******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EVANDRO P. LIMA

(SC 19736)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

Argued November 9, 2016—officially released May 16, 2017

Vishal K. Garg, for the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls III, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Maureen T. Platt, state’s attorney, and John J. Davenport, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The defendant, Evandro P. Lima,

appeals1

from the judgment of the trial court, which

denied his motion to vacate his guilty plea to one count

of conspiracy to commit larceny in the third degree in

violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-124 and 53a-48. The

defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying that motion because, under General

Statutes § 54-1j (a),2

the court was required but failed to

ask the defendant whether he had spoken with counsel

about the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty before accepting the plea offer. We disagree

with the defendant that the trial court improperly failed

to inquire of the defendant whether he had consulted

with counsel about the possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea because the defendant

expressly acknowledged that he understood those consequences, which is all that was required for purposes

of § 54-1j (a). We therefore affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The

defendant entered a plea of guilty under the Alford

doctrine3

to conspiracy to commit larceny in the third

degree after he and a friend took an automobile worth

approximately $10,000 from a dealership for a test drive

and never returned it. During the plea canvass, when

the court asked the defendant whether he had discussed

with his attorney the case and his decision to plead

guilty, he answered in the affirmative. The defendant

also responded in the affirmative when the court asked

him whether he understood that, if he was not a citizen,

his conviction could result in his ‘‘removal from the

United States, exclusion from readmission or denial of

naturalization . . . .’’ At the conclusion of the plea canvass, the trial court also asked the assistant state’s attorney and defense counsel whether there was any reason

why the court should not accept the defendant’s plea,

and both responded that they were not aware of any

such reason. Following the plea canvass, the court sentenced the defendant to one year of incarceration.

Thereafter, pursuant to § 54-1j (a) and (c), the defendant filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea, claiming

that the trial court improperly failed to determine

whether he had spoken to defense counsel about the

possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty

before the court accepted the defendant’s plea. The

trial court denied the defendant’s motion, concluding

that § 54-1j (a) contains no requirement that the court

ask the defendant whether he had discussed with counsel the possible immigration consequences of pleading

guilty; rather, it requires the court to ask only whether

he understood that pleading guilty could have such

consequences. Under the trial court’s reading of the

statute, only if the defendant had answered the court’s
question in the negative was it obligated to conduct an

additional inquiry.

The defendant claims on appeal that § 54-1j (a) is

ambiguous as to whether the trial court was required to

make an express inquiry of the defendant to determine

whether he had discussed with counsel the possible

immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The

defendant contends that this ambiguity arises from the

fact that, although the statute provides that the trial

court must allow a defendant time to discuss with counsel those possible consequences of his plea if he has

not already done so, it is silent as to the manner in

which the trial court is to determine whether such a

discussion had taken place. According to the defendant,

two possibilities exist. The first is that, before accepting

the defendant’s plea, the court must ask the defendant

directly whether he has discussed the immigration consequences of the plea with his attorney. The second is

that the court may ascertain whether such a discussion

had taken place when it asks the defendant whether

he understands that his plea could carry with it certain

adverse immigration consequences because, if the

defendant has not previously discussed that issue with

counsel, he will respond to the court’s inquiry in the

negative. The defendant further maintains that, in light

of this ambiguity, this court may consult extratextual

evidence of the statute’s meaning, such as its legislative

history, prior judicial decisions and the laws of other

states, which, according to the defendant, support his

reading of the statute.4

As in all cases of statutory interpretation, we begin

our analysis with the pertinent statutory language. Section 54-1j (a) provides that the court shall not accept

a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally to ensure that he fully understands that, if he

is not a United States citizen, his conviction may have

certain enumerated immigration consequences under

federal law, and, further, if the defendant has not discussed these possible consequences with his attorney,

the court shall permit him to do so before accepting

his plea offer. Section 54-1j(c) provides that, if the court

fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (a),

and the defendant can demonstrate that his conviction

may have one of the enumerated immigration consequences, the court, upon motion of the defendant within

three years of the plea, shall vacate the judgment and

permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and

enter a plea of not guilty.

Thus, by its terms, ‘‘[§] 54-1j (a) permits a court to

accept a defendant’s plea only if the court conducts a

plea canvass during which . . . (1) the court personally addresses the defendant and (2) the court determines that the defendant understands fully the possible

immigration consequences that may result from entering a plea.’’ State v. James, 139 Conn. App. 308, 313,
57 A.3d 366 (2012). The defendant maintains, however,

that § 54-1j imposes a third requirement, namely, that

the trial court must inquire directly of the defendant as

to whether he has discussed with counsel the possible

immigration consequences of pleading guilty. In the

defendant’s view, this requirement inheres in the language directing the court to allow the defendant the

opportunity to have such a discussion if he has not

already done so.

As the defendant acknowledges, however, the Appellate Courtrejected this very argument in State v. James,

supra, 139 Conn. App. 313–14, concluding that § 54-1j

(a), by its plain terms, does not require that the trial

court determine whether the defendant has discussed

with counsel the possible immigration consequences

of a guilty plea. Although acknowledging that an attorney has a well established and independent duty to

advise a client about those possible consequences of

pleading guilty; id., 313 n.1; the Appellate Court rejected

the contention that § 54-1j (a) was a source of that duty,

stating in relevant part: ‘‘We do not read [§ 54-1j (a)]

. . . as requiring defense counsel to advise the defendant of the possible immigration consequences of entering a plea5 or as requiring that the court specifically

inquire as to whether defense counsel advised the

defendant of the possible immigration consequences

of entering a plea. Rather, we read [the] conditional

language [at issue] to direct the court, before accepting

a plea, to provide the defendant an opportunity to discuss with defense counsel the possible immigration

consequences of entering a plea if the court is made

aware that the defendant has not [previously] discussed

those immigration consequences with defense counsel.’’ (Footnote altered.) Id., 313–14.

We agree with the Appellate Court that § 54-1j (a)

does not purport to require the trial court to inquire

directly of the defendant as to whether he has spoken

with counsel about the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty before the court accepts

the defendant’s guilty plea. Well established rules of

statutory construction compel this conclusion, chief

among them the bedrock principle that the legislature

is fully capable of enacting legislation consistent with

its intent, particularly in the area of criminal procedure.

See, e.g., State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 101, 981

A.2d 427 (2009) (Palmer, J., dissenting in part) (‘‘[a]

review of other criminal procedure statutes demonstrates that, when the legislature has desired to impose

specific requirements on the conduct of a pretrial hearing, it has said so explicitly’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]); Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

278 Conn. 751, 771 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (legislature

knows how to enact legislation consistent with its

intent). Thus, we may assume that, if the legislature

had intended to require the trial court to determine that

the defendant had discussed with counsel the possible
immigration consequences of pleading guilty, it would

have indicated such an intent explicitly, in the same

manner that it directed the trial court to determine that

the defendant fully understood those consequences. ‘‘It

is not the province of this court, under the guise of

statutory interpretation, to legislate such a policy, even

if we were to agree with the [defendant] that it is a

better policy than the one endorsed by the legislature

as reflected in its statutory language.’’ DiLieto v.County

Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 316 Conn. 790,

803–804, 114 A.3d 1181 (2015); see also State v.

Whiteman, 204 Conn. 98, 103, 526 A.2d 869 (1987) (‘‘[i]t

is not the function of courts to read into clearly

expressed legislation provisions [that] do not find

expression in its words’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

Our interpretation finds support in the fact that,

under subsection (c) of § 54-1j, a conviction may be

vacated only ‘‘[i]f the court fail[ed] to address the defendant personally [to] determine that [he] fully understands the possible consequences of [his] plea, as

required in subsection (a) of [§ 54-1j] . . . .’’ Once

again, we may presume that, if the legislature had

intended to allow a conviction to be set aside for any

other reason, it would have indicated such intent

explicitly.

In reaching our determination, we are also mindful

‘‘that the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates

once a defendant’s sentence has begun and that a court

may not take action affecting a defendant’s sentence

unless it expressly has been authorized to act.’’

(Emphasis added.) State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147,

154, 913 A.2d 428 (2007). In light of this limitation on

the court’s jurisdiction, we previously have stated that

‘‘[t]he only reasonable interpretation [of § 54-1j (a)] is

that a court has jurisdiction [to vacate a conviction]

only if the conditions expressly provided [thereunder]

are satisfied.’’ State v. Ramos, 306 Conn. 125, 140, 49

A.3d 197 (2012). As we have explained, § 54-1j(c) authorizes the trial court to vacate a conviction only if the

court failed to determine that the defendant understood

that pleading guilty may adversely affect his immigration status and, within three years following the acceptance of the plea, the defendant moves to vacate his

conviction upon a showing that the conviction may

result in one or more of the possible immigration consequences enumerated in § 54-1j (a). Because the trial

court’s canvass of the defendant in the present case

complied with the requirements of § 54-1j (a), the trial

court properly denied the defendant’s motion to vacate.6

The defendant nonetheless argues that this court’s

decision in State v. Hall, 303 Conn. 527, 35 A.3d 237

(2012), supports his contention that the trial court was

required to ascertain from him whether he had discussed with counsel the possible immigration conse-
quences of pleading guilty. Specifically, the defendant

relies on this court’s statement in Hall that ‘‘the statute,

on its face, turns on communication between the defendant and his attorney about immigration consequences’’

and the statement that, ‘‘based on the text of the statute,

the legislature was primarily concerned with ensuring

that defendants engage in a conversation with their

counsel, not the court,regarding the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 536.

We disagree that the quoted language, when considered

in context, supports the defendant’s contention.

In Hall, the defendant, Osibisa Hall, claimed that,

under § 54-1j (c), the trial court’s failure to address

him personally during the plea canvass—the court had

addressed his attorney instead—to determine whether

he understood the immigration consequences of his

plea required that his conviction be vacated and that he

be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. See id., 530–32.

Before accepting Hall’s plea, the trial court had asked

whether there were any immigration issues to be concerned about, and counsel had responded that there

were but that he had discussed them with Hall and that

Hall understood them. See id., 530–31. The state also

advised the court during the hearing that Hall was to

be deported after serving his sentence. See id., 531–32.

In light of these facts, this court concluded that the

trial court had substantially complied with the basic

tenets of § 54-1j (a), which was all that the statute

required under State v. Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 778

A.2d 134 (2001). See State v. Hall, supra, 303 Conn.

533–36; see also State v. Malcolm, supra, 662 (‘‘only

substantial compliance with [§ 54-1j (a)] is required to

validate a defendant’s guilty plea’’).

In reaching our determination, we rejected Hall’s contention ‘‘that [a 2003] amendment to § 54-1j (a) subsequent to our decision in Malcolm require[d] us to revisit

the substantial compliance standard.’’ State v. Hall,

supra, 303 Conn. 534. In so doing, we explained that,

‘‘[p]rior to the 2003 amendment; see Public Act 2003,

No. 03-81, § [1 (P.A. 03-81)]; the statute provided that

[t]he court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo

contendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless the court advises him of the following: If you

are not a citizen of the United States, you are hereby

advised that conviction of the offense for which you

have been charged may have the consequences of

deportation, exclusion from admission to the United

States, or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws

of the United States. . . . General Statutes (Rev. to

2003) § 54-1j (a). As a result of the amendment, rather

than requiring the court to advise the defendant of the

potential immigration consequences of his plea, the

statute requires the court to [address] the defendant

personally and [to determine] that the defendant fully

understands [those potential consequences] . . . .’’

(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Hall, supra, 534. Hall, however, argued that

the 2003 amendment also ‘‘require[d] the court in all

circumstances to direct its immigration inquiry to the

defendant himself, not his attorney . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. In addressing this argument, we acknowledged ‘‘that § 54-1j, as amended,

places an additional burden on the court to ascertain

the defendant’s understanding of the potential consequences of his plea . . . .’’ Id., 534–35. We also emphasized that the better practice for trial courts is ‘‘full

and literal compliance with the statute.’’ Id., 538. We

concluded, however, that the purpose of the statute—

‘‘to warn a defendant of possible immigration consequences from a guilty plea’’—remained the same following the amendment and that, just as before, ‘‘rather than

demanding that trial courts instruct defendants on the

intricacies of immigration law, [the statute] seeks only

to put defendants on notice that their resident status

could be implicated by the plea.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 535.

In light of the purpose of § 54-1j, we concluded that

the trial court had substantially complied with that statutory provision because the record revealed ‘‘that [Hall]

was adequately warned that his immigration status

could be implicated by his guilty pleas. In response to

the court’s inquiry, defense counsel stated on the record

that he had informed [Hall] about potential immigration

issues and that [Hall] understood the possible consequences of his pleas. The trial court properly relied

[on] these representations by defense counsel.’’ Id., 536.

Such reliance, we observed, was also consistent with

the trial court’s duty under § 54-1j(a)to allow the defendant time to discuss the immigration consequences of a

guilty plea with counsel if the defendant has not already

done so. Id. That provision, we noted, reflects that ‘‘the

legislature was primarily concerned with ensuring that

defendants engage in a conversation with their counsel,

not the court, regarding the immigration consequences

of guilty pleas.’’ Id.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, however, our

observation concerning the legislature’s understanding

of the trial court’s role in effectuating the policy

reflected in § 54-1j was intended simply to underscore

the reasonableness of the trial court’s reliance on

defense counsel’s representations regarding Hall’s

understanding of the immigration consequences of his

plea, because it was the duty of counsel, not the trial

court, to apprise Hall of those consequences. Indeed,

the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution requires defense counsel to advise a defendant

about the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty whenever that defendant considers entering

such a plea. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

367, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) (‘‘[a]uthorities of every stripe—including the American Bar Associ-
ation, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar

publications—universally require defense attorneys to

advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for

[noncitizen] clients [during plea negotiations]’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]); Budziszewski v. Commissioner of Correction, 322 Conn. 504, 506–507, 142 A.3d

243 (2016) (‘‘the federal constitution’s guarantee of

effective assistance of counsel requires criminal

defense counsel to accurately advise a noncitizen client

of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to

a crime, as described in federal law’’).

We note, moreover, our observation in Hall; see State

v. Hall, supra, 303 Conn. 535 n.7; that the 2003 amendment to § 54-1j, which added the language at issue in

this appeal, appears to have been enacted in response

to two Appellate Court decisions, namely, State v. Webb,

62 Conn. App. 805, 813–14, 772 A.2d 690 (2001), and

State v. Irala, 68 Conn. App. 499, 518–21, 792 A.2d 109,

cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923, 797 A.2d 519, cert. denied,

537 U.S. 887, 123 S. Ct. 132, 154 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2002),

neither of which supports the defendant’s interpretation

of the statute. As we previously discussed, prior to the

2003 amendment, § 54-1j (a) provided that a ‘‘court shall

not accept a plea . . . unless the court advises’’ the

defendant that if he was not a citizen of this country, his

conviction ‘‘may have the consequences of deportation,

exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial

of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United

States.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 54-1j (a).

In Webb, the defendant, Delroy Anthony Webb,

argued that the term ‘‘advises,’’ as used in the preamendment version of the statute, ‘‘required the court to

actively interact with the defendant and to engage in

a colloquy to ensure that he fully underst[ands] the

deportation consequences of his guilty plea . . . .’’

State v. Webb, supra, 62 Conn. App. 813. Although the

Appellate Court rejected this claim, the legislature

apparently agreed with it because, shortly thereafter,

it amended § 54-1j (a) to require, in language nearly

identical to the language the Appellate Court had used

to describe Webb’s claim, that the trial court actively

interact with a defendant during the plea canvass to

ensure that the defendant fully understands the possible

immigration consequences of pleading guilty. See P.A.

03-81, § 1, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 2005)

§ 54-1j (a).

In State v. Irala, supra, 68 Conn. App. 499, the Appellate Courtrejected a claim that the trial court had misled

the defendant, Fanny Irala, by informing her, in accordance with the preamendment version of § 54-1j (a),

that, if she was not a citizen, her conviction ‘‘could’’

result in her deportation; (emphasis omitted) id., 519;

when, in fact, under federal immigration law, her con-
viction was certain to result in her deportation. See id.

In rejecting Irala’s claim, the Appellate Court, relying

on State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn. 663–64, held that

the preamendment version of § 54-1j did not require

trial courts to ‘‘instruct defendants on the intricacies

of immigration law, [but sought] only to put defendants

on notice that their resident status could be implicated

by the plea. . . . [T]he statute’s purpose [was] simply

to recognize that this collateral consequence [of a guilty

plea] is of such importance that the defendant should

be informed of its possibility. . . . The onus rests . . .

with the defendant and her counsel to determine the

final result applicable to her situation under federal

immigration law before entering a plea.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Irala, supra, 520.

When read in light of Irala, the 2003 amendment requiring the court to inform defendants that they have the

right to discuss with counsel the immigration consequences of pleading guilty if they have not already done

so is properly understood as a codification of the principle, applied in Irala, that it is primarily the role of

counsel to provide such advice, not the role of the

court.7

We note, finally, that the scant legislative history surrounding the 2003 amendment does not support the

defendant’s interpretation of the amendment but,

instead, suggests that it was enacted solely to reduce

the number of habeas cases in which the petitioners

claimed not to have understood the immigration implications of pleading guilty. Such a reduction was to be

achieved by requiring defendants, when entering a

guilty plea, to state for the record their understanding

that it may adversely impact their immigration status.

Dana Clark, who testified in support of the proposed

legislation on behalf of the Office of the Chief Public

Defender, stated in relevant part: ‘‘This bill would

require the court to ascertain whether a defendant

understands the possible immigra[tion] consequences

prior to pleading guilty or nolo contendre in a criminal proceeding.

‘‘Currently there is no requirement that the court

ascertain whether the defendant understands the immigration ramifications [of pleading guilty]. As it stands

now, the court is required . . . only to advise the defendant that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States

. . . certain immigration consequences [may ensue].

‘‘Since the court is already required to give this

advice, the only substantial change would be that the

court asks the defendant a question, which requires an

answer, instead of simply making a statement about

the consequences.

* * *

‘‘By requiring the court to ascertain affirmatively that
the defendant understands the possible consequences

on the record, the defendant would no longer be able

to request that the judgment be vacated or the plea

withdrawn by way of a writ of habeas corpus on the

ground that he or she did not understand the immigration consequences.

‘‘This door would be closed because the defendant’s

affirmative acknowledgment of his or her understanding of the consequences would be on the record. . . .

‘‘Passage of [the proposed legislation] would result

in a decrease in the number of habeas corpus petitions

brought before the court that allege that [a] plea was

not voluntary. This decrease in the number of petitions

filed would provide the Habeas Unit [of] the Office of

[the] Chief Public Defender more time to devote to

other petitions in the system, which is already so [overburdened].’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,

Judiciary, Pt. 7, 2003 Sess., pp. 2163–64. Thus, contrary

to the defendant’s assertion, the legislative history is

fully consistent with our conclusion that the 2003

amendment was not intended to impose any requirements on the trial court apart from the ones expressly

provided therein.8

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the

trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General

Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

2 General Statutes § 54-1j (a) provides: ‘‘The court shall not accept a plea

of guilty or nolo contendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding

unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines

that the defendant fully understands that if the defendant is not a citizen

of the United States, conviction of the offense for which the defendant has

been charged may have the consequences of deportation or removal from

the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United States or denial

of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States. If the defendant

has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant’s attorney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the

defendant’s plea.’’

General Statutes § 54-1j (c) provides: ‘‘If the court fails to address the

defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands

the possible consequences of the defendant’s plea, as required in subsection

(a) of this section, and the defendant not later than three years after the

acceptance of the plea shows that the defendant’s plea and conviction may

have one of the enumerated consequences, the court, on the defendant’s

motion, shall vacate the judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw

the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.’’

Unless otherwise noted, all references to § 54-1j are to the current revision

of the statute.

3 A defendant pleading guilty under the Alford doctrine neither admits

guilt nor protests innocence, but merely acknowledges that the state can

produce evidence that would be sufficient to obtain a conviction. See North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).

4

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain

and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,

we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory

language . . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-

2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship

to [the broader statutory scheme]. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous

and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to deter-
mine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . When a statute is not plain

and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative

history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation

and common law principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pond, 315 Conn. 451,

466–67, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015). Furthermore, whether § 54-1j (a) required the

trial court to inquire directly of the defendant as to whether he had spoken

to counsel about the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty

before the court accepted his plea presents an issue of statutory construction

over which our review is plenary.

5 The court in James made clear that it was not suggesting that defense

counsel has no duty to advise an accused of the immigration consequences

of a guilty plea but, rather, that § 54-1j is not the source of that duty. State

v. James, supra, 139 Conn. App. 313 n.1.

6 We note, moreover, that, even if we were to agree with the defendant

that § 54-1j (a) is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the

principle of legislative acquiescence would counsel against the construction

advanced by the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Flemke, 315 Conn. 500, 512,

108 A.3d 1073 (2015) (‘‘[o]nce an appropriate interval to permit legislative

reconsideration has passed without corrective legislative action, the inference of legislative acquiescence places a significantjurisprudential limitation

on our own authority to reconsider the merits of our earlier decision’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). State v. James, supra, 139 Conn. App.

308, which rejected a claim identical to the defendant’s; id., 313–14; was

decided by the Appellate Court four and one-half years ago, enough time

to give rise to an inference that the legislature does not disapprove of the

Appellate Court’s interpretation of § 54-1j. See, e.g., Rivera v. Commissioner

of Correction, 254 Conn. 214, 252, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000) (six year interval

without legislative action supported inference of legislative acquiescence).

7 The defendant also contends that we should construe § 54-1j (a) as

directing trial courts to inquire whether a defendant has discussed the

possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty with counsel because

statutes in several other jurisdictions require that the court allow time for

a defendant to have such a discussion only upon the defendant’s request.

The defendant asserts that the absence of any such ‘‘ ‘upon request’ language

. . . from § 54-1j (a) strongly suggests that the onus is on the court, rather

than [on] the defendant, to ensure that the defendant has had adequate time

to speak with counsel about immigration consequences.’’ We will not read

into § 54-1j requirements that are not contained therein merely because

other states have chosen different language to effectuate the same policy.

We note, moreover, that the statutes that the defendant cites are arguably

less protective of noncitizen defendants because, unlike § 54-1j (a), they do

not require courts to determine that a defendant fully understands that

pleading guilty may result in his deportation or inability to later reenter the

country; instead, they merely require that the court advise the defendant

that such consequences may ensue from the entry of a guilty plea.

8 Having concluded that, under § 54-1j, the trial court is not required to

ask a defendant whether he has consulted with counsel about the possible

immigration consequences of his guilty plea when that defendant has

informed the court that he understands those possible consequences, we

nevertheless believe that it is a good practice to make such an inquiry. Thus,

we therefore encourage our trial courts to do so.