Filed 2/22/24 In re David B. CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re DAVID B., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

V.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329813

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05098A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lisa Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Conditionally affirmed and remanded with instructions.
2

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Amir Pichvai, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________________________

Mother, V.B., appeals from an order terminating her 

parental rights over her son, David B., at a Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing. She contends the 

order must be reversed because the Department did not provide 

notice of the proceedings to her conservator and the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying her request to continue the 

hearing. We conclude any error in failing to provide notice to 

mother’s conservator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and that the court did not abuse its discretion. 

Mother also argues the Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department) did not comply with its initial inquiry duty 

under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1901 et seq.) and related California law. The Department 

agrees, as do we, that the requirements imposed by ICWA were 

not satisfied. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the order and 

remand the matter to ensure compliance with ICWA. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Detention

In September 2020, a few days after mother gave birth to 

David, the Department received a referral alleging mother was 

under a “L[anterman] P[etris] S[hort] conservatorship” due to her 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
3

“severe” mental health condition. Mother’s conservator at the 

time was a public guardian, but the public guardian informed a 

social worker there was a court hearing set for October 14, 2020, 

to see if David’s maternal grandfather would be appointed 

mother’s conservator.

It was reported mother suffered from schizophrenia and 

had a history of methamphetamine addiction. Mother allegedly 

was delusional, hearing voices, and not coherent. Because of 

mother’s “cognitive and functional impairment[s],” it was 

reported mother was unable to care for herself or her newborn 

child. Mother allegedly had “psychotic and paranoia episodes 

very often.” Her psychiatrist explained, “[Mother] ‘[r]equires 24/7 

supervision if she is with [David]’” and added mother could be a 

danger to others if she did not take her medication. 

A few days later, the Department filed a section 300 

petition on David’s behalf alleging mother’s mental and 

emotional issues and substance abuse placed David at risk of 

serious harm.2 The ICWA-010(A) inquiry form attached to the 

petition indicated mother and her public guardian stated David 

had no known Indian ancestry. After the detention hearing, 

where the juvenile court detained David in shelter care, maternal 

grandfather was appointed mother’s conservator. 

Mother, maternal grandfather, and mother’s counsel 

appeared for mother’s arraignment in early November 2020. The 

matter was continued to the following day to allow mother’s 

counsel to speak with mother and maternal grandfather. The 

2 The petition additionally alleged David’s half-sibling, E.V., was 

a prior dependent of the juvenile court due to mother’s substance 

abuse. In August 2016, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over 

E.V. with sole legal and physical custody granted to E.V.’s father and 

monitored visits ordered for mother. 
4

next day, the juvenile court conducted a hearing and determined 

mother did not need a guardian ad litem to proceed with the 

dependency hearings. The court further inquired whether 

mother had any “American Indian heritage,” to which mother’s 

counsel replied, “[N]o, she does not.” An ICWA-020 parental 

notification of Indian status form was also filed by mother’s 

counsel on mother’s behalf indicating she did not have any Indian 

ancestry. The court found ICWA did not apply to mother. In 

addition, nonparty J.D. was found to be David’s alleged father. 

David remained detained in shelter care and monitored visitation 

was ordered for mother. 

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report and Hearing

David was later placed with his maternal great aunt, R.C. 

Mother was living with maternal grandfather, who reported that 

he took care of mother “‘24/7.’” The social worker interviewed 

mother about the petition’s allegations, and mother claimed, “‘I 

just have stress and anxiety. I don’t see things, not me. Someone 

is doing this to me. I know people can do this to me through the 

internet. . . . I do hear voices they ask me for money. They ask 

me that if when my mom dies am I willing to give the voices 

money [sic].’” Mother further stated she had been put on “‘many 

5150 holds . . . because of the drugs’” and confirmed she had a 

long history of methamphetamine use. Mother visited with 

David, but David’s caregiver, R.C., expressed mother would not 

engage with the child and appeared to be disconnected during 

visits. 

The social worker also interviewed maternal grandfather. 

Maternal grandfather stated there had “been so many 

hospitalizations. Countless times” “because of the amount of 
5

drugs she consumed so the [doctors] probably thought she was 

trying to [commit] suicide.” Maternal grandfather revealed

mother told him the voices she heard wanted her to relapse. 

At the adjudication hearing in January 2021, the juvenile 

court sustained the petition as pled. David was declared a 

dependent and removed from parental custody. The juvenile 

court ordered the Department to provide reunification services to

mother. Visitation was ordered to remain monitored. 

C. Six-Month Review Period 

Mother continued residing with maternal grandfather and 

was in partial compliance with her case plan. During this period, 

mother was hospitalized multiple times due to 

methamphetamine use and experiencing “psychotic and paranoia 

episodes.” Mother told the social worker she was hearing voices 

in her head urging her to use methamphetamine and was having 

recurring thoughts of using the drug again. 

Mother was dropped from her court-ordered programs due 

to her hospitalizations. When not hospitalized, mother was 

compliant with her visitation, although she only visited for one to 

two hours. While mother at times appeared coherent at visits, 

David’s caregiver stated in most instances mother appeared slow 

in processing information and looked sedated. 

At the six-month review hearing in August 2021, the 

juvenile court found mother was in partial compliance with her 

case plan and continued reunification services. 
6

D. 12-Month Review Period

In October 2021, J.D. was found to be David’s biological 

father. The juvenile court ordered reunification services for J.D.

and found ICWA did not apply to him.

During this review period, mother experienced consecutive 

hospitalizations for her mental health that precluded her from 

completing her case plan. The social worker was unable to 

contact mother during this period. Further, mother was unable 

to visit David regularly due to her hospitalizations. For visits 

that did occur, R.C. reported mother visited for only 20 to 30 

minutes and rarely was able to meet David’s needs. R.C. 

indicated mother continued lacking parenting skills “due to being 

withdrawn and having difficulty making functional and rational 

choices to increase her bonding.” R.C. stated that during a visit, 

mother secretly gave David a Cheeto that caused David to start 

choking. R.C. had to quickly remove the Cheeto from David’s 

throat “as [mother] sat there with a blank stare.” R.C. believed 

maternal grandfather was not ensuring mother was complying 

with her medications. 

At the 12-month review hearing in November 2021, the 

juvenile court found the parents’ compliance with their case plans 

was not substantial, but their services were continued. 

E. 18-Month Review Period

Mother was again hospitalized multiple times for her 

mental health issues and made little progress with her courtordered case plan. Mother’s visits were inconsistent and lasted

only 20 to 30 minutes each. R.C. continued reporting mother 

lacked parenting skills and was hearing voices. The Department 
7

assessed there was a high risk of harm to David’s physical and 

emotional health if returned to mother’s custody. 

At the 18-month review hearing in June 2022, the juvenile 

court determined mother’s progress in her case plan was

unsubstantial and terminated her reunification services. As to 

J.D., his reunification services were continued for four months. 

Because R.C. and her husband were unable to provide a 

permanent home for David, he was placed with a paternal uncle 

and his fiancé in September 2022. Concerning ICWA, in January 

2023, R.C. told the Department her family did not have any 

Indian heritage. At a review hearing in early October 2022, at 

which neither mother nor maternal grandfather appeared, J.D.’s 

reunification services were terminated. The court then set a 

section 366.26 hearing for January 31, 2023, to select and 

implement a permanent plan for David. 

F. Section 366.26 Hearings

The Department subsequently served mother with notice of 

the section 366.26 hearing by certified mail, return receipt 

requested. The Department’s report for the hearing was not 

attached to the notice. 

Mother was present at the section 366.26 hearing on 

January 31, 2023, without maternal grandfather. The juvenile 

court asked mother’s counsel whether counsel had any objection 

to the court finding notice of the hearing was proper. Mother’s 

counsel had no objection. The Department informed the court 

additional time was needed to obtain all adoption readiness 

documents. The court continued the matter to May 1, 2023, to 

allow the Department to complete the adoption assessment and 

ordered mother back for the continued hearing. 
8

After David was placed with his paternal caregivers in 

September 2022, mother did not have any visits until February 

2023. The paternal caregivers did not have mother’s contact 

information and incorrectly believed mother’s visitation rights 

were terminated. Mother also stated she did not have the 

caregivers’ contact information but wanted visits. When visits 

resumed, it was reported mother still did not engage with David 

and instead followed maternal grandfather while he followed 

David. The Department attempted to address these issues with 

mother and maternal grandfather via text message in March 

2023 but did not receive a response. 

The Department served notice of a review hearing set for 

April 3, 2023, on mother and maternal grandfather. Neither 

appeared at the hearing, and the juvenile court ordered adoption 

as the permanent plan for David. Notice of the May 1, 2023, 

section 366.26 hearing was then sent to mother by first-class mail 

at maternal grandfather’s residence. 

Neither mother nor maternal grandfather were present at 

the May 1, 2023, hearing. Mother’s counsel explained he was not 

able to contact mother but “did speak with the maternal 

grandfather, who indicated mother may be in an inpatient drug 

program.” Mother’s counsel requested a continuance to make 

further efforts to reach mother but admitted, “I concede notice is 

proper.” The court denied the continuance request. Mother’s 

counsel then argued the parental benefit exception to adoption 

applied and requested a plan of legal guardianship be ordered. 

The court determined no exception to adoption applied and 

terminated parentals rights. Lastly, the court found there was 

no reason to know David was an Indian child as defined under 

ICWA. 
9

Mother timely appealed the order. 

DISCUSSION

A. Any Failure to Give Mother’s Conservator Notice of, 

or Require Her Conservator to Appear for, the 

Section 366.26 Proceedings was Harmless Beyond a 

Reasonable Doubt

Mother asserts notice to her of the section 366.26 

proceedings was improper because her conservator, maternal 

grandfather, did not get notice of the hearings and was not 

provided with copies of the Department’s section 366.26 reports. 

Further, mother asserts the juvenile court should have ordered

mother’s conservator to appear for the proceedings but did not do 

so. The Department argues, in pertinent part, that any failure to 

give notice to mother’s conservator or require him to be present 

for the proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We 

agree with the Department. 

Until parental rights are terminated, parents are entitled 

to notice at each step of the juvenile proceedings as a matter of 

statute and due process. (§ 294; In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 

Cal.App.4th 100, 106.) Notice must be reasonably calculated to 

apprise the parent of the pendency of the action and afford the 

parent an opportunity to present any objections. (In re Daniel S.

(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 909 (Daniel S.).) Additionally, a

failure to provide parents with a copy of the social worker’s report 

that the juvenile court will rely on in coming to a decision is a 

denial of due process. (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 

413.) However, errors in notice do not automatically require

reversal. (Daniel S. at p. 912.) We review such errors to 
10

determine whether they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Id. at pp. 912–913.)

Furthermore, “when a dependency court is informed that a 

conservator has been appointed for a party, the dependency court 

also has a sua sponte obligation either to appoint a [guardian ad 

litem] for that party or to order that the party shall appear 

through his or her conservator.” (In re A.C. (2008) 166 

Cal.App.4th 146, 155.) But the failure to appoint a guardian ad 

litem or to compel a parent’s conservator to appear does not 

violate due process rights and is subject to the harmless error 

standard. (Id. at pp. 148, 157 [we do not set aside the judgment 

unless a different result would have been probable had the error 

not occurred].) 

The record does not show maternal grandfather was served 

with notice of the section 366.26 hearings or provided with copies 

of the Department’s reports prepared for the proceedings. 

However, when asked by the juvenile court whether there was

any objection to finding notice of the January 31, 2023, hearing 

was proper, mother’s counsel affirmatively stated there was none. 

At the May 1, 2023, hearing, mother’s counsel expressly conceded 

notice was proper.3 A party’s failure to object to lack of notice 

forfeits the issue on appeal. (In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 

Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 

1209–1210.) Nevertheless, as the Department does not assert

mother forfeited the issues regarding notice she raises, we reach 

the merits of mother’s arguments. 

3 Given that mother’s counsel conceded notice was proper and 

stated counsel had spoken with maternal grandfather before the 

hearing, the court could have reasonably inferred maternal 

grandfather had actual notice of the hearing. (See In re Desiree M.

(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329, 335.) 
11

Mother cites to Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 903, in

contending the failure to properly notice maternal grandfather 

was prejudicial. In Daniel S., the child was placed in protective 

custody after the mother, “a chronic paranoid schizophrenic,” 

“was placed on a section 5150 hold because she was considered a 

danger to herself and others.” (Id. at p. 908.) After a temporary 

conservatorship was established over the mother, the juvenile 

court appointed a guardian ad litem for her. (Id. at pp. 909, 911, 

fn. 7.) Thereafter, the juvenile court sustained the petition 

against mother at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. (Id. at 

p. 909.) 

The mother appealed, arguing the jurisdiction and 

disposition orders had to be reversed because she was not 

properly noticed. (Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) 

The appellate court held the social services agency did not have 

to serve the mother with notice, given her mental state. (Id. at 

p. 911.) Instead, notice of the proceedings should have been 

served on the mother’s temporary conservator, and thus, she was 

not properly notified of the hearing. (Id. at pp. 911–912.) 

However, the failure to provide notice to the mother’s conservator 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the result of 

the hearing would have been the same. (Id. at p. 914.) “There 

was simply no defense to the petition and no alternative but to 

remove [the child] from [the mother’s] care.” (Ibid.) At the time 

of the hearing, she was still hospitalized and could not care for 

herself or anyone else, and she was not stabilizing on her 

medication. (Ibid.) 

Here, mother contends that unlike in Daniel S., the failure 

to notice maternal grandfather was prejudicial because maternal 

grandfather could have ensured mother appeared, or could have 
12

appeared himself and explained mother’s absence, if he was 

properly noticed. Even if we assume it was error not to provide

maternal grandfather with notice of the hearings or copies of the 

Department’s reports, or to otherwise require maternal 

grandfather to appear, mother does not show reversal of the 

order terminating her parental rights is required. The main 

issues at a section 366.26 hearing are whether the child is likely 

to be adopted and whether there is a statutory exception to 

adoption. The evidence supported the finding David was likely to 

be adopted, as the paternal caregivers he was placed with were 

attached to David and wanted to pursue adoption. And David 

was observed to be well-bonded with the paternal caregivers and 

referred to them as “‘mom’” and “‘dad.’” 

Once the juvenile court finds it is likely the child will be 

adopted, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), requires termination 

of parental rights unless an exception in subdivision (c)(1)(A) or 

(c)(1)(B) applies. One of these is the parental benefit exception, 

which mother’s counsel argued applied at the May 1, 2023, 

hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to establish this 

exception applies, a parent must prove three elements: 

(1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into 

account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) that “the child has 

a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the 

kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship”; and (3) that terminating the parentchild attachment “would be detrimental to the child even when 

balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive 

home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636.) 

The record shows mother could not have established the 

parental benefit exception in this case, and neither mother’s nor 
13

maternal grandfather’s appearance would have changed this

result. Mother’s visitation throughout the duration of the case 

was sporadic and inconsistent. When mother did have visits, she 

did not engage with David and was largely unable to meet his 

needs. During the 12-month and 18-month review periods, 

mother visited for only 20 to 30 minutes and appeared 

withdrawn. Mother’s counsel did not object to any of the 

Department’s evidence at the May 1, 2023, hearing. Nor was the 

evidence contradicted. Moreover, nothing in mother’s history of 

visits suggests she formed a connection with David sufficient to 

warrant finding the termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to David. 

Mother contends she or maternal grandfather could have 

objected to the interruption in visitation she experienced after 

David was placed with the paternal caregivers if mother or 

maternal grandfather were present for the hearing. However, 

mother stops short of claiming such an objection would have 

impacted the juvenile court’s analysis of the parental benefit 

exception. The record shows that once visits resumed, the quality 

of visits continued to be poor as mother was still not engaging 

with David. Perhaps this is why mother’s counsel, who spoke 

with maternal grandfather before the hearing, did not raise an 

objection based upon the interruption in visits.

Based on the foregoing, any error in the Department failing 

to give maternal grandfather notice of the section 366.26 

hearings, to provide copies of the section 366.26 reports, or to 

compel maternal grandfather to appear was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 914;

see also In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 918 [reversal not 
14

required where outcome of proceeding not affected by lack of 

notice].)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in

Denying the Request to Continue the Section 366.26

Hearing

Next, mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in

denying her counsel’s request for a continuance at the May 1,

2023, hearing. We disagree.

“Section 352 provides that courts may ‘continue any

hearing’ under the dependency law ‘beyond the time limit within

which the hearing is otherwise required to be held’ (§ 352,

subd. (a)(1)), provided there is ‘good cause’ (id., subd. (a)(2)) and a

continuance would not be ‘contrary to the interest of the minor’

(id., subd. (a)(1)). In evaluating the minor’s interest, the court

‘shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt

resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide

children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of

prolonged temporary placements.’” (Michael G. v. Superior Court

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632.) We review the juvenile court’s

decision to deny a continuance for abuse of discretion. (In re D.Y.

(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1056.) A court abuses its discretion

when its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and

results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (Ibid.) “‘The

appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court

exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can

reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ 

[Citation.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
15

At the May 1, 2023, hearing, after informing the juvenile

court maternal grandfather indicated mother may be in an

inpatient drug program, mother’s counsel requested a

continuance “out of an abundance of caution” so that counsel

could make further efforts to “discuss with mother the

recommendations for today and obtain any information about . . .

progress in programs.” Counsel did not identify any other basis

for a continuance. Mother’s counsel conceded notice for the

hearing was proper, and mother offers no explanation as to why

any other information maternal grandfather had about mother’s

whereabouts could not have been shared with counsel prior to the

hearing. 

Although mother asserts she “would likely have appeared”

for a continued hearing date and testified about interruptions in

her visitation and her bond with David, as discussed above,

mother does not establish her testimony would have changed the

outcome of the hearing. Mother’s counsel did not explain to the

juvenile court how mother’s testimony would establish an

exception to adoption, such that the court should further delay

David’s permanent placement. The juvenile court acted within

its discretion in deciding the need for prompt resolution and

providing David with a stable environment outweighed mother’s

request for a continuance. Under these circumstances, the

juvenile court’s decision to proceed with the section 366.26

hearing without mother present was not arbitrary, capricious, or

patently absurd.

C. Further ICWA Inquiry was Required in this Case

Mother argues the Department failed to fulfill its duty of

initial inquiry required by ICWA, as it did not inquire of several
16

known and available maternal relatives about potential Indian

heritage. The Department concedes further inquiry into David’s

ancestry is necessary.

“ICWA was enacted to curtail ‘the separation of large

numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes

through adoption or foster care placement’ [citation], and ‘to

promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by

establishing . . . standards that a state court . . . must follow

before removing an Indian child from his or her family’

[citations].” (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review

granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.).) Whether ICWA

applies depends on whether the child who is the subject of the

custody proceeding is an Indian child. (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1

Cal.5th 83, 90.) Both ICWA4 and state statutory law define an

“Indian child” as a child who is either a member of an Indian

tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the

biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C.

§ 1903(4); accord, § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)

Under state law, the juvenile court and the Department

have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a

child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has

been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see

In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11–12.) The duty of inquiry

includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child, parents, legal

guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others

who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child

abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian

4 Our state Legislature incorporated ICWA’s requirements into 

California statutory law in 2006. (In re Abbigail A., supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

p. 91.) 
17

child.”5 (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) If this initial inquiry creates a

“reason to believe” a child is an Indian child, the Department is

required to “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian

status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as

practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th

1041, 1052.) The juvenile court may find that a child is not an

Indian child if the agency’s “proper and adequate” inquiry and

due diligence reveals no “reason to know” the child is an Indian

child. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1050.) “We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s

Indian ancestry for substantial evidence.” (In re H.V. (2022) 75

Cal.App.5th 433, 438.) 

Mother contends the Department failed to fulfill its duty of

initial inquiry required by ICWA and state law. The Department

concedes its inquiry efforts as to mother’s heritage were

insufficient, and we agree. Aside from asking mother, maternal

grandfather, and R.C. about possible Indian ancestry, the

Department failed to discuss mother’s heritage with any other

maternal relatives. ICWA requires social services agencies to ask

a child’s available extended family members whether the child is

or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The Department

did not ask any of the several maternal relatives it had contact

with or was aware of about David’s potential status as an Indian

child. The Department further concedes its inquiry error in this

case was prejudicial and further investigation into David’s Indian

ancestry is warranted. We agree and remand for the Department

5 “[E]xtended family members” include adults who are the child’s 

“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sisterin-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 

U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting federal definition].)
18

to conduct further investigation into David’s Indian ancestry

through mother.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating mother’s parental rights is 

conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded with instructions 

to the Department and the juvenile court to conduct further 

ICWA inquiry as soon as practicable. If that inquiry reveals 

evidence of Native American heritage, then the Department and 

the court must comply with the additional ICWA requirements, 

including, if applicable, the notice requirements of section 224.3. 

If it does not, then the order shall stand.

MORI, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.