Present: All the Justices 

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY 

v. Record No. 941863 

DARYL F. LACLAIR OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

 November 3, 1995 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA 

v. Record No. 941896 

DARYL F. LACLAIR 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Thomas A. Fortkort, Judge 

 These two appeals in a declaratory judgment proceeding 

present a question of motor vehicle insurance coverage. The 

dispositive issue is whether an intentional shooting by a person 

occupying an uninsured vehicle constitutes "use" of the vehicle 

for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage. We answer that 

query in the negative, and reverse. 

 The facts are virtually undisputed. On November 21, 1990, 

appellee Daryl F. LaClair, an Arlington County deputy sheriff, 

was operating his marked police vehicle on Lee Highway in 

Arlington County. An automobile ahead of LaClair, driven by one 

Marcus Arban, was being operated erratically in the left lane. 

The officer assumed the driver was lost and was attempting to 

read a map. 

 As the officer pulled alongside the automobile in the right 

lane, it sped in front of him, pulled into the right lane, and 

stopped. The officer stopped his vehicle "four to five feet" 

behind Arban's automobile, followed standard procedures for 
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making a traffic stop, such as activating emergency lights, 

stepped from his vehicle, and began to approach the automobile. 

He was wearing leisure clothes, not his police uniform. 

 When Arban began to open the door on the driver's side of 

the automobile, the officer ordered him to remain in the vehicle. 

 The door continued to open, and the officer again told Arban to 

remain in his car. 

 Suddenly, the officer felt a blow to his left elbow. As he 

turned to examine the elbow, "a second shot struck" him; the 

bullet grazed his head cutting through his right eyelid and 

exited the eyebrow. The officer dove between the automobile and 

his police vehicle to avoid further shots. As the Arban car 

began to leave the scene, the officer, partially blinded, managed 

to fire several shots into its rear. 

 The next day, the Prince William County police attempted to 

serve a search warrant on Arban. He resisted entry into his 

home. During an exchange of gunfire, Arban and a police officer 

were killed. 

 Subsequently, LaClair filed a civil action in Arlington 

County against Arban's personal representative seeking recovery 

against the estate for his personal injuries. The automobile 

liability insurer on Arban's vehicle denied coverage. 

 Appellant Travelers Insurance Company issued a policy of 

automobile insurance on LaClair's personal automobile. Appellant 

Insurance Company of North America (I.N.A.) carried the liability 
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insurance on the vehicles of the Arlington County Sheriff's 

Office. 

 Later, Travelers and I.N.A. sought, in the present 

declaratory judgment action, a ruling that they were not 

obligated to provide coverage to LaClair under the uninsured 

motorist provisions of their respective polices for the claims 

made in the personal injury action pending in Arlington County. 

As pertinent to the issue to be decided in this appeal, the 

respective policies obligated the insurer to pay LaClair all sums 

that he is legally entitled to recover as damages from the driver 

of an uninsured motor vehicle resulting "from the ownership, 

maintenance or use of" the uninsured motor vehicle. 

 After an evidentiary hearing in the declaratory judgment 

proceeding, the trial court "determined as a matter of fact that 

the shooting of Captain LaClair was an intentional, not an 

accidental act, and that Arban was still partially inside his car 

at the time he fired the shots at Captain LaClair." In deciding 

the question whether "the circumstances of this case constitute 

`use' of an automobile as that term is employed in the insurance 

policies," the trial court ruled in favor of LaClair in an August 

1994 order from which these appeals were taken. 

 The court below opined that LaClair's "injuries were linked 

to the `use' of the vehicle by Arban." The court said that 

"Arban's vehicle, in a fundamental way, was used to facilitate 

the act which produced the injury to . . . LaClair. Arban used 
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his vehicle first to lure . . . LaClair into stopping behind him, 

then as a shield, from behind which the shots were fired, and 

finally as a swift means of escape." The court, stating that 

Arban's car "was the instrumentality and the accessory" for 

inflicting the injuries, found that LaClair's injuries were 

covered under the uninsured motorist provisions of Travelers' and 

I.N.A.'s policies. This was error. 

 We have examined the question whether an injury or death 

arose from the "use" of a motor vehicle in three fairly recent 

insurance coverage cases. In State Farm Mutual Automobile 

Insurance Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984), we 

held that a death resulting from discharge of a shotgun, resting 

in a gun rack affixed to a pickup truck, did not arise out of 

"use" of the vehicle under the circumstances of that case. We 

said that the truck was merely the situs for a social gathering, 

and was not employed for any enterprise usually associated with 

use of the vehicle. Id. at 501, 318 S.E.2d at 398. 

 There, we noted certain basic concepts that are uniformly 

applied to the "ownership, maintenance, or use" provisions of 

automobile liability policies. Id. at 500, 318 S.E.2d at 397. 

We said that these "precepts are consistent with the principles 

applicable to insurance contracts generally. For example, 

consideration must be given to the intention of the parties to 

the insurance agreement in determining the scope of the coverage 

afforded." Id. 
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 Also, we pointed out that "the `ownership, maintenance, or 

use' provision should be construed in the light of the subject 

matter with which the parties are dealing; the terms of the 

policy should be given their natural and ordinary meaning." Id. 

 Importantly, we said that although "ownership, maintenance, or 

use of the vehicle need not be the direct, proximate cause of the 

injury in the strict legal sense," nonetheless, there must be a 

causal relationship between the incident and the employment of 

the "motor vehicle as a vehicle." Id. 

 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Rice, 239 

Va. 646, 391 S.E.2d 71 (1990), we applied the principles set 

forth in Powell and ruled that an injury caused by the accidental 

discharge of a rifle arose out of the "use" of the motor vehicle 

under the circumstances of that case. There, two hunters were 

utilizing a Jeep vehicle to transport themselves, and their 

hunting equipment, to the site where they would embark on their 

hunting expedition. While unloading the vehicle at the site, the 

rifle discharged injuring one hunter. We concluded "that the 

requisite causal relationship between the accident and employment 

of the Jeep as a vehicle for imposition of coverage on the 

automobile carrier exists." Id. at 650, 391 S.E.2d at 73. 

 And, in Erie Insurance Company Exchange v. Jones, 248 Va. 

437, 448 S.E.2d 655 (1994), decided after the trial court's 

ruling in the present case, we applied the Powell principles and 

held that two automobile liability insurers were not 
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contractually bound to provide uninsured motorist coverage in a 

wrongful death claim because the damages were "merely incidental 

or tangential" to use of the truck in question, under the facts 

of that case. Id. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 659. There, the 

operator of the uninsured truck alighted from the stopped vehicle 

and, with a rifle in hand, walked to the side of an automobile 

that had been following the truck closely with the driver 

repeatedly raising and lowering the headlights. While tapping 

the rifle barrel on the car window, the rifle discharged, killing 

a passenger in the car. 

 Applying the foregoing principles to the present facts, we 

hold that the employment of Arban's vehicle did not amount to a 

"use" of that vehicle within the meaning of the policy provisions 

at issue. Even though Arban may have utilized the vehicle to 

"lure" LeClair into stopping behind him, even though Arban was 

partially inside his car when the shots were fired, even though 

Arban employed the car as a "shield," even though the vehicle was 

employed to "facilitate the act which produced the injury," and 

even though Arban's car may have been an "accessory" to the 

shooting, nevertheless, none of those acts or circumstances 

involved the use of the Arban vehicle as a vehicle. Thus, we 

conclude that the requisite causal relationship between the 

incident and employment of the automobile as a vehicle does not 

exist. 

 Manifestly, the natural and ordinary meaning of "use" of a 
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private, passenger motor vehicle does not contemplate its 

utilization as a mobile or stationary pillbox or fortress, or as 

a shield, or as an outpost from which an assailant may inflict 

intentional injury with a firearm. 

 Therefore, the judgment appealed from will be reversed, and 

we will enter final judgment here in favor of the insurers 

declaring that neither owes coverage to LaClair under their 

respective policies. 

Reversed and final judgment.