# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 19 , 20 20 *

Decided May 20 , 2020

Before
JOEL M. FLAUM , Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER , Circuit Judge

AMY C

. BARRETT , Circuit Judge

No. 1 9

- 2 621
JOHN DAN BUMPHUS , JR. , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

v

. UNIQUE PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, et al. , Defendants

- Appell ees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois

.
No. 1 6

- CV

- 3 1 2

- SMY

- GCS

Staci M. Yandle , Judge

.

O R D E R John Bumphus, Jr. , seek s to contest the rejection of his claims for wrongful termination

. A fter t he district court entered its final judgment , Bumphus did not promptly appeal. Instead, he filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) , which the district court denied , precipitating this appeal . We review only the district

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief s and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C)

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 2 621 Page 2

court’s denial of that Rule 60(b) motion and , because th e cour t reasonably decided that the motion did not warrant disturbing the underlying judgment , we affirm.
Bumphus applied to UniQue Personnel Consultants, a job

- placement agency, in 2015. A few days later, he bega n work at a w arehouse

. Soon after, b ack pain prevented him from completing his work. He told supervisors about his back conditions

— including spinal stenosis

— and they told him to bring a doctor’s note explaining his limitations , which he did. In response, the warehouse offered him a different position that paid less

. Bumphus rejected the offer and did not return to the warehouse

. Bumphus sued UniQue and other defendants , and the case proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, the district court considered claims that Bumphus brought against defend a nts under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

– 5 , the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 621 l , and under state law

. The court ruled that Bu mphus had failed to state valid claim s under these law s , but it allowed to stand an additional claim, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) , 42 U.S.C. § 12112, against UniQue. Bumphus appealed from t h e order dismissing some of his claims , and this court ordered him to address whether it should dismiss his appeal for lack of a final judgment

. In response, Bumphus moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal . T his court granted his motion and dismiss ed the appeal

. In the next stage, the district court granted Uni Q ue’s motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim and entered its final judgment . Bumphus did not appeal from that final judgment within the 30

- day time limit

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(a) (1)(A)

. I nstead , ove r 90 days after the entry of judgment, he moved for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 . The district court denied the motion , reasoning that Bumphus had not shown a clerical mistake in the judgment,
see F ED

. R. C IV . P. 60(a), nor had he presented newly discovered evidence or shown any other exceptional reason for the court to grant relief under Rule 60(b).
On appeal , Bumphus devotes most of his brief to arguing that the district court erred when it dismiss ed for failure to state a claim his discrimination and state

- law theories for relief

. But the merits of t h at dismissal are not properly before us because Bumphus did not appeal from the district court’s judgment within the required 30 days of its entry

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(a)(1)(A) . Moreover, h is Rule 60 motion, which he filed over 90 days from the entry of the judgment, did not toll the 30

- day deadline to appeal. See F ED

. R. A PP . P. 4 ; Blue v. Int’l. B h d. of Elec. Workers , 676 F.3d 579, 583

– 84 (7th Cir.No. 19

- 2 621 Page 3

2012 )

. Therefore, Bumphus’s appeal , which he filed within 30 days of the denial of his Rule 60 motion, is limited to the district court’s denial of that post

- judgment motion.
That brings us to t he propriety of the denial of Bumphus’s Rule 60 motion , which we review deferentially for abuse of discretion

. Dolin v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC , 951 F.3d 882, 886 ( 7th Cir. 2020). Bumphus contends that the district court erred because he presented new evidence that the court had not previously considered before entering summary judgment for UniQue

. R elief under Rule 60 based on “ new ” evidence is allowed only when the movant , using reasonable diligence, could not h ave discovered the evidence before judgment

. See F ED

. R. C IV . P. 60(b)(2). Bumphus asserts that he did not have the evidence before judgment , but he does not say that he could not with diligence have acquired it sooner . Without such an assertion, the district court could permissibly den y the motion. See Gleason v. Jensen , 888 F.3d 847, 853 ( 7th Cir. 2018). Moreover , Bumphus has not refuted the district court’s conclusion that his evidence merely duplicat ed what the court had already considered when ruling on the motion for summary judgment , and thus was not new

. The court therefore properly denied Bumphus’s post

- judgment motion for relief.
We have considered Bumphus’s remaining arguments, and none has me rit.

AFFIRMED