COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Clements, Haley and Senior Judge Overton Argued at Richmond, Virginia

TYRONE ALONZO BULLOCK OPINION BY v. Record No. 0145-05-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS JULY 5, 2006 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Margaret P. Spencer, Judge Richard G. White, Jr., for appellant. Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorn ey General (Rober t F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Tyrone Alonzo Bullock was convicted on his pl eas of guilty of two counts of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence on the robbery convictions for twenty years upon certain conditi ons and sentenced Bullock to consecutive terms of three and five years’ incarceration in the Department of Corre ctions on the firearm convictions. On appeal, Bullock contends the tr ial court erred (1) in re fusing to consider the possibility of allowing him to serve any part of his sentences in a juveni le facility under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) and (2) in concluding it lacked the discretion under Code § 18.2-53.1 to suspend any portion of the mandatory minimum sent ences on the firearm convictions or to set those sentences to run concurren tly. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.- 2 - I. BACKGROUND The relevant facts and procedural posture of this case are not in dispute. Using a twelve-gauge shotgun, Bullock robbed Brian Wa lthall at gunpoint of $40 on February 22, 2004. Approximately thirty minutes later, Bullock robbed William Buckman at gunpoint of $20. Shortly after the second robbery, Bullock was arre sted and charged with the two robberies and with using a firearm in the commission of each of the robberies. Bullock was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses. Bullock was subsequently certified to be tried as an adult in the circuit court, and a grand jury returned indictments charging him with the two robberies and the two related firearm offenses. On September 30, 2004, Bullock pled guilty in the circuit court to all four charges. After hearing a summary of the evidence, th e court accepted Bullock’s guilty pleas and convicted him of the charges. At the sentencing hearing, both parties agreed that the trial court had the discretion to sentence Bullock as a serious juvenile o ffender under Code § 16.1-272 with respect to the robbery convictions. They disagreed, however, as to what discretion the court had with respect to sentencing Bullock for the use of a firear m convictions. Bullock argued that, under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1), the court could a nd should allow him to serve a ll or at least part of his sentences on the two firearm convictions as a se rious juvenile offender in the Department of Juvenile Justice. The balance of his sentence, if any, he further argued, could then be served as an adult in the Department of Corrections. He further argued that th e two mandatory minimum sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1 could be suspended in whole or in part under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) or be set to run co ncurrently with each other. The prosecutor argued that the inflexible “mandatory minimum” provision of Code § 18.2-53.1 preclude d application of the discretionary sentencing options in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) and required that the two mandatory- 3 - minimum sentences on the firearm convictions be served consecutively with each other in the Department of Corrections, without suspension or reduction. At the conclusion of the sentencing heari ng, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence on the robbery convictions for twenty years on certain c onditions. Stating it lacked the discretion to “suspend any part of the time” of the mandatory minimum sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1 and that they “must run consecutiv e[ly],” the court sentenced Bullock to serve consecutive terms of three and five years’ inca rceration on the use of a firearm convictions. Asked by defense counsel if it would “consider committing [Bullock] under [Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i)] so that at leas t some of th[e] time [would be] in the juvenile system,” the court responded: “No, the Court is sentencing him as an adult. The appropriate placement will be determined by the Department of Corrections.” Asked by the court if “there [was] anything else,” both parties responded in th e negative, and the proceedings ended. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS This appeal involves the application of Code §§ 18.2-53.1 and 16.1-272(A)(1). Code § 18.2-53.1 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to use any . . . shotgun . . . or display such weapon in a threatening manner while committing . . . robbery . . . . Violation of this section shall constitute a separa te and distinct felony and any person found guilty thereof shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years for a first conviction, and to a mandatory minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of this section. Such punishment shall be separate and apart from, and shall be made to run consecutively with, any punishment received for the commission of the primary felony. Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) provides as follows: In any case in which a juvenile is indicted, the offense for which he is indicted and all ancill ary charges shall be tried in the- 4 - same manner as provided for in the trial of adults, except as otherwise provided with re gard to sentencing. . . . 1. If a juvenile is convicted of a violent juvenile felony, for that offense and for all ancillary crimes the court may order that (i) the juvenile serve a portion of the sentence as a serious juvenile offender under § 16.1-285.1 and the remainder of such sentence in the same manner as provided for a dults; (ii) the juvenile serve the entire sentence in the same ma nner as provided for adults; or (iii) the portion of the sentence to be served in the same manner as provided for adults be suspended conditioned upon successful completion of such terms and conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency case including, but not limited to, commitment under subdivision 14 of § 16.1-278.8 or § 16.1-285.1. Because Bullock was a juvenile who was trie d and convicted as an adult in the circuit court on two counts of robber y—a “violent juvenile felony” under Code § 16.1-269.1—and two ancillary counts of use of a firearm in the commission of those robberies, both Code § 18.2-53.1 and Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) were facially applicab le to Bullock’s sentencing. After suspending imposition of sentence on the robbery convictions, th e trial court sentenced Bullock “as an adult” to consecutive terms of three and five years’ incarceration in the Department of Corrections on the two firearm convictions. A. The Trial Court’s Consider ation of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) Bullock claims the trial court abused its discretion during senten cing by “refus[ing] to consider the possibility of sentencing [him] to serve part of his sentence[s]” on the use of a firearm convictions in a juvenile correctional fa cility, as permitted by C ode § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i). Bullock concedes “the trial court had the authority to sentence him as it did” under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(ii). He asserts, however, that, having “improperly adopted the Commonwealth’s position” that Code § 18.2-53.1 precl uded Bullock from serv ing any part of his sentences on the firearm convicti ons in the juvenile system, the court failed to “give proper consideration” to the sentencing alternative available under Code § 16.1- 272(A)(1)(i). Thus,- 5 - Bullock contends, this matter should be remande d to the trial court for reconsideration of sentencing. We disagree. “Absent clear evidence to the c ontrary in the record, the judgme nt of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.” Yarborough v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E. 2d 286, 291 (1977); see also Johnson v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 391, 396, 404 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1991) (“On appeal, the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct.”). The party al leging reversible error has the burden “to show by the record” that the allege d error occurre d. Johnson , 12 Va. App. at 396, 404 S.E.2d at 387; see also Smith v. Commonwealth , 16 Va. App. 630, 635, 432 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1993) (“ An appellate court must dispose of the case upon the record and cannot base its decision upon appellant’s petition or brief, or statements of counse l in open court.”). For purposes of this appeal, we will assu me, without deciding, that the underlying contention implicit in Bullock’s claim of error—th at the trial court was required, in determining the sentences for Bullock’s use of a firearm convi ctions, to specifically consider the sentencing alternative set forth in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i)—is correct. Nevertheless, wefind that the record before us fails to show by clear evidence that the alleged error actually occurred. Indeed, although the record shows the trial court re fused to allow Bullock to serve an y part of his sentences on the firearm convictions in a j uvenile facility, the reco rd fails to support by clear evidence Bullock’s assertion that the trial court refused to “consid er the possibility” of allowing him to do so. To the contrary, taken as a whole, the record supports the conclusi on that, in determining Bullock’s sentences on the firearm convictions , the trial court was aware of and gave consideration to all of the senten cing alternatives set forth in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1). The record demonstrates that Bullock ’s counsel thoroughly advised the trial court of the sentencing options available to it under Code § 16 .1-272(A)(1) and argued at length infavor of the court allowing- 6 - Bullock to serve part, if not all, of his se ntences in the juvenile system under Code §§ 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) or 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii). Defe nse counsel specifically advised the court that Bullock “should not be put in the adult system” and that the court could “sentence him as a serious juvenile offender” under Code § 16 .1-272(A)(1)(i) and allow him to se rve at least the first part, if not all, of his total sentence in the juvenile system. After the trial court announced it was suspending imposition of sentence on the robbery convictions and impo sing a total sentence of eight years on the firearm convictions , Bullock’s counsel sp ecifically asked if the court would allow Bullock to serve at least some of the imposed sentence in a juvenile facility. The court responded in the negative, stating simply that it wa s “sentencing [Bullock] as an adult.” In other words, having been informed by counsel that Bullock could be properly committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice under Code §§ 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) and 16.1-272(A)(1)( iii) or sentenced to the Department of Corrections as an adult under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(ii), the court decided that the sentencing alternative set forth in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(ii) was the most appropriate option under the circumstances before it. There being no clear evidence in it to the c ontrary, the record t hus shows that, in sentencing Bullock “as an adult,” in accordance with Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(ii), the court gave consideration to and ultimately rejected the ot her sentencing options available under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1). The court’s fa ilure, in announcing its decision, to specifically indicate it had considered the sentencing alternative set fort h in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) does not ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the court failed to cons ider that alternative. Despite being given the opportunity to do so, neither party asked the court to articulate the basi s for its decision, and nothing in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) required the cour t to make any findings or otherwise expressly indicate that it had considered the se ntencing alternative available under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) before refusing Bullock’s request to be sentenced under that section. We- 7 - conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s refusal to allow Bullock to serve any time in the juvenile system does not constitute a failure by the court to consider the possibility of sentencing him under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i). Moreover, there is no clear evid ence in the record that suppo rts Bullock’s assertion that the trial court adopted the Commonwealth’s position that the court had to sentence Bullock to the Department of Corrections under Code § 18.2-53 .1. Although he provides no factual basis for that assertion, Bullock apparent ly equates the court’s negative response to defense counsel’s inquiry whether the court would c onsider allowing Bullock to serv e at least a part of his total sentence for the firearm convictions in the juveni le system with a determ ination by the court that it lacked the discretion to do so. We will not, however, “fix upon isolated statements of the trial judge taken out of the full contex t in which they were made, and use them as a predicate for holding the law has been misa pplied.” Yarborough , 217 Va. at 978, 234 S.E.2d at 291. Indeed, when taken in context with the trial court’s other comments in announcing its rulings fr om the bench, the trial court’s statement that it would not consider a llowing Bullock to serve any time in a juvenile facility because the court was “sentencing him as an adult” does not suppo rt Bullock’s assertion that the court adopted th e Commonwealth’s position. In declaring it lacked the discretion to suspend Bullock ’s sentences on the firearm convictions, the trial court stated that it could not “suspend any part of the time.” In announcing it lacked the discretion to set th e two sentences on the firearm c onvictions to run concurrently, the court stated the two sentences “ must run consecutive[ly].” (Emphasis added.) The court, however, made no such declarati on regarding its discretion when it ruled on Bullock’s request to be allowed to serve some part of his sentences in a juvenile facility. Th e court merely indicated it would not consider sentencing Bullock as a juvenile under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i) because it was “sentencing him as an adult,” the sent encing alternative available under Code- 8 - § 16.1-272(A)(1)(ii). Given its earlier comments, it is clear that, had the court believed it lacked the discretion to consider allowing Bullock to se rve some part of his sentences as a juvenile offender under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i), it would ha ve said so. It did not, and, there being no clear evidence in the record showing otherwise, we cannot say the court failed to consider the possibility of sentencing Bullock as a serious juvenile offender under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(i). We hold, therefore, that Bullock failed to meet his burden of showing bythe record that the alleged error actually occurred. Accordingly, we reject Bullock’s claim of error. B. The Trial Court’s Sentencing Discretion under Code § 18.2-53.1 Bullock contends the trial court erred in concluding it lacked the discretion under Code § 18.2-53.1 to suspend any portion of his sentence s on the firearm convictions. According to Bullock, the legislature’s amendment of Code § 18.2-53.1 in 2004 permitted the court to suspend his sentences under Code § 16.1-272(A )(1)(iii). Bullock also conte nds the trial court erred in concluding it lacked the disc retion under Code § 18.2-53.1 to se t his two mandatory minimum sentences on the firearm convictions to run concurrently with each other. In considering the merits of Bullock’s clai ms, we are guided by the elementary principle that “[t]he primary objective of st atutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.” Commonwealth v. Zamani , 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998). Thus, we construe a statute “with reference to its subject matter, the object sought to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the provision s should receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather than one which will defeat it.” Esteban v. Commonwealth , 266 Va. 605, 609, 587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003). Furthermore, although “[i]t is a cardinal principle of law that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against th e [Commonwealth]” and “cannot be extended by implication, or be made to include case s which are not within the letter and spirit of the statute,” Wade v. Commonwealth , 202 Va. 117, 1 22, 116 S.E.2d 99, 103 (1960), “we will not apply- 9 - ‘an unreasonably restrictive interpre tation of the statute’ that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein,” Ar mstrong v. Commonwealth , 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S. E.2d 139, 144 (2002) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth , 219 Va. 759, 7 61, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)). 1. Suspension of Sentences Bullock concedes that Code § 18.2-53.1 requires the imposition of a “mandatory minimum” sentence that, pursuant to Code § 18.2-12.1, may not normally be suspended. Bullock also acknowledges that this C ourt determined in Green v. Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 567, 507 S.E.2d 627 (1998), that the inflexible term s of Code § 18.2-53.1 pr ohibiting suspension of the mandatory sentence imposed for a use of a firearm convicti on prevailed over the discretionary terms of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) permitting suspension of a juvenile offender’s sentence. Bullock asserts, however, that Green was superseded by the General Assembly’s amendment of Code § 18.2-53.1 in 2004. As amended, Bullock argues, Code § 18.2-53.1 no longer specifically precludes suspension under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii) of a juvenile offender’s sentence for a use of a firearm convic tion. Thus, Bullock concludes, the trial court erred in ruling it lacked the di scretion to suspend the mandatory minimum sentences imposed for his firearm convictions. In response, the Commonwealth contends that, notwithstanding the 2004 amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1, this Court’s decision in Green still controls and prec ludes the suspension of Bullock’s firearm sentences under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii). We agree with the Commonwealth. Consideration of Bullock’s c ontention that the legislatur e’s 2004 amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1 abrogated our decision in Green requires a review of Green and the legislative background of the amendment of Code § 18.2-53.1 that followed. See generally Lucy v. County of Albemarle , 258 Va. 118, 122, 516 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1999) (hol ding that courts may review the- 10 - legislative background of statutes at issue where the statutes “are in apparent conflict and susceptible to differing constructions ” and judicial construction is necessary to reconcile them in a manner “consistent with legislative intent”). At the time we examined the application of Code §§ 18.2-53.1 and 16.1-272(A)(1) in Green , Code § 18.2-53.1 provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Violation of this sect ion shall constitute a separate and distinct felony and any person found guilty th ereof shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three year s for a first conviction, and for a term of five years for a second or subsequent conviction under the provisions of this section. Notw ithstanding any ot her provision of law, the sentence prescribed for a vi olation of the provisions of this section shall not be suspended in whole or in part, nor shall anyone convicted hereunder be placed on probation. Such punishment shall be separate and apart from, and shall be made to run consecutively with, any punishment received for the commission of the primary felony. The relevant part of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) provide d then, as it does now, that the sentence of a juvenile offender sentenced as an adult may “be suspended conditioned upon successful completion of such terms and conditions as may be imposed in a juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency case.” Observing in Green that the application of Code §§ 18.2-53.1 and 16.1-272(A)(1) appeared to be in conflict “becau se one allow[ed] what the other specifically prohibit[ed],” we considered the plain meaning of the te rms of the statutes, noting as follows: Code § 18.2-53.1 states that courts “shall” sentence one convicted of the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony to a mandatory sentence “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” The word “notwithstanding” is de fined as “withou t prevention or obstruction from or by.” Webs ter’s Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1993). Given that unde rstanding of the word, we conclude that the terms of C ode § 18.2-53.1 are not limited by other incongruous laws because the General Assembly intended Code § 18.2-53.1 to function “without obstruction” from them. Nothing in Code § 16.1-272 cont radicts this interpretation.- 11 - Green , 28 Va. App. at 569-70, 507 S.E.2d at 628- 29. We further noted that Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) did “not contain mandatory lan guage as [did] Code § 18.2-53.1” and reasoned as follows: Our interpretation of the statutes is also in concert with our opinion in Lafleur v. Commonwealth , 6 Va. App. 190, 366 S.E.2d 712 (1988). In Lafleur , we interpreted Code § 18.2-53.1 in light of Code § 19.2-311, which allowed alte rnate sentencing for certain youthful offenders. We found that the purpose of Code § 18.2-53.1 was “‘to deter violent cr iminal conduct rather than to reform the most dangerous class of criminals.’” Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth , 219 Va. 759, 763, 250 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1979)). To apply the juvenile sentencing provisions in place of the mandatory sentence in Code § 18.2-53.1 “would substitute a discretionary penalty for an inflexible one.” Id. Because “the General Assembly has directed a contrary policy which courts must follow,” we held a mandatory sentence was rightfully imposed. Id. We are under no less a burden to follow the General Assembly’s clear mandate in this case. Green , 28 Va. App. at 570, 507 S.E.2d at 629. For th ese reasons, we held that “Code § 18.2-53.1 required the trial court to impose [an] . . . uns uspended sentence despite the provisions of Code § 16.1-272.” Id. In 2004, the General Assembly of Virgin ia passed House Bill 1059, whereby Code § 18.2-53.1 was amended to its present form by adding the phrase “mandatory minimum” to describe the terms of imprisonment to be impos ed and deleting the sentence “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sentence prescrib ed for a violation of the provisions of this section shall not be suspended in whole or in part, nor shall anyone convicted hereunder be placed on probation.” 2004 Va. Acts, c. 461, at 674. In the same bill, the General Assembly enacted Code § 18.2-12.1, which provides:
“ Mandatory minimum ” wherever it appears in this Code means, for purposes of imposing punishment upon a person convicted of a crime, that the cour t shall impose the entire term of confinement, the full amount of the fine and the complete requirement of community service prescribed by law. The court- 12 - shall not suspend in full or in part any punishment described as mandatory minimum punishment. Id. It is clear, therefore, that, while th e 2004 amendment removed the “Notwithstanding any other provision of law” clau se from Code § 18.2-53.1, the amended statute retained, under the definition of “mandatory minimum” in Code § 18.2-12.1, its prohibition against suspending any part of the mandatory sentence impose d for a use of a firearm conviction. In contending the 2004 amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1 abrogated this Court’s decision in Green , Bullock relies exclusivel y on our judgment in Green that the phrase “Notwithstanding any other provision of law” indicated the sentencing provisions of Code § 18.2-53.1 were intended to take precedence over the sentencing provisions of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) and on the General Assembly’s deletion of that phrase when it amended Code § 18.2-53.1 in 2004. The removal of that phrase, Bullock argues, clearl y reflected the General Assembly’s intent to supersede Green and allow the courts to apply th e sentencing provi sions of Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii) to suspend any part, if not all, of a juvenile offender’s mandatory minimum sentence for a use of a firearm conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1. Although seemingly sound at first glance, Bu llock’s argument ultimately fails under closer scrutiny. For one thing, Bullock’s exclusive reliance on the removal of the “Notwithstanding any other provision of law” clause from Code § 18.2-53.1 to support his argument that the 2004 amendment abrogated our decision in Greenignores the fact that we based our decision in Green on two separate, independent gr ounds, only one of which involved the “Notwithstanding any other pr ovision of law” clause. Ind eed, after addressing the meaning of the “Notwithstanding any other provision of law” clause in Code § 18.2-53.1, we proceeded in Green to address the application of our rationale in Lafleurregarding the st atute’s underlying purpose. Green , 28 Va. App. at 570, 507 S.E.2d at 629. Noting that, unlike Code § 16.1-272(A)(1), Code § 18.2-53.1 contained “manda tory language” and that “the purpose of- 13 - Code § 18.2-53.1 was ‘“to deter violent criminal conduct rather than to reform the most dangerous class of criminals,”’” we held that “[ t]o apply the juvenile se ntencing provisions [in Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)] in place of the ma ndatory sentence in Code § 18.2-53.1 ‘would substitute a discretionary penalty for an infl exible one’” in subvers ion of “the General Assembly’s clear mandate” and thwart the st atute’s purpose, which we could not do. Id. (quoting Lafleur , 6 Va. App. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Ansell , 219 Va. at 763, 250 S.E.2d at 763)). As it was unrelated to the “Not withstanding any other pr ovision of law” clause in Code § 18.2-53.1, this rationale provided a sepa rate, independent basis for our decision in Green

. Because we had a separate, independent basis for our decision in Green that was undisturbed by the 2004 amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1, we cannot say the 2004 amendment reflects an intent by the General Assemb ly to countermand our decision in Green . See Weathers v. Commonwealth , 262 Va. 803, 805, 553 S.E.2d 729, 730 (2001) (“When the General Assembly acts in an area in which one of its appellate courts already has spoken, it is presumed to know the law as the court has stated it and to acquies ce therein, and if the legislature intends to countermand such appellate decision it must do so explicitly.”) Indeed, while the 2004 amendment to Code 18.2-53.1 removed the “Notwithst anding any other provi sion of law” clause from the statute, it did not add any provision to the statute explicitly allowing the courts to apply Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii) or any other statute to suspend part, if not all, of a mandatory minimum sentence imposed under Code § 18.2-53.1. To the contrary, when read in conjunction with Code § 18.2-12.1, Code § 18.2-53.1 still provides that the trial court “shall impose the entire term of confinement” required by the statute for a firearm conviction and that the court “shall not suspend in full or in part any” of that term of confinement. Plainly, the aforementioned purpose ascribed to Code § 18.2-53.1 in Ansell , Lafleur , and Green —“to deter violent criminal conduct- 14 - rather than to reform the most dangerous cl ass of criminals”—remains unchanged, despite the 2004 amendment. To read the amended statute as Bullock urges would undermine that purpose. We conclude, therefore, th at, notwithstanding the 2004 am endment to Code § 18.2-53.1, our decision in Green remains valid and precludes the courts from applying Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii) to suspend any part of a mandatory minimum sentence imposed under Code § 18.2-53.1. The legislative background of the 2004 amen dment to Code § 18.2-53.1 further buttresses this conclusion. While it is true that, “in th e field of statutory cons truction, a presumption normally arises that a change in law was in tended when new provision s are added to prior legislation by an amendatory act,” Boyd v. Commonwealth , 216 Va. 16, 20, 215 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1975) (per curiam), no such pres umption arises where “there is clear indication that the General Assembly intended that the legislation declar e or explain existing la w,” Chappell v. Perkins , 266 Va. 413, 420, 587 S.E.2d 584, 587-88 (2003) (citing Boyd , 216 Va. at 20, 215 S.E.2d at 918). Here, the legislative background of the 2004 amendment of Code § 18.2-53.1 clearly demonstrates that the amendment to Code § 18.2-53.1 was not a “change[] of substance, which add[ed] rights to, or withdr[e]w existing rights fr om, an original act,” but rather a “change[] of form, which merely interpreted” the existing law. Boyd , 216 Va. at 20, 215 S.E.2d at 918. As previously mentioned, the General A ssembly amended Code § 18.2-53.1 and enacted Code § 18.2-12.1 in House Bill 1059. See 2004 Va. Acts, c. 461, at 674. In the same bill, the General Assembly amended twenty-five other exis ting statutes involving mandatory penalties. See id. at 673-90. All but one of the statutes am ended by the General Assembly in House Bill 1059 were altered to include the specific phrase “mandatory minimum,” or to exclude language made redundant by the inclusion of the definiti on of that phrase in Code § 18.2-12.1, or, like Code § 18.2-53.1, to do both. See id. ; Code §§ 4.1-305; 18.2-36.1; 18.2-51.1; 18.2-57; 18.2-121;- 15 - 18.2-154; 18.2-248; 18.2-248.01; 18.2-248.1; 18.2-248.5; 18.2-255; 18.2-255.2; 18.2-270; 18.2-308.1; 18.2-308.2; 18.2-308.2:2; 18.2-308.4; 19.2-120; 30-19.1:4; 46.2-301; 46.2-341.28; 46.2-357; 46.2-391; 53.1-203. The remaining stat ute was amended, for apparent stylistic purposes, by rearranging the passa ge therein containing the phrase “mandatory minimum.” See 2004 Va. Acts, c. 461, at 689; Code § 53.1-116. According to the legislative summary accompanying House Bill 1059, the amendments set forth in House Bill 1059 were enacted in re sponse to recommendations by the Virginia State Crime Commission based on its study of Title 18.2. See House Bill 1059, Mandatory minimum punishment; definition (2004), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/ 041/lis.htm. The Crime Commission recommended “amendments throughout the Virginia Code to use consistent language when describing mandatory minimum crim inal sentences.” Report of the Virginia State Crime Commission to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia, The Reorganization and Restructuring of Title 18.2 , House Document 15, 5 (2004), available at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By +Year/HD152004/$file/HD15_2004.pdf. To that end, the Commission suggested that a “definition of mandatory minimum punishment [be] added to the Code and language in various sections thro ughout the Code [be] conformed” with that definition. Id. It is clear, therefore, that the underlying purpose of the am endments set forth in House Bill 1059 was not to make substantive changes to the existing Code sections that required or referred to mandatory penalties, bu t to make the language used in those sections consistent with the new statutory definition of “mandatory mini mum” set forth in Code § 18.2-12.1 and to make other minor editorial corrections where necessary. The changes in each of the twenty-five other statutes amended in House Bill 1059 are consistent with this view. Plainly, then, the General Assembly did not intend, in enacting House Bill 1059, to substantively change the existing scope- 16 - of Code § 18.2-53.1 to permit suspension under Code § 16.1-272(A)(1)( iii) of the mandatory sentences required by Code § 18.2-53.1. Rather, it intended merely to make the terms of Code § 18.2-53.1 conform with those of Code § 18.2-1 2.1. Thus, the General Assembly added the phrase “mandatory minimum” to describe the te rms of imprisonment to be imposed under Code § 18.2-53.1 and deleted those terms that became su rplusage with Code § 18.2-12.1’s addition to the Code. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in ruling it lacked the discretion to suspend Bullock’s sentences on his firearm convictions under C ode § 16.1-272(A)(1)(iii). 2. Consecutive or Concurrent Sentences Bullock contends that, because Code § 18.2-53.1 does not specifically require that mandatory sentences on multiple use of a firearm convictions run consecutively with each other , the trial court erred in concluding it lacked the di scretion to allow Bullock to serve his three- and five-year sentences for his use of a firear m convictions concurrently. We disagree. Code § 18.2-53.1 requires the trial court to sentence a person convicted of using a firearm in the commission of a felony “to a mandatory mini mum term of imprisonment of three years for a first conviction, and to a manda tory minimum term of five y ears for a second or subsequent conviction.” As previously mentioned, the purp ose of Code § 18.2-53.1 is “to deter violent criminal conduct by impo sing a mandatory penalty,” not to reform or rehabilitate “‘the most dangerous class of criminals.’” Lafleur , 6 Va. App. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Ansell , 219 Va. at 763, 250 S.E.2d at 763). Read in conjunction with Code § 18.2-12.1, Code § 18.2-53.1 expressly requires the court to “impose the entire term of confinement” and provides that “[t]he court shall not suspend [the senten ce] in full or in part.” We c onstrue this language as meaning that the trial court may not set the “mandato ry minimum” sentences imposed for multiple convictions under Code § 18.2-53.1 to run concurrently with each other. To construe the statute- 17 - as Bullock urges would require us to apply “‘an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute’ that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein” and thwart the statute’s purpose, which we may not do. Armstrong , 263 Va. at 581, 562 S. E.2d at 144 (quoting Ansell , 219 Va. at 761, 250 S.E.2d at 761); see also Lafleur , 6 Va. App. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 713. We hold, therefore, that the tr ial court did not err in ruli ng that Bullock’s “mandatory minimum” sentences on his firearm convicti ons “must run consecutive[ly]” under Code § 18.2-53.1. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and Bullock’s sentences. Affirmed.