UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4658

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

BRIAN TERRANCE COLES, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:03-cr-00346-REP-1) 

Submitted: April 8, 2009 Decided: April 29, 2009 

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, 

Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Brian Terrance Coles appeals the district court’s 

order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

twenty-seven months’ imprisonment on finding that Coles 

embezzled money from his employer in violation of the terms of 

his supervised release. On appeal, Coles argues that the 

district court erred in finding that he had embezzled money and 

that his sentence is therefore plainly unreasonable. We affirm. 

 After considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, a district court may revoke a term of supervised 

release on finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant violated a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3) (2006). We review the district court’s factual 

determinations for clear error. See United States v. Carothers, 

337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003). 

 Here, the district court did not err in finding, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Coles embezzled money from 

his employer, Carlton Jackson, thereby violating a condition of 

his supervised release. The evidence was uncontroverted that 

Coles directed that a commission payment of approximately $6,700 

owed to his employer be sent instead to him. Indeed, he 

admitted doing so, and agreed, but failed, to return the money. 

 The Government also introduced evidence that Coles 

arranged to receive another approximately $16,000 in commissions 

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meant for loan officers at Jackson’s branch office. Though 

Coles’s counsel argued that Coles was entitled to the money as 

commissions for loans he had originated, this contention is 

without factual support. As the district court did not commit 

clear error in accepting as credible the testimony of the 

Government’s witnesses, and the evidence submitted before the 

district court established that Coles embezzled approximately 

$23,000 owed to Jackson or other individuals employed by 

Jackson, the district court did not err in finding that Coles 

violated a condition of his supervised release. 

 Coles also challenges his sentence. We will affirm a 

sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is 

within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly 

unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). This court first assesses the sentence 

for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and 

substantive considerations that we employ in our review of 

original sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to 

take into account the unique nature of supervised release 

revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39. If we conclude a 

sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm it. Id. at 439. 

It is only if we find a sentence procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable that we must “decide whether the sentence is 

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plainly unreasonable.” Id.; see United States v. Finley, 531 

F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2008). 

 Although the district court must consider the Chapter 

7 policy statements of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual and the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006), “the 

[district] court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke [the] 

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Though a sentencing court must 

provide sufficient explanation of the sentence to allow 

effective review of its reasonableness on appeal, the court need 

not “‘robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.’” 

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(probation revocation) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 445 

F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006)). 

 We find that Coles’s sentence is not plainly 

unreasonable. The district court sentenced Coles to twentyseven months’ imprisonment, the maximum allowable under the 

statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). A review of the record makes 

it clear that the court adequately considered the applicable 

§ 3553(a) factors. First, the court stated that the “sentence 

is warranted by virtue of the nature of [Coles’s] original 

offense,” and commented on the negligible deterrent effect of 

Coles’s prior sentences. The court also cited the need to 

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protect the public from Coles’s future offenses. As the 

district court sentenced Coles to the statutory maximum 

sentence, and adequately justified its sentence, Coles’s 

sentence is not unreasonable, much less plainly so. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We deny Coles’s motion to file a pro se supplemental 

brief. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court, and further argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED