II 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3633 

To require the withholding of United States contributions to the United 

Nations until the President certifies that the United Nations is not 

engaged in global taxation schemes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 11, 2006 

Mr. INHOFE (for himself, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. WARNER, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. 

BUNNING, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. KYL, Mr. ENSIGN, Mr. COBURN, 

Mr. SHELBY, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. DEMINT, Mr. CHAMBLISS, Mrs. 

HUTCHISON, Mr. VITTER, Mr. ISAKSON, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. THUNE, Mr. 

BOND, Mr. SMITH, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. GREGG, Mr. BURNS, Mr. TALENT, 

Mr. BURR, Mr. ALLEN, and Mrs. DOLE) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To require the withholding of United States contributions 

to the United Nations until the President certifies that 

the United Nations is not engaged in global taxation 

schemes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protection against 

5 United Nations Taxation Act of 2006,’’ the ‘‘PUNT Act 


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1 of 2006,’’ or as the ‘‘Helms-Biden Reauthorization Act of 

2 2006’’. 

3 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

4 Congress makes the following findings: 

5 (1) Congress has previously taken action in op6 position to United Nations taxation schemes in sec7 tion 921 of the United Nations Reform Act of 1999 

8 (chapter 2 of title IX of the Admiral James W. 

9 Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act, 

10 Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by 

11 section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106–113 and con12 tained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A– 

13 478) (commonly referred to as ‘‘Helms-Biden’’)). 

14 (2) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop15 ment Report, released September 7, 2005, envisages 

16 ‘‘raising additional revenue through international 

17 taxation mechanisms’’. 

18 (3) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop19 ment Report states, ‘‘Several governments are as20 sessing the implications of an international tax on 

21 aviation fuel. Even set at a low level, such a tax 

22 could raise $9-$10 billion a year.’’ 

23 (4) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop24 ment Report states, ‘‘Another proposal calls for a 

25 flat-rate tax on airline passenger tickets,’’ with sevVerDate Aug 31 2005 01:43 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3633.IS S3633

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1 eral countries having ‘‘reached an agreement in prin2 ciple to introduce a national air ticketing tax to fi3 nance development spending’’. 

4 (5) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop5 ment Report states, ‘‘Other countries have advocated 

6 a tax on currency transactions. Indeed, Belgium has 

7 already passed legislation on the adoption of a cur8 rency tax.’’ 

9 (6) It has been estimated that a ‘‘Tobin tax,’’ 

10 named after Dr. James Tobin who first proposed it, 

11 would raise $13,000,000,000,000 from a small levy 

12 on international currency transactions. 

13 (7) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop14 ment Report states, ‘‘Advocates for the use of inter15 national levies to mobilize financing for development 

16 claim that the approach would produce important 

17 benefits for the MDGs [Millennium Development 

18 Goals] and beyond.’’ 

19 (8) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop20 ment Report highlights the fact that, in a 2004 re21 port, the Government of France argues that new 

22 international taxes and fees are a good idea. 

23 (9) The 2005 United Nations’ Human Develop24 ment Report recognizes that ‘‘the United States, in 


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1 particular, is opposed to the approach’’ of employing 

2 international taxation mechanisms. 

3 (10) United Nations officials have made numer4 ous and repeated proposals to provide financing for 

5 the United Nations outside the scrutiny of Member 

6 States of the United Nations, including borrowing 

7 from international financial institutions, assuming 

8 control of bonds issued by Member States, and im9 posing taxes on an extensive range of transactions, 

10 goods, and services. 

11 (11) The 1994 United Nations’ Human Devel12 opment Report stated that ‘‘[i]t is appropriate that 

13 the proceeds of an international tax be devoted to 

14 international purposes and be placed at the disposal 

15 of international institutions’’. 

16 (12) On January 14, 1996, United Nations 

17 General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that 

18 an international tax would mean that ‘‘[he would] 

19 not be under the daily financial will of the Member 

20 States’’. 

21 (13) The United Nations and its organizations 

22 are replete with mismanagement, waste, corruption, 

23 and inefficiency which cost American taxpayers mil24 lions of dollars each year. 


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1 (14) The power to tax is an attribute of sov2 ereignty. 

3 (15) The United Nations does not have the at4 tributes of sovereignty and is not a sovereign power. 

5 (16) The United Nations has no legal authority 

6 to impose taxes on United States citizens. 

7 (17) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

8 Representative to the United Nations wrote to col9 leagues at the United Nations to caution against 

10 international spending targets ‘‘which bear no rela11 tion to countries’ needs or ability to use aid effec12 tively’’ and to warn against ‘‘ignor[ing] the need for 

13 an enabling environment at the national level for aid 

14 to be effective in promoting development’’. 

15 (18) The Report of the United Nations Com16 mission on the Private Sector and Development esti17 mates that developing countries have 

18 $9,400,000,000,000 in private financial assets that 

19 cannot be fully mobilized because of corruption and 

20 inadequate legal protection for property and con21 tracts. 

22 (19) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

23 Representative to the United Nations observed, 

24 ‘‘Prosperity requires institutions at the national level 


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1 that generate wealth and enable countries to partici2 pate in the global economy.’’ 

3 (20) As a matter of prioritization, foreign na4 tional and international corruption and legal protec5 tion for property and contracts must be addressed 

6 before additional spending of American taxpayer dol7 lars on foreign aid exacerbates these problems. 

8 (21) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

9 Representative to the United Nations observed, ‘‘De10 velopment is about putting into place a complex set 

11 of policies and institutions that will generate eco12 nomic growth and sustain it over the long haul to 

13 the benefit of all countries.’’ 

14 (22) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

15 Representative to the United Nations observed, ‘‘A 

16 global partnership is predicated on the acceptance by 

17 developing countries of their national responsibility 

18 to undertake specific reforms to improve their eco19 nomic governance and respect for human rights and 

20 the rule of law.’’ 

21 (23) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

22 Representative to the United Nations stated clearly 

23 and firmly that ‘‘the United States is unable to 

24 agree’’ to ‘‘new open-ended donor financial commit25 ments’’. 


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1 (24) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

2 Representative to the United Nations stated clearly 

3 and firmly that ‘‘the U.S. does not accept global aid 

4 targets or global taxes’’. 

5 (25) Any activity by United Nations officials, 

6 personnel, agents, or contractors to develop, advo7 cate, or promote international taxes or fees, except 

8 as noted in section 3(b)(4), is unacceptable and 

9 must be thoroughly investigated. 

10 (26) On August 30, 2005, the United States 

11 Representative to the United Nations cautioned 

12 against ‘‘global governance’’ and objected to 

13 ‘‘assert[ing] a primacy for the United Nations in 

14 international economic governance without respect15 ing the roles and mandates of other institutions’’. 

16 (27) On March 21, 2005, United Nations Sec17 retary-General Kofi Annan addressed the General 

18 Assembly to present a report entitled, ‘‘In Larger 

19 Freedom’’ that advocates, ‘‘Global development as20 sistance must be more than doubled over the next 

21 few years. . . . Each developed country that has not 

22 already done so should establish a timetable to 

23 achieve the 0.7 percent target of gross national in24 come for official development assistance no later 

25 than 2015, starting with significant increases no 


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1 later than 2006, and reaching 0.5 percent by 2009. 

2 The increase should be front-loaded through an 

3 International Finance Facility, and other innovative 

4 sources of financing should be considered for the 

5 longer term.’’ 

6 (28) The term ‘‘innovative sources of financ7 ing’’ involves developing, advocating, endorsing, pub8 licizing, promoting, and collecting international taxes 

9 and fees. 

10 (29) According to the ‘‘In Larger Freedom’’ re11 port, the United Nations proposes to create an inter12 national revenue service named the International Fi13 nance Facility. 

14 (30) This proposed international revenue serv15 ice would extract long-term binding financial com16 mitments from developed nations and collect this 

17 money. 

18 (31) This proposed international revenue serv19 ice would also issue debt on the global market for 

20 bonds issued by supranational institutions and agen21 cies and transfer wealth to developing nations. 

22 (32) The January 2003 proposal of the United 

23 Kingdom for an International Financing Facility, 

24 which the United Nations has endorsed, states, 

25 ‘‘There have been other proposals for new and innoVerDate Aug 31 2005 01:43 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3633.IS S3633

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1 vative ways to raise funds to meet these goals, in2 cluding a Tobin tax, arms tax and an issue of IMF 

3 special drawing rights (SDRs).’’ 

4 (33) On Friday, June 10, 2005, at the United 

5 Nations in New York, the Inter-Parliamentary 

6 Union (IPU), in cooperation with the United Na7 tions Department for Economic and Social Affairs 

8 (Financing for Development Office), organized a 

9 panel discussion entitled, ‘‘Promoting innovative 

10 sources of financing for development: What role for 

11 parliaments?’’. 

12 (34) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

13 2005, laid the lobbying groundwork for global taxes 

14 and fees, stating ‘‘The panel aimed at providing the 

15 United Nations with a first direct impression of the 

16 political support that currently exists at the par17 liamentary level or that may be mobilized in future 

18 for innovative sources of development financing.’’ 

19 (35) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

20 2005, concluded that ‘‘most proposed new sources of 

21 financing will eventually require a legislative frame22 work either to regulate existing financing mecha23 nisms or to create brand new ones’’. 

24 (36) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

25 2005, stated, ‘‘[T]he role of parliaments is essential 


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1 to mobilize the required political support for the var2 ious innovative mechanisms on the table.’’ 

3 (37) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

4 2005, lobbied to maximize new international taxes, 

5 ‘‘The seven parliamentarians on the panel agreed 

6 that no single innovative proposal alone would suf7 fice to fill the financing gap left open by traditional 

8 sources (estimated between 50 and 100 billion dol9 lars a year). It was important therefore that a num10 ber of proposals be advanced at the same time.’’ 

11 (38) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

12 2005, explained the rationale behind the first, most 

13 promising way to levy new international revenues 

14 from the likes of United States nationals, stating, 

15 ‘‘Among these, the IFF was likely to be a favourite 

16 because it did not require universality, could mobi17 lize considerable sums, created a more predictable 

18 and stable flow, and could easily be scrutinized by 

19 contributing countries’ parliaments. Because the 

20 IFF can be implemented in the short term, it con21 stitutes the most rapid response. . . . The first IFF, 

22 to raise $4 billion . . . will be launched this year.’’ 

23 (39) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

24 2005, lobbied to find the most efficient way to trans25 fer wealth out of the United States, stating, ‘‘On reVerDate Aug 31 2005 01:43 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3633.IS S3633

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1 mittances, the impression of the panel was that it 

2 should not be too difficult to find some creative solu3 tion to reduce the average 20 percent transaction 

4 fee, and thus increase the overall flow.’’ 

5 (40) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

6 2005, lobbied to make life easier for illegal immi7 grants, stating, ‘‘A more intractable problem, how8 ever, has to do with facilitating money transfers for 

9 illegal migrants who fear exposure to the authorities. 

10 The situation has become particularly difficult in the 

11 United States, the largest remittance-sending coun12 try, following the tightening of security measures 

13 since the September 11th attacks.’’ 

14 (41) The United Nations panel of June 10, 

15 2005, confronted the challenges of international tax16 ation and offered some glimmer of hope, ‘‘When it 

17 comes to discussions about international taxation, 

18 some of the parliamentarians on the panel felt 

19 strongly that this would for several years to come be 

20 a political non-starter in too many legislatures (al21 though the Canadian House of Commons did adopt 

22 a motion on an international currency transaction 

23 tax that expressed support for such a tax ‘in concert 

24 with the international community’). The reasons ad25 duced for this negative assessment were the classic 


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1 ones: international taxes can distort investment and 

2 trade flows, can undermine national sovereignty, 

3 may be impossible to universalize, and may even 

4 tamper with a country’s defence capacities (in the 

5 case of taxes on arms sales).’’ 

6 (42) In order to tax with the greatest of ease, 

7 the United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, advo8 cated the following: ‘‘For other panelists, however, 

9 at least some new fiscal levies could be instituted 

10 without seeking a universal consensus. The best ex11 ample of this is given by flight departure taxes; 

12 these can be implemented at the country level and 

13 can generate a fairly predictable and rich stream.’’ 

14 (43) On August 28, 2005, Asia-Europe Dia15 logue & Partner offered their Declaration on Innova16 tive Sources of Financing for Development, ‘‘At the 

17 initiative of President Luiz Ina ́cio Lula da Silva, of 

18 Brazil, we gathered in New York, on 20th Sep19 tember 2004, to . . . increase financing for develop20 ment. . . . [T]he international discussions of innova21 tive sources of funding have gained momentum. The 

22 issue has become a regular feature in UN discus23 sions on financing for development and has been in 

24 the agenda of multilateral financial institutions and 

25 other important international fora.’’ 


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1 (44) The United Nations General Assembly 

2 agenda item dated on October 15, 2004, and titled 

3 ‘‘Follow-up to and implementation of the outcome of 

4 the International Conference on Financing for De5 velopment’’ states the determination of the General 

6 Assembly ‘‘to continue to implement and build fur7 ther on the commitments made and agreements 

8 reached at the International Conference on Financ9 ing for Development and to strengthen the coordi10 nated and coherent engagement of all relevant stake11 holders in the financing for development process’’. 

12 (45) The World Federalist Movement Web page 

13 on Global Economic Governance states that organi14 zation’s position on global levies or taxes, noting the 

15 United Nations’ calls for major efforts to mobilize 

16 additional financial resources and stating that a 

17 treaty or convention for collection of revenues for 

18 funding is in the works: ‘‘For multilateral institu19 tions to be effective and independent they must have 

20 stable and adequate funding. There is a fundamental 

21 need for new financial mechanisms to provide for a 

22 strengthened and democratized multilateral system. 

23 Since the U.N. conference on Financing for Develop24 ment in 2002, more intergovernmental attention has 

25 been given to the possibility of innovative sources of 


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1 finance such as environmental charge, currency 

2 transaction taxation, taxation of arms trade, Inter3 national Financial Facility as proposed by the Brit4 ish government, and remittance’s benefits as well as 

5 voluntary contributions through credit cards and lot6 teries. 

7 ‘‘Several reports have been written on the feasi8 bility of some of these innovative sources of finance 

9 by Member-States and U.N. bodies. In the note by 

10 the U.N. Secretary-General on innovative sources of 

11 financing for development, he calls for ‘major efforts 

12 by developing countries and the international com13 munity to mobilize additional financial resource’. 

14 Brazil, France, Chile and Spain have taken the lead 

15 in a campaign for Action against Hunger and Pov16 erty emphasizing the need for innovative finance 

17 mechanisms if the Millennium Development Goals 

18 (MDGs) are to be accomplished. 

19 ‘‘Whereas the current intergovernmental debate 

20 about innovative sources of finance is placed within 

21 the framework of financing development and more 

22 specifically the MDGs, WFM believes that the de23 bate should be seen in a broader perspective to also 

24 include the element of independent funding of multi25 lateral organizations. 


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1 ‘‘At present the most powerful countries provide 

2 the vast majority of funding for international organi3 zations and possess an immense and unbalanced 

4 control over the political decisions of these organiza5 tions. To reverse this trend, WFM calls for a mix6 ture of state and independent funding of inter7 national organizations to ensure fair and democratic 

8 decision-making processes exempt from power poli9 tics. WFM thus believes that independent funding 

10 for multilateral organizations would address the 

11 challenges and obstacles for achieving democratic 

12 global governance. 

13 ‘‘WFM specifically consider the global taxation 

14 of transnational currency transactions to be the 

15 most important source of independent funding and 

16 advocates a global implementation of the Tobin tax. 

17 Eventually, in cooperation with other NGOs and 

18 legal experts, WFM hopes to draft a treaty or con19 vention for collection of revenues for funding the 

20 multilateral system that can be proposed and carried 

21 forth in intergovernmental processes.’’ 

22 (46) The International Financial Institutions in 

23 Latin America state on their Web page the fol24 lowing: ‘‘Another study on innovative sources of fi25 nancing for development, commissioned by the U.N. 


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1 from WIDER (The World Institute for Development 

2 Economics Research), was published in August 

3 2004. Undertaken by Professor Anthony B. Atkin4 son of Nuffield College, Oxford University, the study 

5 examines some of the same potential sources for ad6 ditional aid as well as considering how international 

7 taxes might be administered by national authorities. 

8 ‘‘In addition to the Tobin tax, it considers a 

9 global environmental levy, a carbon-use tax, applied 

10 at a rate of US4.8 cents a US gallon (E 0.01 per 

11 litre). This tax ‘levied only on high-income countries 

12 could indeed raise some US$60 billion a year.’.’’ 

13 (47) On August 17, 2004, the United Nations 

14 General Assembly distributed a document entitled, 

15 ‘‘Innovative Sources of Financing for Development’’, 

16 which stated the following: 

17 ‘‘The General Assembly, in its resolution 

18 58/230 of 23 December 2003, decided to con19 sider at its fifty-ninth session possible innova20 tive sources of financing for development, and 

21 requested the Secretary-General to submit the 

22 result of the analysis on this issue as called for 

23 in paragraph 44 of the Monterrey Consensus of 

24 the International Conference on Financing for 

25 Development. In the Consensus, heads of State 


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1 and Government recognized the value of explor2 ing innovative sources of finance provided that 

3 those sources did not unduly burden developing 

4 countries, and agreed to study, in the appro5 priate forums, the results of the analysis re6 quested from the Secretary-General on possible 

7 innovative sources of finance. 

8 ‘‘In this connection, it should be recalled 

9 that the General Assembly, in the context of the 

10 five-year review of the implementation of the 

11 outcome of the World Summit for Social Devel12 opment, adopted resolution S-24/2 of 1 July 

13 2000, on further initiatives for social develop14 ment, in which it called for a rigorous analysis 

15 of the advantages, disadvantages and other im16 plications of proposals for developing new and 

17 innovative sources of funding, both public and 

18 private, for dedication to social development 

19 and poverty eradication programmes. 

20 ‘‘In response to the decisions of the Assem21 bly, the Department of Economic and Social 

22 Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat com23 missioned the World Institute for Development 

24 Economics Research of the United Nations 

25 University (UNUWIDER) to undertake, during 


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1 the period from 2003 to 2004, a study of new 

2 and innovative sources of development finance. 

3 The purpose of the study was not to devise new 

4 financing mechanisms for development but to 

5 consider some of the better-known existing pro6 posals, focusing on their design and policy im7 plications. An international expert on fiscal 

8 issues, Professor Anthony B. Atkinson, Warden 

9 of Nuffield College, Oxford University, led the 

10 project, which engaged a number of academics 

11 to prepare separate papers on a selection of in12 novative financing proposals. The UNU13 WIDER study, entitled New Sources of Devel14 opment Finance, will be published by Oxford 

15 University Press in 2004. 

16 ‘‘An edited version of a policy-focused sum17 mary, entitled ‘New Sources of Development Fi18 nance: Funding the Millennium Development 

19 Goals’, prepared by Professor Atkinson in his 

20 capacity as director of the UNU-WIDER study, 

21 is contained in the annex to the present note. 

22 It presents the analytical framework, short 

23 summaries of the seven proposed sources of 

24 funding (i.e., global environmental taxes, tax on 

25 currency transactions, creation of new special 


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1 drawing rights, an international finance facility, 

2 increased private donations for development, a 

3 global lottery and global premium bond, and in4 creased remittances from emigrants), an over5 view of the key findings, and some conclu6 sions.’’. 

7 (48) The foreword to the United Nations Uni8 versity book entitled ‘‘New Sources of Development 

9 Finance’’ observes that, ‘‘Proposals for any form of 

10 global taxation meet immediate opposition from pow11 erful elements in the US Congress. On the other 

12 hand, there is widespread appreciation of the need 

13 for new resource flows. . . .’’ 

14 (49) The foreword to the book also explains 

15 that earmarking of taxes for particular uses can be 

16 an effective tactic for the implementation of new 

17 taxes, stating that ‘‘[w]e can learn from the analysis 

18 of the ear-marking of taxes. . .’’. 

19 (50) The foreword to the book also clearly ex20 plains the lobbying goal of the book, stating, ‘‘The 

21 ultimate aim is to help break the present impasse in 

22 external finance for developing countries, and we be23 lieve this study will make an important contribution 

24 to the debate.’’ 


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1 (51) One contributor to New Sources of Devel2 opment Finance suggests that taxes be collected by 

3 national governments and then provided for inter4 national purposes, perhaps through ‘‘an inter5 national agency’’. Another contributor suggests the 

6 establishment of a ‘‘World Tax Authority’’ under the 

7 United Nations system. 

8 (52) In June 2001, Ruben P. Mendez, formerly 

9 of the United Nations Development Programme, 

10 presented a paper entitled ‘‘The Case for Global 

11 Taxes: An Overview’’ to the United Nations ad hoc 

12 Expert Group Meeting on Innovation in Mobilizing 

13 Global Resources for Development. 

14 (53) In ‘‘The Case for Global Taxes’’ Mr. 

15 Mendez claims that as a percentage of gross na16 tional product, official development assistance from 

17 the United States to foreign nations ‘‘runs at about 

18 0.22 per cent, or less than one-third of the univer19 sally accepted norm of 0.7 per cent’’ and explains 

20 that the public transfer of resources from the United 

21 States to foreign nations could be brought to 22 to 

22 28 percent, or one hundred times what it is now, 

23 through a formal system of international taxation of 

24 the United States. 


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1 (54) According to Jeffrey D. Sachs, a Special 

2 Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Annan 

3 on the Millennium Development Goals, the rate of 

4 United States assistance remains at 0.15 percent 

5 and, therefore, ‘‘We are short by $65 billion each 

6 year.’’ 

7 (55) In his 2001 United Nations paper, Mr. 

8 Mendez states, ‘‘Permits to pollute, in fact, are a 

9 form of corrective, or ‘Pigovian’, taxation and could 

10 presage the acceptance of global taxation per se in 

11 view of the interest of the big industrial polluting 

12 nations in this approach.’’ 

13 (56) The 2001 United Nations paper continues, 

14 ‘‘In the international economy, however, the global 

15 commons are generally used free of charge. It is 

16 therefore only logical to have a system of global 

17 taxes, or user charges. The global commons may be 

18 defined as those physical attributes of the universe 

19 that fall outside national jurisdiction or ownership. 

20 In addition to the traditional, tangible kinds of geo21 graphical space and features, e.g., land, bodies of 

22 water, ocean depths, air, natural resources and eco23 systems, they include impalpable but nevertheless 

24 important physical facts such as the different levels 


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1 of outer space, the orbits of geostationary satellites, 

2 and the electromagnetic spectrum.’’ 

3 (57) The 2001 United Nations paper reflects, 

4 ‘‘Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist James 

5 Tobin of Yale has proposed taxing foreign exchange 

6 transactions. . . . Professor Tobin has noted that it 

7 could also be a ‘terrific fund raiser’ that ‘could cover 

8 everything’—a potential that has not been lost on 

9 people concerned with international fund raising, 

10 who have now latched on to the ‘Tobin tax’ band11 wagon.’’ 

12 (58) Journalist Steven Solomon, a former staff 

13 reporter at Forbes Magazine, estimates that the 

14 Tobin tax ‘‘might net some $13 trillion a year’’. 

15 (59) The 2001 United Nations paper alter16 nately advocates the creation of a foreign currency 

17 exchange to replace the role banks currently play 

18 and to levy user charges. 

19 (60) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo20 cates an ad valorem tax on international trade, 

21 which the paper claims is justified, arguing, ‘‘trade 

22 uses the global commons, and 95 percent consists of 

23 goods transported by ocean freight. It would be a 

24 form of user fee. An alternative would be a tax on 

25 ocean freight.’’ 


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1 (61) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo2 cates, ‘‘Military expenditures and arms transfers 

3 could also be taxed.’’ 

4 (62) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo5 cates, ‘‘Taxes could also be on specific traded com6 modities, for instance, internationally traded oil, 

7 other exhaustible materials . . . or manufactured 

8 goods.’’ 

9 (63) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo10 cates ‘‘serious attempts to compensate [developing 

11 countries] for the opportunity costs of conservation 

12 or to promote the generation of positive externalities 

13 whose returns these countries are unable to cap14 ture’’. 

15 (64) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo16 cates taxing, overflight, stating, ‘‘Like the high seas, 

17 international air space provides a passage for inter18 national transport. Since it lies outside national ju19 risdiction, is used by aircraft of various nations and 

20 is congestible, there is logic behind having the inter21 national public sector assert global ownership and 

22 charge user fees. One way this could be accom23 plished is through a surcharge on international air 

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1 General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, but not repeated 

2 since an outcry by a group of US congressmen.’’ 

3 (65) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo4 cates, ‘‘In addition to taxing and tapping foreign ex5 change transactions, discussed at the beginning of 

6 this section, there are two measures of a monetary 

7 nature, with considerable possibilities for fund rais8 ing, that are worth revisiting: Special drawing rights 

9 (SDRs) and IMF gold holdings.’’ 

10 (66) The 2001 United Nations paper also advo11 cates, ‘‘The ‘Bhagwati tax’ is one of many which 

12 have an economic and ethical rationale but must be 

13 appraised in terms of political and national juridical 

14 considerations. Although not presented initially with15 in a public economics framework, it can be seen as 

16 a way for the developed countries to compensate 

17 generators of positive externalities—the countries of 

18 origin of the highly trained emigrants, who benefit 

19 the receiving countries and do not produce returns 

20 that can be captured by their home countries. Such 

21 taxes have existed for some time, such as the exit 

22 taxes of the Russian Federation and the former 

23 USSR, although Bhagwati’s point is that it is the 

24 beneficiaries, including the recipient countries, which 

25 should pay the taxes.’’ 


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1 (67) In the 2001 United Nations paper, 

2 Mendez declared that, ‘‘The concept of automaticity 

3 in international public financing [mandatory inter4 national taxation] was first discussed in an official 

5 international forum in 1977, at the United Nations 

6 Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) in Nairobi. 

7 It was developed and incorporated in concrete pro8 posals in subsequent studies and reports, in 1978 

9 and 1980, by the United Nations Environmental 

10 Programme (UNEP) and the Secretary-General to 

11 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and 

12 the General Assembly on financing the UNCOD 

13 Plan of Action.7 These proposals were first analysed 

14 in an international public finance framework in my 

15 1992 book on the subject. . . .’’ 

16 (68) The global tax proposals have thus been 

17 developed from 1977 to the present, calling into 

18 question the validity of the Helms-Biden certification 

19 required under section 921 of the United Nations 

20 Reform Act of 1999 (chapter 2 of title IX of the Ad21 miral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign 

22 Relations Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as en23 acted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 

24 106–113 and contained in appendix G of that Act; 


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1 113 Stat. 1501A–478) (commonly referred to as 

2 ‘‘Helms-Biden’’)). 

3 (69) The 2001 United Nations paper concludes 

4 simply that ‘‘the dawn of global taxation appears to 

5 be at hand’’. 

6 (70) The handling by the United Nations of the 

7 global tax issue is discussed in the book, ‘‘World 

8 Democratic Federalism,’’ by Myron J. Frankman, 

9 who says that one factor behind the ‘‘hostile reac10 tion’’ of the United States Congress ‘‘to activity by 

11 the UN aimed at the promotion of any global taxes 

12 was the publication by the United Nations Develop13 ment Program of a 1996 book titled, ‘The Tobin 

14 Tax’ ’’. 

15 (71) The United Nations and international or16 ganizations have developed, advocated, endorsed, 

17 promoted, and publicized proposals concerning the 

18 imposition of taxes and fees on United States na19 tionals in order to raise revenue for the United Na20 tions and international organizations. 

21 SEC. 3. PAYMENT OF CERTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS CONTIN22 GENT UPON CERTIFICATION OF NO UNITED 

23 NATIONS TAXATION SCHEMES. 

24 (a) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF ASSESSED CON25 TRIBUTIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 


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1 law, until the President submits the certification required 

2 under subsection (b) for a fiscal year, the United States 

3 shall withhold during such year 20 percent of assessed 

4 contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations 

5 and other applicable international organizations. 

6 (b) CERTIFICATION.— 

7 (1) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—The certifi8 cation referred to in subsection (a) is an annual cer9 tification made by the President to Congress that 

10 the following conditions have been met: 

11 (A) NO UNITED NATIONS LEGAL TAXATION

12 AUTHORITY.—Except as provided in paragraph 

13 (2), neither the United Nations nor any of its 

14 specialized or affiliated agencies nor any other 

15 international organization has the authority 

16 under United States law to impose taxes or fees 

17 on the United States Government or on the sev18 eral States or on United States corporate citi19 zens or on United States nationals. 

20 (B) NO TAXES OR FEES.—Except as pro21 vided in paragraph (2), a tax or fee has not 

22 been imposed on the United States Government 

23 or on the several States or on United States 

24 corporate citizens or on United States nationals 

25 by the United Nations or any of its specialized 


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1 or affiliated agencies or any other international 

2 organization. 

3 (C) NO TAXATION PROPOSALS.—Except as 

4 provided in paragraph (2), neither the United 

5 Nations nor any of its specialized or affiliated 

6 agencies nor any other international organiza7 tion has developed, advocated, endorsed, pro8 moted, or publicized any proposal concerning 

9 the imposition of a tax or fee on any United 

10 States national or any income earned in the 

11 United States in order to raise revenue for the 

12 United Nations, any foreign government, or any 

13 international organization. 

14 (2) EXCEPTION.—The conditions in subpara15 graphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1) do not 

16 apply to— 

17 (A) fees for publications or other kinds of 

18 fees that are not tantamount to a tax on United 

19 States citizens; 

20 (B) the World Intellectual Property Orga21 nization; or 

22 (C) the staff assessment costs of the 

23 United Nations and its specialized or affiliated 

24 agencies. 


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1 SEC. 4. SAVINGS CLAUSE. 

2 (a) ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS.— 

3 (1) IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—It shall 

4 not be in order in the House of Representatives to 

5 consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, mo6 tion, or conference report suspending, waiving, or re7 pealing the requirement in section 3(a). 

8 (2) IN SENATE.—It shall not be in order in the 

9 Senate to consider any bill, joint resolution, amend10 ment, motion, or conference report suspending, 

11 waiving, or repealing the requirement in section 

12 3(a). 

13 (b) WAIVER OF RULE IN SENATE.—Subsection (a) 

14 may be waived or suspended in the Senate only by the 

15 affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members, duly chosen 

16 and sworn. 

17 (c) APPEALS.— 

18 (1) PROCEDURE.—Appeals in the Senate from 

19 the decisions of the Chair relating to any provision 

20 of this section shall be limited to 1 hour, to be 

21 equally divided between, and controlled by, the 

22 mover and the manager of the bill, resolution, 

23 amendment, or conference report, as the case may 

24 be. 

25 (2) SUSTAINABILITY OF APPEAL.—An affirma26 tive vote of three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen 


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1 and sworn, shall be required in the Senate to sustain 

2 an appeal of the ruling of the Chair on a point of 

3 order raised under this section. 

Æ 


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