Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Robert J. Little

Brookston, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darney R. Karim,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 14, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

91A02-1502-CR-122

Appeal from the White Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey R. Smith, 

Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

91D01-1407-CM-355

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 2 of 7

[1] Following a bench trial, Darney R. Karim was convicted of Class A 

misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.

1 He presents the following 

restated issue on appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him 

because the victim’s testimony was incredibly dubious.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] From approximately March 2014 to early May 2014, Dawn Dillon (“Dillon”) 

and Karim were in a dating relationship. Around noon on Monday, July 28, 

2014, Dillon got in her car in her driveway. She intended to run a quick errand 

to the store, as she was expecting her parents and children to arrive soon, and 

she wanted to make lunch for them. Dillon realized she could not find her cell 

phone, so she parked the car, stepped out, and looked back inside it for the 

phone, which she found and held in her right hand. At that time, Karim 

suddenly grabbed Dillon’s right wrist. Dillon had not known Karim was there.2 

[4] Karim demanded that Dillon allow him into her house to retrieve belongings 

that he had left there. Dillon refused. Karim turned Dillon around to face him, 

and he grabbed her left upper arm. The car door was open, and Dillon’s back 

was to the car. She struggled to extricate herself from Karim’s grasp, moving 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1), (c). 

2 Dillon lived in a home in the country, along gravel roads. The end of her driveway was near an intersection 

with a stop sign. She frequently heard the sounds of gravel and stopping cars, and, therefore, she did not 

notice or hear when Karim and another individual arrived and parked at the end of her driveway.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 3 of 7

her arms and kicking at him. Dillon told Karim to let her go before someone 

passing by on the nearby road saw him and called the police. The incident 

lasted about a minute, and Karim released her and left. 

[5] At that time, Dillon saw red marks on her arms and legs from the encounter, 

but did not believe that what she saw was enough to report the incident to the 

police. She went to work the next day, and she began to notice bruising. One 

or more of Dillon’s friends encouraged her to report the incident to law 

enforcement. Dillon’s July 29 work shift ended at 10:00 p.m. She went to a 

friend’s home, and that friend convinced Dillon to contact law enforcement. At

approximately 2:45 a.m. on July 30, Dillon went to the White County Sheriff’s 

Department to make a police report.

[6] Dillon met with Deputy Aaron Page and told him what had occurred on July 

28. Deputy Page photographed bruises on Dillon’s right wrist, left arm, and 

right leg. Thereafter, Deputy Page attempted to locate Karim, but was unable 

to find him. On July 30, 2014, the State charged Karim with Class A 

misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. In November 2014, Karim filed 

a notice of alibi defense. 

[7] Karim waived trial by jury, and at the February 2015 bench trial, Dillon 

testified to the above course of events. Deputy Page also testified, describing

that, in the early morning hours of July 30, he met with Dillon at the Sheriff’s 

Department offices regarding the encounter with Karim that occurred in the 

driveway of Dillon’s home on the afternoon of July 28. The photographs that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 4 of 7

Deputy Page had taken of Dillon’s injuries were admitted into evidence without 

objection. Upon questioning, Deputy Page opined that the bruising on Dillon’s 

wrist and arm were consistent with being grabbed, and with regard to the 

bruising on her shin, Deputy Page recalled that Dillon thought she may have 

struck the car’s open driver’s side door while she was kicking at Karim.

[8] Karim testified at trial, acknowledging that he had been in a prior relationship 

with Dillon, but stating that he had not seen her since sometime in June 2014. 

He expressly denied that he came to her home on Monday, July 28, testifying 

that on that date he was out of town at a lake house. He did not know who 

owned the lake house, and said he was there at the invitation of another friend, 

named Devin, who did not testify at trial. Karim did not know where Devin 

was living at the time of trial or how to contact him. The trial court took the 

matter under advisement, and the following day, the trial court issued an order 

finding Karim guilty as charged. Karim now appeals.

Discussion and Decision 

[9] Karim’s sole claim on appeal is that the evidence presented was insufficient to 

convict him. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

neither reweigh the evidence, nor judge the credibility of witnesses. McClellan v. 

State, 13 N.E.3d 546, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Rather, we 

consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 

conviction. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant was 

guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the verdict will not 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 5 of 7

be disturbed. Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder 

could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Boyd v. 

State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. 

[10] Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1(b)(1) provides in relevant part that “[a] person 

who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or 

angry manner . . . commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor.” However, the 

offense is a Class A misdemeanor “if it results in bodily injury to any other 

person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c). Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-29 defines 

bodily injury as “any impairment of physical condition, including physical 

pain,” and scratches, bruises, and red marks are sufficient to establish bodily 

injury. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 138 n.11 (Ind. 2012) (citing to Hanic 

v. State, 406 N.E.2d 335, 337-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), where evidence of red 

marks, bruises, and minor scratches was sufficient to support a finding of bodily

injury). Thus, in order to prove that Karim committed Class A misdemeanor 

battery, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally 

touched Dillon in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, and that such touching

resulted in bodily injury to her.

[11] Here, Karim argues that the evidence was insufficient because Dillon’s 

testimony was incredibly dubious. In general, the uncorroborated testimony of 

one victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 

540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, the “incredible dubiosity rule” provides 

that “a court may ‘impinge on the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of 

witnesses only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 6 of 7

coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.’”

Govan v. State, 913 N.E.2d 237, 243 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Murray v. 

State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. The application of this 

rule is rare and is limited to situations in which a sole witness presents 

inherently improbable testimony such that no reasonable person could believe it 

and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilt. 

Id. The standard to be applied is “‘whether the testimony is so incredibly 

dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.’” 

Morell v. State, 933 N.E.2d 484, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Fajardo v. 

State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007)). While the incredible dubiosity 

standard is not impossible to meet, it requires great ambiguity and inconsistency 

in the evidence. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015).

[12] In support of his claim, Karim mentions some minor inconsistencies in Dillon’s

testimony regarding which of two Zippo-brand Detroit Lions lighters Karim 

appeared to be holding in his hand when he grabbed Dillon’s wrist. He claims 

that her testimony about the lighter was not consistent, and, furthermore, it

“runs counter to human experience” that he could have been holding a lighter 

in his hand as he grabbed her. Appellant’s Br. at 6. He also asserts that it “defies 

logic” that if, as Dillon claims, Karim went to her home “intent on retrieving 

his personal belongings,” he would thereafter simply leave the premises without 

the desired items. Id. at 7. Karim has failed to persuade us that any perceived 

inconsistencies in Dillon’s testimony rise to the level of incredible dubiosity. 

Her testimony was not inherently improbable or equivocal, and there was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 91A02-1502-CR-122 | October 14, 2015 Page 7 of 7

circumstantial evidence, namely bruising, that was consistent with her 

description of the encounter. Deputy Page also confirmed that the injuries to 

her wrist and arm appeared consistent with being grabbed. 

[13] To the extent that Karim’s argument is that Dillon’s testimony was incredibly 

dubious because her testimony contradicted his, i.e., Dillon said Karim was at 

her house on July 28, and he said he was at a lake house on July 28, the 

incredible dubiosity rule is not applicable in that context. See Morell, 933 

N.E.2d at 492 (standard for dubious testimony is inherent contradiction, not 

contradiction between testimony of witnesses). Karim’s actual claim is one 

asking us to believe his testimony over hers. That is merely an invitation to 

reweigh evidence, which we cannot do on appeal. McClellan, 13 N.E.3d at 548. 

The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Karim of Class A 

misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. 

[14] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.