alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION

            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
             (SUBSECTIONS (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF
                          TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE)


         Pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350,  chapter 63 of Title 18,  United States Code),  the
undersigned  officer  of  NT  Media  Corp.  of  California,   Inc.,  a  Delaware
corporation (the  "Company"),  does hereby certify with respect to the Quarterly
Report of the Company on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended September 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "10-QSB Report") that:

         (1) the  10-QSB Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) the information  contained in the 10-QSB Report fairly presents, in
ll material respects,  the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  November 13, 2003          NT MEDIA CORP. OF
                                   CALIFORNIA, INC.


                                   /s/ Chris Briggs
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                   Chris Briggs
                                   President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
                                   Financial Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





















                                                                      Exhibit 32

                                       25
#### Lynda Antonetti et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[976 NYS2d 42]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John A. Barone, J.), entered January 17, 2012, dismissing the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the judgment with respect to defendant Board of Education, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. Appeal from order, same court and *559Justice, entered January 12, 2012, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered June 6, 2012, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to renew and reargue, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as taken from a nonappealable paper insofar as it is addressed to the denial of reargument, and, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment insofar as it is addressed to the denial of renewal.

We affirm the dismissal of the complaint as against the City, because the City is a legal entity separate from the Board of Education and cannot be held liable for torts committed by the Board *(see Perez v City of New York,*41 AD3d 378, 379 [1st Dept 2007], *lv denied*10 NY3d 708 [2008]).

However, the court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against the Board of Education on the ground that the Board did not owe plaintiff Lynda Antonetti a special duty. The argument that the Board owed no special duty to plaintiff is barred by equitable estoppel and because defendants raised it for the first time in their reply brief. An order of the Supreme Court (Stanley Green, J.), entered January 9, 2012, which denied defendants’ motion for leave to amend their answer to deny that the Board of Education operated the premises on which plaintiffs injury occurred, became law of the case binding the trial court when defendants failed to appeal it, and cannot be challenged on this appeal *(see Hallsville Capital, S.A. v Dobrish,*87 AD3d 933, 934 [1st Dept 2011]). The court found that defendants were estopped from amending the answer because their motion for leave was made six years after the commencement of the action and more than two years after the expiration of the statute of limitations.

In light of defendants’ delay in moving for leave to amend, the doctrine of equitable estoppel arises from plaintiffs’ reasonable reliance, to their detriment, upon the representations set forth in defendants’ joint verified answer *(see Bender v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,*38 NY2d 662, 668 [1976]; *Blount v Bovis Lend Lease Holdings, Inc.,*35 AD3d 310 [1st Dept 2006]).

The argument having been raised for the first time in defendants’ reply brief, plaintiffs had no opportunity to respond to it *(see Caribbean Direct, Inc. v Dubset LLC,*100 AD3d 510 [1st Dept 2012]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.
#### Mildred Lawn, Respondent, v Jennifer Gigliotti, Appellant.

[870 NYS2d 794]

In an action to recover damages for false arrest and false imprisonment, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, J.), dated October 18, 2007, as denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) to vacate a judgment of the same court entered June 20, 2007, upon her defaults in appearing at a compliance conference, at trial, and at an inquest on damages, in favor of the plaintiff and against her in the principal sum of $55,355.50.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) to vacate the judgment entered June 20, 2007 is granted.

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) to vacate the default judgment. Under the peculiar circumstances of this action, the defendant presented both reasonable excuses for her defaults in appearing (see *Matter of Zrake v New York City Dept. of Educ.,*17 AD3d 603, 603-604 [2005]; *Beneficial Fin. Co. of N.Y. v Kramer,*48 AD2d 822 [1975]) and a meritorious defense to the action (see *generally Levy v Grandone,*14 AD3d 660, 661 [2005]; *Kandekore v Town of Greenburgh,*243 AD2d 610 [1997]; *People v Bero,*139 AD2d 581, 584 [1988]).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant’s remaining contention. Skelos, J.E, Dillon, Garni and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
#### State v. Ballard

Case below: 180 N.C. App. 637

No. 001P07

1. AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA05-1398)

2. AG’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. AG’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

4. Def’s Conditional PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed 01/03/07 Stay Dissolved 05/03/07

2. Dismissed as Moot 05/03/07

3. Denied 05/03/07

4. Dismissed as Moot 05/03/07

Hudson, J., Recused
# EXHIBIT 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Tellabs, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended July
2, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Timothy J. Wiggins, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to and for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |     | 
| | --- | 
| | (1) | 
| | (2) | 

|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Timothy J. Wiggins 
|Timothy J. Wiggins     
|Chief Financial Officer
|Dated: August 10, 2004 

A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

---
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1



                                 HOLLINGER INC.



                  RETRACTION PRICE OF RETRACTABLE COMMON SHARES



     Toronto, Canada, August 18, 2004 -- Hollinger Inc. (TSX: HLG.C) announces
that the Retraction Price of the retractable common shares of the Corporation as
of August 19, 2004 shall be $7.25 per share.

     Hollinger's principal asset is its approximately 68.0% voting and 18.2%
equity interest in Hollinger International. Hollinger International is an
international newspaper publisher with English-language newspapers in the United
States and Israel. Its assets include the Chicago Sun-Times and a large number
of community newspapers in the Chicago area, The Jerusalem Post and The
International Jerusalem Post in Israel, a portfolio of new media investments and
a variety of other assets.

     For further information please call:

J. A. Boultbee                        Peter G. White
Executive Vice-President              Co-Chief Operating Officer and Secretary
Hollinger Inc.                        Hollinger Inc.
(416) 363-8721                        (416) 363-8721

                              www.hollingerinc.com
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3757 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

950 Missouri Avenue in East St. Louis, Illinois, as the ‘‘Katherine 

Dunham Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 27 (legislative day, JULY 26), 2006 

Mr. OBAMA (for himself and Mr. DURBIN) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 950 Missouri Avenue in East St. Louis, Illinois, as the ‘‘Katherine Dunham Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. KATHERINE DUNHAM POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 950 Missouri Avenue in East St. 

6 Louis, Illinois, shall be known and designated as the 

7 ‘‘Katherine Dunham Post Office Building’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCE.—Any reference in a law, map, regu9 lation, document, paper, or other record of the United 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
2 

•S 3757 IS

1 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

2 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Katherine Dunham 

3 Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Matthew J. Roskwitalski, Respondent, v Catherine D. Fleming, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 901]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Margaret O. Szczur, J.), entered May 14, 2012. The order, among other things, suspended respondent’s visitation with the subject children.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the conditions imposed on the resumption of visitation and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent mother appeals from an order that suspended her visitation with the three children in the custody of petitioner, the children’s maternal grandfather, and directed her to engage in mental health counseling “to allow for *1433future access to these children when deemed appropriate by the children’s counselor.” Contrary to the mother’s contention, we conclude that the determination of Family Court to suspend visitation with all three children has a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see Matter of Hameed v Alatawaneh,*19 AD3d 1135, 1135-1136 [2005]; *Murek v Murek*[appeal No. 2], 292 AD2d 839, 840 [2002]). In determining that visitation with the mother would be detrimental to the youngest child, the court properly considered the deleterious effects of such visitation on the two older children *(see Matter of Thomas v Thomas,*35 AD3d 868, 869 [2006]; *Matter of Herrera v O’Neill,*20 AD3d 422, 423 [2005]).

The court erred, however, in directing the mother to engage in mental health counseling as a condition of visitation and in delegating its authority to the children’s counselor to determine when a resumption of visitation would be appropriate *(see Hameed,*19 AD3d at 1136). We therefore modify the order accordingly.

Present—Scudder, EJ., Smith, Centra, Carni and Sconiers, JJ.
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certification.


  I, William Augustin IV, certify that:

  1.I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
    required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form
    10-K of Bear Stearns ALT-A Trust 2007-2 (the "Exchange Act periodic
    reports");

  2.Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole,
    do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
    material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
    circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
    respect to the period covered by this report;

  3.Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
    information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered
    by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

  4.I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicers and
    based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in preparing the
    servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of
    Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports,
    the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing
    agreements in all material respects; and

  5.All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
    asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment
    of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required
    to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB
    and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to
    this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material
    instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in
    this report on Form 10-K.

    In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
    provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: EMC Mortgage
    Corporation as Servicer and HSBC Mortgage Corporation, USA as Servicer.

    Dated:   March 30, 2008


    /s/ William Augustin IV
    Signature

    Vice President
    (senior officer in charge of the servicing function of the master
    servicer)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

REBECCA CLARK

,

Appellant

- Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Appellee

- Below,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 309, 2019

Court Below: Superior Court

o f the State of Delaware.

C.A. No. N18A

- 03

- 004

Submitted: January 8, 220

Decided: January 31, 2020

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN , Justices.

O R D E R

This 31 st day of January 2020, the Court having considered this matter on the

briefs filed by the parties has determined that the final judgment of the Superior

Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Superior

Court in its opinion dated June 19, 2019

.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Barry Arkim, Also Known as Ed Mason, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 884]

—Motion for writ of error coram nobis denied. Present— Scudder, EJ, Smith, Feradotto, Lindley and Valentino, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Sitara Saleem, Appellant, v. Waqar Ahmed Chaudhry, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Waqar Ahmed Chaudhry, Respondent, v. Sitara Saleem, Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[973 NYS2d 246]

In related family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the mother appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Hepner, J.), dated September 10, 2012, which, after a hearing, and upon a finding that she committed the family offenses of aggravated harassment and harassment in the second degree, granted the father’s petition, directed the mother to refrain from, inter alia, harassing or menacing the father, and dismissed her petitions.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A family offense must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence *(see*Family Ct Act § 832; *Matter of Pearlman v Pearlman,*78 AD3d 711, 712 [2010]).

Here, the father established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the mother committed the family offenses of aggravated harassment and harassment in the second degree *(see Matter of Fiore v Fiore,*34 AD3d 803 [2006]). The mother failed to establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, either that the father committed a family offense or that he violated a temporary order of protection dated September 7, 2010. The Family Court’s determinations turned on its assessment of the parties’ credibility, and, since its assessment is supported by the record, they will not be disturbed *(see Matter of Richardson v Richardson,*80 AD3d 32, 43-44 [2010]).

*818Moreover, contrary to the mother’s contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court’s failure to conduct a dispositional hearing does not warrant reversal *(see Matter of Hassett v Hassett,*4 AD3d 527 [2004]; *Matter of Dabbene v Dabbene,*297 AD2d 812 [2002]).

The mother’s remaining contentions are either not properly before this Court or without merit. Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Kim Fuesrt, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-QSB of Colorado Wyoming Reserve Company.

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.



Date:  November 14, 2005

/s/ Kim Fuerst



Kim Fuerst



Chief Executive Officer
#### Barbara Green, Respondent, v Gracie Muse Restaurant Corp., Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 240]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan A. Madden, J.), entered on or about July 10, 2012, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant restaurant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, in this action where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on a slippery substance on the restaurant’s floor. Defendant demonstrated that it had no notice of the allegedly defective condition by submitting, inter alia, the testimony of its manager who stated that on the day of the accident, he had been on duty for several hours before plaintiffs fall, and walked around and inspected the entire restaurant every three to four minutes. He also testified that he did not see any spills of food, liquid, or debris on that day, and did not receive any complaints about such conditions. The hostess on duty at the time also testified that she did not receive any such complaints. Moreover, the manager observed that the floor was clean and dry prior to the accident, and inspected the area where plaintiff fell shortly thereafter and saw that it was still clean and dry. Plaintiff also testified that she passed the same area in the restaurant about 45 minutes before her accident and did not observe a hazardous condition *(see Warner v Continuum Health Care Partners, Inc.,*99 AD3d 636, 637 [1st Dept 2012]; *compare Porco v Marshalls Dept. Stores,*30 AD3d 284 [1st Dept 2006]).

*579In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff did not perceive a defective condition on the floor either prior to or subsequent to her fall. She first observed a greasy substance on the soles of her sandals a day later, in her hospital room. There is a lack of evidence that the substance on the bottom of her sandals was on the part of the restaurant floor where she slipped, let alone for a long enough period of time to permit defendant to notice it *(see Berger v ISK Manhattan, Inc.,*10 AD3d 510 [1st Dept 2004]; *Segretti v Shorenstein Co., E.,*256 AD2d 234 [1st Dept 1998]).

The opinion of plaintiffs expert that the coefficient of friction of the subject area of the restaurant floor was below the generally accepted minimum, causing the floor to be dangerously slippery even when it was clean and dry, failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Such inherent slipperiness alone is not actionable *(see DeMartini v Trump 767 5th Ave., LLC,*41 AD3d 181 [1st Dept 2007]), and the expert failed to connect any observation of the floor to the accident *(see Reed v Piran Realty Corp.,*30 AD3d 319 [1st Dept 2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 801 [2007]). The expert also failed to show that the floor’s condition when he inspected it was the same as on the day of the accident, almost a year and a half earlier *(see Alston v Zahar’s & Co., Inc.,*92 AD3d 553 [1st Dept 2012]).

Concur—Tom, J.E, Sweeny, Saxe, Román and Feinman, JJ.