alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>



Exhibit 10.3      Promissory Note with Guardian Financial Services, Inc.

                                 PROMISSORY NOTE

                                  U.S. $300,000



FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Guardian Financial Services, Inc., a Nevada corporation
("Maker"), hereby promises to pay to Bentley Communications Corp., a Florida
corporation ("Payee"or "Holder") the principal sum of Three Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($300,000), on or before June 30, 2003 (the "Due Date"). This note shall
bear interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date hereof. Maker delivers
this note to Payee as consideration for purchase of 30,000,000 shares of $.0001
par value common stock of Bentley Communications Corp., a Florida corporation.

This promissory note has been delivered to Payee and accepted by Payee in the
State of California and shall be governed and construed generally according to
the laws of said State. Maker and Payee each waive any objection to the
jurisdiction of or venue in such court and to the service of process issued by
such court and agrees that each may be served by any method of process described
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Maker and Payee each waive (1) the
right to claim that such court is an inconvenient forum or any similar defense
and (2) trial by jury.

No waiver by the holder of any payment or other right under this Note shall
operate as a waiver of any payment or right. This promissory note can be repaid
prior to the Due Date.

Executed on June 18, 2002 by the Maker.


                                        Guardian Financial Services, Inc.,
                                        a Nevada corporation



                                        By: /s/Delores Serafino
                                            -----------------------
                                        Name: Delores Serafino
                                        Title: President
#### Demetrius JONES, Jr., Petitioner—Appellant, v. Kevin WENDT, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 06-6268.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 4, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 18, 2006.

Demetrius Jones, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Betsy S. Jividen, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Ap-pellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Demetrius Jones, Jr., a prisoner in custody under a sentence imposed by a Superior Court of the District of Columbia, seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jones has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a certificate of ap-pealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
(January 29, 2009)

#### In the Matter of John F. Marchisotto, Appellant, v Raymond Kelly, as Police Commissioner, et al., Respondents.

[872 NYS2d 51]

*556Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael D. Stallman, J.), entered January 24, 2008, denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul respondents’ determination, which denied petitioner’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits by virtue of a tie vote of respondent Board of Trustees (Board), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner sustained a fracture of the middle phalanx of the fourth digit of his left hand when he attempted to unclog an overflowing toilet using a plumber’s snake. The Board denied him an accident disability pension on the ground that use of the tool was not among his ordinary job duties, finding that petitioner “knew the proper procedure was to call maintenance for a professional to handle the job,” and concluding that “the incident does not fit the criteria for accidental disability.”

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s conclusion that the activity in which petitioner was engaged at the time of injury was not “undertaken in the performance of ordinary employment duties” *(Matter of Lichtenstein v Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Police Dept. of City of N.Y., Art. II,*57 NY2d 1010, 1012 [1982]). Because the determination of which activities constitute the regular duties of a police officer is a matter within the particular expertise of the Board, its findings are entitled to deference *(see Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,*49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]), and because the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Board’s findings, its decision must be upheld *(see Matter of Salvati v Eimicke,*72 NY2d 784, 792 [1988]). Concur—Lippman, EJ., Tom, Buckley, Moskowitz and Renwick, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clark Carter, Appellant.

[825 NYS2d 830]

Mercure, J.

Appeal from an order of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Czajka, J.), entered November 7, 2005, which classified defendant as a risk level III sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

Defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of sodomy in the third degree, a class E felony. In 2005, defendant appeared in County Court for a risk level determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act *(see*Correction Law art 6-C). The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders had evaluated defendant and recommended that he be classified as a risk level III sex offender. This was based on a risk assessment score of 115 which placed defendant in the presumptive risk level III category. After County Court held a hearing, it adopted the Board’s recommendation resulting in the instant appeal.

We affirm. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of County Court’s statement of its factual findings and conclusions of law. As defendant asserts, the court was required to set forth “the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determination[ ] [was] based” (Correction Law § 168-n [3]). Contrary to defendant’s assertions, however, County Court did comply with the statutory mandates. It cited to, among other things, the circumstances under which the crime had been committed, the circumstances under which certain counts of the indictment were dismissed, the statement made by defendant when he pleaded *1024guilty to the offense, as well as his conduct since the plea was entered and the Board’s evaluation. While brief, it cannot be said that the court’s findings constituted merely a “generic listing of factors . . . precluding meaningful appellate review” *(People v Miranda,*24 AD3d 909, 911 [2005]; *cf. People v Sanchez,*20 AD3d 693, 695 [2005]; *People v Lee,*292 AD2d 639, 640 [2002]). Furthermore, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the risk level classification and, therefore, it cannot be said that County Court abused its discretion in accepting the recommendation that defendant be classified as a risk level III sex offender *(see People v Barnett,*32 AD3d 1132, 1133 [2006]; *People v Dickison,*24 AD3d 980, 981 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 709 [2006]).

Cardona, EJ., Crew III, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2525 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2525

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to expand eligibility for, and 
    extend authorization of, certain programs for homeless veterans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 6, 2023

   Mr. Ruiz introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to expand eligibility for, and 
    extend authorization of, certain programs for homeless veterans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Health Care for Homeless Veterans 
Act''.

SEC. 2. HEALTH CARE FOR HOMELESS VETERANS PROGRAM: EXPANSION OF 
              ELIGIBILITY; EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Expansion of Eligibility.--Section 2002(b)(1) of title 38, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting ``2031,'' after ``2013,''.
    (b) Extension of Authorization.--Section 2031(b) of such title is 
amended by striking ``2024'' and inserting ``2029''.

SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF PROGRAM OF ADDITIONAL SERVICES 
              FOR HOMELESS VETERANS.

    Section 2033(d) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``2024'' and inserting ``2029''.
                                 <all>
```
|   | (1)      | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  and |
|--------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2)      | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company      at the date and for the periodsindicated. |
|--------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      March 31,      2009                                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                   |
| /s/      Teresa Kelley                                                      |
| Teresa      KelleyChief      Financial Officer (Principal FinancialOfficer) |

----
##### 



William J. Biggar

12 Strath Avenue
Toronto, Ontario
M8X 1P9


BY FACSIMILE (705) 324-9282
(original sent by mail)



November 21, 2003



Board of Directors
Cabletel Communications Corp.
230 Travail Road
Markham, Ontario L3S 3J1



Dear Sirs:

Please accept this letter as notice of my resignation from the Board of
Directors of Cabletel effective immediately.

I have enjoyed my association with Cabletel over the past 2-1/2 years, but
unfortunately my appointment in September as President and CEO of MI
Developments Inc. has created significant demands on my time, necessitating a
reduction in my outside commitments.

I wish the Board and management all the best in their future endeavours with
Cabletel.



Yours very truly,

(William J. Biggar Signature)

William J. Biggar
#### State v. Sloan

Case below: 180 N.C. App. 527

No. 024A07

1. Def’s (Sloan) NOA Based Upon a Constitutional Question (COA05-1513)

2. Def’s (Sloan) PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Dismissed *ex mero motu*03/08/07

2. Denied 03/08/07
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report of China Green Creative, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned officers of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such officer’s knowledge: 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report. 

Dated:  April 15, 2011

By: /s/ Ye Xing Zhang

Ye Xing Zhang

*Chief Executive Officer and President*

(Principal Executive Officer)
EX-35.1
(logo) OCWEN


ANNUAL SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO ITEM 1123 OF REGULATION AB

March 7, 2008

RE: MABS 2007-WMC1

For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 (the "Reporting Period"), Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC ("OLS") furnishes this annual servicer compliance statement
pursuant to Item 1123 of Regulation AB, indicating its compliance with the
servicing standards of the Securities & Exchange Commission as set forth in
Regulation AB, 17 CFR SECTION 229.1100, et seq., ("Regulation AB"). In this
regard, I make the following representations, which are true to the best of my
knowledge and belief in all material respects.

1. A review of the servicing activities of OLS during the Reporting Period, and
of its performance under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated as of
February 1, 2007 (the "Agreement"), has been performed under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on this review, OLS has fulfilled all of
its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the
Reporting Period.

By: /s/ Ronald M. Faris
Name: Ronald M. Faris
Title: President


Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC
1661 Worthington Road Suite 100
Centrepark West
West Palm Beach, FL 33409
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Angel M. Cruz, Appellant.

[824 NYS2d 808]

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of *899Chenango County (Sullivan, J.), rendered September 5, 2003, which revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.

*898Crew III, J.

*899In March 2003, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape in the third degree in satisfaction of a 12-count indictment. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to 10 years of probation, the terms of which provided, among other things, that defendant not violate any state, federal or local law during such probation. In July 2003, defendant was arrested and charged with sexual abuse in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child, prompting the filing of a petition charging defendant with violation of his probation. Following a hearing, County Court terminated defendant’s probation and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of lVs to 4 years. Defendant now appeals and we affirm.

Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the People’s evidence supported a finding of defendant’s violation by a preponderance of evidence *(see*CPL 410.70 [3]). While it is true that some of the 13-year-old victim’s testimony was inconsistent with her prior written statement and her testimony was contradicted by that of defendant’s wife, we need note only that County Court’s determination resolving witness credibility must be accorded “great weight” *(People v Barber,*280 AD2d 691, 694 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 825 [2001]). Deferring to County Court’s credibility determination, the evidence amply supports its finding of defendant’s violation of probation. We have considered defendant’s remaining argument concerning the purportedly harsh and excessive nature of his sentence and find it equally unavailing.

Mercure, J.P, Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Exhibit 10.2 Agreement Conflict of Interest





Exhibit 10.2




CONFLICT OF INTEREST AGREEMENT 







AGREEMENT dated this 30th day of June 2015, by and between CubeScape, Inc. (hereinafter “CubeScape”), a Nevada corporation, with offices located at 1854 Oxford Avenue, Cardiff-By-The-Sea, California 92007, and David Estus, President of CubeScape.




The parties hereto agree and acknowledge that by virtue of David Estus’ other business activities as described in CubeScape’s Form S-1 Registration Statement, certain potential conflicts of interest may arise.




In an effort to resolve such potential conflicts of interest, we have entered into this written agreement with David Estus: 




·

any business opportunities that David Estus may become aware of independently or directly through his association with us would be presented by him solely to us; 




·

any business opportunities disclosed to David Estus by the management of other entities would not be presented by him to us if so requested by them;  




·

any business opportunities disclosed to David Estus by us would not be presented by him to any other entity, unless and until we passed upon same; and 




·

in the event that the same business opportunity is presented to David Estus by both us and any other business entity, he shall only render his services to the business entity that first disclosed such business opportunity to her.

The above constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties hereto.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed as of this 30th day of June 2015.  




CUBESCAPE, INC.













By: /s/ David Estus                                      

           David Estus, President










By: /s/ David Estus                                      

           David Estus, Individually
~FF~~EOF~EA'LTORNEY'G~NERALOF~~A~ AUSTIN

Pear Stir
..,

sion next menti~mib r&a, that it end oolleotad level p~dame, oontraoteQEonorable 0. P. Lo&hart, Page P

no al& &se’sements~‘haW:sm?ip been needed~ or pada .,and that. the, probabflitle6. sre~ t&&t no eaaesamenta

vi.l.l. ever be'necided. “Xq 1941. the Dompauy :snanded its aliarter anix,br-lay 80’as to ‘prvvlde .that thenosf&th It oodld opera?% 88’8. legal reserve iriutual. oomgmy; But it la stated in the ‘Mm.ndod’eharter and.by-laws that the amailments ‘were eff beted ,by the. Oompahy without $bandoning.Its~right to operate utqdei the other proe~,ai6ne .oi GsJiforni~ law uuder pihiah pr+vZouslg it had ‘been:,tiy ear orsted, e tha lioansed and operatiingg ana further operations should be nithout &wgirrg or affecting In shy wag the, old out stEinding poLieiee
. *It Is etated, that slnoe the amendment a&l polloisa ,pow‘fesuad, an& to be issued in the rutu.26, are to be without aaseeambnt poyera and upon the level pramium, legal reserve ba,sis,’ providi.ng fok unalterable sma oertalu In benefits.‘We enoloa~+ hazewith &a-oer$iiied oopy of **9hq66~** aa amandatl **and Bp4aw8**  as amenbaa, **whi,ah we**  **iek you**  ts **PebUn 6e**  **w** with **polir** epiaien a8 to whe6har wdaP this plan OS OQaqa6irm 6hfS ~qmkpany can 1awfuU.y .bS adJtQe& to Texas as a mutwl ooapanp ‘opbrit Fos on the old line ox?Legal rsrerve .ba~im* under ow ,br+la 475717.”
A%W.sle’ 6757, VQPIIM~~Annotated Tetis GtrtZ Statubw ;, reada sis foli6wal

“No maoh.ftirei@~ life forrur&ee aimpanes, or ~3.Weand aoaident, bealth~aixd ao1 oidan6, or ~life; health ana aaoident inmarana~~ oompqny,shall traneaotany bW&ien~ of inmrauae ia thl8 State, uulers swh aompaqp ia poeserasd oi at leaat me hundred thousand dollara of aotual~paid~ up sash 5oney oapftal invested ia uuah tae’aurlbiaa ae~provlded under the laws of the Btrafe, tiamitory Or oomtry Of its oree6ion. JYa. mutW1 life ~inouranae OP auoidant izmmanae OaplPWi or llia.and aeoident, health and aooidant,, o$ l.ir?, health and aooldent iuaurataoe ‘ocm~paxty

operatfng on the old’lina -of legal meerre basis, ahall traneaet any b+aineas or ineu~~oa in thtrr State, unleae euoh aampesy Is posaeesed of at leant one hundred t+oueand dollare of net eurplw aaeet~s Invested in seaurities provided ror udar the Lawa of the State, terri6org or oow6ry of its oreation.*

‘After a ,aareiul examination of the oharter and by-laws rubnltted UB by you with ~eforanoa to the above named oompa~y it ie ‘hour 

### 520’

### 521

opinian that sw,h ampany aan be Iawreallq admIttea WTamaa aa a mutual wmgany 0 Una as .lagaZ reoono baris i 6Pabing an the old un ar Artfola~ 4757, Vu,A* @I.8:,) 10 it posroroas wla not etlrplu8 r* @xed.by.~Arttele 4737, and ir not othemiaa air~mL&fied.

We are retuning herewith the instPoment8 you sent w with raiesanea to.ttil8matbar.

Wm.a. Paoning; Aeaistent

ATTORl?EYGENERAL 03 !J!ms
667 A.2d 668

#### IN THE MATTER OF GREGORY P. COBBS, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW.

November 16, 1995.

CORRECTED ORDER

The Office of Attorney Ethics having filed a petition with the Court seeking the immediate temporary suspension from practice of GREGORY P. COBBS of MORRISTOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1992, for failure to cooperate in an ethics investigation as required by *Rule*l:20-3(g)(3), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that pursuant to *Rule*1:20 — 3(g)(4), GREGORY P. COBBS is temporarily suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately and until the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New Jersey financial institution maintained by GREGORY P. COBBS pursuant to *Rule*1:21-6 shall be restrained from disbursement *587except on application to this Court, for good cause shown, pending the further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that GREGORY P. COBBS be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension; and it is further

ORDERED that GREGORY P. COBBS comply with *Rule*1:20-20 dealing with suspended attorneys.