This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 ELEUTERIA SANCHEZ, 2 Worker-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 31,570 4 NEW MEXICO MEDICAL SURGICAL 5 HOSPITAL , d/b/a ROSWELL REGIONAL, and 6 ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY, 7 Employer/Insurer-Appellees. 8 APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 9 Terry S. Kramer, Workers ’ Compensation Judge 10 Chavez Law Firm 11 Gonzalo Chavez 12 Roswell, NM 13 for Appellant 14 French & Associates, P.C. 15 Katherine E. Tourek 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellees 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 GARCIA, Judge. 202 Worker Eleuteria Sanchez appeals fro m a compensation order in which the 1 Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) denied her claim for benefits on the grounds 2 that she failed to provide timely noti ce to her employer, New Mexico Medical 3 Surgical Hospital, d/b/a Roswell Regional (Employer). See generally NMSA 1978, 4 § 52-1-29(A) (1990). Worker cites the latentinjury doctrine to argue that her delay 5 in notifying Employer was permissible becauseshe was uncertain about the extent of 6 her injury and whether it was casually relate d to her job. For the reasons discussed 7 below, we affirm the determination of the WCJ. 8 BACKGROUND 9 Worker was employed as a housekeeper by Employer. Worker’s employment 10 duties required her to have the ability to lift up to fifty pounds and included cleaning 11 rooms; wiping and cleaning shelves, walls and equipment; hauling trash; vacuuming; 12 sweeping; and mopping. On Saturday, July3, 2010, Worker felt a pull in her back 13 and pain radiating down her left leg while she was performing her mopping duties. 14 She reported her symptoms to a co-worker at or near the time of her injury. Worker’s 15 pain was not severe enough toprevent her from finishing her shift or completing her 16 regular duties. Worker also worked a full day on July 4, 2010. During this shift, she 17 suffered from pain and discomfort. 18 Worker first sought medical attention for her symptoms on July 6, 2010. She 19 was seen by David Aguilar, a Certified Nurse Practitioner at the clinic associated with 203 Employer. Worker reported to Nurse Aguilar that she had first started feeling pain 1 three days earlier and that she noticed pain in her back and in her leg after completing 2 long shifts at work. Nurse Aguilar diagnos ed Worker with acute back pain and placed 3 her on restrictions. The restrictions in cluded no heavy lifting; no extended standing, 4 sitting, walking, or driving; and no bendi ng, pushing, or pulling. Worker’s next 5 scheduled shift was on July 8, 2010. 6 Shortly after her clinical visit, Worker provided the work restriction slip to her 7 supervisor and met with Employer’s human resources director. Worker reported that 8 she was not injured at work to both her s upervisor and to Employer’s human resources 9 director. Nonetheless, Worker’s restri ctions prevented her from completing her 10 regular duties. Worker was removed fro m the schedule, effective July 6, 2010. 11 Worker saw Nurse Aguilar again on July 10 and 15, 2010, for follow-up 12 appointments. Due to Worker’s conti nued complaints of pain, Nurse Aguilar 13 recommended an MRI of her lower back which was performed on July 23, 2010. The 14 MRI evidenced a herniated disc at the L4-5 level. On July 27, 2010, Nurse Aguilar 15 communicated the results of the MRI to Worker and gaveher a no-work restriction. 16 Worker notified Employer that her injury was work-related shortly after she received 17 the results of her MRI. As a result, Worker completed a Notice of Accident form and 18 Employer completed an Employer’s First Report of Injury form. 19 The WCJ noted that: 1) fifteen days from the accident was July 18, 2010; 2) 204 fifteen days following the first day of medi cal care and the first day Worker was taken 1 off work was July 21, 2010; and 3) fifteendays from when Worker first missed work 2 due to the injury was July 23, 2010. Thus, it determined that the July 27, 2010, notice 3 to Employer was not a timely notice of the accident as required by Section 52-1- 4 29(A). The WCJ concluded that Worker di d not have a valid excuse for her failure 5 to timely notify Employer and, therefore, her claim for workers’ compensation 6 benefits was barred. Worker timely appealed the determination of the WCJ. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 This Court reviews workers’ compensation orders using a whole record 9 standard of review. See Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight) , 108 N.M. 124, 126, 10 767 P.2d 363, 365 (Ct. App. 1988). Pursuant to that standard, we review “all the 11 evidence bearing on a finding or decision, favorable and unfavor able, in order to 12 determine if there is substantial evidence to support the result.” Id. at 128, 767 P.2d 13 at 367. We review the WCJ’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Tom 14 Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett , 2005-NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320. 15 However, “[w]here the testimony is conflic ting, the issue on appeal is not whether 16 there is evidence to support a contrary resu lt, but rather whether the evidence supports 17 the findings of the trier of fact.” Id. (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted); 18 Bagwell v. Shady Grove Truck Stop , 104 N.M. 14, 17, 715 P.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 19 1986). 205 DISCUSSION 1 On appeal, Worker argues that she wa s not aware of the seriousness of her 2 injury or its possible comp ensable character until after receiving the results of her 3 MRI on July 27, 2010. Because of the nature of her injury, Worker alleges that she 4 could not be expected to provide notice until after the MRI was taken. Thus, she 5 asserts that her notice to Employer was timely under the latent injury doctrine. 6 Generally speaking, when a worker knows or has reason to know that he or she 7 suffered a work-related injury, the worker is required to provide notice of injury to his 8 or her employer within fifteen days. See § 52-1-29(A); Garnsey v. Concrete Inc. of 9 Hobbs , 1996-NMCA-081, ¶ 12, 122 N.M. 195, 922 P.2d 577 (observing that a worker 10 is required to provide notice once the wo rker “knew, or should have known by the 11 exercise of reasonable diligence, that he or she had sustained a compensable injury”). 12 However, when a worker fails to recognize that an injury is work-related, and the 13 failure is reasonable, the latent injury doc trine tolls the notice requirement until after 14 the worker becomes aware of the probable casual relations hip between the injury and 15 employment. See Gomez v. B.E. Harvey Gin Corp. , 110 N.M. 100, 102, 792 P.2d 16 1143, 1145 (1990) (requiring a worker to provide notice once he or she recognizes or 17 should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of his 18 or her injury); Garnsey , 1996-NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15, 19-20 (re fusing to require a worker 19 to provide notice before the worker deve loped reason to believe his condition was 206 related to work); Flint v. Town of Bernalillo , 118 N.M. 65, 68, 878 P.2d 1014, 1017 1 (Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that the notice period should not begin to run until the 2 worker “has reason to understand not only the nature and gravity of the injury but its 3 relation to employment” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 4 The latent injury doctrine typically applies when a worker has been involved 5 in an accident and suffered ha rm, but is able to continueworking for a period of time 6 thereafter, such that the worker is unawarethat the injury he or she has suffered is 7 disabling and compensable in nature. See Gomezat N.M. 101-102, 792 P.2d at 1144- 8 45 (noting that the worker was released to return to work without restriction after the 9 injury causing accident and that the worker continued to work for nearly a month and 10 a half); Martinez v. Darby Const. Co. , 109 N.M. 146, 147, 782 P.2d 904, 905 (1989) 11 (explaining that the worker continued to perform his job for almost six months after 12 the accident that ultimately led to his disability). 13 In this case, although Worker’s injurywas unknown in the sense that she was 14 unaware of its exact diagnosis until after her MRI, it was al so immediately identifiable 15 and disabling. Worker immediately felt pain and was taken off of the work schedule 16 within three days of her injury. Thus, insofar as Worker was unable to continue 17 working, her injury is distinguishable fro m the type of latent injury that normally 18 triggers an application of th e latent injury doctrine. See, e.g. , Gomezat N.M. 102, 792 19 P.2d at 1145 (tolling notice pursuant to the latent injury doctrine because the 207 compensable nature of an in jury “may become apparent to a worker only after loss of 1 the capability to perform regular duties”). Worker claims the latent injury doctrine 2 remains applicable, despite her immediate pain and the inability to perform her regular 3 tasks, because she neither knew nor shoul d have known that her problem was work 4 related or compensable until after she was diagnosed with the herniated disc. We 5 disagree. 6 “[T]he time to give notice for a latent injury begins when a worker knows, or, 7 with reasonable diligence, should have known of the compensable injury.” Garnsey , 8 1996-NMCA-081, ¶ 16. The WCJ determinedthat Worker should have provided 9 notice, at the very latest, fifteen days af ter her injury caused her to miss her scheduled 10 shift on July 8, 2010. Substantial evid ence in the record supports the WCJ’s 11 determination that Worker should have beenaware of the compensable nature of her 12 injury by this time. On the date of the injury, Worker first indicated that her back and 13 leg were hurting when she reported her sympto ms to a co-worker. She again indicated 14 awareness of the causal relationship betweenher injury and her job when she told 15 Aguilar how the accident happened, that she had first started feeling pain three days 16 prior to her examination on July 6, 2010, and that she noticed in creased back and leg 17 pain after working long hours. Moreover, as we have previously mentioned, Aguilar’s 18 restrictions made it nearly impossible for Worker to perform her regular duties as a 19 housekeeper. As a result, she was taken off of the work schedule immediately 208 following her first medical appointment on Ju ly 6, 2010. Two days later, she missed 1 her first previously scheduled shift. Atthis time, substantial evidence supports a 2 finding that Worker’s inability to perform her job required tasks should have put her 3 on notice that the July 3, 2010, injury was compensable. See Gomez110 N.M. at 102, 4 792 P.2d at 1145. 5 Worker essentially disregards the foregoing evidence on appeal, focusing 6 instead on Nurse Aguilar’s failure to speci fically diagnose her injury until July 27, 7 2010. However, our cases indicate that a statutory deadline will be tolled only when 8 a worker is unaware of the di sabling nature of an injury, not while a worker awaits a 9 definitive pronouncement from his or her medical care provider. Cf. Gerke v. Romero , 10 2010-NMCA-060, ¶ 12, 148 N.M. 367, 237 P.3d 111 (rejecting the argument that 11 under the discovery rule, the accrual date is based upon the claimant’s receipt of a 12 proper medical diagnosis); Martinez v. Showa Denko, K.K. , 1998-NMCA-111, ¶ 24, 13 125 N.M. 615, 964 P.2d 176 (holding that the di scovery rule does not uniformly toll 14 the statutory limitation period until a defi nitive medical opinion regarding the cause 15 of an injury has been provided to the claimant); Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc. , 120 16 N.M. 550, 554, 903 P.2d 861, 865 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that due to the factual 17 nature of inquiry, the statute of limitations is not automatically tolled until a worker 18 is actually told by a health care provider that he or she has suffered a permanent 19 impairment). We acknowledge that the context and the specific f acts of this case are 209 different, but the general principle continue s to be applicable to Worker’s injury. 1 Worker contends that the foregoing analys is is inconsistent with more general 2 principles of law, which provide that a worker is “not charged with medical 3 knowledge which apparently transcends that possessed by the attending physician.” 4 Sedillo v. Levi-Strauss Corp. , 98 N.M. 52, 54, 644 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Ct. App. 1982) 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . However, in this case Worker has not 6 been charged with such superior medi cal knowledge because the notice requirement 7 is premised upon the worker’s recognition of a probablerelationship between her 8 injury and her employment. Gomez , 110 N.M. at 102, 792 P.2d at 1145. Unlike post9 traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a painful work-related back injury that prevents a 10 worker from returning to work is the type of “ obvious or common place injury 11 apparent to the ordinary claimant” and does not require a special diagnosis before 12 reporting the injury to an employer. See Flint , 118 N.M. at 68, 878 P.2d at 1017 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d). Worker’s conduct and statements to 14 Nurse Aguilar and her co-worker indicate that she should have recognized the 15 probablerelationship between her employment and the injury. The severity of 16 Worker’s injury and that it was compensa ble and disabling became clear when she 17 was restricted from returning to work on July 8, 2010, and could not return to work 18 thereafter. There was substantial evid ence to support the WCJ’s conclusion that 19 Worker’s back injury could and shoul d have been discovered and reported to 2010 Employer by July 23, 2010. As a result, the WCJ correctly determined that the latent 1 injury doctrine did not apply to the notice given by Worker to her Employer. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the disposition of the WCJ. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________________________ 6 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 7

WE CONCUR: 8

_____________________________ 9 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 10

_____________________________ 11 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 12