Filed 4/5/23 In re Clayton B. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Clayton B., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ESTELA L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B319817

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No 21CCJP01791)

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Commissioner. 

Affirmed.
2

David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey M. Blount, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Estela L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

awarding mother monitored visitation with her son (Clayton B.)

under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 362.4 and the 

judgment upon terminating jurisdiction. Mother argues the court 

erred in denying her request for unmonitored visits. We disagree 

and affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Dependency referral and petition

The family consists of mother, father, and their son Clayton 

B. (born May 2006).

2 The family has an extensive referral history 

beginning in 1998 including substantiated allegations of sexual 

abuse, physical abuse, general neglect, emotional abuse, and 

domestic violence. In 2005, prior to Clayton’s birth, a dependency 

proceeding stemming from mother and father’s domestic violence, 

father’s substance abuse, mother’s inappropriate discipline, and 

father’s sexual abuse of one of the children resulted in a grant of 

sole legal and physical custody of the children to mother. In 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

2 Mother and father are parents to approximately five or six 

other older children (the record is not clear as to the exact 

number), but they are not parties to this case.
3

2012, a dependency proceeding prompted by father’s 

inappropriate discipline and mother’s lack of protection resulted 

in a grant of physical custody of five children, including Clayton, 

to mother. Recent referrals included allegations of mother 

hitting father with an iron, a piece of glass, and a laptop on 

separate occasions, including in the presence of one of their 

grandchildren. Police call logs reflected four calls to the home 

over the past year because of conflicts between mother and 

father.

3

The current matter came to the attention of the Los 

Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) in March 2021 after a referral alleging domestic violence 

between mother and father in Clayton’s presence. When 

interviewed, father confirmed that, on the day of the incident, he 

was in the garage working on his car when a female neighbor 

came by and said hello. Mother was watching from a window of 

the home, and subsequently approached him and accused him of 

cheating. Mother asked father to leave. Father initially refused,

but then relented and asked Clayton to help get the car ready. 

Mother continued to berate them and grabbed an axe and swung 

it at father, only to have Clayton take it away from her. Mother 

then went after father with a tire iron, which Clayton also took 

from mother. Clayton was not injured. Father called the police 

and mother was arrested.

3 Mother’s criminal history included arrests for assault with 

a deadly weapon and spousal battery, while father’s criminal 

history included convictions for forgery, grand theft, petty theft, 

possession of a controlled substance, robbery, and driving with a 

suspended license.
4

Father told DCFS that mother’s violence was escalating 

and she had used objects to try to hurt him in the past. Mother’s

“mood swings” and multiple personalities concerned father. 

Mother’s issues included jealousy and insecurity; mother quit her 

job so that she could be home to keep an eye on father. Father 

had also observed mother talking to herself and he had told 

mother she needed to seek help. Father did not believe that 

mother was a danger to Clayton.

When interviewed, Clayton confirmed that he had 

overheard mother accusing father of cheating on her, after which 

he had to intervene to grab an axe and tire iron from mother. 

Clayton also observed mother’s mood swings, talking to herself, 

and her “rages” against father over the last six months. Clayton 

felt safe and comfortable around father, but not mother, with 

whom he did not feel close. Mother kicked Clayton out of the 

home when he defended father.

Mother explained that the incident began when father was 

talking to a female friend and the friend did not acknowledge 

mother, which upset her. Mother confronted father, leading to an 

argument and father leaving the home. Father returned home 

the next day and the argument continued. Father told mother to 

leave the home. Mother then grabbed an axe but did not intend 

to hurt father. When Clayton took the axe away, mother grabbed 

a tire iron, only to have Clayton take the tire iron away. Mother 

was arrested and then father bailed her out.

Mother agreed that physical altercations were not 

appropriate in front of children. Father’s involving Clayton in

mother and father’s arguments made mother upset at times. 

Mother denied having any mental health issues, including mood 

swings or hallucinations, but acknowledged having moments 
5

where she does not understand what is happening. Mother 

wanted to work things out with father because they had been 

together for 30 years.

In interviews later that month, mother and father reported 

they had not yet enrolled in any programs because they were 

busy renovating the house. They were also attempting to 

reconcile. Father reported that he and mother recently had an 

argument, prompting him to leave the home to avoid further 

conflict.

Clayton denied any recent further incidents in the home, 

but said mother was displaying odd behavior, including throwing 

tiles when no one was present, slamming cabinet doors late at 

night, and having “anger splats,” which Clayton described as 

mother being upset and yelling. Mother did not attempt to harm 

Clayton and Clayton was not afraid of mother. He stayed in his 

room because that was the “ ‘safest place’ ” to be. Clayton’s school 

records reflected he was failing his classes and had a 48 percent

attendance record.

In April 2021, mother informed the social worker that 

juvenile court involvement was unnecessary because she 

participated in programs when her other children were before the 

court. The social worker responded that her lack of progress 

despite those programs was concerning. Father informed the 

social worker he would be moving out.

II. Petition and detention hearing

In April 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on 

Clayton’s behalf alleging: that mother and father engaged in 

domestic violence in Clayton’s presence, including mother’s 

brandishing an axe and tire iron at father; that mother had

untreated mental and emotional problems, including aggressive 
6

behavior, fluctuating moods, auditory hallucinations, and talking 

to herself; and, that father failed to protect Clayton. The petition 

accordingly alleged that mother’s conduct came within the 

provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), 

(b) (failure to protect), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The petition 

further stated that Clayton and his siblings are prior dependents 

of the juvenile court due to his parents’ domestic violence. That 

same month, the juvenile court detained Clayton from mother

and placed him with father.

At the detention hearing, which also took place in April 

2021, mother and father entered a general denial. After the 

parties submitted on DCFS’s recommendation that Clayton be 

released to father’s custody, the juvenile court found a prima 

facie case for detaining Clayton and showing he is a person 

described by section 300 and continued his placement with 

father. Mother was granted monitored visitation twice per week 

not in father’s home. The court ordered family maintenance 

services.

III. Jurisdiction and disposition

A. The jurisdiction and disposition report

The combined adjudication and disposition hearing was 

scheduled for June 2021. Prior to it, DCFS submitted a report 

with updated interviews.

Clayton continued to reside with father, with whom he 

continued to feel safe. Mother no longer lived in the home but 

she came by at times to get her belongings, and was angry when 

she did so. Mother had not visited Clayton; Clayton “d[id] not 

wish” to visit with mother “at this time.”

Clayton stated that he had grown accustomed to his 

parents’ arguments and would go to his room during them. 
7

Regarding the referral incident, Clayton recalled that father had 

gathered his belongings to leave but mother wanted him to leave 

with nothing. Clayton had to stop the axe mid-air. While 

Clayton struggled with mother over the axe, mother grabbed a 

tire iron. Clayton was successful in getting both items away, and 

then father called the police.

According to Clayton, mother needed “mental help” to get 

in “the right mind set” because “if you love someone you don’t try 

to hurt or physically abuse them.” He did not have a close 

relationship with mother. He did not believe mother would hurt 

him, but was concerned about her behavior. Mother had mood 

swings, became very angry, and would threaten to kick Clayton 

out of the home when he defended father.

When interviewed, mother’s thoughts were scattered and 

she needed redirection. Addressing the referral incident, mother 

said that a female friend of father’s came to the home and was 

disrespectful. Mother and father argued and father left the 

home. When father returned, the argument resumed. When 

mother picked up an axe, she did so “just to pick it up” and did 

not brandish the axe at father. However, mother acknowledged 

wrestling with Clayton over the axe and then grabbing a tire 

iron, which she then kicked to the side while struggling with 

Clayton over the axe. Mother claimed the incident was a 

“misunderstanding,” and said that her relationship with Clayton, 

though needing “a little bit of work,” was still “pretty good.” 

Mother denied physical altercations with father in the past, 

saying that police only responded to the home during verbal 

altercations.

Regarding her mental health, mother denied talking to 

herself, saying she did not know what father was talking about 
8

and would have been hospitalized if she were talking to herself. 

Mother acknowledged that she previously saw “someone” for her 

mental health but was not diagnosed with anything. That person 

gave her Benadryl.

When interviewed, father reiterated that mother began 

talking to herself at the beginning of the year and he told her she 

needed to seek help. While father did not see her talking to 

herself again, father described that mother had different 

personalities, and one personality did not know what the other

was doing. Regarding the referral incident, father stated that it 

happened quickly and was “shocking,” but he did not feel 

personally threatened by mother. Father’s arguing with mother 

had become physical and was “tiresome.” Mother would yell in 

his face and he “couldn’t take it” anymore.

Paternal aunt was also interviewed, stating that mother 

had stayed with her for a month and was helpful. Paternal aunt 

claimed that Clayton was disrespectful to mother and she had 

never seen mother raise her voice or get mad. Father and 

Clayton got along well.

DCFS recommended that mother undergo a psychiatric 

evaluation and participate in individual counseling, parenting 

classes, and a 52-week domestic violence program and that father 

participate in individual counseling, parenting classes, family 

preservation services, a 52-week domestic violence program, and 

drug testing.

B. The jurisdiction/disposition hearing

At the June 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, 

the court admitted several exhibits into evidence and then heard 

argument from counsel. Mother asked that the petition be 

dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence and current risk to 
9

Clayton. She asked that Clayton be released to home of parents 

or, if the petition was sustained, for unmonitored visits. Father 

asked that he be stricken from the petition as nonoffending, and 

objected to any drug testing requirement given that the petition 

was based upon mother’s mental health issues. He did not 

oppose participating in parenting or domestic violence classes, 

individual counseling, or Clayton remaining placed in his care. 

Clayton’s counsel asked that the petition be sustained as to 

mother and that Clayton remain with father. Clayton did not 

want to see mother and was “concern[ed]” about her. Clayton 

therefore requested that visits remain monitored.

The juvenile court sustained the allegations under section 

300, subdivision (a) as pled, but struck the reference to father’s 

failure to protect under section 300, subdivision (b).4 At the 

disposition hearing that followed, Clayton was adjudged a 

dependent and released to father. Mother was granted family 

maintenance services to include a domestic violence program, 

conjoint counseling with Clayton, individual counseling to 

address case issues, mental health counseling, and monitored 

visitation with discretion to liberalize.

IV. Six-month status review report and hearing

In December 2021, DCFS reported that Clayton continued 

to reside with father and was doing well in father’s care. Mother 

had been showing up to the home unannounced and refusing to 

4 For completeness, we note the record appears to be silent 

as to how the court proceeded with the allegation made under 

section 300, subdivision (j). The reporter’s transcript does not 

indicate the court struck the allegation. However, the minute 

order from that hearing indicates that the court sustained only 

the allegations under subdivisions (a) and (b).
10

leave, and was admonished not to do so. Mother began domestic 

violence counseling but was discharged for missing four sessions. 

She received a psychiatric evaluation in October 2021 and did not 

meet medical necessity for mental health services. However, the 

social worker referred her to individual therapy services so that 

she could be assessed for non-acute, long-term conditions. 

Mother had a scheduled intake appointment but the social 

worker could not confirm confirmation of enrollment. Mother had 

not received a psychological assessment nor been prescribed 

psychiatric medication. Because mother had not made progress 

in individual counseling, mother’s conjoint counseling with 

Clayton had not commenced.

Clayton attended monitored visits with mother once or 

twice per month. The visits were infrequent because Clayton 

chose to put his schooling, homework, after school swim lessons 

and social life ahead of visits with mother. The social worker 

believed that, while Clayton was receptive to suggestions 

regarding visits, he was “ultimately . . . not interested in 

consistently visiting” mother. During the visits that did occur, no 

safety issues or concerns were reported. Because visits were 

infrequent, mother’s visits with Clayton were not liberalized to 

unmonitored.

The Department recommended that mother and father

receive an additional six months of services, and that the court 

set a three-month progress review hearing to address possible 

termination of jurisdiction.

Later that month, the juvenile court found that mother and 

father were in compliance with their services plan. Finding that 

continued jurisdiction was necessary, services were extended, 

Clayton’s placement continued, and a section 364 review hearing 
11

was set. After mother’s counsel requested that visits be 

unmonitored, the court afforded DCFS the discretion to liberalize 

visits.

V. Nine-month status review report and hearing

In March 2022, DCFS reported that mother enrolled in a 

domestic violence program, but had attended only one session so 

it was too early to determine her progress. Mother was actively 

participating in individual counseling as of January 2022. 

Mother was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed 

anxiety and depressed mood. She attended four of six sessions, 

which, according to her therapist, was not enough time for her to 

make “any real progress.” However, psychiatric services were 

unnecessary and mother was ready to partake in conjoint therapy 

with Clayton.

Clayton was still living with father and doing well. Mother 

and Clayton engaged in monitored visits two or three times per 

month. The visits were not more frequent because Clayton did 

not prioritize them. Visits were not liberalized because of 

mother’s insufficient programmatic progress. Further, Clayton 

was uncomfortable with unmonitored visits, explaining that, 

while he was not afraid of mother, he was concerned that mother 

might bring up her relationship with father, which made him 

stressed. When the social worker conveyed Clayton’s comments 

to mother, mother insisted there was a misunderstanding 

because Clayton had never conveyed these sentiments to mother. 

This response concerned the social worker because mother could 

not understand Clayton’s point of view, underscoring the need for 

conjoint counseling.
12

DCFS recommended termination of the case with a custody 

order granting father full physical custody and mother and father 

joint legal custody.

At the initially scheduled March 2022 review hearing, 

mother requested to return to the family home and keep the case 

open for an additional three months for reunification. Mother 

was participating in her programs and conjoint counseling was 

about to begin. Clayton’s counsel asserted that Clayton did not 

want unmonitored visits and submitted on DCFS’s 

recommendation. The hearing was adjourned to address an 

unrelated matter relating to the family’s housing benefits.

At the continued April 2022 review hearing, mother’s 

counsel reported that mother was actively engaged in domestic 

violence and individual counseling. Counsel reiterated that 

mother wished to reunify and requested joint physical and legal 

custody, or in the alternative, unmonitored visits. Counsel for 

Clayton, father, and DCFS submitted on DCFS’s 

recommendation that jurisdiction be terminated. Clayton’s 

counsel stated that Clayton wanted to remain in father’s home 

with only monitored visits with mother, describing that a “rift” 

was present between Clayton and mother even prior to the 

referral incident, and that rift widened since mother has not been 

in the home.

The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, granting father 

sole physical custody and joint legal custody to both parents. The 

court ordered monitored visits for mother, citing the “disturbing” 

nature of mother’s conduct and her failure to complete her case 

plan, and further noting that Clayton “in no uncertain terms, 
13

wishes the visits to remain monitored.”5 The court further 

ordered that visits occur two times a week for two hours per visit, 

and further provided that those visits could be “amplified” to four 

hours upon agreement of the parties, including Clayton.

Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court erred in 

denying her request for unmonitored visits with Clayton.

Specifically, mother asserts that the order was not supported by 

the evidence because unmonitored visits posed no emotional or 

physical risk or detriment to Clayton. Further, the juvenile court 

improperly delegated authority to Clayton to set the terms of 

visitation and effectively refuse visits altogether. We find no 

abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s ruling.

A juvenile court that is terminating jurisdiction is 

authorized to make orders addressing custody and visitation.

(§§ 361.2, 362.4; In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 [“When 

terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has been declared a 

dependent child of the court, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile 

court to issue a custody and visitation order (commonly referred 

to as an ‘exit order’).”]) In making exit orders, a juvenile court 

must consider the best interests of the child. (In re John W.

(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.) We review those orders for an 

abuse of discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 

Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) We cannot disturb the juvenile court’s 

custody determination without an arbitrary, capricious, or 

5 Counsel for DCFS added that although mother was ordered 

into conjoint counseling with Clayton, Clayton “does not have any 

interest in conjoint [counseling].”
14

patently absurd exercise of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319; In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 

102.) Where the juvenile court applied the correct legal 

standards and substantial evidence supports the order, there is 

no abuse of discretion. (Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237 

Cal.App.4th 894, 901; In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 

814, 839.)

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 

that mother’s visits with Clayton be monitored. The two primary

factors that the juvenile court cited in support of its order were 

supported by substantial evidence. First, mother had engaged in 

a sequence of “disturbing” and violent conduct evincing her 

deteriorating mental health, culminating in her attacking father 

with an axe and a tire iron, which, but for Clayton’s intervention, 

could have resulted in serious injury or death to father and/or 

Clayton. Mother repeatedly minimized the seriousness of her 

violent actions and the existence of any mental health issues. 

Second, the court correctly relied upon mother’s undisputed

shortcomings in adhering to her case plan. This ranged from

mother’s visiting the family’s home unannounced and refusing to 

leave (despite DCFS’s admonitions not to do so) to mother’s

spotty attendance of individual counseling and domestic violence 

programming. These considerations alone reflect the visitation 

order was in Clayton’s best interest and supported by substantial 

evidence.

Mother nonetheless contends that monitored visits were 

not necessary to ensure Clayton’s security or well-being. 

According to mother, her issues stemmed from her relationship 

with father—not Clayton—and those issues caused Clayton no 
15

detriment. Instead, Clayton did not wish to visit with mother 

because he did not like her. Mother is mistaken.

Clayton never stated he did not wish to visit with mother or 

did not like mother. To the contrary, he participated in visits, 

albeit not as often as permitted by the court given his school and 

social obligations. This led the social worker to conclude that he 

was “not interested” in more regular visits with mother, not that 

Clayton did not wish to see mother at all. Indeed, Clayton’s 

discomfort appeared to be rooted not in the visits occurring, but 

the conditions under which they occurred. Clayton was 

concerned mother would bring up her relationship with father, 

and the prospect of that occurring in an unmonitored setting 

made him stressed.

Therefore, even accepting mother’s suggestion there was 

“no indication” that mother actually had brought up mother and 

father’s relationship with Clayton during their visits, the juvenile 

court could fairly credit Clayton’s statements that he was 

concerned about the likelihood there would be further issues 

without a monitor present, especially given the traumatizing 

nature of the referral incident and the extensive history of 

mother and father involving Clayton in their disputes. Although 

Clayton insisted he was not afraid of mother, mother’s difficulties 

in her relationship with father and in managing her deteriorating 

mental health had conspicuous, adverse effects on Clayton, who 

was struggling in school and often—including during events 

subsequent to the referral—had to retreat to his room in order to 

feel safe. For these reasons, the conclusion that monitored 
16

visitation was in Clayton’s best interest was eminently 

reasonable.

6

Additionally, the juvenile court did not improperly delegate 

its authority to fashion visitation orders. Mother’s contrary 

arguments misread the record and the relevant authorities. As 

mother’s cases themselves reflect, a juvenile court must often

balance the need for regular parent-child visitation with the need 

to be flexible and receptive to the changing needs of the child and 

dynamic family circumstances. (In re S.H. (2003) 111 

Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) A juvenile court is solely empowered to 

determine whether any visitation occurs, and may not delegate 

that authority to another party, including the child. (Id. at pp. 

317–318.) However, as to the time, place, and manner of 

visitation, the inquiry remains whether any limitations are in the 

child’s best interest. Accordingly, the child’s input and refusal 

must be considered, though it may not be the “ ‘sole factor.’ ” (In 

6 To the extent that mother suggests that a juvenile court 

must find a detriment to the child in order to impose limitations 

on visitation in an exit order, mother is mistaken. Because the 

relevant inquiry as to exit orders made pursuant to section 362.4 

is the best interest of the child (In re John W., supra, 41 

Cal.App.4th at p. 973; In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 

704, 712), this is not like other contexts where a detriment 

finding is required to deny visitation. (§ 362.1, subd. (a); In re 

Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008; In re C.C.

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491 [visitation under § 362.1 is 

mandatory unless court finds visitation would pose a threat to 

the child’s safety].) In any event, for the reasons we have set 

forth above, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded 

unmonitored visits were detrimental to Clayton’s well-being.
17

re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49–50; accord In re S.H., at 

p. 317.)

The juvenile court’s exit order adhered to these principles. 

As mother acknowledges, all of the juvenile court’s orders, 

including its exit orders, contained a required minimum amount 

of visits, and Clayton was never permitted to entirely refuse 

visits. Mother’s complaints instead appear to stem from the 

infrequency of visits with Clayton (i.e., the manner of visitation). 

But the court was well within its authority—and was, in fact, 

required—to consider Clayton’s input in determining the manner 

of visitation, provided it was not the sole factor in its calculus. 

(In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 49–50; accord In re

S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317.) That was hardly the case 

here, given the court’s sound reliance upon the severity of the 

allegations and mother’s inability to adhere to her case plan in 

fashioning its visitation order.

Mother’s further suggestion that the juvenile court “left the 

door open” for Clayton to “possibly stop all visits” by providing 

that visitation could be changed upon “ ‘agreement of the parties 

including Clayton’ ” is again inaccurate. The portion of the 

court’s order referenced by mother pertains to the expansion (not 

limitation) of visitation, providing that visitation could be 

“amplified” to four hours by agreement of the parties, including 

Clayton. In other words, the court did not afford Clayton the veto 

power that mother suggests.7

7 Mother suggests for the first time in her reply brief that by 

allowing Clayton to refuse to participate in conjoint counseling, 

Clayton foreclosed any hope that mother had of gaining 

unmonitored visits. However, even if we were to consider it on 
18

On this record, the juvenile court’s order for monitored 

visits was not an abuse of discretion.

the merits (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1269 

[appellate court need not consider arguments raised for the first 

time in reply]), mother’s argument once again lacks record 

support. None of the court’s prior orders permitted Clayton to 

refuse conjoint counseling. The primary impediment to conjoint 

counseling throughout the proceedings was mother’s delayed 

progress with her case plan. Though counsel for DCFS briefly 

remarked at the end of the section 364 hearing that Clayton was 

not interested in conjoint counseling, the court had by that point

nearly finished rendering its termination and exit orders, and 

mother cites no other evidence that Clayton had previously

refused conjoint counseling.
19

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s April 2022 judgment and order are 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

NGUYEN (KIM), J.*

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

EGERTON, J.

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.