alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.1



 Exhibit 10.1 

[Letterhead] 
 August 18, 2015 

Richard M. Olson 
 Dear Rick: 

It is with great pleasure that I am able to offer you the position of President and Chief Operating Officer of The Toro Company. Earlier today, the Board of
Directors formally elected you to this position effective as of September 1, 2015 and subject to your written acceptance of this offer. 
 The
following confirms the terms and conditions of this offer: 
  

			
	Title:	  	 President and Chief Operating Officer

(President & COO)

		
	Effective Date:	  	September 1, 2015
		
	Base Salary:	  	Your Base Compensation will be set by the Compensation & Human Resources Committee (C&HR Committee) at its meeting to be held in September 2015 taking into account your new responsibilities.
		
	Annual Cash Incentive:	  	 Your F’15 Annual Performance Award, including the payout target and performance measures and weightings, will remain unchanged.

 
 Your F’16 Annual Performance Award, including the payout target and performance
measures and weightings, will be set by the C&HR Committee at its meeting to be held in December 2015 (the December 2015 Meeting) taking into account your new responsibilities.

		
	Long-Term Incentives:	  	All of your outstanding long-term incentive awards, including Stock Option Awards, Restricted Stock Unit Awards and Performance Share Awards (F’13 to F’15, F’14 to F’16 and F’15 to F’17) will remain
unchanged, including the performance measures and weightings for the Performance Share Awards.









			
		  	Your F’16 long-term payout target will be set by the C&HR Committee at the December 2015 Meeting taking into account your new responsibilities. Similar to prior years, it is expected that one-half of the value of your
F’16 long-term payout target will be delivered in the form of Stock Option Awards and the other half will be delivered in Performance Share Awards.
		
	Executive Perquisites:	  	Your perquisites will remain at their current level.
		
	Responsibilities, Reporting Structure & Board Status:	  	As the President & COO, you will be responsible for all of our businesses and global operations and continue to report to me. You have not been appointed to The Toro Company Board of Directors at this time but it is expected
that you will work closely with me on all Board-related matters and attend all Board meetings.

 Rick, on behalf of the Board and myself, I want to congratulate you on this significant achievement. I look forward to your
acceptance of this offer and working with you to continue to drive the company to even higher levels of success. 
  

	
	Sincerely,
	
	/s/ Michael J. Hoffman
	
	Michael J. Hoffman
	Chairman and CEO
	The Toro Company








 August 19, 2015 

To the Board of Directors of The Toro Company: 
 I, Richard M.
Olson, consent to being elected as the President and Chief Operating Officer of The Toro Company effective as of September 1, 2015. 
  

	
	 /s/ Richard M. Olson

	Signature
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                        48,172,792
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                  0
<EQUITIES>                                   4,427,692
<MORTGAGE>                                   7,888,140
<REAL-ESTATE>                                7,631,446
<TOTAL-INVEST>                              75,565,756
<CASH>                                       2,797,141
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                                   0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                       4,179,672
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             124,243,712
<POLICY-LOSSES>                             75,064,203
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                                  0
<POLICY-OTHER>                                 637,138
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                        1,816,081
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                              9,697,977
<COMMON>                                     9,211,048
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  15,310,134
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               124,243,712
<PREMIUMS>                                   4,532,608
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                          5,165,284
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                             254,170
<OTHER-INCOME>                              11,196,502
<BENEFITS>                                   4,825,029
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                  1,033,053
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                                 0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                900,508
<INCOME-TAX>                                   208,184
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            692,324
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   692,324
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .17
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                       0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                      0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0
        

</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DECEMBER 23, 2014

NO. 03-12-00797-CR

Marchelo Lamont Pryce, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES PEMBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the 

trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                       3,343,191
<SECURITIES>                                   955,636
<RECEIVABLES>                               45,720,592
<ALLOWANCES>                               (1,846,167)
<INVENTORY>                                 48,039,379
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           109,257,460
<PP&E>                                      27,762,133
<DEPRECIATION>                             (9,847,175)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             202,344,555
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       29,609,021
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    976,755
<COMMON>                                       151,216
<OTHER-SE>                                 130,963,422
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               202,344,555
<SALES>                                     52,134,341
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            52,134,341
<CGS>                                       35,947,413
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               35,947,413
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            16,037,353
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             856,496
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (750,936)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   322,902
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (428,034)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (428,034)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.04)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.1


CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of D'Angelo Brands, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the year ended April 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Frank D'Angelo,
President/Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the  financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Frank D'Angelo
-----------------
Frank D'Angelo,
President and Principal Accounting Officer


August 06, 2003
Exhibit 32.2




Certification
of Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002




Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned
officer of Mandalay Media, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does
hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:




The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2008 of the
Company (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information
contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
February 20, 2009




/s/
      Jay A. WolfJay
      A. WolfChief
      Financial Officer and Secretary(Principal
      Financial Officer)




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and shall be furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Justin Walker, Appellant.

[870 NYS2d 812]

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.), rendered February 6, 2008, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the first degree.

In satisfaction of a two-count indictment, as well as another unindicted charge, defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and waived his right to appeal. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant as negotiated to 12V2 years in prison and five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.

Appellate counsel for defendant seeks to be relieved of his assignment on the basis that there are no nonfrivolous issues to be advanced on appeal. Having examined counsel’s brief and the record, we concur. As such, the judgment is affirmed and counsel’s application for leave to withdraw is granted (see *People v Cruwys,*113 AD2d 979 [1985], *lv denied*67 NY2d 650 [1986]; *see generally People v Stokes,*95 NY2d 633 [2001]).

Cardona, EJ., Peters, Kane and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and application to be relieved of assignment granted.
#### In the Matter of Leigh Churchill, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

[963 NYS2d 603]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered April 4, 2012 in Albany County, which, among other things, dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Central Office Review Committee denying petitioner’s grievance.

Petitioner, an inmate at a state correctional facility, claims *1283that the Deputy Superintendent of Programs improperly refused his request for a $3.79 advance for special handling of his legal mail. Petitioner’s subsequent grievance was denied and, when that determination was upheld upon administrative review, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and we now affirm.

Both 7 NYCRR 721.3 (a) (3) (v) and Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Directive No. 2788 require that, in order for an inmate to receive a postage advance for special handling, the inmate must specify a statute or court rule that requires the special handling. Here, petitioner’s request contained no such information. Accordingly, the denial of petitioner’s grievance had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious *(see Matter of Brooks v Fischer,*95 AD3d 1578, 1578 [2012]; *Matter of Green v Bradt,*91 AD3d 1235, 1237 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 802 [2012]). There is no merit to petitioner’s argument that counsel should have been consulted before his request was denied. Inasmuch as the Deputy Superintendent’s initial denial was based on information indicating that petitioner had no pending requests to post mail, it was unnecessary to consult with counsel as to whether an advance for legal mail was required. Finally, petitioner’s claim that his grievance was not investigated is belied by the record.

Rose, J.P, Stein, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
#### Coon *v.*Abbott.1

*(Circuit Court, E. D. New York.*

November 28, 1888.)

Equity—Practice—Time for Taking Testimony.

When a party's time to take his testimony has expired without its being taken, the court may. on cause shown, grant relief by allowing the testimony to be taken and filed *nunc pro tunc.*

In Equity. Application for extension of time to take *testimony.*

*H. A. West,*for complainant.

*John J. Allen,*for defendant.

1

 Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar.

Lacombe, J.

The defendant has failed to secure the taking of his proof by reason, apparently, of some misunderstanding between his counsel and his solicitor as to who would attend to it. To thus lose the opportunity of his presenting his defense, if he has any, would be a great hardship. The court has power under the rule to grant relief by allowing the testimony to be taken and filed *nunc pro tunc. Fischer*v. *Hayes,*6 Fed. Rep. 76. In view of the fact that the next term for trial of equity causes will not be held till March, the granting of such relief will work no injustice to the complainant. The defendant may enter an order extending his time to take testimony to and including December 31st, such testimony, when taken, to be filed *nunc pro tunc*as of August 10, 1888. If defendant wishes to cross-examine any of plaintiff’s witnesses who were examined on July 9th to July 13th, he may, before taking any of his own testimony, secure their presence by subpoena, and upon their appearance proceed with their cross-examination. Complainant may have 20 days after close of defendant’s case to take testimony in rebuttal. Defendant must accept notice of trial for March term, and the case is ordered on the calendar for that term.
#### Maria Pilar Bustos et al., Respondents, v Lenox Hill Hospital, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[963 NYS2d 115]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered July 26, 2011, which denied defendant Lenox Hill Hospital’s motion to set aside the verdict, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in defendants’ favor dismissing the complaint.

The only testimony plaintiffs’ expert gave as to the alleged deviation from the accepted standard of medical care in the performance of the birthing maneuvers was that the maneuvers “were excessive and caused th[e] injuries” and deviated from the appropriate standard of care. He did not explain or in any other way support his opinion, which therefore was speculative and conclusory and without probative force *(see e.g. Rivera v Greenstein,*79 AD3d 564, 568 [1st Dept 2010]).

As to plaintiffs’ theory that there was a deviation from the accepted standard of care in the dosage of the epidural block given to plaintiff Maria, their own expert conceded that the dosage was standard and appropriate.

Concur—Andrias, J.E, DeGrasse, Abdus-Salaam and Feinman, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jamel Gadson, Appellant.

[973 NYS2d 768]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.), rendered December 9, 2010, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a new trial.

A new trial is required due to the trial court’s failure to meaningfully comply with CPL 310.30. During deliberations, the jury sent four notes to the trial court. The record reflects that, on the fourth occasion, the court did not disclose the contents of the note to the prosecutor and defense counsel until *serially reading,*and immediately responding to, the questions contained therein in the presence of the jury. All three of the questions in this note concerned the subject of accomplice liability.

*1099The jury’s requests for further explanation of the meaning of accomplice liability within the context of this case required a “substantive response” *(People v Lockley,*84 AD3d 836, 839 [2011]; *see People v McGhee,*103 AD3d 667, 668 [2013]; *People v Stocks,*101 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2012]), rather than a merely “ministerial” one *(People v Lockley,*84 AD3d at 839; *see People v Brown,*106 AD3d 755, 756 [2013]; *People v Alcide,*95 AD3d 897, 898 [2012], *affd*21 NY3d 687 [2013]; *People v Bryant,*82 AD3d 1114 [2011]). As such, the trial court’s failure to afford defense counsel “the opportunity to provide suggestions” *(People v Lockley,*84 AD3d at 839) regarding the court’s responses to the jury’s questions constituted “a mode of proceedings error . . . requiring reversal” *(People v Tabb,*13 NY3d 852, 853 [2009] ), despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s handling of the jury’s fourth note *(see People v McGhee,*103 AD3d at 668).

In light of our determination, the defendant’s remaining contentions have been rendered academic *(see People v Nazario,*100 AD3d 783, 785 [2012]; *People v Thomas,*68 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2009]). Mastro, J.P., Leventhal, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jason DeLeon, Appellant.

[825 NYS2d 781]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (West, J.), rendered June 5, 2002, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel is without merit. The record indicates that there was no colorable basis to suppress either the complainant’s identification of the defendant *(see People v Edmonson,*75 NY2d 672, 677 [1990], *cert denied*498 US 1001 [1990]; *People v Nieves,*26 AD3d 519, 520 [2006]; *Matter of Kassan D.,*282 AD2d 747, 747-748 [2001]) or the defendant’s statement made in response to a routine booking question *(see People v Rodney,*85 NY2d 289, 293 [1995]; *People v Acevedo,*258 AD2d 140, 143 [1999]; *People v Langston,*243 AD2d 728, 728 [1997]). As the defendant failed to make a showing that defense counsel had no legitimate explanation for failing to make the suppression motion, it should “be presumed that counsel acted in a competent manner and exercised professional judgment in not pursuing” such a motion *(People v Montana,*71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; *see People v Cabo,*228 AD2d 689, 689 [1996]; *People v Allen,*193 AD2d 609, 609-610 [1993]). Likewise, the defendant failed *to*show that defense counsel’s ultimate decision not to put into writing his oral motion pursuant to CPL 270.10 was not “legitimately based on the justifiable belief that there [was] no ‘colorable’ basis to do so” *(People v DeFreitas,*213 AD2d 96, 101 [1995], quoting *People v Garcia,*75 NY2d 973, 974 [1990]; *see Duren v Missouri,*439 US *759357, 364 [1979]; *People v Faulk,*251 AD2d 345 [1998]; *People v Branch,*244 AD2d 562 [1997]; *People v Hobson,*227 AD2d 643, 644 [1996]). Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s remarks during summation was not unreasonable, as the subject remarks were made “in response to the defense counsel’s comments on credibility and the conflicts between the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses and the defendant’s testimony” *(People v Phillips,*285 AD2d 477, 478 [2001]; *see People v Halm,*81 NY2d 819, 821 [1993]; *People v Ashwal,*39 NY2d 105 [1976]; *People v Adamo,*309 AD2d 808, 809 [2003]), and “the issue of credibility was central to the trial” *(People v Banks,*258 AD2d 525, 526 [1999]; *see People v Crawford,*130 AD2d 678 [1987]).

Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Moody,*300 AD2d 510, 510 [2002]; *People v Younger,*299 AD2d 431, 431 [2002]; *People v Borum,*293 AD2d 483, 484 [2002]; *People v Corona,*232 AD2d 652, 652 [1996]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see *People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80, 83 [1982]). Prudenti, PJ., Krausman, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.