United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IOENGINE, LLC,

Appellant

v.

INGENICO INC.,

Appellee

KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF 

COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES 

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2021-1227, 2021-1331, 2021-1332

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2019-

00416, IPR2019-00879, IPR2019-00929.

______________________ 

Decided: May 3, 2024

______________________ 

NOAH LEIBOWITZ, Dechert LLP, New York, NY, argued 

for appellant. Also represented by GREGORY CHUEBON; 

ROBERT W. ASHBROOK, JR., DEREK J. BRADER, MICHAEL A.

FISHER, Philadelphia, PA; MICHAEL JOSHI, Palo Alto, CA.

 LAWRENCE M. GREEN, Sunstein LLP, Boston, MA, 

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2 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

argued for appellee. Also represented by ROBERT M.

ASHER, KEVIN R. MOSIER, SHARONA STERNBERG, KERRY L.

TIMBERS; TIMOTHY MICHAEL MURPHY, Nutter McClennen & 

Fisher, LLP, Boston, MA. 

 MICHAEL S. FORMAN, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for 

intervenor. Also represented by FARHEENA YASMEEN 

RASHEED. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant IOENGINE, LLC (IOENGINE) appeals a series of Final Written Decisions of the United States Patent 

and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

(Board) finding unpatentable certain claims of U.S. Patent 

Nos. 8,539,047 (’047 patent), 9,059,969 (’969 patent), and 

9,774,703 (’703 patent) (collectively, the Challenged Patents) during inter partes review (IPR). The Board determined claims 1–21, 23–25, 27, and 28 of the ’047 patent,

claims 1, 2, 4–8, 13–16, 19–21, 24, 25, and 27–29 of the ’969 

patent, and claims 55, 57–63, 67–72, 74, 77, 78, 81–87, 89, 

92–98, 100, 103, 104, 106–112, 116–121, 123, and 126–129

of the ’703 patent to be unpatentable. We reverse the 

Board’s unpatentability determinations as to claims 4 and 

7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the 

’703 patent because the Board erred in its application of the 

printed matter doctrine. We affirm the Board’s unpatentability determinations as to all other claims.

BACKGROUND

The Challenged Patents share an ancestor, written description, and title—“Apparatus, Method and System for a 

Tunneling Client Access Point.” The written description 

discloses a tunneling client access point (TCAP) that is a 

“highly secure, portable, power efficient storage and data 

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IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 3

processing device” (i.e., a “portable device” as recited in the

claims). ’047 patent Abstract.1 The TCAP, upon plugging

in to an access terminal (e.g., any existing desktop or laptop 

computer) may make use of the terminal’s traditional user 

interface and input/output peripherals, while the TCAP itself provides storage, execution, and/or processing resources. ’047 patent col. 2 ll. 39–46. The TCAP thereby 

“tunnels” data through the access terminal by allowing

data to be provided through the access terminal’s input/output facilities for the user to observe without the 

data actually residing on the access terminal. ’047 patent 

col. 4 ll. 26–28. The TCAP may also tunnel data through 

an access terminal across a communications network to access remote servers without requiring its own more complicated set of peripherals and input/output facilities. Id. col. 

4 ll. 28–31. 

The Challenged Patents claim a “portable device” (the 

TCAP) configured to communicate with a terminal. The 

claims recite a memory, on either the portable device or 

terminal, that stores first program code which, when executed, presents an interactive user interface. Also stored 

in memory are second, third, and fourth program code that

are configured in various ways to facilitate communications, including with a communications network node. 

Claim 1 of the ’969 patent is illustrative, and recites:

1. A portable device configured to communicate 

with a terminal comprising a processor, an input 

component, an output component, a network communication interface, and a memory configured to 

store executable program code, including first program code which, when executed by the terminal 

1 Given the overlap between the specifications of the 

Challenged Patents, we cite only to the ’047 patent for simplicity.

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4 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

processor, is configured to present an interactive 

user interface on the terminal output component, 

and second program code which, when executed by 

the terminal processor, is configured to provide a 

communications node on the terminal to facilitate 

communications to the portable device and to a 

communications network node through the terminal network communication interface, the portable 

device comprising: 

(a) an external communication interface configured 

to enable the transmission of communications between the portable device and the terminal; 

(b) a processor; and 

(c) a memory having executable program code 

stored thereon, including: 

(1) third program code which, when executed 

by the portable device processor, is configured to 

provide a communications node on the portable device to coordinate with the communications node 

on the terminal and establish a communications 

link between the portable device and the terminal, 

and facilitate communications to the terminal and 

to a communications network node through the terminal network communication interface; and 

(2) fourth program code which is configured to 

be executed by the portable device processor in response to a communication received by the portable 

device resulting from user interaction with the interactive user interface; wherein the portable device is configured to facilitate communications 

through the communication node on the terminal 

and the terminal network interface to a communications network node.

’969 patent at claim 1 (emphasis added). 

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Appellee Ingenico Inc. (Ingenico) filed three petitions 

for IPR of the Challenged Patents. The Board issued Final 

Written Decisions finding certain claims of the Challenged 

Patents unpatentable. IOENGINE appeals, arguing that 

the Board incorrectly construed the claim term “interactive 

user interface,” incorrectly applied the printed matter doctrine, and otherwise erred in its anticipation and obviousness analysis. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

I 

IOENGINE contends that the Board erroneously construed the claim term “interactive user interface” to mean 

“a display containing interface elements with which a user 

may interact to result in a computer taking action responsively.” In each of its Patent Owner Responses, 

IOENGINE requested that the Board construe “interactive 

user interface” to mean “a display containing interface elements with which a user may interact to result in the terminal taking action responsively by responding to the 

user.” On appeal, however, IOENGINE proposes a new 

claim construction that it never proffered to the Board: “a 

presentation containing interface elements with which a 

user may interact to result in the device executing code to 

present / affect the presentation taking action responsively 

by modifying what is presented.” In contrast to its position 

during the IPRs, IOENGINE argues on appeal that the 

claims encompass either the terminal or the portable device 

taking responsive action. Compare J.A. 581–82 (“[T]he Petition actually agrees with Patent Owner that it is the terminal that must take action in response to the user 

interaction . . . .”), with Appellant’s Br. at 23 (“[I]f the terminal processor executes code to present the IUI, an ‘interactive’ user interface means that the terminal responds to 

the user; if the portable device processor executes code to 

present the IUI, an ‘interactive’ user interface means that 

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6 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

the portable device responds to the user.”). Furthermore, 

IOENGINE’s new construction requires the responsive action to be “modifying what is presented,” rather than “responding to the user,” as IOENGINE proposed in its Patent 

Owner Response during IPR.2

IOENGINE forfeited its proposed claim construction 

by not presenting it to the Board during IPR. See Monsanto 

Tech. LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 878 F.3d 1336, 

1342 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding patent owner waived 

new claim construction argument where the construction 

was not proffered to the Board in inter partes reexamination proceedings). While we retain case-by-case discretion 

over whether to apply waiver,3 we have held that a party 

waives an argument that it failed to present to the Board 

because it deprives the court of the benefit of the Board’s 

informed judgment. In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 

2 IOENGINE’s proposed construction in its Patent 

Owner’s Preliminary Response included “the terminal taking action responsively by modifying what is presented.” 

However, following the Board’s institution decision,

IOENGINE’s Patent Owner Response switched its construction to require “the terminal taking action responsively by responding to the user.” IOENGINE’s choice 

before the Board to drop its argument for “modifying what 

is presented” and pivot to “responding to the user” seems

to be a clear abandonment of “modifying what is presented.” 3 “By and large, in reviewing this court’s precedent, 

it is evident that the court mainly uses the term ‘waiver’ 

when applying the doctrine of ‘forfeiture.’” In re Google 

Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 

“Though previous cases may have used the term ‘waiver’ 

instead of ‘forfeiture,’ their holdings are good law for a case, 

like this one, involving the issue of forfeiture.” Id. at 862 

n.8.

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IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 7

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 

417 F.3d 1241, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Watts, 354 F.3d 

1362, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

IOENGINE argues that it did not forfeit its proposed

construction because, in IOENGINE’s view, its constructions before the Board and this Court embody the same 

concepts. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9–10 (citing Gaus v. 

Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We 

disagree. Requiring a terminal to take responsive action 

differs meaningfully from requiring either the terminal or 

the portable device to take responsive action. Requiring 

the responsive action to respond to the user also differs 

meaningfully from requiring the responsive action to modify what is presented. We accordingly find that IOENGINE 

forfeited its proposed claim construction.

II

We next address IOENGINE’s challenges to the 

Board’s anticipation determinations. “[A]nticipation is a 

question of fact subject to substantial evidence review.” 

Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1068 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.’” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 

1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

IOENGINE contends that the Board erred in concluding that U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2003/0020813A1 

(Iida) anticipates certain challenged claims of the ’969 and 

’703 patents. According to IOENGINE, Iida fails to disclose an interactive user interface even under the Board’s 

construction, on the grounds that the “menus” of Iida are 

static images that provide no interactivity because they 

lack “clickable elements, checkboxes, or pointer events,” 

“positional feedback,” or any “other way to engage.” Appellant’s Br. 30. IOENGINE also argues that Iida’s disclosure 

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8 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

of pressing a number on a separate keypad involves no interaction with interface elements.

The Board considered these arguments and found them 

unpersuasive. Relying on testimony by the petitioner’s expert Mr. James Geier, the Board reasonably found that 

Iida’s menu screens, which display choices that a user can 

select, disclose interactive interface elements, and that Iida 

also discloses taking action in response to user selections. 

J.A. 144–45. As to IOENGINE’s argument that Iida’s interaction with a separate keypad does not disclose interaction with interface elements, the Board “decline[d] to 

import a limitation requiring that user interaction be 

based on location and/or movement of a user’s point of interaction.” J.A. 145. We see no reason to disturb these 

findings by the Board. 

IOENGINE also argues that Iida fails to disclose “second program code” providing a “communications node” on 

the terminal and “third program code” providing a “communications node” on the portable device, as required by 

certain claims of the Challenged Patents. According to 

IOENGINE, the Board erred by relying on Mr. Geier’s testimony to infer a missing claim element not disclosed in 

Iida. But the Board’s findings relied on Mr. Geier’s testimony that (1) Iida’s control unit (the disclosed terminal) 

acts as a communications node by executing code to perform configurations to enable the terminal to communicate

over a network, and (2) Iida’s camera (the disclosed portable device) establishes its own communications node to coordinate network communications. J.A. 138–39, 140–41; 

J.A. 233–34, 238–39. The Board also relied on disclosures 

in the Challenged Patents’ own written description that 

the terminal or portable device may itself act as a communications node. Substantial evidence thus supported the 

Board’s finding that Iida discloses program code providing 

a “communications node.” We therefore affirm the Board’s 

anticipation determinations as to all claims aside from 

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IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 9

claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 

110–11 of the ’703 patent, which we discuss next. 

III

We turn, then, to IOENGINE’s argument that the 

Board erred in applying the printed matter doctrine to determine that Iida anticipates claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent. In 

particular, IOENGINE argues that the Board incorrectly 

applied the printed matter doctrine to accord no patentable 

weight to certain claim limitations that recite “encrypted 

communications” and “program code.” 

“This court and its predecessor have long recognized 

that certain ‘printed matter’ falls outside the scope of patentable subject matter under U.S. patent law.” C R Bard 

Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc., 979 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2020) (citing AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 

1064 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 

(CCPA 1976)). Although “printed matter” historically referred to claim elements involving actual “printed” material, today the doctrine has expanded to include any 

information claimed for its communicative content, regardless of medium. Id. 

We apply a two-step test to determine whether a limitation should be accorded patentable weight under the 

printed matter doctrine. First, we determine whether the 

limitation in question is directed toward printed matter. In 

re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A “limitation is printed matter only if it claims the content of information.” Id. Put another way, printed matter is “matter 

claimed for what it communicates.” Id. at 850. “Only if the 

limitation in question is determined to be printed matter” 

do we proceed to the second step, which asks “whether the 

printed matter nevertheless should be given patentable 

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10 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

weight.”4 Id. “Printed matter is given such weight if the 

claimed informational content has a functional or structural relation to the substrate.” Id.

Claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 patent, to which the Board 

applied the printed matter doctrine, both depend on claim 

2, which requires the “fourth program code [] when executed by the portable device processor, [to be] configured to 

cause a communication to be transmitted to the communication network node.” Claim 4 of the ’969 patent recites 

“wherein the communication caused to be transmitted to 

the communication network node facilitates the transmission of encrypted communications from the communication 

network node to the terminal.” In other words, claim 4 contemplates the portable device sending a communication to 

the communication network node, which in turn facilitates 

sending encrypted communications to the terminal. The 

Board determined that the term “‘encrypted communications’ claims only communicative content, i.e. printed matter” because it found “nothing in the claim that requires 

anything beyond sending and receiving data, even if the 

data is in an encrypted form.” J.A. 151. The Board further 

found that there was “no functional relationship of the encrypted data to the communication carrying it” because 

nothing in the claims required “the data being used or manipulated” or “any processing of encrypted data beyond the 

transmission of the same.” Id. The Board thus concluded 

that the limitation should be afforded no patentable 

weight.

We disagree with the Board that the claimed “encrypted communications” constitute printed matter. As 

discussed above, printed matter is matter that is claimed 

for its communicative content—i.e., the content specifically 

4 Giving a limitation “patentable weight” means it 

may be used as a basis for distinguishing prior art. Distefano, 808 F.3d at 848.

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IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 11

being communicated. The fact that there is a communication itself is not content; content is what the communication actually says. Nor is the form of a communication, 

such as whether the communication is encrypted, considered to be content. Printed matter encompasses what is 

communicated—the content or information being communicated—rather than the act of a communication itself. 

We have previously found that an FDA label providing 

dosage instructions for using a medical product is printed 

matter, that a label instructing a patient to take a drug 

with food is printed matter, that instructions on how to perform a DNA test are printed matter, and that numbers 

printed on a wristband are printed matter. Distefano, 808 

F.3d at 849–50 (collecting cases). Unlike those examples, 

which claim communicative content such as medical instructions or numbers, the encrypted communications here

are not being claimed for any content that they are communicating. We therefore find that the claimed “encrypted 

communications” do not constitute printed matter.

The Board also declined to afford patentable weight to 

the “program code” limitation recited in claim 7 of the ’969 

patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent. 

The relevant limitation in claim 7 of the ’969 patent recites 

“the communication caused to be transmitted to the communication network node facilitates the download of program code on the communication network node to the 

terminal.” That is, in claim 7, the communication to the 

communication network node facilitates the download of 

program code to the terminal, rather than the transmission 

of encrypted communications, as described above in claim 

4. Similarly, claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent 

recite “caus[ing] a communication to be transmitted to the 

communications network node to facilitate the download of 

program code from the communications network node to 

the” terminal or portable device. As to claim 7 of the ’969 

patent, the Board determined that “‘program code’ in claim 

7 is not entitled to patentable weight” because the “recital 

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12 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

of ‘downloading’ of program code in claim 7 is limited to 

downloading (sending or transmitting) the code, which is a 

communication, and no other function is recited in the 

claim.” J.A. 155. As to claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 

patent, the Board determined that “program code” “is 

‘printed matter’ because it claims the content of the information that is downloaded,” J.A. 253, and that it is not entitled to patentable weight because “the downloaded code 

is merely generic and has no functional relationship with 

either the portable device or the terminal,” J.A. 255. 

Here, too, we disagree with the Board. The “program 

code” is not claimed for its communicative content; no informational content is claimed. See Distefano, 808 F.3d at 

851 (“Although the selected web assets can and likely do 

communicate some information, the content of the information is not claimed.”). Indeed, the claim is altogether 

silent as to the contents of the claimed “program code.” 

That the code is being downloaded does not change the 

analysis. Because there is no particular content being 

claimed, the program code is not printed matter. To conclude otherwise would impermissibly expand the printed 

matter doctrine far beyond its current scope. 

Because “encrypted communications” and “program 

code” are not being claimed here for the content they communicate, they are not printed matter. The inquiry stops 

there; if the claim element is not printed matter, we need 

not consider whether it has a functional or structural relation to its substrate. 

Finally, no remand is needed because Ingenico conceded at oral argument that it did not submit alternative 

grounds for invalidity, other than the printed matter doctrine, with respect to the “encrypted communications” and 

“program code” limitations. Oral Arg. at 20:47–21:31 

(available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=21-1227_12072023.mp3). Accordingly, we reverse the Board’s anticipation determinations as to claims 

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IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 13

4 and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of 

the ’703 patent. 

IV 

We next address IOENGINE’s challenges to the 

Board’s obviousness determinations. This court reviews 

the Board’s ultimate obviousness determinations de novo 

and its underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 

1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “Motivation to combine is one 

of those underlying factual issues.” Id. (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “What a reference teaches and the differences between the claimed 

invention and the prior art” are also questions of fact. In 

re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). 

According to IOENGINE, a skilled artisan would not 

have been motivated to combine Iida with U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2002/0065872 (Genske) because 

“Genske’s computer-based GUI contradicts Iida’s core reliance on the camera to provide static images to ensure compatibility with even the lowest-common-denominator 

phone.” Appellant’s Br. 44. IOENGINE also argues that 

the combination was based on hindsight, given certain

gaps in Iida and Genske’s disclosures. Id. at 45. 

IOENGINE further argues that the Board improperly 

mixed and matched embodiments disclosed in those references to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 47.

We find each of these arguments to be unpersuasive. 

The Board relied on the petitioner’s expert testimony, as 

well as the disclosures in Iida and Genske themselves, to 

conclude that a skilled artisan would have been motivated 

to combine Iida and Genske. J.A. 41–48. Substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding. The Board also addressed IOENGINE’s argument as to the purported gaps 

in Iida and Genske’s disclosures by noting that “‘[t]he question in an obviousness inquiry is whether it would have 

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14 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant disclosures of the two references, not 

whether each individual reference discloses all of the necessary elements.’” J.A. 40 (quoting Game & Tech. Co., Ltd. 

v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 

2019)). We find that the Board appropriately combined relevant disclosures of the two references in its obviousness 

analysis, and that there was no impermissible “mixing and 

matching,” as IOENGINE contends.

IOENGINE further argues that the Board erred in determining that Iida discloses certain claim limitations in

the ’047 patent. First, IOENGINE contends that the Board 

erred in finding that Iida teaches the “second program 

code” which, when executed, “enables the portable device 

to . . . cause a communication to be sent,” as recited in 

claims 1, 24, and 27 of the ’047 patent. Appellant’s Br. 54 

(emphasis omitted). IOENGINE argues that claims 1 and 

24 expressly require the second program code to be stored 

in the memory of the portable device, but that Iida discloses

the code being stored on the terminal. Appellant’s Br. 

54–55. The Board disagreed, finding that the petitioner 

sufficiently showed that “program code stored on Iida’s 

camera (portable device) performs the functions required 

in claim 1 for ‘second program code.’” J.A. 50–51 (citing 

Iida, J.A. 1229, at ¶¶ 54, 65; FIG. 4C). Moreover, the Board 

noted that “[n]othing in the claim language requires that 

all communication-related program code reside[] on the 

portable device, as opposed to the terminal.” J.A. 51. We 

find the Board’s analysis reasonable, and thus supported 

by substantial evidence.

Second, IOENGINE contends that the Board erred in 

finding that Iida discloses the limitation reciting that “executing the first program code . . . causes the terminal processor to present an interactive user interface on the first 

output component” in claim 25 of the ’047 patent. The 

Board considered and reasonably rejected this argument, 

noting that IOENGINE’s position is “premised on an 

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IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 15

implicit claim construction” that “present an interactive 

user interface” refers to controlling and generating the content of the interface. J.A. 68. The Board relied on “the ’047 

patent’s other uses of the word ‘present’” to conclude that 

“‘present’ simply refers to showing or displaying,” with no 

requirement that the presentation be generated by a certain device. J.A. 69. From this, as well as Iida’s disclosures, the Board concluded that Iida discloses the disputed 

limitation of claim 25. We see no error in the Board’s understanding of the claim term “present,” and thus find that 

substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion. 

Finally, IOENGINE argues that the Board erred in its 

determination that claims 74, 89, 100, and 123 of the ’703 

patent, which include the limitation “wherein the data 

stored on the portable device memory comprises a digital 

certificate,” are rendered obvious by Iida in combination 

with U.S. Patent No. 6,088,805 (Davis). IOENGINE alleges that it would not have been obvious to substitute 

Iida’s username and password for Davis’s certificates because the certificate in Davis is associated with a client device, not a user. Appellant’s Br. 63. But the disclosure in 

Davis that the Board relied on expressly discusses individual user HTTP-layer authentication that may be accomplished via digital certificates. J.A. 274 (citing J.A. 14837 

col. 1 ll. 38–45). We find no error in the Board’s determination that it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan 

to combine Iida and Davis to arrive at the claimed “digital 

certificate.”

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Board’s determinations as to all claims found to be obvious. 

CONCLUSION

We find none of IOENGINE’s remaining arguments 

persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the 

Board’s determinations of unpatentability as to claims 4 

and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of 

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16 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC. 

the ’703 patent. We affirm the Board’s determinations of 

unpatentability as to all other claims. 

REVERSED-IN-PART, AFFIRMED-IN-PART

COSTS

No costs.

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