J-S21045-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WADE ANTHONY MASON,

Appellant No. 2483 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 22, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006304-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED March 14, 2016

This is a pro se appeal from the order dismissing Appellant’s second 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on the basis that it 

was untimely filed. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On January 

20, 2011, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, sexual assault and simple 

assault. Thereafter, on April 11, 2011, the PCRA court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate term of seven to fourteen years of imprisonment, and a 

consecutive two-year probationary term. Following the denial of Appellant’s 

timely post-sentence motion, Appellant filed an appeal to this Court, in 

which he raised a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during the 

Commonwealth’s closing argument. In an unpublished memorandum filed 

on April 14, 2012, we rejected Appellant’s claim and affirmed his judgment 
J-S21045-16

- 2 -

of sentence, and on September 19, 2012, our Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Mason, 48 

A.3d 484 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 757 (Pa. 2012).

Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA court 

appointed counsel. After reviewing the record and Appellant’s proposed 

issues, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw and “no-merit” letter 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 

Thereafter, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s pro se petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se

response. By order entered March 26, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA petition and granted PCRA counsel’s to withdraw. 

Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal to this Court. In an unpublished 

memorandum filed on January 16, 2015, we affirmed the order denying 

post-conviction relief. Commonwealth v. Mason, 118 A.3d 448 (Pa.Super. 

2015). Appellant did not file a timely motion for allowance of appeal.

Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his second, on March 

20, 2015. Within this petition, Appellant reiterated his claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct that he unsuccessfully litigated during his direct appeal. See 

supra. The PCRA court issued Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition as untimely filed. Appellant filed a pro se 

response on May 18, 2015. By order entered June 22, 2015, the PCRA court 
J-S21045-16

- 3 -

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. This pro se appeal follows. Both 

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

 Appellant raises the following issue:

(1) WHETHER THE [PCRA] COURT [ERRED] WHEN IT 

REFUSED TO GRANT [APPELLANT] A MISTRIAL 

AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH STATED IN ITS 

CLOSING REMARKS TO THE JURY THAT HE 

STALKED THE STREET[S] OF CHESTER.

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Our scope and standard of review is well-settled:

In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the 

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of 

the PCRA court's hearing, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party. Because most PCRA appeals involve 

questions of fact and law, we employ a mixed standard of 

review. We defer to the PCRA court's factual findings and 

credibility determinations supported by the record. In 

contrast, we review the PCRA court's legal conclusions de 

novo.

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In order to address Appellant’s issue, we must first determine whether 

the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant’s second PCRA petition 

was untimely filed. This Court’s standard of review regarding an order 

dismissing a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the 

PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 
J-S21045-16

- 4 -

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1166 (Pa.Super. 2001). 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000). Generally, a 

petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, 

must be filed within one year of the date the judgment is final unless the 

petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for 

filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. sections 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and 

(iii), is met.1 See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 

(Pa. 2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. A PCRA petition invoking one of these 

statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claims 

____________________________________________

1 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).

 
J-S21045-16

- 5 -

could have been presented.” Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783; see also

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on December 18, 2012, 

when the ninety-day time period for filing a writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); 

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Therefore, Appellant needed to file the PCRA petition at 

issue by December 18, 2013, in order for it to be timely. As Appellant filed 

the instant petition on March 20, 2015, it is untimely unless he has satisfied 

his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions 

applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 

1999).

Within his brief, Appellant has neither acknowledged the PCRA’s time 

bar nor attempted to prove any exception thereto. Thus, the PCRA court 

correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s second 

PCRA petition. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant 

post-conviction relief.2

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

2

In doing so, we echo the PCRA court’s conclusion that, even if his latest 

PCRA petition was timely, Appellant would not be entitled to relief because 

the petition at issue “mirrors the allegations of his first PCRA petition and 

therefore represents another desperate attempt to re-litigate issues already 

rejected by this Court, Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court.” PCRA Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 4.
J-S21045-16

- 6 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/14/2016