[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-15135

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00483-CEH-JSS-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAJOR MARQUIS ATKINS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(February 5, 2021)

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Dajor Atkins appeals his conviction for aiding and abetting the brandishing

of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. Atkins also appeals the district court’s denial of a two-level 

minor-role reduction in calculating his applicable guidelines range. No reversible 

error has been shown; we affirm.

Briefly stated, Atkins and codefendant Riley Harris robbed an AT&T store

on 2 June 2018. On the day of the robbery, Atkins drove himself and Harris to the 

store and backed into a parking spot. Harris then entered the store, pointed a gun 

at the store’s employees, and stole about $50,000 in cash and merchandise. During 

the robbery, Atkins stayed in the car, maintained cell phone communication with 

Harris, kept a lookout, and then acted as the getaway driver. 

In a second superseding indictment, a federal grand jury charged Atkins with 

conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 

(“Count 1”), aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1951(a) and (b), and 2 (“Count 2”), aiding and abetting the brandishing of a 

firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) 

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and 2 (“Count 3”), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 4”). 

Following a trial, the jury found Atkins guilty of the charged offenses. The 

district court later sentenced Atkins to a total of 154 months’ imprisonment: 70 

months on each of Counts 1, 2, and 4 plus a mandatory consecutive 84-month 

sentence for Count 3.

I.

Atkins first challenges the district court’s denial of his motions for judgment 

of acquittal on Count 3.

*

 Atkins contends that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to prove that Atkins had advance knowledge that Harris would use or 

carry a firearm during the robbery. 

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of judgment of acquittal on 

sufficiency of the evidence grounds.” United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 

1303 (11th Cir. 2013). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, “we 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all 

reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor.” Id. We 

* On appeal, Atkins raises no challenge to his convictions for Counts 1, 2, and 4.

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cannot overturn a jury’s verdict unless no “reasonable construction of the evidence 

would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. 

“[W]hen the government relies on circumstantial evidence, the conviction 

must be supported by reasonable inferences, not mere speculation.” Id. “[I]n 

giving effect to such inferences as may reasonably be drawn from the evidence 

juries properly apply their common knowledge, observations and experience in the 

affairs of life.” United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 

1985) (en banc). Credibility questions are for the jury; we will not disturb the 

jury’s credibility finding “unless the testimony is ‘incredible as a matter of law’”

such that “it relates to ‘facts that the witness could not have possibly observed or 

events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.’” United States v. 

Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009). 

A person is liable for aiding and abetting a federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 

2 -- and is “punishable as a principal” -- if he “(1) takes an affirmative act in 

furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s 

commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 70-71 (2014). Under 

section 924(c), a person is subject to an enhanced penalty if he brandishes a 

firearm during a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 

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A person has the requisite intent to aid and abet a section 924(c) offense

when he participates actively in the crime with advance knowledge that one of his 

accomplices will use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission. Id. at 77-78. 

Advance knowledge is “knowledge that enables [the defendant] to make the 

relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice” to either “attempt to alter [the] plan,” 

“withdraw from the enterprise,” or “go ahead with his role in the venture” and, 

thus, show his intent to aid an armed offense. Id. at 78. In other words, advance 

knowledge means “knowledge at a time the accomplice can do something with it --

most notably, opt to walk away.” Steiner v. United States, 940 F.3d 1282, 1290 

(11th Cir. 2019). When a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun 

is displayed or used by an accomplice, a jury may infer that the defendant had 

advance knowledge. Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 78 n.9; Steiner, 940 F.3d at 1292. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence 

presented at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude 

beyond a doubt that Atkins had advance knowledge that Harris planned to carry or 

use a gun during the robbery. At trial, Harris testified that -- two weeks before the 

2 June robbery -- Harris told Atkins about three earlier robberies Harris had 

committed. Harris and Atkins then agreed to commit a robbery together with 

Atkins acting as the driver. During that conversation, Harris told Atkins that, to 

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prepare for the robbery, Harris first needed to get a rental car and “a new gun.” 

When Atkins was later told by Harris that he was ready to commit the robbery, the 

jury could infer reasonably that Atkins understood that Harris had acquired a gun 

to use during the crime. 

Harris also testified that -- while both he and Atkins were in the car 

immediately before the robbery -- Harris audibly cocked his gun. It is reasonable 

to infer that Atkins heard the gun cocking and knew that Harris had brought a gun 

as planned. Atkins’s continued participation in the robbery after Harris said he 

needed to get a gun and after Harris cocked the gun supports a finding that Atkins

had advance knowledge that Harris planned to carry or use a gun during the 

robbery. 

The evidence produced at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to find Atkins 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the district court committed no error in denying 

Atkins’s motions for a judgment of acquittal on Count 3.

II.

Atkins next contends that the district court calculated incorrectly his 

guidelines range by failing to apply a two-level minor-role reduction under 

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U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Atkins argues that his role in the robbery was minimal in 

comparison to Harris’s involvement.

The district court’s denial of a minor-role reduction is a finding of fact that 

we review for clear error. United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 

(11th Cir. 2016). Under the clear error standard, we will defer to the district 

court’s findings unless we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.” Id.

Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), a defendant’s base offense level may be reduced 

by two levels if the defendant was “a minor participant in any criminal activity.” 

The defendant bears the burden of establishing his minor role by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1192. 

Two elements inform the sentencing court’s determination about a 

defendant’s role in an offense: (1) “the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for 

which he has been held accountable at sentencing;” and (2) the defendant’s “role as 

compared to that of other participants in his relevant conduct.” Id. (alterations 

omitted). About the first element, we have said that a minor-role reduction is 

appropriate “[o]nly if the defendant can establish that [he] played a relatively 

minor role in the conduct for which [he] has already been held accountable -- not a 

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minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy.” United States v. De Varon, 175 

F.3d 930, 944 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 

The district court committed no clear error in denying Atkins a minor-role 

reduction. The evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that Atkins acted as a 

lookout, maintaining cell phone communication with Harris for the duration of the 

robbery. Atkins then served as the getaway driver, began driving away from the 

scene as Harris jumped into the car, and chose the escape route. This evidence 

supports the district court’s determination that Atkins’s role was crucial to the 

ultimate success or failure of the robbery. That Atkins played a lesser role in the 

offense than did Harris -- by itself -- warrants no minor-role reduction. See id.

(“[T]hat a defendant’s role may be less than that of other participants engaged in 

the relevant conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is 

possible that none are minor or minimal participants.”). 

AFFIRMED.

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