United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued March 5, 2008

Decided April 30, 2008

Before

     FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

         DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

         DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐1677

SAMUEL NII ADDO WILSON,              

      Petitioner,                                        

                   

v.                

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General of the United States,

      Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board

of Immigration Appeals

No. A76 773 335

O R D E R

Samuel Nii Abdul Wilson, a citizen and native of Ghana, entered the United

States without inspection in 1994 and has lived in this country ever since.  In 2001 the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began removal proceedings against him.

Wilson conceded that he was subject to removal, but presented an application for

withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

An immigration judge denied Wilson’s application, concluding that he had failed to

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐1677 Page 2

establish that he was at risk of persecution if returned to Ghana or that he is a member

of a cognizable social group.  The IJ ordered that Wilson be granted voluntary

departure.  The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision.  Wilson petitions

for review, arguing that the BIA erred in denying his application because he fears

persecution on account of his ties to his family which, according to him, constitutes a

social group.  We deny the petition for review.

In December 2001, the INS issued a Notice to Appear, charging that Wilson was

subject to removal pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(I) as an alien present in the United

States without being admitted or paroled.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I).  At the

hearing, Wilson, through counsel, conceded removability but asked for withholding of

removal and relief under the CAT.

Wilson testified that he had been a member of the Ga tribe and lived in the

southeastern part of Ghana, where his father was a local tribal chief, and his father was

responsible for buying and selling land, including the land near a gravel and limestone

quarry.  His father, Wilson said, created enemies by repeatedly selling the rights to the

same pieces of land to different members of the Nanumba tribe, who were squatters

living near and around the quarry.  In addition, Wilson testified that his father did not

disclose all of the land sales he made and kept money that should have been shared

with the Ga Tribe.  Wilson said that, in revenge, two members of the Nanumba tribe

hired gangsters called “Macho Men” who in late 1992 burned down his family’s home.

After settling the dispute, his father continued to resell the same land and engender

hatred against his family, culminating in the murder of his father in October 1994.

Wilson left Ghana for the United States seven months before his father’s death, but

testified that he learned of the murder from an article in a Ghanaian newspaper.  Wilson

did not keep copies of the newspaper articles, but he claimed that he read that members

of the Nanumba tribe hired “Macho Men” who beat his father, slit his throat, placed a

tire filled with gasoline around his neck, and set him on fire.

Wilson testified that he was afraid to return to Ghana because, based on

conversations he had with unnamed people there, members of his own tribe expect him

to revenge his father’s death.  He fears that if he refuses to do so, his own tribe members

will kill him.  He also maintains that the Ga and Nanumba tribes have reconciled and,

in addition to fearing his own tribe, he fears that members of the Nanumba tribe who

were cheated by his father might take revenge against him if he were to return to
No. 07‐1677 Page 3

Ghana.  Wilson said that he would be recognized if he returned to Ghana because he

had accompanied his father on some of his land sales.  He believes the police are

impotent and the courts too corrupt to provide him any protection.

To support his claim, Wilson offered a 2003 U.S. Department of State country

report on human rights practices in Ghana; and a United Nations report on minorities

in Ghana.  Both reports listed the presence of the Ga Tribe in southeast Ghana and the

existence of the Nanumba tribe and mention land disputes, chieftaincy disputes, and

mob vigilante justice, including specific mention of the “Macho Men.”  Nonetheless, the

U.N. report concluded that the “birth of the fourth Republic has led to a relatively

liberalized political and human rights atmosphere in Ghana,” and the State Department

report noted that the government generally respects “the human rights of its citizens.”

In July 2006 the IJ issued a written opinion denying Wilson’s application.  The IJ

stated that although Wilson’s testimony was credible, Wilson failed to make a claim

based on ethnicity, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.  The IJ

reasoned that Wilson’s father was murdered because he swindled people out of land,

not because he was a member of a cognizable group.  And in any event, Wilson failed to

provide any evidence to corroborate his claim that he was under threat of mistreatment

for refusing to avenge his father’s death.  Finally, the IJ denied relief under the CAT,

concluding that Wilson had not shown that he faces a likelihood of being tortured by

the government of Ghana or that the government has any interest in mistreating him.

Wilson appealed to the BIA, which denied his appeal, finding that Wilson had

failed to “articulate a nexus between his fear of return and a protected ground in the

Act.”  The BIA held that any fear of retribution Wilson might have was based on

personal matters, not on his membership in a social group, and found that Wilson was

unlikely to be in danger because the murder of his father occurred many years ago.  The

BIA also agreed with the IJ that Wilson failed to show that he was more likely than not

to be subject to torture “by or at the acquiescence of any government official if returned

to Ghana.”  

Wilson argues in this court that the BIA erred in refusing to grant withholding of

removal and that he should be granted relief because he fears persecution on the basis

of his membership in a social group.  But he now identifies his family, not his tribe, as

the relevant social group.  Specifically, he argues that he will face persecution at the
No. 07‐1677 Page 4

hands of the Nanumba because of his status as “his father’s son.”  Wilson also contends

that he was not required to corroborate his claims because the IJ found his testimony

credible, and in any event, he argues that the State Department report and U.N. report

provide sufficient corroboration.  Finally, he argues that he qualifies for relief under the

CAT because the State Department report supports his contention that Ghana will not

protect him from the Macho Men.

When the BIA issues its own opinion, as it did here, as opposed to adopting or

merely supplementing the opinion of the IJ, we review only the opinion of the BIA.

Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2007).  We review Wilson’s claims for

withholding of removal and relief under the CAT using the substantial evidence

standard, and will uphold the BIA’s decision if it is “‘supported by reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”  See id. at 660

(quoting INS v. Elias‐Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).  We review the BIA’s legal

conclusions de novo, Feto v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2006), and will grant the

petition only if the record “compels” the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to the

relief sought, Tarraf v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 2007).

The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he will likely face

persecution if removed. Id.  To meet that burden and establish eligibility for

withholding of removal, Wilson must “demonstrate a clear probability of persecution

on account of his ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.’”  See Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A)).  To show a “clear probability” of persecution, Wilson must establish

that he would “more likely than not” face persecution if returned to Ghana, a more

stringent test than the one for establishing asylum.  See Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082,

1087 (7th Cir. 2006).  Furthermore, “[t]he acts of private citizens do not constitute

persecution unless the government is complicit in those acts or unwilling to take steps

to prevent them.”  Chakir v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2006).  For relief under

the CAT, Wilson must establish that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured

upon his removal to Ghana.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see also Binrashed v. Gonzales, 502

F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2007).

Wilson first argues that his family constitutes a social group and that he will face

persecution based on his status as “his father’s son.”  As the government points out, this

argument is waived because he did not argue to either the IJ or the BIA that his family
No. 07‐1677 Page 5

was the social group facing persecution. See Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1062 (7th Cir.

2000); Mojsilovic v. INS, 156 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1998).  Although Wilson contended in

his petition before the BIA that he is in particular danger because he is “a chief’s son,”

he specifically identified his tribe, not his family, as the social group targeted for

persecution.  Because Wilson failed to exhaust the argument that he would be

persecuted based on his status as his “father’s son” on appeal to the BIA, we cannot

review this claim.  Tarraf, 495 F.3d at 535.

In addition, as the BIA pointed out, Wilson’s fears arise from personal matters,

not his membership in a social group.  We have repeatedly held that a personal dispute

cannot give rise to a claim of asylum, see Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993, 998‐99 (7th Cir.

2006) (collecting cases), and thus it could not support the more stringent requirements

for withholding of removal, Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007).  Wilson

conceded that his father was killed because he cheated people out of land.  Any

retribution that he fears from his own tribe or from the Nanumba tribe is based on that

fact, not his membership in any social group.  He presented no evidence that his family

as a group has been or is a particular target of persecution, or that he would be targeted

merely because he is a member of the Wilson family.  Wilson never contended that his

mother was targeted by the Nanumba or by the Ga tribe before she died, and Wilson

admits that his fears stem from having accompanied his father on some of the land

transactions.  Therefore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Wilson’s

fears of persecution arise from a personal matter, rather than his status as a member of a

social group.

Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence to support the BIA’s finding that it is

unlikely Wilson would face persecution or “be subjected to torture by or at the

acquiescence of any government official if returned to Ghana” based on a killing that

occurred 13 years ago.   Wilson has no personal knowledge of threats against him.  His

fear of retribution, instead, is based on second‐hand threats reported to him from

unnamed people in Ghana shortly after the death of his father.  Although the State

Department and U.N. reports mention the existence of Macho Men and land disputes in

Ghana, they do not lend support to Wilson’s allegations that he would be killed for

failing to avenge his father’s death, nor do they support his conjecture that the

Nanumba tribe would seek revenge after such a long passage of time.  Wilson

speculates that he would not be safe in any part of Ghana, though he provides no

evidence that Macho Men outside his tribal area even know about or remember his
No. 07‐1677 Page 6

father or Wilson’s involvement in his father’s dealings.  In addition, Wilson provides no

evidence to support his claim that Ghana would fail to protect him or would acquiesce

to his mistreatment.

Wilson’s next argument—that “corroborative evidence was not necessary since

the IJ found that Wilson was a credible witness”—misunderstands the purpose of the

corroboration the IJ sought.  The IJ did not seek corroboration for Wilson’s testimony;

rather, he sought additional evidence to support Wilson’s claim beyond Wilson’s own

speculation.  Wilson left Ghana before his father’s murder and could testify only to

reading about his father’s death and talking to unnamed people in Ghana soon after the

murder.  He had no further evidence of any danger to him.  Merely finding Wilson

credible does not mean that Wilson satisfied his burden to prove that he would be

persecuted if he returned to Ghana.  Thus the BIA’s finding that Wilson had “not

sufficiently demonstrated that his life or freedom would be threatened on account of

any protected ground if returned to Ghana” is supported by substantial evidence. See

Tariq 505 F.3d at 654, 657.

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, we DENY the petition.