alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

875 

KA 12-00989 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, SCONIERS, WHALEN, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REID T. HOUSTON, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CARA A. WALDMAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL),

FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Victoria M.

Argento, J.), rendered April 12, 2012. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon

in the third degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the

third degree (Penal Law § 265.02 [3]). County Court properly refused

to suppress the weapon seized by the police pursuant to a search order

authorizing the search of the apartment shared by defendant and a

probationer. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the affidavit

submitted by the probation officer in support of his application for a

search order provided the issuing court with “reasonable cause to

believe that the [probationer had] violated a condition of [his]

sentence” by using and possessing illegal drugs (CPL 410.50 [3]; see

People v Borger, 57 AD3d 691, 691), and the court therefore properly

issued an order authorizing the search of the premises where the

probationer resided (see Borger, 57 AD3d at 691; People v Dawson, 73

AD2d 979, 980, appeal dismissed 51 NY2d 1005). In view of defendant’s

failure to provide sufficient factual support for his allegation that

the search order was not supported by reasonable cause to believe that

the probationer had violated a condition of his sentence, the court

properly concluded that a hearing was not required (see generally

People v Vanness, 106 AD3d 1265, 1266, lv denied 22 NY3d 1044; People

v Jenkins, 64 AD3d 993, 994). 

Entered: July 2, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
##### 



SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549
 FORM 6-K Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the month of September 2004 Commission File Number 1-14916 BROOKFIELD PROPERTIES CORPORATION (Translation of registrants name into English)
 BCE Place
181 Bay Street
Suite 330
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5J 2T3
(416) 359-8600 (Address of principal executive offices)
 Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports
under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F. Form 20-F     o
    
    Form 40-F     þ
 Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper as
permitted by Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(1):     o Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper as
permitted by Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(7):     o Indicate by check mark whether by furnishing the information contained in this
Form, the registrant is also thereby furnishing the information to the
Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Yes     o
    
    No     þ
 If Yes is marked, indicate below the file number assigned to the registrant
in connection with Rule 12g3-2(b): 82-




---



##### 



SIGNATURES Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. Date: September 27, 2004 Brookfield Properties CorporationBy:
    /s/ Craig LaurieName:
    Craig LaurieTitle:
    Senior Vice President & Chief
Financial Officer




---



##### 



EXHIBIT LIST Exhibit
    
    Description99.1
    
    Press Release dated September 27, 2004
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 89 (Monday, May 11, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 21833]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10894]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,750]


Chick Machine Co., Inc., Butler, PA; Notice of Termination of 
Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on April 6, 2009 in response to a petition 
filed by a company official on behalf of workers of Chick Machine Co., 
Inc., Butler, Pennsylvania.
    The petitioner has requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 9th day of April 2009.
Richard Church,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-10894 Filed 5-8-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Herman Everett, Appellant.

[973 NYS2d 207]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura A. Ward, J.), rendered December 16, 2011, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of assault in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of two years, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). The element of serious physical injury (Penal Law § 10.00 [10]) was established, because the victim’s permanent loss of four front teeth constituted a protracted impairment of her health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ *(see People v Lanier,*44 AD3d 547 [1st Dept 2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 1035 [2008]; *People v Howard,*79 AD2d 1064 [3d Dept 1981]). Since the teeth are lost, the victim can never eat with them, notwithstanding that she has been fitted with a prosthetic device; accordingly, her loss is not just protracted, but permanent. While the fact that damage to an organ has been successfully repaired *576may affect whether the injury qualifies as serious *(see e.g. People v Rosado,*88 AD3d 454, 455 [2011], *lv denied*18 NY3d 928 [2012]), this does not apply when the organ is permanently lost, irrespective of whether it is replaced by a prosthesis.

Furthermore, the victim’s loss of four front teeth also constituted a “serious and protracted disfigurement,” since “a reasonable observer would find her altered appearance distressing or objectionable” *(People v McKinnon,*15 NY3d 311, 315 [2010]; *see also People v Snyder,*100 AD3d 1367, 1368 [4th Dept 2012], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1010 [2013] [disfiguring dental injuries]). The fact that the victim received a removable prosthetic device did not ameliorate the seriousness of her injuries, since whenever she removes the device, the disfigurement will be readily apparent.

We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining arguments. Concur — Sweeny, J.P., Renwick, Feinman and Clark, JJ.
#### Margaret Godfrey et al., Appellants, v Andrew J. Spano et al., Respondents. New York State Comptroller, Intervenor-Respondent.

Submitted September 14, 2009;

decided September 17, 2009

Reported below, 57 AD3d 941.

*778Motion by New York State Association of Counties for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Two copies of the brief must be served and 24 copies filed within seven days.
**Exhibit 31.2**

**Certifications**

I, Jeffrey D. Cushman, certify that:

1.             I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q ofBancTec, Inc;

2.             Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;

3.             Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly presentin all material respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport.

4.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation, and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarterin the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and

5.             Theregistrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions).

a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial data; and

b) Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
| Date:  November 14, 2006 |     | /s/ Jeffrey D. Cushman                               |
|-------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------|
|                          | * * | *Jeffrey D. Cushman*                                 |
| * *                      | * * | *Senior Vice President and Chief  Financial Officer* |

 

----
#### In the Matter of Jian Hua Tan, Appellant, v New York City Transit Authority, Respondent.

[964 NYS2d 103]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol E. Huff, J.), entered April 20, 2012, denying the petition to annul a determination of nonparty New York State Division of Human Rights, dated August 24, 2011, which denied petitioner’s complaint of disability discrimination by nonparty Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority in terminating his employment, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The determination that there was no probable cause to believe that petitioner was subjected to disability-based discrimination was rationally based *(see Matter of Pajooh v State Div. of Human Rights,*82 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2011]; *Matter of Allen v Division of Human Rights,*82 AD3d 585 [1st Dept 2011]). Indeed, the record demonstrates that petitioner falsified his time sheets to show that he was working during times when he was absent from the office *(see e.g. Costello v St. Francis Hosp.,*258 F Supp 2d 144, 155 [ED NY 2003] [“(a)n employee’s falsification of a time sheet can constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee”]).

We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

Concur—Gonzalez, E.J., Mazzarelli, Moskowitz, Renwick and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andre Roldan, Appellant.

[975 NYS2d 681]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Foley J.), dated April 17, 2012, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

One of the defendant’s contentions on appeal is that he was entitled to a downward departure from the presumptive risk level because he allegedly had an “exceptional response” to *910treatment while incarcerated. A defendant seeking a downward departure has the initial burden of “(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is not otherwise adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence” *(.People v Wyatt,*89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]). The Sex Offender Registration Act Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary recognize that “[a]n offender’s response to treatment, if exceptional, can be the basis for a downward departure” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 17 [2006]; *see People v Washington,*84 AD3d 910, 911 [2011]). Here, however, the defendant’s evidence did not prove that he had an exceptional response to treatment *(see People v Perez,*104 AD3d 746, 747 [2013]; *People v Hays,*99 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2012]; *People v Peeples,*98 AD3d 491, 492 [2012]; *People v Watson,*95 AD3d 978, 979 [2012]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding his request for a downward departure are without merit. Accordingly, he was not entitled to a downward departure from the presumptive risk level *(see People v Peeples,*98 AD3d at 492; *People v Watson,*95 AD3d at 979; *People v Wyatt,*89 AD3d at 131). Mastro, J.E, Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

29
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 13 (Wednesday, January 21, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2995-2996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00846]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM


Forms Submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for 
Extension of Clearance

AGENCY: Selective Service System.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following forms have been submitted to the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) for extension of clearance in compliance with the

[[Page 2996]]

Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 35):

SSS FORMS 2, 3A, 3B and 3C

    Title: Selective Service System Change of Information, Correction/
Change Form, and Registration Status Forms.
    Purpose: To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the Selective 
Service System registration data.
    Respondents: Registrants are required to report changes or 
corrections in data submitted on the SSS Form 1.
    Frequency: When changes in a registrant's name or address occur.
    Burden: A burden of two minutes or less on the individual 
respondent.
    Copies of the above identified forms can be obtained upon written 
request to the Selective Service System, Reports Clearance Officer, 
1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209-2425.
    Written comments and recommendations for the proposed extension of 
clearance of the form should be sent within 30 days of the publication 
of this notice to the Selective Service System, Reports Clearance 
Officer, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209-2425.
    A copy of the comments should be sent to the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer, Selective Service 
System, Office of Management and Budget, New Executive Office Building, 
Room 3235, Washington, DC 20503.

    Dated: January 14, 2015.
Lawrence Romo,
Director.
[FR Doc. 2015-00846 Filed 1-20-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8015-01-P
#### In the Matter of Allstate Insurance Company, Appellant, v Liberty Mutual Insurance, Respondent.

[872 NYS2d 146]

In a proceeding pursuant to CFLR article 75 to confirm an arbitration award, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Garvey, J.), entered January 7, 2008, which denied its motion for leave to renew the petition to confirm the award, which was denied in an order of the same court dated November 22, 2006.

*728Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Although a motion for leave to renew generally must be based on newly-discovered facts, this requirement is a flexible one, and a court has the discretion to grant renewal upon facts known to the movant at the time of the original motion, provided that the movant offers a reasonable justification for the failure to submit the additional facts on the original motion *(see Matter of Gold v Gold,*53 AD3d 485, 487 [2008]; *Matter of Surdo v Levittown Pub. School Dist.,*41 AD3d 486 [2007]; *Heaven v McGowan,*40 AD3d 583 [2007]; *Allstate Ins. Co. v Davis,*23 AD3d 418 [2005]). Nevertheless, “[a] motion for leave to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation” *(Elder v Elder,*21 AD3d 1055, 1055 [2005]; *see Lardo v Rivlab Transp. Corp.,*46 AD3d 759 [2007]; *Matter of Leyberman v Leyberman,*43 AD3d 925 [2007]).

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying its motion for leave to renew. The petitioner’s motion was based upon evidence that either was in its possession at the time its petition to confirm the arbitration award was brought, or could have been obtained earlier with due diligence, and it did not sufficiently justify, inter alia, its failure to attach a copy of the award it was seeking to confirm to its petition. Moreover, the petitioner failed to offer a reasonable justification for its eight-month delay in moving for leave to renew to correct various deficiencies in the petition, which included the failure to submit a copy of the arbitration award *(see Christ v Solomon,*6 AD3d 569 [2004]; *Matter of Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co. v Singh,*297 AD2d 349 [2002]; *Cole-Hatchard v Grand Union,*270 AD2d 447, 448 [2000]). Skelos, J.E, Dillon, McCarthy and Eng, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 33.4

 

**ASSERTION OF COMPLIANCE WITH**

**APPLICABLE SERVICING CRITERIA**

 

 

The Bank of New York and The Bank of New York Trust Company, N. A. (collectively, the “Company”) provides this platform-level assessment of compliance with the servicing criteria specified in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

 

Management has determined that the following servicing criteria are applicable in regards to the following servicing platform for the following period:

 

Platform: Publicly-issued (i.e., transaction-level reporting initially required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) residential mortgage-backed securities and other mortgage-related asset-backed securities issued on or after January 1, 2006 (and like-kind transactions issued prior to January 1, 2006) for which the Company provides trustee, securities administration, or paying agent or custodial services.

 

Applicable Servicing Criteria: All servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d), to the extent required by the related transaction agreements as to any transaction, except for the following criteria: 1122(d)(1)(ii), 1122(d)(1)(iii), 1122(d)(1)(iv), 1122(d)(4)(iv), 1122(d)(4)(v), 1122(d)(4)(vi), 1122(d)(4)(vii), 1122(d)(4)(viii), 1122(d)(4)(ix), 1122(d)(4)(x), 1122(d)(4)(xi), 1122(d)(4)(xii), 1122(d)(4)(xiii) and 1122 (d)(4)(xiv).

 

Period: As of June 30, 2007 and for the period January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2007.

 

With respect to the Platform and the Period, the Company provides the following assessment of compliance in respect of the Applicable Servicing Criteria:

 

• The Company is responsible for assessing its compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.

 

• The Company has assessed compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.

 

1

• As of June 30, 2007 and for the Period, the Company was in material compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria.

KPMG LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report with respect to the Company’s assessment of compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria as of and for the Period. 

 

The Bank of New York

The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.

 

 

/s/ Patt J. Tadle           Patrick J. Tadle

Authorized Signer

 

 

The Bank of New York

 

/s/ Samir Pandiri          

Samir Pandiri

Authorized Signer

 

September 18, 2007

 

 

 

 

 

2
Exhibit 32

                          ASPEN EXPLORATION CORPORATION

                   Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350


     To my knowledge: the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended
December 31, 2004, containing financial statements for the quarter then ended,
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Act of
1934; and the information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Aspen
Exploration Corporation for the periods presented.



February 10, 2005



/s/  Robert A. Cohan
----------------------------------
     Robert A. Cohan,
     Chief Executive Officer,
     Chief Financial Officer
#### State v. Burchfield

Case below: 183 N.C. App. — (5 June 2007)

No. 311A07

1. Def’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA06-922)

2. AG’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

1. _

2. Allowed 08/23/07