# ORIGINA ]ntbe Wniteb**~tates** 

# Ql:ourt ofjf 

# eberal Ql:Iaims
No

. 14-229 C Filed: December 5, 2014 NOT PUBLISHED 

### **************************************** * * MICHAEL HARRIS, 

### * * Plaintiff,

### pro se, 

### * *
v
. 

### * * THE UNITED STATES, 

### * * Defendant. 

### * * * ****************************************
MichaelHarris,Lake City, Florida, Plaintiff,

### prose. 

# FILED
DEC

- 52014
U.S. COURT OF FEDERALCLAIMS

Anna BondurantEley, United States Department ofJustice, Civil Division, Washington, D

.C., Counsel for the Government.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND ORDERDENYINGRECONSIDERATION

On August 22, 2014, Michael Harris ("Plaintiff') filed a Motion For Reconsideration ("Pl. 59(a) Mot.") of the July 30, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Final Order in 

### Harris v. United States (Docket No. 7). For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration is denied

.

### I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND.1

On December 1, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA") and Prison Realty Trust ("PRT") in the United States District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida, Jacksonville Division ("District Court"), alleging that his employer, CCA, engaged in employment discrimination in violation ofTitle VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

### §200e 

### etseq. See Harris v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3:00-cv-1297 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
Priorto trial, the United States District Courtrequiredbothparties to proffer stipulations, in lieu of offering evidence at trial. Am. Comp!. 2. The District Court explained that the proposed stipulation process to Plaintiff, who initialed the document to "show [his] approval." Am. Comp!. 2. The Stipulated Agreement ("Agreement") contained background factual information concerning Plaintiffs employment at CCA and the chronology ofevents leading up to his termination. 

### See generally Am. Comp!. App. 2. After both parties initialed the Agreement, the District Court read the stipulations to thejury. 3/10/2004 Dist. Order 2. On November 5, 2003, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, finding that CCA "had retaliated against Plaintifffor exercising his rights under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 3/10/2004 Dist. Order I. On November 6, 2003, the District Court entered judgmentonthejuryverdict.
On November 24, 2003, CCA filed a Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(l), or, in the alternative, a Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment. On March 10, 2004, the District Court granted CCA's November 24, 2003 Renewed Motion and found that Plaintiff failed to adduce admissible evidence sufficient to establish the elements of an unlawful retaliation claim entitling to damages, so thejury award was "based upon pure speculation." 3/10/2004 Dist. Order 6, 8, 12. Consequently, the District Court vacated the November 6, 2006 Judgment for the Plaintiff. 3/10/2004 Dist. Order 14. On March 11, 2004, the District Court entered Judgment in favor of CCA.
On April 9, 2004, Plaintifffiled a Notice OfAppeal in the District Court. On April 22, 2004, the District Court granted Plaintiffs April 9, 2004 Notice OfAppeal. On June 15, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor ofCCA, as a matter oflaw. 

### Harris v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 139 F. App'x 156 (11thCir. 2005).

1 The relevant facts discussed herein were derived from: the April 8, 2014 Amended Complaint ("Am. Comp!."), including appendices attached thereto ("Am. Comp!. App. 1-2"); the April 8, 2014 Notice OfDirectly Related Cases ("Pl. Notice"); Plaintiffs December 1, 2001 Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ("Dist. Comp!."); CCA's November 24, 2003 Renewed Motion ForJudgment As A Matter OfLaw or, in the alternative, a Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment ("11/24/2003 CCA Dist. Mot."); and various United States District Court for the Middle District ofFloridaOrders ("

__Dist. Order").

2In the seven to eight years that followed, "Plaintiff [] filed numerous post-trial motions unsuccessfully seekingto reinstate thejuryverdict." 7/23/2013 Dist. Order 1.2


### II, PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
On March 25, 2014, Plaintifffiled a Complaint in the United States Court ofFederal Claims, together with two Appendices: (1) the Pretrial Stipulations ("Comp!. App. B"); and (2) verificationthatthe Agreementwas andpartofthe DistrictCourt'srecord.
The Pretrial Stipulations containedthe following agreed-upon facts:

• Plaintiffis an African-American and amemberofaprotectedclass underTitle VII. Comp!. App. A 'i[A.

• Plaintiff was employed by CCA at its correctional facility in Lake City, Floridaand supervised by ChiefofSecurity Steve Listerfrom January 6, 1997 until his employment was terminated by Warden David Eads on April 17, 2000. Comp!. App. A 'i['i[ B, C, E.

• Plaintiffwas promoted to Shift Supervisor in late July 1997 and remained in thatcapacityuntil his termination. Comp!. App. A 

### 'i[ I.

• From September 8, 1999 to May 8, 2000, Plaintiff filed "at least three" discrimination claims against CCA withthe United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Comp!. App. A 'ID.

2 On August 22, 2007, Plaintifffiled a MotionFor ReliefFor Fraud ("8/22/2007 Pl. Dist. Mot."), alleging that CCA and the District Court Clerk's Office conspired to back-date CCA's 11/24/2003 post-trial motion to ensure that it was timely. 8/22/2007 

### Pl. Dist. Mot. 2-3. On October 26, 2007, the District Court also denied Plaintiffs August 22, 2007 Motion For Relief For Fraud ("10/26/2007 Dist. Order"), because the "record clearly and unequivocally establishes thatno fraud was perpetratedonthe [District] Courtand Plaintiff[.]" 10/26/2007Dist. Order 2.
On June 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion To Compel Enforcement Of Court Order. Therein, Plaintiffargued that, although the District Court's 3/10/2004 Order ruled in favor of CCA on the Title VII retaliation claim, it ruled in Plaintiff's favor with respect to his Workers' Compensation retaliation claim. On July 23, 2013, the District Court denied Plaintiffs June 26, 2013 Motion To Compel Enforcement OfCourt Order for lack ofjurisdiction. 712312013 Dist. Order.
On August 8, 2013, Plaintifffiled a Motion For Reconsideration And Enforcement Of Stipulated Fact Agreement challenging the District Court's July 23, 2013 Order and argued, for the first time, that CCA violated the 11/3/2003 Pre-trial Statement when it filed the November 24, 2003 post-trial Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law. On October 10, 2013, the District Court denied the Plaintiff's amended August 8, 2013 Motion for lack ofjurisdiction, as the casewas on appeal.



### 3• On September 16, 1999, Plaintiffwas injured duringhis employment, was put on leave from September 19, 1999 to March 13, 2000, and received "medial and wage lossbenefits from CCA'sworkers' compensationinsurancecarrier." Compl. App. A

### if L, M.

• OnDecember27, 1999, while onleave, Plaintiff"wentto work for the Florida Department ofCorrections" as a corrections officer, intending to "complete a one-year probationary period ofemployment with the Florida Department of Corrections and to thereafter quit his employment with CCA." Compl. App. A 

### ififN-P.

• OnMarch 13, 2000, Plaintiffreturnedto work at CCA. Compl. App. A

### ifR.

• Over the following month, Warden Eads repeatedly attempted to discuss Plaintiffs employment with the Florida Department of Corrections, but Plaintiff refused to discuss the matter, because it was a "workers' comp issue." Compl. App. A

### iii!R-U.

• On April 17, 2000, Warden Eads terminated Plaintiffs employment, because ofhis unwillingness to provide the information requested. Compl. App. A 

### ifV.
The March 25, 2014 Complaint alleges claims for: breach ofcontract; a violation ofthe Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial; and a violation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Compl. 1. The Complaint also alleges that CCA retaliated after he filed discrimination claims and engaged in "fraud on the [c]ourt." Comp!. 1. Plaintiffseeks: ajury trial to adjudicate a breach ofthe Pretrial Stipulations; enforcement ofthe Pretrial Stipulations; and payment ofdamages for pain and suffering caused by CCA's and PRT's breach and for "misleadingthe [District Court] into [taking] actions against [Plaintiff]." Comp!. 4.
TheMarch25, 2014 Complaintalso alleges thatCCAviolatedthe Pretrial Stipulationsby filing the November 24, 2003 Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter OfLaw, or in the alternative, a Motion ForNewTrial or a Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment. Comp!. 2. The District Court also breached the Pretrial Stipulations by granting CCA's post-trial motion. Comp!. 3-4; see also 3/10/2004 Dist. Order. The Complaint further alleges that the breach by CCA and the District Court violated Plaintiff's Seventh Amendment rights and his right to due process oflawunderthe FourteenthAmendmentto the United States Constitution. Compl. 3. In addition, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered considerable harm to his reputation for appearing in court. Compl. 3-4. Finally, the Complaint alleges that the statute oflimitations does not apply in this case, because the District Court'sjudgmentnever became final, and CCA remains inviolationofthe Pretrial Stipulations. Comp!. 4.
On April 8, 2014, Plaintifffiled an Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") to: correct a citation; further clarify the breach ofcontract claim; and request appointment ofcounsel. Onthe
same day, Plaintifffiled a Notice OfDirectly Related Cases, pursuant to Rules ofthe Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") 40.2, to inform the court ofthe prior litigation in the United States DistrictCourtfor the Middle DistrictofFlorida.

4

### On May 20, 2014, the Government filed a Motion For Summary Dismissal ("Gov't Mot.") pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l), arguing that the United States Court ofFederal Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims alleged in either the March 25, 2014 Complaint or April 8, 2014 Amended Complaint. On July 30, 2014, the court granted the Government's Motion and dismissed Plaintiffscase. On August 22, 2014, Plaintifffiled a Motion For Reconsideration, pursuant to RCFC 59(a) ("PL 59(a) Mot."), and aMotion To Transferto local district court in Florida ("PL Transfer Mot."). On September 29, 2014 the Government filed a Response To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration. On November 21, 2014, the Government filed a Corrected Response To Plaintiff'sMotionForReconsiderationAndTo AlterAnd AmendJudgment ("Gov'tResp.").
On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Reply And Motion To Strike Defendant's Response ("PL Reply").


### III. STANDARD OF REVIEW FORMOTION FORRECONSIDERATION.
A motion for reconsideration must be supported "by a showing of extraordinary circumstances whichjustify relief." Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 

### 44 Fed. CL 298, 300 (1999). The decisionto grant or deny amotion for reconsideration lies within the discretion ofthe court. See Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. UnitedStates, 

### 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that "the decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the [trial] court"). A movant cannot prevail by "merely reasserting arguments which were previously made and were carefully considered by the court." Id.; see also Bishop v. United States, 

### 26 CL Ct. 281, 286 (1992) (holding that reconsideration "is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway the court") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, a movant must show that: an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; new evidence is now available; or, the motion is necessaryto preventmanifestinjustice. Id. 

### at 286.


### IV. DISCUSSION.
A. Plaintiff's Argument.
Plaintiffs August 22, 2014 Motion For Reconsideration argues that the Stipulated Agreement actually was a Title VII settlement agreement and that the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to entertain claims alleging breaches of Title VII settlement agreements under Holmes v. UnitedStates, 

### 657 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and VanDesande v. United States, 

### 673 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 3. According to Plaintiff, Holmes 

### held that a suit against the government alleging a breach ofa settlement agreement is "fundamentally a suit to enforce a contract" and therefore within this court'sjurisdiction. PL 59(a) Mot. at 4. In addition, VanDesande 

### held that a settlement agreement is a contract '"within the meaning ofthe Tucker Act."' Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 4 (quoting Vandesande, 

### 673 F.3d 1351). Thus, Plaintiffargues that this court hasjurisdiction over his breach ofcontract claim. PL 59(a) Mot. at 5-6.
Plaintiff also claims that the court erred in dismissing his Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment claims. PL 59(a) Mot. at 9-12. According to Plaintiff, McBryde v. United States,



### 5

### 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) held that the use ofthe word "shall" generally makes a statute money-mandating. Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 11. Since the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments contain the word "shall," they are money-mandating and the court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs Seventh and FourteenthAmendmentclaims. Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 11. Next, Plaintiffargues that the court should reconsider its decision, because the district court'sjudgmentwas not final. Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 13. According to Plaintiff, because "there was never any pre-judgment interest added to thejudgment in this [c Jase[,]" the court "did not have jurisdictionoverthe post-trial motions in this [c]ase." Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 12-13.
In addition, the Government violated RCFC 11, because the Government's attorneys failed to sign the Government's September 29, 2014 Response. Pl. Reply at 9-10. Moreover, electronic signatures are not allowed where the Government "cannot forward any e-mails to the [c]ourt" and where the Government "[has not] made any notifications to [Plaintiff] to do so." Pl. Reply at 10. Thus, Plaintiffargues thatthe court should strike the Government's September 29, 2014 Response. Pl. Reply at 10. Finally, ifthe court does not reconsider its dismissal ofPlaintiff's case onjurisdictional grounds, Plaintiffrequests that the court transfer this action to a court ofcompetentjurisdiction '"inthe interestof justice.'" Pl. TransferMot. at 2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1631); Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 14-15.
B. The Government's Response.


### The Government responds that Plaintiffs breach ofcontract claim has no merit, because "the Stipulated Agreement that forms the basis for [Plaintiffs breach ofcontract] claim is not a Title VII settlement agreement." Gov't Resp. at 6 (emphasis omitted). The Stipulated Agreement is "bereft ofany language suggesting that [Plaintiff] and CCA have agreed to any sort ofsettlement"; the stipulation was read to thejury at trial "so that thejury 

### could determine the outcome of the Title VII dispute between [Plaintiff] and CCA." Gov't Resp. at 6. The Government adds that even ifthe Stipulated Agreement were a Title VII settlement agreement, Holmes 

### and VanDesande 

### are not applicable, because these cases "do not stand for the proposition that the Court ofFederal Claims possesses broadjurisdiction to adjudicate any and all contractual breach claims that might be related to Title VII settlement agreements." Gov't Resp. at 6. "[B]oth cases still require, as a prerequisite to Tucker Act jurisdiction, that the United States be a party to the alleged agreement." Gov't Resp. at 6 (emphasis omitted) (citing Holmes, 

### 657 F.3d at 1309). The Government was not a party to this contract, because "the StipulatedAgreement is between Plaintiffand CCA only." Gov'tResp. at 8 (emphasis omitted). "The district court's onlyrole was to readthose facts to thejury, whichitdid." Gov'tResp. at 8.
The Government then argues that the cases cited by Plaintiffin support ofhis Seventh and FourteenthAmendmentclaims do not stand for the propositionthatthe word "shall" makes a statute money-mandating. Gov'tResp. at 8. These cases actually hold that "theuse ofthe word 'shall' or similar language in connection with acts obligating the Government topaymoney, 

### has
a money-mandating effect." Gov't Resp. at 8 (citing McBryde, 

### 299 F.3d at 1361). Because the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment do not use the word "shall" "in connection with acts

6

### signifying any payment obligationonthe part ofthe Government[,]" the court correctlyheldthat the Seventhand FourteenthAmendments are notmoney-mandating. Gov'tResp. at 9.
The Government next claims that "[a]ny finality, or lack thereof, with respect to the district court's decision

...has absolutely no bearing on the question of whether this [c]ourt possesses subject matterjurisdiction to entertain [Plaintiff's] [C]omplaint." Gov't Resp. at 9. The real issue is whether Plaintiffhas any claim against the United States Government "based upon any money-mandating source oflaw, or based upon any express or implied contract with the United States." Gov't Resp. at 10. Because Plaintiffdoes not have such a claim, the court correctlydismissedPlaintiff's Complaint. Gov'tResp. at 10. Finally, the Government argues thattransferring Plaintiff's case to any other venue is not warranted. Gov't Resp. at 10. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, this court may transfer a case "when three elements are met: (1) 

### The transferring court lacks subject matterjurisdiction; (2) the case could have been filed in the court receiving the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice." Brown v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 546, 550 (2006). According to the United States CourtofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, the phrase '"ifinthe interest of justice' relates to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits." Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff "has not stated a colorable breach ofcontract claim against any entity," he has not brought any claims that are legally viable, and his defamation and fraud claims wouldbe untimely under Florida law. Gov't Resp. at 11-12 (citing FL. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(g) (two-year statute of limitations for defamation) and FL. STAT. ANN. 

### §95.11(3)0) (four-year statute of limitations for fraud)). Transferringthe case would notbe inthe interest of justice. Gov'tResp. at 10-11.
C. The Court's Resolution.
Plaintiff's August 22, 2014 Motion For Reconsideration argues that the Stipulated Agreement was actually a Title VII settlement agreement and that the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to entertain claims alleging breaches of Title VII settlement agreements. Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 3. As discussed in the July 30, 2014 Memorandum Opinion and Final Order in Harris v. United States (Docket No. 7), the Stipulated Agreement was between private parties: Plaintiffand Plaintiff's former employer, CCA. See Am. Comp!. App. 2. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Agreement is a contractbetween the Government and Plaintiff, his contract claim must still be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, because the Agreement cannot "fairly be interpreted as contemplating money damages for breach." Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1315. The Agreement does not provide for payments, and nothing in the language contained therein indicatesmoney damages were contemplated as a remedy forbreach. See AmComp!. App. 2.
Plaintiffargues thatthe word "shall"found inthe language ofthe Seventh and Fourteenth amendments makes them money-mandating statutes. Pl. 59(a) Mot. at 9-12. Plaintiff is incorrect, because the use ofthe word "shall" in the cases cited has a money-mandating effect only in connection with acts obligating the Government to pay money. See McBryde, 299 F.3d at 1361. Because the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments do not use the word "shall" in connection with the Government's obligation to pay money, the Seventh and Fourteenth amendments are notmoney-mandating.

7Plaintiffs October 24, 2014 Reply and Motion To Strike Government's Response argues that the Government violated RCFC 11, because the Government's attorneys failed to properly sign the Government's September 29, 2014 Response. Pl. Reply at 9-10. But, the RCFC does not state that electronic signatures are disallowed for pro se cases. Appendix E of RCFC prescribes the procedures governing electronic filings ofcases to the court's system; it does not prohibit electronic signatures onotherwise properly filed documents. See RCFC App. E. Thus, Plaintifffails to establish a legitimate ground for strikingthe Government'sResponse. Finally, Plaintiff requests that the court transfer this action to a court of competent jurisdiction "inthe interestof justice,"inthe eventthatthe court does notreconsiderits dismissal ofPlaintiffs case onjurisdictional grounds. PL Transfer Mot. at 2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, this court may transfer a case "when three elements are met: (I) The transferring court lacks subject matterjurisdiction; (2) the case could have been filed in the court receiving the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the interest ofjustice." Brown, 74 Fed. CL at 550. According to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, the phrase '"ifit is in in the interest of justice' relates to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits." Galloway Farms, 834 F.2d at 1000 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1631). "Frivolous claims include 'spurious and specious arguments' and 'distortion and disregard of the record and opposing authorities, [which] indicate plainly that the present appeal does not rest on the razor's edge of frivolity, but falls clearly on the side of the frivolous."' Id. (quoting Devices for Med, Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff's claims are frivolous, because his Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment claims and his RCFC 11 claim concerning electronic signatures are unsupported by case law orthe RCFC. Plaintiffalso fails to establish a breach of contract--or that there is even a contract between him and the Government. Therefore, transferring the case wouldnotbe inthe interest of justice, and Plaintiffs Motion For TransferOfCase mustbe denied.
V. CONCLUSION.
Forthese reasons, the courthas determinedthatPlaintiffdid notestablish amanifesterror oflawormistake offact. See Bishop, 26 Cl. Ct. at 286. The courtalso has consideredPlaintiffs arguments in his Motion To Strike and finds them to be frivolous. Accordingly, Plaintiffs August 22, 2014 Motionfor Reconsideration and Octo 2014 Motionto Strike are denied.

IT IS SOORDERED.

8 

## s Judge