alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       3,401,118
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   32,150
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      53,078,653
<DEPRECIATION>                            (34,096,460)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,119,002
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                     35,730,147
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,119,002
<SALES>                                      7,506,798
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,593,659
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,426,332
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,521,383
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            645,944
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   645,944
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32 (b)

                             CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

        In connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Enzo  Biochem,  Inc.,  and
Subsidiaries ("the Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2004 as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Barry Weiner.,  Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.  906  of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or
15 (d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


        (2) The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


         /s/  Barry Weiner




         Barry Weiner
         Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>    1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         118,680
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      548
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (58)
<INVENTORY>                                      2,120
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               133,677
<PP&E>                                           3,996
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (1,256)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 136,417
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,087
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            35
<OTHER-SE>                                     124,519
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   124,554
<SALES>                                          1,318
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,318
<CGS>                                          (2,396)
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  (2,396)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                56,274
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  37
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (55,410)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (55,410)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (55,410)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (3.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (3.32)


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Larry M. Peterson, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 864]

Appeal from a judgment of the Cattaraugus County Court (M. William Boiler, A.J.), rendered May 14, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 220.39 [1]). We agree with defendant that the waiver of the right to appeal does not encompass his challenge to the severity of the sentence because “no mention was made on the record during the course of the allocution concerning the waiver of defendant’s right to appeal” with respect to his conviction that he was also waiving his right to appeal any issue concerning the severity of the sentence *(People v Pimentel,*108 AD3d 861, 862 [2013]; *see People v Maracle,*19 NY3d 925, 928 [2012]). We nevertheless conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present — Smith, J.P, Centra, Fahey, Garni and Whalen, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification by David C. Warren Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the filing of the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Year Ended December 31, 2003 (the Report) by eMerge Interactive,
Inc. (Registrant), the undersigned hereby certifies that:



1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and



2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.



/s/    DAVID C.
WARRENDavid C. WarrenPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Director(Principal Executive Officer)
#### State v. Hennis

Case below: 184 N.C. App. - (3 July 2007)

No. 342P07

AG’s Motion for Temporary Stay (COA06-1134)

Allowed 07/19/07
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ruben Morales-Lopez, Also Known as Ruben Morales, Appellant.

[973 NYS2d 442]

Egan Jr., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Washington County (McKeighan, J.), rendered October 14, 2011, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the first degree.

Defendant was charged in a seven-count indictment with numerous crimes stemming from his unlawful entry into his former wife’s home, during the course of which he punched and strangled her in the presence — or within earshot — of their two *1249small children. In full satisfaction of that indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to burglary in the first degree and waived his right to appeal with the express understanding that County Court would sentence him to a period of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 14 years, together with a period of postrelease supervision ranging from *2%*to 5 years. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.

We affirm. Although defendant asserts that the sentence imposed, which fell within the range promised by County Court, is harsh and excessive, he is “precluded from raising this claim given his valid waiver of the right to appeal” *(People v Cano,*93 AD3d 994, 994 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 995 [2012]; *see People v Lewis,*95 AD3d 1442, 1443 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 998 [2012]). Assuming, without deciding, that such waiver does not also encompass County Court’s alleged violation of CPL 380.50, defendant failed to preserve this argument by registering an appropriate objection at the sentencing hearing — at which time the asserted omission could have been remedied *(cf. People v Cianfarani,*81 AD3d 998, 999 [2011]; *People v Wallace,*29 AD3d 1085, 1085 [2006], *lv denied*7 NY3d 796 [2006]). Finally, by pleading guilty and waiving his right to appeal, defendant forfeited any claim that the order of protection issued by County Court was overbroad *(see People v Trombley,*91 AD 3d 1197, 1200 [2012], *lv denied*21 NY3d 914 [2013]).*

Lahtinen, J.P., Stein and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

*

 That said, defendant retains the right to apply to County Court for a modification of the order of protection.
1 Distr ict Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana,

sitting by designation.

2 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-50399

ESTEBAN VILLEGAS-ALANIS; ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

ESTEBAN VILLEGAS-ALANIS; SAN JUANITA GONZALES DE VILLEGAS; MARIA DE LA PAZ VILLEGAS; ALEJANDRO VILLEGAS; JUAN ESTEBAN

VILLEGAS; JOSE LOPEZ; ANTONIO CAZARES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

JAMES D. WURTH; ROBERT L. SCHEER; MIKE MORRIS; MURRAY

EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

(DR-99-CV-66)

May 14, 2001
Before POLITZ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges, and FALLON, 1
District Judge.

PER CURIAM: 2

Having considered the briefs, pertinent parts of the record,

and the arguments of counsel, and concluding there was no abuse ofdiscretio n, the denial of a preliminary injunction prior to the

dist rict court ruling, i nter alia , on personal jurisdiction is

affirmed, and this matter is remanded for further appropriate
proceedings.

AFFIRMED
111, 911 11



# 111111l 

# 11 

# 1a1 * 1111

1 

### STATE OF LOUISIANA maml-

10 WESLEY S. RICKS NO. 2023 KW 1124 

### JANUARY 29, 2024 In Re: 

### Wesley S. Ricks, applying for supervisory writs, 

### 20th

Judicial District Court, Parish of West Feliciana, No. 

### 16-WCR-259. BEFORE: PENZATO, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.

WRIT DENIED AS MOOT. We are 

## advised by the office of the Clerk of Court of West Feliciana Parish that the trial court 

### acted on relator's writ of habeas corpus on August 14, 2023. AHP CHH Smm
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claudio JIMENEZ-MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-40414.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Oct. 25, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Sarah Beth Landau, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Claudio Jimenez-Martinez, Federal Correctional Institution, Three Rivers, TX, pro se.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Claudio Jimenez-Martinez (Jimenez) has requested leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as required by *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Jimenez received a copy of counsel’s motion but filed no response. Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses no nonfrivo-lous issues for appeal. Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-6123

In Re: MICHAEL A. HARRIS, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (No. 5:05-cv-00092-FPS) Submitted: April 19, 2007 Decided: April 25, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael A. Harris, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Michael A. Harris petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) petition. He seeks an order from this court directing the district court to act. Our review of the docket sheet reveals that the magistrate judge filed on March 9, 2007, a recommendation that the § 2241 petition be denied. Accordingly, because significant action has recently occurred in this case, we deny the mandamus petition. We grant Harris’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### Deborah Mello, Appellant, v Narco Cab Corp. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[963 NYS2d 581]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (George J. Silver, J.), entered April 11, 2012, which, in this action for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident, denied plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as against all defendants, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted to the extent of finding no culpable conduct by plaintiff on the issue of liability, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff established that, as a back-seat passenger in a taxi cab that rear-ended a second vehicle, she was free of negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff testified that just before the ac*635cident occurred, her friend, who was with her in the back seat, was in the process of instructing the driver to slow down. The driver testified he did not hear plaintiffs friend, and there is no basis for finding that plaintiff or her friend did anything to cause the accident or could have prevented it *(cf. Bruni v City of New York,*2 NY3d 319, 328 [2004]). Since plaintiff was an innocent rear-seat passenger who cannot be found at fault under any version of how the accident occurred, the motion should have been granted to the extent indicated *(see Garcia v Tri-County Ambulette Serv.,*282 AD2d 206 [1st Dept 2001]; *see also Medina v Rodriguez,*92 AD3d 850 [2d Dept 2012]).

Concur— Tom, J.E, Acosta, Saxe, Freedman and Feinman, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Frances May Rankin, Respondent, v Russell Robert Rankin, Respondent, and Alexa Mary-Jean Matz, Appellant.

[975 NYS2d 337]

Order, Family Court, New York County (Carol J. Goldstein, Ct. Atty. Ref.), entered on or about October 12, 2012, which denied respondent mother’s motion to dismiss the petition of paternal grandmother for visitation with the subject child, and scheduled the matter for trial, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

It is undisputed that the child and the mother lived in New York since the child’s birth, and that New York was the child’s home state at the time of the initial custody order. It is also undisputed that New York remained the child’s home state at the time the petition was filed. Thus, the court had jurisdiction to modify its initial custody order, which limited visitation to the father *(see*Domestic Relations Law §§ 76 [1] [a]; 76-a [2]). Moreover, New York retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction because no determination was made that the child, the child and one parent, or the child and a person acting as a parent lacked a significant connection to this state, that substantial evidence was no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships, or that the child and the parent lived in another state, since the mother and the child did not move to Florida until after the petition was filed *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 76-a [1] [a]).

The court properly exercised its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the parties after they moved to other states because the mother failed to sustain her burden of demonstrating that public or private interests militated against the litigation going forward in this state *(see Islamic Republic of Iran v Pahlavi,*62 NY2d 474, 479 [1984], *cert denied*469 US 1108 [1985]), where an alternative forum was unavailable to the petitioner grandmother. Concur — Andrias, J.E, Friedman, Richter, ManzanetDaniels and Feinman, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-03-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-29-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-27-1998
<CASH>                                          11,752
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,873
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (45)
<INVENTORY>                                      4,738
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                27,006
<PP&E>                                          30,131
<DEPRECIATION>                                (11,893)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  64,538
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,187
<BONDS>                                        101,084
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            13
<OTHER-SE>                                    (55,322)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    64,538
<SALES>                                         18,246
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                18,246
<CGS>                                           10,933
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,933
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,088
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     5
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,722
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,680
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,049
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,631
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,631
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Citimortgage, Inc., Respondent, v Isaac Brown, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[974 NYS2d 272]

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Isaac Brown appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Ecker, J.), dated October 31, 2011, as denied his motion, inter alia, in effect, pursuant to CFLR 5015 (a) (3) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court (Owen, J.) dated January 14, 2009, entered upon his default in appearing or answering the complaint.

*594Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The appellant moved, inter alia, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale entered upon his default in appearing or answering the complaint, and, thereupon, to dismiss the complaint. The appellant argued that the instrument assigning the mortgage to the plaintiff was fraudulently executed and filed so that the plaintiff could commence this action. The Supreme Court denied the appellant’s motion on the ground that he had made several prior applications to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale, and was collaterally estopped from seeking the same relief again. We affirm the order insofar as appealed from, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the Supreme Court.

The appellant did not demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged in the type of fraud or misconduct that would warrant vacatur of the judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) *(see U.S. Bank N.A. v Allen,*102 AD3d 955 [2013]; *US Bank N.A. v Tate,*102 AD3d 859 [2013]; *Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Hunter,*100 AD3d 810 [2012]; *Bank of N.Y. v Stradford,*55 AD3d 765, 766 [2008]). Moreover, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the invocation of a court’s inherent power to vacate a judgment in the interest of substantial justice is warranted in this case *(see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp.,*100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003]; *U.S. Bank N.A. v Slavinski,*78 AD3d 1167, 1168 [2010]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion, inter alia, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale. Dillon, J.P, Lott, Austin and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**








**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Shiming U.S., Inc. ("the Company") on
      Form
      10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Shiming Wang, Chief
      Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
      knowledge:


(1)
              the
                  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
                  15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                  and
 
 (2)
              the
                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                  respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
                  Company.







/s/
      Shiming Wang





Shiming
      Wang


Chief
      Executive Officer





Dated:
      April 17, 2007