alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 14

- 00864

- CV
Jeremil RODRIGUEZ , Appellant

v. JP Morgan JP MORGAN CHASE BANK , Appellee From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 14

- 0255

- CV Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 11, 2015
DIS MISSED The clerk’s record and reporter’s record were bo th due on January 5, 2015. On January 9, 2015, this court ordered appellant to provide written proof to this court no later than January 19,
2015 that either (1) the clerk’s fee has been paid or arrangem ents have been made to pay the clerk’s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the clerk’s fee. Our order informed04

- 14

- 00864

- CV
appellant that if he failed to provide such written proof within the time provided, this appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution. 1 A filing fee of $195.00 was due from appellant when this appeal was filed but was not paid.
See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 51.941(a) (West 2013); id. §§ 51.0051, 51.207(b)(1), 51.208 (West 2013); T EXAS S UPREME C OURT O RDER R EGARDING F EES C HARGED I N C IVIL C ASES I N THE
S UPREME C OURT , I N C IVIL C ASES I N THE C OURTS OF A PPEALS , A ND B EFORE THE J UDICIAL P ANEL

ON M ULTIDISTRICT L ITIGATION (Misc. Docket No. 13

- 9127, Aug. 16, 2013). On January 13, 2015,
this ordered appellant to , no later than January 22, 2015, either (1) pay the applica ble filing fee or (2) provide written proof to this court that he is excused by statute or the Rules of Appellate Procedure from paying the fee. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 20.1. Our order informed appellant that if he
failed to provide such written proof within the time ordered, this appeal would be dismissed. See
T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3. Appellant has not responded to either of our orders ; therefore, this appeal is dismissed. Costs of appeal are assessed against appellant.

PER CURIAM

1 On January 26, 2015, the court reporter filed a letter with this court stating she has had no communication with appellant, nor has she received a deposit to begin work on the reporter’s record.

- 2

-
#### State v. Michaux

Case below: 185 N.C. App.-(7 August 2007)

No. 441P07

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. 7A-31 (COA06-1040)

Denied 11/08/07
#### State v. Lewis

Case below: 176 N.C. App. 191

No. 558PA04

1. AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA03-785-2)

2. AG’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

3. AG’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

4. Def’s Motion to Dismiss the State’s PDR as Improvidently Granted and as Moot

1. Allowed 03/10/06 360 N.C. 489 Stay Dissolved 08/23/07

2. Dismissed as Moot 08/23/07

3. Dismissed as Moot 08/23/07

4. Dismissed as Moot 08/23/07
##### 



Exhibit 99.1











new


new
AFFIDAVIT
                  AND
                  NOTICE OF
                  iNTENT TO
                  HOLD

                
                  .
                    .
                    MINING CLAIM(S\ AND SITES)

                   

                  TO
                    ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

                

              	 	
                

              
	 	 	 
	
                The
                  undersigned certifies that the owner or claimant intended or intends
                  to
                  hold
                  the mining claim(s). miU site(s). and/or tunnel
                  site(s)
                  listed below
                  from
                  12:00.p.m. on September 1 of the year
                  before
                  this affidavit
                  was
                  made and recorded, until 11:59 a.m. on September 1 of the year
                  that this
                  affidavit was
                  made
                  and
                  recorded. 

              	 	
                

                205740
Exhibit
10.26





AMENDMENT
TO


TARGA
RESOURCES INVESTMENTS INC.


KEY
EMPLOYEE LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN








WHEREAS, TARGA RESOURCES INVESTMENTS
INC. (the “Company”) has heretofore adopted the TARGA RESOURCES INVESTMENTS INC. KEY
EMPLOYEE LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN(the “Plan”) for the benefit of certain
of the employees of the Company and its affiliates and as an incentive for such
individuals to remain employees of the Company or its affiliates;




WHEREAS, the Company may amend
the Plan at any time in its discretion; and




WHEREAS,the Company desires
to amend the Plan to comply with section 409A of the Internal Revenue of Code of
1986, as amended;




NOW, THEREFORE,the Plan shall
be amended as follows, effective as of December 18th, 2008:




1.           Section
6 of the Plan shall be deleted, and the following shall be substituted
therefor:




“6.           Payment of Incentive Benefit
After Death of Employee.  If an Employee terminates employment
due to death and is entitled to receive the Incentive Benefit which would be
payable on the next following Employment Incentive Date pursuant to Section 4(a)
hereof, such Incentive Benefit shall be paid in a lump sum cash payment, subject
to applicable withholding, as soon as practicable after the date of death but in
no event later than the 15th day of
March following the end of the calendar year during which the death occurs to
(a) the Employee’s beneficiary (or beneficiaries) designated under the
employer’s group life insurance plan, if living, or, (b) if none is so
designated or living, the executor of the Employee’s estate.”




2.
            The
      third sentence of Section 4(a) of the Plan shall be deleted, and the
      following shall be substituted
therefor:




“Except
as provided in Section 6 below with respect to payments made after the death of
an Employee, such Incentive Benefit shall be payable in a lump sum cash payment,
subject to applicable withholding, (A) within 20 business days after the date of
termination in the event of a termination other than for Cause, or (B) in the
event of a determination of Disability, no later than the earlier of (1) March
15 of the year following the year of the date of determination or (2) 30
business days after the Incentive Payment Date.”




EXECUTED and effective as of
December 18, 2008.





TARGA
RESOURCES INVESTMENTS INC.








By:                      /s/Rene R.
Joyce________


Name:                                Rene
R. Joyce


Title:                                Chief
Executive Officer
#### Jiovon Anonymous, an Infant, by His Father and Legal Guardian, Thomas Anonymous, et al., Respondents, v City of Rochester et al., Appellants.

Submitted March 30, 2009;

decided April 2, 2009

Motion by New York Civil Liberties Union for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed. Two copies of the brief must be served and 24 copies filed within seven days.
#### State v. Huffman

Case below: 177 N.C. App. 565

No. 328P06

1. Def’s NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA05-1297)

2. AG’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal

3. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. _

2. Allowed 01/25/07

3. Denied 01/25/07
#### Michael A. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Helen F. FAHEY, Chairwoman; David N. Harker, Vice Chairman; Gene Johnson, Director, Defendants-Appel-lees.

No. 06-7032.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 17, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 20, 2006.

Michael A. Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Carson Vorhis, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Michael A. Brown appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Brown v. Fahey,*No. 2:05-cv-00466-RBS (E.D. Va. filed May 8; entered May 11, 2006). We deny Brown’s motion for appointment of counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 8, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 06-31068 Summary Calendar

MATTIE WYRE Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS ST. HELENA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.

------------------------------

GUSTAVIA CEASAR Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS IBERVILLE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.

------------------------------ LIONEL DUNN, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Middle District of Louisiana

(3:04-CV-82)*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. 2 Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appellants appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for conditional class certification pursuant to § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Appellees contend that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, interlocutory decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, non-final judgments certified as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and other non-final orders or judgments to which an exception applies. Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 2002). The denial of a § 216(b) class certification is not a final decision under § 1291, nor does it fall under the “collateral order” exception to § 1291's final judgment rule. See Baldridge v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc. , 404 F.3d 930, 931, 933 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, absent certification under § 1292(b), it is not an interlocutory decision over which we have jurisdiction. See § 1292(a). The district court did not certify its decision as final under Rule 54(b), and there is no other exception that applies to give us jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Davis BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-30574.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 12, 2006.

Filed Oct. 2, 2006.

*42James A. McDevitt, Esq., USSP-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dawn Reynolds, Esq., Dawn Reynolds, Esq., Attorney at Law, Dallas, OR, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, KLEINFELD and BEA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Michael Davis Bryant appeals his conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to “felon in possession of a firearm” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The firearm was found in the trunk of his brother’s car, parked in front of Bryant’s mother’s residence. Bryant claims that the gun should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree rooted in the allegedly unlawful search of the mother’s residence. Under the terms of his probation, Bryant had consented to searches of his person, property, and residence. He contends that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the premises searched constituted his residence. He relies upon the fact that he had provided a different address for his residence to his probation officer.

*43The district court found that the probation officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Bryant was not living at the address he provided, but was living instead at his mother’s house. This finding was not clearly erroneous. The probation officer testified that Bryant could not be found at the address he had given, and a police officer testified that both a friend and a relative of Bryant told the officer Bryant was living at his mother’s house. This information was confirmed by a confidential informant and by the fact that petitioner had been seen by officers at the searched residence both before the day of the search and before the search itself. The district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous. *See, e.g., United States v. Watts,*67 F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir.1995), *rev’d on other grounds,*519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997).

Bryant challenges his sentence on the ground that the district court erroneously relied upon an *Alford*plea as one of the prior convictions making him a career offender. We have held to the contrary. *United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez,*434 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.2005). Finally, the district court did not err in holding that Bryant’s state riot offense is a “violent felony” for purposes of sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 31


                                                  THE IMPAC COMPANIES
                               19500 Jamboree Road  Irvine  CA  92612
                               www. IMPACCOMPANIES.COM 1-800-597-4101


             CERTIFICATION TO BE PROVIDED BY THE MASTER SERVICER WITH
                               WITH FORM 10-K


     Re: Impac Secured Asset Corp.,
         Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1

I, Mario Fegan, certify that:

     1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form
10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on
Form 10-K of Impac Secured Assets Trust 2007-1 (the "Exchange Act
periodic reports");

     2.  Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports,
taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading as of the last day of the period covered by this
Report;

[logo IMPAC]

     3.  Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and
other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the
period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic
reports;

     4.  I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
servicers and based on my knowledge and the complianc reviews conducted
in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in this report
under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange
Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations
under the servicing agreements; and Based on my knowledge and the servicer
compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of
Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports
the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing
agreements; and

     5.  All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation
reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in
accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report,
except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material
instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been
disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.


In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information
provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties, Countrywide Financial
Corporation and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.




Date: 3/28/08

/S/  Mario Fegan
Mario Fegan
Senior Officer in Charge of the
Servicing Function of the Master Servicer
Exhibit 32.01
 
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In connection with the Annual Report of 1st Home Buy & Sell Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ending June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Garry Unger, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  1350,
as adopted pursuant to  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:
  (1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Garry Unger
 By: Garry Unger
 Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
  Dated: October 13, 2009
  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
   1
#### Matter of Rachel A. Stanley, an Attorney, Resignor.

[964 NYS2d 56]

Voluntary resignation accepted and name removed from roll of attorneys.

Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Carni, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ. (Filed Apr. 18, 2013.)
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 370 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 370

  To preserve and protect the free choice of individual employees to 
  form, join, or assist labor organizations, or to refrain from such 
                              activities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 14, 2005

Mr. Lott (for himself, Mr. Allard, Mr. Cochran, Mr. DeMint, Mr. Hatch, 
Mr. Sessions, Mr. Thune, and Mr. Warner) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, 
                     Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To preserve and protect the free choice of individual employees to 
  form, join, or assist labor organizations, or to refrain from such 
                              activities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Right-to-Work Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.

    (a) Rights of Employees.--Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act (29 U.S.C. 157) is amended by striking ``except to'' and all that 
follows through ``authorized in section 8(a)(3)''.
    (b) Unfair Labor Practices.--Section 8 of the National Labor 
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(3), by striking ``: Provided, That'' 
        and all that follows through ``retaining membership'';
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or to 
                discriminate'' and all that follows through ``retaining 
                membership''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (5), by striking ``covered by an 
                agreement authorized under subsection (a)(3) of this 
                section''; and
            (3) in subsection (f), by striking clause (2) and 
        redesignating clauses (3) and (4) as clauses (2) and (3), 
        respectively.

SEC. 3. AMENDMENT TO THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT.

    Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 152) is amended by 
striking paragraph Eleven.
                                 <all>
```
From: The District Court of the 20th Judicial District. County of Lake.

#### STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff, vs. JONATHAN DENTON, Defendant,

CAUSE NO. DC-06-173 DECISION

On July 15, 2009, the defendant was sentenced for violation of the conditions of a suspended sentence, to a commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections for a term of five (5) years, with no time suspended, for the offense of Stalking, a felony.

*82On November 12, 2009, the defendant’s application for review of that sentence was heard by the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court.

The defendant was present and was represented by Eric Olson. The state was not represented.

Before hearing the application, the defendant was advised that the Sentence Review Division has the authority not only to reduce the sentence or affirm it, but also increase it. The defendant was further advised that there is no appeal from a decision of the Sentence Review Division. The defendant acknowledged that he understood this and stated that he wished to proceed.

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court of Montana provides that “the sentence imposed by the District Court is presumed correct, and the sentence will not be reduced or increased unless it is deemed clearly inadequate or excessive.” (§46-18-904(3), MCA).

The Division finds that the reasons advanced for modification are insufficient to hold that the sentence imposed by the District Court is inadequate or excessive.

Therefore, it is the unanimous decision of the Sentence Review Division that the sentence shall be affirmed.

Done in open Court this 12th day of November, 2009.

DATED this 25th day of November, 2009.

Chairperson, Hon. Stewart Stadler, Member, Hon. Blair Jones and Member, Hon. Richard Simonton.
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-75,223-05
IN RE REIDIE JACKSON, Re lator

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF M ANDAM US CAUSE NO. 98-J-226 IN THE 130 DISTRICT COURT T H F ROM MA TAGORD A COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R
Relator has filed a motion for leave to file a writ o f m an damus pursuant to the orig inal jurisdiction of this Court. I n it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of habea s corpus in the 130 District Court of Matag orda County , that more than 35 day s have elapse d, and that the t h application has not y et bee n forwa rded to this Court. I n thes e circumstances, additional fac ts are neede d. Respondent, the District Clerk of Matag orda County , is order ed to fi l e a re s ponse, which may be made by submitt ing the rec ord on such habea s corpus application, submitt ing a copy of a timely filed order which desig nates issues to be investiga ted ( see McCree v. Hampton , 824 S.W .2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), or stating2

that Relator has not filed a n application for

a wr it of habea s corpus in Matag orda County

. Should the response include an order desig nating issues, proof of the date the district attorney ’s office was
serve d with the habea s application shall also be submitted with the response. T his application for leave to file a writ of mandamus shall be held in abey ance until Respondent has su b m i t t ed the appropr iate re sponse. Such re sponse shall be submitted within 30 day s of the date of this order. Filed: Apr il 27, 2016 Do not publish