UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5040

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CARLOS CONJO-BERERA, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00057-RLV-DCK-2) 

Submitted: October 22, 2009 Decided: November 10, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Matthew G. Pruden, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, P.L.L.C., 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, 

Acting United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Carlos Conjo-Berera was convicted after a jury trial 

of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(2006), and one count of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) 

(2006), and was sentenced to 324 months in prison. Conjo-Berera 

timely appealed. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 During trial, Conjo-Berera called coconspirator 

Ambrocio Aly Orozco to testify, but Orozco invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, ConjoBerera sought to introduce evidence of Orozco’s prior statement 

that Conjo-Berera was not his cocaine supplier. The district 

court refused to admit the evidence under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 804(b)(3). On appeal, Conjo-Berera argues that the 

district court erred in excluding this evidence. 

 We review the district court’s rulings on the 

admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 346 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Hearsay is generally not 

admissible in evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 802. However, Rule 

804(b)(3) provides an exception to the rule when an unavailable 

declarant has made a statement against penal interest. A 

statement is admissible under this exception if: (1) the 

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speaker is unavailable; (2) the statement is actually adverse to 

the speaker’s penal interest; and (3) corroborating 

circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 

statement. United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th 

Cir. 1995). The party seeking to introduce the statement has 

the formidable burden of establishing these prerequisites. 

Blake, 571 F.3d at 350. In this case, the district court 

determined that the first two elements were satisfied, but 

Conjo-Berera failed to demonstrate “corroborating 

circumstances.” 

 We have previously listed several factors relevant in 

assessing corroboration of a statement sought to be admitted 

under Rule 804(b)(3): 

(1) whether the declarant had at the time of making 

the statement pled guilty or was still exposed to 

prosecution for making the statement, (2) the 

declarant’s motive in making the statement and whether 

there was a reason for the declarant to lie, 

(3) whether the declarant repeated the statement and 

did so consistently, (4) the party or parties to whom 

the statement was made, (5) the relationship of the 

declarant with the accused, and (6) the nature and 

strength of independent evidence relevant to the 

conduct in question. 

 

Bumpass, 60 F.3d at 1102. Our review of the record convinces us 

that the district court, having correctly found “not even a 

minimal level of corroboration,” properly ruled the evidence 

should be excluded. Because Conjo-Berera failed to meet the 

“corroborating circumstances” element of Rule 804(b)(3), the 

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district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 

Orozco’s hearsay statement. 

 Conjo-Berera next contends that the district court 

erred in calculating the drug quantity attributed to him at 

sentencing. The district court’s determination of drug amount, 

made under a preponderance of the evidence standard, is a 

factual issue we review for clear error. United States v. 

Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147 (4th Cir. 2009). We reverse only if 

“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 570 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“When a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy involving the 

manufacture of cocaine base, the district court must estimate 

the total quantity of cocaine base that could be made from any 

cocaine powder seized.” United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 

1151, 1158 (4th Cir. 1995). 

 Our review of the record convinces us that the 

district court did not clearly err in calculating the quantity 

of drugs attributable to Conjo-Berera. There was sufficient 

evidence that Conjo-Berera routinely supplied large quantities 

of powder cocaine to Michael Cherry, knowing that Cherry would 

cook that cocaine into cocaine base, and having watched Cherry 

do so on more than one occasion. Thus, this claim entitles 

Conjo-Berera to no relief. 

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 We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED