IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 14, 2018

CHRISTOPHER YOUNG v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. 40701514 William R. Goodman, III, Judge

No. M2017-01106-CCA-R3-PC

In 2008, the Petitioner, Christopher Young, pleaded guilty to possession of a Schedule II 

controlled substance with a six-year sentence to be served on Community Corrections. In 

2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction 

court summarily dismissed as untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that this 

matter should be remanded to the lower court to allow him to file an amended petition in 

light of recent case law. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR. and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined. 

Brittany K. Byrd, Dallas, Texas and Jessica M. Van Dyke, Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellant, Christopher Young

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel; 

John W. Carney, Jr., District Attorney General; and Chris W. Dotson, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Background

This case originates from the Petitioner’s 2007 arrest for drug possession, which 

resulted in him being charged by a grand jury with three drug offenses, one of which was 

possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a charge to which he later pleaded 

guilty. The 2008 guilty plea and sentencing hearing transcripts are not included in the 

record, but the record indicates that the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to six years, 

allowing him to serve his sentence on Community Corrections. It appears that the United 

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States Federal Government subsequently charged the Petitioner with a drug offense and 

he was convicted and sentenced in that case in 2013. 

In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, alleging 

that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 2008 guilty plea 

was not voluntarily entered. He contended that his attorney (“Counsel”) had not advised 

him that, by pleading guilty, his conviction could later be used to enhance any future 

sentence, such as the one he received in federal court in 2013. He stated that, had he

known of this possibility, he would have proceeded to trial. The State responded that the 

petition fell outside the statute of limitations and did not qualify for one of the exceptions 

for the tolling of the statute. The State requested that the petition be summarily 

dismissed. 

The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a 

motion requesting that he be allowed to attend his post-conviction hearing via 

teleconference; he was in a federal medical facility in Kentucky at the time. The postconviction court reviewed the petition, and then issued an order, addressing neither of the 

Petitioner’s motions but dismissing the petition as follows:

(1) this Petition is barred by the statute of limitations and (2) this Petition 

comprises no allegation relevant to either any of the statutorily-defined 

exceptions to the statute of limitations or to the statutorily-defined 

requirements for reopening a prior petition for post-conviction relief. 

It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his case is subject to one of the exceptions 

to the statute of limitations and that this matter should be remanded to allow him to file 

an amended petition in light of recent case law found at Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 

1958 (2017). The Petitioner further contends that an attorney should have been appointed 

following the filing of his pro se petition and that a hearing should have been held with 

the Petitioner in attendance. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly 

dismissed the petition as time-barred and that none of the exceptions are applicable, as 

Lee does not establish a new constitutional right. Finally, the State contends that the 

Petitioner has waived his argument regarding a hearing being held because he failed to 

include the relevant documents in the record and he failed to adequately brief the issue. 

In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her 

conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional 

right. T.C.A. §40-30-103 (2014). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual

allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence. 
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T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2014). The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive 

on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against it. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 

456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are subject to a 

purely de novo review by this court, with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457. 

The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee 

Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 

S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The 

following two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by the Sixth 

Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s 

errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial 

whose result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it 

cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 

breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Melson, 772 

S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989).

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must 

determine whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 

936. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must show 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House 

v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 

(Tenn. 1996)). When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing 

court should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, 

taking into account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. 

Mitchell, 753 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The reviewing court should 

avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight” and “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s 

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. If the petitioner shows that counsel’s 

representation fell below a reasonable standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 

2002). This reasonable probability must be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 
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1994). 

This standard also applies to claims arising out of the plea process. Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). To satisfy the requirement of prejudice in a case 

involving a guilty plea, the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s errors, he or she “would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Id. at 59.

A. Statute of Limitations

We begin by addressing the issue of whether the Petitioner’s petition was timebarred, and, in the event that it was, if the Petitioner was entitled to a tolling of the statute 

of limitations. A person in custody under a sentence of a court of this state must petition 

for post-conviction relief within one year of the date of the final action of the highest 

state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one year 

of the date on which the judgment becomes final. T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a) (2014). The 

statute explicitly states, “The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason, 

including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity.” Id. It 

further stresses that “[t]ime is of the essence of the right to file a petition for postconviction relief or motion to reopen established by this chapter, and the one-year 

limitations period is an element of the right to file the action and is a condition upon its 

exercise.” Id. In the event that a petitioner files a petition for post-conviction relief 

outside the one-year statute of limitations, the trial court is required to summarily dismiss 

the petition. T.C.A. § 40-30-106(b) (2014).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b) sets out three exceptions to the 

statute of limitations for petitions for post-conviction relief:

No court shall have jurisdiction to consider a petition filed after the 

expiration of the limitations period unless:

(1) The claim in the petition is based upon a final 

ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right 

that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial, if 

retrospective application of that right is required. The 

petition must be filed within one (1) year of the ruling of the 

highest state appellate court or the United States supreme 

court establishing a constitutional right that was not 

recognized as existing at the time of trial;

(2) The claim in the petition is based upon new 

scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner is actually 

innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner 
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was convicted; or

(3) The claim asserted in the petition seeks relief from 

a sentence that was enhanced because of a previous 

conviction and the conviction in the case in which the claim is 

asserted was not a guilty plea with an agreed sentence, and 

the previous conviction has subsequently been held to be 

invalid, in which case the petition must be filed within one (1) 

year of the finality of the ruling holding the previous 

conviction to be invalid.

Additionally, due process concerns may toll the statute of limitations for postconviction relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded:

[B]efore a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with 

procedural requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires 

that potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of 

claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 

Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982)). Our supreme court has also recognized that 

“extraordinary circumstances” might require the tolling of the statute of limitations, 

specifically cases where “circumstances beyond a petitioner’s control prevented the 

petitioner from filing a petition for post-conviction relief within the statute of 

limitations.” Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 634 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. 

Smith, 357 S.W.3d 322, 358 (Tenn. 2011)).

In the case under submission, the Petitioner was required to file his petition for 

post-conviction relief within one year of March 19, 2008, the date that his judgment 

became final. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(a) (2014); State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646, 650 

(Tenn. 2003) (holding that “a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea becomes 

final thirty days after acceptance of the plea agreement and imposition of sentence”). 

The Petitioner alleges that he later learned of the consequences of his guilty plea when he 

was sentenced in federal court in 2013. The Petitioner filed his petition on April 7, 2017, 

just over nine years after his guilty plea, and over three years after his federal sentence 

was imposed. Thus, his filing was barred by the statute of limitations. 

We then turn to address whether any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year 

statute of limitations are applicable to the Petitioner’s claims. The Petitioner contends 

that his claim falls under the first exception, that the claim is “based upon a final ruling of 

an appellate court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at 

the time of trial, if retrospective application of that right is required.” T.C.A. § 40-30-

102(b)(1). He contends that Lee v. United States announces a new standard for assessing 
6

the prejudice prong in an ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry. He argues that it 

should be applied retroactively. The State contends that Lee did not establish a 

constitutional right that did not exist at the time of the Petitioner’s guilty plea, nor did it 

require retroactive application of its holding, and thus cannot be used to toll the statute of 

limitations. We agree with the State.

The petitioner in Lee, a thirty-five year resident of the United States with virtually 

no ties to his country of origin, was deported after pleading guilty to a crime and sought 

post-conviction relief on the basis that he would not have entered a guilty plea but for the 

deficient advice of his attorney that he definitively would not face deportation. In its 

opinion in Lee, the United State Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner had 

“demonstrated a ‘reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1969 

(citation omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that, considering the unusual 

circumstances of the Lee petitioner’s case and looking to the contemporaneous evidence 

substantiating the petitioner’s claim, the petitioner had demonstrated prejudice sufficient 

to surmount the standards recited in Strickland and Hill. Id.; see also Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694; Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

The Petitioner in the present case claims that, in light of the holding in Lee, the 

Supreme Court established a new standard for demonstrating prejudice. We disagree. 

The Lee court cited Hill repeatedly, most notably in its holding, when it concluded that 

the petitioner had demonstrated prejudice. As such, the Petitioner’s claim that he would 

not have pleaded guilty had Counsel advised him that his conviction could be used to 

enhance any future sentence is not based on a “constitutional right that was not 

recognized as existing at the time of trial,” T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1), as no such right 

was declared by Lee. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a tolling 

of the statute of limitations, and we conclude that the post-conviction court properly 

summarily dismissed his petition on this basis. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on 

this issue.

B. Summary Dismissal

The Petitioner next contends that the post-conviction court erred when it 

summarily dismissed his petition and when it failed to appoint counsel following the 

filing of his pro se petition. He contends that the law of this State requires that he be 

represented by counsel, although he concedes that a court may refuse to appoint counsel 

in the case of a petition that conclusively shows a petitioner is not entitled to relief. The 

State responds that the Petitioner’s argument is waived due to an inadequate record and 

failure to outline the issue in the “Statement of the Issues” in his brief.

We note that in the event that a petitioner files a petition for post-conviction relief 

outside the one-year statute of limitations, the trial court is required to summarily dismiss 
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the petition. T.C.A. § 40-30-106(b) (2014). “Where a petition conclusively shows that 

the petitioner is entitled to no relief, it is properly dismissed without the appointment of 

counsel and without an evidentiary hearing.” Givens v. State, 702 S.W.2d 578, 580 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). 

The post-conviction court stated in its order dismissing the petition:

(1) this Petition is barred by the expiration of the statute of 

limitations and (2) this Petition comprises no allegation relevant to any of 

the statutorily-defined exceptions to the statute of limitations or to the 

statutorily-defined requirements for reopening a post-conviction petition for 

post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner’s petition did not allege any facts as to why he waited more than 

three years to file his petition after he became aware of the consequences of his 2008 

guilty plea in 2013. As such, his petition conclusively demonstrated that he was not 

entitled to relief, and the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition summarily.

III. Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude the 

post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction 

relief. In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the 

judgment of the post-conviction court.

________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE