COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Seni or Judge Bumgardner

DEBRA DERR v. Record No. 1264-09-1
VIRGINIA BEACH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM OSCAR DERR DECEMBER 1, 2009 v. Record No. 1310-09-1
VIRGINIA BEACH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge (Elizabeth R. Gold, on brie f), for appellant Debra Derr. (Ashton H. Pully, Jr.; Counseli ng & Litigation, P.C., on brief), for appellant Oscar Derr. (Mark D. Stiles, City Attorney; Ch ristopher S. Boynto n, Deputy City Attorney; Nianza E. Wallace II, Asso ciate City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. (Anna Clarke Sas; Virginia Beach Law Group, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the minor child.

Debra Derr (mother) and Oscar Derr (father) appeal the trial court’s ruling to change the goal for the foster care permanency plan to adoption and to termin ate their visitation with their child. Mother and father argue th at the trial court erred by (1) gr anting the change in goal in the permanency plan because the rem oval and change of plan were not timely and consistent with

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - statutory guidelines; (2) finding th at the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for a change in goal; (3) finding that the Virginia Beach Depart ment of Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to retain the child with the parents be fore permitting a change of goal to adoption; (4) finding th at the parents did not make timely substantial prog ress in their efforts to have their child returned to them, necessitating a change in goal; (5) finding that a change in goal was in the best interests of the child; and (6) terminating the parent s’ visitation with the child. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily a ffirm the decisions of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND The parties’ child was born on January 10, 2007. In April 2007, the Department offered in-home services and anger mana gement to mother and father. 1 On August 14, 2007, the Department removed the ch ild because mother and fa ther were involved in a physical altercation with one another while mother wa s holding the child. Since the parents were unable to make a safety plan, the Department placed the child in fo ster care. In August 2007, the Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic Re lations District Court (the JDR court) entered an emergency removal order and preliminary protective order. In Octo ber 2007, the JDR court ad judicated the child an abused and neglected child. The Department offered additio nal services to the parents. Both parents submitted to a psychological evaluation and parenting evaluation. Mother completed an anger management class and couples/relationship classe s, and father completed a batterer’s intervention program,

1 The Department had a history of involvement with mother and father because of domestic violence. Mother ha s two other child ren, both of whom are in the custody of other relatives. Father had a Child Protective Services finding of abuse against his stepson, mother’s oldest child.- 3 - couples/relationship classes, an d a parenting educatio n class. From Augu st 2007 until January 2008, mother and father ha d weekly visitation with the child. The parties vi sited together with the child, and then visited separately. In January 2008, the Department placed the ch ild with mother’s sister in California. The parents’ visitation was limited to telephone calls. In May 2008, the child return ed to foster care in Virginia because the California social service workers became conc erned when the child failed to thrive and did not bond w ith her aunt. During this time period, moth er and father we re participating in individual therapy and attending relationshi p groups. They also started couples therapy. From May 2008 until Novemb er 13, 2008, mother and fath er each had one-hour weekly visits with the child. On July 24, 2008, a new fost er care plan was filed with th e court because, although the parents had complied with the Department’s requests, there was no sign of improvement. The plan asked for a change of goal from return to home to adoption. On August 26, 2008 , the JDR court approved the change in goal. Mother an d father appealed to the trial court. On November 13, 2008, the tria l court reduced the vi sits to thirty minutes for each parent due to the child’s reactions to the visits. The child threw tantrums when she entered the Department’s building for visitation . The child was more “clingy” on the days of the visits, and in the evenings, the child would scream and clutch her foster mother. On March 9 and 17, 20 09, the trial court hear d the evidence and appr oved the change of goal to adoption. At the conclusi on of the hearing, the guardian ad litem moved to terminate the visitation between the par ties and the child. Over the parents’ objections, the tria l court granted the motion. Mother and fa ther timely appealed.- 4 - ANALYSIS We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted). Issue 1 – Change in goal Mother and father argue that the trial cour t erred in granting the change in goal because the removal and change of plan were not timel y or consistent with statutory guidelines. In the case of a child who was the subject of a foster care plan filed with the court pursuant to § 16.1-281, a permanency planning hearing shall be held within 11 months of the dispositional hearing at which the foster care plan pursuant to § 16.1-281 was reviewed if the child . . . is under the legal custody of a local board of social services or a child welfare agen cy and has not had a petition to terminate parental rights filed on the child’s behalf , has not been placed in permanent foster care, or is age 16 or over and the plan for the child is not independent li ving. The board or child welfare agency shall file a petition for a permanency planning hearing within 10 months of the dispositi onal hearing at which the foster care plan was reviewed pursuant to § 16.1-281. Code § 16.1-282.1. The adjudicatory and dispositional hearing took place on Octobe r 16, 2007. Code § 16.1-282.1 requires that the petition for pe rmanency planning hearing be filed “within 10 months of the dispositional hearing”; therefore, the petition ha d to be filed by August 16, 2008. On July 24, 2008, the Departme nt filed the petition for a permanency planni ng hearing and a ne w foster care plan requesting a change in goal to adoption. Th e permanency planning hearing had to be held “within 11 months of the dispos itional hearing”; therefore, th e hearing had to occur before September 16, 2008. Id. On August 26, 2008, the JDR court held the permanency planning hearing- 5 - and entered an order approving the plan with th e goal of adoption. The Department met the deadlines required by the statute. Mother and father argue that the Department acted too quickly in changing the goal from return to parents to adoption, espe cially since the child wa s in California for fi ve out of the eleven months that she was in the Department’s custody. Mother and father suggest that the hearing should have occurred closer to the statutory deadline in order to provide the parents with more time to “work on their issues.” The Department filed its petition twenty-three days before the deadline, and the permanency planning hear ing occurred twenty-one days befo re the deadline. The statute does not require th at the Depart ment or court wait until the last possible da y to act; instead, it says that the filing shall oc cur “within” ten mont hs of the dispositional hear ing and the hearing shall occur “within” eleven months of the dispositional hearing. Therefore, the statutory requirements were met, and the tria l court did not err. Issue 2 – Evidence was su fficient to satisfy th e statutory requirements Mother and father argue that the trial court e rred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Code § 16.1-282. 1. “A preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governs judicial review of the foster care plan r ecommendations, while the more stringent clear-and-convincing-evidence st andard applies to the ultim ate termination decision.” Najera v. Chesapeake Div. of Soc. Servs. , 48 Va. App. 237, 240-41, 629 S.E.2d 721, 722 (2006) (citing Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 266 & n.3, 616 S.E.2d 765, 769-70 & n.3 (2005)). The Department met its burden to prove that the evidence was sufficient to change the goal from return to parents to adoption. The Depa rtment made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with mother and father. The Department provided numerous services to the parents. Although the parents complied with the Department’s requirements, there was no evidence of- 6 - any improvement by the parents. The Department removed the child due to domestic violence in the household. During the time that the child was in foster care, the parents completed anger management classes and a batter er’s intervention program. They participated in individual counseling. However, their behavi or did not improve. For exampl e, mother continued to have difficulty controlling her anger around the chil d during visitations. On January 20, 2009, the child threw a tantrum. She tried to get away from mother. Mother picked up the child, who arched her back. Mother “gritted her teeth and balled up one of her fists; and with [the child] in her arms became very abrupt in her movement.” When mother put the child down, the child retreated against the wall and “rolled into fetal position.” Mother and father continued to have loud, serious arguments. On several occasions, a so cial worker from the Department heard them arguing while she spoke with one of them on the te lephone. One social worker testified that the “level of volatility” between mother and father di d not decrease over time and, in fact, at some times, it increased. The Department proved that the parents con tinued to have volatile behaviors, and the testimony was that it would take years of therapy to help mother and father. The fact that the child was not present during all of the arguments between the pa rents does not diminish the seriousness of the situation and the potential problems for the child growing up in such a household. See Wright v. Alexandria Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 16 Va. App. 821, 824, 433 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1993) (a mother’s parental rights were terminated because of the “parents’ chaotic lifestyle and history of domestic violence”). The evidence was sufficient to support a change in goal to adoption. Issue 3 – Reasonable efforts Mother and father contend the Department di d not make reasonable efforts to retain the child with the parent s before changing th e goal to adoption.- 7 - “‘Reasonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, a c ourt must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Ferguson v. Stafford County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. , 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992). After hearing the evidence, the trial cour t concluded that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with her parents, but the go al should be changed to adoption. The trial court held that the Department had “done a ll that they [sic ] can.” The part ies participated in individual counseling, relationship classes, parenting classes, anger management classes, a batterer’s intervention program, and couples therapy. The Department also arranged and supervised visits between the child and mother and father. Furthermore, the Department explored placement with a relative, which lasted for five months. There was sufficient evidence to prove that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with her parents. Issue 4 – Mother’s and father’s progress Mother and father argue that the trial court e rred in finding that they did not make timely and substantial progress in their efforts to have their child returned to th em. Mother and father explained that they completed all of the Department’s requirements, except for the couples therapy, which they had started. However, despite all of the se rvices offered to the parents, they had not made significant improvements. They continued to have loud argu ments, and mother demonstrated anger around the child in January 2009. Dr. Kathleen Dring, who testifie d as an expert witness, stated that mother and father still had significant work to impr ove their parenting skills. Dr. Dring conducted ps ychological and parenting- 8 - evaluations on both parents. She had not seen significant improve ment in either parent’s parenting skills over the time that the child was in fost er care. Dr . Dring concluded th at mother would require at least 2 to 3 years of individual, maybe two times per week, therapy, which she is motivat ed and dedicated to attending and involving herself with, and in conjunction with medication for her mood disorder. Then and only then do I think that she would be – have less chance of being im pulsively angry and appropriately nurturing toward [the child]. Dr. Dring concluded that it would ta ke longer for father to improve hi s parenting skills. She stated, I’m not as hopeful with Mr. De rr because of some of the anti-social tendencies that he has. He is not someone who is going to accept any kind of therapeutic interventions very easily. . . . I think therapy with him is going to be difficult and unless he’s highly motivated, not going to have much productive outcome. So I am not as – it may take 3 to 4 years, again, but I’m not sure what the outcome could be. When asked about the effect on the child if she has to wait two to four years for her parents to complete counseling, Dr. Dring explained that “it would have a very detrimental effect on [the child] . . . not to be able to esta blish a set home and a parenting relationship with some parents if she has to wait for 3, 4, 5 more years.” “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capa ble of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that mother and father had not made timely and substantial progress in their efforts to have their child returned to them. Issue 5 – Best interests of the child Mother and father argue that the trial court e rred in finding that a ch ange in goal was in the best interests of the child.- 9 - When considering matters regarding a child, “t he paramount considera tion of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. Contrary to mother and father’s assertions, the trial court did expl ain its decision that a change in goal was in the child’s best interest s. The trial court complimented the parents for trying and completing many of the Department’s requirements; however , it was not enough. The parents did not make substantial progress, which would allow the child to be returned to them. Their anger issues remained, and they needed ye ars of therapy. Meanwhile, the child had been in foster care for approximately nineteen months. The trial court conclude d that the child needed “some permanency.” The child could not wait any longer to find out wh en, or if, the parents were able to improve themselves. The evidence supports the finding that a change in goal was in the child’s best interests. Issue 6 – Termination of visitation Mother and father argue that the trial cour t abused its discretion in terminating their visitation with the child. Initially, mother and father we re each able to visit with the child fo r one hour ev ery week. However, in November 2008, the trial court redu ced the visitation so that each parent visited with the child for thirty minutes every week. At the hearing in March 20 09, the trial court terminated the visitation. “In matters of custody, visitation, and relate d child care issues, the court’s paramount concern is always the best interests of the child.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 327-28, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “As long as evidence in the record supports the tr ial court’s ruling and the trial court has not abused its discretion, its ruling must be affirmed on appeal.” Brown v.
Brown , 30 Va. App. 532, 538, 518 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1999).- 10 - The trial court heard evidence of how the visitation negatively affected the child. Before the visits, the child would cry, and afte r the visits, the child was clingy and cried at night. Her teachers described the negative changes in the child after the visits. The reduction in visitation ti me did not improve th e child’s reactions to visitation. The guardian ad litem classified a visitation in January 2009 as “horrific” because the child threw a tantrum and tried to get aw ay from mother. When mother picked up the child, the child arched her back and mother balled her fists. When the child was placed down , she retreated fr om mother and curled up in the fetal po sition. Despite the reduction in time, the visita tion was continuing to have a detrimental effect on the child. The evidence supports the trial court’s deci sion to terminate the parents’ visitation.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ru ling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.