Voting Systems Performance and Test Standards: 

An Overview 

This document provides an overview of the Voting System Standards (the “Standards”), 

developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). This overview serves as a companion document 

for understanding and interpreting both Volume I, the performance provisions of the Standards, and 

Volume II, the testing specifications. 

Background

The program to develop and implement performance and test Standards for electronic voting 

equipment is over 25 years old. However, national interest in this program has been renewed as a result 

of the 2000 Presidential election. 

In 1975, the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology) and the Office of the Federal Elections (the Office of Election Administration’s predecessor 

at the General Accounting Office) produced a joint report, Effective Use of Computing Technology in 

Vote Tallying. This report concluded that a basic cause of computer-related election problems was the 

lack of appropriate technical skills at the state and local level to develop or implement sophisticated 

Standards against which voting system hardware and software could be tested. A subsequent 

Congressionally-authorized study produced by the FEC and the National Bureau of Standards cited a 

significant number of technical and managerial problems affecting the integrity of the vote counting 

process. The report detailed the need for a federal agency to develop national performance Standards that 

could be used as a tool by state and local election officials in the testing, certification, and procurement of 

computer-based voting systems. 

In 1984, Congress appropriated funds for the FEC to develop voluntary national Standards for 

computer-based voting systems. During this developmental period more than 130 participants, including 

state and local election officials, independent technical experts, election system vendors, Congressional 

staff, and other interested parties, attended numerous public hearings and reviewed the proposed criteria 

for the draft Standards. Prior to final issuance, the FEC published the draft Standards in the Federal 

Register and requested that all interested parties submit formal comments. After reviewing all responses 

and incorporating corrections and suitable suggestions, the FEC formally approved the Performance and 

Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems1

 in January

1990. 

 1

 This document is generally referred to as the Voting Systems Standards. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 2

 The national testing effort is overseen by NASED’s Voting Systems Board, which is composed of 

election officials and independent technical advisors (see attachment).

2

 NASED has established a process 

for vendors to submit their equipment to an Independent Test Authority (ITA) for evaluation against the 

Standards. To date, Wyle Laboratories, Inc., CIBER, Inc., and SysTest Labs are certified by NASED to 

serve as program ITAs for the testing of hardware and the examination of software. 3

 

Since NASED’s testing program was initiated in 1994, more than 30 voting systems or 

components of voting systems have gone through the NASED testing and qualification process. In 

addition, many systems have subsequently been certified at the state level using the Standards in 

conjunction with functional and technical requirements developed by state and local policymakers to 

address the specific needs of their jurisdictions. 

 As the qualification process matured and as qualified systems were used in the field, the Voting 

Systems Board, in consultation with the ITAs, was able to identify certain testing issues that needed to be 

resolved. Moreover, rapid advancements in information and personal computer technologies have 

introduced new voting system development and implementation scenarios not contemplated by the 1990 

Standards. 

In 1997, NASED briefed the FEC on the necessity for continued FEC involvement, citing the 

importance of keeping the Standards current in its reflection of modern and emerging technologies 

employed by voting system vendors. Following a Requirements Analysis released in 1999, the 

Commission authorized the Office of Election Administration to revise the Standards to reflect 

contemporary needs of the elections community. 

Issues Addressed by the Revised Standards

The primary goal of the Standards is to provide a mechanism for state and local election officials 

to assure the public of the integrity of computer-based election systems; this has remained unchanged 

since 1990. However, the methods for achieving this goal have broadened over the last decade. 

 The revised Standards provide a common set of requirements across all voting technologies, 

using technology-specific requirements only where essential to address the specified technology’s impact 

on voting accuracy, integrity, and reliability. The original Standards classified systems as either 

Punchcard and Marksense (P&M) or Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) and defined separate Standards 

for each technology. The new document revises this terminology to specify standards for two separate 

categories: paper-based voting systems and DRE voting systems. 

Paper-based systems encompass both punchcards and optically scanned ballots. Electronic 

systems include a broad range of DRE systems, such as those that use touch screens and/or keyboards to 

record votes. In addition, voting systems that use electronic ballots and transmit official vote data from 

the polling place to another location over a public network are now designated as Public Network DRE 

Voting Systems and are subject to the standards applicable to other DRE systems, and to requirements 

specific to systems that use public network telecommunications. 

 

2

 The FEC’s Director of the Office of Election Administration and representatives from IEEE, Wyle Laboratories, 

SysTest, and Ciber serve as ex-officio members. 3

 NASED also continues to encourage other qualified testing facilities to request certification as Independent Test 

Authorities.
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 3

Revised Performance Features

 The revised Standards provide new or expanded coverage of the following functional and 

technical system capabilities: 

• Election Management Functions: Performance requirements are specified for components that 

define, develop and maintain election databases; perform election definition and setup functions; 

format ballots; count votes; consolidate and report results; and maintain audit trails. 

• Feedback to Voter: Performance requirements are defined for DRE systems and for paper-based 

precinct-based systems in order to provide direct feedback to the voter that indicates when an 

undervote or overvote is detected. 

• Accessibility: Performance requirements are defined for voting systems so that a system can 

meet the specific needs of voters with disabilities. These requirements were developed by the 

Access Board, a federal agency responsible for developing accessibility standards. The 

requirements are based on the accessibility standards for electronic and information technology 

established in 36 CFR Part 1194 - Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility 

Standards, which implement Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998. The 

requirements provide common standards that must be met by all voting devices claiming 

accessibility and specific standards related to various types of DRE voting systems. 

• Audit Trails: Performance requirements for audit trails are strengthened to address the full range 

of election management functions, including such functions such as ballot definition and election 

programming. 

• Telecommunications: Performance requirements are defined for hardware and software 

components of voting systems that transmit voting-related information using public 

telecommunications components. These requirements apply to systems where data is carried 

between devices at a single site, and systems where data is carried between devices in two 

geographically distinct locations. Systems must be designed to provide the secure transfer of 

many distinct types of vote data, including lists of eligible voters, voter authentication 

information, ballot definition information, and vote transmission and tabulation information. Due 

to the limits of existing technology to prevent unauthorized use of data, the Standards include 

some blanket prohibitions against the communications or transfer of certain types of data via 

telecommunications under any circumstances. 

• Broadcasting of Unofficial Results: Performance requirements are defined for the content and 

labeling of data provided to the media and other organizations (in reports, data files, or postings 

to official Web sites) prior to the canvass and certification of election results. 

Revised Test Features

The revised Standards also provide a restructured and expanded description of the tests performed 

by ITAs: 

• Expanded Testing Standards: Additional tests are defined to address the expanded functional 

and technical requirements for voting systems. 

• Stages in the Test Process: The test process is re-defined in terms of pre-testing, testing, and 

post-testing activities. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 4

• Distinction Between Initial Tests and Testing of Modifications to Previously Tested 

Systems: A voting system remains qualified as long as no modifications are made. Any changes 

to a system must be submitted to the appropriate ITA. The proper course of action to evaluate the 

implication of a modification to a system, including the possibility of requiring additional testing, 

depends on the nature of the changes made by the vendor. Some criteria for determining the 

scope of testing for modifications are defined in the Standards, but the ITA has full discretion to 

evaluate this criteria against modifications made to the system. 

• Documentation Submitted by Vendors: The description of documentation provided by vendors 

as part of the Technical Data Package (TDP) is refined to support the collection of all information 

required by the ITAs to conduct the expanded testing. 

Revised Organizational Features

The Standards have been reorganized and edited to better suit the needs of different user groups 

and to improve readability. These changes include: 

• Multiple Volumes: While the original Standards was published as a single document, the 

revision is divided into two distinct volumes. Volume I, Voting System Performance Standards, 

provides an introduction to the Standards. It describes the functional and technical requirements 

for voting systems, and provides a summary of the ITA’s testing process. This volume is intended 

for a general audience including the public, the press, state and local election officials, and 

prospective vendors, as well as the ITAs and current vendors already familiar with the Standards 

and the testing process. Volume II, Voting System Test Standards, is written specifically for 

jurisdictions purchasing a new system, vendors, and ITAs. This volume provides details of the 

test process, including the information to be submitted by the vendor to support testing, the 

development of test plans by the ITAs for initial system testing, the testing of modifications to the 

system, the conduct of system qualification tests by the ITAs, and the test reports generated by 

the ITAs. 

• Standards, Guidelines and Fundamental System Development Techniques: The revised 

Standards clearly identify individual elements as mandatory requirements or recommended 

guidelines. Such requirements are designated in the Standards by the term “shall.”The Standards 

no longer provide descriptions of basic professional system developmental and managerial 

techniques, which were included in the 1990 version of the Standards. However, they do provide 

references to common industry practices, and require the vendors to submit documentation of its 

processes for some topics such as quality assurance and configuration management. 

• Human Interface and Usability Standards: Recent controversy over the design of the 

Presidential ballot in certain jurisdictions has highlighted the importance of ballot design and 

system usability by both election officials and the general public. Human interface and usability 

issues are addressed in Appendix C to Volume I. This appendix provides guidelines to vendors 

and election officials to aid in the design and procurement of systems that are easy to use by the 

general public. Additionally, the FEC has begun the development testable human factors 

standards that will be incorporated into the Standards upon completion. 

• Inclusion of Selected Test Procedure Details: Volume II of the Standards specify the procedure 

for certain hardware tests for voting devices and vote counting devices. However, many tests of 

hardware and software in a voting system can not be developed without examining the design and 

configuration of the specific system seeking qualification. Because of this, the Standards give the 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 5

ITAs wide latitude to develop and perform appropriate tests to fully evaluate a system against the 

Standards. 

 

Issues Not Addressed by the Revised Standards

This revisions to the Standards do not provide sufficient guidance for a number of important 

issues. Some of these issues are outside the scope of the Standards, some are only partially addressed by 

the Standards, and some will be addressed in future modules of the Standards. These issues include: 

• Administrative Functions: The revised Standards do not address administrative and managerial 

practices outside the direct control of the vendor. Election officials have long recognized that 

adequate Standards and test criteria are only part of the formula for ensuring that votes are cast 

and counted in an accurate manner. The other key component that is often overlooked in the rush 

to embrace technological solutions to election problems is efficient and consistent administration 

and management. Effective administration at the local level requires the adoption and 

implementation of consistent and effective procedures for acquiring, securing, operating and 

maintaining a voting system. Although the Standards mandate that vendors document many 

components of optimal managerial practices, the execution of such procedures are not included in 

a Standards document that focuses on the system itself. 

• Integration with the Voter Registration Database: Local and statewide automated voter 

registration databases have become more common in recent years as election officials throughout 

the country attempt to harness innovations in network computing to address the needs of 

increasingly complex voter registration information requirements. In some instances, a voter 

registration database will contain many data fields common to other election administration 

applications. These applications include campaign finance recording, election worker 

management, and the reporting of election results. Although many of these applications are codependent, the testing of the design and interface between the voting system and the voter 

registration database has been specifically excluded from this update of the Standards for 

practical reasons. First, because there is such a variety of databases and interfaces being used 

among the various states and within the localities of each individual state, there is no practical 

and systematic way to test a voting system against all possible combinations and configurations. 

Second, many of the voting systems being used today still do not include an electronic interface 

with the voter registration database. At such time when the majority of voting systems and voter 

registration databases become more seamlessly integrated, a module will be added to the 

Standards covering their performance, functionality, and testing. 

• Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Products: Some voting systems use one or more readilyavailable COTS hardware devices (such as card readers, printers, or personal computers) or 

software products (such as operating systems, programming language compilers, or database 

management systems). These devices and software are exempted from certain portions of the 

qualification testing process so long as such products are not modified in any manner for use in a 

voting system. 

• Internet Voting: A recent report4

 conducted by the Internet Policy Institute and sponsored by the 

National Science Foundation in cooperation with the University of Maryland stated: 

 

4 “Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting: Issues and Research Agenda” March, 2001. Internet 

Policy Institute. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 6

“Remote Internet voting systems pose significant risk to the integrity of the 

voting process and should not be fielded for use in public elections until 

substantial technical and social science issues have been addressed. The 

security risk associated with these systems are both numerous and 

pervasive and, in many cases, cannot be resolved using even today’s 

most sophisticated technology.”

The findings of this and other studies on internet voting have led the FEC and NASED to 

conclude that controls cannot be developed at the present time to make remote Internet voting 

sufficiently risk-resistant to be confidently used by election officials and the voting public. 

Therefore, the Standards can not be written for the testing and qualification of these systems for 

widespread use in general elections. However, the Standards do not prohibit the development and 

use of these systems for special populations such as military and civilian government employees 

based outside the United States. In addition to Federal Voting Assistance Program use of Internet 

voting, States are encouraged to conduct pilot tests and demonstration projects in accordance with 

applicable state regulations. 

The Standards contemplate the development of systems that integrate public telecommunications 

networks other than the Internet at the poll site setting. These voting systems are considered 

public network direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems and must meet the same revised 

Standards for security, accuracy, and reliability as other similarly defined voting systems. Such 

systems must additionally meet requirements specific to systems that integrate certain 

telecommunications components.

• Human Error Rate vs. System Error Rate: In the Standards, the term “error rate” applies to 

errors introduced by the system and not by a voter’s action, such as the failure to mark a ballot in 

accordance with instructions. The updated accuracy standard is defined as a ballot position error 

rate. The error rate applies to specific system functions, such as recording a vote, storing a vote 

and consolidating votes into vote totals. Each location on a paper ballot card or electronic ballot 

image where a vote may be entered represents a ballot position. The Standards set two error 

rates: 

1. Target error rate: a maximum of one error in 10,000,000 ballot positions, and 

2. Testing error rate: a maximum acceptable rate in the test process of one error in 

500,000 positions. 

This system error rate applies to data that is entered into the system in conformance with the 

applicable instructions and specifications. Further research on human interface and usability 

issues is needed to enable the development of Standards for error rates that account for human 

error. 

 

Summary of Content of Volume I 

 Volume I contains performance standards for electronic components of voting systems. In 

addition to containing a glossary (Appendix A) and applicable references (Appendix B), Volume I is 

divided into nine sections:

• Section 1- Introduction: This section provides an introduction to the Standards, addressing the 

following topics: 

• Objectives and usage of the Standards; 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 7

• Development history for initial Standards; 

• Update of the Standards; 

• Accessibility for individuals with disabilities; 

• Definitions of key terms; 

• Application of the Standards and test specifications; and 

• Outline of contents. 

• Section 2 - Functional Capabilities: This section contains Standards detailing the functional 

capabilities required of a voting system. This section sets out precisely what it is that a voting 

system is required to do. In addition, this section sets forth the minimum actions a voting system 

must be able to perform to be eligible for qualification. For organizational purposes, functional 

capabilities are categorized by the phase of election activity in which they are required: 

• Overall Capabilities: These functional capabilities apply throughout the election 

process. They include security, accuracy, integrity, system auditability, election 

management system, vote tabulation, ballot counters, telecommunications, and data 

retention. 

• Pre-voting Capabilities: These functional capabilities are used to prepare the voting 

system for voting. They include ballot preparation, the preparation of electionspecific software (including firmware), the production of ballots or ballot pages, the 

installation of ballots and ballot counting software (including firmware), and system 

and equipment tests. 

• Voting Capabilities: These functional capabilities include all operations conducted at 

the polling place by voters and officials including the generation of status messages. 

• Post-voting Capabilities: These functional capabilities apply after all votes have been 

cast. They include closing the polling place; obtaining reports by voting machine, 

polling place, and precinct; obtaining consolidated reports; and obtaining reports of 

audit trails. 

• Maintenance, Transportation and Storage Capabilities: These capabilities are 

necessary to maintain, transport, and store voting system equipment. 

For each functional capability, common standards are specified. In recognition of the diversity of 

voting systems, some of the standards have additional requirements that apply only if the system 

incorporates certain functions (for example, voting systems employing telecommunications to 

transmit voting data) or configurations (for example, a central count component). Where systemspecific standards are appropriate, common standards are followed by standards applicable to 

specific technologies (i.e., paper-based or DRE) or intended use (i.e., central or precinct count). 

The requirement that voting systems provide access to individuals with disabilities is one of the 

most significant additions to the Standards. The FEC has incorporated specifications that were 

developed by the Access Board and are based on the accessibility Standards for electronic and 

information technology established in 36 CFR Part 1194 - Electronic and Information 

Technology Accessibility Standards, which implement Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act 

Amendments of 1998. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 8

• Section 3 - Hardware Standards: This section describes the performance requirements, physical 

characteristics, and design, construction, and maintenance characteristics of the hardware and 

related components of a voting system. This section focuses on a broad range of devices used in 

the design and manufacture of voting systems, such as: 

• For paper ballots: printers, cards, boxes, transfer boxes, and readers; 

• For electronic systems: ballot displays, ballot recorders, precinct vote control units; 

• For voting devices: punching and marking devices and electronic recording devices; 

• Voting booths and enclosures; 

• Equipment used to prepare ballots, program elections, consolidate and report votes, 

and perform other elections management activities; 

• Fixed servers and removable electronic data storage media; and 

• Printers. 

The Standards specify the minimum values for the relevant attributes of hardware, such as:

• Accuracy; 

• Reliability; 

• Stability under normal environmental operating conditions and when equipment is in 

storage and transit; 

• Power requirements and ability to respond to interruptions of power supply; 

• Susceptibility to interference from static electricity and magnetic fields; 

• Product marking; and 

• Safety. 

• Section 4- Software Standards: This section describes the design and performance 

characteristics of the software embodied in voting systems, addressing both system level software 

and voting system application software, whether COTS or proprietary. The requirements of this 

section are intended to ensure that the overall objectives of accuracy, logical correctness, privacy, 

system integrity, and reliability are achieved. Although this section emphasizes software, the 

software standards may influence hardware design in some voting systems. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 9

The requirements of this section apply to all software developed for use in voting systems, 

including: 

• Software provided by the voting system vendor and its component suppliers; and 

• Software furnished by an external provider where the software is potentially used in 

any way during voting system operation. 

The general standards in this section apply to software used to support the broad range of voting 

system activities, including pre-voting, voting and post-voting activities. System specific 

Standards are defined for ballot counting, vote processing, the creation of an unalterable audit 

trail, and the generation of output reports and files. Voting system software is also subject to the 

security requirements of Section 6. 

• Section 5 - Telecommunications Standards: This section describes the requirements for the 

telecommunications components of voting systems. Additionally, it defines the acceptable levels 

of performance against these characteristics. For the purpose of the Standards, 

telecommunications is defined as the capability to transmit and receive data electronically 

regardless of whether the transmission is localized within the polling place or the data is 

transmitted to a geographically distinct location. The requirements in this section represent 

functional and performance requirements for the transmission of data that is used to operate the 

system and report official election results. Where applicable, this section specifies minimum 

values for critical performance and functional attributes involving telecommunications hardware 

and software components. 

This section addresses telecommunications hardware and software across a broad range of 

technologies such as dial-up communications technologies, high-speed telecommunications lines 

(public and private), cabling technologies, communications routers, modems, modem drivers, 

channel service units (CSU)/data service units (DSU), and dial-up networking applications 

software. 

Additionally, this section applies to voting-related transmissions over public networks, such as 

those provided by regional telephone companies and long distance carriers. This section also 

applies to private networks regardless of whether the network is owned and operated by the 

election jurisdiction. For systems that transmit data over public networks, this section applies to 

telecommunications components installed and operated at settings supervised by election 

officials, such as polling places or central offices. 

• Section 6 - Security Standards: This section describes the essential security capabilities for a 

voting system, encompassing the system’s hardware, software, communications, and 

documentation. The requirements of this section recognize that no predefined set of security 

Standards will address and defeat all conceivable or theoretical threats. However, the Standards 

articulate requirements to achieve acceptable levels of integrity, reliability, and inviolability. 

Ultimately, the objectives of the security Standards for voting systems are to: 

• Establish and maintain controls that can ensure that accidents, inadvertent mistakes, 

and errors are minimized; 

• Protect the system from intentional manipulation and fraud; 

• Protect the system from malicious mischief; 

• Identify fraudulent or erroneous changes to the system; and 

• Protect secrecy in the voting process. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 10

These Standards are intended to address a broad range of risks to the integrity of a voting system. 

While it is not possible to identify all potential risks, the Standards identify several types of risk 

that must be addressed, including: 

• Unauthorized changes to system capabilities for defining ballot formats, casting and 

recording votes, calculating vote totals consistent with defined ballot formats, and 

reporting vote totals; 

• Alteration of voting system audit trails; 

• Altering a legitimately cast vote; 

• Preventing the recording of a legitimately cast vote, 

• Introducing data for a vote not cast by a registered voter; 

• Changing calculated vote totals; 

• Preventing access to vote data, including individual votes and vote totals, to 

unauthorized individuals; and 

• Preventing access to voter identification data and data for votes cast by the voter such 

that an individual can determine the content of specific votes cast by the voter. 

• Section 7 - Quality Assurance: In the Standards, quality assurance is a vendor function with 

associated practices that confirms throughout the system development and maintenance life-cycle 

that a voting system conforms with the Standards and other requirements of state and local 

jurisdictions. Quality assurance focuses on building quality into a system and reducing 

dependence on system tests at the end of the life-cycle to detect deficiencies. 

This section describes the responsibilities of the voting system vendor for designing and 

implementing a quality assurance program to ensure that the design, workmanship, and 

performance requirements of the Standards are achieved in all delivered systems and components. 

These responsibilities include: 

• Development of procedures for identifying and procuring parts and raw materials of 

the requisite quality, and for their inspection, acceptance, and control. 

• Documentation of hardware and software development processes. 

• Identification and enforcement of all requirements for in-process inspection and 

testing that the manufacturer deems necessary to ensure proper fabrication and 

assembly of hardware, as well as installation and operation of software or firmware. 

• Procedures for maintaining all data and records required to document and verify the 

quality inspections and tests. 

• Section 8 - Configuration Management: This section contains specific requirements for 

configuration management of voting systems. For the purposes of the Standards, configuration 

management is defined as a set of activities and associated practices that assures full knowledge 

and control of the components of a system, beginning with its initial development, progressing 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 11

throughout its development and construction, and continuing with its ongoing maintenance and 

enhancement. This section describes activities in terms of their purpose and outcomes. It does 

not describe specific procedures or steps to be employed to accomplish them—these are left to the 

vendor to select. 

The requirements of this section address a broad set of record keeping, audit, and reporting 

activities that include: 

• Identifying discrete system components; 

• Creating records of formal baselines of all components; 

• Creating records of later versions of components; 

• Controlling changes made to the system and its components; 

• Submitting new versions of the system to ITAs; 

• Releasing new versions of the system to customers; 

• Auditing the system, including its documentation, against configuration management 

records; 

• Controlling interfaces to other systems; and 

• Identifying tools used to build and maintain the system. 

Vendors are required to submit documentation of these procedures to the ITA as part of the 

Technical Data Package for system qualification testing. Additionally, as articulated in state or 

local election laws, regulations, or contractual agreements with vendors, authorized election 

officials or their representatives reserve the right to inspect vendor facilities and operations to 

determine conformance with the vendor’s reported configuration management procedures.

• Section 9 - Overview of Qualification Tests: This section provides an overview for the 

qualification testing of voting systems. Qualification testing is the process by which a voting 

system is shown to comply with the requirements of the Standards and the requirements of its 

own design and performance specifications. The testing also evaluates the completeness of the 

vendor's developmental test program, including the sufficiency of vendor tests conducted to 

demonstrate compliance with stated system design and performance specifications, and the 

vendor’s documented quality assurance and configuration management practices. 

The qualification test process is intended to discover errors that, should they occur in actual 

election use, could result in failure to complete election operations in a satisfactory manner. This 

section describes the scope of qualification testing, its applicability to voting system components, 

documentation that is must be submitted by the vendor, and the flow of the test process. This 

section also describes differences between the test process for initial qualification testing of a 

system and the testing for modifications and re-qualification after a qualified system has been 

modified. 

Since 1994, the testing described in this section has been performed by an ITA that is certified by 

NASED. The testing may be conducted by one or more ITAs for a given system, depending on 

the nature of tests to be conducted and the expertise of the certified ITA. The testing process 

involves the assessment of: 

• Absolute correctness of all ballot processing software, for which no margin for error 

exists; 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 12

• Operational accuracy in the recording and processing of voting data, as measured by 

the error rate articulated in Volume I, Section 3; 

• Operational failure or the number of unrecoverable failures under conditions 

simulating the intended storage, operation, transportation, and maintenance 

environments for voting systems, using an actual time-based period of processing test 

ballots; 

• System performance and function under normal and abnormal conditions; and 

• Completeness and accuracy of the system documentation and configuration 

management records to enable purchasing jurisdictions to effectively install, test, and 

operate the system. 

Summary of Volume II Content

• Section 1 - Introduction: This section provides an overview of Volume II, addressing the 

following topics: 

• The objectives of Volume II; 

• The general contents of Volume II; 

• The qualification testing focus; 

• The qualification testing sequence; 

• The evolution of testing; and 

• The outline of contents 

• Section 2 - Technical Data Package: This section contains a description of vendor 

documentation relating to the voting system that shall be submitted with the system as a 

precondition for qualification testing. These items are necessary to define the product and its 

method of operation; to provide the vendor’s technical and test data supporting the its claims of 

the system's functional capabilities and performance levels; and to document instructions and 

procedures governing system operation and field maintenance. 

The content of the Technical Data Package (TDP) is intended must contain a complete 

description of the following information about the system: 

• Overall system design, including subsystems, modules, and interfaces; 

• Specific functional capabilities; 

• Performance and design specifications; 

• Design constraints and compatibility requirements; 

• Personnel, equipment, and facilities necessary for system operation, maintenance, 

and logistical support; 

• Vendor practices for assuring system quality during the system’s development and 

subsequent maintenance; and 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 13

• Vendor practices for managing the configuration of the system during development 

and for modifications to the system throughout its life-cycle.

• Section 3 - Functionality Testing: This section contains a description of the testing to be 

performed by the ITA to confirm the functional capabilities of a voting system submitted for 

qualification testing. It describes the scope and basis for functional testing, the general sequence 

of tests within the overall test process, and provides guidance on testing for accessibility. It also 

discusses testing of functionality of systems that operate on personal computers. 

• Section 4 - Hardware Testing: This section contains a description of the testing to be performed 

by the ITAs to confirm the proper functioning of the hardware components of a voting system 

submitted for qualification testing. This section requires ITAs to design and perform procedures 

that test the voting system hardware for both operating and non-operating environmental tests. 

Hardware testing begins with non-operating tests that require the use of an environmental test 

facility. These are followed by operating tests that are performed partly in an environmental 

facility and partly in a standard test laboratory or shop environment. The non-operating tests are 

intended to evaluate the ability of the system hardware to withstand exposure to various 

environmental conditions incidental to voting system storage, maintenance, and transportation. 

The procedures are based on test methods contained in Military Standards (MIL-STD) 810D, 

modified where appropriate, and include such tests as: bench handling, vibration, low and high 

temperature, and humidity. 

The operating tests involve running the system for an extended period of time under varying 

temperatures and voltages. This ensures that the hardware meets or exceeds the minimum 

requirements for reliability, data reading, and processing accuracy contained in Section 3 of 

Volume I. Although the procedure emphasizes equipment operability and data accuracy, it is not 

an exhaustive evaluation of all system functions. Moreover, the severity of the test conditions has 

in most cases been reduced from that specified in the Military Standards to reflect commercial, 

rather than military, practice. 

• Section 5 - Software Testing: This section contains a description of the testing to be performed 

by the ITAs to confirm the proper functioning of the software components of a voting system 

submitted for qualification testing. It describes the scope and basis for software testing, the initial 

review of documentation to support software testing, and the review of voting system source 

code. 

The software qualification tests encompass a number of interrelated examinations. The 

examinations include selective review of source code for conformance with the vendor’s stated 

standards, and other system documentation provided by the vendor. The code inspection is 

complemented by a series of functional tests to verify the proper performance of all system 

functions controlled by the software. 

• Section 6 - System Level Integration Testing: This section contains a description of the testing 

conducted by the ITAs to confirm the proper functioning of the fully integrated components of a 

voting system submitted for qualification testing. It describes the scope and basis for integration 

testing, testing of internal and external system interfaces, testing of security capabilities, testing of 

accessibility features, and the configuration audits, including the evaluation of claims made in the 

system documentation. 

System-level qualification tests address the integrated operation of hardware, software 

and telecommunications capabilities (where applicable) to assess the system’s response 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 14

to a range of both normal and abnormal conditions in an attempt to compromise the 

system. 

• Section 7 - Examination of Vendor Practices for Configuration Management and Quality 

Assurance: This section contains a description of examinations conducted by the ITAs to 

evaluate the extent to which vendors meet the requirements for configuration management and 

quality assurance. It describes the scope and basis for the examinations and the general sequence 

of the examinations. It also provides guidance on the substantive focus of the examinations. 

In reviewing configuration management practices, the ITAs examine the vendor’s: 

• configuration management policy;

• configuration identification policy;

• baseline, promotion and demotion procedures;

• configuration control procedures;

• release process and procedures; and

• configuration audit procedures.

In reviewing quality assurance practices, the ITAs examine the vendor’s: 

• quality assurance policy;

• parts and materials tests and examinations;

• quality conformance plans, procedures and inspection results; and

• voting system documentation.

Conclusion

 Almost eighty percent of the States have adopted the Standards. The Commission recommends 

that individual States continue to decide how best to adopt and implement the Standards to aid in the 

procurement of electronic voting systems. States are also encouraged to develop and implement 

individual certification processes to make sure that qualified voting systems can meet the unique and 

particular demands of the purchasing jurisdiction. 

As a whole, implementation of the original Standards, combined with NASED’s national testing 

program, has allowed election officials to be more confidant than ever that the voting systems they 

procure will work accurately and reliably. Although the requirements for voting systems and the 

technologies used to build them have evolved over the past decade, the revised Standards will close the 

gaps in the Standards for system performance and testing. In order to prevent technology gaps in the 

future, the FEC and NASED are committed to making the Standards a living document capable of being 

updated in an expedited manner to respond to constantly evolving technology. Such technological 

innovation should be embraced in order to maintain a sophisticated and robust voting systems industry. 
Voting Systems Standards: An Overview 15

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE ELECTION DIRECTORS 

VOTING SYSTEMS BOARD 

Thomas R. Wilkey, Chair 

Executive Director 

New York State Board of Elections 

Albany, New York 

Denise Lamb, Vice Chair 

Director 

State Bureau of Elections 

Santa Fe, New Mexico 

David Elliott, Asst. Director of Elections 

Office of the Secretary of State 

Olympia, Washington 

Sandy Steinbach, Director of Elections 

Office of Secretary of State 

Des Moines, Iowa 

Donetta Davidson, 

Secretary of State 

Denver, Colorado 

Connie Schmidt, Commissioner 

Johnson County Election Commission 

Olathe, Kansas 

Yvonne Smith (Member Emeritus) 

Former Assistant to the Executive Director 

Illinois State Board of Elections 

Chicago, Illinois 

Brit Williams, Professor Emeritus 

CSIS Dept, Kennesaw State College 

Kennesaw, Georgia 

Paul Craft, Computer Audit Analyst 

Florida State Division of Elections 

Tallahassee, Florida 

Jay W. Nispel, Senior Principal Engineer 

Computer Sciences Corporation 

Annapolis Junction, Maryland 

Steve Freeman, Software Consultant 

League City, Texas 

Robert Naegele, President 

Granite Creek Technology 

Pacific Grove, California

Ex Officios: 

Penelope Bonsall, Director 

Office of Election Administration

Federal Election Commission 

Washington, D.C. 

Stephen Berger, Chair 

IEEE Voting Equipment Standard 

Working Group 

Georgetown, Texas 

Jim Dearman

Wyle Laboratories 

Huntsville, Alabama 

Jennifer Price 

Shawn Southworth 

CIBER, Inc 

Huntsville, Alabama 

Carolyn Coggins 

SysTest Labs 

Denver, Colorado

Committee Secretariat: 

The Election Center 

R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director 

Houston, Texas 

Tele: 281-293-0101 

Fax: 281-293-0453 

email: electioncent@pdq.net