UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

M.M., individually, as the father of JOHN 

DOE 1, and as the legal representative of the 

ESTATE OF JOHN DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:21-cv-2783 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2017, terrorists detonated a bomb near the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. The blast

killed nearly a hundred people, including eight Afghan security contractors employed by the 

United States (collectively, the Contractors). The Contractors’ estates and relatives (collectively, 

Plaintiffs) blame the Islamic Republic of Iran. In their view, Iran knowingly and willfully 

supported, trained, and directed the Taliban and the Haqqani Network—two well-known terrorist 

organizations—to carry out the attack. So Plaintiffs sued Iran for materially supporting 

extrajudicial killings in violation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 

Iran ignored this case, and Plaintiffs now move for default judgment and damages. 

Plaintiffs have successfully shown that Iran lacks sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s 

terrorism exception. They have proven the Court has personal jurisdiction over Iran. And they

have established their entitlement to a favorable judgment, although they are not all entitled to 

the full damages they seek. So the Court will partially grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default 

Judgment and award them damages as allowed by law.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns a 2017 terrorist attack in Kabul. Plaintiffs, the estates and relatives of 

U.S. contractors killed in that bombing, claim Iran provided material support to the responsible 

terrorist groups. See Pls.’ Mot. for Default J. (Default Mem.) at 2,1 ECF No. 27-1. Because of 

that support, Plaintiffs say, Iran should be held liable.

Under the FSIA, foreign states are generally immune from suit in the United States. See 

Mohammadi v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But “that grant of 

immunity is subject to a number of exceptions.” Id. Plaintiffs say the “terrorism exception” 

applies here. Default Mem. at 12. Under that exception, victims may sue foreign states that 

provide material support for extrajudicial killings carried out by terrorist organizations. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1605A.

Iran never responded. So Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. See generally Default 

Mem. To prevail on that motion, Plaintiffs must prove that the Court has both subject matter and 

personal jurisdiction over Iran. See Jerez v. Repub. of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

And they must also “establish[] [their] claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 

court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). 

Plaintiffs primarily rely on two expert reports. See Exp. Rep. of Phillip Smyth (Smyth 

Rep.), ECF No. 27-3; Exp. Rep. of Abbie Aryan (Aryan Rep.), ECF No. 27-4. This is common 

in FSIA cases because “firsthand evidence and eyewitness testimony is difficult or impossible to 

obtain from an absent and likely hostile sovereign.” Owens v. Repub. of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 

785 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Opati v. Repub. of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601 

(2020). The Court has reviewed these experts’ credentials and is satisfied that each is qualified 

1 The Court’s page references correspond to the pagination generated by CM/ECF. 
3

to offer the opinions discussed below. Accord Borochov v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 589 F. Supp. 

3d 15, 26 (D.D.C. 2022) (accepting expert reports as sufficient to meet plaintiffs’ evidentiary 

burden); see also Fissler v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 2022 WL 4464873, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 

2022) (qualifying Smyth as an expert on Iran’s relationship with militia groups and those militia 

groups’ terrorism tactics).

The Court starts with findings of fact. Then it proceeds to jurisdiction, merits, and 

damages. 

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Taliban and the Haqqani Network

The Taliban is a “militant group operating mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Selig v. 

Islamic Repub. of Iran, 573 F. Supp. 3d 40, 52 (D.D.C. 2021).

2

 And as Smyth explains in his 

expert report, the Taliban and Haqqani Network are closely connected. The Haqqani Network 

“is a quasi-autonomous organization” that “functions as the Taliban’s core leadership and 

fighting group.” Smyth Rep. ¶ 27; see also Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (finding that the 

Haqqani Network and the Taliban “operate as a single entity”). Like the Taliban, the Haqqani 

Network is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. See Foreign 

Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist2

 The Court may not take “judicial notice of the truth of findings and conclusions” from other 

cases “absent some particular indicia of indisputability.” Murphy v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 740 

F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). No such indicia appear here 

given the “one-sided” nature of this proceeding. Id. at 58–59. Still, “the FSIA does not require 

this Court to relitigate issues that have already been settled in previous decisions.” Id. at 59 

(cleaned up). So “the Court may review evidence considered in an opinion that is judicially 

noticed, without necessitating the re-presentment of such evidence.” Id. The Court does so here, 

drawing on uncontroverted facts from other cases only when they accord with the evidence 

presented by Plaintiffs here. 
4

organizations/ (last accessed Dec. 15, 2023). And it “actively work[s] . . . with other terrorist 

organizations,” especially al-Qaida. Smyth Rep. ¶ 27. 

For years, the Taliban and the Haqqani Network were at odds. See Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d 

at 52. But they began working together in the 1990s and “grew even closer during the U.S. 

invasion” of Afghanistan. Id. at 52–53 (recounting various connections). Because of this, “the 

original distinctions between these two groups . . . collapsed.” Id. at 53.

B. Iran’s Support for the Taliban and Haqqani Network

The Court has recently recounted Iran’s history of sponsoring terrorist groups. See 

generally Roth v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 651 F. Supp. 3d 65, 73–77 (D.D.C. 2023); Brown v. 

Islamic Repub. of Iran, 2023 WL 4824740, at *2–3 (D.D.C. July 27, 2023). The Court 

nonetheless “expounds on those findings” below with additional evidence presented by 

Plaintiffs’ experts. Murphy v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010).

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban and Haqqani Network began in earnest around 2000. 

Smyth Rep. ¶ 34. In the years that followed, Taliban leadership publicly visited Iran “numerous 

times.” Id. But the links between Iran and the Taliban do not stop there. At one point, a Taliban 

faction “was based in Iran.” Id. ¶ 22. And Taliban leaders have received “monetary support and 

individualized training” to “help build Taliban tactical and combat capabilities.” Id. ¶ 24 

(cleaned up). As Aryan puts it, “Iran systematically and purposefully provided material support 

to the Taliban throughout all times relevant to this case, and increasingly so beginning in 2015.” 

Aryan Rep. ¶ 35.

Iran’s financial assistance to the Taliban and Haqqani Network has taken many forms. One 

is “direct funding.” Id. ¶ 49. For instance, it paid bounties to the Taliban for each Afghan or 

American soldier killed—$1,700 for an Afghan soldier and $1,000 for a U.S. servicemember. 
5

See id. And it has sent payments directly to Taliban fighters’ families. See id. Iran has also

funded the Taliban indirectly “by enabling the group’s international narcotics trade.” Id. ¶ 48. 

That money has “allow[ed] . . . the Taliban to rapidly and effectively develop and deploy forces 

eager to attack U.S. interests within Afghanistan.” Id.

Both terrorist organizations also receive weapons and equipment from Iran. See Aryan 

Rep. ¶ 5 (“During my work, I uncovered numerous Iranian-made weapons used in battles by the 

Taliban.”). Smyth claims that Iran’s “transfer of . . . weapons systems[] and technology related 

to explosive devices” is “particularly” noticeable when it comes to vehicle borne improvised 

explosive devices (VBIEDs). The use of VBIEDs packed with ammonium nitrate is “an 

institutionalized technique utilized by Tehran.” Smyth Rep. ¶ 15. Indeed, Iran “pioneered” “this 

type of bomb makeup and its use in VBIEDs.” Id. ¶ 41.

The expert reports here accord with the Court’s findings in other cases. For instance, this 

Court has previously found that Iran coordinated with, and provided a safe haven to, the Taliban

and the Haqqani Network. See, e.g., Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 53. And the Court has also found 

that Iran has helped train, finance, and arm these organizations. See, e.g., id. at 53–54.

C. Attack Against the Security Contractors

On May 31, 2017, a vacuum truck packed with 3,300 pounds of explosives rumbled into 

Zanbaq Square in Kabul. See Aryan Rep. ¶¶ 29–30. The terrorists’ target was a satellite office 

of the U.S. Embassy called the Jefferson Building. See id. ¶ 26. The truck made it through the 

Square’s first checkpoint. See id. ¶ 30. But guards at Jefferson’s outer checkpoint turned it 

away. See id. So the driver adapted, turning left to reach Jefferson from a different direction. 

See id. But that plan was foiled too, when guards at the nearby German Embassy’s checkpoint 
6

stopped the truck and asked to inspect it. See id. ¶ 31. Out of options, the driver detonated the 

bomb. See id.

The blast was catastrophic. It killed over 90 civilians, injured another 400, and left a 30-

foot-wide crater where the truck was parked. See id. Among those killed were eight Afghan 

security contractors working for the United States. See Estate Reps. Affs., ECF Nos. 28-3

through 28-10. In this lawsuit, they are known as John Does 1 through 8, or the Contractors for 

short. Each was working near the blast and was instantly killed. See Pls.’ Resp. to Show Cause 

Order (Damages Mem.) at 51, ECF No 31.

Both experts blame Iran, the Taliban, and the Haqqani Network for the attack. Smyth 

concludes that “[t]he Taliban and the Haqqani Network, acting in concert, carried out the Zanbaq 

Square bombing.” Smyth Rep. ¶ 65. To him, “[t]here is no other reasonable explanation.” 

Id. Aryan agrees. He believes that “Iran, working alongside and through the Taliban, actively 

sought” to carry out this bombing as a “means of retaliation against the United States” for killing 

an Iranian ally. Aryan Rep. ¶ 36. Of course, this attack predated the Taliban’s recent restoration 

to power in the Afghan government. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Court may enter a default judgment against a party who fails to appear. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55(b)(2). But the entry of a default judgment “is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 

F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court must first determine whether it has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the matter. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And it must 

also “satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6.

In cases like this where the defendant is a sovereign state, special procedures govern. 

The FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States 
7

courts.” Mohammadi, 782 F.3d at 13 (cleaned up). Generally, foreign states are immune from 

suit under the FSIA. But that immunity “is subject to a number of exceptions.” Id. at 13–14. 

Plaintiffs claim that Iran is liable under the terrorism exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. That 

section provides subject matter jurisdiction over, and a federal cause of action against, foreign 

states that engage in terrorism. See Borochov, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 30. Plus, it “addresses 

personal jurisdiction by specifying procedures that a plaintiff must follow to effect service on a 

foreign state.” Id.

Different evidentiary burdens accompany personal and subject matter jurisdiction. For 

personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must only make a “prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Mwani, 

417 F.3d at 6–7. But for subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must “establish[] [their] claim or 

right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Without binding law 

from the FSIA or the D.C. Circuit, district courts have discretion to determine “how much and 

what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide.” Han Kim v. Dem. People’s Repub. of Korea, 

774 F.3d 1044, 1046–51 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Courts must also “adjust evidentiary requirements 

to . . . differing situations.” Id. at 1048 (cleaned up). Still, any evidence must be admissible and 

“sufficient for a court to come to the ‘logical conclusion’ that the defendant is responsible for the 

plaintiffs’ injuries.” Borochov, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (quoting Han Kim, 77 F.3d at 1051).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court starts by assessing whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Next, the Court 

considers whether it has personal jurisdiction over Iran. Then it examines Plaintiffs’ causes of 

action and decides whether they prevail under specific theories of liability. And finally, the 

Court evaluates Plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages.
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A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The terrorism exception comes with two threshold requirements: First, the claimant or 

victim must be a U.S. national, a U.S. servicemember, a U.S. government employee, or “an 

individual performing a contract awarded by the United States Government, acting within the 

scope of the employee’s employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii). And second, the State 

Department must have designated the foreign government as a state sponsor of terrorism at both 

the time of the attack and when a resulting claim is filed. See id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

Plaintiffs meet both prerequisites. John Does 1 through 8 were serving as security 

contractors for the United States when the blast killed them. See Mot. for Default J. (MDJ) Exs. 

3–10, ECF Nos. 27-5 through 27-12. And the State Department has designated Iran as a state 

sponsor of terrorism since 1984. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, 

https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism (last accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

Having satisfied these initial requirements, Plaintiffs must also show that their claims fall 

within the terrorism exception’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The waiver applies only when:

[1] money damages are sought against a foreign state [2] for personal injury or 

death [3] that was caused by [4] an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 

sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such 

an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is [5] engaged in by 

an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope 

of his or her office, employment, or agency.

28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Plaintiffs’ Complaint satisfies the first two elements. They ask for 

money damages from Iran. See Am. Compl. at 35–40, ECF No. 35 (describing prayer for relief). 

And they do so based on the Contractors’ deaths. See id. at 23–35 (listing causes of action). So 

the Court turns to the last three elements: extrajudicial killings, material support, and causation. 
9

1. The Contractors’ Deaths Constitute Extrajudicial Killings

Plaintiffs must show that the Contractors died in an “extrajudicial killing.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A(a)(1). The Zanbaq Square bombing counts as an extrajudicial killing. The FSIA 

defines “extrajudicial killing” by borrowing that phrase’s definition from the Torture Victim 

Protection Act of 1991 (the TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A(h)(7). The TVPA, in turn, calls an extrajudicial killing “a deliberated killing not 

authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the 

judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” TVPA § 3(a), 

106 Stat. at 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note). So Plaintiffs must show that the Contractors

died in: “(1) a killing; (2) that [was] deliberated; and (3) [was] not authorized by a previous 

judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 770.

Plaintiffs easily meet the first element. The bombing instantly killed John Does 1 

through 8. Damages Mem. at 51. And their relatives either identified their bodies or were 

informed of their passing through other channels. See MDJ Ex. 3 ¶ 16; Ex. 4 ¶ 17; Ex. 5 ¶ 15; 

Ex. 6 ¶ 18; Ex. 7 ¶ 12; Ex. 8 ¶ 19; Ex. 9 ¶ 11; Ex. 10 ¶ 15. 

The killing was also deliberate. As Aryan explains, the Zanbaq Square attack was carried 

out in retaliation for the American killing of an “Iranian ally,” Mullah Mansour, the year earlier. 

Aryan Rep. ¶¶ 26, 35. That suggests planning. More, he says that smuggling the explosives, 

“keeping them in a safe place, and then finding an explosives expert to place them in the vacuum 

truck tank” was a tricky task, which is “why it took about a year to execute the plan.” Id. ¶ 29. 

Finally, the Taliban killed John Does 1 through 8 “without due process.” Han Kim, 774 

F.3d at 1050. “There is no question that these acts of terrorism lacked the traditional protections 
10

of due process.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 60–61. So Plaintiffs have established all three 

elements of an extrajudicial killing.

2. Iran Materially Supported the Taliban and Haqqani Network 

As detailed above, Iran provided various forms of support to the Taliban and the Haqqani 

Network. Iran provided training. See Smyth Rep. ¶ 24. And it provided weapons. See Aryan 

Rep. ¶ 5; Default Mem. at 8. It even gave the organizations direct payments and propped up the 

Taliban’s narcotics trade. See Smyth Rep. ¶ 48. So Plaintiffs have offered enough evidence to 

show that Iran materially supported the Taliban and Haqqani Network. They have also shown 

that Iran’s support came from “an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting 

within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); see

Smyth Rep. ¶¶ 16–26 (describing Taliban support from Iranian leadership). 

3. Iran’s Material Support Proximately Caused the Contractors’ Extrajudicial Killings

Plaintiffs must finally show that Iran proximately caused the victims’ deaths by providing 

the terrorist groups with material support to carry out the extrajudicial killings. See Selig, 573 F. 

Supp. 3d at 61. Proximate cause requires a “reasonable connection” between the defendant’s 

conduct and the plaintiff’s harm. Id. (quoting Owens, 864 F.3d at 794). Here, that means

Plaintiffs must show both that Iran’s “actions were a substantial factor in the sequence of events 

that led to their deaths and that their [deaths] must have been reasonably foreseeable or 

anticipated as a natural consequence of [Iran’s] conduct.” Id. (quoting Owens, 864 F.3d at 794)

(emphasis added). To do that, “it is enough for Plaintiffs to have shown that Iran’s financial and 

military aid . . . played a significant role in aiding [the terrorist groups’] operational capacity.” 

Id. (cleaned up). 
11

Plaintiffs’ expert reports demonstrate this degree of connection. Take Aryan’s bottomline conclusion: “The deaths of the eight Afghan contractors . . . were the direct and foreseeable 

consequence of the material support and direction provided to the Taliban by Iran.” Aryan Rep. 

¶ 37. He holds this conclusion to “a reasonable degree of certainty” given the attack’s nexus to 

the United States’ killing of Mullah Mansour, an Iranian ally and “leader of the Taliban.” Id.

¶ 35. After the leader’s assassination, Iran and the Taliban worked together to “actively [seek] 

out means of retaliation against the United States in Afghanistan.” Id. ¶ 36. And the bombing 

near the Jefferson Building—executed around the anniversary of Mansour’s death—“was the 

first of those retaliatory attacks.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 36. All this, combined with Aryan’s “deep 

knowledge of the region and fifteen years of on-the-ground engagement,” leaves him with “no 

doubts” that “the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and [t]he Islamic Republic [were] the main 

sponsor[s] of the May 31, 2017 Kabul bombing.” Id. ¶ 38.

Smyth agrees. In his view, “the Taliban and Haqqani Network . . . carried out the Zanbaq 

Square bombing,” and it “was committed with Iranian support, inspiration, and funding.” Smyth 

Rep. ¶¶ 65–66. Smyth backs this conclusion by noting the various ways that Iran supported the 

terrorist organizations. Id. ¶¶ 46–49. And to him, one point of connection stands out—the type 

of bomb used in the attack. The attacker’s truck was packed with a mix of plastic explosives and 

ammonium nitrate, a deadly cocktail signaling “an Iranian connection.” Id. ¶¶ 40–41. This 

alone constitutes powerful evidence that Iran’s assistance was a “substantial factor in the 

sequence of events” leading to the Contractors’ deaths. Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (quoting 

Owens, 864 F.3d at 794). 

Smyth also states that the Contractors’ deaths were reasonably foreseeable byproducts of 

Iran’s illicit aid. While he thinks the attack may have been aimed at another target initially, the 
12

place of its eventual detonation “suggests the bomb was meant for an American target or for the 

German embassy” nearby. Smyth Rep. ¶ 56. In his view, “it is highly likely that this secondary 

target was surveyed or at least shared with” the attackers. Id. ¶ 57. 

Based on this uncontested evidence, the Court finds that Iran’s material support to the 

Taliban and Haqqani Network proximately caused the Contractors’ extrajudicial killings. Iran 

appeared set on revenge. It provided funding, training, and weapons to groups bent on killing 

Americans. That support was a substantial factor behind the attack. And the Contractors’ 

resulting deaths were reasonably foreseeable. Given the sheer degree of entanglement between 

Iran and the Taliban, Iran must have had “an awareness of how [its] support would be used.” 

Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 61. So Plaintiffs have met the terrorism exception, stripping Iran of 

immunity and granting the Court subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). 

B. Personal Jurisdiction

The Court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign state when it has subject matter 

jurisdiction and plaintiffs have served process as required in 28 U.S.C. § 1608. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1330(b).

Section 1608 “provides four methods of service in descending order of preference.” 

Barot v. Emb. of the Repub. of Zambia, 785 F.3d 26, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015). First, plaintiffs can

deliver “a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for 

service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1608(a)(1). Second, plaintiffs can deliver “a copy of the summons and complaint in 

accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents.” Id. 

§ 1608(a)(2). Third, plaintiffs can “send[] a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of 

suit . . . by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the 
13

clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” 

Id. § 1608(a)(3). And fourth, if the others do not work, plaintiffs can serve the documents 

through the State Department. Id. § 1608(a)(4).

Here, Plaintiffs could not use the first two routes because the United States and Iran lack 

a “special arrangement” for service of process, “and Iran is not party to an international 

convention on service of judicial documents.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 62. Plaintiffs tried the 

third route, foreign mailing, but that failed. See Default Mem. at 27 (“The Clerk’s office 

indicated that it was unable to complete service in this manner.”). So Plaintiffs followed the 

fourth route and served Iran through the State Department. See id.; see also Return of Service 

Aff., ECF No. 22. 

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiffs properly served Iran. So the 

Court has personal jurisdiction over Iran.

C. Plaintiffs Have Alleged Viable Causes of Action

Plaintiffs here fall into two groups: the estates’ Representatives and the Contractors’ 

Relatives. This distinction matters because the Representatives may rely on the federal cause of 

action contained in § 1605A(c), but the Relatives must resort to state law or its foreign 

equivalent. A glance at the FSIA’s structure supports this conclusion. 

The FSIA’s terrorism exception has both “strong” and “weak” functions. In its strongest 

form, the exception strips a foreign state of its sovereign immunity and it provides plaintiffs a 

cause of action. The cause of action appears in § 1605A(c). To recover under it, a plaintiff must 

show “personal injury or death caused by acts described in [the terrorism exception]” contained 

in § 1605A(a)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Put another way, a plaintiff can state a claim under 

§ 1605A(c) whenever the terrorism exception applies and confers subject matter jurisdiction. 
14

But the FSIA’s cause of action has limits. Only certain individuals can invoke it: U.S. 

nationals, U.S. servicemembers, U.S. Government employees and contractors, or the legal 

representatives of these individuals. See id. § 1605A(c)(1)–(3). Those “[i]neligible to invoke 

§ 1605A(c)’s new federal cause of action” may still rely on the “terrorism exception to overcome 

[Iran’s] sovereign immunity.” Opati, 150 S. Ct. at 1606. But then they must “advance claims 

sounding in state law” or its foreign equivalent. Id.; see also Fraenkel v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 

Ministry of Foreign Affs., 892 F.3d 348, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting ineligible plaintiffs “may 

continue to pursue claims under applicable . . . foreign law” (cleaned up)). This is the FSIA’s 

terrorism exception in its weaker form: it still strips the foreign state of immunity but grants no 

federal cause of action. 

Groundwork laid, the Court evaluates Plaintiffs’ claims, starting with the 

Representatives. 

1. The Representatives

The estates’ Representatives sue under the FSIA’s federal cause of action. Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 153–232 (grounding Counts I through VIII in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)), ECF No. 33. And as far 

as establishing liability goes, they have carried their burden. The Court has already found that 

the terrorism exception applies and confers subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. See 

supra Section IV.A. So that analysis also shows that the FSIA’s cause of action is available to 

the Representatives. See Borochov, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (“The Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction analysis shows that the exception’s cause of action is available here.”). 

The Representatives further suggest they prevail under the FSIA’s cause of action 

because they are entitled to relief under various “common law tort theories.” Default Mem. at 

29. This half-federal, half-state approach draws support from Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
15

315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2003), which cautioned courts against creating “federal common 

law” for FSIA claims. See also Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353 (“The courts are not authorized to 

craft a body of federal common law in deciding FSIA terrorism exception cases.”). But this 

warning seems outdated because § 1605A(c) did not exist when the D.C. Circuit decided Bettis. 

When Bettis was decided in 2003, the FSIA’s terrorism exception lacked “a federal cause 

of action against foreign states.” 315 F.3d at 333. So some courts incorporated one from state 

law; others fashioned it from “federal common law.” Id. Bettis cleared up this confusion. The 

FSIA said that a “foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a 

private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1606. So the Circuit directed courts to 

“look[] to the common law of the states” to discern the bounds of a plaintiff’s cause of action. 

Bettis, 315 F.3d at 333. And because the Restatement serves “as a proxy for state common law,” 

the Circuit also accepted it as a measure of “the controlling substantive law.” Id.

But Congress disrupted this landscape in 2008 when it “created an express federal cause 

of action for acts of terror.” Opati, 140 S. Ct. at 1606; see also Nat’l Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 339–40 (2008). And Congress 

made the elements of this new cause of action coextensive with the immunity waiver in 

§ 1605A(a)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (permitting liability “for personal injury or death 

caused by acts described in subsection (a)(1)”). To be sure, state and foreign law still has a place 

in FSIA litigation for plaintiffs who are “[i]neligible to invoke § 1605A(c)’s new federal cause of 

action.” Opati, 140 S. Ct. at 1606. But eligible plaintiffs pressing claims under § 1605A(c) need 

not also establish their ability to recover under some other source of substantive law. 

One caveat: the D.C. Circuit has signaled that “well-established statements of common 

law” may still be relevant “in determining damages under § 1605A(c).” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 
16

353. But the Court sees little need to resort to those statements here. The FSIA entitles the 

Representatives to “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 

§ 1605A(c). So as long as the Representatives prove these damages “by a reasonable estimate,” 

they are entitled to them. Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353.

All told, the Representatives have adequately proven their claims under § 1605A(c). 

2. The Relatives

Things work differently for the Relatives. Because they lack access to the cause of action 

in § 1605A(c), they must rely on state or foreign law for their cause of action. But that requires a 

threshold determination of which jurisdiction’s law applies. See Oveissi v. Islamic Repub. of 

Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For the reasons stated below, the Relatives’ claims 

must proceed under Afghan law. And under that law, the Relatives’ claims succeed. 

a. Choice of Law

Start with the choice-of-law issue. Two jurisdictions have an interest in this dispute: 

Afghanistan, the location of the attack and nationality of the Contractors’ Relatives; and the 

District of Columbia, the forum state where Plaintiffs have sued. See Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab 

Repub., 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 41 (D.D.C. 2016). There is a “true conflict” between the law of 

these jurisdictions. Id. at 42 (quoting Barimany v. Urb. Pace LLC, 73 A.3d 964, 967 (D.C. 

2013)). Afghan law permits solatium damages for family members “up to the second degree.” 

Exp. Rep. of Rohullah Azizi (Azizi Rep.) ¶¶ 24, 49(h), ECF No. 31-1. But in the District, 

solatium damages are unavailable “to compensate an immediate family relative for their grief 

arising from the loss of a loved one.” Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 42. Given the conflict, the 

Court must decide which jurisdiction’s law controls. 
17

The District of Columbia’s choice-of-law rules guide the inquiry. See Cassirer v. 

Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 142 S. Ct. 1502, 1509–10 (2022). Its rules meld a 

“governmental interest analysis” with a “most significant relationship test.” W.A. v. Islamic 

Repub. of Iran, 427 F. Supp. 3d 117, 139 (D.D.C. 2019). The first part of the analysis “evaluates 

the governmental policies underlying the applicable laws and determines which jurisdiction’s 

policy would be most advanced by having its law applied” to the case. Id. (cleaned up). Then

the second part calls for a consideration of four factors from the Second Restatement of Conflict 

of Laws: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the 

injury occurred; (3) the parties’ domicile, residence, and nationality; and (4) “the place where the 

relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (1971)).

The Relatives urge the Court to evaluate their intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claim under D.C. law. See Default Mem. at 30. But the Court disagrees and concludes “that the 

factors overwhelmingly point in the direction of [Afghanistan].” Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 842. 

The first part of the test is inconclusive. On the one hand, Afghanistan has a significant 

interest in protecting its citizens against terrorist attacks and in vindicating victims of these

attacks. Cf. id. (“France has a strong governmental interest in both deterring attacks within its 

sovereign borders and ensuring compensation for injuries to its domiciliaries.”). And going by

the uncontroverted evidence here, Afghanistan still maintains these interests despite the “recent 

transition” in its “political landscape since August 2021.” Azizi Rep. ¶ 6. On the other hand, the

United States also has a strong interest in protecting its contractors. See, e.g., Est. of Doe v. 

Islamic Repub. of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying D.C. law to claims based 

on a terrorist attack in Lebanon). 
18

But even if the first part of the test is a wash, the remaining factors tilt decisively toward 

Afghan law. The injuries occurred in Afghanistan. So did the conduct causing the injuries. And 

all the Relatives are Afghan nationals, most of whom still live in Afghanistan. See Mot. to 

Proceed Anonymously ¶ 3, ECF No. 1 (“Plaintiffs are, for the most part, citizens and residents of 

Afghanistan.”). These factors strongly favor Afghan law. Indeed, the Relatives’ chief tie to the 

United States is their relationship to Afghan contractors working for the United States in 

Afghanistan. Beyond that, the Relatives have advanced no other connections to the United 

States—much less the District of Columbia. 

And this last point merits emphasis. Even if the Relatives could show that the United 

States had some overwhelming interest in this case, they would still have to show which 

jurisdiction’s common law provides the rule of decision. And on this record, the Relatives have 

not shown why the District has a stronger interest than, say, Arkansas or Alaska. Cf. Dammarell 

v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 2005 WL 756090, at *19 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) (“The District of 

Columbia can lay claim to very little interest in this case.”). Merely suing here is insufficient. 

So the Court concludes Afghan law governs the Relatives’ claims. Accord Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 

842–43 (applying French law to a U.S. citizen’s claim based on terrorist attack in France); 

Borochov, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 37–38 (applying Israeli law to Israeli citizens’ claims based on 

terrorist attack in Israel). 

b. Liability Under Afghan Law

When applying foreign law, the Court “may consider any relevant material or source, 

including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules 

of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Earlier this year, the Court directed the Relatives to provide 

information about Afghan law. See Order, ECF No. 29. In response, the Relatives filed an 
19

expert report from Professor Rohullah Azizi.3 His report surveys potentially applicable Afghan 

law and concludes it “allows the Family Member Plaintiffs . . . to recover against Iran for 

damages caused by the Zanbaq Square bombing.” Azizi Rep. ¶ 49(a).

Under Afghan law, when there is no “clear statutory provision[] endorsing customary 

practices,” courts rely “primarily . . . on the provisions” of the Civil Code of Afghanistan. Id.

¶ 19. So Azizi relies on the Civil Code of Afghanistan, which “acknowledges the potential for 

harm to secondary victims, particularly . . . where the deceased was financially supporting a 

family.” Id. ¶ 20. He points to Article 797, which stipulates that “if a person possesses technical 

instruments or other objects requiring special attention to prevent harm, they will be considered 

liable in case of harm inflicted by these items.” Id. ¶ 30. To avoid liability, that person must 

“prove that adequate precautions were taken to prevent harm.” Id. Under this theory, a claimant 

must prove harm and causation. See id.

The Court finds that the Relatives can recover against Iran under Article 797 because it is 

the closest comparator (at least on this uncontroverted record) to the intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim the Relatives pleaded. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 233–41; see also Borochov, 

589 F. Supp. 3d at 39 (permitting pleaded claim to be governed by analogous foreign law). A 

bomb is an “object[] requiring special attention to prevent harm.” Azizi Rep. ¶ 29. And Iran’s 

“funding of a violent insurgent group” is similarly analogous to “possessing a dangerous object.” 

Id. ¶ 30. 

3

 Azizi graduated in the top of his class with a Bachelor’s in law from Kabul University. Azizi 

Rep. at 4. He then earned his LL.M. from Tulane University School of Law. See id. Azizi has 

served as a law professor at Afghan universities, and he worked as a Curriculum Advisor for the 

Afghanistan Legal Education Project at Stanford Law School. See id. at 4–5.
20

So Article 797 controls. Id. ¶ 49(b). And the Relatives have shown their “right to relief” 

under this law “by evidence satisfactory to the [C]ourt.” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353. First, they 

have shown harm; the Contractors were killed, and their Relatives have suffered serious financial 

consequences. See Family Affs., ECF Nos. 32-4 through 32-11. Second, they have shown that 

“the harmful act” proximately caused the damage they incurred. Azizi Rep. ¶ 27(c). The

terrorists’ failure to “pay special attention to prevent harm” foreseeably resulted in the

Contractors’ deaths and the ensuing financial harm to their families. Id. ¶ 30. Through its 

material support to the Taliban and Haqqani Network, Iran contributed to that harm. Id. ¶ 49(c). 

More, Azizi says that none of the potentially applicable defenses apply. See id. ¶ 49(d); 

¶ 47 (listing potential defenses). The Court agrees. Lack of capacity and lack of free will can be 

dismissed out of hand. See id. ¶ 47(a)–(b). So too with self-defense because the bombing was 

an unjustified act of aggression, not an act meant to defend “oneself or one’s property.” Id.

¶ 47(c). Finally, Iran cannot claim “contributory negligence or assumption of risk.” Id. ¶ 47(d). 

The Contractors did not “increase their harm by their own actions,” nor did they “assume the 

risk” that they would be killed by a terrorist attack. Id.

For these reasons, the Relatives may recover against Iran under Afghan law.

D. Damages

In uncontested cases, damage awards for acts of terrorism require the plaintiffs to “prove 

that the consequences of the defendants’ acts were reasonably certain to occur, and [they] must 

prove the amount of damages by a reasonable estimate.” Abedini v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 422 

F. Supp. 3d 118, 136 (D.D.C. 2019) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs have already shown that death and 

emotional distress were reasonably foreseeable consequences of Iran’s actions. See supra 

Section IV.A.3. So the Court turns to whether Plaintiffs have proven the extent of their damages 
21

“by a reasonable estimate.” Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 136 (cleaned up). Like liability, 

however, the controlling law for damages differs for the Representatives and Relatives. So the 

Court addresses each in turn.

1. The Representatives

The Representatives’ entitlement to damages comes from the FSIA. It states their 

“damages may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). And it says that “a foreign state shall be vicariously liable for the acts of

its officials, employees and agents.” Id. The Representatives only seek economic and punitive 

damages against Iran. So the Court evaluates their entitlement to each. 

a. Economic Loss Damages

Plaintiffs retained economists Chad L. Staller and Stephen M. Dripps from the Center for 

Forensic Economic Studies to evaluate the loss of economic and household support resulting 

from the Contractors’ deaths. Staller and Dripps have the academic credentials and experience 

necessary to opine on economic loss damages. See Econ. Rep. at 42–49, ECF No. 32-3. And 

their opinions have previously served as the basis of damage awards in this district. See, e.g., 

Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 65. 

A brief word on the economists’ materials and methods. Staller and Dripps consulted 

many materials to reach their conclusions. For instance, they consulted family member 

affidavits, employment contracts, a household services questionnaire, and additional information 

provided by Plaintiffs’ counsel. See Econ. Rep. at 1, 7, 11, 16, 21, 26, 31, 37. Using this 

information, Staller and Dripps gauged the life expectancy of each deceased contractor and 
22

calculated the value of their lost household services.4 See, e.g., id. at 2–3; see also Opati v. 

Repub. of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 68, 77 (D.D.C. 2014) (concluding “household services lost” 

constitutes a form of recoverable economic damages). The economists assessed each 

contractor’s household services by multiplying their hourly compensation by the number of 

hours they spent performing household services, such as providing educational assistance to 

family members (see Econ. Rep. at 2), keeping the house in order (see id. at 7), and caring for 

children (see id. at 12). Then these estimations were increased to account for future growth and 

decreased to account for present value. See, e.g., id. at 3. 

A few months ago, the Court identified a potential flaw in this methodology: the use of 

“average life expectancy at birth as of 2021.” Order at 1, ECF No. 33 (quoting Econ. Rep. at 2)

(emphasis added). Because none of the Contractors was born in 2021, the Court queried whether 

the economists’ valuations were based on reasonably accurate life expectancies. See id. at 2. 

In response, Plaintiffs said that Staller and Dripps stand by their original estimations for 

two reasons. See Pls.’ Resp. to Order Regarding Econ. Damages, ECF No. 37. 

First, the pair note in their supplemental report that “historical and specific data” for life 

expectancy in Afghanistan “is simply unavailable.” Suppl. Econ. Rep. at 1, ECF No. 37-1. So 

they used “a methodology that is as accurate as possible based upon available relevant data.” Id. 

Here, that meant using “the most recent life expectancy data provided by The World Bank.” Id. 

4 Curiously, the Representatives do not seek lost wages yet use the Contractors’ wages to 

estimate the value of their household services. This approach is far from normal, but given the 

lack of readily ascertainable alternative values and the absence of objections from Iran, the Court 

will largely adopt their approach. Of course, the Representatives only had to provide a 

reasonable estimation of their economic damages. See Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353. And the Court 

finds that the economists’ valuations generally fall within this ballpark. 
23

And second, Staller and Dripps claim their conclusions are conservative given how life 

expectancy is measured. See id. at 1–2. The World Bank’s measure of life expectancy captures 

“the average number of years a newborn is expected to live if mortality patterns at the time of 

birth remain constant in the future.” Id. at 1. But “high mortality in young age groups” causes 

the average measure of life expectancy to skew downward. Id. Controlling for a subject’s 

present age increases their life expectancy. See id. That is why, for instance, an 80-year-old 

American has a life expectancy of 89.2 years, and a newborn only 77 years. See id. at 2. For 

these reasons, Staller and Dripps “stand[] by the life expectancy at birth figures applied in [their] 

initial report as the most accurate available estimate of anticipated life span applicable to this 

[case].” Id.

Given this added explanation, and without impeachment from defense, the Court is 

persuaded that Staller and Dripps’ overall valuations represent “reasonable estimate[s]” of the 

Representatives’ economic losses. Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353. So the Court turns to an 

assessment of economic losses attributable to each estate. 

i. Economic Loss for John Doe 1. John Doe 1 was 26 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 62 years. Econ. Rep. at 2. He made $2.60 per hour and his family said that he 

worked an average of 24 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 

and Dripps claim $120,322 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 4. So the Court will award the Estate of John Doe 1 $120,322 in 

economic damages. 

ii. Economic Loss for John Doe 2. John Doe 2 was 32 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 62 years. Econ. Rep. at 7. He made $2.60 per hour and his family said that he 

worked an average of 18 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 
24

and Dripps claim $77,507 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 9. So the Court will award the estate of John Doe 2 $77,507 in 

economic damages. 

iii. Economic Loss for John Doe 3. John Doe 3 was 29 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 62 years. Econ. Rep. at 12. He made $2.88 per hour and his family stated that he 

worked an average of 29 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 

and Dripps claim $151,395 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 14. So the Court will award the estate of John Doe 3 $151,395 in 

economic damages. 

iv. Economic Loss for John Doe 4. John Doe 4 was 30 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 62 years. Econ. Rep. at 17. He made $2.57 per hour and his family said that he 

worked an average of 29.5 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 

and Dripps claim $132,541 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 19. So the Court will award the estate of John Doe 4 $132,541 in 

economic damages. 

v. Economic Loss for John Doe 5. John Doe 5 was 43 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 62 years. Econ. Rep. at 22. He made $1.96 per hour and his family stated that he 

worked an average of 31 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 

and Dripps claim $67,121 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 24. So the Court will award the estate of John Doe 5 $67,121 in 

economic damages. 

vi. Economic Loss for John Doe 6. John Doe 6 was 49 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 62 years. Econ. Rep. at 27. He made $2.60 per hour and his family stated that he 
25

worked an average of 40 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 

and Dripps claim $79,048 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 24. So the Court will award the estate of John Doe 6 $79,048 in 

economic damages. 

vii. Economic Loss for John Doe 7. John Doe 7 was 38 when he died and had a life 

expectancy of 77.3 years because his family permanently moved to the United States after his 

death and the economists “assume he would have resettled” with his family. Econ. Rep. at 32. 

This assumption appears well-founded because he and his wife had applied for an American visa 

and had reached the interview stage before his death. See John Doe 7 Family Affs. at 4, ECF 

No. 32-10. If John Doe 7 had been able to join his family, he would have made $14.99 per hour

according to the economists’ estimates. Econ. Rep. at 32. And his family conveyed that he 

worked an average of 37 hours per week on household services. Id. Given these inputs, Staller 

and Dripps claim $838,188 captures the value of his total lost household services over his 

expected lifetime. Id. at 35. So the Court will award the estate of John Doe 7 $838,188 in 

economic damages. 

viii. Economic Loss for John Doe 8. John Doe 8 was 28 when he died. Econ. Rep. at 38. 

Plaintiffs argue he had a life expectancy of 81.3 years. Id. But this assumes that he would have 

joined his family in Turkey, where they relocated after his death. Id. And it assumes he would 

have lived past the age of 65. Id. The Court discredits both assumptions. Unlike John Doe 7, 

who died while his family’s visa application was pending, there is no indication John Doe 8 and 

his family had plans to move to Turkey prior to his death. John Doe 8’s Representative has 

given the Court no reason to believe the family would have emigrated but for this tragic attack. 
26

And the economists simply speculate John Doe 8 “would have lived to [] age 65.0,” 

which triggers a higher 81-year life expectancy. Id. The Representatives must prove their 

damages “by a reasonable estimate.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 64 (cleaned up). But they have 

plucked their life-expectancy baseline—age 65 instead of “at birth”—from guesswork, not 

evidence. And their methodology here is strikingly different than their methodology used with 

the prior Contractors. Because of these flawed assumptions, the Court will use the “at birth” 

Afghan life expectancy of 62 years that the economists used for John Does 1 through 6. 

Nor have Plaintiffs or the economists established the effective hourly rate for John Doe 8. 

They simply pegged it to the “monthly minimum wage in Turkey,” which the Court finds 

inapplicable for the reasons stated above. Id. And they somehow concluded that Turkey’s 

minimum wage ($3.46 per hour) multiplied by 37 hours over the remainder of John Doe 8’s 

inflated life expectancy (53 years) produces $5,283,745 in lost household services. But that 

math does not add up. Before factoring in future growth and present value adjustments, those 

variables ($3.46 per hour x 37 hours per week x 52 weeks x 53 years) produce a sum closer to 

$352,823. So the economists’ $5,000,000-plus projection seems to miss by a country mile. 

Instead, the Court uses John Doe 3’s wage of $2.88 per hour—the highest Afghan wage 

in the record—as its baseline. See id. at 12. And because John Does 3 and 8 had similar 

remaining life expectancies (33 years), the Court multiplies John Doe 3’s total loss figure for one 

weekly hour ($5,221) by the number of hours John Doe 8’s family said he worked (37). That 

produces a total of $193,177 in lost household services over John Doe 8’s expected lifetime. The 

Court finds that this figure represents a far more “reasonable estimate” of the economic losses 

incurred John Doe 8’s estate. Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 64 (cleaned up). So in an exercise of the 
27

Court’s “sound discretion,” it will award the estate of John Doe 8 $193,177 in economic 

damages. Id. at 51 (cleaned up). 

b. Punitive Damages

While the FSIA entitles the Representative to punitive damages, it does not specify the 

extent of those damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). The Representatives seek $150 million in 

punitive damages for each estate. See Damages Mem. at 50. But this Court and others have 

criticized the flat-fee approach to punitive damages for being “inflexibl[e]” and unhelpful in 

deterring Iran because it “already faces billions in punitive damage awards.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 

3d at 76–77. So instead the Court will adopt its usual practice in cases like this and award 

punitive damages in an amount that matches compensatory damages. See, e.g., id. at 77

(collecting cases); Borochov, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 49 (“[T]he Court will award punitive damages 

equal to compensatory damages[.]”). 

This mirrored approach resonates with Supreme Court precedent. See Exxon Shipping 

Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513–15 (2008) (condoning a 1:1 ratio between punitive and 

compensatory damages). It “meets the four objectives of punitive damages.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 

3d at 77. And it will still hopefully deter Iran “from continuing to sponsor terrorist activities.” 

Id. For these reasons, the Court will award the Contractors’ estates a total of $1,659,299 in 

punitive damages, a sum that mirrors the estates’ total economic loss damages. See supra 

Section IV.D.1.a. 

2. The Relatives

Now for the Relatives’ damages. Recall that Afghan law governs their cause of action. 

See supra Section IV.C.2.a. So Afghan law should govern their damages, too, at least under the 

normal rule that damages are “calculated pursuant to the law under which liability was found.” 
28

Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 47. But the Relatives propose a different path. They argue

Afghan law entitles them to solatium damages, but federal law governs the extent of those 

damages. See Damages Mem. at 17. The Court agrees. 

Uncontroverted evidence shows that Afghan law permits relatives to recover damages for 

“intellectual harm.” Azizi Rep. ¶ 49(h). And according to Plaintiffs’ expert, intellectual 

damages are “essentially the same” as solatium damages. Id. Both compensate the claimant for 

“mental anguish, bereavement and grief that those with a close personal relationship to a 

decedent experience as the result of the decedent’s death, as well as the harm caused by the loss 

of the decedent, society and comfort.” Belkin v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 

(D.D.C. 2009); see also Azizi Rep ¶¶ 36, 41(b) (“Generally, intellectual harm . . . refer[s] to nonphysical, non-economic harm, such as emotional distress or psychological trauma” caused by 

“the death or serious injury of a relative”). Yet the record contains hardly any evidence on how 

the Court should calculate those damages under Afghan law. 

That is where federal law comes in, says the Relatives. They urge the Court to calculate 

damages under the framework established in Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 

229, 269 (D.D.C. 2006). See Damages Mem. at 17. Though it may seem counterintuitive, the 

Relatives’ blended approach to damages complies with the D.C. Circuit’s instruction that courts 

should “default to the application of federal law when there is a lack of information regarding the 

proper calculation of damages under foreign law.” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 358. So given this 

instruction, and lacking adequate information on Afghan law, the Court looks to federal law to 

calculate the Relatives’ solatium damages. And the Court focuses its analysis on solatium 

damages because the Relatives seek nothing else. See Damages Mem. at 16–18, 51–55. 
29

To calculate the Relatives’ damage awards, the Court uses the Heiser framework as its 

touchstone. In that case, the court awarded $8 million to a decedent’s spouse, $5 million to a 

child, $5 million to a parent, and $2.5 million to a sibling. See Heiser, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 

The Court recognizes that this framework serves as “a useful reference point” although it is “not 

binding precedent.” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 351. That said, “many judges in this district adhere to 

the Heiser framework in awarding solatium damages.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 65. And the 

Court finds that framework fitting here. Of course, future cases might be different. 

Heiser’s tiered amounts “are not set in stone.” Murphy, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 79. They can 

be adjusted up or down based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See id. But the 

Relatives here seek—and have proven their entitlement to—awards in step with Heiser’s 

baseline amounts. See Damages Mem. at 51–55. So that is the path the Court takes based on the 

following analysis of the Contractors’ families. The Court uses pseudonyms when referring to 

the Relatives because they “would face a serious risk of retaliatory harm” if their identities were 

publicly revealed. See Order, ECF No. 2 (granting Plaintiffs’ permission to proceed 

anonymously). 

a. Relatives of John Doe 1. John Doe 1 is survived by seven relatives suing here: his 

father and mother (M.M. and Ha.), three brothers (A.M., A.Z., and Ma.), and two sisters (Mu. 

and Zu.). See Damages Mem. at 18–23. 

M.M. is John Doe 1’s father and the legal representative of his estate. See John Doe 1 

Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-4. He says his relationship with John Doe 1 struck the balance 

between respect and friendship. Id. at 2. And their relationship extended beyond the home. 

M.M. trained John Doe 1 and the other Contractors to be security guards. Id. at 1. At some 

point, however, M.M. lost his hand, causing John Doe 1 to become the family’s primary source 
30

of income. Id. at 2. When M.M. learned of his son’s death, he became numb. He says he “could 

not feel anything,” and “felt as if he had lost all of [his] senses.” Id. Since then, M.M. has 

suffered from memory loss, apathy, anxiety, depression, nerve pain, chronic musculoskeletal and 

neuropathic pain, and muscle spasms. Id. And he has received medical treatment for many of 

these ailments. Id. To date, M.M. struggles with the reality of losing his son’s companionship 

and support. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards M.M. $5,000,000 in solatium damages.

John Doe 1’s passing also pained his mother, Ha. When Ha. initially heard of the 

bombing, she was told her son survived unscathed. Id. at 7. Yet reality hit hard when her son’s 

coffin arrived at her home. Id. She fainted and denied her son’s death. Id. In her own words:

I felt that my heart died along with my son. His absence is felt throughout our life. 

It is sensed spiritually, financially, mentally, and physically. My son held a unique 

role in our family and kept the social bonds in the family strong. His presence has 

been irreplaceable. 

Id. at 8. Since her son’s death, Ha. has endured blood pressure abnormalities, nerve pain, 

immobility, and depression. Id. Her physicians have prescribed several medications for her 

ailments and have told her that they stem from the stress of John Doe 1’s death. Id. She has 

“lost interest” in daily life, and she claims therapy has not alleviated “the pain and sorrow” in her 

life. Id. She also has trouble facing a future without John Doe 1. She especially “wanted to see 

[her] son get married and see his children.” Id. at 9. Yet “[t]his dream will never be fulfilled.” 

Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Ha. $5,000,000 in solatium damages.

A.M. was shocked when he learned of the bombing and his brother’s death. Id. at 13. He 

immediately left his house to search for John Doe 1’s body. And he found it at the local hospital. 

Id. A.M. lost his ability to attend university because John Doe 1 was paying his way. Id. at 14. 

So although A.M. was studying to become a dentist, he now works as a blacksmith and has no 

plans to continue his education. Id. A.M. will “always feel” his brother’s loss, and suffers from 
31

memory loss and physical weakness. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards A.M. 

$2,500,000 in solatium damages.

John Doe 1’s death similarly shattered dreams for A.Z. With John Doe 1’s help and 

financial assistance, A.Z. was preparing to take university entrance exams. Id. at 19–20. But he 

abandoned this path after the bombing because no one else could finance his education. Id. 

Since his brother’s death, he has “struggle[d] to make plans and decisions” and has been “unable 

to study well” or “focus on [his] lessons.” Id. at 20. Based on these facts, the Court awards A.Z. 

$2,500,000 in solatium damages.

Ma. was roughly 11 years old when he lost his older brother. Id. at 23. When John Doe 

1 died, Ma. “felt as though [he] had been smashed into pieces.” Id. John Doe 1 had an 

especially close relationship with Ma. because Ma. was “the youngest brother.” Id. He leaned 

on John Doe 1 for love and support “in all areas of [his] life.” Id. And John Doe 1 “paid for all 

[of Ma.’s] necessities.” Id. Ma. describes losing his big brother as “the most painful thing [he 

has] experienced,” and it has left him with “a lifetime of sorrows and pain.” Id. at 24. Indeed, 

he experiences “nightmares or night terrors” because of his brother’s death. Id. Based on these 

facts, the Court awards Ma. $2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

John Doe 1 brought “laughter and happiness” to his sister Mu. Id. at 27. She describes 

him as “a kind, loving, and honest person” who defended her against others and made her able to 

relax. Id. Though she first thought her brother survived the bombing with an injury to his leg, 

she became “totally shocked” when she learned he died. Id. at 28. Her eyes went “dark” for 

several hours upon hearing the news, and all she could do was “cry and scream.” Id. Since his 

passing, Mu. has faced depression, nervousness, and a short temper. Id. Her doctors constantly 

tell her “to forget about that day,” but she finds that “impossible.” Id. Like her brothers, Mu. 
32

had to drop out of school when John Doe 1 died. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Mu. 

$2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

John Doe 1 left a similar impression on his other sister, Zu. She “felt like the strongest 

person in the world because [her] brother loved, supported, and sponsored [her].” Id. at 31. Like 

her sister, Zu. thought her brother had only been injured. Id. So she fainted when she heard the 

news and woke up later in a hospital. Id. To this day, Zu. suffers from depression and thoughts 

of self-harm. Id. at 32. She “often feel[s] hatred for [herself] and others surrounding [her].” Id. 

Based on these facts, the Court awards Zu. $2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

b. Relatives of John Doe 2. John Doe 2 is survived by eight relatives suing here: his wife 

(R.S.) and son (M.H.M.), father and mother (M.Y. and Na.), three brothers (A.F., A.Fd., and 

M.A.), and sister (Di.). See Damages Mem. at 23–27. 

A.F. is John Doe 2’s older brother and the legal representative of his estate. See John 

Doe 2 Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32–5. A.F. was close with his brother and was shocked to 

learn of his passing. Id. at 2. When he got the news, he rushed to John Doe 2’s wife and 

children. Id. He found them “in a very devastating situation.” Id. Following Afghan custom, 

A.F. married his brother’s wife “to care for her and their children.” Id. He did so “to help keep 

their family together,” but this caused him to forgo marrying the woman he loved. Id. The new 

arrangement also forced A.F. to drop out of school. Id. Despite all the disruptions, A.F. knows 

“[i]t was the right thing to do” and remains “proud of how [his] family has supported one 

another.” Id. at 3. Based on these facts, the Court awards A.F. $2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

R.S. is John Doe 2’s widow. Id. at 6. She describes him as a “dutiful husband” who 

provided a “happy life” for her and her family. Id. She recalls cleaning the house when she 

received word about the bombing. Id. Yet she did not believe that her husband had died until 
33

his coffin arrived at the house. Id. When she saw the coffin, her “entire world became dark.” 

Id. at 7. And it slowly sank in that she “had lost [her] life partner and the support of [her] and 

[her] children.” John Doe 2’s death brought “long-lasting issues” to R.S.’s physical and 

emotional health. She sees his face everywhere she looks and suffers from anxiety, high blood 

pressure, diabetes, and loss of vision. Id. Her doctor blames these ailments on the bombing and 

her husband’s death. Id. As a result of the financial difficulties caused by John Doe 1’s passing, 

she married A.F. even though neither of them desired that arrangement. Id. She also recounts 

the emotional distress her young son experiences when he sees photos of his father. Id. at 8. 

Based on these facts, the Court awards R.S. $8,000,000 in solatium damages.

M.H.M. is the minor son of John Doe 2. Id. at 7–8. He was one and a half when his 

father died. Id. at 7. Although he did not immediately comprehend the loss, his mother says 

“[h]e fully realized the reality of his father’s death at the age of three.” Id. at 8. He often tells 

R.S. that he remembers his father and “cries when he looks at his photos.” Id. As a result, 

M.H.M. has lost his appetite and become malnourished despite attempts to give him fortified 

foods. He also “wonders why his mother has married his uncle and struggles to cope with this 

new family dynamic.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards M.H.M. $5,000,000 in 

solatium damages. 

M.Y. is John Doe 2’s father. Id. at 12. He had a “pleasant relationship” with his son, 

who helped him “in all aspects of life.” Id. By the time of the bombing, M.Y. had grown older 

and John Doe 2 had taken up the role of breadwinner for the family. Id. M.Y. learned of the 

bombing on television, then rushed to the hospital. Id. at 13. He describes it as “the hardest day 

of [his] life.” Id. at 13. John Doe 2’s death caused M.Y. to lose “all [his] power and strength 

and become a weak and poor father.” Id. The loss brought headaches and severe stress upon 
34

M.Y. Id. He now feels weak, cries constantly, and often visits doctors who tell him that his 

stress may lead to paralysis or stroke unless it abates. Id. He also suffers from mental illness, 

high blood pressure, memory loss, insomnia, apathy, and very low energy levels—none of which 

afflicted him prior to his son’s death. Id. The loss has also brought financial hardship to M.Y. 

He claims the family “can hardly make ends meet and cannot afford most of [their] needs.” Id. 

Based on these facts, the Court awards M.Y. $5,000,000 in solatium damages.

Na. is John Doe 2’s mother. Id. at 18. They had a “wonderful and close” relationship. 

Id. And Na. saw many of John Doe 2’s dreams come to fruition, including fathering a child of 

his own. Id. But Na. says all this was cut short when her other sons told her of his death. Id. at 

19. The news caused Na. to “los[e] all hope immediately,” and left her “speechless” and numb. 

Id. It also stirred up many medical issues for Na., such as diabetes, anxiety, physical weakness, 

and psychological trauma. Id. Though she desires medical attention for these ailments, she 

cannot afford to treat them all. Perhaps worst of all, Na.’s “heart yearns for the days [she] would 

see [her] son spending time with his child,” but she cannot even “look at [her] grandson” given 

his resemblance to John Doe 2. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Na. $5,000,000 in 

solatium damages.

A.Fd. is John Doe 2’s brother. Id. at 22. He recalls his brother’s love and support, 

especially when it came to his education. Id. Indeed, John Doe 2 paid A.Fd.’s tuition and gave 

him “extra money for daily expenditures.” Id. This allowed him to focus on his studies. Id. But 

things changed for the worst when A.Fd. learned of John Doe 2’s passing. The loss made A.Fd. 

feel as if he had “lost one of [his] own body parts” and left him with a lingering “sense of 

despair.” Id. at 23. Ever since, A.Fd. suffers mental breakdowns, nervousness, and nightmares 

whenever he thinks of his brother’s death. Id. He also had to drop out of school because he 
35

could no longer afford tuition. Id. Likewise, he cannot seek necessary medical treatments 

because the costs are out of reach. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards A.Fd. $2,500,000 

in solatium damages. 

M.A. is John Doe 2’s second brother. Id. at 26. The two “pledged to fight life’s 

problems” together, and John Doe 2 financially supported M.A. Id. M.A. recalls learning of the 

explosion when one of his brother’s friends gave him a call. Id. Concerned, he raced to the 

hospital where he “realized what had actually happened” and began “hitting and slapping [his] 

face and screaming very loudly.” Id. at 27. He calls the loss of his brother a “dire tragedy” that 

made him feel as if he had “lost an arm.” Id. He gets “sadder and angrier by the day” when he 

thinks of the senseless bombing. Id. And the grief he experiences has caused severe headaches, 

stomach problems, and acid reflux. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards M.A. $2,500,000 

in solatium damages.

Di. is John Doe 2’s sister. Id. at 30. She had a “great bond” with her brother—one so 

close it felt like a “spiritual[] connect[ion].” Id. She recalls learning of her brother’s death when 

a relative interrupted her watching television. Id. It was the “most difficult moment of [her] 

life.” Id. It left her with “an extremely terrible feeling that was too difficult to explain with 

words.” Id. at 31. And it caused her to experience “psychological dysfunction” such that she 

“cannot get along with girls [her] age or with others in society.” Id. Her ability to memorize 

things has been dampened as well. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Di. $2,500,000 in 

solatium damages. 
36

c. Relatives of John Doe 3. John Doe 3 is survived by six relatives suing here: his 

widow (Mz.), two minor children (Mb. and Be.), father and mother (M.B. and B.S.), and brother 

(G.B.). See Damages Mem. at 27–30.

5

Mz. is John Doe 3’s widow and the mother of his two minor children, Mb. and Be. See

John Doe 3 Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-6. Mz. and John Doe 3 had been married for three 

years when he died. At the time, their son, Mb., was two years old and their daughter, Be., was 

six months old. Id. Mz. characterizes the “entire three years” of her marriage with John Doe 3 

as a period full of “love, attention, joy, and comfort.” Id. Yet that period came crashing to a 

close when she learned of the bombing from relatives who appeared with her husband’s coffin. 

Id. at 2. She immediately became weak and fainted. Id. And she describes the adjustment to 

life without her husband as “extraordinarily strenuous.” Id. Since his death, she feels like her 

life is “meaningless.” Id. She “no longer smile[s] or laugh[s].” Id. And she suffers from 

depression, physical weakness, high blood pressure, and kidney pain. Id. Although she has seen 

doctors and therapists, she cannot get over the loss. Id. Finances have become tight for her 

family, their plans of moving to the United States got put on hold, and her children miss the 

“hugs, kisses, and love” their father gave them every day. Id. at 3–4. Based on these facts, the 

Court awards Mz. $8,000,000 in solatium damages, Mb. $5,000,000 in solatium damages, and 

Be. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

M.B. is John Doe 3’s father. Id. at 9. He describes his son as “true and loyal,” always 

willing to provide for his parents and family. Id. M.B. felt the blast when it went off because his 

house was located next to Zanbaq Square. Id. at 10. Alarmed, he “immediately went outside” 

5 R.K. is John Doe 3’s nephew and the legal representative of his estate. See John Doe 3 Family 

Affs. at 27, ECF No. 32-6; Am. Compl. at 5 ¶ 18. But Plaintiffs do not ask for any damages on 

behalf of R.K. See Damages Mem. at 27–30. So the Court awards none. 
37

and “felt a strong pain inside [his] heart” sensing the possibility that his son had been harmed. 

Id. Then his worst fears came true when he arrived at the hospital to find his son’s body being 

washed and prepared for burial. Id. He remembers falling to the ground and blacking out until 

he “was at [his] son’s grave.” Id. The loss devastated him and has impaired his health. Id. 

Before his son’s death, M.B. was healthy. Now he suffers from anxiety, high blood pressure, a 

brain disorder, and loneliness. Id. Doctors blame these ailments on the bombing and stress 

brought on by his son’s death. Id. at 11. Because John Doe 3 supported him and the rest of the 

family, M.B. also worries what will happen when they “completely run out of money.” Id. 

Based on these facts, the Court awards M.B. $5,000,000 in solatium damages.

John Doe 3’s death had a similar effect on his mother, B.S. Id. at 15. B.S. had a loving 

relationship with her son, and he used to call her daily to check in on her. Id. Like her husband, 

B.S. felt the shockwave when the bomb went off. Id. at 16. Then she remembers going to a 

relative’s house where she “just stared at [her] son’s body.” Id. She recalls being so shocked 

that she could not even cry. Id. She just “lost all of [her] emotions and senses for the first few 

days.” Id. Then the physical illnesses and psychological trauma set in, paralyzing her right 

hand, disrupting her memory, and causing her eyelids to malfunction due to “excessive crying 

and anxiety.” Id. Although she wants treatment for these ailments, she finds it difficult to afford 

proper care. Id. at 17. Based on these facts, the Court awards B.S. $5,000,000 in solatium 

damages. 

G.B. is John Doe 3’s brother. Id. at 21. They had a “strong relationship” and “great 

respect” for each other. Id. He recalls working at the U.S. Embassy when the bomb went off, 

causing him to immediately worry about his brother’s safety. Id. at 22. Then he raced to the 

hospital where he found his brother’s body lying next to several other deceased individuals. Id. 
38

He could not believe it. He “held his hands tightly, yelling at him to wake up.” Id. But that 

never happened. The loss has been difficult for G.B. to comprehend. Every time he thinks of his 

brother, his eyes swell with tears. Id. Now he also suffers from anxiousness, memory loss, and 

depression—afflictions he never experienced before the bombing. Id. Doctors have told him 

that his health problems “undoubtedly” stem from his brother’s death. Id. at 23. Since then, 

G.B. has taken responsibility for his brother’s wife and children, and spends all his income on 

their basic needs. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards G.B. $2,500,000 in solatium 

damages. 

d. Relatives of John Doe 4. John Doe 4 is survived by nine relatives suing here: his 

widow (Za.), two minor children (Ne. and Du.), mother (A.G.), four brothers (Se., Qu., Sh., and 

Sa.), and sister (Ns.). See Damages Mem. at 30–35.

Za. is John Doe 4’s widow and the legal representative of his estate. See John Doe 4 

Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-7. She is also the mother of their minor daughters, Du. and Ne. 

Id. Before John Doe 4 died, they shared in a life “full of joy, happiness, and love.” Id. at 2. His 

presence made Za.’s life worry-free, and he provided for all their needs. Id. That all changed 

when Za. heard about the explosion on television. Id. She tried to contact John Doe 4 by 

telephone, but he never answered. Id. Then one of his brothers called and delivered the bad 

news. Id. She could hardly believe it. She became weak and dizzy, yet unable to cry. Id. 

Every area of her life has been impaired. Financially, her family feels strapped. Id. Physically, 

she suffers from severe headaches and a general sense of weakness. Id. Psychologically, she 

endures anxiety and an inability to control her emotions. Id. And relationally, she had to marry 

her brother-in-law to ensure continuity of care, though it was an arrangement she never desired. 

Id. at 3. Based on these facts, the Court awards Za. $8,000,000 in solatium damages. 
39

Za.’s minor daughters, Du. and Ne., also mourn the loss of their father. Id. at 4. Ne. was 

an infant when John Doe 4 died. Id. The trauma was so severe for Za. that it made her unable to 

“breastfeed for a long time,” depriving Ne. of her primary source of nourishment. Id. at 3. Her 

mother grieves the fact that Ne. “lost the warm embrace of her father” at such an innocent age. 

Id. at 4. Much the same for Ne.’s older sister Du., who was only three years old when the attack 

happened. Id. Du. registered the loss immediately. Her “screams and cries were heard 

throughout [the] neighborhood.” Id. And she cries every day she thinks about her father. Id. 

This angers Za., who has to watch Du. endure “pain and sorrow” in “what should be the most 

carefree season of her life.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Du. and Ne. $5,000,000 

each in solatium damages.

A.G. is John Doe 4’s mother. Id. at 11. They had a relationship deeper than words could 

describe. Id. A.G. wrote: “I not only lost my son, but also my life when he died. No one can 

take his place in my heart.” Id. When she learned of is passing, she “felt as if the sky had 

fallen,” and “could not breathe.” Id. at 12. Physically and psychologically, her life has not been 

the same. Her body is weak and her hands tremble. Id. She also desires seclusion, and suffers 

from anxiety, panic disorder, uterine disorder, and high blood pressure. Id. Her life’s biggest 

desire—“to go to the Hajj (Islamic pilgrimage) with him”—is now impossible to fulfill. Id. at 

13. Based on these facts, the Court awards A.G. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

John Doe 4’s death also rocked his four brothers: Se., Qu., Sh., and Sa. Id. at 17, 23, 29, 

and 34. For instance, they viewed their brother as a “friend, teacher, and mentor.” Id. at 17. 

And they recount stories of his emotional support and financial assistance. See, e.g., id. at 29 

(giving Sh. money to “support [his] family”); id. at 34 (Sa. describing their “unique bond” due to 

their closeness in age). They all remember the moment they learned of John Doe 4’s death. Se. 
40

fainted and hit his factory’s floor. Id. at 18. Qu. “lost [his] cool” and recalls the heartache he felt 

when he saw his dead brother. Id. at 24. Sh. became “fiercely sad and unintentionally broke 

some of the hospital’s glasses.” Id. at 30. And Sa. “could not feel [his] feet on the ground,” “fell 

several times,” and thought he was “burning in hell.” Id. at 35. The bombing changed their lives 

for the worse. Se. suffers from “excessive anxiety,” which forced him to drop out of university. 

Id. at 18. He also married Za. out of a “sense of responsibility,” although he did not “wish to 

marry her.” Id. at 19. Qu. has been afflicted by anxiety, depression, and hemorrhoids. Id. at 24. 

Sh. feels a tendency to self-harm, lost some of his hearing, and no longer “get[s] along with 

people in society.” Id. at 30. And Sa. similarly cut his hands, has a heart disease, and had to quit 

his studies due to the lack of financial support. Id. at 35. Based on these facts, the Court awards 

each of the brothers $2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

So too with John Doe 4’s sister, Ns. Id. at 40. Her brother “loved and respected” her and 

cared for her given her husband’s disability. Id. When she learned of his passing, she “lost 

every sense of feeling in [her] body.” Id. at 41. She describes it as having “a body without a 

soul.” Id. And she says the loss has taken a physical toll on her body. She now looks “ten or 

fifteen years older than [her] real age,” gets homesick, and endures severe headaches whenever 

she thinks about John Doe 4. The headaches have gotten so bad that she was forced to quit her 

profession as a tailor. Id. at 41–42. Based on these facts, the Court awards Ns. $2,500,000 in 

solatium damages. 

e. Relatives of John Doe 5. John Doe 5 is survived by four relatives suing here: his 

widow (So.), two minor children (Nm. and Pa.), and brother (Es.). See Damages Mem. at 35–37.

So. is John Doe 5’s widow, mother of their two minor children, and the legal 

representative of his estate. See John Doe 5 Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-8. She remembers 
41

her husband as “a wonderful man” who cared for her in a “lovely and warm relationship.” Id. at 

2. They were married for seventeen years when he died. Id. The moment she learned of his 

passing, it marked the beginning of a “dark and sorrowful life” for her and her family. Id. At 

first, she could not tolerate the news and “fainted many times.” Id. All she could feel was “pain, 

sorrow, tears, and [a] lack of hope.” Id. at 3. Now she endures high anxiety and has even 

harmed herself at times. Id. Her head feels like it is “about to explode,” yet she cannot afford 

medical treatment. Id. The financial difficulties also stamped out the dream she shared with 

John Doe 5 to “buy a house of [their] own.” Id. at 4. Unless things get better, she foresees “a 

very dark future for [her] children.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards So. $8,000,000 

in solatium damages. 

Nm. and Pa. also feel the negative effects of their father’s absence. Id. at 5–6. Nm. was 

very young when John Doe 5 died, and it marked the first time he learned what death was—a 

heartbreaking experience for So. to watch. Id. at 5. Without his father’s “love, hugs, and strong 

support,” Nm. lives an anxious life and lacks the ability to take English and computer classes. 

Id. Pa. has faced similar roadblocks since her father’s passing. For instance, she wants to 

become a tailor, but her family can no longer afford a sewing machine. Id. at 6. And her 

emotional state has suffered, too. She keeps a picture of her father nearby and always cries when 

she looks at it. The loss left her depressed, and her mother calls her condition “very worrying.” 

Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards each of the children $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

That leaves Es., John Doe 5’s brother. Id. at 15. John Doe 5 was a father figure to Es. 

given their own father had passed when the attack occurred. Id. But “everything changed in the 

worst way possible” for Es. when his brother died. Id. He recalls learning of the attack when he 

heard “a death announcement” over a loudspeaker. Id. He started to tremble, then “lost control 
42

over [his] body” and “could not think straight.” Id. at 16. Es. developed an ongoing heart 

problem, but he cannot treat it due to the tight financial situation his brother’s passing brought on 

the family. Id. He had also planned to build a home with his brother using their accumulated 

life savings. Id. That dream, however, has been dashed because all his earnings now go to basic 

needs. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Es. $2,500,000. 

f. Relatives of John Doe 6. John Doe 6 is survived by 10 relatives suing here: his widow 

(G.G.), seven children (Mt., Om., Sk., Ta., Sm., Ra., and Fa.), mother (B.B.), and two sisters 

(B.Z. and Hk.). See Damages Mem. at 37–43.

G.G. is the widow of John Doe 7 and the legal representative of his estate. See John Doe 

6 Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-9. She describes John Doe 6 as a dedicated provider that 

“prioritized taking care of his wife and children.” Id. at 2. G.G. was home when she heard the 

explosion, but did not realize that her husband died until his coffin was brought to the house the 

next day. Id. She passed out, and when she woke “[t]he entire world became hell.” Id. The 

death made her “feel entirely alone and incomplete.” Id. She also now suffers from body pain, 

asthma, headaches, and high blood pressure—all in addition to anxiety, self-harm, and 

uncontrollable trembling. Id. Though G.G. would like treatment for her afflictions, she cannot 

afford it due to the loss of her husband’s income. Id. As the mother to their children, she attests 

that “[e]very single person in the family has been negatively affected by the torment of [her] 

husband’s death and needs regular attention and medical care.” Id. at 3. Based on these facts, 

the Court awards G.G. $8,000,000 in solatium damages.

John Doe 6’s death wrecked his two young sons, Mt. and Om. Id. at 3–4. Before the 

attack, Mt. was “a sociable and clever boy” who excelled in school and lived according to a fixed 

schedule. Id. at 3. Now he has “cognitive issues and can barely understand or learn his lessons.” 
43

Id. G.G. knows he needs therapy and medical help but laments she cannot afford it. Id. at 4. So 

too with their other son Om., who was the youngest member of the family. Id. He learned of his 

father’s death when he returned from school. Id. Upon hearing the news “he started hitting 

himself, fell to the ground, and called out ‘father’ to the coffin repeatedly.” Id. His mental 

condition ever since has been “awful.” Id. He cannot sleep at night and grinds his teeth. Id. He 

also had to switch from private to public school due to the loss of his father’s income, which has 

“made him less successful academically.” Id. at 5. Based on these facts, the Court awards Mt. 

and Om. $5,000,000 apiece in solatium damages. 

Sk. is John Doe 6’s grown daughter. Id. at 11. She lived near her father, which allowed 

him to drop by every day after work. Id. He even gave her money from his paycheck though she 

never asked for it. Id. When her brother told her of the bombing, her “mind exploded” and she 

fell to the ground. Id. His passing has robbed her of “peace and comfort” in her life and left her 

with many physical and psychological issues. Id. For instance, she can no longer concentrate or 

focus and gets fevers constantly. Id. She has also lost three babies at birth—tragedies her 

doctors attribute to the anxiety associated with her father’s gruesome death. Id. Based on these 

facts, the Court awards Sk. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

Ta. is John Doe 6’s first grown son. Id. at 17. John Doe 6 was Ta.’s “role model in life.” 

Id. Indeed, Ta. “wanted to follow his footsteps throughout [his] life because he possessed all the 

necessary characteristics of a good man and father.” Id. Ta. notes that his father constantly 

“struggled and sacrificed” to give his family a better life. Id. When the bomb went off, he 

immediately became concerned. Id. at 18. The next day, his worst fears were confirmed when 

officials “brought a piece of his body to [their] house.” Id. His grief was “all-encompassing,” 

and led to many “mental and psychological problems.” Id. It also caused him to drop out of 
44

school because he “needed to work hard and work long hours to provide food and shelter for 

[his] family.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Ta. $5,000,000 in solatium damages.

Sm. is John Doe 6’s second grown son. Id. at 23. He had “an incredibly strong bond 

with [his] father,” characterized by his father’s kindness, support, and companionship. Id. Sm. 

worked near Kabul Square, so he raced to the scene when he heard the blast. Id. Police then 

directed him to the local hospital where he walked in on the “horrifying sight” of victims without 

heads, hands, or feet. Id. Though he could not find his father at the hospital, officials later 

delivered a coffin containing “parts of [his] body.” Id. at 25. This made Ha. feel “like the pillar 

of [his] family had crumbled.” Id. He dreamed of the “haunting experience” he had in the 

hospital searching for this father. Id. And he stopped his education to start providing for his 

family. Id. He also regrets the fact that his father died without witnessing his wedding. Id. 

Based on these facts, the Court awards Sm. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

Ra. is John Doe 6’s third grown son. Id. at 30. He was a teenager at the time of the 

attack, and never imagined that he would lose his father. Id. John Doe 6 helped Ra. remain 

“mentally calm and physically strong” whenever he faced challenges in his life. Id. But the 

bombing brought all this to an end. Ra. isolated himself and developed a cognitive disorder. Id.

at 31. For example, Ra. has violent outbursts for no reason, breaking windows and trying to 

harm others. Id. Although antipsychotic medication temporarily patches these problems, he has 

yet to find a permanent fix. Id. Due to his mental issues, he has been unable to pursue education 

or land a stable job. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Ra. $5,000,000 in solatium 

damages. 

Fa. is John Doe 6’s minor daughter. Id. at 35. Fa. admired her father for “always [doing] 

the right thing,” and misses his “warm embrace.” Id. She notes that he gave all his children “the 
45

same love and support”; he “did not discriminate between his sons and daughters.” Id. She 

recalls learning of his death when she returned to school only to find her family members 

“screaming and crying intensely.” Id. at 35. She became “completely depressed,” lost her 

appetite, and was stunned that she had lost her “strong shelter.” Id. Though she had dreamt of 

becoming a lawyer, she lost interest in school after her father’s death. Now she thinks her 

“ambitions will never come true.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Fa. $5,000,000 in 

solatium damages. 

B.B. is John Doe 6’s mother. Id. at 41. B.B. had a “strong and beautiful relationship” 

with her son that made her “feel secure and confident in life.” Id. But she became “emotionally 

dead” when she learned of his death. Id. It has been “very difficult” to accept his passing and 

she has learned that crying cannot lessen “the strong and everlasting grief and sorrow in [her] 

heart.” Id. at 42. Every day of her life she struggles with grief, anxiety, and depression. Id. 

This has made her a “sad and isolated person in the community.” Id. Based on these facts, the 

Court awards B.B. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

B.Z. is John Doe 6’s first sister. Id. at 45. B.Z. describes her brother as caring and 

peaceful, filling her life with “love, compassion, and kindness.” Id. Learning of his death broke 

her heart and left her with “everlasting grief and pain.” Id. at 46. It also plunged her mind into 

“psychological chaos,” leaving her unable to “build good relationships with [her] family or 

friends.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards B.Z. $2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

Hk. is John Doe 6’s second sister. Id. at 49. Hk. relied on John Doe 6 to “feel secure in 

society,” and he assisted her financially. Id. Realizing he had died was an awful experience. It 

caused her to lose all hope “and start[] cursing holy things.” Id. at 50. Hk. says her brother’s 

death is “the most painful and unforgettable experience” in her life. Id. Before his passing, she 
46

was a “friendly and sociable girl.” Id. Now she suffers from “hopelessness, a short temper, and 

anxiety.” Id. She often thinks her life is meaningless, and she fears death and the idea of losing 

more of her loved ones. Id. “Neither medication nor meditation have helped,” and additional 

treatment lies beyond her family’s financial capabilities. Id. at 51. She is unsure how long she 

can continue to suffer. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards Hk. $2,500,000 in solatium 

damages. 

g. Relatives of John Doe 7. John Doe 7 is survived by four relatives suing here: his 

widow (N.E.) and three children (E.E., S.E., and Sa.E.). See Damages Mem. at 43–46. 

N.E. is John Doe 7’s widow and the legal representative of his estate. See John Doe 7 

Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-10. N.E. states her marriage provided her emotional support and 

companionship, as well as encouragement and various forms of assistance. Id. at 2. N.E. sums 

up their relationship by calling John Doe 7 a “dear friend, companion, and wonderful partner.” 

Id. at 3. She recalls sitting at the breakfast table with their children when they heard the 

explosion. Id. She immediately dialed John Doe 7 on his cell phone, but he never answered. Id. 

Though she scoured the scene of the blast and visited the local hospital, she had trouble finding 

John Doe 7. Id. at 4. This caused her to fear the worst—fears soon confirmed by family 

members. Id. Upon hearing the news, N.E. “screamed and felt as if the sky . . . had shattered.” 

Id. She remembers that day as the “darkest moment of [her] life.” Id. John Doe 7 died in the 

midst of applying for visas to relocate to the United States. Id. Though those visas were 

granted, N.E. found relocation unexpectedly burdensome given her inability to speak English 

and limited knowledge of life here. Id. She often thinks how much easier it would have been 

with her husband. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards N.E. $8,000,000 in solatium 

damages. 
47

E.E. is John Doe 7’s son. Id. at 5. He was very young at the time of the attack but still 

missed the “considerable amount of time and attention” his father gave him when he was alive. 

Id. at 6. According to N.E., E.E. says he “misses his father on a daily basis.” Id. This frustrates 

his ability to concentrate on his studies. Based on these facts, the Court awards E.E. $5,000,000 

in solatium damages. 

S.E. is John Doe 7’s first adult daughter. Id. at 12. S.E. had an “extremely strong” bond 

with her father when he was alive. Id. They “were more than just father and daughter.” Id. 

They were “best friends.” Id. She recalls washing her face when the bomb detonated. Id. 

Though she went to school that day, a relative picked her up and told her she needed to return 

home. Id. at 13. When she arrived, she saw the anguish in her family members’ faces. Id. The 

news shattered her heart. Her father’s death left her in a state of “profound depression” and with 

“severe psychological difficulties.” Id. Moving to America made the pain worse. She was 

“completely unfamiliar with the English language” and felt hopeless “[s]eeing other children 

happily accompanied by their fathers.” Id. at 14. Though her emotional wellbeing has improved 

through counseling, her grief still haunts her. Id. For instance, she still feels irritable and 

sensitive, and has trouble sleeping at night. Id. at 14–15. She also has to work long hours while 

attending college classes to support her family. Id. at 15. Based on these facts, the Court awards 

S.E. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

Sa.E. is John Doe 7’s second adult daughter. Id. at 19. Sa.E.’s relationship with John 

Doe 7 “ran incredibly deep.” Id. They were “like the closest of friends,” and he “consistently 

played a pivotal role in [her] life, serving as a mentor and steadfast supporter.” Id. She recalls 

seeing an urgent news alert on the television the morning of the bombing. Id. at 2. Then she 

noticed it occurred near her father’s workplace. Id. Family members told her what happened, 
48

and her heart sank. Id. She became completely shocked and broke down into tears. Id. Sa.E. 

says her father’s death “remains the most traumatic event of [her] life.” Id. Though her family 

has started over in the United States, her father’s absence persists as a “source of sorrow.” Id. at 

21. Based on these facts, the Court awards Sa.E. $5,000,000 in solatium damages. 

h. Relatives of John Doe 8. John Doe 8 is survived by six relatives suing here: his father 

and mother (M.Q.G. and F.G.) and four siblings (M.O.G., B.G., M.G., and T.G.). See Damages 

Mem. at 46–48. 

M.Q.G. is John Doe 8’s father and the legal representative of his estate. See John Doe 8 

Family Affs. at 1, ECF No. 32-11. M.Q.G. describes John Doe 8 as “the most responsible one of 

all [his] children,” noting he was “already ready to step in” and do what was needed. Id. at 2. 

Officials told M.Q.G. that his son’s “stomach burst due to the intense pressure of the explosion.” 

Id. This traumatized M.Q.G., causing him to always feel worried, sad, and impatient. Id. John 

Doe 8 was engaged when he died, and M.Q.G. regrets never being able to see him get married. 

Id. at 3. M.Q.G. has received some treatment for his psychological problems, yet cannot afford 

all the treatment he needs. Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards M.Q.G. $5,000,000 in 

solatium damages. 

F.G. is John Doe 8’s mother. Id. at 7. Like M.Q.G., F.G. describes her son as “extremely 

responsible and caring,” always willing to work and study diligently to help his family. Id. 

News of John Doe 8’s death made F.G.’s whole world collapse. Id. She heard the explosion and 

immediately feared for her son’s life. Id. at 8. A family member later identified his body and 

informed F.G. that the explosion caused “his stomach and heart to burst, resulting in instant 

death.” Id. at 8. This caused her to become overwhelmed with grief. Since the loss, F.G. has 

struggled with insomnia, fatigue, anxiety, and high blood pressure. Id. The psychologists she 
49

has seen attribute her problems to her son’s traumatic death. Id. Before the attack, she had been 

studying at a religious school. Id. Yet she has since stopped attending because she lacks the 

energy and concentration to keep going. Id. She, like her husband, also regrets being unable to 

see John Doe 8 get married. Id. at 9. 

F.G. also notes that her youngest son, M.O.G., was around two years old when his older 

brother died. Id. She remembers the love John Doe 8 had for M.O.G. and recalls times he would 

bring gifts home for his younger brother. Id. Since John Doe 8 died, M.O.G. refers to his grave 

as “his brother’s house.” Based on these facts, the Court awards F.G. $5,000,000 and M.O.G. 

$2,500,000 in solatium damages. 

John Doe 8’s death profoundly impacted his other three siblings: B.G., M.G., and T.G. 

B.G. recalls his brother’s kind heart and support for everyone in the family. Id. at 13. M.G. says 

her relationship with John Doe 8 was “truly special,” and especially misses “waiting for him to 

come home so [they] could watch [their] favorite movie.” Id. at 17. T.G., too, had a “wonderful 

relationship” with John Doe 8, saying he was always “a responsible and supportive member of 

[their] family.” Id. at 25. B.G. was around 13 years old when John Doe 8 died. Id. at 14. The 

bombing made him fear death, isolate himself from others, and perform poorly in school. Id. 

M.G. was in tenth grade when she heard the explosion. Id. at 18. She shook and fell to the 

ground when she learned her brother had died. Id. And she recalls seeing his burned face in the 

casket, something no sibling should ever have to see. Id. Since his passing, her performance in 

school plunged (she used to be the top student in her class). Id. at 19. And she has become 

“extremely emotional and easily agitated.” Id. at 18. John Doe 8’s death similarly haunts T.G.’s 

“mind and soul.” Id. at 26. He says that day “is etched as the worst and saddest day of [his] 
50

life.” Id. Based on these facts, the Court awards B.G., M.G., and T.G. $2,500,000 apiece in 

solatium damages. 

* * *

In closing, the Court notes that no damage award or amount of money can erase the 

nightmare these Relatives endured. The Zanbaq Square attack took their fathers, brothers, sons, 

and husbands. That said, the Court’s monetary awards “must be grounded in the law, not 

sympathy or instinct.” Borochov, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 48. 

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court will partially grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment 

and award them damages.

6

 A corresponding Order will issue today. 

Dated: December 22, 2023 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

6 Plaintiffs hint at a request for prejudgment interest. They requested it outright in their 

Complaint. See Am. Compl. at 35–40. But they never mentioned it again. See Damages Mem. 

at 51–55. If Plaintiffs still seek prejudgment interest, the Court denies that request. While the 

Court has discretion to award prejudgment interest, the “tide of persuasive precedent . . . plainly 

weighs against” it. Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (cleaned up). More, “[t]he Court has carefully 

considered” each Plaintiff’s entitlement to damages, and their “awards are intended to be fully 

compensatory.” Id. at 78. This makes prejudgment interest unwarranted.