IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30441

ECOSYSTEM INVESTMENT PARTNERS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CROSBY DREDGING, L.L.C.; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:16-CV-16504

Before KING, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ecosystem Investment Partners (EIP) invests in projects which restore, 

build, improve, and protect natural resources. For its efforts, the Government 

compensates EIP with environmental-mitigation credits. EIP then sells those 

credits to entities seeking to offset their ecologically destructive actions.

This lawsuit arose after the Army Corps of Engineers decided to build 

new wetlands to offset environmental damage from another one of its projects. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 20, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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EIP sued the Corps and the Corps’ contractor, alleging that the Corps violated 

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by deciding to build its own 

wetlands without considering whether EIP’s credits were a reasonable 

alternative. EIP asked the district court to order the Corps not to build the new 

wetlands. EIP’s lawsuit was dismissed, and it took this appeal. 

We agree with the district court that EIP lacks statutory standing to sue. 

EIP has not alleged an environmental injury that would place it within NEPA’s 

zone of interests. Accordingly, EIP lacks a legislatively conferred cause of 

action, and thus we AFFIRM.

I.

After Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, Congress 

authorized and funded the United States Army Corps of Engineers to develop 

a storm-and-flood-protection system in southeast Louisiana. This Hurricane 

and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS) was to involve the 

construction of a series of canals, floodwalls, and levees. This sort of

development obligated the Corps under the Water Resources Development Act 

of 1986 (WRDA) to produce a report with “a specific plan to mitigate for 

damages to ecological resources.” See 33 U.S.C. § 2283(d)(1). As the mitigation 

report pertained to a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality 

of the human environment,” the Corps was required under NEPA to prepare

an environmental-impact statement (EIS) detailing “the environmental impact 

of” and “alternatives to” its proposed action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i), (iii); 

40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (defining EIS).

To expedite its NEPA analysis, the Corps and the Council on

Environmental Quality (the body charged with overseeing the implementation 

of NEPA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342–4344), agreed to an emergency arrangement.

See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. Under the arrangement, the Corps would issue 

individual environmental reports (IERs). This would allow the Corps to

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consider the impact of its actions piecemeal rather than omnibus in the hopes 

of accelerating the project.

Of relevance to this appeal are a pair of IERs analyzing the Corps’ plans 

to offset the HSDRRS’s destruction of brackish marsh in and near Lake 

Pontchartrain (a lake directly to the north and east of New Orleans). For those 

unfamiliar with coastal-wetland ecology, brackish marshes are moderately 

salty marshes that form upstream of salt marshes and whose salinity is diluted 

by the influx of fresh water from coastal rivers. The Corps’ first IER

contemplated that the HSDRRS’s brackish-marsh destruction could be offset 

with credits purchased from Corps-approved mitigation banks. Mitigation 

banks, per Corps regulation, are sites “where resources (e.g., wetlands, 

streams, riparian areas) are restored, established, enhanced, and/or preserved 

for the purpose of providing compensatory mitigation for impacts authorized 

by [Corps] permits.” See 33 C.F.R. § 332.2. The Corps releases credits to the 

mitigation bank’s sponsor, who will then usually sell its “credits to permittees 

whose obligation to provide compensatory mitigation is then transferred to the 

mitigation bank sponsor.” See id.

But less than a year after this IER, which contemplated the use of 

mitigation banks, the Corps reversed course in a supplemental IER (SIER). 

Instead of buying credits to offset its destruction of brackish marsh, the Corps 

decided to build its own replacement marshes. To that effect, the Corps decided

to build three mitigation projects. The New Zydeco Ridge project is the third of 

these projects and the subject of this lawsuit. The Corps awarded the contract 

for the New Zydeco Ridge project to Crosby Dredging, LLC. Three days later, 

EIP brought this lawsuit. 

EIP sued the Corps and Crosby Dredging and asked the district court to 

enjoin construction of the New Zydeco Ridge project. EIP’s complaint alleges

that it owns the only Corps-approved brackish-marsh mitigation bank in the 

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Lake Pontchartrain region. To offset brackish-marsh destruction in the region, 

the Corps calculated that it needed a total of 118 mitigation units (known as 

Average Annual Habitat Units, or AAHUs). When the Corps first issued its 

SIER, EIP claims that it had credits worth 3.0 AAHUs available for sale or 

transfer to offset this brackish-marsh destruction. Nine months later—but a 

full year and a half before the Corps awarded the contract to Crosby 

Dredging—the Corps released more credits to EIP, bringing EIP’s credit total 

up to a value of 25 AAHUs. By contrast, the New Zydeco Ridge project would

provide, EIP asserts, only 23.7 AAHUs in mitigation out of the 118 needed.

Based on this, EIP claimed the Corps violated NEPA in two ways. The 

Corps violated NEPA, according to EIP, when it issued its SIER without 

considering the alternative of purchasing EIP’s credits. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 4332(C)(iii) (requiring a list of “alternatives to the proposed action”). And the 

Corps violated NEPA again, per EIP’s complaint, when it did not supplement 

its NEPA analysis after the value of EIP’s credits reached 25 AAHUs. See

40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (requiring a supplement when “significant new 

circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing 

on the proposed action or its impacts” arise). As NEPA does not afford private 

litigants a cause of action to enforce its provisions, see Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. 

Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), EIP brought its claim 

through section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 702. 

Both defendants moved to dismiss based on failure to state a claim under 

Rule 12(b)(6).1 The district court granted the motions, holding that EIP lacked 

 

1 Crosby Dredging also moved to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under Rule 12(b)(1). The district court granted Crosby Dredging’s 12(b)(1) motion, but gave 

no indication that it was dismissing based on a lack of Article III standing—a jurisdictional 

defect—rather than statutory standing—a defect in the plaintiff’s ability to state a cause of 

action. See Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011). 

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statutory standing and, alternatively, had not pleaded a violation of NEPA.2

The court ruled that EIP lacked statutory standing because its only injury was 

a lost business opportunity, an injury type outside of NEPA’s zone of interests. 

On appeal, the defendants urge us to affirm dismissal based on lack of

Article III and statutory standing. We examine both matters de novo, see 

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), starting (as we 

must) with Article III standing, see Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, 

Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011). We ultimately conclude that EIP 

has Article III standing but no statutory standing—that is, it lacks a

“legislatively conferred cause of action.” See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 

Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 & n.4 (2014).

II.

The oft-repeated requirements of Article III standing are that the 

plaintiff “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision.” See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 

(2016). These three requirements form the “irreducible constitutional 

minimum” of standing. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560 (1992)). But when a plaintiff asserts a procedural right, as is the case here, 

we do not hold him “to the normal standards for redress[a]bility and 

immediacy.” See Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1998) 

 

Because we conclude that EIP has Article III standing, the district court erred by 

granting the 12(b)(1) motion. “Unlike a dismissal for lack of constitutional standing, which 

should be granted under Rule 12(b)(1), a dismissal for lack of prudential or statutory standing 

is properly granted under Rule 12(b)(6).” See id. Nevertheless, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment, as its dismissal based on failure to state a claim was proper. See United States v. 

El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We may affirm the district court’s ruling on 

any ground supported by the record.”). 

2 Because we affirm based on a lack of statutory standing, we do not reach the question 

of whether EIP pleaded a violation of NEPA. 

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(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). A NEPA plaintiff need not show that his

requested remedy “will in fact redress his injury” but only that “there is a 

possibility that the procedural remedy will redress his injury.” See id.

(emphasis added); see also Gulf Restoration Network v. Salazar, 683 F.3d 158, 

167 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying this reasoning to NEPA). 

That said, Article III’s requirements may not be relaxed to the point of 

oblivion. “[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest 

that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo”—will not do.

See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). Without a

“tangible personal injury,” the plaintiff would only be suing to enforce “his and 

every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws.” 

Friends of St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church v. FEMA, 658 F.3d 460, 467–68 

(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573).

In this case, EIP tries to “establish standing in its own name” and thus 

must satisfy “the same standing test that applies to individuals.” See OCAGreater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ass’n of 

Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Dismissal due to lack of Article III standing is proper based on: “(1) the 

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts 

evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts 

plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” See Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 

245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Barrera–Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 

657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). As the party invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction, 

EIP has the burden to show Article III standing. See Wittman v. 

Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (2016). We are satisfied that EIP has 

met this burden. 

Starting with injury in fact, EIP asserts a concrete and particularized 

economic injury—“a quintessential injury upon which to base standing.” 

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See Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586 (5th Cir. 2006).3 EIP

pleaded that it owns the “only available mitigation bank that could have been 

used by the Corps” and that by failing to consider alternatives, the Corps

“bypassed use of EIP’s” mitigation bank. This deprived EIP of any chance it 

had to immediately sell its banked credits. 

This sort of injury falls squarely within a well-established line of cases 

holding that loss of a non-illusory opportunity to pursue a benefit constitutes 

injury in fact. See, e.g., N.J. Television Corp. v. FCC, 393 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). “[A] plaintiff suffers a constitutionally cognizable injury by the loss 

of an opportunity to pursue a benefit . . . even though the plaintiff may not be 

able to show that it was certain to receive that benefit had it been accorded the 

lost opportunity.” See Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 785 

F.3d 719, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting CC Distribs., 

Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). This rule originates

from the equal-protection context, where the Supreme Court recognizes injury 

in fact based on a denial of an equal opportunity to compete—say, for housing 

which the plaintiff would otherwise be qualified for, see Vill. of Arlington 

Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977), for every spot in 

a medical-school class, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 

 

3 The defendants argue that EIP cannot establish an Article III injury in fact because 

it failed to plead an environmental injury. “The relevant showing for purposes of Article III 

standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.” Friends of the 

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). It is true that the 

typical plaintiff who alleges a procedural violation of an environmental-protection statute 

will normally show Article III injury in fact through some environmental injury. But under 

these statutes, bread-and-butter economic injuries still support Article III standing. See

Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 674–75 (5th Cir. 1992) (identifying 

an economic injury as supporting Article III standing for a suit brought to rectify a NEPA 

violation); Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 640 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Injury in 

fact is not confined to economic injury . . . .” (emphasis added)). Of course, the defendants’ 

argument is well-taken with respect to whether Congress has granted EIP a cause of action, 

and forms the basis for our conclusion that EIP lacks statutory standing. 

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280–81 n.14 (1978), or on an equal basis for government contracts, see Ne. Fla. 

Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 

656, 666 (1993). This rationale extends beyond equal-protection claims and is 

well-suited for the facts before us. Cf. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 

S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (finding injury in fact when the challenged action 

deprived the party of “a chance to obtain a settlement that respected their 

priority” in bankruptcy); Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560, 566 (9th Cir. 2007)

(same for denial of opportunity “to be considered for a program that would have 

allowed [the plaintiff] to serve only six months in prison”); All. for Clean Coal 

v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1995) (same for deprivation of plaintiffs’

“rights to compete on an equal footing in interstate commerce”).

It is true that EIP still has its credits and can sell them later. But, the 

delay in recovering its investment and the lingering uncertainty that it will 

ever be recouped constitutes economic harm. Even if this harm is small, “[f]or 

standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an 

‘injury.’” See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 

366 U.S. 420, 424, 430–31 (1961) (finding that appellants fined five dollars plus 

costs had standing to assert an Establishment Clause challenge).

Moving on, EIP’s injury is fairly traceable to the asserted NEPA

violation. This is not a case where an “intervening, independent act of a third 

party” was “a necessary condition of the harm’s occurrence.” See Texas v. 

United States, 787 F.3d 733, 752–53 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Clapper v. Amnesty 

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013)). Nor is it one where the “challenged 

action has played a minor role” in causing the harm. See id. EIP’s lost chance 

to unload its credits flowed directly from the Corps’ decision not to consider 

mitigation banks as an alternative. 

Lastly, EIP meets the relaxed standard for redressability. While it is not 

likely, there is at least “some possibility” that enjoining the New Zydeco Ridge 

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project until the Corps reviews alternatives would “prompt the [Corps] to 

reconsider [its] decision” not to use EIP’s credits. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 

549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007). Of course, EIP “cannot establish with any certainty 

that” after review the Corps would buy EIP’s credits. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

572 n.7. But given EIP’s assertion that its bank is the only one available to 

offset the HSDRRS’s damage to the brackish marsh, and its assertion that it 

could eventually offset the same number of AAHUs as the New Zydeco Ridge 

project, it is at least a possibility. See Sierra Club, 156 F.3d at 613; cf. Texas, 

787 F.3d at 753–54 (holding that a party asserting a procedural right showed 

redressability because an injunction barring action pending notice and 

comment “could prompt [the agency] to reconsider its decision”).4

Convinced that EIP has Article III standing, we next turn to whether it 

has statutory standing under NEPA. We conclude that it does not. 

III.

While NEPA imposes a variety of obligations upon federal agencies, 

NEPA does not confer a private cause of action to enforce its provisions.

See Fla. Audubon Soc’y, 94 F.3d at 665. Accordingly, a private party seeking to 

rectify a NEPA violation must bring suit through the APA, see id., which

confers standing to an entity “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 

 

4 The Government argues that EIP’s failure to show that NEPA affords it a right to 

sell its credits means that EIP suffered no injury in fact. We reject the Government’s attempt 

to link the discrete issues of Article III standing and EIP’s failure to state a claim. The 

Government’s argument is fatally flawed because it “confuses weakness on the merits with 

absence of Article III standing.” See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249 n.10 (2011). 

“[T]he question whether a plaintiff states a claim for relief ‘goes to the merits’ in the typical 

case, not the justiciability of a dispute, and conflation of the two concepts can cause 

confusion.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 219 (2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Steel 

Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92 (1998)). And this argument is undermined by 

Sabine River. There, we “put the proverbial cart before the horse” and assumed that a 

statutory violation occurred. See Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 676. This allowed us to conclude 

that the plaintiffs had both Article III and statutory standing. Id. It also meant that we 

rejected the district court’s conclusion that because no statutory violation occurred, the 

plaintiffs’ injuries were outside the zone of interests protected by NEPA. Id. at 673. 

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within the meaning of a relevant statute,” see 5 U.S.C. § 702. This requirement

is satisfied if the plaintiff asserts an interest “‘arguably within the zone of 

interests to be protected or regulated by the statute’ that he says was violated.” 

Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 

209, 224 (2012) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 

150, 153 (1970)). This “zone of interests” test “is not meant to be especially 

demanding.” Id. at 225 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 

(1987)). It “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s ‘interests are so marginally 

related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it 

cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’” Id.

(quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399).

Congress’s purpose in enacting NEPA was to “declare a national policy 

which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 

environment; . . . promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to 

the environment and biosphere . . . ; [and] enrich the understanding of the 

ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 4321.5 Naturally, NEPA’s zone of interests covers environmental injuries and 

not purely economic ones.6 See Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 

 

5 While NEPA’s statement of purpose does provide that Congress sought to “stimulate 

the health and welfare of man,” see 42 U.S.C. § 4321, the Supreme Court has held that those 

two “goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of protecting the physical 

environment.” See Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773 

(1983). 

6 That said, a plaintiff need not be “pure of heart” to vindicate NEPA. See Realty 

Income Tr. v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Latin Ams. for Social &

Econ. Dev. v. Adm’r of Fed. Highway Admin., 756 F.3d 447, 466 (6th Cir. 2014); Ranchers 

Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 

1078, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1236 

(D.C. Cir. 1996). A plaintiff with both environmental and economic injuries falls within 

NEPA’s zone of interests even if the plaintiff’s economic interests are the real “impetus” for 

its lawsuit. See Realty Income Tr., 564 F.2d at 452. The defendants in this case argue that 

EIP has no environmental injury, not that EIP’s economic interests blight its environmental 

ones. Accordingly, we need not address whether there are circumstances where an 

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F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases from the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, 

and D.C. Circuits). We have held that NEPA “was designed to protect the 

environment,” not “contractors’ rights.” See Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 1992). Environmental injuries include, but 

are not necessarily limited to, detrimental effects upon a plaintiff’s 

“recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment.” See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 

497 U.S. 871, 886 (1990). 

NEPA’s design, not just its purpose, is also crucial for the zone-ofinterests analysis. NEPA is known as a “procedural statute.” See, e.g., Medina 

Cty. Envtl. Action Ass’n v. Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d 687, 695 n.13 (5th 

Cir. 2010). That is, it “imposes only procedural requirements to ‘ensur[e] that 

the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully 

consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.’” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 

349 (1989)). But “NEPA itself does not mandate particular results.” Robertson, 

490 U.S. at 350. It “merely prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency 

action.” Id. at 351.

 

overwhelming economic interest may foreclose a party with an environmental injury from 

asserting a NEPA violation.

We also acknowledge that statutory zones of interests must be construed “not by 

reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question . . . , but by reference to the particular 

provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175–76 

(1997). Based on this, at least one other circuit has held that purely economic interests may 

confer statutory standing under NEPA “if the particular NEPA provision giving rise to the 

plaintiff’s suit evinces a concern for economic considerations.” See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 

McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Cent. S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y 

of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 895–96 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a specific provision 

of NEPA does not protect economic interests); Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. 

Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1125–27 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that another provision in NEPA 

does protect pure economic interests). But in this case, neither party argues that the specific 

NEPA provisions in play evince any concern for economics. We therefore do not address 

whether any specific NEPA provision permits suit based on pure economic interest.

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As NEPA cannot prevent informed-yet-environmentally-destructive

actions, we have recognized that an “implicit” injury arises when an agency 

fails to prepare an EIS—“the creation of a risk that serious environmental 

impacts will be overlooked.” See Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 674 (quoting City of 

Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)). This sort of injury can

occur even when “the fact of actual damage . . . is somewhat speculative.” See 

Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 640 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis 

removed). The whole “point of the [NEPA] lawsuit” is to uncover the deleterious 

environmental effects of the agency’s project. See id. If we imposed a higher

standard, we “would in essence be requiring” the plaintiff to “conduct the same 

environmental investigation that he seeks in his suit to compel the agency to 

undertake.” See City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671.

But while we have recognized that such “implicit” NEPA injuries may be 

“somewhat speculative,” we have not relaxed the necessary showing of 

environmental injury to the point of meaninglessness. As we held in Sabine 

River, plaintiffs must have “a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the 

challenged project [such that they can] expect [ ] to suffer whatever 

environmental consequences the project may have.” See 951 F.2d at 674

(alterations in original) (quoting City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671); see also Save 

Our Wetlands, 711 F.2d at 640 (NEPA injury established by a history of fishing 

and plans to fish “in the general area of the project”); Save the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. 

Corps of Eng’rs, 610 F.2d 322, 323–25 (5th Cir. 1980) (NEPA injury established

by residing near the bay into which the project would expel wastewater).

In this case, the question of whether EIP has statutory standing comes 

to us after a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. We therefore apply the Twombly/Iqbal

standard. See Harold H. Huggins Realty, 634 F.3d at 796. Under this standard, 

EIP’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

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U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)). This is “a context-specific task that requires” us to draw on our 

“judicial experience and common sense.” See id. at 679. “[A]ll well-pleaded 

facts” must be viewed “as true and . . . in the light most favorable to” EIP. 

See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dorsey v. 

Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)). We consider EIP’s

whole complaint, see United States ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 

816 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2016), and limit our inquiry to “the contents of the 

pleadings, including attachments thereto,” see Brand Coupon Network, L.L.C. 

v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Collins v. 

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000)).

As EIP’s precise allegations in its complaint are of particular importance, 

we recite the relevant ones here. EIP’s complaint alleged that it is a Delaware 

LLC with its principal place of business in Maryland. According to EIP’s 

complaint, its mitigation bank is located on the East Orleans Land Bridge in 

Orleans Parish, Louisiana, and the Corps’ New Zydeco Ridge project is located 

within the Big Branch National Wildlife Refuge near Slidell, Louisiana. Per 

EIP’s complaint, the New Zydeco Ridge project would offset 23.7 AAHUs worth 

of damage, and EIP could eventually supply credits worth 25 AAHUs. EIP also 

claims that the Corps’ HSDRRS would cause “negative impacts to wildlife 

habitat.” EIP finally alleges that the public’s interest “will not be disserved by 

a permanent injunction” against building the New Zydeco Ridge project and 

that EIP “will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, as the 

Corps’[] actions have bypassed the use of EIP’s” mitigation bank. 

We conclude that EIP has not pleaded facts showing an injury within 

NEPA’s zone of interests. From its assertions in its complaint, we discern no 

environmental injury to EIP (or anyone else for that matter). At the outset, 

EIP’s clearest assertion of injury—that it “will suffer irreparable harm” from 

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the bypassing of its bank—relates to its pocketbook not the environment. And

EIP only asserts that the public’s interest “will not be disserved” by stopping

the New Zydeco Ridge project, not that the public’s interest will be served by, 

say, stopping some undiscovered environmental harm. 

EIP did affirmatively allege that the HSDRRS would cause “negative 

impacts to wildlife habitat.” But this harm is unrelated to the NEPA violation 

EIP asserts or the relief it requests. What EIP alleged was that the Corps’ 

SIER—which set forth and analyzed the Corps’ WRDA-required plan for 

mitigating the HSDRRS’s damage—violated NEPA. It also asked the district 

court to stop the New Zydeco Ridge project. EIP did not claim that the HSDRRS

itself did not comply with NEPA. Nor did it seek to stop the HSDRRS. This 

mismatch devastates EIP’s case. Our inquiry focuses on “whether the 

particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims

asserted” and “each form of relief sought.” See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 

547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (alteration in original) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 

468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); then quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)). EIP’s failure to tie its claim

and relief sought to the HSDRRS means it cannot use the environmental 

harms flowing from the HSDRRS to establish statutory standing. 

Moving on, EIP tries to establish that it will suffer an environmental 

injury from the New Zydeco Ridge project itself. EIP stumbles out of the gate, 

however, as it did not affirmatively allege that any environmental harm—

known or unknown—could flow from the project. In fact, EIP instead seemed 

to allege that the project would be eco-friendly—it would “replace the brackish 

marsh habitats that were impacted” by the HSDRRS. EIP resists this

conclusion in three ways. First, EIP established environmental injury, so the 

argument goes, simply by asserting a NEPA violation along with proximity to 

the project. Second, EIP submits that the mitigation from its credits would be

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faster and more certain than the Corps-constructed project. Third, EIP argues

that even if it lacks an environmental injury, stopping the Corps’ project will 

vindicate its free-floating interest in environmental protection. All three

arguments fail.

EIP’s first argument—that geographic proximity plus a NEPA violation 

equals environmental injury—oversimplifies things and thus distorts the law. 

Admittedly, a party’s proximity can usually allow an inference that she will be 

exposed to unrevealed environmental risks. See Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 674. 

Proximity can be a good proxy for whether a party will bear the unforeseen

consequences of an agency’s project. It goes without saying that a homeowner

could get hurt if something goes wrong at a federally licensed dam being built 

next door. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. It is “[a]n obvious inference” that 

“residents of a geographical area ‘use’ that geographical area” such that those 

residents need not allege specific acts like “camping, hiking, fishing or 

sightseeing” to establish environmental injury. See Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at

325. We know that if things go awry, nearby residents will hear the commotion,

breathe the polluted air, drink the toxic sludge, see the dead animals, or get 

flooded. The nearby resident thus can “expect [ ] to suffer whatever 

environmental consequences the project may have.” See Sabine River, 951 F.2d 

at 674 (quoting City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671).

But this case is a good example of why proximity can sometimes be a 

poor proxy for injury. In this case, nothing in EIP’s complaint indicates that 

EIP uses or enjoys its bank’s brackish marsh or the area nearby. And it is not

an “obvious inference” that a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business 

in Maryland uses or enjoys its wetlands located in Louisiana in any way a 

resident would. So even though EIP owns property somewhat nearby, from 

EIP’s complaint we cannot see how it will “suffer whatever environmental 

consequences the project may have.” See id. 

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A further defect in EIP’s proposed formula exists. Sabine River’s usually 

applicable logic—that a NEPA violation means an environmental harm may 

be overlooked—has little purchase in this case. The New Zydeco Ridge project 

is a mitigation project designed to offset damage from the HSDRRS. In the 

past, when we and other courts have found implicit environmental injury, it 

has been for projects like the construction of a wastewater pipeline, see Save 

the Bay, 610 F.2d at 323–24, granting a right of way across wetlands for 

transmission lines, see Save Our Wetlands, 711 F.2d at 637, building a freeway, 

see City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 665, or constructing a port, see Friends of the

Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 928 (9th Cir. 1988). The potential for 

environmental damage in such cases is obvious. In this case, by contrast, 

commonsense indicates that a mitigation project will be environmentally net 

beneficial and pose little risk. EIP’s bare allegation that the Corps’ mitigation 

project violates NEPA, without more, is insufficient to present even a 

speculative threat to EIP. Cf. Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory 

Comm’n, 457 F.3d 941, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no injury when the 

plaintiff “fail[ed] to explain why the new, on average more protective, 

regulation present[ed] a credible threat to its members’ health”).7

Sabine River’s logic is inapplicable for yet another and more important

reason: EIP pleaded the wrong kind of NEPA violation. It alleged that the 

Corps overlooked alternatives, not risks. EIP’s complaint was that the Corps’ 

SIER did not consider alternatives that could offset a similar amount of 

environmental damage as the New Zydeco Ridge project. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(C)(iii). But EIP did not submit that the Corps failed to calculate 

 

7 We need not address whether a mitigation project supported by some plausible 

allegation of how environmental harm could arise can ever give rise to an environmental 

injury. We also do not need to address the circumstance where a person alleges that his 

aesthetic preferences will be harmed by a mitigation project which replaces one habitat with 

another. 

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properly the environmental impact of its project. See id. § 4332(C)(i). This case 

consequently diverges from prior ones finding implicit injury based on an 

agency’s failure to prepare an EIS at all. See Sabine River, 951 F.2d at 673; 

Save Our Wetlands, 711 F.2d at 638–39; Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 325. Given 

that the NEPA-mandated inquiry designed to reveal issues with the New 

Zydeco Ridge project has already been done, we require more specificity about 

what harms might flow from the project. EIP’s failure to do so renders any 

environmental injury “too speculative to support [its] standing.” See Sabine 

River, 951 F.2d at 675 (quoting S. E. Lake View Neighbors v. Dep’t of Hous. & 

Urban Dev., 685 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 1982)).

EIP’s second point—that even if the Corps’ project is environmentally 

beneficial, EIP’s bank would offset damage faster and with more certainty—

makes no sense. Putting to the side whether an entity can create its own NEPA

standing by building environmentally beneficial projects, there is no tradeoff 

between the New Zydeco Ridge project and EIP’s bank. In this, EIP is different

from the plaintiffs in Sabine River, who had standing to enjoin an 

environmentally beneficial agency action. See 951 F.2d at 676. There, the 

agency’s action—acceptance of a non-development easement—would foreclose 

the plaintiffs’ better proposed use for the land—building a water reservoir 

upon it. See id. at 672–73. Here, by contrast, EIP’s mitigation bank and the 

Corps’ project can coexist. Per EIP’s complaint and briefing, its bank is already 

built and the credits dispersed.8 Any environmental benefits the New Zydeco 

 

8 While the Corps can release credits before the mitigation bank is built, see 33 C.F.R. 

§ 332.2, EIP’s briefing states that the wetlands in its bank are “already restored.” And EIP’s 

complaint alleged that the Corps could meet its mitigation target by “acquiring an already 

constructed project, i.e., acquiring mitigation bank credits from private parties holding 

wetlands . . . that previously have been restored, enhanced, or preserved and then ‘banked’ 

in order to be readily available to offset the negative impacts to wildlife habitat resulting 

from projects like the HSDRRS.” 

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Ridge project brings are in addition to, not subtraction from, the benefits of 

EIP’s bank.

EIP’s third argument—that an injunction will vindicate its free-floating 

interest in environmental protection—is unavailing. To show it has an interest 

in environmental protection, EIP cites its status as a mitigation banker. It also

supplies us with a variety of facts about its mission and past projects, none of 

which was alleged in its complaint. We will not consider these materials. See 

Brand Coupon, 748 F.3d at 635 (holding that district courts are generally 

limited to the pleadings when evaluating 12(b)(6) motions); United States ex 

rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 

2003) (“A party who neglects to ask the district court for leave to amend cannot 

expect to receive such a dispensation from the court of appeals.”). But even

were we to consider them, our conclusion would stay the same. EIP’s “mere 

‘interest in a problem,’” no matter its sincerity or expertise, “is not sufficient 

by itself to render [EIP] ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning 

of the APA.” See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972). A NEPA 

plaintiff must “establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or 

the adverse effect upon him) falls within” NEPA’s zone of interests. See Nat’l 

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 883; see also Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 733 (requiring 

a link between the Article III injury in fact and the interest asserted under the 

zone-of-interests test); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 

1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same). A party cannot simply rely on its or the 

public’s free-floating interest in environmental stewardship. See Maiden Creek 

Assocs., L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 823 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2016)

(requiring environmental injury to the NEPA plaintiff itself or those it 

represents); Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 274 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (same). And, as explained above, we cannot deduce from EIP’s complaint

how anyone, let alone EIP, will suffer an environmental injury from the Corps’ 

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mitigation project. Accordingly, there is not even a free-floating environmental 

interest for EIP to vindicate.

As a final effort, EIP argues it is well-suited to vindicate the 

Government’s overall statutory and regulatory scheme governing 

environmental-mitigation credits. According to EIP, as a mitigation-bank 

sponsor it plays a central role in the Government’s overall policy of requiring 

offsets for environmental damage. EIP claims that mitigation-bank credits are 

the statutory and regulatory preferred means to satisfy the Government’s 

mitigation needs. See Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 

110-114, § 2036(c), 121 Stat. 1041, 1094 (2007), amended by Water 

Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, § 1163, 

130 Stat. 1628, 1669–70 (2016) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2317b); 33 

C.F.R. 332.3(b)(2). To that effect, EIP supplies us with a myriad of regulations 

which extol the potential benefits of mitigation banks. See, e.g., Federal 

Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 

Fed. Reg. 58,605–02, 58,607 (Nov. 28, 1995). EIP further argues that the Corps’ 

decision to overlook mitigation credits diminishes private companies’ 

incentives to build and invest in mitigation banks.

We find this set of arguments unpersuasive. We need not consider what 

role EIP plays within the Government’s overall scheme for mitigation credits. 

The zone-of-interests test focuses on “the statute whose violation is the 

gravamen of the complaint,” and, more precisely, “the statutory provision

whose violation forms the legal basis for [the] complaint.” See Nat’l Wildlife 

Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 883, 886 (emphasis added); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 

U.S. 154, 175–76 (1997). EIP’s complaint claims that the Corps violated NEPA, 

not some broader array of statutes and regulations from which we can infer a 

statutory or regulatory purpose to protect mitigation bankers. 

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It also does not help EIP that the statutes and regulations in play all 

regulate the Corps. Merely because two provisions regulate the same agency

does not mean those provisions are the same “relevant statute” for purposes of 

the zone-of-interests test. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal 

Workers Union, AFL–CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 529–30 (1991). In Air Courier, the 

plaintiffs tried to show standing through a different provision from the one 

they claimed was violated. See id. at 529. The two provisions, which both 

regulated the Postal Service, had been enacted separately but eventually 

codified together. See id. The Court refused to allow the plaintiffs to “leapfrog 

from” one provision to the next. See id. at 530. Here, we similarly will not 

permit EIP to leapfrog, not just from one NEPA provision to another, but from 

NEPA to separately codified statutes as well as regulations promulgated 

outside the scope of NEPA. “[T]o accept this level of generality in defining the 

‘relevant statute’ could deprive the zone-of-interests test of virtually all 

meaning.” See id. at 529–30. And EIP’s last argument—that it needs a return 

on its investment to continue doing mitigation projects—renders it akin to the

hypothetical disappointed contractor from Sabine River who wants to build an 

environmentally beneficially project, but needs money to do so. See 951 F.2d at 

676. In sum, without a plausible allegation of some environmental “harm

flowing to” EIP, it cannot establish statutory standing under NEPA. See id.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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