Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-892 | December 30, 2019 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chad K. Green,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-892

Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sharp, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

39C01-1806-F6-649

39C01-1608-F5-754

Darden, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-892 | December 30, 2019 Page 2 of 19

Statement of the Case

[1] Appellant Chad Green appeals the sentence he received for his conviction of 

residential entry, a Level 6 felony,1and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a 

Class A misdemeanor.2 In addition, Green appeals the trial court’s imposition 

of his entire previously suspended sentence following his admission to violating 

the terms of his probation. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Green presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether Green’s sentence for residential entry and operating a 

motor vehicle while intoxicated is inappropriate.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him 

to serve his entire previously suspended sentence in Cause No. 

39C01-1608-F5-754.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the night of August 19 and into the early morning hours of August 20, 2016, 

Green and his girlfriend, Kimberleigh Edwards, had been drinking at an 

establishment in Madison, Indiana. Green became extremely intoxicated. 

After Green and Edwards left the establishment and entered a vehicle, they 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).

2

Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (2001).
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began arguing. At one point, a police officer pulled next to their car and asked 

if everything was alright. Edwards told the officer everything was okay because 

she feared Green would hurt her otherwise. Once the officer left, the pair drove 

on to a location where they both exited the vehicle. Edwards attempted to 

leave the area, but Green grabbed her by the back of her neck and squeezed, 

causing Edwards pain, discomfort, and soreness. While squeezing the back of 

Edwards’ neck, Green directed her back toward their car. When they were near 

the car, Green placed one hand on Edwards’ chest and one hand on her back 

and squeezed, causing abrasions to her chest and back. Edwards was able to 

pull away from Green and run down the street, where she was met by Officer 

Decker.

[4] Officer Decker observed Edwards bent over with her hands on her knees, and 

he could hear her screaming and crying. Officer Decker put Edwards in his 

patrol car for her safety, and they drove toward an alley where she indicated 

Green had gone. As they approached the alley, they saw Green walking, and

Edwards told Officer Decker she wanted to press charges against Green for his 

assault upon her. Officer Decker called for additional officers for back-up 

purposes and activated his emergency lights to signal Green to stop, but Green 

continued walking. Officer Decker then exited his patrol car and verbally 

ordered Green to stop, but Green merely turned around and commenced

walking backward. Green became agitated when Officer Decker informed him

of the reason for the stop. Officer Decker then caught up to Green and ordered 

him to place his hands behind his back, but Green tensed his arms and refused 
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to follow the officer’s orders. Officer Decker was eventually able to place 

Green in restraints. Once Green was secure, he was given his Miranda rights, 

and initially he agreed to speak with Officer Decker. However, Green became

confrontational and verbally abusive and then refused to speak.

[5] Edwards was removed from the police car, and officers attempted to place 

Green in the car. Green refused several requests to get into the police vehicle, 

verbally assailing the officers and spitting on Officer Decker. Officers were able 

to get Green into the police vehicle, after which he kicked Officer Decker, 

striking the officer’s hands, right wrist, and right forearm and causing pain, 

discomfort, and soreness. Green continued to verbally and physically assault 

Officer Decker as the officer fastened the seat belt around him.

[6] Green was transported to the jail and placed in a cell, where he began kicking 

the door. Due to this behavior, the jail staff requested Officer Decker’s 

assistance with placing Green in a restraint chair. The officers told Green 

several times to stop resisting and to lie down, but Green refused and assumed a 

fighting stance with raised fists. After repeatedly refusing the officers’ orders to 

lie down, Green was tased. The officers were then able to place Green in the 

restraint chair.

[7] Based upon this incident, the State charged Green on August 22, 2016 in cause 

number 39C01-1608-F5-754 (“F5-754”) with criminal confinement, a Level 5 
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felony;

3

intimidation, a Level 6 felony;

4

battery resulting in moderate bodily 

injury, a Level 6 felony;5battery against a public safety official, a Level 6 

felony;

6

resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor;

7

domestic battery, a 

Class A misdemeanor;8and public intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor.9 At 

Green’s initial hearing on the same day, the court set his bond at $10,000 cash 

only, and, as a condition of his bond, the court entered a no contact order 

against him on behalf of Edwards.

[8] Shortly thereafter, on September 7, 2016, the State filed a petition for 

revocation of bond, revocation of inmate phone access, and revocation of 

inmate outgoing mail privilege. In its petition, the State alleged that Green had 

violated the no contact order, thereby violating the conditions of his bond, by 

calling Edwards from jail after the no contact order was entered. Specifically, 

the State asserted that just after the no contact order was entered at his initial 

hearing on August 22, Green returned to the jail and called Edwards. In that 

conversation, he discussed his case with her, acknowledged the existence of the 

no contact order, and instructed her to tell the prosecutor that she was not 

 

3

Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3 (2014).

4

Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1 (2014).

5

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2016).

6

Id.

7

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2016).

8

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3 (2016).

9

Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3 (2012).
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“trying to have [Green] prosecuted.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 47. The State

asserted that, as of September 6, Green had made twenty-four phone calls from 

the jail to Edwards and had spoken to Edwards during at least thirteen of those 

calls. Subsequently, Green filed an application for release on own recognizance 

or reduction of bail. In November 2016, following a hearing on both motions, 

the trial court released Green on his own recognizance on the condition that he 

be transported directly to the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center in 

Fort Wayne. The trial court ordered Green to immediately report back to the 

county jail upon discharge from the center, absconding from the center, or 

successful completion of the program in order for a hearing to be held as to 

whether he would remain free on his own recognizance.

[9] In April 2017, Green petitioned the trial court to modify his release conditions. 

He was scheduled to graduate from the Adult Rehabilitation Center program in 

May 2017 and had been accepted into the Jefferson House Transitional 

Housing for Men. In light of these circumstances, he requested to be released to 

the Jefferson House rather than returning to the county jail to await a hearing as 

the trial court had previously ordered. In granting Green’s request to modify

his release conditions, the trial court conditioned his release on his compliance 

with the rules and regulations of the Jefferson House. Following a pre-trial 

conference in July 2017, the trial court ordered that, because Green was no 

longer required to reside at the Jefferson House, he would be placed on 

electronic monitoring and supervised by community corrections as a condition 

of his pre-trial release.
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[10] On August 3, 2017, the State filed a second petition for revocation of bond, 

alleging that Green had again violated the no contact order by marrying 

Edwards on July 7, 2017. Additionally, on August 10, 2017, the county pretrial 

services department filed a notice of violation of pretrial release conditions, 

asserting that Green had violated the conditions of his pretrial release by failing 

to refrain from illegal activity; Green had been charged with invasion of privacy 

on August 8.

[11] No hearing was held on these motions, however, because, on September 7, 

2017, Green and the State entered into a plea agreement with regard to the 

charges in F5-754. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Green would plead 

guilty to Level 5 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor 

domestic battery. He was to be sentenced to 1,825 days with 1,742 days 

suspended to probation on the felony and to zero days in jail on the 

misdemeanor. The agreement provided that, as a condition of his probation, 

Green would serve the suspended portion of his sentence under the supervision 

of community corrections. Further conditions included Green participating in a 

batterer’s intervention program and being evaluated for alcohol and substance 

abuse and complying with any treatment recommendations. The court also 

vacated the no contact order. For its part, the State agreed to dismiss all 

remaining counts in F5-754 and all counts in another case. On November 17, 

2017, Green was sentenced according to the plea agreement.

[12] On June 16, 2018, police were dispatched to the apartment of Anitra Beach. 

She told the officers that Green had opened the door to her apartment and 
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walked in uninvited. When he entered the apartment, he was yelling and 

appeared to be looking for someone. He overturned some furniture and walked 

out. Beach told the officers that Green was behaving like he was drunk and 

that he smelled of alcohol.

[13] As the officers were leaving Beach’s apartment, they received a dispatch of a 

traffic accident. It was discovered that the driver of the vehicle involved in the 

accident was Green and that he had driven into a brick mailbox and had a cut 

on the back of his head and two cuts on his forehead. He was slow to respond 

to the officers’ questions, emitted an odor of alcoholic beverages, had glazed, 

watery and bloodshot eyes, had slow and slurred speech, had difficulty 

maintaining his balance while walking, and refused medical treatment. The 

officers conducted two field sobriety tests, both of which Green failed. The 

officers then took Green to the jail for a certified breath test, but he provided 

insufficient breath samples. Thereafter, Green agreed to a blood draw, but,

once he arrived at the hospital, he refused to give his consent and stated he 

wanted to speak with a lawyer. Based upon these incidents, Green was charged 

on June 29, 2018 in cause number 39C01-1806-F6-649 (“F6-649”) with 

residential entry, a Level 6 felony; operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class 

A misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C 

misdemeanor.10

 

10 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a).
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[14] On August 6, 2018, in F5-754, the State filed a petition for a fifteen day no bond 

detention of Green, followed on August 10 by a petition to revoke Green’s 

community corrections placement. The petition to revoke alleged that Green 

had violated his probation conditions requiring him to obey the law, 

immediately report any contact with law enforcement, report to community 

corrections for office appointments, and pay community corrections fees. The 

State asserted that Green had been arrested and charged with operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated and residential entry in F6-649, that he had failed to 

report these new charges, that he had failed to report for his community 

corrections appointment on July 5, and that he had failed to pay fees in the 

amount of $2,010.

[15] On January 29, 2019, Green pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

Level 6 felony residential entry and Class A misdemeanor operating while 

intoxicated in F6-649, and the State agreed to dismiss the charge of Class C 

misdemeanor operating while intoxicated. Green also admitted to violating his 

probation in F5-754. The parties left sentencing to the discretion of the court.

[16] On March 21, 2019, the court sentenced Green to 365 days on the felony 

concurrent with 365 days on the misdemeanor in F6-649. For his probation 

violation in F5-754, the court terminated his probation and sentenced him to 

serve his entire previously suspended sentence of 1,742 days. The court further 

ordered that Green serve his sentences in the two causes consecutively. It is 

from these sentences that Green now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

I. Inappropriate Sentence

[17] Green first contends that his aggregate sentence of 365 days for his conviction 

of both felony residential entry and misdemeanor operating while intoxicated in 

F6-649 is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[18] Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a 

sentence, article 7, sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize 

independent appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may revise a sentence authorized 

by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we determine 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender. Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). However, “we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s 

sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give ‘due 

consideration’ to that decision and because we understand and recognize the 

unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Stewart v. 

State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Such deference to the trial 

court’s judgment should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence 

portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by 

restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as 

substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Stephenson 

v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Thus, the question under Appellate 

Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the 
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question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 

N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of 

persuading the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. 

Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[19] A plea agreement that does not provide for an open plea but nevertheless 

affords the trial court some discretion in sentencing is subject to review under 

Rule 7(B). Rivera v. State, 851 N.E.2d 299, 301-02 (Ind. 2006). Such is the case 

here, where Green’s sentence was left to the trial court’s discretion.

[20] To assess whether a sentence is inappropriate, we look first to the statutory 

range established for the class of the offenses. Here, Green was convicted of a 

Level 6 felony, for which the advisory sentence is one year, with a minimum 

sentence of six months and a maximum sentence of two and one-half years, and 

a Class A misdemeanor, for which the sentence may not exceed one year. Ind. 

Code §§ 35-50-2-7 (2016), 35-50-3-2 (1977). The court sentenced Green to the 

advisory sentence of one year on the felony conviction concurrent with one 

year on the misdemeanor.

[21] Next, we look to the nature of the offenses. Green, drunk and uninvited, 

entered the apartment of Beach, whom he apparently did not know. He was 

yelling, and he overturned some of Beach’s furniture before leaving her 

apartment. He then got into his car and drove into a brick mailbox, causing 

property damage and injuring himself.
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[22] With regard to the character of the offender, we observe, as did the trial court,

that Green’s criminal history is significant. Even a minor criminal history is a 

poor reflection of a defendant’s character. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Yet, Green’s criminal history is far from 

being considered minor; indeed, the court characterized it as “extensive” and 

consisting of “an unbroken chain of criminal convictions going back three states 

to 1990.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 47. Green’s documented criminal history spans more 

than twenty-five years, commencing in New Jersey with possession of cocaine 

in 1990 and assault and a weapons offense in 1991. From 1995 to 2014 in 

Delaware he committed two offenses of robbery, four offenses of resisting,

reckless/intentional/serious assault, two offenses of loitering for drug related 

activity, possession of a deadly weapon, burglary of a dwelling, receiving stolen 

property, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Thereafter, Green was 

convicted of public intoxication and driving while suspended in 2016 in 

Indiana, followed by his convictions in 2017 of Level 5 felony criminal 

confinement and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery in F5-754. Moreover, 

in addition to his violation of the protective order involving Edwards in F5-754, 

Green had previously violated a protective order in Delaware.

[23] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a)(6) (2015) provides that, in determining a 

defendant’s sentence, the court may consider the fact that the defendant 

recently violated conditions of probation as an aggravating circumstance. 

Green committed the offenses in F6-649 while on probation in F5-754, and the 

trial court found that to be a significant aggravating factor. Further, such is a
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significant indicator of poor character. See Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2008) (determining that defendant’s commission of offenses while on 

probation is “substantial consideration” in assessment of his character), trans. 

denied. Additionally, Green’s criminal history reflects that he has committed 

violations during previous probationary periods. 

[24] Green claims that, at the time of sentencing, he had been reformed such that his 

character did not warrant a one-year sentence. In support of this argument, he 

points to his medical issue; his maintenance of a substance-free and crime-free 

life in the months leading up to his sentencing; his continued employment; and 

his scheduling of future counseling appointments.

[25] In sentencing Green, the trial court responded as follows to his assertion that he 

was reformed: “So for Mr. Green to testify here today that he’s a changed man, 

the Court disagrees.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 46. The trial court then discussed the 

factors it found to be mitigating. As requested by Green, the trial court found

his medical condition to be a mitigator. It seems Green believes this mitigator 

should prevent him from serving his suspended sentence, but Green has 

presented nothing to show that he could not receive treatment for his health 

condition while he is incarcerated. Cf. Henderson v. State, 848 N.E.2d 341, 344-

45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no error in trial court’s refusal to consider 

defendant’s poor health as mitigator because she failed to present evidence that 

her multiple health conditions would be untreatable during incarceration).
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[26] In addition, the trial court took into account that Green had not had any other 

violations while he was released and awaiting sentencing. The trial court 

noted, however, that this finding was tempered by the fact that he was not being 

monitored or tested during this time so there was no way to verify the validity 

of his claim. And, as requested by Green at sentencing, the trial court also 

found his employment history to be a mitigating factor.

[27] The trial court further considered Green’s history of substance abuse as a 

mitigating factor but noted that this factor is diminished by the fact that he has 

committed violent crimes against people in the past while under the influence of 

these substances. The trial court also noted that, although Green testified at 

sentencing about having scheduled some type of counseling appointment in the 

future, he offered no “proof of his attendance at AA meetings or counseling.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 60. In addition, we note that just a year prior to this 

incident, the trial court had allowed Green to be released on his own 

recognizance in order to enter a rehabilitation center. In May 2017, Green 

graduated from that program and was accepted into a transitional housing unit, 

which the trial court again allowed in lieu of his return to jail. Despite 

successfully completing treatment after receiving special accommodation from 

the trial court to do so, Green squandered the progress he had made by drinking 

excessively and committing these new offenses in F6-649. Although Green 

claims that much of his criminal behavior is due to his substance abuse 

problem, this does not necessarily weigh in favor of a more lenient sentence, 

especially after having received treatment. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 
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1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (trial court did not err in failing to consider 

defendant’s substance abuse as mitigating factor), trans. denied; Bennett v. State, 

787 N.E.2d 938, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that defendant’s alcoholism 

could properly have been considered aggravating circumstance), trans. denied; 

Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“a history of 

substance abuse is sometimes found by trial courts to be an aggravator, not a 

mitigator”), trans. denied. In spite of this precedent, the trial court gave 

mitigating consideration to Green’s substance abuse issues.

[28] Although not discussed in Green’s brief to this Court, the trial court also found

Green’s guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance.

[29] The finding of mitigating circumstances is not mandatory but is within the 

discretion of the trial court. Page v. State, 878 N.E.2d 404, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), trans. denied. Further, the court is not obligated to give the same weight 

to a proffered mitigating factor as does the defendant. Id. Green presents this 

Court with the same mitigating factors he argued to the trial court. The trial 

court found these factors to be mitigating, and Green presents no additional 

information to this Court to support a different result than that reached by the 

trial court.

[30] Having considered these mitigating circumstances as well as the significant 

aggravating circumstances of Green’s extensive criminal history and his 

commission of new offenses while on probation, the trial court nevertheless

sentenced Green to the lenient, advisory sentence of one year. Green has not 
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met his burden of presenting compelling evidence portraying in a positive light 

the nature of the offenses and his character in order to overcome the trial court’s 

sentencing decision.

II. Sentencing Discretion

[31] Next, Green asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when, upon 

revoking his probation in F5-754, it ordered him to serve the entirety of his

suspended sentence of 1,742 days.

[32] A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence on probation; rather, such 

placement is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a 

right. Davis v. State, 743 N.E.2d 793, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans denied. 

Further, probation is a criminal sanction for which a convicted defendant 

specifically agrees to accept conditions upon his behavior in lieu of 

imprisonment. Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), 

trans. denied. These restrictions are designed to ensure that probation serves as a 

period of genuine rehabilitation and that the public is not harmed by a 

probationer living within the community. Jones v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[33] Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) (2015) provides that if the court finds a 

violation of a condition of probation, it may: (1) continue the person on 

probation, with or without modifying the conditions; (2) extend the person’s 

probationary period for not more than one year; and/or (3) order execution of all 

or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. (Emphasis 
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added). A trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wilkerson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 458, 464 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Prewitt v. State, 878 

N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).

[34] In support of his argument for leniency, Green relies on several cases where this 

Court determined the trial court had abused its discretion by ordering a 

defendant to serve his entire suspended sentence. First, Green cites Puckett v. 

State, 956 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), in which the Court determined the 

trial court abused its discretion by considering multiple improper factors before 

imposing Puckett’s entire previously suspended sentence for his probation 

violation. Here, however, Green makes no claim that the trial court considered 

improper factors when it sentenced him for his probation violation; therefore, 

the reasoning in Puckett is inapplicable in this case.

[35] In Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), this Court reversed the 

trial court’s order revoking Johnson’s community corrections placement and 

ordering him to serve the remainder of his executed sentence in prison because, 

among other things, his violation was a minor, technical one. Although Green

attempts to rely on Johnson, he concedes that his commission of the new 

offenses in F6-649 is not a mere technical violation. See Appellant’s Br. p. 15. 

And we would add that it is also not a minor violation. Thus, Johnson is 

inapplicable here as well.
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[36] Finally, Green suggests he should not have been ordered to serve his entire 

suspended sentence because, prior to June 16, 2018, he had not previously 

violated his probation; he admitted to the violation and took responsibility for 

his actions; he had an ongoing health issue; and, at the time he committed the 

offenses, he was experiencing a relapse in his battle with alcohol abuse because 

he was upset over the end of his marriage to Edwards.

[37] In deciding to order Green to serve the balance of his previously suspended 

sentence, the trial court considered all of this information and set forth the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances as discussed in Issue I., above. On 

appeal, Green merely restates the factors he proffered to the trial court. He

makes no showing of any error by the trial court, and we find none. As his 

twenty-five-year criminal history demonstrates, he has repeatedly demonstrated 

his unwillingness to comply with the conditions of his probation and to 

conform his behavior to lead a law-abiding life. Moreover, he squandered the 

opportunity to remain alcohol free after the trial court afforded him an 

opportunity for treatment and rehabilitation in F5-754. Green’s history 

provides nothing to suggest that he will comply with probation conditions in the 

future. Thus, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to order Green to serve 

his entire previously suspended sentence is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances of this case.
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Conclusion

[38] Considering both the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender 

and giving due consideration to the trial court’s sentencing decision, we are 

unable to conclude that Green’s one-year sentence in F6-649 is inappropriate. 

Furthermore, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 

ordering Green to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence upon 

revocation of his probation in F5-754.

[39] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.