(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MISSOURI, INC., FKA 

GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC. v. NEVILS 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 

No. 16–149. Argued March 1, 2017—Decided April 18, 2017 

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA) authorizes the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to contract with private carriers for federal employees’ health insurance. 5 U. S. C. 

§8902(a), (d). FEHBA contains an express-preemption provision,

§8902(m)(1), which states that the “terms of any contract under this

chapter which relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or 

benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede

and preempt any State or local law . . . which relates to health insurance or plans.”

OPM’s contracts have long required private carriers to seek subrogation and reimbursement. Accordingly, OPM’s regulations make a 

carrier’s “right to pursue and receive subrogation and reimbursement 

recoveries . . . a condition of and a limitation on the nature of benefits 

or benefit payments and on the provision of benefits under the plan’s 

coverage.” 5 CFR §890.106(b)(1). In 2015, OPM published a new rule 

confirming that a carrier’s subrogation and reimbursement rights

and responsibilities “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of

coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits)

within the meaning of ” §8902(m)(1), and “are . . . effective notwithstanding any state or local law, or any regulation issued thereunder,

which relates to health insurance or plans.” §890.106(h). 

Respondent Jodie Nevils was insured under a FEHBA plan offered 

by petitioner Coventry Health Care of Missouri. When Nevils was injured in an automobile accident, Coventry paid his medical expenses. 

Coventry subsequently asserted a lien against part of the settlement

Nevils recovered from the driver who caused his injuries. Nevils satisfied the lien, then filed a class action in Missouri state court, alleging that, under Missouri law, which does not permit subrogation or 
 

 

 

 

2 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Syllabus 

reimbursement in this context, Coventry had unlawfully obtained reimbursement. Coventry countered that §8902(m)(1) preempted the 

state law. The trial court granted summary judgment in Coventry’s 

favor, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. Finding §8902(m)(1) susceptible to diverse

plausible readings, the court invoked a “presumption against

preemption” to conclude that the federal statute’s preemptive scope

excluded subrogation and reimbursement. On remand from this 

Court for further consideration in light of OPM’s 2015 rule, the Missouri Supreme Court adhered to its earlier decision. A majority of 

the Missouri Supreme Court also held that §8902(m)(1) violates the

Supremacy Clause. 

Held: 

1. Because contractual subrogation and reimbursement prescriptions plainly “relate to . . . payments with respect to benefits,”

§8902(m)(1), they override state laws barring subrogation and reimbursement. Pp. 6–9.

(a) This reading best comports with §8902(m)(1)’s text, context, 

and purpose. Contractual provisions for subrogation and reimbursement “relate to . . . payments with respect to benefits” because subrogation and reimbursement rights yield just such payments. When a 

carrier exercises its right to either reimbursement or subrogation, it 

receives from either the beneficiary or a third party “payment” respecting the benefits the carrier had previously paid. The carrier’s 

very provision of benefits triggers the right to payment. Congress’

use of the expansive phrase “relate to,” which “express[es] a broad 

pre-emptive purpose,” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 

U. S. 374, 383, weighs against Nevils’ effort to narrow the term

“payments” to exclude payments that occur “long after” a carrier’s 

provision of benefits. Nevils’ argument that Congress intended to

preempt only state coverage requirements, e.g., inclusion of acupuncture and chiropractic services, also miscarries. 

The statutory context and purpose reinforce this conclusion. 

FEHBA concerns “benefits from a federal health insurance plan for 

federal employees that arise from a federal law.” Bell v. Blue Cross & 

Blue Shield of Okla., 823 F. 3d 1198, 1202. Strong and “distinctly 

federal interests are involved,” Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. 

v. McVeigh, 547 U. S. 677, 696, in uniform administration of the program, free from state interference, particularly in regard to coverage, 

benefits, and payments. The Federal Government also has a significant financial stake in subrogation and reimbursement. Pp. 6–8.

(b) McVeigh’s suggestion that §8902(m)(1) has two “plausible”

interpretations, 547 U. S., at 698, Nevils asserts, supports application of the presumption against preemption here. But the Court nev-
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

er chose between the two readings set out in McVeigh, because doing 

so was not pertinent to the discrete question whether federal courts

have subject-matter jurisdiction over FEHBA reimbursement actions.

Having decided in McVeigh that §8902(m)(1) is a “choice-of-law prescription,” not a “jurisdiction-conferring provision,” id., at 697, the 

Court had no cause to consider §8902(m)(1)’s text, context, and purpose, as it does here. Pp. 8–9.

2. The regime Congress enacted is compatible with the Supremacy

Clause. The statute itself, not a contract, strips state law of its force.

FEHBA contract terms have preemptive force only if they fall within 

§8902(m)(1)’s preemptive scope. Many other federal statutes found to 

preempt state law, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Federal Arbitration Act, leave the contextspecific scope of preemption to contractual terms. While 

§8902(m)(1)’s phrasing may differ from those other statutes’, 

FEHBA’s express-preemption provision manifests the same intent to 

preempt state law. Pp. 9–11.

492 S. W. 3d 918, reversed and remanded. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other 

Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
 

 

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Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–149 

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MISSOURI, INC., FKA 

GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC., PETITIONER v.
 

JODIE NEVILS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

MISSOURI
 

[April 18, 2017] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959

(FEHBA), 5 U. S. C. §8901 et seq., Congress authorized the 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to contract with

private carriers for federal employees’ health insurance. 

§8902(a), (d). FEHBA contains a provision expressly 

preempting state law. §8902(m)(1). That provision reads: 

“The terms of any contract under this chapter which 

relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or 

benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) 

shall supersede and preempt any State or local law, or 

any regulation issued thereunder, which relates to 

health insurance or plans.” 

Contracts OPM negotiates with private carriers provide 

for reimbursement and subrogation. Reimbursement 

requires an insured employee who receives payment from 

another source (e.g., the proceeds yielded by a tort claim) 

to return healthcare costs earlier paid out by the carrier.

Subrogation involves transfer of the right to a third-party

payment from the insured employee to the carrier, who 
 

 

2 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Opinion of the Court 

can then pursue the claim against the third party. Several 

States, however, Missouri among them, bar enforcement of

contractual subrogation and reimbursement provisions.

The questions here presented: Does FEHBA’s expresspreemption prescription, §8902(m)(1), override state law 

prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement; and if 

§8902(m)(1) has that effect, is the statutory prescription

consistent with the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. 

VI, cl. 2? We hold, contrary to the decision of the Missouri

Supreme Court, that contractual subrogation and reimbursement prescriptions plainly “relate to . . . payments

with respect to benefits,” §8902(m)(1); therefore, by statutory instruction, they override state law barring subrogation and reimbursement. We further hold, again contrary 

to the Missouri Supreme Court, that the regime Congress

enacted is compatible with the Supremacy Clause. Section 

8902(m)(1) itself, not the contracts OPM negotiates, triggers the federal preemption. As Congress directed, where 

FEHBA contract terms “relate to the nature, provision, or 

extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with

respect to benefits),” §8902(m)(1) ensures that those terms 

will be uniformly enforceable nationwide, free from state 

interference. 

I 

A 

FEHBA “establishes a comprehensive program of health

insurance for federal employees.” Empire HealthChoice 

Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U. S. 677, 682 (2006). As 

just noted, supra, at 1, FEHBA contains an expresspreemption provision, §8902(m)(1). FEHBA assigns to

OPM broad administrative and rulemaking authority over

the program. See §§8901–8913. OPM contracts with 

private insurance carriers to offer a range of healthcare 

plans. §§8902, 8903. 

OPM’s contracts with private carriers have long included 
 

 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

provisions requiring those carriers to seek subrogation and

reimbursement. Accordingly, OPM has issued detailed

regulations governing subrogation and reimbursement 

clauses in FEHBA contracts. See 5 CFR §890.106 (2016). 

Under those regulations, a carrier’s “right to pursue and 

receive subrogation and reimbursement recoveries constitutes a condition of and a limitation on the nature of 

benefits or benefit payments and on the provision of benefits under the plan’s coverage.” §890.106(b)(1).

In 2015, after notice and comment, OPM published a 

rule confirming that “[a] carrier’s rights and responsibilities pertaining to subrogation and reimbursement under

any [FEHBA] contract relate to the nature, provision, and

extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with

respect to benefits) within the meaning of ” §8902(m)(1).

§890.106(h). Such “rights and responsibilities,” OPM’s

rule provides, “are . . . effective notwithstanding any state

or local law, or any regulation issued thereunder, which 

relates to health insurance or plans.” Ibid. Its rule, OPM 

explained, “comports with longstanding Federal policy and

furthers Congres[s’] goals of reducing health care costs

and enabling uniform, nationwide application of [FEHBA]

contracts.” 80 Fed. Reg. 29203 (2015) (final rule). 

B 

Respondent Jodie Nevils is a former federal employee

who enrolled in and was insured under a FEHBA plan

offered by petitioner Coventry Health Care of Missouri.1 

Nevils v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 418 S. W. 3d 451, 453 

(Mo. 2014) (Nevils I ). When Nevils was injured in an 

automobile accident, Coventry paid his medical expenses. 

Ibid. Nevils sued the driver who caused his injuries and 

recovered a settlement award. Ibid. Based on its contract 

—————— 

1Coventry was formerly known as Group Health Plan, Inc. Pet. for 

Cert. ii. We refer to both the current and former entities as “Coventry.” 
 

4 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Opinion of the Court 

with OPM, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a–130a, Coventry

asserted a lien for $6,592.24 against part of the settlement 

proceeds to cover medical bills it had paid. Nevils I, 418 

S. W. 3d, at 453. Nevils repaid that amount, thereby 

satisfying the lien. Ibid. 

Nevils then filed this class action against Coventry in

Missouri state court, alleging that Coventry had unlawfully 

obtained reimbursement. Ibid. Nevils premised his claim 

on Missouri law, which does not permit subrogation or

reimbursement in this context, see, e.g., Benton House, 

LLC v. Cook & Younts Ins., Inc., 249 S. W. 3d 878, 881– 

882 (Mo. App. 2008). Coventry countered that §8902(m)(1) 

makes subrogation and reimbursement clauses in FEHBA 

contracts enforceable notwithstanding state law. The trial 

court granted summary judgment in Coventry’s favor, 

Nevils v. Group Health Plan, Inc., No. 11SL–CC00535 

(Cir. Ct., St. Louis Cty., Mo., May 21, 2012), App. to Pet. 

for Cert. 28a, 32a, and the Missouri Court of Appeals

affirmed, Nevils v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 2012 WL 

6689542, *5 (Dec. 26, 2012). 

The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. Nevils I, 418 

S. W. 3d, at 457. That court began with “the assumption 

that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be 

superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear

and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id., at 454 (quoting 

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 516 (1992)) 

(alterations in original). Finding §8902(m)(1) susceptible 

to diverse “plausible readings,” the court invoked a “presumption against preemption” to conclude that the federal

statute’s preemptive scope excluded subrogation and 

reimbursement. 418 S. W. 3d, at 455. 

Judge Wilson, joined by Judge Breckenridge, concurred 

in the judgment. Id., at 457. Observing that “it defies

logic to insist that benefit repayment terms do not relate

to the nature or extent of Nevils’ benefits,” id., at 460 

(emphasis deleted), Judge Wilson concluded that “Con-
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

gress plainly intended for §8902(m)(1) to apply to the 

benefit repayment terms in [Coventry’s] contract,” id., at 

462. He nevertheless concurred, reasoning that the Supremacy Clause did not authorize preemption based on 

the terms of FEHBA contracts. Id., at 462–465. 

Coventry sought our review, and we invited the Solicitor

General to file a brief expressing the views of the United

States. Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 574 

U. S. ___ (2014). While Coventry’s petition was pending,

OPM finalized its rule governing subrogation and reimbursement. See supra, at 3. This Court granted certiorari, 

vacated the Missouri Supreme Court’s judgment, and 

remanded for further consideration in light of OPM’s 

recently adopted rule. Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. 

Nevils, 576 U. S. ___ (2015). 

On remand, the Missouri Supreme Court adhered to its

earlier decision. Nevils v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 492 

S. W. 3d 918, 920, 925 (2016). OPM’s rule, the court maintained, “does not overcome the presumption against 

preemption and demonstrate Congress’ clear and manifest

intent to preempt state law.” Id., at 920. 

Judge Wilson again concurred, this time joined by a 

majority of the judges of the Missouri Supreme Court. Id., 

at 925.2 In their view, Congress’ “attempt to give preemptive effect to the provisions of a contract between the

federal government and a private party is not a valid 

application of the Supremacy Clause” and, “therefore, does

not displace Missouri law here.” Ibid. 

We granted certiorari to resolve conflicting interpretations of §8902(m)(1). 580 U. S. ___ (2016). Compare 492

S. W. 2d, at 925 (majority opinion), with Bell v. Blue Cross 

& Blue Shield of Okla., 823 F. 3d 1198, 1199 (CA8 2016) 

—————— 

2Under Missouri law, a “concurring opinion” in which “a majority of

the court concur[s]” is binding precedent. Mueller v. Burchfield, 359 

Mo. 876, 880, 224 S. W. 2d 87, 89 (1949). 
 

 

6 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Opinion of the Court 

(§8902(m)(1) preempts state antisubrogation law); 

Helfrich v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Assn., 804 F. 3d 

1090, 1092 (CA10 2015) (same). 

II 

Section 8902(m)(1) places two preconditions on federal 

preemption. See supra, at 1. The parties agree that Missouri’s law prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement

meets one of the two limitations, i.e., the State’s law “relates to health insurance or plans.” §8902(m)(1). They

dispute only whether the subrogation and reimbursement

requirements in OPM’s contract with Coventry “relate to 

the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits,” 

“including payments with respect to benefits.” Ibid. 

Coventry contends that §8902(m)(1) unambiguously 

covers the contractual terms at issue here. In any event, 

Coventry, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, 

urges that the rule published by OPM in 2015 leaves no 

room for doubt that insurance-contract terms providing for

subrogation and reimbursement fall within §8902(m)(1)’s

preemptive scope. See supra, at 3. Deference is due to 

OPM’s reading, Coventry and the United States assert,

under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). In Nevils’ view, by

contrast, §8902(m)(1) does not preempt state antisubrogation and antireimbursement laws in light of the presumption against preemption. Given that presumption, Nevils

maintains, OPM’s rule is not entitled to deference. 

Though we have called Nevils’ construction “plausible,” 

McVeigh, 547 U. S., at 698, the reading advanced by Coventry and the United States best comports with 

§8902(m)(1)’s text, context, and purpose. 

A 

Contractual provisions for subrogation and reimbursement “relate to . . . payments with respect to benefits” 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

because subrogation and reimbursement rights yield just 

such payments. When a carrier exercises its right to

either reimbursement or subrogation, it receives from 

either the beneficiary or a third party “payment” respecting the benefits the carrier had previously paid. The 

carrier’s very provision of benefits triggers the right to 

payment. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31; Helfrich, 804 F. 3d, at 

1106; Bell, 823 F. 3d, at 1204. 

Congress’ use of the expansive phrase “relate to” shores

up that understanding. We have “repeatedly recognized” 

that the phrase “relate to” in a preemption clause “express[es] a broad pre-emptive purpose.” Morales v. Trans 

World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383 (1992); accord 

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2014) 

(slip op., at 5, 9). Congress characteristically employs the 

phrase to reach any subject that has “a connection with, or

reference to,” the topics the statute enumerates. Morales, 

504 U. S., at 384. The phrase therefore weighs against

Nevils’ effort to narrow the term “payments” to exclude 

payments that occur “long after” a carrier’s provision of 

benefits (Brief for Respondent 27 (quoting McVeigh, 547 

U. S., at 697)). See Nevils I, 418 S. W. 3d, at 460 (Wilson, 

J., concurring); cf. Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2013) (slip op., at 10) (in the Federal Employees’ Group 

Life Insurance Act context, it “makes no difference” 

whether state law withholds benefits in the first instance 

or instead takes them away after they have been paid). 

Given language notably “expansive [in] sweep,” Morales, 

504 U. S., at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted), 

Nevils’ argument that Congress intended to preempt only

state coverage requirements (e.g., for acupuncture and 

chiropractic services, see Brief for Respondent 36) also 

miscarries. 

The statutory context and purpose reinforce our conclusion. FEHBA concerns “benefits from a federal health 

insurance plan for federal employees that arise from a 
 

8 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Opinion of the Court 

federal law” in an area with a “long history of federal

involvement.” Bell, 823 F. 3d, at 1202. Strong and “distinctly federal interests are involved,” McVeigh, 547 U. S., 

at 696, in uniform administration of the program, free

from state interference, particularly in regard to coverage,

benefits, and payments. The Federal Government, moreover, has a significant financial stake. OPM estimates 

that, in 2014 alone, FEHBA “carriers were reimbursed by 

approximately $126 million in subrogation recoveries.” 80 

Fed. Reg. 29203. Such “recoveries translate to premium

cost savings for the federal government and [FEHBA]

enrollees.” Ibid. 

B 

Invoking our suggestion in McVeigh that §8902(m)(1) 

has two “plausible” interpretations, 547 U. S., at 698,

Nevils nonetheless urges us to apply a presumption

against preemption because §8902(m)(1) does not clearly 

cover contractual terms pertaining to subrogation and

reimbursement. This argument is blind to McVeigh’s 

context.

 In McVeigh, we considered the discrete question whether 

28 U. S. C. §1331 gives federal courts subject-matter 

jurisdiction over FEHBA reimbursement actions. See 547 

U. S., at 683. Our principal holding was that §1331 did 

not confer federal jurisdiction. Ibid.; see Bell, 823 F. 3d, at 

1205. 

 The carrier in McVeigh, as part of its argument in favor 

of federal jurisdiction, asserted that §8902(m)(1) itself

conferred federal jurisdiction. See 547 U. S., at 697. In 

responding to that assertion, we summarized competing

interpretations of §8902(m)(1) advanced in briefing, readings that map closely onto the parties’ positions here. See 

ibid. (carrier and United States as amicus curiae urged 

interpretation similar to Coventry’s; an amicus brief in 

support of beneficiary offered interpretation similar to 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

Nevils’).

We made no choice between the two interpretations

set out in McVeigh, however, because the answer made 

no difference to the question there presented. Id., at 

698. “[E]ven if FEHBA’s preemption provision reaches 

contract-based reimbursement claims,” we explained, “that 

provision is not sufficiently broad to confer federal jurisdiction.” Ibid. Because §8902(m)(1) is a “choice-of-law 

prescription,” not a “jurisdiction-conferring provision,” id., 

at 697, we had no cause to consider §8902(m)(1)’s text, 

context, and purpose, as we do today, see supra, at 6–8.3 

III 

Nevils further contends that, if §8902(m)(1) covers 

subrogation and reimbursement clauses in OPM contracts,

then the statute itself would violate the Supremacy Clause 

by assigning preemptive effect to the terms of a contract,

not to the laws of the United States. We conclude, however, 

that the statute, not a contract, strips state law of its 

force. 

Without §8902(m)(1), there would be no preemption of

state insurance law. FEHBA contract terms have preemptive force only as they “relate to the nature, provision, or 

extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with

respect to benefits),” §8902(m)(1)—i.e., when the contract 

terms fall within the statute’s preemptive scope. It is 

therefore the statute that “ensures that [FEHBA contract]

terms will be uniformly enforceable nationwide, notwithstanding any state law relating to health insurance or

plans.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Many other federal statutes preempt state law in this

way, leaving the context-specific scope of preemption to 

—————— 

3Because the statute alone resolves this dispute, we need not consider

whether Chevron deference attaches to OPM’s 2015 rule. 
 

 

10 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Opinion of the Court 

contractual terms. The Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq., for 

example, preempts “any and all State laws insofar as

they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” §1144(a).

And the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 

et seq., limits the grounds for denying enforcement of 

“written provision[s] in . . . contract[s]” providing for arbitration, thereby preempting state laws that would otherwise interfere with such contracts. §2. This Court has 

several times held that those statutes preempt state law, 

see, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U. S. ___, 

___–___ (2016) (slip op., at 5–12) (ERISA); Marmet Health 

Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U. S. 530, 532–534 (2012) 

(per curiam) (FAA), and Nevils does not contend that 

those measures violate the Supremacy Clause, see Brief 

for Respondent 22.

Nevils instead attempts to distinguish those other statutes by highlighting a particular textual feature of 

§8902(m)(1): Section 8902(m)(1) states that the “terms of 

any contract” between OPM and a carrier “shall supersede

and preempt” certain state or local laws. (Emphasis added.) 

That formulation, Nevils asserts, violates the Supremacy 

Clause’s mandate that only the “Laws of the United 

States” may reign supreme over state law. U. S. Const., 

Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Nevils’ argument elevates 

semantics over substance. While Congress’ formulation

might differ from the phrasing of other statutes, 

§8902(m)(1) manifests the same intent to preempt state 

law.4 Because we do not require Congress to employ a 

—————— 

4Congress’ choice of language is not unique to §8902(m)(1). Several 

related statutes governing federal-employee and military-member

benefits employ similar formulations. See §8959 (“The terms of any

contract that relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or 

benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede 

and preempt any State or local law, or any regulation issued thereunder, which relates to dental benefits, insurance, plans, or contracts.”); 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

particular linguistic formulation when preempting state 

law, Nevils’ Supremacy Clause challenge fails.5 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme

Court of Missouri is reversed, and the case is remanded 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 

—————— 

§8989 (same for vision); §9005(a) (same for long-term care); 10 U. S. C. 

§1103(a) (certain state laws “shall not apply to any contract entered 

into pursuant to this chapter”). 5Nevils’ speculation about the Government’s outsourcing preemption

to private entities, see Brief for Respondent 24, is far afield from the

matter before us. This case involves only Congress’ preemption of state

insurance laws to ensure that the terms in contracts negotiated by

OPM, a federal agency, operate free from state interference. 
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Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–149 

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MISSOURI, INC., FKA 

GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC., PETITIONER v.
 

JODIE NEVILS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

MISSOURI
 

[April 18, 2017] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 

I join the opinion of the Court with one reservation. A 

statute that confers on an executive agency the power to

enter into contracts that pre-empt state law—such as the 

Federal Employee Health Benefits Act of 1959, 5 U. S. C.

§8902—might unlawfully delegate legislative power to the 

President insofar as the statute fails sufficiently to constrain the President’s contracting discretion. See Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., 

concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 11–22); see also 

Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 

472 (2001). Respondent, however, failed to make that 

argument. The Court therefore appropriately leaves that 

issue to be decided, if at all, on remand.