MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Laura Paul

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Malena Shumaker,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 26, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

77A05-1603-CR-468

Appeal from the Sullivan Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, 

Judge.

Cause No. 77D01-1512-CM-830

Darden, Senior Judge

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Statement of the Case

[1] Malena Shumaker appeals her conviction of theft, a Class A misdemeanor.1 

We affirm.

Issue

[2] Shumaker presents one issue, which we restate as: whether there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain her conviction for theft as an accomplice.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 1, 2015, Shumaker, her boyfriend Michael Myers, and Stephen 

Boatman stopped at a convenience store in Sullivan, Indiana, to get gasoline for 

their car. Shumaker and Myers entered the store while Boatman stayed with 

the car.

[4] A surveillance camera recorded Shumaker’s actions in the store but did not

record any audio. Shumaker waited until another customer had finished his 

transaction with the clerk before approaching the counter. Myers momentarily

stepped away from Shumaker and out of the camera’s view. Shumaker tried to 

exchange a $25 gift card for cash, but the clerk refused.

[5] Next, Myers walked up to the counter and stood next to Shumaker, near the 

cash register. A small red Salvation Army donation bucket sat on the counter 

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (2014).

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in front of the cash register, out of the clerk’s sight. As Shumaker and the clerk 

were talking, Myers looked down at the bucket, put his hand on it, and furtively

slid it back and forth on the counter until it was close to where he was standing.

[6] When the clerk turned around to get cigarettes for Shumaker, Shumaker turned 

to Myers, made eye contact, and said something to him. At that point, Myers 

slipped the bucket into his jacket and turned to walk out of the store. As Myers 

was leaving the store, Shumaker leaned over and onto the counter and was 

talking to the clerk, whose back was to Shumaker, as she appeared to retrieve 

another item for Shumaker. Shumaker paid for the cigarettes and purchased $5 

worth of gasoline, and then she left the store. The three drove away after 

Boatman put gasoline in the car.

[7] Later, the clerk discovered the donation bucket was missing and called the 

police. An investigation led to Myers and Shumaker. The State charged 

Shumaker with theft. The case was tried to the bench, and the trial court 

determined Shumaker was guilty. The court imposed a sentence, and this 

appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Rarely do we have an opportunity to see evidence from the same perspective as 

the finder of fact, but in this case the primary piece of evidence is State’s Exhibit 

1, the surveillance recording. Nevertheless, we cannot observe the demeanor of 

the parties’ witnesses, which is extremely important, and we must be hesitant to 

overlook the finder of fact’s role, therein, in doing so. As a result, when an 

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appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we 

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Wright v. 

State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005). We consider conflicting evidence in 

the light most favorable to the judgment. Id. at 906. We will affirm if the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could 

have allowed a reasonable finder of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005).

[9] Shumaker argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that 

she was an active participant in the theft of the donation bucket. To obtain a 

conviction for theft, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt,

that: (1) Shumaker (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) exerted unauthorized 

control over property of another person (4) with intent to deprive the other 

person of any part of its value. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2. Myers testified at trial 

and admitted to stealing the bucket, claiming that Shumaker had nothing to do 

with the crime. The State countered by arguing that Shumaker was guilty of 

theft as Myers’ accomplice. As stated by the governing statute: “A person who 

knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit 

an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (1977).

[10] In order to sustain a conviction as an accomplice, there must be evidence of the 

defendant’s affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which 

an inference of common design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime 

may reasonably be drawn. Vandivier v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied. An accomplice need not participate in each and every 

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element of the crime in order to be convicted of it. Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 

443, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Furthermore, it is not necessary for 

the State to show a defendant was party to a preconceived scheme, such as a 

conspiracy; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an 

illegal act. Id.

[11] In determining whether a person aided another in the commission of a crime, 

we consider: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with 

another engaged in criminal activity; (3) failure to oppose the crime; and (4) a 

defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime. 

Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 2003). A defendant’s mere presence 

during the commission of the crime or failure to oppose the crime are, by 

themselves, insufficient to establish accomplice liability. Ransom v. State, 850 

N.E.2d 491, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[12] In this case, it is undisputed that Shumaker was present during the theft. She

entered the convenience store with her companion, Myers, and engaged in a 

conversation with the clerk while Myers furtively moved the donation bucket

back and forth along the counter until it was near him and out of the sight of 

the clerk. It is obvious from the video that just before Myers slipped the bucket 

into his jacket, Shumaker turned to Myers, made eye contact, and had a verbal

exchange with him. After Myers had completed the theft, Shumaker did not 

extricate herself from the situation, disassociate herself from Myers, or 

otherwise oppose the crime. To the contrary, from viewing the video she 

appears that she may have distracted the clerk by leaning over and onto the 

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counter and drawing attention to herself, thus allowing Myers to leave the store 

unnoticed. Finally, Shumaker got into the car with Myers and Boatman and 

drove away.

[13] Shumaker argues that Myers admitted at trial that he stole the donation bucket, 

and he claimed he did it without Shumaker’s prior knowledge. The trial court 

was the finder of fact, and the task of weighing credibility is reserved to it alone. 

The court was not required to believe Myers, who also stated at trial that his 

memory of the night in question was hazy because he had been under the 

influence of controlled substances. Myers also stated he still loved Shumaker. 

In summary, crediting Myers’ testimony would require us to reweigh the 

evidence, which our standard of review forbids.

[14] In any event, arguably, it may appear that Shumaker had no advance 

knowledge of the crime, but, the video strongly suggests that she became 

acutely aware of the crime as it was developing and ultimately occurred and it 

could be reasonably construed that she participated in it. Therefore, the 

evidence is sufficient to establish that she knowingly took concerted action to 

participate in the crime of theft as an accomplice. See Smith v. State, 809 N.E.2d 

938, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for 

resisting law enforcement with a vehicle as an accomplice because, even though 

defendant was a passenger in the car, he did not ask the driver to stop and 

removed the license plate from the rear window in an attempt to hinder police 

identification), trans. denied.

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[15] Shumaker cites Pennington v. State, 459 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), in 

support of her claim, but that case is distinguishable. In that case, a panel of 

this Court found the evidence insufficient to support a conviction of theft as an 

accomplice because there was no evidence that the defendant distracted the 

store employee while her brother left the store with a stolen radio. By contrast, 

in this case the surveillance video clearly showed Shumaker making eye contact 

with Myers and saying something to him just before he slid the donation bucket 

into his jacket. Next, Shumaker leaned over and onto the counter and engaged 

in a conversation with the clerk as Myers prepared to leave the store, giving the 

appearance of providing cover or a distraction to prevent the detection of the 

crime and/or his participation.

Conclusion

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[17] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

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