### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nuary 4, 200 5 S es sio n
MARY TAYLOR LOPEZ v. DANNY HOLB ROOK TAYLOR ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Wilson County No. 12524 John D. Wootten, Jr., Judge

No. M2003- 02481-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 28, 2005

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s a

dis pu te be tw e e n d ivo rc e d p are nts ov e r o ne of the ir so n’ s c oll e g e e xpe ns e s. Their older

son became elig ible for a substantial tuiti on discount after his father was employ ed by the university

wher e he w as enr olled. Howeve r, the father a nd son conce aled the f ather ’s employ ment and the son’s discount f rom the mother a nd actua lly sen t h er s t atements that did not ref lect the discount. The mother paid one-ha lf of the expenses ref lected in these statements until she discovere d the tuition dis count. She then filed suit ag ainst her f o rm er husba nd and her

son in the Circuit Court for Wil son County alleg ing brea ch of contra ct and f raud. She a lso sought a de clar ation reg arding her c ontinuing oblig ation to pay her son’ s colleg e expenses. F ollowing a bench trial, the trial court c oncluded that the f ather had brea ched the marital dissoluti on ag ree ment and orde red the fathe r to pay

the mother $2,737.01. The court also found that the mother had br eac hed the marital disso l u t ion ag ree ment by declining to pay

her son’ s colleg e expenses af ter discove ring the tuition d is c o u n t an d o r d e r e d h e r

to r e s u me p a y in g h e r s h ar e o f th e s e e xp e n s e s

. T h e mo th e r ap p e a le d

. We ha ve c on c lud e d ( 1) that th e fathe r c omm itt e d a ma te ri a l br e a c h o f the ma ri ta l di sso lut iona g re e me nt, (2) that the father and the son eng ag ed in fraudulent conduct by conce aling the tuition dis count from the mother a nd then pocke ting he r over payments, (3) that the mother did not breac h the marital dissolu t i o n agreement whe n she stopped paying he r son’s colleg e expenses, and ( 4) that the trial court e rre d in calculating the amount of the mother’s ove rpayment. Acc ordingl y , we ha ve determined that the mother is entitled to rec over $3,590 f rom the husband a nd that the actions of the fathe r and son wa

rra nt terminating her oblig ation to pay the son’s colleg e expenses. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t And Reverse d in P art

W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Br ad W. Hornsby

and Aa ron S. Guin, Murfre esboro, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Mary

Tay lor L o p e z.
Gre g ory D. Smi t h , Na s h v i l l e, T en n es s ee , fo r t h e a p p el l ee s , Da n n y Ho l b ro o k T ay l o r, Ad am Ho l b rook Tay lor, and Phillip AnthonyTay lor.-2- OP IN ION

I.

I n October

1992, the Wils on County Gene ral S essions Court g rante d Danny Tay lor a divorc e from Mary

Tay lor (now Ma

ry T ay l o r L o p ez) on the g round of irr econc ilable diffe renc es. I n the marital dissoluti on ag ree ment that was incorporated into the final decr ee, the parties ag ree d to joint custody of their two sons, ag ed ten a nd seven, w ith Ms. L opez as the prim ary residential pa

rent. The parties a lso ag ree d that they would “equa lly pay the children’ s colleg e educ ation including tuition, books, school dues and r oom and boar d while they attend colleg e.” Following the divorce , the parties’ childre n appar ently beg an re siding with Mr. Tay lor, and Ms. L opez beg an paying c hild support. Either in late 1999 or early 2000, Mr. Taylor filed a pe tition to inc rea se and extend Ms. L opez’s child support obligations. Ms. L opez responded by reque sting
a re duct i o n i n h er c hild support because the parties’ oldest child, Adam Tay lor, was a bout to turn
e ig hte e n. I n a n o rd e r date d Ma rc h 29 , 20 00 , the c ou rt de nie d M r. Tay lor ’s pe tit iona nda dju ste d M s. L op e z’s c hil d s up po rt

pay me nts e ff

e c tiv e on Ad a m T a y lor ’s e ig hte e nthbirthd a y . The cou rt a lso clarified the pa

rties’ oblig ations with reg ard to pay ing f or their c hildren’s colleg e educations. The
or de r s pe c if

ic a lly state d th a t: the Petitioner [Mr. Tay lor] and Re spondent [Ms

. L opez] shall both be
re qu ir e d to pay

one-ha lf of the c oll e g e e xpe ns e s f

or the pa rt ie s’
c hil dr e n, as ord ered by

the F ina l D e c re e of

Di vo rc e . T his sh a ll include one- half of the child’s tuition, books, school dues, and r oom a ndbo ard . T hat th e c hil d s ha ll e sta bli sh a check ing a c c ou nt at a Natio na l B a nk

of his c ho os ing int o wh ic h the pa rt ie s wi ll de po sit

the ir one-ha lf of the amounts nece ssary to pay for tuition, school dues, and room and boa

rd. The c hild shall, with t he assistanc e of the Petitioner, provide information pertaining t o the bank a ccount, a nd documentation of the exact amount of th ese e x penses to the Respondent in a timely

manner so that th e appropriate sums can be de po sit e d to sa id b a nk

a c c ou nt w ith in f

if te e n ( 15) day s o f the ir
rec eipt. Costs for books shall be initially paid by the child, or by

the Petitioner, who shall then pro v i d e Respondent with copie s of the
re c e ipt s, a ndsh e sh a ll the n r e imb ur se the pr op er amou nt t o h is
acc ount, or t o the Petitioner, within fifteen ( 15) day s of the date she
re c e ive s su c h r e c e ipt s.
The orde r also require d eac h party to pr ovide $100 per month f or the child’s “e ntertainment a nd food expenses.”

I n A ug us t 20 00 , A da m T a y lor e nr oll e d at D a vidL ipscom b Un ive rs ity fo llo wi ng his g ra du a tio n fr om hig h sch oo l. I n De c e mbe r 2 00 0, Mr . T a y lor be c a me e mpl oy e d b y

Da vidL ips c omb Un ive rs ity

a s it s E xec uti ve Vi c e Pr e sid e nt f or F inanc ia l A ff

a ir s. On e of

the e mpl oyme nt b e ne fi tsT he se d i sco un t s b eg an i n the se co nd sem ester o f t he d ep en d en t ’ s f

i rst scho o l year, an d t he am o un t o f t he se 1
d i s c o u n t s i n c r e a s e d e v e r y y e a r t o a m a x i m u m o f 7 5 %.

H e w a s n o t e n tit le d to the tuitio n d isc o u n t d u rin g h is first se m e ste r, a n d h e re c e iv e d a $ 2 ,0 0 0 a c a d e m ic 2

s ch ol ar s h i p. -3- Mr . T a y lor

re c e ive d w a s th a t hi s d e pe nd e nts be c a me e lig ibl e to r e c e ive su bs ta nti a l tu iti on dis c ou nts if they attended David L ipscomb University

. Mr. Tay lor and Adam Tay lor dec ided not to inform 1 Ms. L op e z that Mr . T a y lor wa s e mpl oy e d at D a vidL ips c omb Un ive rs ity or that A da m T a y lor

wo uld be paying a

discounted tuition. Their plan suc cee d for f our semeste rs. Adam Tay lor’s net e x penses f or the F all 2000 semester wer e $5,764. Mr. Tay lor prepa red a letter for Adam to se nd to Ms. L opez, and Ms. L opez 2 promptly deposited $2,882 into Adam’s acc ount. Adam Tay lor was entitled t o a 2 5 % t uition discount in the Spring 2001 se mester. De spite the fac t that his net expenses were $4,624, Mr. Taylor prepa red a letter for his son to send Ms. L opez stating that his expenses were $5,944. Be lieving that amount to be ac curate, Ms. L opez de posited $2,972 into Adam’s acc ount. There afte r, Mr. Tay lor paid $2,312 towar d his son’s colleg e expenses, and Adam Taylor wrote his father a chec k for $6 32 .5 0 – the a mou nt o f M s. L op e z’s ov e rp a y me nt.

T h i s p at t er n re p ea t ed i t s el f d u ri n g t h e Fa l l 2 0 0 1 an dt h e S p ri n g 2 0 0 2 s em es t er s

. E v en t h o u gh Adam Tay lor’s net e x penses f or the Fa ll 2001 and Spring 2002 semester s were $3,862, Ms. L opez deposited $3,410 into her son’s acc ount based on Mr. Tay lor’s and A dam’s re prese ntations that the expenses wer e $6,820.

When the time c ame to r equest payment for the Fa ll 2002 semester , Mr. Taylor and Ada m re pr e se nte d to Ms. L op e z that Ad a m’ s n e t e xpe ns e s w e re $7 ,3 16 , e ve n th ou g h th e y we re a c tua lly
on ly $3 ,5 93 . M s. L op e z de c lin e d to de po sit a ny fu nd s into he r son ’s a c c ou nt be c aus e by thi s ti me she had discovere d that Mr. Tay lor was working for David L ipscomb University , and she suspe cted that her son wa s rec eiving a tuition discount. Her suspicions we re confirme d when Adam Tay lor
re fu se d to re sp on d w he n s he a sk e d h im i f h e wa s r e c e ivi ng a tui tio n d isc ou nt.

In D e c e m b e r

2 0 0 2 , M s

. L o p e z f

i l e d a n a c t i o n i n t h e C i r c u i tC o u r tf o r W i l s o n C o u n t y, alleg ing br eac h of contra ct and f raud. She a lso sought a de clar at o ry j u dg ment reg arding her continuing oblig ation to pay child support. She reque sted the trial court e ither to resc ind the portion of the marital dissolut ion ag ree ment obligating he r t o pay colleg e ex penses or to order Mr . Tay lor and Ada m to reimburse he r for the over payments she had made as a r esult of their de ception.

Mr . T a y lor

too k th e po sit ionthat th e tui tio n d isc ou nt s ho uldbe c re dit e d e nti re ly to h im be c aus e it w a s a be ne fi t he re c e ive d b y wo rking a t D a vidL ips c omb Un ive rs ity . T hu s, e ve n a ft e r M s. L o p ez fi l ed h ers u i t , M r. T ay l o r a n d Ad am s en tM s

. L o p ez a l et t ers t at i n g t h atAd am ’s co l l ege expenses for the Spring 2003 semester wer e $7,618, even though his net e x penses we re only $3,676. When Ms. L opez declined to deposit $3,809 into Adam’s ac co u n t , M r. Tay lor and Adam filed a counter claim ag ainst Ms. L opez for $3,809.D ur i ng t hi s per i od , M s

. L op ez ear ned b et ween $ 22 , 00 0 and $ 26 , 00 0 per y ear

. M r

. T ay l or e ar ned $90 , 00 0 per 3
y ear.
-4- The c ou r t conducted a

bench trial in J une 2003. Ms. L opez presente d evidenc e substantiating the conduc t of Mr. Tay lor and Adam since Adam’s enrollment at David L ipscomb University . She also pointed out the income disparity betwee n her and Mr. Tay lor and explained that she ha d been 3 require d to wi t h d ra w funds fr om her IRA to pay these c olleg e expenses. Mr. Tay lor and Ada m Tay lor wer e unre pentant about their conduct, insisting tha t t h e discount belong ed to Mr. Ta y lor rathe r than to Ada m Tay lor. For example, Adam Taylor explained:
[I ]t wa s my Da d’ s ben e fi t and the re fo re dir e c tly ha d n o r e la tio n o n my mom. . . . So, i t wasn’t her benef it, and there was no re ason to g ive her any - - I mean, one thing, we didn’t want her into our life, y ou know. So, we fe lt there wa s no rea son to let her know if it wa s not hers.

M r. T ay l o r j u s t i fi ed h i s ac t i o n s b y ex p l ai n i n g:

I f y ou g o back to the history of barte ring , exchang e, y ou know, what people pay

for thing s. I

mean, y ou’re inte rp retation of pay is much differ ent than my interpre tation of pay

. I f y ou’re talking a bout [ how] Ms. L op ez wrote a che ck, that’s one thing. . . . [I f] y ou’retalking about how I

paid that. I drive to Nashville every day , an hour up, an hour bac k. I f y ou want to know, my compensation is occurring every day . A nd , y ou kn ow , a g a in, I me nti on e d a

fe w m inu te s a g o, the on ly person to g ain in this is Mrs. L opez be cause these two boy s don’t pay anything. No w, I jus t w a nt t o s a y , y ou kn ow , pay in y ou r t e rm s is tot a lly differ ent than pay

in my terms. You know, in t he deposition y ou we nt ove r a n d o v e r

w i t h t h a t

. B u t

t h e r e a l i t y

o f i ti s , I c e r t a i n ly be lie ve that I

pay ma ny , many

tim e s o ve r the te rm s p a y , w ithmy employ ee tuition discount.

Ne ith e r M r. Tay lor

no r A da m T a y lor

pr ov ided a sou nde xpla natio n f or the ir de c isi on to k e e p M s. L opez in the dark a

bout Mr. Tay lor’s employ ment at David Lipscomb University or the e x istence of the tui tio n d isc ou nts . A da m T a y lor te sti fi e d th a t Ms . L op e z wa s n ot t oldbe c aus e of “ pa st activities that had oc curr ed.” F or his p ar t , M r. T ay l or testified that he “didn’t see any rea son I neede d to let her know that I wa s em p loy ed at Lipscomb University . I didn’t see that it had a ny value.”

The trial c ourt conc luded that Mr. Tay lor and Adam Tay lor had not committed fraud but that Mr . T a y lor ha d bre a c he d the mari ta l diss olu tio n ag re e me nt an d sho uld be re qu ir e d to re imb ur se Ms.T h e t r i al c ou r t i n i t i al l y de t er mi n ed t h at M s

. Lope z’ s ov er pay men t s a mou n t ed t o $6, 793. 4

T he co urt found that M s. L o p ez shoul d no t ha ve st o p p ed p ayi ng thes e exp enses af t er s he f i l ed her l awsui t and 5

t hat M r. T ayl o r had o nl y p art i al l y co m p l i ed b y p ayi ng A d am T ayl o r’ s car i nsur ance which averaged o nl y $7 0 pe r mo nt h.
-5- L opez for her

overpay ments. The court order ed Ms. L opez to continue pay ing her share of A dam 4 Tay lor ’s c oll e g e e xpe ns e s. Th e c ou rt a lso c on c lud e d th a t bo th p art ie s h a d n ot c omp lie d w iththe ir obligations to pay

Adam Tay lor $100 per month for his “entertainment and food e x penses.” 5

Sho rt ly a ft e r i ts d e c isi on , th e tr ia l c ou rt inf orme d th e partie s th a t it

int e nd e d to mod if

y its decision in sever al material respe cts and r eq u es t ed t he parties to return to court for additional finding s of fa ct. On S eptember 12, 2003, the trial court modified its decision to find that both parties had bre ache d the marital dissolution ag ree ment. The court conclude d that Ms. L opez had bre ache d the ag ree ment by

ref using to pay

for Adam Tay lor’s colleg e expenses af ter she filed her suit. The court a lso reduce d the $6,793 j udg ment ag ainst Mr. Tay lor to $2,737.01 to take into consideration the pa rt ie s’ re sp e c tiv e tui tio n o bli g a tio ns fo r the F a ll 2 00 2 a ndSpring 20 03 se me ste rs

.
Ms. L opez appea led. She takes issue w ith the trial court’s conclusions (1) that she bre ache d the martial dissolution ag ree ment by di s co n t i nuing the colleg e expenses payments after she discovere d the activiti es of Mr. T ay lor and Adam Tay lor and (2) that Mr. Taylor and Adam Tay lor had not committed fraud. She also asserts that the trial court e rre d by reduc ing its orig inal $6,793 jud g me nt andby

re fu sin g to g ive he r ac c e ss to Adam Taylor ’s c oll e g e fi na nc ia l re c or ds . Fo r the ir part, Mr. Tay lor and Adam Tay lor assert that the trial court made sever al serious mathe matical er rors wh e n it c a lc ulate d M s. L op e z’s ov e rp a y me nt.

II. T HE P A R TI ES ’ R ESP ECTIVE O B L I GAT I ONS T O P AY C OLLEG E E X PE N SES

W e t u rn fi r s t t o t h e l ega l b as i s fo r t h e p ar t i es ’ o b l i gat i o n s t o p ayt h ei r c h i l d re n ’s co l l ege e xpe ns e s. Th e se e xpe ns e s a re no t le g a lly

re qu ir e d b e c aus e pa

re nts g e ne ra lly

do no t ha ve a du ty

to support their children past the ag e of ma jority

. Bl ac kbu rn v . B lac kbu rn , 526 S.W .2d 463, 465 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code A nn. § 34-1-102( b) (2001) . Howeve r, parents may voluntarily take on g reater
su pp ort ob lig a tio ns th an th e law re qu ir e s, a ndwh e n th e y do , th is o bli g a tio n c a n b e e nf or c e d a s a matter of c ontrac t. Hathaway v. Hathaway , 98 S.W. 3d67 5, 67 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Bryan v. Leach , 8 5 S. W.3 d 1 36 , 1 51 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Sandusky v. Sandusky , No. M2000-00288-COAR3-CV, 2001 WL 327898, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001) (No T enn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

Ma

rt ia l di sso lut iona g re e me nts fr e qu e ntl y memo ri a lize div or c ing pa rt ie s’ a g re e me nts reg arding the payment of college expenses. These ag ree ments are essentially contra cts betwe en a husband and w ife in conte mplation of divorce. To wn e r v . Towner , 858 S.W .2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 19 93 ); Pylant v. Spive

y , 174 S.W .3d 143, 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). T hey should be construe d and enfor ced just like other c ontrac ts. Bogan v. Bogan , 6 0 S.W.3 d 7 21 , 7 30 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Ho ney c utt
v . H on ey c utt , 152 S.W .3d 556, 561 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. 2 0 0 3 ). L ike all other c ontrac ts, marital-6-

dissoluti on ag ree ments contain an implied cove nant of g ood faith and f air de aling in the perf

ormanc e and interpr eta t i o n o f the c ontrac t. El lio tt v . E lli ott , 149 S.W .3d 77, 84-85 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2004). Whil e thi s c ov e na nt d oe s n ot c re a te ne w c on tr actua l r ig hts or ob lig a tio ns , it

pr ote c ts the pa

rt ie s’
rea sonable e x pectations and their rig ht to rece ive the bene fits o f t he ag ree ment they enter ed into. Goot v. Me tropolit an Gov’ t , No. M 2003-002013-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 3031638, at *6-7 (T enn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005). The pa rties’ marital dissolut ion agr ee ment is so clear and unambig uous that we ne ed not
re so rt to the c a nons of

c on tr a c t c on str

uc tio n to a sc e rt a in the pa rt ie s’ int e nt o r the natur e of the ir ag ree ment. Eac h party ag ree d to pay one-ha lf of their c hildren’s (1) colleg e tuition, (2) school books
a nddu e s, a nd(3 ) r oo m a ndbo ard. Th ey als o ag re e d th a t e a c h o f the m w ou ld p ro vid e e a c h c hil d $100 per month for

“ente rtainment and food expenses” while attending colleg e. This interpre tation
wa s r e ite rate d a nd c on fi rm e d in the tr ia l cou rt ’s Ma rc h 29, 20 00 or de r. Th us , f or the pu rp os e of

thi s opinion, we conc lude that both Mr. Taylor and Ms. L opez were contra ctually obligated to pay

onehalf of the expenses eac h of t heir children actually incurre d for tuit ion, books and dues, a nd room and boar d.

III
.

T HE C O N D U C T O F M R . T AYL OR A ND A D A M T AYL OR
Neither party

disag ree s with the trial court’s c onclusion that Mr. Tay lor, with the assistance
o f Ad am Tay lor, brea ched the martial dissolution agr eeme nt by knowing ly

prese nting Ms. L opez with materia lly incomplete and misleading tuition statements for the purpose of i nducing her to pa y more than he r shar e of A dam Taylor’s colleg e expenses. B y violating the covenant of g ood faith and fa i r de al i n g, M r. T ay l o r wa s ab l e to ev ad e hi s o b l i gat i o n t o p ay o n e- h al f of h i s s o n ’ s c o l l e ge expenses. Howeve r, Ms. L opez asserts that the trial court erre d by declining to find that Mr. Tay lor’s conduct wa s fraudulent. We ag ree

. Th e e s s e n c e o f f

r au d is d e c e p ti o n

. I n it s mo s t g e n e r a l s e n s e , f r au d is a tric k o r ar tif

ice or oth e r u se of

fa lse inf orma tio n th a t in du c e s a pe rs on to ac t in a way that he or sh e wo uldno t othe rw ise have acte d. See Rawlings v. John Hancoc k Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 78 S.W .3d 291, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 01 ). F ra

ud occu rs when a

pe rs on int e nti on a lly

mis re pr e se nts a

ma te ri a l f

a c t or int e nti on a lly produce s a fa lse impression in or der to mislea d another or to obtain an unfair adva ntag e. Brown v. Birman Managed Care, I nc. , 42 S.W .3d 6 2 , 6 6 (T en n . 2001). The e lements of a c laim for fr aud include: (1) an intentional m i s re p resentation of an e x isting material fac t, (2) knowledg e of the repr esentation’s falsity , and (3) injury cause d by

rea sonable re liance on the misrepre sentation. Concrete Spac es, Inc . v. Sende r , 2 S.W. 3d90 1, 90 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; First Nat’l Bank v . Brooks Farms , 82 1 S.W.2 d 925 , 927 (T e nn . 1 99 1) ; Metropolitan Gov’t v . McKinney , 852 S.W .2d 233, 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

The e vidence in this record f ails to support the t rial court’s conclusion t hat M r. Tay lor and Adam Tay lor did not fraudule ntly induce Ms. L opez to pay more than her require d share of Ada m Tay lor’s colleg e expenses. B eg inning in the Spring 2001 semester , they intentionally

repr esente d to Ms. L opez that Adam Taylor’s colleg e expenses we re g reater than the y actua lly wer e. Ms. L opezM s

. Lop ez depo s i t ed $2 , 97 2 i nt o her son’ s account f or hi s expens es d ur i ng t he Spri ng 200 1 s emes t er

. B as ed 6 on he r s on’ s act ual net ex pens es , he r pay ment s houl d hav e been onl y $2, 34 0. T he r ecor d s hows t hat af t er M s

. Lop ez
m a d e the d e p o sit i n he r so n ’s ac c o u n t, h e w ro te a c h e c k to his fa the r fo r $ 6 3 2 .5 0

. -7- rea s o n ab ly r e li e d o n th e s e r e p r e s e n tati o n s a n d , a s a r e s u lt , p a id mo r e th a n h e r s h ar e of Ada m Tay lor’s colleg e expenses. In fac t, by the Fa ll 2002 semester, Mr. Tay lor and Adam T ay lor wer e re qu e sti ng Ms. L op e z to ma ke pay me nts that e xce e de d A da m’ s a c tua l e xpe ns e s. Mr . T a y lor un fair ly benef itted from this arrang ement, not only beca use he tricked Ms. L opez into paying more than he r share of their son’s e x penses, but also be cause on at least one occa sion, Adam Tay lor g ave him the dif fe re nc e be tw e e n th e a mo un t Ms . L op e z de po sit e d inhis a c c ou nt andhe r c or re c t sh are of

his
e xpe ns e s. 6

IV. T HE C ON SEQUEN C ES OF THE C O N D U C T O F M R . T AYL OR A ND A D A M T AYL OR

Ms. L opez also takes issue with the trial court’s conclusions (1) that she bre ache d the marital dissoluti on ag ree ment when she discontinued paying he r son’s colleg e expenses an d (2 ) t h at she should be requir ed to continue pay ing he r son’s colleg e expenses despite the fac t tha t Mr. Tay lor, wi th A da m T a y lor ’s a ssi stanc e , b re a c he d h is o bli g a tio ns un de r the marita l di sso lut iona g re e me nt. She insists that she did not br eac h contra ct beca use the conduct of both Mr. Taylor and Adam Tay lor provide g rounds for te rminating her oblig ation. We ag ree

. This matter is s tr aig h tf

o rw a r d w it hr e g a r d to whateve r contra ctual oblig ations Ms. L opez may have ha d to Mr. Tay lor. A party to a contra ct may terminate its per formanc e under the contra ct when the other party (1) is w holly unable to c omplete the contr act, City of Brist ol v. Bostwick , 146 Tenn. 205, 211, 240 S.W

. 774, 776 (1922); (2) manifests an intent to abandon the contra ct, Brady v. O liver , 125 Tenn. 595, 614, 147 S.W

. 1135, 1139 (1911); (3) manifests an intent to no long er be bound by the c on tr a c t, Church of Christ Home for Age d, Inc. v. Nashville Trust Co. , 184 Tenn. 629, 642, 202 S.W. 2d17 8, 18 3 ( 19 47 ); or (4 ) co mmi ts fr aud on the pa rty se e kin g to t e rm inate the c on tr a c t. W .F. H o lt Co

. v
. A & E Elec. Co. , 66 5 S. W.2 d 7 22 , 7 30 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 3) . M r. Tay lor ’s c on du c t, whether it be char acte rized as a br eac h of c ontrac t or fraud, excused Ms. L opez of furthe r pe rf orma nc e of

he r c on tr a c tua l ob lig a tio ns to h im.

Ho we ve r, Mr . Ta y lor a nd Ms. L op e z are no t the on ly pa rt ie s with le g a lly

pr ote c ta ble int e re sts in the marital dissolution agr eeme nt. Their sons ar e intended third- party benef iciarie s of the portion of the mari ta l di sso lut iona g re e me nt r e g ard ing the pay me nt of c oll e g e e xpe ns e s. Suc h a g re e me nts
are g ener ally reg arde d as intended third-party benef iciary contra cts beca

use their purpose is to c onfer a bene fit on the children c overe d by the ag ree ment. See I

n r e Marriage of Smith & Maesc her, 21 Ca l. A pp . 4 th 1 00 , 1 05 (C a l. C t. A pp . 1 99 3) ; So uth ar d v . S ou tha rd , 756 So. 2d25 1, 25 3 ( F la . D ist

. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); Noble v. Fisher , 89 4 P.2 d 1 18 , 1 23 (I daho 19 95 ); Miller v. Miller , 516 N.E.2d 837, 84 4 ( I ll. Ct. Ap p. 19 87 ); Steve ns v. Stev ens , 7 98 S.W. 2d13 6, 13 9 ( Ky . 1 99 0) ; Adams v. Adam s , 320 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638-39 (N.Y . Sup. Ct . 1971).M r

. T ay l or ’ s a n d Adam T ay l or ’ s a ct i on s w i l l n o t a f f ect th at por t i on of t h e par t i es ’ ma r t i al di s s ol u t i on 7

a g r e e me n t c on c e r n i n g t h e i r ot h e r s on ’ s c ol l e g e e x pe n s e s be c a u s e t h e r e i s n o e v i de n c e t h a t h e pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e s c h e me t o def r aud M s

. Lop ez. -8- When third-party

benef iciary contracts are involved, determining whe ther one party ’s continuing pe rformance is ex cused by the other pa

rty ’s bre ach de pends upon whe ther the perf ormanc e of the non-bre aching party is conditioned on the other pa rty ’s p erformanc e. As Professor Corbin ha s expl ained:

I f the c ontrac t betwee n the promisee and the promisor is a bilater al contra ct, the promise made for the bene fit of a third pa rty may be unconditional or i t may

be conditional on performanc e of the return promise or tender

there of. I f unconditional, a br eac h of duty by the promisee will not aff

ect the right of

the bene ficiary

ag ainst the promisor. I f conditional and de pendent, on the other hand, a f ailure by the promisee to perform his part may terminate the duty

of perf ormanc e by

the promisor.

9 A RT H U R L I NTON C O R B IN , C OR B I N ON C ON TR AC TS § 819, at 246-47 (I nterim ed. 1979) ( C O R B IN ON C ON TR AC TS ). The analy sis with reg ard to third-party benef iciary contra cts is further

complicated by the principle that “[w] rong ful ac ts of the promisee, subse quent to the making of the c ontrac t, that would g reatly

aff ect his own rig ht, m ay not affe ct the bene ficiary ’s rig ht at all.” 9 C OR B I N ON C ON TR AC TS § 818, at 244.

B a se d u po n the plain la ng ua g e of the mari ta l di sso lut iona g re e me nt, Mr . T a y lor ’s a ndMs. L op e z’s pr omi se s to pay Ad a m Tay lor ’s c oll e g e e xpe ns e s w e re un c on dit ion a l. T he a g re e me nt d id
no t st a te that Ms . L op e z wo uldpay he r s ha re of the c oll e g e e xpe ns e s a s lo ng a s Mr

. Tay lor pa id h is
or vic e ve rs a . E a ch pare nt ind e pe nd e ntl y ow e d to Ad a m T a y lor

on e -h a lf of his c oll e g e e xpe ns e s. T h er ef o re , s i m p l y

b ec au s e M r. T ay l o r b re ac h ed t h e c o n tra ctb y fa i l i n g t o p ay h i s s h ar e o f t h e c o l l ege expenses does not, wi t h o u t m o re , excuse Ms. L opez from her obligations under the marital dissoluti on ag ree ment.

The a naly sis, however , does not end with Mr. Tay lor. Adam Tay lor’s conduc t may be take n int o a c c ou nt t o d e te rm ine wh e the r M s. L op e z sho uldbe re qu ir e d to c on tin ue pay ing a po rt ionof

his colleg e expenses. See R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F C O N T RA CT S § 309 (1981) (“A be nefic iary ’s rig ht ag ainst the promisor is subject to any claim or de fense arising from his own conduc t or ag ree ment”). Adam Tay lor ac tively

participated in the fraud ag ainst his mother

. By doing so, he for feited his rig ht to have his colleg e expenses paid by Ms. L opez, and Ms. L op ez s h o u l d be re lieved of any further ob lig a tio n to pay

he r s on ’s c oll e g e e xpe ns e s. 7-9- V. T HE R E I M B URS E M E NT F OR M S . L OPEZ ’ S O V ERPA Y M ENTS All pa rties take issue with the manner in w hich the trial court calc ulated the a mount that Mr. T ay l o r w o u l d b e r eq u i r e d t o re i m b u rs e M s

. L o p ez fo r h ero v erp ay m en to f A d am T ay l o r’ s co l l ege e xpe ns e s. Ms. L op e z ins ist s tha t she is en tit le d to the orig ina l judg me nt o f $ 6, 79 3. F or the ir pa rt , Mr . T a y lor

a ndAd a m T a y lor

ins ist that th e tr ia l c ou rt

sh ou ld ha ve dir e c te d him t o p a y $3 ,3 96 .5 0 to Ms. L op e z a nd the n re qu ir e d the pa rt ie s the pay e qu a l share s of the re ma ini ng ba la nc e ow e d to Da vid L ipscomb University . We have de termined that both of these calc ulations are f lawed.

The c alculation of Ms. L opez’s overpayments is straightf orwa rd. B eca use of the e vidence that the parties eac h paid their share of A dam Tay lor’s books, the calc ulation should be based on the actua l statements sent by

David Lipscomb University for Adam Tay lor’s tuition, s ch o o l fe es and du e s, a ndro om andbo ard . T akin g the e vid e nc e re g ard ing Ms. L op e z’s act ual pay me nts int o c on sid e ratio n, the fo llo wi ng ta ble re fl e c ts a

pr op e r c a lc ulatio n o f M s. L op e z’s ov e rp a y me nts :

Se m e st e r Ne t E xpe nse s Lope z Shar e Lope z P ay m e nt Ove r pay m e nt

Fa ll 2000 5,764 2,882 2,882 0 Spring 2001 4,679 2,340 2,972 632 Fa ll 2001 3,862 1,931 3,410 1,479 Spring 2002 3,862 1,931 3,410 1,479

Total 18,167 9,084 12,674 3,590

We have a lrea dy

determined that Ms. L opez had cause to discontinu e s u b sidiz ing A dam Tay lor’s colleg e expenses whe n she discover ed what h e an d h i s fa ther ha d been doing . Acc ording ly , the damag e ca lculation need not take into acc ount any colleg e ex penses Adam Tay lor incurr ed during and af ter the Spring 2002 semester

.
Ms. L opez al s o as s erts that she is entitled to re cover the additional taxes she was re quired to p a y wh e n s he wi thdre w fu nd s f ro m he r IRA to p a y

Ad a m T a y lor ’s c oll e g e e xpe ns e s. Whil e the se additional taxes could very well be include d in the assessment of damag es, Ms. L opez presente d no evidenc e of their a mount. The party seeking damag es has the bur den of pr oving the m. W alker v

. Sid ney Gi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W.3 d 66, 71 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; Inman v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank , 634 S.W .2d 270, 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Without any evidenc e in the rec ord re g arding the amount of a dditional tax es Ms. L opez was re quired to pay , we ha ve no basis for a war ding he r a dd iti on a l dama g e s o n a

pp e a l.

T h e ev i d en ce d em o n s tra t es t h at M s

. L o p ez p ai d $ 3 , 5 9 0 m o re fo r Ad am T ay l o r’ s c o l l ege expenses than she wa s require d to pay under the marital dissolution agr eeme nt . She is, theref ore, entitled to an orde r re quiring Mr. Taylor to reimburse her f or these ove rpayments. Acc ording ly , on-10-

re ma nd , th e c ou rt

sh ou ld m od if

y its Se pte mbe r 1 2, 20 03 or de r t o r e qu ir e Mr . T a y lor to pa y Ms. L opez $3,590 rather

than the $2,737.01 payment contained in the or der.

VI
. M S . L OPEZ ’ S R E QUE S T F OR A CCE S S T O H E R S ON ’ S C OLLEG E F I N A N C I A L R E CORDS Finally , Ms. L opez ta

kes issue with the trial court’ s denial of he r re quest for a cce ss to Adam Tay lor ’s c oll e g e fi na nc ia l re c or ds

. I n lig ht of the prior c on du c t of Adam T a y lor a ndMr . T a y lor , th is reque st would be rea sonable if Ms. L opez had an obligation to continue paying a portion of her

son’s colleg e expenses. Howeve r, she no longe r needs acc ess to these re cords be cause we ha ve re lieved he r o f any

fu rthe r o bli g a tio n to pay

a ny po rt ionof

Ad a m T a y lor ’s c oll e g e e xpe ns e s.
VI I.

I n s umm a ry , w e re ve rs e the po rt ion s o f the S ept emb e r 1 2, 20 03 or de r f ind ing (1 ) that Ms

. L opez brea ched the marital dissolution agr eeme nt, (2) that s h e h ad a c ontinuing oblig ation to pay Ad a m T a y lo r ’ s c o ll e g e e xp e n s e s a f te r th e Sp r in g 2 0 0 2 s e me s te r , ( 3 ) th a t M r

. T a y lo r a n d A dam Tay lor had not f

raudule ntly induced Ms. L opez to pay more of Adam Tay lor’s colleg e expenses than she wa s require d to pay , and (4) that Ms. L opez w as entitled to rec over $2,737.01 f rom Mr. Taylor. We a ff ir m a ll o the r p ortio ns of

the or de r andre ma ndthe c a se to t he tr ial cou rt wi th d ir e c tio ns to enter an orde r direc ting Mr. T ay lor to pay Ms. L opez $3,590 to r eimburse he r for the over payment of Ada m Tay lor’s colleg e expenses and for whateve r other proce eding s consistent with this opinion
ma y b e r e q u ir e d

. We tax th e c o s ts o f th is ap p e a l t o D a n n y

H o lb r o o k

T a y lo r f o r w h ic h e xe c u tion, if nec essary , may

issue.

______________________________ WI LL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.