110. 84-195 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsRONALD LEE RATY, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Allen Beck, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana 

Charles Bradley, Deputy County Atty., Billings 

Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 25, 1984 

Decided: December 13, 1984 

Filed: DEc 13 ?g8q 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Defendant Ronald Lee Raty appeals from a judgment of 

conviction for aggravated assault, in the Thirteenth Judicial 

District Court in Yellowstone County. We affirm in part and 

reverse in part. 

Raty was charged with two counts of aggravated. assault 

stemming from separate incidents. He was accused of stabbing 

Covina Fredericks on April 28, 1983 and of assaulting Janet 

LaRance in her home on September 8, 1983 and strangling her 

with a rope. Trial by jury was held on January 25 through 

37, 1984 in Yellowstone County and Raty was acquitted of the 

Frederick's knifing but convicted of assaulting LaRance. 

The evidence presented at trial showed that on September 

8, 1983, Raty appeared at the home of Janet LaRance and rang 

the doorbell. When LaRance opened the door Raty entered, 

chased her through the house, cornered her, then strangled 

her with a rope for 10 or 20 seconds. Raty then released his 

victim and fled. JJaRance ran outside and asked two 

construction workers for help telling them she had been 

attacked. One of the construction workers chased Raty and 

caught him a couple blocks from the scene while Raty was 

entering his parked car. Meanwhile LaRance called the 

police. Raty was taken into custody. 

Raty testified at trial that he went to the LaRance home 

thinking that a woman who owed him twenty dollars was inside. 

The woman slammed the door on his foot; he batted the door 

open and entered the house. Raty did not remember using the 

rope, but thought that he put his arm around her neck and his 

hand over her mouth. 
At trial defendant Raty put. into issue his state of mind 

at the time of the crime. He introduced evidence aimed at 

showing that he did not possess the requisite mental elements 

of "purposely" or "knowj-ngly" which must be proven by the 

State to obtain a conviction for aggravated assault. 

Defendant showed that he came from a deprived background. He 

had been abused as a child, beaten by his stepfather and 

watched his mother carted off to a mental hospital. Dr. 

Tranel, a Billings psychologist, testified that the defendant 

suffered from psychomotor epilepsy which caused an organic 

personality disorder and marked. behavior changes. 

In accord with section 46-14-201, MCA, though section 

46-14-212, MCA, defendant notified the State of his intention 

to rely on the mental disease or defect defense. Raty was 

examined by a clinical team at Warm Springs State Hospital. 

Dr. Harris testified. at trial that in his opinion the 

defendant was capable of standing trial and had a 

passive-aggressive personal-ity . He testified that the 

d-efendant had possible epilepsy by history only and had a low 

I.Q. Harris also testified that the defendant had the 

capacity to have the particular state of mind which is an 

element of the offense charged. See section 46-14-213, MCA. 

Ronald Lee Raty was convicted of violation of section 

45-5-202, MCA, aggravated assault, and sentenced, to the 

maximum term of 20 years in the state prison. He was also 

sentenced to 10 years to be served concurrently for the use 

of a dangerous weapon, a rope, pursuant to section 46-18-231, 

MCA . 

Appellant raises the following issues: 

(1) FJhether the evidence was sufficient to prove to 

element of purpose or knowledge? 
(2) Whether the defendant should have been sentenced to 

a term of years at the State Mental. Hospital rather than the 

Montana State Prison due to diminished mental capacity? 

We note that the defendant does not challenge the 

constitutionality of Montana's statutes which abolished the 

traditional insanity defense. Our recent decision in State 

v. Korell (Mont. 1984), - P.2d - , 41 St.Rep. 2141, held 

the statutes, sections 46-14-201, MCA, et seq., are not 

unconstitutional. Korell is the law in Montana today and in 

its light we must affirm the conviction by the lower court. 

There is sufficient evidence on the record to support 

the jury finding that the defendant acted knowingly and/or 

purposely when he assaulted Ms. LaRance. 

"Purposely" is defined as follows: 

"[A] person acts purposely with respect to a result 

or to conduct described by a statute defining an 

offense if it is his conscious object to engage in 

that conduct or to cause that result . . ." 

Section 45-2-101 (58) , MCA. 

"Knowingly" is defined as follows: 

" [A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct 

or to circumstance described by a statute defining 

an offense where he is aware of his conduct or that 

the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly 

with respect to the result of conduct described by 

a statute defining an offense when he is aware that 

it is highly probable that such result will be 

caused hy his conduct . . ." Section 45-2-101 (33) , I4CA. 

Raty remembered the details of the entire incident 

except using the rope on LaRance. He testified he thought 

LaRa.nce was a girl named. Patty and that he wanted to get her 

because she owed him $20.00. Raty remembers running away and 

being chased by the constructj-on workers. Raty stated that 

he was running because he was chasing someone else. This 

testimony tends to show that Raty was aware of his conduct. 

He could remember his conduct. He tried to conceal his 
reason for fleeing which tend-ed to prove he knew he had done 

something wrong. State v. Pierce (Mont. 1982), 647 P.2d 847, 

39 St.Rep. 1205. 

The evidence also shows that Raty acted purposefully. 

His conduct was not the result of reflex. Evidence that Ra-ty 

possessed the rope prior to entering the LaRance home and 

evidence that Raty intended harm to the woman he thought owed 

him money tend to prove that it was his conscious object to 

engage in the conduct of strangling LaRance. Dr. Harris' 

testimony tended to show the defendant possessed the mental 

elements of the offense despite the existence of psychomotor 

epi-lepsy . 

Based on the evidence presented at trial the jury had 

sufficient grounds to find the defendant guilty of aggravated 

assault beyond a reasonable doubt. We will not disturb that 

finding on appeal. 

SENTENCING 

The appellant contends that he should have been 

sentenced to a term of years at Warm Springs State Hospital 

instead of sentenced to prison. The disposition of a 

defendant who raised the lack of mental state defense is set 

forth in Chapter 14, Part 3 of the Montana Code Annotated. 

If the jury finds that the defendant had the requisite state 

of mind at the time of the offense, criminal guilt is 

determined. After guilt has been established, the court, not 

the jury, must determine if the guilty person was suffering 

at the time of the offense from a mental disease or defect. 

Section 46-14-311, MCA. The following procedure is followed. 

The sentencing judge must consider any relevant evidence 

presented at trial plus any additional evidence presented at 

the sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant was 
able to appreciate the criminality of his acts or to conform 

his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time he 

committed th.e offense for which he was convicted. Section 

46-14-311, MCA; Corell, supra. If the defendant is found 

mentally i.11 under the above test, he is sentenced to the 

care of the director of institutions for a definite period of 

time not to exceed the maximum possible sentence. Section 

46-14-312(2), MCA. If the defendant is cured from the mental 

disease or defect which rendered him incapable of 

appreciating the criminality of his act or conforming his 

conduct to the requirements of the law he is then transferred 

from the State Hospital to prison to serve out the remainder 

of his sentence. While in the care and custody of the mental 

health professionals at Warm Springs, the mentally ill 

convict receives no credit for good time served and is not 

eligible for parole. 

There is no advantage for one not in need cf care for a 

mental disease or defect to request to be sentenced under 

section 46-14-312(2), MCA, to the care of the Department of 

Institutions instead of to prison. 

The defendant, Raty, asked the court to be sentenced to 

Warm Springs. The District Court was required to make a 

finding pursuant to section 46-14-31-1, MCA, whether or not 

the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense 

for which he was convicted was suffering from a mental 

disease or defect which rendered him unable to appreciate the 

criminality of his conduct or to conform hi-s conduct to the 

requirements of law. 

The court made no such finding. The reasons stated at 

the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing order for 
imposing a 20-year prison sentence on the defendant were as 

follows: 

"1) The Court considered the information in the 

presentence investigation report. 

"2) The defendant has been acquitted by a jury of 

one of the counts previously charged against him; 

and the Court takes that into consideration. 

"3) The Court considered the reality of this case 

and that the defendant comes from a very deprived 

background as a child and was abused as a child and 

the Court is sympathetic toward the defendant 

because of that situation. 

"4) The Court also realizes that this defendant 

has developed into a person whom the Court deems to 

be a danger in the community by reason of the acts 

he had committed and for which the jury found him 

guilty." 

The record shows that the District Court did not fulfil 

its duty to independently evaluate the defendant's mental 

condition. See Korel-1, supra, State v. Watson (~ont. 19841, 

For this reason we must vacate the sentence and remand 

for resentencing. 

Affirmed in part. 

Reversed in part. 

,' , 

i Justice i 

We Concur: 

Ti--L-$i. ~PQ Chief Justice