J-S63034-19

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

TYREE A. LAWSON

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 2543 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered July 30, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000542-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., MURRAY, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JANUARY 10, 2020

Tyree A. Lawson (Appellant) pro se appeals from the July 30, 2018

order, which dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We vacate the order of the 

PCRA court, and remand this case to consider the legality of Appellant’s

sentence.

By way of a brief history, [Appellant] was convicted on 

March 9, 2011[,] of burglary, two counts of conspiracy, and 

three counts of robbery – inflicting serious bodily injury.[1] On 

June 1, 2011, [Appellant] was sentenced to a term of 19 to 60

years’ imprisonment. His judgment of sentence was affirmed on 

appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on August 7, 2012, 

____________________________________________

1 These convictions stemmed from charges filed due to Appellant’s 

participation in a “vicious home invasion robbery or attempted robbery” that 

occurred on June 12, 2006. N.T., 6/1/2011, at 30.
J-S63034-19

- 2 -

and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal 

on January 18, 2013. [Commonwealth v. Lawson, 60 A.3d 

559 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 62 A.3d 379 (Pa. 2013).]

[Appellant] filed his first pro se PCRA petition on June 18, 

2013. Counsel was appointed and later wrote a no-merit letter. 

After a pre-dismissal notice was issued, a final order of dismissal 

was issued on October 7, 2013. [This Court affirmed the order 

denying this petition on September 19, 2014. Commonwealth 

v. Lawson, 107 A.3d 231 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum).] Since that time, [Appellant] has filed a series of 

PCRA petitions, all of which have been denied.

On June 19, 2018, Appellant filed his most current PCRA 

petition at issue in this appeal. Therein he asserted that 

because a previous unrelated 2009 [federal] attempted murder 

conviction [(Federal Conviction)] was later vacated and nolle 

prossed in 2018, the information th[e trial court] had at the time 

of his 2011 sentencing hearing was incorrect and caused hi[m] 

to be sentenced to a harsher sentence than would have 

happened otherwise. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 1-2.

On July 16, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s petition. The PCRA court concluded that despite the facial 

untimeliness of the petition, Appellant indeed established newly-discovered 

facts pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (providing that PCRA petitions 

must be filed “within one year of the date the judgment [of sentence] 

becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that [...] 

the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner 

and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”), and 

therefore the petition was timely. However, the PCRA court concluded that 

Appellant was not entitled to relief. Order, 7/13/2018.
J-S63034-19

- 3 -

Appellant filed a response on July 23, 2018.2 On July 30, 2018, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. “Due to an error, a second final 

order was issued [by the PCRA court] on August 13, 2018.” PCRA Court

Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 2 n.1. On August 30, 2018, Appellant filed a notice 

of appeal to this Court.3 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents numerous issues for our review.4 See 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. However, before we reach the issues set forth on 

appeal by Appellant, we must address the timeliness of the PCRA petition. 

“Pennsylvania law makes it clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an 

____________________________________________

2 This document is not in the certified record; however, that does not affect 

our disposition.

3 According to Appellant, the notice of appeal was from both the July 30, 

2018 and August 13, 2018 orders. To the extent this notice of appeal was 

filed from the July 30, 2018 order, the notice was arguably filed late. See

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing a notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days 

after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken). Here, the order 

was entered on July 30, 2018, and a notice of appeal was due on August 29, 

2018. The notice of appeal was filed one day late on August 30, 2018. 

However, because Appellant is incarcerated, he is entitled to the benefit of 

the prisoner-mailbox rule, which provides that the date of filing is the date 

the prisoner provided the notice of appeal to prison authorities. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1997) and Smith v. 

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 683 A.2d 278 (Pa. 1996). 

Here, Appellant dated his notice of appeal August 28, 2018, and presumably 

provided it to prison authorities that day, such that it arrived and was 

docketed by the clerk of courts on August 30, 2018. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Appellant’s appeal from both orders was timely filed.

4 We note with disapproval that the Commonwealth has not filed a brief in 

this appeal.
J-S63034-19

- 4 -

untimely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 140 A.3d 55, 57 (Pa. 

Super. 2016). “The question of whether a [PCRA] petition is timely [filed]

raises a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review [is] plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

Instantly, Appellant conceded that his petition was filed untimely, and 

he attempted to plead and prove the newly-discovered facts exception set 

forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).5 Here, it was Appellant’s position that 

one factor that was considered in his 2011 sentencing hearing in the instant 

case was the Federal Conviction. According to Appellant, the Federal 

Conviction was overturned on March 15, 2018. See PCRA Petition, 

6/18/2018, at ¶ 6. Thus, Appellant argued in his PCRA petition that he 

satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception because this fact was 

____________________________________________

5

The timeliness exception set forth in [subs]ection 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned 

those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due 

diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to 

protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he 

could not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise 

of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced.

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citations omitted). Furthermore, Appellant had to file his petition within 

one year “of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(2).
J-S63034-19

- 5 -

unknown to him prior to March 2018 and could not have been discovered 

sooner.

Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant established 

the applicability of the newly-discovered facts timeliness exception. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 5. Appellant could not have learned 

that the Federal Conviction was overturned prior to March 15, 2018, and he 

filed his PCRA petition shortly thereafter.

Nevertheless, the PCRA court, citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi), went

on to conclude that Appellant was not entitled to relief because the 

overturning of the Federal Conviction did not satisfy the test for a claim of

after-discovered evidence. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/15/2018, at 6. That 

subsection provides for PCRA relief in cases where a petitioner establishes 

the “unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has 

subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the 

trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).

It is Appellant’s position on appeal6that he is entitled to a new 

sentencing hearing because the trial court utilized the now-overturned 

Federal Conviction to support its conclusion that Appellant was a violent 

____________________________________________

6

In his PCRA petition, Appellant invoked the after-discovered evidence 

subsection, as well as other subsections of the PCRA, including subsections 

providing relief for violations of Appellant’s constitutional rights and for his 

sentence being greater than the lawful maximum. See PCRA Petition, 

6/19/2018, at ¶¶ 14-16. However, on appeal, Appellant limits his argument 

to the after-discovered evidence subsection. 
J-S63034-19

- 6 -

criminal, and enhanced his sentence accordingly.

7 See N.T., 6/1/2011, at 38 

(sentencing court explaining that Appellant’s criminal history includes 

“serious crimes of violence”). In other words, Appellant is arguing that the 

outcome of his sentencing hearing would have been different.

Our review of the case law reveals no instance where either this Court 

or our Supreme Court has applied the after-discovered evidence subsection 

of the PCRA to sentencing hearings. In fact, the language of the statute 

itself appears to preclude this application, referring to “exculpatory 

evidence” which was unavailable “at the time of trial ... and would have 

changed the outcome of trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9543(a)(2)(vi). Sentencing hearings are not trials, and one cannot be 

exculpated at a sentencing hearing. Thus, we conclude that the PCRA court 

____________________________________________

7 Our review of the sentencing transcript in the instant matter reveals that 

Appellant successfully argued at sentencing that the Federal Conviction, 

which resulted from an incident where Appellant attacked U.S. Marshalls 

while resisting their arresting him, should not be calculated as part of his 

prior record score in this case because the conviction occurred after the 

commission of the crime for which Appellant was being sentenced. N.T., 

6/1/2011, at 14. The Commonwealth agreed with Appellant’s position and 

changed Appellant’s prior record score accordingly. Id. at 15. Thus, the 

record is clear that the subsequent vacatur of the attempted murder 

conviction did not affect Appellant’s prior record score. However, the trial 

court was made aware, through the pre-sentence investigation report, of 

Appellant’s numerous prior crimes and arrests, including the resisting arrest 

incident that led to the Federal Conviction. 
J-S63034-19

- 7 -

did not err in denying relief on the basis that Appellant failed to satisfy the 

standard for after-discovered evidence.

8

We now consider the legality of Appellant’s sentence in light of the 

reversal of the Federal Conviction. Although Appellant did not raise this 

issue on appeal, issues concerning the legality of a sentence may be raised 

by this Court sua sponte so long as we have jurisdiction. See 

Commonwealth v. Randal, 837 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. 2003). Where a 

petitioner has satisfied a timeliness exception to the PCRA, as has occurred 

in this case, we have jurisdiction to address a claim regarding the legality of 

Appellant’s sentence. See Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182, 

192 (Pa. 2018).

The statute governing credit for time served provides that “[i]f the 

defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of the sentences is set 

aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit against the maximum 

and any minimum term of the remaining sentences shall be given for all 

time served in relation to the sentence set aside since the commission of the 

offenses on which the sentences were based.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(3). Thus, 

to the extent Appellant was serving prison time for the Federal Conviction at 

____________________________________________

8 To the extent Appellant is arguing that the PCRA court should consider 

Appellant’s newly-discovered fact in deciding to reduce his sentence, such a 

claim clearly implicates the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. 

Issues concerning the discretionary aspects of a sentence, other than those 

couched as the ineffective assistance of counsel, are not cognizable under 

the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 801 (Pa. Super. 

2003).
J-S63034-19

- 8 -

the same time he was serving prison time for the instant case, he may be 

entitled to credit for time served.9 However, the record before this Court is 

inadequate for us to make that determination. Accordingly, we remand this 

case to the PCRA court to consider this issue.

Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/10/20

____________________________________________

9 “A claim asserting that the trial court failed to award credit for time served 

implicates the legality of the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 

A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2018).