### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ma y 3, 200 5 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. HEN RY ER IC N AS H
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 4747 Joseph H. Walk er, III, Judge

No. W2004-02403-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 7, 2005

T h e d e f e n d a n t ap p e a ls h is c o n v ic ti o n f o r p o s s e s s io n o f c o c a in e w ith in te n t to d e li ver a nd the resulting el ev en -y ear

sentenc e. F ollowing our revie w, we f

ind all issues presente d to be either waived or without merit; therefor e, we aff irm both the conviction and sente nce. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
J O HN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., filed a c oncurring opinion. C. Michael Robbins (on appe al ) and L arry M. Sarg ent (a t trial), Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the appellant, He nry

Eric Na sh.
Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Gen eral andRe po rt e r; J. Ros s D y e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Eliz abeth T. Rice , District Attorney Gene ral; and James Walter Fr eela nd, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
Fa cts and Proce dural History
The de fenda nt, Henry

Eric Na sh, was c o n v i ct ed by a jury of one c ount of possession of a Schedule I I

controlled substanc e (c ocaine ) with intent to deliver (a Class B fe lony ). Ther eaf ter, he was sente nced a s a Rang e I , standard offe nder to e leven y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. On dir e c t app e a l to thi s c ou rt , th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t: (1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support the convic tion; (2) the trial court erre d in allowing the prosec ution to int roduce ev i d ence identify ing the defe ndant as be ing named in t h e s earch wa rra nt and byIn c o n d u c ting o u r a n a lysis, we ha v e a d d re sse d the issu e s in a d iff e re n t se q u e n c e tha n the y w e re p re se n te d in 1 the d e fen d a n t’s b rie f. -2-

permitting Serg eant Tay lor to rec ite hear say details of information provided by a n in fo rm a nt i n c on ne c tio n w ith se c uring the wa rr a nt; (3) the trial court erre d in its i nstructions to the jury conce rning the def inition of “knowing ly ”; (4 ) the e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s we re ina pp ro pria te ly app lie d in vi e w o f the Sup re me Court’s holding in B lakely v. Washington; and (5 ) t h e t ri al co u rt er re d i n d en y i n g al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g. Following a thoroug h revie w of the issues pr esente d, we a ffirm the de fenda nt’s conviction and 1 sentenc e. At trial, Serg eant Ga

rrisonTaylor testified t h at h e i s employ ed with the Coving ton Poli ce De pa rt me nt a s su pe rv iso r o f the dr ug un it. Hi s e xpe ri e nc e in l a w e nf or c e me nt l e d h im t o e sti ma te the ave rag e pric e of c ocaine to be $200 per g ram. Turnin g to the prese nt case , Serg eant Tay lor rec alled that he pe rsonally observe d the defe ndant at the r esidenc e located at 802 Hill Street in the day s leading up to M ay 3 0 , 2003. He sta t ed that he obtained a

sear ch wa

rra nt, which was dire cted to the Hill Street re sidence and the defe ndant. Serg eant Tay lor was supe rvising the execution of the se ar ch wa rr ant and wa s accom p an i ed by

other off icer s when the w arr ant was e x ecute d in the early morning hours of May 30, 2003.
Once on t h e scene , Serg eant Tay lor and the othe r off icer s initi ated a

knock and announce, and, af ter re ceiving no response , forc ibly enter ed the r esidenc e. The defe ndant was a lone and wa s found in the re ar be droom of t he residence

. Upon entering the bedroom, the officers discove red w hat was be lieved to be c ompressed pow der c ocaine and a blue pill bott l e co n t aini ng cra ck coc aine on a nig ht stand within the defendant’s arm’s re ach. T hey also found $485 in ca sh in a dresse r dra wer in the sa me ro om. No ta

bly , n o d ru g pa

ra ph e rn a lia wa s f ou nda ndthede fe nd a nt d id n ot a pp e ar t o be under the influenc e of c ocaine or alc ohol. A fter perf orming a field test on the seized contra band, Serg eant Tay lor’s suspicions wer e conf irmed, as the te st indi ca t ed that both substances c ontained coca ine base

. The substances wer e later sent to the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation (TB I ) lab for a conf irmed identification.
On cr oss- e xa mi n a ti o n , Se r g e a n t T a y lo r e xp lain e d th a t h e a n d th e o th e r o f f ic e r s f o u n d the defe ndan t i n t h e re ar be droom in his box er shorts, as if he ha d been a sleep. He reiter ated that the drug s were found on a nig ht stand next to the bed, while the cash was discovered in the drawer of a dre sser located ag ainst a wa ll on the side of the bed. Ser g eant Tay lor stated that the de fenda nt appea red to ha ve bee n sleeping on the left side of the bed, ne x t to the tab l e wh ere the drug s were found. He did not reca ll if he saw a ny of the de fenda nt’s clothes in the house.
On re direc t examination, S erg eant Tay lor testified that the c ash wa s found in denominations-3-

of thirteen twe nty -dollar bills; eleven te n-dollar bills; and twenty -three five-dollar bills. He rec alled that a n a g g re ssi ve pit

bu ll m e t th e of

fi c e rs a s th e y

e nte re d th e ho us e a ndthat th e de fe nd a nt h a d to re str a in the do g in or de r fo r the m to e xec ute the se arc h. Se rg e a nt T a y lor no te d th a t th e de fe nd a nt d id not exhi bit fear

in approa ching th e d o g. On recross-e x amination, he ac knowledg ed that dog s are g e n e r a l l y p r o t e c t i v e o f t h e i r h o m e s a n d t h a tt h e r e w e r e o t h e r p i tb u l l s i n r e s i d e n c e s i n T i p t o n C o u n t y.
I nvestig ator Pam F ord Simpson testi fied that she is e mploy ed with t h e Coving ton Poli ce Depa rtment and that she w as fa miliar with the defe ndant and the H ill S tree t residenc e bec ause she also liv es i n that neig hborhood. She stated that she is able to observe persons c oming a nd g oing from the house and that she ha d seen the defe ndant i n the y ard w ith friends “on se vera l occa sions.” I nvestig ator Simpson test ified that she wa s involved in the execution of the sea rch w arr ant on the re sid e nc e . O n c ro ss- e xami na tio n, sh e a c kn ow le dg e d that sh e did no t se e the de fe nd a nt at th e Hi ll Street re sidence every

day

. Special Ag ent Dana

Rose testified that she is employ ed wit h t h e T BI in the controlled substances ide ntification d i v i s i on. Following the deposit of the se ized contraba nd by Serg eant Ta y lor , Sp e c ia l A g e nt R os e ide nti fi e d th e su bs ta nc e s to be 3. 9 g rams of c oc a ine ba se a nd6. 5 g ra ms of coc aine, both Schedule I I controlled substanc es. Minnie L ee Nash testified that her son, the defe ndant, was living with her a t 91 Talley Road in A tok a , T e nn e sse e , in Ma y 20 03 . Sh e a c kn ow ledged th at he did stay a way fr om the ho us e occa sionally

on Saturday

nights. On cross-e x amination, Nash stated that she would not allow cra ck coca ine to be kept at her home.
Talesa Nash then te stified that, al t h oug h she wa s marrie d to the defe ndant, they wer e not liv ing tog e the r i n M a y

20 03 or a t th e tim e of tria l. S he state d th a t th e de fe nd a nt v isi te d h e r h ome a t 80 2 H ill Str e e t of

te n a ndso me tim e s sp e nt S a tur da y nig hts the re
. Mr s. Na sh re c a lle d that in la te May 2003, she hosted a ba

rbec ue for

friends a nd family at her home in anticipation of moving f rom the re sidence . She stated that her belong ings w ere packe d in box es and that she had some money on the dre sser in her

bedroom. Mrs. Na sh testified that she wa s not at home when the sear ch wa rra nt was e x ecute d beca

use she left af

ter be coming upset with the defe ndant for drinking. She state d that when she left at a

pproxi mately

7:30 or 8:00 p.m., the defe n d an t was a sleep on he r bed a nd six or se ve n p e op le we re play ing g a me s in he r b e dr oo m. Mrs. Nash n ote d th a t he r s on s h a ve a pit bu ll named Z eus, which the y

have ha d for some time.
On cr oss- e xa mi n a ti o n , M r s
. N a s h te s ti f ie d th a t h e r s o n s ar e a g e s te n , s ix, a n d f iv e
. She explained that the defe ndant knew how to control the dog , as did the re st of the family . She stated that she had se en the defenda nt smoke cra ck cocaine approxim ately two times but that she did not see him do so at her

house. She re iterate d that the def endant slept at her residenc e on May 30, 2003, beca use she lef

t him there af

ter discove ring that he had be en drinking

. Mrs. Nash testified tha t the defe ndant did not stay

at her residenc e whe n she wa s not there. She f urther sta ted that the coc aine se ize d d ur ing the se a

rc h d id n ot b e lon g to h e r o r h e r s on s.-4-

As the final witness at trial, Sheldon E dwar ds testified that he was prese nt with the defe ndant a t th e Hi ll St

re e t r e sid e nc e on Ma y 29 , 200 3. He re c a lle d tha t a g ro up of frie nd s a ndfamil y

c a me to the residenc e to watc h a baske tball game, s moke, and drink. Edwar ds stated that those attending the party wer e contributing money to help Mrs. Nash move and that they broug ht drug s and alc ohol with them as they

came into the house. Edwar ds testified t hat he and som e other individuals moved the def endant into the bedr oom at approximately 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. because he was drunk and that three people we re le ft in the house afte r the defe ndant passed out. Edwar ds testified that he sa w the drug s on the nig ht stand when he took the defe ndant t o t h e b ed ro o m b u t that he did not see the defe ndant put the drug s on the table.
On cr oss-examination, Edwards testified that he saw people at the party snorting pow der coca ine, smoking c rack coc aine, smoking marijuana , and smoking marijuana lace d with coca ine. He f urther sta ted, howeve r, that he did not see the def endant smoking cocaine and that he and the de fe nd a nt on ly smo ke d mari jua na
. Ed wa

rd s re ite rate d that pe op le we re g ivi ng mon e y to M rs . N a sh to help with her move a nd further not ed that people who attended the pa rty left some drug s in the h o u s e. On re d i re ct -e x am i n a t i o n , E d wa rd s s t at ed t h at h e n ev ers aw t h e d ef en d an tb ri n g an y

d ru gs into the house.
Ba sed upon the e vidence pre s ented at trial, the defe ndant was c onvicted of one count of possession of a S chedule I I controlled subst ance (coc aine) with intent to deliver and wa s sentence d a s a Ra ng e I , sta nd ard of

fe nd e r to e le ve n y e ars in the De pa rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n. He no w a

pp e a ls h is conviction and se ntence

. An a ly sis
I . Sufficienc y
Th e de fe nd a nt fi rs t challe ng e s the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

his c on vic tio n. Th is court doe s not rewe igh or

ree valuate the evidenc e in determining suff iciency . State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) . A jury verdic t, once a pproved by

the trial judg e, ac cre dits the St ate’ s witnesses and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the State. State v. Big bee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994) . Acc ording ly , the State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate vie w of the evidenc e and all leg itimate a nd rea sonable infere nces that may be dra wn there from. I d. I t is our dut y to affirm the conviction if t he evidence, viewed under the a ppropriate standards, w as suffic ient for a ny rational trier of fac t to have found the essential ele ments of the off ense be y o n d a re as o n ab l e doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(e) ; J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789, 61 L . Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Elkins, 102 S.W .3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 2003)

. Although the evidenc e of the defe ndant’s g uilt is circ umstantial in nature, cir cumstantial evidenc e alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. St ate v. Tha rpe, 726 S.W.2d 896, 899-900 (Tenn. 1987) ; State v. Greg ory , 862 S.W .2d 574, 577 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. The c ircumstantial e vid e n c e , h o w e v e r , m u s te xc l u d e e v e r y o t h e r r e a s o n ab l e t h e o r y

o r h yp o t h e s i s o t h e r

t h a n g uil t. Tharpe , 726 S.W .2d at 900. I n addition, “it must establish such a certainty of g uilt of the ac cused-5-

as to convince the m ind bey ond a reasonable doubt that [t he defenda nt] is the one who committed the crime.” I d. (citations omitted).
Th e c on vic tio n off

e ns e re qu ir e s pro of that the de fe nd a nt kno wi ng ly po sse sse d c oc a ine wi th the intent to deliver it. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 41 7 (2 0 0 3 ). P o s s essi on may be ac tual or constructive. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W .3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001) . To prove c onstructive possession, the Sta te mus t e sta

bli sh the defe nd a nt h a d th e po we r andint e nti on a t a g ive n ti me to e xer c ise dominion and control over the drug s either directly or t hroug h others. I d. at 903; State v. Patterson, 96 6 S. W.2 d 4 35 , 4 45 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ). Pr e se nc e in the are a of the dr ug s o r a sso c ia tio n w ith those possessing drug s is insuff icient, alone, to e stablish c onstructive possession. State v. Cooper, 736 S.W .2d 125, 12 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) . Further, pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated s ec t i o n 39-17-419, “ [i ]t may be infe rre d from the a mount of a controlled substanc e or substanc es possessed by

an off ender , along with other relevant facts surr ounding the arr est, that the controlled substance or

substances w ere possessed with the purpose of selling or otherw ise dispensing .” Taking the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the State, we c onclude t hat there was sufficie nt evid ence to prove that the defe ndant knowing ly possessed coc aine. At tria l, Serg eant Tay lor and I nvestig ator Ford both testified t hey had personal knowledge that the def endant ha d been at the Hill Street residence in the day s leading up to May 30, 2003. Furthermore , when the se arc h war rant was executed, the defe ndant was the only individual in the house and the c ocaine was found within his reach, on a

table next to the bed wher e he ha d been sle eping . Moreove r, it was undisputed that the seized contra

band wa s positivelyidentified as 10.4 g rams of c ocaine

. We f urthe r c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt to f indthat th e de fe nd a nt i nte nd e d to de liv e r the c oc a ine . I n a dd iti on to the amo un t of contr aba ndse ize d f ro m th e re sid e nc e a ndits estimated stree t value of $2080, there are additional fac ts supporting the infe renc e that the de fenda nt int e nd e d to se ll o r d e liv e r the c oc a ine . We pa rt ic ula rl y no te that Se rg e a nt T a y lor te sti fi e d th a t he did not disc over any drug para pherna lia in the house and did not find the def endant unde r the influenc e of drug s or alcohol. F urther, a lthough the te stimony sug g ested that the de fenda nt did not li ve at the residenc e, the r ecor d ref

lects that Serg eant Tay lor and Investig ator F ord had se en him there in the day s p r io r to h is arr e s t. F in a ll y , th e o f f ic e r s s e iz e d $ 4 8 5 in c a s h f r o m th e r o o m in w hich the de fe nd a nt s le pt, in the fo llo wi ng de no min a tio ns : thi rt e e n twe nty -d oll ar b ill s; e le ve n te n- do lla r b ill s; a ndtw e nty -thr e e fi ve -d oll ar b ill s. I n o ur vie w, thi s e vid e nc e , ta

ke n c umu la tiv e ly , w a s su ff ic ie nt t o support the infer ence that the def endant intende d to deliver the c ocaine

. I I . Testimony

of Serg eant Tay lor Next, the de fe n d an tco n t en d s t h at t h e t ri al co u rt er re d i n al l o wi n g t h e p ro s ec u t i o n t o i n tro duce evidenc e ident i fy ing the defe ndant as na med in the sea rch w arr ant, and by

permitting Ser g eant Tay lor to rec ite hear say details of an informant’s statement used to secur e the se arc h war rant. The rec ord re flec ts that the defe ndant filed a motion in l imine seeking to exclude, inter alia:
1. Th e on e pa g e do c ume nt e nti tle d A ff ida vit fo r S e arc h Wa

rr a nt andSe arc h Wa

rr a nt:-6- a. The A ffidavit for

Searc h Warrant a lleg es Sg t. Garrison Tay lor rec eived numer ous complaints from conc erne d citizens of cra ck coca ine being sold from 802 Hill Stree t in Coving ton, Tennesse e; b. The Af

fidavit for Sea

rch Warr ant alleg es that an un-na med [sic] confide ntial informant, while we aring an audio device , purcha sed c r a c k c o c a i n e f

r o m a b l a c k m a l e n a m e d H e n r y N a s h a t 8 0 2 H ill prior to the issuance of the sea rch w arr ant; and c. The Sea

rch Warr ant identifies the de fenda nt as violating the law and name s him as the person oc cupy ing the premises to be se arc he d b y

the wa rr a nt. Prior to trial, the parties a nd the trial court addre ssed the motion, at wh i ch t i m e the f ollowing exchang e wa s made: [S tate]: Yo u r Honor, there is a se arc h war rant, a nd there will be some minimum ref ere nce to a s ea rch w arr ant just to establish that the police are n’t kicking s o m eb o d y ’s d o o r i n wi t h o u ts o m e k i n d o f l ega l wr i t

. As fa r a s t h e v ar i o u s l an gu age of the sea rch w arr ant about conc erne d citizens and a controlled dr ug buy within the past 72 h o u r s , w e ’ r e n o t g o in g to g o in to th a t. T h a t’ s w h a t th e M o ti o n in L imine a dd re sse s. [Trial Court] : The Cou rt g rants the motion with reg ard to the pa rticulars in the a ff ida vit , a bs e nt a jury -o ut he ari ng abo ut the a dmi ssi bil ity of a ny prior ba d c on du c t. [S t at e] : Your Honor, w hat we f rankly had planne d to do was just make some ba re ref ere nce to the se arc h war

rant a nd m ak e i t an exhibit for identification purposes without being published to the jury , no ref ere nce to conce rned c itiz ens and that sort o f t h i n g. [Tr ia l Co urt]: Y e s, sir . A ny re sp on se to that? [De fe ns e Cou ns e l]: Y ou r H on or , I ha ve no ob

je c tio n to that. [Tr ia l Co urt]: A ll rig ht. Th e Cou rt wi ll a llo w that. [Defense Counsel] : Your Honor, w e also raise in our Mot ion in L imine any ref ere nce to th e s e ar c h w arr a n t s p e c if ic a ll y id e n ti f y in g [t h e d e f

e n d a n t]

. [Trial Court] : The court would allow, I think, a witness to establish that they wer e at the pr op e r r e sid e nc e a ndto e sta bli sh , if the y kn ow, if

the wi tne sse s [si c ] kno ws , whose re sidence it is, so t hat whate ver the fac ts a re – I don’t know what the f acts a re – but as far

as any prior conduc t alleg ed in the af fidavit by the defen d ant, the Court will gr ant the Motion in L imine, so that the State is not to ref er to that in opening or-7-

voir dire or

with any witnesses unl ess t here ’s a prior jury -out hearing to determine the a dmi ssi bil ity

of a ny pr ior ba d c on du c t.
At tr ia l, S e rg e a nt T a y lor

wa s e xami ne d a s f

oll ow s: [S tate]: All right. Now, d irec ting y our attention bac k to May 30, 2003, and the a dd re ss o f 802 Hi ll Stre e t in Cov ing ton , fir st o f a ll, that is in T ipt on Cou nty , is it n ot? [Sg t. T a y lor ]: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. [S tate]: Di d y o u h ave prior knowledg e that [the defe ndant] was stay ing at that residenc e in the day s befor e and inc luding Ma y 30, 2003? [S g t. Tay lor]: Yes, I

did. [ S t a t e ] : H a d yo u p e r s o n a l l y o b s e r v e d h i ma tt h a tr e s i d e n c e o n M a y 3 0 a n d t h e d a ys prec eding May

30? [S g t. Tay lor]: Yes, I

have. [Sta te ]: Di d y ou ha ve kn ow le dg e on oc c a sio n that he wa s in sid e that r e sid e nc e wi thi n 72 hours of May

26, 2003? [Sg t. T a y lor ]: Th a t’ s c or

re c t. [S tate]: On May

26, 2003 – first of all, let me show y ou a piec e of pa per. I f I may sh ow y ou wh a t pu rp orts to be a n Af fi da vit fo r Se arc h War

rant a nd a Se arc h Wa

rr a nt. Ar e y ou fa mil iar w ith tha t? [Sg t. T a y lor ]: Ye s, I

a m. [Sta te ]: I s that a true a nd e xac t c op y of the se arc h wa rr a nt that y ou we re inv olv e d in o b t ai n i n g? [Sg t. T a y lor ]: Ye s, it i s. [S tate]: On what date w as it obtained? [Sg t. T a y lor ]: I t wa s sig ne d on May 26 , 2 00 3, a t 9: 02 a .m. , in Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Co urt, by J udg e Peele r. [S tate]: W hat day

was it executed or did y ou – [S g t. Tay lor]: The date of e x ecution would have been on May 30.-8-

[S tate]: And what addre ss was it directe d to? [ S g t

. T a yl o r ] : T h a tw o u l d h a v e b e e n 8 0 2 H i l l S tr e e t , C o v i n g t o n , T i p t o n C o u n t y, Tenne ssee. [Sta te ]: An d w ha t pe rs on , if a ny , w a s it

dir e c te d to a t th a t a dd re ss? [Defense Counsel] : Your honor, I ’d object to r eleva nce. Who it’s direc ted to is not rele vant to the ca se. The only issue here is whether o r n o t t h ey h ad a valid searc h war rant to sea

rch the premises, whic h they did. [Trial Court] : All right. The Court will allow the question, overrule the objection. [S tate]: To what person or persons wa s the sear ch wa rra nt directe d at 802 Hill Street in Covington? [S g t. T a y lo r ]: Wo u ldh a v e b e e n [t h e d e f e n d a n t]

. Th e de fe nd a nt n ow c ha lle ng e s th is p ortio n o f S e rg e a nt T a y lor ’s te sti mon y on g round s th a t it constitutes inadmissibl e hea rsay , that it is i rre levant, and that any probative va lue it may

have ha d is substantiallyoutweig hed by its prejudicial nature . See Te nn. R. Evid. 802; 402; 403.
I n f ir s t a d d r e s s in g th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s h e ar s a y ar g u me n t, w e n o te th a t th e q u e s ti o ns prese nted to Serg eant Tay lor wer e phra sed an d an s we re d such that they repr esente d only

his personal observations an d n o t t h e stateme nt of an informant. Although an informant could ha ve obser ved simil ar ac t i v i ty , Serg eant Tay lor did not relay secondha nd information but only testified as to the activity he witnessed firsthand. There fore , the testimony was not he arsa y
. See Te nn. R. Evid. 802. Next, we turn to the rele vance of Serg eant Tay lor’s testimony

. Evidence is r eleva nt if it has “any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the action more probable or less proba ble than it would be without the evidence .” Te nn. R. Evid. 402. Once the court concludes the evidenc e is rele vant, it should ex clude the ev i d en ce i f i ts probative value is substantially

outweig hed by

its prejudicial ef

fec t. Tenn. R. Evid. 403; St ate v. J ames, 81 S.W. 3d 75 1, 75 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . A tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on a s to the re le va nc e of e vid e nc e un de r R ule 402 will be reve rsed only

upon a showing of abuse of discre tion. St ate v. Power s, 101 S.W .3d 383, 395 (Tenn. 2003)

. Upon re view, we conclude that the identification of the person to whom the se arc h war rant was dire ct ed wa s i rrelevant to the issues pre sented a t trial. Howeve r, g iven the natur e of the evidenc e pre sented, we further conclude that the trial court’s failure to exclude the testimonywas harmless e rror . As we ha ve noted, the rec ord reflec ts that the defendant wa s the only person f ound in the house and that over te n g rams of c ocaine wer e discove red ne x t to the bed wher e the de fenda nt-9-

a d b e e n s le e pin g
. F urthe r, the de fe nd a nt did no t app e ar to be int oxic a te d by e ith e r dr ug s or a lc oh ol, and no drug para

phernalia was found at the residenc e. Finally , office rs had seen the def endant at the Hill Stree t r esidenc e in the day s leading up to his arre st. There fore , it is our determination that eve n if the irre levant testimony had bee n excluded, there is not a rea sonable probability that a diffe rent c on c lus ion wo uldha ve re su lte d. As su c h, the e rr or wa s h arm le ss.
I I I

. J u ryI n s tru ct i o n o n t h e D ef i n i t i o n o f “ Kn o wi n g”
The de fenda nt further

contends that the tria l court er red in instructing the jury as t o both the “natur e of c onduct,” a nd the “cir cumstance s surrounding the conduct” lang uag e in defining the term

“ kn ow ing ly ” to the jury . I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt ins truc te d th e jury

that: Knowing ly

means that a

person a cts knowing ly

with respec t to the conduc t or circ umstances surr ounding the conduct whe n the per son is awar e of the nature of the c on du c t or

that th e c ir c ums ta nc e s e xist. Th e requi re me nt o f kno wi ng ly is a lso e s t ab l i s h e d i f

s h o w n t h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n ta c t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y.
I ntentionally

means that a person acts intentionally with respec t to the nature of the c onduct or the r esult of the conduct when it’s the pe rson’s consc ious objective or desire to eng ag e in the conduc t.
I nitially , we note that the defe ndant has waived this issue for f ailure to raise it in his m otion for new trial. Specifica lly , Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e) provides that for appeals of “ case s tried by a jury , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon e rror in the admission or exclusion of evidence , jury instructions gr an t ed o r refused, . . . or other action committed or occur ring during the trial of the c ase, or other g round upon which a new trial is sought, unless the same wa s specific ally

stated in a motion for a

new t ri al; otherwise suc h issues will be treate d as waived.” Notwithstanding w aiver , we f urther c onclude that the trial court did not err in instructing on both the “natur e of c onduct” and the “cir cumstance s surrounding conduct” lang uag e. This court has previously

held that possession of coc aine with intent to se ll or deliver is a nature of c onduct offe nse, requiring that the defe ndant be awa re he or she is in possession of cocaine. State v. Fr ank Ga itor, No. E2001-02531- CCA-R3-CD, 20 0 2 T en n
. C rim. App. LEXI S 1106, at *34 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvil le, Dec . 23, 2002) app. denied (Tenn. May 27, 2003). F urther, the culpable me ntal states of “intentional” and “know ing” are applicable to nature of conduct o ff

en s es. State v. De

ji A. Og undiy a, No. M2002-03099- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 152 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, F eb. 19, 2004). Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-11-302 pr ovides the following de fi nit ion s f

or tho se te rm s: (a) “I ntentional” ref

ers to a per son who ac ts intentionallywith respec t to the nature of the c onduct or to a r esult of the conduc t when it is the person’s c onscious objective or de sir e to e ng a g e in the c on du c t or c a us e the re su lt.-10-

(b) “Knowing ” re fer s to a person w ho acts knowing ly with respec t to the conduct or to circumstanc es surrounding the conduc t when the person is awa re of the nature of the c on du c t or

that th e c ir c ums ta nc e s e xist. A p e rs on a c ts kno wi ng ly wi th re sp e c t to a re su lt o f the pe rs on ’s c on du c t w he n th e pe rs on is a wa re that the con du ct is re a so na bly c e rt a in t o c a us e the re su lt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-302(a ), (b) (2003). In the instant case , the trial court proper ly omitted the separ ate “ result of c onduct” lang uag e fr om the definition of “knowing ” and instruc ted the jury on the re m ainder

of the de finition. A plain reading of the statute lea ds us to conclude that the instruction on both the “nature of conduc t” and “ circ umstances surr ounding c onduct” lang uag e wa s no t in e rr or , in that th e pr op e r d e fi nit ion c a n b e app lie d a s th e c on du c t e le me nt o f the of fe ns e dictates. I n this case, the trial court expli citly instructed that knowing possession of cocaine was a n e sse nti a l e le me nt o f the of fe ns e . M or e ov e r, the de fi nit ion of int e nti on a l is the sa me fo r b othre su lt of conduc t and natu re o f co n d uct offe nses. Ther efor e, the tria l court did not err in instructing the jury on the entire definition as g iven in the statute.
I V. B lakely

v. Washington
The de fendan t also challeng es his enhanc ed sente nce ba sed upon the Supreme Court’s ho ldi ng B lake ly

v. Was hin g ton , 5 42 U. S. 2 96 , 1 24 S

. Ct

. 25 31 (2 00 4) . O ur Sup re me Cou rt , howeve r, has r ece ntly

determined th at Bl ak elydoes not impact the va lidityof Tenne ssee’ s sentenc ing sc heme. See State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 632 (Tenn. 2005)

. Thus, the def endant is not entitled to relief ba sed on this issue.
V. Denia l of Alternative Sentencing
Fi n al l y , t h e d ef

en d an tco n t en d s t h at t h e tri al co u rt er re d i n d en y i n g al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g. This court’s re view of a

sentenc e imposed b y

the trial court is de novo with a presumption of corr ectne ss. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). This pre sumpt i o n i s co n d i tioned upon an a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing prin c ipl e s a nda ll rele v an t fa cts and c ircumstance s. State v. Pettus, 986 S .W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1999). I f the trial court fa ils to comply wi t h t h e st atutory direc tives, there is no pre sumption of corre ctness and our revie w is de novo. State v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997)

. The burden is upon the appea ling party to show that the sentenc e is imprope r. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d), Sentenc ing Commiss i o n Comments. I n conducting our re view, we are require d, pursuant

to T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o ta ted sec tion 40-35-210, to consider the following fac tors i n s en t en ci n g: (1) [t] he evide nce, if

any , rec eived at the trial an d t h e sentenc ing he aring ; (2) [t] he prese ntence report; (3) [t] he princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing alternatives; (4) [t] he natur e and c hara cteristics of the criminal conduc t involved; (5)-11-

[e] vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; and (6) [ a]ny statement the de fenda nt wishes t o m ak e i n t h e d ef

en d an t ’s o wn b eh al f a b o u ts en t en ci n g.
Un de r the Cr imi na l Se nte nc ing Re fo rm Ac t of 19 89 , tri al judg e s a

re e nc ou ra g e d to us e a lte rn a tiv e s to inc arc e ratio n. An e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d or sta nd ardof fe nd e r c on vic te d o f a

Cla ss C , D, or E f elony is presumed to be a

favor able c andidate f

or alternative sente ncing o p t i o n s in the absenc e of e vidence to the contra ry . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(6) (2003).
I n determining if inca

rce ration is appropriate, a trial court may consider the need to pr otect so c iety by re str a ini ng a

de fe nd a nt h a vin g a

lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t, the ne e d to a vo id de pr e c ia tin g the se ri ou sn e ss of th e of fe ns e , w he the r c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula rl y app ro pria te to eff ectively deter others likely

to commit si milar offe nses, and whether less restric tive measure s have often or rec ently been unsucce ssfully applied to the defe ndant. Tenn. Cod e A n n
. § 4 0-35-103( 1) (2003); see also State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. A court may

also consider the mitigating and enhanc ing f actor s set forth in Tenne ssee Code An no ta te d s e c tio ns 40 -3 5- 11 3 a nd-1 14 a s th e y are re le va nt to the se c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 c on sid e ratio ns
. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b )( 5) (2 00 3) ; State v. Bos to n, 93 8 S.W.2 d 4 35 , 4 38 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1996). Additionally , a court should consider the de fenda nt’s potential or lack of potential for reha bilitation when de termining if an alternative sentenc e would be appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 5) (2003) ; Boston, 938 S.W.2d at 438.
There is no mathematica l equation to be utilized in determining se ntencing alternatives. Not only should the sentence fi t the offe nse, but it should fit t he off ender as we ll. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 5

- 1 0 3 ( 2 ) ; S tate v
. B a te y , 3 5 S. W. 3 d 5 8 5 , 5 8 8

- 8 9 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 2 0 0 0 )

. I ndeed, individualiz ed punishment is the essenc e of alternative sentenc ing. State v. Dowdy , 894 S

. W

. 2d 30 1, 30 5 ( Te nn . Crim . App . 199 4)

. I n summ ary , sen te nc ing mus t be de te rm ine d o n a c a se -b y -c a se basis, tailoring eac h sentenc e to that particular defenda nt based upon the fac ts of that case and the circ umstances of

that defe ndant. State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)

. At t h e c o n cl u s i o n o f t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, t h e t ri al co u rt n o t ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
I ’ve revie wed the pre sentenc e re port, the principles of sentenc ing, the statement of the def endant, the nature a nd char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved[.]

. . . . Under T.C.A. 40-35-114, the Court finds enhanc ing fac tor number two applies; that is, the de fe nd a nt h a s a

pr e vio us his to ry of cri min a l be ha vio r o r c ri min a l c on vic tio ns in addition to what’s nec essary to establish the appropriate ra ng e. The defe ndant has multipl e misdemeanor convictions and multip l e felony-12-

c on vic tio ns . H e ha s in 19 99 a n E fe lon y of failu re to a pp e ar, a no the r Efe lon y

of failu re to appea r, a possession of a wea

pon, and another possession of a wea pon; in 1998 the C felony of coc aine, a nd another

– an eva ding a

rre st, that i s , in 1998. I n 1997 a possession of a wea pon by a convic ted fe lon; in 1993 an evading arr est, a possession with intent conviction; in 1 99 2 a n e va din g arr e st, a ndmul tip le oth e r m isd e me a no r c on vic tio ns
.

. . . . The de fenda nt does not qual if y f o r p r o b ation under T.C.A. 40-35- 303, and the Court doesn’t believe alternate sentenc ing is a ppropriate under T.C.A. 40- 35-106.
Th e de fe nd a nt h a s a

re c or d o f v iol a tio n o f the la w. As he no te d in his statement, he’s be en into court multiple times. Measure s less restrictive than confine ment have be en applied ma ny times without s u cc es s
. He’ s had a blatant disreg ard f

or the law for y ear s. The Court finds confine ment is nece ssary to protect so c ie ty , w he re he ha s, thi s d e fe nd a nt, a lon g h istory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; t o a vo id depre cating [si c] the seriousness of the offe nse; that a sente nce f or this defe ndant would perha

ps be a de terre nt to others; and mea sures less re strictive have been applied multiple times to t he def endant without succ ess. Up on re vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s, we c on c lud e that it c on sid e re d bo th the app lic able sentenc ing principles and the particula r facts of t he ca se and pr operly found that the de fenda nt was not an appr opriate c andidate f or alternative sente ncing

.

Conclusion
Ba sed on the for eg oing r easoning , we a ffirm the de fenda nt’s conviction and se ntence

.

___________________________________

J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE