Filed 10/7/24 Irvine Ranch Water Dist. v. Orange County Water Dist. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

IRVINE RANCH WATER 

DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v.

ORANGE COUNTY WATER

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B329089

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. Nos. 

BS168278, BS175192, 

21STCV33390, 

22STCV22517)

GOLDEN STATE WATER 

COMPANY,

Cross-Complainant and 

Appellant,

v.

IRVINE RANCH WATER DISTRICT,

Cross-Defendant and 

Respondent.
2

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mitchell Beckloff, Lawrence Riff, and Amy 

Hogue, Judges. Affirmed.

Alston & Bird, Edward J. Casey, and Matthew C. 

Wickersham for Irvine Ranch Water District.

Rutan & Tucker, Joseph D. Larsen, and Jeremy N. 

Jungreis for Orange County Water District.

Meyers Nave, Gregory J. Newmark, and Kiana AmiriDavani for East Orange County Water District, Yorba Linda 

Water District, and Mesa Water District.

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Scott S. Slater, 

Christopher R. Guillen, and Jessica L. Diaz for Golden State 

Water Company.

Anaheim City Attorney’s Office, Alison M. Kott, and Daniel 

J. Payne; Best & Krieger, Jeffrey W. Dunn, and Wendy Y. Wang 

for City of Anaheim.
3

Irvine Ranch Water District (Irvine Ranch) is one of several 

entities that extract water from the Orange County Groundwater 

Basin (the Basin). The Orange County Water District (OCWD)

manages the Basin pursuant to the Orange County Water 

District Act (the Act).1 One of OCWD’s statutorily-provided tools 

for managing the Basin is a fee assessed on groundwater that a 

producer pumps in excess of an OCWD-set ratio of groundwater 

to groundwater plus water from “supplemental sources.” (§ 40-

31.5, subds. (a), (c)(2), (j)(2).) The trial court found the statutory 

definition of “supplemental sources” does not include recycled 

water and Irvine Ranch appeals that determination. In a 

consolidated cross-appeal brought by Golden State Water 

Company (Golden State), we also consider a separate issue: 

whether the trial court correctly decided, via a motion for

judgment on the pleadings, that Golden State has not stated (and 

cannot by amendment state) its own affirmative claim for water 

rights independent of a groundwater claim that Irvine Ranch 

made, but later abandoned, pursuant to a 1933 judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pertinent Provisions of the Orange County Water 

District Act

“To maintain an adequate level of groundwater in its 

territory and protect groundwater quality, [OCWD] acquires 

water from various sources at its own expense and discharges it 

1 The uncodified Act is Chapter 40 of the Water Code 

Appendix. Undesignated section references that follow are to the 

Act as reprinted in West’s Annotated California Water Code 

Appendix.
4

from [OCWD] facilities in Orange County. This process 

replenishes or ‘recharges’ groundwater in the 

[Basin]. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [OCWD’s] recharge activities effectively 

store water in the groundwater basin, but [OCWD] does not itself 

use or extract groundwater. Other entities, such as [Irvine 

Ranch], operate extraction wells and produce water for public 

drinking water supplies and for other uses.” (Orange Co. Water 

Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 

343, 358-359.) Irvine Ranch and similar entities are therefore 

often referred to as “producers” of water.2 (Wat. Code, § 60021.) 

As we shall discuss in more detail, producers collectively

pump the majority of their water from the Basin, but they also 

rely on other sources. Because it generally costs producers less to 

pump groundwater than to purchase water imported from outside 

the Basin, the Act empowers OCWD to impose limitations on,

and disincentives to, groundwater extraction. (§ 40-31.5, subd. 

(a).) 

Pursuant to the Act, OCWD commissions a report each 

year evaluating, among other things, the amount and cost of 

water produced from Basin groundwater and “supplemental 

sources” in the prior year, the condition of groundwater supplies 

in the Basin, and the probable availability of water from 

supplemental sources in the next water year. (§ 40-31.5, subd. 

(d).) Following a public hearing at which interested parties may 

2

In addition to Golden State, the producer Real Parties in 

Interest in this case are East Orange County Water District, 

Yorba Linda Water District, Mesa Water District, and the City of 

Anaheim. We shall refer to them collectively as the Other 

Producers.
5

comment on the report (§ 40-31.5, subd. (e)), OCWD holds 

another public hearing at which the board of directors determines 

whether to use certain Basin management tools in the upcoming

year, including “basin equity assessments and . . . production 

requirements and limitations . . . .” (§ 40-31.5, subd. (f)(1).)

This case chiefly concerns basin equity assessments and 

the formula used to determine the amount of an assessment for 

producers. Following the public hearings just described, OCWD’s 

board of directors may establish the next year’s “basin production 

percentage,” which is “the ratio that all water to be produced 

from groundwater supplies within the district bears to all water 

to be produced by persons and operators within the district from 

supplemental sources and from groundwater within the district 

during the ensuing water year.” (§ 40-31.5, subds. (c)(2), 

(g)(2)(b).) In language important to resolution of this appeal, the 

Act defines “supplemental sources” as “sources of water outside 

the watershed of the Santa Ana River, excepting that portion of 

that watershed on and along Santiago Creek upstream of the 

downstream toe of the slope of the Villa Park Flood Control Dam, 

such as, but not limited to, water produced from the Metropolitan 

Water District of Southern California.” (§ 40-31.5, subd. (c)(1).)

The basin production percentage does not establish a hard 

cap on the amount of Basin groundwater that producers may 

pump (either collectively or individually). Producers, however, 

are subject to an assessment or rebate based on whether their 

actual basin production percentage is greater or less than the 

prescribed basin production percentage. (§ 40-31.5, subds. (j)(2)-

(3)(A).) As stated in the Act, proceeds from these assessments

“shall be used to equalize the cost of water to all persons and 

operators within the district and to acquire water to replenish the 
6

groundwater supplies of the district.” (§ 40-31.5, subd. (b).) 

Thus, in theory, once a producer exceeds the basin production 

percentage and begins to incur an additional charge for 

groundwater (i.e., the basin equity assessment), groundwater will 

no longer be cheaper than imported water and the producer may 

therefore decide to obtain water from another source. 

Conversely, any producer that does not or cannot pump up to the 

basin production percentage (OCWD has, for instance, imposed 

additional limits on pumping in certain parts of the Basin to 

mitigate seawater intrusion) will receive a rebate. 

The basin equity assessment rate may vary from year to 

year, it need not be uniform among producers, and, for an 

individual producer, it may vary between water used for 

irrigation and non-irrigation purposes. (§ 40-31.5, subds. 

(g)(2)(E)-(F).) The amount of an individual producer’s basin 

equity assessment is determined by multiplying the amount by 

which the producer’s groundwater production exceeds the basin 

production percentage by the applicable basin equity assessment 

rate.3 (§ 40-31.5, subd. (j)(2).) 

This is all a bit obscure, so we shall briefly recapitulate the 

key points in what we have said so far. One of OCWD’s tools for 

managing the Basin is a system of incentives encouraging 

3 The rebate due to a producer whose mix of Basin 

groundwater and water from supplemental sources puts them 

below the basin production percentage is “determined by the 

number of acre-feet by which the production of the person or 

operator from groundwater as required by the district is less than 

the acre-foot equivalent of the basin production percentage 

multiplied by the basin equity assessment rate applicable to that 

person or operator.” (§ 40-31.5, subd. (j)(3).)
7

producers to produce some share of their water from 

“supplemental sources.” Each year, OCWD sets a target ratio 

describing the ideal proportion of production of water from 

groundwater and from supplemental sources. That is the basin 

production percentage. Individual producers who exceed this 

target (i.e., produce more water from groundwater than OCWD’s 

determined target groundwater level) pay a basin equity 

assessment based on the amount by which their groundwater 

production exceeds the target. 

Whether a particular water source is classified as a 

supplemental source has consequences for an individual producer 

and for the Basin as a whole. First, the classification may impact 

the Basin-wide target. If OCWD counts water from a particular

source as a “supplemental source,” the expected ratio of water 

produced from groundwater to water produced from groundwater 

plus supplemental sources will be lower and the basin production 

percentage will be set lower. If OCWD does not count the source 

as among the “supplemental sources,” the basin production 

percentage will be set higher. For producers making use of the 

source in question, all other things being equal, more water 

produced from supplemental sources means a lower basin 

production percentage and a correspondingly lower basin equity 

assessment (if any).

B. Irvine Ranch’s Water Recycling Activities

Irvine Ranch serves approximately 108,000 water service 

connections within an area that includes all of Irvine; parts of 

Tustin, Newport Beach, Costa Mesa, Orange, and Lake Forest; 

and unincorporated areas of Orange County. Since the 1960s, 

Irvine Ranch has spent millions of dollars building and 
8

maintaining a water recycling system. It currently operates two 

water recycling facilities: the Michelson Water Recycling Plant in 

Irvine and the Los Alisos Water Recycling Plant in Lake Forest.4 

These facilities collect and treat wastewater from sources within 

Irvine Ranch’s service area. During the 2015-2016 water year, 

these facilities together produced more than 22,000 acre feet of 

recycled water. 

Since at least 2013, Irvine Ranch has taken the position 

that the water it recycles should be classified as supplemental 

source water in calculating its basin equity assessment. The 

interpretive dispute hardened in April 2016, when Irvine Ranch 

sent OCWD a letter protesting the agency’s determination that

recycled water does not qualify as a supplemental source. Irvine 

Ranch argued its recycled water qualifies as water from a 

supplemental source under the Act because it is outside the 

watershed of the Santa Ana River. Specifically, Irvine Ranch 

contended the Act’s definition of “supplemental sources” as 

“sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River”

should be understood to mean water that is not taken from a 

source that flows to the replenishment of the groundwater basin. 

Because the wastewater treated at Irvine Ranch’s recycling 

facilities is not taken from such a source (the water would 

otherwise flow through sewer pipes to the ocean), Irvine Ranch 

asserted the water it recycles must be a supplemental source. 

OCWD rejected this understanding of the Act.

4

Irvine Ranch does not dispute that both facilities are 

located within the Santa Ana River watershed as understood to 

refer to the area in which water drains into the Santa Ana River. 
9

C. Irvine Ranch’s Petition and Complaint, Other 

Producers’ Cross-Complaints, and the Trial Court’s 

“Phase One” Ruling

At its meeting in April 2016, OCWD’s board of directors 

adopted Resolution No. 16-4-37 (the 2016 Resolution) 

establishing the basin production percentage and setting basin 

equity assessment rates for the upcoming water year. A couple 

months later, Irvine Ranch filed a petition and complaint 

challenging the 2016 Resolution because OCWD did not count 

recycled water as a supplemental source in calculating the basin 

production percentage. When OCWD adopted a similar 

resolution the following year, Resolution No. 14-4-25 (the 2017 

Resolution), Irvine Ranch filed an amended petition and 

complaint challenging that resolution as well.5 Beyond

challenging the classification of recycled water, Irvine Ranch also 

sought a declaration of its right to pump up to 4,500 acre feet of 

Basin groundwater for export to customers outside OCWD 

boundaries pursuant to a judgment entered in 1933. 

The Other Producers (see footnote 2, ante) who do not 

operate water recycling facilities in the Basin intervened and 

filed cross-complaints for declaratory relief that asked the court 

5 Later in 2017, OCWD adopted Resolution No. 17-11-151 

(the Corrective Resolution) correcting “clerical errors” in findings 

in the 2016 and 2017 Resolutions that included recycled water in 

a figure reflecting water from supplemental sources. The error in 

the findings did not impact the basin production percentage 

calculations, which did not count recycled water as water from a 

supplemental source. Irvine Ranch responded by filing a third 

amended petition and complaint (the Third Petition) that added a 

challenge to the Corrective Resolution. 
10

to reject Irvine Ranch’s construction of a “supplemental source” 

and Irvine Ranch’s claim to water rights arising from the 1933 

judgment. As we shall discuss in more detail, Golden State 

contends its cross-complaint also sought additional relief 

concerning its own water rights. 

The Third Petition was tried in multiple phases pursuant 

to the parties’ stipulation. 

The first phase addressed the Third Petition’s first through 

fourth causes of action that respectively sought: (1) a writ of 

mandate compelling OCWD to re-calculate the basin equity 

assessment owed for 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 with recycled 

water counted as a supplemental source; (2) a writ of mandate 

compelling OCWD to rescind the Corrective Resolution based on 

procedural objections and because it excluded recycled water 

from the class of supplemental sources; (3) invalidation of the 

2016 and 2017 Resolutions because they excluded recycled water 

from the class of supplemental sources; and (4) a writ of mandate 

compelling OCWD to rescind the 2016 and 2017 Resolutions and 

conform its actions to an interpretation of the Act classifying 

recycled water as a supplemental source. The first phase also 

addressed the Other Producers’ causes of action for declaratory 

relief related to the classification of recycled water. 

Following a hearing in June 2018, the trial court issued a 

Phase One ruling rejecting Irvine Ranch’s construction of the 

Act’s definition of a supplemental source and siding with OCWD 

and the Other Producers’ understanding of the term. Relying on

the plain text of the Act, the court found the definition of

“supplemental sources” (“sources of water outside the watershed 

of the Santa Ana River, excepting that portion of that watershed 

on and along Santiago Creek upstream of the downstream toe of 
11

the slope of the Villa Park Flood Control Dam . . .”) did not

include water recycled in the Santa Ana River watershed. Citing 

dictionary definitions of “watershed” and “outside,” the trial court 

reasoned the phrase “outside the watershed” is used in a 

geographic rather than a hydrologic sense, meaning that 

wastewater within the geographic bounds of the Santa Ana River 

watershed is not water from a supplemental source simply 

because it does not drain into the river. The court further 

explained that the statutory definition’s exclusion of a “portion of 

th[e] watershed on and along Santiago Creek” was “consistent 

with a perception that the watershed is a geographical area of 

land” because “land can be apportioned” but “[a] system of 

drainage” cannot. The court additionally emphasized that the

only other use of the term “watershed” elsewhere in the Act 

concerns OCWD’s power to take property “located within” and “at 

any place” within the watershed by eminent domain, which again 

supported a geographical understanding of the term watershed 

as used in the supplemental sources definition.

6

 

Although the trial court believed there was no need to

consider historical revisions to the Act, it explained that doing so 

6 The court conceded “it would have been more enlightened 

for the Legislature to define ‘sources of water outside the 

watershed’ to mean water from any source other than the waters 

draining into the Santa Ana River,” but it concluded the clear 

and unambiguous text of the Act demonstrated a contrary intent. 

The trial court rejected the contention that its construction led to 

absurd results because, among other things, a geography-focused 

definition of supplemental sources increases certainty in a 

scheme that incentivizes purchase of water from sources outside 

the geographic bounds of the Santa Ana River watershed. 
12

would only support its plain text conclusion. As the court 

detailed, the Act’s definition of “supplemental sources” was 

amended in 1991 to include “reclaimed water,”7but that provision 

was removed just a few years later. The trial court found this 

significant in two respects. First, the later “decision to delete 

‘reclaimed water’ . . . signified an intention to exclude recycled 

water from the definition of ‘supplemental sources.’” But, second, 

even during the short period when the reference to reclaimed 

water remained in the definition of supplemental sources, the

definition still distinguished between reclaimed water and

sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River

because it “defin[ed] supplemental sources to mean ‘reclaimed 

water and sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa 

Ana River’” as opposed to “‘sources of water outside the 

watershed of the Santa Ana River including reclaimed water.’”8 

D. Subsequent Proceedings

The only subsequent trial phase that is relevant for our 

purposes in this appeal is phase three, which addressed Irvine 

7 The Water Code uses the phrases “reclaimed water” and 

“recycled water” interchangeably. (Wat. Code, § 26.) 

8 Over the course of the proceedings, Irvine Ranch filed 

additional petitions and complaints, all of which were 

consolidated with the original matter. As pertinent here, these 

pleadings challenged OCWD’s continuing practice of excluding 

recycled water from supplemental sources. Based on the trial 

court’s Phase One ruling, the parties stipulated to the denial of 

all causes of action in Irvine Ranch’s petitions and complaints 

that rely on its construction of “supplemental sources” in the Act. 
13

Ranch’s alleged rights under a 1933 judgment and Golden State’s

purported claims for relief concerning its own water rights. 

In a seventh amended supplemental petition and 

complaint, Irvine Ranch sought a declaration that it is entitled to 

pump and export a certain amount of groundwater without being 

assessed a surcharge based on a judgment in favor of The Irvine 

Company, its predecessor in interest, in 1933. In their crosscomplaints, the Other Producers sought opposing declarations 

that Irvine Ranch has no such right. Golden State contends it 

also sought additional relief by way of two claims in its own

cross-complaint: a third cause of action for declaratory relief 

“pertaining to the rights of the parties to groundwater underlying 

the Basin pursuant to the 1933 judgment” and a fourth cause of 

action to enjoin Irvine Ranch “from extracting non-surplus water 

under a claim of water rights from the 1933 [j]udgment, or any 

other claim under applicable law, in a manner that causes harm 

to [Golden State] and the Basin.” 

After asserting its declaratory relief claim, Irvine Ranch 

discovered that The Irvine Company abandoned its rights under 

the 1933 judgment prior to the alleged transfer of rights to Irvine 

Ranch. Upon discovery of this fact, Irvine Ranch moved to 

dismiss the relevant cause of action seeking declaratory relief

concerning its purported rights under the 1933 judgment and

stipulated to declaratory relief in favor of each of the Other 

Producers—except Golden State, which was attempting to assert 

its own water rights—on their corresponding cross-claims.

Irvine Ranch filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

to terminate the litigation as to Golden State. Irvine Ranch 

argued Golden State was entitled to declaratory relief that Irvine 

Ranch had no rights under the 1933 judgment but there was no 
14

need for injunctive relief. Irvine Ranch also argued Golden State 

was not entitled to declaratory relief beyond what Irvine Ranch 

conceded because there was no longer any case or controversy 

concerning the parties’ water rights and, in any case, Golden 

State had not joined all parties necessary for an adjudication of 

its own water rights. Golden State argued in opposition that its 

claims did not depend on Irvine Ranch’s claim under the 1933 

judgment, it was entitled to a declaration of its rights in relation 

to Irvine Ranch, and this relief did not require any other parties 

to be named. 

The trial court granted Irvine Ranch’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings following a hearing. The court recognized it 

confronted a “very odd motion” in which Irvine Ranch was 

“insisting that [it] lose on a cross-complaint and [Golden State] 

insisting that it not win.” But the court believed the matter 

“c[ame] down to” a careful reading of Golden State’s crosscomplaint, which made “pretty clear that the third cause of action 

is about rights under the 1933 judgment.” It was “[l]ikewise[ ] 

clear as well that [the fourth cause of action] is . . . about the 

1933 judgment.” The trial court accordingly issued an order 

declaring Irvine Ranch does not possess any rights under the 

1933 judgment, declining to “issue declaratory or injunctive relief 

as to any aspect of groundwater rights that may be held by 

[Golden State] . . . as such relief is beyond the scope of [Golden 

State’s] Fourth Amended Cross-Complaint,” and denying Golden 

State injunctive relief “because there is no present demonstrated 

need for such relief in light of the judicial declaration” it granted. 

The trial court emphasized the judgment to be entered “shall not 

prejudice [Golden State’s] groundwater rights, if any, or [Golden 
15

State’s] right, if any, to challenge groundwater rights asserted by 

others.” 

Following the trial court’s ruling on the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, all parties stipulated to entry of a 

final judgment consistent with their earlier stipulations and the 

court’s prior orders. Irvine Ranch now appeals the Phase One 

ruling that recycled water in the Basin is not a supplemental 

source and Golden State appeals the order granting Irvine 

Ranch’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

II. DISCUSSION

The sole issue Irvine Ranch raises in its appeal is whether

the phrase “sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa 

Ana River” refers to water coming from outside the area of land 

in which water drains into the Santa Ana River or, as Irvine 

Ranch prefers, any water outside the “drainage system” flowing 

into the Santa Ana River and replenishing the Basin. Our review 

is de novo, and we hold the text of the Act clearly employs the 

term “watershed” to describe a geographical area. The 

unambiguous statutory text obviates any need to delve into 

earlier revisions to the Act, but, as the trial court explained, that 

history would only confirm what we hold based on the text of the 

statute alone.

In its cross appeal challenging the order granting Irvine 

Ranch’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Golden State 

contends its cross-complaint raised claims unrelated to the 1933 

judgment and, in any case, the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying it leave to file an amended complaint asserting such 

claims. Both arguments lack merit. The operative crosscomplaint reveals Golden State was asserting its rights vis-à-vis 
16

Irvine Ranch only with respect to the 1933 judgment. In 

addition, any amendment to seek a broader declaration as to the 

priority of any appropriative right possessed by Golden State 

relative to Irvine Ranch (or related injunctive relief) would be 

futile because there is no actual controversy.

A. The Phase One Ruling Is Correct Because Recycled 

Water Is Not Water from a Supplemental Source 

Under the Act

1. Plain meaning

The Act defines “supplemental sources” to mean “sources of 

water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River, excepting 

that portion of that watershed on and along Santiago Creek 

upstream of the downstream toe of the slope of the Villa Park 

Flood Control Dam, such as, but not limited to, water produced 

from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.” 

(§ 40-31.5, subd. (c)(1).) 

To decide whether Irvine Ranch is correct that the water it 

recycles falls under this definition, we begin with “the words of a

statute, ‘because they generally provide the most reliable 

indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citation.]” (Pineda v. WilliamsSonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 529.) “We do not 

consider statutory language in isolation; instead, we examine the 

entire statute to construe the words in context. [Citation.] If the 

language is unambiguous, ‘then the Legislature is presumed to 

have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language 

governs.’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language permits more 

than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other 

aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public 
17

policy.’ [Citation.]” (Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 966, 972.)

Absent any indication the Legislature intended a word or 

phrase to be read in a special or technical sense, we give the 

statutory language its “‘“plain and commonsense meaning.”’” 

(City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616; 

Turo Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 517, 521.) 

“Courts appropriately refer to dictionary definitions ‘to ascertain 

the ordinary, usual meaning of a word.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

Here, the Act does not define “watershed,” and there is no 

indication the Legislature intended the term to have a technical 

or special meaning. Dictionary definitions of “watershed” 

emphasize its spatial character. The Oxford English Dictionary, 

for example, defines it as either “3. . . . (a) The slope down which 

the water flows from a water-parting[ or] (b) the gathering 

ground of a river system; a catchment area or drainage basin.”9 

9

In addition to this definition and various figurative uses, 

there is another geographic sense of “watershed” that does not 

apply here: “1.a. The line separating the waters flowing into 

different rivers or river basins; a narrow elevated tract of ground 

between two drainage areas; a water-parting.” (Oxford English 

Dict. Online (2015) 

<https://www.oed.com/dictionary/watershed_n1?tab=meaning_an

d_use#15070030> [as of May 22, 2024]; accord Merriam-Webster 

Dict. Online (2024) <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/watershed> [as of May 24, 2024]

[“Opinion on the literal geographic meaning of watershed is 

divided. On one side of the debate are those who think the word 

can only refer to a ridge of land separating rivers and streams 

flowing in one direction from those flowing in the opposite 

direction. That’s the term’s original meaning, one probably 

borrowed in the translation of the German Wasserscheide. On 
18

(Oxford English Dict. Online (2015) 

<https://www.oed.com/dictionary/watershed_n1?tab=meaning_an

d_use#15070030> [as of May 22, 2024], emphasis added.) 

Merriam-Webster likewise defines “watershed” to mean “a region 

or area bounded peripherally by a divide and draining ultimately 

to a particular watercourse or body of water.” (Merriam-Webster 

Dict. Online (2024) <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/watershed> [as of May 24, 2024], 

emphasis added.) These definitions make clear that hydrologic 

features may help define the area of a watershed, but they do not 

constitute the watershed itself.

The geographic character of the term “watershed” is 

underscored in the Act’s exception to the general rule that only 

sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa Ana River 

qualify as supplemental sources. In deference to vested water 

rights, the Act provides that “supplemental sources” include 

sources of water within “that portion of that watershed on and 

along Santiago Creek upstream of the downstream toe of the 

slope of the Villa Park Flood Control Dam . . . .” (§ 40-31.5, subd. 

(c)(1).) If “watershed” referred to the Basin’s drainage system, 

the exception would simply refer to Santiago Creek upstream of 

the dam; there would be no need to specify “that portion of that 

watershed on and along” the creek. Indeed, it would make little 

sense to speak of a source of water “on and along” a source of 

water.10 

the other side of the argument are those who think watershed can 

also apply to the area through which such divided water flows.

The latter sense is now far more common in America”].)

10 Irvine Ranch attempts to turn this argument on its head, 

suggesting it is nonsensical to read “watershed” in a manner such 
19

Irvine Ranch suggests that if the Legislature had intended 

to define supplemental sources as those outside a geographic 

area, it would have described the boundaries by metes and 

bounds as it did in describing OCWD’s boundaries in section 40-1. 

There is no indication, however, that OCWD’s boundaries are 

identical to those of the watershed. The Legislature might well 

have decided the need for immediate certainty as to OCWD’s 

boundaries dictated a metes-and-bounds approach but left the 

term “watershed” to speak for itself.

Venturing beyond section 40-31.5, the Act also uses the 

term “watershed” in a geographic sense in its provision for 

OCWD’s exercise of eminent domain. In section 40-2, subdivision 

(10), the Act authorizes OCWD “[t]o exercise the right of eminent 

domain to take any property necessary to the exercise of any of 

the powers granted by this act, except that the district shall not 

have the right of eminent domain as to water, water rights, 

reservoirs, pipelines, water distributing systems, waterworks, or 

powerplants, all or any of which are already devoted to beneficial 

or public use and located within the watershed of the Santa Ana 

River . . . . No language or provision of this act . . . shall be 

interpreted or construed so as to limit or abridge the right of the 

district . . . to exercise its right of eminent domain to condemn 

that the exception may be paraphrased to refer to sources of 

water within “that portion of th[e] [land] on and along Santiago 

Creek” upstream of the dam. We fail to see the absurdity. Irvine 

Ranch believes “no person would use the word ‘land’ to describe a 

body of water (essentially equating land with water),” but that is 

not what the statutory text does. Both the text and Irvine 

Ranch’s paraphrase simply refer to sources of water by their 

spatial location.
20

property at any place within the Santa Ana River watershed for 

rights-of-ways upon and across and under which to construct 

pipelines, conduits, tunnels and/or aqueducts necessary or 

convenient for any of the purposes of the district . . . .” (Emphasis 

added.)

There is good reason to understand the reference to 

watershed in the supplemental sources definition in this same 

geographic sense. (See, e.g., People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 

860, 868 [“‘One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction 

is that interrelated statutory provisions should be harmonized 

and that, to that end, the same word or phrase should be given 

the same meaning within the interrelated provisions of the law.’ 

[Citation]”]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 132.)

Although ‘“[w]hen the occasion demands it, the same word may 

have different meanings to effectuate the intention of the act in 

which the word appears’” (People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 

462, 468), this occasion makes no such demand. It is not 

reasonable to suppose the Legislature used “watershed” in its 

standard, dictionary sense in one part of the Act and silently 

adopted a non-standard usage in another—particularly where 

alternatives were readily available.

Notwithstanding this textual evidence, Irvine Ranch 

contends the term “watershed” must be understood to refer to a 

“water system” in order to “fulfill the undisputed statutory 

purpose underlying the [basin equity assessment]—to discourage 

the overproduction of local groundwater supplies by encouraging 

the use of sources of water that are not part of the watershed’s 

drainage system that replenishes the Basin.” Even if a 

geographic reading of “watershed” results in a smaller set of 

“supplemental sources,” however, this does not necessarily mean 
21

there will not be enough water from the remaining supplemental 

sources to achieve the Basin-wide basin production percentage. 

In other words, there is no indication that Irvine Ranch’s 

proposed construction of “watershed” is the only construction that 

protects against over-production of groundwater from the Basin.11 

At a more fundamental level, Irvine Ranch’s statement of 

the Act’s purpose falsely suggests natural re-charge by the 

watershed’s drainage system is the sole means by which the 

Basin is replenished. Far from passively relying on natural recharge, however, the Basin is a heavily managed underground 

reservoir into which OCWD pumps a substantial amount of 

imported water. Counting recycled water as a supplemental 

source would permit Irvine Ranch to pump more groundwater 

while depriving OCWD of revenue needed to buy imported water 

to replenish the Basin (or else forcing other producers to shoulder 

those costs). (§ 40-31.5, subd. (b) [“The proceeds of the basin 

equity assessments imposed and collected shall be used to 

equalize the cost of water to all persons and operators within the 

district and to acquire water to replenish the groundwater 

supplies of the district”].)

Irvine Ranch’s further argument that a geographic 

understanding of “watershed” leads to absurd results also lacks 

merit. Although “we ‘will not give statutory language a literal 

meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences that the 

Legislature could not have intended,’” “troubling” consequences 

are not absurd. (In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 946, 948.) “To 

11 Irvine Ranch’s implied assertion that the Act should be 

amended to provide stronger incentives to the development and 

use of recycled water is properly addressed to the Legislature.
22

justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded 

statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the 

Legislature could not have intended them. [Citation.]” (Id. at 

948.) Here, Irvine Ranch contends that reading “watershed” in a 

geographic sense would permit a producer to pipe wastewater 

from within the watershed to a recycling facility outside the 

watershed and call it supplemental water. Nothing in our 

opinion today, however, decides whether transporting 

wastewater outside the watershed for treatment is sufficient to 

transmute it into supplemental source water. No absurd results 

follow from construing “sources of water outside the watershed” 

to exclude Irvine Ranch’s recycled water that is captured, treated, 

and produced within the watershed. 

2. History of statutory revisions

The Act’s unambiguous meaning governs in this case, and 

we have no need to consider legislative history as an additional 

aid to construction. (Kirzhner, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 972.) But even

if the statute were determined to be ambiguous in its use of 

“watershed,” a survey of past revisions to the statute 

overwhelmingly supports reading the term in a geographic sense, 

as we have done.

12

In 1991, the Legislature amended the definition of 

“supplemental sources” in section 40-31.5 to include “reclaimed 

water and sources of water outside the watershed of the Santa 

12 Finding ambiguity (where none exists) would also raise the 

question of whether OCWD’s understanding of supplemental 

sources would merit some deference. (See, e.g., McHugh v. 

Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227.) 
23

Ana River, excepting that portion of that watershed on and along 

Santiago Creek upstream of the downstream toe of the slope of 

the Villa Park Flood Control Dam, such as, but not limited to, 

water produced from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 

California.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 105, § 1, emphasis added.) Minutes 

of a 1991 meeting of OCWD’s Board of Directors reflect that it 

sought this amendment to incentivize producers to purchase 

recycled water processed at an OCWD facility at a rate higher 

than that charged for groundwater.13 

Significantly, the 1991 amendment did not list reclaimed 

water as another example of “sources of water outside the 

watershed of the Santa Ana River” alongside water purchased

from the Metropolitan Water District. Instead, reclaimed water 

was listed as a separate category of water. Thus, pursuant to the 

1991 amendment, reclaimed water’s status as a supplemental 

source did not rest on its being outside the watershed and 

Legislature evidently did not regard all wastewater as water 

outside the watershed. The 1991 amendment accordingly refutes

Irvine Ranch’s view that any water not draining into the Santa 

Ana River is outside the watershed.14 

13 At oral argument, counsel for Irvine Ranch conceded its 

recycled water was classified as a supplemental source while this 

amendment was in effect.

14 Irvine Ranch attempts to harmonize the 1991 amendment 

with its construction of “watershed” by arguing that because 

some treated wastewater is (or at least was) discharged into the 

Santa Ana River, the 1991 amendment had to list reclaimed 

water as a standalone category in order “to treat all reclaimed 

water as a [s]upplemental [s]ource.” This argument makes no 

practical sense. It would be impossible for OCWD to track a 

producer’s use of water entering the Basin in this manner and 
24

In 1995, the Legislature deleted the language added by the 

1991 amendment. (Stats. 1995, ch. 29, § 6.) The Legislature’s

reversion to the pre-1991 definition compels the inference that 

reclaimed water is no longer categorically supplemental source 

water. (Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 158, 170 [“When the Legislature alters statutory 

language, ‘as for example when it deletes express provisions of 

the prior version,’ the presumption is that it intended to change 

the law’s meaning”].) It is not reasonable to suppose the 

Legislature added a provision categorically identifying reclaimed 

water as a supplemental source and subsequently deleted that 

provision because it believed the pre-existing “outside the 

watershed” provision had the same effect.

Irvine Ranch nonetheless argues the significance of 1995 

amendment is unclear because the Legislature could have “use[d] 

words of exclusion . . . to effectuate an exclusion of all reclaimed 

water from the definition of [s]upplemental [s]ource . . . .” But 

this point is not relevant to the dispute before us. OCWD’s 

construction of the Act to exclude recycled water generated and 

treated within the watershed as a supplemental source does not 

imply that recycled water generated and/or treated outside the 

watershed is not water from a supplemental source.15 

credit it as water from a supplemental source. Wastewater that 

percolates into the Basin is just groundwater, and the 1991 

amendment was not structured to incentivize its production.

15 Irvine Ranch’s related contention that the Legislature did 

not signal any “intention to effectuate a major policy reversal” 

going “from an amendment (1991) including all recycled water in 

Section 31.5(c)(1) to an amendment excluding all recycled water” 

is misplaced for the same reason. Similarly, Irvine Ranch’s 
25

Because the history of revisions to section 40-31.5 only 

confirms what we have already concluded looking to the text of 

the statute, we hold the trial court correctly determined Irvine 

Ranch’s recycled water is not from a supplemental source.16

B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Irvine Ranch’s 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Golden 

State’s Cross-Complaint 

1. Legal framework

“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general 

demurrer, tests the allegations of the complaint or crosscomplaint, supplemented by any matter of which the trial court 

takes judicial notice, to determine whether [the] plaintiff or crossemphasis of excerpts from analyses of the 1995 amendment 

characterizing it as making “technical” changes to the Act does 

not diminish its significance because these same documents 

highlight the substantive impact on the definition of 

supplemental sources. For example, a Senate Rules Committee 

analysis includes a “[d]igest” indicating the 1995 amendment 

“make[s] technical changes to the [Act], as specified,” but goes on 

to explain that it would “[r]emove[ ] reclaimed water from the 

definition of supplemental sources.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 

Sen. Floor Analyses, Assem. Bill No. 1140 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.), 

as amended Apr. 17, 1995.) 

16 In a footnote near the end of its opening brief, Irvine Ranch 

asks us to reverse the trial court’s order striking certain evidence 

submitted with its reply brief. Irvine Ranch does not describe the 

evidence, discuss how it relates to the issues on appeal, or 

otherwise make any attempt to carry its burden to demonstrate 

how it was prejudiced by the purported error. The point is 

insufficiently presented and waived.
26

complainant has stated a cause of action. [Citation.] Because the 

trial court’s determination is made as a matter of law, we review 

the ruling de novo, assuming the truth of all material facts 

properly pled.’ [Citation.]” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 166.)

“‘Denial of leave to amend after granting a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ 

[Citation.]” (Brooklyn Restaurants, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd.

(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1043.) “An abuse of discretion 

occurs if ‘“there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be 

cured by amendment.”’ [Citations.]” (Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v. 

Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 24, 32.)

2. Golden State’s operative complaint did not 

assert claims unrelated to the 1933 judgment

As we have already mentioned, Golden State’s operative 

cross-complaint included a third cause of action for declaratory 

judgment and a fourth cause of action for injunctive relief. 

Golden State contends each cause of action addressed both Irvine 

Ranch’s purported water rights under the 1933 judgment and its 

own allegedly prior appropriative rights. We construe the 

allegations liberally (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 

Cal.5th 248, 272), but even so construed, these causes of action 

only concern Golden State’s rights in relation to Irvine Ranch’s 

abandoned claims under the 1933 judgment.

The third and fourth causes of action in Golden State’s 

cross-complaint incorporate preceding portions of the crosscomplaint by reference. In the first paragraph of the crosscomplaint, Golden State explains that it “seeks to constrain the 

rights of [Irvine Ranch] to take or export water from the Basin to 
27

the detriment of [Golden State] . . . as specifically set forth herein 

in accordance with the principles set forth by the California 

Supreme Court in Tulare Irrigation District v. LindsayStrathmore Irrigation District (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489 [(Tulare)] and 

its progeny.” Golden State emphasizes the complaint “does not 

contest or seek to declare the water rights of the [Other 

Producers] in this case or [OCWD], and should not be construed 

as a request for a general adjudication of water rights in the 

Basin or to quiet title thereto.” 

Golden State mentions its own water rights in paragraphs 

19 and 20 of the cross-complaint. It alleges it “has been 

continuously and without interruption pumping groundwater 

from the Basin and distributing the water for reasonable and 

beneficial use since well before 1933” and “[a]s between [Irvine 

Ranch] and [Golden State], the entirety of [Golden State’s] use 

has a priority date arising before 1933 based upon the doctrine of 

‘gradual development’ under its continuous and uninterrupted 

application of water to a public use.” In paragraphs 40 and 42, 

Golden State alleges Irvine Ranch’s “claimed right to 

groundwater in the Basin, whatever it may be, is junior in time 

and priority to [Golden State’s]” and California law “prevented 

any rights acquired by [Irvine Ranch], whatever they may be, 

from diminishing the pre-existing rights held by [Golden State].” 

In paragraph 45, Golden State alleges that “[e]ven if [Irvine 

Ranch] acquired water rights under the 1933 Judgment, [Golden 

State’s] rights in the Basin are paramount to any water rights 

[Irvine Ranch] acquired under the 1933 Judgment or otherwise 

relegated to a junior priority in favor of the intervening-public 

use of [Golden State] and other public water suppliers.” 
28

Golden State’s third cause of action for declaratory relief 

alleges “[a]n actual, present, and justiciable controversy now 

exists between the parties regarding substantial questions 

pertaining to the rights of the parties to groundwater underlying 

the Basin pursuant to the 1933 judgment.” (Emphasis added.) 

Golden State alleges Irvine Ranch has no rights under the 1933 

judgment and, even if it did, any “attempt to exercise those 

rights, or any other rights it may claim under applicable law, by 

using non-surplus water outside the Basin without offsetting 

such use by an equal amount of imported water constitutes an 

unlawful export.” Golden State next states in paragraph 55 of 

the cross-complaint that it “desires a judicial determination and 

declaration (1) as to the validity of its assertions set forth above 

as to [Irvine Ranch’s] rights exclusively under the 1933 

Judgment and (2) as to the validity of [Golden State’s] 

appropriative water rights to pump groundwater from the Basin.” 

The next paragraph indicates that “[i]f the Court finds that 

[Irvine Ranch] has acquired and maintained a right to pump and 

export groundwater from the Basin arising under the 1933 

Judgment, [Golden State] seeks a declaration that it is not bound 

by the 1933 Judgment and that the rights of [Golden State] are 

paramount to [Irvine Ranch’s] rights to take surplus water 

arising under the 1933 Judgment.” 

Golden State points to language in paragraph 55 (desiring 

a judicial declaration “as to the validity of [its] appropriative 

water rights to pump groundwater from the Basin”) as a request 

for a declaration of its rights independent of Irvine Ranch’s rights 

under the 1933 judgment. The conditional framing of the 

subsequent paragraph, however, makes clear that it sought a 

declaration of its rights only if the trial court determined Irvine 
29

Ranch had rights under the 1933 judgment. The prayer for relief 

is framed in the same manner.17

Golden State’s emphasis on its allegations that its water 

rights have priority over any rights claimed by Irvine Ranch—

based on the 1933 judgment or otherwise—does not indicate 

Golden State sought a more general declaration. Putting aside 

Irvine Ranch’s failed challenge to OCWD’s construction of the Act 

and its abandoned claim to rights under the 1933 judgment, 

there are no allegations that Irvine Ranch asserted any rights 

that would disrupt OCWD’s management of the Basin in 

accordance with the Act. Because the relative priority of the 

parties’ water rights does not matter under this regime and 

Golden State’s cross-complaint expressly disclaims any intent to 

alter this regime, the cross-complaint cannot be read to seek a 

declaration of Golden State’s rights except in relation to Irvine 

Ranch’s rights under the 1933 judgment.18

17 Paragraph three in the prayer for relief requests “[t]hat the 

Court declare and enter judgment determining that IRWD has no 

present valid right to pump and export groundwater from the 

Basin arising from the 1933 Judgment and that [Golden State] 

holds appropriative water rights to pump groundwater from the 

Basin and devoted that water to a public use[.]” Paragraph four 

requests “[i]f the Court finds that IRWD has acquired and 

maintained a right to pump and export groundwater from the 

Basin arising under the 1933 Judgment, that the Court declare 

and enter judgment that [Golden State’s] rights to produce 

groundwater from the Basin are paramount to any rights, 

whatever they may be, that IRWD may have to export 

groundwater from the Basin arising under the 1933 Judgment[.]” 

18 Golden State contends Irvine Ranch’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings was the wrong vehicle to “surgically target[ ] 
30

The fourth cause of action for injunctive relief also fails to 

state a cause of action in light of Irvine Ranch’s concession that it 

has no rights under the 1933 judgment. After reciting allegations 

that Irvine Ranch “claims the right to extract and export Basin 

water under the 1933 Judgment” and “unless restrained . . . , 

[Irvine Ranch] will export non-surplus water under the 1933 

Judgment,” the cross-complaint asserts “[Irvine Ranch] must be 

enjoined from extracting non-surplus water under a claim of 

water rights from the 1933 Judgment, or any other claim under 

applicable law, in a manner that causes harm to [Golden State] 

and the Basin.” Again, notwithstanding Golden State’s emphasis 

on its request concerning “any other claim under applicable law,” 

there are no allegations that Irvine Ranch asserted any other 

claim that would disrupt the status quo.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Golden State leave to file an amended 

cross-complaint

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave 

to amend where, in all probability, amendment would be futile. 

(Foroudi v. The Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 

1000.) Here, it does not appear Golden State can plead an actual 

parts of [its] [t]hird [c]ause of [a]ction as lacking merit.” Code of 

Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(2) provides that a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings may only address a cause 

of action in its entirety. Because the judgment disposes of all 

aspects of Golden State’s third cause of action—properly 

construed to address only Irvine Ranch’s claim of rights under 

the 1933 judgment—Golden State’s argument lacks merit. 
31

controversy supporting declaratory relief or related injunctive 

relief.19

Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 provides, in pertinent 

part, that “[a]ny person . . . who desires a declaration of his or her 

rights or duties with respect to another, . . . may, in cases of 

actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the 

respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in 

the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and 

duties . . . .” 

19 Golden State did not request leave to amend (for the fifth 

time) in the trial court. In its opening brief on appeal, Golden 

State suggests it “could have cured any deficiency in the form of 

[its] [w]ater [r]ights [c]laims by more clearly articulating them as 

standing separate and apart from IRWD’s claims to rights under 

the 1933 Judgment.” We assume solely for the sake of argument

that this request is sufficiently detailed to merit discussion. (See 

generally Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 

Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491 [“‘The plaintiff bears the burden of 

proving there is a reasonable possibility of amendment. 

[Citation.] . . . [¶] To satisfy that burden on appeal, a plaintiff 

“must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and 

how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.” 

[Citation.] The assertion of an abstract right to amend does not 

satisfy this burden. [Citation.] The plaintiff must clearly and 

specifically set forth the “applicable substantive law” [citation] 

and the legal basis for amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause 

of action and authority for it. Further, the plaintiff must set 

forth factual allegations that sufficiently state all required 

elements of that cause of action. [Citations.] Allegations must be 

factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary’”]; Rubenstein v. 

The Gap, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 870, 881 [“‘While such a 

showing can be made for the first time to the reviewing court 

[citation], it must be made’”].)
32

“‘“The ‘actual controversy’ language in Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1060 encompasses a probable future 

controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties. 

[Citation.]” [Citation.] It does not embrace controversies that are 

“conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to 

obtain an advisory opinion from the court.” [Citation.] Thus, 

while a party may seek declaratory judgment before an actual 

invasion of rights has occurred, it must still demonstrate that the 

controversy is justiciable. [Citation.] And to be justiciable, the 

controversy must be ripe.’ [Citation.] ‘“To determine whether an 

issue is ripe for review, we evaluate two questions: the fitness of 

the issue for judicial decision and the hardship that may result 

from withholding court consideration.”’ [Citation.] The twopronged test for ripeness has also been described as follows: ‘(1) 

whether the dispute is sufficiently concrete so that declaratory 

relief is appropriate; and (2) whether the parties will suffer 

hardship if judicial consideration is withheld.’ [Citation.]” 

(Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 418.) 

Golden State contends it is entitled to a declaration of its 

water rights relative to Irvine Ranch based on Irvine Ranch’s 

efforts “to alter OCWD’s management of the Basin and obtain a 

‘discrete and specific advantage in the apportionment of water’” 

through “each of the claims [Irvine Ranch] has pursued in this 

case—e.g., claims relating to the definition of ‘supplemental 

source’ in the . . . Act, the export of water from the Basin, and the 

1933 judgment . . . .” This legal maneuvering has not, however, 

resulted in any advantage to Irvine Ranch relative to other 

producers in the Basin. 

Golden State alternatively contends “the present shortage 

in the Basin” gives rise to an actual controversy because “if there 
33

is curtailment, as between [Irvine Ranch] and [Golden State], it 

should follow the common law rule of priority.” Golden State 

argues that, “[a]s the public water supplier for four communities 

in Orange County, [it] desires certainty as to the existence of its 

rights and their priority date under the law so that it may plan 

accordingly.”

Even if we assume the possibility of curtailment is more 

than conjecture, a declaration of Golden State’s rights relative to 

only one of the many other producers in the Basin does not 

realistically facilitate planning. Golden State’s alleged 

appropriative rights would be of no use—regardless of their 

priority relative to those of Irvine Ranch—if there is no surplus 

water in the Basin. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1241 [explaining that only surplus water 

is subject to appropriative rights].) A declaration of one party’s 

rights relative to another’s in a basin is appropriate in some 

instances. It is no substitute for a basin-wide adjudication, 

however, where the concern is a general shortage—and Golden 

State has made clear it is not seeking a basin-wide adjudication. 

In short, a general shortage of water in the Basin does not give 

rise to a concrete dispute between Golden State and Irvine 

Ranch, and withholding declaratory relief will not prejudice 

Golden State.

Golden State further contends an actual controversy 

necessarily exists where two parties claim groundwater rights in 

the same basin. That is not our view of the authorities on which 

Golden State relies. For example, Golden State characterizes

Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation 

District (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489 (Tulare) as establishing that “the 

courts have, since 1935, authorized a plaintiff water right holder 
34

to bring an action to protect its rights against continued use by 

the defendant.” In Tulare, however, our Supreme Court 

emphasized that a declaratory judgment concerning the current 

and prospective reasonable beneficial uses of a riparian 

landowner protects their rights “against [an] appropriative use 

ripening into a right by prescription . . . .” (Id. at 525.) That is 

not a risk here, as Golden State observes in its cross-complaint 

that California Civil Code section 1007 precludes Irvine Ranch 

from acquiring prescriptive rights at Golden State’s expense.20

Golden State’s reliance on Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 

Cal.2d 351 is misplaced for the same reason. (Id. at 374 [“the 

owner [of water rights] is entitled to a judgment declaring his 

preferential and paramount right and enjoining the assertion of 

an adverse use which might otherwise ripen into a prescriptive 

right”], emphasis added.)

Other authorities Golden State cites also fail to establish 

an actual controversy exists between Golden State and Irvine 

Ranch. The principle that the owner of water rights may 

“maintain an action to quiet title to [the rights] as against any 

adverse claimant or to protect [the rights] by obtaining 

20 Civil Code section 1007 provides that “[o]ccupancy for the 

period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to 

bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title 

thereto, denominated a title by prescription, which is sufficient 

against all, but no possession by any person, firm or corporation 

no matter how long continued of any land, water, water right, 

easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use 

by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any 

public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right 

against the owner thereof.”
35

declaratory or injunctive relief against unlawful infringement of 

it” (Orange County Water District v. City of Riverside (1959) 173 

Cal.App.2d 137, 159, emphasis added) does not aid Golden State 

because Golden State does not allege unlawful infringement of its 

rights by Irvine Ranch. Both Tehachapi-Cummings County 

Water District v. Armstrong (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 992 and City of 

Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266 involved basinwide (or nearly basin-wide) adjudications of water rights. 

(Tehachapi-Cummings, supra, at 995; City of Santa Maria, supra, 

at 276.)

Because there is no actual controversy warranting a 

declaration of Golden State’s rights relative to Irvine Ranch, 

there is likewise no threat of harm sufficient to warrant 

injunctive relief. (Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assn. v. City of 

Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305-306.) Golden State 

does not articulate how Irvine Ranch’s continued production of 

groundwater from the Basin will harm either Golden State or the 

Basin itself.
36

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. OCWD, East Orange County 

Water District, Yorba Linda Water District, Mesa Water District, 

Golden State, and the City of Anaheim are awarded costs on 

Irvine Ranch’s appeal. Irvine Ranch is awarded costs on Golden 

State’s cross-appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM, J.