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### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON

FR EDD Y L EE P AR RISH , JR
. v. D AV ID M ILLS, STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Laud erdale County

No. 5992 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2005-02196-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled Janu ary 31, 2006

The P etiti o n e r , Fr e d d y

L e e Pa rr is h , Jr

. , ap p e a ls th e trial c o u rt’ s d e n ial o f h is p e ti ti o n f

o r habea s corpus r elief. TheState has filed a mot ion reque sting that this Court affirm the trial court pur suant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appe als. The State’s motion is gr anted. Thejudgme nt of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t Affir m e d P ur sua nt to Rul e 20 , R ule s o f the Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and J.C. M C LIN , J J . joined.

Fr eddy L ee Par rish, J r., pro se

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Seth P. Kestner , Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llee, the State of

Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

It appea rs from the ple ading s befor e this Court that, i n 1 9 99, the Petitioner Fr eddy L ee Parrish, Jr., entered g uiltypleas in the Gibson County Circuit Court t o t wo co u n t s of ag g ravated burg lary , one count of t heft of property valued ove r $1,000 but less than $10,000, and onecount of ag g ravated robbe ry . For these convictions, the Petitioner rec eived an eff ective se ntence of fifte en y ear s incarc eration.2

On A u g u s t 1 6 , 2 0 0 5 , th e Pe ti ti o n e r f il e d a n ap p li c a ti o n f

o r h ab e a s c o rp u s r e lief in the L auder dale Count y Circuit Court. As g rounds for habea s corpus relief, the Petitioner claimed that thejud g me nts of

c on vic tio n r e fl e c te d th a t hewo uldbe e lig ible fo r p aro le a ft e r s e rv ic e of thi rty perc ent of his sen t en ce

. He a lleg ed that, af ter his incar cer ation, he wa s place d on involuntary
se gre g a tio n p ur su a nt t o D e pa rtme nt o f C or

re c tio n p oli c y , th e re by

inc re a sin g his pa

ro le e lig ibi lit y indefinitely

pursuant to sec tion 40-35-501(l)( 2), T e n n e s s e eCo d eA n n o ta te d. Petitioner asserte d that operation of section 40-35-501 (l )(2) invalidated the terms of his plea ag ree ment rende ring the jud g me nts of

c on vic tio n v oid . A dd iti on a lly , Pe tit ione r a rg ue d th a t se c tio n 4 0- 35 -5 01 (l )( 2) is unconsti t utional. By

order enter ed Aug ust 16, 2005, the trial court de nied habe as cor pus relief , fi nd ing that th e Pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e ha d n ot e xpir e d and th at th e tria l c ou rt “ ha d ju ri sd ic tio n to sentenc e the de fendant in the manner w hich the def endant wa s sentence d.” The court further f ound that th e c o u rt d idn o t h a v e ju r is d ic ti o n if th e p e ti ti o n w e r e tr e a te da s o n e s e e k in g p o s t- c o nviction relief . A timely

notice of a

ppeal doc u m en t wa s filed. The Petitioner is cur rently confine d at the West Tennessee State Prison in Henning, T ennesse e.

I n this state, the grounds upon which ha beas c orpus petitions are g rante d arenarr ow. Habe as corpus r elief only

addre sses detentions that res u l t from void judgme nts or expired sentence s. See Archer v . State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) . A judg ment is void “only when ‘ [i ]tappea

rs upon the fac e of the judgme nt or the rec ord of the proce eding s upon which the judg ment is render ed’ that a c on vic tin g c ou rt

wa s w ith ou t ju ri sd ic tio n o r a uth ority to s e nte nc e a

de fe nd ant , or

that a defe ndant’s sentenc e of imprisonment or other restraint ha s expi red.” Hickm an v. State, 153 S.W .3d 1 6 , 2 0 (T en n

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( q u o t i n g State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted)). The pe titioner bear s the burden of establishing e ither a void judg ment or an illeg al conf inement by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. P a s s a re ll a v
. S ta te , 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). I f the pe titioner car ries this burden, he is entitled to immediate re lief. Howe ver, w herethe alleg ations in a petition for writ of ha beas c orpus do not demonstrate that the judgme nt is void, a trial
co u rtmay

corr ectly dismiss the petition without a hearing. Mc Lan ey v . B e ll, 5 9 S. W. 3 d 90, 93 (T e nn

. 20 01 ) ( c iti ng T. C.A . § 29 -2 1- 10 9 ( 20 00 ); se e , e .g ., Arc he r, 851 S.W .2d at 164 (pa renthe tical omitted)). The P etitioner does not contend that his sentenc es haveexpired, thus, he is onlyentitled to relief if his judgments ar e void.

I n his petition subm itted to the trial court, the Petitioner a sser t ed t hreeg rounds for ha beas corpus r elief: the c onstitut ionality of sec tion 40-35-501(l)( 2), Tenne ssee Code A nnotated, the
vo lun tary natur e of his g uil ty ple a s, a ndthebr e a c h o f h is p le a a g re e me nt b y

theState . T he se c la ims do not entitle Petiti oner to habeas corpus relief. First, the Petit ioner' s assertion that his g uiltyplea
was unknowing and involuntary is not cog nizable in a habea s corpus action beca use even if

true the judgme nt would be re ndere d voidable, not void. See B ryan Pearson v . State, N o

. E 2 0 03-02597- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1 6 0 6 9 8 2 , at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J ul. 16, 2004), pe rm . to appeal denied, (Tenn. N ov. 8, 2004).
Next, the Petitioner’s c onstitut ional challeng e to sec tion 40-35-501(l)( 2), Tenne ssee Code Annotated, f

ails. Petiti oner a sserts that his se ntence is void and illeg al due to oper ation of sec tionT en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 5 0 1 (l)(2) p ro vid es: 1 T he depart ment of

cor r ect i on s hal l not ce r t i f y an i nmat e f

or a par ol e g r ant he ar i ng , ot her t han an i ni t i al grant heari ng, i f , at t he t i m e t he d ep art m ent of co rr ect i o n wo ul d other wi se have cert i f i ed t he inm a te a s e ligib le , t h e inm a te is cla ssified a s m a x im u m c u sto d y. S u c h d e c e rtifi c a tio n sh a ll

co nt i nue fo r t he d urat i o n of such cl ass i f i cat i o n, and fo r a peri o d of t wo (2) y ears t hereaf t er. It ap p ears t hat t he P et i t i o ner com m i t t ed a cl ass B dis ci p l i nary i nf ract i o n on o r abo ut A ugust 7, 20 0 3 , res ul t i ng i n a
c la ssifica tio n o f m a x im u m c u sto d y.
3 40 -3 5

- 5 0 1 ( l ) ( 2 ) , w h i c h e xt e n d e d t h e r e l e a s e e l i g i b i l i t y p e r i o d i m p o s e d b y t h e tr i a l c o u rt

. I n th is 1 respe ct, he c ontends that section 40-35-501(l)(2) unconstitutionally extends the sentence imposed by th e trial c o u rt a n d d e p r iv e s th e Pe ti ti o n e r o f h is v e s te d r ig h t to p ar o le e li g ib il ity . I n a similar arg ument, Petitioner claims that the State bre ache d the pl ea ag ree ment beca use he w as not provided rele ase e ligibility

at thirty perc ent servic e. The Petitioner’s arg uments fail. Contrary to the Petitioner’s arg ument, there is no constituti onal or inher ent right to be conditionally rele ased be fore the expiration of a prison sen t en ce. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W .3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Gree nholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Pe nal and Corr. C omplex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979) ; Da nie ls v . Tr

au gh be r, 98 4 S. W.2 d 9 18 , 9 24 (T e nn . Ct . A pp .1 99 8) ; se e als o T. C. A. § 40-35- 503( b) (2003) ( stating that "[r]elease on parole is a privileg e and not a rig ht") ). Tenne ssee Code A nnotated
se c tio n 4 0- 35 -5 01 (2 00 3) , th e statut e a ddre ssi ng pa ro le e lig ibi lity date s, do e s n ot p ro vid e a c e rt a inty of par ole for se ntence s g reater than two y ear s. Rather, it simply"pr ovides no more than a mere hope th at t he b e n e f

i t w i l l be o bt ain ed. " Id. (c i t i n g Gre e nh olt z, 442 U.S. at 11, 99 S. Ct . at 2100). The op e ratio n of se c tio n 40 -3 5- 50 1( l) (2 ) do e s no t e xten d the orig inal se nte nc e imp os e d b y thetria l c ou rt

. Thus, the Petitioner’s cha lleng es to the propriety of his r elea se elig ibilit y date ha ve no bea ring upon the validity

of the c onvictions, and cannot be treated as a petition for writ of ha

beas c orpus.

The Petitioner failed to state a g round upon which habea s corpus relief can be gr an ted. Acc ording ly , the trial court properly dismiss ed the pe tition. The St ate’ s motion i s g rante d and the judgme nt of the trial court is affirmed in a ccor dancewith Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls.

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### JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, J UDGE