This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-1974

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Moses Gum Benjamin,

Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2014

Reversed and remanded

Schellhas, Judge

Olmsted County District Court

File No. 55-CR-12-6676

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County 

Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica Surges Shacka, 

Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith, 

Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SCHELLHAS, Judge

Because appellant did not acknowledge on the record that the evidence is 

sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable-doubt standard, to find him guilty, and
2

because the record does not reflect that the district court independently concluded that a 

strong probability exists that appellant would be found guilty of the charge of seconddegree assault with a dangerous weapon, we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand 

for further proceedings.

FACTS

In response to a dispatched report of assault, police arrived at F.A.A.’s residence 

where F.A.A. told them that appellant Moses Gum Benjamin entered her residence 

without her consent, argued with her, and refused to leave without his children. Benjamin 

did not reside with F.A.A. but is the father of her children. F.A.A. reported that Benjamin 

picked up a large kitchen knife and stated, “I can finish this right now. I’m serious. I will 

finish this right now.” F.A.A. also reported that Benjamin walked toward her until his 

chest was touching her chest and his hand in which he held the knife was touching her.

When a ringing telephone distracted Benjamin, F.A.A. ran out of the house with the 

children. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Benjamin with three counts of firstdegree burglary, one count of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, one count 

of terroristic threats, and one count of domestic assault.

At a plea hearing, Benjamin waived his right to a trial and entered an Alford plea 

to the charge of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in exchange for 

dismissal of the other charges. Benjamin affirmed that he was entering his plea freely and 

voluntarily, that he was given enough time to talk with his attorney, and that he 

understood that his plea could result in immigration consequences. While maintaining his 

innocence, Benjamin affirmed that he was accepting the state’s plea offer because it 
3

would result in a better outcome for him than was likely if the case was taken to trial. The 

prosecutor questioned Benjamin about the factual basis for the Alford plea as follows: 

THE PROSECUTOR: Mr. Benjamin, you understand that the 

police reports include information that [F.A.A.] reported to 

the police?

BENJAMIN: I understand. But there’s a lot of them are not 

correct.

THE PROSECUTOR: That you disagree with that?

BENJAMIN: Yeah, right.

THE PROSECUTOR: But among the things she told the 

police is that you did not have her consent to come over to the 

house?

BENJAMIN: Right.

THE PROSECUTOR: And you understand that entering 

without consent and committing the assault that you’re 

alleged to have committed would constitute burglary in the 

first degree?

BENJAMIN: Right.

THE PROSECUTOR: And if [F.A.A.] testified at trial 

consistent with the report that she gave to the police, there’s a 

substantial likelihood a jury would find you guilty of first 

degree burglary?

BENJAMIN: Right.

THE PROSECUTOR: And you also—you mentioned a 

couple times that she had also reported that there was a knife 

involved?

BENJAMIN: There was no knife. That was made out, sir.

THE PROSECUTOR: You understand that’s what she 

reported to the police?

BENJAMIN: Right.

THE PROSECUTOR: And that it would be enough evidence 

that a jury could convict you of what you’re pleading guilty 

to, which is a second degree assault?

BENJAMIN: Right.

(Emphasis added.) 

The district court accepted Benjamin’s plea to second-degree assault and 

dismissed the other charges. A few days after the plea hearing, the prosecutor submitted 
4

copies of the police reports to the district court, stating that they were being sent “to 

support the factual basis for this plea.” Before sentencing, Benjamin moved to withdraw 

his plea, claiming that he had changed his mind about pleading and expressing

dissatisfaction with his attorney’s representation. He professed his innocence and argued 

that allowing his plea withdrawal would be fair and just. The district court denied the 

motion and sentenced Benjamin. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

On appeal, Benjamin challenges the accuracy of his Alford plea. He did not argue 

this ground for withdrawal in district court when he moved for permission to withdraw 

his plea. “A defendant is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and 

contend that the record made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate” to establish 

the requirements of a valid plea. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). We 

review the validity of a plea de novo. See Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 

2012) (“Whether a plea is valid is a question of law which we review de novo.”). 

A Proper Factual Basis

A valid plea is one that is accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Trott, 338 

N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to 

protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be 

convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” Id. To be accurate, a plea must be 

supported by a “proper factual basis,” and the district court has the responsibility to

ensure that a proper factual basis is established. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 

(Minn. 1994). A proper factual basis exists when “sufficient facts on the record . . .
5

support a conclusion that [the] defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he 

desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation 

omitted). 

Here, Benjamin entered an Alford plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 

37–38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167−68 (1970) (holding constitutional court’s acceptance of 

defendant’s guilty plea, even though defendant maintained his innocence, where state 

demonstrated strong factual basis for plea and defendant clearly expressed his desire to 

enter plea based on overwhelming evidence against him); see also State v. Goulette, 258 

N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (permitting the acceptance of Alford pleas “if the court, 

on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered 

in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a 

jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly 

entered”). 

“[C]areful scrutiny of the factual basis for the plea is necessary within the context 

of an Alford plea because of the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while maintaining 

innocence.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 648−49 (Minn. 2007). An Alford plea 

“requires a strong factual basis.” Id. at 649 (emphasis added). “[T]he defendant’s 

acknowledgment that the State’s evidence is sufficient to convict is critical to the court’s 

ability to serve the protective purpose of the accuracy requirement.” Id. In Theis, the 

supreme court enunciated a “best practice” for ensuring a defendant this protection:

The best practice . . . is to have the defendant specifically 

acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing that the 

evidence the State would likely offer against him is sufficient 
6

for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find the 

defendant guilty of the offense to which he is pleading guilty, 

as was done in both Goulette and Ecker. 

The strong factual basis and the defendant’s agreement 

that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction 

provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that 

there is a strong probability that the defendant would be 

found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, 

notwithstanding his claims of innocence. In such a 

circumstance, the court can ensure that an Alford plea meets 

the accuracy prong.

Id. (citation omitted).

In this case, Benjamin offered an Alford plea to second-degree assault with a 

dangerous weapon. See Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012) (stating that a person is 

guilty of second-degree assault if he or she “assaults another with a dangerous weapon”).

“Assault” is defined as “an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate 

bodily harm or death” or “the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm 

upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2012). “Dangerous weapon” is defined to 

include a “device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, 

is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Id., subd. 6 (2012).

Although Benjamin agreed, when questioned by the prosecutor, that “if [F.A.A.]

testified at trial consistent with the report that she gave to the police, there’s a substantial 

likelihood a jury would find [him] guilty of first degree burglary,” he did not offer an 

Alford plea to first-degree burglary—he offered an Alford plea to second-degree assault 

with a dangerous weapon. No one asked Benjamin, and he never specifically 

acknowledged on the record at the plea hearing, “that the evidence the State would likely 
7

offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find 

[him] guilty of the offense to which he [wa]s pleading guilty.” See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 

649. During his plea colloquy, Benjamin merely agreed with the prosecutor that “it would 

be enough evidence that a jury could convict [him] of what [he was] pleading guilty to, 

which [was] a second degree assault.” (Emphasis added.) Cf. id. at 650 (concluding that 

Alford plea was invalid when defendant “acknowledged that there was a mere ‘risk’ that 

he would be found guilty of the crime to which he was pleading guilty” and did nothing 

“to affirm that the evidence supporting the[] allegations would lead a jury to find him 

guilty”). We conclude that the facts contained in Benjamin’s plea colloquy are 

insufficient to establish a strong factual basis for the Alford plea to second-degree assault 

with a dangerous weapon and that Benjamin’s plea is invalid because the facts are 

insufficient to fulfill the accuracy requirement. See id. at 649 (“An Alford plea is not 

supported by the defendant’s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by his claim 

of innocence; precedent therefore requires a strong factual basis for an Alford plea.”).

The state contends that a proper factual basis is established through the complaint 

and the police reports. A court may consider the facts alleged in a criminal complaint in 

determining whether a plea contains an adequate factual basis. See Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 

252 (stating that record contained a copy of the complaint and “defendant, by his plea of 

guilty, in effect judicially admitted the allegations contained in the complaint”). But, in 

Trott, in concluding that a sufficient factual basis supported Trott’s plea, the supreme 

court stated that “[t]he record also contains pictures of the victim’s injuries taken at the 

hospital following the beating. Moreover, the trial judge carefully interrogated the 
8

defendant about the acts, and the defendant freely admitted that he had beaten the boy for 

up to 10 minutes.” Id. In this case, the record contains no indication that Benjamin agreed 

that the district court could rely on the probable-cause section of the complaint to 

determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for Benjamin’s plea or that the court in fact 

relied on the complaint. And the prosecutor did not submit the police reports to the 

district court until a few days after the plea hearing. 

A factual basis must be established before a court accepts a plea. See Minn. R. 

Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(8); Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. 1979).

Because the record does not reflect an agreement of the parties that the district court 

could rely on the complaint or the police reports, none of which was introduced or 

offered to the court at the plea hearing, we will not consider them now to supplement the 

facts contained in the record of the plea hearing.

Independent Analysis of Factual Basis by District Court

To ensure that an Alford plea meets the accuracy requirement of a valid plea, the

district court must analyze the factual basis offered for the plea and reasonably and 

“independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be 

found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of 

innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647, 649 (citing Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 758, 760). In 

this case, the record does not reflect that the district court conducted an independent 

analysis of the factual basis or concluded that, based on the factual basis offered, a strong 

probability exists that Benjamin would be found guilty of the charge of second-degree 
9

assault with a dangerous weapon, notwithstanding his claims of innocence. The district 

court merely stated that it accepted Benjamin’s plea.

Because the factual basis established at the plea hearing is insufficient to support 

Benjamin’s Alford plea to second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, and because 

the record does not reflect that the district court conducted an independent analysis of the 

factual basis or concluded that, based on the factual basis offered, a strong probability 

exists that Benjamin would be found guilty of the charge of second-degree assault with a 

dangerous weapon, we conclude that Benjamin’s plea is not accurate and therefore is 

invalid.

Reversed and remanded.