alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Cheesman *et al. v.*Shreve *et al.*

*(Circuit Court, D. Colorado.*

December 13, 1888.)

1. Mines and Mining—Trespassers.

_ Parties who attempt to enter, beneath the surface, within the side lines of the lands of another, and to mine and take ore therefrom, are *prima facie*trespassers.

2. Same—Courts—Federal Jurisdiction.

Where such entry is claimed to be made under the mining laws of the United States, and the right to enter turns upon the construction to be given to such laws, the case is within the jurisdiction of the United States circuit court.

3. Injunction—Preliminary—Disputed Legal Title—Conflicting Affidavits.

Where the affidavits are conflicting, a preliminary injunction will be issued against trespassers, leaving the question of the title to the property to be settled by a suit at law.

In Equity. On bill for injunction.

Application for injunction by Walter S. Cheesman and others against James A. Shreve and others to prevent trespass upon mining lands.

*G. J. Hughes, Jr.,*for complainants.

*B. F. Montgomery,*for defendants.

Brewer, J.

These defendants are entering beneath the surface, within the side lines of ground patented to complainants, and seeking to mine and take ore therefrom. *Prima facie*they are trespassers. They justify this entrance under authority of the laws of the United States, and especially section 2322 of the Revised Statutes, which give to the *37owner of a vein, lode, or ledge, the top or apex of which lies within the surface lines of his own location, the right to follow that vein downward, outside of the side litres of his location, and into territory whose surface belongs to another. Involved in their claim is the question whether there is such a vein as is provided for in that section; a question as to the right of entrance, as affected by priority of location and the dip of the vein. Those questions are presented, and, whatever may be the true answers thereto, it is obvious, from past judicial expressions, that they cannot he considered as mere sham, or pretended, hut as real, substantial questions. Hence, as questions arising under the laws of the United states, they present a case cognizable by the court. *Mining Co.*v. *Larimer*Co., 8 Fed. Rep. 724; *Starin*v. *New York,*115 U. S. 248, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28. As the defendants are entering within the side lines of complainant’s property, *prima facie*they are trespassers; and where the affidavits, upon an application fora preliminary injunction, are conflicting, the rule is to preserve the possession as against such *prima facie*trespassers by a preliminary injunction, leaving the question of title to the property to be established by a suit at law. Temporary injunction will issue upon the giving of a bond in the sum of §25,000, conditioned according to law.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gustavo SANCHEZ-RIVERA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-41272

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gustavo Sanchez-Rivera pleaded guilty to one charge of attempted illegal reentry into the United States and was sentenced to serve 70 months in prison and a three-year term of supervised release. Sanchez-Rivera argues that the district court erred by concluding that his prior conviction for burglary of a habitation constituted a crime of violence and by assessing a 16-level adjustment for this conviction. This argument is, as Sanchez-Rivera concedes, foreclosed. *See United States v. Valdez-Maltos,*443 F.3d 910, 911 (5th Cir.2006), *cert. denied,*- U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 265, 166 L.Ed.2d 205 (2006); *United States v. Garcia-Mendez,*420 F.3d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir.2005), *cert. denied,*- U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1398, 164 L.Ed.2d 100 (2006).

Sanchez-Rivera also challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Sanchez-Rivera’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Sanchez-Rivera contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*- U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Sanchez-Rivera properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *Almendarez-Torres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

Sanchez-Rivera has shown no error in connection with his conviction or sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 89 (Monday, May 11, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 21829]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10917]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,639]


Business Confidential; Tyco Safety Products, Westminster, MA; 
Notice of Termination of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on March 20, 2009 in response to a petition 
filed by a company official on behalf of the workers of Tyco Safety 
Products, Westminster, Massachusetts.
    The petitioners requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 20th day of April 2009.
Richard Church,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-10917 Filed 5-8-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
663 A.2d 637

#### IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH P. CAPONE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

September 11, 1995.

ORDER

JOSEPH P. CAPONE of VOORHEES, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1987, having pleaded guilty to 18 *U.S.C.A.*§§ 1014 and 2, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that pursuant to *Rule*l:20-13(b)(l), JOSEPH P. CAPONE is temporarily suspended from the practice of law pending the final resolution of ethics proceedings against him, effective immediately and until the further order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that JOSEPH P. CAPONE be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension; and it is further

ORDERED that JOSEPH P. CAPONE comply with *Rule*1:20-20 dealing with suspended attorneys.
From: The District Court of the 2nd Judicial District. County of Silver Bow.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. CRAIG BARTH, Defendant,

CAUSE NO. DC-08-48 DECISION

On November 20, 2008, the defendant was sentenced to a commitment to the Department of Corrections for a term of five (5) years. The Court sentenced the defendant to the maximum sentence because the Defendant has previously completed a residential alcohol treatment facility and the large number of DUI convictions (13). Additionally, the Defendant committed the present offense while on parole for a felony DUI.

On May 7, 2009, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Deirdre Caughlan. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 7th day of May, 2009.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2009.

Chairperson, Hon. Stewart Stadler, Member, Hon. Blair Jones and Member, Richard Simonton.
**Exhibit 31.1** **CERTIFICATIONS    PURSUANT TO    RULE 13a-14(A)    OF THE EXCHANGE ACT**     I, Panagiotis Zafet, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Chairman of    the Board of Seanergy Maritime Corp., certify that:     1. I have reviewed this annual report on    Form 10-K    of Seanergy Maritime Corp.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any    untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material    fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the    circumstances under which such statements were made, not    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and    other financial information included in this report, fairly    present in all material respects the financial condition,    results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of,    and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I    are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure    controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act    Rules 13a-15(e)    and    15d-15(e))    for the registrant and have:     a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or    caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed    under our supervision, to ensure that material information    relating to the registrant, including its consolidated    subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those    entities, particularly during the period in which this report is    being prepared;     b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s    disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report    our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure    controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by    this report based on such evaluation; and     c. disclosed in this report any change in the    registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that    occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter    that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to    materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over    financial reporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I    have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal    control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s    auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of    directors:     a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in    the design or operation of internal control over financial    reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the    registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and    report financial information; and     b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves    management or other employees who have a significant role in the    registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. /s/  Panagiotis    Zafet    Panagiotis Zafet    Chief Executive Officer and Co-Chairman of the Board    (Principal Executive Officer)     Date: March 31, 2008
#### Edin MUJADZIC, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. HOTEL GOVERNOR, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-35279.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 11, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 17, 2006.

Edin Mujadzic, Beaverton, OR, for Plaintiff — Appellant.

Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Upon review of the record, the opening brief and appellant’s response to this court’s order to show cause, we conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. *See United States v. Hooton,*693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per cu-riam) (stating standard).

*120Accordingly, we summarily affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 of WebSafety,
Inc. fka Blindspot Alert, In, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December
31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, John R. Williams, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of
my knowledge:




1.           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The
information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




By:
                /s/ John R. Williams,
Jr.John
      R. Williams, Jr.Chief
      Financial Officer




Dated:  November
23, 2009





This
certification accompanies this report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purpose of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, another document
authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to WebSafety, Inc. fka Blindspot Alert, In.
and will be retained and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
667 A.2d 692

#### IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

December 11, 1995.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board on July 17, 1995, having filed with the Court its decision concluding that by way of reciprocal discipline RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT of HOLLIS HILLS, NEW YORK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1983, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, retroactive to July 1, 1993, the date of respondent’s temporary suspension from practice;

And that the Disciplinary Review Board having concluded pursuant to *Rule*l:20-14(a)(4)(E) that although respondent had been disbarred in New York on the basis of his guilty plea to one count of a federal indictment charging him with willfully and knowingly presenting false statements of material fact to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, in violation of 18 *U.S.CA*1001, discipline substantially different from disbarment is warranted by respondent’s misconduct;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further concluded that no application for reinstatement should be made by respondent until such time as respondent is reinstated to practice in New York;

And RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT having been ordered to show cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that RICHARD D. SILVERBLATT is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, retroactive to July 1, 1993, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

*636ORDERED that *no*application for reinstatement shall be made until respondent is reinstated to practice in the State of New York; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he comply with *Rule*1:20-20; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 23, 2020

No. 04

- 19

- 00893

- CV

Judy BARRERA

, Appellant

v.

BEXAR COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a University Health System and Charles Reed,

Appellee

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CI22275

Honorable Michael E. Mery, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The court reporter’s second request for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record is

GRANTED. The reporter’s record is due on or before April 9, 2020

.

_________________________________ Irene Rios , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 23rd day of March, 2020

.

___________________________________ M ichael A. C ruz

, Clerk of Court
##### 



News Announcement CONTACT:Richard E. Gaetz, President/CEO
    
    Robert L. RindermanSean Washchuk, VP Finance/CFO
    
    Purdy TranVitran Corporation Inc
    
    Jaffoni & Collins Incorporated416/596-7664
    
    212/835-8500 or VVN@jcir.com
 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE VITRAN TO REPURCHASE UP TO 5% OF ITS OUTSTANDING SHARES TORONTO, ONTARIO (February 8, 2005)  Vitran Corporation Inc. (AMX: VVN, TSX: VTN), a North
American transportation and logistics firm, today announced its intention to commence a normal
course issuer bid to acquire up to 620,984 shares (approximately 5%) of its outstanding common
shares by way of open market purchases through the facilities of, and in accordance with, the Rules
and Policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The Shares will be repurchased for cancellation. The bid will commence on February 9, 2005 and end February 8, 2006. As at February 2, 2005, Vitran
had 12,419,678 common shares outstanding. Vitrans management believes such purchases to be a
prudent use of funds. About Vitran Corporation Inc.
Vitran Corporation Inc. is a North American group of transportation companies offering
less-than-truckload, logistics, truckload, and freight brokerage services. To find out more about
Vitran Corporation Inc. (AMX:VVN, TSX:VTN), visit the website at www.vitran.com. Statements in the press release regarding managements future expectation, beliefs, goals, plans,
or prospects constitute forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties, which may
cause actual results to differ materially from the statements made. For this purpose, any
statements that are contained herein that are not statements or historical fact may be deemed to be
forward-looking statements made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the United States Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Without limiting the foregoing, the words believes,
anticipates, plans intends, will, should, expects, projects, and similar expressions
are intended to identify forward-looking statements. You are cautioned that such statements are
subject to a multitude of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual result, future
circumstances or events to differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking
statements. These risks include, but are not limited to, economic factors, demand for the
Companys services, fuel price fluctuations, the availability of employee drivers and independent
contractors, risks associated with geographic expansion, capital requirements, claims exposure and
insurance costs, competition, government regulation changes, environmental hazards and other risks
detailed from time-to-time in the Companys public disclosure documents or other filing with the
Canadian and United States securities commissions or other securities regulatory bodies. The
forward-looking statements are made as of the date hereof, and the Company disclaims any intention
and has no obligation or responsibility, except as required by law, to update or revise any
forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. # # #
663 A.2d 636

#### IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY R. POCARO, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

September 11, 1995.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed a report with the Court on June 15,1995, recommending that JEFFREY R. POCARO of SUMMIT, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1982, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year for his admitted violation of *RPC*8.4(b) and (c), respondent having engaged in fraudulent conduct while acting as attorney for the borrower in a sale-leaseback transaction involving race horses, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JEFFREY R. POCARO is hereby suspended from practice for a period of one year, effective September 30, 1995, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he comply with *Rule*1:20-20; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
From: The District Court of the 13th Judicial District. County of Yellowstone.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. STACEY DIAZ, Defendant,

CAUSE NO. DC-08-029 DECISION

On August 29,2008, the defendant was sentenced to a commitment to the Department of Corrections for a term of three (3) years for the offense of Escape, a felony, all of which shall run consecutively with the sentence received in Criminal Cause No. DC-04-420.

On April 3, 2009, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Kris Copenhaver. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that she understood this and stated that she wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 3rd day of April, 2009.

DATED this 21st day of April, 2009.

Chairperson, Hon. Stewart Stadler, Member, Hon. Blair Jones and Member, Hon. Richard Simonton.