alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Robert R. Matthews, 

Plaintiff, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

FILED 

APR 2 2 2009 

NANCY MAYER WHllTINGTON CLERK 

u.s. DISTRICT COURT' 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 09 U'743 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This matter comes before the Court on consideration of a pro se complaint and an 

application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant the application and dismiss the 

complaint because it fails to meet the minimum requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. 

The factual allegations of the complaint consist of only the following words: "Fraud 

many hundred's judicial review error's, failure to treat's, misdiagnosis's, treatment for disability 

claims compensation pain and suffering[.]" Compi. at l. The remainder of the one-paragraph 

complaint identifies the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ("V A"), Erik K. Shinseki, and several V A 

offices or sub-agencies and their addresses. Id. The complaint asks for no relief. See id. 

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short 

and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment 

for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose of the minimum standard of 

Rule 8 is to give fair notice to the defendants of the claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a 
responsive answer, to prepare an adequate defense and to determine whether the doctrine of res 

judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). 

The Complaint fails to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a). The complaint does not make 

clear what conduct or decision by the V A gives rise to this complaint. It does not indicate what 

the plaintiff wants from this lawsuit, and it does not provide the court with enough information to 

determine its own jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint without 

prejudice. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 

Date: ¥/¥,~ Unid±~i£~ 

- 2 -
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALVIN THOMAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0534-CG-M

)

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this action be and is hereby DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to prosecute and to obey the Court’s Order.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00534-CG-M Document 6 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Wellstone Filters, Inc. (the "Company") on Form  10-KSB for the  period  ending  December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof  (the "Report"),  I, Learned J. Hand, Chief Executive and Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Learned J. Hand

By: Learned J. Hand

Chief Executive and Financial Officer

March 25, 2008
EX-10.2



 





Exhibit 10.2




Addendum




to the




Integration Agreement




between




Norsk Hydro ASA (“Hydro”)




and




Statoil ASA (“Statoil”)



This addendum to the Integration Agreement (the “Integration Agreement”) concerning the merger of
Hydro’s petroleum activities with Statoil (the “Merger”) is entered into between Hydro and Statoil.





	1.	 	INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION




Hydro and Statoil has, in accordance with clause 3 of the Integration Agreement, conducted a due
diligence review to verify the Information Assumption.



The due diligence review is governed by a separate agreement dated 25 January 2007.



The due diligence review was completed on 27 January in Stavanger.





	2.	 	CHANGE OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE MERGER




Clause 2.4, third paragraph, sub-clause (i) of the Integration Agreement shall be amended as
follows:





	(i)	 	Hydro’s Petroleum Activities shall be allocated a Net Interest-bearing Debt (as defined in
Annex 2) of NOK 1 000 000 000 (one billion) as per 1 January 2007.




Clause
2.4, third paragraph, sub-clauses (ii) - (v), shall remain unchanged.





	3.	 	OTHER CONDITIONS FOR THE MERGER




The Parties confirm by the entering into of this addendum to the Integration Agreement that the due
diligence review which were to be completed in accordance with clause 3 of the Integration
Agreement, has been concluded.



Except for what follows from the above clauses, all other conditions in the Integration Agreement
regarding the Merger shall remain unchanged.




	 	 	 
	Oslo, 30 January 2006 [sic]
	 	 
	 
	 	 
	/s/ Helge Lund

	 	/s/ Eivind Reiten
	 
	 	 
	For Statoil ASA

	 	For Norsk Hydro ASA
	 
	 	 
	Helge Lund

	 	Eivind Reiten
	 
	 	 
	CEO

	 	CEO
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16** 
**- 1119** 

SHERIF A. PHILIPS ,
Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

NORTH CAROLINA STATE; NORTH CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM; NORTH CAROLINA AGENCY; VIDANT MEDICAL CENTER, f/k/a Pitt County Memorial Hospital; M.D. PAUL BOLIN; RALPH WHATLEY; DAVID CREECH, Pitt County Memorial Hospital lawyer; JAY SALSMAN, Pitt County Memorial Hospital lawyer; DEBBIE MEYER, Law Firm, Cary, NC; KAREN ZANER, Law Firm, Dallas, TX; JAMES CROUSE, Law Firm, Raleigh, NC; NARDINE GUIRGUIS, Law Firm, Raleigh, NC ,
Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. James C. Fox , Senior District Judge. ( 5:15

- cv
- 00095

- F )

Submitted : July 28, 2016 Decided: August 1, 2016

Before MOTZ and HARRIS , Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Sherif Philips, Appellant Pro Se. Kathryn Hicks Shields, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina; Walter Gregory Merritt, HARRIS, CREECH, WARD & BLACKERBY, New Bern, North Carolina; Joseph Lawrence Nelson, DICKIE, MCCAMEY &2 CHILCOTE, Charlotte , North Carolina; John Thomas Crook, David Stebbins Coats, BAILEY & DIXON, Raleigh, North Carolina; Felix Hill Allen, IV, THARRINGTON SMITH LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:
Sherif Philips appeals the district court’s order denying
relief on his civil complaint. We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the
reasons stated by the district court. Philips v. N

. C

. State , No

5: 15

- cv
- 0095

- F ( E.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2015)

. We deny Philip s ’
motions to appoint counsel and for consideration of recusal. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Arthur Kelly, Appellant.

[872 NYS2d 499]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Feldman, J.), rendered December 20, 2004, convicting him of murder in the first degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony and physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court *869properly denied suppression of certain physical evidence found in the defendant’s apartment. “[T]he police may lawfully conduct a warrantless search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party who possesses the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises or personal property in question” *(People v Cosme,*48 NY2d 286, 290 [1979]; *see People v Adams,*53 NY2d 1, 8 [1981]). Here, the People established that the defendant’s wife, with whom he resided in the subject apartment, voluntarily granted the police permission to enter the apartment and voluntarily signed a statement in the detective’s memobook memorializing her consent to the search of the apartment *(see People v Forino,*39 AD3d 664, 665 [2007]). Moreover, the evidence adduced at the hearing established that the defendant’s wife had “common authority” over the suitcase-type container recovered from the bedroom that she shared with the defendant *(see United States v Matlock,*415 US 164, 171 [1974]; *see People v Adams,*53 NY2d at 9; *People v Loomis,*17 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2005]; *People v Jackson, 170*Misc 2d 478, 479, 484-485 [1996]). Accordingly, it was “clearly reasonable for the officers ... to rely on her apparent capability to consent to a search” of the suitcase *(see People v Adams,*53 NY2d at 10).

The hearing court properly found that the People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification by an eyewitness was based on that witness’s independent observation of the defendant (see *People v Adelman,*36 AD3d 926, 927 [2007]; *People v Radcliffe,*273 AD2d 483, 484 [2000]).

The defendant’s contention that the admission of a statement by his wife to the police violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause (see *Crawford v Washington,*541 US 36 [2004]) is unpreserved for appellate review (see *People v Mitchell,*35 AD3d 507 [2006]; *People v F & S Auto Parts, Inc.,*24 AD3d 795, 796 [2005]; *People v Bones, 17*AD3d 689, 690 [2005]). In any event, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the alleged error, was overwhelming, and there is no reasonable possibility that the alleged error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction. Thus, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; *People v Rush,*44 AD3d 799, 800 [2007]). Rivera, J.E, Spolzino, Florio and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
May 2, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

JAMIE FINCH, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00285-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The 

record indicates that the appeal should be DISMISSED. The Court orders the 

appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion and this decision be certified 

below for observance.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
RULE 13a-14(b) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K, (the Report), of Triton PCS Holdings,
Inc. (the Company) for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission as of the date hereof, I, Michael E. Kalogris, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as appropriate,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Michael E. KalogrisName: Michael E. Kalogris
Title: Chief Executive Officer
Date: March 16, 2005
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to Triton PCS Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Triton PCS Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. This certification accompanies the annual report on Form 10-K to which it relates, is not
deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and is not to be incorporated by
reference into any filing of Triton PCS Holdings, Inc. under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date
of the annual report on Form 10-K, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in
such filing).
EXHIBIT 32

                                  CERTIFICATION
                           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Lucky Strike Explorations
Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Michael
Noble, as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Date: February 23, 2009                      By: /s/ Michael Noble
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                 Michael Noble
                                                 Chief Executive Officer
                                                 Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies each Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of ss.18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.0



                SEARCH FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
              Statement re: Computation of Per Share Earnings Loss


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                   Six Months Ended     Six Months Ended
                                                  September 30, 1997   September 30, 1996
                                                  ------------------   ------------------
<S>                                                         <C>            <C>  
Weighted Average Shares:
     Common stock outstanding at end of period              6,829          3,958
     Adjustment for weighting of shares                    (2,444)          (557)
     Common stock equivalents assumed outstanding              --            --


                                                          -------        -------
Weighted average shares outstanding                       $ 4,385        $ 3,401
                                                          =======        =======

     Net Income(Loss)                                     $(6,231)       $(1,991)
                                                          =======        =======

Computation of net income(loss) per share:
     Net income(loss) divided by weighted
     average shares outstanding                           $ (1.42)       $ (0.59)
                                                          =======        =======
</TABLE>
1

John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov’t Code

Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004). 

NO. 07-04-0313-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

AUGUST 10, 2004

______________________________

SHERYL D. ATWOOD,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2002-478,973; HON. DRUE FARMER, PRESIDING

_______________________________

ABATEMENT AND REMAND

_______________________________

Before QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1

Appellant Sheryl D. Atwood appeals from a judgment convicting her of driving while

intoxicated. The reporter’s record is due in this cause. An extension of the applicable

deadline was sought by the court reporter. To justify the extension, the court reporter

represented that appellant has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay for the record.

Nothing of record shows that appellant is indigent and entitled to a free record.
2

Accordingly, we now abate this appeal and remand the cause to the County Court

at Law No. 2 of Lubbock County (trial court) for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial

court shall immediately cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a

hearing to determine the following: 

 1. whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal; 

 2. whether appellant is indigent; and, 

 3. whether the appellant is entitled to appointed counsel and a free appellate 

record. 

The trial court shall cause the hearing to be transcribed. So too shall it 1) execute findings

of fact and conclusions of law addressing the foregoing issues, 2) cause to be developed

a supplemental clerk’s record containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law and all

orders it may issue as a result of its hearing on this matter, and 3) cause to be developed

a supplemental reporter’s record transcribing the evidence and arguments presented at the

aforementioned hearing. Should it be determined that appellant wishes to prosecute the

appeal, is indigent, and is entitled to an appointed attorney but has none, then the trial court

shall appoint counsel, unless appellant knowingly and voluntarily waives counsel.

Furthermore, the name, address, and phone number of any counsel appointed by the trial

court to represent appellant shall be included in the supplemental record. The trial court

shall also file both supplemental records with the clerk of this court on or before September

9, 2004. Should further time be needed by the trial court to perform these tasks, then it

must be requested before September 9, 2004. 

 It is so ordered. 

 Per Curiam 

 Do not publish.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bismark Escolastico, Appellant.

[871 NYS2d 91]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (William I. Mo-gulescu, J., on speedy trial motion; Judith S. Lieb, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered January 5, 2005, convicting defendant of assault in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of five years, unanimously affirmed.

The court’s midtrial order remanding defendant to custody did not deprive him of a fair trial. The remand “did not constitute a prohibition against consulting with counsel, or make it *410impossible for [defendant] to consult with counsel” *(People v Kimes,*37 AD3d 1, 30 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 881 [2007]); on the contrary, the court made a point of giving defendant suitable opportunities to confer with counsel at the courthouse. Furthermore, the jury was never informed that defendant had been remanded, and he has not established that the jury was nevertheless able to discern the change in his status.

Defendant’s pro se claims are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits. Concur—Lippman, EJ., Maz-zarelli, Sweeny, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-0319

_____________________________

WINSTON MURPHY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

James H. Daniel, Judge.

May 22, 2019

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED.

WETHERELL, RAY, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Winston Murphy, pro se, Appellant.
2

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### In the Matter of Terrence S., an Infant. Genesee County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Cassi A.S., Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 883]

— Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Genesee County (Eric R. Adams, J.), entered June 1, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, inter alia, terminated the parental rights of respondent.

*1350It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Present — Centra, J.E, Fahey, Garni, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
|   | (1) | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The      information contained in the Report fully presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations or the      Company. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                         |                         | Across      America Real Estate Exchange, Inc.  |   |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Date:      February 10, 2010 | By:                          | /s/ Brian      L. Klemsz                        |   |
|                         | Brian      L. Klemsz         |                                                 |
|                         | Chief      Executive Officer |                                                 |
|                         | Chief      Financial Officer |                                                 |