IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR N EW CASTLE COUN TY

SHARE IF ALI , as per sonal repr esentative ) of the Estat e of Ameer Ali, and JOY ANN ) MERRIF IELD , as per sonal repr esentative ) of the Est ate of E mily

Lewis, )

) Plaintiff s, )

) v. ) C.A. No.: N11C-12-253 FSS ) BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION, et al, ) ) Defenda nts. ) Submi tted: Mar

ch 7, 2014 Decided : June 30, 2 014 ORDER Upon De fendant B eechcra

ft Corporati

on’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack o

f Person al Jurisdic

tion – GRANTED

This personal injury

case ste ms fr

om an a irplane c rash on Janu ary 21 , 2010 in Alaska. Shortly

after ta keoff, engine fail

ure cause d Decede nts’ airplane to roll left fatally . Plaint

iffs are Decede nts’ representatives. Defendants ma nufactured the airplane

and its com

ponents. N ow, Bee chcraft Corporat ion claim s i ts mini ma l Delaware contacts a

re not enough to subj ect it to general personal jurisdiction here. Hence, this m otion to dism iss.1 10 Del.C. § 3104(c)(4). 2 I. Plainti ffs fi led suit on D ecem ber 30, 201 1. On N ovember 26, 2013, Beechcraft

moved to dismiss for l ack of p ersonal jurisdiction. The court held oral argument March 7 , 2014. II.

As menti oned, Bee chcraft argues i t does not have m inimum contacts with Delaw are and de fendinghere is unreasona ble. As this case involves a c rash in Alaska, involving Al askans, a ndDefenda

nt is a Kans as corporation, thi s is not a specific jurisdiction case. Rather, under Delaw are’s long-arm

statute, Plaintif

f must prove Defenda

nt “e ngages in [ a] per sistent cour se of conduct in the State or derives substan tial reven ue from ... the State.” 1 Specifi cally , Beech craft a rgues: BC has no agent s, distributor s, deale rs, em ployee s, officer s, or direc tors in Delaware. At no tim e has BC maintained

real estate, bank accounts, or other interest in property in Delaware

. BC does not maint ain com

pany records in Delaw are, a

nd does not hol d mee tings of shareholde rs, directors or office rs in Delawa re. Fr om 2003-prese nt, BC’s sa

les of goods to Delaware customer s have accounted for less than one perc ent o f BC’s total sales.... No r has BC pai d, or incu rred any obligation to pay, taxes in D elaware since at least Mar

ch 2007. BecauseDefenda

nt does not ha

ve continuous a

ndsystematic c ontacts with Delaware, requiring it to defend itself here is unreasonable.3 Pred ict abl y, Plaintiffs counter Defendant’s co ntact s are signi ficant, establishin g gen eral juri sdi cti on. Spec ifi call y, Plaintif fs allege Defenda ntdelivered five aircra ft to Del aware custom ers since 2007, for $46,42 5,833.00

. Federal Aviation Administration

public records show that 1,436 Beechcraft a ircraf t are re gistered in Delaware. Fur th er, Bee chc raf t h as ma de 34 ,549 direct mailings to Delaware addresses from 2003-2013. Most persuasively, Plaintiff alleges D efendant, not its sub sid iary, Hawker

Beechcraft

Service s, m aintains a

60,000-fo ot facili ty for

goods, services , and custom

er suppor t in W ilming

ton, Del aware. Each invo ice from the Wilm ington facility showed pay

ment w a s made to De fen dan t, no t th e su bsi dia ry. These invoices total $8,809,053.94 in Delaware revenue from May 2012 to Decem

ber 2013. Further, the Wilmington facility ’s gene ral m anager w as hired by Defenda nt. Ess ent ial ly, Plaintif

fs argue t he subsidiar

y is, at least, an alter

ego of Defend ant. As the subsidia

ry is s ubject t o general

jurisdic tion, De fendant sho uld be also. III. Before discussing the core dispu te, some procedur al background is impor tant. This cas e was or

iginally filed against, among

others, Hawker

Beechcr aft, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Ray theon Company. I

n May 2012, Hawker Beechcraft

Inc. filed for bankruptcy. Pla intiff alleges it em erge d as Beechcraft Corporati on. Defendants, however, disagree. Regardless, the parties later stipulated2 Boone v. Oy Partek , 724 A.2d 1150 (Del. Super. 1997). 3 Id. 4 10 Del.C. § 3104. 4 to substitute B eechcra ft Corporation for t hose Def endants, s t ating “ Beechcraft Corpor ation coven ants ... it is the successor in interest and continuation of Beech Aircraft Company and Ra ytheon Aircraft C ompany.”

In pertine nt part, the stipulation also provide s “the re will b e no statute of limitation d efense asse rted ... [but] [a]ll other defenses are preserved.” Plaintiffs

never argued in their briefs or at oral a rgument that the stipulation’s defenses preserva tionapplies to p ersonal j urisdiction , no r that jurisdic tion over Beechcraft was created by agreem ent. So, there is no reason not to apply traditional personal jurisdic tion. IV.

Plaintiffs bear the burden o f es tablishing personal j urisdiction on a motion to dism iss. 2 As discuss e d, t he partie s agree sp ecific j urisdiction is not applicable. Gene ral j uri sdi cti on r equ ires a two -st ep i nqu iry. 3 First, i s juris diction appropria te under De laware ’s long-arm statute? 4 Second, would asserting j urisdiction violate due

process? A. Long-arm jurisdic tion applies to one who “re gula rly doe s or solicit s busin ess, engages in any oth er persis tent cours e of conduc t in the Sta te or de rive s5 10 Del.C. § 3104(c)(4). 6 Boone , 724 A.2d at 1156. 7 Waters v. Deutz Corp. , 479 A.2d 273, 275 (Del. 1984). 8 Id. citing 13 U.L.A. § 1.03 (1980). 9 LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v . Bowe Co., Inc. , 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). 10 Gerber v. Young , 1987 WL 9670 (Del. Super. 1987).

5 substantial revenue f

rom services, or things used or con sumed in the State.” 5 Further, a defenda nt’s cont acts wit

h Delaw are m

ust be curr

ent. 6 Section 3104(c)( 4) is deriv ed alm ost com pletely from § 1.03(a) (4) of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedur e Act. 7 The com

ment to this subse ction provides, “A sufficient nex us ex ists if (a

) the def endant re gularly

advertise s his products or servic es in

the state o r (b) ca

rries on so me oth er continuo us course of activity there or (c) der ives substan

tial reve nue from

goods used or

consum ed or from services rendere d in the stat e. It is not necessa ry tha t this activity

amoun t to the doing of busines s.” 8 Further , the sta tute should be

construed broadly

to confer jurisdic tion to the maximum

extent possible. 9 Defenda ntadmit tedly has made sales to Delawa re customers averagin g $6.6 million a year , which may be considered “substantial revenue.” Defenda nt also regularl y mails technical publicat ions and safety manuals to Dela ware addresse s. “It is the patter

n of regula

r solicita tion which make s [Defe ndant] su sceptibleto assertion of jurisdicti on.” 10 Where

a com pany so licits busin ess to the country as a whole, has11 Boone , 724 A.2d at 1158. 12 Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1 945) c itin g Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 13 Goodyea r Dunlop Tir

es Opera tions, S.A. v. Brown , 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011).

6 made sales in D elaware deriving substantial revenue, and conduct ed this activity for over a dec ade, sec tion 3104(c) (4) is satisfied. 11 B. Having found Delawa re’s long-arm sta tute c overs Beech craft’s Delawar e busines s, the court turns to d ue process . Federa l due proce ss is a check on a st ate’s long -arm jurisdic tion. But f

or due proc ess constr aints, by advertising natio nal ly a business would subject itself to suit almost anyw here even if, as it

is here, none of the parties or facts has a real tie to thelitigati on forum . Due process permits personal jurisdic tionif an o ut-of-s tate defendant has “ certain m inimum contacts w ith [the state] such that th e ma intenance of the suit

does not offend ‘traditional notions of f air play and s ubst anti al jus tice.’” 12 Esse nti all y, the cou rt may o nly exercise g eneral jurisdic tionwhen a de fendant’ s contacts with De laware are “ so continuous a

nd sys tema tic as to r ender [defen dant] essent ially at home in the forum state.” 13 To underscore its point, B eechcra ft em phasized a

t oral ar gum e nt that gene ral jur

isdiction here mea ns it is subj ect to s uit in Dela ware f or any future c ase. T he standar d, according ly, is a high on e.14 Sonne v. Sacks , 314 A.2d 194 (Del. 1973). 15 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). 16 Id. at 760 (“ Even if w e were to assume

that MBU SA is at home

in Califor

nia, and f urther to assume MBUSA's contacts are imputable to Daimler , there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to gene ral juris diction in C aliforni a, for D aimler' s slim conta cts with th e State ha

rdly render it at home there.”) 7

Plaintiff s’ strongest argument, as m entioned, is that Beechcr a ft’s subsidia ry , Hawker

Beechcr aft Ser vices, w hich indisput ably do es business i n Delaware, is Defendant’s alter ego. Plaintiff asserts D elaware custom ers paid Defendant directly for the subsidiary ’s goods. Plaintiff also argues an

emplo yee of the subsidiary

emplo yee t estified b oth Defe ndant and its subsidiary use the tr ade

name “Be echcraf

t” and his in itial em

ployment paperwork

suggested he

was hire d by Defenda nt. Best of a ll is th at funds pa ss ed directly to the parent. Individual ly and collectiv ely

those rand om facts do not suffice. But, a ssuming they did , th is court simply does not have

subject -mat

ter jur isdiction to pierce th e corpora te veil. 14 Plaintiffs next arg u e the subsidi ary’ s Delaw are conta cts should be imputed to Defe ndant. The United States Supreme Court, addressing a similar situation in Daimler

AG v. Bauman, 15 held

even assuming the subsidiary was subject to general jurisdic tion in the forum state and t

he subsidiar

y’s contacts w ere im

putable to the paren

t, that a lone is not e nough to subj ect the parent to general jurisdic tion. 16 Further, in Daimler , the subsidiary and parent’s contacts to the forum were si gnificantl

y higher tha

n the subsidia

ry and Defenda nt’s cont acts are

to Delawar e17 E.g. Good year Dun lop Tires Op erations, S.A. v. Br own , 564 U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicopt eros Nacio nales de C

olombia, S

.A. v. Ha ll , 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 18 564 U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011). 19 Id. at 761 (“The paradigm all-purpose f orums for general jurisdiction are a c orporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business.)” 20 Id. 21 E.g. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A. , 902 F.2d 194, 199 ( 2d Cir. 199 0); Stewart v. Bus & Car Co. , 293 F. Su pp. 577, 58 3 (N.D. O hio 1968);

.

8 here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must e stablish per sonal jur isdiction over Defe ndant

in its own rig

ht, witho ut regard

to the subsidi ary’ s contacts

. Daimle r was no sea change. 17 Daimler , affir ming Goodyear D unlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 18 held general jurisdiction satisfieddue process onl y where an entity

is incorpor

ated or ha s a princip al place of business within the forum state. 19 Neither crite rion is sa tisfied h ere.

Def endant, as a national enterpris e, has conta cts with ev ery state. As di scusse d, only w

here cont acts are

continuous a

nd syste matic , and whe re the defendant is at hom e in the sta

te, does e xercising personal j urisdiction satisfy due process. As Daimler

poin ted o ut, if

Defend ant’s Delaw are activities suf ficed to allow general jurisdic tion, “thesame global rea ch would presuma bly be available in every other Stat e in which [t he subsi diary’s] sales are size able.” 20

A cco rdi ngl y, d eciding what constitutes substantial contacts requires bot h

an absolute a

nda relati ve analy sis. 21 Defendant’s contacts to Delaware are minim

al, especial ly when view ed relative to its national ne twork. The five air planes De fendant sold in Delaw are total

less than on e percen

t of Def endant’ s total sale s. Less than one22 Bell Helicopter v. C& C Helicopter , 295 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D. Del. 2002). 9 percent of total revenue is insubs ta ntial as a matter o f law. 22 Simi larly , as to the established Delaw are conta cts’ tr iviality , airpla

nes are built to move

beyond the point of sale. A ccordingly , FAA

registra tion recor ds and mailings are simil arly unavailing. In summ ary, the only

connections between Beechcraft Corporat ion and Delaware are a handful of sales to Delaware customer s and legally required mail ings to airplane o wners with Del aware mailing add resses. W hil e Defe ndant owns a subsidiarywith a substantial Dela ware faci lit y, neither the facility nor the subsidiary had anythi

ng to do with the

crash. Nor

do the subsidi ary’ s contacts have any bearing

on wh e ther exer

cising gene ral jur

isdiction over Beechc raft com ports with

due process . Even view ing the rec ord in Plaintiff’ s favor, it sim ply ca nnot be said

tha t Beechcraft is “at hom

e” in Delaware. For the above r

easons, D efendant Beechcr aft Corpo ration’ s Motion to Dism iss is GRANTED

.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Fred S. Silve rman Judge

cc: Prothonota

ry (C ivil) Katherine L. May er, Esquire Matthew Rifino, Esquire Sally Jean Daugherty , Esquire Justin P. Callaway, E squire George Thomas Le es, III, Esquire James C. Shroud, E squire Gary W . Aber, Esquire10