Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 9 / Wednesday, January 14, 2015 / Notices 1979 

17 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 15 U.S.C. 78a. 

3 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

4The Exchange adopted Rule 967NY in 2013. See 

Exchange Rule 967NY; see also Securities Exchange 

Act Release No. 70037 (July 25, 2013), 78 FR 46399 

(July 31, 2013) (NYSEMKT–2013–62). 

5Pursuant to Rule 967NY(b), unless determined 

otherwise by the Exchange and announced to ATP 

Holders via Trader Update, the specified percentage 

is 100% for the contra-side NBB or NBO priced at 

or below $1.00 and 50% for contra-side NBB or 

NBO priced above $1.00. 

6Until recently the Limit Order Filter was only 

applicable to orders received during Core Trading 

Hours, but the Exchange has expanded this price 

protection feature to limit orders received before the 

opening of trading. See Securities Exchange Act 

Release No. 73024 (September 9, 2014), 79 FR 

55049 (September 15, 2014) (SR–NYSEMKT–2014– 

76). 

7Orders entered by a Market Maker are covered 

by Rule 967NY. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.17

Brent J. Fields, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00378 Filed 1–13–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–74017; File No. SR– 

NYSEMKT–2014–116] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE 

MKT LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed 

Rule Change To Amend Rule 967NY 

and To Adopt Rule 967.1NY To Provide 

Price Protection for Market Maker 

Quotes 

January 8, 2015. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3

notice is hereby given that, on December 

29, 2014, NYSE MKT LLC (the 

‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘NYSE MKT’’) filed with 

the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the 

proposed rule change as described in 

Items I, II, and III below, which Items 

have been prepared by the selfregulatory organization. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The Exchange proposes to amend 

Rule 967NY (Price Protection) and to 

adopt Rule 967.1NY to provide price 

protection for Market Maker quotes. The 

text of the proposed rule change is 

available on the Exchange’s Web site at 

www.nyse.com, at the principal office of 

the Exchange, and at the Commission’s 

Public Reference Room. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, the 

self-regulatory organization included 

statements concerning the purpose of, 

and basis for, the proposed rule change 

and discussed any comments it received 

on the proposed rule change. The text 

of those statements may be examined at 

the places specified in Item IV below. 

The Exchange has prepared summaries, 

set forth in sections A, B, and C below, 

of the most significant parts of such 

statements. 

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

1. Purpose 

The Exchange is proposing to amend 

Rule 967NY and to adopt Rule 967.1NY 

to provide price protection for Market 

Maker quotes. The Exchange currently 

offers price protection mechanisms for 

orders and, at this time, is proposing to 

expand its mechanisms to make price 

protection available for Market Maker 

quotes as well. The Exchange believes 

that this proposed enhancement would 

assist with the maintenance of fair and 

orderly markets by averting the risk of 

Market Maker quotes sweeping through 

multiple price points resulting in 

executions at prices that are through the 

last sale price or National Best Bid or 

Best Offer (‘‘NBBO’’) and potentially 

erroneous. 

Rule 967NY, which applies solely to 

orders, affords price protection to orders 

priced a specified percentage through 

the prevailing contra-side market.4

Specifically, Rule 967NY(b) provides a 

price protection filter for incoming limit 

orders, pursuant to which the Exchange 

rejects limit orders priced a specified 

percentage 5 through the NBB or NBO 

(‘‘Limit Order Filter’’).6 To clarify that 

Rule 967NY applies only to orders, the 

Exchange proposes [sic] append the 

word ‘‘Orders’’ to the Rule 967NY 

header to provide ‘‘Rule 967NY. Price 

Protection—Orders.’’ The Exchange 

believes that this proposed change 

would reduce any potential confusion 

regarding the applicability of Rule 

967NY. 

Proposed Market Maker Quote Price 

Protection 

To further enhance the price 

protection functionality available on the 

Exchange, the Exchange proposes to 

adopt a new rule, Rule 967.1NY, that 

would provide for a price protection 

mechanism for quotes entered by a 

Market Maker. To be clear that the 

proposed rule is for Market Maker 

quotes only, and consistent with the 

proposed change to the title for Rule 

967NY, the Exchange proposes to title 

this new rule ‘‘Price Protection— 

Quotes.’’ In addition, Rule 967.1NY(a) 

would provide that the proposed price 

protection filters would be applicable 

only for quotes entered by a Market 

Maker pursuant to Rule 925.1NY and 

would not be applicable to orders 

entered by a Market Maker.7

To take into consideration the unique 

role of Market Makers to enter two-sided 

quotations in their appointments, the 

Exchange proposes to provide for two 

layers of price protection that would be 

applicable to all incoming Market Maker 

quotes. As discussed in detail below, 

the first layer of price protection would 

assess incoming sell quotes against the 

National Best Bid (‘‘NBB’’) and 

incoming buy quotes against the 

National Best Offer (‘‘NBO’’). The 

second layer of price protection would 

assess the price of call or put bids 

against a specified benchmark. 

NBBO Price Reasonability Check 

Proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(1) would 

set forth the Exchange’s proposed NBBO 

price reasonability check, which would 

compare Market Maker bids with the 

NBO and Market Maker offers with the 

NBB. This proposed price protection is 

[sic] mechanism is similar to the Limit 

Order Filter. Specifically, provided that 

an NBBO is available, a Market Maker 

quote would be rejected if it is priced a 

specified dollar amount or percentage 

through the contra-side NBBO as 

follows: 

(A) $1.00 for Market Maker bids when 

the contra-side NBO is priced at or 

below $1.00; or 

(B) 50% for Market Maker bids (offers) 

when the contra-side NBO (NBB) is 

priced above $1.00. 

The Exchange would reject inbound 

Market Maker quotes that exceed the 

parameters set forth in proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(1)(A)–(B) as presumptively 

erroneous. The Exchange believes that 

the proposed percentages are 

appropriate because they are based on 

the percentages already approved for the 

Limit Order Filter and are thus 

calibrated to enable the Exchange to 

reject quotes that otherwise may cause 

price dislocation before the erroneous 

quotes could cause harm to the market. 

The Exchange is also proposing a 

specific dollar threshold for when the 

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1980 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 9 / Wednesday, January 14, 2015 / Notices 

8The Exchange notes that it continually assesses 

whether its price protection mechanisms are 

appropriately calibrated and if it proposes to amend 

the percentages for the Limit Order Filter, it would 

do so by means of a separate rule filing. 

9See proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(1)(A)–(B) (setting 

forth the specified dollar amount or percentages 

‘‘unless determined otherwise by the Exchange and 

announced to ATP Holders via Trader Update’’). 

10See proposed Rule 967.1NY(b). 

11See proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(2). 

NBO is priced at or below $1.00 because 

the Exchange believes that the specified 

dollar amount provides more granular 

price protection than a percentage-based 

protection. For example, if the NBO 

were $0.06, when using a 100% filter, 

the Exchange would be required to 

reject any bids priced $0.12 or more. For 

such low-priced NBOs, the Exchange 

believes it is appropriate to provide 

Market Makers with the ability to enter 

quotes at least $1.00 higher than the 

prevailing NBO.8

In addition, pursuant to proposed 

Rule 967.1NY(a)(1)(A), Market Maker 

offers that arrive when the NBB is 

priced at or below $1.00 would not be 

subject to this filter. The Exchange 

believes that when the NBB is priced at 

or below $1.00, the price of an offer 

would be bound by $0.00, and therefore 

an offer would always be less than $1.00 

away from the NBB. Such offer prices 

would likely not be erroneous and 

therefore the Exchange does not believe 

it necessary to reject such Market Maker 

offers. 

Because there may be market 

scenarios that require the proposed 

parameters to be adjusted, for example, 

during periods of extreme price 

volatility, the Exchange further proposes 

to specify that the Exchange may revise 

these parameters, provided such revised 

parameters are announced to ATP 

Holders via a Trader Update.9

As an additional safeguard and riskcontrol feature, if a Market Maker quote 

is rejected pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) 

of this proposed Rule, the Exchange 

would also cancel any resting same-side 

quote in the affected series from that 

Market Maker.10 The Exchange believes 

it is appropriate to reject any resting 

same-side quote because when a Market 

Maker submits a new quote, that Market 

Maker is implicitly instructing the 

Exchange to cancel any resting quote in 

that same series. Thus, even if the new 

quote is rejected because it is priced a 

specified dollar amount or percentage 

through the contra-side NBBO, in 

violation of proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(1), the Market Maker’s 

implicit instruction to cancel the resting 

quote remains valid nonetheless. 

The following examples, which are 

based on the below market scenario, 

illustrate how the proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a) would operate: 

Option series NBBO Option series NBBO 

December $30 Calls .............................. $9.90 × $11.00 ...................... December $30 Puts .............................. $0.06 × $0.10. 

December $35 Calls .............................. $6.00 × $6.20 ........................ December $35 Puts .............................. $0.60 × $0.65. 

December $40 Calls .............................. $2.82 × $2.85 ........................ December $40 Puts .............................. $2.30 × $2.40. 

Example 1—Proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(1)(A): $1.00 for Market 

Maker bids if the contra-side NBO is 

priced at or below $1.00. A Market 

Maker submits a $1.50 bid for the 

December $30 puts where the NBO is 

$0.10. As this is $1.00 or more above the 

NBO ($0.10 plus $1.00 = $1.10), the 

Exchange would reject the Market 

Maker bid. 

Example 2—Proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(1)(A): Market Maker offers 

that arrive when the NBB is priced at or 

below $1.00 are not subject to this filter. 

From the options chain above, the 

options that have a NBB at or below 

$1.00 are the December $30 and $35 

puts. As these options have a NBB 

below $1.00 (and the offer is bound by 

$0.00—less than $1.00 away from the 

NBB), there are no price protection 

filters and Market Maker offers in these 

options would be subject to standard 

quote processing without delay. 

Example 3—Proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(1)(B): 50% for Market Maker 

bids when the contra-side NBO is priced 

above $1.00. A Market Maker submits a 

bid of $9.30 for the December $35 calls 

where the NBO is $6.20. As this is 50% 

greater than the NBO ($6.20 plus 50% 

= $9.30), the Exchange would reject the 

Market Maker bid. 

Example 4—Proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(1)(B): 50% for Market Maker 

offers when the contra-side NBB is 

priced above $1.00. A Market Maker 

submits a $0.60 offer for the December 

$40 calls when the NBB is $2.82. As this 

is 50% or more below the NBB ($2.82 

minus 50% = $1.41), the Exchange 

would reject the Market Maker offer as 

erroneous. 

Underlying Stock Price/Strike Price 

Check 

Proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(2) and (3) 

would set forth the Exchange’s proposed 

second layer of price protection filters 

for Market Maker quotes. These price 

protection mechanisms would be 

applicable when either there is no 

NBBO available, for example, during 

pre-opening or prior to conducting a reopening after a trading halt, or if the 

NBBO is so wide as to not to reflect an 

appropriate price for the respective 

options series. 

Proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(2) would 

provide price protection for Market 

Maker bids in call options. As proposed, 

if such bids equal or exceed the price of 

the underlying security, the Market 

Maker bid would be rejected.11 With a 

call bid, a Market Maker is bidding to 

buy an option that would be exercised 

into the right to acquire the underlying 

security. The Exchange does not believe 

that a derivative product, which 

conveys the right to purchase a security 

underlying the derivative, should ever 

be priced higher than the prevailing 

price of the underlying security itself. 

Accordingly, the Exchange believes it is 

appropriate to reject Market Maker bids 

for call options that are equal to or in 

excess of the price of the underlying 

security. 

As proposed in new Rule 

967.1NY(a)(2)(A), before the underlying 

security is open, the Exchange would 

use the previous day’s closing price to 

determine the price of the underlying 

security. The Exchange proposes to use 

the prior day’s closing price because, 

although the underlying securities may 

trade in the equities markets outside of 

9:30 a.m. ET to 4:00 p.m. ET, the 

equities market is generally not as liquid 

during this time and equity market 

makers generally do not have quoting 

obligations in after-hours trading. 

Therefore, the Exchange believes that 

using the previous day’s closing price— 

based on trading during Core Trading 

Hours, when the market is most liquid— 

provides a more accurate benchmark 

and thus a more precise price protection 

filter for underlying securities that have 

not yet opened. Per proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(2)(B), once the underlying 

security has opened, the Exchange 

would use the consolidated last sale 

price to determine the price of the 

underlying security. Per proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(2)(C), during a trading halt 

of the underlying security, the Exchange 

would use the consolidated last sale 

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12See proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(3). 

13See proposed Rule 967.1NY(b). 

14The Exchange would also cancel any resting 

quote(s) in the affected class(es) from that Market 

Maker and will not accept new quote(s) in the 

affected class(es) until the Market Maker submits a 

message (which may be automated) to the Exchange 

to enable the entry of new quotes. See proposed 

Rule 967.1NY(b). 

15 Id. 

16The Exchange may disable the Underlying 

Stock Price/Strike Price Check by security without 

affecting the status of the NBBO Price Reasonability 

Checks. 

17 15 U.S.C. 78f(b). 

reported immediately prior to the 

trading halt to determine the price of the 

underlying security. The Exchange 

believes that the consolidated last sale 

price for an underlying security that has 

already opened would provide the most 

accurate benchmark because the market 

is most liquid during Core Trading 

Hours. 

Proposed Rule 967.1NY(a)(3) would 

provide for price protection for Market 

Maker bids in put options. The value of 

a put can never exceed the strike price 

of the option, even if the stock goes to 

zero. For example, a put with a strike 

price of $50 gives the holder the right 

to sell the underlying security for $50 

(no more, or no less), therefore it would 

be illogical to pay more than $50 for the 

right to sell that underlying security, no 

matter what the price of the underlying 

security. As proposed, the Exchange 

would deem any put bid that equals or 

exceeds the strike price of the option 

series to be erroneous and the Exchange 

believes it would be appropriate to 

reject such bids.12

As an additional safeguard and risk 

control feature, when a Market Maker 

quote is rejected pursuant to paragraph 

(a)(2) or (a)(3) of this Rule, the Exchange 

would also cancel all resting quote(s) in 

the affected class(es) from that Market 

Maker and shall not accept new quote(s) 

in the affected class(es) until the Market 

Maker submits a message (which may be 

automated) to the Exchange to enable 

the entry of new quotes.13 The Exchange 

believes that this temporary suspension 

from quoting in the affected option 

class(es) would operate as a safety valve 

that forces Market Makers to re-evaluate 

their positions before requesting to reenter the market. 

Consider the following examples 

which are based on the following: 

Underlying Security Price = $50 

December $50 Calls—December $50 

Puts 

December $70 Calls—December $70 

Puts 

Example 1—Proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(2)(B): MM bid for Call 

rejected if the price of bid is equal to or 

greater than the price of the underlying 

security. A Market Maker submits a 

quote that contains a $53 bid for the 

December $50 calls. With the 

underlying security having a last sale 

price of $50, the Exchange would deem 

any bid for $50 or more (for the right to 

buy stock at $50) as erroneous and 

would therefore reject the bid(s).14

Example 2—Proposed Rule 

967.1NY(a)(3): MM bid for Put rejected 

if the price of bid is equal to or greater 

than the strike price of the option. A 

Market Maker submits a quote that 

contains a $70 bid for the December $70 

puts. The most the December $70 puts 

could ever be worth is $70 even if the 

underlying security goes to zero. The 

Exchange would deem any bid to pay 

$70 or more for the December $70 puts 

to be an erroneous quote and would 

therefore reject the put bid.15

The Exchange believes that the 

proposed extension of the Exchange’s 

price protection functionality to Market 

Maker quotes would assist with the 

maintenance of fair and orderly markets 

by averting the risk of Market Maker 

quotes sweeping through multiple price 

points resulting in executions at prices 

that are through the last sale price or 

NBBO and potentially erroneous. The 

Exchange notes that it retains the ability 

to disable these price protection features 

in response to market events.16

Implementation 

The Exchange will announce the 

implementation date of the proposed 

rule change via Trader Update. The 

Trader Update will be issued at least 30 

days prior to implementation to help 

ensure participants, in particular Market 

Makers, have sufficient notice prior to 

introducing the new functionality. 

2. Statutory Basis 

The statutory basis for the proposed 

rule change is Section 6(b)(5) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’),17 which requires the rules of an 

exchange to promote just and equitable 

principles of trade, to remove 

impediments to and perfect the 

mechanism of a free and open market 

and a national market system and, in 

general, to protect investors and the 

public interest. 

The Exchange believes that this 

proposal meets these requirements 

because it would assist with the 

maintenance of a fair and orderly 

market by introducing new price 

protections that would help to mitigate 

the risks associated with the entry of 

quotes that are priced a specified dollar 

amount or percentage through the last 

sale or prevailing contra-side market, 

which the Exchange believes is 

evidence of error. By rejecting such 

quotes, the Exchange believes it is 

promoting just and equitable principles 

of trade by preventing potential price 

dislocation that could result from 

erroneous Market Maker quotes 

sweeping through multiple price points 

resulting in executions at prices that are 

through the last sale price or NBBO. 

Specifically, when an NBBO is 

available, the Exchange believes 

rejecting Market Maker quotes priced a 

specified dollar amount or percentage 

through the contra-side NBBO would 

remove impediments to and perfect the 

mechanism of a free and open market 

and protect investors and the public 

interest because it would enable the 

Exchange to avoid the submission of 

erroneous quotes that otherwise may 

cause price dislocation before such 

quotes could cause harm to the market. 

The Exchange believes that proposed 

percentages are reasonable as they are 

based on the percentages already 

approved for the Limit Order Filter. In 

addition, the Exchange believes that the 

addition of specified dollar thresholds 

when the NBO is equal to or below 

$1.00 is consistent with the Act because 

it would assist with the maintenance of 

a fair and orderly market by offering 

Market Maker quotes more precise price 

protection. Moreover, the Exchange 

believes it is appropriate to place no 

limit on Market Maker offers that arrive 

when the NBB is priced at or below 

$1.00 because when the NBB is priced 

at or below $1.00, the price of an offer 

would be bound by $0.00, and therefore 

an offer would always be less than $1.00 

away from the NBB—and therefore, not 

likely to be erroneous and not requiring 

price protection. 

Similarly, the Exchange also believes 

that when no NBBO is available, the 

Exchange’s proposed use of benchmarks 

to check the reasonability of Market 

Maker bids for call and put options 

would assist with the maintenance of a 

fair and orderly market by affording a 

second layer of price protection to 

Market Maker quotes. The Exchange 

believes these additional price 

reasonability checks on Market Maker 

bids would remove impediments to and 

perfect the mechanism of a free and 

open market and protect investors and 

the public interest because the proposed 

check would reject Market Maker bids 

that are priced higher than the 

corresponding benchmark, which would 

be the price of the underlying security 

for call options and the strike price for 

put options. 

The Exchange also believes the 

additional risk controls that result in the 

cancellation of a Market Maker’s resting 

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1982 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 9 / Wednesday, January 14, 2015 / Notices 

18 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 15 U.S.C. 78a. 

3 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

quote and/or the temporary suspension 

a Market Maker’s quoting activity in the 

affected option class(es) would remove 

impediments to and perfect the 

mechanism of a free and open market 

and protect investors and the public 

interest because it provides the Market 

Maker with an opportunity to reevaluate their positions before 

requesting to re-enter the market. The 

Exchange believes that this additional 

safeguard would benefit investors and 

the public because it would provide 

market participants with additional 

protection from anomalous executions. 

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement on Burden on Competition 

The Exchange does not believe that 

the proposed rule change would impose 

any burden on competition that is not 

necessary or appropriate in furtherance 

of the purposes of the Act. The 

Exchange believes the proposal would 

not unduly burden any particular group 

of market participants trading on the 

Exchange vis-a`-vis another group (i.e., 

Market Markers versus non-Market 

Makers) as the proposal is designed to 

address the unique role of Market 

Makers to enter two-sided quotations in 

their appointments and would apply 

equally to all Market Makers. Moreover, 

the Exchange believes the proposal 

would provide market participants with 

additional protection from anomalous 

executions. Thus, the Exchange does not 

believe the proposal creates any 

significant impact on competition. The 

Exchange believes this proposal is procompetitive as it may encourage Market 

Makers to quote tighter deeper markets, 

which will increase liquidity and 

enhance competition, given the safeties 

afforded by the proposed price 

protection filters. 

C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement on Comments on the 

Proposed Rule Change Received From 

Members, Participants, or Others 

No written comments were solicited 

or received with respect to the proposed 

rule change. 

III. Date of Effectiveness of the 

Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 

Commission Action 

Within 45 days of the date of 

publication of this notice in the Federal 

Register or within such longer period 

up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may 

designate if it finds such longer period 

to be appropriate and publishes its 

reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which 

the self-regulatory organization 

consents, the Commission will: 

(A) by order approve or disapprove 

such proposed rule change, or 

(B) institute proceedings to determine 

whether the proposed rule change 

should be disapproved. 

IV. Solicitation of Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written data, views, and 

arguments concerning the foregoing, 

including whether the proposed rule 

change is consistent with the Act. 

Comments may be submitted by any of 

the following methods: 

Electronic Comments 

• Use the Commission’s Internet 

comment form (http://www.sec.gov/

rules/sro.shtml); or 

• Send an email to rule-comments@

sec.gov. Please include File Number SR– 

NYSEMKT–2014–116 on the subject 

line. 

Paper Comments 

• Send paper comments in triplicate 

to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities 

and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street 

NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–NYSEMKT–2014–116. This 

file number should be included on the 

subject line if email is used. To help the 

Commission process and review your 

comments more efficiently, please use 

only one method. The Commission will 

post all comments on the Commission’s 

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/

rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 

submission, all subsequent 

amendments, all written statements 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change that are filed with the 

Commission, and all written 

communications relating to the 

proposed rule change between the 

Commission and any person, other than 

those that may be withheld from the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be 

available for Web site viewing and 

printing in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 

Washington, DC 20549, on official 

business days between the hours of 

10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the 

filing also will be available for 

inspection and copying at the principal 

office of the Exchange. All comments 

received will be posted without change; 

the Commission does not edit personal 

identifying information from 

submissions. You should submit only 

information that you wish to make 

available publicly. All submissions 

should refer to File Number SR– 

NYSEMKT–2014–116 and should be 

submitted on or before February 4, 2015. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.18

Brent J. Fields, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00377 Filed 1–13–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–74018; File No. SR– 

NYSEArca–2014–150] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE 

Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed 

Rule Change to Amend Rule 6.60 and 

to Adopt Rule 6.61, Which was 

Previously Reserved, to Provide Price 

Protection for Market Maker Quotes 

January 8, 2015. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3

notice is hereby given that, on December 

29, 2014, NYSE Arca, Inc. (the 

‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘NYSE Arca’’) filed with 

the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the 

proposed rule change as described in 

Items I, II, and III below, which Items 

have been prepared by the selfregulatory organization. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The Exchange proposes to amend 

Rule 6.60 (Price Protection) and to adopt 

Rule 6.61, which was previously 

Reserved, to provide price protection for 

Market Maker quotes. The text of the 

proposed rule change is available on the 

Exchange’s Web site at www.nyse.com, 

at the principal office of the Exchange, 

and at the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, the 

self-regulatory organization included 

statements concerning the purpose of, 

and basis for, the proposed rule change 

and discussed any comments it received 

on the proposed rule change. The text 

of those statements may be examined at 

the places specified in Item IV below. 

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