IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40762

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GERARDO ROSALES-OROZCO, also known as Geraldo Rosales, also known 

as Geraldo S Rosales, also known as Gerardo Rosales, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:18-CR-267-1

Before STEWART, CLEMENT, and HO,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:**

Defendant-Appellant Gerardo Rosales-Orozco timely appeals his 21-

month imprisonment sentence for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He 

contends that the district court erroneously classified his prior state-court 

conviction as a section 1326(b)(2) aggravated felony. Because Rosales-Orozco’s 

 

* Judge Ho concurs in the judgment only. 

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 6, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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prison term has expired, he only seeks reformation of his judgment. We 

AFFIRM the district court’s section 1326(b)(2) application. 

I.

Facts and Sentencing Proceedings

Rosales-Orozco, a citizen of Mexico, is not authorized to live in the United 

States and was removed from the country in March 2009. In March 2018, 

Customs and Border Patrol apprehended Rosales-Orozco in Kenedy County, 

Texas. Prior to this, he had not applied for legal reentry or otherwise received

legal permission to reenter the United States. He was charged with illegally

reentering the United States after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 

Rosales-Orozco subsequently pleaded guilty with no plea agreement. The 

district court accepted his guilty plea, finding him guilty on the one-count 

indictment and scheduled his sentencing for August 15, 2018. 

Before sentencing, the Government conducted a criminal background

check and discovered that, in March 2005, Rosales-Orozco pleaded guilty to

and was convicted of attempted sexual assault in Pennsylvania.1 

At sentencing, the district court reviewed and adopted the presentence 

investigation report’s (PSR) recommendations. The PSR stated that RosalesOrozco’s Pennsylvania conviction should be treated as an aggravated felony 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which triggers a ten-level enhancement under

United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A). RosalesOrozco did not object to the PSR’s section 1326(b)(2) characterization. The 

district court adopted the classification and sentenced Rosales-Orozco to a 21-

month imprisonment term with no supervised release to follow. Neither party 

objected to the imposed sentence. 

 

1 The underlying facts and imprisonment term are irrelevant for the purposes of this 

appeal. 

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Rosales-Orozco now timely appeals and contends that the district court 

committed reversible plain error in sentencing him under section 1326(b)(2). 

He was released on September 22, 2019. He nonetheless requests reformation 

of his judgment to avoid collateral consequences should he later attempt to 

gain legal reentry into the United States. 

II.

As mentioned, Rosales-Orozco did not raise any objections at sentencing 

and his imprisonment term has expired.2 Failure to object warrants our plain 

error review of this appeal. United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 

2004) (en banc) (“[A]ll forfeited [objections] in a criminal proceeding are subject 

to [plain error] analysis.”). For Rosales-Orozco to prevail, he must show: (1) 

“an error or defect”; (2) that is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to 

reasonable dispute”; and (3) that “affect[s] [his] substantial rights.” Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If these requirements are satisfied, 

we have discretion to correct the error “only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (citation 

omitted).

 

2 Given that Rosales-Orozco has been released, a mootness issue arises, as he may no 

longer have a personal stake in this case’s outcome. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, –––

U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016). As we discussed in United States v. Ramirez-Gonzales, 

aggravated felonies “could potentially impact [an alien’s] ability to legally reenter the country 

in the future.” 840 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2016). In turn, “a determination that a crime was 

an ‘aggravated felony,’ as compared to a non-aggravated felony, may give rise to sufficient 

collateral consequences to preserve a live controversy even where the appellant was 

deported.” Id.; accord 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (stating that three “crime of violence” convictions 

trigger 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for possessing a firearm). Because the section 

1326(b)(2) aggravated-felony classification has collateral consequences, we hold that RosalesOrozco’s release does not moot this appeal. 

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III.

This appeal centers on whether the district court committed reversible

error for considering Rosales-Orozco’s previous Pennsylvania conviction as the 

categorical equivalent to an aggravated felony under section 1326(b)(2). 

A.

The Predicate Offense is Not Categorically Equivalent to a “Crime of Violence”

We must first look to the generic offense and predicate Pennsylvania 

offense before evaluating whether they are categorically equivalent. 

Section 1326(b)(2) is the generic offense at issue. It applies when, prior 

to illegal reentry, an alien was deported for being convicted of an “aggravated 

felony.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). As defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), an 

“aggravated felony” includes a “crime of violence [(“COV”)] . . . as defined in 

section 16 of Title 18.” A COV is “an offense that has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).3 Section 16(a)’s COV definition is 

commonly referred to as the use of force, force-as-an-element, or force clause. 

United States v. Ramos, 744 F. App’x 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2018). 

The predicate offense or statute of conviction is section 3124.1 of the 

Pennsylvania Crimes Code which prohibits sexual assault, provided that “a 

person commits a felony in the second degree when that person engages in 

intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the 

complainant’s consent.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1.

To evaluate whether the predicate matches the generic, we employ a 

categorical approach. See United States v. Conde-Castaneda, 753 F.3d 172, 

175 (5th Cir. 2014). Put differently, if the elements of Rosales-Orozco’s 

 

3 We do not discuss 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because it is unconstitutionally vague. See 

Sessions v. Dimaya, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210, 1233 (2018). So Rosales-Orozco’s 

prior conviction cannot qualify as an aggravated felony under this provision. 

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predicate offense “are the same as or narrower than those of the generic 

offense” under section 16(a), then his predicate offense may be treated as an 

aggravated felony for sentence-enhancement purposes. Id. (citing Descamps

v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 256–57 (2013)). We examine the elements, 

rather than the facts, of Rosales-Orozco’s predicate offense to determine 

whether the statute “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 

use of physical force against the person.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 

According to Rosales-Orozco, the elements of his section 3124.1

conviction do not match with section 16(a)’s COV elements that would qualify

it as a section 1326(b)(2) aggravated felony. The Government’s counter 

argument is that his conviction is an aggravated felony under the force clause. 

Even if the predicate offense does not qualify, the Government contends that 

any error in classifying this offense was not clear or obvious. 

The parties’ arguments clarify the appeal’s central issue—whether 

Pennsylvania’s section 3124.1 requires physical force equivalent to the degree 

of force required for a Section 16(a) COV. The answer is no—section 3124.1 

does not have a physical force element parallel to that of a COV. 

Our decision in United States v. Sarmiento-Funes is instructive. 374 

F.3d 336, 341–42 (5th Cir. 2004), superseded on other grounds by USSG. App. 

C, amend. 722, as stated in United States v. Rodriguez-Juarez, 631 F.3d 192, 

193 (5th Cir. 2011). There, in the context of USSG § 2L1.2, which contains a 

nearly identical force clause, we examined Missouri’s sexual assault statute. 

Id. at 339. We held that this statute did not have an element requiring the use 

of physical force because it encompassed conduct where the victim could assent 

but the law disregards the victim’s assent due to a lack of capacity, “such as 

when it [was] the product of deception or a judgment impaired by intoxication.” 

Id. at 341. Consequently, without an element of physical force, the Missouri

statute was not a COV under the USSG’s former definition. Id. at 341–42; cf. 

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United States v. Velasco, 465 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that under 

USSG’s force clause, “the use of physical force must be a fact that is necessary 

for the prosecution to secure a conviction.”).

Section 16(a)’s force clause is also “almost identically worded to the use 

of force provisions in the [Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)].” Ramos, 744 

F. App’x at 217. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that in 

applying ACCA’s identical elements clause, “the phrase ‘physical force’ 

means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to 

another person.” 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis 

in original). Given that the Florida battery statute could be satisfied with any 

intentional physical contact, “no matter how slight,” the high court concluded 

that this state statute does not qualify under the ACCA. Id. Under the ACCA 

force clause, the physical force must be violent physical force. 

Using the foregoing as guideposts, the predicate statute must require a 

degree of violent force to qualify as a COV under section 16(a). Section 3124.1 

does not meet this benchmark as it does not require physical violent force to 

sustain a conviction; in turn, Rosales-Orozco’s conviction is not a COV. 

Pennsylvania state law supports this conclusion. For example, an 

appellate court made clear that section 3124.1 was enacted “to fill the loophole 

left by the rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse statutes by 

criminalizing non-consensual sex where the perpetrator employs little if no 

force.” Commonwealth v. Pasley, 743 A.2d 521, 524 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); 

accord Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 1734 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6951409, at 

*5 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 26, 2015) (unpublished) (“We recognize that sexual 

assault contemplates a form of rape where force is not a factor.”) (citing 18 PA.

CONS. STAT. § 3124.1). Indeed, as Rosales-Orozco notes, Pennsylvania courts 

routinely affirm section 3124.1 convictions where violent physical force was not 

exhibited. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1046 (Pa. Super. 

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Ct. 2016) (affirming conviction because “the evidence supports the findings 

that the victim . . . ‘was intermittently unconscious throughout the assault and 

was at all relevant times in such impaired physical and mental condition so as 

to be unable to knowingly consent’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Erney, 548 Pa. 

467, 473 (Pa. 1997))); Commonwealth v. Thompson, No. 1087 MDA 2017, 2018 

WL 3193082, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 2018) (unpublished) (upholding 

conviction as supported by sufficient evidence where “the Victim was asleep 

[from drinking] when [the defendant] began the sexual intercourse. As such, 

the Victim could not have consented . . . to the sexual intercourse.”); In the 

Interest of R.S.A., No. 3114 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 2399630, at *1–6 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. June 2, 2017) (unpublished) (affirming conviction in a case involving a

“thirteen-year-old Appellant deceiv[ing] [a] seven-year-old Victim by luring her 

into bathroom under false pretenses . . . [and] trick[ing] [her] into opening her 

mouth to receive a treat” and instead orally penetrating her). Without an 

element of violent physical force similar to section 16(a), this predicate offense 

cannot fit in the prism of the force clause. Thus, section 3124.1 does not qualify 

as a COV under the force clause—and therefore is not a section 1326(b)(2) 

aggravated felony. Accord United States v. Owens, 672 F.3d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 

2012) (stating that Alabama offenses of second-degree rape and second-degree 

sodomy were not violent felonies under the ACCA’s force clause because the 

statutes covered sexual intercourse with victims that were legally incapable of 

consent).

B.

The Error Does Not Merit Reversal

We assume without deciding that this was plain error. We nonetheless 

conclude that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the proceedings. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Despite being 

sentenced under section 1326(b)(2), Rosales-Orozco received a sentence within 

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the statutory range for a conviction under section 1326(a) and has already been 

released from prison. Nor are any potential immigration consequences 

fundamentally unfair. Rosales-Orozco apparently has no plans to return to the 

United States. He testified under oath at his sentencing hearing that “the only 

thing that I ask for is a chance to return to my family and not to return here 

again.” And were he to change his mind and try to return lawfully, his two 

prior illegal entries and his conviction for attempted sexual assault—

regardless of whether it categorically constitutes a “crime of violence”—would 

undoubtedly present major obstacles to securing a visa. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Rosales-Orozco’s sentence and 

the section 1326(b)(2) penalty enhancement. 

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