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15>l^g^\7 GttSfi*i A rmca^t feo5 f.Clerk Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas P.O. Box 12308 Austin, TX 78711 Jeremy Crespin TDCJ No. 1807429 Hughes Unit Rt. 2, Box 4400 Gatesville, TX 76597

February 28, 2015 

### RE: WR-82,141-04 and W^-82,141-03

Dear Clerk: PLEASE FILE THE ENCLOSED MOTION IN BOTH OF THE ABOVE REFERENECED 

### CASES (WR-82,141-04 and WR-82,141-03). '• 1 Please find enclosed one original of "Applicant's PRO SE 

### Motion for Leave to Suggest Court to Reconsider, On Its Own Initiative, the Denial of Relief in These Writ Application." Please FILE it in both cases and present it to the Court for action. Thank YOU for your time and assistance inthismater
Respectfully,

JC/swd cc: FILE DA x Jerer^ Crespin Applicant PRO SE CresDinJ'CCA WRIT NO(S). WR-82,141-03 AND WR-82,141-04 § IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL EX PARTE § § APPEALS OF TEXAS JEREMY CRESPIN § § AT AUSTIN, TEXAS APPLICANT'S PRO SE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUGGEST COURT TO RECONSIDER, PWl OWN INITIATIVE, THE DENIAL OF RELIEF IN.THESE WRIT APPLICATIONS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THIS COURT: Applicant, Jeremy Crespin, first received.a copy of the convicting court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings") on Monday, February23, 2015. This Court denied felief in these writ applications on Wendsday, February 25, 2015. Those 2 days

were not sufficient, time for Applicant to file OBJECTIONS to the convicting Court's Findings. Priorly, in a "motion to stay", Applicant had asked this Court to require the convicting court clerk to provide Applicant with a copy of the Findings. It appears that, rather than resolve that concern in the open, this Court utilized back channel (and ex parte) communications with the convicting court officals and "dismissed" the motion to stay. The result being, that while Applicant (thankfully) received a copy of the Findings, as a pratical matter Applicant was not given 10 days to file OBJECTIONS to thosefindings (as was requested in the motion to stay). See, Tex. R. App. Proc, 73.4(b)(2). Thus, Applicant request leave to suggest that this Court RECONSIDER, on its own initiative, the denial of relief in these article 11.07 writ cases. See, Tex. R. App. Proc.,79.2(d). And, that upon reconsideration, or rehearing, that this Court 

### consider Applicant's OBJECTIONS to the convicting court's Findings. Primarly, this Court hadpreviously determined that Applicant 

### had alleged facts -that, if true, might entitle him to relief and

### that additonal facts were needed. See, CCAOrder in Writ No. 

## wr-82,141-03 (12/17/2014). Yet., the only additonal facts gathered
was trial counsel's "answer" which contains no facts relative 

## to the grounds raised in thewrit applications.-Thus, the Convicting court's Findings are not supportedby the writ record before this Court. See. JEx parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex.Crim. App.l998)("Although the findings indicate that documents
... 

## corrob.ra.te-Appl-icant'.s allegations.,...our recorjLdoes not include 

## any suchdocuments. The record is devoid of anpevidence..." to support the trial court's findings.) Worse still, the convicting court puportsto make acredibilitydetermination:about trial 

## counsel; however, even if the convicting courtwere,privy to ! confidential attorney-client communications between trial counsel and other defendants, the advice given to other defendants does 1 

### not.support Findings onwhatadvicecounsel gave to Applicant. 

## See, Pensionv. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,.. n. "(1988)(veryreal
concern that counsel can just be lazy in one case is one reason 

### anAnders.brief is necessary). Applicant's OBJECTIONS to the convicin^court's Findings^follow:
. 1) Irrespective of what happen in the juvenile court, the convicing court did not have jurisdiction to enter 

### the Judgment of convictin inwrit No. WR-82,141-03 because Section 8.07 of the Penal Code prevents prosecution 

### and conviction of.any one under the age of 15 for a 

### second degree-4^oJ^W1and on the date of this offense,
. as recorded in the Judgment, Applicant was under the 

## age of 15. See, Exparte Waggoner, 61 S.W.3d. 429, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) 

### 2) An 11.07 writ application seeks relief from a final felony Judgment and, therefore, it is the date of the offense recorded in the Judgment that matters; 

### which, requires that the law in effect on the date of the offense, as recorded in the Judgment, to be 

### applied (and in 1994 Applicant did not have to object, 

## prior to trial, to problems with age restrictions). See, Waggoner, 61 S.W.3d at 431 n.2.3) The express findings set out.on the face of the juvenile court Order limited the transfer to conduct that happen when Applicant was 16 years old; therefore, inspite of any "on or about" language the juvenile court never waived its exclusive jurisdiction over conduct that happen on the date of the offenses, as recorded in the Judgment, and the convicting court did not have any jurisdiction to enter the Judgments of conviction in Writ No(s). WR-82,141-03 and WR-82,14104. 

### See, Moon v. State, No. PD-1215-13 (Tex.Crim.App.

- December 10, 2014)(PUBLISHED)(insufficiency of the evidence to be measured by the express.findings set' out on the face of the juvenile court Order); Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, .491-492 (Tex.Grim.App.2011) 

### (language in jury instruction could limit.the "on or about" dates the jury could consider to dates when the defendant was over 18 years old.)
. 

### 4) ApplicantwasvNOTrequired to cite law in the writ application, rather law must be cited in the memorandum of law, and in his memorandum of law Applicant did cite to Richardson.v. State, 770 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. 

### Crim.App.1989) which relies upon Section 54.02(g) of the Family Code to prohibit the separate prosecution, or rather the retroactive separation of a companion case out of the underlying juvenile court order. See, 

### "Instruction" for 11.07 writ application form (rev. 01/14/2014) 5) The statue, Penal Code 3.01, itself threatened • stacked sentences of these two separatly indicted cases and, regaurdless of any other promises, by pleading guilty in exchange for, 5 years deferred adjudication probation, Applicant avoided.the threatened result. 6) There is a fourth category, that creates ex post facto laws, mainly laws that "permit conviction on quantum of evidence, where that quantum, at the time 

### the new law was enacted, would have been legally insufficient" ^and under the statue of limitations in effect on the

date of these offense^ at the time of trial there would -have-been -i-n-s-ltf-f-i-c-i-en-t evidenee—t-o-sustain- the-Gonvic-tions -SeeVXarmeTI v". Texas; t20^STCr:-l&20, 1&40(2000) ;
- - "
- 

### Phillips v. State, 362 S.W.3d 606, 610 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). (acknowledging fourth category); See, also, ie., Lemell v. 

### State, 915 S.W.2d 486, "488 (Tex
.Crim.App.1995) (failure 

### to prove statue of limitaions dates results in reversial for insufficient evidence). 1. Moreover, while the convictingcourt is allowed to usepersonal, recollection 

### toresolvedisputedfacts (underArticle11.07 §3(d))~ thatprovisionrefers topersonal recollectionabout the case athandNOTanygeneral knowledge the 

### Judgemighthave, especiallywhen there isnothing in thewrit recordbefore this Court to support those findings. See, Evans,. 964 S.W.2dat 648.7) Trial counsel's "answer" contains no facts relative to the grounds raised in the writ application and, thus, the convicting court's Findings concerning ineffecitve assistance of counsel are not supportted by the record before this Court. See, Evans, 964 S.W.2d at 648; See also, Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441, 445, 451 (5th Cir 1996)(additional discovery and evidentiary 

### hearing were required, in part,, when counsel's affidavit did not squarely address the relevant issues). 8) The convicing court made imporoper jumps in logic in its Findings, to include: a) Trail counsel's conduct in other cases proves what knowledge of the law counsel

- -has -gene-rally, what-investigation-counsel ~di~d "±n~~t'he's"e case~s7"~and-what—advice counsel gave to Applicant. b) The fact that trial counsel discussed some unspecified strategies with Applicant proved that counsel actually discussed matters of law that Applicant complains counsel did not in the writ applications. c) The fact that trial counsel was ready 

### to proceed to trial proves that counsel correctly advised Applicant about the guilty plea. d) The fact that Applicant choose to plea guilty proves that trial counsel either did not have to provide adequate advice about the guilty plea or that counsel did provide correct advice. e) That just because Applicant was prescribed anti-psychotic medications that it proves 

### trial counsel was aware of that fact^and that counsel inveestigated that fact»5>impact upon Applicant's competency. 9) The convicting court never resolved numerous controverted previously unresolved facts, to include:' a) Was the complainant present and available 

### to testify on June 15, 2010? See, Applicant's Exhibit "A" (Affidaivt of Debra Crespin). b) Did trial counsel tell Applicant whether the complainant was orwas not available to testify on June 15, 2010? c) Did trial counsel advise Applicant that the State could obtain a conviction without the testimony of the complainant?* d) Did trial counsel advise Applicant that the State could use the "out-cry" statement 

### against Applicaat(to obtain a conviction)? e) Did trial counsel advise Applicant that the State could use the recorded phone call between Applicant and the complaintant to either help convict him or at the sentencing hearing to obtain a harsher sentence? f) Regardless of what the plea papers state, did trial counsel advise Applicant that thedefferred adjudication probation had severe disadvantages that the 5 years in prison plea bargain did not have? 

### g) Did trial counsel investigate at all 

### the problem with,the dates between the juvenile court Order and the indictments and did counsel 

### advise Applicant that if the State only proved at trial the 1994 dates and the defense made the State "elect" which dates it was seeking a conviction for -- that there was a chance 

### to prevent the convietion(s), or at least to prevent a stacked sentence. h) Was trial counsel aware that Applicant had mental helth problems and was taking 

### prescribed anti-psychotic medication AND did trial counsel perform any investigation into Applicant's competency? 

### 10) The police believed that Applicant's demeanour during the recorded phone call between Applicant and the complainant was incriminating and the recording could have been used at sentencing; therefore, the 

### recording should have been supressed when Applicant had invoked his right to counsel and, thereafter, 

### never waived his right to counsel. See, Rhode Island v. 

### Innis, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980)(anytype of incrimination is suffienct. to require suppression). 

### 11) No where does Applicant claim that the registration 

### requirment was an expost facto violation; rather, at all times, becuase Applicant was under the age of 17 on the date of the offenses., Applicant was only required by law to register once a year --•• never every 

### 90 days

-- and the appeal was affirmed soley upon the failure to register.every 90 days (the amendment of the statute of limitaions was a separate error of counsel) 

### AND, insufficient, or no evidence, claims may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, Tex.Code. Crim. Pore, art. 62.001(6) and 62.058. 

### 12) Yet, the convictingf;:courtfailed to aquire a response fromrevocation counsel or revocation appellate counsel. 

### Thus, not.only are the convicting court's Findings not supported 

### by the record, they continuallymisconstrue Applicant's grounds forvrelief.and: the applicable law.. This Court should not have denied relief based upon the Convicting court's Findings. Indeed, it would be a denial of DUE PROCESS to deny relief based upon 

### suchpoor Findings. See ie., Townsend v. Sain, 83 S.Ct. 745 (1963) (state habeas court must provide full and fair opportunity

### to develope facts andhave the factual basis of calims considered), overruled in part on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct. 1715 (1992)(n.5 still requires full factual develope in state court 

### proceedings), Exparte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Grim.App.1967) 

### (same); See also, (Michael) Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1479 (2000).

DISCUSSION OF ONLY TWO OBJECTIONS 

### Rather than represent arguements on each and every one of Applicant's OBJECTIONS, Applicant will focus on the convicting court's lack of jurisdiction to enter the Judgments and that the writ record before this Court does not support the convicting 

### court's Findings. (Applicant has filed numerous pleadings addressing 

### the content of the OBJECTION^ to include, aREPLY to the State's Response, AREPLY to this Court's Order of 12/17/2014, aMotion to STRIKE Trial Counsel's Response, and, of course, the original memorandum of law.)

JURISDICTION TO ENTER JUDGMENTS 

### The convicting court's Findings appear to conclude that 

### because the "proper" date for the offenses are in September 1996, when Applicant was 16 years old, that these is nothing wrong with these convictions. It is correct that it will be important to focus on the conduct whenApplicant was 16 years old. However, 

### the Findings (or conlcusions) overlook that it is the date in the Judgment(s) that will determine if these convictions are 

### improper. Especially, when the only evidence to support the Judgments are the judical confessions that admit to offenses 

### in Septmber 1994 (overwhich the convicting court hadno jurisdiction) Applicant is entitled to RELIEF.Date In Judgments Matter An 11.07 writ application seeks relief from a final felony 

### judgment. See, Tex. Code Crim. Proc, art. 11.07 § 1... The Judgments in these cases record the dates of the offenses, as .required by law, as September 1994. See, Tex. Code Grim. Proc, art. 42.01 §1(14). The only eviednce introduced' at trial were the judical confessions, and they admit to the offenses happening in September 1994- -Thus, the-dates_t.ha.t-mater in .these .cases. _.. . ~2 " "~" are the dates in the Judgment. At this point, the dates in the juvenile court order and the indictment, are immaterial.

Date in Judgments = Applicable Law The law is already establishes by this Court that for offense^ that happen in 1994, there is no requirment to object to a district court's lack of jurisdiction based upon age-related reasons. See, Waggoner, 61 S.W.3d 431 n. 2. Thus, this Court, and the <oncivting court, were incorrect to consider whether Applicant 

### objected under Article 4.18(b)(1). That statue does not apply to these Judgment that Applicant is seeking relief from.

Judgment in WR-82,141-03 is VOID

Moreover, no matter what happen in juvenile court, the convicting court had no jurisdiction to convict Applicant of an offense that'happen when he was under 15 years of age. See, Tex. Penal Code § 8.07; See also, Acts 1975, 64th Leg, p. 2158, ch. 693. Thus, this Court's own case law establishes, that the Judgment in Writ No. WR-82,141-03 is VOID. See, Waggoner, 61. S.W.3d at 431.

Did "White Card" Overrule Waggoner? 

### This Court should not summarly overrule Waggoner, this Court's

### establishedprecedent, with a "white card" denied without written

order. Application of Legal Theories = WR-82,141-04 VOID Thus, established precedent requires reflief from the Judgment in WR-82,141-03. Yet, it does take some application of leagal theories to determine that the Judgment in WR-82,141-04 is VOID. There are several legal theories under which to determine that this Judgment is VOID (which have been discussed in privious 

### pleadings); but, only one legal theory will be addressed here.

Moon v. State = Face of Juvenile Court Order Matters Just recently, this Court has held that the express findings set out on the face of the juvenile court's Order are controlling. 

### See, Moon, PD-1253-13 (applying Family Code § 54.02(h)). The face of the juvenile court's Order in these cases expressly set out that the juvenile court was only transfering conduct, that happen when Applicant was 16 years old and that happen on or 3 about September 1, 1996.

Conduct Not Person Transfered While it is true.that an indictment, and conviction, following
a transfer from the juvenile court may be based upon any conduct 

### that the juvenile court transfered

-- it is only conduct, not
a person, that is transfered. See, Livar v. State, 929 S.W.2d 573, 

### 574 (Tex.App.

- Ft. Worth .1996)(following Ex parte Allen, 618 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex.Crim.App.1981(Op. on reh'g). Thus, 

### 2. See,Ruizv. State, 499 S.W.2d299 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)(underpriorversion of Article 42.01 the date of the offense did not matter unless it reflected the convictionwasbarredby statuteof liomitaionANDAS LONGAS THEDATEWAS IN AGEEMENTWITHTHEJUDICAL CONFESSION). It couldbe argued that under the present version ofArticle 42.01 the date of offense does matter and espcially when it is necceassary to determine theapplicable law andothermaterialmattersAND that the date in the Judgementmust match the JUDICALCONFESSION.the express findings set out on theface of the juvenile court's Order work as limiting language that limits the conduct that 

### is transfered. See, Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 491-492. Therefore, inspite of any "on or about" language in either the juvenile 

## court's order or the indic^»frt

-- the onlyconduct the convicting court had jurisdiction over was from when Applicant was 16 years 

### old. Id. The juvenile court never waived its exclusive jurisdiction over any conduct that happen in September 1994 (the dates in 

### the Judgments and Judical Confessions). Therefore, the Judgewrrt 

### in Writ No. WR-82,141-04 for an offense that happen on Septmeber 1, 

### 1994 is VOID (as well as the Judg&wrrt in WR-82,1.4-lfB). Applicant
is entitfiled to RELIEF.

FINDINGS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD!. Is there any doubt that even when the state does not have to offer any post-convction relief, that once the state chooses 

### to offer post- conviction relief procedures applicant's are entitled 

### to DUE PROCESS in using those procedures? Applicant has not te^ <% afforded DUE PROCESS when the trial court continualy misconstrued 

### his grounds for relief and failed to allowApplicant an opportunity to gather additional evidence to support his grounds for relief. For instance, this Court hadpriorly determined that Applicant's grounds that revocation and revocatioi^aappellate counsel were 

### ineffective to fail to object to the revocation of probationibased 

### upon the sex offender registration requirments "if true, might entitle him to relief." See, CCA Order in WR-82,141-03 (12/17/2014). 

### Yet, when the convicting court's Findings misconstued that ground as some type of complaint about an ex post facto law, this Court did not revisit its original determination that there was a vaild calim made in that grounds*No Facts in Trial Counsel's "Answer" 

### The simple fact is that trial counsel's "answer", that is devoid of any supporting facts, can not support any Findings 

### of Fact.. See, Exparte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008)(no deference to findings and conclusions that are not supportted 

### by the record). The only "fact" in trial counsel's "answer" is that counsel "was able to secure [Applicant] a five year probation 

### which.he quickly._.v.iolated." (emphasis a_dded)

. This fact only
serves to affirm, not refute, Applicant's grounds. Applicant's most basic complainant is that trial counsel, was so pleased with himself at securing the most lenient, plea bargain allowed by law, that counsel did not fell the need to explain to Applicant 

### little things like the differences between regular "probation" 

### and deferred adjudication probation. In short, counsel's response, shows that, once again, this case is not imporant enough to merit his precious time to eVplain the relevant facts and law. How on earth such an "answer" from counsel can support the Findings is lost upon Applicant.
Not About Credibility All the convicing court did was find that trial counsel
was credifable. Okay, great. But, what facts did counsel diclose that were creditable? Only the one.-- that'he secured the most 

### 3. Thejuvenilecourt's Orderlimits theconduct in.WR-82,141-03 to exactly 

### happening onSeptember 1, 1996 (not "on orabout"). 4. Therecordalso does not support theconvictingcourt's<finding that,the 

### pleapapers explained thatifApplicantwasplacedon.deferredadjudication probationhe couldbe sentencedanywherewithin the applicablerange. First, at the time of thepleaApplicantdidNOTknow thecorrect termilogy. Andwhat the 

### pleapapers actually sayis thatApplicantwaspleaing to "Deferredcommunity supervisionfor 5years" andif"unadjudicatedcommunity supervision"wereviolated he couldbe sentenced anywherewithin the range. NEVERDOTHEPLEAPAPERS COMBINE THETERMS "DEFERRED" and "UNADJUDICATED". Thus, Applicant did not understand, fromthepleapapers, that the "probation"he wasagreeing to couldresult inaLIFE senteceifrevoked. ; . inrio\/ n ; *. 

### 5. See, ExparteImoudou, 234S.W.3d866, 871n.4(Tex.Crim.App.l992)(alenient sentecedoes not refute ineffective assistance), ExparteLangley, 833 S.W.2dl41, 144(Tex.Crim.App.1992)(same).lenient plea bargain allowed by law. Thus, the resolution of these cases is NOT about credibility. It is about the lack of facts to support any Findings made bythe convicting court. Sure, there are some facts disclosed by the trial record. But, it is those exact proceedings that Applicant has.raised as being Consitutinally infrim. Meaning, whatever was said on the record and in open court is NOT inline with the previously unknown, and confidential, communications between Applicant and trial counsel.. Thus, the trial record does not. resolve the disputed facts -- it only makes the facts disputed. It is the convicwrt^ court's duty to gather additonal, facts to resolve the disputed facts.Townsend, 83 S.Ct. at 757.

CONCLUSION And, that is just what this Court has already had to Order the convicting court to do -- gather additional, facts. Yet, I trial counsel's "answer" is not sufficient additonal facts to resolve the controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of Applicant's confinement. Thus, the writ record doeSnot support the Findings made by the convicting court. This Court should reject the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and rather than deny relief, ORDER the conviciting court to gather additional facts to resolve the disputed facts (ex. was the complainant 

### present at court and available to testify on June 15, 2012). The failure to do so is a denial of DUE PROCESS (for which the federal courts may. resolve).

PRAYER 

### Thus, Applicant, Jeremy Crespin, asks for this Court's LEAVE to suggest that this Court, on its own intiative, RECONSIDER

### the denial of relief, based upon the convicting court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of LawWITHOUT AHEARING, .in both Writ No(s). 

### WR-82,141-03 and WR-82,141-04; AND, ANY AND ALL OTHER RELIEF THIS
COURT FINDS PROPER IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. Respectfully Submitted, 

# 5 Jeremy^Crespin TDCJ No. 1807429 Hughes Unit Rt. 2, Box 4400 Gatesville, TX 76597

APPLICANT PRO SE

VERIFICATION / CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

### I, Jeremy Crespin, TDCJ Id No. 1807429, being presently incarcerated in the Hughes Unit of TDCJ-GID, in Coryell County, Texas, do declare under the penalty of perjury that the'facts inthis motion for leave are true and correct and that I have 

### caused a copy of this motion to be served on the Dallas County District Attorney on the date executeAbelow byplacing it into the prisonmail system to mailed 1st class USPS. 

## EXECUTEDon this the % ft day: of P»p.lo^aAf^ 2015.
Jeremy Crespin A Applicant PRO SrE*