J-S17039-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

v. :

:

DANIEL R. WESLING, :

:

Appellant : No. 980 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-45-CR-0001697-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2017

Daniel R. Wesling (“Wesling”) appeals, pro se, from the Order denying 

his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),1

and granting Brian Gaglione, Esquire’s (“Attorney Gaglione”) Petition to 

Withdraw as counsel for Wesling. We affirm.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and 

procedural background, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/25/16, at 1-2.2

On appeal, Wesling raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [PCRA] court err in allowing the assigned [PCRA] 

counsel[, Attorney Gaglione,] to withdraw before amending 

[Wesling’s] PCRA [Petition,] both denying [Wesling] a full and 

 

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Wesling received an aggregate prison sentence of 180 to 360 years.
J-S17039-17

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fair opportunity to present his claims[,] and violat[ing] 

Pa.R.Cr[im].P. 904 and 905 [and] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541?

2. Was not Public Defender[,] Robin Spishock[, Esquire 

(“Attorney Spishock”),] ineffective at a critical stage?

3. Was [sic] not Attorney’s [sic] [George Henry] Newman[, 

Esquire (“Attorney Newman”)] (local [counsel]), [Michael] 

Salnick[, Esquire (“Attorney Salnick”)] (pro hac vice 

[counsel])[,] and [Jack] Fuchs[, Esquire (“Attorney Fuchs”)]

(pro hac vice [counsel]) [(collectively “replacement counsel”)] 

ineffective?

4. Was [sic] not both groups of attorney’s [sic] ineffective?

5. Was [sic] not [Wesling’s] [c]onstitutional rights violated when 

the statute of limitations had completed running in 2007[,] 

and [Wesling] was charged in 2009?

Brief for Appellant at 4.

In reviewing the denial of a PCRA Petition, we examine whether the 

PCRA court’s determination “is supported by the record and free of legal 

error.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)

(citations omitted).

In his first issue, Wesling contends that the trial court erred by 

permitting assigned PCRA counsel, Attorney Gaglione, to withdraw from 

representation. Brief for Appellant at 8. Wesling states that he spoke with 

Attorney Gaglione upon his appointment as counsel, but claims that Attorney 

Gaglione failed to discuss the case with Wesling after Attorney Gaglione had 

reviewed the record. Id. at 8, 9. Wesling asserts that he expected Attorney 

Gaglione to file an amended PCRA petition, rather than a “no merit” letter 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 
J-S17039-17

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Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 

Brief for Appellant at 8. Wesling claims that he sent a letter to the PCRA 

court, expressing his intention to proceed pro se and amend his Petition, 

“but to no avail as [Wesling’s] PCRA [Petition] was denied ....” Id. Wesling 

claims that Attorney Gaglione violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 by not responding 

to the PCRA court’s March 18, 2016 Order,3or further representing him in 

these proceedings. Brief for Appellant at 9. Wesling also claims that, 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(B), the PCRA court should have permitted an 

amendment of Wesling’s PCRA Petition if the court determined that the

petition was deficient. Brief for Appellant at 9. 

Pursuant to Turner/Finley, independent review of the record by 

competent counsel is required before withdrawal on collateral appeal is 

permitted. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 

2009). In Pitts, our Supreme Court explained that such independent review 

requires proof of

1. A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing the nature and 

extent of his review;

2. The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing each issue the 

petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3. The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation,” in the “no-merit” letter, 

of why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4. The PC[R]A court conducting its own independent review of 

the record; and

 

3

In its March 18, 2016 Order, the PCRA court denied Wesling’s Petition, and 

granted Attorney Gaglione’s Petition to Withdraw.
J-S17039-17

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5. The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the petition was 

meritless.

Id. (citation and brackets omitted). Further, our Court has held that the 

Supreme Court in Pitts did not expressly overrule the additional 

requirement imposed by this Court in Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 

607, 615 (Pa. Super. 2006), stating

that PCRA counsel seeking to withdraw contemporaneously 

forward to the petitioner a copy of the application to withdraw 

that includes (i) a copy of both the “no-merit” letter, and (ii) a 

statement advising the PCRA petitioner that, in the event the 

trial court grants the application of counsel to withdraw, the 

petitioner has the right to proceed pro se, or with the assistance 

of privately retained counsel.

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Here, the PCRA court determined that, in the Turner/Finley “no 

merit” letter, Attorney Gaglione had described the extent of his review, 

identified the issues that Wesling sought to raise, and explained why the 

issues lacked merit. See PCRA Court Order, 3/18/16, at 1-3. The PCRA 

court also confirmed that Attorney Gaglione had provided a copy of the 

Turner/Finley “no merit” letter to Wesling. See id. at 3.4 The PCRA court 

 

4 Pursuant to Friend, Attorney Gaglione was also required to provide 

Wesling with a statement advising him that, in the event the PCRA court 

permitted Attorney Gaglione to withdraw, Wesling had the right to proceed 

pro se, or with the assistance of privately retained counsel. See Widgins, 

29 A.3d at 818. Although the PCRA court did not address this additional 

requirement, our independent review of the record confirms that Attorney 

Gaglione provided Wesling with a notice of his intention to seek permission 

to withdraw from representation, and advised Wesling of his rights to 

proceed pro se, or retain private counsel.
J-S17039-17

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thereafter reviewed the issues raised in the Turner/Finley “no merit” letter 

and, after conducting an independent review, determined that the issues 

Wesling sought to raise lacked merit. See id. at 1-3 (wherein the PCRA 

court agreed with Attorney Gaglione’s assessment that the issues raised by 

Wesling lacked merit, and noted that Wesling had failed to file a response to 

the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of its intent to dismiss the Petition 

without a hearing). Based on our independent review of the record, we 

conclude that the PCRA court’s decision to permit Attorney Gaglione to 

withdraw from representation is supported by the record and free of legal 

error, and affirm on this basis as to Wesling’s first issue. See id.

5

 

In his second issue, Wesling contends that Attorney Spishock was 

ineffective for (1) counseling Wesling to waive his preliminary hearing; and 

(2) failing to file pretrial motions. Brief for Appellant at 10. Specifically, 

Wesling asserts that Attorney Spishock was ineffective “for not putting in 

any time[-]critical motions” requesting the prosecution to fix the dates when 

the alleged offenses occurred with reasonable certainty, thereby preventing 

Wesling from raising statute of limitations or alibi defenses. Id. at 14. 

Wesling also claims that Attorney Spishock failed to communicate with 

Wesling’s replacement counsel, Attorney Newman, Attorney Salnick, and 

 

5 To the extent that Wesling attempts to raise, on appeal, an ineffectiveness 

claim regarding Attorney Gaglione, he failed to challenge his PCRA counsel’s 

representation after receiving Attorney Gaglione’s notice of withdrawal 

letter, and the Notice of the PCRA court’s intent to dismiss his Petition 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Thus, Wesling has waived any claim that his 

PCRA counsel was ineffective. See Pitts, 981 A.2d at 880 n.4.
J-S17039-17

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Attorney Fuchs. Id. at 15. Although Wesling concedes that replacement 

counsel were permitted to file supplemental pretrial Motions, and to request 

a hearing, he argues that replacement counsel were “unable to recover from 

time critical omissions of [Attorney] Spishock[].” Id. at 11, 15, 16. 

To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Wesling must demonstrate by 

the preponderance of the evidence that 

(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular 

course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some 

reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but 

for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability 

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). A failure to satisfy 

any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. 

Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). Counsel is 

presumed to be effective and the burden is on the appellant to prove 

otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 439 (Pa. 2011).

Notably, Wesling has not addressed, or even discussed, the 

appropriate legal standard for establishing the ineffectiveness of Attorney 

Spishock. Even if we were to conclude that Wesling’s arguments had 

satisfied the first two prongs of the ineffectiveness test, we are persuaded 

by the PCRA court’s reasoning that Wesling cannot satisfy the third prong of 

the test. In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Wesling’s ineffectiveness 

claim regarding Attorney Spishock’s failure to request a bill of particulars, 

and determined that the issue lacked merit because one of Wesling’s 
J-S17039-17

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replacement counsel, “Attorney Salnick[,] adequately raised and argued a 

[M]otion for a bill of particulars.” See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/25/16, at 3. 

Additionally, in its prior Orders, the PCRA court addressed Wesling’s 

additional ineffectiveness claims regarding Attorney Spishock, and 

determined that the claims lack merit. See PCRA Court Order, 3/18/16, at 

1-3 (addressing Wesling’s claim that Attorney Spishock was ineffective for 

counseling Wesling to waive his preliminary hearing); see also PCRA Court 

Order, 2/23/16, at 1-2 (same). We agree with the reasoning of the PCRA 

court, which is supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on 

this basis as to Wesling’s second issue. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/25/16, 

at 3; PCRA Court Order, 3/18/16, at 1-3; PCRA Court Order, 2/23/16, at 1-

2.

In his third issue, Wesling claims that replacement counsel were 

ineffective for failing to request a bill of particulars from the Commonwealth. 

Brief for Appellant at 16-17. Wesling argues that replacement counsel 

“failed to raise, litigate or preserve the issue of whether the Commonwealth 

proved the dates of the commission of the offenses beyond a reasonable 

doubt[,] and did not fix the date of the offenses with reasonable certainty[,]” 

thereby causing prejudice to Wesling. Id. at 17-18. Wesling contends that, 

if the Commonwealth had presented “the realistic dates” of his alleged 
J-S17039-17

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offenses, then he would have been able to produce evidence of his 

innocence, including receipts and bank statements. Id. at 34.6 

Once again, Wesling has not addressed, or even discussed, the 

appropriate legal standard for establishing the ineffectiveness of his 

replacement counsel. Additionally, as noted above, the PCRA court 

determined that Wesling’s third issue lacked merit because replacement 

counsel did, in fact, raise and argue a Motion for a bill of particulars. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/25/16, at 3. We agree with the reasoning of the 

PCRA court, which is supported by the record and free of legal error, and 

affirm on this basis as to Wesling’s third issue. See id.

In his Statement of Questions Presented, Wesling framed his fourth 

issue as follows: “Was [sic] not both groups of attorney’s [sic] ineffective?” 

Brief for Appellant at 4. To the extent that Wesling intended to raise 

additional ineffectiveness claims regarding his counsel, he has failed to 

provide a discussion in his appellate brief in support of his fourth issue. See

 

6 Wesling also contends that replacement counsel were ineffective, and 

violated his Sixth Amendment rights, because they failed to follow 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 578, which requires that “all pretrial requests for relief shall be 

included in one omnibus motion.” Brief for Appellant at 16 (citing 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 578). Wesling further asserts that replacement counsel “failed 

to preserve, raise or litigate the issue of [a] statute of limitations defense.” 

Brief for Appellant at 34. However, these issues were not raised in Wesling’s 

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. Concise Statement of matters complained of on 

appeal. Accordingly, he failed to preserve them for our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (providing that, if 

an appellant is directed to file a concise statement of matters to be raised on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), any issues not raised in that 

statement are waived.).
J-S17039-17

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Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the argument section of the parties’ briefs 

“shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; 

and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive type or in type 

distinctly displayed - the particular point treated therein, followed by such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Moreover, 

in its Opinion, the PCRA court deemed this issue as too vague to be 

adequately addressed. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/25/16, at 4; see also 

id. (wherein the PCRA court reviewed the transcript pages cited in Wesling’s 

Concise Statement, and determined that it had found no ineffectiveness of 

counsel therein).7 Accordingly, we determine that Wesling failed to preserve 

this issue for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding 

that this Court may find waiver where a concise statement is too vague). 

In his Statement of Questions Presented, Wesling framed his fifth issue 

as follows: “Was not [Wesling’s c]onstitutional rights violated when the 

statute of limitations had completed running in 2007[,] and [Wesling] was 

charged in 2009?” Brief for Appellant at 4. Notably, Wesling has failed to 

provide a separate discussion in his appellate brief in support of his fourth 

issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). However, Wesling raised this issue in his 

 

7 To the extent that Wesling had intended to support this issue with those 

arguments raised in support of his third issue that we have deemed waived, 

see footnote 4, supra, he failed to raise those arguments before the trial 

court. See Lord, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised 

in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.). Thus, we cannot consider them on appeal. 
J-S17039-17

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Concise Statement and addressed this issue elsewhere in his appellate brief, 

albeit in the discussion supporting his third issue on appeal. While Wesling 

is in technical violation of our Appellate Rules, we will nevertheless address 

his fifth issue on appeal. 

Wesling indicates that he was convicted under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552, 

which was amended in 1990 to extend the time period in which to 

commence prosecution for sexual offenses against minors to five years from 

the date the victim turned 18 years old. Brief for Appellant at 34. Wesling 

claims that because P.U. was born in 1981, and K.B. was born in 1984, the 

Commonwealth would have had until 2004 to commence prosecution for 

sexual offenses committed against P.U., and until 2007 to commence 

prosecution for sexual offenses committed against K.B. Id. Wesling argues 

that the Commonwealth brought charges against him in 2009, which was 

beyond the statute of limitations. Id. Wesling acknowledges that section 

5552 was amended in 2002 to extend the time period in which to commence 

prosecution for sexual offenses against minors to twelve years from the date 

the victim turned 18 years old, but claims that the legislature did not intend 

the amendment to apply to crimes committed prior to its effective date. 

Brief for Appellant at 35, 40; see also id. at 34 (wherein Wesling asserts 

that the sexual offenses of which he was convicted occurred from 1990 

through 2000).
J-S17039-17

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Under the PCRA, an issue will be deemed waived if the petitioner could 

have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, or on direct appeal. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). As Wesling could have raised this issue before 

trial, at trial or in his direct appeal, we deem the issue as waived.8 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/2017

 

8 Even if we had not deemed this issue to be waived, we would have 

concluded that it lacks merit for the reasons expressed by the PCRA court in 

its Orders. See PCRA Court Order, 3/18/16, at 2; see also PCRA Court 

Order, 2/23/16, at 1-2. 
4. We issued an Amended Notice of Disposition without Hearing;" on · · 

Defendant's PCRA Petition on February 13, 20 J 6. As of the date of this Order, Defendajit~l{;,t, 

not filed a response. · ... , • ,]'~~~~;~;~,1-~ . 

1 .- .. /\:;{{l '<J)\r?· · 

.-;~:, . \:Ii\i~t~~t~i't:·;:Jit11:t . 

2/8/16, pp. 1, 2 (quoting Defendant's prose PCRA Petition). 

had no reasonable basis other than to undermine the truth determining process."' No merit Ietter, 

charged" and "that Attorney Spishock 'rendered deficient performance and her counsel decisions· 

passage of time between when these crimes were alleged to have occurred and when you were 

frames the issues raised by Defendant as follows: ''the statute of limitations had TUI). due to the 

Counsel, together with a "no merit" letter, in which he details bis review of Defendant's file and 

3. On February 9, 2016, Attorney Gaglione filed a Petition to Withdraw as 

three times upon request of defense counsel, the last deadline being set at February 10, 2016. 

PCRA Petition to cure any defects in the original pro se petition. This deadline was extended 

2. Attorney Gaglione was given until November 23, 2015 to file an Amended 

represent Defendant in this matter. 

1. On October 22, 2015, Brian S. Gaglione, Esq., was court appointed to 

Conviction Collateral Relief is DENIED for the following reasons: 

AND NOW, this 18th day of March 2016, Defendant's Motion for PostORDER 

POST-CONVICTION 

RELIEF ACT PETITION 

DANIEL WESLING, 

Defendant 

v. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1697 CR 2012 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY-TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 03/31/2017 09:49 AM
... - ... -- . 

Attorney Spishock committed by waiving your preliminary hearing and not filing p~:!ijaj:J'{.~;:: - 

2 

. . y,/},~~itl~~; 

• -r- :.:... : ··~:.:-:::;;: 

equivalent of a preliminary hearing, so any error of judgment or missed opportunity that_ 

and a Habeas Motion. The hearing that was held on the Habeas Motion is the functional 

Private counsel filed a number of pre-trial motions on your behalf, including an Omnibus Motion 

compromised your defense in any way. You hired private counsel prior to trial in this matter. 

Additionally, Attorney Gaglione states "I can't see how Attorney Spishock 

without merit."No merit letter, 2/8/16, pp. 1-2. 

amendments are ex post facto as they relate to your case, and so your first issue in your PCRA is 

statute never actually ran prior to it's being amended and extended, you can't argue that the 

until 2011 and 2014 respectively to commence proceedings against you, at worst. ... Since the 

years beyond attainment of a victim's 18th birthday. As a result, the Commonwealth then had 

Specifically, in 2002, the statute oflimitations on 'major sexual offenses' was extended to 12 

(assuming that all of the offenses occurred in 1990 only ... ). However, prior to 2004 and the 

potential running of the statute of limitations, the Pa. Legislature amended§ 5552 again. 

worst, until 2004 on the older child and 2007 on the younger one within which to file charges 

born in 1981 and 1984, respectively, that meant that the Commonwealth would have had, at 

age.' At the time of the 1990 amendment, that period was 5 years .... Since the children were 

any time up to the period of limitation provided by law after the minor has reached 18 years of 

prosecution for 'any sexual offense committed against a minor who is less than 18 years of age 

were committed against children .... In 1990 [42 Pa. C.S.A.] § 5552 was amended to allow 

I 

are all alleged to have occurred somewhere between 1990-2001. Additionally, all of the offenses 

regard to specific dates upon which the crimes are alleged to have happened, it is clear that they 

/ 

reasons: "[T]he statute of limitations has not in fact run. While the allegations are murky with 

5. Attorney Gaglione requests to withdraw as counsel for the following 

V Wesling, 1697 CR2012 

_- ,( 

. 

. 
District Attorney 

Brian S. Gaglione, Esq. 

Daniel Wesling, Defendant 

SCI-Somerset 

1590 Walters Mill Road 

Somerset, PA 15510 

Clerk of Courts 

cc: 

regular first class mail at the State Correctional Institution in Somerset, Pennsylvania. 

a copy ofthis decision upon the Defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, and by 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Clerk of Courts serve 

Brian S. Gaglione, Esq., is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition to Withdraw as Counsel filed by 

Order within which to file an appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 

8. Defendant is advised that he has thirty (30) days from the date of this 

Gaglione that the issues raised in Defendant's PCRA Petition are without merit. 

7. After anindependent review of the record, this Court agrees with Attorney 

Gaglione on February 9, 2016. 

6. A copy of the "no merit'' letter was sent to Defendant by Attorney 

bounds of expected advocacy." No merit letter, 2/8/16, p. 2. 

defense and the people who actually defended you appeared to do it competently and within the 

collateral relief through the PCRA statute. In short, Ms. Spishock had very little to do with your 

motions was rectified. ... [I]n looking at the pre-trial filings, the transcripts from trial, arid the 

briefin support of your appeal, I was unable to find any issues that rise to the level necessary for. 

Wesling, 1697 CR2012 
1 

I According to defense counsel, as is evidenced in his motions for extension of time, there was some difficulty in 

locating Appellant's copies of the trial transcripts. Appellant's trial counsel was admitted pro hac vice from Florida 

and the sponsoring attorney practices primarily in Philadelphia See Motion to Admit Counsel Pro Hae Vice-Jack 

Fuchs, 3/13/2013; Motion 10 Admit Counsel Pro Hae Vice-Michael Salnick, 3/13/2013. 

which to file the Amended PCRA to December 23, 2015. We granted a second extension to 

January 29, 2016. We granted a third, and final, extension to February 10, 2016.1 

November 23, 2015, after motion by defense counsel, we granted an extension of time within 

Gaglione, Esq., to represent Appellant and file an Amended PCRA Petition on his behalf. On 

On October 15, 2015, Appellant filed a prose PCRA Petition. We appointed Brian 

sentence on June 30, 2015, and no petition for allocatur was filed. 

addressed, and he timely filed an appeal. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of 

times between 1990 and 2001. Appellant was timely sentenced, post-sentence motions were 

time of trial, the victims were no longer minors as the alleged offenses took place at various 

sexual assault, indecent assault, and corruption charges with respect to two minor victims. At the 

On October 9, 2013, Appellant was found guilty after trial by jury of numerous rape, 

his PCRA Petition. The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows: 

("Appellant") appeal from this Court's Order dated March 18, 2016, denying, without hearing, 

We submit this statement pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) in response to Daniel Wesling's 

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) 

PCRAAPPEAL 

DANIEL WESLING, 

Defendant 

v. 980 EDA 2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1697 CR 2012 

COURT OF C0~1MON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY 

FORTY~ THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COM1\10MVEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 03/31/2017 09:49 AM
2 

2 The only change between our original Notice and our Amended Notice was a portion of the Appellant's address to 

ensure he received our Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 

3 Appellant did file correspondence with the Court during that time, however, none of the correspondence addressed 

the merits of Appellant's PCRA Petition. 

4 Furthermore, pursuant to this Court's Order, Attorney Gaglione's office ensured Appellant received said 

transcripts. See Certificate of Service, 4/ 1212016. 

... (Page 19 line 18 to Page 21 line 9);" and (5) denying Appellant's PCRA claim that the statute 

( 4) "[i]neffectiveness of counsel both Attorney groups documented in transcript of May 14, 2013 

were ineffective for failing to properly argue for a bill of particulars and expert testimony; 

that trial counsel (George Henry Newman, Esq., Michael Salnick, Esq., and Jack Fuchs, Esq.) 

(1) allowing Attorney Gaglione to withdraw; (2) denying Appell~t's PCRA claim that Robin 

Spishock, Esq. was ineffective at the preliminary hearing; (3) denying Appellant's PCRA claim 

In his concise statement, Appellant claims this Court erred in the following ways: 

statement, timely; on April 21, 2016. 

Appellant was granted an extension to file his Concise Statement and we received said 

ordered that Appellant file a concise statement pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) within 21 days. 

All relevant Notes of Testimony had previously bee~ transcribed 4 

On March 24, 2016, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. On March 30, 2016, we 

and granting Attorney Gaglione 's request to withdraw as counsel. 

received no response.' on March 18, 2016, we filed an Order denying Appellant's PCRA Petition. 

Appellant 20 days from the date of the Amended Notice within which to file a response. Having 

of Disposition Without Hearing pursuant to P.ennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. On 

February 23, 2016, we filed an Amended Notice ofDisposition Without Hearing' and granted 

review of counsel's "no merit" letter and an independent review of the record, we filed a Notice 

Petition to Withdraw as Counsel with an attached "no merit" letter. On February 17, 2016, after 

On February 9, 2016, instead of receiving an Amended PCRA Petition, we received a 

Wesling, 1697 CR 2012 

980 EDA 2016 
Appellant claims constituted ineffectiveness regarding expert testimony, we will not speculate as 

claim involving expert witness testimony. N.T., Mot., pp. 8-9. As we cannot determine what 

careful review of the cited pages of the May 14, 2013, hearing transcript, we cannot identify any 

and that such claim is evident from certain pages in the May 14, 2013, hearing transcript. After 

contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert ''to impeach accuser P.B." 

raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all."). Appellant 

Super. 2001) ("[A] Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues 

vague to be adequately addressed. See Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa. 

r: 

.,;t ( Regarding Appellant's ineffectiveness claim based on expert testimony, said issue is too 

.. ', . ·~ 

for a bill of particulars is without merit. 

Mot., p. _."). Thus, Appellant's issue regarding ineffectiveness based on the lack of a request 

bill of particulars. See Notes of Testimony, Motion, 5/13/2016, pp. 22-27 (hereinafter ''N.T., 

2013 hearing transcript reveals that Attorney Salnick adequately raised and argued a motion for a 

Appellant's ineffectiveness claim based on a bill of particulars, a thorough review of the May 14, 

brought to this Court's attention. Nevertheless, Appellant's issue lacks merit. Regarding 

Appellant's third issue was not raised in his pro se PCRA Petition and is just now being 

they are without merit. 

we incorporate said Orders by reference and adopt our reasoning therein on these issues and find 

argument in his fifth issue in our February 23, 2016, and March 18, 2016, Orders. Accordingly, 

March 18, 2016, Orders. Additionally, we adequately addressed Appellant's statute of limitations 

We fully addressed Appellant's first and second issues in our February 23, 2016, and 

constitutional rights. 

oflirnitations and the uncorroborated testimony of the victim's violated Appellant's 

Wesling, 1697 CR 2012 

980 EDA 2016 
4 

5 We do note, however, that to the extent Appellant's claim is in regard to the alleged ineffectiveness of Attorney 

Spishock on pretrial matters, we have previously stated this issue was adequately addressed in our February 23, 

2016, and March 18, 2016, Orders and we incorporate by reference and rely on our reasoning in those Orders. 

constitutionality of uncorroborated victim testimony is without merit. 

Charlton, 911 A2d 933 (Pa. 2006). Thus, we find Appellant's argument regarding the 

A.2d 554, 562 (Pa. Super. 2006) ( quotation omitted) appeal denied by Commonwealth v. 

defendant, despite contrary evidence from a defense witness." Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 

testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a 

merit. The appellate courts of Pennsylvania have "long-recognized that the uncorroborated 

and is just now being brought to this Court's attention. Nevertheless, Appellant's issue lacks 

The second part of Appellant's fifth issue was also not raised in his prose PCRA Petition 

· it raises an issue which is too vague to be determined.' 

his counsel was ineffective. See id. at 686. Thus, we believe this issue is waived to the extent that 

three pages of testimony cited. Furthermore, we will not speculate as to how Appellant believes 

A.2cl at 686-87. We cannot determine what Appellant claims constituted ineffectiveness in the. 

19-21. Thus, Appellant's fourth issue is too vague to be adequately addressed. See Dowling, 778 

Appellant's fourth issue is also vague. We have reviewed the pages of the May 14, 2013,. 

hearing transcript cited by Appellant and find no ineffectiveness claims therein. N.T., Mot., pp. 

testimony is waived to .the extent that it raises an issue which is too vague to be determined. 

not enough for meaningful review." (quoting Commonwealth v. Butler, 756 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. 

Super. 2000))). Thus, we believe Appellant's issue regarding ineffectiveness based on expert 

to same. See id at 686 ("When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is 

Wesling, 1697 CR 2012 

980 EDA 2016 
5 

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cc: District Attorney 

Daniel Wesling,pro se 

# LP 8976 

SCI Somerset 

1600 Walters Mill Rd. 

Somerset, PA 15510 

Clerk of Courts 

Prothonotary-Superior Court 

MPW2016-0021 

this time. 

Appellant's assertions of error are without merit. Nothing further remains to be determined at 

Wesling, 1697 CR2012 

980EDA2016 

For the reasons stated above and in our February 23, 2016, and March 18, 2016, Orders,