NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARY L. BECKNER, individually,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. RECONTRUST COMPANY,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 12

- 56945 D.C. No. 2:12

- cv - 03379

- GHK

FFM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. King, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 13, 2018 ** Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA , Circuit Judges. This matter has been stayed since February 2, 2015, pending issuance of the
mandate in Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A. , No. 10

- 56884, or further order of the court. We hereby lift the stay. Mary L. Beckner ap peals pro se from the district court’ s judgment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 26 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 12

- 56945

dism issing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and
state law claims

. We have jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo a dismissal under Fed eral R ule of Civ il P rocedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim , and we m ay affirm on any ground supported by the record. Kwan v.
SanMedica Int’l , 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm

. D ismissal of Beckner’s FDCPA claims was proper because the alleged
communication s were not attempt s to collect a “ debt ” as defined by the FDCPA

. See Ho v. Recon T

rust Co. , 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 201 7 ) (“[A]ctions taken to
facilitate a non

-

judicial foreclosure . . . are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); see also Dowers v. Nationsta r Mortg., LLC , 852 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity

. . . only through Section 1692 f (6),” and that “[a]s for the remaining FDCPA provisions, ‘debt collection’ refers only to the coll ection of a money debt”).
Dismissal of Beckner ’s FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) was proper because Beckner failed to allege facts sufficient to show that ReconTrust Company’s conduct was unfair or unconscionable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6); Ho , 858 F.3d at 57 2

- 7 3 ( determining that 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) protects a consumer3 12

- 56945

against abusive practices of a security enforcer); Dowers , 852 F.3d at 971 (discussing protections for borrowers under § 1692f(6)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on ReconTrust Company’s motion to dismiss without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);
C.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7

- 15 ; Carpi nteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa
Barbara , 344 F.3d 822, 832 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (“ T he district court was within its discretion to dispense with oral argument

. ” (citations omitted) ). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief

. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). Beckner’s request to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 16) is denied

. AFFIRMED.