IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 29, 2018

BRIAN M. HASLETT ET AL. v. BARRY GREGORY ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 16-886-I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor

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No. M2018-01952-COA-T10B-CV

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The defendants moved to disqualify the chancellor after the denial of their motion for 

summary judgment. As grounds for disqualification, the defendants submitted that the 

chancellor had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct in denying their motion for 

summary judgment and in not promptly entering an order on a motion to compel. After 

the chancellor’s denial of the motion to disqualify, this accelerated interlocutory appeal 

followed. Because the motion identified no justifiable basis for the chancellor’s 

disqualification, we affirm. 

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Accelerated Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of 

the Chancery Court Affirmed and Case Remanded

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.

FRIERSON II and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JJ., joined.

Eugene N. Bulso, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Barry A. Gregory; Billy 

G. Gregory; Estelle A. Gregory; Scott Stephens; and Priority Trust Services MCD Trust 

#7756372.

OPINION

I.

On August 9, 2016, in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, Brian 

M. Haslett and Tina G. Haslett filed suit against Barry Gregory; his parents Billy G. 

Gregory and Estelle A. Gregory; Scott Stephens; and Priority Trust Services MCD Trust 

#7756372.

1

 As the chancery court later described, the suit arose from the plaintiffs

 

1 The suit also named as defendants S. Madison Roberts IV and Daphne M. Davis. References to 

12/17/2018
2

quitclaiming their home to a third-party in the face of an impending foreclosure/tax sale:

The Plaintiffs were delinquent in their real property tax payments and their 

home was scheduled for the Clerk and Master tax sale. According to the 

Plaintiffs, shortly before the tax sale, the Defendant Barry Gregory 

persuaded them to sign a quitclaim deed conveying their property to the 

entity, “Priority Trust Services MCD Trust #7756372,” without payment or 

other consideration. According to the Plaintiffs, they were also in default 

of their mortgage held by the Bank of America and serviced by the 

similarly named “Priority Trustee Services of TN, L.L.C.” The Plaintiffs 

contend that they transferred their real property to Priority Trust Services 

MCD Trust #7756372 because Barry Gregory deceptively caused them to

believe that he was associated with or represented Priority Trust Services of 

TN, L.L.C. and was speaking for the Bank of America. The Plaintiffs also 

contend that promises were made by Barry Gregory that they could remain 

in their home for the year and that he would take care of the mortgage. The 

deed that the Plaintiffs were persuaded to sign named an attorney, Daphne

Davis, as the deed preparer with an address at the Bank of America Plaza. 

The deed included the term “FORECLOSURE #668732161405.” Barry 

Gregory testified in his deposition that Daphne Davis did not prepare the 

deed to his trust, that he prepared the deed, and that he inserted a false

foreclosure reference in the deed to mislead investors. Barry Gregory is a 

real estate investor who has purchased thousands of properties, some of 

them at tax sales. It appears that Mr. Gregory also buys properties from 

delinquent taxpayers before tax sales, hoping to generate profits from the 

transactions.

Barry Gregory’s parents, the Defendants Billy and Estelle Gregory, 

purchased the Plaintiffs’ real property at the delinquent tax sale for an 

amount that the Plaintiffs contend, was about half of its market value. The 

Plaintiffs claim that their home was then sold for its market value, double 

the amount of the tax sale price.

Priority Trust Services MCD Trust #7756372 then sought to be 

awarded approximately $134,000 in excess funds remaining after all taxes 

and interest were paid from the purchase funds. At the time of the sale, the 

delinquent tax statutes provided that excess funds are awarded to delinquent 

taxpayers. Thus, the Court awarded the excess funds to the Plaintiffs who 

then divided the money with Priority Trust Services MCD Trust and the 

Defendant purchasers in accordance with a written agreement. The 

Plaintiffs claim that in September 2015, after the agreement was executed 

 

the defendants in this opinion exclude Mr. Roberts and Ms. Davis.
3

and the excess funds were divided, they learned that their mortgage 

servicer, Priority Trustee Services of TN, L.L.C., was not the Priority Trust 

Services, MCD Trust #7756372 to whom they conveyed their home. The 

Plaintiffs claim they also learned that neither the actual mortgage servicer 

Priority Trustee Services of TN, L.L.C. nor the Bank of America were 

involved in the transfer of the [sic] their home or in the division of the 

excess funds. Instead, the Plaintiffs learned that Barry Gregory was the 

sole owner of the trust.

The defendants think little of the suit. They question the motivations behind the 

suit.2 And they question the suit’s legal merit. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs 

signed a settlement agreement “resolving the very claims . . . asserted in . . . [the] 

Complaint.” Additionally, they argue that their dealings with the plaintiffs do not come 

within the purview of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), which forms 

the basis for some of the plaintiffs’ claims.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Among other things, the 

defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because defendant Barry 

Gregory made no representations on which the plaintiffs relied, the parties executed a 

release that barred all of the asserted claims, the plaintiffs’ dealings with the defendant 

did not “affect[] the conduct of any trade or commerce” so as to fall within the TCPA, 

and the plaintiffs’ TCPA claims were time barred. 

The chancery court denied the motion for summary judgment from the bench and 

instructed counsel for the plaintiffs to prepare a proposed order. The defendants claim 

that the court “provided no explanation or legal grounds for [its] decision.” In particular, 

the defendants fault the court for “offer[ing] no analysis or grounds for denying 

defendant’s [sic] Motion [for Summary Judgment] regarding, inter alia, plaintiffs’ TCPA 

claim and conspiracy claim” and that its justification for not granting summary judgment 

on plaintiffs’ fraud claim “had no relation to the evidence, the elements of that claim, or 

the defendants’ argument.” 

Before the court could enter its order denying the motion for summary judgment, 

the defendants moved to disqualify the chancellor. As grounds for the motion to 

disqualify, the defendants accused the chancellor of violating the rules of the Code of 

Judicial Conduct, primarily in connection with the denial of summary judgment. See

TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10. The defendants also cited a delay in the entry of an order on a 

motion to compel. 

 

2 According to the defendants, the plaintiffs’ attorney induced the plaintiffs to file suit as a means 

to exact “a measure of revenge for what [the plaintiff’s attorney] perceived to be the misfortune such 

defendants had caused him” from an earlier suit. We gave a brief description of the earlier suit in Family 

Trust Servs., LLC v. Reo Holdings, LLC, No. M2016-02524-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2203216 at *1

(Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2018), perm. appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018).
4

Specifically, with respect to their motion for summary judgment, the defendants 

alleged that the chancellor “blatantly violated [Tennessee] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 

56.04’s requirement that the court state the legal grounds upon which it denied 

defendants’ Motion.” According to the defendants, the chancellor’s omission amounted 

to a violation of Rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to 

“comply with the law.” The defendants also accused the chancellor, in making her oral 

ruling on summary judgment, of misstating the deposition testimony of one of the 

plaintiffs. The defendants asserted that this misstatement violated the requirement under 

Rule 2.5 that a judge perform judicial duties competently.

The defendants also alleged that the chancellor failed to enter an order on an 

unopposed motion to compel, which had been pending over three months. They claimed 

that the motion sought “documents necessary to defend the claims asserted against 

defendants at trial.” Again according to the defendants, the chancellor’s failure to act on 

the motion to compel constituted another violation of Rule 2.5 in that the chancellor did 

not perform her judicial duties “promptly and diligently.” Finally, the defendants 

submitted that “[a] person of ordinary prudence would conclude from these multiple 

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct—all of which favor plaintiffs—that the Court 

is not unbiased, that is, that the Court wants the plaintiffs to win this case.” As such, the 

defendants claimed Rule 2.11 required the chancellor’s disqualification. 

The chancellor denied the motion to disqualify in an order addressing each of the 

alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. On the motion for summary 

judgment, the chancellor noted that even an incorrect decision on the defendants’ motion 

would not be a sufficient basis for disqualification. And she observed that there were 

disputed issues of material fact and allegations of fraud that made the case unsuitable for 

summary judgment. Any error in her characterization of the plaintiffs’ testimony could 

be addressed at a trial on the merits. The chancellor also emphasized that an order on the 

motion for summary judgment had not been entered and that it was common for her to 

correct or modify a ruling by revising a proposed order or to reject a proposed order and 

to draft her own. 

On the motion to compel, the chancellor explained that the proposed order 

compelling the documents was filed electronically and simply overlooked. The first time 

the defendants informed the court of their concerns over the delay in entry of the order 

was in the motion to disqualify. The chancellor commented that “[i]t would have been 

helpful if the Defendants’ attorneys had notified the calendar clerk that they were waiting 

on the order” or made some mention of the matter at the hearing on summary judgment. 

The defendants petitioned for an accelerated interlocutory appeal of the denial of 

their motion to disqualify. The defendants also moved this Court to stay the proceedings 

in the chancery court pending the disposition of the appeal. We denied the request.
5

II.

A.

Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee governs the procedure 

for “determin[ing] whether a judge should preside over a case.” TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10B. 

The rule allows for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a 

motion for disqualification or recusal. Id. § 2.01. In an accelerated interlocutory appeal, 

our review is limited to the trial court’s ruling on the motion for disqualification or 

recusal. See id.; Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he only 

order we may review is the trial court’s order that denies a motion to recuse.”). We 

review a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to disqualify de novo. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10B,

§ 2.01. 

In an accelerated interlocutory appeal, we may request an answer from the other 

parties and briefing. Id. § 2.05. We may also set oral argument. See id. § 2.06. After a 

review of the defendant’s petition for recusal appeal and supporting documents, we have 

determined that an answer, additional briefing, and oral argument are unnecessary. Thus, 

we act summarily on the appeal. See id. § 2.05. 

B.

In Tennessee, litigants “have a fundamental right to a ‘fair trial before an impartial 

tribunal.’” Holsclaw v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc., 530 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tenn. 2017) 

(quoting State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 470 (Tenn. 2002)); see also TENN. CONST. art.

VI, § 11. Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must “disqualify himself or 

herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Rule 2.11(A). “[T]he test for recusal is an objective 

one.” State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 307 (Tenn. 2008). Recusal is required “when a 

person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the 

judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.” Davis v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564-65 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Alley v. State, 882 

S.W.2d 810, 820 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). The decision to recuse is vested in the 

judge’s discretion.3 State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 72 (Tenn. 2010).

To seek disqualification or recusal, a party must come forward with some 

evidence that would give a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position a 

reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10B 

 

3 The defendants do not argue that recusal was mandatory under either Article 6, Section 11 of the 

Tennessee Constitution or Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-2-101 (2009). See Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 72.
6

§ 1.01 (“The motion [for disqualification or recusal] shall be supported by an affidavit 

under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal knowledge and by other 

appropriate materials.”); Davis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313-14 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (on petition for rehearing). Here, the evidence relied on by the 

defendants is the denial of their motion for summary judgment, including the chancellor’s

ruling from the bench. To them, the oral ruling and the denial of summary judgment 

indicates bias on the part of the chancellor. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Rule 2.11(A)(1) 

(“[P]ersonal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer” are among the 

circumstances warranting recusal.). Near the end of their petition for recusal appeal, the 

defendants summarize their argument as follows:

The key issue here is whether the trial court’s summary judgment rulings 

would cause a person of ordinary prudence to question the trial court’s 

impartiality. The answer plainly is yes. No impartial trial court could so 

flagrantly disregard the clear mandate of Rule 56.04 even after such 

mandate was called to her attention. No impartial trial court could rely on 

mere assertions in a pleading to defeat a summary judgment supported by 

undisputed evidence that contradicts the assertions in a complaint.[4]

The way the defendants frame the issue for this appeal demonstrates their 

fundamental misunderstanding of recusal. The defendants erroneously equate bias with

what may or not be an error of law, denial of a motion that allegedly shows that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law.

5

 See TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04. As our supreme court explained, “[a] 

trial judge’s adverse rulings are not usually sufficient to establish bias.” Cannon, 254 

S.W.3d at 308. That is true “even if [the adverse rulings are] erroneous, numerous and 

continuous”; there must be something more to justify disqualification. Alley, 882 S.W.2d 

at 821; see also Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 308. 

The defendants have failed to show the something more that would be necessary

to justify disqualification. Their claim of partiality relies solely on one adverse ruling, 

the denial of their motion for summary judgment. Determining whether that ruling was 

in error is beyond the scope of this proceeding. In sum, we are presented with no facts 

that would support the proposition that the denial of the motion for summary judgment 

 

4 We omit one case citation from the quoted passage.

5 The defendants compounded their error in the court below by equating what may or may not be 

an error of law with a violation of the requirement of Rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Most 

Rule 1.1 violations occur “when a judge violates a criminal law in his or her personal conduct,” although 

the failure to follow “clear procedural rules of law” has also been found to be a violation. In re Neely, 

390 P.3d 728, 747-48 (Wyo. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Neely v. Wyoming Comm’n on Judicial 

Conduct & Ethics, 138 S. Ct. 639 (2018). 

 
7

resulted from the chancellor’s bias or prejudice against the defendants. 

III.

The facts asserted by the defendants did not require the disqualification of the 

chancellor. Thus, we affirm the denial of the motion for disqualification. 

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W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE