which directs respondent to consider "[t]he seriousness of the offense and 

the history of criminal conduct of the prisoner," because the victim's family 

members' statements did not relate to the actual offense of conviction or to 

any acts for which he had been charged or which had been adjudicated 

against him. Additionally, he contended that the testimony could not be 

considered under both subsection (c) and subsection (e) of NRS 213.1099(2) 

because to do so constituted impermissible double counting of the 

evidence. 

Having considered the parties' arguments and the appellate 

record, we conclude that appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus 

or the declaratory relief that he sought in this action. Initially, appellant's 

contention that unadjudicated or undocumented acts may not be 

considered in the context of the seriousness of a prisoner's offense or his or 

her history of criminal conduct lacks merit. See Gometz v. U.S. Parole 

Com'n, 294 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The [Parole] Commission 

can make independent findings of criminal conduct and even consider 

unadjudicated offenses that are connected to the offense of conviction."); 

Kajevic v. Baer, 588 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (E.D. Mich. 1984) ("The Parole 

Commission is not restricted to considering information only about the 

offense for which a prisoner was formally convicted, but may also consider 

information about the prisoner's total offense behavior." (citations 

omitted)); State ex rel. Lipschutz v. Shoemaker, 551 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ohio 

1990) (concluding that unadjudicated illegal conduct was properly 

considered as part of a prisoner's "pattern of criminal or delinquent 

behavior"). 

2 
Moreover, with regard to appellant's double counting 

argument, a review of NRS 213.1099(2) demonstrates that the subsections 

set forth therein are not independent factors to be considered in isolation 

from each other, but instead, are an amalgam of considerations that will 

necessarily be considered collectively. See Beckworth v. New Jersey State 

Parole Board, 301 A.2d 727, 733-34 (N.J. 1973) (explaining that a parole 

board's predictions as to whether there is a reasonable probability that the 

prisoner will abide by the law and whether release is compatible with the 

welfare of society should be based on "the aggregate of all of the factors 

which may have any pertinence," including matters such as the prisoner's 

criminal record, his or her prior experience on parole, and the 

circumstances of the offense); see also Ex parte Harris, 181 P.2d 433, 436 

(Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (providing that a prisoner's "crime record" is 

important to determining whether he is a "good parole risk"); State v. 

Ouimette, 367 A.2d 704, 711 (R.I. 1976) (explaining that a prisoner's past 

criminal conduct and the seriousness of the offense of conviction are 

relevant to determining whether an inmate is likely to live lawfully on 

release). As consideration of these subsections will overlap significantly, 

respondent necessarily may consider the same evidence in evaluating 

multiple subsections when it is appropriate to do so. 

Because appellant was not entitled to the relief that he 

sought, the district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err by 

denying appellant a writ of mandamus or by declining to issue declaratory 

relief. See Reno Newspapers v. Sheriff, 126 Nev. , 234 P.3d 922, 

924 (2010) (explaining that, while the district court's denial of a writ 

petition generally is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this court will 

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, C.J. 

Gibbons 

Parraauirre 

CHrry 

J. 

J. 

J. 

review the denial of a writ petition involving questions of statutory 

interpretation de novo). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge 

Robert Leslie Stockmeier 

Attorney General/Dep't of Public Safety/Carson City 

Pershing County Clerk 

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