If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

In re NAYEEMA AHMED

MEGHAN PEREGAND,

Petitioner-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

October 13, 2022

v No. 360372

Washtenaw Probate Court

NAYEEMA AHMED, LC No. 22-000096-MI

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and BORRELLO and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order committing her to a combined 

hospitalization of 180 days, which included an initial hospitalization period of up to 60 days. 

Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 14, 2022, petitioner Meghan Peregand filed a petition, dated February 9, 

2022, alleging that respondent Nayeema Ahmed had a mental illness and that, as a result of that 

mental illness, respondent could reasonably be expected in the near future to cause serious injury 

to herself or others. The petition also alleged that respondent was unwilling to voluntarily 

participate in treatment and her judgment was so impaired by the mental illness that respondent 

presented a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to herself or others. Petitioner 

requested the trial court to find respondent was a person requiring treatment and to commit her to 

a combination of hospitalization and assisted outpatient treatment. The petition was received by 

the hospital on February 11, 2022. The petition was accompanied by two clinical certificates, one 

from Dr. Megan Dawson, a psychiatrist, and one from Dr. Luay Hadad, a psychiatrist and 

physician.

The trial court held a mental health hearing on February 16, 2022. The trial court heard 

testimony from Dr. Emily Escott, a licensed psychologist employed by the Stonecrest Center who 
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was certified as an expert in the field of psychology, as well as testimony from respondent. Dr. 

Escott concluded that respondent had a mental illness and noted respondent had a documented 

history of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Dr. Escott said that respondent’s most appropriate 

diagnosis was bipolar disorder. Dr. Escott testified that the primary concern for respondent was 

her ability to adequately care for herself. Respondent testified she had been mostly without 

medication for the last year-and-a-half and had substantially improved during that time. 

Respondent seemed to believe that she did not need any mental health treatment. Respondent also 

testified she did not believe that she needed to take any medication.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that there was clear and convincing 

evidence that respondent was an individual requiring treatment for a mental illness, specifically 

bipolar disorder. The trial court also found that because of that mental illness, respondent’s 

judgment was impaired, she did not understand the need for treatment, and she was unwilling to 

voluntarily participate in necessary treatment. The trial court granted the petition and determined 

that an order that allowed for hospitalization up to 60 days, and assisted outpatient treatment of 

not more than 180 days, was appropriate. The trial court stated that the hospitalization would last 

only until respondent was stabilized on the prescribed medication. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a probate court’s dispositional rulings and 

reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a probate court’s decision.” In re Portus, 

325 Mich App 374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The probate 

court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes. Id. “A probate court’s finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court 

is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence 

to support the finding.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Unpreserved errors are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Sanborn, 

337 Mich App 252, 258; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, 

three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear 

or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 

135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent first argues that there were anomalies in the petition’s clinical certificate 

relating to when the first clinical certificate was completed and when respondent was hospitalized.1 

 

1 To the extent that respondent alleges that the alleged anomalies amount to a violation of MCL 

330.1429, that issue has been abandoned on appeal. Respondent raised that issue in her statement 

of questions presented but provided no argument on the issue. See People v Henry, 315 Mich App

130, 148-149; 889 NW2d 1 (2016) (“Failure to brief a question on appeal is tantamount to 

abandoning it.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if the issue were not abandoned, 

there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that any of the requirements under that section 

were violated.
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This issue was not raised with the trial court and is, therefore, unpreserved. In re Utrera, 281 Mich 

App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).

Respondent contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the court should have 

investigated the anomalies in the petition. According to respondent, the petition was false because

it was signed on February 9, 2022, and states that a clinical certificate had been taken within 72 

hours, yet there was no evidence that a clinical certification had been taken within the 72 hours 

preceding February 9. Respondent also asserts that the hospital did not receive the petition until 

13 hours after respondent was hospitalized. Respondent argues, therefore, that the trial court 

should have inquired about these anomalies in the documents.

The lower court record demonstrates that the petition for mental health treatment was 

signed by petitioner on February 9, 2022, received by the hospital on February 11, 2022, and filed 

with the trial court on February 14, 2022. The petition asserted that there was a clinical certificate 

by a psychiatrist taken within the last 72 hours. The lower court record also establishes that 

respondent was hospitalized at 2:23 p.m. on February 11, 2022, and that the hospital received the 

petition at the exact same time. Dr. Dawson’s clinical certificate stated that her examination of 

respondent began on February 11, 2022, at 1:00 a.m. and was completed at 1:33 a.m. Thus, when

the hospital received the petition, the assertion in the petition that a clinical certificate had been 

taken within 72 hours was correct. But even if the appropriate framework from which to assess 

the timing of the certificate is at the time the petition was signed, and not when the hospital 

received it, respondent offers no argument that this alleged discrepancy would have changed the 

trial court’s ultimate decision. See In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 135 (under plain error review, 

appellant must show the error affected substantial rights).

Regarding respondent’s claim about when the hospital received the petition, respondent 

appears to assume that her hospitalization began in the early morning hours of February 11, 2022,

when Dr. Dawson’s evaluation took place. But according to the notice of hospitalization, 

respondent was not hospitalized until 2:23 p.m. on February 11. Respondent’s allegation that the 

hospital did not receive the petition until 13 hours after respondent was hospitalized is contradicted 

by the lower court record. Therefore, respondent has not established that the trial court plainly

erred when it failed to investigate these alleged anomalies.

Next, respondent argues that Dr. Dawson’s clinical certificate was deficient because it did 

not state whether respondent was a person requiring treatment, and Dr. Hadad’s clinical certificate 

was deficient because it did not include any facts to support the conclusion that respondent was a 

person requiring treatment. By failing to raise this argument with the trial court, this issue is also 

unpreserved. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8.

Under MCL 330.1434(4), “a clinical certificate that accompanies a petition must have been 

executed within 72 hours before the filing of the petition and after personal examination of the 

individual.” The trial court shall conduct a hearing on the petition after receipt of “[a] petition for 

a determination that an individual is a person requiring treatment, a clinical certificate executed by 

a physician or a licensed psychologist, and a clinical certificate executed by a psychiatrist.” MCL 

330.1452(1)(a).
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For both clinical certificates, respondent has not established that it was plain error for the 

trial court to proceed with the hearing on the basis of these clinical certificates. Although the 

clinical certificates could have been more detailed, under the relevant statute, the trial court had 

the documents required to proceed with the hearing. See MCL 330.1452(1)(a) (stating that a 

hearing is to be convened upon the court’s receipt of “[a] petition for a determination that an 

individual is a person requiring treatment, a clinical certificate executed by a physician or a 

licensed psychologist, and a clinical certificate executed by a psychiatrist.”). Respondent has not 

identified any authority suggesting that the clinical certificates were statutorily deficient. 

Additionally, the petition, which is required to include the facts that form the basis for the assertion 

that respondent was a person requiring treatment, included the facts respondent claims are missing 

from the certificates. Because the trial court was in receipt of the necessary documents to hold a 

hearing, and respondent has identified no authority that indicates that either clinical certificate was 

legally insufficient, the trial court did not plainly err when it proceeded with the hearing.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that 

respondent be hospitalized. We disagree.

Under MCL 330.1465, the court “may not find that an individual is a person requiring 

treatment unless that fact has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A “person 

requiring treatment” is defined as any of the following:

(a) An individual who has mental illness, and who as a result of that mental 

illness can reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or 

unintentionally seriously physically injury himself, herself, or another individual, 

and who has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are 

substantially supportive of the expectation.

(b) An individual who has mental illness, and who as a result of that mental 

illness is unable to attend to those of his or her basic physical needs such as food, 

clothing, or shelter that must be attended to in order for the individual to avoid 

serious harm in the near future, and who has demonstrated that inability by failing 

to attend to those basic physical needs.

(c) An individual who has mental illness, whose judgment is so impaired by 

that mental illness, and whose lack of understanding of the need for treatment has 

caused him or her to demonstrate an unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or 

adhere to treatment that is necessary, on the basis of competent clinical opinion, to 

prevent a relapse or harmful deterioration of his or her condition, and presents a 

substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to the individual or others. 

[MCL 330.1401(1)(a)-(c).]

Under MCL 330.1472a(1), upon a finding that an individual is a person requiring 

treatment, the trial court shall issue an initial order of involuntary mental health treatment within 

certain durational limitations. The trial court may enter “[a]n initial order of combined 

hospitalization and assisted outpatient treatment shall not exceed 180 days. The hospitalization 

portion of the initial order shall not exceed 60 days.” MCL 330.1472a(1)(c).
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Respondent contends that there was insufficient evidence that hospitalization was required. 

Specifically, respondent highlights the trial court’s statement that respondent would be 

hospitalized until “she stabilizes on the medication that will be prescribed” and argues that there 

was no evidence that the hospital had attempted to, or planned on, requiring medication for 

respondent. But the trial court’s finding that respondent should be medicated while hospitalized 

is supported by the evidence. Dr. Escott explicitly testified that medication would help respondent. 

Additionally, a report prepared by the hospital/court liaison recommended that respondent be 

hospitalized for stabilization and take medications as prescribed. Furthermore, the record 

established that respondent was unwilling to voluntarily take medication, making it necessary to 

provide that medication in a hospital setting. Respondent’s allegation that the lower court record 

lacked evidence that the hospital was planning to provide medication to respondent is simply

inaccurate. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that respondent be 

involuntarily hospitalized.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron