1

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-14-00100-CV 

IN RE WYATT SERVICES, L.P., RELATOR 

 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

 

April 4, 2014 

 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Wyatt Services, L.P. (Wyatt) has filed for a writ of mandamus wherein it asks that 

we “issue a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable Ana Estevez, [251st] District 

Court, [Potter] County, Texas, to vacate the order staying this case and compelling 

arbitration.” Wyatt also requests that we instruct the trial court to “finally decide [it’s] 

claims for equitable relief prior to any referral order.” We conditionally grant the writ of 

mandamus in part and deny it in part.

Background

Wyatt entered into a contract with Northwest Texas Healthcare System 

(Northwest) on April 1, 2004, under which agreement Wyatt provided services for 

indigent healthcare. The initial contract term was five years, and at the expiration of that 
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period, the parties could renegotiate and extend the accord for an additional three 

years.1 Among the many provisions of the accord there also appeared several 

pertaining to the resolution of contractual disputes. They provided that:

7.18.1 Conciliation and Mediation. If a dispute among the Parties relating 

to this Agreement is not resolved within 10 business days from the date 

that any Party to this Agreement has notified the others that such dispute 

exists, such dispute shall be submitted jointly for mediation according to 

the mediation rules of the American Health Lawyers Association Dispute 

Resolution Committee using a qualified mediator familiar with health care 

matters. If such representatives are unable to resolve the dispute within 15 

days from the date that it is first presented to them, then such dispute shall 

be referred to binding arbitration. The parties will share the cost of 

mediation equally.

7.18.2 Binding Arbitration. Any dispute under this Agreement that remains

unresolved following efforts to reconcile the dispute shall be submitted to 

arbitration according to the Arbitration Rules of the American Health 

Lawyers Association ("AHLA"). Any decision made by the Arbitrator or the 

Board of Arbitration (as applicable) (either prior to or after the expiration of 

such 30-day period) shall be final, binding and conclusive on the parties to 

the arbitration, and each Party to the arbitration shall be entitled to enforce 

such decision to the fullest extent permitted by law and entered in any 

court of competent jurisdiction. The fees and expenses of the arbitration 

process shall be borne by the unsuccessful Party.

7.18.3 Equitable Relief. Nothing in this paragraph is intended to preclude 

either Party from seeking a claim or claims for equitable relief, including, 

without limitation, claims for specific performance, a preliminary injunction, 

 

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The provisions specifying the term and its extension state:

5.1 Term. This Agreement shall be effective as of the Effective Date and shall continue in effect 

for an initial Term of five (5) years. Upon mutual agreement, this Agreement shall be renewed for three (3) 

year Subsequent Terms until and through the expiration of the Indigent Care Agreement between 

[Northwest] and the Amarillo Hospital District, unless earlier terminated as provided in Section 5.2.

and

5.3 Termination After Initial or Subsequent Terms. Notwithstanding termination provisions as 

outlined in Paragraph 5.2, the intent of the parties is to have an Agreement that continues through the 

term of the ICA, allowing for annual renegotiation of financial terms . . . . [T]he Party seeking termination 

will provide notification to the other Party no less than one hundred and eighty (180) days in advance. In 

the event the Termination Event involves the Parties' inability to reach agreement related to financial 

matters, termination will not occur until the Parties have exhausted the Dispute Resolution process 

described in this Agreement.
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or a temporary restraining order. Once the claims for equitable relief are 

finally decided, any and all remaining claims shall be submitted to 

arbitration pursuant to the terms of this agreement, and the Arbitrator shall 

be bound by the findings and rulings of the court on the claims for

equitable relief.

According to the record before us, the agreement was amended on April 1, 2008,

and extended to March 31, 2014. As the latter date approached, Wyatt discovered that

Northwest intended to forego renewal of the accord. This discovery led it to sue 

Northwest for breach of contract, specific performance, and injunctive relief. Thereafter, 

Northwest moved to abate the proceedings and compel arbitration. The trial court 

convened a hearing upon the motion on February 18, 2014, and, subsequently, signed 

an order granting the motion to “stay proceedings and compel arbitration.” It also

“enjoin[ed] [sua sponte] the expiration of the . . . Agreement until the earlier of 180 days 

from November 18, 2013, or a final decision in the . . . Arbitration.” The decision caused 

Wyatt to petition this court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to set-aside

the February 18th order and allow the equitable claims to be tried before arbitration 

occurs.

Authority

Whether a writ of mandamus should issue depends upon whether 1) the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion in issuing the order and 2) the petitioner lacks an 

adequate legal remedy by appeal. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 

204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). Additionally, a trial court abuses its discretion if 

it misinterprets or misapplies the law. In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 

S.W.3d 637, 642-43 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833

840 (Tex. 1992). 
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Next, while the law favors arbitration, E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 

307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2010), its availability depends upon the existence of a 

contract mandating it. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 

2003). That is, arbitration is a creature of contract. In re Brown, No. 07-13-00025, 2013 

Tex. App. LEXIS 13816, at *9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo November 7, 2013 orig. 

proceeding). So, its existence of one’s right to pursue the extra-judicial procedure is 

governed by the terms of the contract purporting to mandate it. More importantly, the 

party seeking to compel arbitration must establish that the claim involved comes within 

the scope of the agreement. See VSR Fin. Serv. v. McLendon, 409 S.W.3d 817, 827

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (stating that a party seeking to compel arbitration

must establish the existence of a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement and that the 

claims at issue fall within that agreement's scope). 

With the foregoing rules in mind, we return to the contract at issue. That it 

provided for arbitration is beyond question. Yet, the parties to it expressed that the duty 

to arbitrate was not "intended to preclude either. . . from seeking a claim or claims for 

equitable relief, including, without limitation, claims for specific performance, a 

preliminary injunction, or a temporary restraining order." (Emphasis added). According

the words within this quotation their plain meaning, see In re Green Tree Servicing, 

LLC, 275 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) (stating that 

the rules applicable to construing contracts apply to construing arbitration clauses; so, 

we accord the words of the clause their plain meaning), leads us to conclude that 

despite the arbitration clause, the parties remained free to pursue equitable claims and 

remedies through the court system. And, when we consider the remaining verbiage 
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contained in paragraph 7.18.3 of the contract at bar, we further conclude that the 

demands for equitable relief, irrespective of their facial merit, must be "finally decided"

first and only then may arbitration proceed. 

Wyatt clearly sought equitable relief here. Again, it prayed for specific 

performance of the contract and injunctive help. So, under the terms of the parties' very 

own contract they had to be "finally decided" before any other claims could be sent to 

arbitration. Yet, they were not.2 Instead, the trial court ordered the parties to go to 

arbitration while the equitable claims remained unadjudicated. This decision deviated 

from the law applicable to enforcing the parties' agreement and constituted a clear 

abuse of discretion. 

Next, our Texas Supreme Court has stated that "the balance will generally tilt

toward reviewing orders compelling arbitration only on final appeal" rather than through 

a mandamus proceeding. In re Gulf Exploration, LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Tex. 

2009); In re J.W. Res. Exploration & Dev., Inc., No. 07-09-00189-CV, 2009 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 6676, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo August 25, 2009) (orig. proceeding). Yet, it did 

not foreclose the availability of mandamus relief in all situations where arbitration is 

compelled. Indeed, it said that whether an appeal is adequate "depends on a careful 

balance of the case-specific benefits and detriments of delaying or interrupting a 

particular proceeding." In re Gulf Exploration, LLC, 289 S.W.3d at 842. And, though 

 

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At the hearing, the trial court indicated its doubt about the viability of the equitable claims by 

calling them "artfully-pled claims of damages." Yet, the trial judge said "I am not denying them, because 

I believe that . . . you would have been entitled to the summary judgment date. But at the summary 

judgment date, no matter what I did, I am going to do the same injunction." Emphasis added. Nor does 

the record before us contain a final judgment indicating that the claims were "finally decided." And, if the 

equitable claims truly are meritless, as proposed by Northwest, they may be susceptible to actual and 

final disposition through appropriate summary proceedings; however, we are not in a position to so 

declare where the trial court did not first "finally decide" the matter.
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the situation before us does not risk the frustration of legislative policy, see id. at 842-43 

(wherein the court noted that such a circumstance could authorize the use of review 

through a mandamus proceeding), it nonetheless implicates unordinary circumstances 

involving more than the waste of time and money. See id. (stating that the waste of 

time and money in pursuing an appeal after final judgment does not render a final 

appeal inadequate). Here, the parties intended that the arbitrator be bound by the prior 

rulings of the trial court in addressing the claims within his bailiwick. In other words, and 

per the terms of the contract, the arbitrator’s discretion to resolve the dispute before him 

is rather fettered and dependent upon the manner in which the trial court first 

adjudicates the equitable claims before it. So, allowing the arbitrator to proceed first 

could frustrate the arbitration itself. It is not inconceivable that a final decision rendered 

by a trial court on the equitable claims could control and potentially conflict with the 

arbitrator's decision on related legal (that is, non-equitable) claims.3 That, in turn, would 

present the need for further arbitration given that the arbitrator is obligated to abide by 

the trial court's ruling. And, if one is to add into the mix the time-sensitive nature of the 

dispute4and the nature of the contract,

5 more than the mere risk of wasting time and 

money are implicated. Thus, it can be said that the decision jeopardizes the policy 

favoring arbitration since arbitration may not resolve the matter given the need for later, 

and ultimately controlling, judicial action. At the very least, the arbitrator would benefit 

 

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If the equitable claims are baseless and "finally decided" to be such, then there is no potential 

for conflict. But, the trial court has not so held via any final ruling. So, we can only speculate on the 

matter, which, in turn, leaves open the possibility of potential conflict.

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But for the temporary injunction issued by the trial court, the contract was to expire by March 31, 

2014. Yet, the temporary injunction itself expires on May 18, 2014.

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It involves the provision of medical services to the poor by Wyatt.
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by knowing to what findings of fact and conclusions of law, if any, he would have to 

defer (given the contractual limitations on his authority) in rendering his decision. 

The totality of the unique circumstances at bar prevent us from holding that Wyatt 

has an adequate appellate remedy here. We do not attempt to impugn In re J.W. Res. 

Exploration & Dev., Inc. (supra) or reject In re Gulf Exploration, LLC (supra) but rather 

endeavor to follow their actual principles. Both hold that orders compelling arbitration 

are seldom subject to review via a mandamus proceeding while neither foreclose the 

possibility given the presence of extraordinary circumstances. Extraordinary 

circumstances exist here. And, in view of our holding that the trial court abused its 

discretion in ordering arbitration to proceed without first adjudicating the equitable

claims, Wyatt has shown itself entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to 

withdraw the order to arbitrate until it has "finally decided" the pending equitable claims.

As for Wyatt's effort to have us review, through mandamus, the temporary 

injunction issued by the trial court, we note that such can generally occur through an 

interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (a) (4) (West 

Supp. 2013) (stating that “[a] person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district 

court . . . that . . . grants or refuses a temporary injunction. . . .”). Wyatt need not wait 

for arbitration to occur or the trial court to finally adjudicate the equitable claims before it 

can cause the matter to be considered. Thus, the relator has an adequate legal 

remedy, which, in turn, vitiates the propriety of considering the matter through a 

proceeding for mandamus relief. We would note though that the trial court may care to 

revisit the matter given our disposition of the arbitration question, however. 
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Accordingly, we conditionally grant Wyatt's petition for writ of mandamus 

directing the trial court to withdraw its order compelling arbitration. However, we trust 

that the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion. Thus, we will issue the 

appropriate writ of mandamus only if the trial court fails to vacate the order within 15

days of the date of this opinion.

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Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

 

6 We deny Wyatt’s Motion for Temporary Relief filed on March 30, 2014, as moot.