FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRUCE MATTHEWS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 11-55186

v. D.C. No.  3:10-cv-01671-JLS- NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

M WMC ANAGEMENT COUNCIL; TENNESSEE

TITANS, OPINION

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 11, 2012—Pasadena, California

Filed August 6, 2012

Before: John T. Noonan and Raymond C. Fisher,

Circuit Judges, and James E. Gritzner,

Chief District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Fisher

*The Honorable James E. Gritzner, Chief District Judge of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation. 

8685
COUNSEL

Andrew S. Tulumello (argued), Washington, DC; Jeffrey L.

Kessler, Adam J. Kaiser and Jeffrey H. Newhouse, Dewey &

LeBoeuf LLP, New York, New York; Matthew M. Walsh,

Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, Los Angeles, California, for the

plaintiff-appellant.

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8687
Rex S. Heinke (argued), L. Rachel Helyar and Johanna R.

Shargel, Akin Gum Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles,

California; Daniel L. Nash, Akin Gum Strauss Hauer & Feld

LLP, Washington, DC, for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce Matthews played professional

football for 19 years. When he retired in 2002, he was

employed by the Tennessee Titans. In 2008, he filed a workers’ compensation claim in California, alleging that he suffered pain and disability from injuries incurred during his

career as a professional football player.

Matthews asks us to vacate an arbitration award that prohibits him from pursuing workers’ compensation benefits

under California law. He contends that the award violates California public policy barring contractual waiver of workers’

compensation benefits and federal labor policy providing that

an employment agreement may not preempt state minimum

labor standards. Matthews also argues that the award is in

manifest disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the

United States Constitution.

We hold that Matthews has not alleged sufficient contacts

with California to show that his workers’ compensation claim

comes within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime. He has therefore not met his burden of establishing that the arbitration award prohibiting him from pursuing

California benefits violates an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy of the state of California. Because Matthews has not shown that the award deprives him of

something to which he is entitled under state law, he likewise

has not shown that it violates federal labor policy. Nor has

8688 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
Matthews established that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We accordingly

affirm the district court’s order confirming the arbitration

award.

BACKGROUND

Matthews played football in the National Football League

(NFL) from 1983 to 2002, first for the Houston Oilers and

later for its successor teams, the Tennessee Oilers and the

Tennessee Titans (Titans). He retired in 2002. In 2008, Matthews filed for workers’ compensation benefits in California.

Matthews claimed pain and disability resulting from injuries

incurred while he was employed by the NFL at “various”

locations over 19 years of “playing and practicing professional football.” He did not allege that he sustained any particular injury in California.

The Titans and the National Football League Management

Council (NFLMC) filed a grievance against Matthews. They

argued that by applying for workers’ compensation benefits in

California, Matthews breached his employment agreement,

which provided that all workers’ compensation claims would

be decided under Tennessee law.1 They sought to prevent

Matthews from pursuing his workers’ compensation claim in

California. Pursuant to a binding arbitration clause in the NFL

collective bargaining agreement, the parties arbitrated their

dispute.

The arbitrator found that the choice of law clause in Mat1Matthews’ contract said, in pertinent part: 

Jurisdiction of all workers compensation claims and all other

matters related to workers compensation . . . including all issues

of law, issues of fact, and matters related to workers compensation benefits, shall be exclusively determined by and exclusively

decided in accordance with the internal laws of the State of Tennessee without resort to choice of law rules. 

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8689
thews’ contract constituted a “promise[ ] to resolve workers

compensation claims under Tennessee law” and that by pursuing workers’ compensation under California law, Matthews

was in violation of the agreement. The arbitrator ordered Matthews to “cease and desist” from seeking California benefits.

Matthews filed suit in federal district court to vacate the arbitration award. See 29 U.S.C. § 185; Carter v. Health Net of

Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that

the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) creates federal

question jurisdiction over petitions to confirm or vacate arbitration awards).

In January 2011, the district court denied Matthews’

motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted the Titans

and the NFLMC’s cross-motion to confirm the award. Matthews appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The facts do

not appear to be in dispute. We review de novo the district

court’s resolution of legal questions. See Aramark Facility

Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1877, 530 F.3d 817,

822 (9th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

I.

“[B]ecause federal labor policy strongly favors the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration, [j]udicial scrutiny of

an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.” United Food &

Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry

Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (second

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld so long as they represent a plausible interpretation of the contract.” Aramark, 530

F.3d at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

One narrow exception to this rule is when the arbitration

award is contrary to public policy. “ ‘[A] court need not, in

8690 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
fact cannot, enforce an award which violates public policy.’ ”

Id. (quoting Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No.

1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc)). To

vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds, we must

“(1) find that an explicit, well defined and dominant public

policy exists . . . and (2) that the policy is one that specifically

militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” Foster

Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted). Any such public policy “must be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general

considerations of supposed public interests.” E. Associated

Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S.

57, 62 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Matthews argues that the arbitration award here contravenes California workers’ compensation policy and federal

labor policy. We address each argument in turn.

A. California Public Policy

Matthews contends that California has an explicit, welldefined and dominant public policy militating against agreements that purport to waive an employee’s right to seek California workers’ compensation benefits before a California

tribunal, no matter how tenuous the connection between California and the employee or the employment. Matthews

derives this “no waiver” policy primarily from the California

workers’ compensation statute, see Cal. Labor Code § 5000

(“No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the employer

from liability for the compensation fixed by [the workers’

compensation statute].”); id. § 2804 (“Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the

benefits of this article or any part thereof, is null and void

. . . .”), and the decision of the California Supreme Court in

Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 1

Cal. 2d 250, 260 (Cal. 1934), which held that the statutory

predecessor to § 5000 of the California Labor Code barred an

employer from using a contractual choice of law clause to

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8691
prevent an employee from receiving workers’ compensation

benefits under California law. Matthews contends that by prohibiting him from seeking benefits under California law, the

arbitration award violates this fundamental policy.

[1] We do not read California’s policy so broadly. Rather

than guarantee a universal right to seek California workers’

compensation benefits, the workers’ compensation statute

establishes a rule that an employee who is otherwise eligible

for California benefits cannot be deemed to have contractually

waived those benefits, and an employer who is otherwise liable for California benefits cannot evade liability through contract. See Cal. Labor Code § 3600(a)(1) (providing that

employers are liable for work-related injuries to their employees only when, among other things, “at the time of the injury,

both the employer and the employee are subject to the compensation provisions of this division”); id. § 5000 (“No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the employer from

liability for the compensation fixed by this division . . . .”

(emphasis added)); id. § 2804 (“Any contract or agreement,

express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part thereof, is null and void . . . .”

(emphasis added)). The “no waiver” rule applies only when

an employee’s workers’ compensation claim is subject to California law.

Our reading of the statute is consistent with Alaska Packers. There, an employee applied for workers’ compensation

under California law despite a choice of law clause in his

employment agreement, which provided that the parties

would resolve workers’ compensation disputes under Alaska

law. See Alaska Packers Ass’n, 1 Cal. 2d at 252-53. The California Supreme Court concluded that the choice of law clause

was unenforceable under the statutory predecessor to § 5000,

but only after finding that the employment relationship in

question had sufficient contacts with California to apply California’s workers’ compensation law. See id. at 255-57, 260

(holding that employment relationships entered into in Cali8692 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
fornia were subject to California’s workers’ compensation

laws, under which a “contract attempting to avoid the liability

imposed by the [workers’ compensation] act [was] invalid”).

See also Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 10

Cal. 2d 567, 576 (Cal. 1938) (holding that an employee who

resided in Massachusetts, entered into an employment relationship in Massachusetts and worked primarily in Massachusetts but was injured while temporarily working in California

could not recover California workers’ compensation benefits

“unless [California’s] interest in the controversy [was] superior to that of Massachusetts” so as to justify the application

of California law).

[2] To establish that the arbitration award here violates

California policy, Matthews must show that his workers’

compensation claim comes within the scope of California’s

workers’ compensation regime. See Foster Poultry Farms, 74

F.3d at 174 (recognizing that the party seeking to vacate an

arbitration award bears the burden of showing that it violates

an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy).

Because of our highly limited and deferential standard of

review of arbitration awards, it must be clear that Matthews

is within the category of injured employees to which California workers’ compensation law extends. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)

(explaining that a violation of an alleged public policy “must

be clearly shown if an award is not to be enforced”). 

In Pacific Employers, 10 Cal. 2d 567, the California

Supreme Court applied California workers’ compensation law

to an employee who was injured and incurred medical

expenses while working in California, even though the

employee resided in Massachusetts, was regularly employed

in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts employer and was only

temporarily in California when the injury occurred. See id. at

569-70, 578. The court acknowledged that, given the employee’s limited contacts with California, California’s interests

would ordinarily be only “casual” as compared to the interests

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8693
of Massachusetts, id. at 576, but concluded that, because the

employee was injured and received medical treatment in California, California’s interest was superior, id. at 577-78. The

court reasoned that providing California hospitals and doctors

convenient mechanisms for obtaining compensation for services rendered to injured employees was a critical component

of California’s workers’ compensation regime and that maintaining an effective workers’ compensation system was of

vital interest to the state. See id.

[3] Under Pacific Employers, then, California’s workers’

compensation law covers an employee who suffers a discrete

injury in California, at least where the costs associated with

the employee’s injury may impact California’s medical system and other resources. See id. at 576-78.2

 If Matthews had

suffered an injury requiring medical treatment while playing

a game in California, Pacific Employers would appear to foreclose enforcement of the Tennessee choice of law clause in

his employment contract (and thus the arbitration award).3

2Although Pacific Employers emphasized the burden injured employees

place on the state’s medical and other resources, more recent case law suggests that, with one exception (see infra n.3), California’s workers’ compensation law may cover employees who suffer discrete injuries in

California even if they do not, in fact, burden the state’s medical system

or other resources. See Dailey v. Dallas Carriers Corp., 43 Cal. App. 4th

720, 726-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he California Workers’ Compensation Act applies to a worker employed in another state who is injured

while working in California.”); Booker v. Cincinnati Bengals, Case No.

ADJ4661829 at 3 (WCAB May 1, 2012) (Opinion and Order Denying

Petition for Reconsideration) (noting that the California Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board “has subject matter jurisdiction over all injuries

sustained in California”). We need not decide whether it is sufficient to

allege a discrete injury alone, with no attendant burden on state resources,

because Matthews has alleged neither a discrete injury nor a burden on

state resources. 

3Section 3600.5(b) of the California Labor Code creates an express

exception to this general rule exempting from coverage an employee hired

out of state but injured in California, so long as the employee’s injury is

covered by the workers’ compensation laws of the state of employment

and that state likewise exempts from its law California employers and

employees in comparable circumstances. See Cal. Labor Code

§ 3600.5(b); Dailey, 43 Cal. App. 4th at 727. Neither party argues that

§ 3600.5(b) applies here. 

8694 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
[4] On the record before us, however, Matthews has not

shown that his claim falls within the scope of the Pacific

Employers rule. In his application for workers’ compensation

benefits, Matthews asserted that he suffered cumulative injuries incurred at “various” locations between 1983 and 2001.

He did not allege any specific injury in California or a need

for medical services in California. Matthews likewise did not

allege in his complaint before the district court that he suffered any discrete injury in California. Nor has he directed us

to anything in the record indicating that he tried to prove

injury in California, or any burden on the state’s resources.4

Indeed, Matthews did not even allege that he played football

in California, although we take judicial notice of the fact that

Matthews’ teams played 13 games in California during Matthews’ 19-year career. See Tennessee Titans Team Page,

NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/teams/profile?team=TEN (last

visited July 19, 2012); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (allowing a

court to take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned”).5

In briefing, Matthews argues — without citation to the

record — that he was injured in California, apparently on the

theory that all the games he played during his career contributed to the ailments he suffers today. Matthews may be correct, as a matter of fact, that every game (or at least most

4The record does not reveal what evidence Matthews presented to the

arbitrator. It is clear from the arbitration award that Matthews argued the

Tennessee choice of law clause in his employment contract violated California’s “no waiver” policy and that it should be up to the California

courts to decide whether to apply California or Tennessee law. It is not

apparent what facts, if any, he offered to support this argument. 

5We grant the Titans and NFLMC’s request for judicial notice of these

statistics, which are available on the NFL’s website. Matthews did not

object to the request for judicial notice or question the accuracy of the statistics. In briefing, Matthews asserts that he “played a number of professional football games in the State of California.” 

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8695
games) contributed to his cumulative injuries, but it is not

clear that, as a matter of California law, this means he falls

within the category of employees to whom California extends

workers’ compensation coverage. The facts underlying Matthews’ claim are distinct enough from existing California

cases that we cannot say whether the California courts would

consider Matthews’ limited contacts with the state sufficient

to justify the application of California law. 

[5] Under our standard of review of arbitration awards, this

uncertainty is fatal to Matthews’ claim. He has not shown that

he falls within the category of employees to whom the “no

waiver” rule applies. He has thus not shown that the arbitration award is contrary to a clear, well-defined and dominant

public policy of the state of California. See Misco, Inc., 484

U.S. at 43; Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d at 174.

To be precise, we do not hold that employers may use binding arbitration of choice of law clauses as a means to evade

California law where it would otherwise apply. Nor must an

employee challenging an arbitration award show that he necessarily would prevail on his workers’ compensation claim

before a California tribunal.6 An employee who makes a

prima facie showing that his claim falls within the scope of

California’s workers’ compensation regime may indeed be

6For example, a California tribunal may dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

a claim that would otherwise fall within the scope of the Pacific Employers rule because the employer established that the requirements of

§ 3600.5(b) of the California Labor Code were met. See Cal. Labor Code

§ 3600.5(b) (providing for California jurisdiction over injuries sustained in

California unless certain conditions ensuring adequate insurance coverage

and reciprocity in the state of employment are satisfied); Dailey, 43 Cal.

App. 4th at 726-27 (recognizing § 3600.5 as an exception to the general

rule that California’s workers’ compensation statute applies to workers

employed in another state but injured in California). Or a California tribunal may dismiss on the merits after finding that the employee did not in

fact sustain the injury in the course of his employment. See Cal. Labor

Code § 3600(2), (3) (limiting liability to injuries arising out of employment). 

8696 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
able to establish that an arbitration award prohibiting him

from seeking such benefits violates California policy. Matthews did not do so here because he did not allege facts showing an injury in California or any burden on the state’s

medical system, and it is not clear that California would

extend its workers’ compensation regime to cover the cumulative injuries Matthews claims, given his limited contacts with

the state.

B. Federal Labor Policy

[6] Matthews argues that the arbitration award also violates federal labor policy, which provides that an employee

may not, through a collective bargaining agreement, bargain

away state minimum labor standards. See Metro. Life Ins. Co.

v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755-56 (1985) (holding that

the National Labor Relations Act does not permit “unions and

employers to bargain for terms of employment that state law

forbids employers to establish unilaterally”); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1994) (“[LMRA Section] 301

cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.”); see

also Contract Servs. Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d 294 298-

99 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that California’s workers’ compensation statute “cannot be undercut by collective bargaining”).

Matthews contends the arbitration award conflicts with this

explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy by interpreting the NFL collective bargaining agreement and his employment contract so as to waive his right to California workers’

compensation benefits. 

[7] As we explained above, it is not clear that Matthews’

workers’ compensation claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime. He has therefore not

shown that an arbitration award preventing him from seeking

California benefits deprives him of something to which he is

entitled under state law. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 43 (explaining

that a violation of an alleged public policy “must be clearly

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8697
shown if an award is not to be enforced”). Accordingly, Matthews has not met his burden of establishing that this policy

“specifically militates against” enforcement of the arbitration

award in this case. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d at 174.

II.

Matthews also argues that we must vacate the arbitration

award because it is in manifest disregard of the Full Faith and

Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Like the public policy exception, manifest disregard of the law is a narrow

exception to the general principle of deference to arbitration

awards. It is “shorthand for a statutory ground under the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)], . . . which states that the court

may vacate ‘where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.’ ”

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache

Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).7

“[F]or an arbitrator’s award to be in manifest disregard of the

law, it must be clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). “Neither erroneous

legal conclusions nor unsubstantiated factual findings justify

federal court review of an arbitral award under the [FAA].”

Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 994. 

[8] The Full Faith and Credit Clause says that “Full Faith

and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,

Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S.

CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. In decisions upholding the California

Supreme Court in Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, the

United States Supreme Court held that the Full Faith and

Credit Clause did not prevent California from applying its

7The Titans and NFLMC point out that we have not decided whether the

FAA applies to arbitration of collective bargaining agreements. See Poweragent Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 358 F.3d 1187, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir.

2004). For purposes of our discussion here, we will assume that it would.

8698 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
workers’ compensation statute even though it conflicted with

the laws of Alaska and Massachusetts, respectively. See

Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294

U.S. 532 (1935); Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident

Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493 (1939). Matthews contends

that these decisions established that “California has the absolute right to apply its workers’ compensation laws within its

borders and to prohibit any employee from waiving those

rights.” He argues that the arbitrator ignored this principle and

impermissibly “impos[ed] the law of Tennessee upon the tribunals of the State of California.”

We disagree. The Supreme Court did not hold that California had an “absolute right” to apply its law, irrespective of the

extent of its contacts with the employee or employment relationship in question. To the contrary, in each case, the Court

emphasized California’s substantial interest in the controversy

before it. In Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542-43, the Court

recognized California’s strong interest in regulating employment relationships entered into within the state, particularly

when injury to the employee may result in a burden on the

state’s resources. See also id. at 549-50. Similarly, in Pacific

Employers, 306 U.S. at 503, where the Court considered California’s right to apply its laws to a Massachusetts resident

injured while working in California, the Court concluded that

“[f]ew matters could be deemed more appropriately the concern of [a] state” than “legislat[ing] for the bodily safety and

economic protection of employees injured within it.” See also

Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (recognizing

Arkansas’ interest in providing a remedy to employees injured

in Arkansas). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that

“ ‘for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant

contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state

interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor

fundamentally unfair.’ ” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472

U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449

U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion)).

MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL 8699
[9] That the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not prevent

California from applying its law in Alaska Packers and

Pacific Employers does not mean that the arbitration award

here, which precludes the application of California law, manifestly disregards the clause or Supreme Court precedent interpreting it.8

 As we discussed above, California’s interest is

highly attenuated in this case. On the facts alleged it is not

even clear that the courts of California would consider California’s interest sufficient to justify the application of California law to Matthews’ workers’ compensation claim.9

 For an

award to be in manifest disregard of the law, “[t]he governing

law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be

well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” Carter v.

Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Neither Alaska Packers

nor Pacific Employers “explicitly” requires the application of

California law here. Because Matthews has not shown that the

Full Faith and Credit Clause guarantees California’s right to

apply its law on the facts of this case, he has not established

that the arbitrator recognized yet chose to ignore “well

defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” law. Id.

AFFIRMED.

8

In Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, the Supreme Court held that

the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require California to substitute the

law of another state for its own laws when California was competent to

legislate in the area and had an interest in applying its law. See Alaska

Packers, 294 U.S. at 549-50; Pacific Employers, 306 U.S. at 504-05. We

assume, without deciding, that this reasoning could be extended to prohibit an arbitration award from requiring the application of Tennessee law

when California could, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, apply its

own law instead. 

9Matthews asserts in his brief that, like the employee in Pacific Employers, he suffered injuries while temporarily working in California. We reiterate that the record is silent on this point. Even assuming, however, that

games Matthews played in California contributed, cumulatively, to the ailments he suffers today, it is not clear that California would extend its

workers’ compensation regime to cover him. See supra at 8695-96. 

8700 MATTHEWS v. NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL