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*********************************************** 
THOMAS G. STONE III v. EAST COAST

SWAPPERS, LLC

(SC 20382)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 42-110g (d)), ‘‘[i]n any action brought by a person’’

under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a

et seq.), ‘‘the court may award . . . reasonable attorneys’ fees based

on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount

of recovery.’’

The plaintiff sought to recover damages and attorney’s fees from the defendant, a motor vehicle repair shop, for violation of CUTPA in connection

with the installation of a modified engine in a car owned by K, the

plaintiff’s son-in-law, and financed through W Co., a third-party automobile finance company. The plaintiff had loaned K the money to pay the

defendant for the requested work, but the engine was never installed

because K did not want to pay for certain additional costs that the

defendant indicated were necessary for installation. K subsequently

failed to repay the loan, and the plaintiff obtained a judgment against

K and secured a lien on the car that was subsequent in right only to

that of W Co. The plaintiff informed the defendant of his status as a

second position lienholder on the car’s title. Subsequently, the defendant,

which had retained the car, sold it at an auction. The plaintiff alleged

that the defendant had violated CUTPA by refusing to perform the work

that had been paid for and by failing to provide the plaintiff, a lienholder,

with statutory notice of the auction. The trial court concluded that the

plaintiff had proven a CUTPA violation and awarded him damages. The

court also concluded, however, that the plaintiff had not proven the

evil motive or malice necessary to award punitive damages, and it exercised its discretion by finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to

attorney’s fees. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment

to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had

declined to award him attorney’s fees. The Appellate Court affirmed the

trial court’s judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification,

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that this court should adopt

a presumption pursuant to which a plaintiff prevailing in a CUTPA action

should ordinarily recover attorney’s fees under § 42-110g (d) unless

special circumstances would render such an award unjust: there was

no language in § 42-110g (d) or legislative history indicating that the

legislature intended a presumption in favor of attorney’s fees, this court

has previously held that an award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA is

discretionary, and this court declined to import such a presumption into

CUTPA when the legislature did not choose to include one; moreover,

the legislature has directed that the courts of this state, in interpreting

the provisions of CUTPA, shall be guided by interpretations given by

the Federal Trade Commission in interpreting the federal analogue to

CUTPA, and that commission has not adopted a presumption in favor

of awarding attorney’s fees for violations of the federal analogue.

2. The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court had not

abused its discretion when it declined to award the plaintiff attorney’s

fees under the test applicable to awarding punitive damages under

CUTPA: the trial court failed to recognize the different purposes that

attorney’s fees and punitive damages serve under CUTPA, and, by identifying the more demanding test for awarding punitive damages, namely,

intentional, wanton, malicious, or evil conduct, as its rationale for not

awarding attorney’s fees under § 42-110g (d), the trial court improperly

required a more demanding showing from the plaintiff, which was at

odds with the purpose of the attorney’s fees provision in CUTPA, that

is, to foster the use of private attorneys in vindicating the public goal

of ferreting out unfair trade practices by commercial actors in connection with consumer transactions; accordingly, the case was remanded for
reconsideration of the plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney’s fees.

Argued June 1—officially released December 11, 2020*

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, violation

of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, and for

other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Hartford, where the court, Huddleston, J.,

granted in part the defendant’s motion to strike; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Noble, J.; judgment

for the plaintiff, from which the plaintiff appealed to

the Appellate Court, Alvord, Bright and Norcott, Js.,

which affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.

Reversed; further proceedings.

William J. O’Sullivan, with whom, on the brief, was

Michelle M. Seery, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Mario Cerame, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy Brignole, for the appellee (defendant).

J.L. Pottenger, Jr., Jeffrey Gentes, and Sophie Laing

and Stefanie Ostrowski, law student interns, filed a brief

for the Housing Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization et al. as amici curiae.
Opinion

McDONALD, J. This certified appeal requires us to

consider the circumstances under which a plaintiff may

be denied attorney’s fees under the Connecticut Unfair

Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-

110a et seq. The plaintiff, Thomas G. Stone III, appeals

from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the

judgment of the trial court, which found that the defendant, East Coast Swappers, LLC, had violated CUTPA

and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, but

declined to award punitive damages or attorney’s fees.

See Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 191 Conn. App.

63, 65, 213 A.3d 499 (2019). The plaintiff contends that

we should adopt a presumption whereby a plaintiff

prevailing in a CUTPA action should ordinarily recover

attorney’s fees under General Statutes § 42-110g (d)

unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust. Regardless of whether we adopt such a

presumption, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate

Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not

abused its discretion when it failed to award the plaintiff

attorney’s fees. Although we decline to adopt the plaintiff’s suggested presumption, we conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion.

The Appellate Court’s decision sets forth a detailed

recitation of the facts as found by the trial court; see

id., 65–71; which we summarize in relevant part. Patrick

Keithan, who was the plaintiff’s son-in-law at the time,

purchased a 2008 Mitsubishi Lancer Evolution from a

car dealership in Georgia, where he was stationed for

his military service. He financed the purchase, in part,

through a loan from Wachovia Dealer Services, Inc.1

Thereafter, Keithan experienced performance issues

with the car’s engine. He towed the car from Georgia

to Windsor Locks, Connecticut, where the defendant,

a motor vehicle repair shop, was located. The defendant

initially replaced the car’s turbocharger, but the engine

still experienced performance issues. Keithan returned

to Georgia to fulfill his military service obligations and

left the car with the defendant. Keithan ultimately

decided to have the defendant install a Buschur Racing

short block.2 A co-owner of the defendant, Paul Scott,

drafted an estimate for this work, which he sent to Keithan.

The estimate referenced the purchase of the Buschur

Racing short block and its installation and provided an

estimated cost of more than $9000.

The plaintiff loaned Keithan the money to pay the

defendant. A promissory note for the loan was executed

by Keithan and his wife, the plaintiff’s daughter. Keithan’s wife subsequently sent a check to the defendant

for the contracted amount.

Upon receipt of the payment, the defendant shipped

the car’s engine to Buschur Racing, which performed

the requested work on the engine and returned the
modified engine to the defendant. As Scott prepared

the modified engine for installation, his foreman

informed him that additional parts were needed to

install the engine. The foreman discovered that these

parts were damaged when he took the original engine

apart to prepare to send it to Buschur Racing. A request

for additional funding for the parts was communicated

to Keithan, but he did not want to pay the extra money,

and the modified engine was never installed in the car.3

The car remained in the defendant’s possession.

Keithan never repaid the plaintiff any portion of the

loan. Consequently, the plaintiff attempted to obtain

title to the car by filing a title application with the motor

vehicle division of the Georgia Department of Revenue.

He was unsuccessful because the title application

required Keithan’s signature, which was missing.

The plaintiff subsequently traveled from his residence

in Maryland to the defendant’s location and asked to

see the car. Scott refused to allow the plaintiff to look

at the car or the modified engine and informed him that

the engine had never been reinstalled and that Keithan

had refused to pay for any of the extra work or parts

involved. Thereafter, another co-owner of the defendant

sent a letter to Keithan, in which she indicated that she

had been contacted by the plaintiff. The letter referenced the sum of $14,151.71 being owed to the defendant, which represented the costs of additional

shipping, engine parts, and storage over the previous

year.

The plaintiff subsequently filed an action against Keithan in Maryland and obtained a judgment in the amount

of $10,348. This judgment permitted the plaintiff to

eventually secure a lien on the car subsequent in right

to that of Wells Fargo Auto Finance. See footnote 1 of

this opinion. The lien was reflected in a certificate of

title, which was issued by the Georgia Department of

Revenue.

Thereafter, the defendant filed a ‘‘Notice of Intent

to Sell’’ or an ‘‘Artificer’s Lien’’4 with the Connecticut

Department of Motor Vehicles, claiming a lien of $1792.

The Department of Motor Vehicles issued the defendant

an ‘‘Affidavit of Compliance and Ownership Transfer’’

for use in providing valid title to a purchaser for a

vehicle subject to an artificer’s lien.

Extensive communications took place between the

plaintiff, the plaintiff’s wife, and the defendant’s owners

regarding the plaintiff’s obtaining the car in satisfaction

of his lien. During these communications, the plaintiff

informed the defendant that he had secured his status

as a second position lienholder on the Georgia title.

The plaintiff, however, had not provided the defendant

with a copy of the new Georgia title.

Keithan filed for bankruptcy protection in Maryland

and secured the discharge of the plaintiff’s judgment.
Wells Fargo’s security interest was identified as $10,700

at the time of the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy

petition, which was obtained by the defendant’s counsel, identified the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor.

Thereafter, both parties retained counsel who

exchanged communications regarding their clients’

respective claims related to the vehicle. In September,

2013, the plaintiff commenced the underlying action

against the defendant, alleging, among other things, that

the defendant had violated CUTPA.5

In November, 2013,

the defendant, on the advice of its counsel, sold the car

at an auction for $19,000. Although he had provided

notice of the auction to Keithan and Wells Fargo and

published notice in a local newspaper, Scott, on behalf

of the defendant, did not provide notice of the auction

to the plaintiff.

The record reveals the following procedural history.

In December, 2016, the plaintiff filed the operative, single count complaint, alleging that the defendant had

violated CUTPA by refusing to perform the work that

had been paid for—namely, failing to install the modified engine in the car—and by failing to provide the

plaintiff, a lienholder, with statutory notice of the auction.6 The case was tried to the court in January, 2017.

The trial court issued a memorandum of decision

in which it concluded that the plaintiff ‘‘has proven a

violation of CUTPA7

[but] has not proven the evil motive

or malice necessary to award punitive damages, and

[the trial court] exercise[d] its discretion by finding that

the plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney’s

fees. Damages [were] awarded in the amount of $8300.’’

(Footnote added.)

In declining to award either punitive damages or

attorney’s fees, the court reasoned: ‘‘The court finds as

a matter of fact that the plaintiff has not proven that

[the defendant’s] actions constituted a reckless indifference to the rights of [the plaintiff], an intentional and

wanton violation of his rights, malice or evil. [The defendant] had been given an application for a title listing

[the plaintiff] as a second position lienholder but had

never been provided with the actual title. [The defendant] did make the effort to review Keithan’s bankruptcy filing, which listed [the plaintiff] as an unsecured

creditor. [The defendant] did consult with counsel

before selling the vehicle at auction. The court cannot

find, therefore, that [the defendant’s] actions warrant

punitive damages. For similar reasons, the court exercises its discretion and does not award attorney’s fees

to the plaintiff.’’

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment

to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court erred

in failing to award him attorney’s fees. While the appeal

was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting that

the trial court articulate the factual and legal bases for
its decision not to award attorney’s fees. Specifically,

the plaintiff requested that the court clarify its use of

the phrase ‘‘[f]or similar reasons’’ in its memorandum

of decision. The trial court issued an articulation,

explaining: ‘‘The use of the phrase ‘similar reasons’ was

meant to signify that the court relied on the same reasons enumerated in the preceding sentences, to wit,

‘[the defendant] had been given an application for a

title listing [the plaintiff] as a second position lienholder

but had never been provided with the actual title. [The

defendant] did make the effort to review Keithan’s bankruptcy filing, which listed [the plaintiff] as an unsecured

creditor. [The defendant] did consult with counsel

before selling the vehicle at auction.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.)

The Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that it should recognize a rebuttable presumption whereby a prevailing plaintiff in a CUTPA action

‘‘should ordinarily recover attorney’s fees unless special

circumstances would render such an award unjust.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone v. East Coast

Swappers, LLC, supra, 191 Conn. App. 72. The Appellate

Court reasoned that the use of the word ‘‘may’’ in § 42-

110g (d) indicates that the statute does not provide

for a mandatory award of fees; rather, the court has

discretion to award attorney’s fees. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 74. It also reasoned that such a

rebuttable presumption would result in a loss of the trial

court’s statutory discretion. Id., 74–75. The Appellate

Court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the

trial court abused its discretion in declining to award

attorney’s fees, reasoning that, ‘‘[a]lthough the [trial]

court relied on the same factual findings in its decision

not to award punitive damages, nothing in the court’s

memorandum of decision or articulation suggests that

the court improperly required the plaintiff to show, in

order to be entitled to recover attorney’s fees, that the

defendant acted with malice, reckless disregard, or evil

intent.’’ Id., 76.

We thereafter granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did

the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied an

award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff after the plaintiff

prevailed on his claim under [CUTPA]?’’ Stone v. East

Coast Swappers, LLC, 333 Conn. 924, 217 A.3d 993

(2019).

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate

Court incorrectly focused on the phrase ‘‘may award’’

in § 42-110g (d) in isolation and should have construed

CUTPA’s fee shifting provision broadly in favor of the

plaintiff, as one whom the legislature intended to benefit, and in light of CUTPA’s remedial purpose to encourage attorneys to accept and litigate unfair trade

practices claims. The plaintiff further contends that we
should take this opportunity to emphasize that ‘‘a decision whether to award [attorney’s] fees under CUTPA

is distinct from the decision regarding punitive damages

and requires a distinct analysis . . . .’’ In particular, he

argues that we should adopt a presumption whereby a

prevailing plaintiff in a CUTPA action should ordinarily

receive a fee award unless a trial court finds that special

circumstances would render a fee award unjust. Regardless of whether we adopt such a presumption, the plaintiff also contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the trial court required proof of reckless

disregard or malice as a prerequisite to an award of

attorney’s fees.

The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s construction of ‘‘may award’’ in § 42-110g (d) is at odds with

the plain meaning of the statute and there is no basis

in the legislative history of the statute to conclude that

this court should adopt a presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. The defendant

also contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney’s fees because,

affording the trial court every reasonable presumption

in favor of upholding the ruling, it simply found the

plaintiff’s arguments for fees unavailing.

Whether the phrase ‘‘may award’’ in § 42-110g (d)

establishes a presumption that a prevailing plaintiff

should ordinarily recover attorney’s fees in a CUTPA

action is a question of statutory interpretation over

which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Ulbrich v. Groth,

310 Conn. 375, 448, 78 A.3d 76 (2013). ‘‘In making such

determinations, we are guided by fundamental principles of statutory construction.’’ In re Matthew F., 297

Conn. 673, 688, 4 A.3d 248 (2010), overruled in part on

other grounds by In re Jose B., 303 Conn. 569, 34 A.3d

975 (2012); see General Statutes § 1-2z. ‘‘[O]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

apparent intent of the legislature.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308,

943 A.2d 1075 (2008). ‘‘[I]t is a basic tenet of statutory

construction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole

and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a

reasonable overall interpretation.’’ (Emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. Dept. of

Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 403–404, 999

A.2d 682 (2010). ‘‘Legislative intent is not to be found

in an isolated sentence; the whole statute must be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Historic

District Commission v. Hall, 282 Conn. 672, 684, 923

A.2d 726 (2007).

We are mindful that CUTPA, as a remedial act, is

‘‘construed liberally in an effort to effectuate its public

policy goals.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Associated Investment Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Williams

Associates IV, 230 Conn. 148, 158, 645 A.2d 505 (1994);
see also General Statutes § 42-110b (d). CUTPA’s primary goal is ‘‘eliminating or discouraging unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or

practices.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 184 Conn. 607,

616–17, 440 A.2d 810 (1981). As a result, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff

who establishes CUTPA liability has access to a remedy

far more comprehensive than the simple damages

recoverable under common law. The ability to recover

both [attorney’s] fees . . . and punitive damages . . .

enhances the private CUTPA remedy and serves to

encourage private CUTPA litigation.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 617.

We begin with the text of the statute. Section 42-110g

(d) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any action brought by

a person under this section, the court may award, to

the plaintiff, in addition to the relief provided in this

section, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on

the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not

on the amount of recovery. . . .’’ The term ‘‘may award’’

is not defined in § 42-110g; nor is it defined in the provision setting forth the definitions used within CUTPA,

§ 42-110a.

We have previously explained that ‘‘the word ‘may’

imports permissive conduct and the conferral of discretion. . . . Only when the context of legislation permits

such interpretation and if the interpretation is necessary

to make a legislative enactment effective to carry out

its purposes, should the word ‘may’ be interpreted as

mandatory rather than directory.’’ (Citations omitted.)

State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn. 5, 17–18, 912 A.2d 992 (2007).

Section 1-2z directs us to consider related statutory

provisions to determine whether the text is ambiguous.

Accordingly, we look to a related subsection of § 42-

110g to put the legislature’s use of ‘‘may award’’ in

subsection (d) in context. See, e.g., Studer v. Studer, 320

Conn. 483, 489, 131 A.3d 240 (2016) (‘‘[i]n interpreting

a statute, [r]elated statutory provisions . . . often provide guidance in determining the meaning of a particular

word’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 42-

110g (a), CUTPA’s punitive damages provision, provides

in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the

use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may bring an action . . . to

recover actual damages. . . . The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages . . . .’’

We find it significant that the legislature employed

the term ‘‘may award’’ in the attorney’s fees provision;

General Statutes § 42-110g (d); but employed ‘‘may, in

its discretion, award’’ in the punitive damages provision. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 42-110g (a).

The addition of the phrase ‘‘in its discretion’’ in subsection (a) renders the legislature’s use of ‘‘may award’’

in subsection (d) ambiguous because it demonstrates
that the legislature did not use ‘‘may award’’ uniformly

in § 42-110g. Cf. Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284

Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39 (2008) (‘‘[t]he use of the

different terms . . . within the same statute suggests

that the legislature acted with complete awareness of

their different meanings . . . and that it intended the

terms to have different meanings’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). We conclude that ‘‘may award’’ in § 42-

110g (d) is ambiguous because, when read in context,

it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc., 322

Conn. 291, 303, 140 A.3d 950 (2016).

A broader understanding of the attorney’s fees and

punitive damages provisions of CUTPA is foundational

to our analysis. We have previously explained the distinction between attorney’s fees and punitive damages

under CUTPA: ‘‘Section 42-110g (a) expressly authorizes the trial court to award punitive damages in addition to the award of attorney’s fees authorized by § 42-

110g (d). Nothing in the language of the statute suggests

that punitive damages are the same as attorney’s fees,

consistent with the common-law rule. If the legislature

had intended to impose such a limitation, it presumably

would have done so either by authorizing the trial court

to award double attorney’s fees or by authorizing it

to award double punitive damages. The fact that the

legislature enacted two distinct provisions indicates

that it contemplated two distinct types of awards. See

Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 666 n.8, 509 A.2d 11

(1986) (‘[when] CUTPA applies, it permits a recovery

of punitive damages and attorney’s fees that the common law does not ordinarily permit’); Hinchliffe v.

American Motors Corp., [supra, 184 Conn. 617] (‘The

plaintiff who establishes CUTPA liability has access

to a remedy far more comprehensive than the simple

damages recoverable under common law. The ability

to recover both [attorney’s] fees . . . and punitive

damages . . . enhances the private CUTPA remedy

and serves to encourage private CUTPA litigation.’

. . .).’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) Ulbrich

v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 449–50.

This distinction exists because, unlike the purpose

of permitting an award of attorney’s fees—to foster the

use of private attorneys in vindicating the public goal

of ferreting out unfair trade practices in consumer transactions by commercial actors generally—the purposes

of punitive damages are focused on deterrence and

punishment of particular commercial actors. See id.,

455 n.64; see also Hylton v. Gunter, 313 Conn. 472,

486 n.14, 97 A.3d 970 (2014) (punitive damages under

CUTPA are distinct from common-law punitive damages because ‘‘they are not intended merely to compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused by the defendant’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)). As such, punitive

damages under CUTPA are not limited to the measure of
common-law punitive damages, and the most important

factor in measuring punitive damages under CUTPA is

the ‘‘reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct . . . .’’

Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 455. The Appellate

Court has similarly explained that, under CUTPA, a

plaintiff’s ‘‘entitlement to recover attorney’s fees stands

on a different footing’’ than his or her entitlement to

punitive damages. New England Custom Concrete, LLC

v.Carbone, 102 Conn. App. 652, 667, 927 A.2d 333 (2007).

In short, the analysis for awarding attorney’s fees is

distinct from the analysis for awarding punitive

damages.

CUTPA’s legislative history underscores the purpose

of the attorney’s fees provision. In 1976, the legislature

amended the attorney’s fees provision to strengthen

CUTPA’s mechanism of encouraging private litigation

by removing the court’s authority to award attorney’s

fees to the prevailing party and providing instead for

fee awards only to prevailing plaintiffs.8 See Public Acts

1976, No. 76-303, § 3; see also Gill v. Petrazzuoli Bros.,

Inc., 10 Conn. App. 22, 32, 521 A.2d 212 (1987). Representative Raymond C. Ferrari remarked: ‘‘The purpose

of this act is to stop unfair or deceptive practices. The

only way to accomplish that effectively is to encourage

litigation by private parties. The only way to encourage

that litigation in the public interest is to provide only

for attorney’s fees in the case for plaintiffs.’’ 19 H.R.

Proc., Pt. 6, 1976 Sess., p. 2191. Similarly, Senator Louis

Ciccarello explained: ‘‘[B]oth the [Department] of Consumer Protection and the Attorney General’s [O]ffice

and private attorneys are all of the opinion that in order

to protect consumers of the [s]tate that plaintiff’s fees

are extremely necessary. The reason for, there is a lot

of hesitancy in bringing [an action] of this nature and

in order to pursue this sort of private attorney general

method, you have to have plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. I

think it’s fair and I think it should also be pointed out

that reasonable attorney’s fees are granted only upon

discretion of the court, so therefore, a plaintiff may not

be able to receive any fees whatsoever.’’ 19 S. Proc.,

Pt. 6, 1976 Sess., p. 2278.

The attorney’s fees provision is integral to effectuating CUTPA’s policy of encouraging litigants to act as

private attorneys general. It serves to ‘‘encourage attorneys to accept and litigate CUTPA cases. CUTPA cases,

however, may entail long hours with little likelihood of

an award that will cover reasonable expenses. For this

reason . . . § 42-110g (d) offers an attorney who

accepts a CUTPA case the prospect of recovering reasonable fees and costs.’’ Gill v. Petrazzuoli Bros., Inc.,

supra, 10 Conn. App. 33. The present case, in which the

trial court awarded $8300 in compensatory damages,

demonstrates the importance of the attorney’s fees provision. If attorneys did not have the prospect of recovering fees, there would be little incentive for them to

litigate cases with small damages at stake, even if the
unfair trade practice conduct was substantial. See Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., 191 Conn.

App. 110, 132, 213 A.3d 542 (2019) (‘‘[t]he availability

of statutory attorney’s fees under CUTPA serves both

to deter unfair trade practices and to compensate attorneys for taking on small cases to enforce the public

policy of protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive conduct’’ (emphasis added)). Thus, a court’s inquiry

into whether to award attorney’s fees is largely distinct

from whether to award punitive damages because fees

seek to encourage attorneys to take on CUTPA litigation, whereas punitive damages seek to address reprehensible conduct.

Having established that a trial court’s determination

of whether to award attorney’s fees is distinct from the

determination of whether to award punitive damages,

the question that remains is whether we should adopt

a presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees to

a prevailing plaintiff in a CUTPA action. There is no

language in § 42-110g (d) and no legislative history indicating that the legislature intended a presumption in

favor of attorney’s fees. As this court has previously

stated, ‘‘[a]warding . . . attorney’s fees under CUTPA

is discretionary . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Gargano

v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616, 622, 525 A.2d 1343 (1987);

see also Woronecki v. Trappe, 228 Conn. 574, 580 n.7,

637 A.2d 783 (1994); Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209

Conn. 579, 590, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989). The legislative

history of § 42-110g (d) also makes clear that legislators

found it significant that ‘‘reasonable attorney’s fees are

granted only upon discretion of the court, so therefore,

a plaintiff may not be able to receive any fees whatsoever.’’ (Emphasis added.) 19 S. Proc., supra, p. 2278,

remarks of Senator Ciccarello.

Our legislature has employed presumptions in other

statutes and has chosen not to do so here. See, e.g.,

General Statutes § 5-145a (hypertension and heart disease presumed to have been suffered in performance

of certain personnel’s duty); General Statutes § 46b-56b

(presumption that it is in best interest of child to be in

custody of parent); General Statutes § 52-183 (presumption of agency in motor vehicle operation); General

Statutes § 52-470 (d) (rebuttable presumption of delay

without good cause for habeas petitions filed outside

time limits). ‘‘Our case law is clear . . . that when the

legislature chooses to act, it is presumed to know how

to draft legislation consistent with its intent and to

know of all other existing statutes . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 155, 12 A.3d 948 (2011); see

also Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner of

Revenue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 219, 38 A.3d 1183 (‘‘it

is a well settled principle of statutory construction that

the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly

. . . or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses

to do so’’ (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 940,
133 S. Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012). We decline

to import such a presumption into CUTPA’s statutory

framework when the legislature did not choose to

include one.

Moreover, we are mindful that, in interpreting the

statutory provisions of CUTPA, ‘‘[t]he legislature has

directed that ‘courts of this state shall be guided by

interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission

and the federal courts to Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal

Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. [§] 45 (a) (1)).’ General Statutes § 42-110b (b).’’ McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 567, 473 A.2d 1185

(1984). Although a small number of states have mandated an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs;

see, e.g., Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 187 N.J. Super.

465, 469, 473, 455 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1982) (under

New Jersey law, award of attorney’s fees to prevailing

consumer is mandatory under provisions of state Consumer Fraud Act); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662,

669 (Tex. 1977) (under Texas law, ‘‘the consumer who

proves all the elements required to recover actual monetary damages shall recover three times the actual monetary damages and, supported by adequate proof,

reasonable [attorney’s] fees and court costs’’); our

research has not revealed, and the plaintiff does not

contend, that the Federal Trade Commission has

adopted a presumption similar to the one the plaintiff

asks us to adopt.

The plaintiff nonetheless contends that we should

adopt a presumption because claims brought under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and similar federal

statutes contain a similar fee shifting provision—‘‘may

allow’’—and the United States Supreme Court has held

that a prevailing plaintiff ‘‘should ordinarily recover

[attorney’s fees] unless special circumstances would

render such an award unjust.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412,

416–17, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978). The

plaintiff contends that the rationale supporting the presumption in Title VII and similar federal statutes applies

with equal force to fee awards under CUTPA, given that

CUTPA’s purpose to encourage private attorney general

actions is like that of Title VII and similar federal statutes. As the Appellate Court noted, however, Title VII

protects civil rights, which hold an especially valued

status in our law. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park

Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 19 L.

Ed. 2d 1263 (1968) (plaintiff who brings civil rights

action is ‘‘vindicating a policy that Congress considered

of the highest priority’’). Although we do not diminish

the significance or importance of deterring unfair or

deceptive trade practices, the plaintiff does not identify

any authority that suggests we should put protection

from unfair trade practices on the same plane as vindicating violations of civil rights. Two of the cases the
plaintiff relies on are also distinguishable from the present case because, unlike in CUTPA litigation, those

cases involve circumstances in which the prevailing

party did not otherwise have monetary recovery available. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, supra, 419,

421 (prevailing defendant should have possibility of

recovering its expenses in resisting groundless action);

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., supra, 402

(explaining that attorney’s fees are significant because

prevailing plaintiff is not otherwise entitled to damages). Accordingly, we decline to adopt a presumption

in favor of attorney’s fees under § 42-110g (d).

Although we do not agree with the plaintiff that there

is an established statutory presumption in favor of an

award of attorney’s fees, a trial court should be able

to articulate appropriate reasons why it would not exercise its discretion to award attorney’s fees in furtherance of CUTPA’s legislative objectives. Moreover, in

exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider

the purpose of CUTPA attorney’s fees when deciding

whether a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded such

fees. See, e.g., Red Rooster Construction Co. v. River

Associates, Inc., 224 Conn. 563, 575, 620 A.2d 118 (1993)

(trial court’s exercise of discretion ‘‘imports something

more than leeway in decision making and should be

exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and

should not impede or defeat the ends of substantial

justice’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case,

we are mindful that ‘‘[a]warding . . . attorney’s fees

under CUTPA is discretionary; General Statutes § 42-

110g [d] . . . and the exercise of such discretion will

not ordinarily be interfered with on appeal unless the

abuse is manifest or injustice appears to have been

done.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 446. As we

have explained, however, ‘‘[a] court’s discretion must

be informed by the policies that the relevant statute is

intended to advance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology

Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 55, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013).

Indeed, a statute’s purpose is ‘‘a paramount factor for

the trial court to consider’’ when exercising its discretion. Id., 59.

Here, the trial court failed to recognize the difference

between statutory punitive damages and common-law

punitive damages,9 and failed to recognize the different

purposes that attorney’s fees and punitive damages

serve under CUTPA. In its memorandum of decision,

the trial court stated: ‘‘The court finds as a matter of fact

that the plaintiff has not proven that [the defendant’s]

actions constituted a reckless indifference to the rights

of [the plaintiff], an intentional and wanton violation
of his rights, malice or evil. . . . The court cannot find,

therefore, that [the defendant’s] actions warrant punitive damages. For similar reasons, the court exercises

its discretion and does not award attorney’s fees to the

plaintiff.’’ (Emphasis added.) When asked to articulate

what it meant by ‘‘similar reasons,’’ the trial court

explained that ‘‘[t]he use of the phrase ‘similar reasons’

was meant to signify that the court relied on the same

reasons enumerated in the preceding sentences . . . .’’

(Emphasis in original.) The court did not consider the

remedial policy objectives of § 42-110g (d). Rather, the

court identified the more demanding test for awarding

punitive damages—intentional, wanton, malicious, or

evil conduct—as its rationale for not awarding attorney’s fees. It improperly required a more demanding

showing from the plaintiff, which is at odds with the

purpose of the attorney’s fees provision of CUTPA. To

interpret the attorney’s fees provision so narrowly

undermines the legislative intent because it neither

enhances the private CUTPA remedy nor encourages

private CUTPA litigation. See, e.g., Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., supra, 184 Conn. 617.

The defendant contends that the trial court did not

require intentional, wanton, malicious, or evil conduct.

The defendant argues that affording the trial court every

reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the ruling

demonstrates that the trial court simply was not persuaded that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees.

We disagree. After initially stating that, ‘‘[f]or similar

reasons,’’ it was not awarding the plaintiff attorney’s

fees, the trial court removed any doubt that it was

applying the punitive damages standard in its articulation, explaining: ‘‘The use of the phrase ‘similar reasons’

was meant to signify that the court relied on the same

reasons enumerated in the preceding sentences . . . .’’

(Emphasis in original.) Those reasons in the preceding

sentences were solely directed at determining whether

the defendant’s actions constituted a reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff, an intentional and

wanton violation of his rights, malice or evil, in other

words, a determination as to whether the defendant’s

conduct warranted punitive damages. We take the trial

court at its word that it relied on the same factors to

deny attorney’s fees as it did to deny punitive damages.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, applying that

standard to the determination of whether to award

attorney’s fees constituted an abuse of discretion. Cf.

Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc.,

308 Conn. 1, 19, 60 A.3d 222 (2013) (trial court abused

discretion because it failed to apply proper legal test);

Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367, 999

A.2d 721 (2010) (‘‘[n]otwithstanding the great deference

accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a

trial court’s ruling . . . may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong

standard of law’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion

when it declined to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees

under the test applicable to punitive damages.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it

declined to award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff and

to remand the case to that court for its consideration

of the plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney’s fees

consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* December 11, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1

It is undisputed that Wells Fargo Auto Finance is the successor in interest

to Wachovia Dealer Services, Inc., and that it subsequently acquired the debt.

2 A short block is a component of an engine on which other components

are assembled.

3 At trial, Scott testified that, although the estimate stated that it included

installation, he intended the word ‘‘installation’’ to include only the removal

of the car’s engine and not the subsequent installation of the modified engine.

4 A motor vehicle repair shop may apply to obtain an artificer’s lien if it

claims a lien on a motor vehicle in its possession on which it had completed

authorized work that is properly recorded on an invoice, and, ‘‘if no application that the lien be dissolved upon such substitution of a bond is made

within thirty days of the date of the completion of the work upon the

property by the bailor for hire, the bailee shall immediately send a written

notice of intent to sell to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, stating . . .

the date the work was completed . . . [and] the amount for which a lien

is claimed . . . . Upon approval by the commissioner of such notice, the

commissioner shall issue the bailee an affidavit of compliance and such

bailee shall provide such affidavit to the purchaser at the time of sale. . . .’’

General Statutes § 49-61 (b); see also Form H-100A, Connecticut Department

of Motor Vehicles, available at https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/DMV/20/29/

H100Apdf.pdf (last visited December 9, 2020).

Although § 49-61 was the subject of certain amendments in 2014 and 2017;

see Public Acts 2017, No. 17-104, § 1; Public Acts 2017, No. 17-79, § 20; Public

Acts 2014, No. 14-130, § 27; those amendments have no bearing on the merits

of this appeal. See footnote 7 of this opinion. In the interest of simplicity,

we refer to the current revision of the statute.

5 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated General

Statutes § 14-65f (a) when it ‘‘obtained payment from Keithan, using [the

plaintiff’s] funds, through the artifice of falsely promising to install a new

[e]ngine in the [v]ehicle and sought to perpetuate this ruse in its communications with [the plaintiff’s] agent by deliberately attempting to pass off a used

engine as new.’’

6 During the trial, the trial court noted that the discharge of a personal

debt is not ‘‘probative of whether . . . there was a valid lien.’’ Because

neither party has raised the issue of whether the plaintiff’s lien is affected

by the bankruptcy discharge of the plaintiff’s judgment, we have no occasion

to address it.

7 The trial court found that the defendant violated General Statutes §§ 14-

65f and 49-61. Section 14-65f provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Prior to

performing any repair work on a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle repair shop

shall obtain a written authorization to perform the work . . . that includes

an estimate in writing of the maximum cost to the customer of the parts

and labor necessary for the specific job authorized. . . .

* * *

‘‘(b) If the repair shop is unable to estimate the cost of repair because

the specific repairs to be performed are not known at the time the vehicle

is delivered to the repair shop, the written authorization required by this

section need not include an estimate of the maximum cost of parts and

labor. In such a case, prior to commencing any repairs, the repair shop shall

notify the customer of the work to be performed and the estimated maximum

cost to the customer of the necessary parts and labor, obtain the customer’s

written or oral authorization and record such information on the invoice.
. . .’’

The court found that, although an oral authorization was provided by

Keithan with respect to the defendant’s estimate for the Buschur Racing

short block, the estimate’s explicit inclusion of a fixed cost for the ‘‘installation’’ of the modified engine was a misrepresentation on the part of the

defendant.

In addition, § 49-61 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) . . . . Within ten days

of receipt of such information relative to any lienholder, the bailee shall mail

written notice to each lienholder by certified mail, return receipt requested,

stating that the motor vehicle is being held by such bailee and has a lien

upon it for repair and storage charges. . . .

* * *

‘‘(e) . . . [I]f the last usual place of abode of the bailor is known to or

may reasonably be ascertained by the bailee, notice of the time and place

of sale shall be given by mailing the notice to him by certified mail, return

receipt requested, at least ten days before the time of the sale, and similar

notice shall be given to any officer who has placed an attachment on the

property and, if the property is a motor vehicle . . . any lienholder. . . .’’

(Emphasis added.)

The court found that the defendant violated § 49-61 by failing to provide

written notice of the auction to the plaintiff. The court concluded that

‘‘[t]he violation of [§ 49-61 (e)], together with [the defendant’s] purported

acquisition of lien rights in violation of § 14-65f, constitute a violation of

CUTPA because each violation was both deceptive and a violation of public

policy as found in §§ 14-65f and 49-61.’’

We note that the plaintiff was not a party to the transaction between the

defendant and Keithan, and it is unclear on this record what legal authority

entitled the plaintiff to assert a CUTPA violation on the basis of the defendant’s misrepresentation to Keithan. It is also unclear how the defendant’s

failure to give notice to the plaintiff as a lienholder in accordance with § 49-

61 constitutes a CUTPA violation because it is not obvious that the obligation

to give statutory notice to a lienholder is within CUTPA’s definition of

‘‘trade’’ and ‘‘commerce.’’ See General Statutes § 42-110a (4) (‘‘ ‘[t]rade’ and

‘commerce’ means the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for

sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property,

tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state’’). We express no view on either of

these issues because neither party has raised them before this court. See,

e.g., State v. Connor, 321 Conn. 350, 362, 138 A.3d 265 (2016) (‘‘[o]ur appellate

courts generally do not consider issues that were not raised by the parties’’).

8 The importance of the private consumer remedy itself has been emphasized during debate on various amendments to chapter 735a of the General

Statutes. For example, Senator Stephen C. Casey remarked: ‘‘The bill in

general would promote greater cooperation between public and private

efforts to enforce the . . . trade practices act. The Attorney General’s

[O]ffice is hampered in this enforcement effort by limited staff. Private

litigation under this act is essential and the proposal would ease the burden

on private individuals and thus encourage private litigation.’’ 22 S. Proc.,

Pt. 8, 1979 Sess., p. 2575; see also 19 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1976 Sess., p. 2191,

remarks of Representative Raymond C. Ferrari; 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 1973

Sess., p. 7323, remarks of Representative Howard A. Newman.

9

‘‘[C]ommon-law punitive damages are akin to statutorily authorized attorney’s fees in practicality and purpose, insofar as both provide the same

relief and serve the same function . . . namely, fully compensating injured

parties.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 313 Conn. 485–86. As we explained, punitive

damages under CUTPA are distinct from common-law punitive damages

because they are not intended merely to compensate the plaintiff for the

harm caused by the defendant; they also serve to punish and deter reprehensible conduct. See, e.g., Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 310 Conn. 455.