### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 29, 200 8 S es sio n

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v

. S HA N N ON A LA N GR IF F IN

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Hamilton County No. 255146 Rebec ca J. Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2007-01311-CC A-R10- CD - Filed June 26, 2008

The de fenda

nt, Shannon Alan Griff

in, was cha

rg ed with two counts of attempted fir s t deg ree murder, two counts of ag g ravated assault involving use of a deadly wea pon, and two counts of ag g ravated assault ca using se rious bodily

injury afte r twice hitting his landlord with his car

. The jury found the defe ndant g uilty

of all four

counts of ag g ra v at ed as s au l t but could not rea ch a ve rdict on the two

c ounts of a tte mpt e d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r. Th e tr ia l cou rt me rg e d the fo ur

a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult c ounts into two convictions a n d
, as to the attempted first de g ree murder c ounts, declar ed a mistrial and

or de re d a ne w tri a l. P ur su a nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure 10
, the de fe nd a nt a pp e a ls from the tria l court’s de cision, arguing that he may not be re tr i ed on the attempted f irst deg ree
mur de r c ounts be c a

us e the re did

no t e xist ma

nif e st n e c e ssi ty

fo r a mis tr ia l and a re tr ia l w ou ld v iol a te the Do u b le Je o p a r d y Cl a

u s e o f th e F if

th A me n d me n t. F o ll o w in g o u r r e v ie w , w e a f f ir m the trial

c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P. 10 Extraor din ary Appeal; Orderof the Cr iminal Cou rt A ffirm ed

A LA N E. G LE NN , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I P TO N , P.J., and T H O M A S T. W OOD ALL , J., joined.

Daniel J. Ripper, Chattanooga , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Shannon Alan Gr iffin.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Jo hn H. Ble ds oe , As sis ta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; W ill ia m H . Co x, Di str ic t A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; a nd Ba te s Br ya n, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y G e ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

At trial, Serg eant Jerome Ha lbert of the Chattanoog a Police D ep artment introduce d a

rec ording of a state ment taken from the defendant following his appre hension. I n his statement, the de fe nd a nt s a id t

hat he ha d be e n ha vin g pr ob le ms with the vic tim , w ho wa s h is l a nd lor d a nd liv e d in-2-

the oth e r s ide of

his du ple x. Se ve ra l w e e ks pr ior to t he of fe ns e s, the de fe nd a nt ca lle d the po lic e to the ir re sid e nc e be c a

us e the vic timwa s p lay ingmus ic lou dly . A ft e r t he po lic e de pa

rt e d, the vic tim pounded on the defendant’s door and threatene d to assault hi m and have him thrown in jail. Two day s befor e the of

fense s, the defe ndant g ave the victim a letter stating that he was lea ving at the end of the ne xt mon th an d a che c k f or the ne xt mon th’ s r e nt l e ss h is s e c ur ity de po sit . H e sa id t

ha t th is up se t th e vic tim , w ho re pe a te dly c a lle d h im a

nd le ft thr e a te nin g me ssa g e s ove r the ne xt tw o d a y s. On the sec ond day
, the victim wa s play ing his music loudly when the de fenda

nt returne d home from a fr i en d ’s hous e ar ound 11:00 p.m. Som etime af ter midnig ht, the defe ndant ca lled the police beca use the victim had not turned dow n his music.

The ne x t day
, the vi ctim continued to leave messag es on the defendant’s phone while he was at work. When the defe ndant arr ived home, the victim wa s not the re but his music w as p l ay i ng lou dly . T he de fe nd a nt c a lle d th e po lic e , w ho tol d him the y c ou ld not do a ny thi ng un til the vic tim

arr ived home. Hour s later, the vic tim ar rived home and the defe ndant ag ain ca lled the police. The victim left befor e the police arr ived. The defe ndant said the next thing he reme mbere d was driving down Rossvill e B oulevar d “in a ha ze.” He sa w the victim at a Kr y s t al restaurant, pulled into the p ar k i n g l o t , an d c o n f

r o n t edh i m ab o u th i s re ce n tb eh av i o r. As t h e d ef en d an twa s dri v i n g t h ro u gh the par king lot, the victim pulled out o f t h e d ri ve-throug h lane a nd cut him off. The defe ndant de c ide d to tr

y to b a c k u p a nd g o a ro un d th e vic tim ’s tr uck ; as he di d s o, the vic timg ot o ut o f h is truck, a pproac hed the de fenda

nt’s car from the pa sseng er’ s side, jumped onto the hood, and f ell over the driver ’s side. The de fenda nt estimated his speed wa s five miles per hour and said he continued driving beca

use “I know I didn’t hurt him.”

The de fenda

nt said that during the encounte r he hear d a voice telling him, “He’ s g onna scr ew y ou over.” The ne x t thing he remembe red was returning to Kry stal and see ing the victim’s fac e as his car bounc ed up and dow n. He sa id that he watc hed eve ry thing u n fold “like a

drea m” and that he did not reme mber how fast he was going or which direction he wa s traveling during his second trip throug h the Kry stal parking lot. He stated that he returne d to his apar tment and waited for the po lic e to a rr ive to r e sp on d to his no ise c omp la int . H e sa id h e be lie ve d th a t hi s “ ha ze” wa s a re su lt of the stre ss of dea ling with the victim. He de nied that he we nt looking for the victim when he g ot into his car.

Th e de fe nd a nt s a id t

hat in the da y s fol low ing the e nc ounte r, he ha d a “g ut fe e lin g ” te lli nghim to run. He dr ove to J acksonville, F lorida, to t ry t o make se nse of what had happe ned. As he was driving , he sawimag es i n his head of the victim’s fac e and his c ar bounc ing up a nd down. He the n drove to Michig an and tur ned himself in to the police.

The victim testified t hat he had a g ood rela tionship with the defendant unti l just prior to the of fe ns e s. Th e ir

re la tio ns hip be g a n to de te ri or a te wh e n th e de fe nd a nt p a rk e d h is c a r o n th e g ra ss i n front of the duplex and kicked a hole in one of the wa lls. The victim said he serve d the def endant wi th a n e vic tio n n oti c e a ft e r h e kic ke d a ho le in t he wa ll. He de nie d th a t he lef t th e ra dio on

to induce the de fenda

nt to move out.-3-

The victim stated that on May 2, 2005, he wor

ked all day and returned home around 10:00 p.m. to let his dogs out. He then w ent to Kry stal and pulled into the drive-throug h lane. He decide d that the line was too long , so he par ked his truck a

nd g ot out. He said t he only thing he reme mbere d afte r exiti ng his vehicle wa s being hit by the def endant’ s car

.
The victim testified t hat as a result of t he offenses he suffe red a lace rate d liver, a c ollapsed lun g , a nd a tr a c he oto my

. He inc ur

re d f ra c tur e s in

his na sa l bo ne , c la vic le , f e mur , r ibs , p e lvi s, sk

ull
, and ey e socke t and lost his right ey e. On c ross-examination, t h e v i cti m denied that the de fenda nt had conf ronted him about noise or that the pol ice had spoken t o him about a noise c omplaint. He de nie d e ve r t

hr e a te nin g by

ph on e to p hy sic a lly

ha rm the de fe nd a nt.

Natasha Epping er, w ho was working in the Kry stal drive-throug h on May 2, 2005, testified that at the beg inning of

her shift she sa

w t he victim ’s t ruck pull out of her drive-thr oug h line. She saw the vic tim ex it his t ruck a nd g et hit by

a small ca

r. She ca lled for he lp, then returne d to her window and saw the s ame car hit the vi ctim ag ain, drag him toward the dumpster, and drive off.

Candice B arne s was in the Kr y stal drive-throug h lane b eh i n d the victim’s truck whe n the defe ndant’s ca

r eme rg ed fr om an alley

and nea rly hit her ca

r. She said t h e def

endant pulled up b e s i d e t h e v i c t i m ’ s t r

u c k a n d c o n f r o n t e d h i m

. S h e t e s t i f

i e d t h a tt h e v i c t i m a t t e mp t e d t o p u l l a w a y, but the defendant blocke d him in. The victim got out of his truck a nd the def endant a cce lera ted. The forc e of the colli sion threw the victim over the car and onto t he pave ment. The de fenda nt left the parkinglot, and the vi ctim asked Bar nes t o call the police. Shortly there afte r, the de fenda

nt returne d to the parking lot at a hig her r ate of speed and hit the vi ctim ag ain, dra g g ing him throug h the par king lot.

Dr. Patrick J. B ower s, J r., an ophthalmologist, testified that he trea ted the victim for injuries to his right ey elid and cor nea. H e testified that the vic tim eventually lost v i s i o n i n his right e y e, which had to be remove d. Dr. Dona ld Ba rker , a g ener al surg eon who t re at ed t h e victim in the

em e r g e n c y r o o m a f

te r th e o f f e n s e s , te s ti f

ie d th a t th e v ic ti m h a d a s e v e r e p e lv ic f r a c tu r e , a fe mur fra cture , fra cture d ribs on the rig ht side of his c hest, a partially collapsed rig ht lung, a nd a lac erated liver.

The defe ndant elec ted not to testify or prese nt othe r proof. The jury beg an deliber ations at 10:25 a.m. on November

30, 2006. At some time during deliberations, the jury sent the trial cour

t

a no te statin g tha

t th e y c ou ld no t re a c h a n a g re e me nt on the a tte mpt e d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r c ounts

. At 4:15 p.m., the court called the jury into the courtroom, whe re the following exchang e took place :

TH E CO UR T: Ok a y

. Yo u a ll se nt me

. . . a no te e a rl ie r s a y ingtha

t th e re wa s a

big or small problem, that on Counts 1 and 2 y ou all wer e split and y ou thought – kind of indicate d may

be hopelessly split. Has the jury rea ched ve rdicts on Counts 3, 4, 5 and 6?

[J URY FO REPERS ON]: Yes, ma’am.-4-

THE COURT: And have y ou completed the ve rdict for ms on those?

[JURY F OR EPE RSO N]: Y e s, ma ’a m.
THE COURT: Do y ou fee l like . . . if there was a ny amount of fur

ther de liberation that y ou would be able to co m e t o gether on Counts 1 and 2 or do y ou think y ou’re hopelessly

deadloc ked?

[J URY FO REPERS ON]: The voices spoken a s though w e ar e dea dlocked. B ut I ’m not rea lly sure if the juror that fe els that way understands w hat is being said.

THE COURT: Well, y ou mean what the conseque nces a re?

[J URY FO REPERS ON]: No, ma’am.

THE COURT: Okay . Well --

[J URY FO REPERS ON]: Do y ou want me to spea k openly ? Imean -

-
THE COURT: Well, I don’t want y ou to embar rass any body or point out any

names
o r a n y t h i n g.
[JURY F OR EPE RSO N]: N o, ma ’a m, n ot c a lli ng name s.
THE COURT: Yes, g o ahea d.

[J URY FO REPERS ON]: But okay , well, we do ha ve ac cording – y ou k n o w, like
y ou say , we do have 3, 4, 5 and 6 we have thos e fill ed out, the counts. B ut on 1 and 2 is where we do divide. And that juror in pa rticular actua lly

said that they ’re basing their opinion from past experienc e. And I ’m not rea lly sure if that person

un de rs tand s w hat’ s g oin g on . A nd so by that bei ng the c a se that on e ma ke s a differ ence

. THE COURT: Okay . Well, that’s fair. Well, I know y ou’ve w orked longand har d and it sounds to me like possibly on it – as far as – what I can do is take the verdict from the others and decla

re a mistrial on Count Nos. 1 and 2 and w e’ll just try it over ag ain with a diffe rent jury . That’s what will happen.

So I ’m g oing to decla

re a mistrial on Count Nos. 1 and 2 bec ause I ’m g oing to declar e the jury

is hung on Count Nos. 1 and 2.

Subsequently , the def

endant f iled a motion t o d i s m i ss the attempted first de g ree murder counts on the g rounds that the mistrial was g rante d without manifest nece ssity
, and the r etrial of the-5-

defe ndant would place him in jeopar dy twice for the same offe nse. The trial c ourt denied the motion b y wr i t t en o rd er , s t at i n g:

The Double J eopar dy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Uni t ed S t ates Constit ution and Ar t icle I , § 10 of the Te nnessee Constit ution prohibit successive pr os e c uti on s, wh e the r t

he fi rst e nd s in

c on vic tio n o r a c qu itt a l, a nd mul tip le punishments for the same offe nse. I n a jury trial of a c ase in wh i ch t h e co u rt has jurisdiction, jeopardy

attache s when the jury

is im p an el ed and sw orn. [citation omitted]

Not ever y retria l, how ever , is unc onstitut ional. One e x ception to the g ener al unconstitution a li ty

of re trials is the exi stence of manife st nece ssity for the de clar ation of a mistrial. I n cases i n wh i ch the de fenda nt did not consent to declar ation of a mis tr ia l, s e ve ra l pr inc ipl e s g uid e the a pp lic a tio n o f t

he e xce pti on

by tr ia l c ourt s. [citations om itted]

. . . .
The recor d ref

lects t hat, when the jury

first indicated tha t it could not agr ee
on ve rd ic ts o n th e c ounts of

a tte mpt e d f

ir st- de g re e mur de r, the Court a dmo nis he d it that its verdicts must be unanimous and urg ed it to continue deliberating. One juror

even w rote to inform the Court that he would never chang e his mind. The Court’s

re sp on se wa s to su g g e st that pe rh a ps he c ou ld c ha

ng e the min ds of the oth e r j ur or s. When the jury

ag ain re ported that they could not ag ree on the ver dicts, howeve r, the Court inquired whethe r they wer e hopelessly deadloc ked. Althoug h the fore person did not respond to this inquiry with a simple “ y es” or “no”, from his r esponse a nd the Court’s prior exchang es with the jury , it was appa rent to the Court that i t would be futile to repe at the unanimit y instruction or give the jury another opportunity

to ag ree

. The Court there fore finds t hat there was a manifest nec essity

for the de clar ation of a mistrial on the counts of attempted fi rs t-deg ree murder. I t follows that the discharg e of the jury

pursuant there to did not ope rate as an a cquittal on and does not bar the retria l of those counts.

The de fenda

nt then filed an e x traordina ry a p p e a l, p u r s u ant to Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 10, challengingthe trial cour t’s ruling that he may

be re tried on the attempted first deg ree murder

c ounts

.

AN AL YSI S

Th e de fe nd a nt a rgue s that he may no t be re tr ie d o n th e a tte mpt e d f ir st d e g re e mur de r c ounts be c a us e a mis tr ia l w a s n ot r e qu ir e d b y manif e st n e c e ssi ty , a

nd re tr ia l w ou ld p la c e him

tw ic e in jeopar dy for the sa

me offe nse, in violation of the Fif th Amend m en t

. T h e State re sponds that-6-

manif e st n e c e ssi ty

wa s p re se nt an d re tr ia l doe s not vio la te the Do ub le Jeop a rd y Cla us e

. As we wi ll explain, we ag ree with the State.

I. Manif est Ne cessity

No pe rs on

sh a ll, fo r t

he same of

fe ns e , b e tw ic e pu t in

je op a rd y of lif e or lim b. U. S. Co ns t. amend. V; Te nn. Const. art. I , § 10. The prohibition on double jeopar dy protec ts a g ainst a sec ond pr os e c uti on

fo r t he same of

fe ns e a ft e r a c qu itt a l or

c on vic tio n a

nd mul tip le punis hme nts fo r t he same offe nse. State v. B eaur eg ard, 32 S.W.3d 681, 682 (Tenn. 2000). I n a jury trial, jeopar dy

attache s when the jur

y is sworn. State v. Penning ton, 952 S.W .2d 420, 422 (Tenn. 1997)

.
Where a defe ndant’s first trial is terminate d befor e a finding of g uilt or a cquittal, a sec ond prosec ution for the same offe nse is not barr ed if there exis ted a “ manifest nec essity ” for termination of the fir st pro ce ed i n g, reg ardle ss of the def endant’ s consent or obje ction. State v. Smit h, 871 S.W .2d 667
, 6 7 1 -7 2 (T en n. 1994); State v. Mounce, 859 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tenn. 1993) . “The impossibi lity

of a jury

rea ching a ver dict has long been rec og nized as a suffic ient rea son for decla ring a mistrial. ” I d

. at 3 2 1 -2 2. The fa ilure of a jury to rea ch a ve rdict is not an eve nt which terminates jeopa

rdy . Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984)

.
Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court ha s a do pte d s e ve ra l pr inc ipl e s to g uide t ri a l c ourt s in the ir application of the manifest nec essity doctrine. The deter

mination of whe ther to g rant a mistrial and permit a re trial rests with the sound discre tion of the trial cour t. When ascer

taining w hether

a mistrial is appropriate, tria l c ourts should c onsider all rele vant fac tual circ umstances, and the bur den of pr ov ingmanif

e st n e c e ssi ty

re sts on the Sta te . “ F ina lly , r e tr ia l wil l no t be pr oh ibi te d b y do ub le jeopar dy principles whe re the ends of just ice, unde r the c ircumstance s, would otherwise be defe ated, or whe re the circ umstances show that a fa ir and unbiase d tri al co u l d not be had, or wher e any unfore seen e merg ency , conting ency , or happe ning a fter the empane ling of the jury preve nts the trial from g oing f

orward ac co rd ing to or derly and esta blished leg al proc edure .” Smith, 871 S .W.2d at 672. Additionally , “g reat defe renc e should be paid by a re viewing court to the trial c ourt’s dec ision to declar e a mistrial bec ause the jury is unable to ag ree upon a ver dict.” I d. at 672-73.

The defenda

nt arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in dec laring a mistrial beca use it did not

a sc e rt a in w ithc e rt a int

y wh e the r the jur

y wa s “ ho pe le ssl y de a dlo c ke d. ” I n su pp or t of thi s a rgume nt, he cites State v. Skelton, 77 S.W .3d 791, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) , wher e this court held that when juror s return w ith a non-unanimous vote, the tria l court must ei t her r eturn them to the jury

room for further deliberations or ask the jurors whether they believe a verdic t might be possible af ter fu rt h e r d e l i b e r a t i o n

. H e a r g u e s t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u rt a s k e d t h e j u r y w h e t h e r i t be lie ve d it could re ach a

unanimous verdict, the f

orepe rson’s re sponse, “The voices spoken a s though w e ar e d e a d l o c k e d
, ” i s t o o a m b i g u o u s t o s u p p o rta f i n d i n g o f m a n i f e s tn e c e s s i t y.
We disag ree with the defendant’s contention that the circumstances did not support the trial court’s f inding of manifest nec essity

and dec lara tion of a mistrial. The re cord r efle cts that the jury deliberated for ne arly

six hours before determining that it could not rea ch a ve rdict on the a ttempted-7-

fi rs td egr ee m u rd er co u n t s

. I n cl u d ed i n t h e re co rd i s a no t e f ro m o n e j u ro r t o t h e t ri al co u rt s t at i n g, “I shall not chang e my

mind reg ardle ss of how long we deliberate.” I n response to this note, the trial court encour ag ed the juror to attempt to chang e the minds of the other jurors. I n its order de ny ing the de fe nd a nt’ s mot ion to dis mis s, the tr ia l c ourt state d that juro rs sh oo k th e ir he a ds to i nd ic a te the ir lack of hope of unanimity when asked if fur ther de liberations might be productive. A s stated above
, we a ffor d g reat defe renc e to a tria l court’s de cision to gr ant a mistrial based on the inability of the jur y to r e a c h a

un a nim ou s verd ict

. The re c or d s up po rt s th e de te rm inatio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

that a

m i s t r i a l w a s w a r

r a n t e d b y m a n i f e s tn e c e s s i t y.

II. Retr ial

Th e de fe nd a nt a lso a rgue s th a t he may no t be re tr ie d f

or the tw o c ounts of atte mpt e d f ir st deg ree murd er beca

use to do so would place him twice in jeopar dy for the sa

me offe nse. He

a na log ize s to Sta te v. Ad a ms, 97 3 S.W.2 d 224 , 229 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 7) , w he re thi s c ourt he ld th at t h e d efendant could not be c onvicted of both a g g ravated assault and attempted first deg ree murder, based on the s ame c riminal conduct, be cause the two offe nses wer e the same for pur poses of double jeopa

rdy analy sis. The Adams cour t reve rsed the defe ndant’s convic tion for ag g ravated assault and va cate d the defe ndant’s sente nce f or that off ense. I d. The State a g ree s that the defe ndant may not be convicte d of both ag g ravated assault and attempted first deg ree murder but arg ues that Adams does not bar re trial of the de fenda nt. The State conte nds that if the def endant is convic ted of attempted f

irst deg ree murder a

t the second trial, the prope r proc edure is to merg e his convictions for attempted first deg ree mu rd er and ag g ravated assault. As we will ex plain, we a g ree with the State.

I nitially , we note that Adams is disti nct from this ca se. Ther e, the de fenda nt was convic ted in the same proc eedingof both attempted fir st deg ree murder a nd ag g ravated assault. The holding in Ad a ms wa s ba se d on the pr inc ipl e that a de fe nd a nt may no t be punis he d tw ic e fo r the same offe nse. 973 S.W.2d at 229. I n the pre sent appe al, the def enda n t was c onvicted of a g g ravated assault, but the jury could not r eac h a verdic t on attempted first deg ree murder. To this point, he ha s be e n s ub je c te d to on ly

on e punis hme nt f

or e a c h ins ta

nc e of str iki ng the vic tim

. Ad a ms d oe s n ot h old that a def endant may

not be retried following a finding of g uilt on agg ravated assault and a mistrial on attempted first de g ree murder.

As to this iss u e , th e St a te r e li e s u p o n St a te v

. Co n w a y , 7 7 S. W. 3 d 2 1 3 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. App. 2 0 0 1 )
, i n w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n tw a s c h a r g e d

w i t h D U I an d

D U I p e r se based on the same c riminal conduct. The jury

at his first trial acquitted him of DUIbut could not rea ch a una nimous verdict on t h e c h a r g e o f D U I pe r se

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s r e tr i e d a n d c o n v i c t e d o f D U I pe r se . Conway , 77 S.W. 3d a t 21 7. He a rgued on a pp e a l th a t hi s r e tr ia l pl a c e d h im twi c e in j e op a rd y fo r t he same of fe ns e . H ow e ve r, thi s c ourt a ff ir me d h is c on vic tio n, ho ldi ng that the do ub le je op a rd y c la us e did

n o tp re cl u d e t h e S t at e f

ro m re t ry i n g t h e d ef

en d an tb ec au s e b o t h DU Ian d D U I perse could be deter mined by the jury without an election, and each offense contained differ ent elements. I d. at 218.-8-

I n this c a se , unli ke Conwa y , th e de fe nd a nt w a s convic ted of on e of fe ns e a nd the jur y c ou ld not rea ch a verdic t on the second offe nse. Neve rtheless, the holding of Conway rema ins applicable. The jury could make a

deter mination of g uilt or innocence on both attempted first deg ree murder a nd ag g ravated assault wi t h o ut the State making an ele ction. The off enses of attempted first de g ree murder a nd ag g ravat ed as s au l t contain diffe rent e lements. Compare Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13- 20 2( a ), 39 -1 2- 10 1 a

nd Te nn . Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -1 02 (a ). Re tr ia l of the de fe nd a nt w ill no t vi olate his Fifth Amendment r ight not to be place d twice in je opardy for the same offe nse. I f the de fenda nt is convicted of attempted first deg ree murder upon r etrial, his attempted fi rs t d egree murde r conviction(s) w ill merg e with his ag g ravated assault convictions. See S tate v. Calvin Fleming , No. W2006-00098-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 609889, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2007)

.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g a

uth or iti e s and

re a so nin g , th e jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l court

is aff irmed.

___________________________________ ALAN E. G LENN, JUD GE