J-S53016-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: U.S.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1017 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered March 20, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-AP-0000217-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2019

M.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the March 20, 2019 decree in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her daughter, U.S.B. (“Child”), born in February of 2017.1

Upon review, we affirm.

In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court found as 

follows.

On February 25, 2017, the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) learned that three week-old Child and her 

parents resided in a three-story rooming house and that Child was 

left unattended for hours while Mother and Father smoked 

marijuana on the porch of the rooming house. DHS was familiar 

with the family and aware that Mother’s parental rights had been 

terminated as to Child’s older sibling on May 26, 2011. On April 

14, 2017, a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report was issued 

____________________________________________

1 By separate decree on March 20, 2019, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of Child’s putative father, A.B. He did not file 

a notice of appeal.
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after Mother requested that Child be placed in foster care because 

she was about to lose her house. The GPS report also alleged that 

Mother was mentally unstable[,] and Mother was not taking 

prescribed mental health medication. In the past, Mother had 

voluntarily admitted herself at the Belmont Center for 

Comprehensive Treatment for post-partum psychosis, depression 

and hallucinations. The GPS report alleged that Mother was 

unable to meet Child’s needs[,] and that Mother and Father were 

experiencing domestic abuse issues.

On April 27, 2017, following a hearing, Child was adjudicated 

dependent. The [c]ourt ordered that Mother be referred for a 

Parenting Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”). On October 5, 2017, the 

trial court found that aggravated circumstances existed since 

Mother’s parental rights had been terminated on another child and 

ordered that no reasonable efforts were to be made to reunify the 

Child with Mother. On January 17, 2018, the Community Umbrella 

Agency (“CUA”) identified Mother’s parental objectives, which 

were (1) Mother continue to take psychotropic medications; (2) to 

attend mental health treatment and (3) to seek housing. The 

underlying Petition to Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights to Child 

was filed on March 19, 2018. On [March] 20, 2019, after 

hearing,[2], [3]the trial court ruled to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)(2)(5) and (8) and 

found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best 

interest of Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/19, 2-3 (citations to record omitted).

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2 During the hearing, Child was represented by her Child Advocate, Frances 

Odza, Esquire.

3 DHS presented the testimony of Jeremy Kohut and Tamika Gillard, CUA 

caseworkers; Magalie Clamie, the CUA caseworker who supervised Mother’s 

visits with Child; and Dr. Erica Williams, a licensed psychologist and the 

director of forensic services at Forensic Mental Health Services, who 

performed the PCE on Mother. Mother testified on her own behalf.
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Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 

2, 2019.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)[?]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights without 

giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination 

would have on the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs of Child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 511(b)[?]

Mother’s Brief at 5.

Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, as follows.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 
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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, we conclude that the certified record supports the decree

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),4 which provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

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4 This Court need only agree with the trial court with respect to any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. 

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Based 

on this disposition, we need not consider the decree pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), (5), or (8).
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(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

This Court has explained that the moving party must produce clear and 

convincing evidence with respect to the following elements to terminate 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2): (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 

Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), parents are required to make diligent 

efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002). A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding 

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely 

or disingenuous. Id. Further, the grounds for termination of parental rights 
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under Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. Id. at 

337. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), we have explained, “Intangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted). 

However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the 

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of 

any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted). 

Mother asserts on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because she 

complied with her permanency plan objectives. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, 

the trial court countered, “Although Mother was clearly willing to try to meet 

her [permanency plan] objectives[,] she remained incapable of caring for 

Child. Specifically, she has significant mental health issues which have not 
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been remedied.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/19, at 5. We discern no abuse of 

discretion.

Mr. Kohut, the CUA caseworker, testified that Mother’s permanency plan 

objectives required her to comply with medication management, to participate 

in supervised visitation, domestic violence counseling, parenting classes at 

Family School and a PCE evaluation, and to obtain housing. N.T., 3/20/19, at 

15. Mr. Kohut testified that Mother was in full compliance of her permanency 

plan. Id. at 22. He testified, inter alia, that Mother receives ongoing mental 

health treatment. Id. In addition, in February of 2019, Mother entered into 

a two-year lease agreement for an apartment. Id.

However, Dr. Williams, who performed the PCE of Mother and issued a 

report dated February 28, 2019, testified that, because of her mental health 

instability, Mother does not have the capacity to provide safety or permanency 

to Child. Id. at 42. Dr. Williams explained on direct examination: 

[Mother] had a limited understanding as to why [Child] was 

removed from her care. Child [w]as not . . . provided care by 

Mother for very long and, during that time, there [were] concerns 

regarding Child’s safety.

Throughout the case of Child . . ., Mother has had mental health 

instability. She is diagnosed with multiple different diagnoses, but 

all similar to mood disorders or symptoms of psychosis. 

She’s had these disorders since childhood and--

THE COURT: What kind of disorders?

DR. WILLIAMS:-- she mentioned schizo-[a]ffective disorder, 

as well as depression. Prior records note bipolar disorder, as well 

as schizophrenia, and each of those disorders have similar 
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symptoms. It’s diagnosed based on which symptoms appear first, 

and how long they last.

So, depending on the course of her presentation, different 

hospitals have provided different diagnoses, but the consistent 

underlying factor is the mood disturbance, the depression, as well 

as the symptoms of psychosis that cause her to have paranoid 

ideation, and not react to reality the way to somebody else would 

react to reality.

THE COURT: Would this cause problems in raising the child?

DR. WILLIAMS: Unfortunately, yes. And in the case of 

[Mother], this is not something that an individual chooses to have 

[or] chooses to not be able to treat. She [has] done everything

that [has] been asked of her. She is compliant with her mental 

health treatment.

She is receiving intensive intervention for this, and simply, what 

[is] currently available for treatment is not stabilizing her at this 

time. 

[DHS COUNSEL]: Is there anything that could change your 

opinion?

DR. WILLIAMS: There’s the potential, with the modification 

of treatments for this disorder, that something new could come 

out. However, at this time, there is nothing out on the horizon. 

She [has] received this level of intervention since she was a child. 

She [has] had the most intensive case management treatment for 

the last 10 years. . . .

. . . 

THE COURT: -- there is no medication now that could help 

her?

DR. WILLIAMS: They have not found one that is a match for 

her, correct. So, she has had significant attempts of her current 

medication that she’s on, and the program she’s in [which] 

ensures [her] compliance.

However, she still presents with a thought disorder that would 

disrupt her ability to care for [Child].
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Id. at 42-45.

For instance, upon inquiry by the trial court regarding the basis for her 

recommendation of supervised visitation, Dr. Williams testified that Mother’s 

“mental status can shift rapidly, and she may or may not be interacting with 

. . . what is happening in the environment, as somebody else sees it.” Id. at 

45. Dr. Williams clarified, “So, it’s difficult to know whether or not [Mother is] 

going to be seeing the world as it’s happening with Child in her care. . . .” Id.

However, if Mother’s mental status shifts during supervised visitation, Dr. 

Williams stated that, under those circumstance, Child’s “safety can 

immediately be taken care of.” Id. Therefore, the testimonial evidence 

reveals that, despite ongoing intensive mental health treatment, Mother 

remains incapable of performing adequate parental duties.

Similarly, with respect to obtaining housing, Mother testified that she 

had been residing in her own apartment for approximately two months. Id.

at 58. On cross-examination by the Child Advocate, Mother testified that she 

lives in an independent apartment in an apartment complex. Id. at 65. 

However, at the time of the PCE, Dr. Williams testified that Mother was 

residing “in a housing program where she has adults providing her care and 

making sure that she’s well. . . .” Id. at 44. Dr. Williams recommended that 

Mother remain living in “supportive housing.” Id. at 47. Therefore, despite 

Mother obtaining independent housing, the record is devoid of any evidence 

that Child would be safe in that environment.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the testimonial evidence 

supports the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2). Mother’s mental health instability, from which she has suffered

for most of her life, has rendered her incapable of performing her parental 

duties to Child since Child was approximately two months old. Despite 

ongoing mental health treatment and full compliance with her permanency 

plan, Mother remains incapable of performing her parental duties. The record 

supports the court’s conclusion that the causes of Mother’s incapacity cannot 

or will not be remedied. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother asserts that the court abused 

its discretion in terminating her parental rights because a bond exists between 

her and Child. We disagree.

As this Court has explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental 

rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond 

against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the 

orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine 

whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 

397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 

473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 
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also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court 

should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Further, our Supreme Court has stated, “Common sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in 

a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

In re T.S.M., supra at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the bond 

considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking 

clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed, 

“Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation 

to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, 

all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In this case, the trial court found that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would not have a detrimental effect on Child. Rather, it would be in 

Child’s best interest. The testimonial evidence supports the court’s findings.

Tamika Gillard, the CUA case manager, testified that no parent-child 

bond exists between Mother and Child. N.T., 3/20/19, at 33, 36, 38. As such, 

she testified that Child would not suffer irreparable emotional harm if Mother’s 

parental rights are terminated. Id. at 35. 

Ms. Gillard testified that Child has resided in her current foster home for 

one year, and that she visits Child there once per month. Id. at 34-35. She 
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testified that she has observed a bond between the foster mother and Child 

in the form of Child “[h]ugging, laughing, talking, singing, asking for food, 

asking for drinks.” Id. at 34-35. 

Based on the foregoing, and the entirety of the testimonial evidence, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that terminating 

Mother’s parental rights serves the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of Child pursuant to Section 2511(b). Accordingly, we 

affirm the decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/31/19