_________________

_________________ 1 (Slip Opinion) Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the Unit ed States, Washingt on, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov , of any typographical or other formal errors. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 23–719

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
[March 4, 2024]

P ER C URIAM

. A group of Colorado voters co ntends that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits for

mer President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secretary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on sev

eral grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse.

I Last September, about six months before the March 5, 2024, Colorado primary election, four Republican and two unaffiliated Colorado voters file d a petition against former President Trump and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold in Colorado state court. These voters—whom we refer to as the respondents—contend that after former2 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam President Trump’s defeat in the 2020 Presidential election, he disrupted the peaceful trans fer of power by intentionally organizing and inciting the crowd that breached the Capitol as Congress met to certify the election results on January 6, 2021. One consequence of those actions, the respondents maintain, is that former President Trump is constitution

ally ineligible to serve as President again. Their theory turns on Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amend

ment. Section 3 provides: “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con

gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State leg

islature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.” According to the respondents, Section 3 applies to the for

mer President because after taking the Presidential oath in 2017, he intentionally incited the breaching of the Capitol on January 6 in order to retain power. They claim that he is therefore not a qualified candidate, and that as a result, the Colorado secretary of state may not place him on the primary ballot. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§1–1–113(1), 1–4– 1101(1), 1–4–1201, 1–4–1203(2)(a), 1–4–1204 (2023).

After a five-day trial, the state District Court found that former President Trump had “engaged in insurrection” within the meaning of Section 3, but nonetheless denied the respondents’ petition. The cou rt held that Section 3 did not apply because the Presidency, which Section 3 does not mention by name, is not an “office . . . under the United3 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam

States” and the President is not an “officer of the United States” within the meaning of that provision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a. In December, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part by a 4 to 3 vote. Reversing the District Court’s operative holding, the majority concluded that for purposes of Section 3, the Presidency is an office under the United States and the President is an officer of the United States. The court otherwise affirmed, holding (1) that the Colorado Election Code permitted the respond

ents’ challenge based on Section 3; (2) that Congress need not pass implementing legislation for disqualifications un

der Section 3 to attach; (3) t hat the political question doc

trine did not preclude judicial review of former President Trump’s eligibility; (4) that th e District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence portions of a con

gressional Report on the events of January 6; (5) that the District Court did not err in co ncluding that those events constituted an “insurrection” and that former President Trump “engaged in” that insurrection; and (6) that former President Trump’s speech to the crowd that breached the Capitol on January 6 was not protected by the First Amend

ment. See id. , at 1a–114a. The Colorado Supreme Cou rt accordingly ordered Secre

tary Griswold not to “list President Trump’s name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot” or “count any write-in votes cast for him.” Id. , at 114a. Chief Justice Boatright and Justices Samour and Berkenkotter each filed dissent

ing opinions. Id. , at 115a–124a, 125a–161a, 162a–183a. Under the terms of the opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, its ruling was automatically stayed pending this Court’s review. See id. , at 114a. We granted former Presi

dent Trump’s petition for certiorari, which raised a single question: “Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential pri

mary ballot?” See 601 U. S. ___ (2024). Concluding that it4 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam
did, we now reverse.

II A Proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the States in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment “expand[ed] federal power at the expense of state autonomy” and thus “funda

mentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor

ida , 517 U. S. 44, 59 (1996); see also Ex parte Virginia , 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). Section 1 of the Amendment, for in

stance, bars the States from “dep riv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” or “deny[ing] to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” And Section 5 confers on Congress “power to enforce” those prohibitions, along with the other provisions of the Amendment, “by appropriate legislation.” Section 3 of the Amendment likewise restricts state au

tonomy, but through different means. It was designed to help ensure an enduring Union by preventing former Con

federates from returning to power in the aftermath of the Civil War. See, e.g. , Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2544 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens, warning that with

out appropriate constitutional reforms “yelling secession

ists and hissing copperheads” would take seats in the House); id. , at 2768 (statement of Sen. Howard, lamenting prospect of a “State Legislature . . . made up entirely of dis

loyal elements” absent a disqualification provision). Sec

tion 3 aimed to prevent such a resurgence by barring from office “those who, having once taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United St ates, afterward went into re

bellion against the Government of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 626 (1869) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Section 3 works by imposing on certain individuals a pre

ventive and severe penalty—disqualification from holding5 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam a wide array of offices—rather than by granting rights to all. It is therefore necessary, as Chief Justice Chase con

cluded and the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized, to “ ‘ascertain[ ] what particular individuals are embraced’ ” by the provision. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a (quoting Grif

fin’s Case , 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). Chase went on to explain that “[t]o accom

plish this ascertainment and en sure effective results, pro

ceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of deci

sions, more or less formal, are indispensable.” Id. , at 26. For its part, the Colorado Supreme Court also concluded that there must be some kind of “determination” that Sec

tion 3 applies to a particular person “before the disqualifi

cation holds meaning.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. The Constitution empowers Congress to prescribe how those determinations should be made. The relevant provi

sion is Section 5, which enables Congress, subject of course to judicial review, to pass “a ppropriate legislation” to “en

force” the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Or as Senator Howard put it at the time the Amendment was framed, Section 5 “casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the amendment are car

ried out in good faith.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2768. Congress’s Section 5 power is critical when it comes to Section 3. Indeed, during a debate on enforcement legisla

tion less than a year after ratification, Sen. Trumbull noted that “notwithstanding [Section 3] . . . hundreds of men [were] holding office” in violation of its terms. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626. The Constitution, Trumbull noted, “provide[d] no means for enforcing” the disqualifica

tion, necessitating a “bill to give effect to the fundamental law embraced in the Constitution.” Ibid. The enforcement mechanism Trumbull championed was later enacted as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, “pursuant to the power6 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam conferred by §5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania , 458 U. S. 375, 385 (1982); see 16 Stat. 143–144.

B This case raises the question whether the States, in addi

tion to Congress, may also en force Section 3. We conclude that States may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office. But States have no power under the Constitution to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal of

fices, especially the Presidency. “In our federal system, the National Government pos

sesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.” Bond v. United States , 572 U. S. 844, 854 (2014). Among those retained powers is the power of a State to “order the processes of its own governance.” Alden

v. Maine , 527 U. S. 706, 752 (1999). In particular, the States enjoy sovereign “power to prescribe the qualifica

tions of their own officers” and “the manner of their election . . . free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Taylor

v. Beckham , 178 U. S. 548, 570–571 (1900). Although the Fourteenth Amendment restricts state power, nothing in it plainly withdraws from the States this traditional author

ity. And after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, States used this authority to disqualify state officers in ac

cordance with state statutes. See, e.g. , Worthy v. Barrett

, 63 N. C. 199, 200, 204 (1869) (elected county sheriff ); State ex rel. Sandlin v. Watkins , 21 La. Ann. 631, 631–633 (1869) (state judge). Such power over governance, however, does not extend to federal officeholders and candidates. Because federal offic

ers “ ‘owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people,’ ” powers over their election and qualifications must be specifically “dele

gated to, rather than reserved by, the States.” U. S. Term7 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U. S. 779, 803–804 (1995) (quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)). But nothing in the Constitution delegates to the States any power to en

force Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. As an initial matter, not even the respondents contend that the Constitution authorize s States to somehow remove sitting federal officeholders who may be violating Section 3. Such a power would flout the principle that “the Constitu

tion guarantees ‘the entire independence of the General Government from any control by the respective States.’ ” Trump v. Vance , 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020) (quoting Farmers and Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota , 232 U. S. 516, 521 (1914)). Indeed, consistent with that princi

ple, States lack even the lesser powers to issue writs of mandamus against federal offi cials or to grant habeas cor

pus relief to persons in federal custody. See McClung v. Silliman , 6 Wheat. 598, 603–605 (1821); Tarble’s Case , 13 Wall. 397, 405–410 (1872). The respondents nonetheless maintain that States may enforce Section 3 against candidates for federal office. But the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not affirmatively delegate such a power to the States. The terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by Con

gress, which enjoys power to enforce the Amendment through legislation pursuant to Section 5. This can hardly come as a surprise, given that the sub

stantive provisions of the Amendment “embody significant limitations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer , 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). Under the Amendment, States can

not abridge privileges or immunities, deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process, deny equal protection, or deny male inhabi tants the right to vote (with

out thereby suffering reduced representation in the House). See Amdt. 14, §§1, 2. On the other hand, the Fourteenth Amendment grants new power to Congress to enforce the8 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam provisions of the Amendment against the States. It would be incongruous to read this particular Amendment as granting the States the power—silently no less—to disqual

ify a candidate for federal office. The only other plausible constitutional sources of such a delegation are the Elections and Electors Clauses, which authorize States to conduct and regulate congressional and Presidential elections, respectively. See Art. I, §4, cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl. 2. 1 But there is little reason to think that these Clauses implicitly authori ze the States to enforce Sec

tion 3 against federal officeholders and candidates. Grant

ing the States that authority would invert the Fourteenth Amendment’s rebalancing of federal and state power. The text of Section 3 reinforces these conclusions. Its fi

nal sentence empowers Congre ss to “remove” any Section 3 “disability” by a two-thirds vote of each house. The text im

poses no limits on that power, and Congress may exercise it any time, as the respondents concede. See Brief for Re

spondents 50. In fact, historically, Congress sometimes ex

ercised this amnesty power po stelection to ensure that some of the people’s chosen candidates could take office. 2 But if States were free to enforce Section 3 by barring can

didates from running in the first place, Congress would be

——————

1 The Elections Clause directs, in re levant part, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Electi ons for Senators and Representa

tives, shall be prescribed in each Stat e by the Legislature thereof.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1. The Electors Clause similarly provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,” who in turn elec t the President. Art. II, §1, cl. 2.

2 Shortly after the Fourteenth Amen dment was ratified, for instance, Congress enacted a private bill to remo ve the Section 3 disability of Nel

son Tift of Georgia, who had recently been elected to represent the State in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427. Tift took his seat in Congress immediately thereafter. See Cong . Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499– 4500 (1868). Congress similarly acted postelection to remove the disa

bilities of persons elected to state an d local offices. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 29–30, 120–121 (1868); ch. 5, 15 Stat. 435–436.9 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam

forced to exercise its disabilit y removal power before voting begins if it wished for its decision to have any effect on the current election cycle. Perhaps a State may burden con

gressional authority in such a way when it exercises its “ex

clusive” sovereign power over its own state offices. Taylor

, 178 U. S., at 571. But it is implausible to suppose that the Constitution affirmatively de legated to the States the au

thority to impose such a burden on congressional power with respect to candidates for federal office. Cf. McCulloch

v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819) (“States have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner con

trol, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress”). Nor have the respondents identified any tradition of state enforcement of Section 3 agai nst federal officeholders or candidates in the years following ratification of the Four

teenth Amendment. 3 Such a lack of historical precedent is generally a “ ‘telling indication’ ” of a “ ‘severe constitutional problem’ ” with the asserted power. United States v. Texas

, 599 U. S. 670, 677 (2023) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U. S. 477, 505 (2010)). And it is an especially telling sign here, be

cause as noted, States did disqualify persons from holding state offices following ratification of the Fourteenth Amend

ment. That pattern of disqualification with respect to state, but not federal offices provides “persuasive evidence of a general understanding” that the States lacked enforcement power with respect to the latter. U. S. Term Limits , 514

——————

3 We are aware of just one exampl e of state enforcement against a would-be federal officer. In 1868, the Governor of Georgia refused to commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional election, because—in the Governor’s view—Section 3 made Christy inel

igible to serve. But the Governor’s determination was not final; a com

mittee of the House reviewed Christy’ s qualifications itself and recom

mended that he not be seated. The full House never acted on the matter, and Christy was never seated. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives §459, pp. 470–472 (1907).10 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

U. S., at 826. Instead, it is Congress that has long given effect to Sec

tion 3 with respect to would-be or existing federal office

holders. Shortly after ratifi cation of the Amendment, Con

gress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870. That Act authorized federal district attorn eys to bring civil actions in federal court to remove anyon e holding nonlegislative of

fice—federal or state—in violation of Section 3, and made holding or attempting to hold office in violation of Section 3 a federal crime. §§14, 15, 16 Stat. 143–144 (repealed, 35 Stat. 1153–1154, 62 Stat. 992–993). In the years following ratification, the House and Senate exercised their unique powers under Article I to adju dicate challenges contending that certain prospective or sitting Members could not take or retain their seats due to Section 3. See Art. I, §5, cls. 1, 2; 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§459–463, pp. 470–486 (1907). And the Confiscation Act of 1862, which predated Section 3, effectively provided an additional procedure for enforcing disqualification. That law made engaging in insurrection or rebellion, among other acts, a federal crime punishable by disqualification from holding office under the Un ited States. See §§2, 3, 12 Stat. 590. A successor to those provisions remains on the books today. See 18 U. S. C. §2383. Moreover, permitting state enforcement of Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates would raise se

rious questions about the scope of that power. Section 5 limits congressional legislation enforcing Section 3, because Section 5 is strictly “remedial.” City of Boerne , 521 U. S., at 520. To comply with that limitation, Congress “must tailor its legislative scheme to reme dying or preventing” the spe

cific conduct the relevant provision prohibits. Florida Pre

paid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S. 627, 639 (1999). Section 3, unlike other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes con

duct of individuals. It bars persons from holding office after11 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam taking a qualifying oath and then engaging in insurrection or rebellion—nothing more. An y congressional legislation enforcing Section 3 must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870 and §2383, reflect “congruence and proportionality” be

tween preventing or remedying that conduct “and the means adopted to that end.” City of Boerne , 521 U. S., at 520. Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 123. Any state enforcement of Section 3 against federal office

holders and candidates, though, would not derive from Sec

tion 5, which confers power only on “[t]he Congress.” As a result, such state enforcement might be argued to sweep more broadly than congressio nal enforcement could under our precedents. But the notion that the Constitution grants the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Section 3 should be enforced with respect to federal offices is simply implausible. Finally, state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the Presidency would raise heightened concerns. “[I]n the con

text of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.” Ander

son v. Celebrezze , 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983) (footnote omitted). But state-by-state resolution of the question whether Section 3 bars a particular candidate for President from serving would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an

swer consistent with the basic principle that “the President . . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.” Id. , at 795 (emphasis added). Conflicting state outcomes concerning the same candi

date could result not just from differing views of the merits, but from variations in state law governing the proceedings that are necessary to make Se ction 3 disqualification deter

minations. Some States might allow a Section 3 challenge to succeed based on a preponde rance of the evidence, while12 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam others might require a heightened showing. Certain evi

dence (like the congressional Report on which the lower courts relied here) might be admissible in some States but inadmissible hearsay in others. Disqualification might be possible only through criminal prosecution, as opposed to expedited civil proceedings, in particular States. Indeed, in some States—unlike Colorado (or Maine, where the secre

tary of state recently issued an order excluding former Pres

ident Trump from the primary ballot)—procedures for ex

cluding an ineligible candidate from the ballot may not exist at all. The result could well be that a single candidate would be declared ineligible in some States, but not others, based on the same conduct (and perhaps even the same fac

tual record). The “patchwork” that would likely result from state en

forcement would “sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States” as a whole. U. S. Term Limits

, 514 U. S., at 822. But in a Presidential election “the impact of the votes cast in each Stat e is affected by the votes cast”— or, in this case, the votes no t allowed to be cast—“for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson , 460 U. S., at 795. An evolving electoral map could dramatically change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the country, in different ways and at different times. The dis

ruption would be all the more acute—and could nullify the votes of millions and change the election result—if Section 3 enforcement were attempted af ter the Nation has voted. Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such chaos—arriving at any time or different times, up to and perhaps beyond the Inauguration.

* * * For the reasons given, respon sibility for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests with Congress and not the States. The judgment of the Colorado13 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Per Curiam Supreme Court therefore cannot stand. All nine Members of the Court agree with that result. Our colleagues writing separately further agree with many of the reasons this opinion provides for reaching it. See post , Part I (joint opinion of S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ.); see also post , p. 1 (opinion of B ARRETT , J.). So far as we can tell, they object only to our taking into ac

count the distinctive way Section 3 works and the fact that Section 5 vests in Congress the power to enforce it. These are not the only reasons the States lack power to enforce this particular constitutional provision with respect to fed

eral offices. But they are important ones, and it is the com

bination of all the reasons set forth in this opinion—not, as some of our colleagues would have it, just one particular ra

tionale—that resolves this case. In our view, each of these reasons is necessary to provide a complete explanation for the judgment the Court unanimously reaches. The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court is reversed. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.B ARRETT , J., concurring

_________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of B ARRETT , J. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 23–719

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
[March 4, 2024]

J USTICE B ARRETT , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presiden

tial candidates. That principle is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit was brought by Colorado voters under state law in state court. It does not require us to address the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced. The majority’s choice of a different path leaves the re

maining Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my judgment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue in the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particu

larly in this circumstance, writings on the Court should turn the national temperature down, not up. For present purposes, our differences are far less important than our unanimity: All nine Justices agree on the outcome of this case. That is the message Americans should take home.S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

_________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in judgment 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 23–719

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
[March 4, 2024]

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , J USTICE K AGAN , and J USTICE J ACKSON , concurring in the judgment. “If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization , 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (R OBERTS , C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamen

tal principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is” only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases . . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, decid

ing not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colo

rado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chao tic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation’s federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though “[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in the judgment 2 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in judgment five Justices go on. They deci de novel constitutional ques

tions to insulate this Court and petitioner from future con

troversy. Ante, at 13. Although only an individual State’s action is at issue here, the majority opines on which federal actors can enforce Section 3, and how they must do so. The majority announces that a disqualification for insurrection can occur only when Congress enacts a particular kind of legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend

ment. In doing so, the majority shuts the door on other po

tential means of federal enforcement. We cannot join an opinion that decides momentous and difficult issues unnec

essarily, and we therefore co ncur only in the judgment.

I Our Constitution leaves some questions to the States while committing others to the Federal Government. Fed

eralism principles embedded in that constitutional struc

ture decide this case. States cannot use their control over the ballot to “undermine the National Government.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U. S. 779, 810 (1995). That danger is even greater “in the context of a Presidential election.” Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U. S. 780, 794–795 (1983). State restrictions in that context “implicate a uniquely important national in terest” extending beyond a State’s “own borders.” Ibid. No doubt, States have signifi

cant “authority over presidential electors” and, in turn, Presidential elections. Chiafalo v. Washington , 591 U. S. 578, 588 (2020). That power, however, is limited by “other constitutional constraint[s],” including federalism princi

ples. Id ., at 589. The majority rests on such principles when it explains why Colorado cannot take Petition er off the ballot. “[S]tate

by-state resolution of the question whether Section 3 bars a particular candidate for President from serving,” the major

ity explains, “would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an

swer consistent with the basic principle that ‘the PresidentS OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in the judgment 3

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in judgment . . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.’ ” Ante , at 11 (quoting Anderson , 460 U. S., at 795). That is especially so, the majority adds, because different States can reach “[c]on

flicting . . . outcomes concerning the same candidate . . . not just from differing views of the merits, but from variations in state law governing the proceedings” to enforce Section 3. Ante , at 11

. The contrary conclusion that a handful of officials in a few States could decide the Na tion’s next President would be especially surprising with respect to Section 3. The Re

construction Amendments “were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sover

eignty.” City of Rome v. United States , 446 U. S. 156, 179 (1980). Section 3 marked the first time the Constitution placed substantive limits on a State’s authority to choose its own officials. Given that co ntext, it would defy logic for Section 3 to give States new powers to determine who may hold the Presidency. Cf. ante , at 8 (“It would be incongru

ous to read this particular Amendment as granting the States the power—silently no less—to disqualify a candi

date for federal office”). That provides a secure and sufficient basis to resolve this case. To allow Colorado to take a presidential candidate off the ballot under Section 3 would imperil the Framers’ vi

sion of “a Federal Government directly responsible to the people.” U. S. Term Limits , 514 U. S., at 821. The Court should have started and ended its opinion with this conclu

sion.

II
Yet the Court continues on to resolve questions not before us. In a case involving no federal action whatsoever, the Court opines on how federal enforcement of Section 3 must proceed. Congress, the majority says, must enact legisla

tion under Section 5 prescribing the procedures to “ ‘ “ascer

tain[ ] what particular individuals” ’ ” should be disqualified.S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in the judgment 4 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in judgment

Ante , at 5 (quoting Griffin’s Case , 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase, Circuit Justice)). These musings are as inadequately supported as they are gratui

tous. To start, nothing in Section 3’s text supports the major

ity’s view of how federal dis qualification efforts must oper

ate. Section 3 states simply that “[n]o person shall” hold certain positions and offices if they are oathbreaking insur

rectionists. Amdt. 14. Nothing in that unequivocal bar sug

gests that implementing legislation enacted under Section 5 is “critical” (or, for that ma tter, what that word means in this context). Ante , at 5. In fact, the text cuts the opposite way. Section 3 provides that when an oathbreaking insur

rectionist is disqualified, “Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.” It is hard to understand why the Constituti on would require a congres

sional supermajority to remove a disqualification if a simple majority could nullify Section 3’s operation by repealing or declining to pass implementing legislation. Even peti

tioner’s lawyer acknowledged the “tension” in Section 3 that the majority’s view creates. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Similarly, nothing else in the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the majority’s view. Section 5 gives Congress the “power to enforce [the Amendment] by appro

priate legislation.” Remedial legislation of any kind, how

ever, is not required. All the Reconstruction Amendments (including the due process and equal protection guarantees and prohibition of slavery) “are self-executing,” meaning that they do not depend on legislation. City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U. S. 507, 524 (1997); see Civil Rights Cases , 109 U. S. 3, 20 (1883). Similarly, other constitutional rules of disqualification, like the two-term limit on the Presidency, do not require implementing legislation. See, e

. g ., Art. II, §1, cl. 5 (Presidential Qualifications); Amdt. 22 (Presiden

tial Term Limits). Nor does the majority suggest otherwise.S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in the judgment 5

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in judgment It simply creates a special rule for the insurrection disabil

ity in Section 3. The majority is left with ne xt to no support for its require

ment that a Section 3 disqualification can occur only pursu

ant to legislation enacted for that purpose. It cites Griffin’s Case , but that is a nonprecedential, lower court opinion by a single Justice in his capacity as a circuit judge. See ante , at 5 (quoting 11 F. Cas., at 26). Once again, even peti

tioner’s lawyer distanced himself from fully embracing this case as probative of Section 3’s meaning. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35–36. The majority also cites Senator Trumbull’s statements that Section 3 “ ‘provide[d] no means for enforc

ing’ ” itself. Ante , at 5 (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 626 (1869)). The majority , however, neglects to men

tion the Senator’s view that “[i]t is the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment that prevents a person from holding office,” with the proposed legislation simply “affor[ding] a more ef

ficient and speedy remedy” for effecting the disqualifica

tion. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626–627. Ultimately, under the guise of providing a more “com

plete explanation for the judgment,” ante, at 13, the major

ity resolves many unsettled questions about Section 3. It forecloses judicial enforcement of that provision, such as might occur when a party is prosecuted by an insurrection

ist and raises a defense on that score. The majority further holds that any legislation to enforce this provision must prescribe certain procedures “ ‘tailor[ed]’ ” to Section 3, ante, at 10, ruling out enforcement under general federal stat

utes requiring the government to comply with the law. By resolving these and other questions, the majority attempts to insulate all alleged insurrectionists from future chal

lenges to their holding federal office.

* * * “What it does today, the Court should have left undone.”S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in the judgment 6 TRUMP v. ANDERSON

S OTOMAYOR , K AGAN , and J ACKSON , JJ., concurring in judgment

Bush v. Gore , 531 U. S. 98, 158 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissent

ing). The Court today needed to resolve only a single ques

tion: whether an individual State may keep a Presidential candidate found to have engaged in insurrection off its bal

lot. The majority resolves much more than the case before us. Although federal enforcement of Section 3 is in no way at issue, the majority announces novel rules for how that enforcement must operate. It reaches out to decide Section 3 questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to disqualify a Presidential candidat e under that provision. In a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons that course. Section 3 serves an important, though rarely needed, role in our democracy. The American people have the power to vote for and elect candidates fo r national office, and that is a great and glorious thing. The men who drafted and rati

fied the Fourteenth Amendmen t, however, had witnessed an “insurrection [and] rebellion” to defend slavery. §3. They wanted to ensure that those who had participated in that insurrection, and in possible future insurrections, could not return to prominent roles. Today, the majority goes beyond the necessities of this case to limit how Section 3 can bar an oathbreaking insurrectionist from becoming President. Although we agree that Colorado cannot enforce Section 3, we protest the majority’s effort to use this case to define the limits of federal enforcement of that provision. Because we would decide only th e issue before us, we concur only in the judgment.