In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1163

CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ESTATE OF DIMITRY KARPOV, DECEASED, and

MARGARITA KARPOV, Administratrix of the

Estate of Dimitry Karpov,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 06 C 33—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 22, 2008 —DECIDED MARCH 17, 2009

Before CUDAHY, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Carolina Casualty sought a

declaratory judgment that its liability was limited to the

$1 million per-accident limit set forth in the insurance

policy it issued to Net Trucking, Inc. and Stanislaw Gill.

The defendants, who were among several of the victims

in a tractor-trailer/automobile accident, argued that the
2 No. 08-1163

Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) and an endorsement Carolina

Casualty issued verifying compliance with the MCA

established coverage at $750,000 per person. The district

court rejected this argument, holding that the policy

limited liability to $1,000,000 per accident. The district

court granted Carolina Casualty summary judgment

and we affirm.

I.

On Sunday August 21, 2005, Stanislaw Gill, who was

driving a tractor-trailer for Net Trucking, Inc., rear-ended

a stopped automobile in a construction zone on the

Indiana Toll Road. This collision set off a chain reaction

which eventually led to the death of four individuals,

the injury of numerous others, and property damage to

several automobiles and the Indiana Toll Road.

At the time of the accident, both Net Trucking and Gill

were insured under a policy issued by Carolina Casualty.

The policy stated that Carolina Casualty’s maximum

liability for any one accident, regardless of the number

of claimants or vehicles involved, was $1 million.

Attached to the Carolina Casualty policy, as required for

all commercial trucking insurance policies, was an “MCS90” endorsement which likewise provided that Carolina

Casualty’s maximum liability per accident was $1 million.

Carolina Casualty initiated this interpleader action,

naming as defendants Gill, Net Trucking, and those

individuals who were injured in the August 21, 2005,

accident or who had filed claims arising out of the acci-
No. 08-1163 3

dent. Carolina Casualty sought a declaration that its

liability was limited to $1 million for the entire accident.

Carolina Casualty also deposited $1 million into the

district court registry for the benefit of the various claimants.

The parties to the interpleader action filed cross-motions

for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor

of Carolina Casualty, holding that its liability was

limited to the $1 million per-accident policy limit and

that neither the MCA nor the MCS-90 endorsement

issued by Carolina Casualty established a $750,000 perperson policy minimum. Interpleader defendant

Margarita Karpov, individually and as the administratrix

of the estate of Dimitry Karpov, appeals.

II.

The Carolina Casualty insurance policy issued to Gill

and Net Trucking expressly established a $1 million peraccident policy limit. Specifically, the “TRUCKERS COVERAGE FORM,” “SECTION II—LIABILITY COVERAGE,”

provided:

C. Limit Of Insurance.

Regardless of the number of covered “autos,” “insured,” premiums paid, claims made or vehicles

involved in the “accident,” the most we will pay for the

total of all damages and “covered pollution cost or

expense” combined, resulting from any one “accident”

is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown

in the Declarations.
4 No. 08-1163

In turn, the “Truckers/Motor Carrier Coverage Form

Declarations” page listed $1,000,000 under “LIMIT THE

MOST WE WILL PAY FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR

LOSS.” Additionally, the MCS-90 endorsement provided:

“The policy to which this endorsement is attached provides primary or excess insurance as indicated by the X,

for the limits shown.” An “X” was placed in the box

corresponding to: “This insurance is primary and the

company shall not be liable for amounts in excess of

$1,000,000 for each accident.”

Notwithstanding this clear and unambiguous peraccident limit, the appellants argue that the MCA and the

MCS-90 endorsement establish a $750,000 per-person

liability minimum. The $750,000 figure comes from the

MCA, which provides:

(b) General requirement and minimum amount—

(1) The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe

regulations to require minimum levels of financial

responsibility sufficient to satisfy liability amounts

established by the Secretary covering public liability,

property damage, and environmental restoration

for the transportation of property by motor carrier or

motor private carrier . . . . (2) The level of financial

responsibility established under paragraph (1) of

this subsection shall be at least $750,000.

49 U.S.C. § 31139(b)(1)-(2).

The appellants argue that the $750,000 minimum level

of financial responsibility applies on a per-person basis.

In support of their position, they point to 49 U.S.C.

§ 13906(a)(1), which provides:
No. 08-1163 5

(1) Liability insurance requirement.—The Secretary

may register a motor carrier under section 13902 only

if the registrant files with the Secretary a bond, insurance policy, or other type of security approved by

the Secretary, in an amount not less than such

amount as the Secretary prescribes pursuant to, or as

is required by, sections 31138 and 31139, and the

laws of the State or States in which the registrant is

operating, to the extent applicable. The security must

be sufficient to pay not more than the amount of the

security, for each final judgment against the registrant

for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or

use of motor vehicles, or for loss or damage to

property (except property referred to in paragraph

(3) of this subsection), or both. A registration remains

in effect only as long as the registrant continues to

satisfy the security requirements of this paragraph.

(Emphasis added.)

The appellants argue that because 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1)

states that the security must be sufficient to pay “for

each final judgment” for bodily injury to, or death of, “an

individual,” the minimum amount of security required

by section 31139, namely $750,000, applies on a per-person

basis and not on a per-accident basis, notwithstanding

the clear language of the insurance policy.

The appellants’ argument, however, ignores the full

text of section 13906. The relevant provision states: “The

security must be sufficient to pay not more than the

amount of the security, for each final judgment against the

registrant for bodily injury to, or death of, an
6 No. 08-1163

Fourth Circuit Local Rule 32.1 permits the citation to unpub- 1

lished decisions issued prior to January 1, 2007, if the decision

has precedential value and there is “no published decision

that would serve as well.”

individual . . . .” 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1) (emphasis added).

The court in Hamm v. Canal Insurance Company, 10

F. Supp. 2d 539 (M. D. N. C. 1998), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1283

(4th Cir. 1999), aptly explained the meaning of this statutory language.

With respect to the statute, it provides that “the security must be sufficient to pay, not more than the

amount of the security.” The clear meaning of this

statement is that whatever amount is to be paid

will not exceed the amount of the security which

has been established by the statute or the policy itself.

This would mean that if the actual amount of the

security is the minimum required by the statute, then

the limit of potential liability for an insurer would

be $750,000. However, if as in this case, the insured

voluntarily elects to obtain a security in a larger

amount, such as $1 million, then that amount becomes the limits of potential liability for the insurer

for claims resulting from a single accident.

Id. at 544 (emphasis added).

The Hamm decision was appealed to the Fourth Circuit,

which in an unpublished decision held that “the district

court correctly determined that Canal’s potential financial

obligation is limited by the terms of the Policy and

the MCA to $1 million per accident.” Hamm, 178 F.3d 1

1283 at *1.
No. 08-1163 7

Similarly, in Stevens v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 2002

WL 31951274 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2002), aff’d 375 F.3d 464

(6th Cir. 2004), the insurer had issued a policy with a

liability limit of $1 million per accident. The insured

was involved in an accident resulting in injuries to four

individuals and environmental cleanup, costing in excess

of $2.5 million. Id. at *1, n.1. The injured parties cited to

49 U.S.C. § 13906 for the proposition that the insurer

must pay not more than the amount of the security for

each final judgment and thus argued that the insurer

was required to pay up to $1 million for each injured

person. Id. at *5. The district court in Stevens found the

Hamm decision persuasive and rejected this argument,

holding that no coverage existed beyond the $1 million

limit of liability. Id. at *7-8.

We agree with Hamm and Stevens and likewise conclude that the “not more than the amount of the security”

statutory language refers to the $1,000,000 security peraccident that Net Trucking obtained from Carolina Casualty.

The appellants have not cited any case law interpreting

section 13906 as establishing a per-person limit. Nonetheless, the appellants claim that even if the statute did not

establish a per-person liability limit, the MCS-90 endorsement, which Carolina Casualty attached to its insurance

policy, set the liability limit at $750,000 per person. The

MCS-90 endorsement provided that:

The insurance policy to which this endorsement is

attached provides automobile liability insurance and

is amended to assure compliance by the insured,
8 No. 08-1163

within the limits stated herein, as a motor carrier of

property with Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier

Act of 1980 and the rules and regulations of the

Federal [Motor Carrier Safety Administration].

The appellants argue that this endorsement established

as a policy limit the $750,000 per-person minimum established by section 13906. There are three problems with

this argument. First, as noted above, section 13906

does not mandate a $750,000 per-person minimum.

Second, even if the statute did establish such a minimum, the endorsement expressly stated that it provides

coverage “within the limits stated herein,” and the endorsement set the limit at $1,000,000. Third, the Secretary

of Transportation has set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 387.15,

Illustration I, the appropriate form for the MCS-90 endorsement. This form states the policy limits on a peraccident basis, providing: “The policy to which this

endorsement is attached provides primary or excess

insurance, as indicated by ‘X’, for the limits shown: This

insurance is primary and the company shall not be liable

for amounts in excess of $ ______ for each accident.” 49

C.F.R. § 387.15, Illustration I (emphasis added). Accordingly, the MCS-90 endorsement did not establish a

$750,000 per-person liability minimum.

The appellants attempt to overcome the express language of the policy and the MCA by referring to

legislative history and public policy. However, neither

legislative history nor public policy can overcome the clear

statutory language and regulatory form, which establish

$750,000 as the minimum amount of financial responsi-
No. 08-1163 9

bility, and the policy language which defines the liability

on a per-accident basis. Five Points Rd. Jt. Vent. v. Johanns,

542 F.3d 1121, 1128 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that resort to

legislative history is only necessary if the statutory language is ambiguous); see also Hamm, 10 F.Supp.2d at 544-

48 (rejecting public policy argument that MCA-90 endorsement establishes a $750,000 per-person limit). The

$1,000,000 per accident policy limit governs.

III.

The insurance policy clearly and expressly limited

Carolina Casualty’s liability to a maximum of $1,000,000

per accident. Neither the MCA nor the MCS-90 endorsement establishes a per-person limit. Accordingly, the

district court properly granted Carolina Casualty summary judgment. For these and the foregoing reasons,

we AFFIRM.

3-17-09