UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DONALD RAY COWAN, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 16-5030 (D.C. No. 4:15-CV -00117-JHP-PJC) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before GORSUCH , BALDOCK , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges. **

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Donald Cowan was convicted of manslaughter in 2007 in Oklahoma state court. After comple ting his four-year prison sent ence and moving to Arkansas, Cowan filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the State of Oklahoma in federal district court. He assert s certain Oklahoma statutes and state court procedures infringe on his Constitutional rights, pa rticularly his Second Amendment rights regarding self-defense and firearm possessi on. He asked the district court to, among

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collatera l estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 29, 2016 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 other things, strike down a number of Oklahoma statutes, vacate his 2007 manslaughter conviction, and order Oklahoma to return his firearm. A magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Cowan’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Co wan failed to show that he had Article III standing. The magistrate judge concluded that Cowan, now an Arkansas resident, did not face an immine nt threat of injury from the Oklahoma statutes and court procedures he identified. Thus, Cowa n would have to rest on his actual past injury—the 2007 manslaughter conviction. But the magistrate judge concluded that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and principles of res judicata barred the district court from reviewing th at conviction. Further, the magistrate judge noted that the Eleventh Amendment barre d Cowan’s suit because Cowan failed to establish that Oklahoma had waived its sovereign immunity and also failed to name a state official as a defendant to survive under Ex parte Young . Cowan objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, mainly on the groun ds that the magistrate judge did not consider the merits of whether Okla homa’s statutes infringed on his Second Amendment rights. The district c ourt adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, incorrectly stating that Cowan had not object ed but nonetheless stating that it made its conclusion “upon fu ll consideration of the entire record and the issues presented herein.” The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.3 Cowan now appeals to this Court. 1 He argues in his opening brief that the district court got it wrong b ecause the magistrate judge an d district court failed to address his Second Amendment arguments. Notably, however, Cowan fails to argue how the magistrate judge or district cour t erred in its jurisd ictional analysis, an analysis that precludes us fr om reaching the merits. We conclude he has failed to carry his burden of establishing standing to invoke federal jurisdiction for the reasons articulated by the magistrate judge and adop ted by the district court. Although the district court did not acknowledge Cowan’ s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, it nonetheles s indicated it fully consider ed the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Regardless, even if such a review was not de novo, the district court’s error was harmless because we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusions. We deny Cowan’s request to set aside the doctrines of collater al estoppel and res judicata. Further, we agree with the magi strate judge that the Eleventh Amendment bars Cowan’s suit against the State of Oklahoma. As much as Cowan would like us to, we cannot bypass Article III’s limitations on our jurisdiction to reach the merits of th is case, even though those merits also involve the Constitution. “Fed eral courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They

1 Cowan proceeded in forma pa uperis in the district cour t and renews his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on a ppeal. Cowan could proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization unless the distri ct court certified that an appeal was not taken in good faith or found that Cowan was not otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). The dist rict court has not done so, and thus Cowan’s motion is moot. See Singleton v. Hargett , 188 F.3d 519, 1999 WL 606712 at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (unp ublished table opinion) (dismiss ing as moot petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the court of appeals).4 lack power to decide issues—however im portant or fiercely contested—that are detached from” an actual case or controversy. Brown v. Buhman , 822 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016). To the extent Cowan rais es arguments that would have been more properly included in his opening brief and otherwise asks us to consider the merits of his case, we summarily deny hi s extraneous motions and petition for writ of mandamus as moot. The Court orders that: 1. The district court’s “Order Affi rming and Adopting the Report and Recommendation of the United St ates Magistrate Judge” is AFFIRMED

. 2. The “Motion for Leave to Proceed on Ap peal Without Prepayment of Costs or Fees (non-PLRA)” is DENIED AS MOOT

. 3. The “Motion to Set Aside the Doctrine s of ‘Collateral Estoppel’ and ‘Res Judictia’ [sic] in the Interest of Justice / Motion to Adjudicate This Appeal as a Case of First Impression” is DENIED

. 4. The “Motion to Certify Constitu tional Questions of Law” is DENIED

. 5. The “Motion for Declaratory Judgment an d Motion for an Ex traordinary Writ” is DENIED AS MOOT

. 6. The “Motion to Declare the Current Statutory Treatment of the Lawful Use and Discharge of Firearms as a Heat of Passion Crime as Dictated by the Oklahoma Firearms Control Act of 1971 and the First Degree Manslaughter Statute Unconsoctitutional [sic]” is DENIED AS MOOT

.5 7. The “Motion to Declare the Statutory Treatment of the Exercise of Second Amendment Rights as an Affirmative Defense Known as the ‘Stand Your Ground Defense’ Un constitutional” is DENIED AS MOOT

. 8. The “Petition for a Writ of Mandamus Di rected to the Ho norable James H. Payne, Judge of the Northe rn District of Oklahoma an d General Frank J. Glass, Chief of the United States National Guard Bureau” is DENIED AS MOOT

. 9. The “Motion for Expedited Hearing” is DENIED AS MOOT

. Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED

.
Entered for the Court

Per Curiam