Filed 11/26/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. $2,709 U NITED STATES CURRENCY , Defendant;

DONNA O. BRADFORD

Defend ant and Appellant. B250709
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA111198)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Paul A. Bacigalupo, Judge. Affirmed

.

David L. Kelly, under appointment by the Court of A ppeal, for Defendant and Appellant Donna O. Bradford

.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *2

The People may initiate a civil pr oceeding to forfeit seized cash or its equivalent connected to drug trafficking . (Health & Saf

. Code, § § 11488.4, subd. (a), 11470, subd. ( f) .) 1 When the amount to be forfeited is less than $25,000 in value , the property’s owner
must be convicted of a dr ug crime and “the issue of forfeiture shall be tried in conjunction” with the related criminal case. (§ 11488.4, subds. (i)(5), (i)(2), (i)(3).) Does the rule requiring simultaneous trial apply when the defendant enters a plea to the criminal charges? W e conclude it does not, and affirm the forfeiture of cash in this case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND After Donna O. Bradford (Defendant) was found in possession of cocaine and $2,709 in cash, the People initiated two proceedings: (1) the People char ged her with two felony counts of possessing cocaine for sale (§ 11351.5) and alleged she was on bail at
the time of the second count (Pen. Code, § 12022.1) ; and (2) the People filed a petition in court to forfeit the $2,709 in cash (§ 11488.4, subd. (a); § 11470, subd. (f)

. ) 2 The People served Defendant (through her counsel) with requests for admissions regarding the ownership and use of the cash. The People also served Defendant with written notice that
it would seek to bifurcate the upcoming criminal t rial in order to litigate the criminal charges and then the civil forfeiture action before the same jury. Just days before trial, Defendant announced her intention to enter a plea to the criminal charges in exchange for a dismissal of the on

- bail enhance ment and a sentence of three years’ formal probation subject to a suspended, 76

- month p rison sentence. The trial court asked the parties abou t the pending forfeiture action , and Defendant’s attorney responded that discovery was ongoing and that the plea d id “not affect” the for feiture proceeding. The court then accepted Defendant’s pleas.

1 All further stat utory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 The People instituted administrative forfeiture proceedings, but filed judicial proceedings once Defendant objected to the administrative forfeiture. ( People v. Angeloni (1 995) 40 Cal.Ap p.4th 1267, 1271.)3

After six months went by without any response to the People’s requests for admission, the People moved to have them deemed admitted under Code of Civil
Procedure secti on 2033.280; the motion was served on Defendant through her counsel. No one appeared for the Defendant at the hearing on the mo tion, and the court granted it. The People served a notice of ruling. Approximately two years later, the People moved for sum mary judgment in the forfeiture proceeding on the ground that the deemed admissions co nclusively est ablished
Defendant lack ed sta nding to contest the forfeiture, that the cash was used to facilitate her drug crimes and that the cash was proceeds of those c rimes . Defendant appeared, and the court appointed the public defender. Defendant oppo sed summary judgment. The court gave defense counsel time to get up to speed, but ultimately granted the motion after finding that Defendant’s prior counsel had been p roperly notified of the motion to deem
the request s admitted, and that the deemed admissions conclusively established the People’s entitlement to the property. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION The civil forfeiture provisions of California law “allow for the seizure and forfeiture of property used for, and proceeds traceable to, unlawful drug transactions.” ( People v. $400 (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1615, 1618; see generally §§ 11469

- 11495.) Where, as here, the property to be forfeited is less than $25,000 i n cash, there are three key procedural prerequisites to forfeiture , in addition to filing and notice requirements
not at issue here : (1) the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cash is the proceeds of a drug transaction, or was intended t o be or was actually used to buy drugs or to facilitate any number of drug crimes (§ § 11488.4, subd. (i)(2), 11470, subd. (f)); (2) the defendant must be convicted of an “underlying or related [drug] offense” that
occurred within five years of either the s eizure of the cash or the notice of the People’s4

intention to seek forfeiture (§ 11488.4, subd. (i)(3 ) ) 3 ; and ( 3 ) the civil forfeiture action must be “tried in conjunction” with the “underlyi ng or related criminal action” ( subd. (i)(5)), in a bifurcated pr oceeding before the same trier of fact, which is presumptively a jury (subd. (i)(3)). (See generally People v. $10,153.58 (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1525 ( $10,153.58 ).) The parties may agree to have the civil forfeiture and criminal
actions tried in a unitary proceeding (rather than a bifurcated proceeding) and may agree to have both tried before a judge (rather than a jury), but the parties cannot waive the “statutory requirement” that the civil forfeiture and criminal actions be tried “in conjunction ” with one another. ( $10,153.38, at pp. 1526

- 1527 , 1529.) Defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the civil forfeiture order in this case because (1) the forfeiture action was “tried” more than two years after she entered her pl ea, in violation of the statutory mandate that the two actions be “tried in conjunction ” with each other; and (2) the court’s grant of summary judgment violated her constitutional and statutory right to trial by jury. ( Defendant also asserts in passing th at the trial court violated her right to counsel, but that issue is forfeited because not supported by reasoned argument or citation to authority ( City of Huntington Beach v.
Public Utilities Com. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 566, 589) and is without merit becau se no such right exists in forfeiture proceedings ( People v. $30,000 United States Currency (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 936, 942

- 944). ) Our review of these claims is plenary. The first and second arguments raise questions of statutory interpretation and the se cond also challenges the constitutionality of the civil forfeiture statutes. We review each type of claim de novo . ( Finberg v.
Manset (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 529, 532 [“We review de novo questions of interpretation and constitutionality of a statute ”].)

3 The requirement that a criminal conviction precede any forfeiture was repea l ed in 1989, but reenacted in 199 4 . (See Stats. 1988, ch. 1492, § 9; Stats. 199 4 , ch. 314, § 13.)5

I. Simultaneous Trial The trial court’s duty to try a civil action seeking forfeit ure of less than $25,000 in cash “in conjunction ” with the underlying or related criminal action is a product of two statutory provisions

-- namely, subdivisions (i)(3) and (i)(5) of s ection 11488.4.
Subdivision (i)(3) provides that, as to forfeitures of less than $25,000 in cash, that:

“ A judgment of forfeiture requires as a condition precedent thereto, that a defendant be
convicted in an underlying or related criminal acti on of an offense specified in
subdivision (f) or (g) of Section 11470 . . . If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying or related criminal offense, the issue of forfeiture shall be tried before the same jury, if the trial was by jury, or tried befor e the same court, if trial was by court, unless waived by all parties. The issue of forfeiture shall be bifurcated from the criminal
trial and tried after conviction unless waived by all the parties. ” (§ 11488.4, subd. (i)(3), italics added.)
Subdivis ion (i)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that: “ If there is an underlying or related criminal action, and a criminal conviction is required before a judgment of forfeiture may be entered, the issue of forfeiture shall be tried in conjunction therewith.
Tri al shall be by jury unless waived by all parties. ” ( § 11488.4, subd. (i)(5), italics added.) Together, these provisions erect a requirement th at the defendant “be convicted” of a related drug crime before her property may be civilly forfeited, and spec ify that the criminal and forfeiture actions (1) “be tried” before the same trier of fact; and (2) “be tried in conjunction” with one another. Without exception, the plain text of these provisions addresses what must happen when the defendant is to be “tr ied” or has been “found guilty.” These words make sense only if the defendant has gone to trial on the criminal charges

-- not if she has enter ed a plea. Had the Legislature intended these provisions to apply when a defendant enters a plea, it could have s pecified that the two actions be “resolved” or “disposed of” “in conjunction” with one another. It did not, and we must give effect to that choice.6

What is more, the simultaneous trial requirement is designed to “conserve scarce judicial asset s by obviat ing the need for a second trial.” ( $10,153.38
, supra , 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.) When a defendant enters a plea, there will be at most one trial ; the policy behind subsections (i)(3) and (i)(5) of s ection 11488.4 is simply not implicated.
To be sure , a global resolution of the criminal and forfeiture actions is certainly to be encouraged. But Defendant’s argument that simultaneous resolution is required puts the defendant desiring to enter a plea to a difficult choice of (1) agreeing to a settlement
of the forfeiture action before discovery is completed, which she might otherwise have rejected in order to take advantage of the pending, favorable plea agreement; (2) rejecting the otherwise acceptable plea agreement and going to trial on the criminal c harges because she will be having a trial on the forfeiture action anyway; or (3) at a minimum
, postponing the plea until the forfeiture action is ready for trial or settlement, thereby sacrificing speedy resolution of the criminal case (cf. Cal. Const., a rt. I , § 1 5 [ criminal defendant’s “right to a speedy public trial”]; art. I, § 29 [People’s “right . . . to a speedy and public trial”]; Pen. Code, § 1382 [statutory speedy trial right]). These options are all

unsavory

. Not surprisingly , a requirement th at a defendant be forced to select from them
is nowhere t o be found in the language o f, or policy behind, s ection 11488.4. Defendant offers two further arguments in support of her position. She contends
that $10,153.38 mandates that a forfeiture action b e resolved or tried at the same time as a plea to the related criminal case. $10,153.38 does no such thing. The issue in that case was whether the People could obtain a civil forfeiture order years after the defendant
went to trial on, and was convicted o f, the related drug charges. ( $10,153.38
, supra , 179 Cal.App.4th at p p . 1523

- 1524 .) It did not deal with a defendant who entered a plea

. Moreover, as we explained above, the language and policy cited in $10,153.38 counsel that pleas be treated differen tly.
Defendant next cites the canon o f statutory construction that s tatutes imposing
forfeitures a re disfavored. ( People v. $17,522.08 U.S. Currency ( 2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1081 ( $17,522.08 ).) The task of statutory interpretation begins with the st atutory7

text; where, as here, that text is “clear and unambiguous” and consistent with the Legislature’s intent, the task ends there as well. ( Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions,
Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103; People v. Garrett (2 001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1 417, 1422 .) We consequently have no cause and no warrant to resort to any of the canons of statutory construction. ( Baeza v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222 [“‘If the language is clear and unambiguous th ere is no need for construction ’” ] .) We accordingly hold that a civil action to forfeit less than $25,000 cash need not
be tried or otherwise settled at the same time th at the criminal defendant enters a plea on the “underlying or related” criminal drug charges.
II. Trial By Jury A perso n facing civil forfeiture of her property has a constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial. “Trial by jury is an inviolate right” under the California Constitutio n. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) Section 11488.4, subdivision (i)(5) echoes this rig ht, providing that “[t]rial shall be by jury unless waived by all parties.” (§ 11488.4, subd. (i)(5).) But civil forfeiture proceedings are “civil in nature,” despite their connection to an ongoing criminal proceeding. ( $17,522.08
, supra , 142 Cal.App.4t h at p. 1083.) The right to a jury trial in civil pr oceedings is different from the right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings. In civil cases, the rig ht may be forfeited through nonassertion or by conduct (Code Civ. Proc. , § 631, subds. (a), (f)); in criminal cases, the right must be knowingly and intelligently waived ( People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1071

- 1072). More to the point, in civil cases the right to jury trial does not ripen “unless there is a genuine issue of material fact suitable for a jury to resolve.” ( Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co. (9th Cir. 1987) 831 F.2d 1440, 1447.) This is why courts may grant summary judgment in civil cases without offending the losin g party’s right to a jury trial ( Kurokawa v. Blum (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 976, 991 [summary judgment “does not improperly take away [the] constitutional right to a jury trial”]), and why courts demand strict compliance with summary judgment procedures to avoid infringing that right. ( Bahl v. Bank of America (2001 ) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 .)8

The trial court in this case granted summary judgment in the civil forfeiture action. Defendant does not raise any procedural improprieties in the court’s handling of the summary judgment motion, or its earlier order deeming admitted the Peop le’s requests for admission. As a result, Defendant’s right to a jury trial was not violated.
Defendant nevertheless raises two additional arguments, neither of which alters our conclusion. She asserts she was never informed of her right to a jury trial in the forfeiture action; whether or not notice is required, Defendant received it when the People
served her with its pre trial notice of bifurcation that spelled out that right . Defendant also suggests that the cash at issue was her tax refund, not drug money. But Defendant never answered the request for admissions and has never asserted that her failure to answer was the “result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect

. ” (Code Civ. Proc.
, § 2033.280, subd. (a)(2)

. ) T he court’s order deeming th e requested admissions to be
admitted is therefore conclusive and may not be “contested th rough contradictory evidence.” ( St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 775; Code Civ.
Proc. , § § 2033.280, subd. ( c ), 2033.410, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITIO N The judgment is accordingly affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

_____________________ __ , J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:

____________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN

- GERST

____________________________, J.
CHAVEZ