1995 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-17-1995

W B v Matula

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-5033

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Recommended Citation

"W B v Matula" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 271.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/271
1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

No. 95-5033 

 

W.B., Parent of the Minor, E.J., on her 

own behalf and on behalf of her son, E.J., 

 Appellants

v. 

JOAN MATULA; MARY ANGELA ENGELHARDT; JUDY BEACH; 

CATHERINE BRENNAN; PATRICIA CERICOLA; DR. GARY DANIELSON; 

ANN PEARCE; KATHLEEN MAHONY; CAROL BURNS; 

FLORENCE NOCTOR; DR. JEFFREY OSOWSKI; NEW JERSEY STATE 

BOARD OF EDUCATION; WARREN COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF EDUCATION; MARY LOU VARLEY; MANSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION; 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY; DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OF 

SPECIAL EDUCATION; EMPLOYEES OF THE MANSFIELD TOWNSHIP 

BOARD OF EDUCATION 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil No. 93-3124) 

 

Argued August 22, 1995 

BEFORE: GREENBERG, COWEN, and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges 

(Filed October 17, l995) 

 

 Rebecca K. Spar (argued) 

 Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman 

 & Leonard, P.A. 

 25 Main Street, 4th Floor 

 Hackensack, NJ 07601 

 Attorney for Appellant

 David A. Wallace (argued) 
2 

 942 Route 517 

 P.O. Box 741 

 Hackettstown, NJ 07840 

 Attorney for Appellees

 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

 

SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 

 Plaintiff, on behalf of her disabled child, seeks damages 

for the persistent refusal of certain school officials to 

evaluate, classify and provide necessary educational services. 

The matter was dismissed by the district court on the grounds 

that a settlement of the administrative proceeding barred pursuit 

of the claims for damages. We conclude that the settlement 

agreement was not susceptible to summary disposition. Indeed, we 

question the propriety of demanding and receiving a release of 

such claims in exchange for providing services to which a 

disabled child is otherwise entitled. However, since the 

settlement agreement did not clearly waive such claims, we do not 

determine whether such a waiver would be against public policy. 

We do conclude that the agreement does not bar such claims as a 

matter of law, and therefore reverse and remand the matter for 

trial. 

 Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 504 

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act against school officials, alleging 

that the child was deprived of his right to a free, appropriate 
3 

public education, in violation of the U.S. and New Jersey 

Constitutions and federal and state statutes and regulations. 

Despite resistance by school officials and following extensive 

administrative proceedings, the mother ultimately succeeded in 

having her child evaluated, classified as neurologically impaired 

and provided with special education services. Plaintiffs then 

sued for compensatory and punitive damages incurred in the period 

before the school agreed to provide these services. The district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all 

claims predicated upon a settlement of the administrative 

proceeding. We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate 

in part. 

I. 

 Plaintiff W.B. and her minor child, plaintiff E.J., moved to 

Hackettstown, New Jersey during the summer of 1991. W.B.'s 

requests for special educational services for E.J., defendants' 

alleged resistance to these requests, and the damages arising 

from this alleged resistance, occurred while E.J. was in the 

first and second grades. We will recount these events in some 

detail. While some of the facts may be in dispute, most are not, 

and in any event, in view of the procedural posture of the case, 

we recite the facts from the viewpoint of the plaintiffs. 

 Before the start of school in the fall of 1991, W.B. met 

with defendant Joan Matula, principal of the Mansfield Township 

Elementary School ("the school"), to discuss her concerns about 

E.J.'s behavioral problems, including touching and hitting other 
4 

children. W.B. also completed forms at the school in which she 

stated that E.J. had received speech therapy. 

 E.J. entered the first grade in September 1991 and was 

placed in a class taught by defendant Mary Angela Engelhardt. 

Engelhardt soon reported that E.J. exhibited a variety of 

disruptive behaviors, including not paying attention in class, 

fighting with other students, failing to remain seated, making 

continuous noises and repeatedly touching other children. The 

teacher also observed that E.J. had difficulty beginning tasks, 

finishing those he did start and coloring within the lines. In 

addition, throughout the school year E.J. urinated and defecated 

in his pants. In October the school nurse, defendant Florence 

Noctor, told W.B. that other children were teasing E.J. because 

of his "bathrooming problem." Moreover, within the first few 

weeks of school, Engelhardt informed W.B. that E.J. might have 

Attention Deficit Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder ("ADHD"), a condition with which W.B. was unfamiliar. 

 In October, W.B. met with Engelhardt and defendant Carol 

Burns, Chief School Administrator and the person responsible for 

compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. and § 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act ("§ 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794. The group 

discussed E.J.'s behavioral and academic problems, but no 

defendant referred E.J. for an evaluation or special education 

services, nor did anyone inform W.B. of E.J.'s possible 

entitlement to such services. The same month E.J. began to see 

Dr. Lee Monday, a private therapist. 
5 

 After reading about ADHD later in the fall, W.B. raised it 

to Dr. Monday, who then diagnosed E.J. as having ADHD. W.B. also 

spoke with Matula and Engelhardt and sent them literature about 

the disorder. In December W.B. wrote them explaining that she 

believed E.J.'s behavioral and academic problems were 

attributable to ADHD and specifically requested that E.J. be 

permitted to spend additional time with the school's Resource 

Team. 

 The first actual dispute between the parties concerned 

evaluation. W.B. asked the school to refer E.J. to the Mansfield 

Child Study Team ("CST") for evaluation;1 the school refused, but 

finally agreed after W.B. persuaded Matula, Engelhardt, Burns, 

and Catherine Brennan, director of the CST,2 to meet in February 

1992 with her, Dr. Monday, and a social worker whom Brennan had 

agreed to let observe E.J. in the classroom. Brennan had 

believed that ADHD did not qualify a child for special services 

under IDEA or §504, but when W.B. showed her a memorandum from 

the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services to the contrary, Brennan relented and approved the 

CST evaluation. 

 

1

Among other duties, each CST in New Jersey is charged with the 

responsibility of identifying and diagnosing children needing 

special education services, developing public school programs for 

disabled children, and referring disabled children for 

residential, medical, or psychological treatment. N.J.S.A § 

18A:46-5. 

2

The duties of a CST supervisor "shall include the coordination 

of the special education services in the county." N.J.S.A. 

§18A:46-3. 
6 

 In April 1992, the CST determined that E.J. had ADHD and was 

eligible for § 504 services. However, because E.J.'s academic 

performance was at or above grade level, the CST concluded he was 

not classifiable under IDEA and therefore not eligible for those 

services offered under IDEA but not the Rehabilitation Act. The 

CST concluded: 

 [E.J.] has developed academic skills in the areas 

of reading, mathematics and written language that are 

at or above his current grade placement. He is, 

therefore, not eligible for special education services 

. . . . However, the comprehensive Child Study Team 

evaluation does identify the presence of [ADHD] . . . . 

For this reason, [E.J.] is considered to be a 

handicapped person under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 

Appendix ("App.") at 98. Though one examining physician on the 

CST recommended a speech evaluation, audiometry, and 

tympanometry, these suggestions were not included in the CST 

report. 

 Despite the CST finding that E.J. suffered from ADHD and was 

thus entitled to § 504 services, defendants did not begin 

providing them. Concerned that the CST evaluation had not fully 

assessed E.J., W.B. asked defendants to fund an independent 

evaluation. Defendants refused. 

 In June 1992, W.B. initiated her first IDEA administrative 

proceeding before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law 

("OAL"), seeking an independent evaluation of E.J., his 

classification as neurologically impaired (a status which would 

render him eligible for IDEA services), development of an 

Individual Education Plan ("IEP"), and costs and fees. We will 

refer to this proceeding as "E.J. I." In July 1992, on the date 
7 

of the E.J. I hearing, respondent Mansfield Board of Education 

("the Board" or "Mansfield") signed a consent order agreeing to 

an independent evaluation and adjourning the hearing on the 

balance of W.B.'s petition. 

 The independent evaluation took place soon thereafter. 

According to ALJ McGill, who heard the first and all subsequent 

petitions between W.B. and the Board, the evaluation 

was very significant because the determination was made 

for the first time that E.J. had Tourette's syndrome 

and a severe form of obsessive-compulsive disorder in 

addition to ADHD. Thus, W.B. was substantially correct 

in her belief that the evaluation by the Mansfield CST 

did not properly identify E.J.'s problems. 

E.J. v. Mansfield, OAL Dkt Nos. EDS 11659-93/11798-93, Sept. 1, 

1994 ("E.J. IV"), at 49. 

 In September 1992 E.J. entered the second grade, joining a 

class taught by defendant Judy Beach, but his problems continued. 

Defendants were still not providing § 504 services. 

 As to classification, despite the findings of the 

independent evaluation, in November the CST concluded that E.J. 

was perceptually impaired but not neurologically impaired. The 

distinction is important, because the former classification would 

result in a lower level of IDEA services for E.J. than the 

latter. W.B. attempted to persuade the school to reclassify her 

son as neurologically impaired, and in December 1992, Mansfield 

cross-petitioned to have E.J. classified as perceptually 

impaired.3

 

3

W.B. filed three other petitions in January and February 1993, 

seeking to have Mansfield provide her with (1) a written daily 

log of E.J.'s behavior problems, (2) independent speech, 

occupational therapy, and educational evaluations, and (3) 
8 

 In April 1993, after nearly ten days of hearings, W.B. and 

the Board entered into a settlement stipulating that, as W.B. had 

sought, E.J. would be classified as neurologically impaired. The 

stipulation also incorporated a thirty-page IEP that extended 

through the 1993-94 school year and provided for $14,000 for W.B. 

for attorneys fees and costs. ALJ McGill approved the 

settlement, E.J. v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. Nos. 

5192-92/10038-92, April 12, 1993 ("E.J. I"), and later observed 

that "the settlement was consistent with the overwhelming weight 

of the evidence . . . . [I]t would appear that W.B. was 

substantially correct on the question of classification." E.J. 

IV at 49-50. E.J. had nearly completed second grade. 

 

mediation to resolve her request that the Board fund E.J.'s 

private psychotherapy. Eventually W.B. prevailed in these 

requests too. See discussion of E.J. IV, infra. 
9 

 More administrative proceedings followed,4 culminating in a 

final round of petitions filed in November and December 1993. 

These too were consolidated and referred to ALJ McGill, who held 

hearings for twenty-seven days, and on September 1, 1994 issued a 

fifty-four page opinion ordering the Board to (1) place E.J. in a 

private school at the Board's expense; (2) pay prospectively for 

E.J.'s sessions with the private therapist, Dr. Monday; (3) 

reimburse W.B. for the cost of an independent learning disability 

evaluation of E.J. which the Board had refused to provide; and 

(4) provide a supplemental occupational therapy evaluation. E.J. 

IV at 54. The ALJ McGill's final paragraph is instructive: 

 This decision would not be complete without a 

comment on Mansfield's seemingly endless attacks on the 

parent, W.B. Evidently, Mansfield believes not only 

that W.B. is overly persistent, but also that she is 

 

4

 Shortly after the E.J. I settlement, W.B. requested a few 

modifications to the IEP and then that E.J. be placed in a 

private school because the Board was unable to provide the free 

appropriate education to which E.J. was entitled. The Board 

refused, two petitions followed, and they were consolidated 

before ALJ McGill. At the hearing, W.B. withdrew her request for 

private placement. The Board asked that the withdrawal be with 

prejudice or conditions, but ALJ McGill granted it without 

prejudice. E.J. v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. Nos. 

EDS 6199-93/6302-93, August 6, 1993 ("E.J. II") at 9. In August 

1993, the ALJ found further that there had been no change of 

circumstances since implementation of the IEP and dismissed 

W.B.'s petition to modify it. Id. at 5, 8. 

 Before the decision in E.J. II was rendered, W.B. filed 

another petition alleging changed circumstances that necessitated 

E.J.'s placement in a private school. This petition was referred 

to ALJ McGill, and on September 1, 1993 he denied it, reasoning 

that no changed circumstances warranted amending the IEP. E.J. 

v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. No. EDS 7538-93 

(September 1, 1993) ("E.J. III"). W.B. appealed E.J. III to the 

district court in an action which was consolidated with the 

instant damages action. W.B. and the Board eventually entered 

into a stipulation of dismissal regarding the E.J. III claims. 

See note 8, infra. 
10 

trying to wear down the district to obtain services to 

which E.J. is not entitled. In my view, however, W.B. 

was essentially correct about the major points in 

dispute in these proceedings including evaluation, 

classification and placement. Nonetheless, the 

district has consistently denied W.B.'s reasonable, 

appropriate, and meritorious requests related to E.J.'s 

education. The basic dynamic of this entire dispute is 

that the district has denied W.B.'s meritorious 

requests and W.B. has been left with no alternative to 

an enormously burdensome struggle in order to obtain 

E.J.'s rights under IDEA. In my view, the burden 

placed on W.B. was unnecessary, unwarranted and largely 

the product of the district's unwillingness to 

recognize and appreciate E.J.'s neurological 

impairments despite ample reliable evidence thereof. 

E.J. IV at 54. According to plaintiffs, Mansfield has appealed 

E.J. IV to the district court. 

 The instant action

 W.B. commenced this proceeding in July 1993, several months 

after the Board settled E.J. I by classifying E.J. as 

neurologically impaired and approving an IEP. The complaint 

alleged causes of action directly under § 504; causes pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of procedural due process, the 

equal protection clause, and rights secured by IDEA, its 

regulations, § 504, and state statutes; causes pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1985; and causes directly under the New Jersey 

Constitution and statutes. W.B. sought compensatory and punitive 

damages for defendants' failure to provide E.J. a free, 

appropriate public education. 

 The district court consolidated the action with W.B.'s 

appeal of E.J. III. After the parties consented or stipulated to 

the dismissal of a number of defendants, those remaining in the 

case were Matula, the principal; Engelhardt, E.J.'s first grade 
11 

teacher; Beach, his second grade teacher; Brennan, director of 

the CST; Burns, the school administrator; and Noctor, the school 

nurse, as well as Dr. Gary Danielson, the school psychologist and 

a member of the CST; Patricia Cericola, a speech and language 

therapist and member of the CST; and Ann Pearce, a 

learn_!ÁÁhh#ÁÁÀÀ(ÁÁ-ÁÁpp2ÁÃÃÄÄÐÐÁÁÁ``ÁÁ ̧ ̧ÁÁÁÁhh#ÁÁÀÀ(ÁÁ-ÁÁpp2Á