* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 24 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. RONALD O. McCLELLAND,

Defendants-Appellants. No. 98-3024 (D.C. 96-CR-10054-MLB) (District of Kansas)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief judge, BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App.P.34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. A jury convicted Ronald O. McClelland of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and seven1 Mr. McClelland was given notice of his counsel’s Anders brief on April

27, 1998. However, despite being granted two exten sions of time, Mr. McClelland did not file a response . 2 counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 1956(a)(a)(B)(I). On appeal, Mr. McClelland argues that there was insuff icient evidence presented in the district court to support the jury's verdict an d that his sentence of 262 months was improperly calculated under the Sentencing Guid elines. Mr. McClelland’s lawyer, Jerome R. Jones, has filed a motion to with draw supported by a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). His brief argues that an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the eviden ce and Mr. McClelland’s sentence would be frivolous. 1 We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), grant counsel’s motio n to withdraw, and affirm.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Wilson , 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1997). We will deem evidence sufficient to support a conviction if, vie wing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most f avorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id

.3

In the present case, there was overwhelming evidenc e from which the jury could conclude that Mr. McClelland was guilty of th e alleged charges. For example, at trial, several of Mr. McClelland’s acco mplices testified that he was the leader of a group of people transporting cocain e from California to Kansas. The accomplices described how women were flown to C alifornia, met with Mr. McClelland’s associates, and carried cocaine to him in Kansas. The accomplices also described how, after the narcotics were sold, Mr. McClelland wired money via Western Union to California in order to buy mor e cocaine. Specifically, the government presented testimony and evidence of seve n Western Union transactions carried out in Mr. McClelland’s name o r in the name of a know alias. Testimony from a handwriting expert established that Mr. McClelland signed five of the Western Union forms used to send money to Ca lifornia and that it was probable that he signed the remaining two forms. A dditionally, the government submitted evidence to establish that Mr. McClellanddid not have a lawful source of money during this time period. After careful ex amination of the record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that Mr. McClelland’s claim is meritless and sustai n the convictions.4

Alleged Sentencing Error Mr. McClelland contends that the district court err ed in determining the quantity of drugs for his base offense level calcul ation. Specifically, he asserts that his base offense level was erroneously determi ned by converting the dollar amount indicated by the Western Union wire transfer s into a quantity of cocaine. However, Mr. McClelland’s counsel states in the Anders brief that his sentence was lawful and correct under the Sentencing Guideli nes. “We review the district court's interpretation and application of the Sente ncing Guidelines de novo and review the court's factual findings as to drug quantity for clear error.” United States v. Wacker , 72 F.3d 1453, 1477 (10th Cir.1995) (citations omi tted). When the actual drugs underlying a drug quantity de termination are not seized, the trial court may rely upon an estimate t o establish the defendant's guideline offense level, "so long as the informatio n relied upon has some basis of support in the facts of the particular case and bears sufficient indicia of reliability." Id. at 1477 (quotations omitted). This circuit has specifically held that, where the actual drugs are not seized, sums o f money can be converted to drug equivalents for purposes of sentencing, so lon g as the resulting drug quantities are determined to be relevant quantities under USSG § 1B1.3. United States v. Rios , 22 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s conversion of $14,920.00, found in a brown paper ba g, and $31,600.00, found in5

an envelope, into approximately 1,100 grams of coca ine for sentencing purposes).

In the present case, the probation office converte d the dollar amount of the Western Union wire transfers into a quantity of coc aine. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the estimated amount o f cocaine bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support Mr. McClelland’s base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore affirm Mr. McCl elland’s sentence. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we GRANT Mr. Jones’ motion to withdraw and AFFIRM Mr. McClelland ’s conviction and sentence.

Entered for the Court, Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge