COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JAMES CHRISTIAN CATTERTON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2890-95-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 NOVEMBER 12, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald H. Kent, Judge 

 Richard C. Goemann, Senior Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from his bench trial conviction of grand larceny 

of a motor vehicle, in violation of Code § 18.2-95, James 

Christian Catterton contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to strike the evidence, because the evidence 

did not preclude a reasonable inference that the car was taken 

with the permission of the repair shop bailee, an alternative 

"owner" of the vehicle. We find no error and affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

 The indictment against Catterton charged that he "did 

unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal, and carry away a 1986 

Ford Bronco, . . . belonging to Debora Brooke, with the intent to 

permanently deprive the owner thereof." 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 
- 2 - 

fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 

Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The judgment of the 

trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 In April 1995, Deborah Brooke took her 1986 Ford Bronco to a 

mechanic's shop for repairs. When she returned to pick it up, it 

was missing. She testified that she gave no one permission to 

take the Bronco from the repair shop. She did not know 

Catterton. The mechanic did not testify. 

 On May 19, 1995, Officers McMean and Booth pursued the Ford 

Bronco, which had been involved in a hit-and-run accident. At a 

dead end, the vehicle stopped and a single figure ran from the 

driver's side into a park. The officers saw no one else in or 

about the vehicle. Officer McMean subsequently apprehended 

Catterton in the park. Catterton told the officers that "Fred" 

had been driving the vehicle. 

 Catterton, a convicted felon, testified that earlier on the 

evening of May 18, 1995, a person named Tony took him in the 

Bronco to several bars and that he assumed the Bronco belonged to 

Tony. Catterton did not know Tony's last name. Catterton 

testified that Tony stayed at a bar with a woman and allowed 

Catterton to drive the Bronco home. 

 In every criminal prosecution, "It devolves 

upon the Commonwealth to prove, first, the 

corpus delicti, that is, the fact that the 

crime charged has been actually perpetrated; 

and secondly, that it was committed by the 
- 3 - 

accused. To justify a conviction, the 

evidence must be so convincing as to exclude 

every reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 

prisoner." 

Maughs v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 117, 120, 23 S.E.2d 784, 786 

(1943) (citation omitted). To support a conviction of larceny, 

the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there 

has been an unlawful taking of property from the owner and that 

the taking was committed by the defendant. See id. at 120-21, 23 

S.E.2d at 786. 

 Catterton contends that when Ms. Brooke left the Bronco at 

the repair shop, the repairman, as bailee, became the "owner" of 

the car for the purpose of proving larceny. We disagree. 

 When Ms. Brooke took her vehicle to the repair shop, she 

relinquished possession to the repair shop only for the special 

purpose of fixing her brakes. She retained both her ownership 

and her right to reclaim possession. Ownership for purposes of 

proving larceny may belong either to the true owner or to the 

owner's bailee. 

 "To sustain an indictment for larceny . . . 

it is sufficient that the goods alleged to 

have been stolen are proved to be either the 

absolute or special property of the alleged 

owner." 

* * * * * * * 

 "'Where there is both a general and special 

owner, the rule is nearly universal that the 

pleader may charge the goods as belonging to 

either, though often the convenience of 

making proof will suggest practical grounds 

for choice.'" 

* * * * * * * 
- 4 - 

 "'The rule is general . . . that where 

chattels are taken feloniously from any 

bailee or other special owner . . . the 

ownership may be laid either in such 

possessor or the real owner, at the election 

of the pleader.'" 

Latham v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 934, 940, 37 S.E.2d 36, 38-39 

(1946) (citations omitted). 

 The indictment sufficiently charged larceny by alleging 

theft of the Bronco from its general owner, Ms. Brooke. The 

evidence proved that charge. Ms. Brooke authorized no one to 

take the vehicle from the repair shop. Specifically, she gave no 

such permission to Catterton. 

 "Once [larceny] is established, the unexplained possession 

of recently stolen [property] permits an inference of larceny by 

the possessor." Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251, 356 

S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987). Catterton's possession of the Bronco, 

his flight, and his patently incredible and totally unsupported 

explanation of his possession support the inference that he was 

the thief. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.