate in this instance because 

these actions may place at risk the 

response personnel necessary to 

mitigate plant damage resulting from the 

hostile action. BL–05–02 pointed out 

that actions different than those 

normally prescribed may be more 

appropriate during a hostile action, 

particularly an aircraft attack. This may 

include actions such as evacuation of 

personnel from potential target 

buildings and accountability of 

personnel after the attack has 

concluded. Precise actions would 

depend on site-specific arrangements, 

such as the location of personnel in 

relation to potential targets. Procedures 

would need to be revised to ensure 

plant page announcements are timely 

and convey the onsite protective 

measures deemed appropriate. 

The NRC considered other options to 

attempt to resolve this issue. The NRC 

considered taking no additional 

regulatory action and relying upon 

continuation of the voluntary initiatives 

currently being implemented by 

licensees as a result of BL–05–02. The 

NRC believes that taking no action 

could result in the vulnerability of 

onsite personnel during a hostile action 

event. Action is necessary to ensure 

effective coordination to enable 

licensees to more effectively implement 

their pre-planned actions. Voluntary 

programs do not provide a consistent, 

NRC-approved means for addressing 

needed enhancements. Further, the 

implementation of voluntary actions 

does not ensure that these measures 

would be incorporated into emergency 

plans at new sites. 

The NRC is proposing to revise 

Appendix E by creating a new Section 

IV.I. to address this issue, as discussed 

in Section V of this document. 

6. Challenging Drills and Exercises 

A basic EP principle is that licensees 

conduct drills and exercises to develop 

and maintain key skills of ERO 

personnel. Drill and exercise programs 

contribute to the NRC determination of 

reasonable assurance that licensees can 

and will implement actions to protect 

public health and safety in the unlikely 

event of a radiological emergency. 

Implementation of the current 

regulations provides reasonable 

assurance of adequate protection of 

public health and safety at every nuclear 

plant site. 

In the unlikely event that a licensee 

faces a hostile action event, the response 

organization will encounter challenges 

that differ significantly from those 

practiced in long-standing drill and 

exercise programs because these 

programs have not included hostile 

action event scenarios. The NRC 

regulations addressing this issue are 

general in nature and do not explicitly 

require licensees to include hostile 

action event scenarios in drills and 

exercises, nor do they directly allow the 

NRC to require specific scenario 

content. The NRC believes that its 

regulations should be revised to do so. 

Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted 


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a review of the EP planning basis in 

view of the changed threat environment 

and concluded that the EP planning 

basis remains valid. The NRC observed 

licensee performance during hostileaction EP tabletop drills at four sites, a 

drill at one site, and an exercise at one 

site, as well as several security FOF 

exercise evaluations. The NRC also 

discussed security-based EP issues with 

licensees and Federal, State, and local 

EP professionals and advocacy groups 

and issued BL–05–02 to collect 

information from licensees on the 

enhancements to drill and exercise 

programs to address the hostile action 

contingency. 

Through these efforts, the NRC 

concluded that although EP measures 

are designed to address a wide range of 

events, response to hostile action can 

present unique challenges not addressed 

in licensee and ORO drills and 

exercises, such as: 

• Extensive coordination between 

operations, security, and EP; 

• Use of the alternative emergency 

response facilities for activation of the 

ERO; 

• Execution of initial response 

actions in a hostile environment (i.e., 

during simulated hostile action); 

• The need to shelter personnel from 

armed attack or aircraft attack in a 

manner very different from that used 

during radiological emergencies; 

• Conduct of operations and repair 

activities when the site conditions 

prevent normal access due to fire, 

locked doors, security measures, and 

areas that have not yet been secured; 

• Conduct of operations and repair 

activities with large areas of the plant 

damaged or on fire; 

• Rescue of and medical attention to 

significant numbers of personnel; and 

• Prioritization of efforts to protect 

plant equipment or to secure access to 

plant areas for repairs. 

In response to BL–05–02, all nuclear 

plant licensees stated that they would 

develop and implement an enhanced 

drill and exercise program. Program 

elements are captured in a guidance 

document developed by NEI, NEI 06–04, 

Rev. 1, ‘‘Conducting a Hostile ActionBased Emergency Response Drill.’’ The 

NRC endorsed this document for use in 

a pilot program in RIS 2008–08, 

‘‘Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear 

Energy Institute Guidance Document 

NEI 06–04, ‘Conducting a Hostile 

Action-Based Emergency Response 

Drill,’ ’’ dated March 19, 2008. However, 

implementation of these enhancements 

is voluntary, and the NRC cannot 

require licensees to maintain these 

enhancements, absent issuance of an 

order or a regulation. Issuance of orders 

is resource intensive and an inefficient 

approach to address a generic problem. 

The NRC also became aware of a 

related issue regarding EP exercise 

scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee 

response during these exercises and 

FEMA evaluates the capabilities of 

OROs. Licensees have performed many 

evaluated EP exercises and understand 

NRC and FEMA expectations. Licensees 

design scenarios in coordination with 

State and local agencies to demonstrate 

all key EP functions in a manner that 

facilitates evaluation. As a result, 

scenarios have become predictable and 

may precondition responders to 

sequential escalation of emergency 

classifications that always culminate in 

a large radiological release. Current 

biennial exercise scenarios do not 

resemble credible reactor accidents in 

that the timing is improbable and the 

intermittent containment failure 

typically used is unlikely. Typical 

scenarios used by licensees in biennial 

exercises involve simulated accidents, 

such as a loss of coolant accident or a 

steam generator tube rupture. However, 

certain predictable artifacts emerge in 

almost all biennial exercise scenarios, 

including the following: 

• The ERO will not be allowed to 

mitigate the accident before a release 

occurs; 

• The release will occur after a 

General Emergency is declared; 

• The release will be terminated 

before the exercise ends; and 

• The exercise will escalate 

sequentially through the emergency 

classes. 

In short, responders may be 

preconditioned to accident sequences 

that are not likely to resemble the 

accidents they could realistically face. 

In SRM–M060502, dated June 29, 

2006, the Commission directed the NRC 

staff to develop exercise scenarios in 

conjunction with DHS, as follows: 

The staff should coordinate with DHS 

to develop emergency planning exercise 

scenarios which would help avoid 

anticipatory responses associated with 

preconditioning of participants by 

incorporating a wide spectrum of 

releases (ranging from little or no release 

to a large release) and events, including 

security-based events. These scenarios 

should emphasize the expected 

interfaces and coordination between key 

decision-makers based on realistic 

postulated events. The staff should 

share experiences of preconditioning or 

‘‘negative training’’ with DHS. 

As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/ 

FEMA working group was formed to 

review the development of emergency 

planning exercise scenarios. The 

working group was assigned the task of 

identifying the NRC and FEMA 

regulations that would require revision 

to enhance exercise scenarios and 

guidance to assist in the effective 

implementation of these regulations. 

The working group recommended 

several changes to the FEMA 

Radiological Emergency Preparedness 

(REP) Program Manual that comport 

with proposed changes to NRC 

regulations to address preconditioning 

and the incorporation of hostile action 

exercise scenarios. 

FEMA held focus group meetings in 

several FEMA regions to discuss 

potential policy changes to the REP 

Program Manual. The NRC supported 

these meetings to facilitate questions as 

they may relate to the EP rulemaking 

issue of challenging drills and exercises. 

For example, stakeholders voiced 

opinions on the requirements for the 

development and review of exercise 

scenarios, whether all emergency 

classification levels (ECLs) must be 

included in each exercise or if one or 

more ECLs can be skipped, how 

radiological release conditions and 

options could vary, and if a spectrum of 

scenarios will be varied to create more 

realistic and challenging exercises. 

Comments received from the several 

different focus groups will inform the 

update to the REP Program Manual. The 

NRC also considered stakeholder views 

as they relate to this proposed rule and 

enhancements to EP guidance, although 

some comments were received after the 

deadline to be considered in this 

proposed rule. 

The NRC believes that a regulatory 

change would be necessary to enhance 

scenario content to include hostile 

action scenarios and reduce 

preconditioning through a wide 

spectrum of challenges. This change 

would improve licensee ERO capability 

to protect public health and safety 

under all accident scenarios as well as 

reverse any trend toward 

preconditioning. 

The NRC also considered not making 

any change to the regulations, but 

rejected that option because it would 

not ensure correction of the issues 

discussed above. The NRC also 

discussed the use of voluntary programs 

and although this option could be 

successful, the NRC could not require 

that changes made would be permanent 

and consistent across all sites. 

The NRC is proposing to revise 

Appendix E, Section IV.F. to address 

these issues, as discussed in Section V 

of this document. 

B. Non-Security Related Issues 

The remaining proposed changes 

would be new or amended requirements 


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that would result in a substantial 

increase to public health and safety 

because they would maintain or 

strengthen the ability of licensees to 

effectively implement their emergency 

plans. 

1. Backup Means for Alert and 

Notification Systems 

The regulations for alert and 

notification system (ANS) capabilities 

are found in § 50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. and require 

licensees to establish the capability to 

promptly alert and notify the public if 

there is an emergency event while 

meeting certain ANS design objectives. 

NRC regulations do not currently 

require backup power for sirens or other 

backup ANS alerting capabilities when 

a major portion of the primary alerting 

means is unavailable. The regulations 

also do not address backup notification 

capabilities. If a major portion of a 

facility’s ANS is unavailable and no 

backup exists, then the public may not 

be promptly alerted of an event at the 

facility and the protective actions to be 

taken, which could affect the public’s 

response to the event. 

An ANS provides the capability to 

promptly alert the populace within the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ of a 

nuclear power plant in case of an 

emergency event and to inform the 

public what protective actions may need 

to be taken. The predominant method 

used around U.S. nuclear power plants 

for alerting the public is an ANS based 

on sirens to provide an acoustic warning 

signal. Some sites employ other means, 

such as tone alert radios and route 

alerting, as either primary or 

supplemental alerting methods. The 

public typically receives information 

about an event and offsite protective 

actions via emergency alert system 

(EAS) broadcasts or other means, such 

as mobile loudspeakers. 

In several instances, nuclear power 

plants have lost all or a major portion 

of the alert function of an ANS for 

various reasons, such as damage to ANS 

components caused by severe weather, 

loss of offsite alternating current (AC) 

power, malfunction of ANS activation 

equipment, or unexpected problems 

resulting from ANS hardware/software 

modifications. In other situations, the 

notification capability has been lost 

(e.g., the inability to activate tone alert 

radios which are used to provide both 

an alert signal and notification 

function). 

The NRC has issued multiple INs to 

document the circumstances when ANS 

failures have occurred, including IN 

2002–25, ‘‘Challenges to Licensees’ 

Ability to Provide Prompt Public 

Notification and Information During an 

Emergency Preparedness Event,’’ dated 

August 26, 2002; IN 2005–06, ‘‘Failure 

to Maintain Alert and Notification 

System Tone Alert Radio Capability,’’ 

dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006–28, 

‘‘Siren System Failures Due to 

Erroneous Siren System Signal,’’ dated 

December 22, 2006. IN 1996–19, 

‘‘Failure of Tone Alert Radios to 

Activate When Receiving a Shortened 

Activation Signal,’’ dated April 2, 1996, 

addressed the inability to activate some 

tone alert radios because of a shorter 

tone activation signal permitted as part 

of EAS implementation. Without the 

ability to warn the population, the 

effectiveness of the notification element 

may be significantly reduced. Having a 

backup means in place would lessen the 

impact of the loss of the primary ANS. 

Other events impacting ANS 

operability have involved the 

widespread loss of the electrical grid 

providing power to siren-based systems, 

such as the electrical blackout in several 

areas of the northeastern United States 

and portions of Canada in August 2003. 

As discussed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 

1.155, ‘‘Station Blackout’’ (August 

1988), although the likelihood of failure 

of the onsite AC power system 

coincidental with the loss of offsite 

power is small, station blackout events 

may be substantial contributors to core 

damage events for some plants. 

The U.S. Congress recognized that all 

emergency notification systems may not 

operate in the absence of an AC power 

supply and encouraged the use of newer 

alerting and notification technology. In 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Appropriations Report 

107–740, FEMA was directed to update 

its guidance on outdoor warning and 

mass notification systems and require 

all warning systems to be operable in 

the absence of an AC power supply. The 

House Appropriations Committee also 

urged FEMA to consult with other 

relevant agencies and revise the national 

standard for outdoor warning and mass 

notification to reflect state-of-the-art 

technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy 

Act of 2005 directed the Commission to 

require backup power for the emergency 

notification system, including siren 

systems, for nuclear power plants 

located where there is a permanent 

population, as determined by the 2000 

decennial census, in excess of 

15,000,000 within a 50-mile radius of 

the power plant. Therefore, it is 

appropriate that the NRC also consider 

changes to its existing regulations and 

guidance regarding warning systems for 

all nuclear power reactor licensees. 

The NRC considered several options 

to attempt to resolve this issue, 

including reliance on ANS design 

review standards and related guidance 

documents to address ANS backup 

means. Several NRC and FEMA 

guidance documents, such as NUREG– 

0654, FEMA–REP–10, ‘‘Guide for the 

Evaluation of Alert and Notification 

Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ 

dated November 1985, and FEMA 

Guidance Memorandum AN–1, ‘‘FEMA 

Action to Qualify Alert and Notification 

Systems Against NUREG–0654/FEMA– 

REP–1 and FEMA–REP–10,’’ dated 

April 21, 1987, contain detailed 

information on ANS capabilities and 

design review methodology. Additional 

information on ANS backup capabilities 

could be provided in revisions to these 

documents. As guidance, a provision for 

an ANS backup means would not be 

considered a requirement and its 

applicability to existing approved ANS 

designs would be considered optional. 

As noted previously in this discussion, 

FEMA was also directed to update its 

guidance to require all warning systems 

to be operable in the absence of an 

alternating current power supply. 

However, guidance changes limited to 

backup power requirements for the 

alerting function would not address 

backup capabilities for other types of 

alerting devices or the ANS notification 

function. In summary, this option does 

not provide a regulatory resolution to 

ensure that nuclear power plant ANS 

designs include a backup method to the 

primary means for both alerting and 

notification, and thus the NRC 

considered this option to be 

unacceptable. 

Use of a voluntary approach for ANS 

backup means was also considered. 

Some current nuclear power plant ANS 

designs address one or more aspects of 

backup ANS capabilities, such as 

providing backup power in the event 

primary power to sirens is lost, using 

backup route alerting when sirens are 

inoperable, or designating multiple EAS 

broadcast stations to ensure that 

instructional messages can be 

transmitted. A voluntary approach may 

be appropriate because State and local 

authorities can usually compensate for 

the temporary loss of some ANS 

capabilities. However, allowing 

licensees or applicants to voluntarily 

install backup ANS capabilities will not 

ensure that both the alerting and 

notification functions are addressed, or 

that new sites will have warning 

systems designed with comprehensive 

backup ANS capabilities. Given the 

importance of ANS to alert the public of 

an event at a facility and the protective 

actions to be taken, and without any 

voluntary industry commitment that 


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3Early NRC generic communications routinely 

used the phrase ‘‘emergency classification’’ to 

denote the outcome of the process to assess, 

classify, and declare an emergency condition. This 

document uses the phrase ‘‘emergency declaration’’ 

in place of ‘‘emergency classification’’ except when 

summarizing an earlier document. 

existing or new warning systems will 

have a backup means available, the NRC 

considered a voluntary approach to be 

inappropriate and found this option 

unacceptable. 

The NRC believes that nuclear power 

reactor licensees should be required to 

have backup ANS methods and 

therefore is proposing rulemaking to 

address backup capabilities for both the 

alert and notification functions. Three 

alternatives for addressing this issue in 

rulemaking were considered. 

The first alternative would add a 

regulatory requirement for ANS backup 

power. The most common warning 

system used at U.S. nuclear power 

plants is based on sirens that are 

powered directly, or indirectly through 

batteries, by an AC power source. As 

noted previously in this discussion, the 

loss of power is not the only failure 

mode that can impact warning systems. 

Causes of past ANS inoperability 

problems have included the inability to 

detect siren failures, the inability to 

activate sirens, the failure to test and 

maintain personal home alerting 

devices, the use of telephone callinhibiting devices, and the failure to 

provide and maintain distribution lists 

of tone alert radios. Thus, a regulatory 

requirement addressing only backup 

ANS power would not eliminate any of 

these other failure modes. This 

approach would prescribe one specific 

method as a backup means, precluding 

licensees (or applicants) and offsite 

officials from considering alternative 

methods, such as route alerting or newer 

communications technology, that may 

be more suitable for certain nuclear 

power plant sites. In summary, it would 

address only one of several ANS failure 

modes (i.e., loss of AC power) for one 

alerting method (i.e., sirens). It would 

not address backup methods for other 

types of alerting devices or any part of 

the notification process. Therefore, the 

NRC considered this approach to be 

unacceptable. 

The second alternative would require 

that the primary ANS be designed so 

there would be no common single 

failure mode for the system; therefore, a 

backup system would not be needed. 

This approach would ensure that the 

entire ANS is designed and built to a 

very high level of reliability. Any 

equipment necessary for ANS activation 

and operation (e.g., computers, radio 

transmitters and radio towers, plus the 

actual alerting devices and notification 

means) would have redundant 

components and power sources as 

necessary to eliminate any common 

single failure mode, such as a 

widespread power outage affecting a 

siren-based system. However, ensuring 

that all ANS common single failure 

vulnerabilities have been identified and 

adequately addressed would be 

difficult. Even after extensive analysis 

and testing of a warning system, a 

common failure mechanism may not 

become evident until the system is to be 

activated for an emergency event. For a 

siren-based system, several additional 

sirens (with backup power capabilities) 

may need to be installed to provide 

overlapping acoustic coverage in the 

event clusters of sirens fail and thus 

may discourage licensees at future 

nuclear power plant sites from using 

these systems due to the increased cost 

for installing additional sirens. This 

approach may not be applicable to nonelectronic primary warning systems 

based on other methods, such as route 

alerting. For these reasons, the NRC 

considered this approach to be 

unacceptable. Rejecting this approach 

does not mean that the issue of backup 

power for warning systems will be left 

unaddressed. As discussed previously, 

the House Committee on Appropriations 

has directed FEMA to require all 

outdoor warning systems to be operable 

in the absence of AC power. 

The third alternative was selected for 

rulemaking and would revise Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. to require 

backup measures that would be 

implemented when the primary means 

of alerting and notification are 

unavailable. These proposed changes 

are discussed in Section V of this 

document. 

2. Emergency Declaration Timeliness 

In its oversight of licensee EP 

programs, the NRC has observed a few 

licensees whose responses in 

performing emergency declarations 

were inappropriately delayed. This 

situation may be a result of a lack of a 

specific regulatory timeliness 

requirement. Emergency declaration is 

the process by which a licensee 

determines whether an off-normal plant 

condition warrants declaration as an 

emergency and, if so, which of the four 

emergency classes—Notification of 

Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area 

Emergency, or General Emergency—is to 

be declared. 

These declarations are fundamental to 

the licensee’s EP program in that onsite 

and offsite emergency response 

activities are implemented in a staged, 

proportional manner, based upon the 

level of the declared emergency. If an 

emergency declaration is delayed, the 

subsequent emergency response actions 

may not be timely. Emergency response 

personnel, facilities, and equipment 

may not be in position should it become 

necessary to implement measures to 

protect public health and safety. 

The NRC has issued generic 

communications to alert licensees of 

these concerns and to advise them of the 

NRC’s expectation that emergency 

classifications 3 would be made in a 

prompt manner. In 1985, the NRC 

published IN 85–80, ‘‘Timely 

Declaration of an Emergency Class, 

Implementation of an Emergency Plan, 

and Emergency Notifications,’’ to alert 

licensees of two instances in which 

declarations and/or notifications of an 

actual emergency condition were 

significantly delayed and to express the 

NRC expectation of timely emergency 

declarations. In 1995, the NRC found it 

necessary to publish Emergency 

Preparedness Position (EPPOS)–2, 

‘‘Emergency Preparedness Position 

(EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification 

of Emergency Conditions,’’ to provide 

guidance to NRC staff in evaluating 

licensee performance in the area of 

timely classification. The NRC cited 

classification delays in actual events 

and exercises as the reason for issuing 

the guidance. EPPOS–2 provided the 

NRC expectation that the classification 

should be made promptly following 

indications that conditions have 

reached an EAL threshold and that 15 

minutes would be a reasonable goal for 

completing the classification once 

indications are available to the control 

room operators. The NRC based that 

conclusion on the belief that 15 minutes 

is a reasonable period of time for 

assessing and classifying an emergency 

once indications are available to 

cognizant personnel, and that a delay in 

classification for up to 15 minutes 

would have a minimal impact upon the 

overall emergency response and 

protection of the public health and 

safety. The NRC noted that emergency 

classification schemes have reached a 

level of maturity in which the 

classification of emergencies can be 

accomplished in a relatively short 

period of time once the abnormal 

condition and associated plant 

parameters are known by cognizant 

licensee personnel. EPPOS–2 stated that 

the 15-minute period was not to be 

viewed as a grace period in which a 

licensee could resolve a condition that 

had already exceeded an EAL threshold 

to avoid a declaration. 

This 15-minute goal was not a 

regulatory requirement but was rather a 


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guideline for staff evaluation of a 

licensee’s performance in responding to 

an actual radiological emergency. This 

goal was subsequently incorporated as a 

criterion in the industry-proposed and 

NRC-approved Reactor Oversight 

Process (ROP) EP Cornerstone 

performance indicators (PIs). Although 

the reported classification performance 

during drills and exercises remains 

high, there have been a few instances, 

during actual events, in which 

classifications were inappropriately 

delayed. Although these few actual 

events did not warrant public protective 

measures, this may not always be the 

case. 

The NRC considered the following 

options for addressing this regulatory 

problem. The first option, take no 

action, was rejected because it would 

not address the regulatory problem. The 

second option, continue to rely on the 

industry’s voluntary PI, was rejected 

because the existence of the PI has not 

prevented untimely classifications 

during actual emergencies. Although 

these occurrences were associated with 

Unusual Events or Alerts, the observed 

weaknesses could also have occurred 

under different circumstances in which 

the potential impact to the public could 

have been greater. The third option, 

issue regulatory guidance, was rejected 

because although regulatory guidance is 

an appropriate mechanism for 

identifying acceptable means for 

complying with broadly worded 

regulatory requirements, there is 

currently no regulatory requirement, 

broad or otherwise, that emergency 

declarations meet any particular 

timeliness criterion. The NRC believes 

that the fourth option, an amendment of 

the regulations, would be the best 

course of action to ensure that licensees 

are aware that they are responsible for 

completing emergency declarations in a 

timely manner in the event of a 

radiological emergency. 

Placing a declaration timeliness 

criterion into the regulations would 

clearly establish the NRC’s expectations, 

as well as provide a regulatory 

framework to consistently enforce these 

expectations. The NRC considered 

amending § 50.47(b)(4), Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.B., IV.C., or 

IV.D., or a combination of all of them. 

The NRC opted not to amend 

§ 50.47(b)(4) because it is applicable to 

both onsite and offsite emergency plans, 

whereas Appendix E is applicable to an 

applicant or licensee—the entity 

responsible for making emergency 

declarations. 

The NRC also considered providing 

either a performance criterion or a 

capability criterion. Similar to the 

notification timeliness criterion in 

Appendix E, Section IV.D.3., in which 

the NRC requires licensees to be capable 

of notifying responsible State and local 

governmental agencies within 15 

minutes after declaring an emergency, 

the NRC opted to propose a capability 

criterion, rather than an inflexible 

performance criterion. This would allow 

licensees some degree of flexibility 

during an actual radiological emergency 

in addressing extenuating circumstances 

that may arise when an emergency 

declaration may need to be delayed in 

the interest of performing plant 

operations that are more urgently 

needed to protect public health and 

safety. These delays would be found 

acceptable if they did not deny State 

and local authorities the opportunity to 

implement actions to protect the public 

health or safety under their emergency 

plans and the cause of the delay was not 

reasonably within the licensee’s ability 

to foresee and prevent. Based upon 

these considerations, the NRC is 

proposing to revise Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.C. to address this issue by 

providing a capability criterion. These 

proposed changes are discussed in 

Section V of this document. 

3. Emergency Operations Facility— 

Performance-Based Approach 

Several nuclear power plant licensees 

have submitted requests for NRC 

approval to combine EOFs for plants 

they operate within a State or in 

multiple States into a consolidated EOF. 

In some instances, the consolidated EOF 

is located at a substantial distance from 

one or more of the plant sites and is no 

longer considered a ‘‘near-site’’ facility, 

as required by §§ 50.34(f)(2)(xxv), 

50.47(b)(3), 50.47(d)(1), 50.54(gg)(1)(i), 

and Appendix E, Sections IV.E.8., 

IV.E.9.c., and IV.E.9.d. Guidance 

documents, including NUREG–0696, 

‘‘Functional Criteria for Emergency 

Response Facilities,’’ and NUREG–0737, 

‘‘Clarification of TMI Action Plan 

Requirements,’’ Supplement 1, 

‘‘Requirements for Emergency Response 

Capabilities,’’ that provide criteria for 

establishing and locating emergency 

response facilities also refer to the EOF 

as a near-site facility. However, the 

regulations and guidance do not 

explicitly define the term ‘‘near-site.’’ 

This regulatory structure has resulted in 

confusion for licensees with reasonable 

technical bases for moving or 

consolidating EOFs that would no 

longer be considered ‘‘near-site’’ and led 

to requests for exceptions to NRC 

guidance and exemptions from NRC 

regulations to move or consolidate their 

EOFs. 

In addition, neither regulations nor 

guidance documents address the 

capabilities and functional requirements 

for a consolidated EOF, such as 

capabilities for handling simultaneous 

events at two or more sites, or having 

provisions for the NRC and offsite 

officials to relocate to a facility nearer 

the site if they desire. Thus, licensees 

have been uncertain about when they 

need to submit requests for exceptions 

or exemptions, which alternative 

approaches to existing EOF distance and 

other facility criteria may be acceptable, 

and what additional capabilities they 

need to address for a consolidated EOF. 

A regulatory mechanism (§ 50.54(q)) is 

already in place that allows licensees to 

make changes to their emergency plans 

without prior Commission approval 

when certain conditions are met. This 

mechanism could be applied to 

consolidation of EOFs if clearer criteria 

were established. In the absence of clear 

criteria, several recent licensee requests 

to consolidate EOFs have been 

evaluated by the NRC staff and reviewed 

by the Commission on a case-by-case 

basis. 

Each nuclear power plant site is 

required to have an EOF where the 

licensee provides overall management 

of its resources in response to an 

emergency and coordinates emergency 

response activities with Federal, State, 

local, and tribal agencies. The original 

EOF siting criteria called for the facility 

to be located near the nuclear power 

reactor site and imposed a 20-mile 

upper limit (later modified by the 

Commission to 25 miles) for the 

distance between the site and the EOF. 

This upper limit was generally 

considered to be the maximum distance 

from the nuclear power reactor site 

within which face-to-face 

communications between the licensee, 

offsite officials, and NRC staff could be 

facilitated, and which also permitted the 

timely briefing and debriefing of 

personnel going to and from the site. 

However, advances in computer and 

communication technology after the 

original EOF siting criteria were 

established now allow EOF functions to 

be effectively performed independent of 

distance from the site. Computer-based 

systems allow plant parameter, 

meteorological data, and radiological 

information for multiple sites to be 

collected, analyzed, trended, and 

displayed in a remotely located facility. 

Data and voice communications 

between the EOF and other onsite/ 

offsite emergency response facilities can 

be addressed through a variety of 

independent systems, such as 

microwave, telephone, internet, 


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intranet, and radio, which provide a 

high degree of availability and 

reliability. 

Furthermore, nuclear utility 

consolidation has resulted in initiatives 

to standardize fleet emergency plans, 

use consolidated EOFs, and staff EOFs 

by designated corporate personnel. 

Standardized plans, implementing 

procedures, and accident assessment 

tools, such as a common dose projection 

model, allow emergency responders in a 

consolidated facility to effectively 

perform their functions for multiple 

sites, even if the EOF is not a near-site 

facility. Consolidated facilities eliminate 

the need to duplicate work space, 

displays, communication networks, and 

other capabilities for each site. 

Consolidated facilities can also be 

located at or near corporate offices 

where nuclear support personnel 

designated to fill EOF positions can 

respond more quickly. 

The Commission, in the SRM to 

SECY–04–0236, ‘‘Southern Nuclear 

Operating Company’s Proposal to 

Establish a Common Emergency 

Operating Facility at Its Corporate 

Headquarters,’’ dated February 23, 2005, 

directed the NRC staff to consider 

resolving these issues through 

rulemaking. In that SRM, the 

Commission approved the proposal for 

a consolidated EOF for three nuclear 

power reactor sites operated by 

Southern Nuclear Operating Company 

at the company’s corporate 

headquarters. The Commission also 

instructed the NRC staff to consider 

making ‘‘the requirements for EOFs 

more performance-based to allow other 

multi-plant licensees to consolidate 

their EOFs, if those licensees can 

demonstrate their emergency response 

strategies will adequately cope with an 

emergency at any one of the associated 

plants.’’ 

To address the EOF ‘‘near-site’’ and 

consolidation issues, the NRC 

considered maintaining EOF distance 

criteria as guidance only and to specify 

other EOF criteria in guidance rather 

than in the regulations. However, 

providing these criteria as guidance 

only would not ensure that future 

applicants would follow the criteria. 

Thus, an EOF could be located within 

10 miles of a site with no backup facility 

provided, or could be located beyond 25 

miles of a site without providing a 

facility closer to a site for NRC site team 

and offsite response personnel. An EOF 

could be implemented without meeting 

the proposed performance-based 

criteria. A licensee could relocate or 

consolidate an existing approved facility 

without meeting all or some of the 

criteria and without prior NRC approval 

as long as the licensee determined that 

the provisions of § 50.54(q) were met. 

Under these circumstances, an EOF 

could be implemented that may not 

provide all of the capabilities that the 

NRC believes are necessary for such a 

facility to be fully effective. Therefore, 

the NRC determined that this option 

would not be appropriate. 

The NRC also considered revising the 

regulations (and providing associated 

performance-based criteria) to allow an 

EOF to be located more than 25 miles 

from a nuclear power reactor site 

without prior NRC approval only in 

situations involving the consolidation of 

EOFs for multiple sites operated by the 

same licensee. However, the NRC 

determined that excluding licensees 

from the ability to locate an EOF for a 

single site, or to co-locate an EOF for 

two or more nuclear power plants 

operated by different licensees, at 

distances beyond 25 miles from a site 

without prior NRC approval would be 

unnecessarily restrictive. The capability 

of existing EOFs located more than 25 

miles from a site to function as effective 

emergency response facilities has been 

demonstrated in numerous exercises 

and several actual events, indicating 

that the distance between the EOF and 

a site is not a critical factor in 

determining the overall effectiveness of 

the facility. The siting of a single-site or 

co-located EOF at greater distances from 

a nuclear power plant may also offer 

benefits to licensees and offsite officials 

in terms of increased staffing flexibility 

and reduced response times. Licensees 

may be able to use additional employees 

as EOF emergency responders (who 

would otherwise be unavailable due to 

long response times) when the EOF is 

located closer to their workplace, such 

as a corporate office, or areas where 

these employees reside. Offsite officials 

that report to the EOF may have shorter 

response times when the EOF can be 

located in the vicinity of government 

facilities, or they may be able to colocate their emergency operations at the 

EOF. For these reasons, the NRC 

believes that the options for EOF 

locations should be available to all 

licensees as long as the EOF would meet 

the applicable functional requirements 

associated with consolidated EOFs 

previously approved by the NRC and 

licensees would provide a facility closer 

to the site in situations where the EOF 

is more than 25 miles from a site. This 

approach would ensure that an EOF 

would have the capabilities necessary to 

be fully effective regardless of its 

location with respect to the nuclear 

power plant site, and that provisions 

would be in place for a facility closer to 

the site for use by NRC site team and 

offsite responders. Therefore, the NRC is 

proposing changes to NRC regulations 

(and associated guidance) so the criteria 

for all EOFs would reflect a 

performance-based approach. The NRC 

is also proposing revisions to 

regulations (and guidance) to remove 

the references to an EOF as a ‘‘near-site’’ 

facility and to incorporate specific EOF 

distance criteria into the regulations, as 

discussed in Section V of this 

document. 

In a conforming change, § 52.79(a)(17) 

would be revised to make clear that 

combined license applications need not 

address the requirement governing 

TSCs, OSCs and EOFs in 

§ 50.34(f)(2)(xxv). Instead, the 

requirements in Appendix E, Section 

IV.E.8.a.(i) would apply. That section 

would accurately reflect the need for the 

combined license application to address 

an EOF; by contrast § 50.34(f)(2)(xxv) 

only requires construction permits (and 

not combined licenses) to address an 

EOF. The NRC considered, as an 

alternative to modifying § 52.79(a)(17), 

correcting § 50.34(f)(xxv) to remove the 

language limiting the requirement to 

address an EOF to construction permit 

applications. The NRC decided not to 

propose that approach, but instead have 

the general requirements for EP, 

including Appendix E, apply to 

combined license applications by virtue 

of § 52.79(a)(21). 

4. Evacuation Time Estimate Updating 

EP regulations at § 50.47(b)(10) and 

Part 50, Appendix E, Sections II.G., III., 

and IV. currently require nuclear power 

plant operating license applicants to 

provide evacuation time estimates 

(ETEs) for the public located in the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ. These 

ETEs are used in the planning process 

to identify potential challenges to 

efficient evacuation, such as traffic 

constraints, and, in the event of an 

accident, to assist the onsite and offsite 

emergency response managers in 

making appropriate decisions regarding 

the protection of the public. The current 

regulations do not require any review or 

revision of ETEs following the initial 

licensing of the plant. Although some 

licensees do revise ETEs based on 

updated census data, the use of ETEs in 

evacuation planning is inconsistent and 

they currently do not affect the 

development of public protective action 

strategies. 

Nuclear power plant operating license 

applicants are responsible for 

developing the ETE analysis for their 

respective sites. They submit the 

analysis to the NRC in support of their 

emergency plans, usually as a standVerDate Nov<24>2008 14:35 May 15, 2009 Jkt 217001 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\18MYP2.SGM 18MYP2

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alone document. Applicants include the 

results of the ETE analysis in the onsite 

emergency plan, typically in the 

emergency plan implementing 

procedures for protective action 

recommendations. The ETEs are also in 

the offsite emergency plans for the State 

and local governments within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ. The NRC has 

traditionally taken the lead in reviewing 

the ETE analyses with the assistance of 

a traffic expert contractor, especially for 

contested licensing cases involving ETE 

contentions. 

In NUREG/CR–6953, Vol. 1, ‘‘Review 

of NUREG–0654 Supplement 3, Criteria 

for Protective Action Recommendations 

for Severe Accidents,’’ the NRC 

presented the results of a study of its 

protective action recommendation 

guidance. The NRC concluded in the 

study that ETE information is important 

in developing public protective action 

strategies and should be used to identify 

improvements to evacuation plans. The 

effectiveness of protective action 

recommendation strategies is sensitive 

to the ETE, and therefore, it is important 

to reduce the uncertainties associated 

with ETEs. Improving the accuracy and 

quality of ETE values would help 

licensees recommend and offsite 

officials determine the most appropriate 

protective action. For instance, in the 

study, the NRC determined that for 

some scenarios sheltering may be more 

protective than immediate evacuation if 

the evacuation time is longer than a few 

hours, depending on site-specific 

factors. Further, the NRC concluded that 

the effect of population change upon 

evacuation times should be understood 

by OROs and incorporated into 

protective action strategies. 

To address this issue, the NRC 

considered amending the current 

regulations to require licensees to assess 

changes to the EPZ infrastructure and 

population. The NRC believed that 

changes in infrastructure, or addition of 

a large subdivision to the EPZ, could 

also impact the ETE. The NRC consulted 

with Sandia National Laboratories 

(SNL), who are experts in emergency 

evacuations and have researched and 

drafted several NRC studies related to 

evacuation (e.g., NUREG/CR–6863, 

‘‘Development of Evacuation Time 

Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ 

NUREG/CR–6864, ‘‘Identification and 

Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency 

Evacuations,’’ and NUREG/CR–6953). 

Based upon their expert opinion, SNL 

confirmed that the major contributor to 

changes in ETE is changes in 

population. Although changes in 

infrastructure can impact the ETE, 

population is the more important factor. 

The planning and budget cycle for 

infrastructure projects is measured in 

years, as indicated in GAO–03–764T, 

‘‘Testimony Before the Subcommittee 

on Transportation, Treasury and 

Independent Agencies, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives, ‘Federal Aid Highways: 

Cost and Oversight of Major Highway 

and Bridge Projects—Issues and 

Options.’ ’’ Within the years it takes to 

plan, budget, and construct highway 

infrastructure, the opportunity exists to 

include such improvements in the ETE 

as planned or constructed, based on the 

timing of the infrastructure, whereas 

significant population changes can 

occur over shorter periods of time. 

Therefore, with population changes as 

the major contributor and infrastructure 

changes as an enveloped contributor, 

the NRC determined that simplifying 

the regulations to explicitly require 

assessment of ETEs based on population 

changes was adequate for updates to 

ETEs. In the case of an infrastructure 

change due to a catastrophic event, the 

NRC already has regulations in place to 

ensure that licensees consult with OROs 

to consider the impact of offsite events 

on evacuation routes and ETEs. 

The NRC also considered using 

guidance as a means to solve the 

problem of the lack of specificity in 

regulations directing applicants and 

licensees on the periodicity for updating 

ETEs. Although the availability of more 

detailed guidance would provide 

applicants and licensees with the tools 

to better update their ETEs, this option 

would not provide the regulatory means 

for enforcing the desired frequency of 

ETE updates and consistency of ETE 

determinations. 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

§ 50.47(b)(10) and Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV. to require the periodic 

review of ETEs. The NRC considered 

codifying that all population changes 

result in updates to ETEs, but 

determined that population changes of 

less than 10 percent would not 

significantly impact the ETE. The basis 

for establishing a requirement to update 

ETEs when the population has changed 

by at least 10 percent is derived from 

the U.S. Department of Transportation 

‘‘Highway Capacity Manual’’ (HCM), 

which contains analysis techniques for 

determining the capacity of a roadway, 

(i.e., Level of Service (LOS)). The 

analysis applies a series of curves called 

the ‘‘Speed Flow Curves and LOS for 

Basic Freeway Segments’’ to roadways 

and determines the LOS for a given 

traffic volume. The analysis shows that 

traffic volume is a direct indicator of the 

population involved in an evacuation 

given the roadway system in the area of 

concern. The HCM analysis shows that 

an increase in 10 percent of vehicles on 

roadways that are near capacity (such as 

would be the case in an evacuation) 

likely creates a decrease of one level of 

roadway service (i.e., from Level D to 

Level E). This decrease in roadway 

service results in slower moving traffic 

and longer ETEs. The decrease in LOS 

is not apparent for a vehicle, or 

population, increase of less than 10 

percent. 

Additionally, the NRC believes that 

the 10 percent threshold would balance 

potential inadequacies and burdens. 

Based on the HCM analysis, SNL 

research, and NRC experience, not 

requiring licensees to assess their ETEs 

until the population changes by more 

than 15 percent or 20 percent would 

allow too large a population change 

before assessing the impact on ETEs, 

thereby potentially reducing the 

effectiveness of the ETEs. At the same 

time, requiring an assessment of 

licensee ETEs for a change in 

population of less than 10 percent 

would require licensees to make 

assessments when the change in 

population would not likely have a 

meaningful impact on the ETEs. Thus 

the NRC believes that a population 

change of 10 percent is the adequate 

threshold for requiring an assessment of 

licensees’ ETEs. 

5. Amended Emergency Plan Change 

Process 

Applicants for operating licenses 

under Part 50 for nuclear power 

reactors, research reactors, and certain 

fuel facilities, and early site permits (as 

applicable) and combined licenses 

under Part 52 for nuclear power plants, 

are required by regulation to develop 

emergency plans that meet the 

requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 

and, for nuclear power reactor license 

applicants, the standards of § 50.47(b). 

After the facility license is issued, the 

holder of the license is required by 

§ 50.54(q) to follow and maintain in 

effect emergency plans which meet the 

requirements of Appendix E and, for 

nuclear power reactor licensees, the 

standards of § 50.47(b). Currently, 

§ 50.54(q) also provides a process under 

which a licensee may make changes to 

its approved emergency plans without 

prior NRC approval provided the 

changes would not decrease the 

effectiveness of the emergency plans as 

approved and the plans, as modified, 

would continue to meet applicable 

regulations. However, the NRC has 

determined that the language of 

§ 50.54(q) does not clearly describe the 

requirements the NRC intended to 

impose on licensees, leading to 


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confusion and inefficiencies in 

implementation. 

A licensee must follow and maintain 

in effect its emergency plan if the NRC 

is to continue to find that there is 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency as stipulated by 

§ 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The EP regulations 

generally refer to the onsite emergency 

plan as a stand-alone document. 

However, emergency plans rely upon 

facility capabilities, equipment, and 

resources that are typically outside of 

the control of the licensee’s emergency 

planning organization. The NRC has 

identified several occurrences in which 

licensee personnel outside of the 

emergency planning group have 

changed the status of capabilities and 

resources under their cognizance 

without considering the impact on the 

effectiveness of the emergency plan or 

without alerting the emergency 

planning group. 

Several enforcement actions in the 

past few years have been associated 

with EALs being rendered ineffective by 

configuration changes made to 

instruments referenced in an EAL 

without the change being reflected in 

the EAL, or without a compensatory 

action being put into place. Examples 

include modifications to installed 

seismic instruments that eliminated the 

direct readout of acceleration needed for 

classifying a seismic event and changes 

in reactor vessel level criteria (in a 

boiling water reactor) being made 

without a conforming change being 

made to the EAL. In another finding, 

concrete barriers installed in a securityinitiated change blocked a site access 

road required by the emergency plan to 

be used for site evacuation. Another 

licensee failed to provide adequate 

oversight on utility (external to the 

plant) personnel maintaining the site’s 

ANS, resulting in degradation of that 

system and subsequent enforcement 

actions. Based on its experience in 

reviewing root cause analyses and 

corrective actions associated with 

inspection findings, the NRC believes 

that an underlying cause of these 

occurrences is often that the licensees’ 

configuration control programs may not 

adequately consider the impact of 

configuration changes on the 

effectiveness of the emergency plan. 

The NRC has determined that the 

phrase ‘‘maintain in effect’’ in § 50.54(q) 

is not adequately clear in conveying the 

NRC expectation that an effective 

emergency plan also requires 

maintaining the various capabilities and 

resources relied on in the plan. The 

phrase ‘‘maintain in effect,’’ as applied 

to emergency plans in § 50.54(q), has 

two senses: the first is that the plans are 

in force; the second is that the plans can 

achieve the desired result of providing 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency. Accordingly, the NRC is 

proposing to amend § 50.54(q) to clarify 

that the regulatory intent is the latter 

sense by requiring licensees to follow 

and ‘‘maintain the effectiveness’’ of 

their approved emergency plans. 

Currently, § 50.54(q) also provides a 

process under which a licensee may 

make changes to its approved 

emergency plan without prior NRC 

approval provided the changes would 

not decrease the effectiveness of the 

emergency plan as approved and the 

plan, as modified, would continue to 

meet applicable regulations. Prior NRC 

approval is required for any change that 

could decrease the effectiveness of the 

emergency plan. The NRC and licensees 

have experienced significant difficulties 

in implementing this portion of 

§ 50.54(q) because the current rule 

language does not define what 

constitutes a decrease in effectiveness of 

an emergency plan nor does it identify 

the type of changes that would 

constitute a decrease in effectiveness of 

the plan. The lack of clear evaluation 

criteria has resulted in regulatory 

inefficiencies, such as licensees 

submitting for review changes that do 

not rise to the level requiring prior NRC 

approval and enforcement actions due 

to licensees failing to submit changes 

that were later deemed to warrant such 

a review. A large fraction of the 

enforcement actions in the EP 

Cornerstone are attributable to these 

findings. 

The NRC has attempted to resolve this 

issue through the publication of 

regulatory guidance. In 1998, the NRC 

issued EPPOS–4, ‘‘Emergency Plan and 

Implementing Procedure Changes,’’ to 

provide guidance to NRC inspectors 

regarding their review of licensees’ 

emergency plan changes. In 2004, the 

NEI submitted two white papers 

proposing a definition of ‘‘decrease in 

effectiveness’’ for NRC consideration. 

The NRC could not reach consensus 

with NEI and thus, did not endorse the 

NEI guidance. In 2005, the NRC 

withdrew EPPOS–4 and issued RIS 

2005–02, ‘‘Clarifying the Process for 

Making Emergency Plan Changes,’’ 

dated February 14, 2005, to (1) clarify 

the meaning of ‘‘decrease in 

effectiveness,’’ (2) clarify the process for 

making changes to emergency plans, 

and (3) provide some examples of 

changes that are not decreases in 

effectiveness. Although RIS 2005–02 

provides useful guidance, the NRC and 

NEI have continued to discuss ways to 

improve the § 50.54(q) change process, 

including the use of a regulatory 

framework parallel to that of 

§ 50.54(a)(3) for quality assurance 

programs, § 50.54(p)(2) for safeguards 

plans, and § 50.59, ‘‘Changes, Tests, and 

Experiments.’’ 

During the development of the 

proposed rule language, a concern was 

raised regarding the process to be used 

by the NRC for reviewing proposed 

emergency plan changes. Section 

50.54(q) directs the licensee to submit 

such changes under the provisions of 

§ 50.4, which provides the procedures 

for making certain submissions to the 

NRC. Some confusion exists as to 

whether all proposed emergency plan 

changes submitted under § 50.4 would 

result in a reduction in effectiveness 

and whether Commission review of 

such submissions is necessary. The NRC 

proposes to clarify that the license 

amendment process is the correct 

process to use when reviewing 

submittals involving a proposed 

emergency plan change that the licensee 

has determined constitutes a reduction 

in effectiveness of the plan. The 

proposed rule language addresses this 

clarification. (See Section V of this 

document for further discussion.) 

The NRC also considered other 

options for addressing the § 50.54(q) 

problems. Using a voluntary industry 

initiative was rejected because the NRC 

and NEI have yet to agree on the best 

approach to resolve the problems. 

Issuing more regulatory guidance was 

rejected because that approach has been 

tried but has not resolved the problems. 

The NRC believes that an amendment to 

the regulations, supplemented as 

necessary by regulatory guidance, 

would be the best course of action and 

would ensure that (1) the effectiveness 

of the emergency plans would be 

maintained, (2) changes to the approved 

emergency plan would be properly 

evaluated, and (3) any change that 

reduces the effectiveness of the plan 

would be reviewed by the NRC prior to 

implementation. The NRC proposes to 

issue regulatory guidance concurrently 

with the implementation of the 

amended rule language and would 

consider stakeholder-developed and 

-proposed guidance as an alternative to 

NRC-developed guidance. 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

§ 50.54(q) to replace the existing 

language. Conforming changes have 

been proposed in Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.B. The NRC also believes that 

the proposed rule changes would 

promote consistent and predictable 

implementation and enforcement, while 


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minimizing inefficient and ineffective 

use of licensee and NRC staff resources. 

6. Removal of Completed One-Time 

Requirements 

The NRC is proposing to eliminate 

several regulatory provisions that 

required holders of licenses to take 

certain one-time actions to improve the 

state of EP following the Three Mile 

Island incident in 1979. These actions 

are complete and the requirements are 

no longer binding on any current 

licensee. Corresponding requirements 

for license applicants are provided in 

§§ 50.33 and 50.34. 

The requirements proposed to be 

removed are: 

(1) Section 50.54(r), which requires 

licensees of research or test reactors to 

submit emergency plans to the NRC for 

approval by September 7, 1982, and, for 

the facilities with an authorized power 

level of less than 2 MW thermal, by 

November 3, 1982. There is no longer a 

need for this provision because this 

requirement has expired. The NRC 

proposes to delete this requirement and 

designate the section as ‘‘reserved.’’ 

(2) Section 50.54(s)(1), which requires 

nuclear power plant licensees to submit 

State and local governmental emergency 

plans within 60 days of the November 

3, 1980, effective date of the rule that 

added § 50.54(s)(1) to Part 50, and that 

date has elapsed. However, that portion 

of § 50.54(s)(1) that discusses the size of 

the EPZs would be retained. There is no 

longer a need for this provision because 

this requirement has expired. However, 

the rule language regarding EPZ size 

and footnotes 1 and 2 regarding those 

EPZs remain applicable. The NRC 

proposes to delete the obsolete text 

while retaining the current language 

regarding EPZs and footnotes 1 and 2. 

(3) Section 50.54(s)(2)(i), which 

requires the nuclear power plant 

licensee, State, and local emergency 

response plans be implemented by April 

1, 1981. There is no longer a need for 

this provision because this requirement 

has expired. The NRC proposes to delete 

§ 50.54(s)(2)(i), designating the section 

as ‘‘reserved.’’ 

(4) Section 50.54(u), which requires 

nuclear power reactor licensees to 

submit, within 60 days of the November 

3, 1980, effective date of the rule that 

added § 50.54(u) to Part 50, to the NRC 

plans for coping with emergencies that 

meet the standards in § 50.47(b) and the 

requirements of Appendix E. There is 

no longer a need for this provision 

because this requirement has expired. 

The NRC proposes to delete this 

requirement and designate the section 

as ‘‘reserved.’’ 

The NRC is proposing to eliminate 

these completed one-time requirements 

in the interest of regulatory clarity. 

Eliminating these requirements would 

not relax any currently effective 

regulatory requirement and would cause 

no regulatory burden on any current or 

future licensee or applicant. 

III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the 

Proposed Rule 

A. Public and Stakeholder Meetings 

As part of its comprehensive 

assessment of the NRC’s EP regulations 

and guidance and development of this 

proposed rule, the NRC staff met with 

internal and external stakeholders, 

including FEMA management, on 

numerous occasions including the 

following: 

1. Meeting with NRC regional EP 

inspectors in January 2005 and January 

2006; 

2. Meetings with State, local, and 

Tribal governments and nuclear power 

industry representatives at the National 

Radiological Emergency Preparedness 

(NREP) Conference on April 11–14, 

2005, March 27–30, 2006, and April 7– 

10, 2008; 

3. Public meeting with interested 

stakeholders on August 31 and 

September 1, 2005; 

4. Public meeting with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on 

May 19, 2006; 

5. Public meeting with the NEI/ 

nuclear power industry representatives 

on July 19, 2006; 

6. Regional meetings with State and 

local representatives and nuclear power 

industry working groups that started in 

2007; 

7. Regulatory Information Conference 

on March 16, 2007; 

8. Public meeting with external 

stakeholders on March 5, 2008; 

9. Meeting with nuclear power 

industry representatives at the 2008 NEI 

EP and Communications Forum; and 

10. Public meeting with external 

stakeholders on July 8, 2008. 

The NRC also met routinely with 

representatives of FEMA to coordinate 

issues of mutual interest and to keep 

them informed of NRC EP activities. 

These meetings allowed NRC and FEMA 

to collaborate on rulemaking and 

guidance issues, and to ensure 

alignment and regulatory consistency. 

In addition, FEMA attended the NRC 

public meetings regarding the NRC’s EP 

rulemaking. 

B. Public and Stakeholder Comments 

Received 

At the April 11, 2005, NREP 

Conference, the NRC and FEMA 

conducted a workshop with 

stakeholders. The workshop covered a 

broad range of EP topics. Unanswered 

stakeholder comments and questions 

were recorded by NRC staff, and the 

NRC and FEMA responded to those 

questions and comments in ‘‘Discussion 

of NREP ‘Parking Lot’ Items.’’ 

The NRC conducted a public meeting 

on August 31–September 1, 2005, to 

obtain input regarding EP requirements 

and guidance for commercial nuclear 

power plants. The first day of meetings 

involved a roundtable discussion of 

topics related to the review of EP 

regulations and guidance. During the 

second day, the NRC staff and 

stakeholders addressed the ‘‘Discussion 

of NREP ‘Parking Lot’ Items’’ from the 

April 2005 NREP conference and other 

stakeholder comments and questions. 

The NRC requested comments in 

writing before the August 31–September 

1, 2005, meeting and also received 

comments at the meeting. In addition to 

comments transcribed from the 2-day 

public meeting, the NRC accepted 

written comment submissions until 

October 31, 2005. 

The NRC and FEMA responded to 

generic comments from the August 31– 

September 1, 2005, meeting and 

comments received thereafter in 

‘‘Summary and Analysis of Comments 

(Received Between August 31 and 

October 31, 2005).’’ Site-specific 

comments from the public meeting were 

addressed in ‘‘Summary and Analysis of 

Site-Specific Comments (Received 

Between August 31 and October 31, 

2005).’’ 

The NRC also received comments on 

the review of the EP regulations and 

guidance for nuclear power plants at 

public meetings with stakeholders on 

May 19, 2006, and July 19, 2006. The 

May 19, 2006, meeting was transcribed. 

The NRC staff informed the meeting 

participants that their comments would 

be presented to the Commission in a 

September 2006 SECY paper. These 

comments were provided to the 

Commission in an attachment to SECY– 

06–0200 and, like the stakeholder 

comments from 2005, were used to 

inform the staff’s recommendations to 

the Commission in SECY–06–0200. 

The NRC received three comment 

letters that focused on the draft 

preliminary rule language posted for 

comment on http://www.regulations.gov 

on February 29, 2008. One comment 

letter was submitted by the State of 

Pennsylvania, one was submitted by 

NEI, and one was submitted by the 

Union of Concerned Scientists on behalf 

of several NGOs. A detailed discussion 

of the public comments and the 

Commission’s responses is contained in 


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a separate document (see Section IX of 

this document). The NRC also received 

comments on issues that are outside the 

scope of this proposed rule and on 

regulatory provisions that are not 

proposed to be revised in this proposed 

rule. The NRC determined that these 

comments did not support changing the 

scope of the proposed rule. 

IV. Specific Request for Comments 

In addition to the general invitation to 

submit comments on the proposed rule, 

the NRC also requests comments on the 

following questions: 

1. Inclusion of National Incident 

Management System/Incident 

Command System in EP programs. The 

NRC is considering the need to integrate 

the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS) and more specifically, 

the Incident Command System (ICS), 

into licensee EP programs. On February 

28, 2003, President Bush issued 

Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 5 (HSPD–5), which directed 

DHS to develop and administer a NIMS. 

NIMS/ICS provides a consistent 

nationwide template to enable all 

government, private-sector, and NGOs 

to work together during domestic 

incidents. HSPD–5 requires Federal 

departments and agencies to make the 

adoption of NIMS by State and local 

organizations a condition for Federal 

preparedness assistance. Nongovernment entities, such as nuclear 

power plant licensees, are not required 

to adopt NIMS. More information about 

NIMS and ICS may be found at http:// 

www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ 

index.shtm. 

The NRC has observed coordination 

challenges during hostile action drills 

and observed discussions in some of the 

focus groups discussing the FEMA REP 

Program Manual with respect to the use 

of the ICS between onsite and offsite 

responders. It is likely that these issues 

will be addressed through lessons 

learned in drills and other training, but 

consistency across all nuclear plant sites 

may be an issue. The NRC is seeking 

comments on whether the NRC should 

issue regulations requiring that 

licensees train responders and 

implement the ICS to improve interface 

with offsite response organizations. 

2. Shift staffing and augmentation. 

Licensees are required by § 50.47(b)(2) 

and Appendix E to Part 50 to maintain 

an ERO comprising both an on-shift 

emergency organization and an 

organization capable of augmenting the 

shift in a timely manner. However, the 

regulations state that this shift staffing 

for emergency response must be 

‘‘adequate’’ without providing a 

definition of ‘‘adequate’’ and are silent 

with regard to what constitutes a timely 

augmentation. NUREG–0654 defines the 

measure of adequacy and divides the 

ERO augmentation into 30-minute and 

60-minute responders. However, the 

guidance is not succinct, resulting in 

inconsistencies in ERO shift staffing and 

augmentation strategies among nuclear 

power reactor licensees. 

In SECY–06–0200, the NRC staff 

identified shift staffing as an area of 

concern, noting the challenge in 

evaluating the adequacy of licensee shift 

staffing because of the lack of clarity 

regarding the functional requirements 

for emergency response. To address this 

issue, the NRC considered a revision to 

its regulations to establish functional 

requirements for the emergency 

responders instead of focusing on 

specific emergency responder positions. 

The NRC also realized that the 

functional requirements may be 

dependant upon site- and scenariospecific parameters. Consequently, the 

NRC attempted to design a performancebased system for identifying shift 

staffing needs and intended to include 

it in the development of a broader EP 

performance-based regulatory regimen. 

As a result, the shift staffing element 

was no longer considered in this 

rulemaking effort. 

However, some stakeholders continue 

to express concern regarding emergency 

response organization staffing. The NRC 

recognizes that there is merit in 

enhancing the regulations to provide 

clear direction regarding adequate 

staffing, such as achieving regulatory 

stability through industry consistency 

and accommodating technological 

advancements. Toward that end, the 

NRC requests comments on whether the 

NRC should enhance its current 

regulations to be more explicit in the 

number of ERO staff necessary for 

nuclear power plant emergencies. When 

responding to this question, please 

consider the following draft staffing 

table. The table provides proposed staff 

functions and minimum staffing levels 

for the on-shift and augmenting 

emergency response organization. The 

table modifies the original guidance of 

NUREG–0654, Table B–1 with lessons 

learned from several years of EP 

program inspections by the NRC. 

On-shift 1 Augment w/in 60 min.1 Augment w/in 90 min.1 2

Emergency Director (1) (Shift Manager): Emergency Director (1) (TSC): Emergency Director (1) (EOF): 

• Responsible for overall ERO Command 

& Control until relieved.

• Responsible for overall ERO Command 

& Control until relieved. 

• Responsible for overall ERO Command 

& Control. 

• Responsible for approving event classifications and PARs until relieved.• Responsible for approving event classifications and PARs until relieved. • Responsible for approving PARs. 

Communicator (1): 

• Responsible for communicating event 

classifications and PARs to offsite agencies, including the NRC. 

Communicator (1) (TSC) [In addition to the 

one already on-shift]: 

• Assume responsibility for either ORO or 

NRC communications from on-shift 

Communicator. 

Communicator (1) (EOF): 

• Assumes responsibility for communicating PARs, as well as plant updates, to the NRC (HPN). 

Qualified Health Physics Personnel (2): 3

• Responsible for providing Health Physics coverage to the on-shift staff. 

Site Radiation Protection Coordinator (SRPC) 

(1) (TSC): 

• Responsible for evaluating and assessing plant and offsite data in the development of onsite protective actions and 

offsite PARs. 

• Responsible for recommending onsite 

and offsite PARs to the Emergency Director. 

• Responsible for all Radiation Protection 

activities, including Field Team direction. 

Site Radiation Protection Director (SRPD) (1) 

(EOF): 

• Responsible for evaluating and assessing plant and offsite data in the development of offsite PARs. 

• Responsible for recommending offsite 

PARs to the Emergency Director. 

• Responsible for Field Team direction. 


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On-shift 1 Augment w/in 60 min.1 Augment w/in 90 min.1 2

Dose Projections (1): 

• Responsible for providing dose projections to the Emergency Director for PAR 

determinations, until relieved. 

Additional Qualified Health Physics Technicians [In addition to the personnel already 

on-shift] (OSC): 

• (4) Responsible for providing Health 

Physics coverage for OSC personnel in 

the plant. 

• (2) Responsible for plant surveys. 

Additional Qualified Health Physics Technicians [In addition to the personnel already 

on-site] (OSC): 

• (2) Responsible for providing health 

physics support for the emergency response organization. 

• (1) Responsible for controlling dosimetry issuance and maintaining plant access control for radiologically controlled 

areas. 

EAL Classifications/PARs (1): 4 Dose Projections (1) (TSC): Dose Projections (1) (EOF): 

• Responsible for evaluating plant conditions and dose projections and recommending event classifications and PARs 

to the Emergency Director, until relieved.

• Responsible for providing dose projections to the SRPC for PAR determinations. • Responsible for providing dose projections to the SRPD for PAR determinations. 

Core/Thermal Hydraulics Eng (1): 4

• Responsible for evaluating reactor conditions and providing input to the Emergency Director until relieved. 

Event Classifications (1) (TSC): 

• Responsible for evaluating plant conditions and recommending event classifications to the Emergency Director. 

Off-Site Field Team B: 

• (1) Qualified Radiation Monitor responsible for assessing environ radiation/ 

contamination and providing input to 

SRPC. Also responsible for providing 

Health Physics coverage for team. 

• (1) Driver responsible for transportation. 

Fire Brigade as Defined by Tech Specs: 

The Fire Brigade is controlled by the site-specific Technical Specifications. 

Core/Thermal Hydraulics/PRA Engineer (1) 

(TSC): 

• Responsible for evaluating reactor conditions and providing input to the Emergency Director. 

• Responsible for evaluating plant system 

status and providing PRA input to the 

Emergency Director. 

OSC Supervisors (4): 

• (1) Electrical: Responsible for supervising OSC activities related to electrical equipment. 

• (1) Mechanical: Responsible for supervising OSC activities related to mechanical equipment. 

• (1) I&C: Responsible for supervising 

OSC activities related to IC equipment. 

• (1) HP: Responsible for supervising 

OSC activities related to radiation protection. 

Ops Crew as Defined by Tech Specs: 

Number of Operators on-shift is controlled by 

the site-specific Technical Specifications. 

Maintenance (OSC) (1 electrician, 1 mechanic; 1 I&C): 

• (1) Electrician: Responsible for providing electrical support for ECCS 

equipment, event mitigation, and equipment repair. 

IT Lead (1) (TSC): 

• For sites with digital I&C: Responsible 

for assisting in ensuring that the digital 

I&C equipment operates properly. 

• (1) Mechanic: Responsible for providing 

mechanical support for ECCS equipment, event mitigation, and equipment 

repair. 

• (1) I&C Technician: Responsible for 

providing assist with logic manipulation, 

for providing I&C support for event mitigation and equipment repair, and for 

support of digital I&C if applicable. 

On-Site Field Team (1 qualified radiation monitor and 1 driver): 

• (1) Radiation Monitor responsible for 

assessing environ radiation/contamination and providing input to SRPC. Also 

responsible for providing Health Physics coverage for team. 

Joint Information Center Manager (JIC): 

• (1) Responsible for managing and coordinating media information related to 

the event. 

• (1) Driver responsible for transportation. 

Off-Site Field Team A: 

• (1) Qualified Radiation Monitor responsible for assessing environmental radiation/contamination and providing input 

to SRPC. Also responsible for providing 

Health Physics coverage for team. 

• (1) Driver responsible for transportation. 

TSC Engineering: 

• (1) Electrical/I&C: Responsible for providing engineering coverage for the 

ERO related to electrical or I&C equipment. 

• (1) Mechanical: Responsible for providing engineering coverage for the 

ERO related to mechanical equipment. 


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On-shift 1 Augment w/in 60 min.1 Augment w/in 90 min.1 2

Lead OSC Supervisor (1): 

• Responsible for OSC activities as directed by Emergency Director. 

Security Supervisor (1) (TSC): 

• Responsible for coordinating securityrelated activities and information with 

the Emergency Director. 

Notes: 

1. No collateral duties are assigned to an individual that are beyond the capability of that individual to perform at any given time. 

2. Specified TSC/OSC personnel must be performing their required functions within 60 (90) minutes of an Alert or higher event classification. 

Specified EOF/JIC personnel must be performing their required functions within 90 minutes of a Site Area Emergency or higher event classification. 

3. Two qualified Health Physics personnel for a single-unit site, or one per unit for a multi-unit site. 

4. Could be the STA if justification for collateral duties supports additional responsibilities. 

3. Expanding to non-power reactor 

licensees a requirement for detailed 

analyses demonstrating timely 

performance of emergency response 

functions by on-shift personnel. The 

NRC is proposing to require nuclear 

power reactor licensees to demonstrate 

through detailed analyses that on-shift 

personnel can perform all assigned 

emergency plan implementation 

functions without having competing 

responsibilities that could prevent them 

from performing their emergency plan 

functions. The NRC is seeking 

comments on whether it is necessary to 

add a requirement for non-power reactor 

licensees (i.e., research and test reactor 

licensees) to include in their emergency 

plans detailed analyses demonstrating 

that on-shift personnel can perform all 

assigned emergency plan 

implementation functions in a timely 

manner without having competing 

responsibilities that could prevent them 

from performing their emergency plan 

functions. 

4. Expanding to non-power reactor 

licensees a requirement for the 

capability to assess, classify, and declare 

an emergency condition within 15 

minutes and a requirement to promptly 

declare an emergency condition. The 

NRC proposes to require nuclear power 

reactor licensees to establish and 

maintain the capability to assess, 

classify, and declare an emergency 

condition within 15 minutes after the 

availability of indications to plant 

operators that an EAL has been 

exceeded, and to also require that an 

emergency condition be promptly 

declared as soon as possible following a 

determination that an EAL has been 

exceeded. The NRC is considering 

whether it is necessary to add the 

emergency declaration timeliness 

criteria for non-power reactor licensees. 

The NRC is seeking comments on 

whether to issue regulations requiring 

that non-power reactor licensees meet 

these criteria. 

5. Expanding to non-power reactor 

licensees a requirement for hostile 

action event EALs. The NRC is 

proposing that EALs for nuclear power 

plants must address hostile action 

events. The proposed rule regarding 

EALs would not apply to non-power 

reactors because the EALs for these 

reactors are generally based on projected 

or actual offsite dose and not an 

initiating event. However, hostile action 

directed toward a non-power reactor is 

an initiating event that could 

conceivably cause an offsite dose. The 

NRC is seeking comments on whether 

the NRC should issue regulations 

requiring that non-power reactor 

licensees include hostile action event 

EALs in their emergency plans. 

6. Effective date. As proposed, the 

effective date of this rule would be 30 

days after publication of the final rule 

in the Federal Register, with an option 

for a licensee or applicant to defer 

implementation until 180 days after 

publication of the final rule in the 

Federal Register (with certain 

exceptions). The NRC is concerned that 

combined license (COL) and early site 

permit (ESP) applicants would need to 

submit timely revisions to docketed 

applications, to avoid schedule impacts 

to application reviews, in order to 

comply with the proposed amendments 

should they become final before the 

staff’s licensing review is complete. The 

NRC is seeking comments on how COL 

and ESP applicants would implement 

this rule as proposed, including any 

impacts to the process and schedule for 

the applicant to submit and the NRC to 

review those revisions to COL or ESP 

applications. 

7. Implementation Schedule. As 

proposed, each element of the proposed 

rule would be implemented on a 

schedule that may vary from 

approximately 30 days to 3 years. The 

wide variance in the proposed 

implementation schedule is a result of 

the varying degree of difficulty and 

scheduling problems for some elements 

including the need for analysis, 

development of processes, procurement 

of equipment/facilities, and/or 

coordination with offsite response 

organizations. The NRC is concerned 

that the proposed implementation 

schedule may not be appropriate for 

some offsite response organizations and 

licensees. The NRC is seeking comments 

regarding the appropriateness of the 

proposed implementation schedule. 

V. Section-by-Section Analysis 

The Commission is proposing to 

amend portions of § 50.47, ‘‘Emergency 

plans,’’ § 50.54, ‘‘Conditions of 

licenses;’’ Part 50, Appendix E, 

‘‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness 

for Production and Utilization 

Facilities;’’ and § 52.79, ‘‘Contents of 

applications; technical information in 

final safety analysis report.’’ 

Section 50.47 Emergency Plans 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

§ 50.47(b)(3) to remove the reference to 

the EOF as a ‘‘near-site’’ facility. Criteria 

would be provided in Part 50, Appendix 

E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF 

distance from a nuclear power reactor 

site and for a performance-based 

approach for EOFs, specifying that these 

facilities would need to meet certain 

functional requirements rather than 

requiring that they be located within a 

certain distance of the plant. The intent 

of this change is discussed in the 

section on proposed changes to 

Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.B.3 of this document.) 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

§ 50.47(b)(10) to require licensees to 

review and update their ETEs 

periodically and submit them to the 

NRC for review and approval. Proposed 

changes to Appendix E to Part 50 would 

provide the required frequency and 

details of the ETE updates and 

submissions. Although requirements for 

ETEs are found in both § 50.47(b) and in 

Appendix E to Part 50, the level of 


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detail between them greatly differs. 

Section 50.47(b) establishes the EP 

planning standards that licensees must 

meet, whereas Appendix E sets forth 

more detailed implementation 

requirements. (A discussion of this issue 

is also provided in Section II.B.4 of this 

document.) 

This new requirement would ensure 

that ETEs are reviewed periodically to 

determine whether population changes 

have caused significant changes in the 

ETE. NRC review of ETE updates would 

ensure they are performed routinely, are 

consistent across the industry, and are 

technically sound. NRC guidance would 

provide more details of NRC 

expectations for development of an 

adequate ETE, as well as provide NRC 

reviewers with guidance on the review 

of ETE updates. The NRC would expect 

that the updated ETEs would be shared 

with OROs to be incorporated into 

protective action strategies. 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

§ 50.47(d)(1) to remove the reference to 

the EOF as a ‘‘near-site’’ facility. Criteria 

would be provided in Part 50, Appendix 

E, Section IV.E.8. regarding EOF 

distance from a nuclear power reactor 

site and for a performance-based 

approach for EOFs, specifying that these 

facilities would need to meet certain 

functional requirements rather than 

requiring that they be located within a 

certain distance of the plant. The intent 

of this change is discussed in the 

section on proposed changes to 

Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.B.3 of this document.) 

Section 50.54 Conditions of Licenses 

The NRC proposes to revise § 50.54(q) 

in its entirety. Proposed § 50.54(q)(1) 

would define four terms whose 

meanings would be limited to 

application within the proposed 

§ 50.54(q). Proposed § 50.54(q)(1)(i) 

would define a ‘‘change’’ to the 

emergency plan as an action that results 

in modification or addition to, or 

removal from, the licensee’s emergency 

plan or the resources, capabilities, and 

methods identified in the emergency 

plan. Thus, a change to the emergency 

plan would not be limited to revisions 

to the document labeled ‘‘emergency 

plan.’’ For example, a proposed plant 

configuration change that removes a 

seismic instrument relied upon in the 

emergency plan as an EAL threshold 

would be encompassed by this 

definition. The last sentence in this 

definition calls attention to the 

possibility that other regulatory change 

processes may be applicable. In the 

example above, the plant configuration 

change would likely be subject to the 

requirements of § 50.59 and a technical 

specification change may also be 

involved. (A discussion of this issue is 

also provided in Section II.B.5 of this 

document.) 

The proposed § 50.54(q)(1)(ii) 

definition of ‘‘Emergency plan’’ would 

encompass any document that describes 

the programmatic methods that the 

licensee uses to maintain and perform 

emergency planning functions and to 

demonstrate compliance with the 

requirements of Appendix E, and for 

nuclear power reactors, the planning 

standards of § 50.47(b). Under the 

proposed § 50.54(q), sub-tier documents, 

such as emergency plan implementing 

procedures, would not ordinarily be 

subject to the § 50.54(q) change process 

because these procedures generally only 

provide instructions in performing the 

programmatic methods identified and 

described in the emergency plan. This 

would be consistent with the current 

§ 50.54(q) requirements. However, if a 

license were to relocate a programmatic 

description to another document, that 

description would remain subject to the 

proposed § 50.54(q) change process. For 

example, if a licensee were to relocate 

the details of its emergency 

classification scheme from the 

emergency plan to a wall chart posted 

in the control room, the wall chart 

would be subject to the proposed 

§ 50.54(q) change process. The 

definition would also emphasize, by 

incorporation, the role of the licensee’s 

original emergency plan approved by 

the NRC in minimizing the likelihood 

that a series of incremental changes over 

time will constitute a reduction in 

effectiveness of the original approved 

emergency plan. 

Proposed § 50.54(q)(1)(iii) would 

define the term ‘‘emergency planning 

function’’ in terms of a capability or 

resource necessary to prepare for and 

respond to a radiological emergency. 

During the development of the EP 

Cornerstone of the ROP, a group of EP 

subject matter experts, including NRC 

staff and nuclear power industry 

stakeholders, with input from the 

public, developed a series of planning 

standard functions that would be used 

in determining the significance of 

inspection findings. These planning 

standard functions are paraphrases of 

the broadly worded § 50.47(b) planning 

standards and the corresponding 

requirements in Appendix E to Part 50 

in terms of the significant functions that 

need to be accomplished, or the 

capabilities that need to be in place, to 

maintain the effectiveness of a licensee’s 

emergency plan and emergency 

response capability. Within the EP 

Cornerstone, the significance of 

inspection findings depends on whether 

the planning standards can be 

accomplished (i.e., loss of planning 

standard function) or can be 

accomplished only in a degraded 

manner (i.e., degraded planning 

standard function). The characterization 

of a reduction in effectiveness in the 

proposed rule would capitalize on this 

earlier effort in that any degradation or 

loss of a planning standard function 

would be deemed to constitute a 

reduction in effectiveness. The NRC is 

proposing to use the phrase ‘‘emergency 

planning function’’ in lieu of ‘‘planning 

standard function’’ as used in the ROP 

to allow the definition to be applicable 

to licensed facilities that are subject to 

Appendix E, but are not subject to the 

planning standards of § 50.47(b). The 

emergency planning functions would be 

established in regulatory guidance along 

with examples of typical emergency 

plan changes that would be expected to 

constitute a reduction in effectiveness 

and examples of changes that would 

not. 

The emergency planning functions 

would not replace or supplement the 

regulations upon which they would be 

based and as such, compliance with 

these functions would not be required. 

They would be only used to 

differentiate between changes that the 

licensee would be allowed to make 

without prior NRC approval and those 

that would require prior NRC approval. 

The NRC would not establish these 

emergency planning functions in 

regulations because the underlying 

regulations already exist, and the 

expression of the emergency planning 

functions would differ between nuclear 

power reactors, non-power reactors, and 

fuel facilities licensed under Part 50 or 

Part 52. A draft regulatory guide that 

discusses these emergency planning 

functions for nuclear power reactors has 

been prepared and will be made 

available for public comment in 

conjunction with this proposed rule. 

Proposed § 50.54(q)(1)(iv) would 

define the term ‘‘reduction in 

effectiveness’’ as a change to the 

emergency plan that results in a 

reduction of the licensee’s capability to 

perform an emergency planning 

function in the event of a radiological 

emergency. The phrase ‘‘reduction in 

effectiveness’’ would be an evaluation 

concept that would be used in proposed 

§ 50.54(q) to differentiate between 

changes that the licensee would be 

allowed to make without prior NRC 

approval and those that would require 

prior NRC approval. A determination 

that a change may result in a reduction 

in effectiveness does not imply that the 

licensee could no longer implement its 


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plan and provide adequate measures for 

the protection of the public. The NRC 

may approve a proposed emergency 

plan change that the licensee 

determined to be a reduction in 

effectiveness, if the NRC can find that 

the emergency plan, as modified, would 

continue to meet the requirements of 

Appendix E, and for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, the planning 

standards of § 50.47(b), and would 

continue to provide reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective 

measures can and will be taken in the 

event of a radiological emergency. 

‘‘Radiological emergency’’ as used in the 

proposed § 50.54(q)(1)(iv), would mean 

any condition that would result in the 

declaration of any emergency 

classification level and the 

implementation of the licensee’s 

emergency plan. A nuclear power 

reactor licensee evaluating whether a 

particular emergency plan change 

would constitute a reduction in 

effectiveness would be expected to 

consider the spectrum of accidents 

addressed in the planning basis 

described in NUREG–0654. In making 

this determination, licensees of nonpower reactors and fuel facilities 

licensed under Part 50 would base their 

evaluations on the planning bases for 

their respective facilities. 

Current regulations in Parts 50 and 52 

require applicants for licenses to 

develop emergency plans that meet the 

requirements of Appendix E, and for 

nuclear power reactors, § 50.47(b), as 

applicable, during facility licensing. A 

holder of a license under Part 50 or a 

combined license under Part 52 after the 

Commission makes the finding under 

§ 52.103(g) would be required by 

proposed § 50.54(q)(2) to follow and 

maintain the effectiveness of its 

emergency plan, as originally approved. 

The proposed § 50.54(q)(2) references to 

Appendix E and § 50.47(b), as 

applicable, would extend the 

applicability of these requirements as a 

condition of the facility license (as does 

the current language in § 50.54(q)). The 

NRC would expect licensees to identify 

conditions and situations which could 

reduce the effectiveness of its 

emergency plan, and to take corrective 

and/or compensatory actions to restore 

and maintain the requisite effectiveness. 

Proposed § 50.54(q)(3) would grant 

authority to the holder of a license to 

make changes to its emergency plan 

without prior NRC approval only if an 

analysis demonstrates that the changes 

do not reduce the effectiveness of the 

plan and the plan, as changed, 

continues to meet the requirements in 

Appendix E, and for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, § 50.47(b). The 

reference to Appendix E and § 50.47(b), 

as applicable, in this paragraph, would 

serve to exclude any change for which 

the licensee must request an exemption 

from requirements under § 50.12. 

The NRC would expect a licensee 

considering a change under this section 

to perform an evaluation of the change 

to a level of rigor and thoroughness 

consistent with the scope of the 

proposed change. A licensee’s analysis 

of the impact of a change on the 

effectiveness of the plan would need to 

consider the accidents included in the 

emergency planning basis, the licensing 

basis of the particular emergency plan, 

and any emergency plan elements 

implemented to address site-specific 

emergency response constraints (e.g., 

delay in staff augmentation associated 

with a remote site, commitments to 

State or local governments, existence of 

significant external hazards, etc.). 

Proposed § 50.54(q)(4) would define 

the process by which a licensee would 

request prior approval of a change to the 

emergency plan that the licensee has 

determined constitutes a reduction in 

effectiveness of the plan. Licensees 

pursuing these changes would be 

required to apply for an amendment to 

the license as provided in § 50.90. 

Courts have found that Commission 

actions that expand licensees’ authority 

under their licenses without formally 

amending the licenses constitute license 

amendments and should be processed 

through the Commission’s license 

amendment procedures. (See Citizens 

Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 

F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995); Sholly v. NRC, 

651 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per 

curiam), vacated on other grounds, 459 

U.S. 1194 (1983); and in re Three Mile 

Island Alert, 771 F.2d 720, 729 (3rd Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 

(1986). See also Cleveland Electric 

Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power 

Plant, Unit 1), CLI–96–13, 44 NRC 315 

(1996)). A proposed emergency plan 

change that would reduce the 

effectiveness of the plan would give the 

licensee a capability to operate at a level 

of effectiveness that was not previously 

authorized by the NRC. In this situation, 

the licensee’s operating authority would 

be expanded beyond the authority 

granted by the NRC as reflected in the 

emergency plan without the proposed 

change. Thus, an emergency plan 

change that would reduce the 

effectiveness of the plan would expand 

the licensee’s operating authority under 

its license. A change expanding the 

licensee’s operating authority is, 

according to the courts, a license 

amendment and must be accomplished 

through a license amendment process. 

In addition to satisfying the filing 

requirements for a license amendment 

request in § 50.90 and § 50.91, the 

proposed § 50.54(q)(4) request would 

include all emergency plan pages 

affected by the change, a forwarding 

letter identifying the change, the reason 

for the change, and the basis for 

concluding that the licensee’s 

emergency plan, as revised, will 

continue to meet the requirements of 

Appendix E, and for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, the planning 

standards of § 50.47(b). The NRC would 

review the amendment application to 

make its no significant hazards 

consideration determination and to 

determine if the emergency plan, as 

modified, is a reduction in effectiveness 

under § 50.54(q) and continues to meet 

the requirements in Appendix E, and for 

nuclear power reactors, the planning 

standards of § 50.47(b). 

Proposed § 50.54(q)(5) would apply to 

all licensees subject to § 50.54(q) and 

require that licensees retain a record of 

all changes to the emergency plans 

made without prior NRC approval for a 

period of three years from the date of 

change. The section would also require 

the licensee to submit, as specified 

under § 50.4, a report of each such 

change, including its evaluation, within 

30 days of the change. The NRC expects 

that the record of changes would 

include documentation of the 

evaluation that determined the change 

not to be a reduction in effectiveness. 

The NRC would use this record of 

changes during inspection oversight of 

the licensee’s implementation of 

proposed § 50.54(q)(2). 

Proposed § 50.54(q)(6) would require 

a licensee of a nuclear power reactor to 

retain the emergency plan and each 

change for which prior NRC approval 

was obtained under proposed 

§ 50.54(q)(4) as a record until the 

Commission terminates the license. 

The NRC proposes to remove 

paragraph (r) of § 50.54. Section 50.54(r) 

was published as a final rule on August 

19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) to require thenexisting licensees authorized to possess 

and/or operate a research or test reactor 

facility to submit emergency plans 

complying with Appendix E to Part 50 

to the NRC for approval within one year 

or two years, as applicable, from the 

effective date of the rule (November 3, 

1980). (A discussion of this issue is also 

provided in Section II.B.6 of this 

document.) 

The NRC proposes to amend § 50.54 

by revising § 50.54(s)(1) to remove 

language addressing a one-time 

requirement that has now been 

completed. Section 50.54(s)(1) was 

published as a final rule on August 19, 


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1980 (45 FR 55402). This provision 

required existing nuclear power reactor 

licensees to submit to the NRC within 

60 days after the effective date of the 

rule (November 3, 1980), the 

radiological response plans of State and 

local governmental entities in the 

United States that are wholly or 

partially within a plume exposure 

pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of 

State governments wholly or partially 

within an ingestion pathway EPZ. 

Section 50.54(s)(1) continued to further 

establish the size of the two EPZs. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.B.6 of this document.) 

The NRC proposes to remove 

paragraph (s)(2)(i) from § 50.54. Section 

50.54(s)(2) was initially published as a 

final rule on August 19, 1980 (45 FR 

55402) as a single paragraph. The rule 

was amended on May 29, 1981 (46 FR 

28838), resulting in § 50.54(s)(2) being 

split into two paragraphs, 

§§ 50.54(s)(2)(i) and 50.54(s)(2)(ii). The 

rule language in § 50.54(s)(2)(i) requires 

that the licensee, State, and local 

emergency plans for all operating power 

reactors be implemented by April 1, 

1981, except as provided in Section 

IV.D.3. of Appendix E to Part 50. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.B.6 of this document.) 

The NRC proposes to remove 

paragraph (u) from § 50.54. Section 

50.54(u) was published as a final rule on 

August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402) to 

require then-existing nuclear power 

reactor licensees to submit to the NRC 

plans for coping with emergencies that 

meet the standards in § 50.47(b) and the 

requirements of Appendix E to Part 50 

within 60 days after the effective date of 

the rule (November 3, 1980). (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.B.6 of this document.) 

The NRC is proposing to revise 

paragraphs (gg)(1) and (gg)(2) of § 50.54 

to replace ‘‘DHS’’ with ‘‘FEMA.’’ 

Although FEMA remains within DHS, 

the responsibility for offsite EP for 

nuclear power plants is with FEMA. 

FEMA has requested that ‘‘FEMA’’ be 

used rather than ‘‘DHS’’ for clarity of 

communication with stakeholders. 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

§ 50.54(gg)(1)(i) to remove the reference 

to the EOF as a ‘‘near-site’’ facility. 

Criteria would be provided in Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. regarding 

EOF distance from a nuclear power 

reactor site and for a performance-based 

approach for EOFs, specifying that these 

facilities would need to meet certain 

functional requirements rather than 

requiring that they be located within a 

certain distance of the plant. The intent 

of this change is discussed in the 

section on proposed changes to 

Appendix E, Section IV.E.8. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.B.3 of this document.) 

Appendix E to Part 50, Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness for 

Production and Utilization Facilities 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

several paragraphs within Section IV. of 

Appendix E to Part 50 that would apply 

to licensees and applicants for licenses 

under Part 50 or Part 52 of this chapter, 

as applicable. The NRC would amend 

the first paragraph of Section IV. by 

adding language to require nuclear 

power reactor licensees and license 

applicants to revise their ETEs when the 

decennial census data is available. The 

proposed regulation would require that 

within 180 days of the issuance of the 

2010 decennial census data (expected to 

be available in 2011), ETE revisions be 

submitted to the NRC under § 50.4 for 

review and approval. The NRC would 

establish a schedule for review and 

approval of the updated ETEs. 

Thereafter, nuclear power reactor 

licensees and license applicants would 

be required to annually review changes 

in the population of their EPZ and most 

populous Emergency Response Planning 

Area (ERPA). ERPAs are local areas, 

typically defined by geographic or 

political boundaries that are used to 

communicate protective actions to 

members of the public in familiar 

geographic terms. When the new 

population, including permanent 

residents and transient populations, in 

either the EPZ or most populous ERPA 

would be less than 90 percent or greater 

than 110 percent of the population that 

formed the basis for the currently 

approved ETE, the licensee or applicant 

would be required to update the ETE to 

reflect the impact of this population 

change. The licensee or applicant would 

be required to submit the updated ETE 

to the NRC under the procedures of 

§ 50.4 within 180 days of the availability 

of the population data used in the 

update. (A discussion of this issue is 

also provided in Section II.B.4 of this 

document.) 

The NRC proposes to require 

licensees and applicants to review 

changes in the population of the EPZ 

and the most populous ERPA because 

population density in an EPZ is 

generally not homogeneous and EPZ 

evacuation times are significantly 

influenced by the ERPA with the largest 

population. The NRC considered 

requiring review of all ERPAs or the 

review of individual counties and States 

in addition to the whole EPZ. Review of 

the ERPA with the largest population 

was considered to be a reasonable 

balance between the burden on 

licensees and applicants and the need to 

ensure that the ETE is accurate because 

the ERPA with the largest population is 

generally the one with the most impact 

on evacuation times. 

The proposed requirement for nuclear 

power reactor licensees to evaluate a 

population change impact on the ETE 

during the period between decennial 

censuses would balance the burden on 

licensees and the expected rates of 

change among the relevant populations. 

The U.S. Census Bureau currently 

projects population growth at 

approximately one percent per year in 

the United States. However, certain 

areas experience much greater growth. 

The population of Maricopa County, 

Arizona, for example, experienced 

approximately 6.4 percent growth in the 

two-year period from 2005 to 2007. The 

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station 

is located in Maricopa County. St. Lucie 

County in Florida, where the St. Lucie 

Nuclear Plant is located, experienced 

approximately 9.7 percent population 

growth in the same period. A nuclear 

plant’s EPZ population may not grow at 

the same rate as the corresponding 

county(ies) population, but a review of 

population growth would be 

appropriate, as discussed in Section 

II.B.4 of this document. The review 

would consist of analysis of population 

growth based on either U.S. Census 

Bureau data (e.g., Subcounty Population 

Datasets for population estimates) or 

State/local government estimates and 

would examine the whole EPZ as well 

as the most populous emergency 

planning area within the EPZ. If an ETE 

revision were necessary, it would be 

submitted to the NRC under the 

provisions of § 50.4 for review and 

approval. The NRC would review the 

ETEs to ensure they were consistent 

with NRC guidance on the development 

of ETEs that would be expected to be 

issued with the final rule. 

The updated ETEs would allow for 

more effective development of public 

protective action strategies and review 

of evacuation planning. Sites with little 

population change would be minimally 

impacted by the proposed requirement, 

while those sites with a greater rate of 

population change would be required to 

perform more frequent updates. 

Licensees would also be expected to 

identify and analyze potential 

enhancements to improve evacuation 

times and document whether 

implementation was appropriate. 

The NRC is also proposing to revise 

the first paragraph of Section IV. to 

change the term ‘‘radiation’’ to 

‘‘radiological,’’ to provide consistent use 

of the phrase ‘‘radiological emergency.’’ 

It is also clarifying in this paragraph that 


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the requirements for the submittal of 

emergency response plans apply to not 

only applicants for nuclear power 

reactor operating license applicants 

under Part 50, but also to applicants for 

early site permits (as applicable) and 

combined licenses under Part 52. This 

clarification was intended for but 

inadvertently omitted from a 

rulemaking to update Part 52 (72 FR 

49517, dated August 28, 2007). 

The NRC is proposing to make two 

editorial revisions to Appendix E to Part 

50, Section IV.A.2. One change would 

be to include the abbreviation of 

emergency response organization, 

‘‘ERO,’’ in paragraph 2 of Section IV.A. 

The second revision would clarify that 

paragraph 2.c. should read as follows: 

‘‘Authorities, responsibilities, and 

duties of an onsite emergency 

coordinator. * * *’’ 

The NRC is proposing to amend Part 

50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. to 

require licensees to confirm that ORO 

resources, such as local law 

enforcement, firefighting, and medical 

services, are available to respond to an 

emergency, including a hostile action 

event, at the plant site. Currently, the 

regulations do not explicitly require the 

licensee to take action to ensure that 

OROs are capable of adequately 

responding to the site during a hostile 

action event. This new requirement 

would require licensee coordination 

with the OROs to ensure that licensees 

and OROs are able to effectively 

implement their pre-planned actions for 

any contingency, including hostile 

action events as required by Order EA– 

02–026. This requirement would be 

enforced through routine inspection and 

observation of emergency exercises. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.A.4 of this document.) 

The proposed requirement would also 

contain a new footnote, which would 

define ‘‘hostile action’’ as an act 

directed toward a nuclear power plant 

or its personnel that includes the use of 

violent force to destroy equipment, take 

hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee 

to achieve an end. This includes attack 

by air, land, or water using guns, 

explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other 

devices used to deliver destructive 

force. 

The NRC is proposing to add a new 

paragraph A.9. in Section IV. of 

Appendix E to Part 50. This new 

paragraph would require nuclear power 

plant licensees under this part and Part 

52 to provide a detailed analysis to 

show that on-shift personnel assigned 

emergency plan implementation 

functions are not assigned any 

responsibilities that would prevent 

them from performing their assigned 

emergency plan functions when needed. 

This proposed amendment would 

constitute a new requirement. The 

proposed rule would not specify, by 

position or function, which 

responsibilities must be assigned, but 

would allow licensees the flexibility to 

determine the limit of assigned 

responsibilities for effective emergency 

plan implementation on a site-specific 

basis. This would allow licensees to 

take credit for new technologies that 

could potentially affect the number of 

on-shift staff that would be needed. 

However, licensees would need to 

ensure that the duties assigned to onshift staff were reasonable for one 

person to perform and would not be so 

burdensome as to negatively impact 

emergency response. (A discussion of 

this issue is also provided in Section 

II.A.1 of this document.) 

The licensees would have to perform 

a detailed analysis, such as a job task 

analysis (JTA) or a time motion analysis, 

to demonstrate that on-shift personnel 

could implement the plan effectively 

without having competing 

responsibilities that could prevent them 

from performing their primary 

emergency plan tasks. The NRC would 

expect the analysis to identify all the 

tasks which must be performed by 

available staff during an evolution such 

as response to an emergency. 

Licensees would first need to identify 

the spectrum of accidents defined in 

their licensing bases (i.e., design basis 

accidents (DBAs), as well as the DBT, as 

applicable), for which there must be 

emergency planning. The analysis 

would identify all tasks which must be 

completed for each DBA and the DBT, 

as applicable, and the responders 

responsible for the performance of those 

tasks. Then licensees would ensure that 

there would be sufficient on-shift staff 

to perform all necessary tasks until 

augmentation staff arrives to provide 

assistance. Enhancing the regulations to 

require licensees to ensure that multiple 

responsibilities assigned to on-shift staff 

would not detract from adequate 

emergency plan implementation would 

establish a regulatory framework that 

more clearly codifies the NRC’s shift 

staffing expectations for effective 

emergency response. 

The NRC proposes to amend Section 

IV.B. of Appendix E to Part 50 to add 

a requirement that nuclear power 

reactor licensees and license applicants 

would take hostile action events, which 

may adversely affect the plant (e.g., 

cause personnel harm and/or equipment 

damage), into account in their EAL 

schemes. It would also serve to establish 

consistent EALs for hostile action events 

among existing and future nuclear 

power reactor licensees and allow the 

licensees to make hostile action 

emergency declarations based on a 

credible threat. (A discussion of this 

issue is also provided in Section II.A.2 

of this document.) 

The proposed language would also 

make changes to conform to proposed 

changes to § 50.54(q), which address the 

issue described in Section II.B.5 of this 

document. The current requirement in 

paragraph (1) in Section IV.B. of 

Appendix E that licensees obtain prior 

NRC approval via § 50.4 for changes to 

an EAL scheme from NUREG–0654 to 

one based on NUMARC/NESP–007 or 

NEI 99–01 would be retained, but the 

paragraph numbering would be 

removed. Paragraphs (2) and (3) would 

be deleted and replaced with a new 

requirement that all other EAL changes 

would be required to be made under the 

proposed amended § 50.54(q) change 

process, as discussed earlier in Section 

V of this document. The two remaining 

paragraphs in this section would be 

designated B.1. and B.2. 

The NRC proposes to retain the 

existing language of Section IV.C. of 

Appendix E to Part 50, redesignate that 

language as paragraph C.1., and add a 

new paragraph C.2. Proposed paragraph 

C.2.would require that nuclear power 

plant licensees and applicants under 

this part and Part 52 have and maintain 

the capability to assess, classify, and 

declare an emergency condition within 

15 minutes after the availability of 

indications to plant operators that an 

emergency action level has been 

exceeded and will promptly declare the 

emergency condition upon determining 

that an emergency action level has been 

exceeded. The NRC believes that the 

amended language would emphasize the 

NRC’s expectations regarding the 

timeliness of emergency declarations 

while retaining sufficient operational 

flexibility to respond to extenuating 

circumstances necessary to protect 

public health and safety. The NRC 

would consider the 15-minute criterion 

to commence when plant 

instrumentation, plant alarms, computer 

displays, or incoming verbal reports that 

correspond to an EAL become available 

to cognizant personnel within the 

control room, or in another emergency 

facility in which emergency 

declarations are performed. On receipt 

of such information, the licensee 

personnel would assess the data for 

validity and compare the indications to 

the EALs in the licensee’s emergency 

classification scheme. (A discussion of 

this issue is also provided in Section 

II.B.2 of this document.) 

This 15-minute criterion would end 

as soon as the licensee determines that 


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an EAL has been exceeded and the 

licensee makes the emergency 

declaration. The proposed rule would 

also require the licensee to promptly 

declare the emergency condition as soon 

as the licensee determined that an EAL 

had been exceeded. Because the NRC 

would require emergency declarations 

to be made promptly, the proposed rule 

states that the 15-minute criterion is not 

to be construed as a grace period in 

which a licensee may attempt to restore 

plant conditions to avoid declaring an 

EAL that has already been exceeded. If 

the EAL threshold specifies a duration 

(e.g., ‘‘fire lasting for greater than 10 

minutes from detection’’), the NRC 

would expect the licensee to assess and 

classify the event concurrently with the 

specified condition duration. The 

licensee would then be required to 

promptly declare the emergency 

condition as soon as the specified 

duration has been exceeded. The 

licensee would be expected, but not 

required, to declare the emergency 

condition once it has been determined 

that the condition cannot be corrected 

before the specified duration is 

exceeded. 

The NRC is proposing a capability 

criterion, rather than an inflexible 

performance criterion, to allow 

licensees some degree of flexibility in 

addressing extenuating circumstances 

that may arise during an actual 

emergency. For example, an emergency 

declaration may need to be delayed in 

the interest of performing plant 

operations that are urgently needed to 

protect public health and safety. These 

delays would be found acceptable if 

they did not deny State and local 

authorities the opportunity to 

implement actions to protect the public 

health or safety under their emergency 

plans and the cause of the delay was not 

reasonably within the licensee’s ability 

to foresee and prevent. 

The NRC is proposing to add language 

to Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E to 

require licensees and applicants to have 

backup ANS methods for both the alert 

and notification functions without 

specifying which backup measures 

should be used. This approach would 

allow flexibility in the selection of the 

method best suited for each site and 

would also allow the use of newer 

technologies or other alternative 

methods. Available backup ANS 

methods would enhance the public’s 

ability to be promptly alerted of an 

event at a facility and of possible 

protective actions. (A discussion of this 

issue is also provided in Section II.B.1 

of this document.) 

Section IV.D.3. of Appendix E 

currently acknowledges that, for the 

events more likely to warrant use of the 

alert and notification capability, State 

and local officials will have substantial 

time available to make a judgment 

regarding activation of the warning 

system to alert and notify the public. 

Accordingly, the proposed amendment 

would not impose specific time 

requirements for using a backup 

method. The alerting function could 

involve one or more methods that are 

already used as a backup means at 

several sites, such as multiple, 

independent siren activation points in 

conjunction with siren backup power, 

route alerting, reverse call-out systems 

or newer technologies, such as 

intelligent notification and 

communication systems for notifying 

targeted populations. The notification 

function could involve the designation 

of multiple EAS broadcast stations or 

use of weather alert radios or newer 

technologies, such as advanced 

messaging systems. Guidance would be 

provided for determining the 

acceptability of the backup methods 

based on the alerting and notification 

capabilities of the methods selected, 

administrative provisions for 

implementing and maintaining backup 

methods, identification of resources to 

implement backup methods, and 

periodic demonstration of the backup 

methods. Guidance would also be 

provided to licensees and offsite 

officials regarding the need to ensure 

that the backup methods could alert and 

notify the public in the entire plume 

exposure pathway EPZ, that the 

personnel and resources required to 

implement the backup methods would 

be available during any type of 

emergency (including hostile action 

events), and that designated personnel 

know how to implement backup 

methods. 

The backup method of alerting and 

notification would be capable of 

providing warning signals and 

instructional messages to the population 

in the entire plume exposure pathway 

EPZ when the primary ANS is 

unavailable during an emergency (i.e., 

the primary ANS cannot alert or notify 

all or portions of the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ population). The backup 

means could be designed so that it can 

be implemented using a phased 

approach in which the populations most 

at risk are alerted and notified first, 

followed by alerting and notification of 

people in less immediately affected 

areas. The backup method may have the 

additional capability of being employed 

only in the specific areas impacted 

when a portion of the primary ANS, 

such as a single siren or sirens within 

a community, fails and the extent of the 

affected area and population can be 

determined. 

The new requirement for a backup 

method would apply to both the alerting 

function and notification function of the 

FEMA-approved ANS. However, the 

NRC recognizes that some backup 

methods would not be capable of 

meeting the timeframes that are part of 

the primary ANS design objectives. The 

intent of the proposed amendment 

would not be to have a duplicate 

primary ANS, but to have a means of 

backup alerting and notification in place 

so the public could be alerted in 

sufficient time to allow offsite officials 

to consider a range of protective actions 

for the public to take in the event of a 

severe accident with potential offsite 

radiological consequences. Guidance 

would be provided to clarify the design 

objectives and other criteria for ANS 

backup methods. 

For nuclear power plant sites with no 

backup measures currently in place, 

backup provisions would need to be 

identified, incorporated into the site’s 

ANS design, and submitted for FEMA 

approval as specified in FEMA–REP–10, 

‘‘Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and 

Notification Systems for Nuclear Power 

Plants.’’ For nuclear power plant sites 

that already have provisions for ANS 

backup means in FEMA-approved ANS 

designs, licensees and offsite officials 

would need to confirm that the backup 

methods meet the proposed 

requirements and submit revised ANS 

designs for FEMA approval if changes 

were deemed necessary. Timeframes for 

submitting and approving ANS designs, 

along with implementation of the 

backup methods, could vary 

considerably depending on the level of 

ANS backup measures already in place. 

Therefore, backup methods must be 

ready for demonstration no later than its 

first biennial exercise conducted more 

than one year after the effective date of 

the rule, which would result in a 

maximum of approximately 3 years for 

implementation across the industry. 

Additional changes to Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.3. are being proposed to 

more clearly distinguish between the 

alerting and notification functions of the 

ANS (including clarification of how the 

15-minute design objective applies to 

these functions), to use consistent 

terminology when referring to the 

officials responsible for ANS activation, 

and to update language regarding 

demonstration of ANS capabilities and 

correction of deficiencies. References to 

the alerting function would be added to 

Section IV.D.3. to clearly indicate that 

the requirements for the primary and 

backup ANS apply to both the alerting 


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and notification functions. The wording 

of the primary ANS design objective 

would be revised to clarify that the 15- 

minute criterion applies to the 

completion of the initial alerting and 

start of the initial notification of the 

public (See Public Service Company of 

New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, 

Units 1 and 2), ALAB–935, 32 NRC 57, 

68 (1990)). The phrase ‘‘appropriate 

governmental authorities’’ would be 

used in place of ‘‘State and local 

officials’’ when referring to ANS 

activation to encompass site-specific 

variations in the assignment of the 

responsibility for this function 

according to each offsite emergency 

plan and established ANS activation 

protocols. This responsibility may be 

assigned to a single State or local 

organization, or to multiple 

organizations among various State, 

county, local, and other governmental 

agencies. The use of ‘‘appropriate 

governmental authorities’’ addresses all 

of these combinations. The current 

language in Section IV.D.3. refers to the 

February 1, 1982, date for then-existing 

nuclear power reactor licensees to have 

demonstrated ANS capabilities for their 

sites. The NRC is proposing to remove 

the reference to the February 1, 1982 

date and require that ANS capabilities 

to alert the public and provide 

instructions promptly must be 

demonstrated before exceeding 5 

percent rated thermal power of the first 

reactor at each site, consistent with the 

requirements of § 50.47(d). It is also 

important that licensees promptly 

correct deficiencies found during initial 

ANS installation and testing, as well as 

deficiencies identified thereafter, as 

required by § 50.54(s)(2). However, the 

requirement for correction of ANS 

deficiencies is clearly stated in 

§ 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and does not need to be 

repeated in Part 50, Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.3. 

The NRC is also proposing to add 

language to Section IV.D.3. of Appendix 

E to require licensees under this part 

and Part 52 to implement the 

requirements for a backup means of 

alerting and notification under proposed 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. no 

later than its first biennial exercise 

conducted more than one year after the 

effective date of the rule. 

Note that no changes are proposed to 

the basic requirement in § 50.47(b)(5) for 

nuclear power plant licensees or 

applicants to ensure that the means to 

provide early notification and clear 

instruction (i.e., alerting and 

notification) to the populace in the 

plume exposure pathway EPZ have been 

established. It is not necessary to 

address backup methods in § 50.47(b)(5) 

because the current provision 

establishes the overall requirement for 

alerting and notification. 

The NRC is also proposing to revise 

Section IV.E.5. of Appendix E to change 

the term ‘‘radiation’’ to ‘‘radiological,’’ 

to provide consistent use of the phrase 

‘‘radiological emergency’’; and the 

existing language of Appendix E, 

Section IV.E.8. to redesignate the 

revised language as Section IV.E.8.a.; 

and add new Sections IV.E.8.b., 

IV.E.8.c., IV.E.8.d., and IV.E.8.e. 

Proposed Section IV.E.8.a. would 

remove the reference to the EOF as a 

‘‘near-site’’ facility and add the 

requirement that nuclear power plant 

licensees and applicants under this part 

and Part 52 must provide an OSC. In a 

conforming change, § 52.79(a)(17) 

would be revised to make it clear that 

combined license applications would 

not be subject to the TMI action 

requirements in § 50.34(f)(2)(xxv), 

which address the need for an onsite 

TSC, an onsite OSC, and for an EOF. 

Instead, the requirements governing the 

need for such facilities in Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a(i) would 

apply to combined license applications. 

(A discussion of this issue is also 

provided in Section II.B.3 of this 

document.) 

Proposed Section IV.E.8.b. would 

incorporate EOF distance criteria 

currently found in NRC guidance and 

specify that an EOF must be located 

within 10 to 25 miles of each nuclear 

power reactor site that the facility serves 

or, if the EOF is located less than 10 

miles from a nuclear power reactor site, 

then a backup facility must be provided 

within 10 to 25 miles of a site. The 

distance between the EOF and a site 

would be determined by the straightline distance from the site’s TSC to the 

EOF, which would be consistent with 

the approach described in NUREG– 

0696, Table 2, ‘‘Relation of EOF 

Location to Habitability Criteria.’’ An 

exception to the 25-mile limit would be 

made for an EOF as long as provisions 

for locating NRC and offsite responders 

closer to that nuclear power reactor site 

are made so they can interact face-toface with personnel going to and leaving 

the site for briefings and debriefings. 

During an event, NRC and offsite agency 

staff may wish to relocate from a 

remotely located EOF to another facility 

closer to the nuclear power plant site. 

Suitable space near the site would be 

available so NRC and offsite agency staff 

could coordinate their actions 

efficiently, communicate with 

responders in other onsite and offsite 

emergency response facilities, and 

interface directly with responders at the 

site as needed. This space would allow 

NRC site team and offsite response 

personnel, including Federal, State, and 

local responders, to conduct briefings 

and debriefings with emergency 

response personnel entering and leaving 

the site, communicate with responders 

at other emergency response facilities, 

maintain awareness of conditions at the 

site, and share information with other 

emergency response organizations via 

computer links, such as the Internet. 

Proposed Section IV.E.8.c. would 

provide performance-based criteria 

applicable to all EOFs. The functions 

that an EOF would have to address 

include the capability to obtain and 

display plant data and radiological 

information for each reactor unit or 

plant that the facility serves. In some 

cases, an EOF could serve units or 

plants involving more than one type of 

reactor technology, such as pressurized 

water reactors and boiling water 

reactors, or more than one design of the 

same reactor type. The EOF staff would 

need to be capable of understanding 

conditions for each type of reactor and 

translating technical information into a 

useful form for offsite officials and 

media relations staff. A co-located or 

consolidated facility would also need to 

be capable of supporting effective 

response to events at more than one site 

simultaneously, because widespread 

events affecting multiple sites can and 

have occurred, such as the electrical 

blackout in several areas of the 

northeastern U.S. and portions of 

Canada in August 2003. The ability to 

simultaneously display information for 

multiple plants would also enhance 

effective response to events occurring at 

more than one site. 

By codifying EOF distance 

requirements in Section IV.E.8.b. of 

Appendix E and providing specific 

criteria for EOFs in Section IV.E.8.c., the 

proposed language would obviate the 

need for licensees to seek NRC approval 

at either the staff or Commission level 

to locate an EOF or consolidate EOFs 

meeting certain performance-based 

requirements and having provisions for 

NRC site team and offsite agency 

responders closer to a site if the EOF is 

located more than 25 miles from a site. 

Licensees could then implement a 

relocated or consolidated facility as part 

of their emergency response plans under 

the provisions of § 50.54(q) without 

prior NRC approval. The proposed 

language would also address 

Commission direction provided in the 

SRM to SECY–04–0236, as discussed in 

Section II.B.3 of this document. During 

exercises and actual events, EOFs 

located more than 25 miles from a site 

that have been previously approved by 

the NRC have functioned as effective 


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emergency response facilities and 

demonstrated that a near-site EOF is not 

necessary to adequately protect public 

health and safety. 

Although not included in the 

proposed rule language of Sections 

IV.E.8.b. or IV.E.8.c. as a requirement, 

the NRC believes it is important for 

licensees or applicants to consult with 

offsite agencies that send 

representatives to the EOF prior to 

relocating or consolidating such 

facilities. This consultation is 

particularly important when a licensee 

or applicant intends to use an EOF 

located more than 25 miles from a site 

to ensure that response times to the 

facility would be acceptable to offsite 

responders, adequate communications 

with offsite responders at other 

locations would be available, and there 

would be no jurisdictional concerns 

with the EOF location (e.g., when the 

EOF is located in a different State than 

a nuclear power plant). Additional 

criteria regarding EOF habitability, size, 

staffing, and other characteristics would 

remain as guidance. 

Proposed Section IV.E.8.d. would 

require nuclear power plant licensees 

and applicants under this part and Part 

52, to identify alternative facilities to 

function as staging areas for 

augmentation of ERO staff during 

hostile action events to minimize delays 

in emergency response and provide for 

a swift coordinated augmented 

response. To accomplish this, the 

alternative facility would be required to 

have the following characteristics: 

Accessibility even if the site is under 

threat or actual attack; communication 

links with the EOF, Control Room, and 

plant security; the capability to notify 

offsite agencies if the EOF is not 

performing this action; and the 

capability for engineering assessment 

activities, including damage control 

team planning and preparation. The 

alternative facility should also be 

equipped with general plant drawings 

and procedures, telephones, and 

computer links to the site to ensure that 

the ERO is aware of conditions at the 

site and prepared to return when 

personnel are allowed to re-enter the 

site. This would enable rapid staffing of 

onsite emergency response facilities and 

implementation of mitigation actions 

when ERO personnel enter the protected 

area. However, alternative facilities 

would not be required to reproduce the 

full documentation present at primary 

emergency response facilities. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.A.3 of this document.) 

The NRC also proposes to add a new 

Section IV.E.8.e. to permit a nuclear 

power reactor licensee, that, on the day 

the final rule becomes effective, has an 

approved EOF that does not meet the 

distance criteria for a primary or backup 

EOF, or does not have provisions for a 

facility closer to the site if the EOF is 

located more than 25 miles from a 

nuclear power reactor site, to not be 

subject to the requirements of Section 

IV.E.8.b. These licensees have already 

received approval from the Commission 

for variances from existing requirements 

(and guidance) regarding EOF locations, 

backup EOF facilities, or other EOF 

characteristics. (Also refer to the 

discussion of this issue in Section II.B.3 

of this document.) 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

Sections IV.E.9.c. and IV.E.9.d. to 

remove references to the EOF as a ‘‘nearsite’’ facility. Criteria would be provided 

in Section IV.E.8. of Appendix E, 

regarding EOF distance from a nuclear 

power reactor site and for a 

performance-based approach for EOFs. 

The criteria would specify that these 

facilities would need to meet certain 

functional requirements rather than 

requiring that they be located within a 

certain distance of the plant. The intent 

of this change is discussed in the 

proposed changes to Section IV.E.8 of 

Appendix E. (A discussion of this issue 

is also provided in Section II.B.3 of this 

document.) 

The NRC is proposing to revise 

paragraph F.1.a. of Section IV. to 

remove the word ‘‘radiation’’ because 

the advent of hostile action-based 

scenarios renders usage of the word as 

too limiting in describing potential 

emergencies. This change would 

provide consistent use of the term 

‘‘emergency plan.’’ The NRC is also 

proposing to revise paragraph F.1.b. to 

change the term ‘‘radiation’’ to 

‘‘radiological,’’ to provide consistent use 

of the phrase ‘‘radiological emergency.’’ 

The NRC proposes to add a new 

requirement to Section IV.F.2.a. to 

require licensees to submit, for NRC 

review and approval, scenarios for full 

participation exercises required by 

Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. This 

proposed requirement would enable the 

NRC to ensure that licensee exercise 

scenarios implement the proposed 

requirements of Sections IV.F.2.i. and 

IV.F.2.j. of Appendix E, including 

hostile action events and a variety of 

challenges to reduce preconditioning of 

respondents. The NRC also proposes to 

insert the word ‘‘initial’’ in paragraph 

F.2.a. to distinguish between the 

requirements of paragraphs F.2.a. and 

F.2.b. (A discussion of this issue is also 

provided in Section II.A.6 of this 

document.) 

The NRC is proposing to revise 

paragraphs F.2.a.(ii) and F.2.a.(iii) of 

Appendix E, Section IV. to replace 

‘‘DHS’’ with ‘‘FEMA.’’ Although FEMA 

remains within DHS, the responsibility 

for offsite EP for nuclear power plants 

is with FEMA. FEMA has requested that 

‘‘FEMA’’ be used rather than ‘‘DHS’’ for 

clarity of communication with 

stakeholders. 

The NRC is proposing several 

revisions to Section IV.F.2.b. to require 

licensees to submit, for NRC review and 

approval, scenarios for their onsite 

biennial exercises. This proposed 

requirement would enable the NRC to 

ensure licensee exercise scenarios 

implement the proposed requirements 

of Appendix E, Sections IV.F.2.i. and 

IV.F.2.j., including hostile action events 

and a variety of challenges to reduce 

preconditioning of respondents. The 

NRC also proposes to insert the word 

‘‘subsequent’’ in paragraph F.2.b. of 

Section IV. to distinguish between the 

requirements of paragraphs F.2.a. and 

F.2.b. 

The current language in Section 

IV.F.2.b. requires that licensees ensure 

that adequate emergency response 

capabilities are maintained to address 

several principal emergency response 

functional areas. The NRC is proposing 

to expand the list of principal functional 

areas of emergency response in 

paragraph F.2.b. to include event 

classification, notification of offsite 

authorities, assessment of the impact of 

onsite and offsite radiological releases, 

and development of protective action 

recommendations. These additional 

functional areas are associated with the 

planning standards in § 50.47(b) that 

have a significant impact on 

determining the licensee’s ability to 

implement adequate measures to protect 

public health and safety during a 

radiological emergency (i.e., 

§ 50.47(b)(4) regarding event 

classification, § 50.47(b)(5) regarding 

notification of offsite authorities, 

§ 50.47(b)(9) regarding assessment of 

radiological releases, and § 50.47(b)(10) 

regarding protective actions). 

The NRC proposes to amend the last 

sentence of Section IV.F.2.b. to add ‘‘in 

all participating facilities’’ after 

‘‘operating staff’’ to clarify that the 

operating staff from all facilities need 

not participate in the drill. The NRC 

also proposes to change ‘‘the drills 

could focus on onsite training 

objectives’’ to ‘‘the drills may focus on 

the onsite exercise training objectives’’ 

to make the permissive intent of the 

regulatory language more explicit. 

The NRC is proposing to amend 

Section IV.F.2.f. to add a second 

situation when remedial exercises 

would be required. The proposed 

amendment would explain that 


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remedial exercises would be required if 

the emergency plan is not satisfactorily 

tested during the biennial exercise, such 

that the NRC, in consultation with 

FEMA, could not find reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective 

measures could be taken in response to 

an emergency or determine that key 

ERO skills had been maintained. This 

change would demonstrate the NRC’s 

intent to invoke this requirement for 

exercises where the scope of the 

exercise is not sufficient to demonstrate 

the maintenance of key ERO skills. In 

the past, some exercises have not 

provided such a demonstration due to 

the use of simplistic scenarios. The 

proposed rule change is intended to 

prevent this trend in the future. The key 

skills necessary to implement the 

emergency plan vary among ERO 

members, emergency response facilities, 

and licensees. In general, key skills 

include the ability to implement 

emergency response procedures specific 

to the duties of the ERO member. Key 

skills include specific response 

capabilities that may be assigned in a 

site-specific manner such as: 

• Timely classification of events; 

• Timely notification of offsite 

authorities; 

• Assessment of radiological releases 

onsite and offsite; 

• Development of protective action 

recommendations; 

• Dissemination of information to the 

public via media channels; 

• Engineering assessment, repair plan 

development, and repair of critical 

equipment under emergency conditions; 

• Protection of workers during 

emergency response, including medical 

care; 

• Response to operational transients 

while implementing the emergency 

plan; and 

• Coordination with offsite response 

organizations. 

The NRC also proposes to revise 

Section IV.F.2.g. to require licensees to 

correct any weaknesses or deficiencies 

identified during training evolutions, 

exercises, or drills. This change would 

explicitly state the regulatory intent that 

training evolutions, drills, and exercises 

are included in the requirement for 

critique and correction of weaknesses or 

deficiencies. 

The NRC is proposing to add a new 

Section IV.F.2.i. to Appendix E to 

require all nuclear power plant 

licensees under this part and Part 52 to 

include hostile action events in biennial 

evaluated exercises. The proposed rule 

would also ensure that scenarios would 

be sufficiently varied by requiring the 

use of a wide spectrum of radiological 

releases and events, to properly train 

responders in response to more realistic 

events than currently used in training 

and avoid preconditioning the 

responders to success with 

inappropriate anticipatory responses. 

Licensees would also be required to 

emphasize coordination in their drills 

and exercises among onsite and offsite 

response organizations to strengthen the 

capabilities of the OROs to adequately 

respond to an emergency at the plant 

that would require offsite response. (A 

discussion of this issue is also provided 

in Section II.A.6 of this document.) 

The NRC is proposing to add a new 

Section IV.F.2.j. to Appendix E to 

require that nuclear power plant 

licensees under this part and Part 52 

conduct exercises that provide ERO 

members the opportunity to 

demonstrate proficiency in the key 

skills necessary to implement the 

principal emergency response 

functional areas identified in Section 

IV.F.2.b. Each exercise would also be 

required to provide ERO members the 

opportunity to demonstrate key skills 

specific to the emergency response 

duties in each emergency response 

facility. Each exercise planning cycle 

would consist of six successive (i.e., 

non-rolling) calendar years. During each 

exercise planning cycle, licensees 

would be required to vary the content of 

exercise scenarios to provide ERO 

members the opportunity to 

demonstrate proficiency in the key 

skills necessary to respond to several 

specific scenario elements, including 

hostile action directed at the plant site; 

no radiological release or an unplanned 

minimal radiological release that does 

not require public protective actions; an 

initial classification of or rapid 

escalation to a Site Area Emergency or 

General Emergency; implementation of 

strategies, procedures, and guidance 

developed under § 50.54(hh); and 

integration of offsite resources with 

onsite response. In addition to occurring 

every exercise planning cycle, the 

proposed rule would also require that 

the frequency of exercises involving 

response to a hostile action event not 

exceed 8 years. This proposed 

amendment would prescribe the 

minimum exercise scenario elements 

necessary for licensees to meet NRC 

expectations for challenging and varied 

scenario content in biennial exercises. 

Proposed Section IV.F.2.j. would 

require that licensees maintain a record 

of exercises that documents the contents 

of scenario elements used for each 

exercise during an exercise planning 

cycle to comply with the requirements 

of paragraph F.2.j. The documentation 

would include, but not be limited to, the 

following items for each scenario: 

sequence and timeline of events; extent 

of ERO participation and objectives to 

be demonstrated; opportunities for ERO 

demonstration of classification, 

notification, and development of 

protective action recommendations; 

expected radiological release conditions 

and demonstration of dose assessment, 

including dose projection results; and 

expected onsite/offsite radiological 

survey activities and results. 

The NRC is proposing to add a new 

Section IV.F.2.k. to Appendix E, to 

require a licensee under this part or Part 

52 to implement the requirements under 

proposed Part 50, Appendix E, Section 

IV.F.2. no later than its first biennial 

exercise conducted more than one year 

after the effective date of the final rule. 

The NRC proposes to add a new 

Section IV.I. to Appendix E that would 

require nuclear power plant licensees 

under this part and Part 52 to provide 

an expanded range of protective 

measures for onsite personnel that 

would be appropriate for protection 

against a hostile action event. These 

measures would be site-specific and 

consider issues such as the location of 

workers in relation to potential targets, 

which would dictate if sheltering and/ 

or evacuation would be appropriate to 

adequately protect the workers. Such 

measures are prudent to protect 

personnel necessary to safely shut down 

the reactor and emergency responders 

who would be necessary to implement 

the licensee’s emergency plan. By 

specifying such measures for personnel 

designated to carry out site emergency 

actions, other onsite workers would also 

be protected because the onsite 

protective measures that were deemed 

appropriate to protect against a hostile 

action event would be provided via 

plant page announcements or at the 

direction of site security personnel to 

the site as a whole and would not be 

directed to any particular group of 

workers. The new requirement would 

not direct any specific actions, but 

would allow licensees flexibility to 

determine the most effective protective 

measures for onsite personnel 

protection on a site-specific basis. It also 

would allow licensees to take advantage 

of new technologies or other 

innovations that could further enhance 

the protection of workers. (A discussion 

of this issue is also provided in Section 

II.A.5 of this document.) 

If this proposed rule becomes final, 

the NRC proposes to make it effective 30 

days after publication of the final rule 

in the Federal Register. Licensees and 

applicants, as applicable, would be 

permitted to defer implementation of 

the final rule until 180 days after 

publication of the final rule in the 


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Federal Register, except for the 

following proposed rule changes: 

(1) The requirements under proposed 

§ 50.54(q) (emergency plan change 

process), which would become effective 

30 days after publication of the final 

rule in the Federal Register; 

(2) The requirements under proposed 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. 

(challenging drills and exercises), which 

each applicable licensee would be 

required to implement no later than its 

first biennial exercise conducted more 

than one year after the effective date of 

the rule. Also, the implementation 

schedule for the proposed changes in 

Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. would 

allow licensees to complete biennial 

exercises that would already be in the 

planning process when the final rule 

becomes effective, without having to 

consider the new requirements of the 

final rule. This schedule also would 

have the general effect of allowing 

exercises which meet the new 

requirements to be conducted over a 

two-year period, following the effective 

date of the final rule, thereby allowing 

licensees and the NRC to gain 

experience during initial 

implementation. Consideration will be 

given to States with multiple reactor 

sites for the implementation schedule of 

the exercise requirement under 

Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.; and 

(3) The requirements under proposed 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. 

(backup means for alert and notification 

systems), which each applicable 

licensee would be required to 

implement no later than its first biennial 

exercise conducted more than one year 

after the effective date of the rule. The 

implementation schedule for the 

proposed changes in Appendix E, 

Section IV.D.3. would provide licensees 

a maximum of approximately 3 years for 

implementation across the industry. 

VI. Guidance 

The NRC proposes to revise existing 

guidance and provide new guidance for 

the new requirements in this proposed 

rule. This guidance is intended to 

provide an acceptable method of how 

licensees and applicants can meet the 

requirements of the proposed rule. Final 

guidance would be published 

concurrently with publication of the 

final rule. 

VII. Criminal Penalties 

Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, as amended (AEA), provides for 

criminal sanctions for willful violation 

of, attempted violation of, or conspiracy 

to violate, any regulation issued under 

Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. 

For the purposes of Section 223 of the 

AEA, the Commission is proposing to 

amend 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 and 

Appendix E to Part 50 under Sections 

161b, 161i, and 161o of the AEA. 

VIII. Agreement State Compatibility 

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement States Programs,’’ approved 

by the Commission on June 20, 1997, 

and published in the Federal Register 

(62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this 

rule is classified as compatibility 

‘‘NRC.’’ Compatibility is not required for 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC 

program elements in this category are 

those that relate directly to areas of 

regulation reserved to the NRC by the 

AEA or the provisions of this chapter. 

Although an Agreement State may not 

adopt program elements reserved to the 

NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees 

of certain requirements by a mechanism 

that is consistent with the particular 

States administrative procedure laws. 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations do not 

confer regulatory authority on the State. 

IX. Availability of Documents 

The NRC is making the documents 

identified below available to interested 

persons through one or more of the 

following methods, as indicated. 

Public Document Room (PDR). The 

NRC Public Document Room is located 

at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. 

Regulations.gov (Web). These 

documents may be viewed and 

downloaded electronically through the 

Federal e-Rulemaking Portal http:// 

www.regulations.gov, Docket number 

NRC–2008–0122. 

NRC’s Electronic Reading Room 

(ERR). The NRC’s public electronic 

reading room is located at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. 

Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS) 

NRC Order EA–02–026, ‘‘Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory 

Measures,’’ issued February 25, 2002.

X .................... ML020510635 

SRM–M041214B—‘‘Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1:00 

p.m., Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners’ Conference Room, One White 

Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),’’ dated December 20, 

2004.

X .................... ML043550354 

Bulletin 2005–02 (BL–05–02), ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for 

Security-Based Events,’’ dated July 18, 2005.

X .................... ML051990027 

SECY–06–0200, ‘‘Results of the Review of Emergency Preparedness Regulations and 

Guidance,’’ dated September 20, 2006.

X .................... ML061910707 

SRM to SECY–06–0200, ‘‘Results of the Review of Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance’’ dated January 8, 2007.X .................... ML070080411 

Memorandum to the Commission, ‘‘Rulemaking Plan for Enhancements to Emergency 

Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,’’ dated April 17, 2007.

X .................... ML070440148 

SRM–M060502, ‘‘Staff Requirements—Briefing on Status of Emergency Planning Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006, Commissioners’ 

Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to public attendance)’’ dated June 29, 2006.

X .................... ML061810014 

‘‘Summary of March 5, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Emergency Preparedness Draft Preliminary Rule Language,’’ dated April 3, 2008.X X ML080940227 

Draft Preliminary Rule Language, Emergency Preparedness Rulemaking, February, 

2008.

X X ML080370069 

‘‘Summary of July 8, 2008 Meeting to Discuss Comments on Emergency Preparedness 

Draft Preliminary Rule Language,’’ dated August 6, 2008.

X X ML082180005 

Order EA–02–261, ‘‘Access Authorization Order,’’ issued January 7, 2003 (January 13, 

2003; 68 FR 1643).

X .................... ML030060360 

Order EA–03–039, ‘‘Security Personnel Training and Qualification Requirements (Training) Order,’’ issued April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24514).X .................... ML030910625 

Order EA–03–086, ‘‘Revised Design Basis Threat Order,’’ issued April 29, 2003 (May 7, 

2003; 68 FR 24517).

X .................... ML030740002 


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Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS) 

Federal Register Notice—Final Rule to Amend 10 CFR 73.1: Design Basis Threat 

(March 19, 2007; 72 FR 12705).

X .................... ML070520692 

Information Notice (IN) 91–77, ‘‘Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated November 26, 1991.X .................... ML031190405 

IN 93–81, ‘‘Implementation of Engineering Expertise On-Shift,’’ dated October 12, 1993 X .................... ML031070314 

IN 95–48, ‘‘Results of Shift Staffing Study,’’ dated October 10, 1995 ............................... X .................... ML031060170 

NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1, ‘‘Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 

Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,’’ 

dated November 1980.

X .................... ML040420012 

NUMARC/NESP–007, Revision 2, ‘‘Methodology for Development of Emergency Action 

Levels,’’ dated January 1992.

X .................... ML041120174 

NEI 99–01, Revision 5, ‘‘Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Level,’’ 

dated September 2007.

X .................... ML073330643 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2004–15, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,’’ 

dated October 18, 2004.

X .................... Non-Publicly Available. 

NEI 06–04, ‘‘Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,’’ Rev. 1, 

dated October 30, 2007.

X .................... ML073100460 

RIS 2008–08, ‘‘Endorsement of Revision 1 to Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06–04, ‘‘Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,’’ 

dated March 19, 2008.

X .................... ML080110116 

IN 2002–25, ‘‘Challenges to Licensees’ Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and 

Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,’’ dated August 26, 2002.

X .................... ML022380474 

IN 2005–06, ‘‘Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System Tone Alert Radio Capability,’’ dated March 30, 2005.X .................... ML050680335 

IN 2006–28, ‘‘Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,’’ dated December 22, 2006.X .................... ML062790341 

IN 1996–19, ‘‘Failure of Tone Alert Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,’’ dated April 2, 1996.X .................... ML031060187 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ‘‘Station Blackout,’’ issued August 1988 ........................... X .................... ML003740034 

IN 85–80, ‘‘Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications,’’ dated October 15, 1985.X .................... ML031180307 

Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS)–2, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness Position 

(EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions,’’ dated August 1, 

1995.

X .................... ML023040462 

NUREG/CR–6953 Vol. 1, ‘‘Review of NUREG–0654 Supplement 3, Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,’’ dated December 2007.X .................... ML080360602 

NUREG/CR–6863, ‘‘Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated January 2005.

X .................... ML050250240 

NUREG/CR–6864, ‘‘Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations,’’ dated January 2005.X .................... ML050250245 

Withdrawal of Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) 4, ‘‘Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Changes,’’ dated November 19, 1998.X .................... ML050800537 

RIS 2005–02, ‘‘Clarifying the Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes,’’ dated 

February 14, 2005.

X .................... ML042580404 

‘‘Summary of the Public Meeting to Discuss Selected Topics for the Review of Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ dated September 27, 2005.

X .................... ML052650446 

‘‘Discussion of NREP ‘Parking Lot’ Items,’’ dated August 11, 2005 .................................. X .................... ML052000263 

Transcripts for August 31, 2005 and September 1, 2005 Portion of the Emergency Preparedness Public Meeting.X .................... ML052620366 

‘‘Summary and Analysis of Comments (Received Between August 31 and October 31, 

2005),’’ dated February 28, 2006.

X .................... ML060450376 

‘‘Summary and Analysis of Site-Specific Comments (Received Between August 31 and 

October 31, 2005),’’ dated March 31, 2006.

X .................... ML060860401 

Transcript of Public Meeting for Follow Up Discussions of Selected Topics for the Review of Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance for Commercial Nuclear 

Power Plants, held May 19, 2006.

.................... .................... ML061590186 

NUREG–0696, ‘‘Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,’’ dated February 

1981.

X .................... ML051390358 

SRM to SECY–04–0236, ‘‘Southern Nuclear Operating Company’s Proposal to Establish a Common Emergency Operating Facility at Its Corporate Headquarters,’’ dated 

February 23, 2005.

X .................... ML050550131 

NUREG–0737, ‘‘Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,’’ Supplement 1, ‘‘Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities,’’ dated January 1983.X .................... ML051390367 

Comments submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute on EP draft preliminary rule language 

(Letter identifier for comments: NEI1–X).

X X ML081690809 

Comments submitted by Union of Concerned Scientists on EP draft preliminary rule language (Letter identifier for comments: NGO1–X).X X ML081840067 

Comments submitted by PA Bureau of Radiation Protection on EP draft preliminary rule 

language (Letter identifier for comments: SPA1–X).

X X ML081690778 

EP proposed rule Regulatory Analysis and Backfit Analysis ............................................. X X ML091180228 

EP proposed rule Environmental Assessment ................................................................... X X ML091180223 

EP Paperwork Burden Analysis .......................................................................................... X X ML091180224 


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Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS) 

NRC comment responses for EP draft preliminary rule language ..................................... X X ML091180198 

X. Plain Language 

The Presidential memorandum ‘‘Plain 

Language in Government Writing’’ 

published on June 10, 1998 (63 FR 

31883), directed that the Government’s 

documents be in clear and accessible 

language. The NRC requests comments 

on the proposed rule specifically with 

respect to the clarity and effectiveness 

of the language used. Comments should 

be sent to the NRC as explained in the 

ADDRESSES heading of this document. 

XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995, Public 

Law 104–113, requires that Federal 

agencies use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies unless 

using such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or is otherwise 

impractical. The NRC is not aware of 

any voluntary consensus standard that 

could be used instead of the proposed 

Government-unique standards. The NRC 

will consider using a voluntary 

consensus standard if an appropriate 

standard is identified. 

XII. Finding of No Significant 

Environmental Impact: Availability 

The Commission has determined 

under the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the 

Commission’s regulations in Subpart A, 

‘‘National Environmental Policy Act; 

Regulations Implementing Section 

102(2),’’ of 10 CFR Part 51, 

‘‘Environmental Protection Regulations 

for Domestic Licensing and Related 

Regulatory Functions,’’ that this rule, if 

adopted, would not be a major Federal 

action significantly affecting the quality 

of the human environment and, 

therefore, an environmental impact 

statement is not required. 

The determination of this 

environmental assessment is that there 

will be no significant offsite impact to 

the public from this action. However, 

the general public should note that the 

NRC is seeking public participation and 

the environmental assessment is 

available as indicated in Section IX of 

this document. Comments on any aspect 

of the environmental assessment may be 

submitted to the NRC as indicated 

under the ADDRESSES heading of this 

document. 

The NRC has sent a copy of the 

environmental assessment and this 

proposed rule to every State Liaison 

Officer and requested their comments 

on the environmental assessment. 

XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

The proposed rule contains new or 

amended information collection 

requirements that are subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget for review and approval of 

the information collection requirements. 

Type of submission, new or revision: 

Revision. 

The title of the information collection: 

10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of 

Production and Utilization Facilities.’’ 

The form number if applicable: Not 

applicable. 

How often the collection is required: 

One-time, on occasion and annually 

Who will be required or asked to 

report: Operating nuclear power 

reactors. 

An estimate of the number of annual 

responses: 987. 

The estimated number of annual 

respondents: 97. 

An estimate of the total number of 

hours needed annually to complete the 

requirement or request: 177,242 hours. 

Abstract: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) regulations in 10 

CFR 50.34, 50.47, 50.54, and 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix E prescribe 

requirements for emergency 

preparedness plans and coordination in 

protecting nuclear power reactors, nonpower reactors, and the surrounding 

community against consequences 

resulting from accidents and sabotage. 

The proposed rule contains reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements, 

including those for third parties, which 

are necessary to help ensure that an 

adequate level of emergency 

preparedness is attained by nuclear 

power reactor licensees, non-power 

reactors, and the surrounding 

community. This revision addresses 

changes in information collections 

contained in the proposed rule, 

‘‘Enhancements to Emergency 

Preparedness Regulations.’’ Specifically, 

the draft proposed rule results in 

changes to information collection 

requirements in § 50.47, § 50.54, and 10 

CFR Part 50, Appendix E. 

The NRC is seeking public comment 

on the potential impact of the 

information collections contained in 

this proposed rule and on the following 

issues: 

1. Is the proposed information 

collection necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

NRC, including whether the information 

will have practical utility? 

2. Estimate of burden? 

3. Is there a way to enhance the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected? 

4. How can the burden of the 

information collection be minimized, 

including the use of automated 

collection techniques? 

A copy of the OMB clearance package 

may be viewed free of charge at the NRC 

Public Document Room, One White 

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room 

O–1F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The 

OMB clearance package and rule are 

available at the NRC worldwide Web 

site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/ 

doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 

days after the signature date of this 

notice. 

Send comments on any aspect of 

these proposed information collections, 

including suggestions for reducing the 

burden and on the above issues, by June 

17, 2009 to the Records and FOIA/ 

Privacy Services Branch (T–5F52), U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, or by 

e-mail to 

INFOCOLLECTS.RESOURCE@NRC.GOV 

and to the Desk Officer, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

NEOB–10202 (3150–0011), Office of 

Management and Budget, Washington, 

DC 20503. Comments received after this 

date will be considered if it is practical 

to do so, but assurance of consideration 

cannot be given to comments received 

after this date. You may also e-mail 

comments to 

Christine.Kymn@omb.eop.gov or 

comment by telephone at (202) 395– 

4638. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

XIV. Regulatory Analysis: Availability 

The Commission has prepared a draft 

regulatory analysis on this proposed 

regulation. The analysis examines the 

costs and benefits of the alternatives 

considered by the Commission. The 

Commission requests public comments 


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23282 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

on the draft regulatory analysis. 

Availability of the regulatory analysis is 

indicated in Section IX of this 

document. Comments on the draft 

analysis may be submitted to the NRC 

as indicated under the ADDRESSES

heading. 

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

(5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission 

certifies that this rule would not, if 

promulgated, have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. This proposed 

rule affects only the licensing and 

operation of nuclear power plants. The 

companies that own these plants do not 

fall within the scope of the definition of 

‘‘small entities’’ set forth in the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size 

standards established by the NRC (10 

CFR 2.810). 

XVI. Backfit Analysis 

As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the 

Commission has completed a backfit 

analysis for the proposed rule. The 

Commission finds that the backfits 

contained in the proposed rule, when 

considered in the aggregate, would 

constitute a substantial increase in 

emergency preparedness and would be 

justified in view of this increased 

protection of the public health and 

safety. Availability of the backfit 

analysis is indicated in Section IX of 

this document. 

List of Subjects 

10 CFR Part 50 

Antitrust, Classified information, 

Criminal penalties, Fire protection, 

Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear 

power plants and reactors, Radiation 

protection, Reactor siting criteria, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

10 CFR Part 52 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, 

Combined license, Early site permit, 

Emergency planning, Fees, Inspections, 

Limited work authorization, Nuclear 

power plants and reactors, Probabilistic 

risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor 

siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements, 

Standard design, Standard design 

certification. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC 

is proposing to adopt the following 

amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Part 

52. 

PART 50—DOMESTIC LICENSING OF 

PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 

FACILITIES 

1. The authority citation for Part 50 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 

182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 

948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 

234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 

2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 

2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 

202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 

1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 

112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy 

Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 

Stat. 594 (2005). Section 50.7 also issued 

under Pub. L. 95–601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 

(42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued 

under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, 

Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). 

Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also 

issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23, 

50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec. 

185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 

50.33a, 50.55a and Appendix Q also issued 

under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853 

(42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 

also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 

U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and 

50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97–415, 96 

Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 

also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 

U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80 and 50.81 also 

issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also 

issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 

2237). 

2. Section 50.47 is amended by 

revising paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(10) and 

(d)(1) to read as follows: 

§ 50.47 Emergency plans. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(3) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using assistance resources 

have been made, arrangements to 

accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee’s Emergency Operations 

Facility have been made, and other 

organizations capable of augmenting the 

planned response have been identified. 

* * * * * 

(10) A range of protective actions has 

been developed for the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for emergency workers 

and the public. In developing this range 

of actions, consideration has been given 

to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a 

supplement to these, the prophylactic 

use of potassium iodide (KI), as 

appropriate. Evacuation time estimates 

have been developed by applicants and 

licensees and must be updated on a 

periodic basis. Evacuation time 

estimates and updates must be 

submitted by applicants and licensees to 

the NRC for review and approval. 

Guidelines for the choice of protective 

actions during an emergency, consistent 

with Federal guidance, are developed 

and in place, and protective actions for 

the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ 

appropriate to the locale have been 

developed. 

* * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(1) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using offsite assistance on 

site have been made, arrangements to 

accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee’s Emergency Operations 

Facility have been made, and other 

organizations capable of augmenting the 

planned onsite response have been 

identified. 

* * * * * 

3. Section 50.54 is amended as 

follows: 

a. Revise paragraphs (q), (s)(1), (gg)(1), 

(gg)(1)(i), and (gg)(2); 

b. Remove and reserve paragraphs (r), 

(s)(2)(i), and (u). 

§ 50.54 Conditions of licenses. 

* * * * * 

(q) Emergency Plans. (1) Definitions 

for the purpose of this section: 

(i) Change means an action that 

results in modification or addition to, or 

removal from, the licensee’s emergency 

plan or the resources, capabilities, and 

methods identified in the plan. All such 

changes are subject to the provisions of 

this section except where the applicable 

regulations establish specific criteria for 

accomplishing a particular change. 

(ii) Emergency plan means the 

document(s), prepared and maintained 

by the licensee, that identify and 

describe the licensee’s methods for 

maintaining and performing emergency 

planning functions. An emergency plan 

includes the plans as originally 

approved by the NRC and all 

subsequent changes made by the 

licensee with, and without, prior NRC 

review and approval under § 50.54(q). 

(iii) Emergency planning function 

means a capability or resource necessary 

to prepare for and respond to a 

radiological emergency, as set forth in 

the elements of section IV. of appendix 

E to this part and, for nuclear power 

reactors, the planning standards of 

§ 50.47(b). 

(iv) Reduction in effectiveness means 

a change in an emergency plan that 

results in reducing the licensee’s 

capability to perform an emergency 

planning function in the event of a 

radiological emergency. 

(2) A holder of a license under this 

part, or a combined license under part 


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52 of this chapter after the Commission 

makes the finding under § 52.103(g) of 

this chapter, shall follow and maintain 

the effectiveness of an emergency plan 

that meets the requirements in appendix 

E to this part and, for nuclear power 

reactor licensees, the planning 

standards of § 50.47(b). 

(3) The licensee may make changes to 

its emergency plan without NRC 

approval only if the licensee can 

demonstrate through analysis that the 

changes do not reduce the effectiveness 

of the plan and the plan, as changed, 

continues to meet the requirements in 

appendix E to this part and, for nuclear 

power reactor licensees, the planning 

standards of § 50.47(b). 

(4) The changes to a licensee’s 

emergency plan that reduce the 

effectiveness of the plans as defined in 

§ 50.54(q)(1)(iv) may not be 

implemented without prior approval by 

the NRC. A licensee desiring to make 

such a change shall submit an 

application for an amendment to its 

license. In addition to the filing 

requirements of §§ 50.90 and 50.91, the 

request must include all emergency plan 

pages affected by that change and must 

be accompanied by a forwarding letter 

identifying the change, the reason for 

the change, and the basis for concluding 

that the licensee’s emergency plan, as 

revised, will continue to meet the 

requirements in appendix E to this part 

and, for nuclear power reactor licensees, 

the planning standards of § 50.47(b). 

(5) The licensee shall retain a record 

of each change to the emergency plan 

made without prior NRC approval for a 

period of three years from the date of 

the change and shall submit, as 

specified in § 50.4, a report of each such 

change, including its analysis, within 30 

days after the change is made. 

(6) The nuclear power reactor licensee 

shall retain the emergency plan and 

each change for which prior NRC 

approval was obtained pursuant to 

§ 50.54(q)(4) as a record until the 

Commission terminates the license for 

the nuclear power reactor. 

* * * * * 

(r) [Reserved] 

* * * * * 

(s)(1) Generally, the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors 

shall consist of an area about 10 miles 

(16 km) in radius and the ingestion 

pathway EPZ shall consist of an area 

about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The 

exact size and configuration of the EPZs 

for a particular nuclear power reactor 

shall be determined in relation to local 

emergency response needs and 

capabilities as they are affected by such 

conditions as demography, topography, 

land characteristics, access routes, and 

jurisdictional boundaries. The size of 

the EPZs also may be determined on a 

case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear 

reactors and for reactors with an 

authorized power level less than 250 

MW thermal. The plans for the ingestion 

pathway EPZ shall focus on such 

actions as are appropriate to protect the 

food ingestion pathway. 

* * * * * 

(2)(i) Reserved. 

* * * * * 

(u) [Reserved] 

* * * * * 

(gg)(1) Notwithstanding 10 CFR 

52.103, if following the conduct of the 

exercise required by paragraph IV.f.2.a 

of appendix E to part 50 of this chapter, 

FEMA identifies one or more 

deficiencies in the state of offsite 

emergency preparedness, the holder of a 

combined license under 10 CFR part 52 

may operate at up to 5 percent of rated 

thermal power only if the Commission 

finds that the state of onsite emergency 

preparedness provides reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective 

measures can and will be taken in the 

event of a radiological emergency. The 

NRC will base this finding on its 

assessment of the applicant’s onsite 

emergency plans against the pertinent 

standards in § 50.47 and appendix E to 

this part. Review of the applicant’s 

emergency plans will include the 

following standards with offsite aspects: 

(i) Arrangements for requesting and 

effectively using offsite assistance onsite 

have been made, arrangements to 

accommodate State and local staff at the 

licensee’s Emergency Operations 

Facility have been made, and other 

organizations capable of augmenting the 

planned onsite response have been 

identified. 

* * * * * 

(2) The condition in this paragraph, 

regarding operation at up to 5 percent 

power, ceases to apply 30 days after 

FEMA informs the NRC that the offsite 

deficiencies have been corrected, unless 

the NRC notifies the combined license 

holder before the expiration of the 30- 

day period that the Commission finds 

under paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) of this 

section that the state of emergency 

preparedness does not provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency. 

* * * * * 

4. In Appendix E to Part 50, Section 

IV. is amended as follows: 

a. Revise the introductory text to the 

section, paragraphs A., A.2.c., A.7., B.1., 

B.2., C.1., C.2., D.3., E.5., E.8., E.9.c., 

E.9.d., F.1., F.2.a., F.2.a(ii), F.2.a(iii), 

F.2.b., F.2.f., F.2.g.; 

b. Redesignate E.8. as E.8.a.; add new 

paragraphs E.8.b., E.8.c., E.8.d., and 

E.8.e.; and 

c. Add new paragraphs A.9., F.2.i., 

F.2.j., F.2.k., and I.,, redesignate 

footnotes 3 through 11, as footnotes 4 

through 12 and add a new footnote 3 to 

paragraph IV.A.7. 

Appendix E to Part 50—Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness for 

Production and Utilization Facilities 

* * * * * 

IV. Content of Emergency Plans 

The applicant’s emergency plans shall 

contain, but not necessarily be limited to, 

information needed to demonstrate 

compliance with the elements set forth 

below, i.e., organization for coping with 

radiological emergencies, assessment action, 

activation of emergency organization, 

notification procedures, emergency facilities 

and equipment, training, maintaining 

emergency preparedness, and recovery. In 

addition, the emergency response plans 

submitted by an applicant for a nuclear 

power reactor operating license under this 

part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) 

or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, 

shall contain information needed to 

demonstrate compliance with the standards 

described in § 50.47(b), and they will be 

evaluated against those standards. The 

applicant shall also provide an analysis of 

the time required to evacuate and for taking 

other protective actions for various sectors 

and distances within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for transient and permanent 

populations. NRC-approved evacuation time 

estimates (ETEs) and updates to the ETEs 

shall be used by licensees in the formulation 

of protective action recommendations and 

must be provided to State and local 

governmental authorities for use in 

developing protective action strategies. 

Within 180 days of issuance of the decennial 

census data by the U.S. Census Bureau, 

nuclear power reactor licensees and license 

applicants shall develop an ETE and submit 

it to the NRC for review and approval under 

§ 50.4. During the years between decennial 

censuses, licensees shall estimate permanent 

resident population changes at least annually 

using U.S. Census Bureau data and/or State/ 

local government population estimates. 

Licensees shall maintain these estimates so 

that they are available for NRC inspection 

during the period between censuses and shall 

submit these estimates to the NRC with any 

updated ETEs. If at any time during the 

decennial period, the population of either the 

EPZ or the most populous Emergency 

Response Planning Area increases or 

decreases by more than 10 percent from the 

population that formed the basis for the 

licensee’s currently approved ETE, the ETE 

must be updated to reflect the impact of that 

population change. This updated ETE must 

be submitted to the NRC for review and 

approval under § 50.4 no later than 180 days 

after the licensee’s determination that a 


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23284 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

3A hostile action is an act directed toward a 

nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes 

the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take 

hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve 

an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water 

using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or 

other devices used to deliver destructive force. 

population change of more than 10 percent 

has occurred. 

A. Organization 

The organization for coping with 

radiological emergencies shall be described, 

including definition of authorities, 

responsibilities, and duties of individuals 

assigned to the licensee’s emergency 

organization and the means for notification of 

such individuals in the event of an 

emergency. Specifically, the following shall 

be included: 

* * * * * 

2. A description of the onsite emergency 

response organization (ERO) with a detailed 

discussion of: 

* * * * * 

c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties 

of an onsite emergency coordinator who shall 

be in charge of the exchange of information 

with offsite authorities responsible for 

coordinating and implementing offsite 

emergency measures. 

* * * * * 

7. Identification of, and assistance 

expected from, appropriate State, local, and 

Federal agencies with responsibilities for 

coping with emergencies. Nuclear power 

plant licensees shall ensure that offsite 

response organization resources (e.g., local 

law enforcement, firefighting, medical 

assistance) are available to respond to an 

emergency including a hostile action 3 event 

at the nuclear power plant site. 

* * * * * 

9. Nuclear power plant licensees under this 

part and Part 52 must provide a detailed 

analysis demonstrating that on-shift 

personnel assigned emergency plan 

implementation functions are not assigned 

any responsibilities that would prevent the 

timely performance of their assigned 

functions as specified in the emergency plan. 

B. Assessment Actions 

* * * * * 

1. The means to be used for determining 

the magnitude of, and for continually 

assessing the impact of, the release of 

radioactive materials shall be described, 

including emergency action levels that are to 

be used as criteria for determining the need 

for notification and participation of local and 

State agencies, the Commission, and other 

Federal agencies, and the emergency action 

levels that are to be used for determining 

when and what type of protective measures 

should be considered within and outside the 

site boundary to protect health and safety. 

The emergency action levels shall be based 

on in-plant conditions and instrumentation 

in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. 

These action levels must include hostile 

action events that may adversely affect the 

nuclear power plant. These initial emergency 

action levels shall be discussed and agreed 

on by the applicant or licensee and state and 

local governmental authorities, and approved 

by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action 

levels shall be reviewed with the State and 

local governmental authorities on an annual 

basis. 

2. A revision to an emergency action level 

scheme must be submitted as specified in 

§ 50.4 for NRC approval before 

implementation if the licensee is changing 

from an emergency action level scheme based 

upon NUREG–0654 to another emergency 

action level scheme based upon NUMARC/ 

NESP–007 or NEI 99–01. The licensee shall 

follow the change process in § 50.54(q) for all 

other emergency action level changes. 

* * * * * 

C. Activation of Emergency Organization 

1. The entire spectrum of emergency 

conditions that involve the alerting or 

activating of progressively larger segments of 

the total emergency organization shall be 

described. The communication steps to be 

taken to alert or activate emergency 

personnel under each class of emergency 

shall be described. Emergency action levels 

(based not only on onsite and offsite 

radiation monitoring information but also on 

readings from a number of sensors that 

indicate a potential emergency, such as the 

pressure in containment and the response of 

the Emergency Core Cooling System) for 

notification of offsite agencies shall be 

described. The existence, but not the details, 

of a message authentication scheme shall be 

noted for such agencies. The emergency 

classes defined shall include: (1) Notification 

of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site area 

emergency, and (4) general emergency. These 

classes are further discussed in NUREG– 

0654/FEMA–REP–1. 

2. Nuclear power plant licensees and 

applicants under this part and Part 52 shall 

establish and maintain the capability to 

assess, classify, and declare an emergency 

condition within 15 minutes after the 

availability of indications to plant operators 

that an emergency action level has been 

exceeded and shall promptly declare the 

emergency condition as soon as possible 

following a determination that an emergency 

action level has been exceeded. These criteria 

must not be construed as a grace period to 

attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid 

declaring an emergency action due to an EAL 

that has been exceeded. These criteria must 

not be construed as preventing 

implementation of response actions deemed 

by the licensee to be necessary to protect 

public health and safety provided that any 

delay in declaration does not deny the State 

and local authorities the opportunity to 

implement measures necessary to protect the 

public health and safety. 

D. Notification Procedures 

* * * * * 

3. A licensee shall have the capability to 

notify responsible State and local 

governmental agencies within 15 minutes 

after declaring an emergency. The licensee 

shall demonstrate that the appropriate 

governmental authorities have the capability 

to make a public alerting and notification 

decision promptly on being informed by the 

licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to 

initial operation greater than 5 percent of 

rated thermal power of the first reactor at a 

site, each nuclear power reactor licensee 

shall demonstrate that administrative and 

physical means have been established for 

alerting and providing prompt instructions to 

the public within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ. The design objective of the 

prompt public alert and notification system 

shall be to have the capability to essentially 

complete the initial alerting and initiate 

notification of the public within the plume 

exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 

minutes. The use of this alerting and 

notification capability will range from 

immediate alerting and notification of the 

public (within 15 minutes of the time that 

State and local officials are notified that a 

situation exists requiring urgent action) to the 

more likely events where there is substantial 

time available for the appropriate 

governmental authorities to make a judgment 

whether or not to activate the public alert 

and notification system. The licensee shall 

identify and demonstrate that the appropriate 

governmental authorities have both the 

administrative and physical means for a 

backup method of public alerting and 

notification capable of being used in the 

event the primary method of alerting and 

notification is unavailable during an 

emergency to alert or notify all or portions of 

the plume exposure pathway EPZ 

population. The backup method shall have 

the capability to alert and notify the public 

within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but 

does not need to meet the 15-minute design 

objective for the primary prompt public alert 

and notification system. When there is a 

decision to activate the alert and notification 

system, the appropriate governmental 

authorities will determine whether to 

activate the entire alert and notification 

system simultaneously or in a graduated or 

staged manner. The responsibility for 

activating such a public alert and notification 

system shall remain with the appropriate 

governmental authorities. 

A licensee under this part or Part 52 shall 

implement the requirements for a backup 

method of public alerting and notification 

under Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 no 

later than the first biennial exercise 

conducted at the site more than one year after 

[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE]. 

E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 

* * * * * 

5. Arrangements for the services of 

physicians and other medical personnel 

qualified to handle radiological emergencies 

on-site; 

* * * * * 

8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support 

center and an emergency operations facility 

from which effective direction can be given 

and effective control can be exercised during 

an emergency; (ii) For nuclear power plant 

licensees and applicants under this part and 

Part 52, a licensee onsite operational support 

center; 

b. For the emergency operations facility 

required by paragraph 8.a of this section, 

either a facility located between 10 miles and 

25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), 

or a primary facility located less than 10 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules 23285 

4Use of site specific simulators or computers is 

acceptable for any exercise. 

5Full participation when used in conjunction 

with emergency preparedness exercises for a 

particular site means appropriate offsite local and 

State authorities and licensee personnel physically 

and actively take part in testing their integrated 

capability to adequately assess and respond to an 

accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. ‘‘Full 

participation’’ includes testing major observable 

portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans 

and mobilization of state, local and licensee 

personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers 

to verify the capability to respond to the accident 

scenario. 

6Partial participation when used in conjunction 

with emergency preparedness exercises for a 

particular site means appropriate offset authorities 

shall actively take part in the exercise sufficient to 

test direction and control functions; i.e., (a) 

protective action decision making related to 

emergency action levels, and (b) communication 

capabilities among affected State and local 

authorities and the licensee. 

miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) 

and a backup facility located between 10 

miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power 

reactor site(s). An emergency operations 

facility may serve more than one nuclear 

power reactor site. An emergency operations 

facility may be located more than 25 miles 

from a nuclear power reactor site as long as 

provisions are made for locating NRC and 

offsite responders closer to the nuclear power 

reactor site so that NRC and offsite 

responders could interact face-to-face with 

emergency response personnel entering and 

leaving the nuclear power reactor site. 

Provisions for locating NRC and offsite 

responders closer to a nuclear power reactor 

site that is more than 25 miles from the 

emergency operations facility shall include 

the following: (1) Space for members of an 

NRC site team and Federal, State, and local 

responders; (2) additional space for 

conducting briefings with emergency 

response personnel; (3) communication links 

with other licensee and offsite emergency 

response facilities; (4) computer links to the 

site with Internet access; and (5) access to 

copying equipment and office supplies; 

c. For the emergency operations facility 

required by paragraph 8.a of this section, a 

facility having the following capabilities: (1) 

The capability for obtaining and displaying 

plant data and radiological information for 

each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site 

and for each nuclear power reactor site that 

the facility serves, (2) the capability to 

analyze plant technical information and 

provide technical briefings on event 

conditions and prognosis to licensee and 

offsite response organizations for each reactor 

at a nuclear power reactor site and for each 

nuclear power reactor site that the facility 

serves, and (3) the capability to support 

response to events occurring simultaneously 

at more than one nuclear power reactor site 

if the emergency operations facility serves 

more than one site; 

d. For nuclear power plant licensees and 

applicants under this part and Part 52, an 

alternative facility (or facilities) to function 

as a staging area for augmentation of 

emergency response staff and having the 

following characteristics: Accessibility even 

if the site is under threat or actual attack; 

communication links with the emergency 

operations facility, control room, and plant 

security; the capability to perform offsite 

notifications; and the capability for 

engineering assessment activities, including 

damage control team planning and 

preparation; for use when onsite emergency 

facilities cannot be safely accessed during a 

hostile action event. The alternative facility 

will also be equipped with general plant 

drawings and procedures, telephones, and 

computer links to the site; 

e. A licensee with an approved emergency 

operations facility on [INSERT THE 

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE] 

shall not be subject to the requirements of 

paragraph 8.b of this section; 

9. * * * 

* * * * * 

c. Provision for communications among the 

nuclear power reactor control room, the 

onsite technical support center, and the 

emergency operations facility; and among the 

nuclear facility, the principal State and local 

emergency operations centers, and the field 

assessment teams. Such communications 

systems shall be tested annually. 

d. Provisions for communications by the 

licensee with NRC Headquarters and the 

appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations 

Center from the nuclear power reactor 

control room, the onsite technical support 

center, and the emergency operations facility. 

Such communications shall be tested 

monthly. 

F. Training 

1. The program to provide for: (a) The 

training of employees and exercising, by 

periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure 

that employees of the licensee are familiar 

with their specific emergency response 

duties, and (b) The participation in the 

training and drills by other persons whose 

assistance may be needed in the event of a 

radiological emergency shall be described. 

This shall include a description of 

specialized initial training and periodic 

retraining programs to be provided to each of 

the following categories of emergency 

personnel: 

* * * * * 

2. The plan shall describe provisions for 

the conduct of emergency preparedness 

exercises as follows: Exercises shall test the 

adequacy of timing and content of 

implementing procedures and methods, test 

emergency equipment and communications 

networks, test the public notification system, 

and ensure that emergency organization 

personnel are familiar with their duties.4

a. An initial full participation 5 exercise 

which tests as much of the licensee, State, 

and local emergency plans as is reasonably 

achievable without mandatory public 

participation shall be conducted for each site 

at which a power reactor is located. Nuclear 

power plant licensees shall submit exercise 

scenarios under § 50.4 for prior NRC review 

and approval. 

* * * * * 

(ii) For a combined license issued under 

part 52 of this chapter, this exercise must be 

conducted within two years of the scheduled 

date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full 

participation exercise is conducted more 

than one year before the scheduled date for 

initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests 

the licensee’s onsite emergency plans must 

be conducted within one year before the 

scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. 

This exercise need not have State or local 

government participation. If FEMA identifies 

one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite 

emergency preparedness as the result of the 

first full participation exercise, or if the 

Commission finds that the state of emergency 

preparedness does not provide reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective measures 

can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency, the provisions of 

§ 50.54(gg) apply. 

(iii) For a combined licensee issued under 

part 52 of this chapter, if the applicant 

currently has an operating reactor at the site, 

an exercise, either full or partial 

participation,6 shall be conducted for each 

subsequent reactor constructed on the site. 

This exercise may be incorporated in the 

exercise requirements of Sections IV.F.2.b. 

and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies 

one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite 

emergency preparedness as the result of this 

exercise for the new reactor, or if the 

Commission finds that the state of emergency 

preparedness does not provide reasonable 

assurance that adequate protective measures 

can and will be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency, the provisions of 

§ 50.54(gg) apply. 

b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct 

a subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency 

plan every 2 years. Nuclear power plant 

licensees shall submit exercise scenarios 

under § 50.4 for prior NRC review and 

approval. The exercise may be included in 

the full participation biennial exercise 

required by paragraph 2.c. of this section. In 

addition, the licensee shall take actions 

necessary to ensure that adequate emergency 

response capabilities are maintained during 

the interval between biennial exercises by 

conducting drills, including at least one drill 

involving a combination of some of the 

principal functional areas of the licensee’s 

onsite emergency response capabilities. The 

principal functional areas of emergency 

response include activities such as 

management and coordination of emergency 

response, accident assessment, event 

classification, notification of offsite 

authorities, assessment of the onsite and 

offsite impact of radiological releases, 

protective action recommendation 

development, protective action decision 

making, and plant system repair and 

corrective actions. During these drills, 

activation of all of the licensee’s emergency 

response facilities (Technical Support Center 

(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and 

the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) 

would not be necessary, licensees would 

have the opportunity to consider accident 

management strategies, supervised 

instruction would be permitted, operating 

staff in all participating facilities would have 

the opportunity to resolve problems (success 

paths) rather than have controllers intervene, 

and the drills may focus on the onsite 

exercise training objectives. 

* * * * * 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS2
23286 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 94 / Monday, May 18, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

f. Remedial exercises will be required if the 

emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested 

during the biennial exercise, such that NRC, 

in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find 

reasonable assurance that adequate protective 

measures can be taken in the event of a 

radiological emergency or (2) determine that 

the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) 

has maintained key skills specific to 

emergency response. The extent of State and 

local participation in remedial exercises must 

be sufficient to show that appropriate 

corrective measures have been taken 

regarding the elements of the plan not 

properly tested in the previous exercises. 

g. All training, including exercises, shall 

provide for formal critiques in order to 

identify weak or deficient areas that need 

correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies 

that are identified during training evolutions, 

exercises, or drills must be corrected. 

* * * * * 

i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise 

scenarios that provide reasonable assurance 

that anticipatory responses will not result 

from preconditioning of participants. Such 

scenarios for nuclear power plant licensees 

under this part and Part 52 must include a 

wide spectrum of radiological releases and 

events, including hostile action events. 

Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate 

must emphasize coordination among onsite 

and offsite response organizations. 

j. The exercises conducted under 

paragraph 2 of this section by nuclear power 

plant licensees under this part and Part 52 

must provide the opportunity for the ERO to 

demonstrate proficiency in the key skills 

necessary to implement the principal 

functional areas of emergency response 

identified in paragraph 2.b of this section. 

Each exercise must provide the opportunity 

for the ERO to demonstrate key skills specific 

to emergency response duties in the control 

room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint information 

center. Additionally, in each six calendar 

year exercise planning cycle, nuclear power 

plant licensees under this part and Part 52 

shall vary the content of scenarios during 

exercises conducted under paragraph 2 of 

this section to provide the opportunity for 

the ERO to demonstrate proficiency in the 

key skills necessary to respond to the 

following scenario elements: Hostile action 

directed at the plant site (at an exercise 

frequency of at least once every 8 years), no 

radiological release or an unplanned minimal 

radiological release that does not require 

public protective actions, an initial 

classification of or rapid escalation to a Site 

Area Emergency or General Emergency, 

implementation of strategies, procedures, and 

guidance developed under § 50.54(hh), and 

integration of offsite resources with onsite 

response. The licensee shall maintain a 

record of exercises conducted during each 

six-year exercise planning cycle that 

documents the contents of scenarios used to 

comply with the requirements of this 

paragraph. 

k. A licensee under this part or Part 52 

shall implement the requirements under Part 

50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. no later than 

its first biennial exercise conducted at the 

site more than one year after [EFFECTIVE 

DATE OF THE FINAL RULE]. 

* * * * * 

I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile 

Action Events. 

For nuclear power plant licensees under 

this part and Part 52, a range of protective 

actions to protect onsite personnel during 

hostile action events must be developed to 

ensure the continued ability of the licensee 

to safely shut down the reactor and perform 

the functions of the licensee’s emergency 

plan. 

PART 52—LICENSES, 

CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS 

FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 

5. The authority citation for Part 52 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 

186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 

956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 

2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 

Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 

1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). 

6. In Section 52.79, paragraph (a)(17) 

is revised to read as follows: 

§ 52.79 Contents of applications; technical 

information in final safety analysis report. 

(a) * * * 

(17) The information with respect to 

compliance with technically relevant 

positions of the Three Mile Island 

requirements in § 50.34(f) of this 

chapter, with the exception of 

§§ 50.34(f)(1)(xii), (f)(2)(ix), (f)(2)(xxv), 

and (f)(3)(v); 

* * * * * 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day 

of May 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E9–10947 Filed 5–15–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 


cprice-sewell on PRODPC61 with PROPOSALS2