alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

RODNEY CAMPBELL
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 2456

[ January 8, 2020 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Susan L. Alspector , Judge; L.T. Case No. 15

- 007892CF10A

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nancy Jack, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Koenig, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONFESSION OF ERROR

K UNTZ

, J.

Rodney Campbell appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated battery. On appeal

, he argues the record is insufficient to allow appellate

review of certain issues at trial. In response, the State explains :

The court reporter filed an affidavit indicating part of the notes

for [Campbell’s] trial were damaged and unable to be

transcribed. Following an attempt at reconstructing the missing portion of the transcript, the trial court entered an order that the missing portion of the proceedings could not be

reconstructed.

Based on the se facts, the State concedes error and agrees that the judgment and sentence must be reversed

.2 A defendant is not entitled to a full transcri pt of all proceedings. “When portions of the appellate record are incomplete, ‘[t]he question to be asked is whether the portions are necessary for a complete review.’” Smith v.

State , 801 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting Velez v. State

, 645 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ) . The defendant must also “demonstrate that there is a basis for a claim that the missing transcript would reflect matters which prejudice the defendant.” Jones v. State , 923 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 2006). 1

Here, both Campbell and the State agree that an attempt to provide meaningful appellate review through other means did not succeed

. They also agree that C ampbell satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating a basis for his claim that the missing transcript would reflect matters that prejudiced him. See Jones , 923 So. 2d at 4 89. So we accept the State’s

concession that the judgment and sentence must be reversed because of the missing transcript and remand for a new trial. Se e, e.g. , Robinson v.

State , 262 So. 3d 826 , 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)

.

Reversed and remanded.

C ONNER and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 A transcript itself is not specifically required. See, e.g.

, Terry v. State , 263 So. 3d 799, 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (discussing Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(b)(4)); Griffin

v. Illinois , 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) ( A state is not required to provide a transcript

to a defendant if there are “other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review.”).
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON M OTION FOR E N B ANC R ECONSIDERATION

Appellate case name: Barrett Wakefield and Howard Wakefield III v. Sam Ayers and

Claudia Ayers

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 4

- 0 0648

- CV

Trial court case number: 1007580

- 102

Trial court: County Civil Court at Law No. 4 of Harris County

Date motion filed : October 14, 2016

Party filing motion : Appellant Barrett Wakefield

The en banc court has unanimously voted to deny appellant’s motion for en banc

reconsideration. It is ordered that the motion is denied

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Terry Jennings

Acting for the Court the En Banc Court*

Date: November 8 , 2016

* En banc court consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings, Keyes, Higley, Bland,

Massengale, Brown, Huddle, and Lloyd.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6598

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNNY LEE GORE, a/k/a Manager,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Senior District 

Judge. (4:01-cr-00627-CWH-9)

Submitted: May 23, 2013 Decided: May 30, 2013

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Johnny Lee Gore, Appellant Pro Se. Alfred William Walker 

Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South 

Carolina; Susan Zalkin Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Johnny Lee Gore seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying his motion to recuse or disqualify. This court 

may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders,

28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The 

order Gore seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an 

appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Small Business Administration

          - [Disaster Declaration #14102]

# AGENCY:

U.S. Small Business Administration.

# ACTION:

Amendment 1.

# SUMMARY:

This is an amendment of the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) declaration for the State of Missouri, dated 09/03/2014.

*Incident:*                         Civil Unrest.                    

*Incident Period:*                         08/09/2014 and continuing through 12/17/2014.                    

*Effective Date:*                         12/22/2014.                    

*EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date:*                         06/03/2015.                    

# ADDRESSES:

Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of the Economic Injury disaster declaration for the State of Missouri, dated 09/03/2014 is hereby amended to establish the incident period for this disaster as beginning 08/09/2014 and continuing through 12/17/2014.

All other information in the original declaration remains unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59002)

Dated: December 22, 2014.

Maria Contreras-Sweet,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 2014-30733 Filed 12-31-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 16, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-60902

Summary Calendar

 

MARIE BROWN, Mother and Next Friend of Nicole Brown,

 PlaintiffAppellee,

versus

LONG BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT; ET AL.,

 

Defendants,

ANTHONY KALLAS,

 DefendantAppellant.

--------------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:02-CV-697

--------------------------------------------------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS AND STEWART, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:*

Officer Anthony Kallas appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Officer
 

-2-

Kallas arguesthat there was no evidence that he violated any clearly established constitutionalrights

of Nicole Brown and that even if his tackling of Brown was unconstitutional, there was no caselaw

indicating as much at the time of the arrest. 

Qualified immunity shields police officers from suit “unless their conduct violates a clearly

established constitutional right.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003).

Brown, a teenage girl weighing lessthan 100 pounds with no known history of violence, alleged that

when she fled from Officer Kallas, a 300 pound man who was attempting to arrest her for truancy,

he chased and tackled her and her pelvis was broken as a result of the tackle. As the facts are not in

dispute, it does not appear beyond doubt that Brown will be unable to prove the elements of an

excessive force claim. See Rochon v. City of Angola, 122 F.3d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1997); Ikerd v.

Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Officer Kallas arguesthat the right was not “clearly established” at the time ofthe arrest. See

Mace, 333 F.3d at 623. Although there was no caselaw expressly prohibiting the tackling of a fleeing

teenage girl weighing less than 100 pounds, there was no caselaw permitting it, and the right under

the Fourth Amendment to be free from the excessive use of force by law enforcement officers was

clearly established. See Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 433-34. It does not appear beyond doubt that Brown will

be unable to prove that Officer Kallas’ actions were objectively unreasonable, especially in light of

the nonviolent nature of the offense for which he was arresting her (truancy) and the apparent lack

of threat she posed to anyone. See Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir.

1998). The district court did not err in denying Officer Kallas’ motion to dismiss based on qualified

immunity. 

AFFIRMED.
 

-3-
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2531 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2531

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to 
extend the authority relating to cooperation between the United States 
            and Israel on anti-tunnel defense capabilities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 6, 2023

Mr. Schneider (for himself, Ms. Manning, Mr. Lamborn, and Mr. Pfluger) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
 Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case 
for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of 
                        the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 to 
extend the authority relating to cooperation between the United States 
            and Israel on anti-tunnel defense capabilities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Israel Anti-Tunnel 
Cooperation Extension Act''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF UNITED STATES-ISRAEL ANTI-TUNNEL COOPERATION.

    Section 1279(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2016 (22 U.S.C. 8606 note) is amended by striking 
``December 31, 2024'' and inserting ``December 31, 2026''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.1
 STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
 Agreement Effective Date Seller Buyer Buyers
 RECITALS
 Company
 Business Premises
  AGREEMENT
  ARTICLE 1
SALE AND PURCHASE
 Stock Purchase
 Files and Records Records




---



##### 



Liabilities Liabilities Liens
 Purchase Price Purchase Price
    ARTICLE 2
RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER
  Restrictions Exchange Act Shares
  2




---



##### 



Sales
 ARTICLE 3
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER
  Status
 Authority
 ARTICLE 4
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF BUYERS
  Status.
 Enforceability.
  3




---



##### 



Private Placement Securities
Act
 SEC Reports SEC SEC Reports
 Material Changes
  4




---



##### 



Litigation
 Regulatory Approvals.
 No Brokers.
 Compliance with the Law
 No Representation
  5




---



##### 



ARTICLE 5
CONDITIONS TO SELLERS OBLIGATIONS AT CLOSING
  Representations and Warranties.
 Release of Claims. Exhibit A
 Shares
 Resignations
 ARTICLE 6
INDEMNIFICATION
 Indemnification Indemnified Parties Claims
    6




---



##### 



Failure to Defend
 Unlawful Detainer
 ARTICLE 7
SURVIVAL
 Survival
 ARTICLE 8
MISCELLANEOUS
   7




---



##### 



Expenses
 Further Assurances
 ARTICLE 9
GENERAL PROVISIONS
 Successors and Assigns
 Amendments; Waivers
 Notices
  8




---



##### 



Captions; Number and Gender
 Governing Law
 Arbitration
 Counterparts
 Severability
 [Remainder of page intentionally left blank]
  9




---



##### 



Entire Agreement
  Buyers:David DuquetteJoseph CzikmantoriSeller:U.S. AEROSPACE, INC.By:Its:
  10
## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ N o. 02

- 22 -0 0114

- CR No. 02

- 22

- 00115

- CR

___________________________

On A ppeal from C ounty Criminal Court No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No s . 1665266, 1665265
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion 

### W ILLIAM 

### A DAM 

### W ALKER 

### , Appellant

V



### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION On January 13, 202 1, the trial court sente nced appellant Wi lliam Adam Walker
to 4 0 days ’ confinement for failure to identify under Section 38.02 (d)(2) o f the Texas
Penal Code. 1 See Te x. Pen a l Code Ann. § 38 .0 2(d)(2). No motion for new trial was
filed in either cause number , so appellant ’ s notice of appeal was due February 1 2, 2021, but was not filed until June 1, 2022. See Tex. R. App . P. 26.2(a)(1). We informed him that unless he filed a response showing gr ounds for continuing the appeal s , we would dismiss them

. Walker responded to our letter pro se, but his respo nse does not show ground s for conti nuing the appeal s . We have not received a response from appellant ’ s appointed counsel . Because his no tice of app eal was not timely and because a timely notice of appeal is an essential component of our jurisdiction, we di smiss the ap peal s . See T ex. R. App. P . 25.2(b), 26.2(a)(1) (stating that a defendant has thirty days after the imposition of a sentenc e to file a n otice of appeal ) , 43.2(f) ; Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998 ); Rodarte v. State , 860 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. C rim. App. 1993) ( discussing the rule of appellate procedure that preceded r ule 26.2 , which likewise required the filing of a notice of appeal within thirty days after the imposition
of a sente nce, and dismissing an untimely appeal f or want of j urisdiction )

.

1 In the second trial court cause number from which Walke r now attempt s to appeal, he wa s charged with res istin g arrest, search, or transportation

. The State filed a motion to di smiss , and o n January 13, 2021 , t he trial court signed an order dismissing the second tr ial court ca u se number

.3 Per Curiam
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: September 15, 2022
#### In the Matter of NATHANIEL P., Appellant.

[873 NYS2d 118]

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (Lawrence, J.), dated October 4, 2007, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court entered August 16, 2007, made upon the appellant’s admission, finding that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted criminal mischief in the fourth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile de*861linquent and placed him on probation for a period of two years with the condition that he pay restitution in the amount of $113.19. The appeal brings up for review an order of protection issued at the dispositional hearing.

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing him to pay restitution *(see Matter of Daytrill H.,*32 AD3d 736 [2006]; *Matter of Antonio M.,*214 AD2d 571 [1995]).

The appellant has not preserved for appellate review his claim that his mother’s allocution was defective since he did not move to withdraw his admission on this ground *(see*Family Ct Act § 321.3; *Matter of Nicholas R.,*36 AD3d 923 [2007]; *Matter of Ricky*A., 11 AD3d 532, 533 [2004]; *Matter of Brandon*S., 305 AD2d 609, 610 [2003]).

Since the appellant did not challenge the validity of the order of protection at the dispositional hearing, his challenge to the order of protection is also unpreserved for appellate review *(cf. People v Nieves,*2 NY3d 310, 316 [2004]; *People v Goldberg,*16 AD3d 519, 520 [2005]). Fisher, J.E, Miller, Garni and Balkin, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME, CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, AND CONSOLIDATED 
STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE FORM 10-Q DATED MARCH 31, 1999, AND IS 
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000317187
<NAME> PP&L, INC
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                        4,301
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                        695
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                             890
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                         3,111
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,997
<COMMON>                                         1,476
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                           44
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                                241
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                   1,761
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              295
<PREFERRED>                                        171
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                             2,819
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                      91
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                        0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                        104
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                    61
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                   3,695
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                    8,997
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                          968
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                                76
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                         731
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                         807
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                            161
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                   7
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                     168
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            48
<NET-INCOME>                                       120
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                         12
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                      108
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                             0
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                            0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                             147
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2493 

To amend title 23, United States Code, with respect to vehicle weight 

limitations for certain logging vehicles, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 6, 2023 

Mr. GALLAGHER (for himself and Mr. GOLDEN of Maine) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 23, United States Code, with respect to 

vehicle weight limitations for certain logging vehicles, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safe Routes Act of 

5 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. VEHICLE WEIGHT EXEMPTIONS. 

7 Section 127 of title 23, United States Code, is 

8 amended by adding at the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(x) CERTAIN LOGGING VEHICLES.— 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2493 IH

1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall waive, 

2 with respect to a covered logging vehicle, the appli3 cation of any vehicle weight limit established under 

4 this section. 

5 ‘‘(2) COVERED LOGGING VEHICLE DEFINED.— 

6 In this subsection, the term ‘covered logging vehicle’ 

7 means a vehicle that— 

8 ‘‘(A) is transporting raw or unfinished for9 est products, including logs, pulpwood, biomass, 

10 or wood chips; 

11 ‘‘(B) is traveling a distance not greater 

12 than 150 air miles on the Interstate from origin 

13 to a storage or processing facility; and 

14 ‘‘(C) meets State legal weight tolerances 

15 and vehicle configurations for transporting raw 

16 or unfinished forest products within the State 

17 boundaries in which the vehicle is operating. 

18 ‘‘(3) APPLICATION OF WEIGHT TOLERANCES.— 

19 The waiver in this subsection shall only apply with 

20 respect to a State legal weight tolerance in effect on 

21 the date of enactment of this subsection.’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB