NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 08a0718n.06 Filed: Nove mber 20, 2008 Nos. 06-6070/07-5335 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. AM B RO CI A O RO Z CO -T ORRES , De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt, and UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. PETE ARCI BA R ROCHA, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COUR T FO R THE M I DD L E DI STRI CT OF TENNESSEE

B e fo re : G I L MA

N, SUT TO N, and

KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s.
KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e . Am

br oc ia Or ozc o- To rr e s a

pp e a ls h is s e nte nc e fo llo wi nghis g uilty plea to a dr

ug -conspira cy

char g e. Pete Ar cibar

Rocha a ppeals both hi s co n v i ct i on and
se nte nc e ari sin g ou t of

the same c on sp ir a c y . We a ff ir m. I. A.Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-2- Orozco-Tor

res a nd Rocha e ach pla

y ed a r ole in a coc aine- distribution conspiracy that started in the border

town of B rownsville, Texas, and ended in N ashville, Tenne ssee. The conspirac y beg an in M arc h 2 00 5, wh e n th e Na sh vil le po lice an d th e Un ite d St a te s I mmi g ra tio n a nd Cus tom s Enforc ement Ag ency

(I CE) used a c onfidential informa nt to arra ng e a pur chase of coc aine f rom two men i n N a s h v il le

. T h o s e tw o me nth e nc o n ta c te d thr e e o th e r

p e r s o n s in

T e xa s

— M ar

k Anthony Gar cia, Rita Mar

tinez, and Maria Villar eal—to ar rang e a de livery

of three kilogr ams of coca ine from Br ownsville to Nashville. Roc ha ’s ro le wa s to tr ans po rt the c oc a ine

. He wo rk e d a s a bu s dr ive r fo r Ad a me B us L ine s,
a pass e ng e r- bu s c omp any

wi th r e g ula

r r ou te s f ro m Me xico to v ari ou s c iti e s in the Un ite d St a te s. Gar cia met Rocha at t he B rownsville bus station, and g ave him a ba ckpac k containing three kil og ra ms of c oc a ine

. Roc ha pla c e d the ba g in the dr ive r’ s lug g a g e are a on the fr on t se a t of the bu s. Rocha then dr ove the bus to Houston, with Gar cia onboa rd as a passeng er. I n Houston, Rocha and G arc ia met M artinez and Villare al, and the f our of them boa

rded a n Adame bus f

or N a s h v il le

. Ro c h a d id n o t dr iv e o n th is tr ip , b u t a g a in s to r e d th e b a c k p a c k in the driver’ s lugg ag e ar ea. U

pon rea ching Nashville, they chec ked into a motel. There, R ocha le arne d that the final sale of the coca ine would not be completed until seve ral da y s later, so he left Na shville. Roc ha wa s su

pp os e d to be pa id $2 ,0 00 fo r his ro le in tr ans po rt ing the c oc a ine , b ut G arc ia pa id h im only $500 at that time beca

use the de al had not y et bee n completed. Orozco-Tor

res e ntere d the picture a fe w day s later. He had arrived in Nashville fr om Mex ico one day befor e the c ocaine sale wa s to be co m p l eted. He lear ned of the deal f

rom one of the Na sh vil le purc ha se rs —h is br oth e r- in- law— a t wh os e a pa rtme nt he wa s st ay ing . O ro zco -T or re s a lsoNos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-3- met the ot her Nashville purcha ser that same day , and tol d him that he would like to participate in the sale be cause his brother-in- law “ha d never done this kind of d ea l [ ] an d he didn’t know about . . . these thing s.” The ne x t day , the conf

iden t i al i n fo rm ant went to the apartment to complete the sale. The informant wa s wea

ring a tra nsmitt ing de vice, whic h was monitored by I CE ag ents. I n a conve rsation overhe ard by

the ag ents, Orozco-Tor

res ne g otiated with the informant a bout how the tra nsfer

of
coca ine fo r ca sh would occur . Orozco-Tor res then or dere d two other men to re trieve the coca ine from the motel at which Gar cia, Martinez, and Villarea l were staying. Surve illance a g ents observe d the men g o to the motel and pick up Ga rcia , who was c arr

y ing a black ba ckpac k. The men r eturne d t o t h e ap ar t m en t , an d

s h o we d t h e i n fo rm an tt h re e k i l o gra m s o f c o ca i n e i nt h e b ag. Police then enter ed the a partment a

nd arr ested a ll of the conspirators prese nt, including O r o z c o - T o r

r e s . M art i n e z an d V i l l ar e a l w e r e ar r e s t e d a tt h e m o t e l , an d

t h e i r r o o m w a s s e ar c h e d

. In their purse s, ag ents found a busine ss car d with Rocha’s na me on it, and two picture s of Rocha, one of him in f ro nt o f a n A dame bu s. I CE ag ents lear

ned that Rocha would be driving a bus to Nashville a fe w wee ks later. Tw o ag ents met him at the bus stat i o n and tol d him that his name had come up in an investig ation of a
coca ine-tra ffickinginvestigation. Rocha ag ree d to go with the ag ents to the ir office for an intervie w. There , he made inculpatory statements—telling the ag ents that he he lped transpor t the coca ine, and that he wa s paid for his role in doing so. Rocha wa s not arre sted immediately following his interview, but was dr iven back to the bus statio n b y the a g e nts . Roc ha wa s ar

re ste d sev e ra l day s lat e r an d ch a rg e d with c on sp ir a c y

to d istri bu teNos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-4- and possession with intent to dist ribute cocaine, a nd aiding and abe tting the possession with intent to distribute cocaine

. B. 1. Pr ior to h is tri a l, R oc ha

mov e d to su

pp re ss t he inc ulp a tor

y state me nts that he ma de to the I CE ag ents. At a hear ing on his suppression motion, R ocha te stified that the ag ents had told him at the bus station that “if Iwas willing to cooper ate with them . . . I won’t be a

rre sted.” He testified that he later signe d a Miranda waiver of rig hts form, but that it was his understanding that he wa s signing that form as a

“tra de” f or not g etting a

rre sted. He f

urther te stified that he aske d the ag ents at the
s tati o n if h e n e e d e d an a tt o r n e y , an d th e y to ld h im th a t if h e w a s w il li n g to c o o p e r a te , “ [n]o, y ou don’t nee d one.” Th e a g e nts dis pu te d b oth

a sse rt ion s. Ea c h te sti fi e d th a t th e y ha d not m a de any pr omi se s to Rocha that he would not be ar rested or prosec uted. They also testified that Rocha ha d never asked for a n attorney , and, indee d, had re ad and sig ned a Miranda waiver of rig hts f orm, indicating t hat he un de rs too d his rig hts and wa s will ing to ta lk to the a g e nts wi tho ut an a tto rn e y pr e se nt. I t is a lso undisputed that Rocha was never handcuf fed, that the ag ents told Rocha he was not under a rre st at that time, and that Rocha r ode in the fr ont seat of the a g ents’ ca r to and fr om the police station. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d Roc ha ’s mot ion to s up pr e ss t

he inc ulp a tor

y state me nts , f

ind inghis testimony not cre dible. Specifica lly , with r espec t to Rocha’s te stimony reg ardingthe ag ents’ alleg ed promise not to arre st him i f he c ooperated and sig ned the wa iver of r ights for m, the court found:Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-5- Iam finding that to not be cre dible and not s upported by the facts for the f ollowing r e a s o n s . F i r s to f

a l l , t h e f o r m d o e s n ’ ts ay t h a t
. T h e a g e n t s d i dn ’ tt e s t i f y a c c o r d i n g l y, so there is a conflict in the testimony there , and I

am finding that Mr. Rocha’ s te sti mony in that re g ard is not c re dib le . I t is jus t no t an o bje c tiv e ba sis fo r a pr omi se of no t be ingarr e ste d f

or sig nin g a fo rm . The c ourt also found that a nother a spect of R o ch a’ s testimony —that he had a sked for

a lawy er but wa s told he did not need one—w as “pa rticularly not cre dible in light of his sig ning a nd initialing the wa iver of r ights form.” I t was undisput ed, the court observe d, that Rocha ha d signe d
a wa iver of r ights for

m and under stood that he could have had a lawy er if he ha d wanted one . The court found that Ro ch a’ s t est imony contra dicted the testimony of both of the a g ents, and wa s not
cre dible. Roc ha ’s c a se pr oceeded to a jur y tr ia l, f oll ow ingwh ic h h e wa s c on vic te d o f b oth c ha rg e s. Roc ha ’s pr e se nte nc e re po rt c a lc ulated his Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s r ang e to b e 78 to 9 7 mo nth s’ incar cer ation. Rocha object ed to the repor t’s failure to include a f

our-leve l offense reduc tion for being a “minimal par

ticipant” in the drugconspi ra cy u n d er U.S.S .G. § 3B 1.2. The g overnme nt objected to the r eport’s f

ailure to include a two-le vel enha nceme nt for obstruction of justice unde r U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district cour

t overrule d Rocha’s obje ction to the report’s failure to include a f our-leve l minimal-participant re duction, but g rante d him a two-level reduc tion as a “minor participant” in the conspirac y . The court g rante d the g overnme nt’s reque st for a two- level enha nceme nt for obstruction of justice. Noting that it had “pre viously found that Mr. Rocha

was not cre dible[,] ” the cour t found that his testimony

“wa s intentionally

false, a nd that rises to the leve l of obstruction of justice.” T he district court then sente nced Roc ha to 78 months’ incar cer ation.Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-6- 2. For his part in neg otiating the dr ug transac tion, Orozco-Torr es plea ded g uilty to conspirac y to d istri bu te and

po sse ss wi th int e nt t o d istri bu te c oc a ine . H is p re se nte nc e re po rt c a lc ulate d h is Guidelines ra

ng e as 100 to 125 months’ inca rce ration. Orozco- Torre s objected to the repor t on
se ve ra l g ro un ds , in c lud ingits fa ilure to i nc lud e a mi ni ma l- ro le re du c tio n, its fa ilure to r e du c e his
c ri min a l hi sto ry

c a te g or y on the g ro un ds that it

a lle g e dly ov e rs ta te d h is pr op e ns ity to c omm it c ri me s, and its failure to gr ant a downw ard de parture on the g rounds that his incarc eration would have an

“ e xtra or din a ry

e ff e c t on innocent f

a mil y me mbe rs .” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ov e rr ule d a ll o f t

he se objections, and sente nced O rozco-Torr es to 100 months’ incarc eration. These a ppeals followe d. II. A. Rocha a ppeals both his conviction and his sentenc e. Rocha first argues that his conviction sh o u ld b e v a c a te d b e c a

u s e th e d is tr ic t c o u rt r e f

u s e d to s u

p p r e s s h is in c u lp a to r

y s tate me n ts. H e contends the state ments were not voluntary beca use his “will was . . . overborne by illusory p r o mi s e s ” b y

th e a g e n ts , to th e e f

f e c t th a t h e w o u ld n o t b e ar r e s te d if h e c o o p e r a te d

w it h th e m. We
re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s f or c le ar e rr or , a

nd its de te rm inatio n o f v olu nta ri ne ss de

novo . United States v. Mark s , 209 F.3d 577, 581 ( 6th Cir. 2000).

“ I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a c on fe ssi on

ha s bee n eli c ite d by me ans that are un c on sti tut ion a l, this court looks to the totalit y of t he circumstance s conce rning whether a def endant’ s will has been
o v erborne.” Un i ted States v. Mahan , 190 F.3d 416, 422 ( 6th Cir. 1999). “Police promises ofNos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-7- leniency . . . can be objectively

coer cive,” rende ring a conf essi on involuntary

. United States v. Johnson , 35 1 F .3 d 25 4, 26 1 (6 th Cir

. 20 03 ). B ut “ [a]n y state me nt g ive n fr e e ly and vo lu nt ari ly without any

compelling influence s is, of course , admissible in evidence .” Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). Rocha’s inc ulpatory

statements wer e f

r e e ly a n d v o lu nta r ily g iven. As an initial matter, Rocha does not argue that he w as in custody when he g ave the statements. To the c ontrary , he admits that he a g re e d to g o w iththe I CE a g e nts to the bure a u statio n, that the y tol d him he wa s no t un de r a rr e st, that he wa s neverhandcuf fed, a nd that he rode in the front seat of the ag ent’s ca r to and fr om the station. The “c ompulsion i n here nt in custodial surrounding s” wa s absent, ther efor e, and the prei n t e r r o g a t i o nw ar

n i n g s m an d a t e d

b y Miranda w e r e n o t r e qu ir ed. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 458. Mo re ov e r, Roc ha c on c e de s tha t the a g e nts re a d h im h is Miranda rig hts, and that he sig ned a w aiver

of-r ights for

m, indicating that he was w illing to answe r questions without a lawy er pr esent. Roc ha ’s argume nt, ins te a d, is that hi s “ wi ll w a s o ve rb or ne ” by the a g e nts ’ a lle g e d p ro mis e that he would not be arr ested if he ag ree d to c ooperate. But the district c ourt specif ically found the predic ate f

or this argument—that the ag ents made suc h a promise—to be incre dible. We ha ve no basis to hold that finding to be c lear err or. Unde r the totality of the c ircumstance s, theref ore, Rocha’s statem ents wer e “g iven fre ely and voluntarily

without any

compelling influence s,” and proper ly admissible ag ainst him at trial. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 478. B. 1.Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-8- Rocha a lso appea ls his sentence. H e ar g ues that the dist rict court err ed in imposing a twole ve l ob str

uc tio n- of -j us tic e e nh anc e me nt, and in fa ili ng to g ra

nt a fo ur -l e ve l “ min ima l pa

rt ic ipa nt” reduc tion. I n revie wing an enha ncement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, we re view the district cour t’s fac tual deter

minations for clea

r er ror, its “dete rmination that cer tain conduct c onstitut es obstruction of justice” de novo , an d its ap pli c a tio n of t he e nh anc e me nt de novo

. Un ite d S tat es v . B ag

ge tt , 342 F.3d 536, 540- 41 (6th Cir. 2003). Se c tio n § 3C1 .1 pr ov ide s f or a tw o- le ve l e nh anc e ment whe re a de fe nd ant “ wi llf

ull y obstructed or

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede , the administration of justice.” U .S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The notes to § 3C1.1 rec ite “committing, suborning , or attempting to suborn perjury” as examples of obstructing justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n. 4(b). A de fenda nt commits perjury

when, testify ing under oath, he “g ives false testimony conce rning a materia l matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony , rathe r than a s a re sult of confusion, mistake, or f aulty memory .” United States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1992). I n Du n nigan , the Supreme Court a cknowledg ed the “ conce rn that cour ts will enhance sentenc es as a

matter of c ourse whe never the ac cused takes the stand and is found g uilty .” Id. at 97. To protec t a g ainst this risk, the Court he ld that “if a de fenda nt objects to a sentenc e enha nceme nt resulting from her trial testimony , a district cour t must review the e vidence and make independe nt finding s nece ssary

to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or a n attempt to do the same, unde r the pe rjury definition.” Id. a t 95 . The Court re c og nize d tha t “[w]h e n doin g so , it is pref era ble .

. . to addre ss eac h element of the allege d perjury in a separate and cle ar f inding,” but “[t] he district cour

t’s deter mination that enhance m en t i s re q u i red is suff icient . . . if . . . the c ourtNos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-9- makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompa sses all of the fa ctual predic ates for

a finding of per

jury .” Id. We have a dded additional re quirements. F or a district c ourt to en hance a def endant’ s
sen te n c e u n d e r § 3 C1
. 1 , th e c o u rt mu s t: “ 1 ) id e n ti f y th o s e p arti c u la

r p o rti o n s o f

defe ndant’s testimony that it considers to be perjurious; and 2) either make a specific finding for e ach e lement of per jury or, at lea st, make a f

inding that e ncompasses a ll of the fac tual predic ates for a finding of perjury .” United States v. Lawrence , 3 08 F .3 d 6 23 , 6 32 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) . With res pect t o th e fi rs t require ment, howeve r, we “have never insisted on a rig id adher ence to its t erms,” an d “a district
c ourt ’s fi nd ing s w ill be a de qu a te if : 1) the re c or d is su ff

ic ie ntl y c le ar to ind ic a te wh ic h s ta te me nts the di strict court c onsidered pe rjurious; and 2) the district c ourt found that the state ments satisfied
eac h element of

perjury .” Id. He re , Ro c ha

te sti fi e d und e r o a th at a

su pp re ssi on he ari ngthat I CE a g e nts tol d h im that “ if Iwas willing to cooper ate with them

. . . Iwon’t be a rre sted.” He further

testified that he a sked the ag ents if he ne eded a

lawy er, and they told him, “[n] o, y ou don’t nee d one.” T he district cour t found

a t th e he ari ngthat “ tho se pie c e s of te sti mony by Mr
. Roc ha are n’ t c re dib le , pa rt ic ula rl y no t c re dib le in light of his sig n i n g an d initialing the wa iver of r ights for m.” At sentenc ing, the district court ref ere nced the se finding s, saying that “[o] n the o b s t ru cti on of justice enha nceme nt, the Court previously

found that Mr. Rocha

was not cr edible. In the opinion of the Co u rt his testimony was intentionally

false, a nd that rises t o the level of obstruction of justice, so I ’m g ranting that objection.” Rocha a rg ues that these f

indings were not specific e noug h under Dunnigan and Lawrence
. He c ites our dec ision in Un ite d S tat es v . S pe ar s , 49 F.3d 1136 ( 6th Cir. 1995), wher e we held thatNos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-10- a sente ncing judge ’s g ener al finding that a def endant’ s entire testimony was not cr edible wa s not sp e c if ic e no ug h to wa

rr ant a n o bs tr uc tio n o f j us tic e e nh anc e me nt. I n Rocha’s c ase, how ever , the “r ecor d is sufficiently clea r t o indicate whic h statements the district court found pe rjurious.” Lawrence , 308 F.3d at 632. The district c ourt specif ically found “not cre dible” two materia l a spects of Rocha’s testimony —that he asked f

or a la wy er a nd that the age n t s p ro m i s edh i m h e w o u l d n o tb e a rr es t ed

— an d t h e n r e f e r e n c edt h at fi n d i n g at s en t en ci n g. Thus, unlike Sp e ar

s , there is no ambig uity

in the rec ord her e re g ardingthe statements that the district
c ourt fo un d p e rj ur iou s. Those st atements also “satisfied eac h element of perjury .” Id. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt e xpre ssl y found that the c ited testimony was “ intentionally

false” —thus satisfy i n g t h e “w illful” element of pe rj ur y . Al tho ug h the c ourt

did no t a dd re ss t he “ ma te ri a lity ” of

the te sti mony , th a t e le me nt g e ne ra lly is a question of l aw in this setting. See United States v. Se ymour , 38 F.3d 261, 264 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (whe re a district court’s finding s “enc ompass all elements of pe rjury except materia lity , Dunnigan doe s n o t r e qu ir e a r e ma

n d b e c a u s e mate r ia li ty is a qu e s ti o n o f la w ” )

. A n y e r

r o r , a t an y r a te , was h ar ml e s s b e c a

u s e th e e le me n t i s p la in ly me t h e r e ; R o c h a ’ s p e r

ju r y f o r me d the ba sis for

his suppression motion. The district cour

t’s finding s theref

ore “ encompa ss[ ed] all of the fa ctual pre dicates f or a finding of per

jury ,” and thus satisfy

the rules se t forth in Dunnigan and Lawrence . The district cour t did no t e rr in i mpo sin g a

tw o- le ve l ob str

uc tio n o f j us tic e e nh anc e me nt. 2.Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-11- Roc ha fu rt he r ar g ue s tha t the dis tr ic t court e rr e d in deny ing him a fo ur -l e ve l r e du c tio n to his offe nse l evel as a “minim al participant” i n the conspira cy under U .S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) . The district court did, howe ver, g rant Rocha a two-le vel re duction as a “ minor participant” under § 3B 1.2(b). Se c tio n 3 B 1. 2 p ro vid e s: B a se d o n th e de fe nd ant’ s r ole in t he of fe ns e , d e c re a se the of

fe ns e le ve l a s f oll ow s: (a) I f the de fenda

nt was a minimal participant in any criminal a c tiv ity , d e c re a se by

4 le ve ls. (b) I f the de fenda

nt was a minor pa

rticipant in any

criminal a c tiv ity , d e c re a se by

2 le ve ls. I n c a se s f a lli ngbe tw e e n ( a ) a

nd (b ), de c re a se by

3 le ve ls. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Th e re du c tio n f

or a min ima l pa

rt ic ipa nt “ is i nte nd e d to c ov e r def e nd ants wh o a

re pla inl y among the least culpable of those involved in the conduc t of a g roup.” Id. cmt. n. 4. A re duction fo r a min or pa

rt ic ipa nt “a pp lie s to a de fe nd ant . . . wh o is le ss c ulp a ble tha n mo st o the r p art ic ipa

nts , but whose role c ould not be descr ibed as minimal.” Id. cmt. n. 5. The c ommentary t o t h e S entenc ing G uidelines ca utions that “[i ]t is intended that the downwar d adjustment for a minimal participant will be used infre quently .” Id. cmt. n. 4. “[T] he defe ndant’s lac k of knowledg e or understanding of the scope and structure of the enter prise and of the ac tiviti es of other s is indicative of a r ole as minimal participant.” Id. “This cour

t will n o t d i s t u rb the district court’s de termination of a de fenda nt’s role in the criminal ac tivity

unless it is clearly

err oneous.” United States v. W illiams , 9 40 F .2 d 1 76 , 1 80 (6 thNos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-12- Cir. 1991). The de fenda

nt bear s the burden of

provingby

a pre pondera

nce of the evidence that he
was a minimal participa

nt in the offense. United States v. Salas , 455 F.3d 637, 643 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Th e iss ue , th e re fo re , is wh e the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

c le arl y e rr e d in de te rm ini ngthat Ro cha fai le d to prove that he was a

minimal—rather than a

minor—participant in the of fense

. The dist rict court made no such error. Rocha’s role i n the cocaine- traff icking conspirac y

was to tr a n s p o rtt h e c o c a i n e f r o m B r o w n s v i l l e t o N a s h v i l l e . T h atw a s ane s s e n t i a l r o l e . H e u s e d his p o s i t i o nas a c o m m er ci al b u s dri v er t o s t o re t h e c o ca i n e du ri n g i t s t ra n s p o rt i nt h e d ri v er ’s l u ggage
are a , w h e r e it w a s le s s li k e ly to b e s e ar c h e d b y c u s to ms a g e n ts
. H e tr a v e le d w it h thr ee othe r
me mbe rs of

the c on sp ir a c y

—k no wi ngthe ir

ro le s— and

su c c e ssf ull y de liv e re d th e c oc a ine to Nashville. He was pa id $500 for his servic es. Rocha thus pla y ed a signific ant role in the conspirac y and knew the role of

others in it. That takes him beyond the scope of a m i nimal participant. The district court’s de termination that Rocha ha d not met his burden of provingthat he wa s a minimal pa rt ic ipa nt, the re fo re , w a s n ot c le arl y e rr on e ou s.

C. Orozco-Tor

res a ppeals only

his sentence

. L ike Rocha, he first argues that the district cour t
e rr e d in fa ili ngto g ra

nt h im a mit ig a tin g -r ole re du c tio n. Hi s a rgume nt f a ils a s w e ll. I n his plea ag ree ment, Orozco-Tor res sti pulated to the fa ct that he “ neg otiated with the informant over

how the tra

nsfer of coc aine f

or ca sh would occur ,” and the fac t that he “or dere d” two oth e r c o- c on sp ir a tor s “ to g e t th e c oc a ine and br ingit t o th e a

pa rtme nt. ” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ri g htl y relied on the se fac ts in finding that Orozco-Tor res wa s not a minimal or minor participant. Or ozcoTorre s was not “plainly

among the least c ulpable of those involved” in the conspi ra cy , U.S.S.G.Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-13- § 3 B 1. 2 c mt. n. 4, thu s p re c lud ing a re du c tio n a s a

min ima l pa

rt ic ipa nt. An d h e wa s n ot “ le ss culpable tha

n most other participa

nts,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5—g iven that he g ave or ders to at le a st t w o o f t h e m

—t h u s p r e c l u d i n g a r e d

u c t i o n a s a m i n o r o n e . T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt d i d no t e rr in denying the reque sted reduc tion. Orozco-Tor

res ne x t argues that the district cour t erre d in failing to gr ant a down wa rd depar ture unde r U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)( 1). That se ction provides that a downwar d depar ture may be g rante d “[i] f re liable information indicate s t h at t h e def endant’ s criminal history cate g ory substantially

over- repr esents the se riousness of the de fend a nt’ s c r im in a l history

or the likelihood that the def endant will commit other cr imes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)( 1 ). I n making this determination, the district court c an conside r the ty pes of pr ior convictions, the age of t he convictions, and signs of reha bilitation. United States v. Fletc her , 15 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 1994). We revie w the district court’s de termination only for c lear err or. Id. at 556. This argument is meritless. Orozco-Torr es has se ven prior convictions, including one s for dr ug po sse ssi on , pos se ssi on of a ha nd g un wh ile un de r the inf lue nc e , a nd po sse ssi on

wi th i nte nt t o distribute coca ine. He committed all these offenses betwee n 1999 and 2002—and indeed in the 26 months during that period when he was not in prison. I t understates matters to say that the district
c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o n th is i ssu e wa s n ot c le arl y e rr on e ou s. Orozco-Tor

res a lso argues that his family circ umstances “ war

rante d a downwa

rd depa rture.” He a sse rt s th a t hi s in c arc e ratio n w ill have a ne g a tiv e e ff e c t on hi s w if

e and c hil d, wh o r e ly

on him f o r s u p p o rt
. W e h a v e h e l d

t h a t“ [ e ] x t r a o r d i n ar

y an d s p e c i a l f a m i l y c i r c u m s t an c e s m ay j u s t i f y a downwar d depar

ture in exceptional ca ses.” United Sta t es v. Tocc o , 200 F.3d 401, 435 ( 6th Cir.Nos. 06-6070/07-5335

United States v. Orozc o-Torres; United States v. R ocha

-14- 20 00 ). B ut t

his c a se is no t e xce pti on a l; the c on du c t of c ri min a ls of te n ha s se ve re , h arm fu l e ff e c ts upon their families. The district court did not err on this iss ue. F ina lly , O ro zco -T or

re s c ha lle ng e s th e re a so na ble ne ss o f h is s e nte nc e . We re vie w h is sentenc e for

both p r o c e d u r a l a n d s u b s ta nti v e r e a s o n a

b le n e s s , “under

a def ere ntial abuse-of

-discre tion standard.” Gall v. United States , _ _U .S.

__ , 1 28 S.Ct . 5 86 , 591 (2 00 7)

. A se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly
un re a so na

ble if the dis tr ic t c ourt :
c omm it[s][a ] sig nif

ic ant pr oc e dura l er

ro r, su c h as fa ili ngto c a lc ulate (o r i mpr op e rl y c a lc ulatin g ) t

he Gu ide lin e s r ang e , tr e a tin g the Gu ide lin e s a s man dator y , f a ili ngto c on sid e r t he [18 U .S .C. ] § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s, se le c tin g a

se nte nc e ba se d o n c le arl y err oneous fa ct s , or fa iling to ade quately explain the chosen sentenc e–including an explanation for any

deviation from the G uidelines rang e. Id. at 597. I n r e v i e w i n g

t he su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss o f t

he se nte nc e , w e “ take int o a c c ount t he tot a lity of the c ircumstance s, including the extent of any varia nce f rom the Gu i d el i n es rang e.” Id. I f the sentenc e fe ll within t he Guidelines, w e apply a “r ebuttable pr esumption of su b s t an t ive
rea sonablene ss.” United States v. W ilms , 495 F.3d 277, 280- 81 (6th Cir. 2007). Orozco-Tor

res’ sentenc e was proce durally and substantively rea sonable. The district court

a c kn ow le dg e d th e a dv iso ry natur e of the Gu ide lin e s, c on sid e re d th e § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s, and

pr op e rl y calc ulated a G uidelines rang e of 100 to 125 months’ inca rce ration. The co u rt then sentenc ed Or ozc o- To rr e s at th e bo tto m of the Gu ide lin e s r ang e , 1 00 mon ths , w hic h it de te rm ine d in

its discretion to be r easona

ble under the totality

of the c ircumstance s. We ag ree . III
. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nts in b oth c a se s.