alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

December 13, 2012 Session

MARY KRUGER, ET AL. v. THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dyer County

No. 2011-CV-58 William B. Acree, Judge

No. W2012-00229-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 28, 2013

____________________________________

SEPARATE CONCURRENCE IN PART, DISSENT IN PART

________________________________

HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case.

In the majority opinion, the majority states the issue raised by the Board of Zoning Appeals

(“BZA”) as: “Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Dyer County Zoning

Resolution does not require an applicant seeking a variance to have a written lease.” In a

footnote, the majority observes that the appellate record contained “no such finding by the

circuit court.” Instead of leaving it at that, the majority goes on to “construe the BZA’s

argument as ‘Whether the Resolution requires an applicant seeking a variance to possess a

valid lease.’ ”

If the trial court made no finding on this issue, the majority’s “construction” of the issue

results in this Court giving an advisory opinion, ruling on an issue that the trial court did not

decide. From this, I must respectfully dissent.

Moreover, it appears to me that the petitioner neighbors would have standing to assert that

the BZA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by granting a zoning right to an entity with no

legally cognizable interest in the property at issue. Indeed, the application for a variance asks

the applicant to identify his interest in the subject property. It would not make sense for the

BZA to grant a land zoning right to an entity that did not have a legally cognizable interest

in the property, so it is appropriate to permit them to argue that doing so would constitute an

arbitrary and capricious action.
I must also respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Krugers’ claim should

be dismissed simply because they did not include their street address in the petition. The

petition indicates that they reside in the Viar community and will be adversely affected by

the proposed shooting range. The proximity of the Krugers’ home to the shooting range, and

the amount by which they are adversely affected by it, are all factual issues for trial.

Dismissal of their petition because it does not include their street address is not consonant

with the standard for either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.

As to the remainder of the majority opinion, I concur in the result only reached by the

majority.

______________________________________

HOLLY M. KIRBY, JUDGE

-2-
Abatement Order filed May 14, 2019 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-18-00514-CR

____________

RUBEN NOEL ORNELAS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 212th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 16-CR-3172

ABATEMENT ORDER

Appellant is represented by appointed counsel on appeal, Winston E. 

Cochran. On April 30, 2019, attorney Greg Russel filed a motion to substitute as 

appellate counsel because appellant retained him for representation. Accordingly, 

we enter the following order. 

We ORDER the judge of the 212th District Court to consider Greg Russel’s 

request to substitute. The judge shall see that a record of any hearing is made, and 

shall order the trial clerk to forward a record of the hearing and a supplemental 

clerk’s record containing any orders permitting current counsel to withdraw and 
allowing Greg Russel to substitute. Those records shall be filed with the clerk of 

this court within 15 days of the date of this order.

The appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this court’s 

active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this court’s active docket when the 

trial court’s findings and recommendations are filed in this court. 

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, Hassan.
**Exhibit
      32.2**




**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. §1350**




Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and in connection with the annual report of Cytomedix, Inc.
      (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006, I, Andrew S.
      Maslan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to the
      best
      of my knowledge and belief:




1. The
      Company’s Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006, fully
      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
      information contained in the Company’s Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year ended
      December 31, 2006, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company for said period.




*/s/Andrew
      S. Maslan*


Andrew
      S.
      Maslan




Chief
      Financial Officer


Date:
      November 19, 2007




A
      signed
      original of this written statement has been provided to Cytomedix, Inc. and
      will
      be retained by Cytomedix, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
      Commission or its staff upon request.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 4, 2016

No. 04-16-00170-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.B.R. AND P.Y.R., CHILDREN,

From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009-CI-09297

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On June 20, 2016, the day Appellant’s brief was due, we suspended the appellate 

timetable to allow the parties to mediate. On July 22, 2016, after the parties could not agree on a 

date and time to mediate, we reinstated the appellate timetable and Appellant’s brief was due. 

To date, Appellant has not filed either (1) a motion for extension of time to file the brief or (2) 

the brief.

We ORDER Appellant to show cause in writing within TEN DAYS of the date of this 

order why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.8(a), 42.3(b), (c); Elizondo v. City of San Antonio, 975 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 1998, no pet.). Appellant’s written response must include a reasonable explanation for 

Appellant’s failure to timely file the brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a). 

If Appellant fails to show cause as ordered, this appeal may be dismissed without 

further notice. See id. R. 42.3(b), (c); Elizondo, 975 S.W.2d at 63.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 4th day of August, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### In the Matter of Arturo Hansen, Appellant, v Chandra Balkaran, Respondent.

[976 NYS2d 105]

In a custody and visitation proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Richardson-Mendelson, J.), dated June 14, 2012, as, after a hearing, denied that branch of his petition which was for liberal visitation with the subject child, granted the mother’s application to modify the parties’ judgment of divorce dated September 26, 2013, so as to award the father only supervised visitation with the subject child, and directed him to participate in individual mental health treatment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

In determining visitation rights, the most important factor to be considered is the best interests of the child *(see Jacobs v Young,*107 AD3d 896 [2013]; *Matter of Nicholas v Nicholas,*107 AD3d 899 [2013]; *see also Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 174 [1982]). A visitation order may be modified upon a showing *828that there has been a change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order such that modification is warranted to further the child’s best interests *(see Matter of Nicholas v Nicholas,*107 AD3d at 899; *Matter of Rambali v Rambali,*102 AD3d 797, 799 [2013]). The determination of visitation is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see Matter of Nicholas v Nicholas,*107 AD3d at 899-900; *Matter of Rambali v Rambali,*102 AD3d at 799).

Here, the Family Court’s determination that a change of circumstances had occurred, warranting modification of the visitation provisions of the judgment of divorce to the extent of requiring that the father’s visitation occur with supervision and on a limited schedule, has a sound and substantial basis in the record *(see Matter of Hall v Simmons,*108 AD3d 628 [2013]; *Matter of Smith v Roberts,*67 AD3d 688, 689 [2009]).

Contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court did not condition his ability to reapply for more liberal visitation on his participation in individual mental health treatment *(see Matter of Thompson v Yu-Thompson,*41 AD3d 487, 488 [2007]; *Zafran v Zafran,*306 AD2d 468, 469 [2003]). Mastro, J.E, Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
NO. 12-08-00240-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

J.D. TODD, JR., § APPEAL FROM THE 294TH

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE § VAN ZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant was convicted of the offense of indecency with a child. We have received the trial

court's certification showing that this is a plea bargain case and Appellant has no right to appeal. See

TEX.R. APP. P. 25.2(d). The certification is signed by Appellant and his counsel. Accordingly, the

appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Opinion delivered June 11, 2008.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
VapAria Corporation 10-Q


 


EXHIBIT 10.8


 





Donald J. Bores (“Lender”)


1792 Cranberry Isles Way


Apopka, FL 32712


 


Promissory Note of May 30, 2013 –



Agreement to Extend the Due Date beyond
the June 30, 2015 Extension to December 31, 2015





On this date of June 30, 2015, I, Donald J. Bores, Sr., the
“Lender”, agrees to extend the due date of the $50,000 promissory note entered into on May 30, 2013, then extended
to July 1, 2014, then to December 31, 2014 then to June 30, 2015 to December 31, 2015 under the same terms and conditions as originally
drafted.


Terms of Repayment: This Note, all principal and accrued
interest is now due and payable on or before December 31, 2015. In the event it is paid prior to the due date, the principal and
all accrued interest to the date will constitute payment in full.


Choice of Law: All terms and conditions of this Note
shall be interpreted under the laws of the state on Minnesota.


 


Signed and acknowledged by


 


 


	            /s/Donald J. Bores, Sr,	 


 


Lender


1792 Cranberry Isles Way


Apopka, FL 32712


 


 


June 30, 2015
Exhibit
31.1




CERTIFICATION





I, Philip
Verges, as the Chief Executive Officer of NewMarket Technology, Inc. (the
“Company”), certify that:




1. I have reviewed this annual report on
Form 10-K of the Company;





2. Based on my knowledge, this report does
not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;





3. Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;





4. I am responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))for the registrant and
have:





(a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;





(b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and





(c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and





5. I have disclosed, based on my most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a) All significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and





(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.


Date:
      April 7, 2008
            
            
            /s/
      Philip VergesPhilip
      VergesChief
      Executive Officer
##### 



FORM 6-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the month of September, 2004 Commission File Number: 00-30082 Envoy Communications Group Inc.  
  Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover Form
20-F or Form 40-F. Form 20-F þ Form 40-F o Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper as permitted by
Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(1): o Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper as permitted by
Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(7): o Indicate by check mark whether by furnishing the information contained in this Form, the registrant
is also thereby furnishing the information to the Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Yes o No þ If Yes is marked, indicate below the file number assigned to the registrant in connection with
Rule 12g3-2(b): 82 o




---



##### 



Signatures Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused
this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized. Envoy Communications Group Inc.(Registrant)By:/s/ Geoffrey B. GenoveseName: Geoffrey B. GenoveseTitle: President, Chairmanand Chief Executive Officer
 Dated: February 17, 2005




---



##### 



Exhibit Index Exhibit
    
    Description99.1
    
    Annual report for the year ended September 30, 2004
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TOSECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant to Section 1350,Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned, as principal executiveofficer and principal financial officer of Sirtris Pharmaceuticals, Inc.(the “Company”), does hereby certify that to the undersigned’s knowledge:

 

(1) the Company’s Form 10-K/A for theperiod ended December 31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) the information contained in the Company’sForm 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2007 fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

 

 
| /s/  CHRISTOPH  WESTPHAL                                      |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                                    |   |
| Christoph Westphal                                                      |   |
| *President  and Chief Executive Officer  (principal executive officer)* |   |
|                                                                    |   |
| Date: April 29, 2008                                               |   |
|                                                                    |   |
| /s/  GAREN  BOHLIN                                            |   |
|                                                                    |   |
| Garen Bohlin                                                            |   |
| *Chief  Operating Officer  (principal financial officer)*               |   |
|                                                                    |   |
| Date: April 29,  2008                                              |   |

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Annual Report of MINHAS  ENERGY  CONSULTANTS,  INC. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-KSB for the period ended  December 31, 2007 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Ravinder Minhas, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                       /s/ Ravinder Minhas
                                       --------------------------------
Date: March 24, 2008                   Ravinder Minhas
                                       Chief Financial Officer
1 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont 

_________________ 

NO. 09-18-00126-CV 

_________________ 

IN RE LONNIE KADE WELSH 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Original Proceeding 

435th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas 

 Trial Cause No. 15-01-00659-CV 

________________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 In a mandamus petition, Lonnie Kade Welsh raises two unrelated complaints. 

First, he complains that the trial court failed to grant his January 30, 2017, request 

for an order regarding the handling of his communications with his appellate counsel 

by the Texas Civil Commitment Office. This complaint appears to concern a pro se 

filing made in a case in which Welsh is represented by counsel. See generally In re 

Commitment of Welsh, No. 09-15-00498-CV, 2016 WL 4483165, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Aug. 25, 2016, pet. denied). A trial court is free to disregard any pro se 

motions presented by a party represented by counsel. Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 
2 

919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also In re Commitment of Adams, 408 S.W.3d 

906, 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.). 

 Second, Welsh argues that as a result of changes to Chapter 841 effective after 

the date of his commitment, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a biennial 

review of his civil commitment. The 2015 amendments to Chapter 841 left 

unchanged section 841.082(d), which provides that the committing court retains 

jurisdiction of the biennial review of the case. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

§ 841.082(d) (West Supp. 2017) (“The committing court retains jurisdiction of the 

case with respect to a proceeding conducted under this subchapter, other than a 

criminal proceeding involving an offense under Section 841.085, or to a civil 

commitment proceeding conducted under Subchapters F and G.”). 

Welsh has not demonstrated that he is entitled to mandamus relief. The 

petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. 

PETITION DENIED. 

 

 PER CURIAM 

Submitted on April 18, 2018 

Opinion Delivered April 19, 2018 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Lamont Walker, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[972 NYS2d 140]—

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Cayuga County [Mark H. Fandrich, A.J.], entered February 8, 2013) to review a determination of respondent. The determination found after a tier III hearing that petitioner had violated various inmate rules.

It is hereby ordered that the determination is unanimously confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed. Present — Smith, J.P, Garni, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

TESORO PROPERTY OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC.,

a Florida not-for-profit corporation,

Appellant,

v.

TESORO COMMONS, LLC, 

a Florida Limited Liability Company,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-3006 

[February 14, 2018]

Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth 

Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Robert E. Belanger, Judge; L.T. Case 

No. 562017CA001292.

Albert B. Moore, Fort Pierce, for appellant. 

Owen Schultz of McCarthy, Summers, Bobko, Wood, Norman, Bass & 

Melby, P.A., Stuart, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Tesoro Property Owner’s Association, Inc. appeals an order granting a 

temporary injunction in favor of Tesoro Commons, LLC (“the property 

owner”). Because the trial court failed to make sufficient factual findings 

to support the injunction, we reverse.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) mandates that “[e]very 

injunction shall specify the reasons for entry.” This Court has held that 

strict compliance with rule 1.610(c) is required. Eldon v. Perrin, 78 So. 3d 

737, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Before granting a temporary injunction, 

the trial court must make clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient 

factual findings showing that (1) the movant will suffer irreparable harm 

unless the injunction is entered; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; 

(3) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will succeed on the 

merits; and (4) entry of a temporary injunction will serve the public 

interest. Am. Learning Sys., Inc. v. Gomes, 199 So. 3d 1076, 1082 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2016); Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v. Yacucci, 
2

162 So. 3d 68, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Eldon, 78 So. 3d at 738. Failure 

to make specific findings as to each of these four elements is reversible 

error. Wade v. Brown, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Here, the property owner concedes that neither the oral ruling nor the 

written order contains sufficient findings to support entry of a temporary 

injunction. The trial court failed to make any findings that the property 

owner will suffer irreparable harm unless an injunction is entered, that 

the property owner does not have an adequate remedy at law, or that the 

entry of an injunction will serve the public interest.

Accordingly, we reverse the temporary injunction and remand for 

further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

GERBER, C.J., CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.