alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Violet Geffs et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents/Third-Party Plaintiffs. Temco Service Industries, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Intervenor.

[963 NYS2d 657]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Betty Owen Stinson, J.), entered November 23, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant New York City Department of Education’s (DOE) motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied.

The DOE failed to meet its prima facie burden of showing that it neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the wet condition in the school cafeteria upon which plaintiff slipped and fell *(see Ross v Betty G. Reader Revocable Trust,*86 AD3d 419, 421 [1st Dept 2011]). Defendants’ own submissions show that questions of fact exist as to whether they had notice of the condition. One of the custodial workers at the subject school testified that another custodian called him and told him that caution signs were placed “out,” but because he was not present when the accident occurred, he was unable to testify about where or when the warning sign or signs were placed. Because the presence of at least one warning sign is sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether a defendant had actual notice of a hazardous condition, the DOE’s motion should have been denied *(see Dabbagh v Newmark Knight Frank Global*
      *682
      *Mgt. Servs., LLC,*99 AD3d 448, 450 [1st Dept 2012]; *Rosado v Phipps Houses Servs., Inc.,*93 AD3d 597, 597 [1st Dept 2012]).

Further, even if the DOE could delegate its duty to maintain the school premises in a reasonably safe condition *(see Kush v City of Buffalo,*59 NY2d 26, 29 [1983]; *Jonathan A. v Board of Educ. of City ofN.Y., 8*AD3d 80, 82 [1st Dept 2004]), the DOE did not establish, as was its burden, that the contract between it and third-party defendant Temco Service Industries constituted an exclusive maintenance contract completely displacing the DOE’s duty *(see Church v Callanan Indus.,*99 NY2d 104, 112 [2002]). If any written agreement exists, none was proffered, and the testimony about the agreement indicates that the DOE retained at least some control over cleaning and maintenance *(see Gronski v County of Monroe,*18 NY3d 374, 379-382 [2011]).

Concur—Acosta, J.E, Moskowitz, Renwick, Freedman and Clark, JJ.
Exhibit
31.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER




I, Gary
Spaniak, President and Chief Executive Officer of Classic Costume Company, Inc.,
(the “Registrant”), certify that:




1.    I
have reviewed this yearly report on Form 10-K of the Registrant;




2.    Based
on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;




3.    Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;




4.    The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and we have:




(a)    designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this annual report is being prepared;




(b)    evaluated
the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and




(c)    disclosed
in this annual report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;
and




5.    The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of
directors:




(a)    all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and




(b)    any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal controls over financial
reporting.




Dated:
March 31, 2009




/s/ Gary SpaniakGary
      SpaniakPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer(Principal
      Executive
Officer)
**Exhibit      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

| (1)    | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or                15 (d) of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| (2)    | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |

| /s/              Donald Rabinovitch                                                                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Donald              Rabinovitch, President(Co-Principal                Executive Officer)February                12, 2007 |   |
|                                                                                                                      |   |
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 21 , 2019

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14- 19 -00065- CR

RICHARD RAY MCDONA LD , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 228th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1563875

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant, Richard Ray McDonald, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit theft. Pursuant to the terms of a plea-bargain agreement between appellant and the State, on October 29, 2018, the trial court sentenced appellant to 30 years’ imprisonment.

We lack jurisdiction over this appeal because this is a plea bargain case with

no appe alable matters and appellant has not been granted permission to appeal. I n a plea bargain case

— that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the2

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may appeal only matters raised by a written , pretrial motion or with the trial court’s permission. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Appellant’s punishment do es not exceed the agreed length of
confinement. The record do es not c ontain any appealable pretrial rulings , and the trial court did not grant appellant permission to appeal.
Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Hassan, and Poissant

. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### In the Matter of Joseph Williams et al., Appellants, v Oppenheimer & Company, Inc., Respondent.

[824 NYS2d 716]

In a proceeding to quash a subpoena duces tecum served by the respondent upon an out-of-state nonparty witness in an arbitration proceeding before the National Association of Securities Dealers and for the imposition of a sanction upon the respondent, the petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Dunne, J.), dated November 21, 2005, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as denied that branch of the petition which was to quash the subpoena is dismissed as academic, as the arbitration proceeding has been concluded; and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and is it further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondent.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in not imposing a sanction against the respondent under 22 NYCRR130-1.1 (c). Prudenti, EJ., Schmidt, Dillon and Covello, JJ., concur.
exv10w13a



 




Exhibit 10.13a


PROMISSORY NOTE




	 	 	 
	$11,888,484.00

	 	Phoenix, Arizona
December 14, 2001






     FOR
VALUE RECEIVED, Hermes Onetouch, L.L.C. and John G. Sperling, jointly
and severally (the “Makers”), hereby promise to pay to the order of Apollo Group,
Inc., an Arizona corporation, (the “Payee”), on the
“Maturity Date” (as defined
herein) at such place as Payee may designate in writing from time to time, in lawful
money of the United States of America the principal sum of Eleven Million Eight
Hundred Eighty-eight Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-four and No/100 Dollars
($11,888,484.00).



     Interest on the unpaid principal balance of this Note shall accrue at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date hereof and shall be added to principal
annually and paid at the Maturity Date of this Note. Notwithstanding the previous
sentence, however, in the event of early payoff of this Note, accrued interest shall
be added to the outstanding principal balance for that period of time between the
most recent anniversary date and the early payoff date, as the case may be.



     The Maturity Date of this Note shall be the earlier of (i) the anniversary date
of this Note in the year 2021, or (ii) nine (9) months after the death of John G.
Sperling.



     Makers may prepay the whole or any part of this Note from time to time without
premium or penalty.



     Makers hereby waive presentment, demand, and notice of any kind in
connection with the enforcement or collection of this Note.



     If this Note is not paid when due, the Makers promise to pay all costs of
enforcement and collection and preparation therefor, including but not limited to,
reasonable attorneys’ fees, whether or not any action or proceeding is brought to
enforce the provisions hereof, including, without limitation, all such costs incurred
in connection with any bankruptcy, receivership, or other court proceedings (whether
at the trial or appellate level).



     This Note is governed by the laws of the State of Arizona.



     This Note shall be binding on the Makers and the successors and assigns of either
of them.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Makers have caused this Note to be executed as of the day
and year first above written.





      






Hermes Onetouch, L.L.C.






/s/   John G. Sperling
 
By:  John G. Sperling






/s/   John G. Sperling
 
John G. Sperling
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [TA-W-65,593]

Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an investigation was initiated on March 16, 2009 in response to a petition filed on behalf of the workers of OSF Brands, Inc., Plant #8, Huntingburg, Indiana.

The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 9th day of April 2009.

Linda G. Poole,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. E9-10881 Filed 5-8-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
EX-10.7



 





Exhibit 10.7




AMENDMENT TO DICKS SPORTING GOODS, INC.

SUPPLEMENTAL SMART SAVINS PLAN




     WHEREAS, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. (“Company”) has previously adopted the Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. Supplemental Smart Savings Plan (the “Plan”);



     WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 7.1 of the Plan, the Company may amend the Plan at any time, including for reasons related to tax issues;



     WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan to incorporate certain requirements, and to make certain clarifications to the Plan; and



     WHEREAS, the undersigned has been granted specific authority to execute this amendment.



     NOW THEREFORE, the Plan is amended as follows:



     1. Section 4.2 is revised by restating subsection d to read as follows:




	 	(a)	 	Under no circumstances shall the total aggregate annual combined Base Salary, Quarterly Bonus and Incentive Bonus Award Deferral Credits to the Plan be
greater than the limit specified in Section 402(g) of the Code for the 2006 Plan Year. For purposes of clarity, this aggregate amount is
independent of any elections made or not made under the Dick’s Sporting Goods Smart Savings Plan. For the Plan year beginning January 1, 2007,
the maximum permitted deferral amount under this Plan shall be $12,000. This amount may be increased by the Committee for years after 2007; provided however, that any
action to increase the maximum amount must be taken prior to the Plan year to which such amount relates.





     2. Section 4.4(a) is hereby amended to read as follows:




	 	(a)	 	The Committee will credit the Dick’s Matching Deferral Account of each Participant who defers Compensation in an amount equal to
50% of the amount deferred under 4.2; provided that this matching
credit will not exceed 7% of Compensation.





     3. A new Subsection 3.1(d) is added to read as follows:




	 	(d)	 	Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein; all persons with a salary grade of 15 (Vice Presidents) and higher
will be ineligible to participate in this Plan after December 31, 2006. If a Participant becomes ineligible for participation by
reason of this subsection 3.1(d) during a Plan Year (for example, because of a promotion), such Participant will continue
participation in the Plan until the end of the Plan Year in which the ineligibility resulted.







     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be duly executed this 20th day of December, 2006.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	DICK’S SPORTING GOODS, INC.


	 

	 	By:
	 	/s/ Jay Crosson
	 

	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	Senior Vice President-Human Resources
#### In re C.S. & C.A.S.

Case below: 177 N.C. App. 810

367P06

Respondent’s (Stanley S.) PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA05-1362)

Denied 03/08/07
##### 



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Inter-Atlantic Financial, Inc. (the
Company) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer
of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on his knowledge:(1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
  /s/  D. James DarasD. James DarasChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certification.


  I, Kristen Ann Cronin, certify that:

  1.I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
    required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
    Form 10-K of Thornburg Mortgage Securities Trust 2007-1 (the "Exchange
    Act periodic reports");

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a
    whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
    to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
    light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
    covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

  4.I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
    servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews
    conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in
    this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
    in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled
    their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material
    respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
    for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
    assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
    securities required to be included in this report in accordance with
    Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18
    have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise
    disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance
    described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form
    10-K.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
    information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
    Cenlar, FSB, as Subservicer for Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans, Inc.,
    First Republic Bank, as Servicer, Thornburg Home Loans, Inc., as Named
    Servicer, Colonial Savings, F.A., as Servicer, First Horizon Home Loan
    Corporation, as Servicer, Dovenmuehle Mortgage Company, as Sub-Servicer for
    Mellon Trust of New England and Mellon Trust of New England, as Named
    Servicer.

    Dated:   March 27, 2008


    /s/ Kristen Ann Cronin
    Kristen Ann Cronin

    Vice President
    (Senior Officer in charge of the servicing function of Wells Fargo Bank,
     N.A., in its capacity as Master Servicer)

    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Master Servicer
#### Dale Gibson-Wallace, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Robert J. Dalessandro et al., Respondents.

[872 NYS2d 156]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Dale Gibson-Wallace appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brandveen, J.), entered June 29, 2007, as granted those branches of the respective motions of the defendants which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by her against them on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable to the plaintiff Dale Gibson-Wallace, and those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Dale Gibson-Wallace against them on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) are denied.

*680The Supreme Court erred in finding that, on their respective motions, each of the defendants met their prima facie burden with respect to the plaintiff Dale Gibson-Wallace (hereinafter the appellant) by showing that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In support of their separate motions, both defendants relied upon the affirmed medical report of Dr. Vartkes Khacha-durian, an orthopedic surgeon, who noted, during cervical spine testing on June 14, 2006, that the appellant was able to forward flex to 60 degrees in the cervical spine, but failed to adequately compare that finding to the normal range he provided *(see generally Barrera v MTA Long Is. Bus,*52 AD3d 446 [2008]). In this respect, Dr. Khachadurian noted that “chin to the chest” was normal for cervical forward flexion, but failed to correlate that to his finding that the appellant was able to forward flex to 60 degrees.

The defendant Robert J. Dalessandro further relied on the affirmed medical report of Dr. Matthew Chacko, a neurologist, who noted significant limitations in the appellant’s cervical and lumbar spine ranges of motion based upon his examination that took place more than two years after the subject accident occurred *(see Hurtte v Budget Roadside Care,*54 AD3d 362 [2008]; *Perry v Brusini,*53 AD3d 478 [2008]; *Moorer v Amboy Bus Co., Inc.,*52 AD3d 587 [2008]).

Since the defendants did not meet their prima facie burdens of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, we need not address the question of whether the papers submitted by the appellant were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Coscia v 938 Trading Corp.,*283 AD2d 538 [2001]). Rivera, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo, McCarthy and Chambers, JJ., concur.