If this opinion indic ates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED May 30, 2024

v No. 362790
Lenawee Circuit Court VICTOR PEREZ RUIZ, LC No. 2021

- 020379

- FC

Defendant

- Appellant.

Before: G ARRETT

, P .J., and S ERVITTO and R EDFORD , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first

- degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC

- I) (victim under 13 and defendant over 17), MCL 750.520b (1)(a) and (2)(b) ; and
second

- degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC

- II) (victim under 13 and defendant over 17), MCL 750.520c(1)( a ). Defendant was sentenced to 25 to 40 years ’ imprisonment for CSC

- I and 38 to
180 months ’ imprisonment for CSC

- II

. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 3, 2019, defendant babysat his step grandchildren, EC and LS, at his home. EC was eight years old at the time. D efendant took the children to Walmart and bought them each a gift. When they returned from the store, LS went to play video games. Defendant told EC to go

to the bedroom of his wife, Marcia

. In the bedroom, defendant rubbed EC’s vagina with his penis and performed cunnilingus on her . After the first incident, EC foll owed defendant’s request to

shower. EC watched television before defendant took her in the basement, outside of the bedroom
of defendant ’ s son , Anthony Ruiz

. Defendant repeated the same acts on EC in the basement. After the second incident, EC washed up and they ate lunch. Later, the children’s mother, L isa , came and took t he children home

.

Defendant denied both incidents and testified that Anthony was home all day, and they
both even watched EC draw and paint pictures . Anthony confirmed the testimony and further
testified that he never saw defendant assault EC

. EC and L S both testified that they did not see Anthony that day. EC testified that Anthony slept in his room in the basement all day. L S himself spent most of the day sitting at the dining r oom table playing video games with his headphones on- 2

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talking to players online

. Defendant testified that Lisa came at 3:00 p.m., leaving no time for the incidents to occur, but EC testified that Lisa came a couple hours after the second incident.

On appe al, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence

to bolster defendant ’ s credibility and aid in his defense, eliciting damaging testimony during cross

examination, and misstating the burden of proof during his opening st atement . H e argues that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these errors. Further, he argues that the trial court erroneously instruct ed the jury

, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the error. Finally, defendant argues that his mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment was

unconstitutional.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASS ISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to admit evidence in support of the defense strategy, (2) eliciting damaging and improper credibility testimony, and (3) stating the wrong burden of proof to the jury. 1 Defendant contends that but for trial counsel’ s cumulative errors , there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial

. We disagree. For the reasons we will discuss below, we do not find counsel was deficient regarding evidence and trial strategy about witness credibility. We do conc lude, however, counsel did misstate the law in his opening statement regarding the burden of proof, and was deficient in this regard; but this mistake was corrected multiple times by defense counsel and the court, and as a result did not impact the case.

A . STANDARD OF REVIE W

“ A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law. ” People v Isrow , 339 Mich App 522, 531; 984 NW2d 528 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews the tria l court’s findings of fact for clear error, while it reviews questions of law de novo. People v Trakhtenberg , 493 Mich 38, 4 7 ; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “ Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that the trial cour t made a mistake. ” People v Johnson , 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. US Const, Am VI; Co nst 1963, art 1, § 20. In order to obtain a new trial, a defendant must establish that “ (1) counsel ’ s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel ’ s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that th e outcome would have been different. ” Trakhtenberg , 493 Mich at 51

. “ The inquiry into whether counsel ’ s performance was reasonable is an objective one and requires the

1 Defendant moved both this Court and the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to consider each of the asserted errors, which both courts denied. People v Ruiz , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 15, 2023 (Docket No. 362790 ). Be cause no evidentiary hearing was held below, our review is limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record. People v Gioglio (On Remand) , 296 Mich App 12, 20; 815 NW2d 589 (2012) , vacated not in relevant part 493 Mich 864 (2012)

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reviewing court to determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. ” People v Vaughn

, 491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to und ermine confidence in the outcome .” Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668 , 694 ; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) . “ Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. ” People v

Eisen , 296 Mich App 3 26, 329; 820 NW2d 229 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We will not substitute our own judgment for that of counsel or use the benefit of hindsight in assessing trial counsel ’ s competence. People v Unger , 278 Mich App 210, 242

- 243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless or futile objections. Eisen , 296 Mich App at 329

.

B. EVIDENCE DEFENDA NT ARGUES SHOULD HAV E BEEN OFFERED AT TR IAL

Defendant first argues that trial counsel ’ s performance was deficient because he failed to
move for the admission of a Walmart receipt showing that defendant purchased E C and LS gifts worth a total of $46.07 at 1:44 p.m. on the day of the incident

. On appeal, defendant asserts that the receipt wo uld have helped corroborate his testimony that there was not enough time after he took the children to the store, picked up lunch, and ate lunch with them for defendant to sexually assault EC before Lisa arrived to pick the children up

.

At trial, EC testi fied defendant took her and LS to Walmart and defendant assaulted her
twice after they returned from the store . A couple hours after the incidents, her mother arrived to pick them up . Both EC and her brother testified they stayed all day at defendant’s h ouse

. In contrast, d efendant testified that they left Walmart at approximately 1:45 p.m., picked up food

, and ate at the house, all before Lisa arrived before 3:00 p.m ., leaving no time for either incident to

occur.

Trial counsel’s strategy included eliciting testimony from defendant that there was not time
for the incidents to occur. The timestamp on the Walmart receipt had limited value in relation to this strategy

. N o one contested the time that defendant went to Walmart. More importantly,
testi mony conflicted regarding the time that EC’s mother came to pick up the children

. Because of the conflicting testimony, no witness established a definitive timeline of the day. A dmission of the receipt showing that defendant purchased the gifts at 1:44 p.m. would not show that there was
no time for defendant to assault EC before her mother arrived. Accordingly, trial counsel’s decision not to admit the receipt did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Vaughn , 491 Mich at 670

.

Defendant also asserts that the receipt was necessary to rebut the assertion that defendant bought EC an expensive gift in exchange for her silence

. At trial, EC testified that defend ant bought her a “Game Boy” and EC’s father testified that defendant bought EC a $120 gift in exchange for her silence. Although corroborative, the receipt was unnecessary to rebut the testimony that defendant bought EC an expensive gift to buy her silenc e

. E C called the gift a “Game Boy” in her testimony , but she did not testify how much the gift cost. EC’s father, who was not present the day of the incident, was the only witness to testify that defendant bought an expensive gift. His testimony was reb utted by Anthony ’s testimony that defendant bought a cheap

“ mini game ” “ rip off

” and defendant’s testimony t hat he had a receipt showing that he bought EC- 4

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a $20 handheld game and LS a $20 to $25 gaming gift card

. Trial counsel’s decision to elicit this evidence through testimony was a matter of trial strategy. Given the strong presumption that trial
counsel ’ s decisions are the result of sound trial strategy, we cannot conclude that trial counsel ’ s decision not to offer the receipt as evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

See id

.

Next, defendant argues that trial counsel performed deficiently because he failed to admit text messages wherein EC allegedly texted Marcia to request to go to her and defendant’s house nine days after the incident. Defendant asserts that these text messages would cast doubt on EC’s testimony because she wanted to go to her perpetrator’s house within days of the incident. At trial, trial counsel attempted, but fai led to admit the text message through EC. Trial counsel asked EC
if she sent defendant the text message . After reviewing the text message, EC still did not remember sending it . Trial counsel asked EC to read the contents of the text message a loud , but t he trial court sustained an objection from the prosecution for lack of foundation. Without the proper foundation, evidence cannot be admitted. See People v McDade , 301 Mich App 343, 353; 836 NW2d 266 (2013) ; MRE 901. Defendant does not assert that the t rial court erroneously sustained the objection. The failure to admit the text message was not a result of trial counsel’s deficient performance , but because EC did not remember the text message

. Further, trial counsel could not alternatively admit the te xt message through defendant

. Although unclear who the text message

was sent to , the text message was likely sent to Marcia and not defendant because a text included in the screenshot tells the recipient to share a phone number with defendant. We reject defendant’s

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to admit evidence through no fault of his own.

Defen dant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for his decision not to seek admission
of a video depicting the layout of defendant’s house

. Defendant specifically claims that, by demonstrating how close to the bedroom and basement doors LS sat , the video showed that LS could not have missed seeing defendant take EC through either door to the locations where the
assaults occurred. At trial, LS testified that he sat where he could see the kitchen, living room,
and the two doors. However, he also testified that he was not paying attention because he was wearing headphones and playing video games. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, t he video would
not contradict LS’s testimony

. LS did not testify that he could not have possibly seen defendant take EC through the doors from where he sat , but that he was not paying attention to what EC or
defendant did at the time. Trial counsel’s perfor mance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness for failing to admit the video. See Vaughn , 491 Mich at 670.

Fina l in defendant’s assertion of evidentiary errors , defendant argues that trial counsel was
ineffective when he did not admi t EC’s artwork from the day of the incident . Defendant contends
that the artwork corroborated Anthony ’ s testimony that he was in the home that day and watched

EC draw , but saw nothing indicative of an assault

. At trial, Anthony and defendant both testified that Anthony was in the house and saw EC drawing and painting. In contrast , both EC and LS testified that they did not see Anthony that day . N either EC nor LS testified that EC made artwork that day. “ When credibility is a dominant consideration in asc ertaining guilt or innocence, other independent evidence apart from the testimony of the defendant and the victim is particularly vital
to the fact

- finding process. ” People v Brown , 506 Mich 440, 453; 958 NW2d 60 (2020). Although credibility was a domina nt consideration in this case, admission of the artwork would not corroborate Anthony’s testimony or discredit EC’s and LS’s testimony. Anthony did not describe the pictures he allegedly observed EC making. Nothing in Anthony ’ s testimony demonstrated tha t- 5

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he saw EC drawing and painting these particular pictures on that particular day

. Accordingly, even if the jury accepted that EC made the artwork, the jury had no basis to accept that the artwork was made the day of the incident. Admission of these pict ures would not demonstrate that EC lied about seeing Anthony that day and had little corroborative benefit. Therefore, defendant has not overcome the presumption that trial counsel reasonably determined that the artwork would not aid his defense strategy.

Defendant also argues that trial counsel ’ s performance was deficient because he asked
EC’s parents , Troy and Lisa

, about EC’s truthfulness at trial, to which they stated that she was always truthful, thereby bolstering her credibility. While it is correct t rial counsel asked EC’s parents about her truthfulness

, it is apparent that trial counsel did not seek to bolster her credibility. Instead, trial counsel elicited Troy ’s and Lisa’s testimony to reveal their bias. When trial counsel asked Troy an d Lisa if EC ever lied, both adamantly affirm ed that EC “ never ” lied . Troy said this after he just testified that EC initially lied to him twice when he asked her about the incident. Both Troy and Lisa’s adamant testimony that EC, a young child, never li ed in her life, demonstrated
their bias and hurt their credibility. Trial counsel’s elicitation of this testimony was reasonable trial strategy.

C. STATEMENTS BY DE FENSE COUNSEL REGARD ING BURDEN OF PROOF

Defendant argues that trial counsel ’ s performance was deficient because he misstated the burden of proof, leading the jury to believe that one party or the other had to be believed beyond
a reasonable doubt. During opening statements, trial counsel stated the following when acknowledging that witness te stimony alone was enough to convict defendant:

[T]he prosecutor is absolutely right, when they say, hey, on a case like this, you don’t need any corroboration. The witness’ [sic] testimony or the victim’s testimony is enough. You don’t need to have anyth ing other than testimony to convict. That’s absolutely true.

But that also applies for the [d]efendant. You don’t need anything other than the [d]efendant’s testimony either. This case will come down to who you believe beyond a reasonable doubt . [emph asis added.]

The burden of p roof rests solely on the prosecution. See People v Posey , 512 Mich 317, 323; 1 NW3d 101 (2023 ) ( “ For a jury to find a defendant guilty of a charged crime, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant is guilty of every e lement of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ” ) In context, trial counsel attempted to explain to the jurors that they can believe defendant’s testimony without corroboration as well . However, the manner in which trial counsel expressed this point implied that the jury had to either believe the prosecution ’ s witnesses beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defense ’s witnesses beyond a reasonable doubt . Consequently, trial counsel implied a shift of the burden to both the prosecution and defense that was not re asonable trial strategy

. Therefore, trial counsel performed deficiently when he misrepresented the burden of proof

.

Although trial counsel’s performance was deficient, defendant cannot establish that but for
this deficiency

, a reasonable probability exis ted that the outcome of the trial would be different

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Trial counsel misstated the law briefly during his opening statement. This misstatement was
corrected numerous times. Both before and after opening statements, the trial court instructed the jury on the proper burden of proof. The prosecut ion also correctly stated the burden of proof during opening statement s . During closing argument s , both parties correctly stated the burden of proof. Then, the trial court instructed the jury on the correct burden of proof for a third time before jury deliberations

. “ [ J ] urors are presumed to follow their instructions.” Unger , 278 Mich App

at 235

. Any confusion from trial counsel’s brief misstatement of the law was cured by the trial
court’s correct instruction. Accordingly, defendant cannot establish prejudice.

Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel’s errors cumulatively undermined the outcome

of this case and denied him a fair trial. “[T]he cumulative effect of several errors can constitute sufficient p rejudice to warrant reversal where the prejudice of any one error would not.” People v
LeBlanc , 465 Mich 575, 591; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Because trial counsel ’ s performance contained only one nonprejudicial deficiency, there was no cumulative error that w ould warrant a
new trial.

III. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Defendant argues that he was denied due process because the trial court read an erroneous
instruction for CSC

- I . Alternatively, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffect ive for failing to object to the jury instruction. Review of the purported erroneous instruction is waived. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the instruction.

A. STANDARD OF REVI EW

Trial counsel’s “ affirmative expression of satisfaction with the trial court ’ s jury instruction waive[s] any error ” with the jury instructions. People v Chapo , 283 Mich App 360, 372

- 373; 770 NW2d 68 (2009)

. “W hen the trial court asks whether a party has any objections to the jury
instructions and the party responds negatively, it is an affirmative approval of the trial court’s
instructions.” People v Miller , 326 Mich App 719, 726; 929 NW2d 821 (2019). Trial counsel waived appellate review when he twice affirmed his satisfaction with the instruct ions

. Trial
counsel ’ s waiver extinguished any error, leaving no error to review. Chapo , 283 Mich App at 372

- 373

.

B. CSC

- I JURY INSTR UCTION

Alternatively, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instruction

. Defendant contends that the trial court erred regarding the penetration element of

CSC

- I when it instructed the jury as follows:

The [ d ] efendant is charged with the crime of first degree criminal sexual conduct. To prove this charge, the prosecutor mu st prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the [ d ] efendant engaged in a sexual act that involved touching of [ EC’s ] genital organs with the defendant’s mouth or
tongue.- 7

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Defendant contends that the instruction failed to distinguish CSC

- I from lesser offenses that only require touching for sexual gratification. We disagree.

We review this unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for error apparent
on the record. People v Spaulding , 332 Mich App 638, 656; 957 NW2d 843 (2020)

. Criminal
defendants have “ the right to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence against him. ” People v Mills , 450 Mich 61, 80; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995); see also US Const, Ams VI, XIV; Const 1963, ar t 1, § 20. “J ury instructions are to be read as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish error. ” People v Kurr , 253 Mich App 317, 327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002)

. There is no error when the instructions “fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights.” People v McFall , 224 Mich App 403, 412

- 413 ; 569 NW2d 828 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

To convict defendant of CSC

- I, the jury had to find that defendant engaged in sexual penetration with a person under 13 years of age

. People v Duenaz , 306 Mich App 85, 106; 854 NW2d 531 (2014). “ Sexual penetration ” is defined as “ sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person ’ s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person ’ s body

. . . . ” MCL 750.520a(r)

. Alt hough the trial court did not use the words “ sexual penetration, ” the instruction given described the only way, with the facts presented in this case, that the jury could find that defendant sexually penetrated the victim ’ s genital opening

— by performing cunnilingus. Both the CSC statute and caselaw recognize cunnilingu s as a form of sexual penetration regardless of whether entry of the vaginal canal occurs. MCL 750.520a(r) ; People v Legg , 197 Mich App 131, 132

- 133; 494 NW2d 797 (1992). It is irrelevant that the trial court did not use the word “ cunnilingus ” because th e instructions described the specific act that the jury needed to convict defendant of CSC

- I under a theory of cunnilingus

— a sexual act that involved touching of the victim ’ s genital organs with the
defendant ’ s mouth or tongue. Legg , 197 Mich App at 133 ( defining cunnilingus as “ the placing of the mouth of a person upon the external genital organs of the female

. . . . ” ) ( quotation marks
and citation omitted). Accordingly , the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury regarding

CSC

- I. Because w e conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury, an objection to this
instruction would have be en futile. Eisen , 296 Mich App at 329.

IV. MANDATORY SENTE NCING

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court ’ s application of the 25

- year mandatory
minimum sentence was cruel or unusual both facially and as applied to him. We disagree.

A. STANDARD OF REVI EW

Because defendant did not preserve this claim by raising the issue in the trial court, we review it for plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v Burkett , 337 Mich App 631, 635; 976 NW2d 864 (2021) . However, the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo. Id

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- B. CRUEL AND UNUSUA L PUNISHMENT REVIEW

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” US Const, Am VIII. The Michigan Constitution more broadly prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 ; People v Taylor , 510 Mich 112, 124 n 9; 987 NW2d 132 (2022). When assessing whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, this Court assesses the four following factors: (1) the harshness of the penalty compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed for other off enses in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the goal of rehabilitation. People v Bullock , 440 Mich 15, 30, 33

- 34; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).

Defendant presents both a facial and an as

- applied challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 750.520b(2)(b). “ A facial challenge attacks the statute itself and requires the challenger to
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [ a ] ct would be valid. ” People v
Johnson , 336 Mich App 688, 695; 971 NW2d 692 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted ; alteration in original ). Whereas “ [a] n as

- applied constitutional challenge is based upon the particular facts surrounding defendant ’ s conviction and sentence .” People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand)

, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW 3 d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 330612); slip op

at 9 n 10.

First, defendant’s facial challenge is foreclosed by binding precedent. A convict ion of

CSC

- I under MCL 750.520b(2)(b) is subject to a mandatory minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment.

In People v Benton , 294 Mich App 191, 204

- 207; 817 NW2d 599 (2011), after addressing the
Bullock factors, we held that the 25

- year mandatory minimum sentenc e in MCL 750.520b(2)(b)

was not cruel or unusual

. Defendant concedes that Benton is controlling Michigan caselaw. MCR 7.215(C)(2). Because published caselaw holds that the 25

- year mandatory minimum sentence under MCL 750.520b(2)(b) is not facially cruel or unusual, we conclude that defendant did not demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights

.

Second

, defendant’s as

- applied challenge to his sentence fails because he did not present
unusual circumstances to overc ome the presumption of propor tionality. “ Legislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and presumptively valid. ” Burkett , 337 Mich App at 637 ( quotation marks and citation omitted ). “ [ A ] proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual. ” People v Bowling , 299 Mich App 552, 558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013)

. “ In order to overcome the presumption that the sentence is proportionate, a defendant must present unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate. ” Burkett , 337 Mich Ap p at 637 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant argues that his sentence was disproportionate because of his age and lack of prior criminal history . D efendant does not address the Bullock factors or indicate how his age and lack of prior crimi nal history relate to these factors in his analysis

. A defendant may not simply

“ announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments , and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. ” People v Kevorkian , 248 Mich App 373, 389; 936 NW2d 291 (2001). Accordingly, we only address whether defendant raised sufficiently unusual circumstances to overcome the presumptio n of proportionality.- 9

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Defendant cites journals indicating that the statistical likelihood that someone would molest a child peaks between ages 30 and 40, and decreases to nearly zero after age 70

— the age defendant will be after serving only 10 years of hi s 25

- year

- minimum sentence. 2 The seriousness of the offense is not lessened by defendant’s age at the time of the offense

. T his Court has explained that a “defendant’s age is insufficient to overcome the presumption of proportionality.” People v Purdle

, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 353821 ); slip op

at 6

. D efendant’s lack of criminal history is also insufficient to overcome the presumption that his legislatively

- mandated sentence was proportional. People v Daniel , 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994)

. Accordingly, n o unusual circumstances overcome the presumption of proportionality in this case.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ James Robert Redford

2 See e.g., Hanson, Age and Sexual Recidivism: A Comparison of Rapists and Child Molesters

, Dep’t of the Solicitor General Canada (2001) , available at

< https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/sxl

- rcdvsm

- cmprsn/sxl

- rcdvsm

- cmprsn

eng.pdf > (accessed April 12, 2024).