Dismissed and Opinion filed August 30, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00580-CR

EDUARDO MENDEZ, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 179th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1434761 

O P I N I O N 

Based on a plea bargain agreement between appellant and the State, on April 

30, 2015, the trial court signed an order deferring an adjudication of guilt for the 

offense of indecency with a child by exposure and placing appellant on community 

supervision for eight years. On February 22, 2018, the State filed a motion to 

adjudicate guilt. Appellant and the State entered into another plea-bargain agreement 

under which appellant pleaded “true” to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate 
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in exchange for the State’s sentencing recommendation of three years’ 

imprisonment. The trial court accepted the plea bargain, signed an order adjudicating 

guilt, and sentenced appellant to confinement for three years in the Institutional 

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court entered a 

certification of the defendant’s right to appeal in which the court certified that this 

is a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 

25.2(a)(2).

In a plea-bargain case for deferred adjudication community supervision, the 

plea bargain is complete at the time the defendant enters his plea of guilty in 

exchange for deferred adjudication community supervision. Hargesheimer v. State, 

182 S.W.3d 906, 911–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If a defendant enters a plea of true 

to a subsequent motion to adjudicate, the rule governing plea-bargain appeals does 

not apply. Id. at 913 (“[W]hen the defendant appeals from the proceeding on the 

motion to adjudicate guilt, Rule 25.2(a)(2) will not restrict appeal[.]”).

This case is distinguishable from Hargesheimer in that appellant signed a 

waiver of appeal during the proceeding at which his guilt was adjudicated. The 

waiver states, “As part of my agreement with the prosecutor to plead true, I agree to

waive any right to appeal I may have concerning any issue or claim in this case, 

including my plea of true or admission of guilt.” The waiver further recites, “I 

understand that the prosecutor will recommend that I be adjudicated guilty in this 

cause and my punishment should be set at 3 years [TDCJ] and a fine of $0 and I 

agree to that recommendation.” Appellant initialed both statements in addition to 

signing the agreement.

A pretrial or presentencing waiver of the right to appeal is binding if the 

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ex parte Delaney, 207 

S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If the actual punishment is determined by 
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the plea agreement when the waiver is made, the waiver is knowingly and 

intelligently made. Id. 

The trial court assessed punishment in accordance with the terms of the 

agreement. Therefore, appellant’s waiver of the right to appeal is binding. See 

Jackson v. State, 168 S.W.3d 239, 242–43 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) 

(finding waiver of appeal of order adjudicating guilt binding).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. 

 PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Busby. 

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).