SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2706- 22 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF LOUIS J. LUCZU APPLICATION FOR FIREARMS PURCHASER ID CARD AND/OR HANDGUN PURCHASE PERMIT.

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Argued January 8, 2024

– Decided July 17, 2024 Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. GPA- 0014

- 22. Allan Marain argued the cause for appellant Louis J

. Luczu. Nancy Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the caus e for respondent State of New Jersey (Yolanda Ciccone , Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy Hulett , of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Louis J. Luczu appeals from the trial court's order dated April 11, 2023 , affirming the denial of his application for a Firea rms Purchaser ID Card (FPIC) NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on t he internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 2706

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and Handgun Purchase Permit (HPP, together with the FPIC "the application"). Luczu claims the trial court erred because : (1) he presented "satisfactory proof" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) to sho w his alcoholism is not a disqualifying disability; (2) he does not meet the definition of an alcoholic as defined in subsection (c)(3); and (3) denial of his application violated his Second Amendment right as expressed in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Having reviewed his arguments in li ght of applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I. On February 4, 2022, Luczu applied for an initial F PIC and a HPP with the East Brunswick Police Department. On his application, Luczu answered "yes" when asked if he was an alcoholic. There is also a handwritten "yes" and a typed "no" next to the following question which as k ed : "[h]ave you ever been confined or committed to a mental institution or ho spital for treatment or observation of a mental or psychiatric condition on a temporary, interim, or permanent basis?" As part of standard procedure, L uczu was subjected to various background checks into his criminal, domest ic-violence, and motor vehicle history.3 A- 2706

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The background checks reveal ed three investigation reports, all from an eight-day period in 1992. The first report documented a domestic incident tha t September involving terroristic threats. The second incident occurred two days later and was "another type of domestic violence ha rassment issue," which violat ed an existing restraining order. The third report d ocumented a violation of a restraining order and occurred one week after the second incident. Of particular note to the Department were Luczu's suic idal threats and heavy drinking, which indicated he "would take action upon himself or others" if he drank heavily. This demonstrated to the Department that Luczu should not have a weapon because he posed a risk to the public health, safety and welfare. The Department denied Lu cz u's application pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) , finding issuance of the permit would be contrary to public health, safety and welfare. Luczu appealed to the Law Division. On March 23, 2023, the trial court heard Luczu's ap peal of the Department's denial of his application. Detective Julia Lancos testified on behalf of the Department. Lancos stated, as part of the application process, Luczu needed to answer a series of questions, one of which inquired into w hether he was an alcoholic. Because appellant answered in the affirmative, it was a factor the Department4 A- 2706

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considered in reviewing his application. Lancos testified as to the three investigation reports discovered during appellant's background check. Lancos noted the first report stated Luczu's then-girlfrie nd called the police because he was drinking, acting violently, and discussing suic ide. He was taken to South Amboy Hospital and while there, he called his girlfriend and told her "she would pay for what she did to him[,] and he would make su re she rots in hell." The second report described how Luczu knocked on the do or of his girlfriend's house, in violation of a restraining order. The th ird report detailed how Luczu sent a dozen roses to the victim a week after he vi olated the restraints. These incidents

– involving heavy drinking, suicidal threats, and a stay at a mental health facility

– formed the basis of the denial of the application as it relates to public health, safety and welfare. This concern was bolstered by Luczu's admission he was an alcoholic. Luczu testified on his own behalf. He stated he went to a clinic in 1992 but has been sober for thirty-one years. Luczu joined and is still a member of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). He testified he has a s ponsor with whom he communicates once a month, although he admitted this was "not enough. " Luczu testified he was un aware of a ny restraining orders entered against him. When asked if he was subject to a no-contact order rather than a restraining5 A- 2706

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order, he was equally uncertain. Despite his uncertainty, L uczu did not dispute the reports' accuracy. On cross-examination, Luczu acknowledged alcoholism was a lifelong disease that could not be cured but only controlled . He also testified he responded honestly when he described himself as an alcoholic on his application. At the conclusion of testimony, the court f ound Luczu did not contest the truthfulness of the investigative reports uncovered during his background check.
It expressed concern that he did not recall the restr aining order. It further found Luczu truthfully testified about his alcoholism and that , despite thirty-one years of sobriety, he acknowledged alcoholism was "a dise ase that will remain with him for the rest of his life." With that in mind, the court relied upon N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) as it existed at that time, which pre cluded issuance of a gun permit to an alcoholic unless that person produces a certi ficate from a medical doctor, treatment provider, or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other satisfactory proof, that he is no longer suffering from that par ticular disability in a manner that would interfere with or handicap that person i n the handling of firearms. Based on N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), the trial court f ound appellant had failed to demonstrate or present evidence he no longer suf fered from alcoholism, and6 A- 2706

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although it appears he has been successful in recove ry, the statute was clear that alcoholism is a disqualifier. The Law Division denied Luczu's appeal. This appeal followed.
II. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(d) grants the "chief police office r of an organized fulltime police department of the municipality where th e applicant resides" authority to issue a FPIC or HPP to any applicant d eemed qualified after an informal investigation. In re M.U.'s Appeal of Den ial of Application, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 172 (App. Div. 2023). A denied application may be appealed to the Superior Court, subject to a de novo hearing. Ibid

. "Before the Law Division, '[t]he Chief has the burden of proving the existence of goo d cause for the denial by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Ibid. (alter ation in original) (quoting In re Osworth, 365 N.J. Super. 72, 77 (App. Div. 2003) ). The Law Division applies a fact-sensitive analysis , and "should accept relevant testimonial and documentary evidence, incl uding from the appellant and the police." Id. at 173. Hearsay may be consi dered and is admissible "if it is 'of a credible character

— of the type which responsible persons are accustomed to rely upon in the conduct of their serious affa irs.'" Ibid. (quoting7 A- 2706

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Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)). Such evid ence, however, is insufficient on its own to support the court's decision. Ibid. Our review of the trial court's denial of an applic ation for a FPIC or HPP is limited. Id. at 171. We defer "to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusio ns." Ibid. (quoting Griepenburg v. T wp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)). Legal interp retations and the consequences thereof are subject to de novo review

. I bid. (quoting Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)). Initially we note, although Lu cz u focuses his arguments on the current definition of alcoholism in the statute , his application was initially denied on the basis of the Department's public health, safety and welfare concern, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), not N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). And, although the trial court found Luczu disqualified on the basis of N.J. S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), it correctly applied the language of the statute exist ing at that time. We recently observed that the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:5 8-3 twice: the first amendment took effect on July 5, 2022, and the second amendment became effective on December 22, 2022. Id. at 194

- 195 . The December 2022 amendment "s ubstantially changed the introductory paragraph" to section 2C:58-3 and to section 3(c)(5) of the statute. Id. at 19 5. However, as we8 A- 2706

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concluded in M.U., "[ t]he law favors prospective application" of laws. Ibid. (quoting James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. , 216 N.J. 552, 556 (2014)). Applications submitted before the effective date of the amendmen ts to the statute are evaluated using the prior version of the statute then in effect. I bid

. Thus, for purposes of reviewing Luczu's appeal before this co urt, the prior version of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 (repealed by L. 2022, c. 131, §2, effective December 22, 2022) controls. Th is issue is critical because Luczu relies upon the cu rrent version of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 to dispute the trial court's rulin g. III. Luczu argues: (1) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), hi s thirty-one years of sobriety constitute "other satisfactory proof" h e is no longer suffering from a disqualifying disability which would preclude him f rom obtaining a FPIC or HPP; (2) he does not meet the definition of an alco holic as currently defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3); and (3) denial of his appli cation violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms pursuant to Bruen. Luczu asserts there is no case law expounding upon what constitutes "other satisfactory proof" as used in N.J.S.A. 2C:5 8-3(c)(3). However, Luczu did not produce evidence of consistent compliance w ith AA, such as sign- in sheets or testimony from his sponsor. He also stated he speaks with his sponsor9 A- 2706

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only once a month, which he admitted is not enough. It is undisputed Luczu failed to produce a certificate from a medical doct or or a psychiatrist. Thus, there is sufficient, credible evidence in the recor d that Luczu, having admitted to a statutory disqualifier, did not present suffic ient "other satisfactory proof " he was no longer suffering from the disability. Luczu also argues he does not meet the definition o f an alcoholic pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) and thus his application cannot be denied on that basis.
He directs us to the statutory definition of a "perso n with an alcohol use disorder," codified at N.J.S.A. 26:2B-8 and incorpo rated in N.J.S.A. 2C:58- 3(c)(3), which is

any person who chronically, habitually, or periodic ally consumes alcoholic beverages to the extent that: a

. such use substantially injures the person's health or substantially interferes with the person's social o r economic functioning in the community on a continuing basis, or b. the person has lost the pow er of self-control with respect to the use of such bevera ges . [N.J.S.A. 26:2B-8.] Based upon that definition, he maintains he does not qualify as an alcoholic and, hence, cannot be denied a FPIC or HPP pursuant to N .J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). Rather, he contends he is only an alcoholic "for AA purposes," because AA10 A- 2706

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requires him to admit to being an alcoholic. Accor ding to Luczu, "what he considers himself does not override" the statutory definition. Although the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 several ti mes, the substance of the law as it pertains to this appeal has not changed. The most recent alteration "replace[d] statutory terms regar ding alcohol and substance use, alcoholism, addiction, drug addict, and simila r terms with the terms 'substance use disorder' and 'person with substance use disorder.'" S. Health, Human Servs. & Senior Citizens Comm. Statement to A . 5096 (June 15, 2023). Even applying this most recent version, Luczu is st ill prohibited from obtaining a FPIC or HPP unless he "produces a certificate of a medical doctor, treatment provider, or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, o r other satisfactory proof," that his alcoholism would not interfere with or han dicap his ability to handle firearms. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). Luczu did not do this. The investigative reports detailed not only a history of alcoholism, but mental health treatment and suicidal ideation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the requested credentials, given that Luczu did not pre sent adequate medical evidence he no longer posed a threat to public health, safety and welfare. Second ly , Luczu attempts to minimize his own admission of being an alcoholic by relying upon arguments and evidence not considered by the trial11 A- 2706

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court. He did not testify he considered himself an alcoholic solely for AA purposes, and did not testify his understanding of the term was predicated solely on AA's prerequisites. 1 Simply because Lu czu has maintained three decades of sobriety does not mean he could not be disqualified by N.J.S.A. 2C: 58 -3 after having admitted to a life-long, uncurable condition. Because he did not submit sufficient proof he no longer suffered from the condition to the extent public health, safety and welfare were impacted, we discern no error in the t rial court's denial of the FPIC and HPP to him. With respect to Bruen, we "decline to consider ques tions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an oppor tunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appe al go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public inte rest." Berardo v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2023) (in ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). Constitutional issues are not immune from this prin ciple. State v. Garcia, 210

1 We do not consider the AA Frequently Asked Questions and Cer tificate of Eligibility to transfer ownership of a rifle or shotgun documents included in his appendix because it was not part of the record befo re the trial court. Bd. of Educ. of Clifton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Cli fton, 409 N.J. Super. 389, 443 (App. Div. 2009).12 A- 2706

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N.J. 364, 383 (2012). Luczu failed to challenge th e constitutionality of either N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) or (5) before the trial cour t and we decline to address it

. Affirmed.