Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC13-318

____________

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

vs.

KERRICK VAN TEAMER,

Respondent.

[July 3, 2014]

QUINCE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 

Court of Appeal in Teamer v. State, 108 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

1

 The 

district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the 

Fourth District Court of Appeal in Aders v. State, 67 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2011). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. As we explain, we 

approve the First District’s decision and disapprove that of the Fourth District.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The record presents some confusion regarding the Respondent’s surname. 

Although his full name is “Kerrick Van Teamer,” his surname is “Teamer,” not 

“Van Teamer.” This opinion refers to him and his case below accordingly.

 
On June 22, 2010, an Escambia County Deputy Sheriff observed Kerrick

Teamer driving a bright green Chevrolet. Teamer, 108 So. 3d at 665. After 

noticing the car, the deputy continued on his patrol, driving into one of the 

neighborhoods in that area. Upon traveling back to where he had first seen 

Teamer, the deputy again observed Teamer driving the same car. The deputy then 

“ran” the number from Teamer’s license plate through the Florida Department of 

Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) database, as is customary for him 

while on patrol, and learned that the vehicle was registered as a blue Chevrolet. Id. 

The database did not return any information regarding the model of the vehicle. 

Based only on the color inconsistency, the deputy pulled the car over to conduct a 

traffic stop.

“Upon interviewing the occupants, the deputy learned that the vehicle had 

recently been painted, thus explaining the inconsistency.” Id. However, during the 

stop, the deputy noticed a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the car and 

decided to conduct a search of the vehicle, Teamer, and the other passenger. Id. 

“Marijuana and crack cocaine were recovered from the vehicle, and about $1,100 

in cash was recovered from [Teamer]. [He] was charged with trafficking in 

cocaine (between 28–200 grams), possession of marijuana (less than 20 grams), 

and possession of drug paraphernalia” (scales). Id.

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On October 4, 2010, Teamer filed a motion to suppress the results of the 

stop as products of an unlawful, warrantless search. At the hearing on the motion 

to suppress, the deputy acknowledged that, in his training and experience, he had 

encountered individuals who would switch license plates and he could not verify a

vehicle’s identification number without pulling over the vehicle. Id. On crossexamination, the deputy acknowledged that the car was not reported stolen, he had 

not observed any other traffic violations or suspicious or furtive behavior, he was 

not “aware of any reports of stolen vehicles or swapped plates in the area,” and

“the only thing that was out of the ordinary was the inconsistency of the vehicle 

color from the registration.” Id.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, explaining that the rationale 

for the denial was that the deputy “had a legal right to conduct an investigatory 

stop when a registration search of the automobile license tag reflected a different 

color than the observed color of the vehicle.” The trial court found that the deputy 

made the investigatory stop “because the registration was not consistent with the 

color of the vehicle” and that since “the vehicle was legally stopped for 

investigative purposes,” the odor of marijuana that the officer smelled during the 

stop gave him probable cause to conduct a search. After a jury trial, Teamer was 

convicted on all three counts as charged in the information. The trial judge 

sentenced him to six years on count one and time served on the other two counts.

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Teamer appealed, and the First District reversed the trial court’s denial of 

Teamer’s motion to suppress, certifying conflict with the Fourth District in Aders. 

Id. at 670. The First District acknowledged “that any discrepancy between a 

vehicle’s plates and the registration may legitimately raise a concern that the 

vehicle is stolen or the plates were swapped from another vehicle,” but found that 

such concern must be weighed “against a citizen’s right under the Fourth 

Amendment to travel on the roads free from governmental intrusions.” Id. at 667. 

The district court cited several cases demonstrating that color discrepancy is 

typically one of several factors constituting reasonable suspicion. Id. at 668. The 

First District then cited two nonbinding cases2 for the principle that a color 

discrepancy alone does not provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Id. at 668-69. 

Relying on those cases and other “somewhat analogous cases involving 

investigations of ‘temporary tags,’ ” the district court ruled that a color discrepancy 

alone did not warrant an investigatory stop. Id. at 669-70. The court found that 

under the converse ruling, “every person who changes the color of [his or her]

vehicle is continually subject to an investigatory stop so long as the color 

inconsistency persists.” Id. at 670. The First District stated that it was “hesitant to 

license an investigatory stop” under such circumstances. Id.

2. United States v. Uribe, No. 2:10-cr-17-JMS-CMM, 2011 WL 4538407 

(S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011); Commonwealth v. Mason, 78 Va. Cir. 474 (Cir. Ct. 

2009), aff’d, No. 1956-09-2, 2010 WL 768721 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2010).

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ANALYSIS

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court’s 

determinations of historical facts are reversed only if not supported by competent, 

substantial evidence. Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001). However,

the application of the law to those facts is subject to de novo review. Id. Further, 

this Court is required to construe Florida’s constitutional right against 

unreasonable searches and seizures “in conformity with the [Fourth] Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme 

Court.” Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 

1988) (“[W]e are bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme 

Court with relation to the [F]ourth [A]mendment . . . .”).

The United States Supreme Court has “held that the police can stop and 

briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable 

suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even 

if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 

(1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)); Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 

185, 186 (Fla. 1993) (“[A] police officer may reasonably detain a citizen 

temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is 

committing, or is about to commit a crime.” (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991))).

However, a “police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts 

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which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 

warrant” an investigatory stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Supreme Court has 

described reasonable suspicion as “a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. 

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). This standard requires “something more than an 

‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ ” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Reasonableness, of course, depends ‘on a balance between the public 

interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary 

interference by law officers.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) 

(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)); State v. 

Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435, 439 (Fla. 2003) (“The real test is one of reasonableness, 

which involves balancing the interests of the State with those of the motorist.”).

“When a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the government bears 

the burden of demonstrating that the search or seizure was reasonable.” Hilton v. 

State, 961 So. 2d 284, 296 (Fla. 2007) (citing United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 

242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995) (“As a general rule, the burden of proof is on the defendant 

who seeks to suppress evidence. However, once the defendant has established a 

basis for his motion, i.e., the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, 

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the burden shifts to the government to show that the search or seizure was 

reasonable.” (citation omitted))).

Reasonable suspicion must also be assessed based on “the totality of the 

circumstances—the whole picture,” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002), and “from the standpoint of an objectively 

reasonable police officer,” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Thus, a police officer may draw inferences based on his 

own experience. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (“[A] trained 

officer draws inferences and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that 

might well elude an untrained person.”). However, “the officer’s subjective 

intentions are not involved in the determination of reasonableness.” Hilton, 961 

So. 2d at 294; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (recognizing the 

rejection of “any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops 

depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved”).

“[I]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis” for reasonable 

suspicion. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 

125 (2000) (acknowledging this fact and recognizing that an officer can detain an 

individual to resolve an ambiguity regarding suspicious yet lawful or innocent 

conduct). “[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or 

guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal 

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acts.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant 

case, the State concedes that “the failure to update a vehicle registration to reflect a 

new color is not in specific violation of a Florida law.” Thus, what degree of 

suspicion attaches to this noncriminal act?

To warrant an investigatory stop, the law requires not just a mere suspicion

of criminal activity, but a reasonable, well-founded one. Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186 

(“[A]n investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity.”). In Terry, the stop was found appropriate because the officer “had 

observed [three men] go [t]hrough a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent 

in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation.” Terry, 392 

U.S. at 22. The U.S. Supreme Court described the scenario as follows:

There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street 

corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious 

about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, 

singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked 

in. But the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover 

about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of 

which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or 

anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, 

pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where 

each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference 

between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in one of 

these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the 

two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks 

away.

 

Id. at 22-23. The Supreme Court found that “[i]t would have been poor police 

work indeed for an officer of 30 years’ experience in the detection of thievery from 

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stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior 

further.” Id. at 23. Thus each seemingly innocent activity in Terry had a 

cumulative effect of providing an officer with a reasonable suspicion.

Conversely, in State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1990), this 

Court rejected an officer’s use of a self-created drug courier profile because 

“Florida law does not permit a profile based on factors that are little more than

mundane or unremarkable descriptions of everyday law-abiding activities.” We

noted that a drug courier profile in a Supreme Court case3 was upheld “precisely 

because it described unusual conduct that set the defendant apart from other 

travelers and that strongly suggested concealed criminal conduct.” Id. We

invalidated the profile used in Johnson because “there was nothing at all unusual or 

out of the ordinary about the conduct that” fit within the profile. Id. at 1142-43. In 

so holding, we stated that individuals fitting within the officer’s profile “simply 

cannot be described as an inherently ‘suspicious’ bunch.” Id. at 1143. The 

innocent factors within the profile failed to create a reasonable suspicion.

Turning to the instant case, the sole basis here for the investigatory stop is an 

observation of one completely noncriminal factor, not several incidents of innocent 

activity combining under a totality of the circumstances to arouse a reasonable 

suspicion—as was the case in Terry. The discrepancy between the vehicle 

3. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1.

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registration and the color the deputy observed does present an ambiguous situation, 

and the Supreme Court has recognized that an officer can detain an individual to 

resolve an ambiguity regarding suspicious yet lawful or innocent conduct. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. However, the suspicion still must be a reasonable one. 

Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186 (“Mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop.”). In 

this case, there simply are not enough facts to demonstrate reasonableness. Like 

the factors in Johnson, the color discrepancy here is not “inherently suspicious” or 

“unusual” enough or so “out of the ordinary” as to provide an officer with a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, especially given the fact that it is not 

against the law in Florida to change the color of your vehicle without notifying the 

DHSMV.

The law allows officers to draw rational inferences, but to find reasonable 

suspicion based on this single noncriminal factor would be to license investigatory 

stops on nothing more than an officer’s hunch. Doing so would be akin to finding 

reasonable suspicion for an officer to stop an individual for walking in a sparsely 

occupied area after midnight simply because that officer testified that, in his 

experience, people who walk in such areas after midnight tend to commit 

robberies. Without more, this one fact may provide a “mere suspicion,” but it does

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not rise to the level of a reasonable suspicion.4 Neither does the sole innocent 

factor here—a color discrepancy—rise to such level. The deputy may have had a 

suspicion, but it was not a reasonable or well-founded one, especially given the 

fact that the driver of the vehicle was not engaged in any suspicious activity. 

Moreover, “the government provided no evidence to tip the scales from a mere 

hunch to something even approaching reasonable and articulable suspicion, despite 

attempting to justify a detention based on one observed incident of completely 

innocent behavior in a non-suspicious context.” United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 

646, 652 (7th Cir. 2013).

Reasonableness also “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and 

the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 

officers.’ ” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878); 

Diaz, 850 So. 2d at 439 (“The real test is one of reasonableness, which involves 

balancing the interests of the State with those of the motorist.”). In order to 

determine reasonableness, courts “must balance the nature and quality of the 

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of 

the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place, 

462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he 

4. The State conceded as much during oral argument in this case. When 

asked whether that scenario provided enough reasonable suspicion for a stop, the 

prosecutor responded, “It would depend on what else they were doing . . . .”

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permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its 

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 

legitimate governmental interests.”). Thus we must balance the nature and quality 

of the intrusion required to stop an individual and investigate a color discrepancy 

against the government’s interest in finding stolen vehicles or enforcing vehicle 

registration laws.5

In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court invalidated a roving patrol stop by 

Border Patrol agents near a closed checkpoint operation at the Mexican border. 

422 U.S. at 886. In stopping the vehicle, the agents had relied on a single factor—

“the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants.” Id. at 885-86. As part of 

balancing the public interest with the motorist’s rights, the Supreme Court outlined 

as the governmental interest preventing illegal aliens from entering this country. 

Id. at 878-80. However, despite the importance of that interest, the “modest”

intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the 

border, the Court found that the apparent Mexican heritage of the occupants did 

not provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Id. at 881, 886. The Court stated, 

5. See § 320.02(6), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“Any person who registers his or her 

motor vehicle by means of false or fraudulent representations made in any 

application for registration is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . . . .”); 

§ 320.261 (making it illegal to “knowingly attach[] to any motor vehicle” a license 

plate that was not “lawfully transferred to such vehicle”); § 320.0609(2)(a) 

(making it unlawful to transfer license plates to a different vehicle without 

notifying DHSMV).

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“The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high 

enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does 

not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.” Id. at 886-

87; cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545, 557-59 (1976) 

(upholding stops for brief questioning at fixed checkpoints even with no reasonable 

suspicion of illegal aliens because although the need for such stops is as great as 

that in Brignoni-Ponce, a checkpoint stop is much less intrusive since “the

generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers is appreciably 

less”).

Similarly, in Prouse, the Supreme Court invalidated a random vehicle stop

by roving patrol officers solely to confirm a driver’s compliance with licensure and

registration requirements. 440 U.S. at 659. The Court described the intrusion on 

the motorist’s interests as follows:

We cannot assume that the physical and psychological intrusion 

visited upon the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check 

documents is of any less moment than that occasioned by a stop by 

border agents on roving patrol. Both of these stops generally entail 

law enforcement officers signaling a moving automobile to pull over 

to the side of the roadway, by means of a possibly unsettling show of 

authority. Both interfere with freedom of movement, are 

inconvenient, and consume time. Both may create substantial anxiety.

For Fourth Amendment purposes, we also see insufficient 

resemblance between sporadic and random stops of individual 

vehicles making their way through city traffic and those stops 

occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles are brought to a halt or to 

a near halt, and all are subjected to a show of the police power of the 

community. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other 

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vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’

authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by 

the intrusion.

Id. at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court balanced that intrusion 

with the state’s interests in apprehending stolen vehicles—which the Court 

characterized as indistinguishable from a “general interest in crime control”—and 

promoting roadway safety. Id. at 658-59 & n.18. The Supreme Court held that 

given the alternative mechanisms available for enforcing traffic and vehicle safety 

regulations—the foremost of which being to act only upon observed violations—

the incremental contribution to highway safety of the random stops in that case did

not justify their intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 659.

The intrusion involved in the instant case is similar to that described in 

Prouse, especially considering that anyone who chooses to paint his or her vehicle 

a different color could be pulled over by law enforcement every time he or she 

drives it. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63 (“Were the individual subject to unfettered 

governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security 

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.”). 

Furthermore, the governmental interest here is not nearly as strong as that in 

Brignoni-Ponce of developing “effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of 

aliens at the Mexican border,” 422 U.S. at 878-79, but is more like that in Prouse—

“ensuring that . . . licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are 

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being observed,” 440 U.S. at 658. In fact, the Supreme Court described part of the 

interest at stake here—the apprehension of stolen vehicles—as indistinguishable 

“from the general interest in crime control.” Id. at 659 n.18. 

Even more relevant is the Supreme Court’s finding in Brignoni-Ponce that a 

single factor—the apparent Mexican ancestry of the vehicle’s occupants—was not 

enough to furnish a reasonable suspicion that the occupants were illegal aliens. 

422 U.S. at 885-86. Likewise, the likelihood that a color discrepancy such as that 

at issue here indicates a stolen vehicle may be high enough to make it a relevant 

factor, but standing alone, it does not justify initiating a stop to determine if the law 

has been violated. The deputy here needed more indicia of a violation to 

distinguish between an illegal transfer of license plates, for example, and a legal 

decision to paint one’s vehicle. Conducting an investigatory stop based on a color 

discrepancy only when that discrepancy exists in conjunction with additional 

factors indicating potential criminal activity still protects the government’s 

interests, while also preserving a motorist’s right of freedom from arbitrary 

interference by law enforcement. We find that the governmental interest in this 

case is outweighed by Teamer’s constitutional rights, and the investigatory stop 

was not warranted.

“Under the exclusionary rule announced by the United States Supreme 

Court, ‘the Fourth Amendment bar[s] the use of evidence secured through an 

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illegal search and seizure.’ ” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 293 (alteration in original)

(quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (holding that the federal 

exclusionary rule applies to the states as well)). “Whether the exclusionary 

sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case . . . is ‘an issue separate from 

the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke 

the rule were violated by police conduct.’ ” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 

906 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).

The primary rationale behind the exclusionary rule is to deter law 

enforcement from violating constitutional rights. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12; see also

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he rule is a judicially 

created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through 

its deterrent effect.”). The instant case is not one in which the exclusionary rule “is 

powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights [because] the 

police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful 

prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 14. 

Applying the exclusionary rule here would have the required deterrent effect. See, 

e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 651, 663 (affirming the trial court’s judgment granting the 

defendant’s motion to suppress). 

Further, the State has not demonstrated that any exceptions apply. Brown v. 

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (discussing whether to apply an exception to the 

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exclusionary rule and stating that “the burden of showing admissibility rests, of 

course, on the prosecution”). The State argues a variation of the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception was first found to apply

whenever a law enforcement officer conducts a search while relying, in good faith, 

upon a defective search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922; Massachusetts v. 

Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-89 (1984). Over time, however, the Supreme Court 

extended this exception to other factual scenarios, including searches where police 

acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent. Davis v. 

United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011). However, the rule of Davis has no 

application to the present case because the Aders decision was issued on July 27, 

2011—more than one year after the stop of Teamer’s vehicle. Thus Aders was not 

binding precedent on which the deputy could have relied.

Despite this fact, the State argues that the good faith exception should still 

apply because the deputy here “arrived at a conclusion shared by non-binding 

courts in other jurisdictions,6 and later shared by the Fourth District” in Aders. 

However, there are also nonbinding courts in other jurisdictions that have arrived 

at the exact opposite conclusion. United States v. Uribe, No. 2:10-cr-17-JMSCMM, 2011 WL 4538407 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011); Commonwealth v. Mason, 

6. Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Andrews v. 

State, 658 S.E.2d 126, 127-28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).

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78 Va. Cir. 474 (Cir. Ct. 2009), aff’d, No. 1956-09-2, 2010 WL 768721 (Va. Ct.

App. Mar. 9, 2010). We are satisfied that the exclusionary rule will have an 

appropriate deterrent effect in this case and that none of the exceptions to the rule 

apply.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we disapprove the decision of the Fourth District in 

Aders v. State, 67 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and approve the First District’s 

decision in Teamer v. State, 108 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), reversing the 

trial court’s judgment and sentence and ordering that Teamer be discharged.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

CANADY, J., dissenting.

Because I conclude that the traffic stop of Kerrick Van Teamer’s vehicle 

was based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the trial court 

therefore correctly denied the motion to suppress, I dissent from the majority’s 

approval of the First District Court of Appeal’s decision reversing Teamer’s 

judgment and sentence and ordering that he be discharged. I would quash the 

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decision of the First District on review and approve the decision of the Fourth 

District in Aders v. State, 67 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

I.

“The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the 

traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” 

Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting United States v. 

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). This rule is rooted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1 (1968), where “the [Supreme] Court implicitly acknowledged the authority 

of the police to make a forcible stop of a person when the officer has reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in 

criminal activity.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983).

The Terry rule recognizes that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires ‘some 

minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 

Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)). Reasonable suspicion thus requires 

“something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ” 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). “A determination that 

reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of innocent 

conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). In permitting 

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detentions based on reasonable suspicion, “Terry accepts the risk that officers may 

stop innocent people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). But when a 

stop lacks an objective basis, “the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices 

exceeds tolerable limits.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). Courts making 

“reasonable-suspicion determinations . . . must look at the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ of each case.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.

The rule authorizing stops based on reasonable suspicion—which embodies 

an “exception to the probable-cause requirement”—rests on the Supreme Court’s 

“balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type 

of seizure involved within the meaning of ‘the Fourth Amendment’s general 

proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Place, 462 U.S. at 703 

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). This balancing process involves weighing “the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 

against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 

intrusion.” Id. “A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in 

a variety of settings has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation 

of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of 

officers in the field.” Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. The Supreme Court’s categorical 

authorization of brief investigative detentions based on a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity flows from the conclusion that “[w]hen the nature and extent of 

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the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment 

interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on 

less than probable cause.” Place, 462 U.S. at 703.

II.

Here, the officer’s suspicion was aroused by the discrepancy between the 

color of the vehicle driven by Teamer and the color that was indicated in the 

registration information for the vehicle associated with the license tag on Teamer’s 

vehicle. Because of this discrepancy, a reasonable officer could suspect that the 

license tag may have been illegally transferred from the vehicle to which it was 

assigned. Although the color discrepancy was not necessarily indicative of 

illegality, it constituted “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 

particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 

(quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). The color discrepancy was “something more 

than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.” ’ ” Sokolow, 490 

U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). I would therefore conclude that the 

officer had the “minimal level of objective justification” necessary to conduct a 

stop for the purpose of further investigating the discrepancy. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 

7 (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217).

“It is not uncommon for members of the same court to disagree as to 

whether the proper threshold for reasonable suspicion has been reached.” William 

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E. Ringel, Searches & Seizures Arrests & Confessions § 11:12 (Westlaw database 

updated March 2014). On the issue presented by this case, different courts have 

disagreed regarding whether the color discrepancy was sufficient to establish 

reasonable suspicion. Compare Aders, 67 So. 3d at 371 (holding that “[a] color 

discrepancy is enough to create a reasonable suspicion in the mind of a law 

enforcement officer of the violation of . . . criminal law”); United States v. Uribe, 

709 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2013) (same); Andrews v. State, 658 S.E. 2d 126 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 2008) (same); Smith v. State, 713 N.E. 2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (same); 

with Van Teamer, 108 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding that color 

discrepancy alone does not warrant an investigatory stop); United States v. Uribe, 

2:10-cr-17-JMS-CMM, 2011 WL 4538407 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011) (same); 

Commonwealth v. Mason, No. 1956-09-2, 2010 WL 768721 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 

2010) (same). Different views on this question are no doubt influenced by 

divergent judgments regarding the likelihood that the color discrepancy had an 

innocent explanation—namely, the repainting of the vehicle after it was 

registered—and was not indicative of illegality. The courts in fact have no 

empirical basis for reaching a conclusion about that likelihood. But a stop 

predicated on such a color discrepancy unquestionably falls outside the category of 

“arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” 

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Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. A stop in such circumstances cannot fairly be called an 

“arbitrary and abusive” police practice. Id. at 52.

The crux of the majority’s decision in this case is its conclusion that finding 

“reasonable suspicion based on this single noncriminal factor would be to license 

investigatory stops on nothing more than an officer’s hunch.” Majority op. at 10. 

This conclusion suggests a categorical rule that is not consistent with the 

framework established in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 

Although the totality of the circumstances must be taken into account in every 

case, that does not mean that an officer’s reliance on a “single noncriminal factor” 

—such as the vehicle color discrepancy here—is the equivalent of a “hunch.” The 

majority is wholly unjustified in categorizing an undeniably objective factor as a 

hunch. The majority’s “effort to refine and elaborate the requirements of 

‘reasonable suspicion’ in this case creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with 

one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment.” 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8.

The two cases on which the majority places primary reliance do not support 

the majority’s line of analysis. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 

876 (1975), the Supreme Court considered “whether a roving patrol may stop a 

vehicle in an area near the border and question its occupants when the only ground 

for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry.” The 

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Supreme Court concluded that “Mexican appearance” “standing alone . . . does not 

justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.” Id. at 887. The 

Supreme Court’s rejection of stops based purely on ethnic classification does not 

support the conclusion that all stops where the officer relies on “a single 

noncriminal factor” are unconstitutional. Nor does Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 

648, 655 (1979), where the Supreme Court rejected Delaware’s argument “that 

patrol officers be subject to no constraints in deciding which automobiles shall be 

stopped for a license and registration check because the State’s interest in 

discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways 

outweighs the resulting intrusion on the privacy and security of the persons 

detained.” Prouse thus does not address the issue of reasonable suspicion, and it 

sheds no light on whether reasonable suspicion existed in the case on review here.

III.

The officer’s stop of Teamer did not transgress the requirements of the 

Fourth Amendment. The decision of the First District should be quashed, and 

Teamer’s conviction and sentence should remain undisturbed.

POLSTON, J., concurs.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 

Conflict of Decisions 

First District – Case No. 1D11-3491

(Escambia County) 

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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, 

Criminal Appeals, and Jay Kubica, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, 

Florida, 

for Petitioner

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Summa, Assistant Public 

Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, 

for Respondent 

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