alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Winn *v.*Morris *et al.*

The agreed price for a mule being seventy dollars at the place where the contract of sale was made and where the mule was, with $1.80 added for delivering the animal at another place (both amounts being paid down), and the contract embracing an express stipulation for delivery at the latter place, and no delivery having been made at either place or elsewhere, the purchaser is entitled to recover of the seller, in an action for a breach of the contract, a sum equivalent to that paid, with interest thereon. The death of the mule after the expiration of the time within which delivery should have been made under the contract, would be no obstacle to a recovery. *Judgment reversed,.*

March 26, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

Complaint. Before Judge Janes. Paulding superior court. January term, 1893.

A. L. Bartlett and L. M. Washington, for plaintiff.

George P. Roberts, for defendants.

Winn bought a mule of Morris and Cathcart in Atlanta, and paid them $70 for it. He also paid them $1.80 more, at the same time, to deliver the mule at Watson’s stable in Douglasville, which they agreed to do. They hired a man to carry the mule to Douglasville, but it was never delivered at Watson’s stable, where Winn sent for it on two different days after it should have arrived there. On the fourth day after the trade, he found the mule dead at McClarty’s stable. He would not have bought it but for the agreement to deliver, and told Cathcart, at the time of the trade, that he did not want the mule unless they would deliver it at Watson’s stable in Douglasville. He sued them to recover the $71.80 with interest. They pleaded not indebted, and the jury found in their favor. Plaintiff' moved on the general grounds for a new trial, which was denied, and he excepted.
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certification.

  Re: GSAMP Trust 2007-HE1 (the "Trust") Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
   Series 2007-HE1, issued pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
  dated as of February 1, 2007 (the "Pooling and Servicing Agreement"),
  among GS Mortgage Securities Corp., as
  Depositor, Avelo Mortgage, L.L.C., as Servicer, U.S. Bank National
  Association, as a Custodian, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as a
  Custodian, LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee, and Wells Fargo
  Bank, N.A., as Securities Administrator and Master Servicer,
  GSAMP Trust 2007-HE1

  I, Michelle Gill, certify that:

  1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K ("Annual Report"), and
    all reports on Form 10-D (collectively with this Annual Report, the
    "Reports") required to be filed in respect of period covered by this
    Annual Report, of the Trust;

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Reports, taken as a whole, do not contain
    any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
    fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
    circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
    with respect to the period covered by this Annual Report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
    covered by this Annual Report is included in the Reports;

  4.Based on my knowledge and the compliance statements required in this
    Annual Report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed
    in the Reports, each Servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the
    Pooling and Servicing Agreement in all material respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria
    for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on
    assessment of compliance with servicing criteria required to be
    included in this Annual Report in accordance with Item 1122 of
    Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been
    included as an exhibit to this Annual Report, except as otherwise
    disclosed in this Annual Report. Any material instances of
    non-compliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this
    Annual Report.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
    information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells
    Fargo Bank, N.A. as Master Servicer and Securities Administrator.

    Dated:   March 28, 2008


    /s/ Michelle Gill

    Michelle Gill
    Vice President
    (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
#### Elsa Tavarez et al., Appellants, v Patrick Oquendo et al., Respondents.

[869 NYS2d 782]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Betty Owen Stinson, J.), entered October 17, 2007, upon a jury verdict in defendants’ favor, dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The accident in 2003 occurred when the rear of the tow truck driven by defendant Oquendo struck plaintiff Tavarez as she was about to open and enter the driver’s door of her parked vehicle. On appeal, plaintiffs take issue with evidentiary rulings of the trial court and elements of its charge.

Plaintiffs complain that two eyewitnesses to the accident were not allowed to estimate the speed of defendant’s truck in miles per hour. However, their counsel failed to preserve objection to such alleged error and actually stipulated to ask questions regarding the speed of the vehicle without numerical estimate in miles per hour. Both witnesses testified that the vehicle was “flying” or going “fast,” clearly implying that the vehicle was traveling in excess of the appropriate speed for these circumstances. Furthermore, the testimony elicited from the eyewitnesses showed that neither had witnessed the actual impact, and that both had viewed the scene from a considerable distance.

To the extent preserved, there is no merit to plaintiffs’ other contentions regarding the jury charge. While there was no explicit reference to a duty to avoid hitting pedestrians, the court clearly conveyed that Oquendo was under a duty of reasonable care in the operation of his vehicle, which would include being aware of his surroundings and taking into account the actual and potential dangers existing from weather, road, traffic and other conditions. The court was not required to specifically charge PJI 2:76, regarding pedestrians walking alongside a roadway.

*447To the extent the record offers a basis for review, there were no material discrepancies between Oquendo’s deposition and his trial testimony.

Finally, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The jury clearly believed Oquendo’s version, crediting his testimony that he had traveled past Tavarez at a low rate of speed during a snowstorm, and that it was Tavarez who had “miscalculated,” opening her car door just as the truck was passing. The fact that the truck was able to make a complete stop shortly after the impact also undermines the conclusion that it was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Concur— Mazzarelli, J.E, Saxe, Friedman, Acosta and DeGrasse, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Cecil Adams and Maxine Adams v. Harris County, Texas, 

Relators

Appellate case number: 01-16-00760-CV

Trial court case number: 2014-35653

Trial court: 157th District Court of Harris County

On December 29, 2016, this Court’s Order had directed appellants to pay for the 

reporter’s record within 30 days of that order or else this Court would set the briefing 

schedule without it. On February 6, 2017, appellants, Cecil and Maxine Adams,

proceeding pro se, filed a “Motion to Stay Appeal Pending Ruling on Mandamus Relief 

in Cause No. 01-16-00405-CV.” Appellants state that they filed an “Amended Request 

for Emergency En Banc Motion for Reconsideration and Emergency Notice of Intent to 

File Writ of Mandamus to the Supreme Court of Texas,” also on February 6, 2017, in 01-

16-00405-CV. Appellants claim that a stay is needed because if this Court grants their 

amended motion and petition, that would render this appeal moot.

This Court has not yet determined whether to permit the amended motion or to 

request a response from the real parties in interest in 01-16-00405-CV. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 49.2, 49.6. However, appellants’ motion for a stay does not identify the need to stay 

this appeal pending this Court’s resolution of their amended motion. Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES the appellants’ motion to stay. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(a), (b).

Because the appellants filed this motion partly in response to this Court’s 

December 29, 2016 Order, appellants are ORDERED to pay for the reporter’s record and 

file evidence of payment with this Court within 10 days of the date of this order. If 

appellants fail to comply with this Order, this Court will proceed without the reporter’s 

record and set the briefing schedule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c)(1), (2), 42.3(b), (c).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Evelyn Keyes

 X Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: February 14, 2017
950 A.2d 786

#### ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION of Maryland, Petitioner, v. David William BODLEY, Respondent.

Misc. Docket AG No. 81,

Sept. Term, 2007.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 17, 2008.

*ORDER*

This matter having come before the Court on a Joint Petition for Order Placing Respondent on Inactive Status and Respondent’s Affidavit which accompanied said Petition; and

This Court having considered the Petition and the Affidavit, it is this 17th day of June, 2008;

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the Respondent, David William Bodley, is placed on inactive status by consent, pending further order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the name of David William Bodley from the register of attorneys in this Court and certify that fact to the Trustees of the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland and the clerks of all judicial tribunals in this State in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-772(d).
#### Denise Bagot, Respondent, v Kulbir Kaur Singh et al., Appellants.

Submitted March 2, 2009;

decided April 30, 2009

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### Wolf *v.*The Western Union Telegraph Company.

Where, in transferring a telegraphic message from the instrument to, paper for delivery to the sender, the operator by mistake substituted for the surname of the sender the surname of another person, this was a mere error in transmission; and under the principle decided in *Western Union Telegraph Company*v. *Rountree,*92' *Ga.*611, 18 S. E. Eep. 979, the company was not, merely because of this error, liable for the penalty prescribed by the act *ol*1887.

April 9, 1894.

Argued at the last term.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Action for penalty. Before Judge Butt. Marion superior court. April term, 1893.

*435J. H. Lumpkin, for plaintiff.

Gustin, Guerry & Hall, for defendant.

The message was; “ Can yon look at clothing samples Thursday or Friday ? Abe E. Wolf.” It was correctly transmitted from Savannah to Columbus. At the Columbus office the name of “Abe E. Wolf” was changed to “Abe Ellis ” by mistake of the operator. As thus changed the message was transmitted and promptly delivered to the sendee at Buena Vista. There is a man named Abe Ellis in Columbus, who sends many messages over defendant’s wires.
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Diatect International Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David Andrus, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Dated:  November 15, 2004

By:

/s/ David Andrus________

Name:

David Andrus,

Title:

Principal Executive Officer,

Principal Financial Officer

















---
The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge 1

for the District of Minnesota.

___________

No. 95-2499

___________

Rick Eugene Impola, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

United States of America, * 

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: March 25, 1996

 Filed: March 27, 1996

___________

Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Rick Eugene Impola appeals the District Court's denial of his 28

1

U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.

We affirm.

Impola pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture marijuana in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed

his sixty-month sentence. United States v. Impola, No. 94-1183, 1994 WL

279282 (8th Cir. June 24, 1994) (per curiam). Impola filed this section

2255 motion, alleging that his criminal conviction constituted double

jeopardy because of a previous civil forfeiture, and that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the double jeopardy

argument.
-2-

The District Court's decision that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not

apply was a legal determination, which this Court reviews de novo, see

United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1995), and as

Impola's section 2255 motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing,

this Court should affirm only if the motion, files, and record conclusively

show Impola was not entitled to relief, see United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d

571, 576 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 224 (1995).

Impola's argument is foreclosed by this Court's recent decision in

United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding

defendant not subjected to double jeopardy where civil forfeiture and

criminal prosecution were merely different aspects of "single, coordinated

prosecution"). The government initiated the civil forfeiture proceeding

and the criminal prosecution "at, or very close to, the same time." Id.

at 386. Furthermore, the civil forfeiture complaint and supporting

affidavit made reference to the other events for which Impola was indicted;

and a co-defendant was indicted for the events that led to the civil

forfeiture of Impola's residence. See id. (finding most important

consideration "is whether the government pursued its remedies against the

defendant concurrently or filed a second action after it was dissatisfied

with its initial attempt to prosecute a particular crime"; this Court asks

"common-sense questions," including "whether there is some evidence of

coordination of the two matters that connects them in an obvious way").

As Impola was not subjected to double jeopardy, his counsel was not

ineffective.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
-3-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit
10.1


FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
CHANGE OF CONTROL AGREEMENT


This
Fourth Amendment to Change of Control Agreement is dated as of April 1, 2007 by
and between NetBank, Inc. (the “Company”)
and James P. Gross (the “Executive”).


The
Change of Control Agreement between the Company and the Executive dated as of
April 1, 2003 as amended by the First Amendment to Change of Control Agreement
dated as of March 1, 2004, the Second Amendment to Change of Control Agreement
dated as of March 1, 2005, and the Third Amendment to Change of Control
Agreement dated as of March 1, 2006 (collectively, the “Original Change of
Control Agreement”) is hereby further amended as follows:


 Amendment to Stated Expiration Date.  The Stated Expiration Date set forth in
Section 9(g) of the Original Change of Control Agreement is hereby amended and
restated to read “July 1, 2007.”


The
amendments set forth above shall be effective immediately.  All other terms and provisions of the
Original Change of Control Agreement shall remain unaffected by this Amendment.


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto set their hands as of the date
first above written.


	
  COMPANY:

  	
  EXECUTIVE:

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  NETBANK, INC.

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  /s/ James P.
  Gross

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
    /s/
  Steven F, Herbert

  	
   

  	
  Name: James P. Gross

  
	
   

  	
  Steven F.
  Herbert

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Chief Executive
  Officer
Exhibit 35.1


                          SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT
                            ss.1123 of REGULATION AB

      I, Jay Bray, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
Nationstar Mortgage LLC (formerly "Centex Home Equity Company, LLC")
("Nationstar"), hereby certify that:

      (1)   Based on my knowledge, Nationstar has fulfilled all of its
            obligations under the respective Pooling and Servicing Agreements in
            all material respects throughout the reporting period, except as
            described in Item 1122, Certification Regarding Compliance with
            Applicable Servicing Criteria;

      (2)   I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by
            Nationstar as servicer under the respective Pooling and Servicing
            Agreements, and based on my knowledge and the compliance review
            conducted in preparing the Report on Assessment of Compliance and
            except as disclosed in the Report on Assessment of Compliance and
            the Attestation Report, Nationstar has fulfilled its obligations
            under the respective Pooling and Servicing Agreements in all
            material respects.


Nationstar Mortgage LLC


By: /s/  Jay Bray
    -------------------------------------------------------
Name: Jay Bray
Title: Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


Date: March 15, 2008
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit 

No. 13-2129 

ROGELIO BLACKMAN HINDS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,*

Respondent. 

ERRATA SHEET 

 The opinion of this Court issued on June 24, 2015 is amended 

as follows: 

 On page 12, line 11, underline "See". 

 * Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General 

Loretta E. Lynch has been substituted for former Attorney General 

Eric H. Holder, Jr. as respondent.
**Exhibit
      32.2**






**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**






In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of AFP Imaging Corporation
      (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2007 (the
“Report”), I, Donald Rabinovitch, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
                15 (d) of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and




(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.












/s/
      Donald
      Rabinovitch


Donald
      Rabinovitch,


President


Co-Chief
      Executive Officer


November
      14, 2007






27
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7494

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENNETH FUQUAN ARTIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (4:11-cr-00050-H-1; 4:16-cv00170-H)

Submitted: April 23, 2020 Decided: April 29, 2020

Before WYNN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kenneth Fuquan Artis, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Fuquan Artis seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2018). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2018). When the district court denies relief 

on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists 

could find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. 

See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on 

procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Artis has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the 

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED