### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 10446 Summary Calendar

JILLIAN IZZIO, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, HEATHER ZOELLER, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees
JILLIAN BRANA,

Plaintiff

- Appellant

v. CENTURY GOLF PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, L.P.,

Defendant

- Appellee

v. ANTHONY METZGER,

Movant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:14

- CV

- 3194 United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 15, 2016 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-10446 Document: 00513761024 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2016No. 16

- 10446

2 Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: *
This case is one of several filed against appellee Century Golf Partners
M a nagement, L.P., (Century Golf), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York labor law at New York catering facilities operated by Century Golf. In this case, plaintiffs’ counsel and Century Golf
asked the district court to certify an FLSA class and a state la w class for settlement purposes. The district court certified the classes and approved the
settlement. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the district court’s
class

- certification order and REMAND for an appropriate analysis of the Rule 23(a) fact ors. Plaintiff

- a ppellant Jillian Brana and movant

- appellant Anthony Metzger objected below and argue here (1) that the district court incorrectly certified the classes and (2) that the district court abused its discretion by approving the settlement. Beca use we agree that the district court did not conduct the proper class

- certification analysis , we do not reach appellants’ second argument. “We review a district court’s class certification decisions for abuse of discretion.” Pederson v. La. State Univ. , 213 F.3d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 2000). “Rule 23 governs whether a proposed class fall s within the limited exception to ‘the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” Ibe v. Jones , 836 F.3d 516, 528 (5 th Cir. 2016) ( quoting Califano v. Yamasaki , 442 U.S. 682, 700

– 01 (1979)). Four prerequisites to class certification “must be met by all classes: numerosity, commonality,

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. Case: 16-10446 Document: 00513761024 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/15/2016No. 16

- 10446

3 typicality, and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 14

– 15 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
2 3(a)). Because of the due process concerns inherent in class

- certification decisions, “the Supreme Court requires district courts to conduct a rigorous analysis of Rule 23 prerequisites.” Unger v. Amedisys, Inc. , 401 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005) . It is not enough that both sides may have stipulated to certification, because “the court is bound to conduct its own thorough rule 23(a) inquiry.” Stirman v. Exxon Corp. , 280 F.3d 554, 563 n.7 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Appellants claim that class ce rtification was improper because there are serious questions as to whether the commonality factor is satisfied . They point
to the settling parties’ representation below that “the [four] catering facilities changed their practices at different times in dif ferent ways at different facilities during the class period by making changes to their contracts, menus and customer documents . . . [and] sorting out the legal implications of each language change might be challenging.” They also highlight the settling

p arties’ “admi[ssion]” that “an evaluation of the claims of the Settlement Class members would require an analysis of change in fact or law . . . giv[ing] rise to many different analyses which could prove difficult for a jury and might have implications for a contested class certification motion.” Neither Century Golf nor the settling plaintiffs offer a ny response to appellants’ argument on commonality. In addition, appellants argue that class certification was improper
because the district court did not c onduct an adequate analysis of the Rule 23(a) factors. At an oral hearing, the district court only said, “I’ll certify the class for purposes of this

– of this settlement.” They further emphasize that the district court’s subsequent order stated conclusi onally , “The settlement classes are hereby satisfied.” In each instance, appellants contend, the district Case: 16-10446 Document: 00513761024 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/15/2016No. 16

- 10446

4 court conducted no analysis, much less a rigorous analysis, of the Rule 23(a) factors in accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent. Having reviewed the record and the briefs, we agree with appellants.
Prior to certifying a class , the district court must co nduct its own rigorous analysis of the Rule 23(a) factors, especially when , as is true here, satisfaction of those factors is seriously contested. Se e Stirman , 280 F.3d at 563 & n.7 (holding that the district court’s assertion that “no conflicts exist to preclude certification” was “not a sufficiently ‘rigorous’ analysis” to demonstra te satisfaction of the factors); compare Ibe , 836 F.3d at 530

– 33 (rigorous analysis characterized district court’s reasoning). Because the district court did not conduct the requisite ri gorous analysis , we VACATE the district court’s class

certification order and REMAND the case for appropriate Rule 23 findings. Case: 16-10446 Document: 00513761024 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/15/2016