No. 3--00--0749

	_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	THIRD DISTRICT

	A.D., 2001

In re STEFFANIE L. ADAMS,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

n/k/a Steffanie L. Chan,		)	for the 14th Judicial Circuit,

	Petitioner-Appellee,	)	Rock Island County, Illinois

						)

	and					)	No. 99--F--48

						)

RICARDO SANCHEZ,			)	Honorable

	Respondent-Appellant.					) 	Joseph F. Beatty,

	Respondent-Appellant.					)	Judge, Presiding

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	JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:

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	In this case joint custody was established under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1998)) with physical custody given to the petitioner, Steffanie

Adams, and visitation every other weekend with the respondent,

Ricardo Sanchez.  Steffanie filed a petition to relocate and,

later, a petition for modification of the visitation order.   The

trial court held that Steffanie had an "absolute right to relocate"

and ordered the parties to mediate the visitation schedule.  We hold that the Parentage Act does not give courts the power to

enjoin a parent with joint custody from removing her child from the

state.  Additionally, we hold that Ricardo did not preserve his

right to appeal the agreed visitation schedule.  Accordingly, we

affirm.

FACTS

	Steffanie gave birth to Brandon on January 13, 1995. 

Approximately four years later, Ricardo was identified as the

putative father, and the parties entered into a joint custody

agreement that was made formal in an agreed order.  The agreement

gave Steffanie physical custody of Brandon and gave Ricardo

visitation every other weekend, one evening each week, and certain

holidays.  	

	In May of 2000, Steffanie filed a petition to relocate, which

stated that she had recently married and intended to reside with

her new husband in California.  The petition also stated that

Steffanie received a job offer in California and that moving would

greatly enhance Brandon’s life.  In response, Ricardo filed a

motion to dismiss and a subsequent petition that requested leave to

file a petition to modify custody pursuant to section 610(a) of the

Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act)

(750 ILCS 5/610(a) (West 1998)).  

	In his petition, Ricardo claimed that Steffanie met her

current husband over the Internet and married him shortly

afterwards, even though they met in person only two times and spent

no more than four total days together prior to marriage.  Ricardo

also claimed that although Steffanie continued to abide by the

visitation schedule set forth in the agreed order, she refused to make any adjustments to facilitate "a proper joint parenting

relationship."  Based on these factors, Ricardo argued that

Brandon’s living environment was a danger to his mental, moral, and

emotional health.  Ricardo’s petition was later dismissed by the trial court, and no appeal was taken regarding that dismissal.

	On July 11, 2000, the First District Appellate Court published In re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 476, 732 N.E.2d 11 (2000).  Several weeks later, Steffanie filed a second petition to relocate based on Melton, requesting a modification of visitation.  Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Steffanie had "an absolute right to relocate" based on the decision in Melton and that Steffanie’s motion to relocate was moot.  The court issued an order stating that the parties were required to mediate the visitation issue and that "until all issues

remaining in this case are heard, there are no final and appealable

orders in this case."  The order also stated that, if mediation was

unsuccessful, the court would conduct a hearing regarding the

visitation issues.

	 In lieu of mediation, the parties entered into an agreement for a new visitation schedule, and they presented their agreement

to the court on that same day.  The court issued a supplemental

order, approving the agreement and negating the parties’ obligation

to mediate.  The order stated that Ricardo was reserving his right

to appeal the court’s decision with respect to Melton, that his concession to the visitation schedule was based solely on the

court’s ruling that day, and that the agreement was not a

concession or agreement regarding the issues of removal, relocation, or custody.  The order also stated that it was a full

and final decision of the court, subject to the right of an

immediate appeal regarding the applicability of Melton.  Ricardo filed a notice of appeal three weeks later.

ANALYSIS

	The first issue in this case is whether the court erred when

it dismissed Steffanie’s petition to relocate as moot pursuant to Melton.  This court reviews issues of law de novo. The Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 702 N.E.2d 563 (1998).

	Relying on Melton, the trial court dismissed Steffanie’s petition to remove because it believed that she had "an absolute

right to relocate" Brandon to California.  Ricardo contends that

the trial court erred and.  Ricardo suggests instead that Melton is inapplicable to this case because the parties in Melton did not have joint custody.  Because the parties here have joint custody of Brandon, Ricardo

asserts that section 16 of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/16 (West

2000)) requires that the court apply the "relevant standards" set forth in section 610 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/610 (West

2000)), which relates to modifications of joint custody

arrangements.

	In Melton, the appellate court determined that the trial court lacked the power under the Parentage Act to enjoin a mother from removing her child from the state. Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 732 N.E.2d at 14.  The court also determined, however, that if the

proposed move would result in the mother’s noncompliance with the

visitation schedule, she had to first seek permission from the

court to modify the visitation order. Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 732 N.E.2d at 14.

	We find the reasoning in Melton persuasive.  Although the Parentage Act has adopted some of the provisions of the Marriage

Act, it does not incorporate the entire Marriage Act and does not

confer the same broad powers on the court. See Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 478, 732 N.E.2d at 13.  The court has no inherent powers in parentage cases, and the court’s authority to hear parentage

cases is limited to the exercise of those powers that are expressly

given to ithem by the statute.  See In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982).  Because the Parentage Act does not

expressly give the courts the power to enjoin a parent, even with joint custody, from removing the child from the state, we affirm.  Steffanie’s petition to relocate is moot because the trial court

lacks the power under the Parentage Act to enjoin Steffanie from

removing Brandon from Illinois. out of state.

	But we take issue with the trial court’s suggestion that Steffanie had "an absolute right to relocate" with Brandon because

she, like the mother in Melton, had to first seek permission to modify the visitation schedule if she could not comply with it

after the move.  Because Steffanie sought to relocate to California, it is safe to assume she could not comply with the

weekly visitation schedule, and she  InSteffanie, in in fact, filed a petition to modify visitation.  Therefore, we now consider whether the trial court should have conducted a best interests hearing on Steffanie’s

petition. before allowing Steffanie to relocate with Brandon out of

state as Ricardo asserts. 

	Section 16 of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/16 (West 2000)) provides that the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify an

order for visitation included in a judgment entered under the

Parentage Act. 

 	According to the record, Steffanie properly filed a motion requesting a modification of the visitation schedule based on the

decision in Melton.  After a hearing, the court ordered the parties to mediate the visitation issue.  In its order, the court stated

that it would conduct a best interests hearing if the parties could not reach an agreement.  Rather than mediate, the parties consented

to a new visitation schedule and presented their agreement to the

court.  The court issued a supplemental order approving the

agreement.

	Although Ricardo requests this court to remand this case to

the trial court with orders to conduct a best interests hearing,

the parties agreed to a revised visitation schedule and that

agreement was set forth in an order of the court.  Because the order was a recital of the parties’ agreement and was not a

judicial determination of the rights of the parties, the order is

not appealable.  See English v. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d 736, 393 N.E.2d 18 (1979) (determining that a consent order signed by the

parties in a divorce action was not subject to appeal); Jackson v. Ferolo, 4 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 283 N.E.2d 247 (1972) (determining that a party cannot complain of a judgment, decree, or order to

which he has consented).  Accordingly, Ricardo’s attempt to preserve his right to appeal subject to the applicability of Melton fails.

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	Homer, HOMER, P.J., and McDADE, J., concur.P.m.