FILED

August 28, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JULY 31, 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) NO. 02C01-9802-CR-00040

Appellee, )

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. W. FRED AXLEY,

QUENTIN L. HALL, ) JUDGE

 )

Appellant. ) (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea)

FOR THE APPELLANT:

A. C. WHARTON

Shelby County Public Defender

WALKER GWINN

Assistant Public Defender

201 Poplar Avenue, Ste. 201

Memphis, TN 38103-1947

FOR THE APPELLEE:

JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Attorney General and Reporter

PETER M. COUGHLAN

Assistant Attorney General

Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

WILLIAM L. GIBBONS

District Attorney General

EDGAR A. PETERSON, IV

Assistant District Attorney General

Criminal Justice Complex

201 Poplar Avenue, Ste. 301

Memphis, TN 38103-1947

OPINION FILED: 

AFFIRMED

JOE G. RILEY,

JUDGE
1The record is silent as to the reason for the lengthy delay between the filing of the

motion and the order denying the motion. 

2

O P I N I O N

Defendant, Quentin L. Hall, appeals the order of the Criminal Court of Shelby

County denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea to first degree murder. The

plea was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, and defendant received a life

sentence. Since the judgment became final on the date of entry of the plea of guilty

pursuant to a plea agreement, we conclude the motion to withdraw filed thereafter

was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 18, 1996, the defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement,

entered a guilty plea to first degree murder and received a sentence of life with the

possibility of parole. The petition for acceptance of the plea, signed by the

defendant, specifically waives the right to appeal. Likewise, the order which

accepted the petition noted the waiver of appeal by the defendant. In accordance

with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant on the same date.

On December 16, 1996, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea

pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). He alleged the withdrawal was necessary to

prevent “manifest injustice.” The record reflects that no evidentiary hearing was

conducted. Instead, the parties relied upon the guilty plea transcript and two (2)

prior psychological evaluations. 

On January 13, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to

withdraw.1 The trial court found nothing in the record to indicate a lack of mental

capacity to enter the plea. This appeal followed. 

UNTIMELY FILING OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

The withdrawal of a guilty plea is controlled by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f), which
2Passarella, Warren and Lightfoot all relate to the finality of judgments for purposes

of calculating the statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions. 

3

provides as follows: 

Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. - A motion to withdraw a

plea of guilty may be made upon a showing by the

defendant of any fair and just reason only before

sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice,

the court after sentence, but before the judgment

becomes final, may set aside the judgment of conviction

and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.

(emphasis added). Thus, a motion to withdraw is appropriate only prior to

sentencing based upon “any fair and just reason” or after sentence, but before the

judgment becomes final, “to correct manifest injustice.” The Tennessee rule does

not authorize a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after a judgment has become final.

In this case the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and

waived his right to appeal. Upon waiving his right to appeal on the date of entry of

the guilty plea and judgment of conviction, the judgment became final that day. See

Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Warren v. State,

833 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); Lakeith O. Lightfoot v. State, C.C.A.

No. 02C01-9703-CR-00129, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed February 18,

1998, at Jackson).2 There is generally no right of appeal from a guilty plea entered

pursuant to a plea agreement. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). The only exceptions

are set forth in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2) (i)-(iv). None of these exceptions applies

here. The plea of guilty, waiver of appeal and sentence, all entered November 18,

1996, made the judgment final that day. 

We, therefore, conclude a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is inappropriate

for a guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement except for guilty pleas under

the limited exceptions set forth in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2) (i)-(iv). Since a

judgment immediately becomes final upon a waiver of appeal, the only avenue of
3This motion was not treated as a petition for post-conviction relief by the trial court

nor by the parties. Nor will it be treated as such by this Court. The trial court considered the

motion to withdraw on its merits and did not dismiss it on the basis of untimely filing as

determined by this Court. Furthermore, although the motion was filed in December 1996, the

order of dismissal was not entered until January 1998. As stated, defendant’s only possible

relief is through post-conviction. To complicate matters further, the Public Defender

represented the defendant at the time of the plea, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and

on this appeal. On this appeal the Public Defender alleges in the brief that “[n]either the

defense counsel [Public Defender] nor the court explained to Hall... that a life sentence with

the possibility of parole would mean a sentence... for at least 51 years under our law.”

(emphasis added). It is, therefore, apparent that the Public Defender should not represent

defendant in any attempt to seek post-conviction relief. We voice no opinion as to any

possible future litigation. 

4

relief available to a defendant in such a situation is through post-conviction

proceedings. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq.3 

MANIFEST INJUSTICE

We also will address the motion to withdraw on its merits since the matter

may be appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court. 

Although there was no evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw the

guilty plea, the trial court had before it the transcript of the guilty plea. The trial court

concluded that the transcript gave no indication of mental impairment or a lack of

understanding by the defendant. We reach the same conclusion based upon our

review of the transcript. 

In addition, the trial court had before it two (2) psychological evaluations.

One evaluation indicated that the defendant functioned within the mildly mentally

retarded range, yet found no evidence to indicate he was committable to an

institution. A subsequent evaluation found that he had the mental capacity to

understand the nature of the legal process, to understand the charges and their

potential consequences, and the capacity to confer with counsel and participate in

his defense. Again, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “there is nothing

. . . to indicate that the defendant executed anything other than a competent,

voluntary waiver.” 
5

In summary, the defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the

plea of guilty should be withdrawn to prevent “manifest injustice.” See State v.

Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

____________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

CONCUR:

______________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

______________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE