Filed 7/3/24 P. v. Williams CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

AKKIA JUNICE WILLIAMS,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 G062272

 (Super. Ct. No. 22NF1170)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

Jeffrey Ferguson, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Matthew O. Plunkett, 

Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
2

Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Respondent.

* * *

Akkia Junice Williams was charged in 2022 with a single count of 

violating Penal Code1section 25850, which prohibits the unlicensed public 

carry of loaded firearms. Williams moved to dismiss the charge as 

unconstitutional, citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen

(2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), which held that the “proper cause” requirement in 

New York’s public carry licensing regime violated the Second and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Williams asserted that both section 25850 and California’s 

entire firearm licensing scheme, which at the time allowed the issuance of a 

concealed carry permit only upon a showing of ‘“good cause,”’ among other 

requirements, were invalid under Bruen. 

The trial court found section 25850 was unconstitutional as 

applied to Williams and dismissed the charge. The People appealed. While 

their appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended the relevant 

licensing statutes to remove the “good cause” requirement to comply with the 

Bruen decision.

We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the charge against 

Williams. As other California appellate courts have already recognized, 

Bruen invalidated the now-deleted “good cause” requirement in two of 

California’s firearm licensing statutes; it did not invalidate the entire state 

licensing scheme. Because the “good cause” requirement is severable from 

California’s licensing scheme, the remainder of the licensing scheme as it 

existed when Williams was charged, including section 25850, otherwise 

1 All further statutory references are to this code.
3

remained constitutional. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order 

dismissing the charge against Williams and remand this matter for further 

proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

We begin by summarizing the relevant statutes at play. As 

noted, section 25850 makes it a crime to publicly carry a loaded firearm on 

one’s person or in a vehicle.2 “Although framed as a default prohibition, 

section 25850 is in effect the enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime 

that grants licenses to those who may lawfully carry firearms and withholds 

licenses from those who may not.” (In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 

915 (T.F.-G.).) In isolation, section 25850 “appears broadly prohibitory, [but] 

it exists within a framework of numerous express exemptions.” (Id. at 

p. 908.) One such exemption is section 26010, which provides that 

section 25850 does not apply to persons with concealed carry permits issued 

under sections 26150 to 26235. 

Until recently, those licensing provisions were discretionary in 

that they required the applicant to prove, among other things, that “good 

cause” existed for the issuance of the license and granted the issuing 

authority discretion to issue the license. At the time Williams was charged, 

section 26150 provided that “the sheriff of a county may issue a [concealed

carry] license to [an eligible applicant] upon proof of all of the following: [¶] 

2

Section 25850, subdivision (a), provides: “A person is guilty of 

carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the 

person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an 

incorporated city, city or county, or in any public place or on any public street 

in a prohibited area of an unincorporated area of a county or city and county.”
4

(1) The applicant is of good moral character. [¶] (2) Good cause exists for 

issuance of the license. [¶] (3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a 

city within the county, or the applicant’s principal place of employment or 

business is in the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends 

a substantial period of time in that place of employment or business. [¶] 

(4) The applicant has completed a course of training [relating to firearms 

safety, handling, shooting, and permissible usage].” (Former § 26150, subd. 

(a), italics added.) Section 26155 employed similar language. (See former 

§ 26155, subd. (a) [“the chief or other head of a municipal police department 

of any city or city and county” may similarly issue licenses]; see also former

§ 26202 [if the licensing authority determines good cause does not exist, it 

must state the reason for that determination].) 

The issue before us is whether the above-described licensing 

criteria run afoul of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. We 

therefore briefly summarize the decisions that led to the present case.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme 

Court held that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep 

and bear arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and that a district 

ban on handgun possession in homes was therefore unconstitutional. 

(District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 595, 630 (Heller).) But 

the court also noted that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 

unlimited” and does not include “a right to keep and carry any weapon 

whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Id. at 

p. 626.) For example, “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 

and the mentally ill [and] laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 

sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” are

“presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” (Id. at pp. 626-627, fn. 26.) 
5

Following Heller, California courts rejected various Second 

Amendment challenges to California firearms regulations. (See People v. 

Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 309-314 (Yarbrough) [upholding 

conviction for possessing concealed weapon on private property (§ 12025)]; 

People v. Flores (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [upholding convictions 

for possessing firearm by person prohibited from possessing a firearm 

(§ 12021), carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025), and carrying a loaded 

firearm in a public place (§ 12031)].)

In Yarbrough, the court observed “the Heller opinion specifically 

expressed constitutional approval of the accepted statutory proscriptions 

against carrying concealed weapons,” so “in the aftermath of Heller the 

prohibition ‘on the carrying of a concealed weapon without a permit, 

continues to be a lawful exercise by the state of its regulatory authority 

notwithstanding the Second Amendment.’” (Yarbrough, supra,

169 Cal.App.4th at p. 314.)

Then, in 2022, the United States Supreme Court extended Heller

to recognize “an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside

the home.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 10, italics added.) After clarifying 

the proper test for analyzing challenges under the Second Amendment (id. at 

pp. 22-24), the Bruen court determined New York’s concealed carry licensing 

scheme, which required applicants to demonstrate “proper cause” to get a 

license, was unconstitutional because it prevented law-abiding citizens with 

ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms

(id. at p. 71). In reaching its conclusion, the court contrasted the proper 

cause requirement in ‘“may issue”’ concealed carry licensing regimes, such as 

New York’s and California’s, with ‘“shall issue”’ jurisdictions, where 

authorities must issue concealed carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy 
6

certain threshold requirements, without the ability to deny licenses based on 

a perceived lack of need or suitability. (Id. at pp. 13-15.)

The day after the Bruen decision was issued, the California 

Attorney General issued an alert recognizing that the “good cause” 

requirements in former sections 26150 and 26155 were no longer enforceable. 

The alert instructed local officials not to enforce the good cause requirement,

but to otherwise continue to apply and enforce all other statutory 

prerequisites to obtaining a public carry license (e.g., the requirements of 

showing good moral character, residency, training, fingerprinting, and a 

background check).

Williams was arrested and charged with a single count of 

violating section 25850, subdivisions (a) and (c)(6). She filed a demurrer and 

nonstatutory motion to dismiss the charge as unconstitutional. In her 

moving papers, Williams argued the “good cause” requirement for concealed 

carry licenses in California is unconstitutional under Bruen, and since there 

is no remaining constitutional path to public carry, section 25850 operates as 

a total ban on public carry and is therefore also unconstitutional.

The trial court granted Williams’s motion and dismissed the 

charge against her. Although the court declined to reach the issue of whether 

California’s licensing scheme as a whole is constitutionally void, it concluded 

that under the “expansive” Bruen decision, section 25850 was 

unconstitutional as applied to Williams, whom the court described as “a 

law-abiding adult in possession of [a] firearm for purposes of self defense.”

The People filed a notice of appeal. While their appeal was 

pending, the California Legislature amended sections 26150 and 26155 to 

remove the “good cause” and good character requirements and to make 

issuance of a concealed carry license mandatory if certain requirements are 
7

met (“shall issue”), rather than discretionary (“may issue”). (See Stats. 2023, 

ch. 249, § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)

DISCUSSION

The People begin by contending Williams lacks standing to 

challenge California’s concealed carry licensing scheme since she never 

applied for a concealed carry permit. We assume without deciding that 

Williams does have standing to challenge the scheme’s constitutionality. (See

People v. Miller (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 935, 942 (Miller) [“We assume without 

deciding that Miller had standing to raise the arguments she asserted in her 

demurrer” on the constitutionality of California’s concealed carry 

prohibitions]; cf. In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 161 (D.L.) [juvenile 

who was subjected to a true finding that he unlawfully possessed a loaded 

firearm had standing to bring facial challenge to the constitutionality of 

section 25850].) 

Next, the People contend the trial court misinterpreted Bruen, 

which they assert explicitly endorsed states’ ability to require concealed carry 

permits. The People concede the now-removed “good cause” requirement in 

sections 26150 and 26155 of California’s concealed carry licensing scheme is 

unconstitutional under Bruen, but assert the “good cause” requirement is 

severable from the rest of the statutory scheme, which otherwise remains 

constitutional. Williams counters that California’s entire concealed carry 

licensing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to her, because she was 

engaged in constitutionally protected activity (i.e., being a law-abiding citizen 

who was publicly carrying a firearm) when arrested.

Williams’s facial challenge to the concealed carry licensing 

scheme presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo. (D.L., 
8

supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) After conducting a de novo review, we 

conclude Williams’s constitutional challenge is without merit.

Bruen invalidated only one of California’s statutory prerequisites

for obtaining a public carry license—the “good cause” requirement in former 

sections 26150 and 26155. It did not invalidate all public carry licensing 

schemes or prohibit states from requiring individuals to submit to certain 

licensing requirements in order to legally possess a firearm. Indeed, the 

Bruen court confirmed that states may validly impose “reasonable, welldefined restrictions” on the “right to bear commonly used arms in public.” 

(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 70.) It emphasized that nothing in the opinion 

should be interpreted to suggest that ‘“shall-issue”’ licensing regimes, “which 

often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms 

safety course,” are unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 38, fn. 9; see also id. at 

pp. 79-80 (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.) [noting the court’s “decision does not

prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun 

for self-defense,” and explaining that “shall-issue regimes,” which often 

require the applicant “to undergo fingerprinting, a background check, a 

mental health records check, and training in firearms handling and in laws 

regarding the use of force,” are “constitutionally permissible”].) 

The issue we must resolve is what impact the unconstitutional, 

now-deleted “good cause” licensing requirement has on the rest of California’s 

licensing laws. Our sister courts have uniformly rejected the argument that 

California’s licensing scheme is unconstitutional under Bruen. We agree. 

(People v. Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 403 [“Bruen did not render 

California's entire licensing scheme or the charges against them 

unconstitutional” because “[t]he offending ‘good cause’ requirement is 

severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as is the ‘good moral 
9

character’ element”]; T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 899 [“Although 

California’s ‘good cause’ licensing requirement is undisputedly 

unconstitutional under Bruen, [that] . . . does not render section 25850 

facially unconstitutional”]; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp.147-148 

[rejecting facial challenge to § 25850, subd. (a) (carrying a loaded firearm) 

and concluding “[i]t remains constitutional to punish someone without a 

license for carrying a loaded gun in public”]; Miller, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 943-946 [reversing order sustaining demurrer to charge of carrying a 

concealed firearm in a vehicle under one’s control (§ 25400), finding charge 

was constitutional].)

In D.L., for example, our colleagues in the First District found 

that after severing the “good cause” licensing requirement from former 

sections 26150 and 26155, “California’s firearm licensing framework—and 

the criminal penalties under section 25850—remain valid.” (D.L., supra, 

93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The court reasoned that “the Bruen majority’s 

actual holding was quite limited—that New York’s ‘proper-cause’ licensing 

requirement was unconstitutional,” and “Bruen did not undermine regulation 

of guns based on objective criteria.” (Ibid.) 

In D.L. the defendant made arguments similar to those offered by 

Williams here: that even if the “good cause” condition can be severed, 

sections 26150 and 26155 are still unconstitutional under Bruen because 

(1) they afford unfettered discretion to the relevant law enforcement official 

who “may issue” a license under each statute, and (2) the statutes still 

include a subjective condition that the applicant be of “good moral character.” 

(D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)

The D.L. court rejected those arguments and so do we. “D.L.’s 

argument is not supported by the actual holding in Bruen. As described 
10

above, that holding was based on the ‘proper cause’ language in the New 

York statute, not on its use of the phrase ‘may issue.’ [Citation.] Nor did 

Bruen include any holding regarding the ‘good moral character’ condition. 

[Finally,] D.L.’s new argument concerning the ‘may issue’ language in 

sections 26150 and 26155 is an ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge and not a 

facial challenge because the argument would not apply in all circumstances.” 

(D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) “For all of these reasons,” the D.L.

court “conclude[d] that section 25850 is enforceable and is not 

unconstitutional on its face. It does not pose a present total and fatal conflict 

with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (Id. at p. 167.) Again, we agree.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order dismissing the charge against Williams is 

reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to reinstate the case 

against her.

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

GOODING, J.