COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Bumgardner and Clements 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

EMANUEL DONTA HOLLEY, S/K/A 

 EMANUEL E. HOLLEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1085-01-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 APRIL 9, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Johnny E. Morrison, Judge 

 Joseph R. Winston, Special Appellate Counsel 

(Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Emanuel Donta Holley (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a 

violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to prove the requisite intent to 

distribute. Finding no error, we affirm the conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
 In accordance with well established principles, we consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

below, the Commonwealth in this instance. Watkins v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998) 

(citation omitted). 

 Viewed accordingly, the evidence disclosed that, on the 

evening of October 12, 2000, Portsmouth Police Officers D.B. 

Smith and S.W. Johnson observed three men "standing on [a] 

sidewalk" and detected a "strong odor of burnt marijuana." As 

the officers approached the group, defendant "bent down[,] . . . 

did something by his boot" or "pants leg" and began to "walk 

off," onto property of the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing 

Authority (PRHA). 

 While Smith was "speaking" with defendant, Johnson 

collected marijuana and a "burning marijuana joint" from the 

ground adjacent to the men. Defendant suddenly became "very 

defensive," disassociating himself with the marijuana. Johnson 

then recognized defendant from a previous encounter and advised 

Smith "he had warned [defendant] previously about trespassing" 

on PRHA property. As Smith "went to . . . arrest [defendant] 

for trespassing," defendant "pulled his jeans up[,] kicked both 

his legs up," and "a baggie of crack cocaine," "not quite the 

size of a golf ball," fell "from his left boot." The cocaine 

was described as "several large rocks." 

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 A search of defendant's person incidental to arrest yielded 

a cellular telephone, a pager and $925 cash in $1 to $50 bills, 

segregated by denomination. A certificate of analysis, 

introduced into evidence, reported the "baggie" contained 3.72 

grams of cocaine, but defendant possessed no paraphernalia 

related to use of the drug. 

 At trial, Detective B.J. Karpowski, III was qualified as 

"an expert concerning the sale, packaging, use, and distribution 

of narcotics." Without objection, Karpowski opined that "the 

lack of any devices used to ingest cocaine," "the nine hundred 

twenty-five dollars in various denominations, . . . broken down 

into several different types of bills ranging from one dollar 

bills all the way up to fifty dollar bills," and the possession 

of "several large rocks" of crack cocaine were "inconsistent 

with personal use" of the drug.1 Karpowski fixed the "street 

value" of the cocaine at $372. 

 Recalling the encounter with Officers Smith and Johnson, 

defendant testified he had spoken with "two guys" and was 

proceeding to a nearby residence when the police approached and 

confronted and arrested him. He explained that the cash on his 

person "came from work," "saving up," the "cell phone [was] for 

[his] child when he get[s] sick," and the pager was "us[ed] 

 1

 Karpowski discounted the "significan[ce]" of the cell 

phone and pager to his conclusion. 

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. . . before [he] got the phone." Defendant did not address the 

cocaine found in his possession. 

 On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove the requisite intent to distribute the 

cocaine. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

examine the record in "the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 

443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The credibility of a witness, 

the weight accorded testimony, and the inferences drawn from 

proven facts are matters to be determined by the fact finder. 

See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 

476 (1989). "The judgment of a trial court . . . will be 

disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it." Martin, 4 Va. App. at 443, 358 S.E.2d at 418. 

 "[F]or a defendant to be convicted of possession of a 

controlled substance with the intent to distribute, the 

Commonwealth must prove that the defendant possessed the 

controlled substance contemporaneously with his intention to 

distribute that substance." Stanley v. Commonwealth, 12 

Va. App. 867, 869, 407 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1991) (en banc). "Because 

direct proof of intent [to distribute drugs] is often 

impossible, it must be shown by circumstantial evidence." 

Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 

(1988). 

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 "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a 

conviction as long as it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence." Tucker v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 141, 143, 442 

S.E.2d 419, 420 (1994). However, "[t]he Commonwealth need only 

exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the 

evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the 

defendant." Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 

S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) (citations omitted). Whether a hypothesis 

of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact, see Cantrell 

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 

(1988), and a finding by the trial court is binding on appeal 

unless plainly wrong. See Martin, 4 Va. App. at 443, 358 S.E.2d 

at 418. 

 Circumstances probative of an intent to distribute include 

"the quantity of the drugs seized, the manner in which they are 

packaged, and the presence of an unusual amount of cash, 

equipment related to drug distribution, or firearms." McCain v. 

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 493, 545 S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001) 

(citations omitted). Possession of such cash "in small 

denominations" and the absence of evidence that an accused used 

the drug are also factors indicative of an intent to distribute. 

Glasco v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 763, 775, 497 S.E.2d 150, 

156 (1998) (citations omitted), aff'd, 257 Va. 433, 513 S.E.2d 

137 (1999). 

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 Here, Officer Smith discovered 3.72 grams of cocaine, "in 

several large rocks," together with $925 cash in $1 to $50 

bills, segregated by denomination, circumstances deemed by an 

expert as inconsistent with personal use of the drug. Moreover, 

no related paraphernalia or other evidence suggested defendant 

personally used the drug. Although defendant attributed the 

money to wages, "[t]he trial court was entitled to disbelieve 

[defendant's] explanation and conclude that he lied to conceal 

his guilt." Dunbar v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 387, 394, 512 

S.E.2d 823, 827 (1999) (citation omitted). 

 Such evidence sufficiently established beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant possessed the cocaine with the necessary 

intent to distribute. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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