MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 201 4 ME 46 Docket: Was

- 13

- 42 Argued : November 19, 2013 Decided: March 20 , 2014
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J. , and ALEXANDER , LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR , JJ.

JOHN S. ZABLOTNY

v. STATE BOARD OF NURSING JABAR , J. [¶1] John S. Zablotny appeals from a judgment of the District Court ( Machias, Romei, J. ) affirming the State Board of Nursing’s (Board) decision to
revoke his professional nursing license for two years

. On appeal, Zablotny ’s primary contention is that the court erred in the manner in which it undertook , in
accordance with 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) (2013) , a “de novo judicial review” of the
Board’s decision because it (1) deferred to the Board’s factual findings and (2) d enied the parties the opportunity to re - present evidence that had previously
been submitted to the Board. Because w e agree with Zablotny that the court erred
in its interpretation and application of “de novo judicial review , ” we vacate the judgment and remand for f urther proceedings consistent with th is opinion. 1

1 In addition to Zablotny’s primary contention, he raises several additional arguments on appeal that he asserts requires vacating the trial court’s judgment. Because we agree with his primary contention and vacate on that ground, we do not address the merits of Zablotny’s remainin g arguments.2
I. BACKGROUND [¶2 ] The record contains the followin g facts supporting the Board’ s findings. See Zegel v. Bd. of Soc. Worker Licensure , 2004 ME 31, ¶ 2,
843 A.2d 18

. John Zablotny was employed as a registered nurse at the Down East Community Hospital in Machias

. On December 27, 200 7 , a sixty

- one - year - old patient was taken by ambulance to that hospital, where he was admitted to its emergency room complaining of severe abdom inal pain. Over the next five days, the patient was given regular doses of several different medications to try to alleviate his pain. Despite efforts to diagnose his condition and alleviate his pain , the patient’s pain persisted and h is physical condition worsened

. [¶3 ] On January 1, 200 8 , a snowstorm hit the region , becoming gradually

worse as the day progressed

. That morning, the patient was in severe pain and expressed to his attending nurses that he w ould “rather die ” than live

. Throughout the day , the patient beca me increasingly agitated and repeatedly rang hospital staff
for additional pain medication. Later that afternoon, t he patient expressed his
desire to be discharged against medical advice, but hospital staff ultimately
dissuaded him from doing so. [¶4 ] That evening, a t about 7:00 p.m. , Zablotny bega n his shift as nurse supervisor

. As nurse supervisor, Zablotny was charged with overseeing the overall operation of the nursing staff and attending to his own nursing duties. At the3 beginning of his shift, Z ablotny met with the daytime supervisor , who informed him of the patient’s deteriorating condition and increasing dependency o n pain
medication

. Because the patient’s family had gone home for the day, the daytime supervisor urged Zablotny to continue discourag ing the patient from leaving if he requested a discharge

. [¶5 ] At about 8:00 p.m. , Zablotny was informed by another nurse that the patient wanted to be discharge d . After notifying the patient’s physician of his request to leave , Zablot ny met wi th the patient . Following Zablotny’s conversation with the patient, the patient signed the forms necessary to be discharged against
medical advice. About twenty minutes later, Zablotny walked the patient to the
clerk’s desk and pointed him towards the exit

. The patient then departed
unescorted into blizzard

- like conditions with out any confirmed transportation

. The next day , the police found the patient’s body less than 500 feet from the hospital ’s

entrance

. Shortly thereafter, the ho spital terminated Zablotny’s employment. [¶6 ] In February 2009, the patient ’s sister filed a complaint against Zablotny
with the Board

. Pursuant to its authority under 10 M.R.S. § 8003

- A (2013) and
32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A) (2013) , the Board initiated an investigation. About a year later , the Board informed Zablotny that it would be conducting an adjudicatory hearin g to determine if grounds existed for disciplinary actio n against
his license. See 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) & 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(D) (2013).4 [¶7 ] In April and May 2010, the Board conducted a t wo - day disciplinary hearing. During the hearing, seventeen witnesses , including members of the hospital staff, law enforcement personnel, and Zablotny, testified as to the events that transpired. I n June 2010 , the Board issued its decision , finding that Zablotny
violated several statut es and Board rules. As a result of these violations , t he Board
revoked Zablotny’s professional nursing license for two years, fined him $1,500,
and ordered him to pay p art of the costs of the disciplinary hearing. See 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5)(A

- 1)(2

- A)

- (4)

. [¶8 ] Following the Board’s action, Zablotny file d, pursuant to 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) , a petition for de novo judicial review in the District Court

. Zablotny’s petition urged the court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, during which the District Court would not be required to give deference to the Board’s findings of
fact. In combination with his petition, Zablotny filed a motion for additional
evidence . I n the motion, Zablotny requested that the court re hear “all of the
witnesses who testified before the Board ” so that it could independently weigh the
evidence and make its own credibility determinations during its de novo review. [¶9 ] At the court’s request, the parties extensively briefed what they
considered to be the court’s duties in performing “de novo judicial review ” pursuant to section 8003(5). In May 2011, the court agreed with Zablotny’s interpretation, ruling that it was “o f the view that de novo means de novo,5 essentially , ” and therefore concluded that it would be required to conduct a
“de novo hearing.” However, a fter the Board moved the court to reconsider it s ruling , the court retracted its initial decision and in doing so determined that
“de novo judicial review” precluded it from substitut ing its judgment for the
Board ’s on questions of fact

. T he court concluded that , as a result, it would not rehear the evidence presented to the Board but would instead b ase its review “solely upon the [agency] record filed with the Court

. ” [¶1 0 ] In January 2013, the court , after finding “ competent evidence to support the Board’s findings,” entered a judgment affirming t he Board’s decision to revoke Zablotny’s license

. The court concluded that “the violations found by the Board warranted a revocation of [Zablotny’s] nursing license. ” After judgment was entered, Zablotny timely filed t his appeal. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).
II. DISCUSSION [¶1 1 ] This case requires us to interpret the meaning of the phrase “de novo judicia l review ” as used in 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5). Before doing so, we address two related, but seemingly contradictory, statutes setting forth the procedural requirements necessary for the Board to revoke a nurse’s professional license : 10 M.R.S. § 8 003(5) and 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E ) (201 3 )

. We take this opportunity to clarify the relationship between the revocation proceedings pursuant to 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5), which apply generally to professional licensing boards,6 and the proceedings described in 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E), which apply specif ica lly to the nursing profession.
A. Procedures Available to Revoke Professional License s [¶1 2 ] There are two statutes that the Board of Nursing could use to take disciplinary action against its licensees, namely 10 M.R.S. § 8003 (5) and 32 M.R.S § 2105

- A. T itle 10 M.R.S. § § 8001

- 80 11 (201 3 ) governs the regulation of professional licensing in general, and specifically includes within its reach the Board of Nursing. See 10 M.R.S. § 8001

- A(5)

. Title 10 grants professional boards certain enumerated power s , including the power to suspend and revoke the licenses
of its members

. Id. § 8003(5)(A

- 1) (2), (2

- A). Th e power to revoke licenses under

s ection 8003(5) is not without limitations and can “be precluded by language of
denial” in a board’s more individualiz ed governing statute. Id. § 8003(5).
Nonetheless , when a board has the power to revoke its members’ licenses and chooses to do so, s ection 8003(5) requires that such decision s be “ subject to . . .
de novo judicial review exclusively in [the] District Court. ” Id. The meaning of this provision is the issue before us. [¶1 3 ] Similar to s ection 8003(5) , the Board’s own governing statute provides the Board with the ability to revoke its members’ licenses. 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E). However, u nlike Title 10, Title 32 states that the Board must “file a complaint in the District Court” if the Board concludes that suspension or7 revocation of a license is warranted. Id. ; s ee also M.R. Civ. P. 80G

. Once a complaint has been filed, Title 32 provide s that the p rocedures set forth in
4 M.R.S. § 184 (201 3 ) will govern. 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E). According to

s ection 184, licensees are afforded the opportunity to have a hearing , to call witnesses, and to present evidence to the District Court

. See also M.R.
Civ. P. 80G (d) (providing that trial s involving the revocation of a professional
license are governed by the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure ). [¶1 4 ] At first blush, the procedures for revocation proceedings pursuant to

s ection 8003(5) of Title 10 and s ection 2105

- A of Title 32 appear to be
inconsistent

. One provision affords the Board t he authority to revoke licenses,
which is then subject to “de novo judicial review,” see 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5), while
the other requires the Board to file a complaint in the District Court , see 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E). We faced an almost identical issue with respect to s ection 8003(5) and the Board of Licens ur e in Medicine ’s governing statute in Michalowski v. Board of Licensure in Medicine , 2012 ME 134, ¶ ¶ 1 2

- 25 , 58 A.3d 1074

. In Michalowski , we concluded that the overlapping statutes provide d the Board of Licensure in Medicine with two “co mpl ementary,”

non conflicting methods by which it could revoke its members’ license s
. Id. ¶ 2 5

. These “alternative paths , ” we described , allowed th at board to proceed either by ( 1) “ undertaking its own administrati ve revocation proceeding pursuant to8
T itle 10 , ” or ( 2) “by filing a petition in the District Court seeking a judicial revocation pursuant to Title 32.” 2 Id

. [¶1 5 ] The same principle applies to the Board of Nursing ’s authority to
revoke its members’ licenses

. Although the language contained in Title 32 affirmatively directs the Board to file a complaint in the District Court, it follows the phrase stating , “the board . . . may take any of the following actions . . . .”
32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A) (emphasis added). This language does not expressly deny or reject the authority conferred on the Board by 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5). As a
result , and consistent with our holding in Michalowski , the two provisions provide
the Board with “complementary” and “alternative paths” in revoking its member s’
license s
. 2012 ME 134, ¶ 25, 58 A.3d 1074. [¶1 6 ] The se alternative paths allow professional boards , including the Board of Nursing, to decide which approach is appropriate depending on the
circumstances. See id. ¶ 19. I f , after its initial investigation, the Board is uncertain

2 Since our decision in Michalowski v. Board of Licensure in Medicine , 2012 ME 134 , 58 A.3d 1074, the Legislature has amended the Board of Licensure in Medicine’s governing statute. See P.L. 2013, ch. 355, §§ 8

- 12 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (c odified at 32 M.R.S. § 3282

- A (2013)). In doing so, the Legislature repealed the requirement that the Board of Licensure in Medicine file a complaint in the District Court upon a finding that a suspension or revocation was warranted. Id. § 8; see Michalo wski , 2012 ME 134, ¶ 15, 58 A.3d 1074 (providing now superseded language of statute). As a result, the Board of Licensure in Medicine has only one path now to revoke its members’ licenses, which is provided by 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5)(A

- 1)(2

- A) (2013). Despit e this change, b ecause the Legislature has not similarly repealed the Board of Nursing’s obligations to file a complaint in the District Court, see 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E) (2013), we still consider our interpretation of the interplay between Title 10 an d Title 32 that we undertook in Michalowski to be controlling in this case. 2012 ME 134, ¶ 25, 58 A.3d 1074.9 as to what , if any, sanction to impose, it may choose to hold its own administrative disciplinary hearing, and, upon hearing the evidence presented, decide which disciplinary action is warranted. See i d. ; s ee also 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5). Alternatively, if the Board believes after its initial investigation that a licensee’s

co nduct rises to a level that is undoubtedly worthy of license revocation, t he Board
may file a complaint directly in the District Court

. See Michalowski , 2012 ME 134, ¶ 19, 58 A.3d 1074 ; see also 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A(1

- A)(E). As we explain below, if the Board chooses to proceed with an administrative disciplinary hearing, the licensee maintains the right to a hearing in the District Court if the
Board chooses revocation as a sanction. See 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5).
B. De Novo Judicia l Review [¶1 7 ] We are asked to interpret the meaning of “de novo judicial review ” in 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5). “ We review the court’s interpretation of [ a statute ] de novo by first examining the plain meaning of the statute

. . . to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. ” Baker v. Farrand , 2011 ME 91, ¶ 21, 26 A.3d 806

. As a general rule , “words and phrases that are not expressly defined in a statute must be given their plain and natural meaning and should be construed according to their natural imp ort in common and approved usage. ” Searle v. Town of Bucksport , 2010 ME 89, ¶ 8, 3 A.3d 390 (quotation marks omitted). Even in a plain

- language reading of a statute, we will “ consider the provision at issue in light of the en tire10 relevant statutory schem e, ” Adoption of Tobia s D. , 2012 ME 45, ¶ 15,
40 A.3d 990 , to interpret it in a manner to “ avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent
results ,” S earle , 2010 ME 89, ¶ 8, 3 A.3d 390 (quotation marks omitted)

. [¶1 8 ] The use of interpre tive aids is necessary when the plain language of the statute is ambiguous. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords , 2009 ME 29, ¶ 12,
96 7 A.2d 690 ; Michalowski , 2012 ME 134, ¶ 24 n.6, 58 A.3d 1074. Statutory language is considered ambiguous if it is “reasonably susceptible [to] different interpretations. ” Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hospitality, LLC , 2007 ME 17, ¶ 17,
914 A.2d 1116 (quotation marks omitted). Only then may we “look beyond the
words of the statute to its history [and] the policy behind it.” Lewiston Rac eway, Inc. v. Me. State Harness Racing Comm’n , 593 A.2d 663, 665 (Me. 1991).
1. Plain Language [¶1 9 ] Title 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) provides in relevant part , Any nonconsensual disciplinary action taken under authority of this subsection may be i mposed only after a hearing conforming to the requirements of Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 4, 3 and, except for revocation actions, is subject to judicial review exclusively in the Superior Court in accordance with Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 7

. 4

3 See 5 M.R.S. §§ 9051

- 9064 (2013) (adjudicatory hearing provisions of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act).

4 See 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001

- 11008 ( 2013) (judicial review provisions of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act).11 Any nonconsensual revocation of an occupational or professional license taken under authority of this subsection is subject to, upon appeal with in the time frames provided in Title 5, section 11002, subsection 3, 5 de novo judicial review exclusively in Dis trict Court

. Rules adopted to govern judicial appeals from agency action apply to cases brought under this section. (Emphasis added.) [¶20 ] As evidence d by the plain language of s ection 8003(5), the Legislature distinguishes revocations of profes sional licenses from all other disciplinary actions in three ways. First, the District Court, rather than the Superior Court, has jurisdiction to review the B oard’s revocation decision. See id .; Michalowski , 2012 ME 134, ¶¶ 26

- 27 , 58 A.3d 1074

. Second, although all “nonconsensual disciplinary action [ s ] ” are “subject to judicial review ,” only
revocations of professional license s are “subject t o . . . de novo judicial review .” 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) (emphasis added )

. Third, although “judicial review” of

non consensual disciplinary actions other than revocations must be conducted “in accordance with Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 7,” section 8003(5) provides that an appeal subject to de novo judicial review need only comply with Title 5 ’s

5 Title 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3) (2013) provides:
3. Petition filed. The petition for review shall be filed within 30 days after receipt of notice if taken by a party to the proceeding of which review is sought. Any other person aggrieved shall have 40 days from the date the decision was rendered to petition for review. If the review sought is from an agency’s failure or refusal to act, the petition for review shall be filed within 6 months of the expiration of the time within which the action should reasonably have occurred.12 requirement that the appeal be filed “within the time frames provided in [5 M.R.S. § 11002(3)]

. ” 6 [¶ 2 1] At the outset, it is clear from the pl ain language of s ection 8003(5)
that the Legislature intended for “judicial review” to be based on the record previously pres ented to the agency for all disciplinary actions other than
revocations. Specifically, section 8003(5) provides that, in undertaking “judicial review,” the Superior Court will be governed by the procedures set forth in the judicial review provisions of th e Main e Administrative Procedure Act

. See
5 M.R.S. §§ 11001

- 11008 (2013). Accordingly, like most agency appeals, the Superior Court generally limits its review to the agency record ; defers to the agency’s findings of fact; and either aff irm s , remand s , reverse s , or modif ies the

6 The last sentence of 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) (2013) states, “Rules adopted to govern judicial appeals from agency action apply to c ases brought under this section,” which is in reference to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. Moreover, Rule 80C states that it governs “review[s] of final agency action . . . brought i n the . . . District Court to review disciplinary decisions of . . . licensing boards . . . under . . . 10 M.R.S.A. § 8003.” As both 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) and M.R. Civ. P. 80C indicate, the District Court, in conducting “de novo judicial review,” will be gu ided by Rule 80C’s procedural rules at least in some instances. To the extent, however, that the provisions of Rule 80C are inconsistent with section 8003(5), “the statute must prevail.” Serv. & Erection Co. v. State Tax Assessor , 684 A.2d 1, 1

- 2 (Me. 19 96). See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(a) (stating that Rule 80C governs, “except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of a statute.”). Since we interpret “de novo judicial review” to require a full hearing on both the facts and the law

— a procedure that is not recognized by Rule 80C as currently constituted

— Rule 80C does not provide the District Court with guidance in undertaking de novo judicial review pursuant to section 8003(5). As we have previously indicated, when the reviewing court “functions as the forum of origin for a determination of both facts and law,” certain requirements of Rule 80C “are inapplicable to the proceedings before it.” Serv. & Erection Co. , 684 A.2d at 2. Thus, to the extent that either Rule 80C’s provisions are inconsistent or i napplicable, those provisions should be disregarded by the District Court when conducting de novo judicial review.13 licensing board’s decision based on several statutorily delineated grounds. See i d. §§ 11006(1), 11007(3)

- (4 ). [¶22 ] In comparison , the meaning of the phrase “de novo judicial review” is

not as easily gleaned from either its use in s ection 8003(5) or our prior case law

. Although we have stated that a “ hearing de novo ” requires fact

- finders “to
undertake a de novo review , take evidence , make factual findings, and apply the applicable statutory

. . . provisions entirely ind ependent from the [ Board’s previous] decisi on , ” Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg , 2005 ME 22, ¶¶ 8

- 9, 1 5 , 868 A.2d 161 (quotation marks omitted ), it is unclear if the Legislature intended
for th ose requirements to apply when a court conducts its “ de novo judicial
review .” Moreover, a lthough other courts have been called upon to consider the scope of “de novo judicial review,” their interpretations have been somewhat
inconsistent

. Compare Jamison v. Mo. Dep ’ t of Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Servs. , 218 S.W .3d 399, 415 (Mo. 2007) (explaining that “ de novo judicial review ” requires a trial court to “ base its decision on the evidence presented in the trial court and not merely review the record before the [ administrative agency]”) , with
Tenn

. Waste Movers, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. , 160 S.W.3d 517, 520 (Tenn. 2005) ( stating that a “statute requiring de novo judicial review means a new hearing . . . based upon the administrative record and any additional or supplemental evidence14 which either party w ishes t o adduce relevant to any issue ” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶23 ] Thus, it is unclear to what extent “de novo judicial review , ” as used in section 8003(5), requires the court to hold a hearing . This uncertainty includes
whether the scope of that hearing requires the court to take evidence anew , even if
that evidence was previously presented to the agency , or whether the court is
confined to reviewing the administrative record , supplemented only by new evidence never before presented to the agency. Because the statute is “reasonably susceptible [to] different interpretations , ” Batchelder , 2007 ME 17, ¶ 17,
914 A.2d 1116 (quotation marks omitted) , we look to “indicia of legislative intent such as the statute’s history and its underlying policy” to a scertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Michalowski , 2012 ME 134, ¶ 24 n.6, 58 A.3d 1074 (quotation marks omitted)

. 2. Legislative History [¶24 ] In February 2001 , the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation submitted a proposed amendment to 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) that would grant professional licensing boards the power to revoke t heir members’ licenses.
See L.D. 487 , § 1 (120th Legis. 2001). In its orig inal form , the bill provided that “any no nconsensual disciplinary action ” sanct ioned by a professional licensing15 board, including revocations, would be subject to judicia l review in the Superior
Court. Id. [¶25 ] A committee hearing was held on the proposed bill and written testimony was submitted , including written testimony from th e Maine Medical
Associat ion

. Hearing on L.D. 487 Before the Joint Standing Comm. on Bus. &
Econ. Dev. , 120th Legis. (2001) (statement of Andrew M acL ean on behalf of Maine Medical Association). In part, the MMA voiced concern over L.D. 487 granting agencies the power to permanentl y revoke professional license s without requiring decision s of such heavy consequence to be made by a court

. Id. Because
agency revocation hearings were less formal tha n judicial proceedings, the MMA
feared that the proposed bill would cause licensees to lose significant procedural protections

. Id. Furthermore , t he MMA was concerned that L.D. 487 limited a
licensee’s appeal rights because it did not give the licensee the o pportunity to have
a “ new trial

. ” Id. Because of these concerns and the property interests at stake, the
MMA requested that “ the standard of review on appeal [ be ] ‘de novo,’ meaning
that the court rehears the evidence and redecides the case .” Id. [¶26 ] A fter th at committee hearing, L.D. 487 was amended

. See Comm.
Amend. A to L.D. 487 , No. H

- 206 (120th Legis. 2001) . Of significance, the
committee modified the bill to provide that “nonconsensual revocation [s]

. . . [ would be] subject to . . . de novo judicial review.” Id. The committee note d that16 the bill had been amended to allow licensees whose licenses had been revoked the opportunity to “be heard de novo

. . . in the District Court

. ” Comm. Amend. A to
L.D. 487 , No. H

- 206, Summary (120 th Legis. 2001). L.D. 487 was enacted , effective in September 2001, amending section 8003(5) to grant professional
boards the power to revoke its members’ licenses and affording licensees the right
to obtain “de novo judicial review

. . . in District Court .” See P.L. 2001, ch. 16 7 , § 1 (effective Sept. 21, 2001) (codified as subsequently amended at 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) (2013) )

. 7 [¶27 ] F rom the changes made to L.D. 487 , w e conclude that the Legislature
intended for the parties to “be heard de novo” when the District Court perform s its “de novo judicia l review.” In conducting such review, the fact

- finder “does not examine the evidence presented to the d ecision maker or tribunal below, ” but
instead “looks at the substantive issues afresh, undertakes its own credibility determinations, ev aluates the evidence presented, and draws its own conclusions.” Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick , 2000 ME 157, ¶ 7 & n.3 , 757 A.2d 773 ; s ee also Perry Equip. Co. v. Marine Trading & Trans

. , Inc. , 390 A.2d 1110, 1111 (Me. 1978) (per curium ) (“The availability of a hearing de novo

. . . clearly grants an appellant the right to have the presiding Justice use his independent judgment in

7 Title 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) has since been amended, though the amendments are not relevant in the present case. See P.L. 2007, ch. 402, § C

- 2 (effective Sept. 20, 2007) ; P.L. 2011, ch. 286, § B

- 5 (effective Sept. 28, 2011)

.17 ruling on the merits of the case.”). Construed in this manner, we conclude that the procedural safeguards af forded to Zablotny pursuant to 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) are in harmony with those that could have been available to him if the Board had proceeded under 32 M.R.S. § 2105

- A (1

- A) (E)

. See Michalowski , 2012 ME 134, ¶ 12, 58 A.3d 1074 (stating that when “two statu tes deal with the same subject matter,” we construe the two statutes “in harmony with each other, if possible. ”)

. [¶28 ] Thus, with this interpretation of section 8003(5) clarified, we conclude that the trial court’s original determination was correct

— it w as required
to hold a de novo hearing. As a result, the trial court’s ultimate interpretation of
the requirements necessary in conducting “de novo judicial review , ” 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5), was erroneous, as was its denial of Zablotny’s motion to re

- present evidence presented to the Board. [¶29 ] On remand, the District Court shall evaluate both the factual and legal
issues afresh and ma ke its own independent, nondefe rential decision. See Stewart , 2000 ME 157, ¶ 7 & n.3, 757 A.2d 773. T his obligates the court to hear the evidence presented , independently evaluate the testimony offered, make its own credibility determinations , and reach its own decision regarding the revocation

. In doing so, the court will afford licensees and the public the necessary procedural safeguards that the Legislature intended.18 The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On the briefs: Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., Law Office of Joseph M. Baldacci, Bangor, for appellant John S. Zablotny Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Andrew L. Black, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State Board of Nursing

At oral argument: Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., for appellant John S. Zablotny Andrew L. Black, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State Board of Nursing

Machias Distri ct Court docket numbe r AD

- 2010

- 3 F OR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY