RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 18a0070p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

JULIE HAUTZENROEDER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio Attorney General, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 17-3395 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. 

No. 1:16-cv-00443—Michael R. Barrett, District Judge. 

Argued: January 24, 2018 

Decided and Filed: April 11, 2018 

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SILER and COOK, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Wendy R. Calaway, THE LAW OFFICE OF WENDY R. CALAWAY, CO., 

L.P.A., Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. M. Scott Criss, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wendy R. Calaway, THE LAW 

OFFICE OF WENDY R. CALAWAY, CO., L.P.A., Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephanie 

L. Watson, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

COOK, Circuit Judge. Due to her conviction for sexual battery, Julie Hautzenroeder 

must forever comply with Ohio’s sex offender registration and notification laws. After her 

release from prison and community control, Hautzenroeder filed a habeas petition under 28 

>
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U.S.C. § 2254 challenging her conviction with its attendant ongoing reporting burden. The 

district court dismissed the petition, deciding that it lacked jurisdiction under § 2254 because 

Hautzenroeder was no longer “in custody.” Hautzenroeder timely appealed, and we AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual 

battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, Hautzenroeder 

benefitted from the trial court’s suspending most of her two-year prison sentence and discharging 

her early from community control. But no court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorilymandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with its associated lifetime reporting 

requirements. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). 

Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from 

insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. Ohio moved to dismiss, arguing that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction over the petition because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of 

incarceration and community control expired—in other words, when she was no longer “in 

custody.” Agreeing with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court 

dismissed her petition for want of jurisdiction. That court’s later grant of a certificate of 

appealability as to “whether petitioner is in custody for purposes of habeas relief and whether the 

Court properly granted respondent’s motion to dismiss” occasions this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

“We apply de novo review to questions of subject matter jurisdiction.” Steverson v. 

Summers, 258 F.3d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 2001). As the party opposing dismissal, Hautzenroeder 

bears the burden of establishing the existence of jurisdiction. Brott v. United States, 858 F.3d 

425, 428 (6th Cir. 2017). 

Federal courts may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 2254(a) (emphases added). This language is jurisdictional: if a petitioner is not “in custody” 

when she files her petition, courts may not consider it. Steverson, 258 F.3d at 522. 

The Supreme Court holds that a petitioner is “in custody” when she is subject to 

conditions that “significantly restrain [her] liberty to do those things which in this country free 

men are entitled to do.” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); see also Hensley v. 

Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (“The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is 

designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual 

liberty.”). Comparing herself to a parolee, Hautzenroeder maintains that the continuous burdens 

and restrictions of her Tier III classification similarly circumscribe her liberties, rendering her “in 

custody” under § 2254. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 242 (detailing terms of petitioner’s parole). 

Yet not all consequences that flow from a criminal conviction significantly curb one’s 

liberty. “[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral 

consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ 

for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per 

curiam) (emphasis added). Hautzenroeder is no longer in custody, the State’s argument goes, 

because her obligations are “collateral consequences” of her conviction, not “severe restraints on 

liberty.” See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968) (giving examples of collateral 

consequences, including losing the right to vote, to serve as a juror, or to engage in certain 

businesses). 

In Leslie v. Randle, we decided that a habeas petitioner’s obligations under Ohio’s sex 

offender registration law were “more analogous to collateral consequences such as the loss of the 

right to vote than to severe restraints on freedom of movement such as parole.” 296 F.3d 518, 

522–23 (6th Cir. 2002). But Leslie concerned Ohio’s pre-2007 sex offender registration scheme. 

That year, Ohio revamped its law to align with the federal Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”). See State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 759 (Ohio 2010). To 

prevail, therefore, Hautzenroeder must show that the new law’s requirements so materially differ 

from the old regime’s as to warrant a different result. She argues that several features of Ohio’s 

SORNA meet this test. We are unpersuaded. 
No. 17-3395 Hautzenroeder v. DeWine Page 4

A. Obligation to Provide and Update Information 

First, Hautzenroeder argues that the enhanced reporting requirements of the new law 

materially distinguish her case from Leslie. The State concedes that, as compared to its old 

registration law, Ohio’s SORNA requires offenders to report more information to more officials. 

See Leslie, 296 F.3d at 521 (discussing Ohio’s former registration requirements); compare Ohio 

Rev. Code §§ 2950.04, 2950.06, with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2950.04, 2950.06 (LexisNexis 

2001). She characterizes these requirements as “a unique encumbrance, which chills registrants’ 

freedom of movement.” 

In reality, Hautzenroeder’s obligations under Ohio’s SORNA differ from those under 

Ohio’s previous regime only in degree, not in kind. Her “ability to move to a different 

community or residence is . . . not conditioned on approval by a government official.” Leslie, 

296 F.3d at 522. She need not “remain employed, nor is [she] prohibited from engaging in any 

legal activities.” Id.; see also Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (making the 

same point with respect to Virginia and Texas registration laws). In other words, 

Hautzenroeder’s freedom of movement is unconstrained, her registration and reporting 

obligations notwithstanding. 

Her circumstances are also readily distinguishable from the facts of Jones and Hensley, 

where the Supreme Court found that the petitioners were “in custody” because the government 

exercised direct control over their movements. The Jones petitioner was a parolee; the terms of 

his parole confined him to “a particular community, house, and job.” 371 U.S. at 242. He could 

not drive a car without authorization, and he was to “keep away from undesirable places.” Id. 

The Hensley petitioner, a man released on his own recognizance, was “in custody” because he 

could not “come and go as he please[d]. His freedom of movement rest[ed] in the hands of state 

judicial officers, who [could] demand his presence at any time and without a moment’s notice.” 

411 U.S. at 345, 351. Hautzenroeder suffers no such burdens. 

Though registration obligations present a serious nuisance, as the First Circuit put it, 

“even grievous collateral consequences stemming directly from a conviction cannot, without 

more, transform the absence of custody into the presence of custody.” Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 
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F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the loss of a medical license did not render a sex 

offender who had completed his sentence “in custody”). Other courts likewise hold that personal 

registration requirements are not enough to render a sex offender “in custody.” See, e.g., Dickey 

v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir. 2016) (Oklahoma law); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. 

of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1072–74 (10th Cir. 2014) (Colorado law); Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337–38 

(Virginia and Texas laws); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (California’s 

pre-SORNA registration law). No court of appeals has held otherwise, and Hautzenroeder has 

given us no reason to diverge from this unanimous body of precedent. 

B. Dissemination of Information to the Public 

Ohio’s SORNA requires the county sheriff to inform the offender’s neighbors, area 

school officials, and the local municipal police chief, among others, of the offender’s presence in 

the community. See generally Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.11(A)–(B). School officials may likewise 

inform their employees, who must report if they see the offender near the school. See generally 

Ohio Admin. Code 109:5-4-04. Ohio law also requires that sex offender information (such as 

the offender’s name, physical characteristics, associated addresses, vehicle information, and 

criminal history details) be included in an online database that members of the public can use to 

search for sex offenders in their area. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2950.081, 2950.13(A)(11). 

Hautzenroeder contends that the dissemination of such information transforms her 

conviction into a scarlet letter, encroaching on her liberty interests. She claims that widespread 

knowledge of her status may hinder her efforts to obtain employment or participate in ordinary 

social activities, impair her parenting abilities, and subject her to vigilantism and harassment. 

But Hautzenroeder fails to show how Ohio’s current publicization scheme materially 

differs from the Ohio regime that the Leslie court found non-custodial. On this score, as the 

State observes, there are only two differences between Ohio’s old law and the version we review 

today. First, today’s law requires notifying a broader audience when a sex offender is in a 

community. Compare id. § 2950.11, with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.11 (LexisNexis 2001). 

Second, the current law mandates more extensive dissemination of information about offenders 
No. 17-3395 Hautzenroeder v. DeWine Page 6

via the internet. Compare Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2950.081, 2950.13(A)(11), with Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. § 2950.081 (LexisNexis 2001).

These differences are insufficient to render Hautzenroeder in custody. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Smith v. Doe:

Our system does not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a 

legitimate governmental objective as punishment. . . . It must be acknowledged 

that notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the 

humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the publicity. And the 

geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could have been 

designed in colonial times. These facts do not render Internet notification 

punitive. The purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the 

public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Widespread public access 

is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a 

collateral consequence of a valid regulation. 

538 U.S. 84, 98–99, 105–06 (2003) (emphasis added) (holding Alaska’s registration scheme to 

be non-punitive for retroactive application purposes); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 

538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) (“mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the 

deprivation of a liberty interest” (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976))). 

Hautzenroeder has presented nothing to show that Ohio’s publicization rules are meant to 

humiliate offenders rather than protect the public. Neither the availability of this information on 

the internet nor the expanded community notification provisions place Hautzenroeder “in 

custody.” 

C. Bar on Establishing a Residence in Certain Areas 

Ohio law also forbids sex offenders from “establish[ing] a residence or occupy[ing] 

residential premises within one thousand feet of any school premises or preschool or child daycare center premises.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.034(A). Violations are not criminal; instead, the 

State grants neighbors and local officials standing to sue the offender for injunctive relief (i.e., to 

get a court order compelling the offender to vacate the residence). Id. § 2950.034(B). 

Hautzenroeder portrays this as a particularly burdensome provision that “restrict[s] her 

habitation to certain segments of society.” Not so. Many states impose similar restrictions, 
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which may be more severe than Ohio’s. In Oklahoma, for example, sex offenders may not live, 

either temporarily or permanently, within 2,000 feet of any “school . . . , educational institution, 

property or campsite used by an organization whose primary purpose is working with children, a 

playground or park . . . , or a licensed child care center.” Dickey, 664 F. App’x at 692 (quoting 

Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(A)) (alterations in original). A habeas petitioner alleged that this 

restriction, together with his other obligations under Oklahoma’s sex offender registration 

scheme, rendered him “in custody.” Id. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the scheme was 

“restrictive,” but nevertheless decided that the law’s requirements were “collateral 

consequences . . . and not a continuation of punishment.” Id. at 693–94. 

Hautzenroeder has not demonstrated that Ohio’s residency restrictions amount to 

governmental control over her movements. Although she may not be able to make her home in 

some parts of some neighborhoods, there is no reason to believe that the vast majority of real 

estate is not open to her. Put another way, she has not shown that the law operates to confine her 

to “a particular community[] [or] house.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. And so the residency 

restrictions remain consequences collateral to her conviction. 

D. Fear of Consequences of Deviation 

Should Hautzenroeder fail to register or provide certain information, she would be guilty 

of a third degree felony that carries potential prison time. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2950.99(A)(1). 

Hautzenroeder characterizes her possible criminal liability as a sword of Damocles causing her, 

like the Jones petitioner, to “live in constant fear that a single deviation, however slight, might be 

enough to result in [her] being returned to prison.” 371 U.S. at 242. 

But if Hautzenroeder were to violate Ohio’s SORNA requirements, any repercussions 

would stem not from her original conviction but from a new, separate criminal proceeding. On 

this point we can differentiate Hautzenroeder from a parolee who may face reimprisonment 

stemming from her original conviction. The Supreme Court has observed that this distinction is 

vital. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492–93 (“When the second sentence is imposed, it is pursuant to 

the second conviction that the petitioner is incarcerated and is therefore ‘in custody.’”); see also 

Thomas v. Morgan, 109 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (“[A] petitioner not in physical 
No. 17-3395 Hautzenroeder v. DeWine Page 8

custody must be subject to some sort of supervisory control along with the imminent possibility 

of incarceration without a formal trial and criminal conviction.”). 

In fact, criminal sanction for non-compliance with the registration regime is nothing new 

in Ohio: the State’s former registration scheme likewise criminalized non-compliance. See State 

v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ohio 1998). Still, we held that the old law did not render a 

convicted sex offender “in custody.” Leslie, 296 F.3d at 521, 523. Ohio’s SORNA is not 

meaningfully different in this regard. 

E. Ohio’s SORNA’s Punitive Nature 

Hautzenroeder emphasizes the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding that the State’s SORNA, 

unlike its predecessor statute, is “punitive,” barring its retroactive application. State v. Williams, 

952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112–13 (Ohio 2011); see also Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 581 (holding former sex 

offender registration scheme “remedial, not punitive”). She also cites this court’s recent decision 

in Does #1–5 v. Snyder, where we held that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution 

prohibits the retroactive application of Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act to persons 

convicted before that Act’s passage. 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016). It would be 

incongruous for a law to be considered “punitive” in the ex post facto context, she argues, yet 

fail to render a petitioner “in custody” for habeas purposes. Hautzenroeder also highlights 

Leslie’s citing the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding that Ohio’s old law was “remedial, not 

punitive” as “additional support” for our determination that the petitioner was not in custody. 

See Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522–23; Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 581; see also Calhoun, 745 F.3d at 1074 

(noting that “the Colorado sex-offender registration requirements are remedial, not punitive,” as 

support for holding that a Colorado offender was not “in custody”). 

The State aptly observes, however, that the two issues pose different legal questions. Ex 

post facto analysis asks whether a law imposes a punishment. See Does #1–5, 834 F.3d at 700–

01 (describing test). The habeas custody inquiry asks whether the petitioner is subject to a 

“severe restraint[] on individual liberty.” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351. Whether a registration 

scheme is punitive for ex post facto purposes leaves unanswered the “in custody” question. See 

Dickey v. Patton, No. CIV-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015) 
No. 17-3395 Hautzenroeder v. DeWine Page 9

(magistrate’s report and recommendation) (deciding that petitioner was not “in custody” despite 

the fact that the Oklahoma Sex Offender Registration Act was punitive for ex post facto 

purposes), adopted in full, No. CIV-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8494009, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 

2015), aff’d sub nom. Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Leslie, 

296 F.3d at 523 (Clay, J., concurring) (“[T]he holding in this case is limited to the habeas context 

and does not foreclose a plaintiff from litigating constitutional claims pertaining to a sex offender 

registration statute in a non-habeas proceeding.”). 

So, put simply, Hautzenroeder’s appeal does not hinge on the punitive nature of this 

statute. We are concerned only with whether her statutorily mandated obligations are custodial. 

And as we have explained, they are not. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Hautzenroeder’s habeas petition for 

want of jurisdiction.