3309. Jaclt H. :Dr+e 

Executive Sqcr6tary 

Texas Citiua Commisbiod 

Weglscb, Texar 

. . 

, . . .. . 

August 24, 1951 

Opinion No. V-1253 

Re: Constitutionality of Subdivision (15), Section 2 of Article 111, H.B. 426, Acts 52ad 

Lea. (1951) dealing with the 

purchase and *ale of certain 

pasketlger carryin& motor 

vehicles. 

hri hhve reqqddd in opinion of &is officd on thc coh-. 

stitutionality of Wci provirion8 relatin$ to State-owned a'utomobilcis 

in House.Bill426; the general'appropriation bill for the biennium : ... :.. .- ending '.Ani@f 3.1, 1953, as follows: ,. . . . . . ~ 

1. Is '& pr&iaio,* prohibiting.purchase of motor-. , prDpelled pdssengir-carrying vehicles with funds appropriated by tl* 'bill constitutional? . ' ... 

2. I= the provision declaring such presently owned 

vehicles no longpr needed and requiring their sale and 

disposal constitutional? 

Hon. George W. C&, State Health Officer; Won. C. E. 

Belk, Administrator of the Teiths State Board of Plumbing Examiners; "Hob. H. A;'Blckwith, Chairman of thk 'Board of. Water Engineerb: 'IEoci.'.Robert S..Caiv&rt; Coinp*oller of Public Accounts; 

and an: 'Jesse James. State 'Treasurer, have pending in this office 

requests for. opinionswhicli relate to~ne . .. or both of,the same questions. . . . 

That part of House Bill 426 relevant to your inquiry is 

a rider in the general appropriation bill contained in .subdivision 

(15)' Section 2, Article 111, as follows: 

"All State-owned motor-propelled passengercarryingvehicles under the control of any department, 

commission, board, or other State agency are hereby 

declared to be no longer needed. Such motor-prppelled 

passenger-carrying vehicles shall be sold in compliance with and a8 provided for in Article 666, Revised 

Civil Statutes of Texas, as amended, or otherwise as 

provided by law, not later than October 1. 1951. No 
150 Hon. Jack H. Drake, Page 2 (V-1253) 

The constitutional provision which controls the validity of the rider is Section 35 of Article 111 of the Texas Constitution, which provides: 

motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicle may be 

purchased with any of the funds appropriated in this 

Article, provided, however, that these provisions of 

this Section in regard to the sale and purchase of 

motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles shall 

not apply to the Executive Department, State Highway I 

Department, Department of Public Safety, Game, Fish 

"No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which 

may embrace the various subjectfi and accounts, for and 

on account of which moneys are appropriated), shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in 

its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, 

which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall 

be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed. " . . 

and Oyster Commission and the Railroad Commission. 

provided that the Railroad Commission shall only keep 

and have in its possession not to exceed twenty (20) 

motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles and the 

Texrs Prison System shall only keep and have in its 

possession those vehicles equipped with two-way radios. 

Notices shall be given in writing to persons now using 

said vehicles of the time and place they are going to be 

sold in order that such persons may have an opportunity to bid on said motor-propelled passenger-carrying 

vehicles." 

The Supreme Court, in Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex. 330. 342 

(1881), asserted that the principal object of this provision 

l 

" . , . is to advise the legislature and the people of the 

nature of each particular bill, so as to prevent the insertion of obnoxious clauses, which otherwise might 

be engrafted thereupon and become the law; and also to 

prevent combinations, whereby would be concentrated 

the votes of the friends of different measures, none of 

which could pass singly; thus causing each bill to stand 

on its own merits. *I . 

With specific reference to the reason for this type of 

constitutional limitation in the case of appropriation bills. the Supreme Court of Oregon said: 
Hon. Jack H. Drake, Page 3 (V-1253) 

U The evident purpose of this provision was to 

prevent matters foreign to the general purpose of appropriation bills being attached to them as riders. 

thereby taking advantage of the necessity of the state 

for money to defray its current expenses and to pay 

its officers to pass measures that perhaps would 

otherwise have been defeated." EV-anhofi v. State Industrial Accident Commission. 1-5). 

In dealing with Section 35 of Article III a rule of liberal interpretation has always been applied. The tendency of the 

decisions $s to construe the constitutional provisions on this subject literally rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the acc mplishment of 

the beneficial purpose for which it was adopted? But at the same 

time the Court has been careful to point out, as was originally 

done by Chief Justice Hemphill in Cannon v. Hemphill. 7 Tex. 208 

(1851). that this provision cannot be ignored arid thus nullified. 

.With reference to general appropriation bills, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that "the appropriating of funds to 

be paid from the State Treasury is a 'subject' ~ithin the meaning 

of Article 111, Section 35, of our Constitution." It is clear from 

the terms of the constitqtional provision that general appropriation bills may contain more than one subject of this same nature, 

i.e., appropriations for the various departments and accounts, 

The exception of general appropriation bills from the constitutional prohibition against bills containing more than one subject 

is a limited and restricted exception. The exact wording is 

4. 

. . . except general appropriation bills, which may 

embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and 

on account of which moneys are to be appropriated " ... Aa long as a general appropriation bill includes only 

subjects of appropriating money and limiting the use thereof in 

harmony with general legislation, it may relate to any number of 

different "subjects and accounts." In such instances all of the 

subjects are under the one general object and purpose of appropriating funds from the treasury. The obvious purpose of this 

limited exception was to make certain that appropriations to more 

than one department in the same bill would not be prohibited. In 

1 Giddinks v. San Arltonio, 47 Tex. 548 (1877); Dellinger v. 

State, 28 S.W.Zd 537 e ex. Grim. App. 1930). 

2 Moora v. Sheppard, 144 Tex. 537, 192 S.W.2d 559 (1946). 
3x2 Hon. Jack H. Drake. Page 4 (V-1253) 

all other respects general appropriation bills are subject to the 

same prohibition as all other bills against containing more than 

one subject. The result is that general legislation cannot be embodied within a general appropriation bill. Moore v. Sheppard. 

- supra. 

This does not mean that a general appropriation bill 

may not contain general provisions and details limiting and restricting the use of the funds therein appropriated, if such provisions are necessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation and use of the funds and if they do not conflict with 

br amount 10 general legislation. Conley v. Daughters of the 

Republic. 106 Tex. 80, 156 S.W. 19m913). 

I 

With special regard to what incidental provisions may t 

be included within a general appropriation bill, our Texas courts 

have not stated a general rule. However, from statements as to 

what may not be included and from numerous opinions of the Attorney General, we believe the rule may be stated generally as 

follows: In addition to appropriating money and stipulating the 

amount, manner, and purpose of the various items of expenditure, 

a general appropriation bill may contain any provisions or riders 

which detail, limit, or restrict the use of the fkds or otherwise 

insure that the money is spent for the required activity for which 

it is therein appropriated, if the provisions or riders are necessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation and use 

of the funds, and provided they do not conflict with general legislation. See Linden v. Finley, 92 Tex, 451. 49 S.W. 578 (1899) and 

Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, supra. An extended discussion of this rule will be found in an opinion of the Attorney General 

now being written to the Governor on the general subject of riders 

in a general appropriation bill. 

Applying the above rule to your first question, it is 

obvious that that part of the rider which provides that "No motorpropelled passenger-carrying vehicle may be purchased with any 

of the funds appropriated in this article" is a mere limitation and 

restriction upon the use of the money appropriated by House Bill 

426. It is necessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation and is not an additional subject of general legislation. 

We have found no general statute with which it conflicts. Therefore, it is valid. 

Applying the same rule to your second question and 

that part of the rider which declares certain State-owned passenger vehicles to be no Longer needed and requires that they shall 

be sold, we find no basis for its validity in a general appropriation 

bill. It does not detail, limit or restrict the use of funds therein 

appropriated or otherwise insure that appropriated money will be 
Hon. Jack H. Drake, Page 5 (V-1253) 

spent for the purpose intended. It is not incidental to any appropriation in the Act. Obviously, it deals with a subject other than 

money appropriations. It attempts to do more than appropriate 

money and is therefore a subject of general legislation3 which 

cannot be constitutionally enacted in a general appropriation bill. 

Moore v. Sheppard, supra; Att'y Gen. Op. No. 0-445 (1939). 

If the Legislature can order the sate of State-owned 

automobiles in a general appropriation bill rider, it can by the 

same means order the sale of State office buildings, public school 

lands, or any other State-owned property. The very statement of 

the proposition demonstrates that sale of State property is a subject of general legislation separate from and unrelated to the general appropriation of money to operate the State agencies. It is 

a subject which should have the full consideration, opportunity for 

public notice and hearings, and opportunity for amendment or rejection afforded general legislation but usually denied to subjects 

incorporated as riders in a general appropriation bill. 

The provision for the sale of the State-owned vehicles 

is also invalid because in violation of that portion of Section 35 of 

Article I11 of the Texas Constitution which states that the subject 

of a bill ". . . shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject 

shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the 

title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall 

not be so expressed." 

There is nothing whatever in the caption or title of 

House Bill 426 which could be construed to cover the provision or 

to put a legislator or the public on notice that the bill contained a 

requirement that certain State-owned passenger cars were to be 

sold. The title is long, but we have searched it carefully. The oniy mention of any subject contained in subdivision (15) is the phrase 

'providing certain limitations on the purchase of passenger motor vehicle^."^ This adequately covers and gives notice of the prohibition against urchasin new cars, but it cannot be said to do so 

with reference to E---fB the see of presently owned passenger cars, 

The rule governing narrow title provisions is well 

stated in 50 American Jurisprudence 162, Statutes, Section 183, 

as follows: 

3 It is significant in this connection that a separate bill 

(H.B. 271) with provisions similar to those of subdivision (15) was 

introduced and passed the House, but failed to pass in the Senate. 

4 Emphasis added throughout. 
Hon. Jack H. Drake. Page 6 (V-1253) 

" . . . Under these rules, if a title is narrow 

and restricted, carving out for treatment only a part 

of a general subject, the legislation under it must be 

confined within the same limits. even though the Legislature might, with propriety, have selected a more 

comprehensive title which would have embraced the 

entire subject of legislation.' 

The Supreme Court of Texas has uniformlv held that 

acts broad in scope, but with narrow and restricted tities. are in 

violation of Section 35 of Article 111. In Arnold v. Leonard. 114 

Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925), the Supreme Court said: 

4, The caption is not content to state a purpose to 

amend certain statutes, but proceeds to specify the 

nature of the proposed amendment. Thus the caption 

declares that the amendment consists of a provision 

authorizing the wife, on order of the district court, to 

convey her separate real estate, bonds, and stocks 

without joinder by her husband, when he is insane or 

has permanently abandoned his wife. This language 

not only gives no notice of an intention to change the 

status of certain property from community property 

to the.wifels separate property. but completely disguises any such intention. A caption concealing the 

true purpose of a statute, and stating an altogether distinct and foreign purpose. is necessarily deceptive, and 

cannot be sustained as complying with section 35 of 

article 3 of the Constitution. Ward Cattle & Pasture 

Co. v. Carpenter. 109 Tex. 105, 200 S.W. 521." 

An earlier case striking down a portion of a statutebecause of a narrow caption was Adams v. San Angelo Waterworks 

Company. 86 Tcx. 485, 25 S.W. 605 (1894). Therein the Supreme 

Court said: 

a, 

. . . The first section of the act in question 

grants to any incorporated city or town the power to 

condemn property 'for the construction of water mains 

or supply reservoirs or standpipes for waterworks.' 

as well as for certain other purposes, and provides 

that 'any company or corporation chartered under the 

laws of this state for the purpose of constructing waterworks, or furnishing water supply for any town or city, 

shall have the same right to condemn property necessary for the construction of supply reservoirs or standpipes for waterworks when deemed necessary to preserve the public health, that is given towns and cities 

under this act.' The title of the act is as follows: 
35:- 

Hon. Jack H. Drake, Page 7 (V-1253) 

'An act to amend an act to regulate the condemnation 

of property in cities and towns, for the purpose of opening, widening or changing public streets or avenues or 

alleys, or for water mains or sewers, approved March 

28, 1883. . . . '' 

The caption being restricted to condemnation for 

water mains or sewers and other specified purposes, the portion 

of the body of the act allowing condemnation for reservoirs and 

standpipes was held to violate the caption requirements of Article 

111, Section 35. 

The above cases, along with Gulf Insurance Go. v. 

James, 143 Tex. 424. 185 S.W.2d 966 (1945); Hoch v. Hoch, 140 

-5, 168 S.W.2d 638 (1943); Ward Cattle and Pasture Company v. Carpenter. 109 Tex. 103, ' Gulf Production Gompany v. Garrett. 119 :~~.S~~'~~

and Texas-Louisisna Power Co. v. City of FarmersviIle; 67 S.W. 

2d 235 (Tex. Comm. App. 14331, all support the proposition that 

if the title is narrow, then the portions of the act broader than the 

title art invalid because the narrow title is deceptive and misleading. 

Here we hsve a caption saying with reference to paasenger automobiles only that the Act provides "certain limitations 

on the urchase of passenger motor vehicles," but the body of the 

bill actua %- y contains in addition to limitations on the purchase of 

cars the further provision that, with certain exceptions, all Stateowned passenger vehicles shall be sold. As stated in GuIf Insur- ., ance Go. v. Tames, su ra. . . . the title to the act, as drawn, 1 is] 

capable of misleading -t$- ose interested in the bill." The title to 

the aiit being narrowed to regulations governing the purchase of 

motor vehicles, that portion of the body which attempts to provide 

for the - sale of certain State-owned motor vehicles is invalid. 

SUMMARY 

That portion of subd. (151, Sac. 2. Art. 111, H.B. 

426, Acts 5Znd Leg. (1951), a rider in the general appropriation bill, requiring the sala of certain Stateowned 'motor-propelled passenger-carrying" vehicles, 

is invalid because it is a subject of general legislation 

and cannot be constitutionally enacted in a general appropriation bill. In this respect it violates Sec. 35 of 

Art. I11 of the Texas Constitution. The rider is also 

invalid because it is not covered by the caption or title 

of the Act, the title being restricted to "purchase" of 

new cars and making no mention of "sale" of presently 

owned automobiles. 
Hon. Jack H. Drake, Page 8 (V-1253) 

That portion of the general appropriation bill 

rider which prohibits the purchase of new automobiles 

l 

out of funds therein appropriated is a mere limitation l 

and restriction upon the use of the money. Since it is 

incidental to the appropriation and is not an additional 

subject oi general legislation, this provision docs not 

violate Sec. 35, Art, 111 of the Texas Constitution and 

is therefore valid. 

Yours very truly, 

2~2l-J I 

Attorney General I