NO. 4-01-0496

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

PATRICIA FISCHER, Independent Adminis-	)	Appeal from

tratrix of the Estate of				)	Circuit Court of

LAVEDA MARY ZARA, Deceased,			)	Sangamon County

		Plaintiff-Appellant,		)	No. 00L203

		v.						)

SENIOR LIVING PROPERTIES, L.L.C., d/b/a	)

WESTABBE HEALTH CARE CENTER,			)

		Defendant,				)

		and						)

ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL OF THE HOSPITAL	)	

SISTERS OF THE THIRD ORDER OF ST.		)

FRANCIS, d/b/a ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL		)

OF SPRINGFIELD, and JOSEPH J.			)	Honorable

MAURER, M.D.,						)	Robert J. Eggers,

		Defendants-Appellees.		)	Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

		The question raised in this case is whether an amended

complaint adding additional parties is properly filed within the

period of the statute of limitations when the clerk tells counsel

the order granting leave to file the amended complaint will be

entered by the court as a routine matter, but that is not done. 

The trial court answered the question in the negative and granted

the motions to dismiss filed by the additional defendants.  We

reverse and remand.

	I. BACKGROUND

		Plaintiff Patricia Fischer is the independent

administratrix of the estate of Laveda Mary Zara, who died

December 29, 1998.  An action for the death of a person arising

out of patient care shall not be brought more than two years

after knowledge of the death.  735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2000).  Under section 13-212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code),

the last day for filing an action in this case was December 29,

2000.

		On June 30, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint against

defendant Senior Living Properties, L.L.C., d/b/a Westabbe Health

Care Center (Senior Living).  Summons was issued and Senior

Living filed its entry of appearance.  Plaintiff obtained leave

of court for additional time to file the affidavit and report

required by section 2-622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West

2000)).  Senior Living had not filed an answer as of December 29,

2000.  

		On December 27, 2000, plaintiff's attorney, officed in

Effingham County, filed an amended complaint with the circuit

clerk of Sangamon County.  The amended complaint added two

defendants, defendant St. John's Hospital of the Hospital of

Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, d/b/a St. John's

Hospital of Springfield (St. John's), and defendant Joseph J.

Maurer, M.D.  Plaintiff's attorney personally delivered the

following documents to the circuit clerk:  a certificate of

service on Senior Living, a motion for leave to file the amended

complaint instanter, a proposed order granting leave to file the amended complaint instanter, and summons accompanied by copies of the amended complaint.  The circuit clerk advised plaintiff's

attorney that the order for leave would be tendered to the judge

that day as a routine matter unless plaintiff's attorney was

informed otherwise.  The documents were all file-stamped on December 27, 2000, summons was issued, and St. John's and Dr.

Maurer were served on January 3, 2001.

		On January 30, 2001, Dr. Maurer's attorney told plain

tiff's attorney the court file failed to reflect entry of the

order granting leave to file the amended complaint instanter.  Without objection the order was entered following a hearing on

February 13, 2001.  Dr. Maurer filed a motion to dismiss on March

23, 2001, alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of

action and was not filed within the two-year statute of limita

tions, because the complaint was not filed until after December

29, 2000. 

		On June 5, 2001, after a hearing, the trial court

entered an order allowing St. John's to adopt Dr. Maurer's motion

to dismiss, allowing plaintiff's counsel to file an affidavit to

supplement the record as to the statements made by the clerk's

office personnel, and allowing the motions to dismiss on the

basis that the statute of limitations had expired on December 29,

2000.  The trial court subsequently made a finding under Rule

304(a) (155 Ill 2d R. 304(a)) that there was no just reason for

delaying either enforcement or appeal.  

	II. ANALYSIS

		Motions to dismiss, both under sections 2-615 and 2-619

of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)), present

questions of law which we review de novo.  Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 494, 639 N.E.2d 1282, 1293-94 (1994).

		This court has stated that "an amended complaint, adding additional parties, filed without leave of the court is a

nullity."  Allen v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d 783, 786, 473 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1985).  We had previously recog

nized that there are problems when leave of court must be ob tained to amend a complaint near the end of a limitations period. 

Clark v. Brokaw Hospital, 126 Ill. App. 3d 779, 782-83, 467 N.E.2d 652, 655 (1984) (motion to convert respondent in discovery

to a defendant sufficient if motion made within six-month period

even though the motion is not heard and ruled on until after six-

month period).  The customary deliberate method of setting and

hearing motions may not be appropriate where the statute of

limitations is about to expire.  In Allen, we declined to con sider the procedure mentioned in Clark because there was no evidence that the motion for leave to amend was filed within the period of limitations.  Allen, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 473 N.E.2d at 139.  Allen and Clark both recognize that strict compliance is not always required in obtaining leave to amend a

complaint. 

		Petrella v. Leisky, 92 Ill. App. 3d 880, 417 N.E.2d 134 (1981), the case relied upon by Allen for the "nullity" language quoted above, involved the filing of a complaint as a supplemen

tal pleading under section 2-609 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-609

(West 2000)).  Section 2-609 specifically requires that a supple

mental pleading be "by leave of court and upon terms."  735 ILCS

5/2-609 (West 2000).  The complaint in Petrella was not a proper supplemental pleading because supplemental pleadings are only employed to set forth matters arising after the original pleading

has been filed.  Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 881, 417 N.E.2d at 136.  There was apparently no motion for leave to amend filed in

Petrella.  The case cited by Petrella for the proposition that an ineffective attempt to amend a complaint is a nullity had applied

"prior law" to an attempt to amend made without leave of court

and after judgment.  Register Gazette Co. v. Larash, 109 Ill. App. 236, 237-38 (1903); Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 417 N.E.2d at 137.  Clearly a defendant who is added after judgment

and without any opportunity to defend is unfairly prejudiced by

the amendment.  

		Section 2-616 of the Code, dealing with amendments

"introducing any party who ought to have been joined," contains

no specific requirement that leave of court be obtained.  735

ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2000).  The section simply provides that

"[a]t any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable terms."  (Emphasis added.)  735 ILCS 5/2-

616(a) (West 2000).  Perhaps the legislature could lay down an

inflexible rule that no amendment adding parties could ever be

effective without a signed order granting leave to amend.  The

very general language of section 2-616, however, does not estab

lish such a rule.  The provisions of section 2-616 requiring

leave of court are directory, not mandatory.  In re Estate of Zander v. Department of Public Aid, 242 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777, 611 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1993).     

		Defendants cite a number of cases in support of the

trial court's order.  All those cases recite the statement that "[a]n amended complaint adding additional parties filed without

leave of the court is a nullity."  Callaghan Paving, Inc. v. Keeneyville Construction Co., 197 Ill. App. 3d 937, 939, 557 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1990) (plaintiff's amendment adding a defendant

without leave of court was a nullity and it must be disregarded

on review); First Robinson Savings & Loan v. Ledo Construction Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 569 N.E.2d 304, 307 (1991) (an order adding a defendant obtained ex parte and without notice is void); Greene v. Helis, 252 Ill. aApp. 3d 957, 960, 625 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1993) (leave to amend must be expressly granted by

court order and will not be implied).  

		However, the holdings in all those cases have been

rejected by subsequent decisions of the supreme court and of this

court.  In Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 701 N.E.2d 493 (1998), the supreme court considered a case

where the plaintiff had amended his complaint without leave of

court to add a prayer for prejudgment interest.  The defendant

did not object and filed a response, and prejudgment interest was

awarded, but defendant raised the argument in the appellate court

that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the amended com

plaint, citing Greene and other cases.  The supreme court distin guished those cases because they involved an amendment that would

add a party but also found the cases "unpersuasive."  Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 354, 701 N.E.2d at 498.  "[Section 2-616 of t]he Code

of Civil Procedure provides that technical defects in pleadings

should not prevent the courts from doing justice between the parties."  Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 354, 701 N.E.2d at 498.  

		The idea that the filing of an amended complaint was a

void act because it was done without statutory authority, was a

nullity, and constituted error that was "jurisdictional" has been

rejected by this court.  Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508, 515-516, 690 N.eE.2d 649, 654 (1998) (failure to obtain leave to

file a third-party complaint seeking contribution was waived and

could not be raised for the first time on appeal).  "[T]reating

obtaining of leave as an element of jurisdiction is contrary to

the most recent theories of circuit court jurisdiction."  Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 516, 690 N.E.2d at 654.  Under the 1970

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9), circuit court

jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution and strict compli

ance with the statute is no longer necessary.  Ganci, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 519, 690 N.E.2d at 656; see also Estate of Zander, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 611 N.E.2d at 88 (provisions of section 2-

616 requiring leave of court are directory, not mandatory, and

may be waived).  First Robinson has been overruled by the Fifth District, where it originated.  Savage v. Mui Pho, 312 Ill. App. 3d 553, 558, 727 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (2000).  

		Defendant Maurer argues that even if the trial court

had granted leave to amend on December 27, the complaint would

have to be dismissed because plaintiff did not set the motion for

hearing and give the existing defendant, Senior Living, the

number of days' notice required.  We disagree.  The motion may be

considered as an emergency motion which may be made ex parte and heard without calling the motion for hearing.  Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 558, 727 N.E.2d at 1056.  It is impossible to conceive

of a court denying leave to amend in the situation of this case,

where the parties to be joined are not before it to make their

positions known.  Even if the court suspects the complaint may be

defective, the proper course is to allow it to be filed and then

hear the arguments of the parties.  Motions granting leave to

amend to add parties during the pleading stage are granted as a

matter of routine.  Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 559, 727 N.E.2d at 1057.  The clerk in this case stated these orders were entered

as a matter of routine, and the judge in fact did sign the order.

		If a party files a complaint on paper which measures 8 

1/2 by 12 inches, must the complaint be stricken?  See Supreme Court Rule 10  (134 Ill.

2d R. 10) ("shall be 8 1/2 inches by 11 inches") (134 Ill. 2d R. 10).  If an appel

lee's brief in the appellate court has a cover that is more a

dark blue than a light blue, must the brief be ignored?  See Supreme

Court

Rule

344(c)

("l134

Ill. 2d R. 344(c) ("light blue").  Some rules constitute minor

technicalities; enforcing them exalts form over substance to

deprive a party of his day in court and frustrating the resolu

tion of the litigation on the merits.  Shaifer v. Folino, 272 Ill. App. 3d 709, 720, 650 N.E.2d 594, 601 (1995), quoting

Hatcher v. Kentner, 120 Ill. App. 3d 571, 575, 458 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (1983); Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill. 2d 109, 113-14, 703 N.E.2d 67, 69 (1998) (invalidating lien due to the instant

technicalities would serve no purpose). 

		We conclude that the filing of an amended complaint where the judge has not signed the order granting leave is not

per se inadequate.  We must accordingly consider whether there was substantial compliance with the requirements of sections 2-

616 and 13-212(a) of the Code in this case.  We should consider

the object sought to be obtained and the evils intended to be

remedied by these statutes.  The purpose of a statute of limita

tions is to discourage the presentment of stale claims.  Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 400, 752 N.E.2d 1069, 1075-76 (2001).  Plaintiff should not be allowed to

extend the statute by doing nothing for months, to the prejudice

of the persons sought to be added as defendants.  We should be

wary of a rule whichthat would allow the apparent running of the

statute to be explained away by private actions within the con

trol of counsel.   In re Application of the County Collector, 265 Ill. App. 3d 485, 491, 637 N.E.2d 679, 683 (1994) (important to

establish a clear rule and reliable standard of proof regarding

when documents will be deemed filed).                             

         There is no risk in the present case of manipulation by

counsel.  Counsel here performed the most public of acts: he

handed the complaint to the circuit clerk, who file-stamped it

and caused summons to be served on the parties named.  St. Johns

and Maurer were not unduly prejudiced by the failure to sign the

order granting leave.  They received their summons and copies of

the amended complaint at the same time they would have received

them if the order had been signed.  Nor are defendants prejudiced

by denying them a technical argument which would have defeated plaintiff's claim.  We are not interested in whether defendants

prevail in this case, but whether the matter is resolved justly,

on its merits.  People ex rel. Hartigan v. All American Aluminum and& Construction Co., 171 Ill. App. 3d 27, 33, 524 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (1988) (allowing Attorney General to add parties not named

in the order granting leave to amend).

		The routine nature of these orders is confirmed by the

fact that there were ways defendants could have been added with

out requesting any leave of court.  Petrella recognized that plaintiff could have filed a separate action against the new

defendant without leave of court, and then moved to consolidate

the actions.  Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 882, 417 N.E.2d at 137.  Petrella, however, passed over that possibility: "[r]egardless of what plaintiff could have done, what he did was to file the supplemental complaint as an adjunct to his pending

case."  (Emphasis in original.)  Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 882, 417 N.E.2d at 137.  That attitude is mistaken.  "[I]t is not

an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say:  We see what you

are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall

go on as before."  Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J.).  The character of a pleading is deter

mined by its content and not the title or label asserted by the

petitioner.  People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444, 457, 753 N.E.2d 293, 300-01 (2001) (Fitzgerald, J., specially concurring) (attack

on void judgment need not satisfy requirements of section 2-1401

even though it was a section 2-1401 petition that was filed); La Salle National Trust, N.A. v. Board of Directors of the 1100 Lake

Shore Drive Condominium, 287 Ill. App. 3d 449, 456, 677 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (1997) (plaintiff adequately pled "constructive fraud"

even though those words were not used).  A timely order granting

leave can only be a minor technicality when parties can otherwise

be properly added without obtaining leave.  

		The argument is made the late order granting leave to

amend could have been accepted if, instead of seeking leave to

amend instanter, plaintiff had obtained a hearing date for the motion, notified Senior Living of the motion and hearing date,

and obtained an order allowing amendment.  The only difference

between that and what was actually done is the opportunity given

Senior Living to appear at a hearing and object.  Again, concern

over the rights of Senior Living is misplaced.  It is unlikely

that a defendant such as Senior Living will object to the addi

tion of a defendant, and Senior Living did not object when it was

given the opportunity to do so here.  Objecting to a motion for

leave to amend is not the mechanism for challenging a defective

pleading; the mechanism is the filing of a section 2-615 motion

after the amendment has been allowed.  Trinity Bible Baptist Church v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co., 219 Ill. App. 3d 156, 163, 578 N.E.2d 1375, 1379 (1991).  St. John's and Maurer should

not be heard to complain that Senior Living's rights were vio

lated.

		It is possible to blame every failure of the trial

court and the circuit clerk upon the attorneys, by suggesting they should have better "monitored" the case.  It is fair to

criticize attorneys where something is overlooked in the trial

court and not brought to the court's attention for a lengthy

period of time.  That was not the case here.  Can plaintiff's

attorney be criticized for handing the motion for leave to amend

to the clerk and not to the judge?  "Pleadings subsequent to the

complaint, written motions, and other papers required to be filed

shall be filed with the clerk ***."  134 Ill. 2d R. 104(b). 

Should plaintiff's attorney have ignored the clerk's instructions

and taken the motion for leave to amend to the judge himself? 

Should plaintiff's attorney have phoned the judge or sat outside

his chambers until he was personally told by the judge that the

order had been signed?  A rule whichthat prevents the court from using

court officers and employees and insists upon personal action by

the judge will not promote judicial economy (or civility between

the bench and bar).  Should plaintiff's attorney have gone to

look for a judge?  A system where attorneys select the judge to

sign their orders is not a desirable one.  Local attorneys should

not be advantaged in these cases by their ability to contact a

judge who is not in his chambers or is handling other matters.

		Whatever rule is applied in this case should not vary

from county to county.  Circuit rules may direct how routine

motions are to be handled but those rules should be considered

directory and not allowed to invalidate a filing where there has

been substantial compliance.  

	III. CONCLUSION

		We conclude that plaintiff's attorney properly filed

his papers in the office of the circuit clerk and followed the

instructions given him by the clerk.  The clerk placed the motion

on the court's routine motion call.  The trial court would have

signed the order granting leave to amend as a matter of routine

and did eventually sign the order here without objection.  The

failure to obtain that signature on December 27 was only a minor

technicality.  Plaintiff substantially complied with both sec

tions 2-616 and 13-212(a).  Failure to timely obtain the signa

ture did not cause any delay, defendants were in no way preju

diced, and plaintiff acted in good faith.  

		We reverse the trial court's judgment that the statute

of limitations had expired in this case and remand for further

proceedings.

		Reversed and remanded.   

		TURNER, J., concurs.

		McCULLOUGH, P.J., dissents.

		PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting:

		I respectfully dissent.

		This case involves simply an interpretation of the

Code.  The filing of an amendment pursuant to section 2-616(a) of

the Code cannot be "allowed" unless such action is requested by a

party.  Such a request is implicit in the terms of section 2-

616(a).  

		This court has determined that obtaining leave of court

to file an amendment to a pleading adding a new party was not

necessary to invoke the circuit court's subject matter jurisdic

tion over the proceeding or in personam jurisdiction over the added party where the party appeared and failed to make a timely

objection to the failure to obtain permission to amend.  Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508, 515-19, 690 N.E.2d 649, 653-56 (1998).  Similarly, Ragan found that the failure to obtain leave to amend was not a jurisdictional defect.  Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 355, 701 N.E.2d at 499.  The defendant in Ragan had filed an answer to the complaint, and affirmative defenses and argued the

merits of the pleadings as amended, and on that basis, the su

preme court found the defendant had waived its right to raise the

issue.  Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 355, 701 N.E.2d at 499.  Ragan rejected Greene because it was unpersuasive and distinguished when applied to the facts in Ragan.  In comparing Greene, the supreme court stated: "In contrast, Ragan's amended complaint

added claims and prayers against parties who were already prop

erly before the court."  Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 354, 701 N.E.2d at 498.  Jurisdiction is not the issue here.  A statute of limita

tion is not a condition precedent constituting a jurisdictional

bar to proceedings; it is an affirmative defense.  See Marshall v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Retirement Fund, 298 Ill. App. 3d 66, 74-75, 697 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (1998).  The major

ity's reliance on Ragan is misplaced.

		The question in this appeal is whether the amended

complaint was "filed" within the statute of limitations on Decem

ber 27, 2000.  Plaintiff relies on the fact that an action is

commenced by the filing of a complaint (735 ILCS 5/2-201(a) (West

2000)), and a complaint committed to the custody and control of

the circuit clerk is deemed filed (Kelly v. Mazzie, 207 Ill. App. 3d 251, 253, 565 N.E.2d 719, 720 (1990)).  See Vincent v. McElvain, 304 Ill. 160, 163, 136 N.E. 502, 503 (1922) (a suit is commenced when a party puts in motion the instruments of the

court, not when the court gets jurisdiction of the defendant). 

The mailbox rule is not implicated on the facts of this case.

		However, the issue in this appeal does not involve the

timeliness of the filing of the original complaint.  On just and

reasonable terms, the trial court "may" allow a party to amend

its pleading to join a party as a defendant.  735 ILCS 5/2-616(a)

(West 2000).  A plaintiff may not file an amended complaint

adding new parties without leave of court, and doing so will not

toll the statute of limitations against the new parties. 

Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 881-83, 417 N.E.2d at 136-37.  Also, because an unauthorized amendment to a complaint is a nullity, the later amendment of the complaint does not relate back to the

date when the ineffective amendment was attempted.  Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 417 N.E.2d at 137.  See Callaghan Paving, Inc. v. Keeneyville Construction Co., Inc., 197 Ill. App. 3d 937, 939, 557 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1990) (a plaintiff may only amend a com

plaint to add a claim against a new party with leave of court,

and an amended complaint adding additional parties filed without

leave of court is a nullity); First Robinson Savings & Loan v. Ledo Construction Co., Inc., 210 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 569 N.E.2d 304, 306-08 (1991) (there is no absolute right to amend a plead

ing; filing an amended pleading adding new parties without leave

of court is a nullity; a nullity tolls no statute of limitation). 

This court has recognized that leave to amend a complaint is not

granted until a court order is obtained.  Allen v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d 783, 787, 473 N.E.2d 137, 139 (19985).  In addition, the court must expressly give leave to

amend; it will not be implied.  Greene v. Helis, 252 Ill. App. 3d 957, 960, 625 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1993).  I disagree with the sug

gestion that the granting of a motion to amend a complaint is

"ministerial."  Assuming that (1) had the trial court considered

and denied the motion to dismiss on December 27, 2000, and (2)

this court would have found the denial of the motion to be an

abuse of discretion, such standard clearly accepts the discre

tionary nature of the trial court's ruling on the motion to

amend.  The majority also accepts plaintiff's argument that the

amended complaint should be deemed to have been filed on December 27, 2000, because an employee in the circuit clerk's office

accepted it, file-stamped it, and told him that the order allow

ing amendment would be presented to the trial judge and entered

that day, as a matter of routine. 

		I disagree with the majority's concession that it is

impossible to conceive of a court denying leave to amend in the

situation of this case.  To accept that position would eliminate

the need for section 2-616.  In addition, the majority gives the

circuit clerk too much prerogative and too much responsibility

with respect to an attorney's duties.  As set forth in section 2-

616, "may be allowed" requires some action.  I believe the rule

was even acknowledged to mean something by the plaintiff when in

fact on February 13 his motion was allowed. 

		I would give no validity to the actions of the circuit

clerk's employee.  Neither file-stamping the amended complaint or

prematurely issuing summons without direction to do so from the

trial judge should be deemed a substitution for the trial judge's

considering and ruling on the motion to amend.  The circuit clerk

is not a judge.  In addition, the duties of the circuit clerk do

not encompass accepting delegation to practice law on behalf of a

lawyer's client.  It is the attorney's obligation to the client

to monitor the case and ensure that actions necessary to protect

the interests of the client are taken.  See 134 Ill. 2d RPC.

1.1(a). 

		The majority also states that First Robinson was over ruled by Savage.  I am not persuaded.  Savage disagreed with First Robinson "that an order obtained ex parte and without notice, without more, is void."  Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 558, 727 N.E.2d at 1056.  The Savage court then distinguished First Robinson.  Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 558, 727 N.E.2d at 1056- 57.  In Savage, the court found the order granting leave to amend ex parte was valid and the amended complaint was properly filed (Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 560, 727 N.E.2d at 1058), but made it clear "[a] court's decision to grant a motion for leave to

amend is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. ***

Any doubts as to whether leave *** should be granted should be

decided in favor of the allowance of the amendment" (Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 556-57, 727 N.E.2d at 1055).  Here, there is no

order, let alone an ex parte. order.  Moreover, there are no local rules governing emergency motions as relied on in Savage.  3III Illinois Civil Rules &and Procedure, 212 (West 2001) (LOCAL local rules)RULES.

		I would deem the statute of limitations tolled if,

before the expiration of the limitations period, plaintiff (1)

obtained a hearing date for the motion to amend, even if that

date was beyond the expiration of the limitations period; (2)

filed his motion to amend accompanied by a copy of the proposed

amended complaint; (3) provided notice to all parties already in

the case of the motion and the hearing date; and (4) obtained an

order allowing amendment on that hearing date or at the earliest

convenience of the trial court.  Merely placing the motion on

file is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as that

would allow a plaintiff to file a motion and do nothing for months to the prejudice of the persons sought to be added as

defendants.  I decline to condone the practice employed in this

case and would affirm the order of the circuit court of Sangamon

county granting the motions of Maurer and St. John's to dismiss

the counts of plaintiff's amended complaint directed to those

defendants.