alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bull Run Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the fiscal quarterly period ended February 28, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date therein specified (the Report), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his individual knowledge and belief:  (1)
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2)
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date:
    
    April 11, 2005Signed:
    
    /s/ FREDERICK J. ERICKSONFrederick J. Erickson
Vice President  Finance and Chief Financial Officer
#### Alexander Breytman, Appellant, v Olinville Realty, LLC, et al., Respondents.

Submitted April 27, 2009;

decided June 11, 2009

Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the March 12, 2009 Appellate Division order, dismissed upon the ground that such order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution; motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the March 12, 2009 Supreme Court order, dismissed upon the ground that it does not lie *(see*NY Const, art VI, § 3; CPLR 5602).
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

August 16, 2024 SC-2022-0929 Joseph Gurganus v. Jeffrey Gurganus, Donna Connell, and Trena Wise (Appeal from Fayette Circuit Court: CV-17-10).

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the ruling on the application for rehearing filed in this case and indicated below was entered in this cause on August 16, 2024: APPLICATION OVERRULED. NO OPINION. Bryan, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. WHEREAS, the appeal in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on June 7, 2024: AFFIRMED. NO OPINION. Bryan, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
---

EXHIBIT 15.1



July 26, 2004

The Board of Directors and Stockholders of Genentech, Inc.

We are aware of the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements pertaining to the Genentech, Inc. Tax Reduction Investment Plan, the 2004 Equity Incentive Plan, the 1999 Stock Plan, the 1996 Stock Option/Stock Incentive Plan, the 1994 Stock Option Plan, the 1990 Stock Option/Stock Incentive Plan, and the 1991 Employee Stock Plan, and the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-37072) related to the resale of common shares deliverable upon the exchange of Liquid Yield Option Notes, and in the related Prospectuses, as applicable, contained in such Registration Statements of our report dated July 6, 2004, except for Note 11, as to which the date is July 23, 2004, relating to the unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements of Genentech, Inc. that are included in its Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2004.

Pursuant to Rule 436(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 our report is not a part of the registration statement prepared or certified by accountants within the meaning of section 7 or 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.





| |  | Very truly yours,   
| |  | --------------------
| |  | /s/ERNST & YOUNG LLP

---
Exhibit 4.1


    EXHIBIT
      4.1

     

    200,000,000
      AUTHORIZED, PAR VALUE $.001

     

    CERTIFICATE
      NUMBER  NUMBER
      OF
      SHARES

     

    BMX
      DEVELOPMENT, INC.

     

    INCORPORATED
      UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

    


    


                      CUSIP
      NUMBER

    


    COMMON
      STOCK

    


    


    This
      certifies that ________________________ is the owner of ________________________
      Fully Paid and Non-Assessable Shares of Common Stock Par Value $.001 Per Share,
      of BMX Development, Inc., transferable only on the books of the Corporation
      by
      the holder hereof in person or by duly authorized attorney upon surrender of
      this certificate properly endorsed. This Certificate is not valid unless
      countersigned and registered by the Transfer Agent and Registrar. 

    


    Witness
      the facsimile seal of the corporation and the facsimile signatures of its duly
      authorized officers.

    


    Date

    


    [CORPORATE
      SEAL]

    


     

    -------------------    ------------------

    President                                        
      Secretary

     

                                                                                  
      COUNTERSIGNED: 

                                                                                  
      ---------------------------
      

                                                                                  
      Transfer
      Agent and Registrar

     

                                                                                  
      Attest:_______________________ 

                                                                                  
Authorized
      Signature

    


     

                                                                                  
      [REVERSE SIDE OF CERTIFICATE]

    


     

                                                                                  
      [STANDARD TRANSFER FORM]
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**








CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF


THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








The
      certification set forth below is hereby made solely for the purpose of
      satisfying the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
      and
      may not be relied upon or used for any other purposes.





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Access Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
      Stephen R. Seiler, President and Chief Executive Officer certify pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
      2002, that (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (2) the information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
      Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
      upon request.





Signed
      at
      the City of Dallas, in the State of Texas, this 14th day of November,
      2007.





/s/
      Stephen R. Seiler


Stephen
      R. Seiler


President
      and Chief Executive Officer
#### Erica Daniels, Respondent, v Frances A. Rumsey, Appellant, and BuWayna Daniels, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 3.)

[974 NYS2d 863]

— Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Gerald J. Whalen, J.), entered August 22, 2012. The order, inter alia, granted the motion of defendant BuWayna *1411Daniels for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims against her.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Same memorandum as in *Daniels v Rumsey*([appeal No. 2] 111 AD3d 1408 [2013]). Present — Scudder, EJ., Fahey, Peradotto, Lindley and Valentino, JJ.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Mountains West Exploration, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report").  I,
Denis Iler,  President,  Chief Executive  Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
the company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge
and belief.

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.




                                         /s/ Denis Iler
                                         --------------------------------
                                         Denis Iler, President
Dated: August 19, 2005
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

COLEMAN LOUIS PAYNE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50223

D.C. No. 

3:16-cr-02666-JAH-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 9, 2018

Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Coleman Payne appeals the sentence of 80 months in custody and seven

years supervised release following his guilty plea to one count of receipt of child

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 15 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Payne first contends that the district court committed a procedural error by

inferring that all his chat room visits were for purposes of exchanging or discussing

child pornography. Payne admitted he entered the chat room several times a week

to discuss pedophilia fantasies, and the visits extended over several months. The

district court never stated that all of the visits were related to child pornography,

and the record reflects that a proportion of the visits must have been related. 

Accordingly, the sentence was not based on the adverse inference that all of

Payne’s chat room visits involved child pornography, and there was no procedural

error.

Payne also challenges the district court’s imposition of three special

conditions of release. Two restrictions - no contact with minors and not loitering

near minors - were clear in their meaning and appropriately related to the statutory

goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public from crimes similar to that of

which Payne had been convicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v.

Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d

988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court did not abuse its discretion in

imposing these special conditions of release. The restriction on access to the

internet, however, may reach too broadly in light of the variety of devices and

situations to which it might apply as written. We therefore remand for the district

2
court to clarify that the first sentence of the restriction is aimed at devices that have

the capacity to access child pornography.

As to the family responsibilities standard condition, the parties agree that the

condition should not have been included in Payne’s sentence. We therefore also

remand for the district court to strike the family responsibilities standard condition

from Payne’s conditions of supervised release. 

AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part.

3
#### Jennifer Aurilia, Appellant, v Empire Realty Associates, Respondent.

[873 NYS2d 103]

*774In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (McMahon, J.), dated October 9, 2007, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on a patch of ice on a handicap access pedestrian ramp which led to a parking lot of a shopping center owned by the defendant. The plaintiff walked down the ramp and then walked back up the ramp soon thereafter, and fell. She did not see the “clear” ice at any time before she fell. Snow had fallen approximately eight days before the accident, and the temperature fluctuated between measurements both above and below the freezing point in the days following the snowfall.

The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the ice that allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall. The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition *(see Kaplan v DePetro,*51 AD3d 730, 731 [2008]; *DeFalco v BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,*38 AD3d 824 [2007]).

Under the circumstances, it would be speculative to assume that even if the icy condition were the result of residual moisture left by the snow that fell eight days before the accident, the ice itself had been there for a sufficient period of time to give the defendant constructive notice of that condition *(see Simmons v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,*84 NY2d 972 [1994]; *Christal v Ramapo Cirque Homeowners Assoc.,*51 AD3d 846 [2008]; *Bonney v City of New York,*41 AD3d 404 [2007]; *Robinson v Trade Link Am.,*39 AD3d 616 [2007]; *DeVivo v Sparago,*287 AD2d 535 [2001]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Prudenti, P.J., Spolzino, McCarthy and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Robert E. Drury, certify that: 

 

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of eMergeInteractive, Inc.; 

 

2.  Based on my knowledge, thisannual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report; 

 

3.  Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report; 

 

4.  The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a.  designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b.  (paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986); 

 

c.  evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

d.  disclosed in this report anychange in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a.  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b.  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
exhibit10106.htm


    
      

      

    

     

    
      

      

    

    Exhibit
      10.106

     

     

    
      Mary
        24,
        2007

      


      


      


      SmarTire
        Systems Inc.

      13151
        Vanier Place, Suite 150

      Richmond,
        British Columbia

      V6V
        2J1

      


      Re:  Convertible
        Preferred Stock Held by Cornell Capital Partners, L.P.

      


      On
        March
        22, 2005 SmarTire Systems Inc. (the “Company”) entered into an Investment
        Agreement with Cornell Capital Partners, L.P. (“Cornell”) pursuant to which the
        Company sold an aggregate of $4,000,000 of its Series A 5% convertible preferred
        stock, no par value.

      


      The
        Company was required pursuant to the terms of the Investment Agreement to
        repay
        Cornell the unconverted balance of $3,780,960 on December 22,
        2006.  Such payment was not made.

      


      Cornell
        hereby agrees that an event of default as defined in the Investment Agreement
        and all related agreements to which Cornell and the Company are a party has
        not
        occurred as a result of the failure by the Company to pay Cornell the amount
        due
        on December 22, 2006 and Cornell hereby agrees to extend the date for such
        payment from March 31, 2007 as agreed to on February 15, 2007 and from May
        31,
        2007 as agreed to on March 31, 2007 to July 31, 2007.

      


      Very
        truly yours,

      


      Cornell
        Capital Partners, L.P.

      


      


      


      By: 
        /s/ David Gonzalez

      David
        Gonzalez

      Managing
        Partner & General Counsel
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gabriel RODRIGUEZ-AGUIRRE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-2117.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Nov. 2, 2006.

*226David C. Iglesias, U.S. Attorney, Laura Fashing, Office of the United States Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

Gabriel Rodriguez-Aguirre, Adelanto, CA, pro se.

Before KELLY, HENRY and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

PER CURIAM.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the defendant’s “Ex Parte Motion Requesting That Fine Payments Be Paid Direct To The Court.” We affirm.

In the district court, the defendant requested that he be allowed to make his quarterly payments directly to the court because he is unable to work in prison because of medical restrictions. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of a four million dollar fine as part of his sentence. Because he did not raise this issue before the district court, we will not address it. “Absent compelling reasons, [this court will] not consider arguments that were not presented to the district court.” *Crow v. Shalala,*40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir.1994). This rule applies in criminal as well as civil appeals. *See United States v. Eastteam,*426 F.3d 1301, 1303 n. 2 (10th Cir.2005) (“Because this argument was not properly preserved, we will not address it on appeal.”) (citing to Crow).

There is no reason present here to deviate from this general rule. The defendant had ample opportunity to challenge the imposition of the fine both in his direct appeal and in his § 2255 motion.

AFFIRMED. The government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________

NO. 09

- 17

- 00004

- CV



### _________________

IN RE TYRONE GILBERT

________________________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding

60th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. B

- 197,361

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R elator Tyrone Gilbert filed a petition for writ of mandamus, in which he

asks this Court to compel the court coordinator for the 60th District Court to file

Gilbert’s interrogatories. Gilbert contends the court coordinator has a ministerial

duty to bring Gilbert’s discovery filings and related motions to the attention of the

trial court. Gilbert has failed to demonstrate that the exercise of our mandamus

jurisdiction would be appropriate

. See generally Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §

22.221(a) , (b) (West 2004). Accordingly, we deny relief on the petition for writ of

mandamus.2 PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on January 18, 201 7 Opinion Delivered January 19, 2017

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson , JJ.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11631

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

PAUL WALDE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHARON KERI, 

Process Manager, 

JOHN DOE, 

Unnamed defendant person of 

DMV over see license suspension, 

PERSON OF DMV DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR 

VEHICLES, 

Defendants-Appellees.

USCA11 Case: 24-11631 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 07/03/2024 Page: 1 of 2
2 Opinion of the Court 24-11631

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cv-00412-RH-MAF

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM,GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. Paul Walde, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s 

February 26, 2024 final order and judgment. The statutory time 

limit required him to file a notice of appeal on or before April 11, 

2024, 30 days after the district court’s March 12, 2024 order denying 

his timely motion to reconsider the final order. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). However, he 

did not file his instant notice of appeal until May 20, 2024, and thus,

it cannot invoke our jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Hamer 

v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21 (2017).

No petition for rehearing may be filed unless it complies 

with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir. R. 40-3 and all 

other applicable rules.

USCA11 Case: 24-11631 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 07/03/2024 Page: 2 of 2