IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO., LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 14-00443-N

)

LEONARD E. COWLING, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Ford Motor Credit Company, 

LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) without prejudice, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.

41(a)(2).1 Plaintiff requests dismissal without prejudice of its entire suit. Doc. 22 at 

1. As grounds for the motion, Plaintiff indicates that Defendant Leonard Cowling’s 

debt to Plaintiff has been discharged in bankruptcy. Doc. 22 at 1; see Doc. 22-1. As 

Defendant Cowling has previously filed an answer (Doc. 14), the Court cannot 

construe the motion as a notice of dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

Under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2), the Court may dismiss Plaintiff’s claims “upon 

such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” Such a dismissal is without 

prejudice unless otherwise specified by the Court. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). The 

Eleventh Circuit has explained the relevant considerations for a motion for 

 1 As the parties were made aware (see Docs. 2, 16), this case has been randomly assigned to the 

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including trial. Inasmuch as no party, 

to date, has returned to the Clerk of Court a Request for Reassignment to a United States District 

Judge, there presently exists implicit consent to the undersigned conducting all proceedings in this 

case. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1703, 155 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2003) (“We think 

the better rule is to accept implied consent where, as here, the litigant or counsel was made aware of 

the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the

Magistrate Judge. Inferring consent in these circumstances thus checks the risk of gamesmanship by 

depriving parties of the luxury of waiting for the outcome before denying the magistrate judge’s 

authority. Judicial efficiency is served; the Article III right is substantially honored.”).

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voluntary dismissal in the following terms:

The district court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to 

allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). McCants v. Ford Motor 

Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986). “[I]n most cases, a 

voluntary dismissal should be granted unless the defendant will suffer 

clear legal prejudice, other then [sic] the mere prospect of a subsequent 

lawsuit, as a result.” Id. at 856-57. “The crucial question to be 

determined is, Would the defendant lose any substantial right by the 

dismissal.” Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 

(5th Cir. 1967). In exercising its “broad equitable discretion under Rule 

41(a)(2),” the district court must “weigh the relevant equities and do 

justice between the parties in each case, imposing such costs and 

attaching such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate.” 

McCants, 781 F.2d at 857 . . .

Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp., 252 F. 3d 1253, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2001)

accord Goodwin v. Reynolds, 757 F. 3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Bracket 

v. State Highways and Transp. Comm’n, 163 F.R.D. 305, 307 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (the 

decision of whether to grant dismissal and, if so, whether to impose conditions on 

that dismissal rests in the court’s discretion).

On April 17, 2015, the Court ordered Mr. Cowling to “file any substantive 

response he may have in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss without 

prejudice (Doc. 22) no later than Friday, April 24, 2015.” Doc. 23 at 2. Mr. Cowling 

was informed that if no such response was filed, “the motion w[ould] be deemed 

unopposed and the Court w[ould] unconditionally grant the motion on April 27, 

2015.” Id.

The Court’s deadline has passed, with Mr. Cowling having filed no response in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion 

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to Dismiss without prejudice (Doc. 22) is GRANTED and that this action is 

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Final judgment in accordance with this Order and FED. R. CIV. P. 58 shall 

issue separately.

DONE and ORDERED this the 28th day of April 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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