[Cite as State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54.] 

THE STATE EX REL. BELL, APPELLANT, v. PFEIFFER,

JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54.] 

Judicial notice—Objection to magistrate’s decision constitutes sufficient 

opportunity to be heard—Prohibition—Improper assignment of judge not 

cognizable in prohibition. 

(No. 2011-1242—Submitted January 3, 2012—Decided January 12, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

No. 10AP-490, 2011-Ohio-2539. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of prohibition to 

prevent a judge, a magistrate, and certain attorneys and entities from proceeding 

in a case. Because the prohibition action lacks merit, we affirm.

Facts 

Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Bell

{¶ 2} In February 2003, the Madison County Board of Commissioners 

filed an appropriation action in the Madison County Court of Common Pleas 

against appellant, Greg A. Bell, and his wife, Marcia C. Bell, according to the 

subsequent opinion of the court of appeals in the case, Madison Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. Bell, 12th Dist. No. CA2005-09-036, 2007-Ohio-1373, 2007 WL 

879627. In August 2005, the common pleas court entered judgment upon a jury’s 

finding that the board of commissioners was entitled to an easement on the Bells’ 

property and that the Bells were not entitled to any compensation for the 

easement. 
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{¶ 3} The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Id. 

We did not accept the Bells’ discretionary appeal for review. Madison Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. Bell, 114 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2007-Ohio-4285, 872 N.E.2d 953. 

Bell v. Nichols

{¶ 4} According to Greg Bell’s complaint in the prohibition case now on 

appeal, in April 2008, the Bells filed a civil action against various defendants in 

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The defendants included the 

Madison County Board of Commissioners, Madison County Common Pleas 

Court Judge Robert D. Nichols, and the County Risk Sharing Authority, Inc. 

(“CORSA”)—an Ohio nonprofit corporation operating a county government joint 

self-insurance pool. Attorneys Timothy S. Rankin and Craig J. Spadafore 

represented the board of commissioners and certain other Madison County 

defendants, and CORSA paid the legal fees to the attorneys for their 

representation. Attorneys Linda L. Woeber and Lisa M. Zaring represented Judge 

Nichols, and their legal fees were paid by Columbia Casualty Company 

(“Columbia”), a private insurance company. 

{¶ 5} In July 2008, Judge John P. Bessey recused himself from the case, 

and the administrative judge of the common pleas court transferred the case to 

Judge Beverly Y. Pfeiffer. 

{¶ 6} In April 2009, the common pleas court entered judgment in favor 

of the defendants. The court determined that res judicata barred the Bells’ action 

challenging the Madison County Common Pleas Court’s judgment in Madison 

Cty. Bd. of Commrs. On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Bell v. Nichols, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-438, 2009-Ohio-4851, 2009 WL 2942577. 

We did not accept the Bells’ discretionary appeal. Bell v. Nichols, 124 Ohio St.3d 

1445, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 375. 

{¶ 7} In February 2010, several of the defendants filed a joint motion to 

reactivate the case so that the court could address their motion for sanctions. 
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Judge Pfeiffer reactivated the case, which had previously been stayed due to the 

Bells’ appeal, and referred the motion for sanctions to Magistrate Edwin L. 

Skeens. 

Prohibition Case 

{¶ 8} In May 2010, appellant, Greg A. Bell, filed a complaint in the 

Tenth District Court of Appeals against appellees, Judge Pfeiffer, Magistrate 

Skeens, attorneys Rankin, Spadafore, Woeber, and Zaring, CORSA, and 

Columbia. Bell sought a writ of prohibition (1) to prevent Judge Pfeiffer and 

Magistrate Skeens from issuing any further orders in Bell v. Nichols, (2) to stop 

attorneys Rankin, Spadafore, Woeber, and Zaring from filing any further 

proceedings on behalf of the Madison County Board of Commissioners or any 

Madison County employee in Bell v. Nichols until they complied with the 

applicable legal requirements for representation, and (3) to prevent CORSA and 

Columbia from usurping the authority of the Madison County Board of 

Commissioners in appointing legal counsel to represent the Madison County 

defendants in Bell v. Nichols. Appellees filed motions to dismiss. 

{¶ 9} The court of appeals magistrate issued a decision recommending 

that the court grant appellees’ motions to dismiss Bell’s complaint for a writ of 

prohibition. Bell submitted objections to the magistrate’s decision, and in June 

2011, the court of appeals overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate’s 

decision with additional clarification and reasoning, and denied the writ. 

{¶ 10} This cause is now before the court upon Bell’s appeal as of right. 

Legal Analysis

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Standard 

{¶ 11} In his appeal as of right, Bell asserts that the court of appeals erred 

by failing to apply the proper standard of review in determining appellees’ Civ.R. 

12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. 
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{¶ 12} Dismissal of Bell’s prohibition complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 

was appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint were presumed 

true and all reasonable inferences were made in his favor, it appeared beyond 

doubt that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of 

prohibition. State ex rel. DeGroot v. Tilsley, 128 Ohio St.3d 311, 2011-Ohio-231, 

943 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 5; State ex rel. CNG Financial Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 

149, 2006-Ohio-5344, 855 N.E.2d 473, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 13} Notwithstanding Bell’s argument, the court of appeals magistrate 

cited the correct standard of review in her decision, which was later adopted by 

the court. 

Opportunity to Be Heard 

{¶ 14} Bell claims that he was denied due process of law because the 

court of appeals ignored his timely request to be heard on the propriety of taking 

judicial notice of the facts in the underlying Bell v. Nichols case as well as the 

facts in Madison Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Bell, the Madison County appropriation 

case that Bell and his wife sought to contest in Bell v. Nichols. 

{¶ 15} “A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be 

heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter 

noticed.” Evid.R. 201(E). Bell was given the opportunity to be heard on this 

issue when he raised it in his objections to the magistrate’s decision. No oral 

hearing was required. See Davenport v. Big Brothers & Big Sisters of the Greater 

Miami Valley, Inc., 2d Dist. No. 23659, 2010-Ohio-2503, 2010 WL 2225362, ¶ 26 

(party requesting judicial notice was heard on the propriety of judicial notice 

through written briefs); cf. State v. Raymond, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-78, 2008-

Ohio-6814, 2008 WL 5381816, ¶ 20 (defendant may file supplemental brief to 

take judicial notice of fact at appellate level). 

{¶ 16} Moreover, as the court of appeals concluded, because Bell 

acknowledged that the Bell v. Nichols case must be reviewed in the context of his 
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prohibition case and that case directly challenged the Madison Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. Bell Madison County appropriation case, Bell waived his objection to 

the findings of fact that related to those cases because he had invited any error in 

the court of appeals considering the prior litigation. “ ‘[A] party is not permitted 

to take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced the court to 

make.’ ” Webber v. Kelly, 120 Ohio St.3d 440, 2008-Ohio-6695, 900 N.E.2d 175, 

¶ 7, quoting Davis v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 549, 552, 751 N.E.2d 1051. 

{¶ 17} Therefore, Bell’s claim lacks merit. 

Prohibition—Judicial Appellees 

{¶ 18} Bell next contends that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his 

prohibition claim against Judge Pfeiffer and Magistrate Skeens. To be entitled to 

the requested writ of prohibition, Bell had to establish that the judge and 

magistrate were about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, the exercise of 

that power was unauthorized by law, and denying the writ would result in injury 

for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex 

rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 

N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7. The judge and magistrate were exercising judicial power in the 

underlying case of Bell v. Nichols by considering appellees’ motion for sanctions. 

{¶ 19} For the remaining requirements, without a patent and unambiguous 

lack of jurisdiction, a court possessed of general subject-matter jurisdiction can 

determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an 

adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Pruitt v. Donnelly, 129 Ohio St.3d 498, 

2011-Ohio-4203, 954 N.E.2d 117, ¶ 2. 

{¶ 20} Bell argues that because Judge Pfeiffer was improperly assigned to 

preside over the Bell v. Nichols case when Judge Bessey recused himself, she and 

the magistrate patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the 

case. A claim of improper assignment of a judge, however, cannot be cured in an 

extraordinary-writ action, and the party raising the claim has an adequate remedy 
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by appeal. State ex rel. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of 

Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111, 2010-Ohio-2467, 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36; Keith 

v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-1443, 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14. The 

common pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the Bell v. Nichols case, 

including appellees’ motion for sanctions, so any meritorious challenge to 

whether a particular judge or magistrate of the common pleas court could rule in 

the case would merely make any judgment in that case voidable and thus subject 

to remedy by appeal rather than extraordinary writ. See In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 

205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16. 

{¶ 21} Therefore, Bell’s prohibition claim against Judge Pfeiffer and 

Magistrate Skeens lacks merit. 

Prohibition—Nonjudicial Appellees 

{¶ 22} Finally, Bell asserts that the court of appeals erred in rejecting his 

prohibition claim against the nonjudicial appellees—attorneys Rankin, Spadafore, 

Woeber, and Zaring, and CORSA and Columbia. 

{¶ 23} Bell’s claim lacks merit because none of these appellees exercised 

judicial or quasi-judicial power. That is, Bell did not allege that any statute or 

other applicable law authorized these nonjudicial appellees to hear and determine 

controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling 

a judicial trial when the attorneys represented the Madison County defendants in 

Bell v. Nichols and CORSA and Columbia paid the attorneys for the 

representation. State ex rel. Janosek v. Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, 

123 Ohio St.3d 126, 2009-Ohio-4692, 914 N.E.2d 404, ¶ 1. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 24} The court of appeals did not err in denying Bell’s request for 

extraordinary relief in prohibition. It appeared beyond doubt from his complaint 

that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of 
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prohibition. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Phillip Wayne Cramer, for appellant. 

 Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and A. Paul Theis, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Judge Beverly Pfeiffer and 

Magistrate Edwin Skeens. 

 Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin & Boggs Co., L.P.A., and Timothy S. Rankin, for 

appellees County Risk Sharing Authority, Inc., Timothy S. Rankin, and Craig J. 

Spadafore. 

 Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Linda L. Woeber, and Lisa M. Zaring, for 

appellees Linda L. Woeber, Lisa M. Zaring, and Columbia Casualty Agency. 

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