In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1618 

PAUL NIGL, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

JON LITSCHER, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 17-cv-925 — J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2019 — DECIDED OCTOBER 7, 2019 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Wisconsin Department of Corrections officials denied inmate Paul Nigl’s request to marry his 

former prison psychologist, Dr. Sandra Johnston. Nigl and 

Johnston filed suit, arguing that the denial violates their fundamental right to marry. The denial, however, was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Nigl and Johnston had engaged in a pattern of rule-breaking and deception 

in furtherance of their relationship leading up to the date of 
2 No. 19-1618 

the marriage request, and the Psychology Examining Board 

concluded that Johnston had violated rules designed to protect patients in connection with her relationship with Nigl. 

The defendants also represent that the decision to deny the 

marriage request in January 2017 is not tantamount to a permanent denial. We therefore affirm the district court’s entry 

of summary judgment for the defendants. 

I. Background 

Since 2001, plaintiff-appellant John Nigl has been a prisoner within the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (“Department”), where he is currently serving a 100-year bifurcated sentence for two counts of intoxicated homicide by use 

of a vehicle. From 2001 until September 2015, Nigl was incarcerated at Waupun Correction Institution (“Waupon”). Plaintiff-appellant Dr. Sandra Johnston worked at Waupon as a 

prison psychologist from April 2013 until January 2015, during which time she provided psychological services to Nigl 

and had numerous contacts with him. On Johnston’s last day 

of work at Waupon, Nigl kissed her.1 

After Johnston’s last day at Waupon, Nigl asked his 

brother to find Johnston’s contact information. Johnston and 

Nigl then began communicating regularly by mail, email, and 

phone and became engaged in April 2015. 

Johnston returned to employment with the Department as 

a psychologist in the Department’s central office in July 2015. 

On her first day of work, she submitted a “fraternization policy exception request” form to her supervisor, requesting permission to have contact with Nigl. Where the form asks for 

 

1 Johnston initially admitted to kissing Nigl but later denied it. 
No. 19-1618 3

the “Nature of Employee Relationship to Offender,” Johnston 

checked the box marked “other” and wrote “Met at [Waupon] 

approximately 04/13. Relationship [is] professional.” Johnston did not disclose that she was engaged to Nigl or that she 

was otherwise in a romantic relationship with him. Johnston’s 

supervisor never processed the fraternization policy exception request, but Nigl and Johnston continued to have contact 

anyway. Because Johnston’s fraternization request had not 

been approved, those contacts were a violation of the Department’s fraternization policy, which prohibits Department employees from having “personal contacts ... [and] knowingly 

forming close relationships” with inmates. The Department’s 

fraternization policy “is designed to eliminate any potential 

conflict of interest or impairment of the supervision and rehabilitation” that Department employees provide inmates. 

Around the same time that Nigl was transferred to Redgranite Correctional Institution (“Redgranite”) in September 

2015, the Department learned about Johnston’s relationship 

with Nigl. The Department then terminated Johnston in October 2015 for violations of the Department’s fraternization 

policy. 

A month after Johnston was terminated, she requested to 

visit Nigl. She disclosed on the visitation request form that 

she was Nigl’s “friend” but did not disclose any romantic relationship with Nigl. Johnston noted that the details of how 

they met were confidential under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Department personnel denied 

Johnston’s request pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 

309.08(4)(j) because she had been an employee of the Department less than twelve months earlier. 
4 No. 19-1618 

In ensuing investigations of Johnston’s conduct, Redgranite staff found cards, letters, and photographs from Johnston 

in Nigl’s cell, some of which were sent under the alias “Cassie 

Fox” or “Cass.” Some of the photographs depicted Johnston 

in various stages of undress and in sexually suggestive poses. 

The parties dispute whether Johnston sent Nigl these items 

while employed by the Department. Defendant-appellee Michael Meisner, warden of Redgranite, testified that if Johnston 

sent the items while employed by the Department, then those 

items would be considered contraband. 

Johnston had also set up an account with the prison’s 

phone system under the name Cassie Fox and engaged in 

phone sex with Nigl. The Department prohibits using an alias 

when communicating with an inmate because it thwarts the 

effective monitoring of inmate communications. Meisner believed that Johnston used the alias to conceal her identity as a 

former Department employee and to thwart the security protocol of the institution. 

The Department reported Johnston’s relationship with 

Nigl to the Psychology Examining Board (the “Board”). The 

Board concluded that Johnston, in furtherance of her relationship with Nigl, had violated Wis. Admin. Code §§ Psy 

5.01(14)(a) and (b), which prohibit licensed psychologists 

from “[e]ngaging in sexual contact, sexual conduct, kissing, 

or any other behavior which could reasonably be construed 

as seductive, romantic, harassing, or exploitative” with a client or former client within two years of the end of professional services. The Board’s rules aim to “protect the health, 

safety or welfare of clients or patients.” Bar-Av v. Psychology 

Examining Bd., 728 N.W.2d 722, 728 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). As a 

result of the Board’s findings, it entered an order in August 
No. 19-1618 5

2016 suspending Johnston’s license for one year and limiting 

her license to practice. 

In November 2016, Johnston submitted another request to 

visit Nigl. She again indicated that she was Nigl’s friend but 

did not disclose a romantic relationship with him. Department personnel also denied that request because, among 

other reasons, she had shown a willingness to violate rules by 

communicating with Nigl outside of her professional relationship. 

In December 2016, Nigl requested permission to marry 

Johnston. Under the Department’s policies and procedures, 

an inmate could submit a request to marry if the following 

conditions were met: 

A. The marriage does not pose a threat to the 

security of the facility or a threat to the safety 

of the public; 

B. There are no legal impediments to the marriage; 

C. The inmate is not scheduled for release 

within nine months; 

D. The proposed spouse or the proposed 

spouse’s children are not victims of the inmate; 

E. The proposed spouse has never been convicted in any criminal activity with the inmate; and 

F. The proposed spouse has been on the inmate’s visiting list for a minimum of one 

year or is able to demonstrate a longstanding 

relationship with the proposed spouse. 
6 No. 19-1618 

The decision to approve or deny the request falls within the 

warden’s discretion. The parties agree that the Department 

could accommodate a brief ceremony without compromising 

prison security or placing undue strain on prison resources. 

Defendant-appellee Sara Hungerford, who was a social 

worker at Redgranite at the time, received and reviewed the 

marriage request. Hungerford conferred with her supervisor 

defendant-appellee Zachary Schroeder and recommended 

denial of the request to marry because 

there are reasonable grounds to believe the marriage poses a threat to the security of the facility 

or a threat to the safety of the public, or threatens other legitimate penological interests ... 

[and the] proposed spouse has not been on the 

visiting list for at least one year and is not able 

to demonstrate a longstanding relationship. 

Schroeder and Meisner agreed with Hungerford’s recommendation because of Johnston and Nigl’s violations of Department rules in furtherance of their relationship; Johnston’s violations of the code of professional conduct for psychologists 

and, relatedly, Meisner’s concern that Johnston may have victimized Nigl; Meisner’s belief that the relationship was 

grounded in deception and rule-breaking; Nigl and Johnston’s failure to demonstrate a longstanding relationship; and 

the threat the marriage would pose to the security of the facility and other penological interests. Meisner made the final decision to deny Nigl’s request to marry Johnston in January 

2017. 
No. 19-1618 7

Nigl submitted two inmate grievances about the marriage 

denial in early 2017. The inmate complaint examiner recommended denial of the grievances, finding that the staff acted 

in accordance with Department policy. Nigl appealed the denials of his grievances, and those appeals were also denied. 

Jon Litscher was the Department Secretary and final decisionmaker on internal inmate grievances at the time the grievances and appeals were denied. Defendant-appellee Kevin 

Carr is the current Department Secretary and is substituted 

for former Secretary Litscher pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

43(c)(2). 

In June 2017, Johnston submitted a third visitation request, 

again stating that Nigl was a “friend” but declining to disclose 

their romantic relationship. The request was denied for reasons similar to the reasons the previous visitation requests 

were denied. Since June 2018, Nigl has been housed at Fox 

Lake Correctional Institution (“Fox Lake”). 

Nigl and Johnston filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based 

on the denials of the marriage and visitation requests. The 

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the 

district court granted the defendants’ motion, dismissing all 

claims as to all parties. The district court concluded that the 

denial of the marriage request was “reasonably related to [the 

defendants’] goal of ensuring a secure prison where staff and 

inmates respect the rules.” The plaintiffs appeal the district 

court’s judgment only as to the denial of the marriage request. 

The plaintiffs argue that the district court misapplied the 

four-factor test the Supreme Court set forth in Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78 (1987) when evaluating the plaintiffs’ right to 

marry claim because it relied solely on the first factor and ignored the others. The plaintiffs also argue that the district 
8 No. 19-1618 

court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedent in Riker 

v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015), a case where we held 

that the defendants had not adequately justified their denial 

of an inmate’s marriage request. The defendants respond that 

the district court correctly concluded that the denial of the 

marriage request was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests in institutional security and inmate rehabilitation. 

II. Discussion 

We review de novo the district court’s entry of summary 

judgment and consider the record in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiffs, the party against whom summary judgment 

was entered here. Pagel v. TIN Inc., 695 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 

2012). The district court’s entry of summary judgment for the 

defendants was proper only if no material issue of fact exists 

that would allow a jury to find in favor of the plaintiffs. 

Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 

2013). 

A. Prisoners’ Right to Marry 

Prisoners retain, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a constitutional right to marry, which “like many other rights, is 

subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration.” 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). A prison policy decision 

that impinges on an inmate’s constitutional rights does not violate the Constitution if the decision “is reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89; see also Siddiqi v. 

Leak, 880 F.2d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 1989) (Turner test applies to 
No. 19-1618 9

prison policy decisions as well as prison regulations).2 The Supreme Court has set forth four factors for the Court to consider in making this determination: 

(1) whether there was a rational connection between the decision to deny the marriage request and the legitimate penological interest 

put forward to justify the denial; 

(2) whether alternative means of exercising the 

right remained open to the plaintiffs; 

(3) what impact accommodation of the asserted 

right would have on guards and other inmates; and 

(4) whether obvious, easy alternatives existed to 

accommodate the plaintiffs’ rights at de 

minimis cost to valid penological interests, 

tending to show that the denial was an exaggerated response to prison concerns. 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91. The defendants argue that the case 

can be disposed of under the first factor whereas the plaintiffs 

argue that the Court must consider the first and fourth factors.3 Although “the first one can act as a threshold factor regardless of which way it cuts,” Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 

553 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), the ultimate question remains whether the defendants’ decision to deny the marriage 

 

2 The standard is the same for both Nigl and Johnston. See Keeney v. 

Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[S]o far as challenges to prison 

regulations as infringing constitutional rights are concerned, the standard 

is the same whether the rights of prisoners or of nonprisoners are at 

stake.”) (citation omitted). 

3 The parties agree that the defendants cannot justify their denial of 

the marriage request based on the second or third factors. 
10 No. 19-1618 

request was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 

Courts must give “substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate 

means to accomplish them.” Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 

F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 

U.S. 126, 132 (2003)). The defendants cannot, however, “avoid 

court scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions.” Riker, 798 F.3d at 

553 (citation omitted). “Although the burden of persuasion is 

on the prisoner to disprove the validity of a regulation, prison 

officials must still articulate their legitimate governmental interest in the regulation and provide some evidence supporting their concern.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

B. Denial of Plaintiffs’ Marriage Request 

The defendants’ denial of the plaintiffs’ one-time marriage 

request in January 2017 was reasonably related to their legitimate penological interests in preserving the security of the 

prison, inducing compliance with and promoting respect for 

the prison’s rules governing inmate contacts, and rehabilitating Nigl. The defendants have pointed to several instances of 

misconduct by Johnston and Nigl in furtherance of their relationship: Johnston and Nigl kissing on Johnston’s last day at 

Waupon (a fact that Johnston now denies); Johnston and Nigl 

developing and continuing their relationship in violation of 

Department rules; Johnston using an alias to communicate 

with Nigl; Johnston continuing to have contact with Nigl even 

though her fraternization policy exception request had not 

been approved; Johnston misrepresenting her relationship as 
No. 19-1618 11

merely “professional” and stating that she was only a 

“friend” of Nigl on fraternization policy exception and visitation forms; and Johnston having violated professional rules 

meant to protect clients or patients like Nigl by engaging in 

seductive, romantic, or exploitative conduct with him. 

The plaintiffs’ pattern of rule-breaking and deception in 

furtherance of their relationship continued up to and through 

the date of the marriage request. As recently as one month 

before the marriage request, Johnston falsely identified herself as merely Nigl’s “friend,” and she again identified herself 

as merely a friend on a visitation request form after Nigl submitted the marriage request. Considering these continued 

failures to disclose the true nature of their relationship in the 

context of the previous uses of an alias and other forms of deception, the defendants could have reasonably concluded that 

the couple’s pattern of rule-breaking and deception was ongoing through the time of the marriage request. 

Taking steps to prevent this kind of conduct from recurring in the future is rationally related to the defendants’ interests in maintaining a secure prison capable of effectively monitoring inmate contacts and in promoting respect for its rules. 

Requiring the defendants to grant the plaintiffs’ marriage request at a time when the plaintiffs were engaged in an ongoing pattern of rule-breaking and deception in furtherance of 

their relationship would eliminate or reduce the “sting” from 

the Department’s sanction for the plaintiffs’ misconduct. Cf. 

Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Restrictions on visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage, may well justify deferment, so that the sanction 

for misconduct will have some sting.”). 
12 No. 19-1618 

Moreover, sanctioning the plaintiffs for misconduct to 

promote respect for the prison’s rules was not the only reason 

for denying the marriage request. The defendants also denied 

the request because of Meisner’s concern that Johnston, given 

her position of authority over Nigl, may have been exploiting 

or otherwise victimizing Nigl. That concern is supported by 

the Psychology Examining Board’s finding, published just 

four months before the marriage request, that Johnston violated rules designed to protect psychologists’ clients and patients.4 The denial of the marriage request was therefore rationally related to the defendants’ goal of protecting Nigl 

from the same exploitation that those rules were designed to 

prevent. 

At the time of the marriage request, Johnston was already 

not permitted to visit Nigl. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants still could have segregated Nigl or restricted his 

phone privileges as punishment for the rule violations instead 

of denying the marriage request. The Turner test, however, is 

not a least restrictive alternative test, 482 U.S. at 90, and the 

defendants are entitled to “substantial deference” in determining the most effective means to accomplish their legitimate penological goals, Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. The plaintiffs 

have not made any showing that either one of their proposed 

 4 The plaintiffs concede that Johnston provided psychological services 

to Nigl and had a professional relationship with him. Johnston also wrote 

on a Department form that the details of how she met Nigl were protected 

by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which safeguards medical information. The plaintiffs nevertheless dispute the characterization of Nigl as Johnston’s former “patient.” Regardless of how the 

relationship is labeled, the Board concluded that Johnston, a licensed psychologist, violated rules designed to protect clients and patients in connection with her relationship with Nigl. 
No. 19-1618 13

alternative means was “obvious [and] easy,” Turner, 482 U.S. 

at 90, or could have been substituted at only de minimis cost 

to the defendants’ pursuit of their legitimate penological 

goals, id. at 90–91; see also Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (prisoners 

bear burden to prove invalidity of prison regulations). 

The plaintiffs rely heavily on our decision in Riker, but the 

marriage request issue in that case was decided based on a 

“fundamental infirmity” that does not exist here. 798 F.3d at 

556. The fundamental infirmity, we explained, was that the 

justification the defendants offered for denying the marriage 

request was “premised entirely on its ex-employee visitation 

policy and the security justifications that support that policy.” 

Id. at 556 & n.28 (explaining that the Department “fundamentally misconceive[d] the issue before the court” by resting justifications for the denial of the marriage request on reasons 

for denying visitation privileges). Here, the defendants have 

articulated reasons for the denial of the marriage request that 

exist independently of concerns surrounding visitation. 

It is worth clarifying that before this Court is the January 

2017 denial of the plaintiffs’ request to get married. The defendants readily concede that the denial was a one-time rather 

than permanent denial; that the decision was made, in part, 

because of the temporal proximity between the rule-breaking 

and the request; and that the plaintiffs are welcome to submit 

a new marriage request at Fox Lake, Nigl’s new place of incarceration. While it would weigh on the Court’s balancing of 

the Turner factors if this were a de facto permanent ban, see, 

e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 535 (2006); Overton, 539 U.S. 

at 134, “Turner does not say that every delay violates the Constitution,” Martin, 329 F.3d at 922. Under the circumstances 
14 No. 19-1618 

relevant to the one-time denial of the marriage request in January 2017, the logical connection between the denial and the 

asserted penological interests was not “so remote as to render 

the [decision] arbitrary or irrational,” nor was the denial an 

“exaggerated response” to concerns regarding the plaintiffs’ 

pattern of misconduct, rule-breaking, and deception in furtherance of their relationship. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.5 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court. 

 

5 The Court need not reach, and does not address, issues of qualified 

immunity, standing, or mootness.