1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

IN RE: 

 KATHRYN TOGGAS 

 DEBTOR/APPELLANT Civ. Action No. 19-3589 

(EGS) 

Bankr. Case No. 19-598 

(Chapter 13) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Kathryn Toggas appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order 

Amending Order Dismissing Case, Granting in Part “Motion to 

Vacate Dismissal Order, for Relief from Codebtor Stay, and for 

Imposition of an Equitable Servitude for Two Years,” and 

Imposing an Equitable Servitude on Real Property Located at 3112 

Legation St., NW, Washington, DC 20015 (the “Order”). Upon 

consideration of the briefs, the applicable law, and the entire 

record, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order. 

I. Background

 On September 9, 2019, Ms. Toggas filed a voluntary petition 

for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See A.R., 

ECF No. 3-1 at 1-8 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589).1 Ms. Toggas and her 

husband, Thomas Toggas, are the owners of their residence, 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 
2 

located at 3112 Legation St., NW, Washington, DC, 20015. See 

A.R. ECF No. 3-1 at 2, 3, 46 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). Mr. 

Toggas is the borrower on a May 23, 2008 loan in the amount of 

$1,350,000 secured by the Legation Street property. See A.R.,

ECF No. 3-1 at 24, 29, 30-45 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). Mr. 

Toggas failed to make the payment due on August 15, 2019, and as 

of September 11, 2019, the loan was in default for 122 payments. 

See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 17 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). 

On September 11, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court entered an 

Order to File Mailing Matrix or Show Cause, directing Ms. Toggas 

to file a mailing matrix, which is required to be filed with 

every bankruptcy petition per Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 and 

which Ms. Toggas had failed to file with her petition. See A.R., 

ECF No. 3-1 at 10 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). On September 19, 

2019, the case was dismissed based on Ms. Toggas’ failure to 

respond to the Court’s September 11, 2019 Order to File Mailing 

Matrix or Show Cause. See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 10 (Civ. Action 

No. 19-3589). 

 On October 16, 2019, U.S Bank National Association as Legal 

Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust (“Movant” or 

“Appellee”) filed a Motion to Vacate Dismissal Order, For Relief 

from CoDebtor Stay, and for Imposition of an Equitable Servitude 

for Two Years (Real Property Located at 3112 Legation St., NW, 
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Washington, DC 20015).2 See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 15-23 (Civ. 

Action No. 19-3589). On November 4, 2019, Ms. Toggas filed an 

opposition to the motion, see A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 19-23 (Civ. 

Action No. 19-3589); but failed to appear at the November 6, 

2019 hearing on the motion, see Bankruptcy Petition #: 19-00598-

ELG, ECF No. 27, PDF With Attached Audio File. 

Thereafter, on November 8, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court 

granted the motion in part. See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 32-34 (Civ. 

Action No. 19-3589). Among other things, rather than vacating 

the dismissal order, the Bankruptcy Court amended it “to provide 

that an equitable servitude is imposed upon the Property, which 

servitude shall prevent any stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 1301 

from attaching to the Property by reason of any new bankruptcy 

being filed by any person or entity holding an interest in the 

Property.” A.R., ECF No. 3-2 at 33. (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). 

Ms. Toggas sought a stay pending appeal, arguing that the 

Bankruptcy Court had improperly granted the Motion to Vacate 

Dismissal because the movant’s grounds for seeking relief did 

not fall within the grounds for relief enumerated in Federal 

2 “Bankruptcy Courts have the authority to issue an in rem 

order that operate[s] as an equitable servitude on property to 

preclude the debtor and his successors from taking advantage 

of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) for a period 

sufficient to enable the creditor holding the secured claim to 

consummate a foreclosure.” In re Snow (Great Western Bank v. 

Snow) 201 B.R. 968 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1996), 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(5). See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 

37-44 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). In opposing the stay, Movant 

stated that the Order “permitted the Creditor’s foreclosure sale 

to proceed on November 13, 2019, at which the Creditor was the 

successful bid purchaser of the Property. The Creditor is now 

proceeding with postsale actions necessary to consummate its 

sale, including ratification of the sale and any action 

necessary thereafter to obtain possession of the Property.” 

Appendix to Appellee’s Brief, ECF No. 6 at 43-44. 

On December 22, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court denied Ms. 

Toggas’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 

45-49 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). The Bankruptcy Court concluded 

that Ms. Toggas had no likelihood of success on appeal because, 

among other things, the Court did not vacate the dismissal 

order, but rather amended the order to grant an equitable 

servitude. See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 46-47 (Civ. Action No. 19-

3589). In determining the harm to the movant and other parties, 

the Bankruptcy Court observed that Ms. Toggas “has filed 

numerous bankruptcy petitions in recent years, often immediately 

preceding the date for which a foreclosure sale was scheduled. 

The debtor has thus been engaging in a blatant form of ‘tag 

bankruptcy.’” A.R., ECF No. 3-2 at 48 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). 

From May 2018 through September 2019, Ms. Toggas filed a 

total of seven Chapter 13 petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for 
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the District of Columbia of which this Court takes Judicial 

Notice. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 466 

(6th Cir. 2014) (finding that judicial notice “applies to 

appellate courts taking judicial notice of facts supported by 

documents not included in the record on appeal”); Lewis v. Drug

Enforcement Admin., 777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C.

2011) (“The court may take judicial notice of public 

records from other court proceedings.”). Each case was 

dismissed shortly after being filed for the same procedural 

reason as in the instant case: Ms. Toggas failed to respond to 

the Order to File Mailing Matrix or Show Cause. See Bankruptcy 

Petition #: 18-00312; Bankruptcy Petition #: 18-00649; 

Bankruptcy Petition #: 19-00036; Bankruptcy Petition #: 19-

00146; Bankruptcy Petition #: 19-00340; Bankruptcy Petition #: 

19-00463. The filing of each of these cases cancelled a 

scheduled foreclosure sale. See A.R., ECF No. 3-1 at 19-20 (Civ. 

Action No. 19-3589). 

 On November 11, 2019, Ms. Toggas filed a Notice of Appeal, 

which is ripe for review. 

II. Standard of Review 

This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions of 

the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (conferring 

jurisdiction on federal district courts “to hear appeals ... 

from final judgments, orders, and decrees” 
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of bankruptcy courts). On appeal from a bankruptcy court, a 

district court “may affirm, modify, or reverse 

a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand with 

instructions for further proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. 

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of 

fact only for indication that they are clearly 

erroneous. Id.; see also In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 

(D.D.C.1999). “A finding [of fact] is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on 

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Johnson, 236 B.R. 

at 518 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 

395 (1948)). A bankruptcy court's legal conclusions, however, 

are reviewed de novo. See In re WPG, Inc., 282 B.R. 66, 68 

(D.D.C. 2002) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 

384, 405(1990). The party seeking to reverse 

the bankruptcy court's ruling bears the burden of proof and may 

not prevail by showing “simply that another conclusion could 

have been reached.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
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III. Analysis 

A. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err Amending Its Dismissal 

Order to Provide For an Equitable Servitude In 

Appellee’s Favor 

Ms. Toggas does not challenge the merits of the imposition 

of the equitable servitude, but rather requests reversal of the 

Order based on three procedural claims. First, Ms. Toggas argues 

that the Bankruptcy Court erred because there were no grounds 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(5) (made 

applicable in Bankruptcy Proceedings by Bankruptcy Procedure 

9024) for the Bankruptcy Court to vacate the dismissal order and 

second, that the bankruptcy Court erred because Appellee was not 

a party pursuant to that Rule who could seek to have the 

dismissal order vacated because the order was not entered 

against the Appellee. Br. of Debtors-Appellants, ECF No. 5 at 8-

11. However—and as Appellee points out—the Bankruptcy Court did 

not vacate the dismissal order. Rather, it amended the order to 

provide for an equitable servitude in favor of the Appellee. For 

this reason, Appellee contends that the Appellant’s claims of 

error are moot. Br. for the Appellee, ECF No. 6 at 6-7. Ms. 

Toggas replies that the Court should ignore Appellee’s argument 

because, according to her, the Dismissal Order was not amended 

because: (1) Appellee did not move to amend the Dismissal Order; 

and (2) Appellee provided no grounds for amending the Dismissal 
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Order. Reply Br. of Debtors-Appellants, ECF No. 8 at 4. Ms. 

Toggas’ understanding is inaccurate, however, because the 

Bankruptcy Court did not vacate the Dismissal Order, but rather 

amended it to impose an equitable servitude. A.R., ECF No. 3-2 

at 33. (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). Accordingly, because Ms. 

Toggas’ claims based on Federal Rule of Procedure Rule 60(b)(1)-

(5) are not relevant to the action that the Bankruptcy Court 

actually took, her claims are without merit. 

Third, Ms. Toggas argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred 

because Appellee did not seek the imposition of an equitable 

servitude “during the bankruptcy procedure.” Br. of DebtorsAppellants, ECF No. 5 at 11. However, while the Dismissal Order 

was entered on September 11, 2019, and before the Movant’s 

Motion to Vacate the Dismissal Order was filed on October 16, 

2019, the case has not been closed. See generally Docket for 

Bankruptcy Petition #: 19-00598. Even if the case had been 

closed, the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction for certain 

purposes. See In re Hardy, 209 B.R. 371, 373 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 

1997) (“Notwithstanding the fact that [debtor's] bankruptcy case 

is closed and all scheduled debts have been discharged, the 

Court retains jurisdiction over the debtor's case for certain 

purposes,” including when a “party claims a right or remedy 

created by one of the specific Bankruptcy Code sections.”) 

(citations omitted); cf. Matter of Querner, 7 F.3d 1199, 1201–02 
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(5thh Cir. 1993) (when main bankruptcy case dismissed or closed, 

court has discretion to retain jurisdiction or dismiss related 

proceedings). For these reasons, Ms. Toggas’ claim is without 

merit. 

If Ms. Toggas had challenged the merits of the Bankruptcy 

Court’s imposition of the equitable servitude, such a challenge 

would have been without merit. From May 2018 through September 

2019, Ms. Toggas filed a total of seven Chapter 13 bankruptcy 

petitions. Each was dismissed soon after it was filed on the 

same procedural grounds and each resulted in cancelling a 

scheduled foreclosure sale. Furthermore, Mr. Toggas’ missed 

payments date to August 2009, and his debt at the time Ms. 

Toggas filed her seventh bankruptcy petition in a 16-month 

period was $2,350,000 on a $1,350,000 loan. See A.R., ECF No. 3-

1 at 20 (Civ. Action No. 19-3589). Based on this pattern of 

conduct, there is ample factual and legal basis for the 

imposition of the equitable servitude. See In re Chappelle, No. 

00-0020, 2000 WL 33529767 (Bankr. D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2000) 

(defendants’ abuse of the bankruptcy system, which included 

filing six bankruptcy filings withing three years and a three 

year mortgage default, warranted imposing an equitable 

servitude). See also In re Yimam, 214 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Md. 

1997) (equitable servitude appropriate where debtor and spouse 

filed seven bankruptcy cases “all designed to forestall creditor 
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action” over a four-year, three-month period and failed to make 

a mortgage payment within the last five years); In re Abdul 

Muhaimin, 343 B.R. 159 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006) (equitable servitude 

appropriate where “appropriate based on the three bankruptcy 

cases filed in 17 months by the Debtor or Mr. Muhaimin, two of 

which were filed on the day of or the day prior to a scheduled 

foreclosure sale. This pattern of conduct, while not proven to 

be fraudulent as to creditors, nonetheless is the type of 

conduct that constitutes a continuing abuse of the bankruptcy 

process.”). 

IV. Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy 

Court’s Order. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum 

Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 January 21, 2022