IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No s . 392A16 and 39 3P A 1 6 Filed 18 August 2017 THE FIDELITY BANK,

Petitioner

v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Respondent

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 31 , prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals, of a n opinion and order dated 3 May 201 3 entered by Judge John R. Jolly, Jr. , Chief Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, in the Superior Court, Wake County , and appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 27(a) from a final judgment and order entered on 23 June 2016 entered by Judge Louis A. Bledsoe, III, Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, in the Superior Court, Wake Co unty

. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 June 2017

. Ward and Smith, P.A., by Alexander C. Dale, Donalt J. Eglinton, and Amy P. Wang , for p etitioner

- appell ant

. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, and Perry J. Pelaez, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent

- appellee North Carolina Department of Revenue

. ERVIN, Justice

.
The principal issue before this Court in these consolidated appeals is whether the North Carolina Busi ness Court correctly interpreted N.C.G .S . § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) so as to preclude The Fidelity Bank from deducting “Market Discount Income”F IDELITY B ANK V
. N.C. D EP ’ T OF R EVENUE Opinion of the Court

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- relating to discounted United States obligations for North Carolina corporate income
tax ation purposes. In view of the fact that the relevant portions of N.C .G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) clearly and unam biguously preclude the proposed deduction, we affirm the Business Court’s substantive decision with respect to this issue while reversing the Business Court’s decision to dismiss the second of the two judicial review petitions that Fidelity Bank filed in these cases and remanding that matter to the Business Court for further remand to the North Carolina Department of Revenue with instructions to vacate that po rtion of the Department’s Second Amended Final Agency Decis ion relating to the deductibility issue for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fidelity Bank, a C corporation , is a wholly owned subsidiary of Fidelity Bancshares, Inc

. Fidelity Bank acquired United States government bonds at a discount to face value and held those discounted bonds until maturity, thereby earning income , generally referred to as Market Discount Income, c on sisting of the difference between the amount that Fidelity Bank initially paid for the bonds and the

am ount that it received relating to those discounted bonds at maturity. As a result of the fact that five of these discounted bonds matured during the 2001 tax year , Fidelity earned $724,098.00 in Marke t Discount In come related to the securities in question during that period

. On its 2001 North Carolina corporate income tax return, Fidelity treated this Market Discount Income as taxable income and then deductedF IDELITY B ANK V
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- this Market Discount Income as interest earned on United States government obligations for the pu rposes of determining its net taxable income

. On 8 July 2002, the Department issued a Notice of Corporate Income Tax A ssessment to Fidelity Bank assessing additional North Car olina income tax es of $49,963.00 and associated interest in the amount of $1 132.63 against Fidelity Bank based upo n a determination that Fidelity Bank was not entitled to deduct this Market Dis count Income for the 2001 tax year . On 31 July 2002, Fidelity Bank sent a protest letter to the Department objecting to the Notice of Asse ssment . On 17 May 2006, the Department sent a letter to Fidelity Bank imposi ng additional income tax es and associated interest based upon the rejection of Fidelity Bank’s assertion that it was entitle d to deduct the Market Discount Income that Fidelity Ba nk had earned on the bonds

. On 12 September 2008, following further negotiations between the parties, the Department issued a Notice of Final Determination reiterating its decision to reject Fidelity Bank’s attempt to deduct the Market Di scount Incom e for state corporate income taxation purposes and seeking the payment of additional taxes plus associated interest

. On 11 November 2008, Fidelity Bank filed a Petition for a Contested Case Hearing challenging the Department’s decision with respect to the deduc tibility of the Market Discount Income that Fidelity Bank had earned on the discounted bonds and requesting relie f from the Department’s claim for interest on the additional income tax amount that had been assessed against Fidelity Bank . On 30 June 2009,F IDELITY B ANK V
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- the Administrative Law Judge entered an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Department on the grounds that the Market Discount Inc ome relating
to the discounted bonds was not deductible for North Carolina corporate income tax
purpo ses . 1 On 16 November 2009 , the Administrative Law Judge granted partial summary judgment in Fidelity Bank’s favor with respect to the Depar tment’s attempt to collect interest on the amount of unpaid ta xes that the Department claimed that Fidelity Bank owed

. On 25 November 2009, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision was submitted to the Department for the purpose of allowing the Department to make a final decision. 2 On 22 January 2010, the Department issued a Final Agency Decision in which it adopted the Ad ministrative Law Judge’s decision with respect to the de duc tibility issue and remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for the making of further findings of fact relating to the interest abatement issue

. 3 On 24 F ebruary 2010, Fidelity Bank filed a petition for judicial r eview in the Superior Court, Wake County , for the purpose of challenging the Department’s initial final agency decision. The case stemming from the filing of Fidelity Bank’s first

1 The parties agreed that there were no disputed issues of material fact, so that this case could be appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage of this contested case proceeding.

2 According to the statutory provisions governing administrative pr oceedings in effect at the time, the Administrative Law Judge submitted a recommended decision to the Department, which made the final decision. See N.C.G.S. § 150B

- 34 (2009 ), amended by Act of June 18, 2011, ch. 398, sec. 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1678, 1 686.

3 No proceedings on remand appear to have been conducted before the Administrative Law Judge as a result of the Department’s initial final agency decision.F IDELITY B ANK V
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- judicial review petition was designated a mandatory complex business case and submitted to the Business Court for decision . On 3 May 2013, the Business Court

en tered an order in which it affirmed the Department’s final decision with respect to the deduc tibility issue and remanded the case to the Departmen t for the making of additional findings of fact with respect to the interest abatement issue. 4 On 10 December 2013, the Department issued an Amended Final Agency Decision in which it adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision with respect to the deductibility d ecision as its own and remanded Fidelity Bank’s request for abatement of the interest assessment to the Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings. On 23 April 2015, the Administrative Law Judge entered an Amended Decision concluding that Fidelity Bank should be required to pay interest on the amount of any unpaid 2001 taxes. On 24 July 2015, the Department entered a Second Amended Final Agency D ecision determining that Fidelity Bank was not entitled to deduct the Market Discount Income for purposes of its 2001 corporate income tax return and requiring Fidelity Bank to pay additional taxes and related interest in light of the Department’s rejection of Fid elity Bank’s assertion that the Market Discount Income that it earned during the 2001 tax year was deductible for North Carolina corporate income taxation purposes

.

4 Although Fidelity Bank sought appellate review of the Business Court’s initial decision, th e Court of Appeals dismissed Fidelity Bank’s appeal as having been taken from an unappealable interlocutory order.F IDELITY B ANK V
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- On 19 August 2015, Fidelity filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Department’s se cond amended final agency decision in the Superior Court, Wake County. In its petition , Fidelity Bank requested that the Department’s decision with

res pect to the deductibility issue in the second amended final agency decision be overturned without advanc ing any challenge to the Department’s decision with respect t o the interest abatement issue. On 20 August 2015, t he proceeding resulting from the filing of Fidelity Bank’s second judicial review petition was designated a mandatory complex business case an d referred to the Business Court for decision

. On 15 January 20 16, the Department filed motion s seeking the entry of order s dismissing Fidelity Bank’s second judicial review petition for failure to st ate a claim
upon which relief could be granted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A

- 1, Rule 12(b)(6) , and entering final judgment with respect to the d eductibility issue in accordance with the decision made in response to Fidelity Bank’s first judicial review petition

. On 23 June 2016, the Business Court entered a f inal j udgment and order granting the Department’s motion s to dismiss the second judicial review petition and enter ing final judgment with respect to the deductibility issue consistent with the court’s determination in the proceeding stemming from the first judicial review petition

. Fidelity Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue , Nos. 10 CVS 3405, 15 CVS 11311, 2016 WL 3917735 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake Co unty (Bus. Ct.) June 20, 2016). On 14 July 2016, Fidelity Bank noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Busin ess Court ’s decision with res pect to the deductibility issue in the proceedingF IDELITY B ANK V
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- stemming from the first judicial review proceeding and an appeal to this Court from the Business Court ’s decision to dismiss the second judicial review petition for failure
to s t ate a claim upon which relief could be granted. On 20 October 2016, Fidelity Bank filed a petition with this Court seeking discretionary review of the deductibility decision prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals in the case stemming from the f irst judicial review proceeding. This Court allowed Fidelity Bank’s discretionary review petition on 8 December 2016 , heard consolidated oral argument in both cases on 13 June 2017 , and now consolidates these cases for purposes of decision

. As an initial matter, we must address the correctness of the Business Court’s decision to dismiss Fidelity Bank’s second judicial review petition pursuant to N.C

. G.S. § 1A

- 1, Rule 12(b)(6). In making this determination, the Business Court noted that, “although [the Bus ine ss Court] did not remand the Deductibility I ssue to the Department, the Department elected to include findings and conc lusions on that issue in its Second A mended Final A gency decision.” Fidelity Bank , 2016 WL 3917735, at *4. As the Busin ess Court also noted,

North Carolina law is clear , however, that when an appellate court (i.e., [the Business Court’s] capacity here) remands a case to the trial court (i.e., the Department’s capacity here), an y judgments of the trial court “ which were i nconsistent and at variance with, contrary to, and modified, corrected, altered or reversed prior mandates of the [appellate court] ” are “unauthorized and void.” Id . (second alteration in original) ( quoting Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp. , 323 N.C. 697, 699 , 374 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1989) (emphasis omitted) ( quoting Collins v. Simms ,F IDELITY B ANK V
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- 257 N.C. 1, 8, 12 5 S.E.2d 298, 30 3 (1962) )) . For that reason , the Business Court concluded that “the Department did not have authority to make any findings of fact or conclusio ns o f law concerning the Deductibility Issue in its Second Amended Final Agency D ecision,” rendering “the fin dings and conclusions in the Second Amended Final Agency Decision concerning the Deductibility I ssue void and without legal effect , ” so as to preclude the Department’s decision with respect to the deductibility issue as set out in the second amended final agency decision from being “the proper subject of judicial review.” Id . at *5. As a result, the Business Court granted the Department’s dismissal mot ion. Id . at * 5, 6. On appeal, Fidelity Bank contends that the Business Court erred by dismissing the second judicial review petition on the grounds that, given the Business Court’s determination that the Department’s decision with respect to the deductibi lity issue on remand had been made “without authority and [was] void,” the Business Court should have invalidated, rather than ignored, the Department’s decision to reiterate its earlier decision concerning the deductibility issue in the second amended fin al agency decision. On the other hand, the Department asserts that, “[b]ecause the [second judicial review proceeding] raised the same deductibility issue that the [Business Court’s order in the first judicial review proceeding] had already decided, [the Business Court] was right to hold that Fidelity’s petition in the [second judicial review proceeding] failed to state a claim.” We agree with Fidelity Bank that the Business Court erred by dismissing that portion of its second petition for judicialF IDELITY B ANK V
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- review challenging that portion of the Department’s second amended final agency decision addressing the deductibility issue for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As the Business Court concluded , the Department lacked the authority to revisit the deductibility issue on remand from the Business Court’s decision in the fir st judicial review proceeding, making its findings and conclusions with respect to that issue void. “ A void judgment . . . binds no one.” E. Carolina Lumber Co. v. Wes t , 247 N.C. 699, 701, 102 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1958). The “invalidity” of a void order “may be asserted at any time and in any action where some benefit or right is asserted thereunder, ” Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. , 320 N.C. 669, 677, 360 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1987) (quoting E. Carolina Lumber Co. , 247 N.C. at 701, 102 S.E.2d at 249) , rendering any failure on Fidelity Bank’s part to raise this issue be fore the Business Court and the fact that the order entered by the Business Court in the first judicial

rev iew proceeding was binding upon the Business Court in the second judicial review proceeding insufficient to justify dismissal of the second judicial review petition

. Moreover, the fact that the Business Court did, in fact, determine that the relevant port ion of the Department’s second fina l agency decision was “ void” and the absence of a ny specific showing of prejudice in addition to the risk of confusion arising from the existence of multiple orders addressing the same issue on the same facts do not
suppo rt a decision to refrain from vacating a void administrative decision either . In view of the fact that “a n appeal from a void order cannot be frivolous, ” this CourtF IDELITY B ANK V
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- reversed an “order .

. . dismissing the appeal.” In re Foreclosure of Sharpe , 230 N.C.
41 2, 418, 53 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1949). For similar reasons, we have no hesitancy in determining that a litigant is entitled to assert, in a proceeding seeking judicial review of an administrative decision, that the decision in question is void. In the
event that this assertion is well founded, the reviewing court should vacate the challen ged order rather than dismiss the request for judicial review for failure to state a claim. As a result, since the Department lacked the authority to address the deductibili t y decision on remand, the Business Court’s order relating to the deductibility decision in the proceeding stemming from the second judicial review proceeding should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the Business Court for further remand to t he Department with instructions to vacate that portion of the second amended final agency decision addressing the deductibility issue. The principal substantive issue before us in this case , which is proper ly before this Court in connection with Fidelity Bank’s appeal from the Business Court’s decision to enter a final judgment upholding the Department’s deductibility decision in connection with the first judicial review proceeding , is whether the Busine ss Court erred by affirm ing that portion of the Department’s final agency decision in which the Department determined that Fidelity Bank was not entitled to deduct the Market Discount Income that it earned during the 2001 tax year as inter e st on United States obligations for Nort h Carolina corporate inco me taxation purposes pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). In seeking relief from the Business Court’s decision,F IDELITY B ANK V
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- Fidelity Bank asserts that th e plain and unambiguous language contained in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) a nd 26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(4) render s Market Discount Income deductible interest upon United States obligations for North Carolina corporate income tax ation purposes. According to Fidelity Bank , t he General Assembly intended to adopt the definition of “interest” containe d in 26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(4) given that the taxpayer’s federal taxable income is the “ baseline starting point” for determining a taxpayer’s state net taxable income , see N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.2 (2015) , and that Market Discount Income is treated as interest for purposes of determining federal taxable income

. More specifically, given that 26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(4) states that Market Discount I ncome “ shal l be treated as interest for purposes of [the Code],” 26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(4) (2012) , and given that the General A ssembly has adopted the Code for the purpose of determining a taxpayer’s state income tax liability , see N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.2(15 ), Fidelity Bank contends that the General Assembly intended that Market Discount I ncome should be treated as deductible interes t upon United States obligations for state corporate income taxation
purposes . As a result, given that the Business Court ignored the plain language of the relevant provisions of state law in upholding the Department’s decision with respect to the deducti bility issue, Fidelity Bank contends that the Business Court’s decision with respect to that issue should be reversed

. The Department, on the other hand , contends that the Business C ourt properly determined that Market Discount I ncome does not constitute deduc tible “interest” forF IDELITY B ANK V
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- No rth Carolina income taxation purposes

. According to the Department, t he term “interest” as used in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5 should be understood, in accordance with its plain meaning, as “periodic payments rece ived by the holder of a bond , ” citing Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman , 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998) , cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1090 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Lenox, Inc. v

. Tolson , 353 N.C. 659, 663, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001). Even t hough N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.2(15) provides that a taxpayer’s income for state taxation purposes is dete rmined on the basis of the taxpayer’s federal taxable income, the statutory provisions governing North Carolina income taxation do not adopt the definitions contained in the Internal Revenue Code on a wholesale basis. Instead, the Department asserts that the General Assembly has adopted Internal Revenue Code provisions for use in determining a taxpayer’s obligation to pay North Carolina income taxes on a sel ective basis, so that, for example, N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b) incorporates Internal Revenue Code provisions in only twelve of its twenty

- one subsections

. “[W]hen no such reference appear s
— as here

— words used in the Revenue Act do not take on any specialized meaning they might have under the Code.” The Department claims that , had the General Assembly intended to incorporate the Internal Revenue Code’s definition s into N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) , it would h ave done so expressly. In addition, the Department co ntends that 26 U.S.C. § 1276 of the Code has no application o utside the context of federal tax law given its statement that Market Discount I ncome “shall be treated as interest for purposes of [the Code], ” quoting 26F IDELITY B ANK V
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- U.S. C. § 1276(a)(4)

. As a result, the Department contends that the Business Court’s decision with respect to the deductibility issue should be affirmed. According to N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130. 2(15), a taxpayer’s “State net income” is “[t]he taxpayer’s federal taxable income as dete rmined under the Code, [ 5 ] adjusted as provided in G.S. 105

- 130.5 .” N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.2(15). N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b) allows a taxpayer to take certain “deductions from federal taxable income” “in determining State net income.” Id . § 105

- 130.5(b) (2015). Among the deductions allowed in N.C.G .S. § 105

- 130.5(b) is one for “ [i]nterest upon the obligations of the United States or its possessions, to the extent included in federal taxable income,” provided that “interest upon the obligations of the United Stat es shall not be an allowable deduction unless interest upon obligations of the State of North Carolina or any of its political subdivisions is exempt from income taxes imposed by the United States.” 6 Id . § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). As a result, as both parties ap pear to agree, the proper resolution of the

5 According to N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.2(2), which incorporates a definitions set out in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 228.90, “Code” is defined as “[t]he Intern al Revenue C ode as enacted as of January 1, 2017, including any provisions enacted as of that date that become effective either before or after that date,” N.C.G.S. § 105

- 228.90(b)(1b).

6 In addition to its decision that the Department had correctly dete rmined that Market Discount Income on the discounted bonds that matured in 2001 was not ‘interest,” the Business Court also concluded that the deduct ion that Fidelity Bank had attempted to take was barred by the reciprocity provision contained in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). In view of our decision that Market Discou nt Income is not “interest” for purpose s of N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1), we need not address the issue of whether the deduction in question was barred by the reciprocity provision contained in N. C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) and express no opinion as to the correctness of the interpretation of that statutory provision adopted by the Dep artment and the Business Court.F IDELITY B ANK V
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- substantive issue that is before us in this case hinges upon the meaning of the term “interest” as used in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). “In resolving issues of statutory construction, we look first to the language of the statute itself.” Walker v. Bd. of Tr s . of the N. C. Local Gov ’tal Emp s. Ret. Sys. , 348 N.C. 63, 65, 499 S.E.2d 429, 430 (1998) (quoting Hieb v. Lowery , 344 N.C. 403, 409, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996)).

W hen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc. , 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). However, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment. See Coastal Ready

- Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm’r s of Town of Nags Head , 299 N.C. 6 2 0, 629, 265 S.E.2d 3 79, 385 (1 980) (“T he best indicia of that intent are the language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.”). Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)

. Thus , the initial issue that must be addressed in construing t he relevant statutory language requires a determin ation of whether the language in question is ambiguous or unambiguous. An unambiguou s word has a “definite and wel l known sense in the law.” C.T.H. Corp. v. Maxwell , 212 N.C. 803, 810 , 195 S.E. 36, 40 (1938); see also State Highway Comm’n v. Hemphill , 269 N.C. 535, 539, 153 S.E.2d 22, 26 (1967) (stating that language in a statute is unambiguous when it “express[es] a single, definite and sensible meaning”) (quoting State ex rel. Long v. Smitherman , 251 N.C. 682, 684, 111F IDELITY B ANK V
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- S.E.2d 834 , 836 (1960) ) ) . In the event that the General Assembly uses an unambigu ous word without providing an explicit statutory definition , that w ord will be accorded its plain meaning

. See Walker , 348 N.C. at 66, 499 S.E.2d at 431 (stating that , although “[t]he word ‘terminate’ is undefined in chapter 128 of the North Carolina General Statute s ,” “[a] s t his word is unambiguous, . . . we accord it i ts plain meaning”); see also Poole v. Miller , 342 N.C. 349, 352, 464 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1995) (stating that , although “[t]he word ‘ju dgment’ is undefined in Rule 68,” “[a] s this word is unambiguous, we shall accord it its plain meaning ”) ; In re A ppeal of Clayton

Marcus Co

. , 286 N.C. 215, 219 , 210 S.E.2d 1 99, 202

- 03 (1974) (stating that , “[i]n the construction of any statute , including a tax statute, words must be given their common and ordinary meaning, nothing else appearing , ” and “[w]here, however, the

s tatute, itself, contains a definition of a word used therein, that definition controls, however contrary to the ordinary meaning of the word it may be” (citations omitted))

. On the other hand, in the event that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguou s, its meaning must be determined utilizing the ordinary rules of statutory construction. “T he primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.” Burgess , 326 N.C

. at 209, 388 S.E.2d at 1 37 (citation omitted)

. As we have already noted, “[t] he best indicia of that intent a re the language of the statute

. . . , the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.” Coastal Ready

- Mix Concrete , 299 N.C. at 629, 265 S.E.2d at 385 (citations omitted) . As a general proposition, when the GeneralF IDELITY B ANK V
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- Assembly intends to adopt provisions or definitions from other sources of law into a statute, it does so “by clear and specific reference.” See Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home Stores , 242 N.C. 332, 340, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955) (stating that “[t]he 1941 Act ratified and adopted the North Carolina Building Code published in 1936 by clear and specific reference”). “Special canons of statutory construction apply wh en the term under consideration is one concerning taxation.” In re Estate of Kapoor , 303 N.C. 102, 106, 277 S.E.2d 403, 407 (1981). “[W]hen the statute provides for an exemption from taxation . . . any ambiguities are resolved in favor of taxation.” Id

. at 106, 277 S.E.2d aat 407 (citing In re Clayton

- Marcus , 286 N.C. 215, 210 S.E.2d 199 (1974)). As both parties have observed , there is no statutory definition of the word “interest” as used in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). The Business Court, how ever, defi ned the term in question in the context of bonds as “periodic payments received by the holder of a bond.” 7 Fidelity Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue , No. 10 CVS 3405, 2013 WL 1896987, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County (Bus. Ct.) May 3, 2013). In view of the fact that t he term “int erest ” has a “definite an d well

- known sense in the law,” C.T.H. Corp. , 212 N.C. at 810 , 195 S.E. at 40 , and that this “plain meaning” definition is consistent with the manner in which “interest” is used in other statutory provisions and judicial decisions , s ee e.g., N.C.G.S. § 143

- 134.1(a) (2015) (stating that

7 Fidelity Bank does not appear to dispute that this is a proper “ plain meaning” definition of “interest,” assuming that the use of such a definition is appropriate.F IDELITY B ANK V
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- “the prime contractor shall be paid interest . . . at the rate of one percent (1%) per month”) ; Knight v. Braswell , 70 N.C. 708 , 7 11

- 12 (1874) (enforcing a contract requiring that interest owed on a bond be paid annually ), we conclude, as did the Business Court, that the undefined term “interest” as used in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) is unambiguous and should be understood in accordance with its plain meaning as involving “peri odic payments r eceived by the holder of a bond , ” Fidelity Bank , 2013 WL 1896987, at *5, and that, h ad the General Assembly intended for the term “interest” as used in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) to be defined in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(4), it wo uld have incorporated that definition into N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) “by clear and specific reference,” see Lutz Indus. , 242 N.C. at 340, 88 S.E.2d at 339

. S ince the validity of Fidelity Bank’s challenge to the Business Court’s decision hinges upon the e xtent to which the Business Court correctly interpreted the meaning of the term “interest” as that term is used in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) and since t he Business Court did not err by defining the term “interest” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1 ) as “periodic payments received by the holder of a bond,” we hold that the Business Court correctly concluded that the Market Discount Income that Fidelity Bank received on the discounte d bonds that matured during 2001 was not deductible for North Carolin a corporate income tax purposes. Although Fidelity Bank has vigorously asserted that the plain language of the relevant provisions of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes unambiguously indicates that the General Assembly intended that the term “interest” as used in N.C.G.S. §F IDELITY B ANK V
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- 105

- 130.5(b)(1) be understood to include Market Discount Income given that Market Discount Income is treated as “interest” for purposes of federal corporate income taxation, we do not find this argument persuasive. To be sure, 26 U.S.C . § 1276(a)(1)
states that , “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, gain on the disposition of any market discount bond shall be treated as ordinary income to the extent it does not exceed the accrued market discount on such bond” and 26 U.S.C. § 1 276(a )(4) provides that “any amount treated as ordinary income under [26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1)] shall be treated as interest for purposes of this title.” 26 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1), (a)(4) (2012). For that reason, Market Discount Income is certainly treated a s interest income for the purpose of determining the taxpayer’s federal taxable income. See 26 U.S.C. § 860C(b)(1)(B) (2012)

. However , the fact that Market Discount Income is treated as interest for purposes of determining federal taxable income does not, Fidelity Bank’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding, mean that Market Discount Income should be treated as “interest” for all purposes under the North Carolina Revenue Act. As a general proposition , there is nothing illogical about including Mark et Discount Income , along with all other revenue derived from a discounted bond, as interest for the purpose of calculating federal taxable income while refusing to treat Market Discount Income as interest for purposes of the deduction for interest upon Un ited States obligations allowed by N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). Instead, any decision to require that Market Discoun t Income be treated as interest for theF IDELITY B ANK V
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- purpose of both calculating federal taxable income and the deduction from federal taxable income aut horized by N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) requires specific support in the relevant statutory language. We are unable to read the relevant provisions of the North Carolina Revenue Act to requi re the consistency of treatment for which Fidelity Bank contends. A careful review of the provisions of Chapter 105 of the General Statu t es demonstrates, as the Department notes, that the General Assembly has not adopted the definitions set out in the Internal Revenue Code into the North Carolina Revenue Act on any sort o f wholesale basis. Instead, the General Assembly has selectively incorporated certain of the definitions contained in the Internal Revenue Code into the North Carolina Revenue Act. Although a number of the deductions from federal taxable income for purpo ses of calculating North Carolina net taxable income incorporate various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, no such reference to any provision of the Code appears i n N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). In the event that the provisions of the Internal Revenu e Code were binding throughout the North Carolina Revenue Act, these references to the Code in other portions of N.C.G.S. § 105

- 1 30.5(b) would be superfluous. State v. Buckner , 351 N.C. 401, 408, 527 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2000) (stating that, “[i]f possible, a statute must be interpreted so as to give meaning to all of its provisions”); Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston

- Salem , 302 N.C. 550, 556,
276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981) (stating that “a statute must be considered as a whole and construed, if possible, s o that none of its provisions shall be rendered useless orF IDELITY B ANK V
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- redundant”). As a result, the essential argument advanced in order to justify the construction of N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) advocated for by Fidelity Bank lacks support in the overall structure a nd literal language of the North Carolina Revenue Act. Although Fidelity Bank has directed our attention to the provision in N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) making “ [ i ] nterest upon the obli gations of the United States or its possession s ” deductible “to the exte nt included in federal taxable income,” we are unable to read this language as requiring that Market Discount Income be treated as “interest” for purposes of the deduction authorized by N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1). Instead of shedding light on the definiti on of “interest,” the language in question, when read literally, simply indic ates that anything that qualifies as “interest” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130.5(b)(1) is only deductible to the extent that it is “included in federal taxable income.” Thus, we are u nable to construe N.C.G.S. § 105

- 130,5(b)(1) in the manner contended for by Fidelity Bank. As a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the Busines s Court’s decision concerning the deductibility issue in its order resolving the issues raised in the first judicial review petition and rendered final in the orders addressing the second judicial review petition should be affirmed . However, we further co nclude that the Business Court’s decision to dismiss the portions of the second judicial review petition challenging the Department’s decision concerning the deductibility issue in the second amended final agency decision was erroneous. For that reason, w eF IDELITY B ANK V
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- conclude that the Business Court’s dismissal decision should be reversed and that the case arising from Fidelity Bank’s second judicial review proceeding should be remanded to the Business Court for further remand to the Dep artment for the sole
purpose of entering an order vacating its remand decision with respect to the deductibility issue. AFFIRM ED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

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