UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

LAKELAND REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Case No. 12-600 (RJL) 

) 

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Secretary ) 

Department of Health and Human Services ) 

) 

De&ndanL ) 

<h.-

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(July/Co, 2013) (Dkts. ##9, 11) 

Plaintiff Lakeland Regional Health System ("plaintiff' or "Lakeland") brought the 

present action against Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

("defendant" or "the Secretary") pursuant to Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395kkk-1 (the "Medicare Act") and the Administrative Procedure Act, 

5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (the "APA"), challenging the defendant's final administrative 

decision denying Medicare reimbursement for certain bad debts incurred by plaintiff 

during the 2005 fiscal year. Defendant held that the debts could not be deemed 

"uncollectible" under 42 C.F.R. § 413.89(e) while pending at an outside collection 

agency. Plaintiff argues that defendant's position constitutes a change in policy in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395fnote (hereinafter "Bad Debt Moratorium" or 

1 
"Moratorium"). In the alternative, plaintiff contends that defendant's decision is 

arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the governing statute and regulations. Before 

the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Upon consideration of 

the parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record in this case, defendant's 

summary judgment motion is GRANTED and plaintiffs motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 

1. The Medicare Program and Bad Debt Reimbursements 

The Medicare Act provides health insurance benefits to eligible elderly and 

disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 

Services ("CMS"), formerly the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCF A"), 

administers the Medicare program for the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk; 42 C.P.R. § 

400.200 et seq. Medicare providers like plaintiff enter into written agreements with the 

Secretary to provide services to eligible beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc. Pursuant to 

these agreements, providers are reimbursed for services rendered to eligible beneficiaries. 

See id. The Secretary has broad discretion to determine which "reasonable costs" may be 

reimbursed to Medicare providers, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A), and what 

documentation is required from providers, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a). The Secretary 

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contracts with fiscal intermediaries 1 to determine and process reimbursement payments to 

providers. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h. 

At the close of each fiscal year, providers submit cost reports to their fiscal 

intermediaries for determination of program reimbursement. 42 C.P.R. § § 413 .20,.24. 

After auditing the report, 42 C.P.R. § 1395g, the fiscal intermediary issues a Notice of 

Program Reimbursement ("NPR"), 42 C.P.R.§§ 405.180l(a)-.1803. A hospital may 

challenge an NPR by requesting a hearing before the Provider Reimbursement Review 

Board ("PRRB"). 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). The PRRB's decision is subject to review by 

the Administrator ofCMS. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1); 42 C.P.R.§ 405.1875(a)(l). The 

Administrator's decision constitutes a final agency decision subject to judicial review. 

42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(l); 42 C.P.R. § 405.1877. 

Medicare requires its beneficiaries to bear a portion of the cost of covered services 

in the form of deductibles and coinsurance. 42 C.P.R. §§ 409.80-.83. In order to 

prevent shifting the costs of covered services to non-Medicare patients, the Medicare 

program reimburses hospitals when they are unable to collect coinsurance and deductible 

payments from Medicare beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A); 42 C.P.R.§§ 

412.115(a), 413.89(a), (d). The regulations governing bad debt reimbursement were 

1 In October 2005, Part A fiscal intermediaries became known as Medicare 

administrative contractors. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 

Modernization Act of2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 911(b), 117 Stat. 2385 (Dec. 8, 

2003). 

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written to incentivize providers to practice strong and efficient collection efforts before 

seeking bad debt reimbursement from the Medicare program: 

A bad debt must meet the following criteria to be allowable: 

( 1) The debt must be related to covered services and derived from 

deductible and coinsurance amounts. 

(2) The provider must be able to establish that reasonable collection efforts 

were made. 

(3) The debt was actually uncollectible when claimed as worthless. 

( 4) Sound business judgment established that there was no likelihood of 

recovery at any time in the future. 

42 C.P.R.§ 413.89(e); AR at 580. 42 C.P.R.§ 413.89(e) was first issued in 1966. See 

District Hasp. Partners v. Sebelius, Civ. Action No. 11-1717, slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Mar. 

26, 2013) (Kessler, J.). 

Chapter 3 of the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, Part I ("PRM"), 

contains the Secretary's guidance for interpreting 42 C.P.R.§ 413.89(e). See AR at 

582-85. This manual was first issued in 1968. See Foothill Hasp. -Morris L. Johnston 

Mem 'l v. Leavitt, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008). PRM § 308 mirrors 42 C.P.R. § 

413.89(e), outlining the four main criteria that must be satisfied for reimbursement. AR 

at 582. PRM § 310 discusses the "reasonable collection effort" providers must undertake 

and document before seeking bad debt reimbursement. AR at 582-83. PRM § 310.A 

states that providers may employ the assistance of a collection agency. AR at 582-83. 

PRM § 310.B requires "document[ation] in the patient's file by copies ofthe bill(s) and 

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[other letters or reports]." AR at 5 83. PRM § 310.2 provides for a "presumption of 

noncollectibility": 

If after reasonable and customary attempts to collect a bill, the debt remains 

unpaid more than 120 days from the date the first bill is mailed to the 

beneficiary, the debt may be deemed uncollectible. 

AR at 5 83. PRM § 314 states that a provider "should have the usual accounts receivable 

records-ledger cards and source documents to support its claim" and "[u]ncollectible 

deductibles and coinsurance amounts are recognized as allowable bad debts in the 

reporting period in which the debts are determined to be worthless." AR at 584. PRM § 

316 precludes double-recovery where CMS has reimbursed a provider for a bad debt that 

the provider is later able to collect from a beneficiary. AR at 584-85. 

The Secretary has also issued guidelines for fiscal intermediaries to follow in 

administering the reimbursement system. For example, a 1985 audit guideline regarding 

the use of outside collection agencies states: 

Where a provider utilizes the services of a collection agency .... [i]f 

reasonable collection effort was applied, fees the collection agency charges 

the provider are recognized as an allowable administrative cost of the 

provider. 

Hospital Audit Program§ 4499, Ex. 15 (AR at 349). The 1985 audit guideline further 

states that "[t]o determine the acceptability of collection agency services," the 

intermediary should ensure that "both Medicare and non-Medicare uncollectible amounts 

are handled in a similar manner" and the patient's file "is properly documented to 

substantiate the collection effort." !d. 

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In 1989, the Secretary published a Medicare Intermediary Manual ("MIM") 

instructing fiscal intermediaries that: 

If the [bad] debt is written-off on the provider's books 120 days after the 

date of the bill and then turned over to a collection agency, the amount 

cannot be claimed as a bad debt on the date of the write-off. It can be 

claimed as a bad debt only after the collection agency completes its 

customary collection effort. 

MIM, 13-4, §§ 4198, 4199 (AR at 381, 407-08); Foothill, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 10. An 

HCF A policy memorandum dated June 11, 1990 provides further guidance on the bad 

debt policy set forth in the PRM: 

[U]ntil a provider's reasonable collection effort has been completed, 

including both in-house efforts and the use of a collection agency, a 

Medicare bad debt may not be reimbursed as uncollectible. This is in 

accordance with the fourth criterion in [PRM] section 308, which provides 

that an uncollected Medicare account cannot be considered an allowable 

Medicare bad debt unless sound business judgment established that there is 

no likelihood of recovery at any time in the future. We have always 

believed that, clearly, there is a likelihood of recovery for an account sent to 

a collection agency and that claiming of a Medicare bad debt at the point of 

sending the account to the [collection] agency would be contrary to the bad 

debt policy in [PRM] sections 308 and 310 .... 

HFCA Clarification of Bad Debt Policy ("HFCA Memo"), June 11, 1990 (AR at 414). 

CMS also issued a Joint Signature Memorandum in 2008 stating: 

In accordance with the regulation/policy in effect prior to the August 1, 

1987, moratorium, until a provider's reasonable collection efforts have been 

completed, including both in-house efforts and the use of a collection 

agency, unpaid deductible and coinsurance amounts cannot be recognized 

as a Medicare bad debt. 

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Joint Signature Memorandum re: Clarification of Medicare Bad Debt Policy/Bad 

Debt Policy Related to Accounts at a Collection Agency ("JSM"), May 2, 2008 

(AR at 117). 

2. The Bad Debt Moratorium 

In 1987, Congress enacted what is herein referred to as the "Bad Debt 

Moratorium," prohibiting the Secretary from making changes to the agency's bad debt 

policy in effect on August 1, 1987. See Foothill, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 3. The Moratorium 

states: 

In making payments to hospitals under title XVIII "42 USC 1395fnote" of the 

Social Security Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall not 

make any change in the policy in effect on August 1, 1987, with respect to 

payment under title XVIII of the Social Security Act to providers of service for 

reasonable costs relating to unrecovered costs associated with unpaid 

deductible and coinsurance amounts incurred under such title (including 

criteria for what constitutes a reasonable collection effort). 

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4008(c), 101 

Stat. 1330 (reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1395fnote)? 

2 In 1988, Congress amended the Moratorium to further define "reasonable collection 

effort" to include "criteria for indigency determination procedures, for record keeping, 

and for determining whether to refer a claim to an external agency." Technical 

Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 8402, 102 Stat. 3798 

(reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1395fnote). In 1989, Congress added the following sentence 

to the Moratorium: 

The Secretary may not require a hospital to change its bad debt policy if a 

fiscal intermediary, in accordance with the rules of August 1, 1987, with 

respect to criteria for indigency determination procedures, record keeping, 

and determining whether to refer a claim to an external collection agency, 

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B. Factual and Procedural Background 

Plaintiff hospital provided covered services to Medicare beneficiaries during the 

fiscal year ended September 30, 2005 ("FY05"). Some of the beneficiaries failed to pay 

the hospital coinsurance and deductibles. Plaintiff first made internal efforts to collect 

the debts. AR at 121-22, 556. Plaintiff subsequently wrote the debts off as 

uncollectible and referred them to an outside collection agency. !d. While collection 

efforts at the outside agency were still pending, plaintiff submitted to its fiscal 

intermediary, National Government Services ("NOS"), an FY05 cost report including the 

bad debt write-offs. On August 28, 2007 and September 15, 2008, NOS issued an initial 

and corrected NPR, respectively, regarding plaintiffs FY05 cost report. AR at 90. 

NOS disallowed payments for debts plaintiff sent to the outside collection agency, which 

had not been returned to plaintiffs as uncollectible. !d. 

Plaintiff timely appealed the corrected NPR to the PRRB, arguing that it had met 

all of the statutory criteria for bad debt reimbursement, or in the alternative, that the NOS 

decision constituted a change in policy in violation of the Bad Debt Moratorium. AR at 

64 7-84. Following a hearing on the matter, AR at 251-86, the PRRB concluded that 

NOS' decision was erroneous, AR at 86-96. The Administrator of CMS elected to 

has accepted such policy before that date, and the Secretary may not collect 

from the hospital on the basis of an expectation of a change in the hospital's 

collection policy. 

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6023, 103 Stat. 

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review the PRRB decision. AR at 81-82. On February 16, 20 12, after receiving 

comments from CMS and plaintiff, AR at 18-80, the Administrator reversed the PRRB's 

decision and upheld NGS' adjustments disallowing plaintiffs claimed bad debts, AR at 

1-1 7. On April 16, 20 12, plaintiff filed the instant action, challenging the 

Administrator's decision. See Compl. [Dkt. #1]. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Medicare Act provides for judicial review of the Administrator's final 

decision under the APA. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(l). Under the APA's strict standard of 

review, the Court may set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions that are 

"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 

414 (1971). Factual conclusions may be overturned if"unsupported by substantial 

evidence in a case ... reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413 n.30. 

An agency action may be invalidated under the arbitrary and capricious standard 

only if it is "not rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors." FCC v. 

Nat'! Citizens Comm.for Broad., 436 U.S. 775,803 (1978). When the agency action at 

issue is "the construction of an administrative regulation ... deference is even more 

clearly in order." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). "[T]he agency's 

2167 (reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1935fnote). 

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interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation," especially where "the regulation concerns a complex 

and highly technical regulatory program." Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 

504, 512 ( 1994) (quotations and citations omitted). However, "[i]nterpretations such as 

those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 

manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant 

[heightened] deference." Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 

Under the substantial evidence standard, this Court must "accept the agency's 

factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 

whole." Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992). The Supreme Court has 

defined "substantial evidence" as '"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 383 U.S. 

607, 619-20 (1966) (quoting Canso!. Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). Substantial evidence "is something less than the weight of the evidence, 

and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not 

prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial 

evidence." !d. at 620. If the Secretary's "choice between two fairly conflicting views" 

is based on substantial evidence, the choice must be upheld even if "the court would 

justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). 

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ANALYSIS 

The Administrator found that it has always been the Secretary's policy that 

accounts pending at collection agencies cannot be written off as bad debts until collection 

activity has terminated ("Policy"). See AR at 13-14. This finding is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole including the plain language of 42 C.F.R. § 

413.89(e), interpretive guidance issued by the Secretary before and after the Bad Debt 

Moratorium, and past administrative practice. 

The Secretary's Policy is encompassed by 42 C.F.R. § 413.89(e), which expressly 

provides that a debt is not reimbursable unless it is "actually uncollectible when claimed 

as worthless" and "[ s ]ound business judgment established that there was no likelihood of 

recovery at any time in the future." 42 C.F.R. § 413.89(e). Where, as here, an outside 

collection agency continues collection efforts on behalf of a provider, these criteria 

cannot be met. See Battle Creek Health Sys. v. Leavitt, 498 F.3d 401, 411 (6th Cir. 

2007) ("The very fact that a collection agency was still attempting to collect the bad debts 

at issue indicates that these debts had not yet been determined to be 'actually uncollectible 

when claimed as worthless' and certainly contraindicates that '[s]ound business judgment 

established that there was no likelihood of recovery at any time in the future.'"). After 

all, what provider exercising sound business judgment would spend his precious 

resources on the fool's errand of pursuing an uncollectible debt with no likelihood of 

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future recovery? By prohibiting double-recovery, PRM § 316 eliminates any incentive a 

provider might conceivably have to simultaneously pursue collection from a beneficiary 

and reimbursement from CMS. See Battle Creek, 498 P.3d at 413 (6th Cir. 2007) 

("[PRM § 316 is a] common-sense principle [that] merely recognizes that if a provider 

recovers amounts previously included in allowable bad debts, it must reduce reimbursable 

costs in the period during which the debt was recovered by the same amount."). 

In addition to 42 C.P.R.§ 413.89(e), the Secretary's Policy is reflected in the 

agency's pre- and post- Moratorium interpretive guidance. MIM § 4198 expressly instructs 

that bad debts may be claimed "only after the collection agency completes its collection 

effort." MIM § 4198 (AR at 381). The record contains substantial evidence that this has 

"always" been the Secretary's Policy, consistent with the criteria of 42 C.P.R. § 413.89(e) 

as reiterated in PRM § 308. See HPCA Memo (AR at 414); see also JSM (AR at 117) 

(characterizing the Policy as "longstanding"). Nothing in the PRM suggests that the 

Secretary took a divergent approach to debts pending at collection agencies before August 

1, 1987. The plain language ofPRM § 310.2 creates a discretionary presumption of 

noncollectibility and does not foreclose the possibility that a debt may still be deemed 

collectible after 120 days. See PRM § 310.2 (AR at 340); see also Battle Creek, 498 

P.3d 401 at 411. Plaintiffs interpretation ofPRM § 310.2 as mandatory would negate 

the third and fourth criteria of 42 U.S.C. § 413.89(e). See Battle Creek, 498 P.3d 401at 

11-12. Where, as here, a provider continues collection efforts with an outside agency 

12 
following 120 days of internal effort, PRM § 310.2 is inapposite and PRM Sections 310.B 

and 314 require documentation prior to reimbursement. Here, plaintiff improperly relied 

on PRM § 310.2 and sought premature reimbursement absent proper documentation. 

The Secretary's audit guidelines from 1985 also reflect the Secretary's Policy. 

See Hospital Audit Program§ 4499, Ex. 15 (AR at 349). The guidelines allow a 

provider to recoup fees paid to an outside collection agency "as an allowable 

administrative cost" only "[i]f reasonable collection effort was applied." !d. (emphasis 

added). The use of the past tense ("was applied") precludes reimbursement prior to the 

application of reasonable collection effort. The guidelines further state that the patient's 

file must be "properly documented to substantiate the collection effort." !d. Here, 

plaintiff prematurely sought reimbursement at the outset of the outside agency's 

collection effort, before a valid determination of collectability or uncollectibility could be 

made, and without proper documentation. 

It is not, as plaintiff contends, fatal, per se, that the Secretary's Policy is not 

explicitly set forth in a pre-Moratorium writing. The interpretive guidance in place on 

August 1, 1987 "did not purport to be a comprehensive review of all conditions that might 

be placed on reimbursement of' Medicare bad debts in the Secretary's enforcement of 42 

C.F.R. § 413.89(e). See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 516. Therefore, it cannot 

logically be inferred that the Secretary either lacked a policy to disallow reimbursement of 

accounts pending at collection agencies or had a contrary policy. See id. 

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Finally, plaintiff alternatively argues that the Court should invalidate the 

Administrator's decision as arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the governing law. 

I disagree. Because it is based on an interpretation of an agency regulation, the 

Administrator's decision is entitled to great deference. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. 

at 512. Here, that decision is consistent not only with the plain language of 42 C.F .R. § 

413.89(e) and the agency's interpretive guidance, but also with the agency's 

administrative practice. Indeed, to date, the Secretary has consistently applied the Policy, 

with one exception: the Lourdes Hospital case. See Mesquite Cmty. Hasp. v. Blue Cross 

and Blue Shield Ass 'n, CMS Admin. Decision (Apr. 18, 2007) at 10 (noting that a policy 

allowing providers to write off bad debts pending at a collection agency "would not have 

been in accordance with the rules in effect prior to August 1, 1987"); Foothill 

Presbyterian Hasp. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass 'n, CMS Admin. Decision (Feb. 14, 

2007) at 7 n. 7 (concluding that the Moratorium did not preclude application of the 

Policy); Battle Creek Health Sys. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass 'n, HCFA Admin. 

Decision (Nov. 12, 2004) at 7 (citing the 1990 HFCA Memorandum as evidence of the 

Policy). But see Lourdes Hasp. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass 'n, HCF A Admin. 

decision (October 25, 1995) (AR at 419-23) (allowing reimbursement where a provider 

wrote off accounts as bad debts prior to 120 days of collection effort and subsequently 

sent those accounts to a collection agency). But the HCFA Administrator's 1995 

decision in Lourdes was an isolated ruling; an outlier inconsistent with the Secretary's 

14 
Policy as cited in prior administrative decisions. See e.g., Humana Hosp. v. Aetna, 

HFCA Admin. Decision (Sept. 11, 1992) (citing policy that "until a provider's reasonable 

collection effort has been completed, including both in-house efforts and the use of a 

collection [agency], a Medicare bad debt may not be reimbursed as uncollectible"). 

CONCLUSION 

Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's Motion for 

Summary Judgment and DENIES plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. An Order 

consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

15 

~ I , 

RICHARD . E N 

United States District Judge