Affirme d and Majority and Dissenting Opinion s filed February 15 , 202 4
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00884

- CR

ANGEL DEBOTTIS , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria Coun ty, Texas T rial Cou rt Cause No. 9 2795

- CR

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N

A fter a ppellant Angel Debottis pleaded guilty to tw o counts of intoxication manslaughter, a jury assessed her punishment at fifteen years ’ confinement for each count

. She challenges the ju dgme n t in two is su es. A ppellant argue s that the
t rial court reversibly err ed in admitting (1) appellant ’ s post

- Miranda stat ements and (2) a toxicology report included in appellant ’ s medical records . After reviewing the record and legal authority, we overrul e bo th issues a nd affi rm the trial c ourt ’ s judgm ent.2 Background Appellant consumed several al coholic beverages and then crashed her car into a n o t h e r v e h i c l e , killing the other v eh icle ’ s two oc cupants. Alvin Police Department Officer s Matthew Jrab and John Flo res respond ed to the scen e. Em e r gency personnel treated appell ant in the back of an ambulance. Appellant admitt ed to having four alcoholic be verages before driving her car.
While appellant was in the a mbulan ce, Officer Flores told he r that she was in c ustody for sus pici on of intoxic a tion manslaughter and read a p p e l l a n t her Miranda rights , 1 including her right to remain silent. She chose to remain silent. The ambulance tra n sported appellant to a nearby hospital . Officer Jrab accompanied appellant to t h e hospital and stayed with her for sev eral hours, to

“ make sure that she didn ’ t try to flee o r anything like that. ” Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of in to xication ma nslaughte r , and t he

case proceeded t o a punishment trial b y jury. During trial, the court a dmitted , among other things, video footage from the of ficer s ’ body

- wor n camera s and appellant ’ s medical records from the hospi tal

. The jury assessed appellant ’ s pun ishment at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of fifteen years for each c ount . The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury ’ s verdict, ordering that the sentence for count two would

run conse cutively with the sentence for count one

. Appellant timely appealed

.

1 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966 ).3 Analysis
A. Admission of Post

- Miranda S t atements

In her first i ssue, appellan t cha llenges the trial court ’ s a dmis si on of certain post

- Mira nda statements

. The State introduced e viden ce that, while in the hospital, appellant was “fli rtatio us ” with Officer Jr ab , was concerned about the location of her debit c ard so she could post bon d, “g iggl [ed] and laugh[ed] , ” and

sa id that she believed her life was over. A ccording to appellant, the State relied o n this e vidence to suggest that appellant was un concern ed for the victims and

“ selfish, re calcitrant, and lackin g in remor s e , ” which prob ably led the jur y to assess

a more s ev ere punishment than it would have without this evidence. Appellant
comp lains that the State ’ s use of this evidence to imply a lack of remorse violated her right to remain silent, which she inv oked when a dvised of her Miranda ri ghts wh ile in the a mbulanc e.
To saf eguar d a per son ’ s Fifth Amendment privilege against self

incrimination , law enforcement officials must inform a person in custody b efor e questioning that s he has the right to remain sile nt and that any statement s he makes may be used against her i n cou rt

. Mi randa , 384 U.S. at 444; Ramos v. State , 2 45 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Trial c omment s on a defendant ’ s dec ision to rem ain silent after receiving Miranda warnings violate due p roces s and infringe on the right a gainst s el f

- incrimina tio n. See Wainwright v. Greenfield , 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) ; Dinkins v. State , 894 S.W.2d 330, 356 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1995) (c ommenting on a de f endant ’ s post

- arrest silence is akin to commenting on hi s fail ure to testify at trial becau se it at te mpts to rai se an inference of guilt arising from the invocation of a constitutional right )

. Gener ally, a comment on a d efendant ’ s lack of remorse is an im permissible reference to the defendant ’ s failure
to test ify (o r otherwise re main silent) be cause only the defe nd ant can testify as to4

her own remorse. Swallow v. State , 829 S.W.2d 223, 225

- 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Dick inson v. State , 6 85 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)

. The State respond s that t h e re cord s hows no Mirand a violation bec a use the h ospital con ver s ation s at issue did not stem from a custodial “ interrogation, ” and because an accused ’ s volunte ered statements following Miran da warnings ar e admissible, even if the stateme nts were made whil e in custo d y. T he Sta te cites Pugh v. S tate , 624 S. W.3d 565 (Te x. Crim. App. 2021), Cross v. State , 14 4 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) , and Crawford v. State , 648 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2021, no pet.) ) , for the proposition that when a s usp ec t in vo kes her right to remain silen t but the n initiates “ sm all talk ” with law enforcement, she “ waives her Fifth Amend ment rights, and its p rotections fall
away. ” We will presum e without decid ing that the challenged portions of appel lant ’ s post

- Mira nda conver s ation s w ith Officer s Jr ab and Fl ores in the hospital , together with t estimony that app ellant did not inquir e about the victims,
amount ed to a n impermissible comment on appel lant ’ s silence as a lack of remorse and was erroneously admitted

. A dmis sion of evi dence in violation o f appella nt ’ s Fifth Amend ment right to remain silent would be constitutional error , see Ramos , 245 S.W.3d at 419 , which w e revi ew under the constitutional ha rmle ss

- error stand ard. See Tex. R . Ap p. P. 4 4.2(a). Under this standard, we must conclud e that the error was harmful unless we determine “ beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not co ntribute to the conviction or punishment.” Id. Factors we consider include “the n ature of the err or ( e.g., e rroneous admission or exclusi on of evidence, objectionable jury argument, etc.), whether it was em phasized by the State, the probable implications of the error , and the weig ht the jury would li kely5

have assigned to it in the cour se of it s de libe rati ons.” Snowden v. State , 353 S.W.3d 815 , 822 (Tex. C rim. App. 2011 ). Appellant cites port ion s of Officer Flores ’ s testimony to support her contention that the State ’ s repe a ted ly em phasi zed her lack of remorse : Q. Okay. Now you ’ ve been there 20 plu s m inut es. Co rrect? A

. Yes, sir. Q. Ha s she asked y ou about the victims at all? A. No, sir. Q. Asked you if a nybody is doing all right t hat was out on scene? A. N o, sir. Q. Did she ask about her debit card? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did she ask about her de bit car d a cou ple of t imes? A. Yes, sir. Q

. And was it after it couldn ’ t be located it appears that she first sh owed signs of emotion? A. Yes, si r. Q. Okay. And di d you hear her make some comment about how she
wasn ’ t going to be able to b ail out of ja il toni ght bec ause she didn ’ t have her de bi t card? A. It was intelligible [sic] to me at the time. I couldn ’ t understa nd. Q. Were you able to hear it now? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. So t hat was when she showed emotion. Not about the two deceased people. Co rre c t? A. That ’ s c orrect, sir.

. . . Q. An d to you what does her main concern appear to be at this point in time?6

A

. Undergarments. Q. Okay. Her underwear? A. Yes, si r. Q. Not t he condition of [] anybody or anybody ’ s fa mily members. Corre ct? A. No , si r. Q. But ret

r ieving her underwear. Cor rect? A. Yes , sir.
This brief testimony came during a longer examinatio n of Of ficer Flores , who was one of fifteen prosecution witnesses ( in addition to four defense witnes ses). App el lant also points to the of fice rs ’ bod y
- cam vi deos, but i t is unc le ar from the record ho w much of the videos were pla yed to the jury. B ased on our

re view of the exhi bits, t he period ic small talk between appella nt and Officer Jrab , which was punctuated by long periods of silence , c o mpri sed at most fif teen to twenty minu te s of a two

- and

- a

- half

- hour

- long video of Officer Jrab ’ s presence at the hospital

. 2 T he video of Officer Flores ’ s twenty

- minute pre se nce at the hospital included th e questions from appellant regarding the whe reabout s of her deb it card and underwear. Again , th ese inter actions with appellant were only a few minutes long

. No tably , t he State d id not refer to Officer Flore s ’ s testimon y, or either

2 The p rosecutor and O fficer Jrab had the followi ng exchange : Q

. So the video is for the jury to see and they can see the entirety of the video. Is that correct ? A. C orrec t. Q. But the last

-- and it ’ s not q uite 30 minutes. It ’ s a little under 30 minutes

-- is where a conversation takes place betwe en you and the Defendant. Is that correct? A. Yes, m a ’ am. Q. Okay. Prior to that the re is not a whole lot of t al king going on. It ’ s just you in the room w atch ing her on the hospital bed. Is that rig ht? A. Co rrect. Yes, ma ’ am.7

off icer ’ s body

- ca m video , dur ing closing argument. We do not find that th e Sta te plac ed meani ng ful emphasi s on app ellant ’s post

- incident lack of remorse during the trial. 3 This factor weighs against a finding of ha rm. Next, we consider the probable implicat ions of the p resumed error and the weight the jury would likely have as s igne d to th e evide n ce at issue during it s de liber ations. Appellant argues that t he erron eous admission of the body

- cam footage and the offic ers ’ related testimony probably led the jur y to sentence appellant “ more h arshly

. ” App ellant ci tes “substantial ” m itig ating f actors t hat she claims would have less ened appellant ’s sentence but fo r the erroneous a dmission of the challenged evidence

— her you th, evidence of post

- offense rehabilitation , strong family and community s upport, accep tance of responsibil ity, ap p aren t
traum a from c hildhood separation f rom the n uclear family, and lack of crimi nal histor y.
T he record does not support appe llant ’ s claim t hat the challenged evidence probably led th e jury to sentence appellant mo re harshly th an it otherwise wou ld have h ad t he evid ence bee n exc luded

. The impl ications of admitt ing the challenged evidence are not likely to have had a s igni ficant impact when

co nsidering the record as a whole. A ppellant effectively neutralized the potential
nega tive impact of the evidence d urin g her c ross

- examinatio n of the State ’ s

3 Appellant also relie s on a po rtion of Officer Jrab ’ s testimony in which th e State asked,

“ You stated earlier that you didn ’ t think th a t he r b ehavi or at the hospital was inap propri ate. But giggling and laughing after killing two peopl e, three and a half hours after killing th ose two p eople, is that appropriate behavior? ” Office r Jrab answered, “ No, ma ’ am. ” Thi s testimony , however, was in r e sp onse to de fense counsel ’ s questi on asking Officer Jrab, “ In your conversation with her at the hospital was there anything about her dem ean or tha t seems inappropriate ? ” Officer Jrab answere d, “ No. ” Because defense counsel, not the prosecutor, open e d th is line of qu estioning , and because the cited testimony wa s so flee ting , we cannot say that th e State emphasized appellant ’ s supposed lack of remo r se during Officer Jrab ’ s testimony. See Mora les v. State , 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (di r ec ti n g revie wing courts to consider the character of the alleged error and how it might be considere d in connection with other evidence in the case).8

w itnesses and by present ing controverting testimony during her case

- in

- ch ief. For example, on cross

- examin ation, Offic er Jrab acknowledged that appellant , while in the a mbulance, showed concern for others and ask ed m ore tha n once whether she had hurt anyone

. When appellant overheard on the police radio that two people were killed, Officer Jra

b saw appellant begin crying. A ppell ant also call ed four witne sses du ring h er case

- in

- ch ief, each of who m testified regard ing her rem o rse and her acceptance o f respo nsibility

. Additionally, d uring closing arguments, appellant ’ s attorney asserted that “ [h]er very firs t statement [to po lice] is taking

re sponsibility f

or this

. ” He r a ttorney also posited to th e jury that appell ant pleade d guilty k now ing she was g oing to prison and that she had not “ earned ” community
super vision.

Moreover , there was substantial evidence countering the mi ti gating evidence
pr oduced by appe llant , on whi ch the jury likely placed great weight in asses sing the se ntenc es

. The most signif icant piece of evidence was the video of the accident itself, which cle arly captured the spe ed of appellant ’ s vehicle and th e v i olen t nature of th e impact

. Suc h video s are oft en the “ most compelling evidence

. ” Johnson v. S tate , N o. 14

- 93

- 0 0367

- CR, 1994 W L 622048, at *1 (Tex . App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 10, 1994 , pe t. ref ’ d ) (not designat ed for publication) ; accord Diamond Of fs hore Servs. Ltd. v . Williams , 54 2 S.W.3 d 539, 54 2 (Tex. 2018) ( “ A video can be the single mo st c ompelli ng piece o f evidence in a case, captivating the jury ’ s attention like no other evidence could

. ” ). The video sho wed appellant driving “ off the road ” at s ixty

- five miles pe r hour , and se emingly witho ut braking , headlong into the driver ’ s side of the victims ’ car , wh ich was st opped and waiting to turn into the roadway

. The force of the impact killed the t wo occupants almost instantly and propelled the ir c ar into a power pole , which in tur n cause d a9

trans former to “ explode

. ” Emergency re sponders h ad t o use t he “ jaws of lif

e ” to

access the victims ’ car and retr ieve their bodies.
S imilarly, d uring closing arguments , t he State emp hasized the conscious choice ap pellant m ade to dr ink a nd drive , des pit e bein g a bartender who

“ understands that peop le who are intoxic ated shou ldn ’ t operate mot o r vehicles , ” and the enormous impact of the crime on the family of the victims, a fifty

- five

ye ar

- old mother and her son who w as month s shy of h is tw enty

- fi rst bi rth day

. The State refer

red to the t estimony from appell ant ’ s fathe r, J im, w ho tes tified on
ap pellant ’ s behalf. Jim testified that a p pellant f elt like “ the victims ’ family is, you know, ou t for blood ” and that appella nt blamed the distri ct at torney ’ s offi ce for being too vindictive against her.
The permissib le p u nishme nt i s bet ween t wo and twenty years ’ confinement and a fine of not more than $10 ,000. See Tex. Penal Code § § 12.33 (second

degree felony punishment), 4 9. 08(b) (intoxicatio n man slaughter is a s econd

- deg ree felony)

. The jury assessed punishment o f fi fteen y ears ’ co n fineme nt for each
count and did not assess a general fine under section 12.33 for either count. 4 T he jury also found that appellant used or exhibited a deadly w eapon for each count. Thus , altho ugh t he sentence s were on the hi gher end of the stat utory ran ge, the j ury did not assess the ma ximum allowable

. 5

4 We note that defen se counsel explained to th e jury that appellant would be eli gible f or community super v is io n ( which he h ad previously said she had not “ earned ”) if the y sentence d appellant to c onfinement for two to ten years

. T he written judgment includes a $100 fine under Code of Crim in a l Proc edure article 102.0185

.

5 During the sent encing hearing, the co urt gra nted the State ’ s motion to stack these two sentences. T he judgmen t accordingly orders t hat the punishment for cou nt two would run
cons ecutively with the punishment for coun t o ne

. See T ex . C ode Crim. Proc. a rt. 4 2.08(a). Appellant does not challen ge th is aspect of the ju dgmen t.10

Ba sed on our review of the entire record, w e conclude that the jury likely did
not give the brief evidence of appell ant ’ s pos t

- Miranda c onver satio n s with the

o fficer s significant wei gh t and ins tead focused , as the prosecutor urged , on t he severity of the acts con stitu ting the o ffense and “ the traged y [the victims ’ ] family has had to en d ure and will en dure for the rest o f the ir lives

. ” W e determine beyond

a re asonable doubt that the e rr or , if an y, did not contribute to the jury ’ s a ssessm ent of punish ment. See, e.g. , Snowden , 353 S. W.3 d at 825

- 26 ; Fe nn v. State , No. 01

- 10

- 00383

- CR, 2011 WL 2651914, at * 4

- 5 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [1s t Dist.] Jul y 7, 2011, pet . ref ’ d ) (mem. o p., not designat ed for publ ic ation ) (assuming prosecutor ’ s

comme nt on defendant ’ s silence was error, error did not contribu te to conviction or punishment). We overrule appellant ’ s first issue.
B. Admiss ion of Medical Re cords

I n h er second issue, appe llant com plains about the a dmission of a lab report show ing that her bloo d alcohol content two hours after the crash was 0.254 . Based on that test result, a nurse w ho tre ated appe llant testified that appellant was

su ffering from acute alco hol toxici t y on the night of the crash

. 6 Appellant contends that the lab report is inadm issible hearsay within hears ay

. Sh e also asserts what we
construe as a Confrontation Clause argument

. We review a trial court ’ s ruling on
t h e admission of evide nce for an abuse of d i scretion. See Wells v. State , 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 020 ). A t r ial c ourt a buse s its discretion when its decision lies outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement .” Id. Hearsay is a written or or a l statement, other t han one made by the d e clarant

w hile testifying at the tri al or heari ng, offered into eviden ce to prov e the truth of

6 A witn ess testified without objection tha t the “ legal le vel of into xication [ for drivers] ” is 0 .08

. See T ex. Pen. Code § 49.01(2)( b )

.11

t he matter asserted; and a s such, hearsay is inadmissible evidence unless expressly

e xcepted or excluded from this gene r al rule by statute o r the rules of e viden c e. See T ex. R. Evid. 80 1(a), (d), 802. “If t he out

- of

- court stateme nt is rele v ant o nly if the trier of fact believes t hat the statement was both truthful and accurate, then the
st atement is hearsay.” Coble v. S t ate , 330 S.W.3d 253, 290 n.101 (Tex. Crim

. App. 201 0) ( internal qu otation omi tted); Jone s v. State , 466 S.W.3d 252 , 263 ( T ex. A pp.

— Housto n [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref ’ d )

. A statement about a statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted is consid e red hea rsay within h earsay. At trial, def

ense counsel timely asser ted a doubl e hearsay objection to the enti rety o f appellant ’ s medical records, which consisted of 127 pages. When an exhibit encompasses multiple statements, only some of which are inadmis sible hea rsay, an obj ecting party must i de ntify the specific statem ents that a re objectionable to preserve any erro r for appellate review. See, e.g. , Whitaker v. State , 286 S.W.3d 355, 368

- 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (global hearsay objection to audiotapes insufficie nt to prese rve erro r as to spe ci fic statements made withi n recording ); Barnes v. State , 876 S.W.2d 316, 3 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (global hearsay objection to entire packet of documents insufficient to preserve error as to specific subset of doc uments within pac ket) ; Her nandez v. Stat e , 599 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex . Crim. App

. 1980) (op. on reh ’ g) (when evidence is admitted, a part of which is admissible and a part of which is not, it is incumbent on the party objecting to the admissibility of the ev idence to specificall y point ou t what pa rt is inadmissible to prese rve the all eged error )

. O ther than the single p age of the la b report containing appellant ’ s toxic ology test results, appellant did not d irect the trial court to any other purported double hearsay within the me dical records. Thu s, we confine our evaluatio n of appell ant ’ s double hear say argument to the lab report
page that appellant specifically identified. To the e xtent that appellant complains12

a bout the admi ssion of any o ther portions of the medical records , we conclude that she did not preserve her appe ll ate compl aint because her objection was not

su fficiently specific

. S ee Martin v. State , 151 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.

— Texarkan a 2004 , pet. ref ’ d) (holding error not preserved whe n couns el did not specifical ly object to embedded hearsay) ; s ee Tex. R. Ap p. P. 33.1( a) (1) (A)

. When hearsay contains hearsay, the r ules of e vidence require t hat each part of the combined statements be within an exception to the hearsay rule. Tex. R. Evid. 805 ; S anchez v. State , 354 S.W.3d 476, 485

- 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)

. T he lab rep o rt page was included in the totality of the medical records a dmitted int o evidence. These record s were accompanied by a bu siness records affidavit consistent with t he hearsay ex ception contained in Rule 803(6). Appellant does not di spute that the medica l records fa ll within the business records exception to th e hearsay rule.

A s to t h e specific lab r eport page containing appell ant ’ s blood alcohol test

re sult, the State argues t hat page is a dmissible under the hearsay exception for

s tatements m ade for me d ical diagno sis or treatment

. Tex. R. Evid. 803(4). Under this exceptio n, a hearsay statement is n ot excluded if it : “(A) is made for

— and is reasonably pertinent to

— medical dia gnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or pre sent sympt o ms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.” Tex. R. Evi d. 803(4). For this except ion to appl y , the proponent must show that (1) the out

- of

- court declarant was a ware that the statements were made for purposes of medi c al diagnosi s or treat m ent, and that proper diagnosis or treatment depended upon the veracity o f the statements, and (2) t he statements are pertinent to diagnosis o r treatment, that is, it was reasonab le for the care provider to rely on the statements in di agnosing or treating t he declarant. Taylor v. State , 268 S.W.3d 571, 588

- 89, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Jackson v. State , N o . 14

- 19

-13

00365

- CR , 2 020 WL 6326373 , at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] O ct. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op

. , n ot designated for publication)

. The r eco rd demonstrates that appellant was transporte d to the hospit al after receiv i ng several injuries during the crash

. The medical records reflect the ho s pital staff ’ s diagnosis and tre atment , which included a diag nosis that appel lant was suffer ing fr o m acu te al c ohol toxicity

. The State called as a witness the emergency

room nurse w ho treated appellant on the night of the in cident . She explained that an analysis of appellant ’ s blood a l cohol con tent was pertinent to the doctor ’ s diagnosis of acute alco hol t oxici t y

. The toxicology report con t aining appellan t ’s blood alcoho l level spe cifically state d that the testing results “ should be used for medi cal purposes only. ” We hold that the bl ood test per forme d at the hospital by hospital staff w as conduc ted for m edica l diagnosis or treatment, and t he test result s

w ere admissible under Ru le 803(4). See Garza v. State , No. 13

- 1 9

- 00472

- CR, 2021 WL 822301, at * 4

- 5 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Mar. 4 , 2021 , no p et. ) (mem. op., not designated for pu blication ). The t rial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant ’ s hearsay within he arsay objection to the lab report. Appellant appears to raise an additional challenge to th e la b report ’ s admissibility

. Appellant contends that the wi tness called by the S tate “ coul d not lay a proper found ation , as she : i) could not testify that the lab was properly accredited at the time the testing was conducted; ii) lacked the training and professional cr edentials to understand or interpret the test results; and iii) was not invol v ed in the testing process at the lab. ” Th is argument implicates the Con frontation Clause. See, e.g. , Russ ell v. State , No. 14

- 15

- 00036

- CR, 2016 WL 1402943, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] Apr . 7, 2016 , pet . ref ’ d ) (mem. op., not designat e d fo r pub l ication) ( “ As is clea r from these excerpts, the objection14

appellant made to the blood analysis evidence was that he had not had an opportunity to confront the nurse who had drawn the blood from who m the ‘ whole foundation ’ of the ‘ blood itself ’ w a s co ming. This objection may b e construed as a Confrontation Clause objection and perhaps that the proper foundation had not been laid to the admission of the blood. ” )

. Th e single sente nce quo ted above from appellant ’ s brief constitutes the entirety of appe llant ’ s Confrontation Claus e argument

. A ppellant cites no law

r egarding the C on frontation Clause, nor does she substantively explain that the admi ssion of the toxic ology report violat ed her constitutional rights. Our briefing rules require an appell ant ’ s br ie f to contain a clear and con cise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to auth orit ies and the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i). Appellant ’ s Confrontation Clause contention does not comply with th is rule, and therefore w e do no t add r ess the merit of appellant ’ s argument. See Cain v. State , 501 S.W.3d 17 2, 176 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2016 , no pet. ) ( “ To th e extent Cain ’ s appeal intends to claim a Confrontation Clause violation, it is overruled as insufficientl y briefed

. ” ) ; acc ord a lso D e witt v. State , 651 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [14th Dist.] 2022 , no pet. ) ( “ Because hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are sepa rate grounds to object to the admission o f evidence, we conclude appellant has waived his hearsay co mplaint due t o fai l ure to properly brief the issue. ” ).

I n any event , we note in closing tha t any error in the admission of the lab report was harmless

. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2 (b)

. Not only did a ppellant plead guilty to intoxic ation manslau ghter , but a mple evide nce o f app e ll ant ’ s int oxication was in tr od u ced beyond the t oxicology results. Of fi cer s Jrab and Flor es testified
t hat, when in the bac k of the ambul ance, appellant admitted consuming four alcoholic beverages before drivi ng an d admitted sitting in her car for t wenty15

minutes bef

ore leaving her poin t of ori gin “ in order to sober up

. ” Of f i cer Flores
t estified tha t he could “ smell alcohol on [appellant ]. ” The jury also watched video of the acc iden t, which , a s described above , sho wed the forceful collis io n bet ween appel l ant ’ s car a nd the victim s ’ car

. We conclude that any error in t he admis sion of the toxic ology results did not affect appell ant ’ s substantial rights

. See Blackwell v. State , No. 03

- 03

- 00337

- CR, 200 5 WL 5482 45, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Au stin M ar. 10, 2005, no pet.) ( mem. op., not d e signated fo r publication).

W e o v err u le appellant ’ s s econd issue.
C onclus ion
We aff irm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Kevin Jewell Justice

Panel consists of Justi ces Jewell, Spain, and Wi lson

. (Spain, J ., dissenting) Pu blish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2( b).