alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tellabs, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 27, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Joan E. Ryan, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to and for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s Joan E. Ryan
EXHIBIT
32.2
 STATMON
TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
  CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 19
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Statmon Technologies Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Geoffrey P. Talbot, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the best of my knowledge:
  (1)
                  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
  (2)
                  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
  /s/ Geoffrey P.
Talbot
 Geoffrey
P. Talbot
 Chief
Financial Officer
 April
8, 2009
  A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
by Section 906, has been provided to Statmon Technologies Corp. and will be
retained by Statmon Technologies Corp. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
11685.

#### HARRISON *v.*THE STATE.

]. The prosecuting attorney’s reply to counsel for the defendant, in argument to the jury, as to the failure to introduce proof of bad character of the defendant, was not improper.

2. A verdict finding the defendant “ guilty of shooting at another ” was not a nullity, where he was indicted for assault with intent to murder by shooting at another.

(a) The question whether the verdict was a nullity could not properly be made a ground of a motion for a new trial.

3. In view of the note of the trial judge as to the purpose to which the testimony objected to was limited, and upon an examination of the record, it does not appear that he erred in admitting the testimony.

Decided December 16, 1920.

Indictment for assault with intent to murder; from Randolph superior court — Judge Worrill. May 29, 1920.

*George II. Perry,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. T. Casiellow, solicitor-general, R. R. Arnold,*contra.

*59Luke, J.

1. Upon the trial of this case, and after argument of counsel, the defendant moved the court to “ exclude from the consideration of the jury so much of the solicitor-general’s argument as attacks and criticizes the defendant’s character and his failure to put his character in issue, for the reason such argument is improper, illegal, and prejudicial, inasmuch as the defendant’s character is not in issue.” The court overruled the motion and stated that the argument of the solicitor-general was in response to what was said in the argument of the defendant’s counsel. The argument of the solicitor-general that the defendant wished to exclude was as follows: “ Defendant’s counsel has said that the defendant’s character must be good, for, if it is not good, the State should have brought witnesses here and proven to you that his character is not good. ” “ The law presumes every man’s character to be good, and the State is not permitted to produce witnesses to attack his character, unless he first puts his character in issue, and. this defendant has not done so in this case. ” The remark of the solicitor-general was a correct statement of the law, and was in direct reply to the argument of the defendant’s counsel. It was not error for the court to overrule the motion.

2. The defendant being charged with assault with intent to murder by shooting another, the verdict of the jury finding him “ guilty of shooting at another ” was not a nullity, as averred by the defendant. Moreover, such a question can not be raised by a ground of a motion for a new trial.

3. In view of the trial judge’s note, and upon an examination of the record, it does not appear that there was error in the admission of testimony as complained of by the defendant in ground 3 of the amendment to the motion for a new trial. The defendant was given a legal trial, the evidence authorized the verdict, and it was not error to overrule his motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Broyles, *C. J., and Bloodworth,*J., *concur.*
#### Frances C. Ephriam, Appellant, *v.*Herman Kinstler and Another, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

February 12, 1925.

Trial — new trial — judgment dismissing complaint in action by assignee for rent past due — failure to prove assignment — proof of assignment available — exception may be filed on appeal — new trial granted.

An assignee in an action for rent past due is entitled to an opportumty to submit proof of the assignment, and where, on appeal from a judgment dismissing the *548complaint after trial before the court, it is alleged that such proof is available. the case will be sent back for a new trial.

Failure to file an exception to the decision dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is not jurisdictional, but procedural and the exception may be filed upon appeal.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the City Court of the City of New York entered upon a dismissal of the complaint after trial before the court, a jury having been waived.

*Solon B. Ldlienstern [Samuel D. Lasky*of counsel], for the appellant.

*Robinson, Grosser & Robinson [Robert MúC. Robinson*of counsel], for the respondents.

Per Curiam:

The learned trial justice rightly decided that there was no showing of an assignment to the plaintiff of the rents past due. We are of the opinion, however, that as that point had not been made upon the trial an opportunity should have been afforded the plaintiff of submitting proof that there was such an assignment. As the plaintiff alleges that such proof is available we are sending the case back for a new trial. The failure to file an exception to the decision was not jurisdictional, but procedural, and we permit an exception to be filed. *(Termini*v. *Huth,*191 App. Div. 218; *Lichtbach*v. *Kelbach,*186 N. Y. Supp. 126.)

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

All concur; present, Bijur, Mullan and Cotillo, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

June 28, 2011 

p0620 

Order 

 

June 28, 2011 

142403 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 142403 

 COA: 287470 

Wayne CC: 06-014041-FC 

CHOYA ANTHONY TINSLEY, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 18, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BENDRELL JABAR JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3440

[February 24, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Robert E. Belanger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 56-2016-CF002170-A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Virginia Murphy, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Janvier v. State, 123 So. 3d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

CIKLIN, CONNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-51065

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PAUL HICKS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:15-CR-20-5

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Paul Hicks has moved for leave to 

withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Hicks has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the 

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 18, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-51065 Document: 00513721830 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/18/2016
No. 15-51065

2

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is 

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 15-51065 Document: 00513721830 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/18/2016
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Composite Technology Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2009, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Benton H. Wilcoxon, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
            The Report fully complies with
      the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of 1934; and


(2)
            The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and result of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Benton H WilcoxonBenton
      H WilcoxonChief
      Executive Officer
#### Michael Larron JOE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of SOUTH CAROLINA; Henry McMaster, Attorney General of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-6792.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 29, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 17, 2006.

Michael Larron Joe, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Samuel Creighton Waters, Office of the Attorney General of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Michael Larron Joe seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial *439of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Joe has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
TRACE K. UNDEMAN 

CLE%0IBUPREME COURT 

ORDER BY 

DEPUTY CLERK 

Docket No. 66563 is an appeal from district court orders 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

ENTRY-MASTER, LLC, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

PARKING AND SECURITY SYSTEMS, 

LLC, 

Respondent. 

ENTRY-MASTER, LLC, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

PARKING AND SECURITY SYSTEMS, 

LLC, 

Res s ondent. 

ENTRY-MASTER, LLC, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

PARKING AND SECURITY SYSTEMS, 

LLC; AND ROBERT KATZ, RECEIVER, 

Respondents. 

No. 66563 "" 

No. 67682 

No. 69304 

FILED 

JAN 1 9 2016 

entered September 19, 2014, granting declaratory judgment and ordering 

the dissolution of appellant and appointing a receiver. See NRAP 3A(b)(4). 

Docket No. 67682 is an appeal from the order awarding attorney fees and 

costs. These two appeals have been consolidated. Docket No. 69304 is an 

appeal from a subsequent district court order granting the receiver's 

motion to approve fees and costs and conclude the receivership. 

The receiver has filed a stipulation to dismiss the appeals in all 

three dockets. Appellant challenges that stipulation with a "Motion to 

Strike or in the Alternative Opposition," objecting that the receiver 

himself cannot dismiss the appeals that challenge the validity of his own 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A e /6-01711 
pt , J. 

appointment. The receiver and respondent Parking and Security Systems, 

LLC, have responded, and appellant has filed a reply. 

Having considered these documents, we deny the motion to strike 

the stipulation in Docket Nos. 66563 and 67682. The stipulation of 

dismissal is approved to the following extent. These appeals are dismissed 

without prejudice. 

We grant the motion to strike the stipulation in Docket No. 

69304, and this appeal shall continue. The clerk of this court shall strike 

the stipulation filed on December 14, 2015. We remind appellant that the 

opening brief and appendix remain due on or before April 6, 2016. 1 

It is so ORDERED. 2 

Hardesty 

Oda& 

Saitta Pickering 

'In our resolution of the instant matters, we express no opinion as to 

the merits of the underlying orders that are the subject of these appeals. 

2We deny appellant's motion to strike the notice of appearance of 

counsel for the receiver. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) 1947A 
cc: Hon. Lidia Stiglich, District Judge 

Kauffman and Forman, P.A. 

Fox Rothschild, LLP, Las Vegas 

Oshinski & Forsberg, Ltd. 

Pascale Stevens LLC 

Parsons Behle & Latimer/Reno 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A me 

3
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Annual Report of Piedmont Community Bank Group, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Robert D. Hulsey, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Julie H.
Simmons, Chief Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Robert D. Hulsey, Jr.Robert D. Hulsey, Jr.Chief Executive OfficerMarch 31, 2008/s/ Julie H. SimmonsJulie H. SimmonsChief Financial OfficerMarch 31, 2008
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL ANGEL RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, 

AKA Miguel Rivera, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 14-70189 

Agency No. A205-716-512 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 10, 2018**

Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. 

Miguel Angel Rivera Rodriguez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order 

dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 13 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-70189 

application for asylum and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence 

the agency’s factual findings. Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2008). We deny the petition for review.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Rivera Rodriguez 

established changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum 

application. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(4), (5). Thus, Rivera Rodriguez’s asylum 

claim fails.

In his opening brief, Rivera Rodriguez does not reference withholding of 

removal or otherwise challenge the agency’s denial of the claim. See CorroBarragan v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1174, 1175 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to contest 

issue in opening brief resulted in waiver. Thus, we deny the petition for review as 

to Rivera Rodriquez’s withholding of removal claim.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Rivera Rodriguez failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured with 

the consent or acquiescence of the government of El Salvador. See Aden v. 

Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (2009).

Finally, we reject as without merit Rivera Rodriguez’s contentions as to his 
3 14-70189 

membership in a class action lawsuit, his eligibility for the Deferred Action for 

Childhood Arrivals program, or his claim for Temporary Protected Status. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
Form of Amendment to Change of Control Employment Agreement



 Exhibit 10.2 
 AMENDMENT 
 TO 
 CHANGE OF CONTROL EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment to the Change of Control Employment Agreement
(the “Amendment”) is made as of [                , 2007] by and between
[                    ] (the “Executive”) and The Stride Rite Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation (the “Company”).

 WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive are parties to that certain Change of Control Employment Agreement dated
[                    ] (the “Change of Control Agreement”). 
 WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive desire to amend the Change of Control Agreement solely to the extent set forth herein. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth in this Amendment and in the Change of Control Agreement, the parties
mutually agree as follows: 
  

	1.	Amendment 

 (a) Section 6(a)(i)(B) of the
Change of Control Agreement is hereby amended by deleting said subsection in its entirety and substituting therefor the following: 
 “B. the amount equal to the product of (1) two and (2) the sum of (x) the Executive’s Annual Base Salary and (y) the Target Bonus.” 
 (b) Section 6(a)(i)(C) of the Change of Control Agreement is hereby amended by deleting said subsection in its entirety. 
 (c) Section 6(a) of the Change of Control Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following subsection (v) immediately after subsection
(iv) thereof: 
 “(v) anything in this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if at the time of the
Executive’s separation from service within the meaning of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the ‘Code’), the Executive is considered a ‘specified employee’ within the meaning of
Section 409A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Code, and if any payment that the Executive becomes entitled to under this Agreement is considered deferred compensation subject to interest, penalties and additional tax imposed pursuant to Section 409A(a)
of the Code as a result of the application of Section 409A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Code, then no such payment shall be payable prior to the date that is the earlier of (i) six months and one day after the Executive’s date of termination,
or (ii) the Executive’s death. Any such deferred 








 
payment shall earn interest calculated at the short-term applicable federal rate. On or before the Executive’s Date of Termination, the Company shall
make an irrevocable contribution to a rabbi trust with an independent bank trustee in an amount equal to the amount of such deferred payment plus interest.” 
  

	2.	Effect of Amendment 

 Except as amended hereby, the
Change of Control Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
  

	3.	Counterparts 

 This Amendment may be executed in any
number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one instrument. 
 IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, this Amendment to Change of Control Agreement is entered into as of the date and year first above written. 
  

			
	THE STRIDE RITE CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	  
		 	 [Name]
 [Title]

	
	  
	 [Executive]



  

 2