This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0002 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Johnnie Robert Capers, Appellant. Filed December 5, 2016 Affirmed Reilly, Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-15-2136 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villa lva Lijó, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reilly, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY , Judge A jury found appellant guilty of test-refu sal after police arrested him on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Appellant challenges the conv iction on the grounds that the2 test-refusal statute is unconstitu tional and the state failed to produce suffici ent evidence that he refused to take a breath test and that he was driving while int oxicated. Because we determine that the state pr oduced sufficient evidence to support the verdict and Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is not unconstitutional as applied to a breath test, we affirm. FACTS A police officer on routine patrol stoppe d appellant’s vehicle after observing appellant’s failure to properly signal his turn s. The officer detected a “strong odor” of alcohol coming from inside appellant’s car and noticed that appellant’s speech was “slow” and slurred and his eyes were bloodshot. Appellant admitted th at he had been drinking. The officer conducted a series of field sobrie ty tests, including a hor izontal gaze nystagmus test and the one-legged stand test, both of which appellant failed. Based upon his experience and training, the o fficer concluded that appellan t was impaired and placed him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. The officer administered a preliminary breath test (PBT), which revealed an al cohol concentration of 0.121. The officer transported appellant to a la w enforcement center and read him the implied-consent advisory. Afte r speaking with an attorney, appellant ag reed to submit to a breath test, which was administered us ing the DataMaster/DMT-G breath test machine. Appellant was not able to provide an adequate breath sample after nine attempts and the officer determined that appellant “wasn’ t using any effort to give a proper breath test.” The officer concluded that appellant’s conduct constituted a test refusal. The state charged appellant with first-degree refusal to submit to a chemical test and first-degree impaired driving. The jury re turned a verdict finding appellant guilty of both offenses. The3 district court adjudicated appellant guilty of refusing to submit to a chemical test and imposed the presumptive stayed sentence of 42- months in prison. Th is appeal follows. D E C I S I O N
I. Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is constitutional as applied to the collection of a driver’s breath sample. Minnesota statute criminalizes an individual ’s refusal to submit to a chemical breath

test. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014). In State v. Bernard , the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the state could crimin alize the refusal to s ubmit to a breath test without frustrating the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 859 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). In Birchfield v. North Dakota , the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Bernard decision and upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota’s test-refusal statute as it applies to a breath test. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 21 84 (2016) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving.”), aff’g State v. Bernard , 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015). He re, the police officer read ap pellant the implied-consent advisory and secured his consent to administer a breath test. The test was conducted in an appropriate manner and the office rs gave appellant at least ni ne opportunities to provide an adequate sample. Appellant was afforded hi s constitutional rights and is not entitled to reversal of his conviction on the basi s that the statute is unconstitutional.4 II. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of test-refusal. An appellate court examining the sufficien cy of the evidence “ca refully examine[s] the record to determine whether the facts a nd the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Fox , 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015), cert. denied , 136 S. Ct. 509 (2015). “We view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the ve rdict, and assume that the [jury] disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. Where a conviction or an element of the criminal offense has been proven by circumstantial evidence we apply a heightened standard of review. State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). Heightened sc rutiny is a two-step process requiring the reviewing court to first identify the circum stances proved and de fer to the jury’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances .” We then “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that migh t be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent w ith a hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted). With respect to the first st ep in the heightened-scrutin y analysis, the state proved the following circumstances: the police office r stopped appellant’s car after observing traffic violations; appellant smelled of alcohol , slurred his speech, a nd had bloodshot eyes; appellant admitted to drinking alcohol prior to driving; appellant fa iled the field sobriety tests; the preliminary breath test registered an alcohol concentration of 0.121; appellant5 agreed to submit a sample of his breath for testing after speaking with an attorney; the officer offered appellant nine opportunities to provide an adequate breath sample but appellant did not make an effort to do so; and the officer determined that appellant’s conduct constituted test-refusal. The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any re asonable hypothesis ot her than guilt. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d at 473-74. At this step, we do not defer to the ju ry’s “choice between reasonable inferences.” Id . at 474 (quotations omitted). Appellant argues that he did not refuse to provide a breath sample and relies on State v. Ferrier , in which an impaired driver initially agreed to submit to chemical testing of her urine but was una ble to provide an adequate sample. 792 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). We affirmed Ferrier ’s conviction, stating that “refus al to submit to chemical testing includes any indication of actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process, as determined from the driver’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id . at 102. Here, the officer gave ap pellant nine opport unities to provide an adequate breath sample and coached him on the correct way of blowing into the DataMaster device. Appellant did not indicate that he was physically unable to blow into the machine, and he had just provided an adequate PBT samp le. Appellant did not alert the officers to any medical issu es that prevented him from prov iding an adequate sample. The totality of the circumstances supports a determination that appellant’s failure to provide a breath sample was consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.6 In sum, the totality of the circumstances show that appellant displayed indicia of intoxication, failed the field sobriety tests, re gistered an impaired reading on the PBT, and admitted to drinking before dr iving. The police officer belie ved, based upon his training and experience, that appellant was under the in fluence of alcohol. Appellant agreed to provide a sample of his brea th for chemical testing but was uncooperative with the collection process, despite the officer’s assistance. This ev idence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of refusing to submit to a chemical

test. III. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant wa s guilty of impaired driving. To establish that appellant is guilty of dr iving while under the influence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a ppellant drove, operated, or was in physical possession of a car while impaired. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2014). A person is impaired if the person “had drunk enough alcohol so that the [person’s] ability or capacity to drive was impaired in some way or to some degree” and, as a result, “does not possess that clearness of intellect and control . . . that [the person] otherwise would have.” State v. Ards , 816 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. App. 2012). Because appellant does not dispute that he was driving the car and that the po lice officer personally observed appellant’s condition, the two-part heightened st andard of review does not apply. See Bernhardt v.
State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Mi nn. 2004) (“Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.”).7 The officer observed appellant’s failure to properly signal two turns. Appellant argues that these violations were “at most, mi nor violations,” that were not indicative of impaired driving. However, a traffic violatio n, however slight, provides an objective basis for conducting a traffic stop. See State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997); Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (2014) (requiri ng a driver to signal a turn “continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by th e vehicle before turning”). Based upon appellant’s observed traffic viol ations, the officer had an objec tive basis to stop appellant’s

car. After stopping the car, the offi cer noticed that appellant’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slow and slurred, an d there was a strong odor of alcohol coming from inside the car. Appellant admitted to drinking alcohol prior to drivin g. The officer conducted a series of field sobriety tests, which appellant failed. Appellant argues that these factors are insufficient to show that he was driving whil e impaired. However, evidence of bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol is suffici ent to prove impairment. See State v. Laducer , 676 N.W.2d 693, 697-98 (Minn. App. 2004) (“An admission of drinking, coupled with other indicators of intoxication, is sufficient for probable cause to arrest.”). Based upon his training and experience, the o fficer concluded that appellant was driving while impaired. Police officers are entitled to rely on their training and experience to determine whether a particular factor supports a reasonable su spicion of criminal activity, State v. Smith , 814 N.W.2d 346, 352 (Minn. 2012), an d we are “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” State v. Britton , 604 N.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Minn. 2000).8 The officer’s training and expe rience led him to conclude that appellant was under the influence of alcohol, and ample evidence in the record suppo rts the conviction. 1
Affirmed.

1 We considered the arguments raised by appellant in his pro se supplemental brief in conjunction with our considera tion of the arguments presen ted by appellant’s counsel. Because appellant failed to support his supplemen tal arguments with relevant facts or legal authority, we consid er them waived. See State v. Manley , 664 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Minn. 2003) (deeming as waived pro se arguments that do not cite to relevant legal authority). Additionally, the state challenges appellant’s ab ility to pursue this cl aim. Alth ough the jury found appellant guilty of impaired driving, the district court only entered judgment of conviction on test-refusal. We decline to address a sufficien cy of the evidence challenge for counts on which the defend ant was found guilty but neith er sentenced nor formally adjudicated guilty. See State v. Ashland , 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that the court “need not decid e” a sufficiency of th e evidence challenge to counts for which no sentence was imposed); see also State v. Hoelzel , 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that verdict of gu ilt, without recorded judgment of conviction, is not final, appealable judgment).