### 3309. Jaclt 

### H. :Dr+e Executive Sqcr6tary Texas Citiua Commisbiod Weglscb, Texar

. .

,.

. .. . 

### August 24, 

### 1951
OpinionNo. V-1253
Re: Constitutionality of Subdivision(15), 

### Section2 

### of Article 111, 

### H.B. 426, 

### Acts 52ad 

### Lea. (1951) dealingwith the purchase and *ale of certain pasketlger carryin&motor vehicles.
hri

### hhve reqqdddinopinionof 

### &isofficdon

# thc coh-. stitutionality of Wci

### provirion8 relatin$ toState-owned a'utomobilcis inHouse.Bill426;the general'appropriationbillfor the biennium

: ... :.. .- 

### ending'.Ani@f3.1, 

### 1953,asfollows:

,. . . . .

. ~ 

### 1. Is

## '&pr&iaio,* prohibiting.purchase of motor-. 

### , prDpelled pdssengir-carrying vehicles with funds appropriatedby 

### tl* 'bill

### constitutional?

. ' ... 

### 2. 

### I= the provision declaring suchpresently owned vehicles 

### no longpr needed and requiring their saleand disposal constitutional?
Hon. George W. C&, 

### StateHealth Officer; Won. C.

### E. 

### Belk, Administrator oftheTeiths State Boardof PlumbingExaminers;

### "Hob.

### H.A;'Blckwith, Chairmanof thk 'Board of. Water Engineerb: 'IEoci.'.Robert S..Caiv&rt;Coinp*oller of Public Accounts; and

### an: 'JesseJames. State'Treasurer,have pending 

### inthis office requests for.

### opinionswhicli relate to~ne

. .. 

### or both of,thesamequestions.

. . 

# . Thatpart of House Bill 426 

### relevant toyour inquiry is 

### a rider inthe general appropriationbill contained in.subdivision (15)' 

### Section2, 

### Article 111, 

### asfollows: "All State-owned motor-propelled passengercarryingvehicles under the control of any department, commission, board, or other State agencyarehereby declared to be 

### no longer needed. Such motor-prppelled passenger-carrying vehicles shallbe sold incompliancewith and a8 provided for in

### Article 666, 

### Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, asamended, or otherwise as provided by law, not later than October 1. 1951. No

# 150 Hon. Jack 

### H. Drake, Page 2 

### (V-1253)

The constitutional provision which controls the validity of the rider is Section 

### 35 of Article 

### 111 of the Texas Constitution, which provides: motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicle maybe purchased with any of the funds appropriated in this Article, provided, however, that these provisions of this Section inregard to the sale and purchase of motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles shall not apply to the Executive Department, State Highway I Department, Department 

### of Public Safety,Game,Fish

"No bill, (except general appropriationbills, which may embrace the various subjectfi and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated),shallcontain more than one subject, which shallbe expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced inanact, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to somuch thereof,as shall not be soexpressed. 

### "

. . and Oyster Commission and the Railroad Commission. provided that the Railroad Commission shall only keep and have in its possession not to exceed twenty (20) motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles and the Texrs Prison System shall only keep and have in its possession those vehicles equipped with two-way radios. Notices shallbe given in writing to persons now using said vehicles of the time and place they aregoing to be sold inorder that such persons may have an opportunity tobid on said motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles."

The Supreme Court, in Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex. 330. 342 (1881), asserted that the principal object of this provision l



### "



# . ,

# .is to advise the legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill, so asto prevent the insertionof obnoxious clauses, which otherwise might be engrafted thereupon and become the law; and also to prevent combinations, whereby would be concentrated the votes of the friends of different measures, none of which could pass singly; thus causing each bill to stand on its own merits. *I 

## . With specific reference to the reason for this type of constitutional limitation in the case of appropriation bills. the Supreme Court of Oregon said:

### Hon. Jack 

### H. Drake, Page 3 

### (V-1253)

U

### The evident purpose of this provision was to prevent matters foreignto the generalpurpose of appropriation bills being attached to them as riders. thereby taking advantage of the necessity of the state for money to defrayits current expenses and to pay its officers to pass measures that perhaps would otherwise havebeen defeated." EV-anhofi v. 

### StateIndustrialAccident Commission. 1-5).
In dealing with Section 35 of Article 

### III a rule of liberalinterpretation has always been applied. The tendency of the decisions$sto construe the constitutionalprovisions on this subject literally rather than to embarrass legislationby a constructionwhose strictness is 

### unnecessary to the acc mplishment of the beneficial purpose forwhich itwas adopted? But at the same time the Court has been carefulto point out, aswas originally done by Chief JusticeHemphill in Cannon v. Hemphill. 7

### Tex. 208 (1851). that this provision cannot be ignored arid thus nullified.
.Withreference to general appropriation bills, the Supreme Court

### of Texas has held that "the appropriating of funds to be paid from the State Treasuryis a 'subject' ~ithin the meaning of Article 111, Section35, of our Constitution." It 

### is clear from the terms of the constitqtional provision that general appropriationbills may contain more than one subject of this samenature, i.e., appropriations for the various departments and accounts, The exceptionof general appropriation bills fromthe constitutional prohibition against bills containing more than one subject isa 

### limited and restricted exception. The exactwording is

4.


# .

# . .except general appropriationbills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and onaccount of which moneys areto be appropriated 

### "



# ... Aa long asa general appropriation bill includes only subjects of appropriating money and limiting the use thereof in harmony with general legislation, itmay relate to any number of different "subjects and accounts." In such instances all of the subjects areunder the one general object and purpose of appropriating funds from the treasury. The obvious purpose of this limited exception was to make certain that appropriations to more than one department in the samebill would not be prohibited. In

1 Giddinks v. SanArltonio, 47 Tex. 548 (1877); Dellinger v. State, 28 S.W.Zd 

### 537

# e ex. Grim. App. 1930). 2 

### Moora v. 

### Sheppard, 144 Tex. 537, 192 S.W.2d 559 (1946).

# 3x2 Hon. Jack H. Drake. Page 4 (V-1253)

all other respects general appropriation bills are subject to the same prohibition as all other bills against containing more than one subject. The result is that general legislation cannot be embodied within a general appropriation bill. Moore v. Sheppard. supra. 

# - This does not mean that a general appropriationbill may not contain general provisions and details limiting and restrictingthe use of the funds therein appropriated, if such provisions arenecessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation and use of the funds and if they do not conflict with 

### br amount 10 general legislation. Conley v. Daughters of the Republic. 106 Tex. 

### 80, 156 

### S.W. 19m913). I With special regard to what incidental provisions may t be included within a general appropriation bill, our Texas courts have not stated a general rule. However, from statements asto what may not be included and fromnumerous opinions of the Attorney General,we believe the rule may be stated generally 

### as follows: In addition to appropriating money and stipulating the amount, manner, and purpose of the various items of expenditure, a general appropriation bill may contain any provisions 

### or riders which detail, limit, or restrict the use of the fkdsor otherwise insure 

### that the money isspentfor the required activity for which it istherein appropriated, ifthe provisions or riders arenecessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation and use 

### of the funds, and provided they do not conflict with general legislation. See Linden v. Finley, 92 Tex, 451. 

### 49 S.W. 

### 578 (1899) and Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, supra. An extended discussionof this rule will be foundin anopinion of the Attorney General now being written to the Governor on the general subject of riders in a general appropriationbill. Applying the above rule to your first question, it is obvious that that part of 

### the rider which provides that "No motorpropelled passenger-carrying vehicle may be purchased with any of the funds appropriated in this article"is a mere limitation and restriction upon the use of the money appropriated by House Bill 426. It 

### is necessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation and 

### is not anadditional subject of general legislation. We have found no general statute

### with which 

### it conflicts. Therefore, 

### it is valid. Applying the same rule to your second question and that part of the rider which declares certain State-owned passenger vehicles to be no Longer needed and requires that they shall be sold, we find no basis for its validity in a general appropriation bill. It does not detail, limit or restrict the use of funds therein appropriated or otherwise insure that appropriated money willbeHon. Jack 

### H. Drake, Page 

### 5 (V-1253)

spent for the purpose intended. It is not incidental to any appropriation in the Act. Obviously, it deals with a subject other than money appropriations. It attempts to do more than appropriate money and is therefore a subject of general legislation3 which cannot be constitutionally enacted ina general appropriationbill. Moore v. Sheppard,

### supra;Att'y Gen. Op. No. 0-445 (1939).
If the Legislature can order the sate of State-owned automobiles in a general appropriation bill rider, it can by the same means order the sale of State officebuildings, public school lands, or any other State-owned property. The very statement of the proposition demonstrates that sale of State property 

### is a subject of general legislation separate from and unrelated to the generalappropriation of money to operate the State agencies. It is a subject which should have the full consideration, opportunity for public notice and hearings, and opportunity for amendment orrejection afforded general legislationbut usually denied to subjects incorporated as riders ina general appropriationbill. The provision for the saleof the State-owned vehicles 

### is also invalid because in violation 

### of that portion of Section 

### 35 of Article 

### I11 of the Texas Constitution which states that the subject of a bill

# ".

..shallbe expressed in its title. But if any subject shallbe embraced in anact, which shall not be expressed inthe title, suchact shall be void only as to somuch thereof, as shall not be soexpressed."
There 

### is nothing whatever in the caption ortitle of House Bill

### 426 which could be construed to cover the provision or toput a legislator or the public on notice that the bill contained 

### a requirement that certain State-owned passenger cars were to be sold. The title is long, but we have searched

### it carefully. The on

### iy mention of any subject contained in subdivision 

### (15) is the phrase 'providing certain limitations on the purchase 

### of passenger motor 

## vehicle^."^ This adequately covers and gives notice of the prohibition against urchasin new cars,but it cannot be said to do so 

# E---fB with reference to the seeof presently owned passenger cars, The rule governing narrow title provisions 

### is well stated in 

### 50American Jurisprudence 

### 162, Statutes, Section 

### 183, as follows:

3 It is significant inthis connection that a separatebill 

### (H.B. 271) with provisions similar to those of subdivision (15) was introduced and passed the House, but failed to pass in the Senate. 4 Emphasis added throughout.Hon. Jack H. Drake. Page 

### 6 (V-1253)



### "

# ..

# . Under these rules, if a title is narrow and restricted, carving out for treatment only a part ofa general subject, the legislation under it must be confined within 

### the same limits. even though the Legislature might, with propriety, have selected a more comprehensive title which would have embraced the entire subject of legislation.'
The Supreme Court of Texas has uniformlv held that acts broad in scope, but with narrow and restricted tities. arein violation of Section 35 ofArticle 111. In Arnold v. Leonard. 114 Tex. 535, 273 

### S.W. 799 (1925), the Supreme Court said:

4,The caption is not content to state a purpose to amend certain statutes, but proceeds to specifythe nature of the proposed amendment. Thus the caption declares that the amendment consists of a provision authorizing the wife, on order of the district court, to convey her separatereal estate, bonds, and stocks withoutjoinder by her husband, when he is insane or has permanently abandoned his wife. This language not only gives 

### no notice of an intention to change the status of certain property from community property to the.wifels separate property. but completely disguises any such intention. A caption concealing the true purpose of a statute, and stating an altogether distinct and foreign purpose. 

### is necessarily deceptive, and cannot be sustained as complying with section 35 of article 3 of the Constitution. Ward Cattle & Pasture Co. 

### v. Carpenter. 109Tex. 105, 200 S.W. 521."
An earlier case striking down a portion of a statutebecause of a narrow caption was Adams v. SanAngelo Waterworks Company. 

### 86 Tcx. 

### 485, 

### 25 S.W. 605 (1894). Therein 

### the Supreme Court said:

a, 

# ..

# . The first section of the act inquestion grants to any incorporated city or town the power to condemn property 'for the construction of water mains or supply reservoirs or standpipes for waterworks.' aswell asfor certain other purposes, and provides that 'any company or corporation chartered under the laws of this state for the purpose of constructing waterworks, or furnishing water supply forany town or city, shall have the same right to condemn property necessaryfor the construction of supply reservoirs or standpipes forwaterworks when deemed necessary to preserve the public health, that is given towns and cities under this act.' The title of the act is as follows:

# 35:- Hon. Jack 

### H. Drake, Page 

### 7 (V-1253)

'An act to amend anact to regulate the condemnation of property in cities and towns, for the purpose of opening, widening or changing public streets oravenues or alleys, or for water mains or sewers, approved March 28, 

### 1883. 

# ...'' 

### The captionbeing restricted to condemnation for water mains or sewers and other specified purposes, the portion of the body of the act allowing condemnation for reservoirs and standpipes was held toviolate the caption requirements of Article 111, Section 35.
The above cases, alongwith Gulf Insurance Go. v. James, 

### 143

### Tex. 424. 185S.W.2d 

### 966 (1945);Hoch v. Hoch, 140 -5, 

### 168 S.W.2d 638 (1943);Ward Cattle and Pasture Company v. Carpenter. 109Tex. 103, '

### Gulf Production Gompany v. 

### Garrett. 119

# :~~.S~~'~~.~~~~k~~~
and Texas-Louisisna Power Co. v. City of FarmersviIle; 

### 67 S.W. 2d 235 (Tex. Comm. App. 14331, 

### all support the proposition that 

### if the title 

### is narrow, then the portions of 

### the actbroader than the title artinvalid because the narrow title 

### is deceptive and misleading.
Here we hsve a caption saying with reference 

### to paa

### senger automobiles only that the Act provides "certain limitations on the urchase of passenger motor vehicles," but the body of the bill actua 

# %- y contains in addition to limitations on the purchase of cars the further provision that, with certainexceptions, allStateowned passenger vehicles shallbe sold. As 

### stated inGuIf Insur-


## ., ance Go. v. 

### Tames, su ra. 

# ...the title to the act, asdrawn, 

### 1is] capable of misleading 

# -t$- oseinterested in the bill." The title to the aiit being narrowed to regulations governing the purchase of motor vehicles, that portion of the body which attempts to provide for the saleof certain State-owned motor vehicles is 

### invalid. 

# -

SUMMARY
That portion of subd. (151, Sac. 2. Art. 111, 

### H.B. 426, Acts 5Znd Leg. (1951), a rider in the generalappropriation bill, requiring the sala of certain Stateowned 'motor-propelled passenger-carrying" vehicles, is invalid because it is 

### a subject of general legislation and cannot be 

### constitutionally enacted ina general appropriation bill. In this respect itviolates Sec. 35 of 

### Art. I11 of the Texas Constitution. The rider is 

### also invalid because 

### it is not coveredby the caption or title of the Act, the title being restricted to "purchase" of new cars and making no mention of "sale" 

### ofpresently owned automobiles.

### Hon. Jack

### H. Drake, Page 

### 8 

### (V-1253)

That portion of the general appropriationbill rider which prohibits the purchase 

### of new 

### automobiles 

### l
out of funds therein appropriated 

### is a mere limitation 

### l andrestriction upon the use of the money. Since itis incidental to the appropriation and is 

### not anadditional subject

### oi general legislation, this provision docs not violate Sec. 

### 35, 

### Art, 111 

### of 

### the Texas Constitution and 

### is thereforevalid.
Yours verytruly, 

# 2~2l-J

# I

Attorney General 

# I