IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3
v. NO. 28,965 4 ELSON HONNIE, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 Karen L. Townsend, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 12 Stephanie Erin Brunson, A ssistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 CASTILLO, Judge. 17 Defendant appeals from the district c ourt’s order affirming the magistrate 18 court’s denial of his motion to suppress on grounds that the officer’s stop was invalid, 192 and not based on the community caretaker doc trine. This Court’s first notice proposed 1 to affirm the district court. Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the 2 proposed disposition. We are not persua ded by Defendant’s arguments and affirm. 3 Defendant urges this Court to revisit State v. Walters, 1997-NMCA-013, 123 4 N.M. 88, 934 P.2d 282, because heasserts that it conflicts with the determination in 5 State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032, that the community 6 caretaking function must be totally divorcedfrom the detection, investigation, or 7 acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. [MIO 3, 7] 8 Defendant contends that in Walters , the community caretaki ng doctrine was expanded 9 to cover even those instances in which an officer is actually acting on a non-specific, 10 inarticulable hunch that the defendant is committing a crime but has no reasonable 11 suspicion for an investigatory detention. [MIO 7] We disagree. 12 In Walters , the defendant argued that the po lice officer did not conduct the stop 13 based on the community caretaker doctrine because the stop was not voluntary. 1997- 14 NMCA-013, ¶ 11. The Waltersdefendant pulled over becau se he felt compelled by 15 the manner in which the officer followed him, and that because the stop was not 16 consensual, reasonable suspicion was required. Id. This Court disagreed, analyzed 17 whether the stop was consensu al, and determined that a district court could have 18 reasonably concluded that the defendant was not compelled to stop and that the officer 193 was acting within his caretaker function. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 15, 25. Ryonlater clarified the 1 community caretaker exception: “[c]haracterization of th e exception as a voluntary or 2 consensual encounter was wrong.” 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20. Despite this later 3 explanation, nothing in Ryonsuggests that Waltersimpermissibly broadened the scope 4 of the community caretaker doctrine, as Defendant argues. In fact, Ryonappears to 5 have broadened the community caretaker inquiry. See2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 6 (“ Waltersought not be viewed as limiting the community caretaker exception to 7 voluntary or consensual police-citizen encounters.”). 8 When police are acting as community caretakers, reasonable suspicion and 9 probable cause are not at issue. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20. “In New Mexico we 10 have recognized that officers may stop a vehicle on a public road without probable 11 cause or reasonable suspicion on the basis of a specific, articulable safety concern in 12 their capacity as community caretakers.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted). Where the initial contact by the police is motivated by a concern for 14 public safety rather than a criminal investig ation, police need not justify their decision 15 to approach a person and ask questions. See id. ¶ 17. In a community caretaker case 16 involving an automobile, we consider wh ether the officer had “a specific and 17 articulable concern for public safety requiring the officer’s general assistance.” Ryon , 18 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 26. There was sufficient ev idence in the present case to establish 194 that the officer articulated a specifi c concern for Defendant’s safety. 1 The officer testified that he saw Defendant’s vehicle moving slowly on a state 2 highway and then followed the car as it pulled into the parking lot of a closed 3 business. [RP 082] The officer approachedthe car after seeing Defendant get out of 4 the driver’s side and run around to the passenger side. [RP 083] Specifically, the 5 officer testified that he made contact with Defendant in order to determine if any help 6 was needed. [RP 084] Based on these facts, we conclude that the district court could 7 reasonably conclude that the officer stoppe d to see if anything was wrong and that as 8 a result, the officer acted as a communitycaretaker. See State v. Reynolds , 117 N.M. 9 23, 25, 868 P.2d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It is appropriate, then, for police officers 10 to stop vehicles for a specific, articulable safety concern.”), rev’d on other grounds , 11 119 N.M. 383, 890 P.2d 1315. Th erefore, Defendant was not seized in violation of 12 the Fourth Amendment. See Walters , 1997-NMCA-013, ¶ 10 (explaining that a 13 community caretaker stop is not a seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment). 14 For these reasons, and those stated in th e first notice, we affirm the district 15 court. 16

IT IS SO ORDERED. 175 ________________________________ 1 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 2 WE CONCUR: 3

_________________________________ 4 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 5

_________________________________ 6 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 7