alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Marion Franchini, Appellant, v American Legion Post, Respondent.

[967 NYS2d 48]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth L. Thompson, Jr., J.), entered May 29, 2012, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff alleges that she was injured when, after exiting a door of defendant’s catering facility, she tripped over a single step that separated the area where the door was located from a patio. Defendant submitted evidence, both testimonial and photographic, demonstrating that the step was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous *(see Remes v 513 W. 26th Realty, LLC,*73 AD3d 665, 666 [1st Dept 2010]).

Plaintiffs opposition failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The record fails to support plaintiffs argument that the concrete step created an optical confusion, since it was a different color than the tiled floor *(see Longer v 116 Lexington Ave., Inc.,*92 AD3d 597, 599-600 [1st Dept 2012]). Although there were people present attending a party, there was no evidence that their presence rendered the step dangerous *(compare Cassone v State of New York,*85 AD3d 837 [2d Dept 2011]). Indeed, plaintiff testified that she did not see the step because she was looking straight ahead at a friend when she fell *(see Outlaw v Citibank, N.A.,*35 AD3d 564, 565 [2d Dept 2006]).

Plaintiffs reliance on the unsworn report of her expert is *433unavailing. The expert failed to identify any applicable code, regulation or industry standards that were violated *(see Boatwright v New York City Tr.*Auth., 304 AD2d 421 [1st Dept 2003]).

Plaintiffs argument that the stainless steel trough into which she fell created a dangerous condition is raised for the first time on appeal and therefore we decline to consider it *(see e.g. Bitter v Renzo,*101 AD3d 465 [1st Dept 2012]). In any event, the trough did not cause the accident or present a foreseeable risk of harm *(see e.g. Shatz v Kutshers Country Club,*247 AD2d 375 [2d Dept 1998]).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments, including that defendant had notice of the allegedly defective condition of the step and trough, and find them unavailing. Concur— Gonzalez, P.J., Sweeny, Richter and Clark, JJ.
<PAGE>

                                    FORM 6-K
                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                        Report of Foreign Private Issuer

                        PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-16 OR 15d-16
                     OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                                October 12, 2004

                         Commission File Number: 0-22346

                                 HOLLINGER INC.
                 (Translation of registrant's name into English)

                                10 TORONTO STREET
                            TORONTO, ONTARIO M5C 2B7
                                     CANADA
                    (Address of principal executive offices)

    Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual
                  reports under cover Form 20-F or Form 40-F.

                       Form 20-F [X]    Form 40-F [ ]

  Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper
          as permitted by Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(1): ____________


  Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper
          as permitted by Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(7): ____________


    Indicate by check mark whether by furnishing the information contained in
  this Form, the registrant is also thereby furnishing the information to the
Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

                              Yes [ ]    No [X]


       If "Yes" is marked, indicate below the file number assigned to the
         registrant in connection with Rule 12g3-2(b): 82- ____________



<PAGE>


                                  EXHIBIT LIST


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

Exhibit        Description
-------        -----------
<S>            <C>
99.1           Press Release, dated October 8, 2004 regarding Hollinger Inc.
               Announces Dismissal of US$1.25 Billion Lawsuit.

</TABLE>



<PAGE>



                                   SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.

Date:  October 12, 2004


                                            HOLLINGER INC.


                                            By /s/ Peter G. White
                                               -------------------------------
                                               Name: Peter G. White
                                               Title: Co-Chief Operating
                                                      Officer and Secretary
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Darrell G. Clinton, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, Commissioner, New *1361York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[974 NYS2d 839]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Wyoming County (Mark H. Dadd, A.J.), entered July 13, 2012 in a habeas corpus proceeding. The judgment denied the petition.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner, an inmate serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment of eight years to life, contends that he is entitled to immediate release because he never received a written decision from a parole commissioner revoking his release following his parole revocation hearing in 2006. More specifically, petitioner contends that the determination of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who presided over the hearing was merely a recommendation that had to be confirmed by a commissioner. We reject that contention. Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (3), the ALJ, upon finding that petitioner violated the conditions of his parole, was authorized to “direct [petitioner’s] reincarceration and fix a date for consideration by the board for re-release” (§ 259-i [3] [f] [x] [C]). In fact, as respondent points out, the Parole Board lacked the authority to consider the ALJ’s determination to be a mere recommendation, and the ALJ’s written determination was final when petitioner received it *(see Matter of Mayfield v Evans,*93 AD3d 98, 102-107 [2012]). Present — Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Peradotto, Lindley and Valentino, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          15,611
<SECURITIES>                                   129,824
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               146,183
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 230,933
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    109,356
<COMMON>                                         4,851
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,177,929)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   230,933
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,872
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (20,395)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (20,395)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               (84,891)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (105,286)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01


</TABLE>
Exhibit 35.1

SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (Item 1123)

Residential Funding Company, LLC

RASC Series 2007-EMX1 Trust (the Issuing Entity)

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC, as servicer (the Servicer) pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of February 1, 2007 (as amended from time to time, the
Agreement), among Residential Asset Securities Corporation, as depositor, Residential Funding Company, LLC, as master servicer, and U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee, does hereby certify that:

1. A review of the Servicers activities during the period covered by the Issuing Entitys report on Form 10-K and of the Servicers performance under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations
under the Agreement in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 24th day
of March 2008.



|       |  |                     
|------ |  | --------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
|Name:  |  | Anthony N. Renzi    
|Title: |  | Managing Director
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-06-307-CR

DALE CLARK CHALFANT, JR.	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Dale Clark Chalfant attempts to appeal his conviction for indecency with a child by contact, for which he was sentenced to eight years’ confinement.  The trial court’s certification states that this case is a plea- bargain case and the defendant has no right of appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).  We notified Appellant by letter that his appeal was subject to dismissal based on the trial court’s certification unless he filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3.  Although Appellant filed a pro se response, it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

							PER CURIAM

PANEL D:  HOLMAN, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.	

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  October 19, 2006
|  | 1. | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | 2. | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the                Company |
|--|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                August 19, 2008   | By:    | /s/                Patrick J. Gainer                                                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                        |   | Patrick                J. GainerChief                Financial Officer(Principal                Financial and Accounting Officer) |

----
#### Ramona HILARIO, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-71913.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 11, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 17, 2006.

Ramona Hilario, Long Beach, CA, pro se.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Respondent’s motion for summary disposition is granted because the questions *124raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. *See United States v. Hooton,*693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen filed more than 8 months after the BIA’s final order because the motion to reopen was untimely and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. *See 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); *Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS,*282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, this petition for review is denied.

All other pending motions are denied as moot. To the extent petitioner seeks reinstatement of voluntary departure, this court lacks jurisdiction to grant that request. *See Garcia v. Ashcroft,*368 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.2004). The temporary stay of removal confirmed by Ninth Circuit General Order 6.4(c) shall continue in effect until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the *124courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Peter Andrew HERSHFELDT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Terry GODDARD, Attorney General of Arizona; George Herman, Warden, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-15509.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 2006.*

Filed Oct. 30, 2006.

Peter Andrew Hershfeldt, Pecos, TX, pro se.

Randall Mack Howe, Esq., John L. Sac-coman, Esq., Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Peter Andrew Hershfeldt appeals *pro se*from the district court’s order denying his motion to amend or reinstate his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas *850petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hershfeldt’s motion to amend or reinstate his 1998 habeas petition. Hershfeldt’s amended petition could not relate back to the date he filed his 1998 petition under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there was no pending petition to which his new filing could relate back or amend. *See Henry v. Lungren,*164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1999). To the extent that Hershfeldt’s request to “reinstate” his 1998 petition can be construed as a motion for relief from judgment, we conclude that Hershfeldt did not establish an entitlement to relief under any of the enumerated grounds. *See*Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).

We construe the issue in the opening brief labeled “uncertified” as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. *See*9th Cir. R. 22-l(e). So construed, we deny the motion. *See Hiivala v. Wood,*195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip Williams GEORGE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-30339.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 7, 2012.

Alexander C. Ekstrom, Assistant U.S., USYA — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Yakima, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rebecca Louise Pennell, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDWAID— Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington *&*Idaho, Yakima, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.

D.C. No. 2:07-CR-02119-WFN-l, Eastern District of Washington, Spokane.

Before: WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., JAY S. BYBEE, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Phillip Williams George was charged with, and convicted of, failing on September 27, 2007 to register as required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (“SORNA”). The grand jury charged that George had been convicted in 2003 of sexual abuse of a minor on an Indian Reservation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(A) and 1153, and had subsequently traveled in interstate commerce and failed to register as required by SORNA. We affirmed his conviction. *United States v. George,*625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.2010).

Thereafter, George filed a petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to dismiss the indictment. The motion to dismiss was based on our opinion in *United States v. Valverde,*628 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.2010), in which we held that the Attorney General’s February 28, 2007 interim rule applying SORNA to sex offenders who were convicted before SORNA’s enactment was invalid and that SORNA did not become applicable to such individuals until August 1, 2008. *Id.*at 1160. The motion to dismiss was held in abeyance pending the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari from *Valverde.*

The Supreme Court has now denied the Government’s petition from *Valverde.*Accordingly, as George was charged with violating SORNA on September 27, 2007, at a time when we have determined SORNA was not applicable to persons such as George, his motion to dismiss must be granted.

We hereby grant the motion to dismiss, vacate our prior opinion, and remand this matter to the district court with directions to dismiss the indictment against George. This action renders the petition for rehearing en banc moot.
Exhibit
      4.3

    


    SECOND
      AMENDED ADVISORY SERVICES AGREEMENT

    


    This
      Second Amended Advisory Services Agreement (the “Second
      Amendment”),
      is
      effective as of May 18, 2007, between Mark L. Baum, Esq. (the “Consultant”),
      and
      VoIP, Inc. (the “Company).

    


    WHEREAS,
      on
      May 9,
      2007, the Consultant and the Company entered into an Advisory Services Agreement
      (the “Services
      Agreement”),
      and
      on May 14, 2007 these parties entered into a First Amended Advisory Services
      Agreement; and

    


    WHEREAS,
      the
      Consultant and the Company wish to further amend certain sections of the
      Services Agreement; and

    


    NOW,
      THEREFORE,
      in
      consideration of the mutual covenants contained in this Second Amendment, and
      for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby
      acknowledged, it is agreed as follows:

    


    
      	
              1.

            	
              It
                is agreed that Sections 3(d), 3(e), 4(e), and the related Exhibits
                A and C
                of the Services Agreement shall be
                eliminated.

            


    

    


    
      	
              2.

            	
              It
                is further agreed that the Consultant will not engage in capital
                raising
                or stock promotion activities on behalf of the Company during the
                term of
                the Services Agreement, as amended.

            


    

    


    
      	
              3.

            	
              It
                is further acknowledged that the Consultant is an “accredited investor”
                (as defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D), and such Consultant has
                such
                experience in business and financial matters that he is capable of
                evaluating the merits and risks of an investment in the Company’s
                securities as provide for in the Services Agreement (the “Securities”), as
                amended. Such Consultant is not required to be registered as a
                broker-dealer under Section 15 of the Exchange Act and such Purchaser
                is
                not a broker-dealer. The Consultant acknowledges that an investment
                in the
                Securities is speculative and involves a high degree of
                risk.

            


    

    


    IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF, this Second Amended Advisory Services Agreement has been
      executed by the parties first listed above on as of May 18, 2007.

     

    
      	CONSULTANT:	 	 	COMPANY:
	 	 	 	 
	MARK L. BAUM, ESQ.	 	 	VOIP,
              INC.
	 	 	 	 
	/s/ Mark L. Baum, Esq.	 	 	/s/ Anthony Cataldo
	
              
Mark
              L. Baum, Esq.	 	 	
              
By:
              Anthony Cataldo
	
            	 	 	Its: Chief Executive
              Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of NT Media Corp. of California,  Inc.
(the  "Registrant") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2007, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Ali Moussavi,  Principal  Executive  Officer and Acting  Principal  Financial
Officer of the Registrant,  certify to the best of my knowledge,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Registrant.


                                        /S/ ALI MOUSSAVI
                                        --------------------------------------
Dated:  August 17, 2007                 Ali Moussavi
                                        Principal Executive Officer and Acting
                                        Principal Financial Officer and
                                        Principal Accounting Officer