alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Alfredo REA-BRACAMONTES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-50897.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 23, 2006.

U.S. Attorney, USSD-Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jose Alfredo Rea-Bracamontes, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Larry N. Ainbinder, AFPD, San Diego, CA for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Alfredo Rea-Bracamontes appeals from the 57-month sentence and judgment imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Rea-Bracamontes’ counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief and that there is a valid appeal waiver, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Rea-Bracamontes did not file a *pro se*supplemental brief. The Government did not file an answering brief.

We have reviewed the briefs and conducted an independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and we dismiss in light of the valid appeal waiver. *See United States v. Nguyen,*235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2000) (appeal waiver valid when entered into knowingly and voluntarily).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Henry F. Osgood, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 662]

Stein, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Montgomery County (Catena, J.), rendered June 13, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

Defendant waived indictment and was charged in a superior *1030court information with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. He pleaded guilty to that charge, waived his right to appeal and, thereafter, was sentenced as a second felony offender to the agreed-upon prison term of *21h*to 5 years. Defendant now appeals.

We affirm. Initially, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s contention that the appeal waiver is invalid. The record and plea colloquy establish that defendant was informed that the right to appeal was separate from the other rights forfeited by the guilty plea and that his counsel adequately explained those rights before defendant executed a detailed written waiver in open court. Consequently, we find that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence *(see People v Sylvan,*107 AD3d 1044 [2013]; *People v Fallen,*106 AD3d 1118, 1118-1119 [2013]). Given the validity of the appeal waiver, defendant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the plea and harshness of his sentence are foreclosed *(see People v Sylvan,*107 AD3d at 1044). Although defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his plea survives the appeal waiver, it is not preserved for our review as the record does not reflect that defendant moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Estrada,*102 AD3d 1064, 1064-1065 [2013]). Furthermore, as defendant did not make any statements during the plea allocution that negated an essential element of the crime or otherwise cast doubt on his guilt, the narrow exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable *(see People v Bouton,*107 AD3d 1035, 1035 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1072 [2013]; *People v Revette,*102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]). Similarly, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument, to the extent that it survives the appeal waiver, is unpreserved for our review absent a motion to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Bouton,*107 AD3d at 1035; *People v Colon,*106 AD3d 1367, 1367 [2013]).

Lahtinen, J.E, Spain and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6974

DARIUS JERMOL SIMMONS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD CLARKE, Director,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00046-JCC-TCB)

Submitted: September 13, 2012 Decided: October 19, 2012

Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darius Jermol Simmons, Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen Beatty 

Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Darius Jermol Simmons seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Simmons has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, 

we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability, deny 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed July 20, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D21-924 Lower Tribunal No. 19-19033

________________ 

### Marilia R. Hunter , Appellant,
vs. 

### Andrew Robertson , Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Samantha Ruiz Cohen, Judge. Orshan, Spann & Fernandez-Mesa and Steven P. Spann, for appellant. Davis Smith & Jean, LLC and Laura Davis Smith and Sonja A. Jean, for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and HENDON and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Cabrera v. Cabrera, 987 So. 2d 753, 754–55 (Fla. 3d2

DCA 2008) (rejecting husband’s argument that trial court’s adoption of wife’s proposed final judgment after failing to make oral findings or conclusions of law was improper delegation of its decision-making authority under Perlow v. Berg–Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2004), because (1) final judgment was not verbatim adoption of proposed order; (2) husband had opportunity to submit proposed final judgment and object to wife’s proposed final judgment; and (3) trial court actively participated in hearing); see also Musgrave v. Musgrave, 290 So. 3d 536, 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“[U]pon rehearing the Husband failed to raise an objection to the proposed final judgment based upon the ‘verbatim’ theory, and he cannot now complain error for the first time in this appeal.”).
#### In re Key

Case below: 182 N.C. App. - (17 April 2007)

No. 209P07

Respondent’s (Mark Key) Motion for Temporary Stay (COA06-499)

Allowed 04/30/07
Dated:  3/27/2008                                                                       By: /s/E. Todd Whittemore                                                                    Title:Executive Vice President, Master ServicingAurora Loan Services LLC,   as Master ServicerI, E. Todd Whittemore, certify that:1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2007-AR1 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");2.  Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.  Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;4.  I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and5.  All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.E. Todd Whittemore**Exhibit 31 : Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications**(Senior Officer in charge of the servicing function of Aurora Loan Services LLC, in its capacity as master servicer)Name:In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:Assurant Inc., as Sub-Contractor for Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.GMAC Bank, as Sub-Contractor for GMAC Mortgage, LLCGMAC Mortgage, LLC, as ServicerGMAC Mortgage, LLC, as Subservicer for GMAC Mortgage, LLCGreenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., as ServicerLandAmerica Tax and Flood Services, Inc., as Sub-Contractor for Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.Newport Management Corporation, as Sub-Contractor for Aurora Loan Services LLCU.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, Paying Agent and CustodianWestlake Settlement Services, LLC, as Sub-Contractor for Aurora Loan Services LLC
#### State v. Moss

Case below: 178 N.C. App. 235

No. 617P06

Defs Motion for “Petition for Discretionary Review” CCOA05-1309)

Denied 08/23/07
#### Sanford I. Weisburst, Appellant, v Joanna Dreifus, Respondent.

[869 NYS2d 781]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saralee Evans, J.), entered June 25, 2008, which, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion for an interim award of attorney’s fees, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The record does not show that defendant has significantly greater financial resources at her disposal than plaintiff has *403(Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; *O’Shea v O’Shea,*93 NY2d 187, 190 [1999]; *Charpié v Charpié,*271 AD2d 169 [2000]).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining contention and find it unavailing. Concur—Lippman, P.J., Mazzarelli, Sweeny, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20

- 7290

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. LEO VISTOR PERCELL, JR. , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr. , Senior District Judge. ( 1:19

- cr - 00190

- NCT

- 1 )

Submitted : November 19, 2021 Decided: December 16, 2021

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and RICHARDSON , Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by un published per curiam opinion

.
Leo Vistor Percell, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Leo Vistor Percell, Jr., appeal s the district court’s order dismissing his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. Before seeking compassionate release in the district court, an inmate must satisfy the threshold requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). However, as we recently held, this requirement is nonjurisdictional and, thus, subject to forfeiture or waiver if not timely raised. See United States v. Muhammad , 16 F.4th 126, 129

- 30 (4th Cir. 2021). Here, the district court

— which did not have the benefit of our decision in
Muhammad

— erred by sua sponte raising the threshold requirement and dismissing on that
basis. See id. at 130. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisi onal process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Isiah LAND, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-7030.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 17, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 20, 2006.

Isiah Land, Appellant Pro Se. James Ashford Metcalfe, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

*462PER CURIAM:

Isiah Land seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on April 12, 2005.* The notice of appeal was filed on May 30, 2006. Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we deny Land’s motion for a Government voucher and benefits, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 Although the district court’s judgment was not set forth on a separate document, judgment was entered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(b)(2)(B) on September 9, 2005.
#### Samuel Cosentino, Appellant, v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., Respondent.

Submitted February 2, 2009;

decided March 31, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3763 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3763

      To amend title 49, United States Code, to modify bargaining 
requirements for proposed changes to the personnel management system of 
                  the Federal Aviation Administration.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 31, 2006

   Mr. Pryor introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To amend title 49, United States Code, to modify bargaining 
requirements for proposed changes to the personnel management system of 
                  the Federal Aviation Administration.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL.

    Paragraph (2) of section 40122(a) of title 49, United States Code, 
is repealed.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendment made by section 1 shall be effective as of April 1, 
2006, including with respect to any proposed changes to the personnel 
management system of the Federal Aviation Administration that were 
transmitted to Congress, on or after that date and before the date of 
enactment of this Act, in accordance with the provisions of section 
40122(a)(2) of title 49, United States Code, as last in effect.
                                 <all>
```
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Compas Medical, P.C., as Assignee of Nelson Josner, Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>Praetorian Ins. Co., Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered October 3, 2014. The order denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is modified by providing that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that it had timely denied the claims based on plaintiff's assignor's fraudulent procurement of the insurance policy, in that plaintiff's assignor had materially misrepresented his address in order to procure a lower insurance premium. By order entered October 3, 2014, the Civil Court denied plaintiff's motion and granted defendant's cross motion.</p><p>For the reasons stated in <i>Compas Med., P.C., as Assignee of Nelson Josner v Praetorian Ins. Co.</i> (___ Misc 3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op ______ [appeal No. 2014-2469 Q C], decided herewith), the order is modified by providing that defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.</p><p>Pesce, P.J., Weston and Elliot, JJ., concur.</p><br>Decision Date: June 22, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



                  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Global Gold
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30,
2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I,
Drury J. Gallagher, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer of the
Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended; and

                  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.


 Dated: November 10, 2006


                                               By: /s/ Drury J. Gallagher
                                               ---------------------------------
                                               Drury J. Gallagher
                                               Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
                                               and Treasurer
#### Chet W. Kern, Esq., Respondent, v Shandell, Blitz, Blitz & Bookson, L.L.P, et al., Defendants. Shandell, Blitz, Blitz & Bookson, L.L.P, Appellant, v Sandra Ruth Schiff, Esq., Respondent.

[869 NYS2d 906]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.), entered October 29, 2007, which, in actions between attorneys involving payment of referral fees, granted defendant Schiff s motion to consolidate action No. 2, brought against her by the law firm Shandell, Blitz, Blitz & Bookson, L.L.E (SSSB), with action No. 1, brought against SSSB by Kern, and denied SSSB’s motion for summary judgment in action No. 2, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Common questions of law and fact warranting consolidation include: Kern’s entitlement to share in fees derived from the “referral list” of cases set forth in his agreement with SSSB upon joining that firm; the amount of that entitlement; the amount of the fees realized by Schiff from referral list cases; and the amount of referral list fees already paid by Schiff to SSSB. As the motion court succinctly put it: “both actions concern a dispute over legal fees from cases arising from Kern’s Referral List that SSSB claims it either is owed (the SSSB Action) or does not owe (the Kern Action).” These common issues also require denial of SSSB’s motion for summary judgment against Schiff in action No. 2. Schiff, who claims to be a stakeholder in Kern’s action No. 1 against SSSB, cannot be held *488liable to SSSB for referral fees until action No. 1 resolves SSSB’s liability to Kern for the very same fees. Concur—Tom, J.E, Gonzalez, Buckley, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.
**Exhibit 23.1**
**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**
We consent to theincorporation by reference in Registration StatementNo. 333-7366, No. 333-106654, and No. 33-25333 of NortelNetworks Corporation on Form S-8 of our report dated June 28, 2005 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 11-Kof the Nortel Networks Long-Term Investment Plan for the year ended December 31, 2004.
/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
Nashville, Tennessee