Filed 2/22/24 In re David B. CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re D AVID B

., a Person

Coming Under the Juve nile

Court Law.

L OS A NGELES C OUNTY

D EPARTMENT OF C HILDREN

AND F AMILY S ERVICES

,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.B.,

Defendant and Appellant. B32 9813

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 20 CCJP 05098A )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Lisa Brackelmanns , Judge Pro Tempore

. Conditionally a ffirmed and remanded with instructions

.

### 2 Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Amir Pichvai

, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________________________

Mother, V

. B ., appeals from an order terminating her

parental rights over her son, David B

. , at a Welfare and

Institutions Code section 366.26 1 hearing

. She contends th e

order must be reversed because the Department did not provide

notice of the proceedings to her conservator and the trial court

abused its discretion by denying her r equest to continue the

hearing

. We conclude any error in failing to provide notice to

mother’s conservator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and that the court did not abuse its discretion.

Mother also argues the Department of Children and Family

Services (Department) did n o t comply with its initial inquiry duty

under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.

§ 1901 et seq.) and related California law. The Department

agrees, as do we, that the requirements imposed by ICWA were

not satisfied. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the order and

remand the matter to ensure c ompliance with ICWA.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Detention

In September 2020, a few days after mother gave birth to

David, the Department received a referral alleging mother was

under a “L[anterman] P[etris] S[hort] conservatorship” due to her

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.

### 3

“ severe ” m ental health condition. Mother’s conservator at the

time was a p ublic g uardian , but the p ublic g uardian informed a

social worke r there was a court hearing set for October 14, 2020,

to see if David’s maternal grandfather would be appointed

mother’s conservator.

It was reported mother suffered from schizophrenia and

had a history of meth amphetam in e addiction. Mother allegedly

was delusional, hearing voices, and not coherent. Because of

mother’s “cognitive and functional impairment[s],” it was

reported mother was unable to care for herself or her newborn

child

. Mother allegedly had “psychotic and paranoia episodes

very often

. ” He r psychiatrist explained , “[Mother] ‘[r]equires 24/7

supervision if she is with [David] ’ ” and added mother could be a

danger to others if she did not take her medication.

A few days later , the Department filed a section 300

p etition on David’s behalf alleging mother ’s mental and

emotional issues and substance abuse placed David at risk of

serious harm. 2 The ICWA

- 010 (A) inquiry form attached to the

petition indicated mother and her p ublic g uardian stated David

had no known Indian ancestry. After the detention hearing,

where the juvenile court detained David in shelter care, maternal

grandfather was appointed mother’s conservator.

Mother, maternal grandfather

, and mother’s counsel

appeared for mot her’s arraignment in early November 2020. The

matter was continued to the following day to allow mother’s

counsel to speak with mother and maternal grandfather. The

2 The petition additionally alleged David’s half

- sibling, E.V., was

a prior dependent of the juvenile court due to mother’s substance

abuse. In August 2016, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over

E.V. with sole legal and physical custody granted to E.V.’s father and

monitored visits ordered for mother.

### 4

next day

, the juvenile court conducted a hearing and determined

mother did not need a guardian ad litem to proceed with the

dependency hearings

. The court further inquired whether

mother had any “American Indian heritage,” to which mother’s

counsel replied, “ [N] o, she does not .” An ICWA

- 020 parental

notification of Indian status form was also filed by mother’s

counsel on mother’s behalf indicating she did not have any Indian

ancestry. The court found ICWA did not apply to mother. In

addition, nonparty J.D. was found to be David’s alleged father

.

David remained detained in shelter care a nd monitored visitation

was ordered for mother.

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report and Hearing

David was later placed with his maternal great aunt , R.C.

Mothe r was living with maternal grandfather, who reported that

he took care of mother “‘24/7.’” The social worker interviewed

mother about the petition’s allegations, and mother claimed, “ ‘ I

just have stress and anxiety. I don ’ t see things, not me. Someone

is doing this to me. I know people can do this to me through the

internet.

. . . I do hear voices they ask me for money. They ask

me that if when my mom dies am I willing to give the voices

money [ sic ]

. ’ ” Mother further stated she had been put on “‘many

5150 holds

. . . because of the drugs ’” and confirmed she had a

long history of methamphetamine use. Mother visited with

David, but David’s caregiver, R.C., expressed mother w ould not

engage with the child and appeared to be disconnected during

vis its

. The social worker also interviewed maternal grandfather

. Maternal grandfather stated there had “been so many

hospitalizations. Countless times” “because of the amount of

### 5

drugs she consumed so the [ doctors ] probably thought she was

trying to [commi t] suicide.” Maternal grandfather revealed

mother t old him the voices she hear d want ed her to relapse.

At the adjudication hearing in January 2021 , the juvenile

court sustained the petition as pled

. David was declared a

dependent and removed from parental custody. The juvenile

court ordered the Department to provide reunification services to

mothe r

. V isitation was ordered to remain monitored.

C. Six

- Month Review Period

Mother continued residing with maternal grandfather and

was in partial compliance with her case plan. During this period,

mother was hospitalized multiple times due to

methamphetamine use and experiencing “ psychotic and paranoia

e pisodes

. ” Mother told the socia l worker she was hearing voices

in her head urging her to use methamphetamine and was having

recurr ing thoughts of using the drug again

. Mother was dropped from her court

- ordered programs due

to her hospitalizations. When not hospitalized, mother was

compliant with her visitation , although she only visited for one to

two hours

. While mother at times appeared coherent at visits

,

David’s care giver stated in most instances mother ap pear ed slow

in processing information and looked sedated.

At the six

- month review hearing in August 2021 , the

juvenile court found mother was in partial compliance with her

case plan and continued reunification services

.

### 6

D. 12

- Month Review Period

In October 2021

, J.D. was found to be David’s biological

father

. T he juvenile court ordered reunification services for J.D

. and found ICWA did not apply to him

. During this review period, m other experienced consecutive

hospitalizations for her mental health that precluded her from

complet ing her case plan. The social worker was unable to

contact mother during this period. Further, mother was unable

to visit David regularly due to her hospitalizations. For visits

that did occur, R.C. reported mother visited for only 20 to 30

minutes and rarely was able to meet David’s needs . R.C.

indicat ed mother continued lacking parenting skills “due to being

withdrawn and having difficulty making functional and rational

choices to increase her bonding.” R.C. stated that during a visit,

mother secretly gave David a Cheeto that caused David to start

choking

. R.C . had to quickly remove the Cheeto from David’s

throat “as [mother] sat there with a blank stare.” R.C. believed

maternal grandfather was not ensuring mother was complying

with her medications.

A t the 12

- month review hearing in November 202 1

, t he

juvenile court found the parents ’ compliance with their case plans

was not substantial , but their services were continued

.

E. 18

- Month Review Period

Mother was again hospitalized multiple times for her

mental health issues and made little progress with her court

ordered case plan. Mother ’s visits were inconsistent and lasted

only 20 to 30 minutes each

. R.C. continued report ing mother

lacked parenting skills and was hearing voices. The Department

### 7

assessed there was a high risk of harm to David’s physical and

emotional health if returned to mother’s custody.

A t the 18

- month review hearing in June 2022 , t he juvenile

court determined mother ’s progress in her case plan was

unsubstantia l and terminated her reunification services. As to

J.D., his reunification services were continued for four months.

Because R.C. and her husband were unable to provide a

permanent home for David, he was placed with a paternal uncle

and his fiancé in Sep tember 2022. Concerning ICWA, in January

2023, R.C. told the Department her family did not have any

Indian heritage. At a review hearing in early October 2022, at

which neither mother nor maternal grandfather appeared, J.D.’s

reunification services were terminated. The court then set a

section 366.26 hearing for January 31, 2023, to select and

implement a permanent plan for David.

F. Section 366.26 Hearings

The Department subsequently served mother with notice of

th e section 366.26 hearing by certified mail, return receipt

requested. The Department’s report for the hearing was not

attached to the notice.

Mother was present at the section 366.26 hearing on

January 31, 2023 , without maternal grandfather

. The juvenile

court asked mother’s counsel whether counsel had any objection

to the court finding notice of the hearing was proper. Mother’s

counsel had no objection. T he Department informed the court

additional time was needed to obtain all adoption read iness

documents. The court continued the matter to May 1, 2023, to

allow the Department to complete the adoption assessment and

ordered mother back for the continued hearing.

### 8 After David was placed with his paternal caregivers in

September 2022, mother did not have any visits until February

2023. The paternal caregivers did not have mother’s contact

information and incorrectly believed mother’s visitation rights

were terminated

. Mother also stated she did not have the

caregivers’ contact information but wanted visits. When visits

resumed, it was reported mother still did not engage with David

and instead followed maternal grandfather while he followed

David. The Department attempted t o address these issues with

mother and maternal grandfather via text message in March

2023 but did not receive a response.

The Department served notice of a review hearing set for

April 3, 2023, on mother and maternal grandfather. Neither

appeared at th e hearing, and t he juvenile court ordered adoption

as the permanent plan for Davi d

. N otice of the May 1, 2023,

section 366.26 hearing was then sent to mother by first

- class mail

at maternal grandfather’s residence

. Neither mother nor maternal grandfather were present at

the May 1, 2023, hearing. Mother’s counsel explained he was not

able to contact mother but “ did speak with the maternal

grandfather, who indicated mother may be in an inpatient drug

program.” Mother’s counsel requested a continuance to make

further efforts to reach mother but admitted, “ I concede notice is

proper.” The court denied the continuance request. Mother’s

counsel then argued the parental benefit exception to adoption

applied and re quested a plan of legal guardianship be ordered.

The court determined no exception to adoption applied and

terminated parentals rights. Lastly, the court found there was

no reason to know David was an Indian child as defined under

ICWA.

### 9 Mother timely a ppealed the order.

DISCUSSION

A. Any Failure to Give Mother’s Conservator Notice of

, or Require Her Conservator to Appear for, the

Section 366.26 Proceedings was Harmless Beyond a

Reasonable Doubt

Mother asserts notice to her of the section 366.26

proceedings was im proper because her conservator, maternal

grandfather, did not get notice of the hearings and was not

provided with copies of the Department’s section 366.26 reports

. Further, m other asserts the juvenile court should have order ed

mother’s conservator to appear for the proceedings but did not do

so

. The Department argues

, in pertinent part

, that any failure to

give notice to mother’s conservator or require him to be present

for the proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We

agr ee with the Department.

Until parental rights are terminated, parents are entitled

to notice at each step of the juvenile proceedings as a matter of

statute and due process. ( § 294; In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84

Cal.App.4th 100, 106 .) Notice must be reasonably calculated to

apprise the parent of the pendency of the action and afford the

parent an opportunity to present any objections. ( In re Daniel S.

(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 9 09 ( Daniel S. ) .) Additionally, a

failure to provide par ents with a copy of the social worker’s report

that the juvenile court will rely on in coming to a decision is a

denial of due process. ( In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407,

413.) However, e rrors in notice do not automatically require

reversal. ( Daniel S. at p. 912.) We review such errors to

### 10

determine whether they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

( Id. at pp. 912

– 913.)

Further more

, “w hen a dependency court is informed that a

conservator has been appointed for a party, the dependency court

also has a sua sponte obligation either to appoint a [guardian ad

litem] for that party or to order that the party shall appear

through his or her co nservator. ” ( In re A.C. (2008) 166

Cal.App.4th 146, 155.) But t he failure to appoint a guardian ad

litem or to compel a parent’s conservator to appear does not

violate due process rights and is subject to the harmless error

standard. ( Id. at pp. 148, 157 [we do not set aside the judgment

unless a different result would have been probable had the error

not occurred].)

The record does not show m aternal grandfather was served

with notice of the section 366.26 hearings or provided with copies

of the Department’s reports prepared for the proceedings.

However, when asked by the juvenile court whether there was

any objection to finding notice of the January 31, 2023, hearing

was proper, mother’s counsel affirmatively stat ed there was no ne

.

A t the May 1, 2023, hearing, mother’s counsel expressly conceded

notice was proper. 3 A party ’s failure to object to lack of notice

forfeits the issue on appeal. ( In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149

Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197,

1209

– 1210 .) Nevertheless

, as the Department does not assert

mother forfeited the issues regarding notice she raises , we reach

the merits of mother’s arguments.

3 Given that mother’s counsel conceded notice was proper and

stated counsel had spoken with maternal grandfather before the

hearing, the court could have reasonably inferred maternal

grandfather had actual notice of the hearing. (See In re Desir ee M.

(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 335.)

### 11 Mother cites to D aniel S.

, supra

, 115 Cal.App.4th 903, in

contending the failure to properly notice maternal grandfather

was prejudicial

. In Daniel S.

, the child was placed in protective

custody after the mother, “a chronic paranoid schizophrenic,”

“was placed on a section 5150 hold because she was considered a

danger to herself and others.” ( Id. at p. 908.) After a temporary

conservatorship was established over the mother, the juvenile

court appointed a guardian ad litem for her . ( Id. at pp. 909, 911,

fn. 7.) Thereafter, the juvenile court sustained the petition

against mother at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. ( Id. at

p. 909.)

T he mother appealed, argu ing the jurisdiction and

disposition orders had to be reversed because she was not

properly noticed. ( Daniel S.

, supra , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 909. )

The appellate court held the social s ervices a gency did not have

to serve the mother with notice, given her m ental state. ( Id. at

p. 911.) Instead, n otice of the proceedings should have been

served on the mother’s temporary conservator , and thus, she was

not properly notified of the hearing . ( Id. at pp. 911

– 912

. )

However , the failure to provide notice to the mother’s conservator

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the result of

the hearing would have been the same . ( Id. at p. 914.) “There

was simply no defense to the petition and no alternative but to

remove [the child] from [the mother’s] care.” ( Ibid. ) At the time

of the hearing, she was still hospitalized and could not care for

herself or anyone else , and she was not stabilizing on her

medication. ( Ibid. )

Here, mother contends that unlike in Daniel S.

, the failure

to notice maternal grandfather was prejudicial because maternal

grandfather could have ensured mother appeared, or could have

### 12

appeared himself and explained mother’s absence , if he was

properly noticed. Even if we assum e it was error not to provide

maternal grandfather with notice of the hearings or copies of the

Department’s reports, or to otherwise require maternal

grandfather to appear, mother does not show reversal of the

order terminating her parental rights is required

. The mai n

issu es at a section 366.26 hearing are whether the child is likely

to be adopted and whether there is a statutory exception to

adoption. T he evidence supported the finding David was likely to

be adopted, as the paternal caregivers he was placed with were

attached to David and wanted to pursue adoption

. And David

was observed to be well

- bonded with the paternal caregivers and

referred to them as “‘mom’” and “‘dad.’”

Once the juvenile court finds it is likely the child will be

adopted, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)

, requires termination

of parental rights unless an exception in subdivision (c)(1)(A) or

(c)(1)(B) applies. One of these is the parental benefit exception

, which mother’s counsel argued applied at the May 1, 2023,

hearing

. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to establish this

exception applies, a parent must prove three elements:

(1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into

account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) that “the child has

a substanti al, positive, emotional attachment to the parent

— the

kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from

continuing the relationship”; and (3) that terminating the parent

child attachment “would be detrimental to the child even when

balanced agai nst the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive

home.” ( In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 63 6 .)

The record shows mother could not have established the

parental benefit exception in this case , and neither mother’s nor

### 13

maternal grandfather’s appearance would have changed this

result

. Mother’s visitation throughout the duration of the case

was sporadic and inconsistent. When mother did have visits, she

did not engage with David and was largely unable to meet his

needs. D uring t he 12

- month and 18

- month review periods

,

mother visited for only 20 to 30 minutes and appeared

withdrawn

. Mother’s counsel did not object to any of the

Department’s evidence at the May 1, 2023, hearing. Nor was the

evidence contradict ed

. Moreover, nothi ng in mother’s history of

visits suggests she formed a connection with David sufficient to

warrant finding the termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to David

.

M other contends she or maternal grandfather could have

objected to the interruption in visitation she experienced after

David was placed with the paternal caregivers if mother or

maternal grandfather were present for the hearing . However,

mother stops short of claiming such an objection would have

impacted the juvenile court’s analysis of the parental benefit

exception

. T he record shows that once visits resumed

, the quality

of visits continued to be poor as mother was still not engaging

with David

. Perhaps this is why mother ’s counsel , who spoke

with maternal grandfather before the hearing , did not raise an

objection based upon the interruption in visits.

Based on the foregoing, a ny error in the Department failing

to give maternal grandfather notice of the section 366.26

hearings

, to provide c opies of the section 366.26 reports, or to

compel maternal grandfather to appear was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. ( Daniel S.

, supra , 115 Cal.App.4th at p

. 914;

see also In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 918 [ reversal not

### 14

required where outcome of proceeding not affected by lack of

notice ] .)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in

Denying the Request to Continue the Section 366.26

Hearing

Next, mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in

denying her counsel’s request for a continuance at the May 1,

2023, hearing. We disagree.

“Section 352 provides that courts may ‘ continue any

hearing ’ under the dependency law ‘ beyond the time limit within

which the hearing is otherwise required to be held ’ (§ 352,

subd. (a)(1)), provided there is ‘ good cause ’ ( id.

, subd. (a)(2)) and a

continuance would not be ‘ contrary to the interest of the minor ’

( id.

, subd. (a)(1)). In evaluating the minor ’ s interest, the court

‘ shall give substantial weight to a minor ’ s need for prom pt

resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide

children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of

prolonged temporary placements. ’” ( Michael G. v. Superior Court

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632.) We review the juvenile court’s

decision to deny a continuance for abuse of discretion. ( In re D.Y.

(2018) 26 Cal.App. 5th 1044, 1056.) A court abuses its discretion

when its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and

results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. ( Ibid. ) “ ‘The

appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court

exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can

reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’

[Citation.]” ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318

– 319 .)

### 15 At the May 1, 2023, hearing, after informing the juvenile

court maternal grandfather indicated mother may be in an

inpatient drug program, m other’s counsel requested a

continuance “out of an abundance of caution ” so that counsel

could make further efforts to “discuss with mother the

recommendations for today and obtain any information about

. . .

progress in programs.” Counsel did not identify any other basis

for a continuance. M other’s counsel conceded notice for the

hearing was proper, and mother offers no explanation as to why

any other information maternal grandfather had about mother’s

whereabouts could not have been shared with counsel prior to the

hearing.

Although mother asserts she “would likely have appeared”

for a continued hearing date and testified about interruptions in

her visitation and her bond with David, as discussed above,

mother does not establish her testimony would have changed the

outcome of the hearing. M other’s counsel did not explain to the

juvenile court how mother’s testimony would establish an

exception to adoption, such that the court should further delay

David’s permanen t placement

. The juvenile court acted within

its discretion in deciding the need for prompt resolution and

providing David with a stable environment outweighed mother’s

request for a continuance. Under these circumstances, the

juvenile court’s decision to proceed with the section 366.26

hearing without mother present was not arbitrary, capricious, or

patently absurd.

C. Further ICWA Inquiry was Required in this Case

Mother argues the Department failed to fulfill its duty of

initial inquiry required by ICWA

, as it did not inquire of several

### 16

known and available maternal relatives about potential Indian

heritage. The Department concedes further inquiry into David’s

ancestry is necessary

.

“ICWA was enacted to curtail ‘the separation of large

numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes

through adoption or foster care placement’ [citation], and ‘to

promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by

establishing

. . . standards that a state court

. . . must follow

before removing an Indian child from his or her family’

[citations].” ( In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review

granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 ( Dezi C. ).) Whether ICWA

applies depends on whether the child who is the subject of the

custody proceedin g is an Indian child. ( In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1

Cal.5th 83, 90.) Both ICWA 4 and state statutory law define an

“Indian child” as a child who is either a member of an Indian

tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the

biological ch ild of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C.

§ 1903(4); accord, § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)

Under state law, the juvenile court and the Department

have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a

child for whom a petition under Section 300

. . . may be or has

been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see

In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11

– 12.) The duty of inquiry

includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child, parents, legal

guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others

who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child

abuse or ne glect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian

4 Our state Legislature incorporated ICWA’s requirements into

California statutory law in 2006. ( In re Abbigail A.

, supra , 1 Cal.5th at

p. 91.)

### 17

child.” 5 (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) If this initial inquiry creates a

“reason to believe” a child is an Indian child, the Department is

required to “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian

st atus of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as

practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th

1041, 1052.) The juvenile court may find that a child is not an

Indian child if the agency ’ s “proper and adequate” inquiry and

due diligence reveals no “reason to know” the child is an Indian

child. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); In re D.S.

, supra

, 46 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1050.) “We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s

Indian ancestry for substantial evidence.” ( In re H.V. (2022) 75

Cal.App.5th 433, 438.)

Mother contends the Department failed to fulfill its duty of

initial inquiry required by ICWA and state law. The Department

concedes its inquiry efforts as to mother’s heritage were

insufficient, and we agree. Aside from asking mother, maternal

grandfather, and R.C. about possible Indian ancestry

, the

Department failed to discuss mother’s heritage with any other

maternal relatives. ICWA requires social services agencies to ask

a child’s available extended family members whether the child is

or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The Department

did not ask any of the several maternal relatives it ha d contact

with or was aware of about David’s potential status as an Indian

child. The De partment further concedes its inquiry error in this

case was prejudicial and further investigation into David’s Indian

ancestry is warranted. We agree and remand for the Department

5 “ [ E ] xtended family members” include adults who are the child’s

“gra ndparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother

- in

- law or sister

in

- law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25

U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting federal definition].)

### 18

to conduct further investigation into David’s Indian ancestry

through mother

.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating mother’s parental rights is

conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded with instructions

to the Department and the juvenile court to conduct further

ICWA inquiry as soon as practicable. If that inquiry reveals

evidence of Native American heritage, then the Department and

the court must comply with the additional ICWA requirements,

including, if appl icable, the notice requirements of section 224.3.

If it does not, then the order shall stand.

MORI, J.

We concur:

CURREY , P. J.

C OLLINS , J.