alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                              OF SWISS MEDICA, INC.
                           PURSUANT TO 18 USC ss. 1350

Pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002  (subsection (a) and
(b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) the undersigned
officer of Swiss  Medica,  Inc. (the  "Company")  does hereby  certify,  to such
officer's knowledge, that:

            (c)   The quarterly report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June
                  30, 2005 of the Company fully complies with the requirements
                  of section 13(a) or 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
                  1934; and

            (d)   Information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


Dated:  August 13, 2005


-------------------------
Bruce Fairbairn,
Chief Financial Officer
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ORMANDO WESBY

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 552

[ August 20, 2020 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Mariya Weekes , Judge;

L.T. Case No. 13

- 01581 CF10A

.

Ormando Wesby, Milton, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

W ARNER

, G ROSS and C ONNER

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
                TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ultrak, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Chris Sharng, Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(a)  This Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(b)  The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Chris Sharng
---------------------------
Chris Sharng
Chief Financial Officer
November 19, 2002
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant as of
the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.
  By:
    
    /s/ Philip Cook

Philip Cook
    
    
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Thomas F. Darden

Thomas F. DardenSenior Vice President  Chief Financial Officer
    
    
    
    
    
    President and Chief Executive Officer
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK SUPANICH, a single man

individually and as guardian for S.S., a

minor child,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

KEVIN RUNDLE,

 Defendant,

 and

SANDY PEDIGO, a single woman; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-36186

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05008-RBL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 26, 2012** 

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

FILED

JUL 17 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-36186

Mark Supanich appeals pro se from the district court’s orders dismissing his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to violate his

constitutional rights in state child custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.

2003); Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.

2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Nw. Envtl. Def.

Ctr. v. Brown, 617 F.3d 1176, 1192 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The claims against Nelson and Rundle were properly dismissed, because

Supanich has not identified any deprivation of constitutional rights he suffered due

to Nelson and Rundle’s alleged conspiracy. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (the dismissal of a complaint may be based upon

the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under

a cognizable legal theory); see also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th

Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (dissatisfaction with legal proceedings and conclusory

allegations that attorneys, judges, and others conspired against plaintiff in those

proceedings are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983).

Summary judgment as to the claims against Kay and Pedigo was proper

because Supanich failed to introduce evidence showing there is a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether they conspired to violate his constitutional rights.
3 10-36186

See Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1983) (to survive summary

judgment on a conspiracy claim, plaintiff must show evidence of a connection or

agreement between defendants).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by resolving Pedigo and Kay’s

motions for summary judgment before the discovery period had closed, because

Supanich has not explained below or on appeal what facts he would have

discovered with additional time, nor how the information sought would preclude

summary judgment. See Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“The burden is on the nonmoving party . . . to show what material facts would be

discovered that would preclude summary judgment.”).

AFFIRMED.
#### ARMENTROUT ROEBUCK MATHENY CONSULTING GROUP, P.C., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. JACKSON COUNTY WATER AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, a Georgia Public Utility Authority, Prime Engineering Incorporated, a Georgia Corporation, Defendants-Counter-Claimant-Appellees.

No. 07-12222.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 19, 2007.

William A. Capp, Merchant & Gould, PC, Atlanta, GA, Christopher Thomas Anderson, Timmons, Warnes & Anderson, Athens, GA, for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant.

Steven Salcedo, W. Seaborn Jones, Owen, Gleaton, Jones *&*Sweeney, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Counter-Claimant-Appellees.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON, Circuit Judge, and MARTINEZ,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Armentrout Roebuck Matheny Consulting Group, P.C., (“Armentrout”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson County Water and Sewerage Authority and Prime Engineering, Inc. (together, the “Defendants”). Finding that Armentrout granted the Defendants an implied license to use its copyrighted materials, the district court granted summary judgment for the Authority and Prime. We vacate and remand.

We review a district *court’s grant of*summary judgment *de novo,*“applying the same legal standards that bound the district court, and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Cruz v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc.,*428 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Upon careful consideration and after the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that a reasonable jury, weighing the factors discussed in *Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC,*284 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir.2002), could find that Armentrout did not grant the Defendants an implied license to use its copyrighted materials.1 Therefore, as a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and remand this *175case to the district court for trial on the merits.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

1

. For instance, the following facts lend support to the finding that Armentrout *did not*intend to grant an implied license: (1) the parties were involved in an ongoing relationship, (2) the contract restricted Jackson County’s ability to transfer all rights under the agreement without Armentrout's written consent, and (3) Armentrout placed copyright notices on its materials.
<PAGE>


                            SUPERIOR GALLERIES, INC.

                        2003 Annual Report on Form 10-KSB

                                  EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report of Superior Galleries, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Silvano DiGenova, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


                                    /S/ SILVANO DIGENOVA
                                    -----------------------------------------
                                    Silvano DiGenova, Chief Executive Officer
                                    September 12, 2003



         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

         This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
are not to be incorporated by reference into the Report or any other filing of
the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any
general incorporation language in such filing.
#### Sdhari Cason-Payano, Respondent, v Thomas G. Damiano et al., Respondents, and G.S. D’Antona Landscaping, Inc., Appellant.

[871 NYS2d 110]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes, J.), entered on or about April 9, 2008, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained in a slip and fall on ice in a parking lot, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant-appellant’s snow removal contractor’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted and the complaint dismissed as against the contractor. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant G.S. D’Antona Landscaping, Inc. dismissing the complaint as against it.

*473Plaintiffs theory is that the contractor negligently created or exacerbated a snow-related hazard by piling snow on the sides of the parking lot, rather than removing it, thereby permitting it to melt, trickle into the depressed, uneven area of the lot, and freeze. We reject that theory because it is not supported by the contract or the testimony. While the contractor’s contract with defendant property owners obligated the contractor to initiate snow plowing and sanding/salting in the event of “a minimum accumulation of one inch of snow” and to apply sand/salt in the event of “hazardous icy weather conditions” without snow, it expressly relieved the contractor of responsibility “for the uneven pavement areas that continuously retain water/ice” and did not obligate the contractor to inspect the uneven area of the lot to see if melting and refreezing snow were creating a hazardous condition. Given the parameters of the contract, combined with the testimony that the last snowfall was three or four days prior to the accident, no icy weather conditions existed on the day of the accident, and there was no snow piled up in the lot, only patchy areas on the sides of the lot near the stores, it is speculation to assert that the ice on which plaintiff slipped was formed by snow or ice that the contractor negligently piled up or failed to remove. “By merely plowing the snow, [the contractor] cannot be said to have created or exacerbated a dangerous condition” *(Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs.,*98 NY2d 136, 142 [2002]). Concur—Andrias, J.P., Nardelli, Moskowitz, Renwick and Freedman, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7669

RANDALL E. WHITE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

THOMAS MCBRIDE, Warden, Mount Olive

Correctional Complex,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior

District Judge. (CA-02-103-2)

Submitted: May 18, 2005 Decided: June 10, 2005

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randall E. White, Appellant Pro Se. Dawn Ellen Warfield, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Randall E. White seeks to appeal the district court’s

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)

because the petition was untimely as to one group of convictions,

and because White failed to comply with an order of the magistrate

judge regarding his remaining convictions. The order is not

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude that White has not made the

requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
#### Hudson Insurance Company et al., Respondents, v M.J. Oppenheim, Appellant.

[827 NYS2d 16]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J.), entered May 11, 2006, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or on the ground of forum non conveniens, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Defendant, served with process as the representative of an insurer syndicate that subscribed to a fidelity bond that is part of a comprehensive insurance policy, is subject to jurisdiction in New York as a result of his principals having insured the loss of a New York resident (CFLR 302 [a] [1]), namely, plaintiff Hudson, a subsidiary of plaintiff Fairfax. Although the policy was purchased by Fairfax, a Canadian corporation, it defines “Assured” to include Fairfax’s subsidiaries. Due process is not offended since the bond applies to losses “anywhere in the world,” so the insurers should have reasonably expected to defend an action in New York. There being jurisdiction under CFLR 302 (a) (1), it is immaterial whether there is also jurisdiction under CFLR 301 or CFLR 302 (a) (2) and (3); whether defendant represents all of the subscribing insurers, an issue, we note, that defendant improperly raised for the first time in his reply *(see Schulte Roth & Zabel, LLP v Kassover,*28 AD3d 404 [2006]); whether the permissive service of suit clause, allowing service on defendant in Canada, is void as against public policy, an issue, we note, that defendant improperly raised for the first time on appeal *(see Recovery Consultants v Shih-Hsieh,*141 AD2d 272, 276 [1988]); and what effect, if any, such clause has on jurisdiction, although we do note that the clause purports merely to provide a method for due process notice, and not a basis for jurisdiction *(see Keane v Kamin,*94 NY2d 263, 265 [1999]).

Defendant fails to carry his “heavy” burden of challenging *169plaintiffs’ selection of forum *(see Bank Hapoalim [Switzerland] Ltd. v Banca Intesa S.p.A.,*26 AD3d 286, 287 [2006]; *Sweeney v Hertz Corp.,*250 AD2d 385, 386 [1998] [plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed absent a balancing of factors “strongly favoring” defendant]). There is a sufficient nexus with this jurisdiction, namely, a loss suffered by Hudson. There is no claim of hardship to either witnesses or to defendant, plaintiffs aptly questioning how it would be more convenient for London entities to litigate in Canada, and the motion court aptly questioning the fairness of expressly insuring plaintiffs’ interests “all over the world” while at the same time attempting to restrict litigation to a Canadian forum without an effective forum selection clause. There is no undue burden on our courts, which routinely adjudicate commercial disputes of this nature *(see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v Multimark’s Intl.,*265 AD2d 109, 112 [2000]). Under the circumstances, the availability of a forum in Canada is of no consequence. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Sullivan, Williams and Gonzalez, JJ.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2501 

To repeal Public Law 107–40. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 6, 2023 

Ms. LEE of California introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To repeal Public Law 107–40. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sunset for the 2001 

5 Authorization for Use of Military Force Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDING. 

7 Congress finds that the Authorization for Use of Mili8 tary Force (Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), 

9 signed into law on September 18, 2001, has been used 

10 to justify a broad and open-ended authorization for the 

11 use of military force and such an interpretation is incon12 sistent with the authority of Congress to declare war and 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2501 IH

1 make all laws for executing powers vested by the Constitu2 tion in the Government of the United States. 

3 SEC. 3. REPEAL OF PUBLIC LAW 107–40. 

4 Effective 240 days after the date of the enactment 

5 of this Act, the Authorization for Use of Military Force 

6 (Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is hereby re7 pealed. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00584-CR

IN RE David KARA

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 30, 2013

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

Relator David Kara filed this pro se petition for writ of mandamus on August 26, 2013, 

complaining of the trial court’s order releasing relator on personal bond rather than dismissing the 

prosecution after granting relator’s application for writ of habeas corpus. Relator has been 

appointed trial counsel to represent him in connection with the criminal charges pending against 

him. We conclude that any original proceeding on the issue raised should be presented by relator’s 

trial counsel. Relator is not entitled to hybrid representation. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 

498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The absence of a right to hybrid representation means relator’s pro 

se mandamus petition will be treated as presenting nothing for this court’s review. See id.; see also 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 172064, styled The State of Texas v. David Kara, pending in the 187th 

Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Raymond Angelini presiding.

 
04-13-00584-CR

Gray v. Shipley, 877 S.W.2d 806, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding). 

Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). 

Additionally, relator requested leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus. No leave is 

required to file a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. TEX.R. APP. P. 52. Therefore, relator’s 

motion for leave to file is denied as moot. 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2 -
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 5 (Thursday, January 8, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 1055]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00161]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meeting

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of the 
Government in the Sunshine Act, Public Law 94-409, that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission will hold a Closed Meeting on Thursday, January 
8, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.
    Commissioners, Counsel to the Commissioners, the Secretary to the 
Commission, and recording secretaries will attend the Closed Meeting. 
Certain staff members who have an interest in the matters also may be 
present.
    The General Counsel of the Commission, or her designee, has 
certified that, in her opinion, one or more of the exemptions set forth 
in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3), (5), (7), 9(B) and (10) and 17 CFR 
200.402(a)(3), (5), (7), 9(ii) and (10), permit consideration of the 
scheduled matter at the Closed Meeting.
    Commissioner Gallagher, as duty officer, voted to consider the 
items listed for the Closed Meeting in closed session, and determined 
that no earlier notice thereof was possible.
    The subject matter of the Closed Meeting will be:
    Institution and settlement of injunctive actions;
    Institution and settlement of administrative proceedings;
    Adjudicatory matter; and
    Other matters relating to enforcement proceedings.
    At times, changes in Commission priorities require alterations in 
the scheduling of meeting items.
    For further information and to ascertain what, if any, matters have 
been added, deleted or postponed, please contact the Office of the 
Secretary at (202) 551-5400.

    Dated: January 5, 2015.
Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-00161 Filed 1-6-15; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P