J-S36045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC PARKER

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2444 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001426-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2023

Appellant, Eric Parker, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his bench trial convictions for endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”), 

possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), terroristic threats, simple assault, 

and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1 We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

In 2017[,] the minor complainant [J.J. (“Victim”)] was

residing with his mother Sharita Jones, his two sisters, and 

[Appellant].... Victim detailed the first two incidents 

involving Appellant that caused him to leave the home. On 

one occasion, he poured his sister’s juice in the wrong cup 

and Appellant threw him into a baby stroller and punched

him several times. The second incident occurred when 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(a), 907(a), 2706(a), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
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[Victim]’s mother gave him permission to take a hoagie to 

school for lunch, but Appellant came home that evening 

upset about it and stomped on [Victim] in his shoulder and 

torso area several times for eating the hoagie. [Victim] left 

the home in December of 2019 at age fourteen (14) to stay 

with other family members because he “felt unsafe” and 

“just wanted to get away from the place.” [N.T. Trial, 

10/23/20, at 19.]

[Victim’s] mother was at that time involved in a custody 

case over his brother.... In January 2020 [Victim] was 

approached by Appellant and his mother after school at the 

transportation center when they forced him to make a video 

stating he “felt safe in the home” and “the only reason why 

(he) did this was because ... (his) Play Station and iPhone 

(were taken).” [Id. at 30-32.] Appellant and [Victim’s]

mother provided the script for his videotaped statement and 

the voices of both adults can be heard in the actual video. 

Afterward Appellant and [Victim’s] mother took [Victim] to

reside with them. The video was shown to family who then 

believed [Victim] to be a liar. [Victim] subsequently posted 

a Facebook status indicating the video was untrue and his 

mother was “manipulating them ... (to) turn them against 

(him).”

* * *

[T]he third incident occurred when Appellant became upset 

over [Victim]’s Facebook post. When [Victim] had gone to 

bed, sleeping on the living room floor, Appellant came out 

of his bedroom yelling and shouting [and] then started 

stomping [on Victim’s] left side, head, and neck area. 

Appellant stomped [on Victim] 15-20 times and was wearing 

Nike boots that were dark grey with blue stripes. Then 

Appellant took a “thick glass ...alcohol bottle” and threw it, 

hitting the wall—just missing [Victim]’s head. The bottle 

didn’t break.

Appellant ordered fourteen-year-old [Victim] to leave the 

home that night, barely allowing him to dress and without a 

coat. [Victim] testified Appellant “told me if I go to my 

cousin’s house... he will kill me, and he’ll damn sure kill 

them.” Id. at 60-61. [Victim] left and went to his cousin’s

home anyway where his family took pictures of him, called 
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the police, and an ambulance. The photographs depicted 

[Victim]’s bruises from the incident. [Victim] was

transported to the hospital for treatment and then the Police 

Special Victims Unit.

* * *

The parties...stipulated to [Victim]’s certified medical 

records from St. Christopher’s Hospital. The medical 

documentation indicated [Victim] presented with the

following injuries: facial injury, bruising and swelling and 

two-centimeter linear contusion to right side of face; 

superficial abrasion to his right upper back; and contusion 

to right earlobe. 

[Victim]’s mother...testified [that] Appellant is her husband 

and she has five children. [Victim’s mother] testified [that]

DHS was involved in her home because of [Victim]’s 

behavioral issues. She discussed prior incidents of 

[Victim]’s disobedience but indicated [that] he was never 

physically disciplined by Appellant.... On the night of the 

incident, she recalled [that] Appellant was upset over the

Facebook post and [an altercation that had occurred at 

Victim’s cousin’s house when they went to pick Victim up].... 

[Victim’s mother] further testified that she felt it was

appropriate to use “a slight kick to wake a child up...like if 

you see a homeless person or something, and...slightly kick 

the homeless person to wake up so they can move.” Id. at 

148. 

Appellant testified [that] he is married to [Victim’s mother]

and [has] always had trouble with [Victim]. [Appellant]

denied physically assaulting [Victim] in either [the juice or 

hoagie] instance.... Appellant discussed the Facebook post 

and indicated [that] he was “super pissed” and was “going

to kick him [Victim] out.” Id. at 163.... Appellant testifie[d]

as follows:

He was asleep. I didn’t kick him, kick him in a manner 

for him to be hurt, just enough for him to get the 

attention. It’s an attention seeker... On his

midsection, as I said in the SVU video. So, but at that 

particular point in time, he got jumpy because I just 

woke him up. He literally just went to sleep and I just 
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woke him up. He’s got his hands up and everything. 

So then I start yelling. He is sitting there all teary 

eyed ... because I hurt his feelings.... I threw the 

bottle at the wall. The bottle didn’t break because it 

was a vodka Amsterdam bottle.

Id. at 163-164.

Appellant claimed [Victim]’s “only wound he had to his face 

was ... the three little scratch marks” which were selfinflicted because he doesn't cut his nails. [Id. at 165-166.]

[Appellant] confirmed that if he did not kick [Victim] out he 

would have killed him. Appellant then denied inflicting 

injuries on [Victim] at any time, threatening to hurt or kill 

him. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/4/23, at 2-6) (some record citations omitted). 

Following a bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of all charges

on October 23, 2020. The court deferred sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and a mental health evaluation. On May 

18, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate of three to six years 

of incarceration and five years of probation. Appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion on May 19, 2021, which was denied by operation of law on September 

21, 2021. On May 16, 2022, Appellant filed a petition to reinstate his direct 

appeal rights nunc pro tunc and the court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal 

rights on August 22, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro 

tunc on September 19, 2022. On September 21, 2022, the court ordered 

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal, and Appellant complied on October 21, 2022. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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Whether the evidence presented at trial established

sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of

law for every element of the crimes for which Appellant was

convicted. 

Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by

imposing a sentence that was not based upon the gravity of

the violation, the extent of Appellant’s record, his prospect

of rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and

aggravating factors as noted in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 of the

Sentencing Code. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 7). 

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the only evidence supporting 

his convictions was Victim’s testimony, which was not credible because the 

evidence demonstrated that Victim is “an incorrigible child with history of

deception.” (Id. at 15). Specifically, Appellant asserts that Victim’s testimony 

is unreliable because Victim admitted that he lied to his mother about where 

he was when he wrote the Facebook post. Appellant argues that Victim’s 

testimony about the first two instances of physical violence was not supported 

with corroborating evidence such as medical records or police reports.

Appellant contends that only the third instance of violence was substantiated 

with corroborating evidence, which “only supports a misdemeanor grading, as 

the Commonwealth failed to establish more than one incident of 

endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id.) Appellant concludes that 

the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence to support any of his 

convictions, and this Court should vacate his judgment of sentence. We 

disagree. 
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“In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on 

appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the 

element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was 

insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa.Super. 

2016), appeal denied, 640 Pa. 386, 163 A.3d 403 (2016) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “Such 

specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, [Appellant] was 

convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that 

the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 321 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal 

denied, 656 Pa. 205, 220 A.3d 531 (2019) (quoting Stiles, supra at 982). 

“Therefore, when an appellant’s [Rule] 1925(b) statement fails to specify the 

element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient[,] ... the 

sufficiency issue is waived on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement presented his sufficiency 

challenge as follows: 

The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a 

conviction as a matter of law. No corroborating evidence, 

including physical evidence was presented at trial to support 

the conviction. The trial court erred by failing to grant a 

judgment of acquittal.

(Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 10/21/22, at 1). In response to this boilerplate 

challenge, the trial court was left to guess the elements upon which Appellant 

based his claim. Because Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement failed to specify 
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the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient, the claim 

is waived. See Ellison, supra; Stiles, supra. 

Even if Appellant had properly preserved his claim, Appellant’s issue 

would merit no relief. Appellant essentially asks this Court to reassess the 

credibility of Victim, and to reweigh the evidence presented in Appellant’s 

favor. Nevertheless, the trial court found Victim’s testimony to be credible 

and we are bound by the court’s credibility determinations that are supported 

by the record. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (explaining that in evaluating challenge to sufficiency of 

evidence, this Court may not weigh evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the factfinder). See also Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 320 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (stating: “It is not for this Court to overturn the credibility 

determinations of the fact-finder”). 

Additionally, there is no merit to Appellant’s assertion that the evidence 

was insufficient based on a lack of corroborating evidence to support Victim’s 

testimony. Victim’s credible testimony alone is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s 

convictions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 

(Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 651 Pa. 431, 205 A.3d 315 (2019) (rejecting 

claim that victim’s testimony alone was insufficient evidence to sustain 

conviction; stating: “[T]he uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is 

sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that 

testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the charged 
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crime”). Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is waived and affords him no relief 

in any event.2

In his second issue, Appellant claims that the court sentenced him to an

aggravated range sentence without justification. Appellant contends the court 

failed to consider mitigating factors, “including his consistent and continued 

commitment to mental health treatment, his caring and nurturing relationship

with his wife and other family members, and his remorse for the impact to

[Victim] and his extended family.” (Appellant’s Brief at 17). Appellant asserts 

that the court only considered the nature of the offense and failed to consider 

Appellant’s characteristics and rehabilitative needs. Appellant concludes the 

court abused its discretion in imposing an unreasonably excessive sentence,

and this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for 

resentencing. We disagree. 

As presented, Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281 (Pa.Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 624 Pa. 671, 85 A.3d 481 (2014) (stating contention that court 

focused solely on serious nature of crime without adequately considering 

protection of public or defendant’s rehabilitative needs concerns court’s 

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2 To the extent that Appellant’s sufficiency challenge as presented on appeal 

is more properly construed as a challenge to the weight of the evidence, that 

claim is also waived for failure to preserve it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. 

See Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal 

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 250 A.3d 468 (2021) (reiterating well-settled law that 

issues not preserved in concise statement are waived for appellate review).
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sentencing discretion); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges 

discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 

668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 1195 

(1996) (explaining claim that court did not consider mitigating factors 

challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing).

“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an 

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of 

sentencing issue: 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)). 

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise 

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of 
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the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an 

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any 

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging 

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). “A substantial question exists only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 

2011)). 

“[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that 

the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 629 Pa. 636, 105 A.3d 736 (2014). See also Commonwealth v. 

Trimble, 615 A.2d 48 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding defendant’s claim that court 

failed to consider factors set forth under Section 9721(b) and focused solely 
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on seriousness of defendant’s offense raised substantial question). A 

substantial question also exists where an appellant alleges the court imposed 

a sentence outside of the guidelines without sufficient reasons. See 

Commonwealth v. Holiday, 954 A.2d 6 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 

601 Pa. 694, 972 A.2d 520 (2009).

This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the 

following standard:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on 

appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, bias or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)). 

“[A] court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the 

offense and the character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 

A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1148, 125 S. Ct. 2984, 

162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). “In particular, the court should refer to the 

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his 

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. If the sentencing court has the benefit of a 

PSI report, the law presumes the court was aware of the relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with any mitigating factors. Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362 
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(Pa.Super. 2005).

When considering the propriety of imposing an aggravated range 

sentence, this Court has observed: 

[T]he guidelines were implemented to create greater 

consistency and rationality in sentencing. The guidelines 

accomplish the above purposes by providing a normal for 

comparison, i.e., the standard range of punishment, for the 

panoply of crimes found in the crimes code and by providing 

a scale of progressively greater punishment as the gravity 

of the offense increases.... 

The provision of a “norm” also strongly implies that 

deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts 

about the crime that also deviate from the norm for the 

offense, or facts relating to the offender’s character or 

criminal history that deviates from the norm and must be 

regarded as not within the guidelines contemplation. Given 

this predicate, simply indicating that an offense is a serious, 

heinous or grave offense misplaces the proper focus. The 

focus should not be upon the seriousness, heinousness or 

egregiousness of the offense generally speaking, but, rather 

upon how the present case deviates from what might be 

regarded as a “typical” or “normal” case of the offense under 

consideration. 

An aggravated range sentence ... will thus be justified to the 

extent that the individual circumstances of [an appellant’s] 

case are atypical of the crime for which [he] was convicted, 

such that a more severe punishment is appropriate. 

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal 

citation omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant raised his sentencing issue in a timely postsentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, and included 

in his appellate brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. Further, Appellant’s assertion 

that the sentence was manifestly excessive in conjunction with his claim that 
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the court failed to weigh his rehabilitative needs and/or consider mitigating 

factors raises a substantial question. See Raven, supra; Trimble, supra. 

Appellant’s claim that the court failed to set forth adequate reasons for 

imposition of the aggravated range sentence also raises a substantial question 

for our review. See Holiday, supra. Accordingly, we proceed to address the 

merits of Appellant’s sentencing claims. 

Here, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, defense counsel’s 

arguments, and statements from Appellant and Victim’s mother at sentencing. 

Thus, we can presume that the court was fully aware of and considered 

mitigating factors such as Appellant’s history of mental health struggles, his 

willingness to seek treatment, and his alleged close relationship with his wife 

and children. See Tirado, supra. Further, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, 

the court provided an on-the-record statement of reasons why it imposed a 

sentence in the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines. The court 

noted Appellant’s history of domestic violence and the severe and prolonged 

impact Appellant’s actions had on the young victim as reasons justifying 

imposition of an aggravated range sentence. Further, the court did not find 

Appellant’s expression of remorse to be adequate or sincere where Appellant 

continued to blame Victim for his actions. To address Appellant’s rehabilitative 

needs, the court ordered Appellant to complete anger management classes, 

parenting classes, and a mental health evaluation for dual diagnosis treatment 

as recommended in the PSI report. The record demonstrates that the court 
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properly considered Appellant’s history and rehabilitative needs and explained 

its rationale for fashioning the sentence it imposed. As such, we discern no 

abuse of discretion in court’s determination that a sentence in the aggravated 

range was appropriate. See Fullin, supra; McNabb, supra. Accordingly, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 10/26/2023