UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BETTYE M. HILL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF

No. 96-2507

SOCIAL SERVICES; JOAN O. DAVIS,

L.C.S.W.; DEBORAH RIDER,

L.C.S.W.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Frank A. Kaufman, Senior District Judge.

(CA-95-2465-K)

Submitted: March 24, 1998

Decided: April 21, 1998

Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Bettye M. Hill, Appellant Pro Se. Sandra Irene Barnes, Assistant

Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Bettye M. Hill appeals from the district court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Defendants in her claim of discrimination

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). We affirm.

Under the ADA, a disability is a "physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such

individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). An individual suffers from

a "substantial limitation" if she is unable to perform a major life activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which she can perform a major life activity as compared

to an average person. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1997). In making the

substantial limitation determination, a court may consider: (i) the

nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected

duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term

impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of, or resulting

from, the impairment. See id.

Hill alleges that she is disabled in the major life activities of standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, and driving, all of which are part of her

job requirements. She has presented doctor's certificates advising that

she should not sit or drive for more than two hours, should not lift

more than three to five pounds, and should not reach overhead or

climb, more than one flight of stairs. These medical documents, however, were neither properly authenticated nor provided directly by the

medical doctors, and accordingly they may not be used to oppose the

summary judgment motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, the only

evidence which may properly be considered in determining whether

Hill was disabled under the ADA are the averments contained in her

declaration made under penalty of perjury. The relevant portions are

as follows:

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(1) Hill was released for "light duty" on January 16, 1991,

six days after the accident.

(2) Due to a strenuous work load, Hill suffered a complete

relapse which confined her to bed and left her unable

to walk from April 29 to May 5, 1991.

(3) Hill suffered another relapse and was out sick from

May 17 to May 28, 1991.

(4) To function, Hill must wear a back brace, use a came,

take medication, and wear a neck brace at times.

(5) Hill is substantially limited in the major life activities

of walking, standing, sitting, performing manual tasks,

and lifting.

(6) The Worker's Compensation Commission found that

Hill had a permanent partial disability of "fourteen percent industrial loss" of the use of her body.

(7) As a result of her accident, Hill suffered injuries to her

head, neck, back, hip, arms, legs, wrist, and hands.

(8) Hill has "severe chronic pain in the shoulder, upper

and lower back, sharp pains, and shooting in the arms

and legs."

Averments (1)-(4) and (6)-(8) are insufficient to establish an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity. Averment (5) states

only a legal conclusion without any supporting facts aside from reference to the uncertified exhibits. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants

because Hill failed to present sufficiently attested evidence in

response to the summary judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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