NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW PHILLIP HAMPER,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-1087

D.C. No.

6:22-cr-00003-BMM-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 7, 2024**

Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, BEA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Matthew Phillip Hamper appeals from the district court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress, and the sentence imposed, in a case in which Hamper entered a

conditional guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine 

and possession of an unregistered firearm. Pursuant to his plea agreement with the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 9 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-1087

government, Hamper reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress and the district court’s factual findings regarding his sentence. As the 

parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm. 

1. We review de novo a ruling on a motion to suppress. United States v. 

Dixon, 984 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2020). We reject Hamper’s argument that the 

officers lacked probable cause to search the recreational vehicle (“RV”). The 

street address Hamper reported to the parole office as his residence encompassed 

the entire one-acre property; the parole officers had probable cause to believe that 

Hamper lived at that residence; and they had reasonable suspicion that Hamper 

controlled the RV located on the property (regardless of whether the RV is a 

dwelling or a vehicle). 

To search a residence “pursuant to a parolee’s parole condition, law 

enforcement officers must have probable cause to believe that the parolee is a 

resident of the house to be searched.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 

F.3d 1189, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). But “once validly inside 

[a residence], [officers] need only ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an item is owned, 

possessed, or controlled by the parolee.” United States v. Bolivar, 670 F.3d 1091, 

1095 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 

1991) (establishing that reasonable suspicion governs scope of parole/probation 
3 23-1087

searches).

The officers had probable cause to believe that Hamper lived at 1241 

Highway 282. Hamper had reported that address to the parole office, and pursuant 

to his parole conditions, he was required to obtain permission from that office 

before changing his residence. A tipster, moreover, had indicated that Hamper was 

living at that address. See United States v. Franklin, 603 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 

2010) (probable cause based in part on “a tip that Franklin was living in the [motel] 

room from a credible informant”); United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 957-58 

(9th Cir. 2009) (probable cause based in large part on two tips provided by 

neighbors and one anonymous phone call). Based on the “facts known to the 

officers at the time of the search,” “a man of reasonable caution” would have 

believed that Hamper lived at 1241 Highway 282. United States v. Howard, 447 

F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 

(1983)). 

As the district court found, that probable-cause-as-to-residence 

determination extends to the entire property. Cf. United States v. Alexander, 761 

F.2d 1294, 1301 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] warrant is valid when it authorizes the 

search of a street address with several dwellings if the defendants are in control of 

the whole premises, if the dwellings are occupied in common, or if the entire 

property is suspect.”). Hamper reported 1241 Highway 282 as his residence; it is 
4 23-1087

reasonable to conclude that that residence—a rural, one-acre, fenced-in property—

encompassed the entire premises. Cf. id, 761 F.2d at 1300-01 (holding that warrant 

authorizing search of an entire forty-acre ranch with multiple dwellings, including

one trailer not specifically mentioned in the warrant, was supported by probable 

cause because the entire property was under the suspect’s control); Blight v. City of 

Manteca, 944 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a challenge to the 

search of a mobile home based on lack of probable cause because “there was a 

substantial basis for the issuing judge to believe [defendant] was in control of the 

whole premises” on which the home was located). This is not the case of an 

apartment building, for instance, where various separate units may share a single 

street address. 

Officer Lougee had reasonable suspicion that Hamper controlled the RV. 

See Bolivar, 670 F.3d at 1095; Davis, 932 F.2d at 758. Officer Lougee believed 

that Hamper’s room in the main house was “primarily a spare bedroom” and that

Hamper was sleeping elsewhere on the property. The officers also had reasonable 

suspicion that Hamper stored drugs in the RV, and prior to the search of the RV, 

Hamper had admitted to Officer Lougee that he was using meth. Officer Lougee 

knew that Sheriff Doolittle had “received credible information that Hamper has 

two baggies with 16 ounces of meth in each and 2 pounds of marijuana in his 

camper parked next to his parents’ garage where he is living.” When Officer 
5 23-1087

Lougee approached the RV parked next to the shed next to the garage, the air 

conditioning was on and no one else was on the property. These facts constitute 

reasonable suspicion of control by Hamper. 

Hamper contends that, after he told Officer Lougee that the RV belonged to 

his brother and that the keys used to open the RV were not his, the officers should 

have performed a license plate check or searched the VIN. But the officers had 

reasonable suspicion that Hamper controlled the RV—regardless of who owned it. 

See Davis, 932 F.2d at 760 (noting that the police do not have a duty to inquire into 

ownership, possession, or control where reasonable suspicion has otherwise 

already been developed). 

Hamper’s challenge to the suppression ruling also fails if we were to analyze 

the RV as a vehicle. The RV was found within Hamper’s residence, and as such, 

the officers required only reasonable suspicion that the RV was “owned, possessed, 

or controlled by the parolee.” Dixon, 984 F.3d at 821 (quoting Bolivar, 670 F.3d at 

1095). We have already established that they had such suspicion. 

We affirm the district court’s suppression ruling. 

2. The district court did not clearly err in calculating the weight of the 

drugs involved in Hamper’s offense for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). See 

United States v. Mancuso, 718 F.3d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing 

determination of the drug quantity involved in an offense under the sentencing 
6 23-1087

guidelines for clear error). 

Both testimonial and documentary evidence support the district court’s 

finding. Deputy Grimsrud’s body camera shows him retrieving two bags from a 

cardboard box and placing both bags in a single Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office 

(“JCSO”) evidence bag. Both bags were also reflected in the JCSO evidence log—

albeit in a way that was not self-evident. The total drug weight (3.790 lbs) is 

consistent with two bags in the amounts of 1.06 lbs and 2.73 lbs. The DEA 

documents and Agent Anderberg’s testimony further confirm that the DEA

received and tested two bags. 

The district court did not clearly err in concluding that both bags (weighing 

1.06 lbs and 2.73 lbs) constituted part of Hamper’s offense, and as such, his 

offense involved at least 1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of actual 

methamphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). 

AFFIRMED.