alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLICACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the RegistrationStatement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-150333, effective April 18, 2008) of Bioheart, Inc. and subsidiaries of our report dated May10, 2011 relating to the consolidated financial statements which appear in this Form 10-K. Our report contains an explanatory paragraphregarding the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern.

|               |   |
|--------------------|--------|
| /s/ RBSM LLP       |   |
|               |   |
| Hollywood, Florida |   |
| May 10, 2011       |   |

****
#### Alma G. Davis, Respondent, v Rochdale Village, Inc., et al., Appellants.

[971 NYS2d 340]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), dated April 16, 2012, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of release.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint is granted.

In support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants submitted a release executed by the plaintiff, which, by its terms, barred the instant action against them *(see*CPLR 3211 [a] [5]; *Schiller v Guthrie,*102 AD3d 852 [2013]; *Seff v Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Schlissel, P.C.,*55 AD3d 592 [2008]). “ ‘ “A release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law” ’ ” *(Cardinal Holdings, Ltd. v Indotronix Intl. Corp.,*73 AD3d 960, 962 [2010], quoting *Lee v Boro Realty, LLC,*39 AD3d 715, 716 [2007]; *see Kaminsky v Gamache,*298 AD2d 361, 361 [2002]). *“A*release may be invalidated . . . for any of ‘the traditional bases for setting aside written agreements’ ” *(Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V.,*17 NY3d 269, 276 [2011], *quotingMangini v Mc-Clurg,*24 NY2d 556, 563 [1969]). However, “a signed release ‘shifts the burden of going forward ... to the [plaintiff] to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will he sufficient to void the release’ ” *(Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V.,*17 NY3d at 276, quoting *Fleming v Ponziani,*24 NY2d 105, 111 [1969]; *see Haynes v Garez,*304 AD2d 714, 715 [2003]; *Shklovskiy v Khan,*273 AD2d 371, 372 [2000]).

Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was fraud, duress, or some other fact sufficient to void the release. There is no merit to the plaintiffs contention that she lacked the mental capacity to enter into the release, and she failed to come forward with any valid excuse for failing to read the release prior to signing it *(see Matter of Augustine v BankUnited FSB,*75 AD3d 596, 597 [2010]; *Cash v Titan Fin. Servs., Inc.,*58 AD3d 785, 788 [2009]). In addition, the language of the release was clear *868and unambiguous, and the plaintiffs conclusory and unsubstantiated claim that she intended the release to only apply to her medical expenses, rather than to any claim for personal injuries, is insufficient to set aside the release *(see Lee v Boro Realty, LLC,*39 AD3d 715 [2007]).

Accordingly, the release should have been given effect, and the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint *(see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V.,*17 NY3d at 277-280). Angiolillo, J.E, Chambers, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### Steven Quock, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent, and Abul K. Azad et al., Appellants.

[973 NYS2d 72]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Geoffrey D. Wright, J.), entered November 28, 2012, which granted defendant City of New York’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff police officer was injured in a collision at an intersection between a radio motor patrol vehicle in which he was a passenger, and a taxicab owned by defendant Inta Cab Corp. and driven by defendant Azad. The accident occurred when plaintiffs partner, Officer Santiago, driving east in response to a radio call of a crime in progress, proceeded through a red traffic light and was hit by Azad’s cab, which was traveling northbound.

Dismissal of the action as against the City was proper since there are no triable issues as to whether Santiago acted recklessly in crossing the intersection, as required to impose liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, the statutory predicate for plaintiffs claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e *(see Gonzalez v Iocovello,*93 NY2d 539, 551 [1999]). The record shows that Santiago activated her lights and sirens immediately upon entering the vehicle, thereby alerting those around her to her presence and emergent right of way *(see Frezzell v City of*
      *489
      *New York,*105 AD3d 620 [1st Dept 2013]; *Spencer v Astralease Associated, Inc.,*89 AD3d 530 [1st Dept 2011]). Santiago also reduced her speed as she approached the intersection and although she thereafter accelerated, Santiago looked in the direction of oncoming traffic, but saw no cars approaching *(cf. Campbell v City of Elmira,*84 NY2d 505, 508 [1994]). The fact that Santiago did not see Azad’s taxi until just before the accident does not render her conduct reckless *(see Perez v City of New York,*80 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2011]).

Furthermore, even after accelerating into the intersection, there is no evidence that Santiago was travelling faster than 35 miles per hour, a mere five miles per hour above the applicable speed limit. Considering that she was responding to a report of a crime in progress, Santiago’s relatively modest speed under the circumstances does not rise to the level of reckless conduct *(see Saarinen v Kerr,*84 NY2d 494, 503 [1994]; *Perez,*80 AD3d at 543-544). Concur — Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Saxe, Freedman and Clark, JJ.
1

The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2258

___________

Paul A. Culbreath, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Perryman Realty, Inc.; Danny * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Perryman; Barbara Perryman; Fulton *

Title Company; Karen Plumlee; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Bank of Salem, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 28, 2006

Filed: March 3, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Paul Culbreath appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants. Having carefully reviewed the

record, see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. FAG Bearings Corp., 335 F.3d 752, 757 (8th Cir.

2003) (de novo standard of review), we agree with the district court that Culbreath
-2-

is collaterally estopped from bringing his claim, for the reasons explained in the

district court’s opinion. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
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----

|                    |   |                         |   |   |
|-------------------------|--------|------------------------------|--------|--------|
|                    |   |                         |   |   |
|  May      15, 2008 |   | /s/      Michael Sweet       |   |   |
|                    |   |                         |   |   |
|                    |   | Michael      Sweet           |   |   |
|                    |   | Chief      Financial Officer |   |   |
|                    |   |                         |   |   |

----
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Victor M. Garcia, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of CAI International, Inc. on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of CAI International, Inc.

Date: March 16, 2009



By:

/S/    VICTOR M. GARCIAVictor M. Garcia Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
---

CLISBAKO MINERALS INC.#950, 650 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC V6B 4N8

November 15, 2010

MANADO GOLD CORP., #950, 650 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC V6B 4N8

Re: Extension of Payment Dates under Option Agreement
Dated September 15, 2010

Dear Sirs,

This will confirm our agreement
that in consideration of your agreeing to accelerate the work program on the
Clisbako Property by expending not less than $100,000 to complete a work program
by December 31, 2010, we have agreed to extend the payments set out in paragraph
4(b) of the option agreement as follows:

(a) The payment that was due on October
31, 2010 is extended to February 28, 2011; and

(b) The payment that was due on January
31, 2011 is extended to April 30, 2011.

Please sign where indicated below to confirm our agreement.

Yours truly,

CLISBAKO MINERALS INC.

/s/ David K.
Ryan_____________________________David K. Ryan President
& Director

****

ACCEPTED AND AGREED this 15thday
of November, 2010.

MANADO GOLD CORP.

/s/ Logan B.
Anderson_____________________________Logan B. Anderson
President & Director

---
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 8 (Tuesday, January 13, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1669-1670]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00329]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

[Notice (14-132)]


Notice of Intent To Grant Exclusive License

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of intent to grant exclusive license.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice is issued in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 209(e) and 
37 CFR 404.7(a)(1)(i). NASA hereby gives notice of its intent to grant 
an exclusive license in the United States to practice the inventions 
described and claimed in USPN 6,133,036, Preservation of Liquid 
Biological Samples, NASA Case No. MSC-22616-2 and USPN 6,716,392, 
Preservation of Liquid Biological Samples, NASA Case No. MSC-22616-3 to 
Coated Preservative Products, LLC, having its principal place of 
business in Warner Robins, GA. The patent rights in these inventions 
have been assigned to the United States of America as

[[Page 1670]]

represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. The prospective exclusive license will comply with the 
terms and conditions of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

DATES: The prospective exclusive license may be granted unless within 
fifteen (15) days from the date of this published notice, NASA receives 
written objections including evidence and argument that establish that 
the grant of the license would not be consistent with the requirements 
of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7. Competing applications completed and 
received by NASA within fifteen (15) days of the date of this published 
notice will also be treated as objections to the grant of the 
contemplated exclusive license.
    Objections submitted in response to this notice will not be made 
available to the public for inspection and, to the extent permitted by 
law, will not be released under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. 552.

ADDRESSES: Objections relating to the prospective license may be 
submitted to Patent Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, NASA Johnson 
Space Center, 2101 NASA Parkway, Mail Code AL, Houston, Texas 77058; 
Phone (281) 483-3021; Fax (281) 483-6936.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Michelle P. Lewis, Technology 
Transfer and Commercialization Office, Johnson Space Center, 2101 NASA 
Parkway, Mail Code AO52, Houston, TX 77058, Phone (281) 483-8051. 
Information about other NASA inventions available for licensing can be 
found online at http://technology.nasa.gov.

Sumara M. Thompson-King,
General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2015-00329 Filed 1-12-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7510-13-P
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* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of

opinions that merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-30429 Conference Calendar

__________________ RICHARD J. VINET, Petitioner-Appellant,
versus BURL CAIN, Acting Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary; RICHARD P. IEYOUB, Attorney General, State of Louisiana, Respondents-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 94-CV-2576
- - - - - - - - - - December 20, 1995 Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his confession should have been suppressed and that, if not, the recording of the entire confession should have been played for the jury. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion, which adopted the magistrate judge's report, and find noNo. 95-30429 -2- reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Vinet v. Whitley , No. 94-2576 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 1995). AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 30, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50289 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RICHARD CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:03-CR-00626

-------------------- Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Richard Clark appeals the 51-month sentence imposed following a remand for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Clark pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. He contends that his sentence was unreasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Clark contends that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence by failing to give appropriate consideration to his attempts at obtaining treatment before his incarceration and his inability to obtain treatment in prison.No. 06-50289 -2- Clark’s sentence was within a properly calculated advisory guideline range and is presumed reasonable. See United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Such a sentence is given “great deference,” and we infer that the sentencing court considered all the factors for a fair sentence. See United States v. Smith , 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006). We conclude that Clark has failed to rebut the presumption that his sentence, which was at the bottom of the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, was reasonable. See Alonzo , 435 F.3d at 554-55. Consequently, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
#### United States *v.*Gleason.

*(District Court, D. South Carolina.*

January 15, 1889.)

Evidence—Proof of Handwriting—Weight.

The value to he given to the opinion of a witness as to the authorship of handwriting is to he determined by the opportunity and circumstances under which he has acquired his knowledge. If ho is an illiterate man, or one whose business seldom brings him into contact with writing, his opinion is entitled to much less weight than if he were an educated man, accustomed to ■correspondence, and to seeing people write.

Indictment of Dennis F.. Gleason for sending indecent and threatening postal-cards through the mail.

*L. F. Yowtaam,*U. S. Dist. Atty.

*Buist & Buist,*for defendant.

*332Simonton, J.,

*{charging*jury.) The defendant is indicted for sending through the mail an indecent and threatening postal-card. The card is produced, duly stamped, and a letter-carrier testifies that he received it at the post-office, and delivered it. The government seeks to fasten the guilt on defendant by ]iroof of the handwriting, which it is alleged is that of the defendant. Two witnesses have been introduced for that purpose. Neither of them saw the defendant write the card in question. Both testify that they have seen him write, and from this experience swear to the handwriting. I am requested to charge you with respect to such evidence. As a general rule a witness can only testify as to facts within his personal knowledge. Questions of handwriting are among the exceptions to this rule. Whether or not a paper is in the handwriting of a person, if none of the witnesses actually saw him write it, is a matter of opinion; and the witnesses can speak as to their opinion. In such cases the jury pass upon two questions. The first is as to the credibility of the witness; the second is as to the value to be given to his opinion. This last question depends upon his opportunity and capacity of acquiring the knowledge of the handwriting. Has he seen it under such circumstances as to satisfy the jury that he knows it? In other words, it is not the expression of the opinion which is to satisfy the jury. They must conclude from the facts stated by the witness, the times, places, opportunity, and circumstances under which he acquired his knowledge, whether he really knows it or not. In this connection the jury should consider the capacity and experience of the witness. If he be an illiterate man, or one whose business seldom brings him into contact with writing and written documents, his opinion would be entitled to much less weight than if he be an educated man, himself a penman accustomed to correspondence, and to seeing people write; and this, even if he be in no sense an expert. You have seen these witnesses. You have heard in minute detail all the means of knowledge they had of the handwriting of the defendant. Your verdict will depend upon your conclusion from their testimony.
#### State v. Potts

Case below: 182 N.C. App. 349

No. 197P07

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA06-811)

Denied 08/23/07