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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Peirce Deon Williams, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 7, 2023. No. S-22-566.

1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s 

determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial 

grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless 

clearly erroneous.

2. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it.

3. Speedy Trial: Complaints: Ordinances. The speedy trial statutes, Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016), apply to prosecutions on complaint and of city ordinance violations.

4. Speedy Trial. If a defendant is not brought to trial by the 6-month 

speedy trial deadline, as extended by any excluded periods, he or she is 

entitled to absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other 

offense required by law to be joined with that offense.

5. ____. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must 

exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, 

back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can 

be tried.

6. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Words and Phrases. “Good cause,” for 

purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016), means a 

substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Good cause is something that must be substantial but is also a factual question dealt with on 

a case-by-case basis.

7. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. When a trial court relies on Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy 

trial calculation, a general finding of “good cause” will not suffice. 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

04/07/2023 09:06 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

Instead, the court must make specific findings as to the good cause 

which resulted in the delay.

8. Good Cause: Proof: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s good cause findings must be supported by evidence in the record, and the State bears 

the burden of establishing facts showing that good cause existed. An 

appellate court will give deference to such factual findings unless they 

are clearly erroneous.

9. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Proof. A continuance by the court’s own 

motion, or judicial delay, does not toll the speedy trial statute absent a 

showing by the State of good cause.

10. Rules of the Supreme Court. Under Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1403 (rev. 2010), 

all persons entering a county court courtroom while court is in session 

shall conduct themselves in a quiet and orderly manner.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori 

A. Maret, Judge. Affirmed.

Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellant.

Robert E. Caples, Assistant Lincoln City Prosecutor, for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

Peirce Deon Williams appeals from an order of the district 

court affirming the county court’s decision to overrule his 

motion for absolute discharge pursuant to our speedy trial 

statutes. 1 Williams argues that the time for trial ran, entitling 

him to absolute discharge, and that the district court erred in 

concluding that two periods of time were excludable under 

§ 29-1207(4). Because we conclude that the county court’s 

finding to exclude one of the periods for good cause 2 was not 

clearly erroneous, and the time to bring Williams to trial did 

not run, we affirm the district court’s order.

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).

2 See § 29-1207(4)(f).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about September 21 to October 12, 2020, Williams 

was issued a handwritten “Uniform Citation and Complaint” 

(UC&C) by the Lincoln Police Department for an incident 

that occurred on September 21. 3 The copy of the UC&C in 

the record on appeal fails to show that the UC&C included 

the offense charged and the date of issuance. 4 The UC&C 

purported to summon Williams to appear before the Lancaster 

County Court on November 4 at 1:30 p.m. On October 12, 

the city of Lincoln (State) filed a separate complaint in 

the Lancaster County Court, which “attached and incorporated” the copy of the UC&C. The State’s complaint charged 

Williams with one count of assault and battery, in violation of Lincoln Mun. Code § 9.12.010 (1990). The record 

fails to show that Williams was served with the State’s 

filed complaint. 5

Initial Proceedings

On November 4, 2020, the matter came before the county 

court, and Williams did not appear. The court’s journal entry 

and order from that date stated, “telephone message on 

file,” and showed the county court continued the matter to 

November 12 “on motion of Defense.” The record shows 

that an order to appear in court was “[m]ailed to defendant,” 

ordering Williams to appear in the Lancaster County Court 

on November 12, 2020, at 1:30 p.m. for “[a]rraignment” 

and “[f]urther [a]rraignment.” Williams did not appear on 

November 12. The county court issued a bench warrant for 

Williams’ immediate arrest and granted the State leave to 

amend the complaint to add a count for failure to appear. 

Williams was charged with failure to appear under Lincoln 

Mun. Code § 9.08.110 (1997).

3 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-422 (Cum. Supp. 2022); Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1463 

(rev. 2019).

4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-423 and 29-424 (Reissue 2016).

5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-404 and 29-425 (Reissue 2016).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

On January 27, 2021, Williams voluntarily appeared before 

the county court. The county court held a hearing and advised 

Williams of the charges against him for assault and battery and 

failure to appear. Williams pled not guilty, and a docket call 

hearing was set for February 24. On February 24, the court set 

the matter for trial on April 12, precisely 6 months after the 

State filed its complaint.

On April 12, 2021, when the matter came before the county 

court for trial, Williams began to record a video of the proceeding with his cellular telephone. The court made multiple 

requests for Williams to cease recording, citing local court 

rules. In response, Williams stated that “if you don’t let me 

[record], then . . . I can’t do nothing about that.” He continued 

that “if it was a problem, Your Honor, I believe you would 

have [taken] my phone.” Williams told the court to “do whatever you feel you need to do,” but that he would not voluntarily 

stop recording. On its own motion, the court continued the case 

“to give [Williams] an opportunity to seek some advice, to consider what the Court is directing here and to come back and be 

ready for trial without your phone on.”

The matter again came before the court for trial on June 8, 

2021, and Williams did not appear. The court issued a bench 

warrant and gave the State leave to amend the complaint to 

add another count for failure to appear. On July 12, Williams 

appeared at a docket call hearing, and a third trial date was 

set for the morning of August 23. Williams did not appear for 

the morning trial date. The court issued a bench warrant and 

gave the State leave to amend the complaint to add another 

count for failure to appear. Williams appeared that same afternoon, and the court set a fourth trial date for September 21. 

Williams did not appear on the fourth trial date. The court 

issued a bench warrant and gave the State leave to amend 

the complaint to add another count for failure to appear. The 

amended complaint charged one count of assault and battery and four counts of failure to appear. Because the State 
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

now sought to impose a jail sentence, the court appointed a 

public defender.

On September 22, 2021, Williams appeared before the 

court. The court ordered Williams detained and set bond, 

and a fifth trial date was set for October 20. On September 

24, Williams filed a motion for discovery. On October 13, 

the State moved to continue the trial, and the matter was set 

for trial on November 10. On November 10, a seventh trial 

date was set for December 13 at the State’s request and over 

Williams’ objection.

Motion for Absolute Discharge

On November 11, 2021, Williams moved for an absolute 

discharge of the assault and battery charge on statutory speedy 

trial grounds. 6 At a hearing on the motion, the judicial administrator for Lancaster County Court testified for the State. 

Relevant to this appeal, the judicial administrator testified 

that the court had a system of taking telephonic messages by 

writing messages on a “purple half sheet of paper,” initialing it, and placing it on the court file. The State introduced 

a copy of a telephone message sheet that was attached to 

Williams’ file on November 4. The copy indicated a triangle 

in the space designated for the name of the caller. The judicial 

administrator testified that a triangle is used to indicate the 

defendant and that thus, the message indicated that Williams 

called the court before his initial scheduled court appearance 

and asked for a continuance. She then testified that message 

sheets are not “imaged in,” and do not become part of a certified court file, and that she did not create this message sheet 

or speak with Williams on November 4. The State offered 

the copy of the telephonic message, and Williams objected on 

the grounds of hearsay, authentication, and lack of foundation. 

Over Williams’ objections, the court received the copy of the 

telephonic message into evidence as exhibit 2.

6 See §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

The county court found that the period from November 

4, 2020, through April 12, 2021, was excludable under 

§ 29-1207(4)(b) and (d) because Williams requested the initial 

November 4, 2020, appearance to be continued 7 and, due to his 

failure to appear on November 20, 8 trial was not to begin in the 

matter until April 12, 2021. The county court also found that 

the period from April 12 through June 8 was excludable for 

good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f), due to Williams’ behavior 

“making it impossible for the trial to go forward” on April 12. 

Williams timely appealed from the county court’s order overruling his motion to the district court.

Appeal to District Court

On appeal to the district court, Williams raised two primary arguments relevant to this appeal. First, he argued that 

the period between November 4, 2020, and April 12, 2021, 

was not excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b) or (d) because the 

UC&C was void and, thus, an ineffective summons. Second, 

Williams argued that the period from April 12 through June 

8 was not excludable because no good cause existed under 

§ 29-1207(4)(f). Williams asserted that the record showed he 

was prepared to proceed with the trial on April 12. Williams 

contended that instead of continuing the matter, the county 

court could have ordered a sheriff’s deputy to seize Williams’ 

cellular telephone and proceeded with the trial as scheduled or 

found Williams in contempt.

The district court rejected Williams’ arguments. It concluded that the period from November 4, 2020, through April 

12, 2021, was excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b) because 

Williams requested an indefinite continuance on November 4 

and that consequently, his failure to appear on November 12 

had no bearing under § 29-1207(4). The court also concluded 

that good cause existed to exclude the period from April 

7 See § 29-1207(4)(b).

8 See § 29-1207(4)(d).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

12 to June 8, 2021, because Williams’ conduct prevented the 

trial from occurring, since “[a] trial cannot proceed if a party 

refuses to listen to the judge’s directions.” Williams appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Williams assigns the district court erred in (1) affirming the 

county court’s denial of his motion for absolute discharge and 

(2) finding no error in the county court’s receipt of exhibit 2, 

the copy of the telephonic message, into evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether 

charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a 

factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless 

clearly erroneous. 9 Statutory interpretation presents a question 

of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the 

lower court. 10

ANALYSIS

[2] On appeal, Williams challenges only the excludability 

under § 29-1207(4) of the time periods from November 4, 

2020, through April 12, 2021, and April 12 through June 8. 

Williams conceded at oral argument that reversal was warranted only if we concluded that both periods were chargeable 

to the State. Because we conclude that good cause existed to 

exclude the period from April 12 through June 8, we do not 

address Williams’ other arguments or his second assignment of 

error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it. 11

9 State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021).

10 132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, ante p. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778 

(2022).

11 State v. Yzeta, ante p. 202, 983 N.W.2d 124 (2023).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

[3-5] It is well-established that our speedy trial statutes, 

§§ 29-1207 and 29-1208, apply to prosecutions on complaint 

and of city ordinance violations. 12 If a defendant is not brought 

to trial by the 6-month speedy trial deadline, as extended by 

any excluded periods, he or she is entitled to absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other offense 

required by law to be joined with that offense. 13 To calculate 

the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must exclude the 

day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, back up 

1 day, and then add any time excluded under § 29-1207(4) to 

determine the last day the defendant can be tried. 14 In this case, 

the complaint was filed on October 12, 2020, so absent any 

excludable time, the State had until April 12, 2021, to bring 

Williams to trial.

[6] Section 29-1207(4)(f) provides that “[o]ther periods 

of delay not specifically enumerated” in the statute shall be 

excluded in the speedy trial computation, “but only if the 

court finds that they are for good cause.” We have held that 

“good cause,” for purposes of § 29-1207(4)(f), means a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. 15 We have 

also recognized that good cause is something that must be 

substantial but is also a factual question dealt with on a caseby-case basis. 16

[7-9] When a trial court relies on § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude 

time from the speedy trial calculation, a general finding 

12 See, State v. Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010); State v. 

Stevens, 189 Neb. 487, 203 N.W.2d 499 (1973). See, also, State v. Webb, 

311 Neb. 694, 974 N.W.2d 317 (2022); State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 

949 N.W.2d 490 (2020).

13 State v. Space, 312 Neb. 456, 980 N.W.2d 1 (2022). See § 29-1208.

14 State v. Nelson, ante p. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620 (2023).

15 State v. Coomes, supra note 9. See, State v. Moody, 311 Neb. 143, 970 

N.W.2d 770 (2022); State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224, 964 N.W.2d 682 

(2021).

16 See State v. Coomes, supra note 9.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

313 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

of “good cause” will not suffice. 17 Instead, the court must 

make specific findings as to the good cause which resulted 

in the delay. 18 A trial court’s good cause findings must be 

supported by evidence in the record, and the State bears the 

burden of establishing facts showing that good cause existed. 19

An appellate court will give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 20 Under § 29-1207, a 

continuance by the court’s own motion, or judicial delay, does 

not toll the speedy trial statute absent a showing by the State 

of good cause. 21

The county court found that good cause existed to exclude 

the period from April 12 to June 8, 2021, based on Williams’ 

conduct and refusal to stop recording the proceeding with his 

phone. It is somewhat puzzling that the State did not offer the 

transcript of the April 12, 2021, proceeding, or at least join in 

the offer made by Williams. However, to meet its burden of 

proving excludable time under § 29-1207(4), the State is entitled to rely on evidence offered by the defendant and received 

by the court. 22 We agree with the district court that this finding 

was not clearly erroneous.

Although Williams was entitled to a trial, he was not entitled to a trial in the manner of his choosing. Trials have rules. 

For the effectual administration of justice and the prompt 

disposition of judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court may 

promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all courts. 23

Likewise, each county court may recommend local rules 

17 See id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 State v. Moody, supra note 15. See State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160, 964 

N.W.2d 254 (2021).

22 State v. Coomes, supra note 9.

23 Neb. Const. art V, § 25.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

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STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

for approval by the Supreme Court. 24 The Lancaster County 

Court permits recording in the courtroom only under particular conditions for the purpose of gathering and disseminating 

news to the public. 25 Williams has not argued, nor is any 

evidence found in the record, that he satisfied the enumerated 

conditions to record the April 12, 2021, proceeding.

[10] Moreover, in Nebraska, all persons entering a county 

court courtroom while court is in session shall conduct themselves in a quiet and orderly manner. 26 Williams acknowledged before the county court that the court “has vast powers to control its courtroom.” Yet, he argues that instead of 

continuing the matter, the county court should have exercised 

its authority by “confiscat[ing his] phone for the duration 

of the trial” or holding him in contempt. 27 But it is within 

the inherent power of the court, not at Williams’ discretion, 

to choose how the court exercises its authority to control 

its courtroom. 28

Williams conceded before the county court that had he 

been held in contempt, the resulting period of delay would 

be excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a) as an “other proceeding[] 

concerning the defendant.” Compared with the court’s option 

to hold Williams in contempt, we view the county court’s decision to continue the matter as one of leniency. We decline to 

hold that the county court misused its authority in affording 

leniency to Williams.

24 See Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1448 (rev. 2022).

25 See Rules for Expanded Media Coverage in Neb. Trial Cts: Third Jud. 

Dist. Cty. Ct. (rev. 2014).

26 Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1403 (rev. 2010).

27 Brief for appellant at 29.

28 See, Ecker v. E & A Consulting Group, 302 Neb. 578, 924 N.W.2d 671 

(2019); Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d 761 

(1975); Pressey v. State, 173 Neb. 652, 114 N.W.2d 518 (1962); In re 

Dunn, 85 Neb. 606, 124 N.W. 120 (1909).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

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STATE V. WILLIAMS

Cite as 313 Neb. 981

Still, the court’s leniency has limits. It was Williams’ disorderly conduct and failure to comply with court rules that 

impeded the business of the court. The county court was 

not clearly erroneous in finding that there was a substantial 

reason that afforded a legal excuse to exclude the resulting 

period of delay.

CONCLUSION

The county court’s finding that good cause existed to 

exclude the period from April 12 through June 8, 2021, was 

not clearly erroneous. In light of Williams’ concession that 

every day from June 8 through the filing of his motion to discharge was excluded, the time to bring Williams to trial has not 

passed. Accordingly, the district court did not err in affirming 

the county court’s overruling of Williams’ motion for absolute discharge.

Affirmed.