(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–1276. Argued November 28, 2017—Decided February 21, 2018 

Endeavoring to root out corporate fraud, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and the 2010 Dodd-Frank 

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). 

Both Acts shield whistleblowers from retaliation, but they differ in 

important respects. Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all “employees” who

report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 

or Commission), any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal

supervisor. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1). Dodd-Frank defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a

violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 15 U. S. C. §78u– 

6(a)(6). A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award if original

information provided to the SEC leads to a successful enforcement

action. §78u–6(b)–(g). And he or she is protected from retaliation in

three situations, see §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), including for “making 

disclosures that are required or protected under” Sarbanes-Oxley or 

other specified laws, §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation provision contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement and a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18 

U. S. C. §1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), whereas Dodd-Frank permits a whistleblower to sue an employer directly in federal district court, with a

default six-year limitation period, see §78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa).

The SEC’s regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank provision 

contain two discrete whistleblower definitions. For purposes of the

award program, Rule 21F–2 requires a whistleblower to “provide the 

Commission with information” relating to possible securities-law violations. 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)(1). For purposes of the antiretaliation protections, however, the Rule does not require SEC re-
 

 

 

 

 

 

2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Syllabus 

porting. See §240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii).

Respondent Paul Somers alleges that petitioner Digital Realty

Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) terminated his employment shortly after

he reported to senior management suspected securities-law violations 

by the company. Somers filed suit, alleging, inter alia, a claim of 

whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved

to dismiss that claim on the ground that Somers was not a whistleblower under §78u–6(h) because he did not alert the SEC prior to his

termination. The District Court denied the motion, and the Ninth 

Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that §78u–6(h)

does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistleblower” status, and it accorded deference to the SEC’s regulation under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

467 U. S. 837. 

Held: Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision does not extend to an 

individual, like Somers, who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. Pp. 9–19.

(a) A statute’s explicit definition must be followed, even if it varies

from a term’s ordinary meaning. Burgess v. United States, 553 U. S. 

124, 130. Section 78u–6(a) instructs that the statute’s definition of 

“whistleblower” “shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is, throughout 

§78u–6. The Court must therefore interpret the term “whistleblower”

in §78u–6(h), the anti-retaliation provision, in accordance with that 

definition. 

The whistleblower definition operates in conjunction with the three 

clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell out the provision’s scope. The definition first describes who is eligible for protection—namely, a “whistleblower” who provides pertinent information “to the Commission.”

§78u–6(a)(6). The three clauses then describe what conduct, when 

engaged in by a “whistleblower,” is shielded from employment discrimination. An individual who meets both measures may invoke

Dodd-Frank’s protections. But an individual who falls outside the 

protected category of “whistleblowers” is ineligible to seek redress

under the statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual 

engages. This reading is reinforced by another whistleblowerprotection provision in Dodd-Frank, see 12 U. S. C. §5567(b), which

imposes no requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency. Pp. 9–11.

(b) The Court’s understanding is corroborated by Dodd-Frank’s

purpose and design. The core objective of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program is to aid the Commission’s enforcement efforts by “motivat[ing] people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC.” 

S. Rep. No. 111–176, p. 38 (emphasis added). To that end, Congress

provided monetary awards to whistleblowers who furnish actionable 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Syllabus 

information to the Commission. Congress also complemented the financial incentives for SEC reporting by heightening protection 

against retaliation. Pp. 11–12.

(c) Somers and the Solicitor General contend that Dodd-Frank’s 

“whistleblower” definition applies only to the statute’s award program and not, as the definition plainly states, to its anti-retaliation

provision. Their concerns do not support a departure from the statutory text. Pp. 12–18.

(1) They claim that the Court’s reading would vitiate the protections of clause (iii) for whistleblowers who make disclosures to persons and entities other than the SEC. See §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). But 

the plain-text reading of the statute leaves the third clause with substantial meaning by protecting a whistleblower who reports misconduct both to the SEC and to another entity, but suffers retaliation because of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. Pp. 13–15. 

(2) Nor would the Court’s reading jettison protections for auditors, attorneys, and other employees who are required to report information within the company before making external disclosures.

Such employees would be shielded as soon as they also provide relevant information to the Commission. And Congress may well have

considered adequate the safeguards already afforded to such employees by Sarbanes-Oxley. Pp. 15–16.

(3) Applying the “whistleblower” definition as written, Somers

and the Solicitor General further protest, will allow “identical misconduct” to “go punished or not based on the happenstance of a separate report” to the SEC. Brief for Respondent 37–38. But it is understandable that the statute’s retaliation protections, like its financial

rewards, would be reserved for employees who have done what DoddFrank seeks to achieve by reporting information about unlawful activity to the SEC. P. 16. 

(4) The Solicitor General observes that the statute contains no 

apparent requirement of a “temporal or topical connection between

the violation reported to the Commission and the internal disclosure

for which the employee suffers retaliation.” Brief for United States 

as Amicus Curiae 25. The Court need not dwell on related hypotheticals, which veer far from the case at hand. Pp. 16–18.

(5) Finally, the interpretation adopted here would not undermine 

clause (ii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A), which prohibits retaliation against a

whistleblower for “initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the Commission based upon” information conveyed to the SEC by a whistleblower in accordance with the statute.

The statute delegates authority to the Commission to establish the

“manner” in which a whistleblower may provide information to the

SEC. §78u–6(a)(6). Nothing prevents the Commission from enumer-
 

 

 

 

4 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Syllabus 

ating additional means of SEC reporting, including through testimony protected by clause (ii). P. 18. 

(d) Because “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question

at issue,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842, deference is not accorded to the 

contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule 21F–2. Pp. 18–19. 

850 F. 3d 1045, reversed and remanded. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined. 

THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment, in which ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–1276 

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC., PETITIONER v.
 

PAUL SOMERS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 21, 2018]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Endeavoring to root out corporate fraud, Congress

passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 

(Sarbanes-Oxley), and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. 1376 

(Dodd-Frank). Both Acts shield whistleblowers from 

retaliation, but they differ in important respects. Most 

notably, Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all “employees” who 

report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), any other federal agency, 

Congress, or an internal supervisor. 18 U. S. C. 

§1514A(a)(1). Dodd-Frank delineates a more circumscribed class; it defines “whistleblower” to mean a person 

who provides “information relating to a violation of the

securities laws to the Commission.” 15 U. S. C. §78u– 

6(a)(6). A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award 

if original information he or she provides to the SEC leads 

to a successful enforcement action. §78u–6(b)–(g). And, 

most relevant here, a whistleblower is protected from

retaliation for, inter alia, “making disclosures that are

required or protected under” Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securi-
 

 

 

 

2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

ties Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal anti-retaliation 

proscription at 18 U. S. C. §1513(e), or any other 

law subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction. 15 U. S. C. 

§78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii).

The question presented: Does the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank extend to an individual who has not 

reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC and

therefore falls outside the Act’s definition of “whistleblower”? Pet. for Cert. (I). We answer that question “No”: To

sue under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, a person must first “provid[e] . . . information relating to a

violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” 

§78u–6(a)(6). 

I 

A 

“To safeguard investors in public companies and restore

trust in the financial markets following the collapse of 

Enron Corporation,” Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in 

2002. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U. S. 429, ___ (2014) (slip 

op., at 1). Most pertinent here, Sarbanes-Oxley created

new protections for employees at risk of retaliation for 

reporting corporate misconduct. See 18 U. S. C. §1514A.

Section 1514A prohibits certain companies from discharging or otherwise “discriminat[ing] against an employee in 

the terms and conditions of employment because” the 

employee “provid[es] information . . . or otherwise assist[s] 

in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation” of certain criminal fraud statutes, any SEC rule or regulation,

or “any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against 

shareholders.” §1514A(a)(1). An employee qualifies for 

protection when he or she provides information or assistance either to a federal regulatory or law enforcement 

agency, Congress, or any “person with supervisory author-
Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

ity over the employee.” §1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C).1 

To recover under §1514A, an aggrieved employee must

exhaust administrative remedies by “filing a complaint 

with the Secretary of Labor.” §1514A(b)(1)(A); see Lawson, 571 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). Congress

prescribed a 180-day limitation period for filing such a 

complaint. §1514A(b)(2)(D). If the agency “does not issue 

a final decision within 180 days of the filing of [a] complaint, and the [agency’s] delay is not due to bad faith on 

the claimant’s part, the claimant may proceed to federal

district court for de novo review.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6) 

(citing §1514A(b)). An employee who prevails in a proceeding under §1514A is “entitled to all relief necessary to

make the employee whole,” including reinstatement, 

backpay with interest, and any “special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination,” among such 

damages, litigation costs. §1514A(c). 

B 

1 

At issue in this case is the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation 

provision enacted in 2010, eight years after the enactment 

of Sarbanes-Oxley. Passed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank aimed to “promote the financial

stability of the United States by improving accountability 

and transparency in the financial system.” 124 Stat. 1376. 

Dodd-Frank responded to numerous perceived shortcomings in financial regulation. Among them was the

SEC’s need for additional “power, assistance and money at

its disposal” to regulate securities markets. S. Rep. No. 

111–176, pp. 36, 37 (2010). To assist the Commission “in 

—————— 

1Sarbanes-Oxley also prohibits retaliation against an “employee” who 

“file[s], . . . testif[ies], participate[s] in, or otherwise assist[s] in a 

proceeding filed or about to be filed . . . relating to an alleged violation

of” the same provisions of federal law addressed in 18 U. S. C. 

§1514A(a)(1). See §1514A(a)(2). 
 

4 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

identifying securities law violations,” the Act established 

“a new, robust whistleblower program designed to motivate people who know of securities law violations to tell

the SEC.” Id., at 38. And recognizing that “whistleblowers often face the difficult choice between telling the truth

and . . . committing ‘career suicide,’” Congress sought to

protect whistleblowers from employment discrimination. 

Id., at 111, 112. 

Dodd-Frank implemented these goals by adding a new 

provision to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 15

U. S. C. §78u–6. Section 78u–6 begins by defining a

“whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to 

the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis

added). That definition, the statute directs, “shall apply” 

“[i]n this section”—i.e., throughout §78u–6. §78u–6(a). 

Section 78u–6 affords covered whistleblowers both 

incentives and protection. First, the section creates an 

award program for “whistleblowers who voluntarily

provid[e] original information to the Commission that 

le[ads] to the successful enforcement of [a] covered judicial

or administrative action.” §78u–6(b)(1). A qualifying

whistleblower is entitled to a cash award of 10 to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected in the enforcement action. See §78u–6(b)(1)(A)–(B). 

Second, §78u–6(h) prohibits an employer from discharging, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against a 

“whistleblower” “because of any lawful act done by the 

whistleblower” in three situations: first, “in providing

information to the Commission in accordance with [§78u–

6],” §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i); second, “in initiating, testifying in,

or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the Commission based upon” information provided to the SEC in

accordance with §78u–6, §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii); and third, “in 

making disclosures that are required or protected under” 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

either Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securities Exchange Act of

1934, the criminal anti-retaliation prohibition at 18 

U. S. C. §1513(e),2 or “any other law, rule, or regulation

subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” §78u–

6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Clause (iii), by cross-referencing SarbanesOxley and other laws, protects disclosures made to a

variety of individuals and entities in addition to the SEC.

For example, the clause shields an employee’s reports of 

wrongdoing to an internal supervisor if the reports are

independently safeguarded from retaliation under SarbanesOxley. See supra, at 2–3.3 

The recovery procedures under the anti-retaliation 

provisions of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley differ in

critical respects. First, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, which

contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement and a

180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18

U. S. C. §1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), Dodd-Frank permits a 

whistleblower to sue a current or former employer directly 

—————— 

2Section 1513(e) provides: “Whoever knowingly, with the intent to 

retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the 

commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” 3Section 78u–6(h)(1)(A) reads in full:

“No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, 

directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a 

whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of 

any lawful act done by the whistleblower— 

“(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with

this section; 

“(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or 

judicial or administrative action of the Commission based upon or

related to such information; or 

“(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U. S. C. §7201 et seq.), this chapter,

including section 78j–l(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of title 18, and

any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the 

Commission.” 
 

 

6 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

in federal district court, with a default limitation period of 

six years, see §78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa). Second, DoddFrank instructs a court to award to a prevailing plaintiff 

double backpay with interest, see §78u–6(h)(1)(C)(ii), 

while Sarbanes-Oxley limits recovery to actual backpay 

with interest, see 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(2)(B). Like SarbanesOxley, however, Dodd-Frank authorizes reinstatement 

and compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, 

and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Compare §78u–

6(h)(1)(C)(i), (iii), with 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(2)(A), (C).4 

2 

Congress authorized the SEC “to issue such rules and

regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of [§78u–6] consistent with the purposes of this section.” §78u–6(j). Pursuant to this authority, the SEC published a notice of proposed rulemaking to 

“Implemen[t] the Whistleblower Provisions” of DoddFrank. 75 Fed. Reg. 70488 (2010). Proposed Rule 21F–

2(a) defined a “whistleblower,” for purposes of both the 

award and anti-retaliation provisions of §78u–6, as one or 

more individuals who “provide the Commission with information relating to a potential violation of the securities 

laws.” Id., at 70519 (proposed 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)).

The proposed rule, the agency noted, “tracks the statutory

definition of a ‘whistleblower’” by requiring information

reporting to the SEC itself. 75 Fed. Reg. 70489. 

In promulgating the final Rule, however, the agency 

changed course. Rule 21F–2, in finished form, contains 

two discrete “whistleblower” definitions. See 17 CFR 

§240.21F–2(a)–(b) (2017). For purposes of the award 

program, the Rule states that “[y]ou are a whistleblower if 

—————— 

4Unlike Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley explicitly entitles a prevailing

employee to “all relief necessary to make the employee whole,” including “compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the

discrimination.” 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(1), (2)(C). 
Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

. . . you provide the Commission with information . . . 

relat[ing] to a possible violation of the Federal securities

laws.” §240.21F–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The information must be provided to the SEC through its website 

or by mailing or faxing a specified form to the SEC Office

of the Whistleblower. See ibid.; §240.21F–9(a)(1)–(2).

“For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections,” however, the Rule states that “[y]ou are a whistleblower if . . .

[y]ou possess a reasonable belief that the information you 

are providing relates to a possible securities law violation”

and “[y]ou provide that information in a manner described 

in” clauses (i) through (iii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A). 17 CFR 

§240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii). “The anti-retaliation protections

apply,” the Rule emphasizes, “whether or not you satisfy 

the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for

an award.” §240.21F–2(b)(1)(iii). An individual may

therefore gain anti-retaliation protection as a “whistleblower” under Rule 21F–2 without providing information 

to the SEC, so long as he or she provides information in a 

manner shielded by one of the anti-retaliation provision’s

three clauses. For example, a report to a company supervisor would qualify if the report garners protection under 

the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision.5 

C 

Petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) is a 

real estate investment trust that owns, acquires, and 

develops data centers. See Brief for Petitioner 3. Digital 

Realty employed respondent Paul Somers as a Vice President from 2010 to 2014. See 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 

(ND Cal. 2015). Somers alleges that Digital Realty terminated him shortly after he reported to senior management 

suspected securities-law violations by the company. See 

—————— 

5 In 2015, the SEC issued an interpretive rule reiterating that antiretaliation protection is not contingent on a whistleblower’s provision of

information to the Commission. See 80 Fed. Reg. 47829 (2015). 
 

 

 

8 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

ibid. Although nothing impeded him from alerting the

SEC prior to his termination, he did not do so. See Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 45. Nor did he file an administrative complaint 

within 180 days of his termination, rendering him ineligible for relief under Sarbanes-Oxley. See ibid.; 18 U. S. C. 

§1514A(b)(2)(D).

Somers brought suit in the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California alleging, inter alia, 

a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. 

Digital Realty moved to dismiss that claim, arguing that 

“Somers does not qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ under [§78u–

6(h)] because he did not report any alleged law violations

to the SEC.” 119 F. Supp. 3d, at 1094. The District Court 

denied the motion. Rule 21F–2, the court observed, does 

not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistleblower” status under Dodd-Frank. See id., at 1095– 

1096. Finding the statutory scheme ambiguous, the court 

accorded deference to the SEC’s Rule under Chevron 

U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

467 U. S. 837 (1984). See 119 F. Supp. 3d, at 1096–1106.

On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 850 F. 3d 1045 

(2017). The majority acknowledged that Dodd-Frank’s

definitional provision describes a “whistleblower” as an 

individual who provides information to the SEC itself. Id., 

at 1049. But applying that definition to the antiretaliation provision, the majority reasoned, would narrow 

the third clause of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) “to the point of absurdity”: The statute would protect employees only if they 

“reported possible securities violations both internally and 

to the SEC.” Ibid. Such dual reporting, the majority

believed, was unlikely to occur. Ibid. Therefore, the 

majority concluded, the statute should be read to protect

employees who make disclosures privileged by clause (iii) 

of §78u–6(h)(1)(A), whether or not those employees also 

provide information to the SEC. Id., at 1050. In any 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

event, the majority held, the SEC’s resolution of any statutory ambiguity warranted deference. Ibid. Judge Owens

dissented. In his view, the statutory definition of whistleblower was clear, left no room for interpretation, and

plainly governed. Id., at 1051. 

Two other Courts of Appeals have weighed in on the 

question before us. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit has held that employees must provide information 

to the SEC to avail themselves of Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation safeguard. See Asadi v. G. E. Energy (USA), 

L. L. C., 720 F. 3d 620, 630 (2013). A divided panel of the 

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, over a dissent by Judge Jacobs. See Berman v. NEO@OGILVY LLC, 801 F. 3d 145, 155 (2013).

We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 582 U. S. ___ 

(2017), and now reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment. 

II 

“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must

follow that definition,” even if it varies from a term’s 

ordinary meaning. Burgess v. United States, 553 U. S. 

124, 130 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

principle resolves the question before us. 

A 

Our charge in this review proceeding is to determine the

meaning of “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), Dodd-Frank’s

anti-retaliation provision. The definition section of the 

statute supplies an unequivocal answer: A “whistleblower”

is “any individual who provides . . . information relating to 

a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” 

§78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Leaving no doubt as to

the definition’s reach, the statute instructs that the “definitio[n] shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is, throughout

§78u–6. §78u–6(a)(6). 

The whistleblower definition operates in conjunction 
 

 

10 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

with the three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell out the

provision’s scope. The definition first describes who is 

eligible for protection—namely, a whistleblower who

provides pertinent information “to the Commission.” 

§78u–6(a)(6). The three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) then 

describe what conduct, when engaged in by a whistleblower, is shielded from employment discrimination. See 

§78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). An individual who meets both 

measures may invoke Dodd-Frank’s protections. But an 

individual who falls outside the protected category of 

“whistleblowers” is ineligible to seek redress under the 

statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual 

engages.

Reinforcing our reading, another whistleblowerprotection provision in Dodd-Frank imposes no requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency. 

Title 10 of the statute, which created the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), prohibits discrimination against a “covered employee” who, among other 

things, “provide[s] . . . information to [his or her] employer, 

the Bureau, or any other State, local, or Federal, government authority or law enforcement agency relating to” a

violation of a law subject to the CFPB’s jurisdiction. 12 

U. S. C. §5567(a)(1). To qualify as a “covered employee,” 

an individual need not provide information to the CFPB,

or any other entity. See §5567(b) (“covered employee” 

means “any individual performing tasks related to the

offering or provision of a consumer financial product or 

service”).

“[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one

section of a statute but omits it in another[,] . . . this Court 

presumes that Congress intended a difference in meaning.” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)

(slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Congress placed a government-reporting requirement in §78u–6(h), but not elsewhere in the same 
Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

statute. Courts are not at liberty to dispense with the

condition—tell the SEC—Congress imposed. 

B 

Dodd-Frank’s purpose and design corroborate our comprehension of §78u–6(h)’s reporting requirement. The 

“core objective” of Dodd-Frank’s robust whistleblower 

program, as Somers acknowledges, Tr. of Oral Arg. 45, is

“to motivate people who know of securities law violations 

to tell the SEC,” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38 (emphasis 

added). By enlisting whistleblowers to “assist the Government [in] identify[ing] and prosecut[ing] persons who

have violated securities laws,” Congress undertook to 

improve SEC enforcement and facilitate the Commission’s

“recover[y] [of] money for victims of financial fraud.” Id., 

at 110. To that end, §78u–6 provides substantial monetary rewards to whistleblowers who furnish actionable 

information to the SEC. See §78u–6(b). 

Financial inducements alone, Congress recognized, may 

be insufficient to encourage certain employees, fearful of

employer retaliation, to come forward with evidence of 

wrongdoing. Congress therefore complemented the DoddFrank monetary incentives for SEC reporting by heightening protection against retaliation. While Sarbanes-Oxley

contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement, a 

180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, and a 

remedial scheme limited to actual damages, Dodd-Frank

provides for immediate access to federal court, a generous

statute of limitations (at least six years), and the opportunity to recover double backpay. See supra, at 5–6. 

Dodd-Frank’s award program and anti-retaliation provision thus work synchronously to motivate individuals with

knowledge of illegal activity to “tell the SEC.” S. Rep. No. 

111–176, at 38. 

When enacting Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower regime,

in comparison, Congress had a more far-reaching objec-
 

 

12 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

tive: It sought to disturb the “corporate code of silence”

that “discourage[d] employees from reporting fraudulent 

behavior not only to the proper authorities, such as the 

FBI and the SEC, but even internally.” Lawson, 571 U. S., 

at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision 

covers employees who report fraud not only to the SEC,

but also to any other federal agency, Congress, or an

internal supervisor. See 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1). 

C 

In sum, Dodd-Frank’s text and purpose leave no doubt

that the term “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h) carries the

meaning set forth in the section’s definitional provision.

The disposition of this case is therefore evident: Somers

did not provide information “to the Commission” before his 

termination, §78u–6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a “whistleblower” at the time of the alleged retaliation. He is 

therefore ineligible to seek relief under §78u–6(h). 

III 

Somers and the Solicitor General tender a different view 

of Dodd-Frank’s compass. The whistleblower definition, 

as they see it, applies only to the statute’s award program,

not to its anti-retaliation provision, and thus not, as the

definition plainly states, throughout “this section,” §78u–

6(a). See Brief for Respondent 30; Brief for United States 

as Amicus Curiae 10–11. For purposes of the antiretaliation provision alone, they urge us to construe the 

term “whistleblower” in its “ordinary sense,” i.e., without 

any SEC-reporting requirement. Brief for Respondent 18.

Doing so, Somers and the Solicitor General contend,

would align with our precedent, specifically Lawson v. 

Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198 (1949), and 

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. ___ (2014). 

In those decisions, we declined to apply a statutory defini-
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

tion that ostensibly governed where doing so would have 

been “incompatible with . . . Congress’ regulatory scheme,” 

id., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (internal quotation marks omitted), or would have “destroy[ed] one of the [statute’s] 

major purposes,” Suwannee Fruit, 336 U. S., at 201. 

This case is of a piece, Somers and the Solicitor General

maintain. Applying the statutory definition here, they

variously charge, would “create obvious incongruities,”

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (internal

quotation marks omitted), “produce anomalous results,” 

id., at 22, “vitiate much of the [statute’s] protection,” id., 

at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, as the

Court of Appeals put it, narrow clause (iii) of §78u–

6(h)(1)(A) “to the point of absurdity,” Brief for Respondent 

35 (quoting 850 F. 3d, at 1049). We next address these 

concerns and explain why they do not lead us to depart 

from the statutory text. 

A 

It would gut “much of the protection afforded by” the

third clause of §78u–6(h)(1)(a), Somers and the Solicitor 

General urge most strenuously, to apply the whistleblower

definition to the anti-retaliation provision. Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 20 (internal quotation marks

omitted); Brief for Respondent 28–29. As earlier noted, 

see supra, at 4–5, clause (iii) prohibits retaliation against 

a “whistleblower” for “making disclosures” to various 

persons and entities, including but not limited to the SEC, 

to the extent those disclosures are “required or protected 

under” various laws other than Dodd-Frank. §78u–

6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Applying the statutory definition of whistleblower, however, would limit clause (iii)’s protection to

“only those individuals who report to the Commission.”

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. 

The plain-text reading of the statute undoubtedly 

shields fewer individuals from retaliation than the alter-
 

14 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

native proffered by Somers and the Solicitor General. But 

we do not agree that this consequence “vitiate[s]” clause

(iii)’s protection, id., at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted), or ranks as “absur[d],” Brief for Respondent 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).6 In fact, our reading

leaves the third clause with “substantial meaning.” Brief 

for Petitioner 32. 

With the statutory definition incorporated, clause (iii) 

protects a whistleblower who reports misconduct both to 

the SEC and to another entity, but suffers retaliation

because of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. That would be 

so, for example, where the retaliating employer is unaware that the employee has alerted the SEC. In such a 

case, without clause (iii), retaliation for internal reporting 

would not be reached by Dodd-Frank, for clause (i) applies 

only where the employer retaliates against the employee 

“because of ” the SEC reporting. §78u–6(h)(1)(A). Moreover, even where the employer knows of the SEC reporting, 

the third clause may operate to dispel a proof problem: 

The employee can recover under the statute without having to demonstrate whether the retaliation was motivated

by the internal report (thus yielding protection under

clause (iii)) or by the SEC disclosure (thus gaining protection under clause (i)).

While the Solicitor General asserts that limiting the 

protections of clause (iii) to dual reporters would “shrink

to insignificance the [clause’s] ban on retaliation,” Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation

marks omitted), he offers scant evidence to support that

assertion. Tugging in the opposite direction, he reports 

that approximately 80 percent of the whistleblowers who

received awards in 2016 “reported internally before report-

—————— 

6The Solicitor General, unlike Somers, acknowledges that it would 

not be absurd to apply the “whistleblower” definition to the antiretaliation provision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

ing to the Commission.” Id., at 23. And Digital Realty 

cites real-world examples of dual reporters seeking DoddFrank or Sarbanes-Oxley recovery for alleged retaliation.

See Brief for Petitioner 33, and n. 4 (collecting cases).

Overlooked by Somers and the Solicitor General, in dualreporting cases, retaliation not prompted by SEC disclosures (and thus unaddressed by clause (i)) is likely commonplace: The SEC is required to protect the identity of 

whistleblowers, see §78u–6(h)(2)(A), so employers will

often be unaware that an employee has reported to the 

Commission. In any event, even if the number of individuals qualifying for protection under clause (iii) is relatively 

limited, “[i]t is our function to give the statute the effect

its language suggests, however modest that may be.” 

Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 

270 (2010). 

B 

Somers and the Solicitor General express concern that

our reading would jettison protection for auditors, attorneys, and other employees subject to internal-reporting

requirements. See Brief for Respondent 35; Brief for 

United States as Amicus Curiae 21. Sarbanes-Oxley, for

example, requires auditors and attorneys to report certain 

information within the company before making disclosures 

externally. See 15 U. S. C. §§78j–1(b), 7245; 17 CFR 

§205.3. If the whistleblower definition applies, Somers

and the Solicitor General fear, these professionals will be

“le[ft] . . . vulnerable to discharge or other retaliatory

action for complying with” their internal-reporting obligations. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our reading shields employees in these circumstances, 

however, as soon as they also provide relevant information 

to the Commission. True, such employees will remain 

ineligible for Dodd-Frank’s protection until they tell the 
 

 

 

16 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

SEC, but this result is consistent with Congress’ aim to

encourage SEC disclosures. See S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 

38; supra, at 3–4, 11. Somers worries that lawyers and 

auditors will face retaliation quickly, before they have a 

chance to report to the SEC. Brief for Respondent 35–36.

But he offers nothing to show that Congress had this 

concern in mind when it enacted §78u–6(h). Indeed, Congress may well have considered adequate the safeguards

already afforded by Sarbanes-Oxley, protections specifically designed to shield lawyers, accountants, and similar 

professionals. See Lawson, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 17). 

C 

Applying the whistleblower definition as written, Somers and the Solicitor General further protest, will create 

“an incredibly unusual statutory scheme”: “[I]dentical

misconduct”—i.e., retaliating against an employee for

internal reporting—will “go punished or not based on the

happenstance of a separate report” to the SEC, of which

the wrongdoer may “not even be aware.” Brief for Respondent 37–38. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. The upshot, the Solicitor General warns, 

“would [be] substantially diminish[ed] Dodd-Fran[k] deterrent effect.” Ibid. 

Overlooked in this protest is Dodd-Frank’s core objective: to prompt reporting to the SEC. Supra, at 3–4, 11. 

In view of that precise aim, it is understandable that the 

statute’s retaliation protections, like its financial rewards, 

would be reserved for employees who have done what 

Dodd-Frank seeks to achieve, i.e., they have placed information about unlawful activity before the Commission to

aid its enforcement efforts. 

D 

Pointing to another purported anomaly attending the 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

reading we adopt today, the Solicitor General observes 

that neither the whistleblower definition nor §78u–6(h)

contains any requirement of a “temporal or topical connection between the violation reported to the Commission and 

the internal disclosure for which the employee suffers

retaliation.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. 

It is therefore possible, the Solicitor General posits, that 

“an employee who was fired for reporting accounting fraud

to his supervisor in 2017 would have a cause of action 

under [§78u–6(h)] if he had reported an insider-trading

violation by his previous employer to the Commission in

2012.” Ibid. For its part, Digital Realty agrees that this

scenario could arise, but does not see it as a cause for 

concern: “Congress,” it states, “could reasonably have 

made the policy judgment that individuals who report 

securities-law violations to the SEC should receive broad 

protection over time against retaliation for a variety of 

disclosures.” Reply Brief 11.

We need not dwell on the situation hypothesized by the 

Solicitor General, for it veers far from the case before us. 

We note, however, that the interpretation offered by Somers and the Solicitor General—i.e., ignoring the statutory 

definition when construing the anti-retaliation provision—

raises an even thornier question about the law’s scope.

Their view, which would not require an employee to provide information relating to a securities-law violation to

the SEC, could afford Dodd-Frank protection to an employee who reports information bearing no relationship 

whatever to the securities laws. That prospect could be 

imagined based on the broad array of federal statutes and 

regulations cross-referenced by clause (iii) of the antiretaliation provision. E.g., 18 U. S. C. §1513(e) (criminalizing retaliation for “providing to a law enforcement officer

any truthful information relating to the commission . . . of 

any Federal offense” (emphasis added)); see supra, at 5, 

and n. 2. For example, an employee fired for reporting a 
 

18 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of the Court 

coworker’s drug dealing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation might be protected. Brief for Petitioner 38. It 

would make scant sense, however, to rank an FBI drugtrafficking informant a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank,

a law concerned only with encouraging the reporting of 

“securities law violations.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38 

(emphasis added). 

E 

Finally, the interpretation we adopt, the Solicitor General adds, would undermine not just clause (iii) of §78u–

6(h)(1)(A), but clause (ii) as well. Clause (ii) prohibits

retaliation against a whistleblower for “initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the 

Commission based upon” information conveyed to the SEC

by a whistleblower in accordance with the statute. §78u–

6(h)(1)(A)(ii). If the whistleblower definition is applied to

§78u–6(h), the Solicitor General states, “an employer could

fire an employee for giving . . . testimony [to the SEC] if 

the employee had not previously reported to the Commission online or through the specified written form”—i.e., the 

methods currently prescribed by Rule 21F–9 for a whistleblower to provide information to the Commission. Brief 

for United States as Amicus Curiae 20–21 (citing 17 CFR

§240.21F–9(a)(1)–(2)).

But the statute expressly delegates authority to the SEC

to establish the “manner” in which information may be 

provided to the Commission by a whistleblower. See 

§78u–6(a)(6). Nothing in today’s opinion prevents the 

agency from enumerating additional means of SEC reporting—including through testimony protected by clause (ii). 

IV 

For the foregoing reasons, we find the statute’s definition of “whistleblower” clear and conclusive. Because 

“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

issue,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842, we do not accord deference to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule

21F–2. See 17 CFR §240.21F–2(b)(1); supra, at 6–7. The 

statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition, in short,

precludes the Commission from more expansively interpreting that term. See Burgess, 553 U. S., at 130. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–1276 

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC., PETITIONER v.
 

PAUL SOMERS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 21, 2018]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,

concurring. 

I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately only

to note my disagreement with the suggestion in my colleague’s concurrence that a Senate Report is not an appropriate source for this Court to consider when interpreting 

a statute. 

Legislative history is of course not the law, but that does

not mean it cannot aid us in our understanding of a law. 

Just as courts are capable of assessing the reliability and 

utility of evidence generally, they are capable of assessing

the reliability and utility of legislative-history materials. 

Committee reports, like the Senate Report the Court

discusses here, see ante, at 3–4, 11–12, 16–18, are a particularly reliable source to which we can look to ensure our

fidelity to Congress’ intended meaning. See Garcia v. 

United States, 469 U. S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the 

Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the 

considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed 

legislation’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 186 

(1969))). Bills presented to Congress for consideration are

generally accompanied by a committee report. Such re-
 

 

2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

ports are typically circulated at least two days before a bill 

is to be considered on the floor and provide Members of

Congress and their staffs with information about “a bill’s 

context, purposes, policy implications, and details,” along 

with information on its supporters and opponents. R. 

Katzmann, Judging Statutes 20, and n. 62 (2014) (citing A.

LaRue, Senate Manual Containing the Standing Rules,

Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of

the United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 107–1, p. 17 (2001)). 

These materials “have long been important means of

informing the whole chamber about proposed legislation,” 

Katzmann, Judging Statutes, at 19, a point Members

themselves have emphasized over the years.* It is thus no 

surprise that legislative staffers view committee and 

conference reports as the most reliable type of legislative 

history. See Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 

From the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 

Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan.

L. Rev. 901, 977 (2013).

Legislative history can be particularly helpful when a 

—————— 

*See, e.g., Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, To

Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States before

the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 65–66

(1986) (Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (“[A]s one who has served in Congress 

for 12 years, legislative history is very important to those of us here 

who want further detailed expression of that legislative intent”); Mikva,

Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. Tex. L. Rev. 181, 184 (1986) (“The

committee report is the bone structure of the legislation. It is the road 

map that explains why things are in and things are out of the statute”); 

Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of

Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 28

(1994) (compiling the views of former Members on “the central importance of committee reports to their own understanding of statutory 

text”). In fact, some Members “are more likely to vote . . . based on a 

reading of the legislative history than on a reading of the statute itself.” 

Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An 

Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons:

Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 968 (2013). 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

statute is ambiguous or deals with especially complex 

matters. But even when, as here, a statute’s meaning can

clearly be discerned from its text, consulting reliable 

legislative history can still be useful, as it enables us to

corroborate and fortify our understanding of the text. See, 

e.g., Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 331–332 (2011); 

Carr v. United States, 560 U. S. 438, 457–458 (2010).

Moreover, confirming our construction of a statute by

considering reliable legislative history shows respect for 

and promotes comity with a coequal branch of Government. See Katzmann, Judging Statutes, at 35–36.

For these reasons, I do not think it wise for judges to

close their eyes to reliable legislative history—and the

realities of how Members of Congress create and enact 

laws—when it is available. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–1276 

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC., PETITIONER v.
 

PAUL SOMERS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 21, 2018]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO and 

JUSTICE GORSUCH join, concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment. 

I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent it relies on 

the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. The 

question in this case is whether the term “whistleblower”

in Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision, 15 U. S. C.

§78u–6(h)(1), includes a person who does not report information to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 

answer is in the definitions section of the statute, which 

states that the term “whistleblower” means a person who

provides “information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). As the Court 

observes, this statutory definition “resolves the question 

before us.” Ante, at 9. The Court goes on, however, to 

discuss the supposed “purpose” of the statute, which it

primarily derives from a single Senate Report. See ante, 

at 3–4, 11–12, 16–18. Even assuming a majority of Congress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for

Dodd-Frank with the same intent, “we are a government

of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress 

enacted rather than by what it intended.”* Lawson v. 

—————— 

*For what it is worth, I seriously doubt that a committee report is a 
 

 

 

 

2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

—————— 

“particularly reliable source” for discerning “Congress’ intended meaning.” Ante, at 1 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). The following exchange 

on the Senate floor is telling:

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether 

or not he wrote the committee report? 

“Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report? 

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. 

“Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee report. 

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report? 

“Mr. DOLE. I have to check. 

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who

wrote the committee report? 

“Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to 

search. I was here all during the time it was written, I might say, and 

worked carefully with the staff as they worked. . . .

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas, 

the chairman of the Finance Committee, read the committee report in 

its entirety?

“Mr. DOLE. I am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it.

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, did members of the Finance 

Committee vote on the committee report?

“Mr. DOLE. No. 

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. . . . The report itself is not considered by the 

Committee on Finance. It was not subject to amendment by the Committee on Finance. It is not subject to amendment now by the Senate.

. . . If there were matter within this report which was disagreed to by 

the Senator from Colorado or even by a majority of all Senators, there 

would be no way for us to change the report. I could not offer an 

amendment tonight to amend the committee report. . . . [L]et me just 

make the point that this is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not

subject to amendment, and we should discipline ourselves to the task of

expressing congressional intent in the statute.” Hirschey v. FERC, 777 

F. 2d 1, 7–8, n. 1 (CADC 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 128

Cong. Rec. 16918–16919 (1982)). See also Kethledge, Ambiguities and

Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 

Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315, 317–318 (2017) (describing his experience

as a Senate staffer who drafted legislative history “like being a teenager at home while your parents are away for the weekend: there was no

supervision. I was able to write more or less what I pleased. . . . [M]ost 

members of Congress . . . have no idea at all about what is in the 

legislative history for a particular bill”). 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

FMR LLC, 571 U. S. 429, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring 

in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1). And 

“it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that 

would require Congress to state in committee reports . . . 

that which is obvious on the face of a statute.” Harrison v. 

PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980). For these 

reasons, I am unable to join the portions of the Court’s 

opinion that venture beyond the statutory text.