alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by

designation.

* * Pursu ant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 96-20236

_______________________

ROBERT GANDY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-94-CV-4294)

_________________________________________________________________

February 4, 1998

Before KING and JONES, Ci rcuit Judges, and WERLEIN *

, District

Judge.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge: **

Appellant Robert Gandy was convicted in 1990 by a Texas

jury of aggravated robbery and was assessed a punishment of life

imprisonment a nd a fine. Having exhausted state remedies, he2

alleged in a federal habeas petition that (1) the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the prosecution used

the perjured testimony of a co-defendan t, Richard; (3) his

constitutional right to a spe edy trial was denied; (4) the

prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.

Marilyn

, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (5) the prosecution failed to

prove that he used a deadly weapon. The district court found no

merit in any of these claims.

Upon reviewing appropriate portions of the record,

together with the district court’s opinion and the parties’ briefs

on appeal, we find no reversible error of law or fact in the

rejection of Gandy’s speedy trial contentions. An examination of

the State Court records and the four factors used to determine

whether the State violated Gandy's right to a speedy trial shows

that (1) Gandy was either responsible for or consented to the

delays in the case; (2) Gandy's assertions of his right to a speedy

trial were inconsistent with his pretrial activities and the Agreed

Resettings he signed; and (3) Gandy failed to adduce evidence or

provi de factual allegations which supported his claim that his

trial was prejudiced by the delay. B arker v. Wingo

, 407 U.S. 514,

92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).

Notwithstanding this court’s earlier grant of a

certificate of appealability limited to the speedy trial issue, we

have considered all of the issues he raised on appeal, in light of3

the non-r etroactivity of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act. See Lindh v. Murphy , ____ S. Ct. _____ (1997).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

.
#### John F. HINCK, et ux., petitioners, v. UNITED STATES.

No. 06-376.

Jan. 12, 2007.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1946 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1946

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of 
 Labor, Departmental Management, Salaries and Expenses for fiscal year 
                                 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
        referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of 
 Labor, Departmental Management, Salaries and Expenses for fiscal year 
                                 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
              DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT, SALARIES AND EXPENSES FOR FISCAL 
              YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Department of Labor, 
Departmental Management, Salaries and Expenses for fiscal year 2024 may 
not exceed $337,756,000.
                                 <all>
```
Dr. Jeri Ropero-Miller, F-ABFT, is the Senior Director within the Center 

of Forensic Sciences of the Applied Justice Research Division, RTI 

International. With expertise and board certification by the American 

Board of Forensic Toxicology, she has published nationally and 

internationally on topics of postmortem drug studies, emerging drug 

threats, hair drug studies, drug surveillance and intelligence, and 

technology evaluation and adoption. She is the Program Director for 

the National Institute of Justice’s Forensic Technology Center of 

Excellence and its Criminal Justice Technology Evaluation Consortium; 

the current Project Associate Director for the Drug Enforcement Administration-funded 

National Forensic Laboratory Information System project and the Co-Director for the Bureau of 

Justice Statistics-funded 2018 Census of Medical Examiners/Coroners’ Offices and 2019 Census 

of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories. She received her doctorate in Clinical Chemistry 

and Forensic Toxicology from the University of Florida College of Medicine. She has served in 

multiple positions with the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Organization of 

Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Sciences including the Executive Secretary of the 

Chemistry SAC, Toxicology Subcommittee member, and currently the Forensic Sciences 

Standards Board. She is the 2021-2022 Past President of the American Academy of Forensic 

Sciences.

She was appointed to the FSSB in 2021 where she serves as the AAFS representative.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Oscar A. Aranda, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 823]

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Melchor E. Castro, A.J.), rendered April 29, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a nonjury verdict, of predatory sexual assault against a child and sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a nonjury verdict, of predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law § 130.96) and three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [3]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that his statement to the victim’s stepfather was inadmissible hearsay and did not fall within the admission exception to the hearsay rule *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *see generally People v Jones,*92 AD3d 1218, 1218 [2012], *lv denied*
      *129919 NY3d 962 [2012]), and we decline to exercise our power to address it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *{see*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We reject defendant’s further contention that defense counsel’s failure to object to that testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s statement was indeed an admission *(see People v Ward,*107 AD3d 1605, 1605 [2013]; *see also*Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-204 [Farrell 11th ed 1995]), and thus there was little or no chance that the objection would have been sustained *(see generally People v Lewis,*67 AD3d 1396, 1396 [2009], *lv denied*14 NY3d 772 [2010]). Finally, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes in this nonjury trial *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant’s contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Present — Scudder, PJ., Smith, Fahey, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
#### Hai-Zhong Pang, Respondent, v LNK Best Group, Inc. et al., Appellants.

[976 NYS2d 139]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), entered July 2, 2012, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). The plaintiff submitted evidence that, while in the course of his employment as a laborer removing insulation and broken pipes from the ceiling of a building owned by the defendants, he was standing on an unsecured A-frame ladder when the ladder tipped over, causing him to fall *(see Gonzalez v AMCC Corp.,*88 AD3d 945, 946 [2011]; *LaGiudice v Sleepy’s Inc.,*67 AD3d 969, 971 [2009]; *Gilhooly v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y.,*51 AD3d 719, 720 [2008]; *Ricciardi v Bernard Janowitz Constr. Corp.,*49 AD3d 624, 625 [2008]; *Granillo v Donna Karen Co.,*17 AD3d 531 [2005] ).

In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiffs conduct was the sole proximate cause of his accident *(see Gonzalez v AMCC Corp., 88*AD3d at 946; *Ricciardi v Bernard Janowitz Constr. Corp.,*49 AD3d at 625; *Argueta v Pomona Panorama Estates, Ltd.,*39 AD3d 785 [2007]; *Rivera v Dafna Constr. Co., Ltd.,*27 AD3d 545, 545-546 [2006] ).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). Dillon, J.E, Dickerson, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 31.1****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Timothy J. Kilkenny, certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 of Fullnet Communications, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect tothe year covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the years presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internalcontrol over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, was made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the year inwhich this report was being prepared;  (b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or causedsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed underour supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding thereliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financialstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles;  (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the year covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal year that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.Date: March 31, 2008   /s/ Timothy J. Kilkenny   Chief Executive Officer
CAUSE NO. 2010-25688

LINDA GREEN, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

Plaintiff §

§

v. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

§

ZURICH AMERICAN, §

INSURANCE CO., §

Defendant. § 133RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEFENDANT TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCEDIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION’S

AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

Defendant, Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation

(“TDI

- DWC”) , hereby gives notice of its desire to appeal the Order, which denied

Defendant TDI -DWC ’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, signed by the Court on March 2, 2015.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(8). TDI -DWC filed its original Notice of Accelerated Appeal

on March 23, 2015.

The Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation app eals

to the First Court of Appeals. This case has previously been in the First Court of Appe als

in Petition for Writ of Mandamus styled In re Zurich American Insurance Company , Case

No. 01 -12-01094.

Dated: April 9, 2015 ACCEPTED

01-15-00321-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

4/9/2015 2:25:30 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK2 Respectfully submitted,

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

CHARLES E. ROY

First Assistant Attorney General

JAMES E. DAVIS

Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

DAVID A. TALBOT, JR.

Division Chief, Administrative Law Division

/s/Dennis M. McKinney

DENNIS M. McKINNEY

State Bar No.13719300

Assistant Attorney General

Administrative Law Division

O FFICE OF THE A TTORNEY G ENERAL OF T EXAS

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

- 2548

Telephone: (512) 475

- 4020

Facsimile: (512) 320

- 0167

Dennis.McKinney@texasattorneygeneral.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,

DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION3 CE RTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and forgoing document has

been served to the following on the 9th day of April

, 201 5 to the following parties:

Brad McClellan Via E

- Service

L AW O FFICES OF R ICHARD P ENA

, P.C.

1701 Directors Blvd, Suite 110

Austin, Texas 78744

brad.mcclellan@yahoo.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

David Brenner Via E

- Service

Belinda May Arambula

BURNS ANDERSON JURY & BRENNER, L.L.P.

P.O. Box 26300

Austin, Texas 78755

- 6300

7804 Bell Mountain Drive, # 100

Austin, Texas 78730

dbrenner@bajb.com

barambula@bajb.com

Attorneys for Defendant Zurich American

Raymond L. Kalmans Via E

- Service

Stephen L. Brochstein

Schlanger, Silver, Barg & Paine, LLP

109 North Post Oak Lane, Ste. 300

Houston, Texas 77024

rkalmans@ssbplaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Bessie A. Wilhelm

/s/Dennis M. McKinney

DENNIS M. McKINNEY

Assistant Attorney General
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pedro Luis RAYGOZA-CEDILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-41786.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 2, 2008.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Pedro Luis Raygoza-Cedillo (Raygoza) appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). Raygoza argues that the district court erred in applying a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), based on the determination that his 1992 Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation constitutes a crime of violence. We review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo. *See United States v. Velasco,*465 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir.2006).

Raygoza recognizes that this court has previously held that an offense committed under Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1), the statute of his conviction, is a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2, but argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *James v. United States,*— U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1599-1600, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007), overrules this circuit’s precedent. His argument is unpersuasive.

In *United States v. Gomez-Guerra,*485 F.3d 301, 304 & n. 3 (5th Cir.2007), this court noted that the analysis in *James*expressly does not concern enumerated offenses and pertains only to a residual provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(2)(B)(ii), which § 2L1.2 does not contain. Consequently, *James*is not dispositive of this case. Moreover, because this court has repeatedly held that an offense under § 30.02(a)(1) constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). *See Gomez-Guerra,*485 F.3d at 304; *United States v. Garcia-Mendez,*420 F.3d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir. 2005) ; *see also United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444*F.3d 337, 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2006) .

Raygoza also maintains the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) are unconstitutional in the light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 *746U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. *United States v. Pineda-Amilano,*492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir.2007), *cert. denied,*-U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 872, 169 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LISA ROGERS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION: 15-00253-KD-C

)

MERCHANTS BANK, )

Defendant. )

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the 

issues raised, and a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 14) to which objection is made (and with consideration of the response thereto) (Docs. 15, 

16), the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 14) of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(l)(B) and dated July 23, 2015, is ADOPTED as AMENDED as the opinion of this Court

to include the following ADDITIONAL findings:

In Plaintiff's objection to the Report and Recommendation she attempts to add a new 

claim, as well as argue that she is requesting an accounting. As noted by the Defendant, 

an attempt to amend her complaint by way of an objection to the Report and 

Recommendation is procedurally deficient. The Report and Recommendation addresses

the current complaint and correctly finds that it is due to be dismissed based on the statute 

of limitations.

With those additional findings, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

(Doc. 4) is GRANTED and this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED this the 13th day of August, 2015.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:15-cv-00253-KD-C Document 17 Filed 08/13/15 Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Bioheart, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control
over financial reporting to be designed under my supervision, to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Howard J. Leonhardt
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Dontavis Gowan, * From the 54th District

 Court of McLennan County,

 Trial Court No. 2011-1805-C2.

Vs. No. 11-12-00292-CR * October 17, 2013

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by McCall, J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 McCall, J., and Willson, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.