DA 15-0738

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2017 MT 45

IN THE MATTER OF:

K.J.R.

A Youth.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Toole, Cause No. DJ 12-05

Honorable Robert G. Olson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant

Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar, Assistant 

Attorney General, Helena, Montana,

Merle Raph, Toole County Attorney, Shelby, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: January 18, 2017

 Decided: March 7, 2017

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

03/07/2017

Case Number: DA 15-0738
2

Justice Dirk M. Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 K.J.R. challenges the legality of a Youth Court order that committed him to the 

Department of Corrections for placement at the Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility. 

We affirm.

ISSUES

¶2 We reframe the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Did the Youth Court err by revoking the youth’s previously imposed youth 

court commitment and committing him to the Department of Corrections for 

placement at a state youth correctional facility?

2. Did counsel for K.J.R. provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to 

revocation proceedings in the absence of previously imposed probationary 

conditions?

BACKGROUND

¶3 By petition filed June 20, 2012, the State charged twelve-year-old K.J.R. with 

seven felony and misdemeanor offenses including theft of a motor vehicle, theft of a .40 

caliber handgun, criminal mischief in the shooting of a calf, criminal trespass, and 

accountability to theft of a motor scooter in Toole County, Montana. Upon K.J.R.’s 

admission that he committed “an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a 

criminal act,” the Ninth Judicial District Youth Court adjudicated K.J.R. to be a

“delinquent youth,” as defined by § 41-5-103(11)(a), MCA.

¶4 At the time of the original dispositional hearing on July 12, 2012, K.J.R.’s parents 

were both incarcerated on drug-related offenses and unavailable to parent him. The 

Youth Court committed K.J.R. “to the supervision” of the Youth Court until age
3

eighteen, or sooner released, for placement at a specific therapeutic group home in 

Billings. The dispositional order further provided that the “Youth Court Officer shall 

have the ability to find an alternative suitable placement” if the specified placement was 

“not attainable.”

¶5 For reasons not of record on appeal, the supervising juvenile probation officer 

initially placed the youth at a non-therapeutic group home in Great Falls. Over the next 

three years, the juvenile probation officer moved K.J.R. in and out of a sequence of 

juvenile facilities and foster care homes. Between placements, K.J.R. spent considerable 

time in juvenile detention until his probation officer could secure the next placement.

¶6 K.J.R.’s first placement at the Missouri River Group Home in Great Falls lasted

only a few months before the facility requested his removal for disruptive behavior and 

violations of house rules. The probation officer next placed K.J.R. at the Youth Christian 

Ranch in Roundup, which lasted two years before the facility requested his removal due 

to disorderly conduct, truancy, and marijuana use. The next placement at the North 

Skyline Youth Home in Great Falls ended within a few weeks after K.J.R. fought with 

other boys and violated house rules.

¶7 Violations of house rules similarly triggered K.J.R.’s removal from his fourth 

placement at a therapeutic foster care home in Shelby. His juvenile probation officer 

then arranged for a kinship placement with an aunt in Shelby in anticipation of the return 

of K.J.R.’s mother upon her completion of a prerelease program in Great Falls.

¶8 On September 8, 2015, based on new allegations that fifteen-year-old K.J.R. had 

recently been truant, insubordinate at school, involved in an assault, and failed to timely 
4

return to Shelby from Great Falls, the State filed a petition to revoke K.J.R.’s Youth 

Court probation. At the adjudicatory hearing on September 30, 2015, the Youth Court

adjudicated the alleged probation violations as true.

¶9 The Youth Court continued the dispositional hearing four times to allow K.J.R.’s

counsel time to find an alternative therapeutic placement. At the hearing on October 29, 

2015, counsel reported that his efforts to secure placement for K.J.R. failed because 

K.J.R. lacked an up-to-date psychiatric evaluation. A contemplated out-of-state 

therapeutic placement required Medicaid funding, which was not available without a 

current psychiatric evaluation.

1

¶10 At the close of the dispositional hearing, the Youth Court revoked K.J.R.’s 

original commitment to the Youth Court for private, out-of-home placement. Pursuant to

the recommendations of the juvenile probation officer and the youth placement 

committee, the Court committed K.J.R. to the supervision of the Montana Department of 

Corrections (DOC) for placement at the Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility until age 

eighteen or sooner released. The Court also ordered K.J.R. to complete a chemical 

dependency program at Pine Hills.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11 We review a youth court’s application and interpretation of the Youth Court Act

de novo for correctness. In re K.J., 2010 MT 41, ¶ 13, 355 Mont. 257, 231 P.3d 75 

 

1 Counsel for K.J.R. argued that the Youth Court’s options for disposition were impacted by a 

2012 neuropsychological evaluation, which indicated the youth suffered from a mental disorder. 

However, a mental health evaluation completed at the Cascade County Juvenile Detention 

Center in 2015 disputed the earlier report. The more recent mental health evaluator stated that 

K.J.R.’s earlier diagnosis of mental disorder had been ruled out by a clinician in 2012.
5

(citing In re G.T.M., 2009 MT 443, ¶ 9, 354 Mont. 197, 222 P.3d 626). Whether a person 

has been denied the right to due process is a question of constitutional law and our review 

is plenary. In re A.S., 2004 MT 62, ¶ 9, 320 Mont. 268, 87 P.3d 408.

¶12 The standard of review of a youth court’s modification of a prior order under

§ 41-5-1422, MCA, is for an abuse of discretion. In re C.D.H., 2009 MT 8, ¶ 21, 349 

Mont. 1, 201 P.3d 126 (citing Matter of B.L.T., 258 Mont. 468, 470, 853 P.2d 1226, 1227 

(1993)). The test for an abuse of discretion is “whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, 

without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeded the bounds of reason 

resulting in substantial injustice.” C.D.H., ¶ 21 (citing A.S., ¶ 24).

DISCUSSION

¶13 1. Did the Youth Court err by revoking the youth’s previously imposed youth 

court commitment and committing him to the Department of Corrections for placement at 

a state youth correctional facility?

¶14 K.J.R. contends the Youth Court unlawfully revoked his probation and prior 

Youth Court disposition because his original Youth Court commitment was not subject to

any specific court-imposed probationary conditions. Because the court could not legally 

determine the youth to have violated nonexistent terms of probation, K.J.R. asserts the 

court’s probation revocation and resulting DOC commitment order were unlawful.

¶15 For its part, the State argues on appeal that K.J.R. waived the issue of the validity 

of the subject orders by failing to timely object below. Inattentive to the original 

disposition in this matter, the State further attempts to rebrand various detention release 

conditions imposed by the Youth Court in July and August 2015 as subsequentlyimposed conditions of K.J.R.’s underlying probation.
6

¶16 This Court generally will not review an issue not raised below. In re K.M.G., 

2010 MT 81, ¶ 19, 356 Mont. 91, 229 P.3d 1227 (citing State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, 

¶ 8, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892). The objecting party must first give the trial court the 

opportunity to address and correct any perceived errors. K.M.G., ¶ 36. As an exception 

to the general rule, we will review a final disposition alleged to be illegal or in excess of 

statutory mandates even if the defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court.

K.M.G., ¶ 19 (citing Kotwicki, ¶ 8; State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 

1000 (1979)).

¶17 Because K.J.R. claims the Youth Court unlawfully revoked his prior disposition

and, thus, lacked the subsequent authority to commit him to DOC for placement at Pine 

Hills, the gravamen of his appeal is a challenge to the legality of his second Youth Court 

disposition. We conclude the claim qualifies for review on appeal despite the lack of a 

lower court objection.

¶18 Upon adjudication of a “delinquent youth,” the Youth Court Act authorizes 

various final dispositions in the discretion of the court including, inter alia:

(1) placing “the youth on probation” under the continuing jurisdiction of the 

youth court pursuant to §§ 41-5-1513(1)(a) and -1512(1)(a), MCA; 

(2) committing “the youth to the youth court” for placement in a private, outof-home facility pursuant to §§ 41-5-1513(1)(a) and -1512(1)(c), MCA; or

(3) committing “the youth to the department” for placement in a state youth 

correctional facility until age 18 or sooner released pursuant to 

§ 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA.
7

The youth court may impose any authorized disposition following a formal hearing and 

consideration of a predisposition report or assessment filed and served by a juvenile 

probation officer. Section 41-5-1511(2) through (4), MCA.

¶19 Because the Youth Court Act does not define “probation,” we turn to other parts 

of the Montana Code to determine the meaning of the term. See § 1-2-107, MCA (a word 

or phrase defined by one part of the code is applicable to the same word or phrase in 

other parts of the code except where a contrary intention plainly appears). In the context 

of a juvenile sex crime, the law defines probation as the “supervision of the juvenile by a 

youth court pursuant to Title 41, chapter 5.” Section 45-5-501(3)(b)(ii), MCA. The 

Interstate Compact on Juveniles defines the term as “any kind of supervision or 

conditional release of juveniles authorized under the laws of the compacting states.” 

Section 41-6-101, MCA. Title 46 similarly defines the term as “release by the court 

without imprisonment of a defendant found guilty of a crime . . . subject to supervision 

by the department of corrections upon direction of the court.” Section 46-1-202(21), 

MCA; accord § 46-23-1001(4), MCA. Thus, for purposes of the Act, probation 

generally means the court-ordered release of a youth, subject to supervision under 

court-ordered terms and conditions. The youth court has the exclusive authority 

to impose or modify the terms and conditions of probation. See §§ 41-5-103(18), -1422,

-1511, -1512(1)(a), (i), -1513(1)(a), MCA (adjudication and disposition of delinquent 

youth and court authority to modify youth court orders); compare § 41-5-1703(1)(c), (2), 

MCA (juvenile probation officer duty to supervise youth court probationers and enforce 

probation conditions). 
8

¶20 Upon formal petition and hearing, the court may revoke a youth’s previously 

imposed probation upon a finding that the youth “violated a term of probation.” Section

41-5-1431(1), (2), MCA. The petition “must state the terms of probation alleged to have 

been violated and the factual basis” for the alleged violations. Section 41-5-1431(2), 

MCA. Upon adjudication of the violation of “a term of probation, the youth court may 

make any judgment of disposition that could have been made in the original case.” 

Section 41-5-1431(3), MCA. 

¶21 In contrast, without reference to probation or probation conditions, a commitment 

to the youth court for private, out-of-home placement references only certain conditions 

of placement.

2 By its express and limited references to “probation” and “term of 

probation,” the probation revocation procedure specified by § 41-5-1431, MCA, does not 

apply to a revision or revocation of a commitment for private, out-of-home placement. 

See §§ 41-5-1431, -1512(1)(a), MCA (probation disposition and probation revocation); 

compare § 41-5-1512(1)(c), MCA (commitment to youth court for private, out-of-home 

placement). 

¶22 Though not technically on probation, a youth committed for private, out-of-home 

placement under § 41-5-1512(1)(c), MCA, is nonetheless subject to mandatory 

supervision by the juvenile probation officer. Section 41-5-1523(2), MCA. Akin to 

probation conditions, the youth court may impose terms and conditions of supervision 

incident to a commitment for private, out-of-home placement under § 41-5-1512(1)(c), 

 

2

Incorporated by reference to statutory limitations on state youth correctional facility

placements. See §§ 41-5-1512(1)(c), -1522, MCA.
9

MCA. See, e.g., § 41-5-1512(1)(i), MCA (discretion to order “further care, treatment, 

evaluation, or relief” beneficial to the youth and community). As with probation 

conditions, juvenile probation officers have no authority to impose terms and conditions 

of supervision under a § 41-5-1512(1)(c), MCA, commitment for private, out-of-home 

placement. See §§ 41-5-1523(2), (3), -1703(1), (2), MCA (probation officer supervision 

and case management duties related to private, out-of-home placement).

¶23 Though the Act does not mandate a structured procedure for revision or revocation 

of commitments to the youth court under § 41-5-1512(1)(c), MCA, the Act nonetheless 

vests the youth court with broad discretion to “modify” youth court orders “at any time.”

Section 41-5-1422(1), MCA. Commitment to the youth court under § 41-5-1512(1)(c), 

MCA, and commitment to DOC for placement at a state youth correctional facility under 

§ 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA, are both dispositions available to the youth court upon the 

original adjudication of a delinquent youth. Therefore, a youth court has continuing 

jurisdiction and authority pursuant to § 41-5-1422(1), MCA, to revoke a commitment to 

the youth court under § 41-5-1512(1)(c), MCA, and then to recommit the youth to DOC 

for placement at a state youth correctional facility pursuant to § 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA. 

Exercise of that discretion necessarily requires non-arbitrary findings of fact and 

conclusions of law warranting the change of disposition under the relevant statutory

criteria that would have governed a DOC commitment in the first instance.

¶24 In this case, without citation to a particular dispositional subsection of

§ 41-5-1513, MCA, the Youth Court originally committed K.J.R. “to the supervision of 

the Montana Ninth Judicial District Youth Court” until age of eighteen or “sooner 
10

released.” If the specified therapeutic group home placement was “not attainable,” the 

court authorized the juvenile probation officer to “find an alternative placement.” The 

court’s dispositional order did not reference the term “probation” or impose any 

probation conditions. In contrast to a probationary disposition under §§ 41-5-1513(1)(a) 

and -1512(1)(a), MCA, the original disposition in this case was, as a matter of law, a 

commitment to the youth court for private, out-of-home placement pursuant to 

§§ 41-5-1513(1)(a) and -1512(1)(c), MCA. Because he was never on probation, K.J.R. 

was not subject to a probation revocation under § 41-5-1431, MCA. 

¶25 Nonetheless, the Youth Court retained broad discretion under § 41-5-1422(1), 

MCA, to revoke K.J.R.’s original youth court commitment under § 41-5-1512(1)(c), 

MCA, and then to recommit him to DOC for placement in a youth correctional facility

pursuant to § 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA. Though the parties led it down the wrong 

procedural path, the court’s oral and written findings and conclusions, as well as the 

underlying record, manifest that the Youth Court and supervising juvenile probation 

officer afforded K.J.R. every reasonable opportunity to succeed on supervision under his 

originally imposed court commitment for private, out-of-home placement. The record

further shows that the probation officer, statutory youth court placement committee, and 

ultimately the Youth Court resorted to a state youth correctional facility placement only 

after K.J.R. demonstrated he was not amenable to supervision in the community over a 

period of years and multiple alternative placements.

¶26 Though proceeding under the mistaken belief that this case involved a probation 

disposition subject to probation revocation proceedings under § 41-5-1431, MCA, the 
11

Youth Court clearly had continuing discretionary authority under § 41-5-1422(1), MCA, 

to revoke K.J.R.’s original commitment to the Youth Court and to recommit him to DOC 

for placement at a state youth correctional facility. Aside from correctly pointing out the 

mistaken procedural characterization, K.J.R. has made no particularized showing that any 

of the court’s substantive findings of fact or factual considerations were clearly 

erroneous. K.J.R. similarly has made no showing of prejudice resulting from the mere 

fact that the court mistakenly characterized the proceeding as a probation revocation 

proceeding rather than an exercise of its ongoing discretion to modify youth court orders 

at any time. To the contrary, the record and the court’s orders clearly show that the youth 

received due notice and opportunity to be heard in opposition to the State’s revocation 

petition and that the court made a lawful, non-arbitrary decision based on substantial 

credible evidence.

¶27 This Court will affirm the lower court when it reaches a legally correct result even 

if it reached the right result for the wrong reason. State v. Ellison, 2012 MT 50, ¶ 8, 364 

Mont. 276, 272 P.3d 646 (citation omitted). Therefore, we hold that the Youth Court

acted within its lawful authority without abuse of discretion or factual or legal error when 

it revoked K.J.R.’s original § 41-5-1512(1)(c), MCA, youth court commitment and 

recommitted him to DOC for placement at a state youth correctional facility. 

¶28 2. Did counsel for K.J.R. provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to 

revocation proceedings in the absence of previously imposed probationary conditions?

¶29 As a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, a youth has the right to the 

assistance of counsel during delinquency proceedings when such proceedings may result 
12

in commitment to an institution or other curtailment of the youth’s freedom. In re Gault, 

387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1451 (1967). A youth also has a Montana statutory right 

to counsel in all youth court proceedings. Section 41-5-1413, MCA. The right to counsel 

necessarily includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984) (by implication from the 

Sixth Amendment in adult criminal proceedings); A.S., ¶ 20 (as function of due process in 

child abuse and neglect proceedings). 

¶30 Here, the parties ask the Court to evaluate K.J.R.’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim under the two-part test announced in Strickland, which requires the 

defendant to show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and resulted in

actual prejudice. State v. Notti, 2003 MT 296, ¶ 6, 318 Mont. 146, 79 P.3d 289. Based 

on its presumption of adequate performance, the Strickland test imposes a heavy burden 

on the defendant to show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

¶31 An adult criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel derives from 

the express federal and Montana constitutional rights to counsel in criminal proceedings. 

Because a youth court proceeding is a remedial civil proceeding rather than a criminal 

proceeding, see §§ 41-5-102, -103(11)(a), and -106, MCA, a youth court defendant’s 

right to effective assistance of counsel derives from the federal and Montana 

constitutional rights to due process. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 41, 87 S. Ct. at 1451. To 

date, this Court has adopted no specific criteria for evaluating youth court ineffective

assistance of counsel claims.
13

¶32 While the Strickland test continues to be appropriate for adult criminal 

proceedings, we have previously determined that its highly deferential standard is 

insufficient to protect the fundamental liberty interests at stake in special civil 

proceedings that, though analogous to criminal proceedings, involve protective or 

remedial considerations not present in criminal proceedings. In re Mental Health of 

K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, ¶¶ 62-65, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485 (involuntary mental health

commitment proceedings); In re A.S., ¶¶ 23-25 (child abuse and neglect parental rights 

termination proceedings). In K.G.F., based on pertinent published guidelines,

3 we 

adopted five non-exclusive evaluation criteria for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

in involuntary mental health commitment proceedings. K.G.F., ¶¶ 70-89. In A.S.,

similarly based on pertinent published guidelines,

4 we adopted two non-exclusive

evaluation criteria for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in child abuse and neglect 

termination proceedings. A.S., ¶¶ 26-28. More demanding than the Strickland standard

but “more direct” than the K.G.F. criteria, the A.S. criteria focused on:

(1) . . . whether counsel has experience and training in representing parents in 

[child abuse and neglect proceedings] . . . and whether counsel has a 

verifiably competent understanding of the statutory and case law involving 

[child abuse and neglect proceedings including parental rights termination 

proceedings]; and

(2) . . . whether counsel has adequately investigated the case; whether counsel 

has timely and sufficiently met with the parent and has researched the 

 

3 National Center for State Courts Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, Guidelines for

Involuntary Civil Commitment; 10 Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter, no. 5, 409-514

(1986).

4 National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Resource Guidelines: Improving Court

Practice in Child Abuse & Neglect Cases, 22–23 (1995).
14

applicable law; whether counsel has prepared for the termination hearing by 

interviewing the State’s witnesses and by discovering and reviewing 

documentary evidence that might be introduced; and whether counsel has 

demonstrated that he or she possesses trial skills, including making 

appropriate objections, producing evidence and calling and crossexamining witnesses and experts.

A.S., ¶ 26. 

¶33 In contrast to a criminal proceeding, youth court proceedings are special, remedial,

civil proceedings that affect the development and fundamental liberty interests of youth.

See §§ 41-5-102, -103(11)(a), -106, MCA (nature of youth court proceedings). Under 

Montana law, youth have the same fundamental Montana constitutional rights as adults.

Mont. Const., art. II, § 15. Although analogous, youth court proceedings involve special 

considerations and present special challenges to effective representation not present in 

adult criminal proceedings.5 Consequently, we decline to adopt the Strickland test to 

evaluate youth court ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Moreover, while 

something similar to our A.S. standard may ultimately be a good fit, we are not inclined 

to adopt a particular standard for youth court ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 

this case because the parties have not raised or briefed the issue and the unique facts of 

this case are amenable to disposition under any objective standard. 

 

5 Logic and pertinent national and Montana sources similarly indicate that counsel must have 

specialized knowledge, skills, and experience in the areas of youth court procedure, substantive 

youth court law, and in communicating with and counselling the youth. In addition to agerelated deficiencies and challenges, youth court defendants often present with particular 

disabilities and traumas. Effective advocacy always requires investigation and preparation of the 

case. See, e.g., National Juvenile Defender Center, National Juvenile Defense Standards

(Patricia Puritz, et al., 2012) (standards for best practices in juvenile defense) and Montana 

Public Defender Commission, Practice Standards for Counsel Representing Individuals 

Pursuant to the Montana Public Defender Act (updated 2012) 55-61 (standards for 

representation of youth in Montana youth courts).
15

¶34 K.J.R. asserts that counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the State’s 

revocation petition on the ground that the youth could not violate probation conditions 

not imposed by the court. He further asserts counsel’s omission prejudiced him by 

resulting in revocation of his community placement and ultimate commitment to DOC for 

placement in a state youth correctional facility. K.J.R.’s claim is a record-based claim 

amenable to review on the district court record.

¶35 The record shows counsel for K.J.R. did not object to the State’s incorrectly 

framed petition. A timely objection may very well have alerted the Youth Court to the 

correct procedural posture and correspondingly correct characterization of the process 

and its revocation judgment.

¶36 However, as previously noted, K.J.R. has made no particularized showing that 

any substantive Youth Court finding of fact or factual consideration was clearly 

erroneous. K.J.R. has similarly made no showing of any substantial prejudice resulting 

from the fact that the court mistakenly characterized this matter as a probation revocation 

matter rather than a consideration of whether to modify K.J.R.’s original Youth Court 

placement under the court’s continuing modification authority pursuant to 

§ 41-5-1422(1), MCA. As previously held, the court acted within its lawful authority 

without abuse of discretion or factual or legal error when it revoked K.J.R.’s original 

Youth Court commitment and recommitted him to DOC for placement at a state youth 

correctional facility. Regardless of the alleged deficient performance, K.J.R. has failed to 

show that counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous characterization of the procedure 
16

would have resulted in a different outcome or otherwise prejudiced K.J.R. in any regard.

We hold that K.J.R.’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶37 Regardless of the mistaken characterization of the proceeding as a probation 

revocation matter, the court acted lawfully without error when it revoked K.J.R.’s 

original Youth Court commitment and recommitted him to DOC for placement at a state 

youth correctional facility. K.J.R.’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without 

merit. We affirm.

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

We Concur: 

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ JIM RICE