J-S16017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LAWRENCE JEFFRIES

Appellant No. 1318 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 18, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003347-2013

CP-51-CR-0003348-2013

BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2016

Lawrence Jeffries appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on 

February 18, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

made final by the denial of post-sentence motions on March 31, 2015. On 

December 16, 2014, at the conclusion of a bench trial, the court convicted 

Jeffries of third-degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, four 

counts of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), and possession of 

an instrument of crime (“PIC”).

1

 The court sentenced Jeffries to an 

aggregate term of 27 to 50 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jeffries raises 

sufficiency and weight claims. For the reasons below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a), 2705, and 907(a), respectively.
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The trial court set forth the factual history as follows:

On January 1, 2013, at or around 3:00 a.m., [Jeffries], 

along with Miliak Coleman, Kevin Savage, and James Gatling, 

arrived at a New Year’s Eve party held inside a small residential 

apartment. Soon after [Jeffries] arrived, [Jeffries] and his 

friends confronted several other males, including David Ford, 

Stephen Johnson, Kyle Morris, Kashief Butler, and Amir Johnson, 

who were already present at the party. The initial confrontation 

began over a gesture to Amir’s girlfriend. The verbal 

confrontation became heated when one of [Jeffries’] friends 

stepped on the boot of one of the individuals in the opposing 

group.

During the verbal confrontation, [Jeffries] lifted his fleece 

and exposed a firearm. David Ford testified that before [Jeffries]

lifted his shirt, no other weapons had been displayed at the 

party. The exposure of [Jeffries’] gun escalated the 

confrontation further – it was at that point one of [Jeffries’] 

friends threw a punch and a physical altercation began between 

the two groups of males. Not long after the physical altercation 

ensued, [Jeffries] removed himself from the altercation, stepped 

back into a hallway within the apartment, pulled out a semiautomatic handgun, chambered a round, and fired five shots at 

several males. Ford testified that at the time of the shooting, 

[Jeffries] was not actively engaged in any fighting; nor had he 

been threatened in any way.

After Ashley Lloyd, a party attendee, heard the two groups 

of males arguing, she and a friend fled from the fight and went 

into a separate room inside the apartment. Soon thereafter, 

Lloyd heard the gunfire. People in the same room with Lloyd hid 

in the closet and under the bed. With nowhere left to hide, Lloyd 

kicked out a window screen and jumped from the room’s 

second-story window onto the sidewalk. Lloyd suffered fractures 

in both legs from the fall, and was confined to a wheelchair for 

three months.

Each of the five discharged bullets from [Jeffries’] gun 

struck individuals inside the apartment. All three victims of the 

gunfire were in the group of males that opposed [Jeffries] and 

his friends during the altercation.
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Stephen Johnson was shot in the upper chest, and in the 

right arm. The bullet to Johnson’s chest penetrated his left and 

right lungs as well as his aorta. Johnson died about an hour 

after the shooting at Temple University Hospital from the 

gunshot wound to his chest. Dr. Gary L. Collins, the Deputy 

Chief Medical Examiner, concluded that Johnson was not shot at 

close-range.

Kyle Morris was shot in the torso, the arm, the foot, and 

once in the back, the last of which was characterized as a graze 

wound. Morris testified that he stood roughly ten to fifteen feet 

from [Jeffries] and witnessed [Jeffries] firing at him.

[Jeffries] also shot Kashief Butler once in the right foot. 

Butler testified that at no point during the physical altercation 

was [Jeffries] actively engaged in the fighting. Butler witnessed 

[Jeffries] pull a gun from his waist, back away from the 

altercation, lift the gun, and fire.

Following the shooting, [Jeffries] ran out of the apartment, 

jumped into his car, and called 9-1-1. After calling 9-1-1, 

[Jeffries] drove around the block, parked, placed the firearm on 

the roof of the car, and waited for police. When police arrived, 

[Jeffries] confessed to being the shooter. The police recovered 

the gun from the roof of [Jeffries]’s car.

Later that morning, [Jeffries] waived his Miranda

[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] rights and gave a 

signed, voluntary statement to police detectives. In his 

statement he confessed to shooting Stephen Johnson, Kyle 

Morris, and Kashief Butler and that he owned a registered .40 

caliber firearm.1 He also alleged that he acted in self-defense 

when he shot two of the victims, claiming that he chambered a 

round and fired at one victim because the victim lunged at him. 

He further claimed that he fired at another victim after he saw 

the victim approaching him. He admitted that he was not 

physically touched during the altercation; nor was he engaged in 

fighting when he discharged his firearm.

1

 [Jeffries] testified that he purchased the firearm as a 

Christmas present to himself eight days before the 

shooting.
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At trial, [Jeffries] testified that, with the benefit of 

hindsight, he now believes he may have overacted by 

introducing the gun into the altercation. [Jeffries] claimed that 

he only fired the gun to cause “any type of delayed reaction for 

the melee” so he could escape the apartment.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/2015, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

On January 2, 2013, Jeffries was arrested and charged with murder, 

three counts of aggravated assault, four counts of REAP, and PIC. At a 

bench trial on November 3, 2014, the court convicted him of third-degree 

murder, three counts of aggravated assault, four counts of REAP, and PIC. 

Sentencing was deferred until February 18, 2015, for the completion of presentence and mental health reports. On that date, the court sentenced 

Jeffries to concurrent terms of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for third-degree 

murder and five to ten years’ incarceration for one count of aggravated 

assault; consecutive terms of five to ten years’ imprisonment for the two 

remaining counts of aggravated assault, and concurrent terms of one to two 

years’ imprisonment for PIC and REAP.

On February 23, 2015, Jeffries filed a post-sentence motion, raising a 

weight of the evidence claim with regard to his third-degree murder 

conviction. Four days later, he filed a motion for reconsideration of 
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sentence. The court held a hearing on his motions on March 31, 2015. This 

appeal followed.2

Jeffries first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

third-degree murder conviction because he acted in self-defense and did not 

possess the requisite malice to commit the crime.3 Specifically, Jeffries 

asserts, “[He] did not provoke the use of force” and he “acted so as to 

defend himself and also in the protection of others. [His] friends were being 

assaulted on an equal basis with [him] and perhaps even more so[.]” 

Jeffries’ Brief at 13. He states:

Once hostilities broke out, the lights went out and [Jeffries] and 

his friends were clearly about to be overwhelmed by the ‘other 

side’ which had many more men on its side and whose men were 

____________________________________________

2

 On May 4, 2015, the trial court ordered Jeffries to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Jeffries 

filed a concise statement on May 15, 2015. The trial court issued an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on June 1, 2015.

3

 In his brief, Jeffries raises the sufficiency argument as to all of his 

convictions. See Jeffries’ Brief at 3, 11. However, the trial court found he 

waived the argument with respect to his REAP and PIC convictions because 

they were insufficiently addressed in his concise statement. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/1/2015, at 5 n.2; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii),(vii) and 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Furthermore, Jeffries also presents no argument in his brief as to his 

aggravated assault conviction. Accordingly, we find he has waived the 

argument for failure to develop a sufficient claim. See Commonwealth v. 

Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009) (concluding the appellant’s 

sufficiency claim was waived where his argument was underdeveloped 

because he did not “set forth the elements of the crimes he was convicted” 

or “which specific elements were not met.”), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 

2010).
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larger, more physically capable and older th[a]n the youthful 

group who had arrived with [Jeffries]. Thus, [Jeffries] 

reasonably believed that he and his friends were in imminent 

danger of severe bodily injury or perhaps death.

Id. He further argues:

[Jeffries] and his friends were so vastly outnumbered by a group 

of people who considered themselves to be a “team” and from 

the surrounding facts, it can be taken and/or presumed that the 

“team” was about to do harm to [Jeffries] and his small group of 

friends. Counsel [for Jeffries] believes that the issue is not 

whether [Jeffries] ill perceived that he was in danger but rather 

whether [Jeffries] could have resorted to deadly force. Thus, 

counsel [for Jeffries] believes that [Jeffries] met the subjective 

test of believing he was in danger; the object of the nature of 

the test is whether a reasonable person would have believed that 

he should have resorted to deadly force. Maybe people could 

disagree on that. However, and pursuant to the law, the 

Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Jeffries] failed to act in self-defense.

The law would be unduly harsh if it required [Jeffries] to 

wait until such time as up to eight members of “the team” had 

beaten the starch out of himself and his friends and possibly 

caused life altering injuries or perhaps even death. People have 

been known to have died from receiving one punch. [Jeffries’] 

actions reflected that he did not wish to wait and see how bad 

the beating was going to become. [Jeffries] thus took 

preemptive action.

Id. at 15-16. Moreover, Jeffries claims the evidence did not establish that 

he acted with malice, which is necessary to sustain his third-degree murder 

conviction. Id. at 16-17. He states he “cannot be said to have had the time 

to think about what was going on and [he] simply reacted to the ‘facts on 
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the ground.’ He unreasonably believed that he could act in protection of 

himself and others.” Id. at 17.4

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Regarding third degree murder ... the statute simply states, “All 

other kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree.” [18 

Pa.C.S.] § 2502(c). Importantly, § 2502(c) does not set forth 

the requisite mens rea for third degree murder; however, § 

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4

 Jeffries also states the following actions corroborate the assertion that he 

did not act with malice: (1) he lawfully possessed the weapon; (2) he did 

not personally get into a fight; (3) his involvement began when he stood up 

for his “rather smallish” friend who was having a “hard time confronting the 

eight members of the team[;]” (4) he did not flee; and (5) he confessed to 

the police that he was the shooter. Id. at 17.
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302(c) of the Crimes Code provides, “When the culpability 

sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not 

prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” Id., 

§ 302(c) (emphasis added).

Case law has further defined the elements of third degree 

murder, holding:

[T]o convict a defendant of the offense of third[ ]degree 

murder, the Commonwealth need only prove that the 

defendant killed another person with malice aforethought. 

This Court has long held that malice comprehends not only 

a particular ill-will, but ... [also a] wickedness of 

disposition, hardness of heart, recklessness of 

consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, 

although a particular person may not be intended to be 

injured.

Commonwealth v. Santos, 583 Pa. 96, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa. 

2005) (alteration in original) (internal citation, quotation, and 

emphasis omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 

9, 15 (1868) (defining malice as quoted above). This Court has 

further noted:

[T]hird degree murder is not a homicide that the 

Commonwealth must prove was committed with malice 

and without a specific intent to kill. Instead, it is a 

homicide that the Commonwealth must prove was 

committed with malice, but one with respect to which the 

Commonwealth need not prove, nor even address, the 

presence or absence of a specific intent to kill. Indeed, to 

convict a defendant for third degree murder, the jury need 

not consider whether the defendant had a specific intent to 

kill, nor make any finding with respect thereto.

Commonwealth v. Meadows, 567 Pa. 344, 787 A.2d 312, 317 

(Pa. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 748 A.2d 166, 

174-75, 561 Pa. 34 (Pa. 1999)).

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 

134 S.Ct. 2314 (U.S. 2014).
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With respect to the defense of self-defense, we are guided by the 

following principles. Section 505 sets forth the elements of self-defense, in 

relevant part, as follows:

§ 505. Use of force in self-protection

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--

The use of force upon or toward another person is 

justifiable when the actor believes that such force is 

immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 

himself against the use of unlawful force by such other 

person on the present occasion.

(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of 

force.

...

(2.3) An actor who is not engaged in a criminal 

activity, who is not in illegal possession of a firearm 

and who is attacked in any place where the actor 

would have a duty to retreat under paragraph (2)(ii) 

has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his 

ground and use force, including deadly force, if:

(i) the actor has a right to be in the place 

where he was attacked;

(ii) the actor believes it is immediately 

necessary to do so to protect himself against 

death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or 

sexual intercourse by force or threat; and

(iii) the person against whom the force is used 

displays or otherwise uses:

(A) a firearm or replica of a firearm as 

defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 (relating to 

sentences for offenses committed with 

firearms); or
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(B) any other weapon readily or 

apparently capable of lethal use.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a), (b)(2.3).

“When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the 

Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 

2008 PA Super 83, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at least one 

of the following: (1) the accused did not reasonably believe that 

he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; (2) the 

accused provoked or continued the use of force; or (3) the 

accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with 

complete safety. Commonwealth v. McClendon, 2005 PA 

Super 164, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005). The 

Commonwealth need only prove one of these elements beyond a 

reasonable doubt to sufficiently disprove a self-defense claim. 

Commonwealth v. Burns, 2000 PA Super 397, 765 A.2d 1144, 

1149 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2009), 

appeal denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009).

To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free from fault in

provoking or escalating the altercation that led to the offense, 

before the defendant can be excused from using deadly force. 

Likewise, the Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim by 

proving the defendant used more force than reasonably 

necessary to protect against death or serious bodily injury.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal 

citations and emphasis omitted).

The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two aspects, 

one subjective and one objective. First, the defendant must 

have acted out of an honest, bona fide belief that he was in 

imminent danger, which involves consideration of the 

defendant’s subjective state of mind. Second, the defendant’s 

belief that he needed to defend himself with deadly force, if it 

existed, must be reasonable in light of the facts as they 
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appeared to the defendant, a consideration that involves an 

objective analysis.

Id. at 787, quoting Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (Pa. 

2012).

Additionally, we note the “defense of others” is substantially similar to 

self-defense:

(a) General rule. — The use of force upon or toward the 

person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when:

(1) the actor would be justified under section 505 

(relating to use of force in self-protection) in using such 

force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be 

threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect;

(2) under the circumstances as the actor believes them to 

be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified 

in using such protective force; and

(3) the actor believes that his intervention is necessary for 

the protection of such other person.

(b) Exception. — Notwithstanding subsection (a), the actor is 

not obliged to retreat to any greater extent than the person 

whom he seeks to protect.

18 Pa.C.S. § 506 (some bold and italics removed). Lastly, it bears 

mentioning:

[w]hen the defendant’s own testimony is the only evidence of 

self-defense, the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted 

justification and cannot simply rely on the [fact-finder]’s disbelief 

of the defendant’s testimony:

The disbelief of a denial does not, taken alone, afford 

affirmative proof that the denied fact existed so as to 

satisfy a proponent’s burden of proving that fact. The trial 

court’s statement that it did not believe [a]ppellant’s 
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testimony is no substitute for the proof the Commonwealth 

was required to provide to disprove the self-defense claim.

If there are other witnesses, however, who provide accounts of 

the material facts, it is up to the fact finder to reject or accept 

all, part or none of the testimony of any witness. The 

complainant can serve as a witness to the incident to refute a 

self-defense claim.

Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the trial court correctly found the following:

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that [Jeffries] fired 

his weapon inside the small apartment the night of the shooting. 

Eyewitness testimony, including that of [Jeffries], sufficiently 

established that [he] pulled out his firearm and discharged it at 

several unarmed individuals. [Jeffries’] malice can be inferred 

from his use of a deadly weapon upon a victim’s vital body part. 

Here, [Jeffries] shot the decedent twice – with one bullet 

penetrating both his lungs as well as his aorta – resulting in the 

decedent’s death. His actions plainly establish he killed the 

decedent, and that he did so in a manner exhibiting an extreme 

indifference to the value of human life and an unjustified 

disregard of the likelihood of death.

Further, [Jeffries] testified at trial that he only fired his gun 

to cause “any type of delayed reaction for the melee” in order to 

seek escape. Yet, he did not fire a single shot; nor did he fire 

his gun at the floor or the ceiling. Instead, [Jeffries] fired 

multiple shots at several unarmed people, with each bullet 

striking an individual from the group that opposed him and his 

friends in the altercation. The precision of [Jeffries’] shooting 

shows that he did not fire his gun indiscriminately; nor did he 

fire to cause a delay in the fighting to seek escape. Rather, his 

targeted shooting shows that he fired with the intent to strike 

particular individuals, including the decedent. The evidence is 

therefore more than sufficient to support that [Jeffries] acted 

with the requisite malice for Third-Degree Murder.

...

[Jeffries’] self-defense claim is unsupportable. The 

Commonwealth sustained its burden by disproving this claim by 
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showing that [Jeffries] violated his duty to retreat. Pennsylvania 

law states, in part, that an actor can only stand his or her 

ground if the “person against whom the force is used displays or 

otherwise uses ... a firearm or replica of a firearm ... [or] any 

other weapon readily or apparently capable of lethal use.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a)(2.3). In the instant matter, none of the 

victims, or the other occupants in the apartment, possessed or 

brandished any type of weapon before or at the time of the 

shooting. [Jeffries] therefore had a duty to retreat before using 

deadly force. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a)(2)(ii).

[Jeffries] was not actively engaged in fighting before – or 

at the time – he fired his weapon. [Jeffries] removed himself 

from the altercation, stepped into a hallway, took a moment to 

chamber a round, and fired his weapon. [Jeffries] could have, at 

that point, avoided the danger and safely retreated by way of 

several avenues. The hallway [Jeffries] stepped into led to a 

bathroom and a bedroom. [Jeffries] also had access to a set of 

stairs, adjacent to the hallway, which exited the apartment.

Moreover, [Jeffries] was not free from fault in provoking 

the difficulty that culminated in the slaying. Prior to the 

shooting, [Jeffries] provoked and escalated the situation by 

exposing his firearm and introducing it into the verbal 

confrontation – it was at that point the verbal confrontation 

turned into physical.

There was no evidence that [Jeffries] reasonably or 

unreasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or 

serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use deadly 

force against the victims to prevent such harm. David Ford 

testified that at the time of the shooting, [Jeffries] was not 

threatened in any way. Kyle Morris testified that he stood 

roughly ten to fifteen feet from [Jeffries] when [Jeffries] fired his 

weapon at him. This testimony was corroborated by the Deputy 

Chief Medical Examiner who concluded that the decedent was 

also not shot at close-range. In addition, at no point during the 

physical altercation was [Jeffries] actively engaged in the 

fighting. 

Finally, this Court finds [Jeffries’] testimony on the selfdefense matter not credible. [Jeffries] offered incongruous 

statements on the reasons why he discharged his firearm. He 

first alleged to police that he acted in self-defense when he shot 
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two of the victims. He claimed that he fired at one victim 

because the victim lunged at him; and that he fired at another 

victim after he saw the victim approaching him. Yet, at trial he 

claimed that he did not intend to shoot the victims out of any 

fear that they may harm him; rather, he only discharged his 

firearm to cause a delay in the altercation in order to seek 

escape. Thus, the Commonwealth sufficiently met its burden 

and disproved [Jeffries’] self-defense claim.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/2015, at 6-10 (citations and record citations 

omitted).

We agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict 

winner, we conclude that it was sufficient to disprove Jeffries’ claims of selfdefense and defense of others. First, Jeffries focuses much of his argument 

on the allegation that his own testimony should be considered more credible 

than the remainder of the evidence. The judge, sitting as the fact-finder, 

was not required to do so. See Melvin, 103 A.3d at 39-40. 

Second, contrary to his argument, the physical evidence and the 

testimony of other witnesses refute Jeffries’ testimony. While other 

individuals were engaged in a verbal argument that turned into a physical 

altercation, Jeffries was not involved in the dispute prior to drawing his gun. 

Further, as the court points out, the victims were all actively engaged in the 

argument with Jeffries’ friends, and the evidence established Jeffries 

targeted these victims based on their relationship. 

Third, he was the only individual at the party with a weapon. Jeffries 

even had removed himself from the altercation, stepped into a hallway, and 
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then took a moment to chamber a round before firing his weapon at several 

individuals, who were not in close range.5 Because the location of the brawl 

was not at his home or place of work, Jeffries had a duty to retreat to 

another room before using deadly force. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)(ii). 

Moreover, he escalated the contentious situation by using the weapon, which 

was more force than reasonably necessary, as the evidence did not 

demonstrate he was overwhelmed. See Smith, supra. 

Lastly, despite Jeffries’ assertion that he did not have enough time to 

act with malice, it is well established that malice can be inferred when a 

deadly weapon is directed to a vital part of the body. See Commonwealth 

v. Roots, 306 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. 1973). Here, the bullet from Jeffries’ gun 

struck the victim in the lung, a vital part of the body. See id. (finding 

malice can be inferred where death resulted from a stab wound to the chest, 

which penetrated the lung). Additionally, the evidence demonstrated Jeffries 

acted with a recklessness of the consequences when he introduced a gun 

into a fistfight. See Fisher, supra.

Accordingly, based on the circumstances of the case, we conclude the 

Commonwealth proved Jeffries escalated the altercation by drawing a 

weapon, he continued the attack beyond that which was reasonably 

____________________________________________

5

 Indeed, one can reasonably infer that based on his location, Jeffries was 

not engaged in a physical altercation with the victims prior to the shooting. 

Furthermore, he even admitted at trial that he “may have overreacted 

introducing the gun[.]” N.T., 11/3/2014, at 246.
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necessary to defend himself and others, and he had a duty to retreat. 

Therefore, his sufficiency of the evidence claim for third-degree murder fails

In his second argument, Jeffries argues the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence.6 See Jeffries’ Brief at 18. Specifically, he states the 

“judgment was unreasonable and the law misapplied because the 

Commonwealth did not prove that [Jeffries] failed to act in self-defense.” 

Id. at 19. Moreover, he asserts:

The greater weight of the evidence demonstrated that 

[Jeffries] did not start an argument with anyone; did not hit 

anyone; was standing there when “the team” approached his 

much smaller friend; when it certainly appeared to [Jeffries] as a 

reasonable person that his friend was about to be pummeled; 

that [Jeffries] feared for his own safety because others rushed at 

him and where under all of the circumstances and where 

[Jeffries] and his friends were greatly outnumbered by bigger, 

stronger people, it would not have been prudent [to] wait, and 

hope, that he and his friends were not severely beaten with 

injuries to be sustained that could only be guessed at.

Id.

Appellate review of a weight of the evidence claim is well-established:

A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in 

favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 318–20, 

744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Champney, 

574 Pa. 435, 443–44, 832 A.2d 403, 408–09 (2003). On review, 

an appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the finder 

of fact and consider the underlying question of whether the 

____________________________________________

6

 Jeffries properly preserved his challenge to the weight of the evidence by 

raising it in a post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).
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verdict is against the weight of the evidence, but, rather, 

determines only whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

making its determination. Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321–22, 744 

A.2d at 753; Champney, 574 Pa. at 444, 832 A.2d at 408.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 

134 S.Ct. 1792 (U.S. 2014).

Here, the trial court found the following:

[Jeffries’] weight-of-evidence claim is without merit as the 

verdict was consistent with the evidence and a far cry from 

shocking one’s sense of justice. The Commonwealth presented 

multiple eyewitnesses, who gave consistent accounts, that 

[Jeffries] was not engaged in the physical altercation; that 

[Jeffries] stepped away from the altercation, backed up, and 

fired at three unarmed individuals. In his statement to police, 

[Jeffries] also confirmed this version of the events.

As discussed supra, the evidence sufficiently underscores 

[Jeffries’] malicious behavior, his wickedness of disposition, 

hardness of heart, recklessness of consequences, and disregard 

of social duty. Further, [Jeffries’] self-defense claim is 

unsupportable. Accordingly, the weight-of-the-evidence claim 

must fail, as the evidence was overwhelming as to [Jeffries’] 

guilt for Third-Degree Murder.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/2015, at 12 (record citation omitted).

We again agree with the court’s well-reasoned analysis. Jeffries fails 

to explain in what manner the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

weight claim. Rather, his argument consists largely of claims that the 

greater weight of evidence fell in his favor. As such, he asks this Court to 

reweigh the evidence; however, we decline to do so. As our Supreme Court 

has made clear, we may not reweigh the evidence and substitute our 
J-S16017-16

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judgment for the trial court’s decision. See Lyons, supra. Therefore, 

Jeffries’ weight claim fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2016