### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE June 29, 200 7 S es sio n
HEA THER

MC BRID E v. S HER RYNE BEL WE BB

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Robertson County No. 10925 Hon. Ross H. Hi cks, Circuit Judge

No. M2006- 01631-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Septem ber 25, 2007

I n th is ac tio n, pla int if

f obt a ine d a De fa

ult Judg me nt. De fe nd ant m ov e d to se t a sid e the Judg me nt. Th e Tr ia l Co ur

t r e fu se d, and

we a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uitCo ur t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., joined.

D. Sc ott Wild e r, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or a pp e lla nt.

M. Be n Moore, I I ., Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee.

OP IN ION

I n th is a c tio n f

or dama g e s b a se d o n r e ta liator y dis c ha rg e , p la int if

f o bta ine d a

de fa ult judgme nt ag ainst defe ndant and the T rial Judge r efuse d to s et aside or g rant a new tria l on de fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n. Th e fo c us of thi s a pp e a l is on the Tr ia l Judg e ’s re fu sa l to se t a sid e the de fa ult jud g me nt.

Bac kgr ound

Plaintiff’s action alleg ed that she w as wrong fully terminated f

rom defe ndant’s employ m en t beca

use she r eporte d to the authorities def endant’ s “illeg al” misconduc t at a daycar e ce n ter ope rate d by

defe ndant, and that de fenda nt retaliate d by

terminating her e mploy

ment. The-2-

summons and complaint were persona lly serve d upon defe ndant by the County

Sheriff’ s depar

tment on May 2, 2005, afte r the de puty could not serve Ms. Webb at the day car e ce nter loca t ed at 2443 Hig hway 41 South, Greenbr ier, Te nnessee , 37073. Def endant, u p o n h ear ing that the deputy had be e n to he r b us ine ss, we nt t o th e She ri ff ’s of fi c e and pic ke d u p th e summo ns and

c omp la int

. Subsequently , defe ndant was de posed and she testified that she rec alled re ading the summons and ag ree d that the document state d that if she fa iled t o fi l e an answ er to the c omplaint within 30 day s of servic e, a judg ment of def ault could be take n ag ainst her. She claims, howeve r, that she did not understandingthe meaning of the summons at the time she rec eived it, and that she d id n o t s e e k le g a l c o u n s e l a t th e ti me s h e w a s s e r v e d , b e c a u s e s h e d id n o t h ave mone y to pay an attorney . Def

endant ne ver f

iled an answ er, nor

did she make a

ny appea ranc e until after

the J udg ment
was e ntere d.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for De fault J udg ment on Marc h 8, 2006 and a he aringon the Motion was set for Ma

rch 29, 2006. Acer

tificate of service on the Motion dated Mar ch 7, 2006, and signe d by plaintiff’s attorney , rec ites that the Motion was sent to the def endant at “2443 Hig hway 41 South, Greenbr iar [sic], TN”.

Def endant in her

later de position, t estified that she ne v er rec eived a copy of the Motion for Def

ault, althoug h the address on the certificate of service was corr ect. He r explanation was that L isa Hudson, the dire ctor of the day car e ce nter, would have been responsible for rec eiving the mail delivere d to the cente r, and she would have pa ssed on to the def endant any

mail addre ssed to her.

The Motion for De fau l t wa s delay ed to April 25, 2006, and the rec ord shows that plaintiff’s attorne y

mailed a c opy

of the letter to the Clerk of the Court to that effe ct to defe ndant at the Hig hway

41 South address. Ag ain, def endant testified that she did not rec eive the copy of that le tte r. On Ap ri l 25 , d e fe nd ant d id n ot a pp e ar a nd the Tr ia l Court

e nte re d a De fa ult Judg me nt a g a ins t defe ndant, and se t the hear ing f or dama g es o n J une 7, 2006. The rec ord show that plaintiff’ s attorney sent a co p y

of the Or der to de fenda

nt with a cer

tificate of service stating the order was mailed to the Hig hway

41 South address. Ag ain, Webb ma intained that she did not rece ive the orde r in t he ma il.

A hea

ring on damag es wa s held on J une 7, 2006, and de fenda nt did not appear . The Circuit Court issued a Final Judgment g iving damag es t o plaintiff i n the amount of $16,373.00. The
rec ord shows that plaintiff’s attorney mailed a co p y o f t he F inal J udg ment with a ce rtificate of
se rv ic e to d e fe nd ant at th e Hi g hw ay 41 South a dd

re ss.
The re cord f

urther show s that defe ndant had sold the day car e center on June 1, 2006 and the new owners wer e in possession of t he busi ness when the copy of t he Judgment wa s mailed to that addre ss. The owne rs ca lled defe ndant and infor med her o f t h e l et t er , and then f axed the documents to the defe ndant. Def endant maintains the only documents she r ece ived re lative to the laws uit we re the Sum mon s and

Com pla int and the F ina l Judg me nt.-3- Up on re c e ipt of the Judg me nt, de fe nd ant, thr ou g h c ouns e l, fi le d a Te nn . R. Civ. P. 59 Motion to Set A side the Def ault J udg ment on J une 19, 2006. He r af fidavit was attached, a long with a proposed A nswer. D efe ndant, in her A n swer, ma intains that she was ne ver se rved w ith a
wr itt e n no tic e of the Ap pli c a tio n fo r De fa ult Judg me nt pr ior to the he ari ng , a s r e qu ir e d b y Te nn . R. Civ. P . 55.01.

The Tr ial J udg e over ruled the Motion and de fenda nt has appe aled.

De fe nd ant’ s is su e on

a pp e a l is whe ther

the Tr ia l Co ur

t a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in
re fu sin g to s e t a sid e the De fa ult Judg me nt. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 provides that “[f] or g ood cause shown the court may set aside
a jud g me nt by de fa

ult in a c c or da

nc e wi th R

ule 60 .0 2. ” Th e re le va

nt p or tio n o f R ule 60 .0 2 s tate s, “On motio n an d u p o n such terms a s are just, the court may relieve a par

ty or the pa

rty ’s leg al repr esentative from a f

inal judgme nt, order

or proc eedingfor the f

ollowing r easons: (1) mistake, ina dv e rt e nc e , sur

pr ise or e xcu sa

ble ne g le c t . . . . ” “ Un de r R ule 60 ‘t he burd e n is on

the mov ant t o set forth, in a motion or petition and supporting aff idavits, facts e x plaining w h y t h e m o vant was justified in failing to avoid the mistake, inadver tence , surprise or

neg lect.” Tenn. Dept. Of Human Servs. V. Barbe e , 6 8 9 S

. W

. 2 d 8 6 3 , 8 6 6 (T en n

. 1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g Tenn. State Bank v. Lay , 609 S.W .2d 525, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)). Courts construe Rule 60 with liberality when a party seeks r elief from a defa

ult judg ment. Barbee , at 86 6; Nelson v. Simpson , 826 S.W .2d 483, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). I f any

rea sonable doubt exists as to wheth er t h e d ef ault judgme nt should be set aside, the courts should g rant re lief. Nelson , at 48 6; Ke c k v . Na tio nwi deSy

ste ms , ,499 S.W .2d 266, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

When evaluatinga motion to set aside a de fault judg ment b as ed upon the g rounds spec if ie d in Ru le 6 0

. 0 2 ( 1 ) , th e c o u rt mu s t c o n s id e r thr e e f a c to r s : “ ( 1 ) w h e th e r th e d e f ault was willful; (2) whethe r the de fenda nt has a mer itorious defense ; and (3) whether the non-def aulting party would be pre

judiced if re lief we re g rante d.” Henry v. Goins , 104 S.W .3d 475, 481 (Tenn. 2003) ( citing Barbee , 689 S.W .2d at 866).

Defen d ant maintains she neve r re ceive d the Motion for De fault Judgment that pla i n t i f f ’ s c o u n s e l m a i l e d

t o h e r an d s e e k s r e l i e f

f r o m t h e T r i a l C o u rt ’ s e n t r y o f t h e D e fault J udg ment. The Motion for De fault Judgment containe d a ce rtificate of ser vice e x ecute d by

p la intiff ’s counsel, stating that the Motion was mailed to def endant at the Hi gh wa y

41 South address. A
cer tificate of service is pr ima fac ie evidenc e that a motion was ser ved in the manne r desc ribed in the
cer tificate, a nd raises a

rebuttable presumption that i t wa s re ceive d by the per son to whom it was sent. Or v. Or , No. 01-A-01-9012-CH-00464, 1991WL 226916 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1991),
c iti ng He nr yv . H e nr y , 247 Ark. 771, 447, S.W.2d 657, 659 (1969).

I n the Estate of Vanleer v. H arakas, et al., No. M20 0 1 0 0687COA53CV, 2 0 0 2 W L 3 2 3 3 2 1 9 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. De c. 5 , 2 0 0 2 ) a ca s e s i m i l ar i n s o m e re s p ec t s au t h o re d b y J u d ge Cottrell, the Court held that the defe ndants’ testimony that the not ice wa s not rece ived re butted theThe fa ct that defe ndant rec eived the Complaint and a copy of the Judgment ca sts doubt on 1 he r c re dib ili ty

that sh e did

no t r e c e ive the oth e r t

hr e e ma ili ng s.
The Te nnessee Suprem e C o u rt adopted the w illfulness standard fr om the United States 2 C ourt of Appe als for the Second Circuit. Barbee , 6 8 9 S

. W

. 2 d a t8 6 6 ( qu o t i n g t h e w i l l f u l n e ss sta nd ard fr om Davis v. M

usler , 713 F.2d 907, 915 ( 2d Cir. 1983)).
Am. Alliance I

ns. Co., 92 F.3d at 61 ( c iti ng Un ite d S tates v . E rd os s , 440 F.2d 1221 ( 2d Cir. 3 19 71 ); Dal Int’l Trading Co. V. Sw ord Line, Inc., 28 6 F .2 d 5 23 (2d Ci r. 19 61 ); Benton v. Vinson, El k ins , W e e ms & Se ar ls, , 255 F.2d 299 ( 2d Cir. 1958)).

Mc Nul ty , 137 F .3 d at 73 8; see, e .g. , Commercial Bank of Kuwait v

. Rafidain Bank , 15 F.3d 4 238, 243–44 (2d Cir.1994) (f ailing, f or incre dible rea son s , to respond to the complaint, af ter purposely evadingservice for months); Chira v. L o ckhe ed Aircraft Corp. , 634 F.2d 664, 666 ( 2d Cir .1 98 0) (f

a ili ng , w ith ou t e xplanatio n, to c om pl y wi th sc he du lin g or de rs ); Dominguez v . United States , 583 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1978) (fa iling, for incre dible rea sons, to appea r at a s ch ed u l ed pre- trial confe renc e and de laying, due t o the collapse of counse l’s office floor, more than ten months be fo re mov ing to se t a sid e the re su lti ngde fa ult ); United States v. Cirami , 535 F.2d 736, 739 ( 2d Cir. 19 76 ) ( fa ili ng , w ith ou t e xplanatio n, to r e sp on d to a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g ment ); Schwarz v. United States , 384 F.2d 833, 835–36 (2d Cir.1967) (attorne y ’s decision to w ait until the eve of tria l to inform the Court that he would be una vailable to try

the ca se the ne x t day

was inexcusable)

. -4- presumption that it was rec eived by the per son to whom it was sent. Assum i n g a r guendo , but not deciding , the pre sumption was rebutted, the i ssue t hus become s whether the Ba rb e e

/H e nr yc ri te ri a 1
are met.

T h e f

i r s t c r i t e r i a

p r o v i d e d b y Barbee is whether the default was “willful”. Id. at 866. The orig inal source of the willfulness standa rd wa s the Feder al Second Circuit. That Circuit define s 2 willfulness as “c onduct that is more than mer ely neg lige nt or ca

rele ss.” SE C v . M

c Nul ty , 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1998). This de finition doe s include “strate g ic decision[s] to de fault” and conduc t 3 that is “eg reg ious and not satisfactor ily explained.” .” 4

Def endant’ s conduct in fa iling to re spond to the Complaint and in no t c o n s u lt in g leg al counsel was willful unde r the above stated criter ia. She admitted that she re ceive d the summons and complaint and she r eca lled rea ding the summons. S he ag ree d that the document state d that if she fa ile d to fi le an ans we r to the Com pla int wi thi n thi rt

y da y s of se rv ic e a

de fa ult c ou ld b e take n a g a ins t her. She c laimed, howeve r, she did not under stand the mea ning of t h e s u m mons at the time she
rec eived it.

I n defe ndant’s brie f bef o re u s , s h e ar gues that she is not verse d in the law and ha s on ly a hig h sc ho ol e du c a tio n. No ne of the se e xcu se s p oin t to me re ly ne g lig e nt o r c are le ss c on du c t. She re a d th e summo ns and did no thi ngto respo nd to th e Com pla int a s d ir e c te d b y

the su mmo ns

. This is will ful conduc t. Furthe r, her excuse that she did not understand the lang uag e of the-5- s u m m o n s or that she is not verse d in the law is w ithout mer it. I t is well established that ig noranc e of the law is not ex cusable neg lect or a proper ground for relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Food Lion, Inc.
v. W ashington Count

y Be er Bd., 70 0 S. W.2 d 8 93 ,8 96 (T e nn . 1 98 5) ; Kilby v. Sivley , 745 S.W .2d 284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). A s the Supreme Court noted in Food Lion : “[i] f this Court were to hold that ig no ra nc e of the law i s a

pr op e r g ro un d f

or re lie f u nd e r [T e nn . R. Civ . P. 60 .0 2], i t is ha rd to
conce ive h ow any

judgme nt could be saf

e fr om assault on that g round.” Id. at 896. Fur ther the imp lic a tio n th a t de fe nd ant c ou ld n ot u nd e rs tand the langua g e of the summo ns be c a us e sh e is o nly a hig h school g raduate is not convincing

. She is a business women who at the time the Complaint
was ser ved owned a day car e cente r with some forty -eig ht c hildren. Clear ly , by this recor d, defe ndant acte d in a willful manner when she de cided not to re spond to the Complaint.

At this juncture, we c onclude that it unnecessa ry to addre ss the rema ining c riteria f or se tti ng a sid e a de fa

ult jud g me nt, and ho ld that the Tr ia l Court ’s re fu sa l to se t a side th e def a ult judgme nt should be aff

irmed bec ause de fenda

nt acted w illfully

whe n she did not respond to the Com pla int , w hic h r e su lte d in

the e ntr y of the de fa ult jud g me nt.

We aff irm the J udg ment of t he Tria l Court and rema nd, with the cost of the a

ppeal assessed to the de fenda

nt, Sherry Nebe l Webb.

_________________________

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.