UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHONICE G. GARNETT et al. , Plaintiffs,

v. LAURA ZEILINGER , Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-1757 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER States that participate in the federal Supplemental Nutrition A ssistance Program (“SNAP”) must comply with stric t statutory deadlines for proces sing benefit applications and periodically recertif ying benefit eligib ility. Plaintiffs, thr ee classes of District of Columbia residents, have sued the directo r of the agency that administer s the District’s SNAP program for alleged noncompliance with these deadlines and now move for a p reliminary injunction. The injunction sought would compel the District to: (1) adhere to the statutory timelines for processing both initial and period ic recertification applicatio ns; (2) timely notify eligible households that their benefits w ill expire absent recertificati on; and (3) notify households of any delay in the processing of their applications and of their righ t to a hearing to cont est adverse or delayed eligibility determinations. The Court will grant the plaintiffs’ motion in part. It will i ssue an injunction requiring the District to process SNAP r ecertification applications withi n the statutory d eadlines, which it has fallen well short of doing in the recent past. The Court d eclines, however, to extend that injunction to the processing of in itial applications. The evid ence before the Court suggests that the District is making progress to wards full compliance with th at particular deadline, with the active assistance and supervision of the Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service,2 the federal agency that oversees SNAP. Additional judicial int ervention is therefore unnecessary at this juncture and would be cont rary to the public interest. The Court will instead continue to monitor the District ’s performance as the litigation progresses and consider extending the injunction to initial applicatio ns as warranted. Finally, the Court will also decline to issue injunctions ordering the Distri ct to provide the requested noti fications, finding tha t the plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evid ence at this stage of the litig ation to establis h a likelihood of success on the merits of those claims.

I. Factual Background A. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) Congress originally enacted the Supplemental Nut rition Assistan ce Program (“SNAP”) in 1964 in an effort to combat hunger and malnutrition by providin g assistance to low-income households for purchasing f ood. See Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. ). 1 States can elect to partic ipate in SNAP and, if they do, are responsible for certifying hous ehold eligibility for benefi ts, issuing benefits, and otherwise administering the program on t he state level. Id. §§ 2013(a), 2020(a)(1); 7 C.F.R. § 271.4. The federal government, in turn, provide s the funding for benefits and covers 50 percent of the administrative costs borne by the States. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2025. If a State elects to participate, it must administer its SNAP program in accordance with the SNAP Act and the Secretary of Agriculture’s imp lementing regulations. See 7 U.S .C. § 2020(e); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2.

1 The program’s name was changed from its original name, the “Fo od Stamp Program,” to SNAP in 2008. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 200 8, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 4001, 122 Stat. 923, 1092.3 One of the responsibilities thatparticipating States have is v erifying a household’s eligibility to receive be nefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a)(1). A hou sehold is eligible for SNAP benefits if its net income is below the federal poverty line and its ass ets generally do not exceed $2,000. Id. § 2014(c), (g). The statute and pe rtinent regulations also detail how States must process applications for benefits. Fir st, States must allow a househol d to apply for SNAP benefits the same day that it contacts a SNAP program office in person durin g office hours. Id. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iii). Once a Stat e receives an application for benefits, it must “promptly” certify a household’s eligibility. I d. § 2020(e)(3). This certificati on process must be completed and benefits provided no later than th irty days after the applicati on’s filing. Id. For certain households with extremely low income—less than $150 per month o r liquid assets less than $100—the State must provide bene fits no later than seven days a fter an applica tion is filed. Id. § 2020(e)(9)(A). These are known as “expedited” applications. States must also notify the household when it acts on the hous ehold’s app lication, by sendi ng an approval, denial or “pending status” notific ation within the sta tutory time period. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g). Eligible households are certified to receive benefits for a sp ecific period of time, known as the “certification perio d.” See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4). Sta tes are required to ensure that households receive a notice at the start of the last month of their certification period, warning them of the expiration of the certification period and of the n eed to recertify eligibility to continue receiving benefits. I d. For any household that submi ts a recertification application no later than fifteen days prior t o the expiration of its certific ation period, the State must provide benefits—if the household remai ns eligible—without a break in s ervice. Id. Finally, States must provide households the opportunityfor a hearing if the househo ld is aggrieved by the State’s action. Id. § 2020(e)(10).4 Within the federal government, t he Secretary of Agriculture has delegated most of the administration of SNAP to the F ood and Nutrition S ervice (“FNS” or “the Service”), a component agency of the Department of Agriculture. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3. The Service engages in detailed oversight of the States’ administration of their SNAP programs. For instance, State agencies are required to submit a variety of plans to the Servi ce for approval, such as plans for the computerization of benefit program administration, id. § 27 2.10, annual budget plans, id. § 272.2(c)(1)(i), and plans for qua lity control sampling, id. § 275.11(a). See also id. § 272.2(d) (listing other plans requiring S ervice approval). In addition, States must submit a quarterly summary of their operations t o the Service. Id. § 272.2(c)(1)( ii). Another way in which the Service oversees the administration of State benefit programs is through an annual “quality cont rol review” process. As partof their performance reports to the Service, State agencies are required to perform a quality c ontrol review on a sample of households that either receive d SNAP benefits (“active” cases) or had benefits suspended, denied, or terminated (“neg ative” cases). Id. § 275.10(a). Ea ch case in the sample is then reviewed to check, among other things, whether the household re ceived the correct amount of benefits or whether the State a ccurately terminated or denied b enefits. Id. State agencies submit the results of this quality control review to the Service, whic h further analyzes the results to determine whether the State is in compliance w ith its obligatio ns and to determine error rates for the State’s grants and denials of benefits. Id.; see also id. § 275.3(c) (discussing the Service’s verification of Sta te-reported error ra tes); id. § 275.23(b)(2) (same). Based on the information reported through the quality contro l review, the Service also a wards bonuses to States that show “high or improved performance” on a variety of measures, includ ing error rates for payment5 determinations, accuracy of benefit determinations, and timelin ess of processing applications. Id. § 275.24. Along with this reporting and appr oval oversight, the Service c an levy punitive sanctions if State agencies do not comply w ith their statutory and regula tory obligations. For instance, the Service may temporarily suspend a ll or a portion of the federal funds a State receives to cover administrative costs. Id. § 276.4( b). This suspension “shall remain in effect until [the Service] determines that a State agency has taken adequate corrective ac tion to correct the problem causing the suspension.” Id. The Service can also disallow al l or part of the administrative funds the State agency receives. Id. § 276.4(c). Prior to sus pending or disallowing funds, the Service must provide a warni ng to the State agency. Id. § 276. 4(d). To avoid the proposed sanction, the State agency typica lly must submit a corrective a ction plan that “ determine[s] appropriate actions to reduce s ubstantially or eliminate defici encies in program operations.” Id. § 275.16(a); see also id. § 276.4(d)(i i) (requiring submission of a corrective action plan). The State agency can administrativ ely appeal any suspension or disa llowance of federal funds. Id. § 276.4(f); see also id. § 276.7 (desc ribing the administrative appeal process). Finally, the Service can also elect to seek i njunctive relief against the St ate in federal court to ensure compliance. Id. § 276.5.
B. The District’s administration of SNAP In the District of Columbia, S NAP is administered by the Econom ic Security Administration, an agency within t he District’s Department of H uman Services. Def.’s Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Def.’s Opp’n”) Ex. A (“First Zeilinge r Decl.”), ¶ 6. The Administration also oversees the District’s othe r assistance programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”). Id. ¶ 7. The District operates five servic e centers spread throughout the city6 to provide in-person assistance to those seeking benefits. Id. ¶ 13. These service centers are operated Monday through Friday and handle applications for SNAP and other benefits, including interviewing applicants and pro cessing applications. Id. ¶¶ 13 –14. In addition to running the five service centers, the Distric t also operates a call center that residents ca n contact by telephone for assistance with benefits-r elated issues. Id. ¶ 17. As wit h the service centers, the call center operates Monday through Friday, t hough it also has an automated self-service interactive hotline available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. On October 23, 2017, the District re ceived a letter from the Se rvice indicating it would need to submit a corrective acti on plan aimed at raising the Di strict’s rate of timely processed applications for SNAP benefits . Pls.’ Reply Def.’s Opp’n (“Pls .’ Reply”) Ex. 1, Ex. O (“October 23, 2017 FNS Letter”). 2 The District submitted a draf t corrective action plan on Dece mber 14, 2017, which the Service could not a pprove due to a lack of suff icient detail. Def.’s Suppl. Br. Supp. Opp’n (“Def.’s Suppl. Br.”) Ex. 1 (“Fourth Zeilinger Decl aration”), ¶¶ 8–9. A revised plan was submitted on February 9, 2018, which the Service again declined to approve because of insufficient detail. Id. ¶¶10–11. The Service arranged a tra ining on March 14, 2018 to assist the District in creating an appr opriate plan. Id. ¶ 12. The Distr ict submitted a new working draft to the Service on March 28, 2018, and the Service indicated that t he draft was “what [it’s] looking for.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14. The second revised plan was submitted to the Service on April 11, 2018. Id. ¶ 15. The Court is unaware of its acceptance status at this ti me.

2 The plaintiffs note that the Dis trict has previously been requ ired to submit corrective action plans, which they contend s hows the ineffectiveness of t hat process. But these prior plans dealt with error rates, not timeliness rates. See, e.g., Mem. Law Supp. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj.”) Ex. 1, Ex. W (Nov. 2014 corrective action plan); id. Ex. Z (May 2016 corrective action plan). As a r esult, they are of limited valu e here.7 C. Procedural history In August 2017, a group of D.C. res idents filed suit against Laura Zeilinger, the Director of the District’s Department of H uman Services, alleging that the District’s administration of SNAP was deficient in several respects. 3 Specifically, the plaintiffs alle ged that the District was: (1) failing to process initial applications for benefits and to provide benefits to eligible households within the applicable statutory time limits, in viol ation of the SNAP Act, Am. Compl. ¶ 171; (2) failing to imple ment the SNAP recertificationprocess so as to allow eligible households to continue to receive benefits without a break in s ervice, also in violation of the SNAP Act, id. ¶ 172; and (3) faili ng to provide notice of delay s in processing applications and of the opportunity for a hearing, i n violation of the SNAP Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmen ts, id. ¶ 173. The plaintiffs sou ght declaratory and injunctive relief correcting these violati ons. In conjunction with their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, w hich the Court granted on Marc h 28, 2018, certifying three classes. See Garnett v. Zeili nger, 2018 WL 1524748 (D.D.C. Mar ch 28, 2018). The plaintiffs then filed this m otion for a preliminary injunct ion seeking an order requiring the District to (1) proc ess SNAP benef it applications in accordance with the statutory timelines, (2) provide the opportuni ty for recipients to comple te the recertification process and have SNAP benefits issued for t he new certification period in a timely manner, and (3) send written notice of processing delays and of the opportunity for an administrative hearing to households whose applications w ere delayed in processing. Mem . Law Supp. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj.”) at 1.

3 While Director Zeilinger is technically the sole defendant in this case, the Court will refer to the defendant as “the District.”8 After the District filed its oppos ition to the motion for a pre liminary injunction, the plaintiffs moved to stay briefi ng to allow them to conduct limi ted, expedited discovery on several factual issues raised by the District’s opposition, inc luding a dispute over the accuracy of several reports submitted by the District to the Food and Nutri tion Service. At a December 1, 2017 status conference, the Court directed the parties to meet and consider whether the case should be stayed to allow for further discussion of settlement or the narrowing of disputed issues. See Minute Order (Dec. 1, 2017). W hen the parties reported tha t they were unable to reach any agreement, the Court granted i n part the plaintiffs’ motion for expedited discovery. See Order (Dec. 15, 2017). It permitted the p laintiffs to conduct a limi ted, four-hour corporate representative depos ition on four specific topics and ordered t he District to make more recent versions of the relevant timelin ess reports available to the pl aintiffs. Id. at 6. Following this discovery, the pa rties completed briefing on the preliminary injunction motion. The Court held a heari ng on the motion (along with the then-pending motion for class certification) on March 19, 2018. It then ordered a further ro und of briefing addressing some additional issues, which w as completed on April 24, 2018. The motion is now ripe for resolution.

II. Legal Standard “A preliminary injunction is a n extraordinary remedy never awa rded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The party seeking a preliminary injunction thus bears the burde n of making a “clear showing tha t [he] is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. To make such a showi ng, the party must establish: “ (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likel y to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3)9 that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that aninjunction is in the public interest.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotin g Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

III. Analysis The plaintiffs move for a three -fold injunction that would requ ire the District to: (1) adhere to the statutory timelin es for the processing of all SNA P benefit applications, (2) send out recertification notic es on time as required by the statute, and (3) provide recipients notice of any delays in processing their app lications and of their right to a hearing. The Court will grant the plaintiffs’ first request in pa rt but will deny the other two.
A. Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunc tion requiring the District to process initial and recertification SNAP applications in a timely manner. First, the plaintiffs request a n injunction requiring the Distr ict to process initial and recertification applic ations in accordance with the statutory t imelines. Looking to the four factors for injunctive relief, the Court will grant this part o f the plaintiffs’ request as to the processing of recertification appl ications and will impose moni toring and reporting requirements as to the processing of in itial applications.
1. Likelihood of success on the merits In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs mus t first demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392. Whether the plaintiffs have met this requirement depends in part on whether the SNAP Act requir es absolute or substantial compliance with the timelines f or processing applications. The District argued at the hearing that the Court should follow the approach taken by the Third Ci rcuit in Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1979), which only required substantial compliance with the statute. But Shands is not the proper analog here. For one, Shands is of limited valu e because it involved a different statutory provision and scheme, na mely a requirement under the Aid to Families with Dependent10 Children program (now the TANF program) to provide hearings upo n request. Id. at 1160. Moreover, the approach taken in S hands has since been rejected by multiple courts, which have instead required absolute compliance with statutory requirement s for the administration of welfare programs. See, e.g., Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 13 85, 1387–88 (9th Cir. 1991); Alexander v. Hill, 707 F.2d 780, 784 ( 4th Cir. 1983); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2005 WL 342106, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005). This includes multiple decisions involving the SNAP Act processing timelines at issue here. See Haskins v. Stanton, 79 4 F.2d 1273, 1274 (7th Cir. 1986); Briggs v. Brembly, 2012 WL 6026167, at *17–18 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 792 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2015); Robidou x v. Kitchel, 876 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Vt. 1995); Robertson v. Jackson, 766 F. Supp. 470, 476 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992). As the Court discussed in mor e detail in its opinion on class c ertification, the requirement for absolute compliance with t he timelines for processing appli cations flows directly from the statutory text itself. This text “literally requires strict co mpliance with its provisions.” Haskins, 794 F.2d at 1277; cf. Withrow, 942 F.2d at 1387 (describing sim ilar language in regulations implementing other aspects of the SNAP Act as “unequivocal”). It provides that States shall process applications within a s pecific number of days, without limitations or caveats. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3), (9). In light of this statutory text, the Court joins the we ight of authorities rejecting the approach in Sha nds and concludes that the SNAP Ac t requires absolute compliance. The Court further concludes th at the plaintiffs have demonstrat ed a substantial likelihood of showing the District has faile d to meet this standard. For one, the District conceded at the hearing that it was processing l ess than 95% of applications ontime. Hr’g Tr. 52:19 (March 19, 2018). This concession is confirme d by the evidence in the rec ord that the plaintiffs have11 presented, namely recent data on two metrics of timeliness used by the Food and Nutrition Services. The first such metric is known a s the “Applica tion Processing T imeliness” or “APT” rate. See U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture , Food & Nutrition Serv., “Clarifi cation on the three ways initial SNAP application processing time liness is measured,” at 1 (June 2, 2017). 4 This statistic exclusively covers the timely processing of initial applications, not recerti fication applications, and is calculated based on the sam ple of cases used in the Stat e quality control process. Id. To calculate the APT rate, the F ood and Nutrition Service divides the total number of sample applications timely disposed of by the total number of approved sample applications. Id. at 1–2. The Service then calculates a 95% confidence interval for the A PT rate. Id. When determining whether a State is eligible for a performance bonus or needs to submit a corrective action plan, the Service uses the upper bound of t his confidence interval. Id. The second timeliness metric invo lved here is the overdue appli cation rate, calculated from data contained in quarter ly reports submitted by States. Id. at 4. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2017, the Service has required States to submit rep orts each quarter of the fiscal year (known as “FNS-366B reports”) tha t detail the total number of a pplications—broken down further into the number of r ecertification, initial, and expedi ted applications—approved or denied that quarter as well as how many applications were approved “ov erdue.” Id. According to the

4 While this memorandum is not i n the record, the Court may take judicial notice of an official agency memoranda posted on that agency’s website. See , e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hea lth & Human Servs., 43 F. Supp. 3d 2 8, 33 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Courts in this district have frequentlytaken judicial notice of information posed on official public websites of government agencie s.”). This memo can be found onl ine at https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/clari fication-three-ways-initial- snap-application-processingtimeliness-measured.12 Service, an application is appr oved “overdue” if it was approve d after the requisite statutory time limit ( i.e. , 7 days after submission of an e xpedited application or 30 day s after submission of a standard application). Id. at 5; see also U.S. Dep’t of Agricu lture, Food & Nutrition Serv., “Clarifications for Reporting on t he Certification Section of the FNS-366B,” at 3 (Jan. 11, 2017). 5 Using the data in these reports , a rate of applications appro ved overdue—and thus not within the statutory time limit—can be calculated. The most recent data under both of these metrics indicates that the District is not in full compliance with the statutory timelines. With respect to the A PT rate, the most recent data covers the FNS quality control audit for April to September 201 7. Based on a sample of 279 cases, the District approve d only 87.10% of these cases on time , with an upper limit of the confidence interval of 91.03%. Def.’s Suppl. Br. Ex. 1, Ex. A, at 3. Both of these numbers are obviously below full compliance . Similarly, according to the m ost recent FNS-366B report—for the first quarter of fiscal y ear 2018—the District approved a t otal of 74.54% of applications on time, which includes 94.97% of initial applications, 59.28% of recertification applications, and 94.81% of expedited applications . Def.’s Surreply Supp. Opp’n (“Def.’s Surreply”) Ex. B. 6 These numbers, too, indicate that t he District is not in full c ompliance with the statutory

5 The Court takes judicial no tice of this January 11, 2017 FNS m emorandum as well. See, e.g., Pharm. Research, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 33. The memo can be found online at https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fns -366b-certificati on-section-qu estion-and-answer-memo.

6 To calculate this rate, the C ourt first found the total number of applications approved overdue by adding together the a pplications approved overdue 1- 30 days (Column D in the form), approved overdue 31-60 days ( Column E), approved overdue 61-90 days (Column F) and approved overdue 91+ days (Column G) for each category of appli cations (“total” applications, which encompasses all types; ini tial; recertification; or exped ited). The Court then divided this sum by the total number of approved applications (Column A) for each category of applications and multiplied the result by 100 to arrive at a percent.13 requirements. In light of this e vidence and the statute’s requ irement for full compliance, the Court concludes that the plain tiffs have shown a substantial li kelihood of succeeding on the merits.
2. Irreparable injury Next, the plaintiffs must demons trate that they “would suffer i rreparable injury if the injunction were not granted.” C haplaincy of Full Gospel Church es v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). With respect to irreparable injury, the D.C. Circuit has “set a high standard”—the injury alleged must be “certain and great,” “actu al and not theo retical,” and “beyond remediation.” Id. (citations omitted). In addition, t he injury must be “of such imminence that there is a ‘cle ar and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.’” Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). Declarations from class represen tatives and members establish t hat, without benefits, class members are unable to obtain enough food for themselves a nd their families, requiring them to skip meals and go hungry. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. Prelim Inj. Ex. 2, ¶ 13 (Decl. of Shonice G. Garnett) (“I skip meals all the time.”); Pls.’ Reply Ex. 4, ¶ 9 (Decl. of Nelson Bostic) (“I would just have days where I d idn’t get enough to eat.”). This is particularly true for recipients with dietary restrictions, fo r whom finding food can be particu larly burdensome. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 8, ¶ 25 (Decl . of Elizabeth Telson) (desc ribing difficulty finding substitute meals due to lactose intoleranc e); Decl. of Kathryn Harris [ECF No. 27-6] ¶ 7 (describing difficulty finding substitute m eals due to irritable bowel syndrome). Even for those recipients who are able to obtain food, doing so can come at the cost of p aying for other necessary survival expenses, such as rent, elect ric bills, or phone bills. See, e .g., Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 6, ¶ 16 (Decl. of Diamond Moore) (“I coul dn’t keep up with the rent bec ause I needed the money for14 food . . . I also got behind on my e lectric bill.”); id. Ex. 7, ¶ 10 (Decl. of Sandra Bonilla de Leonzo) (“I had to pay my rent late.”). The harms described in these affidavits—forgoing food or other necessities— are clearly irreparable in nature. “[T]he deprivation of food ‘is extremel y serious and is quite likely to impose lingering, if not irreversib le, hardships upon recipient s.’” Haskins, 794 F.2d at 1276–77 (citation omitted); see al so, e.g., Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[B]ack payments cannot ‘erase either the experience or t he entire effe ct of several months without food, shelter or other necessities.’” (citation omitted)). The District does not disagree . Instead, it argues that the p laintiffs have failed to show that their injury is sufficiently imminent to sustain injunctiv e relief. Def.’s Opp’n at 30; Def.’s Surreply at 21. This is so, it sa ys, because the plaintiffs ha ve not shown that the issues leading to individual declarants’ specific delays in receivi ng benefits ar e likely to occur again. Def.’s Opp’n at 30; Def.’s Surreply at 21. But the District has conce ded that it is processing less than 95% of applications on time . Hr’g Tr. 52:19 (March 19, 2018). Given that it approves roughly 10,000 to 20,000 applications each quarter, see Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. P (fiscal year 2017 FNS366B reports), that means th at at least 500 to 1,000 households per quarter (or roughly 2,000 to 4,000 households annually) are not receiving benefits on time. While the specific declarants here may not be among those unserved households, the harms they suff er are indicative of the harms suffered by such households, which are members of the plaintiff class. These harms, as discussed, are irreparable and will continue to occur to class members until the District is in full compliance. That said, the plaintiffs must show that the injury is of such imminence that there is a “‘clear and present’ need f or equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Chaplaincy of Full15 Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (emphasis added). Put another way, the plaintiffs must show that the District will continue to remain below absolute compli ance without this Court’s intervention. As to initial appl ications, there are reasons to doubt that a full injunction is necessary to prevent the irrepara ble harms the plaintiffs have identified. For one, the District is close to full compliance and ha s shown a trend of rising timeli ness rates. Compare Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. P, at 1 (FNS-366B report for first quarter, fiscal y ear 2017 showing a timeliness rate of 90.59%) and id. Ex. 2, Ex. B (da ta for October 2016 to March2017 showing an APT rate of 79.49% with an upper bound of 88.45%) w ith Def.’s Surreply Ex. B (FNS-366B report for first quarter, fiscal year 2018 showi ng a timeliness rate of 94.97%) and Def.’s Suppl. Br. Ex. 1, Ex. A, at 3 (data for April to September 2017 showing an APT rate o f 87.10% with an upper bound of 91.03%). Moreover, as discussed above, t he District is under an obligati on to prepare a corrective action plan for the Food and Nut rition Service ad dressing its l ow processing rate for initial applications. See October 23, 2017 F NS Letter. The Service re quires the District to bring its APT rate up to 95% within a year of any plan’s approval and has the power to impose sanctions if the District fails to submit an acceptable corrective actionplan or comply with any plan the Service ultimately accepts. See id. The Service has indicated its willingness to reject the District’s plan and to carry out its oversight duties in the fo rmulation of that plan. See Fourth Zeilinger Decl. ¶¶ 9–14. Given the District’s relatively high and rising timeliness rate and the Service’s active regulation here , there are reasons to believe that the District will reach a de minimis level of non-compliance , or even full compliance, as to initial applications in the absence of a court order. As such, injunctive relief may not b e necessary to prevent irreparable harm.16 However, these reasons why inj unctive relief may not be necessa ry to prevent irreparable harm do not apply to recertificat ion applications. For one, th e District has a much lower timeliness rate: 59.28% according to the most recent FNS-366B r eport. See Def.’s Surreply Ex. B. In addition, since the Service monitors the APT rate—which as noted only covers initial applications—there is no parall el corrective action plan proces s triggered by low timely processing rates for recertification applications. To conclude, as to recertificat ion applications—for which no d irect regulatory oversight process exists and for which the D istrict has much lower curren t timeliness rates—the plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm that will occur in the absence of i njunctive relief. As to initial applications, the ongoing FNS c orrective action plan process ma y mean that a full injunction is not necessary to prevent the irreparable harms identified by th e plaintiffs.
3. Balance of equities The third requirement that the pl aintiffs must meet is to demon strate that the balance of equities or hardship tilts in t heir favor. See, e.g., Chaplain cy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297. In deciding how the balance tips, the Court must weigh “the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or w ithholding of the re quested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). The Court must be p articularly cognizant of “the public consequences in employing t he extraordinary remedy of in junction.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court has already discussed t he serious and irreparable harm to class members in the absence of an injunction: chi efly, going without food for thems elves and their families. In contrast, the additional burde n imposed on the District by any injunction would be minimal. As the Seventh Circuit explained i n a case involving a SNAP Act in junction, “[t]he Act itself17 imposes the burden; [an] injuncti on merely seeks to prevent the defendant[] from shirking [its] responsibilities unde r it.” Haskins, 794 F.2d at 1277; see als o Withrow, 942 F.2d at 1388 (“An injunction requiring a dherence to [the SNAP Act] regulations . . . imposes no inappropriate obligations on the state.”); Briggs, 2012 WL 6026167, at *19 (s ame). Because any obligation to comply with the timelines arise s under the statute and pertinen t regulations, an injunction requiring such compliance creates no significant new burdens on the District. The District nevertheless conte nds that if an injunction issues , it will be forced to divert resources and would face “additiona l administrative burdens” in order to comply. Def.’s Opp’n at 37. If it does divert resources, the District says, it may be unable to properly administer other benefit programs or other aspe cts of the SNAP program, and coul d face sanctions from federal regulatory agencies as a resul t. Id.; Def.’s Surreply at 22–23 . But while an injunction might in practical terms demand a diversi on of resources, the legal obli gation to divert those resources is rooted in the statute ; the injunction simpl y enforces the statute’s requirement that the District find the resources needed to m eet all of its obligations. An i njunction thus imposes no burden on the District beyond what the stat ute already requires. Consequ ently, the balance of equities tilts in favor of granting injunctive relief, both as to initial appl ications and recertification applications.
4. Public interest Finally, the plaintiffs must de monstrate that issuance of an in junction is in the public interest. See, e.g., Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F .3d at 297. As the plaintiffs contend, there is a public intere st in enforcing compliance wit h the law. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Espy, 814 F. Supp. 142, 152 (D.D.C. 1993). Th at said, the mere fact that an agency is not in compliance w ith the law is insufficient, by it self, to justify an injunction. “[A]18 federal judge sitting as chancel lor is not mechanically obligat ed to grant an injunction for every violation of law.” Weinberge r v. Romer-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 3 13 (1982). The Court is also particularly c ognizant that with respect to t he statutory timelines, “absolutely perfect compliance is unattainable.” Withrow, 942 F.2d at 1388; see also Haskins, 794 F.2d at 1277; Briggs, 2012 WL 6026167, at *17; Reynolds, 20 05 WL 342106, at *17. As the Ninth Circuit has explai ned, “[t]here i s . . . doubtless a point at which any failure of total compliance is truly de minimis , where the state has come to c omply ‘as strictly as is humanly possible.’” Withrow, 942 F.2d a t 1388; see also Haskins, 794 F .2d at 1277 (“As with any program of this size, a few inadve rtent errors are inevitable, and we are confident that the district court will not exerci se its equitable powers to hold the state in contempt for every minor, inadvertent infraction of the Act if the court is satisfied tha t the officials are complying with the Act as strictly as is humanly possible.”). If a State is compl ying with the timelines for the approval of applications “as s trictly as is humanly possible,” then the public interest would not favor an injunction forcing the di version of resources from oth er important government programs to chase a small and likely unattainable improvement. In addition, the Court must tak e account of the role that the F ood and Nutrition Service plays in administering this statut e and in ensuring the Distric t is complying with its obligations. The Service has demonstrated its willingness and ability to act ively regulate the District’s compliance, as illustrated by the ongoing corrective action pla n process: the Service has rejected inadequate plans and is working c losely with District personnel to resolve its timeliness problems. Fourth Zeilinger D ecl. ¶¶ 9–14. And the Service has tools in its arsenal to enforce the District’s adherence to its co rrective action pla n, namely the ability to suspend or disallow all or part of the District’s administ rative funds or to itself seek i njunctive relief from a federal court.19 See 7 C.F.R. § 276.4. As the regula tory agency with responsibi lity for administering the SNAP program, the Service has an expertise in the statu tory requirem ents that this Court lacks, and it better understands how States ca n practically achieve them. In light of the Service’s expert ise and role, in particular wit h respect to the ongoing corrective action plan process, t he public interest would disfa vor the Court’s interference in the regulatory scheme through the issu ance of injunctive relief. I n other words, this “is not a situation where only an injunc tion can vindicate the purpose of the statute in question, nor one where the statute ‘compel[s]’ such an extraordinary remedy.” A llina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 756 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Weinberger, 456 U .S. at 314). And where the Court has a less intrusive mean s of furthering the statutory purpose and ensuring compliance with the District’s statutory obligations, the public interest would weigh towards choosing such options, especially where, as he re, the plaintiffs seek a manda tory (“do this”) rather than prohibitory (“don’t do this”) injunction. See, e.g., Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (“The power to issue a preliminary injunction, especially a mandatory one , should be ‘sparingly exercised.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). With these considerations in mi nd, the Court concludes that the public interest favors an injunction as to the recertifica tion applications but favors a more limited oversight role for the initial applications. First, the District’s noncompliance as t o recertification applications is far beyond de minimis. The most recent FNS-366B reports—the only d ata that directly measures recertification application timeliness—shows a timeliness rate of 59.28%. See Def.’s Surreply Ex. B. While the District conten ds that it is t ypical for stat es to have a lower rate of timely processing for recertification a pplications as opposed to initi al applications, the District’s rate is well below what other states have reported: Colorado reports mo nthly rates of 94.71% to 97.91%20 for January 2017 to February 2018, New Mexico reports monthly r ates of 90.4% to 98.4% for November 2017 through March 2018, and Texas reports monthly rat es of 96.65% to 99.10% for October 2017 to April 2018. 7 The plaintiffs have also presen ted data indicating that state s have achieved much higher rates; Nebra ska, for insta nce, processed 9 9% of recertification applications on time in Febru ary 2018. Pls.’ Response Def.’s S uppl. Br. (“Pls.’ Response) Ex. E. Although some states may not have r ates this high, this data sh ows that it is possible for states to achieve timeliness rates far hi gher than the District’s. Since the District’s non-compliance well exceeds a de minimis level, and because the Food and Nutrition Service does not directly oversee state compliance on timely processing of recertification applic ations, the Court concludes that the public interest would favor t he full injunctive relief that plaintiffs seek. But initial applications again pr esent a slightly different sto ry. For one, the District’s compliance rates are much closer to a de minimis level of non-c ompliance: statistics suggest the District is likely processing s omewhere around 90–95% of applic ations in a timely fashion currently. 8 Moreover, the District has shown a definite upward trend in i ts timeliness rate,

7 While none of this data is in the record, the Court may take j udicial notice of data publicly released on the relevant state agency’s website. See, e.g., Pharm. Research, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 33. Data for Colorado can be found in the “Statewide tim eliness data by app type” spreadsheet available at https: //www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdhs/ data-economic-security. Data for New Mexico can be found in the “monthly statistical reports ” available at http://www.hsd.state.nm.us/monthl y-statistical-reports.aspx. ( The Court here cites the New Mexico data only for applicati ons received by the 15th day of t he month before benefits expire, the deadline to ensure no break i n benefits.) Data for Texas c an be found in the “SNAP Timeliness” monthly reports avail able at https://hhs.texas.gov/ about-hhs/records-statistics/datastatistics/supplemental-nutritional-assistance-program-snap-sta tistics.

8 The Court infers this given that the most recent APT rate data has the District’s upper bound of the confidence interval a t 91.03% and the most recent FNS-366B form shows a timeliness rate of 94.97%. See Def.’s Surreply Ex. B (FNS-366B report for first quarter, fiscal year 2018); Def.’s Suppl. Br. Ex. 1, E x. A (APT rate data for A pril to September 2017).21 improving from 90.59% of applicatio ns processed on time in the first quarter of 2017 to 94.97% of applications processed on time in the first quarter of 2018. Compare Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. P, at 1 (FNS-366B report for firs t quarter, fiscal year 2017) with Def.’s Surreply Ex. B (FNS-366B report for first quarter, fiscal year 2018). Finally, the District is currently subj ect to a corrective action plan aimed at ensuring that it achieves a 95% APT, bring ing it near rates that other courts have found to be de minimis non-compliance. 9 This regulatory process offers an alternative means of ensuring statutory com pliance without the burden of an injunction. Thus, in light of the relatively high level of compliance that the District has alrea dy obtained and the ongoing corrective action plan process w ith the Service, the Court conc ludes the public interest favors a less intrusive oversight role with respect t o initial applicati on rather than the f ull injunction that will apply to recertif ication applications.
5. Conclusion The Court concludes that the p laintiffs have carried their burd en as to an injunction requiring the District to process recertification applications in accordance with the statutory timelines: they have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that irreparable harm would occur without an i njunction, that the balancing of e quities tilts in favor of injunctive relief, and that the public inter est favors an injunction. The Court will therefore grant this aspect of the plaintiffs’ motion.

Combining these two figures w ith the overall upward trend of th e timeliness rates suggests an actual current rate somewhere between 90% and 95%.

9 See, e.g., Robertson, 766 F. Supp. a t 480 (final injunction ina SNAP application processing timeline case allowing a 97% timeliness rate); Pls.’ Response Ex. A, at 4 ¶ 2 (D. Hawaii preliminary injunction i n a SNAP application processing timelines case allowing a 95% timeliness rate); id. Ex. D, at 8 ¶ 10 (settlement in a SNAP ap plication processing timelines case allowing a 96% timeliness rate).22 On the other hand, the Court conclu des that it will exercise it s equitable discretion to more narrowly tailor relief as to initialapplications. While the plai ntiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits and tha t the balanci ng of equities tip s in their favor, the other two factors point towards a more limited judi cial role in light of the ongo ing federal corre ctive action plan process. That process makes it likely that the District will c ontinue to improve its timely processing of applications until it achieves a 95% APT rate, br inging it close to a level of de minimis noncompliance and eliminat ing the need for a full injun ction. Moreover, the Court is hesitant to take upon itself the role that the Food and Nutriti on Service is curre ntly and actively playing in the regulatory sche me given the Service’s greater ex pertise and experience. That said, there is still a role for the Court to play in monitoring the o ngoing regulatory process. Thus, the Court will require the District to file periodic reports regard ing the status of the corrective action plan and updating the Court on its c urrent timeliness rates. S hould the District show a large or consistent decline in its initial application timeliness rates, or should it fall out of compliance with or fail to progre ss in the correctiv e action plan process, the Court will consider instituting more fulsome injunctive relief c overing initial applications as well.
B. Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunc tion requiring the District to provide an opportunity for SNAP benefit recipients to compl ete the recertif ication process without a break in benefits. In addition to injunctive relief concerning the timely processi ng of benefits applications, the plaintiffs seek an injuncti on requiring the District to “pr ovide an opportunity for SNAP recipients to complete the rece rtification process and have SNA P benefits for the new certification period issued in a t imely manner.” Pls.’ Mot. Pr elim. Inj. at 1. Under the SNAP Act, the District must “insure that each participating househol d receive[s] a notic e of expiration of its certification p rior to the start of the last month of it s certification pe riod advising the23 household that it must submit a ne w application in order to ren ew its eligibility for a new certification period.” 7 U.S.C . § 2020(e)(4). The plaintiffs argue that the District systemically fails to comply with this require ment, which leads to household s being unable to complete the recertification proce ss without a break i n benefits. Pls.’ Mot . Prelim. Inj. at 34. The District responds that the plaintiffs ha ve merely shown isolated failure s to meet the statutory requirements—rather than a systemic and ongoing problem—and thu s have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succe ss on the merits. Opp’n at 21; Surreply at 5. Unlike with the processing of app lications, the plaintiffs have not offered complete statistics on the District’s pr ocessing of recertification noti ces to demonstrate any systemic failure to comply with the statuto ry requirement. Instead, the y rely primarily on (1) bi-weekly reports submitted by the District to the Food and Nutrition Service, (2) testimony from Director Zeilinger regarding a “vendor’s error” resulting in the failure to send 4,500 recertif ication notices in June 2017, and (3) declarations from individuals stating tha t they did not receive recertification notic es when they were due. The Court conclude s that, on the current factual record, the plaintiffs have not c arried their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits. The bi-weekly reports are the c losest thing to statistical evid ence that the plaintiffs present. These are a series of r eports (in the form of a slide deck) that the District presents to the Service every two weeks. See, e.g., Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. R ( Oct. 11, 2017 slide deck). The plaintiffs point primarily to tw o pieces of information contain ed in these reports: the “backlogs” of notices and the “error rate ” for notice generation. Pls.’ M ot. Prelim. Inj. at 34–35; Pls.’ Reply at 12–13. But the significance of t hese two pieces of informat ion is not readily apparent to the Court. Assuming for the moment t hat a “backlog” notice is one sent late, the number of such24 notices reported in the most rece nt reports is small compared t o the total number of notices that the District generates. The December 20, 2017 bi-weekly report —the most recent one in the record—indicates a total of 200 “ backlog” notices. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. W, at 26. Without minimizing the importance of every household receiving the noti ces due to it, 200 notices represents a scant fractio n of 1% of the 55,000 notices the Dis trict sends monthly. First Zeilinger Decl. ¶ 133. Of those 55,000, an average of 4,500 are recertif ication notices, id. ¶ 143, making the 200 backlog notices no more than 4.5% of recertification no tices—assuming all 200 “backlog” notices are recertification notices. This brings the Court to a sec ond limitation in the “backlog” n otice statistics: it is not self-evident from the record tha t the “backlog” notices listed are recertification notices in particular. Indeed, record evide nce indicates they might not b e. In the most recent bi-weekly reports, the “backlog” notices a re all categorized as “Change i n Benefit” notices. See, e.g., Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. W, at 26 (Dec. 20, 2017 slide deck). The Dist rict’s counsel represented at the hearing that a “Change in Benef it” notice is not the same thing as a recertifica tion notice. Hr’g Tr. 58:24–25 (March 19, 2018). Thus, it is not clear to the Co urt that the backlog listed in the most recent reports reflects a backlog in sending out recertifi cation notices. In light of these gaps and the general lack of clarity r egarding what the bi-weekly re ports show, the backlog figures in the bi-weekly reports provide only limited indication of a syst emic failure to print and send recertificatio n notices on time. The same is true with the “erro r rates” that the plaintiffs poi nt to. See, e.g. Pls.’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. W, at 24 (Dec. 20, 2017 slide deck). In her declara tion, Director Zeilinger explains that this “error rate” refers to notices that do not automatica lly generate, likely due to an issue such as an incorrect address or missing information. First Zei linger Decl. ¶ 136. These notices25 are instead manually generated and then sent to a third-party v endor for printing and mailing. Id. Director Zeilinger further attest s that the District’s IT perso nnel monitor notice generation and can quickly re-run notices that fa il to automatically generate to ensure they are processed and sent. Id. ¶ 137. In light of this process, the fact that a no tice is not properly generated “does not mean the notice is untimely sen t.” Id. ¶ 138. The plaintiffs offer no evidence to rebut Director Zeilinger’s representations or to establish that the “error rat es” refer to notices that are ultimately not sent on time. Thus, without m ore evidence, these figures, too, provide little indication of an ongoing systemic failure to se nd recertification notices on tim e. Aside from the bi-weekly reports , the plaintiffs primarily rely on the deposition testimony of Director Zeilinger and a set of individual declarations. Ma ny of those declarations are from class members attesting to their failure to receiv e a recertifi cation notice and the consequent termination of their benefits . See, e.g., Decl. of James Stanl ey [ECF No. 27-2] ¶ 5; Decl. of Roderick Gaines [ECF No. 27-4] ¶7. While these declarations c ertainly suggest that some households are not receiving the notices owed them, they cannot on their own demonstrate a systemic failure. In an attempt to bridge that ga p, the plaintiffs point to other evidence that they argue shows the District has had repea ted, large-scale failures to se nd out notices. The most persuasive piece of evidence they present i nvolves a “vendor’s error” from June 2017, which was one of the key topics in the limited discovery the Court permitted. See O rder at 6 (Dec. 15, 2017) (allowing the plaintiffs to conduct a corpor ate representative depositionregarding the vendor’s error). According to Director Zeilinge r, in June 2017 a vendor’s error resulted in the f ailure to send out any of the recertification notic es due to recipients that month (whose recertification applications would have been due in September 2017). See Pls.’ Reply Ex. 3 (“Zeilinger Dep.”) 124:4–11.26 Director Zeilinger testified tha t the District p repared a file with the necessary information for printing and mailing and successfully transferred that file to the third-party vendor the District uses to print and mail notices. Id. 124:4–11, 126:17–21, 127:9 –12. The vendor, in turn, failed to print and send the notices . Id. 126:17–21. Approximately 4,50 0 households did not receive a recertification noti ce as a result of t his error. Id. 130:11. The failure to provide notice to 4,500 households is obviously disconcerting. But the error is again equally consisten t with a systemic problem as it is with an isolated failure. The District, after all , provided the necessary information to the printer on time. Id. 126:17–18. The printer simply failed t o print the notices. Id. 126:19–21. Ev en a conscientious and well-run system might experience this sor t of unexpected human error. W ithout additional indications that this vendor’s error was mo re than an isolated mistake, it does not bridge the gap left by the other evidence. Moreover, after this error occurred the District took steps to prevent similar ones in the future: it adopted procedures t o “confirm that when files were transmitted for notices, they actually resulted in notices printed and mailed.” Id. 153:12–1 5; see also id. 154:19–24. The biweekly reports that the District submits to the Service also in dicate that it is ver ifying the transfer of files to the printer, confirm ing the files are being process ed, and monitoring the printing process for notices sent with return envelopes. See, e.g., Pls .’ Reply Ex. 1, Ex. W, at 27 (Dec. 20, 2017 slide deck). Given the pro cesses that the District ha s put in place to avoid another27 mailing error, the June 2017 snaf u is not particularly powerful evidence of a systemic and ongoing failure to prepare and s end recertification notices. 10 Nor is there enough evidence of fur ther failures akin to this v endor’s error to establish a likelihood that it is part of a trend of problems as opposed to an isolated error. 11 The plaintiffs point to a declaration submitted by their counsel, who states t hat she called the District’s call center on October 23, 2017 and heard a message that stated: “If you failed to receive timely notification to renew your SNAP benefits, which have now termin ated for October 2017, this is due to a technical issue.” Decl. of Chelsea Sharon [ECF No. 33 -3] ¶ 3. While this message might suggest an additional issue in the production of notices, it gives no sense of the nature of the error, the scope of the error , whether it relates to the sa me vendor error discussed above, or the number of households impacted. Similarly, a class member a ttests that he spoke to someone with the District’s call center who indicated “a lot of people did not get a notice te lling them they needed to recertify.” Pls.’ Reply Ex. 10, ¶ 11 (Decl. of Josep h Carver). Again, however, there is

10 To the extent that plai ntiffs cannot show an ongoing systemic failure, the Court would have concerns regarding their s tanding to seek i njunctive relie f. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).

11 During their deposition of Direct or Zeilinger, the plaintiffs attempted to ask questions regarding other possible erro rs. See, e.g., Zeilinger Dep. 143 :6–15, 166:11–16. The District’s counsel instructed Director Zei linger not to answer such questi ons, over opposing counsel’s objections. Id. The Court agrees with the District that such questions were beyond the scope of the limited discovery order. That order specified that the dep osition would cover “the ‘vendor error’ referenced on pages 9 a nd 22 of Defenda nt’s opposition.” Order at 6 (Dec. 15, 2017). That error was the June 2017 erro r. The District’s opposition made reference to no other vendor’s errors, and the Court’s discovery order was specifical ly tailored to resolve only the factual questions created by t he District’s opposition and the original motion for preliminary injunction. See id. at 4–5. Oth er errors that might have occu rred were not teed up by the District’s opposition or the plai ntiffs’ initial motion and thu s fall outside the scope of the narrowly-tailored discovery or der. The plaintiffs are, of cour se, free to inquire about other possible vendor’s errors in merits discovery.28 no sense of the nature or scope of the error or even that this is a separate error from the one referenced in counsel’s declarati on. While these two declarati ons ultimately provide some suggestion of continued problem s in the generation and deliveryof notices, they are still insufficient to establish that the plaintiffs have shown a subs tantial likelihood of demonstrating an ongoing and systemic failure to produce recertification noti ces. Ultimately, most of the plaintiffs’ evidence—particularly the b i-weekly reports and the June 2017 vendor’s error—is equally c onsistent with the Distric t’s argument that any notice failures were isolated instan ces. At this juncture, with too m any factual questions remaining, that is insufficient for the pl aintiffs to carry their burden o f demonstrating a s ubstantial likelihood of success on the merits. See Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (opinion of Brown, J.) (affirming denial of injunction since “[a]lthoughone could reasonably infer from the evidence” that p laintiffs would preva il in showing standing “one could also conclude the opposite”). Of course, this does not mean that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on the merits. Discovery and further development of the factual record may wel l demonstrate that the plaintiffs have the better understanding of t he evidence they submit. The Court simply concludes that right now the plaintiffs have not pr ovided evidence sufficient to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Consequently, the Court w ill deny their request for a preliminary injunction regardi ng the sending of recertification notices.
C. Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunc tion requiring the District to send written notice of processing delays and of the opportu nity for an administrative hearing. Finally, the plaintiffs seek an i njunction requiring the Distri ct to send written notices of processing delays and of the opportu nity to request an administ rative hearing to households whose applications are delayed beyond the statutory timelines. The Court again concludes that29 the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success onthe current record and will thus deny this aspect of their motion. The plaintiffs’ argument here i s predicated on the statutory an d regulatory requirements for notice and fair hearings, name ly States’ obligations to: (1 ) send written notice within 30 days informing households of the acc eptance, denial, or pending stat us of their applic ation, 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g); (2) provide households notice of their right to re quest a hearing following adverse determinations, id. § 273.15(f); a nd (3) provide such fair hear ings upon request, id. § 273.15(i); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). The plaintiffs contend that t he District is systemically failing to meet these obligations, parti cularly by not informing household s about any delays in processing their applications and of their r ight to a hearing to challenge such delays. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj.
at 37. As to the first contention, the pl aintiffs present only declara tions from several class members indicating that they fa iled to receive notification as to any delays in processing their applications—indeed, that they failed to receive any notice concerning th eir application in contravention of the regulatory requirements in 7 C.F.R. § 273. 10(g). See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 6, ¶ 15 (Decl . of Diamond Moore); id. Ex. 7, ¶ 9 (Decl. of Sandra Bonilla de Leonzo). But as with the failure to send out recertification n otices, in light of the sheer volume of SNAP recipients, declarati ons from a dozen or so households do not suffice to show a systemic failure. And the plaintiffs pr ovide no indication that the cl ass members involved are a representative statis tical sampling of the larger population of households. Without more, the submitted declarations cannot ca rry the plaintiffs’ burden to d emonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.30 Turning to the alleged failure to provide households with not ice of their appeal rights, again the plaintiffs provide insu fficient evidence to show a sy stemic failure. For one, Director Zeilinger, in her first declaration, states that the District r outinely includes anotice of appeal and of hearing rights in adverse de termination notices. First Zeil inger Decl. ¶ 144. None of the individual class member declarat ions contradict this by, for ex ample, stating that the class member received a notice without information regarding her appe al rights. Again, on the current evidentiary record, the plaint iffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits related to this aspect of their requested injunction. In sum, the plaintiffs rely exc lusively on individual declarat ions to establish a likelihood of success on this aspect of the ir case. Such declarations, wi thout more, do not establish a substantial likelihood of demonstr ating a systemic error of the type necessary to support an injunction. As such, the Court will deny this portion of the p laintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. 12
* * * For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and den y in part the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary In junction. It is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiffs file propos ed language for an injunction c overing recertification a pplications and for the r eporting requirements for initial applications, consistent

12 The District also raises a chal lenge to plaintiff Bread for th e City’s standing. However, there only needs to be one plain tiff with standing for a case t o proceed. See, e.g., In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012). No party con tests that the plaintiff class has standing to seek injunctive reli ef given their allegations of h arm flowing from an ongoing, systemic violation of their statu tory rights. As a result, the Court need not at this juncture resolve any arguments as to Br ead for the City’s standing.31 with this opinion, by June 7, 2018. The District shall file an y response to the plaintiffs’ proposed injunction and reporting re quirement language by June 14, 2018. If is further
ORDERED that the District is to r espond to the complaint by July 2, 20 18.
SO ORDERED

.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: May 31, 2018