[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-10901

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00299-RS-EMT

A.L., 

By P.L.B,

P.L.B., 

For Herself, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

JACKSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(November 14, 2013)

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Before HULL, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Appellants A.L., a minor, and his mother, P.L.B., appeal the district court’s 

dismissal of their claims for injunctive relief (Count I), declaratory relief (Count 

II), denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Count III), discrimination 

under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Count IV), and

retaliation under the IDEA and § 504 (Count V).

1

 The district court dismissed 

Appellants’ complaint based on their failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

under the IDEA. We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust the 

IDEA’s administrative remedies de novo. See Babicz v. School Bd. of Broward 

Cnty., 135 F.3d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). After careful review, we 

affirm.

I.

 

1 In their complaint, Appellants also sought a petition for a writ of mandamus (Count VI). 

This count is not addressed in Appellants’ initial brief to this court or in their reply brief. 

Consequently, we do not address it on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 

F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a “legal claim or argument that has not been 

briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed”). 

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Given the complicated procedural history, we recount it here. In total, the 

parties to this appeal have been involved in three due process hearings.2

 We refer 

to those hearings as “AL I,” “AL II,” and “AL III,” respectively. 

On June 7 and 21, 2010, an Individualized Education Program (IEP) was 

developed for A.L. A new IEP was later developed on November 17, 2010. On 

November 24, 2010, prior to the implementation of the November 17, 2010 IEP, 

Appellants initiated AL I, the first of the three due process hearings, and raised

various issues regarding A.L.’s right to FAPE and A.L.’s November 17, 2010 IEP. 

As a consequence, the November IEP did not take effect and the June IEP became 

the stay-put IEP for A.L. pursuant to the automatic stay provisions of the IDEA. 

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). After numerous hearings, a final order in favor of the 

Jackson County School Board (JCSB) was entered on December 27, 2012. 

Appellants then initiated AL II in April 2012. AL II concerned many of the

same concerns as were challenged in AL I: that A.L. was denied FAPE and that a 

new IEP had not been implemented since June 2010. In addition, Appellants 

alleged that JCSB retaliated and discriminated against them. AL II was dismissed 

 

2 Under IDEA, disputes between the parents and school boards are resolved through due 

process proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). A request for a hearing may be made by either 

the school board or the parents. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A). In Florida, these hearings 

are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Florida Division of Administrative 

Hearings (DOAH). See Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 6A-6.03311. 

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without an evidentiary hearing. The final order was filed in June 2012. This final 

order is the subject of the instant appeal. 

The final due process hearing, AL III, was initiated by JCSB in July 2012. 

JCSB initiated this hearing to resolve Appellants’ challenges to A.L.’s FAPE and 

because Appellants wanted to record A.L.’s IEP meetings. Appellants 

counterclaimed for retaliation. A final order in favor of JCSB was entered in 

February 2013.3

Appellants filed their complaint with regard to AL II in federal court on 

September 13, 2012. On October 18, 2012, they amended their federal court 

complaint. At that time, there had been no final order in either AL I or AL III. 

JCSB moved to dismiss Appellants’ federal court complaint because: (1) 

Appellants had not exhausted their administrative remedies as required under the 

IDEA, and (2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 

district court granted JCSB’s motion to dismiss. 

Now on appeal, Appellants argue that it was error for the district court to 

grant JCSB’s motion to dismiss because they had complied with the IDEA’s 

 

3 JCSB has requested that we take judicial notice of the pleadings from this due process 

hearing (AL III). Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that “[t]he court may judicially 

notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the 

trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The pleadings from AL III are pleadings and 

orders filed with the Clerk of the Florida DOAH. As such, the facts “can be accurately and 

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(b). JCSB’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

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exhaustion requirements. JCSB argues that we should affirm the district court 

because Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as their federal 

court complaint was filed prior to the entry of a final order in either AL I or AL III. 

While it is true that there were three separate due process hearings, the claims in 

AL I and AL III were substantially similar to those in AL II. As such, JCSB 

argues, by failing to exhaust their administrative remedies in AL I and AL III, 

Appellants failed to comply with the IDEA and dismissal of AL II was therefore 

appropriate. 

II.

The IDEA guarantees that disabled students receive a FAPE through the 

provision of various special education services, including an IEP as defined in 20 

U.S.C. § 1414(d). See Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 

1309, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2003). A parent who wishes to challenge an IEP, or any 

matter relating to the provision of a FAPE, may request an “impartial due process 

hearing” before an ALJ. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).

Once the administrative proceedings are complete, the IDEA provides that 

either party may challenge those proceedings in state or federal court. See 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In order to bring such a challenge, however, the IDEA 

requires that a plaintiff first exhaust administrative remedies: “before the filing of a 

civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this 

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subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be 

exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought 

under this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).4

 “The philosophy of the IDEA is that 

plaintiffs are required to utilize the elaborate administrative scheme established by 

the IDEA before resorting to the courts to challenge the actions of the local school 

authorities.” N.B. v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir. 1996)

(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We have interpreted the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement as applying to a 

“broad” spectrum of claims. See M.T.V., 446 F.3d at 1158. In M.T.V., we found 

that M.T.V.’s parents’ claims based on past retaliation, which included allegations 

of harassment at IEP meetings, intimidating letters, and needless and intrusive

testing of M.T.V., were “related to” M.T.V.’s education within the meaning of the 

IDEA and therefore subject to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1158–59; see also

20 U.S.C. § 1415(o) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude a 

parent from filing a separate due process complaint on an issue separate from a due 

process complaint already filed.”).

III.

 

4 The exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserting the rights of disabled children 

under not only the IDEA, but also the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Constitution. See M.T.V. v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446 

F.3d 1153, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2006).

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Here, the district court dismissed A.L.’s claims for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. We agree that the issues raised in Counts I-V of 

Appellants’ amended complaint were substantially similar to those issues raised in 

AL I and AL III. At the time Appellants filed their amended complaint, neither AL 

I nor AL III had concluded as the ALJ had not yet entered a final order on either 

matter. Consequently, Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 

before bringing this matter to federal court, and therefore it was correctly 

dismissed. 

AFFIRMED.

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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring.

Had the issues raised by the appellants in AL II been separate and distinct 

from the issues raised in AL I, I would agree with the appellants that they could 

file a federal action once the ALJ entered a final order in AL II. But, as the Court 

correctly notes, the appellants filed AL II while AL I was pending, and the issues 

they raised in AL II were largely the same as those presented in AL I. In other 

words, AL II was duplicative of AL I and was dismissed by the ALJ on that basis. 

Under the circumstances, the appellants did not exhaust their administrative 

remedies as to the common issues raised in AL II until the ALJ entered a final 

order in AL I on December 27, 2012.

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