J-S59042-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GREGORY REEVES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 734 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 4, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1206832-1993

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2020

Gregory Reeves appeals from the denial of his Post Conviction Relief 

Act1 (“PCRA”) petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely. We 

affirm.

In 1994, a jury convicted Reeves of second-degree murder. The trial 

court sentenced Reeves to life imprisonment and we affirmed the judgment of 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Reeves, 671 A.2d 772 (Table) (Pa.Super. 

1995). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on 

February 29, 1996.2 Commonwealth v. Reeves, 673 A.2d 333 (Pa. 1996). 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 The PCRA court states that the Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal 

on November 9, 1995. The discrepancy does not affect our decision, as in 

either case, the petition was untimely. 
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Reeves filed the instant PCRA petition in August 2012 seeking relief 

under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). See PCRA Petition, filed 

8/12/12. Miller held that imposition of a mandatory sentence of life

imprisonment without possibility of parole is unconstitutional as applied to 

defendants who at the time of their crimes were under the age of 18. See 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.

Reeves then filed a pro se motion for leave to amend his PCRA petition, 

but the court never ruled on the motion. Reeves nevertheless filed pro se

amended PCRA petitions in February and August 2016. Subsequently, in June 

2017, the PCRA court appointed counsel. In August 2017, Reeves filed another 

pro se amended PCRA petition.

The following month, in September 2017, counsel filed a Turner/Finley

letter and a motion to withdraw.

3 See Turner/Finley Letter, filed 9/14/17.

The PCRA court held a Grazier4 hearing where Reeves requested and the 

court granted Reeves’ request to proceed pro se. See Written Waiver of 

Counsel, dated 11/14/17. 

Reeves then filed another amended petition on January 5, 2018, titled,

“Motion for Permission to File Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief,” 

which the court granted. Order, filed 1/12/18. The PCRA court issued notice 

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3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 

4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988). 
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of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing and ultimately dismissed 

the petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, filed 1/4/19; Order, filed 2/5/19.

Reeves filed a notice of appeal and the PCRA court entered an order 

directing Reeves to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court states in its

opinion that “Reeves filed . . . a statement of matters complained of on appeal 

on April 3rd” and also listed the issues from the statement as follows:

[D]oes not the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation 

of Pa. Construction of Statutes that are not severable and 

that, as a result Pennsylvania’s sentence statute 18 Pa. C.S. 

§1102(a) (1979)’s mitigating factors must be written in the 

indictment based on the recent statutory decision of the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Batts, 

163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (finding the defendant’s age at the 

time of his offense qualified as a statutory mitigating factor), 

citing Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 600-601 

(2016), reaffirming its decision in Hopkins, 117 A.3d at 

249, as it relates to another similarly worded mandatory 

minimum sentencing statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9718).

***

Second, in Commonwealth v. Burton, 683 Pa. 687 (Pa. 

2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently 

reaffirmed that the presumption that the presumption [sic] 

that information which is of public record cannot be deemed 

unknown for the purposes of the Post Conviction Relief Act, 

42 Pa. C.S. § 9545 (b) (1) (i) (ii), does not apply to pro se

[sic] prisoner petitioner’s [sic] as the application of the 

public record presumption to pro se [sic] petitioner’s [sic] is 

contrary to the plain language of § 9545 (b) (1) (i) (ii). 

Petitioner’s constitutional allegations bring his claim within 

the ambit of sections (b) (1) (i) (ii), he must still prove that

it meets the requirements therein. Under subsections (b) 

(1) (i) (ii), he must also prove that (i) the failure to raise 

the claim previously was the result of interference by 

government officials with the presentation of the claim in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution of the United States; or (ii) the facts 
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upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence.” Such questions require further 

fact-finding and the PCRA court, acting as fact finder, should 

determine whether Petitioner met the “proof” requirement 

under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b) (1) (i) (ii). 

***

Due process requires that this Court permit Petitioner to 

vindicate his right by reviewing the structural errors 

inherent in his conviction that are presented by this Petition. 

The refusal to allow Petitioner means to vindicate his 

constitutional right would violate petitioner’s state and 

federal right to due process. Heisner v. Ryan, 951 F.2d 

599 (3rd Cir. 1991) (state post-conviction procedures are to 

be monitored for violation of litigant’s right to due process); 

Carter v. Vaughn, 62 F.3d 591 (3rd Cir. 1995) (same). This 

Petition, filed within 60 days of the revelation of new 

evidence of the previous administration of the Philadelphia 

District Attorney’s Officer policy and practice of prosecutors 

not being attuned to their constitutional and ethical 

disclosure responsibility, which raises newly available 

evidence in support of important claims about the 

unconstitutionality of the process by which Petitioner came

to be convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 

life, should be considered timely-filed, to allow Petitioner 

post-conviction review in a manner consistent with both 

state and federal due process rights.

PCRA Court Opinion (“PCO”), filed 4/23/19, at 2, 5-6, 6-7, 7-8. However, 

Reeves’ Rule 1925(b) statement is not in the certified record and the docket 

does not reflect that it was filed. It appears that Reeves sent the Rule 1925(b)

statement to the PCRA judge but never filed it with the clerk of courts. 

Reeves’ brief asserts the following issues:

I. Whether petitioner’s [sic] is entitled to relief from his 

conviction and sentence because the Commonwealth 

failed to disclosed [sic] relevant Brady material in a 
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manner depriving him of his rights under the Sixth 

and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

II. Whether petitioner’s [sic] is entitled to relief from his 

conviction and sentence because the trial court 

severed Pennsylvania’s minimum sentencing statute 

in a manner depriving him of his rights under the 

Eighth and Fourteenth amendments of the 

Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. 

Reeves’ Br. at 1.

We need not resolve the confusing questions of which petition is the 

operative petition and whether Reeves’ Rule 1925(b) statement preserved his 

claims on appeal because his PCRA petition was untimely. “Our standard of 

review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the 

evidence of record supports the court’s determination and whether its decision 

is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 960-61 

(Pa.Super. 2019). We also defer to the factual findings of the PCRA court so 

long as those findings are supported by the record. Id. at 961. 

A petitioner has one year from the time the judgment of sentence is 

final to file a PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of 

sentence is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. at § 

9545(b)(3). If the petition is not filed before the one-year deadline expires, 

the petitioner must plead and prove at least one of the three time-bar 

exceptions. These exceptions are:
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with 

the presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section and has 

been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). When a petitioner raises a time-bar exception, he 

or she must raise it within 60 days of the date the petitioner could have first 

raised the exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).5

Here, Reeves’ judgment of sentence became final on May 29, 1996, 

when the time to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court 

expired. See U.S. Ct. Rule 13. Therefore, he had until May 29, 1997, to file a 

timely PCRA petition. Thus, the instant petition filed in January 2018 was 

patently untimely and Reeves bore the burden of pleading and proving at least 

one of the time-bar exceptions. 

In his petition, Reeves claimed the governmental interference 

exception:

Accordingly, to satisfy the governmental official interference 

exception, Petitioner must demonstrate (1) that 

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5 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) has since been amended to allow a petitioner one 

year to file a petition. The amendment applies to claims arising on or after 

December 24, 2017, and thus does not apply to Reeves.
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interference by government officials prevented him from 

discovering the unlawful severance of the statutes in this 

case and bring severance claim sooner, and (2) that he 

could not have known of the governmental interference 

earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence. There 

is no question in this case that the [t]rial [c]ourt sentenced 

him to what have now been determined to be 

unconstitutional provisions of 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711 (requiring 

sentencing factors to be determined by the trial court by a 

preponderance of the evidence) are unseverable, and that 

the statutes at issue are unconstitutional. 

PCRA Petition, filed 1/5/18, at 7. 

In order to satisfy the governmental interference exception, Reeves had 

to plead and prove that his “failure to raise the claim [or claims] previously

was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of 

the claim [or claims] in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States . . .” 

Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (quoting 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)). 

Here, Reeves argues that we should vacate his judgment of sentence 

because “the [t]rial [c]ourt sentenced him to mandatory life without parole 

pursuant to what have now been determined to be unconstitutional provisions 

of 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711 (requiring sentencing factors to be determined by the 

trial court by a preponderance of the evidence) are unseverable, and that the 

statutes at issue are unconstitutional.” PCRA Petition at 7. In support of this 

claim, Reeves cites to Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017)

(Batts II). Id. at 5. Reeves’ argument is meritless for several reasons. 
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First, Batts II is inapplicable to this case, as Batts II involved the 

sentencing of a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without the possibility 

of parole. Here, Reeves was not a juvenile at the time of the murder, but 

rather 24 years old. 

Second, Section 9711 has not been held unconstitutional and the 

imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole on Reeves was not 

illegal. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b). The PCRA court did not err in dismissing 

Reeves’ PCRA petition as untimely.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/20