FILED

June 2, 1999

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

APRIL SESSION, 1999

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9806-CC-00266

)

Appellee, )

)

) WILLIAMSON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. TIMOTHY EASTER

PERRY SALEEM LEE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. ) (Aggravated Assault)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

PERRY SALEEM LEE PAUL G. SUMMERS

Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter

SCCF/CCA

P.O. Box 279 KIM R. HELPER

Clifton, TN 38425 Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

JOSEPH BAUGH

District Attorney General

P.O. Box 937

Franklin, TN 37065-0937

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
 1 We address the issues in a different order than that presented in the Defendant’s brief.

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OPINION

The Defendant, Perry Saleem Lee, was indicted on two counts of

aggravated assault. Following a jury trial in April 1998, he was found guilty of one

count of simple assault against victim Charles Steele and one count of

aggravated assault against victim Kenneth Lockridge. The Defendant now

appeals his convictions pro se, pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

The Defendant presents eight issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence

presented at trial was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial

court erred by denying his motion for a new trial; (3) whether the victims’ in-court

identifications of him violated his right to a fair trial; (4) whether the trial court

erred by proceeding with the trial despite the Defendant’s reservations about his

trial counsel’s familiarity with the case; (5) whether he received ineffective

assistance of counsel; (6) whether the prosecutor made improper statements

during closing arguments; (7) whether the reasonable doubt instruction was

infirm; and (8) whether he was improperly denied records from his trial to perfect

his appeal. 1

All events underlying the Defendant’s present convictions occurred in the

early morning hours of August 29, 1997. Aside from officers involved in the

Defendant’s arrest, the only witnesses to testify at trial were the two victims and

the Defendant. The Defendant and the victims differed in their versions of what

transpired on the night of the crimes.
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Charles Steele, the first victim, testified that he had known the Defendant

since childhood. He stated that on August 29, 1997, around two or three o’clock

a.m., he was “just hanging out . . . sipping a few beers” on Natchez Street. He

reported that at the time, he was standing with a group of people in front of the

house next to the Defendant’s home; part of the group had moved into the

driveway between the two houses. Steele testified that while he was standing on

the sidewalk, the Defendant em erged from his home, asked everyone to leave

the premises, and then said, “Carry your ass back to Hard Bargain” or “Carry that

s__t on back to Hard Bargain.” Steele assumed that the Defendant was

addressing him because he was the only member of the group who lived at Hard

Bargain. Steele testified, “Seemed like I told him . . . there wasn’t no sense in all

this or I was going, I was leaving, or something to that effect . . . .” According to

Steele, while they were talking, the Defendant pulled a machete or a knife, which

Steele described as two and a half feet to three feet long and three to four inches

wide, from either the leg of his pants or a scabbard at his side and began to

swing it. Steele testified that he backed away from the Defendant for about thirty

feet while the Defendant swung the knife at him, then stumbled and fell. Steele

maintained that while on the ground, he raised his hand up in self-defense as the

Defendant continued swinging the knife, and the knife cut his hand. Steele

recalled that after he was cut, it “seemed like [the Defendant] swung at me again,

and I heard the blade hit the ground, and I jumped up and ran . . . toward my car.”

Steele testified that he drove himself to the emergency room of a nearby

hospital, stopping along the way at a gas station to get a towel to clean his bloody

hand. He stated that while at the hospital, he identified the Defendant as his

attacker to police. He further testified that he required several stitches between
 2 Because there is no written transcript of the trial, but rather a videotape record, the

spelling of Vicky Howell’s name may be incorrect.

 3 Lockridge denied ever wearing any type of police wire.

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his first finger and thumb and that his middle finger was cut to the bone, requiring

surgery. He stated that he now has limited use of his middle finger. 

 On cross-examination, Steele admitted to having been previously charged

with the sale of cocaine. He also reported that he may have smoked crack

cocaine on the evening of August 28, 1997, during the time immediately prior to

his confrontation with the Defendant. However, he denied smoking crack cocaine

at or near the Defendant’s residence that night. He also denied having any drug

paraphernalia in his hand at the time of his confrontation with the Defendant, and

he testified that he did not notice anyone else on Natchez Street engaging in drug

use at that time. Furtherm ore, he admitted that after this incident, he told an

acquaintance, Vicky Howell, 2 that he had cut his hand cleaning a turtle, but he

explained that he had lied to Howell because he did not believe it was her

business to know how he had been injured.

Kenneth Lockridge, the second victim, encountered the Defendant, whom

he had known “all his life” and whom he helped raise, shortly after Steele

departed for the hospital. Lockridge testified that he and his girlfriend were

walking down Natchez Street in the early morning hours of August 29, 1997 when

he saw the Defendant across the street. Lockridge testified that he said to the

Defendant, “What’s up, my nigger?” which he “considered . . . being friendly.” He

testified that the Defendant responded, “Hey, fat m____r-f____r, you got your

[police] wire on?”3

 According to Lockridge, the Defendant then crossed the street
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and hit him. Lockridge stated that he said, “Man, go on” and “tried to walk away.”

However, as Lockridge continued walking, the Defendant followed him, hitting

him numerous times about the face and head until Lockridge fell down, hoping

that the attack would cease. Lockridge testified that while he was on the ground,

the Defendant “put [the gun] upside [his] head,” and he feared that the Defendant

might fire the gun. He recalled that at this point, the Defendant’s girlfriend

pleaded for the Defendant to stop, and the Defendant ended the attack.

Lockridge then went to the hospital, where he identified the Defendant as his

attacker. An officer who saw Lockridge at the hospital stated that his nose was

swollen, his mouth was bleeding, and that there was blood on his clothes. 

The Defendant presented a different account of the events underlying his

convictions. He testified that he arrived home around midnight on August 28,

1997 and found a number of people standing in front of his house and in the

driveway next to his home. This disturbed him, he testified, because of the high

incidence of drug use at night on his street. He claimed to have previously put

up “No Loitering,” “No Trespassing,” and “No Parking” signs on his property in an

attempt to protect his children from the drug users in the neighborhood. 

The Defendant testified that on August 28, he parked his car and went

inside for a while before going back outside to the sidewalk to confront the group

of people standing in front of his home. He recounted that he approached the

group and asked them to leave, and some of them began to depart. He stated

that Charles Steele, however, whom he claimed held a “straightshooter,” drug

paraphernalia used for smoking crack cocaine, did not move but instead started

to light the straightshooter. According to the Defendant, he started toward
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Steele, again asking him to leave, and Steele fell down. He then turned back

toward his house, and when he looked back, Steele was gone. The Defendant

denied carrying any type of weapon during this confrontation and stated that he

did not even own a knife matching that described by Steele. 

The Defendant testified that he went back inside his house, told his

girlfriend what had happened, and warned her that he was going back onto the

porch. He stated that he had once been threatened with a “drive-by” shooting by

some teenagers, and he feared that the people who had been standing outside

of his house that evening might return. While on the porch, he saw Lockridge

walking down the street. He stated that while walking toward the Defendant’s

home, Lockridge asked him, “Where’s it at?” He stated that he interpreted this

to mean that Lockridge was looking for drugs. The Defendant reported that when

he told Lockridge to “[g]o on,” Lockridge reached into the bib of his overalls as he

continued to walk toward the Defendant. The Defendant then hit Lockridge, and

he stated that Lockridge “might have swung back.” The Defendant testified, “I put

a left-right on him. Then I hit him with a left. Then I put another left on him.

Then he fell, and I kicked him in the face.” He described the incident as “a fight”

and claimed that Lockridge would not admit it was a mutual confrontation only

“because he got whooped.” He claimed that he was unarmed during the

altercation and that he feared Lockridge might be armed, saying “Late at night

ain’t no telling what a junkie got.” He also admitted that although he had put up

signs on his property, he never reported to police any of the drug-related

incidents in his neighborhood. He explained that he could not do so because he

did not have a phone.
 4 The spelling of Officer Neal’s name has been approximated.

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Both Steele and Lockridge were treated for their injuries at the Williamson

County Medical Center. According to the testimony of police officers who

investigated this incident, Steele and Lockridge each reported essentially the

same version of events at the hospital on August 29 as they later presented in

court. Based on information provided by the two victims at the hospital, Officer

David Neal4 went to the Defendant’s home to investigate. Neal testified that

when he arrived, the Defendant refused to communicate his name or date of

birth. Neal therefore transported the Defendant to the hospital, where Lockridge

identified him. Neal testified that while he was inside the Defendant’s home, he

did not notice any weapons. In addition, no weapons were found during a

subsequent search of the Defendant’s home and vehicle.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The Defendant first contends that the evidence presented at trial is

insufficient to support the jury’s findings of guilt. He argues that it “should be

abundantly clear that had the Defendant intented [sic] to cause serious bodily

injury to either of the victims, it would appear that he was surely coupled with the

ability to do so, if such had been his intent. Yet the State’s case in chief, clearly

shows that the Defendant was the person whom [sic] received serious injuries,

as a result of the alleged criminal episode.” He argues that there was no

corroboration of the victims’ claims of injury and maintains that “the State should

have put forth evidence of the injuries received” beyond testimony offered by the

victims. He also points out the fact that no weapons were found in his

possession. Furthermore, he claims that the only evidence “tending to connect
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the Defendant to this crime is that it was alleged to had [sic] occurred in front of

the Defendant’s home.”

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that “[f]indings

of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the

evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In addition, because conviction by

a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption

of guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the

evidence was insufficient. McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963);

see also State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v.

Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1976), and State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329,

331 (Tenn. 1977)); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Holt v.

State, 357 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tenn. 1962).

In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State “the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may be drawn therefrom .” Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914 (citing

State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)). The court may not “reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence” in the record below. Evans, 838 S.W.2d at

191 (citing Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 836). Likewise, should the reviewing court

find particular conflicts in the trial testimony, the court must resolve them in favor

of the jury verdict or trial court judgment. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914.

We find that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the

Defendant’s convictions. The two victims in this case testified that they had each
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been involved in a confrontation with the Defendant during which the Defendant

wielded a weapon. Each claimed that the Defendant’s aggression was

essentially unprovoked and unreciprocated. Moreover, each victim claimed to

have been injured by the Defendant, and both were treated for their injuries at the

hospital. Testim ony by the Defendant to the contrary presents a classic question

of fact for consideration by the jury. Upon review of the testimony presented at

trial, the jury evidently credited the victims’ accounts of their confrontations with

the Defendant. We will not disturb this conclusion on appeal. Instead, we

resolve the conflicts in trial testimony in favor of the jury verdict, see id., and

conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the

verdict. 

II. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion

for new trial. The State responds that because the motion was premature, it is

a nullity and therefore must be denied. The Defendant also alleges that the trial

judge told him that “the law does not apply in his court room [sic].” Apparently,

he argues that the trial judge maliciously denied his motion for new trial “to

prevent the Defendant from establishing a showing of Judicial Misconduct.”

The jury announced the verdict in this case on April 3, 1998, and the

Defendant filed his motion for new trial on April 21, 1998. The sentencing order

was later filed on May 29, 1998. The trial court denied the motion as premature

but informed the Defendant that the proper time for filing the motion was within

thirty days of sentencing. In his brief, the Defendant claims to have filed a
 5 In arguing that his motion for new trial was improperly denied, the Defendant cites an

older version of the rule, which states that the motion should be filed within thirty days of the

verdict. The rule was amended in 1985 to conform to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-

401. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b) advisory commission comments. 

-10-

second motion for new trial “on or around” May 28,1998, but the record does not

contain a copy of a second motion.

Rule 33(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure controls the time for filing a

motion for new trial. Rule 33(b) states, in pertinent part, “A motion for a new trial

shall be made in writing, or if made orally in open court shall be reduced to

writing, within thirty days of the date the order of sentence is entered.” Id.5

 We

believe that one of the reasons for this rule is that a defendant should not be

required to decide whether to pursue a new trial until such time as the disposition

of the case is known. Only after the sentence is imposed may the Defendant fully

evaluate whether it would be appropriate or beneficial to seek a new trial. 

Here, the Defendant did not file his motion within the technical limits of

Rule 33(b). However, we find no prejudice to the State from the premature filing

of the motion, nor any reason to conclude that the issues raised in the motion for

new trial should not be considered on appeal. We will therefore address the

issue raised in the Defendant’s motion for new trial which he now argues on

appeal.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this trial and find absolutely no

evidence supporting any of the Defendant’s allegations of judicial misconduct.

We are unable to find any comment made by the trial judge that “the law does not

apply in his court room [sic],” either during an in-chamber discussion, when the
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Defendant alleges the comment was made, or during the trial itself. We conclude

that the Defendant’s accusations of judicial misconduct are entirely without merit.

III. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS 

The Defendant argues that the in-court identifications made of him by the

victims were tainted because of suggestive pretrial identification procedures,

including the failure of police to conduct a pretrial lineup. The Defendant has

failed to include this issue in his motion for new trial. Therefore, this issue has

been waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); see State v. Clinton, 754 S.W.2d 100, 103

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

IV. SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

The Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in proceeding to trial

despite his reservations about his counsel’s familiarity with his case, and he

complains that his counsel failed to file two pretrial motions which he requested.

The Defendant failed to include this issue in his motion for new trial. Therefore,

this issue has been waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); see State v. Clinton, 754

S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The sole issue raised by the Defendant in his motion for new trial which he

also argues on appeal concerns ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends

that his representation at trial was deficient, citing a plethora of alleged errors by

his trial counsel, David King, which includes Mr. King’s: (1) failure to properly

investigate the case, including the “validity of the identification procedures used

to identify the Defendant” and “the testimony by Ms. Howell”; (2) failure to request
-12-

a continuance for further preparation because of his late involvement in the case;

(3) failure to spend any time with the Defendant in preparation for the case; (4)

failure to object to an alleged improper statement made by the trial judge or to

move the court for a change of venue following the alleged statement; (5) failure

to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses; (6) failure to bring “to the

attention of the jurors” the victims’ prior criminal records; and (7) failure to reveal

to the jury that the Defendant received a “severe wound” to his hand which he

maintains was caused by the victims. 

In determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the

court must decide whether counsel’s performance was “within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523

S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To succeed on a claim that his counsel was

ineffective at trial, a petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made

errors so serious that the attorney was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed

under the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient representation prejudiced the

petitioner, resulting in a failure to produce a reliable result. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W.2d 744, 747

(Tenn. 1993); Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). To satisfy the

second prong, the petitioner m ust show a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unreasonable error, the fact finder would have had reasonable doubt

regarding petitioner’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This reasonable

probability must be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Harris

v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
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When reviewing trial counsel’s actions, this Court should not use the

benefit of hindsight to second-guess trial strategy and criticize counsel’s tactics.

Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). Counsel’s alleged errors should

be judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746.

The Defendant first argues that his counsel failed to adequately investigate

his case, including the “validity of the identification procedures used to identify the

Defendant.” During an in-chambers discussion prior to the start of the trial, the

Defendant complained that King failed to file a motion, which he had requested,

to suppress identifications made of him by the victims. After further discussion,

during which King explained that he believed he and the Defendant had reached

an agreem ent not to file the motion, the trial judge dismissed the matter, agreeing

with King that the motion did not have merit. Evidently, the Defendant now

argues that had his attorney adequately investigated his case, he would have

determined that the pretrial identification procedures were suggestive and that

they therefore irreparably tainted the identifications of the Defendant made in

court by the victims. 

Suggestive pretrial identification procedures are prohibited to avoid the

“primary evil . . . [of] a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification”

of a defendant by a witness in court. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)

(citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). 

[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of

misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the

criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the
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accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of

certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the

length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200. The central question is whether under a “totality of

the circumstances,” the identification was reliable, even though the procedure

may have been suggestive. Id. at 199. 

Although one-person showups have generally been criticized and

condemned as being overly suggestive, we do not find that the showup

conducted in this case irreparably tainted the victims’ in-court identifications of

the Defendant. Both victims unequivocally identified the Defendant as their

assailant to police on the night of the crimes, even going so far as to name the

street where he lived. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, both victims

testified that they had known the Defendant since childhood. Under these

circumstances, we cannot agree that the showup conducted on the night of the

crimes caused “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” of the

Defendant at trial. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. Thus, we find no error on the part

of Mr. King in not “investigating” the matter further or in failing to file a motion to

suppress the identifications.

The Defendant also contends that had King fully investigated his case, he

would have discovered the testimony of Ms. Howell. Again, this is a matter that

was addressed during the in-chambers discussion prior to the start of the trial.

During the meeting, King stated on the record that Vicky Howell had been

subpoenaed as a witness but failed to show up on the morning of trial. King

stated that Howell had testified at the preliminary hearing that Charles Steele told

her shortly after the crime he had cut his hand on a knife while cleaning a turtle.
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King offered to seek a continuance of the case until such time as Howell could

be procured as a witness, but the Defendant elected to proceed to trial without

Howell’s testimony. Moreover, Steele admitted at trial that he told Ms. Howell

that he received his injury while cleaning a turtle. For these reasons, the

Defendant’s allegation that his counsel failed to “investigate” Ms. Howell’s

testimony is meritless. Furthermore, we find no other evidence that Mr. King

failed to adequately investigate the Defendant’s case.

We find that the Defendant’s second and third claims of error are also

without merit. Much of the Defendant’s dissatisfaction with King’s representation

evidently stems from the fact that he claims to have hired Kent Brisby, a member

of the firm in which King practiced. The Defendant complains that he was not

made aware that King would be handling his trial until “during the date of the

trial.” He contends that King should have requested a continuance to further

investigate the case, and he claims that King spent “absolutely NO time” with him

to prepare for the case. 

 During the in-chambers discussion before trial, the trial judge entertained

discussion concerning the adequacy of the Defendant’s representation. King

stated that he had discussed the case with Brisby and that Brisby believed King

was in a better position to try the case. He also stated that he had spoken with

the Defendant for two hours the night before the trial, during which time they had

discussed the two motions requested by the Defendant. King maintained that he

believed they were “clear on” the motions and ready “to go to war together.” The

Defendant did not deny the truth of these statements. Moreover, the Defendant

admits in his brief that King was present during at least one meeting with Brisby
-16-

to discuss the case. During the in-chambers meeting, the Defendant agreed that

he did not want to continue the case, despite King’s suggestion that he be

allowed to find other representation if necessary. The trial judge concluded that

in his experience, King was a competent attorney and suggested that they move

forward with the trial. In light of these discussions, we find the Defendant’s

second and third allegations of error to be meritless.

The Defendant next contends that his attorney’s representation was

inadequate because his counsel failed to object to an improper comment made

by the trial judge, “the law does not apply in [this] court room [sic],” or request a

change of venue following the comment. We have addressed the issue of judicial

misconduct above and conclude that because we find no such improper

comment in the record, Mr. King did not err by failing to request a change of

venue.

The Defendant’s fifth and sixth contentions of error concern the crossexaminations of the victims. Despite the Defendant’s assertions to the contrary,

King cross-examined both victims about their personal and criminal histories. W e

find no deficiency on the part of Mr. King with regard to the cross-examination of

witnesses.

Finally, the Defendant argues that his counsel failed to reveal the fact that

he received a “serious wound” to his hand which was caused by the victims on

the night of the crimes. However, the Defendant made no mention of any such

wound during his testimony, nor can we find any other reference to the wound in

the record. Had the Defendant wished to reveal this fact, he could have done so
-17-

himself when he took the stand to present his version of the events on August 29,

1997.

Although we find no error on the part of Mr. King, we are convinced that

any error which may have been made did not prejudice the Defendant. We

cannot agree that had Mr. King proceeded differently, the jury would have had

reasonable doubt regarding the Defendant’s guilt. The Defendant points to no

further evidence to support such a finding and has shown no prejudice resulting

from the errors that he alleges King made. This issue is therefore without merit.

VI. IMPROPER STATEMENTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS

The Defendant argues that the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial

remarks during his closing argument. However, the record does not contain a

transcript of closing arguments. The appellant bears the burden of preparing a

complete record on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). In addition, the Defendant

failed to include this issue in his motion for new trial. Therefore, this issue has

been waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); see State v. Clinton, 754 S.W.2d 100, 103

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

VII. JURY INSTRUCTION

The Defendant contends that the jury instruction on “reasonable doubt”

was constitutionally infirm, and he also complains that the trial court failed to read

the instructions aloud to the jury, merely handing them a copy instead. Again, the

Defendant has failed to include this issue in his motion for new trial. Therefore,
 6 The order granting the Defendant’s motion for transcripts and records and appointing an

attorney, which is dated one day after the technical record was filed with this Court, is not

included in the technical record. However, the Defendant has attached a copy of the order

to his brief.

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this issue has been waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); see State v. Clinton, 754

S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

VIII. ACCESS TO RECORD FOR APPEAL

The Defendant complains that he was denied access to trial transcripts and

other records necessary to perfect his appeal. As the State explains,

“[a]pparently, the problem stems from Williamson County’s policy of preparing

video transcripts, which are deemed contraband at the facility where [the

Defendant] is being housed.” In response, the State points out that the trial court

not only granted the Defendant’s motion for transcripts and records from the trial,

but also appointed an attorney to assist the Defendant with his appeal. 6

 The

State maintains that the attorney “could arguably [have] provide[d] assistance in

viewing the videotapes from the trial in order to provide [the Defendant] with

appropriate citations to the record.”

A criminal defendant proceeding pro se on appeal, having been granted

permission to do so by the trial court, certainly must not be denied access to the

full record of his trial, regardless of the record’s format. However, while we agree

that a defendant must be allowed access to all records and transcripts, the

Defendant in this case has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from having

been denied an opportunity to personally view the videotape transcript of the trial.

He has not specified what information he was denied. Thus, in light of the

appointment of counsel to aid the Defendant on appeal and the Defendant’s
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failure to show prejudice resulting from his inability to view the tapes, we

conclude that this issue is without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

____________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE

___________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE