IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CRYSTAL A. CHAMBERS, *

*

 Plaintiff, * CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00198-B

 *

vs. *

*

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

ORDER

Plaintiff Crystal A. Chambers (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability, 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income

under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

401, et seq., and 1381, et seq. On June 13, 2016, the parties 

consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all 

proceedings in this case. (Doc. 23). Thus, the action was 

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order 

the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful consideration 

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, 

it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 1 of 17
2

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits on April 29, 2010, and for 

supplemental security income on May 21, 2010. (Tr. 223, 225)1 . 

She alleges that she has been disabled since August 2, 2008, due 

to lower back injury, depression, and fibromyalgia. (Id. at 

257, 272). Plaintiff’s applications were denied and upon timely 

request, she was granted an administrative hearing before 

Administrative Law Judge Warren Hammond, Jr. (hereinafter “ALJ”)

on November 1, 2011. (Id. at 53). Plaintiff attended the 

hearing with her counsel and provided testimony related to her

claims. (Id.). A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the 

hearing and provided testimony. (Id.). On November 10, 2011, 

the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is 

not disabled. (Id. at 89). Plaintiff requested review by the 

Appeals Council, and on December 21, 2012, the Appeals Council 

remanded the case to the ALJ to further evaluate Plaintiff’s 

depressive disorder in light of the opinion of the reviewing 

State Agency psychologist, to further evaluate whether Plaintiff 

is capable of performing her past relevant work, and to pose a 

hypothetical to the vocational expert that corresponds with the 

 1 When referencing the Social Security Transcript, the Court 

uses the citations found on the transcript, rather than the page 

numbers utilized by CM-ECF. 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 2 of 17
3

RFC. (Id. at 106-09). 

On May 3, 2013, Plaintiff attended a second administrative 

hearing with her counsel and provided testimony related to her

claims. (Id. at 40). A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared 

at the second hearing and provided testimony. (Id. at 49). On 

August 23, 2013, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision 

finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 21-34). The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 

8, 2015. (Id. at 1). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated 

August 23, 2013, became the final decision of the Commissioner. 

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff 

timely filed the present civil action. (Doc. 1). The parties 

waived oral argument on June 13, 2016 (Doc. 22), and agree that 

this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before 

this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

II. Issues on Appeal2

1. Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) to 

find Plaintiff not disabled after 

finding that Plaintiff has the severe, 

non-exertional impairment of depression?

2. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to 

 2 On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings 

related to her physical impairments. Therefore, the Court’s 

discussion is limited to Plaintiff’s mental impairment of 

depression. 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 3 of 17
4

include Plaintiff’s mental limitations 

in the RFC?

III. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on September 11, 1974, and was thirtyeight years of age at the time of her second administrative 

hearing on May 3, 2013. (Tr. 43, 272). Plaintiff testified 

that she completed the twelfth grade in high school and 

completed truck driving school. (Id. at 43). 

Plaintiff testified that she last worked full time in 2004 

as a truck driver. (Id. at 44). Plaintiff quit working in 2004 

because of problems with her back. (Id.). At the time of her 

hearing in 2013, she was working part-time (about twenty-two 

hours a week) at Hertz Rental Car as a reservations clerk. 

(Id.). 

Plaintiff testified that what is keeping her from working 

full time now are problems with her back and hips, making it 

difficult for her to walk and sit for long periods of time. 

(Id. at 45). Plaintiff denied having any other impairments that 

prevented her from working. (Id. at 45, 49). 

Plaintiff testified that she is able to take care of 

herself, that she shops, cooks, and drives. (Id. at 47, 277). 

In her Function Report dated June 22, 2010, Plaintiff stated 

that she lives alone in her own home, that she takes care of her 

own personal needs and needs no reminders to do so, that she 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 4 of 17
5

sets an alarm to remind her to take her medication, that she 

prepares her own meals, that she does house work and laundry, 

that she drives and goes outside at least a couple of times each 

day, and that she shops and handles her own finances and 

banking. (Id. at 276-79). Plaintiff also stated that her

social activities include visiting regularly with friends and 

family in their homes and going to church. (Id. at 280). She 

is able to perform these activities unaccompanied. (Id. at 

280). She reported that concentrating and completing tasks is 

difficult because of her pain. (Id.) She also reported that she 

“do[es] fine” with written instructions “for the most part;” she 

sometimes gets “mixed up” with spoken instructions; she gets 

along “fine” with other people and with authority figures; and 

she has never been fired from a job because of problems getting 

along with other people. (Id. at 281-82). However, she does 

not handle stress or change well. (Id. at 282). 

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s 

role is a limited one. The Court’s review is limited to 

determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is 

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 5 of 17
6

legal standards were applied. 3 Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may not decide the facts 

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that 

of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th 

Cir. 1986). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be 

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. 

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.”). In determining whether substantial 

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking 

into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the 

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4

(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).

B. Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability 

benefits must prove his or her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1512, 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

 3 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal 

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 6 of 17
7

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations 

provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for 

determining if a claimant has proven his disability.4 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

 4 The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the 

claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant 

proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets 

or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is 

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or 

work experience. If the claimant cannot prevail at the third 

step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the 

claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In 

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the 

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective 

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, 

education and work history. Id. Once a claimant meets this 

burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the 

fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy, given the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 

1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such 

jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability 

to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. 

Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 7 of 17
8

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 2, 

2008, the alleged onset date, and that she has the severe 

impairments of status post spinal fusion with residual lumbar 

radiculopathy, obesity, and depression. (Tr. 23). The ALJ

further found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of 

the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 24). 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retains the residual 

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to perform less than the 

full range of sedentary work, with the following limitations: 

“she can sit for approximately six hours and stand and walk for 

about two hours in an eight-hour day. She can occasionally 

crawl, kneel, crouch, and stoop. She cannot climb ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently push or pull. She must 

avoid being on unprotected elevations, near dangerous moving 

machinery, and excessive amounts of dust. She is limited to 

unskilled work.” (Id. at 26). The ALJ also determined that 

while Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, her

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of the alleged symptoms were not entirely credible to 

the extent they were inconsistent with the residual functional 

capacity assessment. (Id. at 27).

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 8 of 17
9

Given Plaintiff’s RFC for less than the full range of 

sedentary, unskilled work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not 

capable of performing her past work, which was medium or semiskilled. (Id. at 32). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s

additional exertional and non-exertional limitations, as 

detailed above, “have little or no effect on the occupational 

base of unskilled sedentary work.” (Id. at 33). The ALJ thus 

concluded that “[a] finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore 

appropriate under the framework of [Medical Vocational Rule

201.28].”5 (Id.).

The Court now considers the foregoing in light of the 

record in this case and the issue on appeal. 

1. Issues

A. Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) to 

find Plaintiff not disabled after finding 

that Plaintiff has the severe, nonexertional impairment of depression?

In this case, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in 

relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) to find her

 5 Medical–Vocational Rule 201.28 directs a finding of not 

disabled for a younger individual aged 18–44, who was a high 

school graduate, with non-transferable skills from skilled or 

semiskilled past work, and capable of performing sedentary work. 

See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App 2; see also Garred v. 

Astrue, 383 F. Appx. 820, 824 (11th Cir. 2010); Kerr v. Astrue, 

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104639, *9-10 n.4, 2010 WL 3907121, *3 n.4 

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by, 

2010 WL 3893922 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010). 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 9 of 17
10

not disabled, given the ALJ’s finding that she has the severe, 

non-exertional impairment of depression. (Doc. 11 at 2). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that she suffers from 

this severe, non-exertional impairment precludes the use of the 

grids to find her disabled. (Id.). Having reviewed the record 

at length, the Court finds that this case must be reversed and 

remanded due to the ALJ’s improper use of the grids. 

It is clear in this circuit that the Commissioner of Social 

Security must develop “a full and fair record regarding the 

vocational opportunities available to a claimant.” Allen v. 

Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation 

omitted). The ALJ must articulate specific jobs that the 

claimant is able to perform given his or her age, education, and 

work history, if any, “and this finding must be supported by 

substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.” Id.

One means by which the Commissioner meets this burden is by 

reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“grids”). Id. at 

1201–02. Exclusive reliance upon the grids is inappropriate, 

however, “‘either when the claimant is unable to perform a full 

range of work at a given residual functional level or when a 

claimant has a non-exertional impairment that significantly 

limits basic work skills.’”6 Id. at 1202 (citations omitted).

 6 Nonexertional limitations are those limitations that “‘affect 

an individual’s ability to meet the nonstrength demands of jobs’

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 10 of 17
11

Where nonexertional impairments are present, “[t]he ALJ 

must ‘make a specific finding as to whether the nonexertional 

limitations are severe enough to preclude a wide range of 

employment at the given work capacity level indicated by the 

exertional limitations.’” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 

(11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Normally, when nonexertional 

limitations are alleged, “the preferred method of demonstrating 

that the claimant can perform specific work is through the 

testimony of a vocational expert.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 

1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986). “‘It is only when the claimant can 

clearly do unlimited types of [work at a given level] that it is

unnecessary to call a vocational expert to establish whether the 

claimant can perform work which exists in the national 

economy.’” Allen, 880 F.2d at 1202 (emphasis in original) 

(citations omitted); see also Garred, 383 F. Appx. at 824 (“When 

a claimant has non-exertional impairments that significantly 

limit her ability to work, the ALJ may use the Guidelines as a 

framework, but should also consult with a VE to determine how 

 

and include mental limitations and restrictions, pain 

limitations, and all physical limitations and restrictions that 

are not reflected in the seven strength demands.” Callens v. 

Astrue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115043, *18, 2012 WL 3542200, *7 

(N.D. Ala. Aug. 15, 2012) (quoting S.S.R. 96–4p). “Exertional 

limitations ‘affect your ability to meet the strength demands of 

jobs,’ and include ‘sitting, standing, walking, lifting, 

carrying, pushing, and pulling.’” Id. at *6 (quoting 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1569(a)).

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 11 of 17
12

the claimant’s impairments affect her ability to perform other 

jobs that exist in the national economy.”) (citing Wilson v. 

Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Turning to the case at hand, the Court finds instructive 

the decision, Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 

1985), in which the Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ erred in 

relying exclusively on the grids to find that the claimant was 

disabled, where the ALJ had previously found that the claimant 

could not perform work requiring more than “gross vision.” The 

Eleventh Circuit stated: 

The ALJ relied exclusively on the grids to 

find that there were jobs in the national 

economy which claimant could perform. 

Exclusive reliance on the grids is not 

appropriate either when claimant is unable 

to perform a full range of work at a given 

residual functional level or when a claimant

has non-exertional impairments that 

significantly limit basic work skills. Broz 

v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1361 (11th Cir.

1982), adhered to sub nom. Broz v. Heckler, 

711 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1983). The ALJ was 

free to rely on the grids despite certain of 

Francis’s non-exertional impairments, such 

as his hand tumor because it was found not 

to impair function of the hand or such as 

his shortness of breath which the ALJ found 

not credible. However, as to Francis’s 

vision problems the ALJ stated:

The Administrative Law Judge has given 

careful consideration to the fact that 

claimant’s impairment probably 

precludes her [sic] from performing 

work which requires her to engage in 

work requiring more than gross vision. 

However, the undersigned is persuaded 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 12 of 17
13

that this restriction does not 

significantly diminish the range of 

medium jobs available to the claimant 

and that the Rule [the grid] cited 

above remains applicable.

After acknowledging that the claimant is 

limited to performing medium work requiring 

only gross vision, the ALJ nevertheless 

applied the grids because he was “persuaded” 

that this impairment did not significantly 

limit the range of medium work available to 

claimant. Yet there is no vocational 

testimony upon which the ALJ could have 

relied to be so persuaded. Whether the 

vision problem is seen as a non-exertional 

impairment or as a limitation on the range 

of medium work claimant could perform, 

reliance on the grid is inappropriate. 

Francis, 749 F.2d at 1566-67. 

In the present case, the ALJ found at step two of the 

sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff’s depression was 

severe, at step three that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties 

with concentration, persistence or pace, and at steps four and 

five that Plaintiff was limited to “unskilled work,” apparently 

in an effort to account for Plaintiff’s concentration 

difficulties. 7 (Id. at 23, 26-30). This is unlike the ALJ’s 

 7 See Scott v. Comm'r of Social Security, 495 Fed. Appx. 27, 28-

29(11th Cir. 2012)(ALJ’s hypothetical to VE adequately accounted 

for moderate limitation in ability to maintain concentration, 

persistence, and pace where ALJ asked VE to include work that 

would require "low stress, simple, unskilled; one, two, or three 

step instructions . . . [and] specifically noted in the 

hypothetical that the person had 'psychological based symptoms 

which affect[ed] his ability to concentrate upon complex or 

detailed tasks; but would remain capable of carrying out simple 

job instructions'"). (Tr. 32, 49).

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 13 of 17
14

findings in Francis concerning the claimant’s hand tremor and 

shortness of breath, which the ALJ there found caused no 

impairment of function, and more analogous to the ALJ’s findings 

in Francis related to the claimant’s vision problems, which the 

ALJ found resulted in limitations to work requiring only gross 

vision. Thus, the ALJ was required to call a vocational expert 

to establish whether Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitation 

(moderate concentration difficulties) eroded the occupational 

base for unskilled sedentary work. 

Stated differently, because the ALJ found that a 

nonexertional limitation (i.e. moderate limitation in 

concentration, persistence and pace) was present in this case, 

he was required to make an additional, specific finding as to 

whether the nonexertional limitation was “severe enough to 

preclude a wide range of employment at the given work capacity 

level indicated by the exertional limitations.”8 Foote, 67 F.3d 

 8 Although the record contains evidence that Plaintiff’s 

depression was controlled on medication and did not affect her 

ability to work (Tr. 389, 449, 509, 522, 525), the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff’s depression was severe, that she had 

moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, and 

that her RFC was limited to unskilled work. (Id. at 23, 25-26). 

Under these circumstances, it is not clear that Plaintiff can 

“do unlimited types of [work at a given level]” or that her nonexertional limitation (moderate concentration difficulties) does 

not significantly limit her basis work skills. See Allen, 880 

F.2d at 1202. Thus, the ALJ was required to call a vocational 

expert to establish whether she can perform work which exists in 

the national economy. Id.

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 14 of 17
15

at 1559. Absent clear evidence that Plaintiff can do unlimited

types of work at the given level, the ALJ was required to call a 

vocational expert to establish whether Plaintiff can perform 

work which exists in the national economy. Allen, 880 F.2d at

1202. Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “additional 

limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of 

unskilled sedentary work,” there was no evidence from a 

vocational expert on which to base that conclusion. Thus, 

reliance on the grid was inappropriate. See Francis, 749 F.2d 

at 1566-67. 

Interestingly, the record shows that the ALJ did obtain

evidence from a vocational expert at Plaintiff’s hearing that

there were jobs in the national economy that an individual with 

Plaintiff’s limitations could perform. (Id. at 50). However, 

the ALJ decided to instead rely exclusively on the grids instead 

of the VE’s testimony. (Id. at 33). Whatever his reason for 

doing so, the ALJ’s exclusive reliance on the grids was 

inappropriate.9

 9 The Court rejects the Commissioner’s implication that any error 

by the ALJ in failing to rely on the VE’s testimony in this case 

was harmless. First, it appears that the hypothetical question 

posed to the vocational expert was flawed, as the ALJ expressly 

stated in his hypothetical that “there would be no mental 

limitations.” (Tr. 50). Furthermore, as aptly stated by the 

Court in Harrell v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68739, *12, 

2014 WL 2093961, *4 (S.D. Ala. May 20, 2014), “[t]he ALJ failed 

to carry her burden ‘to establish that [Harrell] could perform 

other work that exists in the national economy. . . . It is to 

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 15 of 17
16

The ALJ’s findings leave no question that Plaintiff cannot 

perform unlimited types of work at the sedentary level because 

of her nonexertional impairment. Thus, absent testimony from a 

vocational expert that Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitation does 

not significantly limit her basic work skills or preclude her

from performing a wide range of sedentary work, the ALJ’s 

decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Francis, 

749 F.2d at 1567 (absent vocational expert testimony on which 

the ALJ could base his decision that the claimant’s vision 

impairment did not significantly limit the range of medium work 

available, the ALJ’s reliance on the grids was inappropriate); 

Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (the ALJ 

erred in relying on the grids where claimant was not able to do 

unlimited types of light work, i.e., he could not work around 

dangerous machinery or at unprotected heights; in such cases, 

expert testimony was required to determine whether claimant’s 

limitations were severe enough to preclude him from performing a 

wide range of light work.).

 

no avail that the ALJ may have elicited testimony from a VE at 

the hearing regarding work Harrell could perform because the 

ALJ, for whatever reason, chose not to rely on that testimony in 

her decision denying Harrell’s benefits. . . . For that reason, 

the Commissioner’s argument that this Court should ‘read between 

the lines’ and affirm the ALJ’s decision anyway because ‘the ALJ 

already obtained vocational expert testimony, which [counsel for 

the Commissioner on appeal, not the ALJ, believes] clearly 

established that [Harrell] was not disabled’ . . . must be 

rejected.” (Emphasis omitted, brackets in original).

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 16 of 17
17

In sum, the ALJ did not fulfill his duty to develop a full 

and fair record with substantial evidence showing that there 

were specific jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could 

perform. On remand, in accordance with Francis v. Heckler, 749 

F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1985), the Commissioner should utilize the 

services of a vocational expert to identify what sedentary jobs, 

if any, Plaintiff can perform in light of her nonexertional

limitation. See Gray v. Massanari, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6619, *9 

(April 17, 2001), report and recommendation adopted by 2001 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 6544, *1, 2001 WL 530704, *2 (S.D. Ala. May 1, 

2001).

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful 

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the 

parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a 

period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income be REVERSED and REMANDED.10

DONE this 27th day of September, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 10 Having determined that this case must be remanded because of 

the ALJ’s erroneous reliance on the grids, the Court need not 

address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments on appeal.

Case 1:15-cv-00198-B Document 26 Filed 09/27/16 Page 17 of 17