alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

December 20, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh 133486 & (22) Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman,
Justices

v SC: 133486 COA: 274888 Muskegon CC: 05-051481-FH, CURTIS DWAYNE MEANS, 05-051482-FC Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

By order of September 12, 2007, the defe ndant’s appellate coun sel was directed to file a supplemental brief. On order of the Court, the brief having been received, the application for leave to appeal the February 7, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302 (G)(1), in lieu of gran ting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals. That court shall treat the defendant’s application as having been f iled within the deadlin e set forth in MCR 7.205(F) and shall decide whether to grant, deny, or orde r other relief, in ac cordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2). The defendant’s attorney ack nowledges that the defendant did not contribute to the delay in filing and adm its his sole responsib ility for the error. Accordingly, the defendant wa s deprived of his appeal as a result of constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Roe v Flores-Ortega , 528 US 470, 477; 120 S Ct 1029; 145 L Ed 2d 985 (2000); Peguero v United States, 526 US 23, 28; 119 S Ct 961; 143 L Ed 2d 18 (1999).

Costs are imposed against appellate couns el, only, in the amount of $250, to be paid to the Clerk of this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

d1213 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

December 20, 2007

Clerk
Exhibit 4.11


CERTIFICATE OF
AMENDMENT

TO

CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

OF

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS CAPITAL TRUST VII


This Certificate of
Amendment of Lehman Brothers Holdings Capital Trust VII (the “Trust”), is being
duly executed and filed by the undersigned trustee to amend the certificate of
trust of a statutory trust formed under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (12
Del. C. § 3801 et seq.)(the “Act”).


1.             Name.     The name of the statutory trust amended
hereby is Lehman Brothers Holdings Capital Trust VII.


2.             Amendment
of Certificate.  The Certificate of
Trust of the Trust is hereby amended by changing the name and address of the
Trustee in the State of Delaware to the following:


U.S. Bank Trust National Association

300 Delaware Avenue, 9th Floor

Wilmington, Delaware  19801

Attention:  Corporate Trust Services


3.             Effective
Date.  This Certificate of Amendment
shall be effective upon filing.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
undersigned trustee of the Trust has executed this Certificate of Amendment in
accordance with Section 3811(a)(2) of the Act.


 




	
   

  	
   

  	
  U.S.
  BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, not 

  in its individual capacity but solely as Property 

  Trustee

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  EARL DENNISON

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Name:

  	
  Earl
  Dennison

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Title:

  	
  Vice
  President

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  U.S.
  BANK TRUST NATIONAL 

  ASSOCIATION, not in its individual capacity 

  but solely as Delaware Trustee

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/
  EARL DENNISON

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Name:

  	
  Earl
  Dennison

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Title:

  	
  Vice
  President

  
						






 

















 




	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ BARRETT DIPAOLO

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Barrett DiPaolo, not in
  his individual 

  capacity but solely as Regular Trustee

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ JAMES KILLERLANE

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  James Killerlane, not in
  his individual 

  capacity but solely as Regular Trustee

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ ANDREW YEUNG

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Andrew Yeung, not in his
  individual 

  capacity but solely as Regular Trustee

  






 


 


2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

PETITION OF JOSE

CARABALLO FOR A WRIT OF 

MANDAMUS

§

§ No. 27, 2015

§

§

Submitted: January 30, 2015

 Decided: February 12, 2015

Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.

O R D E R

This 12th day of February 2015, upon consideration of Jose

Caraballo’s petition for a writ of mandamus and the State’s answer and 

motion to dismiss, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The Superior Court docket reflects that Caraballo was arrested 

on April 3, 2014 on a charge of Robbery in the First Degree (Cr. ID 

1404001994). He filed a motion to dismiss the charge, which was denied as 

moot after the grand jury returned an indictment against him in June 2014. 

Final case review was held in the Superior Court in November 2014, but a 

trial date was deferred pending defense counsel’s notification to the court of 

the need for a hearing to determine Caraballo’s competency to stand trial. 

Thereafter, defense counsel notified the court by letter that Caraballo wished 

to terminate their attorney-client relationship. On January 29, 2015, the 
2

Superior Court denied counsel’s letter request pending the filing of a formal 

motion to withdraw.

(2) Caraballo filed his petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court 

on January 22, 2015. Caraballo requests this Court to dismiss the charges 

against him because of inconsistencies in the witnesses’ statements to the 

police. The State has moved to dismiss Caraballo’s petition on the ground 

that this Court lacks original jurisdiction to order the requested relief.

(3) We agree. This Court has authority to issue a writ of 

mandamus only when the petitioner can demonstrate a clear right to the 

performance of a duty, no other adequate remedy is available, and the trial 

court arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.1 A writ of mandamus 

is inappropriate to challenge the legality of Caraballo’s arrest and 

indictment, which are issues that are properly reviewable on appeal.2 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Caraballo’s petition is 

hereby DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice

 

1

In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988).

2

In re Evans, 2007 WL 2111090 (Del. July 24, 2007).
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**STATMON
      TECHNOLOGIES CORP.**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**19
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Statmon Technologies Corp. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
      Geoffrey P. Talbot, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
      to
      18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that to the best of my knowledge:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
      **Geoffrey P. Talbot**


**Geoffrey
      P. Talbot**


**** **Chief
      Financial Officer**


**August
      15, 2005**




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Statmon Technologies Corp. and will be
      retained by Statmon Technologies Corp. and furnished to the Securities and
      Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.






22
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

February 10, 2016

Order 

February 10, 2016

152807(46)

CHIROPRACTIC REHABILITATION GROUP, 

PC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

SC: 152807

COA: 320288

Oakland CC: 2013-009983-AV

________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time 

for filing its reply is GRANTED. The reply will be accepted for filing if submitted on or 

before March 3, 2016.
**EXHIBIT 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Venture Catalyst Incorporated (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly periodending December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, L. Donald Speer, II, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350,as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. 

| Date: February 13, 2003 | By:    | /s/  L. DONALD SPEER, II                         |
|-------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                    |   |                                                       |
|                    |   | **L. Donald Speer, II**                               |
|                    |   | **Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer** |
|                    |   | **(Principal Executive Officer)**                     |
#### In the Matter of the Claim of David N. Thesing, Appellant. Eastman Kodak Company, Respondent; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[973 NYS2d 895]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed June 5, 2012, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.

Claimant had worked for the employer for 35 years when, in order to downsize claimant’s department, the employer instituted a voluntary separation package. Claimant was informed that if a sufficient number of employees did not accept the package, the remainder of the targeted reduction would then be accomplished by involuntary separation. Although aware that any employees affected by the involuntary reduction would receive the same benefit package as those accepting the voluntary separation package, and that there was still work available with the employer, claimant accepted the voluntary separation package. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently ruled that claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. This appeal ensued.

We affirm. “Voluntary separation from employment in order to accept an early retirement or separation incentive package when, as here, continuing work is available has been held not to constitute good cause for leaving employment” *(Matter of Willis [Commissioner of Labor],*98 AD3d 1182, 1182 [2012] [citations omitted]; *see Matter of Rubscha [Commissioner of Labor],*105 AD3d 1217, 1218 [2013]). Although claimant testified that he accepted the separation package out of fear of losing his job, claimant was never informed that he was going to be laid off *1016during the work force reduction and, in any event, he was told that those that were to be laid off would receive the same benefits package as those that accepted the voluntary separation *(see Matter of Rubscha [Commissioner of Labor],*105 AD3d at 1218). Further, leaving employment in the anticipation of losing one’s job in the future is not a departure for good cause *(see Matter of Keane [Commissioner of Labor],*93 AD3d 1002, 1003 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 854 [2012]). Under these circumstances, the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed *(see Matter of Willis [Commissioner of Labor],*98 AD3d at 1182, *Matter of Cammisa [Commissioner of Labor],*38 AD3d 1146, 1146 [2007]).

Rose, J.E, Lahtinen, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATION



I, James N. Fairbairn, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Quincy Energy Corp.



2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of and for the periods presented in this annual report.



4. The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: August 12, 2005





/s/ James N. Fairbairn

James N. Fairbairn

Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-40449

Summary Calendar

 

BENNIE BOONE,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,

versus

DEWAYNE CANNON; SHERDONA WALKER; ERIC NELSON;

JOHN CLOYE JOHNSON; WAYNE TEMPELTON,

Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

--------------------

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:01-CV-111

--------------------

December 16, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bennie Boone (prisoner # 87102) appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his civil rights complaint without prejudice for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). A prisoner is required to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a); Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 1998). 

“Dismissal under [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e is made on pleadings without
No. 02-40449 

-2-

proof. As long as the plaintiff has alleged exhaustion with

sufficient specificity, lack of admissible evidence in the record

does not form the basis for dismissal.” Underwood v. Wilson, 151

F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Boone did not allege with sufficient specificity in his

district court pleadings that he exhausted his administrative

remedies through Step 2 of the Texas inmate grievance procedure. 

See Wendell, 162 F.3d at 890; Underwood, 151 F.3d at 296. This

case does not present a rare instance warranting an exception to

the exhaustion requirement. Underwood, 151 F.3d at 296. The

district court thus did not err in dismissing Boone’s 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Boone’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7122

WILLIAM LEBRON CHURCH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF

VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

EDWARD W. MURRAY, Director; VIRGINIA PAROLE

BOARD; COUNTY OF AMELIA, VIRGINIA; THOMAS V.

WARREN, Judge; COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-95-612)

Submitted: September 30, 1998 Decided: November 16, 1998

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Lebron Church, Appellant Pro Se. William W. Muse, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* This case was decided by a magistrate judge exercising

jurisdiction upon consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 636(c)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).

2

PER CURIAM:

William Lebron Church appeals the magistrate judge’s orders

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) complaint and his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion.* We have reviewed the

record and the magistrate judge’s opinions and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate

judge. Church v. Attorney Gen., No. CA-95-612 (E.D. Va. Apr. 14 &

May 7, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit



*** Confidential treatment has been requested with respect to certain portions of this Agreement.  Omitted portions have been filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


KEYSIGHT AGREEMENT AMENDMENT
ANT76


EXHIBIT 10.29


Amendment #9 to Authorized Technology Partner
Program Agreement No. ANT76


by and between Electro Rent Corporation ("Electro Rent")
and Keysight Technologies, Inc. ("Keysight")


This Amendment to the above referenced Program Agreement No. ANT76 (“Agreement”) is executed by and between Keysight Technologies, Inc. (“Keysight”) and Electro Rent Corporation (“Electro Rent”) effective the 1st day of June,  2014 (the “Effective Date”).
The following modifications are hereby made to the Agreement:
1.       Reseller may be eligible for an [***] in the amount of [***] if Reseller’s total [***] equals or exceeds [***].   The [***] will be calculated on Keysight’s [***].    The [***] will be provided in the form of a [***].   Keysight will [***].  The [***] will be available [***]. 
2.    If Resellers receives an [***] but subsequently cancels an order(s) placed in the [***] time frame and such cancellation would result in either [***], Keysight may [***].  


ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE REFERENCED AGREEMENT REMAIN UNCHANGED AND ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.


EFFECTIVE DATE:  April 10, 2015




 
	
					
	AGREED TO:
	 
	AGREED TO:

	Customer:
	Electro Rent Corporation
	 
	Keysight:
	Keysight Technologies, Inc.

	 
	/s/ Meryl Evans
	 
	 
	/s/ Jennifer Baker

	 
	Authorized Representative Signature
	 
	 
	Authorized Representative Signature

	Name:
	Meryl Evans
	 
	Name:
	Jennifer Baker

	Title:
	VP
	 
	Title:
	Contracts Specialist

	Address:
	6060 Sepulveda Bl
	 
	Address:
	9780 South Meridian Blvd.

	 
	Van Nuys, CA 91411
	 
	 
	Englewood, CO 80112











[***] - Confidential portions of this document denoted by [***] have been redacted and filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


	
			
	E08
	 
	 Page 1/1

	Revision Date 01-August-2014


	 
	Revision Number 1

	 
	 
	Printing Date 1 June 2015
EXHIBIT 10.19


 


WORKING CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT


 


Between:


 


AMERICAN RESIDENTIAL GAP LLC (ARG), a Michigan Limited Liability Company
with address at 380, N. Old Woodward Avenue, Ste. 300, Birmingham, MI 48009.


 


And


 


PROGREEN CONSTRUCTION LLC (PGC), a Michigan Limited Liability Company
with address at 380 N. Old Woodward Avenue, Ste. 226, Birmingham, MI 48009.


 


It has been agreed that PGC will perform various duties of construction,
material purchase and other for ARG, both in connection with the reformation of existing properties as well as with new construction.
PGC will invoice ARG weekly or when convenient, with actual cost plus an admin fee of 10%. Copies of such invoices shall be sent
electronically at the time of issuance or as soon as practical thereafter.


 


PGC has access to a specific "construction and expense account"
set up by ARG in Bank of Birmingham, from which invoiced amounts will be paid out to PGC. ARG shall make sure that sufficient funds
are available in this account in order to meet the payments when they become due.


 


Birmingham March 1, 2015


 


	PROGREEN CONSTRUCTION LLC	 	AMERICAN RESIDENTIAL GAP LLC
	 	 	 
	/s/ Jan Telander	 	/s/ Michael Lindstrom
	President	 	President