1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

STANLEY L. BROWN, #267049 ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 2:09-0063-CG-N 

 ) 

ROGER GOODMAN, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 

Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1; and see doc. 17, Third Complaint, extracted from 

CO 08-694 (see below)). This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the undersigned on the Motion for 

Summary Judgment of Defendants, Dallas County Jail Warden Roger Goodman, and Dallas 

County Jail Officials Steve Coleman and Lonnie Averette (Docs. 36, 37) and Plaintiff’s 

response thereto. (Doc. 39). After consideration of these pleadings, and for the reasons set out 

below, it is recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants be GRANTED 

and that Plaintiff’s action be dismissed with prejudice.1

 

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

 Upon a review of the record, the Court summarizes the parties’ allegations which are 

material to the issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff claims that on 

 1

 Plaintiff has several pending motions which, as a result of the adoption of this Report 

and Recommendation, will be rendered MOOT. Docs. 39 (Motion for Subpoena), 40 (Motion 

for Status), 41 (Motion for Status) and 43 (Motion to Appoint Counsel). 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 1 of 18
2 

November 24, 2008, while he was incarcerated at the Dallas County Jail, Defendants Warden 

Goodman, Steve Coleman2

, and Lonnie Averette3 transferred Plaintiff from A-Block to E-Block. 

(Doc. 17 at 4). Subsequently, on the evening of November 28, 2008, while housed in E-Block, 

Plaintiff was attacked by six or seven fellow inmates, who punched and kicked him in his “head, 

face, nose, chin and ribs.” (Doc. 17 at 4; Doc. 18 at 6-7). According to Plaintiff, the inmates 

beat him for five or ten minutes during which time “there was not a single officer around or even 

in the control station.” (Doc. 18 at 6). Plaintiff complains that although every cell should have a 

microphone, the microphone in his cell was not properly working, and thus he was unable to call 

for help. (Id.). 

 The following day, on November 29, 2008, when it was discovered that he was injured, 

Plaintiff was transported to the Vaughn Regional Medical Center where the medical staff 

examined and x-rayed him, and, according to Plaintiff, discovered that his jaw and another facial 

bone was fractured. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that the officers were instructed by the doctors at the 

hospital to bring him back to the hospital in a week, and also to give him certain pills for his 

condition.4 (Doc. 1 at 4). However, according to Plaintiff, he was not given the medication, nor 

was he taken back to the hospital. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that he was denied all medical attention 

 2

 Defendant Dallas County Jail Official Steve Coleman is incorrectly referred to by 

Plaintiff in the Complaint as “Officer Steave.” (Doc. 17 at 4). 

3

 Defendant Dallas County Jail Official Lonnie Averette is incorrectly referred to by 

Plaintiff in the Complaint as “SGT. Loney.” (Doc. 17 at 4). 

4

 According to the records, the “pills” referenced by Plaintiff are the pain medication, 

Lortab. 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 2 of 18
3 

by Warden Goodman and the Dallas County Jail.5

 Plaintiff alleges that he “still can’t see good 

out of left eye now and jaw still be hurting a lot (sic).” (Id. at 4). 

 Defendants offer that Plaintiff did not identify anyone living in “Pod E” as being an 

enemy to him at the time he was booked, or at any other time prior to the altercation on 

November 28, 2008. (Doc. 37, Ex. B at 3). Plaintiff, furthermore, did not request to be 

transferred out of Pod E at any time prior to the altercation. (Id.). Defendant Goodman avers 

that “[o]n prior occasions, the Plaintiff had been involved in altercations with other inmates in 

the Dallas County Jail.” (Doc. 37, Ex. B at 3). Defendant Goodman also notes that forms 

requesting medical care are readily available for inmates in the Dallas County Jail, and that 

Plaintiff did not request any kind of medical care from the date of November 29, 2008, when he 

was treated for his injuries sustained in the altercation, until May 20, 2009. (Doc. 37, Ex. B. at 3, 

Ex. H). 

 Plaintiff has filed three separate Complaints in three separate actions containing the 

allegations referenced above. (Doc. 5 to 2:08-00694-KD-N; Doc. 1 to 2:09-00063-CG-N; Doc. 1 

to 2:09-00064-KD-C). On July 17, 2009, the Court consolidated Brown v. Goodman, 2:09-

00063-CG-N and Brown v. Goodman, 2:09-00064-KD-C, ordering the Clerk to statistically close 

Brown v. Goodman, 2:09-00064-KD-C. (Doc. 16). Additionally, as part of the consolidation, 

the Court extracted the third Complaint filed by Plaintiff in Brown v. Goodman, 2:08-00694-

 5

 Although named as Defendants in two of the three Complaints which are now 

consolidated in the present action, Dallas County Jail and the Dallas County Sheriff’s 

Department have not been served in this action. (Docs. 1, 18). It appears from the Court’s 

docket that on November 3, 2009, these parties may have been erroneously terminated following 

the consolidation of Civil Action No. 2:09-00064-KD-C and Civil Action No. 2:09-00063-CGN. However, the Court having found herein that there is no constitutional violation, there is no 

need to reinstate and serve these parties. 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 3 of 18
4 

KD-N6

 (Doc. 5), consolidating it with the present action, as it has been found to contain similar 

allegations. (Id. at 3). 

 In his three Complaints, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide him a safe 

environment and failed to provide adequate medical treatment following the attack on him by his 

fellow inmates. (Docs. 1, 17, 18). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, as well as for every 

inmate to receive medical attention from the Dallas County Jail, and for every cell to have a 

working microphone. (Doc. 1 at 7, Doc. 18 at 9). 

 In their Answer and Special Report filed on February 16, 2010, Defendants deny that 

they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and assert various defenses including absolute and 

qualified immunity.7 (Docs. 36, 37). On February 18, 2010, the Court entered an Order 

converting Defendants’ Answer and Special Report to a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 

38). On March 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, reasserting his claims against Defendants. (Doc. 39). Defendants’ motion 

and Plaintiff’s response thereto are now before the Court. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court authority under Rule 56 to render 

“judgment as a matter of law” to a party who moves for summary judgment. “[S]ummary 

 6

 In Brown v. Goodman, 2:08-00694-KD-N, Plaintiff’s allegations in his first two 

Complaints concerned conditions of confinement such as sanitation and comfort at the Dallas 

County Jail from November 8, 2008, until November 29, 2008. In Plaintiff’s third Complaint, he 

raised issues regarding his relocation inside the jail on November 24, 2008, and the inmate attack 

which follows on November 28, 2008, and thus the Court consolidated that Complaint and the 

Complaint from 2:09-00064-KD-C into the present action, Brown v. Goodman, 2:09-00063-CGN. 

7

 Having found herein that Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a constitutional 

violation, the issue of whether, and to what extent, Defendants may be entitled to absolute or 

qualified immunity is pretermitted. 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 4 of 18
5 

judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact....’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

 The Court must view the evidence produced by “the nonmoving party, and all factual 

inferences arising from it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield v. Brierton, 883 

F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, the Court is only to “make all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the party opposing summary judgment ... not to make all possible inferences in the 

nonmoving party’s favor.” Torjagbo v. United States, 285 Fed. Appx. 615, 619 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(emphasis in original). 

Rule 56(e)(2) states that: 

[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is properly made 

and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on 

allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its 

response must – by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 

this rule – set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for 

trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary 

judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that 

party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

 “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving 

party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is 

not significantly probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary judgment is 

mandated where a party ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.’” Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 5 of 18
6 

 In a civil action filed by an inmate, although drawing “all justifiable inferences in [the 

inmate’s] favor,” federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and 

disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the 

latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of 

prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient 

evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to 

prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary 

judgment stage. 

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529-30 (2006) (internal citation omitted). “Where the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is 

‘no genuine issue for trial.’ ” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 

III. DISCUSSION

 As discussed above, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19838 for alleged 

constitutional deprivations arising out of an attack by fellow inmates and denial of medical care 

while incarcerated at the Dallas County Jail. (Docs. 1, 17, 18). According to Plaintiff, these 

deprivations occurred from November 24, 2008, until February 6, 2009, when Plaintiff filed his 

Complaint. (Doc. 1 at 4). 

 

 8

 Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 6 of 18
7 

 In addressing Plaintiff’s claims brought under § 1983, the Court begins its analysis “by 

identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed....” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 394 (1989). The record indicates that Plaintiff was being held in the Dallas County Jail in 

November, 2008, as a pretrial detainee on a charge of receiving stolen property. (Doc. 37, Ex. 

A). “‘Claims involving the mistreatment of ... pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 

Unusual Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners.’” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 

F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 

1996)). It makes no difference, however, whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted 

prisoner because “‘the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison 

inmates applies equally to cases involving ... pretrial detainees.’” Id.; see also Purcell ex rel. 

Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1318 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (“‘[T]he 

standard for providing basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under 

both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.’”). “We will refer to the Amendments 

interchangeably, most often referring to the Eighth.” Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 

1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001). 

 The Eighth Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. Amend. 

VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits 

prison officials from exhibiting “‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to 

an inmate.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 

 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the 

Supreme Court summarized a state’s constitutional responsibilities with regard to inmates: 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 7 of 18
8 

[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds 

him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it 

a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his 

safety and general well-being. ... The rationale for this 

principle is simple enough: when the State by the 

affirmative exercise of its Power so restrains an 

individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for 

himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic 

human needs - - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

and reasonable safety - - it transgresses the substantive 

limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the 

Due Process Clause. 

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citations omitted). 

 In order to prevail on his conditions of confinement claim, Plaintiff must prove three 

elements: “(1) a condition of confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981), (2) the defendant’s 

‘deliberate indifference’ to that condition, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327, 

115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991), and (3) causation, Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1389-90 (11th

Cir. 1982).” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993). 

 In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994), the court described the first two 

elements as follows: 

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two 

components, an objective component, which inquires 

whether the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful 

enough to establish a constitutional violation, and a 

subjective component, which inquires whether the officials 

acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 

Sims, 25 F.3d at 983. 

 The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim inquires whether the alleged 

wrongdoing amounted to the infliction of “unnecessary pain or suffering upon the prisoner.” 

LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535. This standard requires that the alleged deprivation be “objectively, 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 8 of 18
9 

‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 

(1991)). The objective standard “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized 

standards, humanity, and decency. . ., but must be balanced against competing penological 

goals.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim generally “inquires whether 

the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Sims, 25 F.3d at 983-84 (citing 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). This component “follows from the principle that 

‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 

 In prison condition cases, the required state of mind for a defendant is “deliberate 

indifference” to an inmate’s health or safety. Id. (citations omitted). In defining “deliberate 

indifference,” the Supreme Court in Farmer stated: 

We hold ... that a prison official cannot be found liable 

under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate 

humane conditions of confinement unless the official 

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health 

or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The court concluded that the “subjective recklessness” standard of 

criminal law is the test for “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 839-40. 

There is no liability for “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not. ...” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. It is not enough that a plaintiff proves that 

the defendant should have known of the risk, conscious awareness is the key. See, e.g., Cottrell 

v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 9 of 18
10 

 A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “reasonable safety,” a 

standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials’ “unenviable task of keeping dangerous 

men in safe custody under humane conditions.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 (citations omitted). 

“Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act 

reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. 

Having set forth the general constitutional principles applicable to this action, the Court will now 

address Plaintiff’s specific claims. 

A. Conditions of Confinement. 

 As discussed above, Plaintiff states that on November 24, 2008, Defendants Warden 

Goodman, and Jail Officials Steve Coleman and Lonnie Averette transferred him from A-Block 

to E-Block in the Dallas County Jail. (Doc. 17 at 4; Doc. 39 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that, 

subsequently, on the evening of November 28, 2008, six inmates “jumped on” him for no reason. 

(Id.; Doc. 18 at 6; Doc. 39 at 3). Plaintiff states that the inmates kicked him in the facial area for 

five to fifteen minutes, and he finally had to lock himself in his room to end the beating. (Doc. 

17 at 4; Doc. 18 at 6). Plaintiff complains that he saw no officers in the control station, and 

further that the room he was in did not have a working microphone for him to call for help. (Id.; 

Doc. 39 at 2). Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment by failing to protect him from the attack by these fellow inmates. 

 While Plaintiff complains that Defendants Goodman, Coleman, and Averette transferred 

him from A-Block to E-Block, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants did this with the intent to 

harm Plaintiff, nor that Defendants had any knowledge that Plaintiff would be in danger. 

Plaintiff fails to show or even to allege that any Defendant had reason to anticipate the attack. 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 10 of 18
11 

 In order to establish the objective element of an Eighth (Fourteenth) Amendment claim in 

a failure to protect case, an inmate must establish that the conditions under which he was 

incarcerated presented “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. It is settled 

that “an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious 

harm. ...” Purcell ex. rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th

Cir. 2005) (Case involving both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims; “confinement in a 

prison where violence and terror reign is actionable.”). On the other hand, “occasional, isolated 

attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Purcell, 

400 F.3d at 1320 (citations omitted). 

 “[A] prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 

1321 (citations omitted). “[N]ot ... every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another 

... translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As discussed above, a prison official’s duty under the Eighth 

Amendment is to ensure “reasonable safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

 In the present case, Plaintiff has not established that he was exposed to “the constant 

threat of violence” while incarcerated at the Dallas County Jail, see Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320, or 

to any other condition that presented “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

834; see also Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Hale produced 

evidence that inmate-on-inmate violence occurred regularly” in the two years preceding the 

attack). 

 While Plaintiff has complained that he was endangered on this occasion by the lack of an 

officer in the control station and by the lack of a working microphone, these allegations do not 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 11 of 18
12 

show a condition that presented “a substantial risk of serious harm.” It is this Court’s opinion 

that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the objective element of his Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

 Even if, arguendo, Plaintiff’s evidence satisfied the objective element of his conditions of 

confinement claim, as previously noted, he must also demonstrate that Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious harm to him. To meet this element, Plaintiff must 

prove that Defendants actually knew that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and they 

“knowingly or recklessly” declined to take action to prevent that harm. LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 

1537. “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did 

not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of 

punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. “‘Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge 

of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 

inference from circumstantial evidence.’” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

842). “Thus, ‘a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the 

very fact that the risk was obvious.’ ” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). 

 As noted above, Plaintiff complains of his transfer from A-Block to E-Block, implying, 

the Court assumes, that this attack occurred as a result of his move. (Doc. 17 at 4). This 

allegation, however, is meritless, as Plaintiff fails to show, or even to allege, any knowledge of a 

substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff on the part of Defendants. Plaintiff also alleges a lack of 

security, claiming that there was no officer in the control station at the moment of the attack and 

that his cell was lacking a working microphone. (Doc. 18 at 6). These allegations reflect not 

deliberate indifference, but, at best, negligence on the part of the Dallas County Jail. 

 While the Court notes that the attack on Plaintiff by his fellow inmates was unfortunate, it 

was not the result of deliberate indifference on the part of the Dallas County Jail, the Dallas 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 12 of 18
13 

County Sheriff’s Department, or Defendants Warden Goodman, and Dallas County Jail Officials 

Coleman and Averette. Further, the evidence in the record indicates that Defendants, once made 

aware of Plaintiff’s injuries, transported him to Vaughn Regional Medical Center. (Doc. 37, Ex. 

B at 3, Ex. F). At Vaughn Regional Medical Center, Plaintiff was given medical care and 

discharged back to Dallas County Jail. (Doc. 37, Ex. F). 

 Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that Defendant Warden Goodman, Defendant 

Coleman, or Defendant Averette were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm to him from the 

other inmates. There is simply no evidence that any Defendant knew that Plaintiff was at risk of 

being attacked by any of the inmates. There is no evidence that any threats had been made 

against Plaintiff and made known to these Defendants, nor is there any evidence “that a 

substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly 

noted by prison officials in the past.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The evidence indicates that this attack was isolated and unexpected. At best, Plaintiff 

has shown acts of negligence with regard to a possible lack of officers and a lack of working 

equipment, and negligence alone does not support a finding of a constitutional violation. 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants actually knew that a substantial risk 

of serious harm existed, i.e., that Plaintiff was at risk of being harmed by another inmate, and 

they knowingly or recklessly declined to take action to prevent that harm, he has failed to satisfy 

the subjective element of his Fourteenth Amendment claim as well. Accordingly, Defendants 

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. 

B. Medical Care Claim. 

 Plaintiff also seeks redress in this action for an alleged constitutional deprivation arising 

out of the denial of medical treatment from November 29, 2008, until the filing of Plaintiff’s 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 13 of 18
14 

Complaint on February 6, 2009, for injuries he claims to have sustained during the attack by 

fellow inmates on November 28, 2008. (Doc. 1 at 4). “[T]he minimum standard for providing 

medical care to a pre-trial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as the 

minimum standard required by the Eighth Amendment for a convicted prisoner; both the right to 

due process and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment are violated by a 

government official’s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Lancaster v. Monroe 

County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997). As discussed above, this type of claim 

under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is said to have an objective component, 

“which inquires whether the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a 

constitutional violation, and a subjective component, which inquires whether the officials acted 

with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Sims, F.3d at 983. 

 To meet the objective element required to demonstrate a denial of medical care in 

violation of the Eighth (or Fourteenth) Amendment, a plaintiff must first demonstrate the 

objective existence of a “serious” medical need. Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 

1176, 1186 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n.9 

(2002). “[A] ‘serious’ medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating 

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 

for a doctor’s attention.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187 (citations omitted). “[T]he medical need must be 

‘one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Farrow v. West, 320 

F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 Also, in order to meet the required subjective element of his denial of medical care claim, 

Plaintiff must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need. Hill, 40 F.3d at 

1186. 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 14 of 18
15 

In Estelle, the Supreme Court established that “deliberate indifference” entails 

more than mere negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. 285; Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 835, 114 S. Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court clarified the “deliberate 

indifference” standard in Farmer by holding that a prison official cannot be found 

deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment “unless the official knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must 

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (emphasis added). In interpreting Farmer and 

Estelle, this Court explained in McElligott that “deliberate indifference has three 

components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of 

that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” McElligott, 182 F.3d 

at 1255; Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (stating that defendant must have subjective 

awareness of an “objectively serious need” and that his response must constitute 

“an objectively insufficient response to that need”). 

Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46 (emphasis in original). 

 In this action, the record reflects that Plaintiff was treated on November 29, 2008, at 

Vaughn Regional Medical Center for injuries sustained in the assault by his fellow inmates on 

November 28, 2008. (Doc. 37, Ex. B at 3, Ex. F). The Vaughn Regional Medical Center records 

reflect that Plaintiff was given a prescription for the pain medication Lortab by the Emergency 

Room physician. (Doc. 37, Ex. F at 8). Following his discharge back to the Dallas County Jail 

on November 29, 2008, Plaintiff made no requests for medical care until May 20, 2009, when he 

submitted a “Prisoner Request Form,” asking to see the doctor “A.S.A.P.” for a “very bad cold,” 

and Plaintiff was treated by the doctor the very same day. (Doc. 37, Ex. B at 3; Ex. H). 

 Neither his medical records nor his inmate file reflect any request for further treatment of 

any alleged facial fracture, or for medication for pain stemming from any injury sustained in the 

attack on November 28, 2008. (Doc. 37, Exs. F, I). “When a prison inmate has received medical 

care, courts hesitate to find an Eighth Amendment violation.” Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 

1035 (11th Cir. 1989). Further, Plaintiff has submitted no “verifying medical evidence” showing 

that any alleged failure to receive follow up medical treatment worsened or exacerbated his 

medical condition. Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188 (emphasis added). 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 15 of 18
16 

 Assuming, arguendo, however, that these Defendants did deny Plaintiff medical 

treatment for his alleged facial fractures associated with the attack by the fellow inmates, 

Plaintiff’s claim still fails as a matter of law. 

 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence, or even allege facts, showing that 

his injuries constituted a “serious medical need.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187. Thus, Plaintiff has failed 

to meet the objective element of his denial of medical care claim. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed 

to present any evidence, or even allege facts, showing that Defendants knew of an excessive risk 

to his health if there was no follow up treatment to the initial treatment for his injuries, and they 

disregarded that risk by conduct that was more than mere negligence. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245, 

46. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet the subjective element of his denial of medical care claim. 

For each of these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim based on Defendants’ failure to provide medical 

treatment for the injuries sustained in the November 28, 2008, inmate attack fails as a matter of 

law. 

C. No Causal Connection. 

 In addition to the foregoing, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Dallas 

County Jail Warden Roger Goodman, and Dallas County Jail Officials Steve Coleman and 

Lonnie Averette because Plaintiff has failed to show how these Defendants’ actions contributed 

to his alleged deprivations. See LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1538 (“[S]ection 1983 requires proof of an 

affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person under color of 

state law and the constitutional deprivation.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 9 

Given the absence of evidence showing that any Defendant’s actions contributed directly to 

 9

 Again, the Court notes that Defendants Dallas County Jail and Dallas County Sheriff’s 

Department have not been served in this action; however, having found no constitutional 

violation herein, the Court has determined that this action is due to be dismissed in its entirety. 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 16 of 18
17 

Plaintiff’s claims, each Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for a lack of 

causation as well as the reasons stated above. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants, Dallas County Jail Warden 

Roger Goodman, Dallas County Jail Officials Steve Coleman, and Lonnie Averette are entitled 

to summary judgment in their favor on all claims asserted against them by Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be 

GRANTED, that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that judgment be entered in 

favor of all Defendants and against Plaintiff on all claims. 

 The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections to this 

recommendation. 

 DONE this __6th __ day of August, 2010. 

 /s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

 KATHERINE P. NELSON 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 17 of 18
18 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND 

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with 

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of 

anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the 

Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982) (en banc). The procedure for 

challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge is set out in more detail 

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that: 

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in 

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(A), by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s 

Recommendation’ within ten days10 after being served with a copy of the 

recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The 

statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation 

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting 

party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a 

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition 

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief 

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief 

may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support 

of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may 

be deemed an abandonment of the objection. 

 A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals; only the 

district judge's order or judgment can be appealed. 

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915 and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original records in 

this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this 

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial 

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost 

of the transcript. 

 /s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 10 Effective December 1, 2009, the time for filing written objections was extended to “14 

days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 

Case 2:09-cv-00063-CG-N Document 44 Filed 08/06/10 Page 18 of 18