1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri. 

2

Effective December 1, 2009, the time period prescribed in Rule 4(b)(1)(A) was

changed from ten days to fourteen days. The revised rule does not apply in this case,

however, because the judgment from which Carter appeals was entered prior to the

effective date of the amendment.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 10-2760

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri.

*

Duane C. Carter, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: December 15, 2010

 Filed: December 20, 2010

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Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

On October 29, 2009, the District Court1

 revoked Duane Carter's supervised

release and sentenced him to twenty-four months' imprisonment. When the court

entered judgment, Rule 4(b)(1)(A)2

 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
3

Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure codifies the prison

mailbox rule and states, "If an inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal

. . . , the notice is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on

or before the last day for filing." Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1). 

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required Carter to file his notice of appeal with the District Court "within 10 days after

the later of . . . the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed." The rule

allowed the District Court to extend the time in which to file the notice of appeal for

"a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed

by" Rule 4(b), but only upon a showing by an appellant of excusable neglect or good

cause. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). 

Carter signed a pro se notice of appeal and a motion for an extension of time on

December 6, 2009, outside the ten-day filing period prescribed by Rule 4(b)(1) but

within the thirty-day extension period permitted by Rule 4(b)(4). The District Court,

however, did not receive those documents until December 17, 2009, outside both the

ten-day filing period and the thirty-day extension period. To determine whether

Carter's notice and motion could be deemed timely filed under Rule 4(c),3

 the District

Court repeatedly ordered Carter to submit the declaration or notarized statement

required by the rule and attest to the date on which he placed the notice and motion

in the prison mail system. When Carter failed to provide the required documentation,

the District Court denied the motion for an extension and transmitted the matter to our

Court. We docketed the appeal on August 10, 2010. 

Pursuant to Circuit precedent, our administrative panel would typically have

dismissed Carter's untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction because we have long held

that Rule 4(b)'s ten-day filing period is jurisdictional. We elected to delay ruling in

this matter, however, because a hearing panel of our Court was considering similar

Rule 4(b) timeliness issues in a case scheduled for oral argument in September 2010.

On October 18, 2010, that hearing panel issued its decision in United States v.

Watson, 623 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 2010). Citing a series of U. S. Supreme Court
4

When the government recognizes a potential violation of Rule 4(b)(1)(A), the

better practice would be to file a motion for dismissal under Rule 27 of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure to avoid briefing on the merits.

5

Neither party cited the Watson decision in its response to the Court's order to

show cause. In fact, in its response, the government cited two cases that were

specifically identified by the Watson Court as "no longer good law." Slip op. at 3.

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decisions, the Watson Court overruled long-standing Circuit precedent that a timely

filed notice of appeal under Rule 4(b) is mandatory and jurisdictional. Id. at 546.

Instead, the Watson Court held, Rule 4(b) "is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing

rule" that may be forfeited or waived if the party asserting application of the rule fails

to timely raise the issue. Id. at 544, 545. The court noted that the timeliness

requirements of Rule 4(b) "'assure relief to a party properly raising them,'" id. at 546

(quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam)), and held that

because the government raised the timeliness issue in a motion to dismiss the appeal

and in its merits brief, the government was "entitled to dismissal," id. The Court cited

with approval an Eleventh Circuit case noting that the timeliness issue is preserved

when it is raised for the first time in a merits brief, United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d

1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009), and a Tenth Circuit case noting that the timeliness issue

is preserved when it is raised for the first time in a response brief, United States v.

Gardun ̃o, 506 F.3d 1287, 1292 n.7 (10th Cir. 2007).4 Id.

After the Watson opinion was issued, we appointed counsel to represent Carter

and directed the parties to show cause why Carter's appeal should not be dismissed as

untimely. The parties responded, and the government argued that Carter's notice of

appeal was untimely under Rule 4(b) and that he had not submitted the affidavit or

notarized statement necessary to prove that he was entitled to the benefit of Rule

4(c)(1), nor had he shown excusable neglect or good cause for failing to timely file his

notice of appeal.5

 Although a party may forfeit or waive its right to the enforcement

of a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, we conclude that by raising the timeliness

issue in its response to our show-cause order, the government has properly objected
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to the timeliness of Carter's notice of appeal and is entitled to dismissal. See Watson,

623 F.3d at 546; Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1313; Gardun ̃o, 506 F.3d at 1292 n.7. 

Carter argues that he has shown good cause or excusable neglect for failing to

timely file his notice of appeal and submit the affidavit or notarized statement required

under Rule 4(c). In the alternative, he argues that we should remand his case for the

District Court to determine whether his notice of appeal was timely. We reject

Carter's arguments. Cf. Grady v. United States, 269 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 2001)

(holding in § 2255 context that "a district court may refuse to consider a prisoner's

Rule 4(c) affidavit due to a lengthy and unwarranted delay in submission"); Porchia

v. Norris, 251 F.3d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 2001) ("We perceive no good reason to allow

an appellant to establish timely filing on remand (the second bite at the apple) when

nothing hinders the appellant from proving timely filing when he first appeals."). 

Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of a timely appeal. 

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