An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-702

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Burke County

No. 11 CRS 52086

SCOTT WESLEY FARRIS,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 December 2012

by Judge Nathaniel J. Poovey in Burke County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 November 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

Carrie D. Randa, for the State. 

Wayne O. Clontz for defendant-appellant.

GEER, Judge.

Defendant Scott Wesley Farris appeals from his conviction 

of driving while impaired. On appeal, defendant contends that 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained during a checkpoint stop. He primarily argues that the 

checkpoint was unreasonable because, according to defendant, at 

least one vehicle was able to drive through the checkpoint 

without being stopped. Because, however, the trial court's 
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findings are supported by competent evidence and those findings 

support the court's conclusion that the primary programmatic 

purpose of the checkpoint was proper and the checkpoint was 

reasonable, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying 

defendant's motion to suppress. 

Facts

The State's evidence tended to show the following facts. 

Beginning around 9:00 p.m. on the evening of 14 July 2011, five 

members of the North Carolina State Highway Patrol conducted a 

checkpoint on the I-40 Westbound off-ramp at exit 103 in 

Morganton, North Carolina. Three Highway Patrol vehicles were 

parked at the intersection at the top of the ramp and had their 

flashing blue lights on to alert motorists of the checkpoint. 

The stoplights at the intersection at the end of the off-ramp 

and the flashing lights of the police cars were not, however,

visible to drivers when they first entered the off-ramp due to a 

slight curve in the ramp. 

Sergeant Mark Cline, the supervisor on scene, had chosen 

the time and location of the checkpoint. The checkpoint was 

conducted within the written guidelines of the Highway Patrol 

and also complied with a standing order from the captain 

requiring that a supervisor be on site at all times during 

nighttime checkpoints. Each car that came through the 
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checkpoint was required to show a valid driver's license, 

registration, and proof of insurance. The officers did not have 

any discretion as to which vehicles they stopped, but rather all 

cars were supposed to be stopped.

Around 9:45 p.m., defendant approached the checkpoint in a 

Ford Ranger pickup truck. Trooper Jason Goudelock asked 

defendant for his driver's license and registration and 

immediately smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the 

vehicle. He also noticed that defendant's eyes were glassy. 

Trooper Goudelock asked defendant to turn off the engine and 

step out of the truck. After observing defendant, Trooper 

Goudelock formed the opinion that defendant was impaired, and he 

arrested defendant for driving while impaired.

On 5 June 2012, the district court found defendant guilty

of impaired driving. Defendant appealed to superior court, and, 

at a pretrial hearing, defendant made an oral motion to 

suppress. Although, contrary to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977 

(2011), defendant did not file a written motion to suppress, the 

State did not object to proceeding with a hearing on the merits. 

After hearing the testimony of Trooper Goudelock and defendant, 

the trial court orally denied the motion to suppress and 

dictated its findings of fact and conclusions of law into the 

record.
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Following the denial of his motion, defendant pled no 

contest to the charge of driving while impaired. Defendant was 

sentenced to an active term of 60 days imprisonment. That 

sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on 18 months of 

supervised probation. Defendant timely appealed to this Court. 

Discussion

Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress. Our review of a trial 

court's denial of a motion to suppress is "strictly limited to 

determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of 

fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they 

are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual 

findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of 

law." State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 

(1982). "The trial court's conclusions of law . . . are fully 

reviewable on appeal." State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 

S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).

Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted 

his motion to suppress because the checkpoint constituted an 

unconstitutional seizure. "'[P]olice officers effectuate a 

seizure when they stop a vehicle at a checkpoint. As with all 

seizures, checkpoints conform with the Fourth Amendment only if 

they are reasonable.'" State v. Jarrett, 203 N.C. App. 675, 
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677, 692 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2010) (quoting State v. Rose, 170 N.C.

App. 284, 288, 612 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2005)). "Thus, 'police may 

briefly detain vehicles at a roadblock checkpoint without 

individualized suspicion, so long as the purpose of the 

checkpoint is legitimate and the checkpoint itself is 

reasonable.'" Id. (quoting State v. Veazey, 191 N.C. App. 181, 

184, 662 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2008)). 

With respect to review of the constitutionality of a 

checkpoint, this Court has held:

"When considering a challenge to a 

checkpoint, the reviewing court must 

undertake a two-part inquiry to determine 

whether the checkpoint meets constitutional 

requirements. First, the court must 

determine the primary programmatic purpose 

of the checkpoint. . . . Second, if a court 

finds that police had a legitimate primary 

programmatic purpose for conducting a 

checkpoint . . . [the court] must judge its 

reasonableness, hence, its 

constitutionality, on the basis of the 

individual circumstances."

Id. (quoting Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 185-86, 662 S.E.2d at 686-

87). Defendant contends that the trial court erred both in 

concluding that the officers had a legitimate primary 

programmatic purpose and that the checkpoint was reasonable.

Defendant argues generally that "it was never established"

that the primary programmatic purpose of the checkpoint was 

proper. Given the finding by the trial court that "[t]he 
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purpose for the license checkpoint was to check driver's 

license, registration, and proof of insurance[,]" it is unclear 

whether defendant is arguing that this finding is not supported 

by competent evidence in the record or that this finding is 

insufficient to establish that this purpose was also "primary," 

"programmatic," and "proper." With regard to whether the trial 

court's finding is supported by the evidence in the record, 

defendant does not point to any contrary evidence or make any 

specific argument that the trial court erred in making the 

finding. Based on our review of the record, we find that the 

trial court's finding regarding the purpose of the checkpoint is 

supported by competent evidence. 

As for whether the purpose found by the trial court is 

proper, courts have recognized as constitutionally permissible

checkpoints for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses, proof 

of insurance, and vehicle registration. See, e.g., Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74, 99 S. Ct. 

1391, 1401 (1979) (indicating that checkpoint with primary 

purpose of checking drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations 

would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment); United States 

v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that "a 

brief stop at a checkpoint for the limited purpose of verifying 

a driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance 
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is a reasonable intrusion into the lives of motorists and their 

passengers even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a 

motorist or passenger is engaged in illegal activity"); State v. 

Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63, 66, 592 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2004) (driver's 

license checkpoint held constitutional); State v. Tarlton, 146 

N.C. App. 417, 423, 553 S.E.2d 50, 53 (2001) (license and 

registration checkpoint held constitutional). 

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 

finding that there was a proper programmatic purpose for the 

checkpoint. However, even if a trial court concludes that the 

primary programmatic purpose was lawful, the court "must still 

determine 'whether the checkpoint itself was reasonable.'" 

Jarrett, 203 N.C. App. at 679, 692 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting 

Veazey, 191 N.C. App. at 191, 662 S.E.2d at 689–90). This Court 

balances the public's interest and the individual's privacy 

interest by applying the three-prong test set out in Brown v. 

Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 361, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 

2640 (1979). "Under Brown, the trial court must consider '[1] 

the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure[;] [2] 

the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest[;] 

and [3] the severity of the interference with individual 

liberty.'" Jarrett, 203 N.C. App. at 679, 692 S.E.2d at 425 

(quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293-94, 612 S.E.2d at 342). 
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Defendant argues that the stop was not reasonable because

there was a factual dispute regarding whether every vehicle was, 

in fact, stopped.1 The trial court found (1) that the checkpoint 

complied with the Highway Patrol's written policy for conducting 

checkpoints, (2) the checkpoint complied with the pre-designated 

pattern of stopping every vehicle, and (3) "[t]he officers did

not have any discretion . . . as to which vehicle they 

stopped[.]"

Trooper Goudelock's testimony amply supported the trial 

court's findings. Although defendant testified that while he 

was stopped at the checkpoint, he witnessed one car that went 

through the checkpoint without being stopped, he also testified 

that he had been drinking that evening and that his blood 

alcohol level was .14. As the trier of fact, the trial judge 

was free to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and chose to 

believe Trooper Goudelock over defendant. It is beyond the 

scope of our review to revisit the trial court's credibility 

determinations. 

Even assuming arguendo that one car was not stopped,

defendant, citing only generally to this Court's decision in

Rose, does not point to any authority suggesting that if one car 

 

1Defendant does not articulate how this argument fits into 

the Brown analysis or allege that the trial court made 

insufficient findings regarding any of the three prongs of 

Brown. 
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is not stopped according to the pre-designated pattern, the 

checkpoint is invalid. Nor does defendant point to any evidence 

showing that the car passed as a result of a discretionary 

decision of any of the officers to allow the car to pass. Even 

if such evidence existed, officer discretion, as only one of 

many factors to consider, "is not a 'lynchpin,' but instead is a 

circumstance to be considered as part of the totality of the 

circumstances in examining the reasonableness of a checkpoint." 

Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 298, 612 S.E.2d at 345. The possibility

that one car was able to sneak past the checkpoint is 

insufficient to undermine the trial court's finding that the 

officers did not have discretion in deciding which car to stop, 

much less render the entire checkpoint unreasonable. See 

Tarlton, 146 N.C. App. at 421, 553 S.E.2d at 53 (concluding 

checkpoint reasonable based in part upon trial court's finding 

that officers "'checked every vehicle in both directions except 

when they were writing citations'" (emphasis added)).

In conclusion, we hold that there is competent evidence to 

support the trial court's finding that all the vehicles were 

stopped. We also hold that, regardless whether one car did, in 

fact, pass through the checkpoint without being stopped, there 

is competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that 

the officers did not have discretion in deciding which vehicles 
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were stopped. This finding, in turn, supports the trial court's 

conclusion that the checkpoint was constitutional. 

No error.

Judges STEPHENS and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).