UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA

___________________________________ ) J I L L IAN L . BROWN, ) ) Plaintiff, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-2456 ( PL F) ) CHI L DREN’S NATI ONAL MEDI CAL ) CENTER, et al. , ) ) Def endants. )

___________________________________ )

OPI NI ON This matter is befor e the Court on def endants’ motions to dismis s. For the

rea sons discussed below, the motions will be g rante d in part and de nied in part.

I . BA CKGROUND Plaintiff J illian Brown, a

n Afric an-A merica

n fema le, beg an her

employ ment at Children’s Hospital National Medic al Center ( “CNMC”), Eme rg ency Medica l Services f

or Children (“EMSC”), N ational Resourc e Center (“N RC”), as a te mporary employ ee in Oc tober 2002; she bec ame a

perma nent employee, a

n Offic e Coordinator, in Apr il 2003. Compl. at 8-9. Among NRC’s employ ees w ere plaintiff’s dire ct supervisor, E dwar d L iao, id. at 9, Ther esa Morrison-Quintana , Partnership Outre ach T eam L eade r, see id. at 2, Susan Eads Role, Dire ctor of Partner ships and Public Pol icy , id. at 3, J ocely n Hulbert, State Partne rship Outrea ch Coordinator, id. at 2, 10, and Ke nneth Allen, id. at 5, Dire ctor of Program Planningand Tra ining,id. at 22, to whom Morrison-Quintana and Hulber

t reporte d, id. at 12. After L iao re signe d in 1 J uly 2006, plaintiff assumed c erta in of his duties, including super vision of two Administ rative Assistants, Patricia Thompson and Na nette Pierre , both Africa

n Americ an. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff then re ported dire ctly

to the NRC’s Ex ecutive D irec tor, Dr. Jane B all. Id. at 9, 21. In the fa ll of 2006, Dr. B all announce d her r etireme nt effe ctive at the e nd of that y ear . Compl. at 10. Accordingto plaintiff, Role and Allen “ beg an pre ssuring [pl aintiff] to joi n, and later lead, a committee to alig n itself ag ainst Dr. B all.” Id. Specifica lly , Role and Allen intended to coe rce Dr. B all either to a ppoint one of them as the ne w Executive Direc tor, or to appoint both as Co-Direc tors, by threatening to acc use Dr. B all of misappropria ting f eder al funds. Id. In further ance of the plot, Role and Allen a lleg edly soug ht to obtain plaintiff’s signature on a

statement attestingto false a lleg ations ag ainst Dr. B all. Id. Plaintiff refuse d, and instead re ported these events to Kathry n Koepe nick, the NRC’s Senior Human Resour ces Consultant, in October 2006. Id. Appar ently there was a

n investigation into Dr. Ball’s a ctivities, and in Novembe r 2006 she wa s “found . . . innoce nt.” Id. Duringthe last wee k of De cembe r 2006, Dr. B all alleg edly

war ned plaintiff that she and Hulber t should “keep a

low profile” beca use Allen ha d them “on his rada r.” Id . Dr. B all alleg edly share d her c oncer

ns with Tasmeen Singh, who be came NRC’s Ex ecutive D irec tor as of January 1, 2007. Id. On J anuar

y 3, 2007, Singh re quested a meetingwith plaintiff to discuss “ac cusations made a g ainst [her] by ‘many /severa l staff.’” Compl. at 12. P laintiff was a ccuse d of havingsaid that Hulbert e arne d more than Mor rison-Quintana , havingforc ed Morr ison-Quintana

Plaintiff has named The resa Morrison-Quintana

and Jocely

n Hulbert a s 1 defe ndants, as we ll as CNMC, Kathry n Kozpenick, and Ta smeen Sing h.

2to adjust her telec ommuting sche dule, and having be haved r udely to others bec ause she was dissatisfied with her job. Id. Acc ordingto plaintiff, the eve nts givingrise to these c omplaints

occur red se vera l y ear s ear lier, see id. at 8; y et none ha d been r aised with prior ma nag ement beca use plaintiff “ was supposedly viewed a s ‘intimidating and phy sically intimi dating ’ and a ‘favorite’ of

[Dr.] Ba ll.” Id. Duringthis meeting, Sing h “made comments that made it obvious that she wa s awa

re [plaintiff] had filed a c harg e of discr imination aga inst a former employ er alleg ing r acia l discrimination.” Id. at 37. When plaintiff aske d who had made complaints ag ainst her, Sing h responde d that the complainant wa s Thompson, one of the a dminist rative assistants whom plaintiff supervised; other staff me mbers alleg edly

confirme d Thompson’s

asser tions. Id. at 12. Plaintiff later le arne d that Morrison-Quintana was he r principa l acc user. See id. at 3, 14, 19.

Be lieving that “Dr. B all’s fe ars we re c oming to fr uition far sooner

than [she] expected,” on January

4, 2007, plaintiff ca lled Hulbert to ask whe ther a ny one had a sked her questions about plaintiff. Compl. at 13. Hulbert re sponded that, prior to January 3, 2007, Singh “solicited fe edbac k from her [about plainti ff],” and H ulbert had r epeated “wha t she had he ard” from other s. Id. Plaintiff alleg edly war ned Hulber

t “to be ca

ref ul beca use Dr. B all . . . had the same fe ars r eg arding. . . Hulbert.” Id.

On J anuar

y 5, 2007, Singh and K oepenic k informed plaintiff that she would be suspended “ for ‘ bullying a nd intimi dating ’” H ulbert. Compl. at 13. Singh stated that “ sever al employ ees ma de alleg ations ag ainst [pl aintiff],” and be cause “too many [were] saying the exact same thing. . . an investig ation would be conduc ted.” Id. Plaintiff believed that “ she wa s being subjected to a

hostile work environme nt beca use one, or

‘many /severa l’ employ ees w ere making

3false a lleg ations ag ainst her, the f abric ated a lleg ations were only supported by

g ossip and hear say ,” and that no one had a ny “intention of interview ing, que stion[ ing] or spea king w ith [ her] to hear her side of

the story .” Id. Rather, plaintiff “ was a lrea dy considere d to be guilty

of the alleg ations,” id. , and indee d was found “ g uilty of the a lleg ations, additional transg ressions, and . . . wa s rude, ha d communication issues, was a bully , intimi dating , phy sically intimi dating , confr ontational, participates in unprofe ssional gossip discussions, and wa s retaliator y .” Id. at 14. On J anuar

y 11, 2007, plaintiff re ported to the NRC “to lea rn of . . . the investigative finding s.” Compl. at 14. On that date, Sing h issued a F inal Writt en Notice to plaintiff, id. , which in re levant par t stated: [T] he notice is be ing issued beca use of conce rns havingto do with 1. intimi dating conduct at the work place and 2. inappropriate communications of confide ntial inf o rm ation and 3. inappropriate conver sations reg ar d i n g other employ ees. As y our m anag er, I have lear ned abou t t h is behavior throug h my investigation and throug h unsolicited complaints. In response to these conc er n s and complaints, I spoke to y ou on J anuar y 3, 2007 to allow y ou the opportunity to r espond and prese nt y our perspe ctive. At the conclusion of this conve rs at ion I direc ted y ou not to have an y conver sations reg arding our meeting with any staff memb er . Howeve r, the next morning it was broug ht to my attention that y ou called a staff member direc tly to ask if t h at individua l had spoken to me reg arding y our perf ormanc e and made comments to that individual about he r own job se curity

. As a result of this reta liatory and int imidating behavior, t he decision was made to immediately remove y ou fr o m the workplac e by initiating a suspension pending the completion of the investigation. As par t of that proce ss, we g ave y ou an opportunity to respond to the complaints made a g ainst y ou. At this time, I have formally rec ommended that we lift the suspension so y ou can return t o wo rk

. T h is notice is to provide y ou with clea r expectations of the sorts of be haviors that ar e and a re not pe rmitted [, and plaintiff was instructed to] ref rain fr om: 41. Conversations with empl o y ees about any NRC employ ee’ s salary (including y our own) or budg et information or any other sensitive e mploy

ment or contra ct information. 2. Un

p r ofessional “g ossip” such as discussions about who mig ht g et fired or war

ning employ ees that they are “next to g o” or acting in ot h er way s that lend themselves to a hostile work environment for

those around you. 3. Makin g i n appropr iate rema rks to co-w orker s reg arding the rea sonablene ss of compensation for NRC staff , the qualifications of employ ees for their pay g rade and job duties, or the produc tivity

of co- worke rs. 4. Be ing confrontational and/or int imidating in y o u r demeanor including the use of an unusuall y l o ud tone or the use of ph y s i cal g estures that may rea sonably be construed as intimi datingto any

employ ee. 5. Retaliatory conduct ag ainst other employ ees who may have broug ht conce rns about y our conduct to the manag er. T his i n cludes hara ssing dialog ue with employ ees such as askin g them direc tly whether they complained, engaging in conver sations w ith a

ny employ ee about what was said or the terms of the suspension or this final n o t i ce, or any other conver sations relate d to the complaints broug ht ag ainst y ou.

* * * I t is ex pecte d that y ou demonstrate cooper ative, courte ous and profe ssional behavior at all times. Any incidents of not respon d i n g to reque sts in a rea sonable timeframe , or any other inappropriate actions/inaction or problematic communication is also not acc eptable behavior under the terms of this notice. Whil e it is m y s i n cere intention to work with y ou in g ood faith to overc ome these perf

ormanc e issues, I need to be absolutely clea r that failure to follow the instruct i o ns above, eng ag ement in any form of reta liation or any continued perf ormanc e problem will result in y our immediate termination.

5Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismi ss [ Dkt. #9] (“Pl.’s First Opp’n” ), Ex. F (F inal

Writt en Notice ) at 1-2 ( emphasis adde d). 2

On J anuar

y 16, 2007, plaintiff “f

iled a complaint with the EEOC a nd copied . . . Singh, . . . Koe penick a

nd the Human Resour ces D epar tment on the complaint.” Compl. at 25; see id. at 16, 33. The c omplaint took the form of cor responde nce to the Washing ton Field Of fice of the Equa l Employ

ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (“EEOC”) . Pl.’s First Opp’n, Ex. J (L etters from plaintiff to EEOC dated J anuar y 15, 2007). Afte r desc ribing at leng th her suspension and the Fina l Writ ten Notice, pla intiff reque sted that the EEOC “r eview [her] submission and . . . investigate this tang ible employ ment action, discrimination/disparate treatment, retaliation, hara ssment, and hostile work envir onment.” Id. , Ex . J at J 2 (pag e number desig nated by plaintiff). Plaintiff submitted an additional letter to the EE OC. See id. , Ex . K (L etter f rom plaintiff to Hal B udnick, Intake Of fice r, Washington F ield Offic e, EEOC, dated May 11, 2007). The outcome of this exchang e is not clea r. After these e vents, plaintiff alleg edly no longe r re ceive d g roup e- mail messag es, was not notified of ma

ndatory training , was de nied ac cess to CNMC’s personne l policies and was pre vented “ from utiliz ing CNMC’s Employ ee Complaint proce ss to file internal g rieva nces.” Compl. at 24. Her wor

kload was inc rea sed to include the taking of meetingminutes (previously a task a ssigne d to an employ ee at a lower g rade ), makingphotocopies, and c overingthe front Singh alleg edly

“made comments that made it obvious that she wa s awa re that 2 [pl aintiff] filed a cha

rg e of discr imination aga inst a former employ er a lleg ing r acia l discrimination.” Compl. at 37. These c omments may have be en made either at the meeting duringwhich the F inal Writt en Notice was issued or at the time plaintiff was notified of her termination. Acc ordingto plaintiff, both the disciplinary actions take n ag ainst her a nd her termination by

RI F we re “ direc tly

related to her pr ior protec ted ac tivity .” Id.

6desk whe n the re ceptionist was not ava ilable, while in other r espec ts she was “ stripped . . . of he r

duties.” Id. at 25. For

example, plaintiff no longe r wa s responsible for proce ssing a

nd

rec onciling c heck a

nd trave l reque sts, id. at 6, was de nied ac cess to files c ontaining budg et information, id . at 8, was de nied a maste r key which would have g iven plaintiff ac cess to other employ ees’ office s, id. , and other wise wa s “held up to all as a n employ ee who could not be trusted with key s, files, [and] confide ntial information[.] ” Id. at 22. Singh a lleg edly “monitored and questioned [her] ever y move, eva luated and r eeva luated eve ry task [she] perf

ormed, micromana g ed . . ., mar g inalized [ her] within the depar tment, effe ctively

demoted [her] and [became] an oppre ssive prese nce in [her] work envir onment.” Id. at 25.

Plaintiff took particular e x ception to the conditions set forth in the F inal Writt en Notice dire cting her to re fra in from using a tone of voice or phy sical g estures that rea sonably could be c onstrued as intimidating to a ny employ ee. I

n her vie w, this provision allowed her

cowor kers “ to construe [her] movements in any way that they saw fit,” a

nd the terms “w ere meant to humiliate [her] and to place he r in a subser vient position t o her Cauc asian c oworke rs.” Compl. at 17. S he believe d that she “w as prohibited fr om using body languag e,” a

nd [e] ven though c ommunication is more nonverba l than verba l, [ she] face d immediate termination if it

wer e construe d that she used a ny body languag e.” Id. at 26. She was “ in constant fea r of losing her job be cause the languag e of the Final Written Notice w as so subjective tha t . . . any employ ee could . . . ac cuse [her] of ‘be ing c onfrontational a nd/or intimi dating in [ her] demea nor[.] ’” Id. In addition, acc ordingto plaintiff, Singh, Koe penick a nd some of plaintiff’ s co-wor kers a lleg edly “used ster eoty

pes,” de scribingher “ as the loud blac k woman who r olls her eyes, wa s ang ry ,

7phy sically intimi dated e veryone, used body languag e, wa s a bully

and had a

problem communicating .” Id. at 16.

Plaintiff’s employ

ment came to an end on Ma rch 5, 2007, at which time Singh and Koe penick infor

med her that, “[a]s a result of an inter nal eva luation of the administrative personne l needs at the [NRC ], t he position of Offic e Coordinator [was] being eliminated.” Compl. at 17. P ursuant to a r eduction in forc e (“ RI F” ), four employ ees w ere terminated, thre e Afric an Amer ican ( plaintiff, Thompson and Pierre ) and one Cauca sian. Id. at 3, 18. Thre e new administrative positions were c reated, and the position of Staff A ssistant “would assume all of the prior r esponsibiliti es” of plaintiff and the two te rminated Af rica n-Amer ican Administrative Assistants. Id. Acc ordingto plaintiff, NRC merely terminated he r, cha

ng ed the position titl e, and tra nsfer red he r re sponsibili ties to a newly titled posit ion, such that she “w as terminate d via a prete x tual RI F.” Id. Plaintiff deemed he r termination by RI F the c ulmination of a serie s of “numer ous neg ative tang ible employ ment actions,” Compl. at 19, desig ned to ac complish what otherwise c ould not have occ urre d under the preva iling law. Pl.’s F irst Opp’n at 4-5.

On J uly 12, 2007, plaintiff filed a char g e of discrimination with t he EEOC. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dis miss [ Dkt. #7-1] (“De fs.’ F irst Mem.”), Ex. A (Charg e of D iscrimination, No. 570-2007-00866 da

ted J uly 12, 2007). Ac cordingto the char g e, plaintiff a lleg ed that CNMC discriminated ag ainst her on the ba sis of her r ace and in re taliation for prior E EO ac tivity betwee n J anuar

y 3, 2007 and Mar ch 13, 2007. Id. , Ex . A. CNMC alleg edly was re sponsible for “Rac e-B ased a

nd Retaliatory

Discrimination; Retaliation; Harassment; Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress; Hostile W ork Environment; Adve rse/Ta ng ible Employ

ment Actions (He ighte ned Scrutiny , Disparate Tre atment, Dec rea sed Responsibiliti es, Reprimand, N eg ative

8Evaluation, De motion, Discharg e); Prete x tual Argument For My Termination; Constructive Termination; Actua l termination (by way of the pre text ual RI F[]).” Id. , Attach. a t 2. The EEO C 3 was “ unable to conc lude that the information obtained [during its investigation] establishes violations” of the applica ble employ

ment discrimination statutes. Compl ., Ex . A (Dismissal and Notice of Rights dated Septe mber 23, 2009). Plaintiff bring s this action under Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 (“ Title VI I ”), a s amende d, see42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , under 42 U .S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), a nd under the District of Columbia Human Rights Ac t (“DCHRA” ), seeD.C. Code § 1-1402.01 et seq. In addition, she bring s common law cla ims of defamation, neg lige nce, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“ I I ED”) , and wr ong ful termination in violation of public policy . Plaintiff demands that a

ny ref ere nce to he r suspension and f inal written notice be expunged f rom her personne l file, that ea ch def endant se nd plaintiff a letter of apolog y , and that a le tter of r eprimand be plac ed in ea ch individual defe ndant’s per sonnel file. She also de mands unspecif ied compensation for past and f uture e conomic and non- economic losses.

I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Dismissal Under Rule 12( b) ( 6) of the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure The F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure r equire that a complaint conta in “‘a short and plain stateme nt of the cla im showing that the ple ader is entitled to relief,’ in or der to ‘g ive the def endant f air notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it re sts.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957));

Plaintiff attache d to her EEO C complaint a four- pag e ty pewr itten document ca lled 3 “Complaint-Particulars.” 9accord Eric kson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Rule 12(b)( 6) tests the leg al

sufficie ncy

of a c omplaint. See B rowning v. Cli nton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a [Rule 12(b)( 6)] moti on to dismi ss, a complaint must contain sufficie nt fac tual matter,

acc epted a s true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw ombly , 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint must be dismiss ed under

Rule 12(b)(6) if it consists only of “[t] hrea dbare rec itals of the eleme nts of a

cause of ac tion, supported by mere conclusory

statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949. On a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the Court treats the fac tual alleg ations of a plaintiff’ s complaint as if they

wer e true , and dra

ws all rea sonable infe renc es stemming f rom such fa ctual alleg ations in the plaintiff’s fa vor. See E

rickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. at 94; Maljack Prods., I nc. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. , 52 F.3d 373, 375 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). Whil e the c omplaint is to be “c onstrued libera lly in the [pl aintiff’s] favor ,” the Court “ne ed not ac cept infe renc es dra wn by plaintiff[] if such infe renc es ar e unsupported by the fa cts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp ., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 ( D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Be ll Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that a cour t is “not bound to acce pt as true a leg al conc lusion couched a s a fa ctual alleg ation”). A lthough “ [a] pro se complaint . . . ‘must be held to less string ent standards tha

n formal plea dings by

lawy ers,’ ” Atherton v. D.C. Office of the M ayor , 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Erickson v . Pardus , 551 U.S. at 94), cert. de nied , 130 S. Ct

. 2064 (2010), “ a pro se complainant must plead ‘f actua l matter’ that pe rmits the court to infer ‘more tha n the mere possibili ty

of misconduct.’” Id. at 681-82 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

10B. Discrimination Based on Race 1. Title VI I Under Title VI I , it is “an unlawful e mploy ment prac tice for

an employ er . . . to fa il

or re fuse to hire or to dischar g e any individual, or otherwise to discr iminate ag ainst any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileg es of e mploy ment, beca use of [her] rac e[.] ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2( a)( 1). Nor ma y an employ er discr iminate ag ainst an employ ee who has opposed a n unlawful e mploy

ment prac tice by

making a cha

rg e, testifying, assisting or pa

rticipatingin an investig ation or proc eeding arisingfrom a violation of Title VI I

. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a ). This languag e identifies “ two elements for an employ

ment discrimination case : (I ) the plaintiff suf fer ed an a dverse employ

ment action (ii) be cause of [her]

rac e” or prior prote cted a ctivity

. Brady v. O ffice of the Serge ant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Def endants re prese nt that the complaint “g oes on for pag es conc erningthe alleg ed hara ssing a

nd reta liatory

conduct [plaintiff] claims she experience d,” De fs. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. and Kathry

n Kopenick’ s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dis miss (“Def s.’ Second Me m.”) [Dkt. # 12-1] at 7, foc using on “ her pur ported unfa ir trea

tment after

. . . Singh bec ame dire ctor of her de partment in January 2007.” Id . at 7-8. Ye t, defe ndants continue, plaintiff’ s “alleg ations of

rac ial discrimination and re taliation are belied by her own fac tual asser

tions,” id. at 8, principa lly those which “ tie the alleg ed disciplinary action and pur

ported hostile conduc t . . . to her prior relationship wit h the forme r depa rtment hea d,” id. , her r efusa l to participate in a scheme to appoint the new D irec tor of the NRC, id. , and re tribution for supporting Dr. B all. Id. at 9.

11Def endants’ r eadingof the c omplaint is overly narr ow and a

ppear s to ignore plaintiff’s awkwar d but perc eptible ef forts to tie defe ndants’ adve rse e mploy ment actions to her

rac e. F or example, plaintiff alleg es that she, “ an Af rica n-Amer ican e mploy ee of

. . . CNMC, was treated in a manne r diffe rent fr om her similarly situated cowor

kers, a nd was subjec ted to . . . CNMC’s alteringthe terms and c onditions of her employ ment.” Compl. at 15. She also alleg es that the RI F wa s a pre text for discr imination aga inst her and other Afric an Amer ican e mploy ees. Id. ; see id. at 17-19, 30. And w ith her asse rtion that “the disciplinary actions take n ag ainst her and the ter

mination of her e mploy

ment from CNMC . . . [were] directly related to her pr ior protec ted ac tivity ,” Compl. at 37; see id. at 25, 33, plaintiff mana g es to alleg e a c laim of reta liation in viol ation of Title VI I . I t matters not that plaintiff fa iled to “spec ifically mention

rac e-ba sed discrimination until many pag es into her Complaint.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def s. Children’s Nat’ l Med. Ctr.’s and Kathry n Koepe nick’s Mot. to Dismiss [ Dkt. #14] (“Pl.’s Second Opp’n” ) at 21.

As the Court construe s the complaint, plaintiff alleg es that def endants both discriminated ag ainst her on the ba sis of her r ace and re taliated ag ainst her by suspending her, by issuing a F inal Writt en Notice , and by terminatingher through a pre text ual RI F. The complaint is not a model of clar ity ; it is rambling , disorg anized and re petitive. But it is also prepa red by a pro se plaintiff and its alleg ations must be construed liber ally

. See H aines v. Kerne r , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Atherton v. D.C. Office of the M ayor , 567 F.3d at 681. Notwithstanding the imprecise a

nd inartful dra fting , plaintiff’s complaint g oes beyond mere conclusory statements and sets for

th specific f

actua l alleg ations that tend to support her c auses of action. In other

12words, the c omplaint does not “stop[ ] short of the line betwee n possibili ty and plausibility

of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949.

Moreove r, plaintiff’s oblig ation at the plea ding sta g e is to put defenda nts on notice of the claims ag ainst them and the ba ses on which they rest. Plaintiff ac complishes this task; she nee d not plead all the f acts she ultimately

must prove in order

to preva il on the merits. See A tchison v. District of Columbia , 73 F.3d 418, 421- 22 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sore ma N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“ This simpl ified notice ple ading standard r elies on libera l discovery rules and summar

y judgme nt motions to define disputed f acts and issues and to dispose of unme ritorious claims.”). Tr eating plaintiff’s fa ctual alleg ations as if they wer e true , and dra

wing all rea sonable infe renc es stemming f rom such fa ctual alleg ations in her f avor, the Court concludes that plaintiff adequa tely states a c laim of discrimination based on

rac e and a

claim for r etaliation under Title VI I

. See, e .g., W

inston v. Clough , No. 07-1411, 2010 WL1875626, at *8 (D.D .C. May 11, 2010); Kornegay v. A T& T , No. 05-0001, 2006 WL825622, at *3 (D.D .C. Mar. 29, 2006) ( “In other wor ds, plaintiff claims that he wa s a qualified e mploy ee terminated unde r fa lse prete nses bec ause of his race [or protected a ctivity ] and theref ore he need not plead all the e lements of a T itle VI Irac e discrimination [or retaliation] claim in order to state a cla im.”) (br acke ts omit ted). The ne x t question is who may proper ly be sued unde r Title VI I . An employ er is def ined under Title VI Ias “a

person e ng ag ed in an industry aff ectingcommerc e who ha s fiftee n or more employ ees . . . a

nd any ag ent of such a

person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Ostensibly , then, a complainant’s supe rvisors or c o-worke rs may be conside red the ag ents of an e mploy er. B ut the District of Columbia Circuit has rejec ted the notion that such individuals may be held pe rsonally

13liable under Title VI I . “[W ]hi le a supe rvisory employ ee ma

y be joined as a

party defe ndant in a Title VI Iaction, that employ ee must be vie wed a s beingsued in his capa city as the a g ent of the employ er, who is alone liable for a violation of Title VI I .” Gary v . Long , 59 F.3d 1391, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (c iting Busby v. City of Orlando , 931 F.2d 764, 772 ( 11th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995). To the e x tent that plaintiff joins Si ng h, Morrison-Quintana , Hulbert a nd Koepe nick as de fenda nts to her Title VI Iclaims bec ause of their status as ag ents of the employ er, the se cla ims “essentially merg e[] with her c laim ag ainst [C NMC] .” Id. Plaintiff’s Title VI Iclaims ag ainst Singh, Morrison-Q uintana, Hulber t and Koepe nick in their individual capa cities there fore must be dismis sed. See, e .g., Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., I nc. , 544 F. Supp. 2d 17, 25 (D.D.C. 2008) ( g rantingsummary judgme nt for the individual def endants who ma

y be sued in their off

icial ca pacities, not their individual ca pacities, unde r Title VI I ); Isse v . Am. Univ. , 540 F. Supp. 2d 9, 27 (D.D .C. 2008) (dismissing Title VI Iclaim ag ainst plaintiff’s immediate supervisor) ; McM

illan v. District of Columbia , 466 F. Supp. 2d 219, 223 (D.D .C. 2006) (dismissing Title VI Iclaim ag ainst actingdepar tment chief in his individual capa city ).

2. Section 1981 Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides: “All per sons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same r ight in eve ry State and Te rritory

to make a nd enfor ce c ontrac ts . . . as is enjoy ed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The statute furthe r “pr ohibits racial discrimination in the ‘making , perf ormanc e, modification, and termination of contr acts, a nd the enjoy

ment of all bene fits, privileg es, terms a nd conditions of the contra ctual re lationship.’” Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics , 610 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17-18 (D .D.C. 2009)

14(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). It is established that such contra cts include e mploy ment contra cts. See J

ohnson v. Ry. E

xpress Age ncy, I

nc. , 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). To state a claim under Sec tion 1981, a plaintiff “must identify an impaire d ‘contra ctual re lationship’ . . . under which [she] has rights,” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v . McD onald , 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006), and she must alleg e “some fac ts that demonstrate that ra ce w as the re ason for the def endant’ s actions.” Bray v. R HT, Inc. , 748 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D .C. 1990). Def endants a rgue that, bec ause the complaint fails to alleg e discrimination base d

on rac e, it there fore fails to alleg e a Sec tion 1981 claim. “Rather, [p]lainti ff spe cifica lly alleg es that the conduc t about which she c omplains stemmed from a powe r strug g le within her depar tment and her

support of the outg oing E x ecutive D irec tor.” De fs.’ Sec ond Mem. at 9; see Def s.’ Fir st Mem. at 7. For

the same r easons that the Court ha s conclude d that the fa ctual alleg ations of plaintiff’s c omplaint support her Title VI Iclaim, these same alleg ations nece ssarily support her Sec tion 1981 claim of discrimination based on r ace .

Be cause the complaint includes no e x press a lleg ations as to the exist ence of a formal, wr itten contrac t or employ ment ag ree ment betwee n plaintiff and CNMC, the Court presumes that plaintiff was a n at-will employ ee of

CNMC. Carl v. Chil dren’s Hosp. , 702 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C. 1997) (T err y , J ., concur

ring ) (“ This court has longand consistently adher ed to the rule that e mploy

ment is presumed to be a

t will, unless the contrac t of employ ment expressly provides other

wise.”) . I t is established that an at-w ill employ ee ma y maintain an ac tion under Section 1981. See She

ppard v. Dick

stein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky , 59 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 1999) ( holding that Sec tion 1981 covers at-will employ ment ag ree ments beca

use “District of Columbia law . . . tre at[s] at-will ag ree ments as contra cts”).

15An employ ment discrimination claim brought under Sec tion 1981 “mirrors, in most way s, an employ

ment discrimination claim broug ht pursuant to Title VI I. . . . [But] [u] nlike Title VI I , individual liabili ty can be imposed for pe rsonal involvement in discriminatory activity that violates Section 1981.” Zaidi v. Amerada Hess Corp. , 723 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516-17 (E.D.N.Y . 2010) (c itations omi tted). More over, “ [i ]ndi viduals with supervisory authority

. . . may be held liable unde r [Section] 1981.” Tnaib v. Docume nt Technologies, LLC , 450 F. Supp. 2d 87, 92 (D.D.C. 2006) ( citing c ases) ; see also Sheppard v . Dickste in, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky , 59 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (f inding that individual supervisors c an be sue d under Sec tion 1981 and deny

ing the ir motion to di smiss); see Page v . W inn-Dixie M

ontgomery, I

nc. , 702 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (notingthat “a c laim for individual liability under [Section] 1981 require s an af

firmative showinglinking the individual def endant with the discr iminatory action.”) . There fore , under D istrict of Columbia law, an at- will employ ee a lleg ing disc rimination based on r ace may

bringa Section 1981 cla im not only ag ainst her e mploy er but a lso ag ainst those supervisors who take ac tions in vi olation of Section 1981. At this stage of the proc eeding s and on the c urre nt rec ord, the c omplaint sufficiently alleg es a Sec tion 1981 claim ag ainst all defe ndants. Their motions to dismi ss the Section 1981 claim will be denied w ithout prejudice. 3. District of Columbia Human Rights Ac t Under the DCHRA, it is unlawful for a n employ er “ [t ]o fail or ref use to hire, or

to discharg e, any

individual[ ,] or otherwise to discriminate a g ainst any individual, with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileg es of e mploy ment, including pr omotion; or to limit , seg reg ate, or

classify his employ ees in a

ny way which would depr ive or tend to de prive a ny

16individual of employ ment opportunities, or otherwise adver sely aff ect [her] status as an employ ee” on the basis of he r ra ce. D .C. Code § 2-1402.11(a) (1). The term “e mploy er” means “any person who, f

or compe nsation, employ s an individual,” as we ll as “any person a cting in the interest of suc h employ er, dire ctly or indirec tly .” D.C. Code § 2-1401.02( 10). An individual there fore may

be held liable pe rsonally under the DCHRA if she is ac ting on be half of a n employ er. W

allace v. Sk

adden, Arps, Slate, Me agher &Flom , 715 A.2d 873, 888 (D.C. 1998) (findingthat the DCHRA applies to individual partner s of law f irm beca use the pa rtners a cted in the intere st of the employ er, a law par tnership); see Zelay a v. UNICCO Serv . Co. , 587 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284-85 (D.D .C. 2008) (conc luding that plaintiff’ s former supervisor c an be individually liable under

the DCHRA); Alston v. District of Columbia , 561 F. Supp. 2d 29, 44-45 (D .D.C. 2008) (a llowing c laim under D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 f or discrimination based on disa bility to proce ed as a g ainst ag ents of the District of Columbi a Public Schools, an educ ational institut ion

cover ed by

the DCHRA); MacI

ntosh v. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n I nt’l . 355 F. Supp. 2d 223, 227-28 (D.D .C. 2005) (citing W allace , denying motion of a ssociation’s Executive Direc tor and a V ice Pre sident to dismi ss DCHRA claims ag ainst them in their individual capac ities).

“The limit ation period for a civil ac tion broug ht pursuant to the [DCHRA] is one y ear .” Jones v . Howard Univ. , 574 A.2d 1343, 1345 (D.C. 1990) ( citing Davis v. PotomacElec. Power Co. , 449 A.2d 278, 280-81 (D .C. 1982)). “When a char g e of discr imination is filed with the EEOC in the District of Columbia, a c laim is automatically cross-f iled with the D.C. Offic e of Human Rig hts (‘DCOHR’) pursuant to a ‘ workshar ing a g ree ment’ betwe en the two a g encie s.” Ellis v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp ., 631 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78 (D.D .C. 2009); W are v. Nick

lin Assocs., Inc. , 580 F. Supp. 2d 158, 164 (D.D .C. 2008) (citing Estenos v. PAH O/W HO Fe d. Credit Union , 17952 A.2d 878 (D.C. 2008)) ; see29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (4)( ii)(A). The timely filing of a complaint with the DCOHR “toll[ s] t he runningof the statute of limit ations while the complaint is pending ,” D.C. Code § 2-1403.16( a), a nd “the timely

filing of a cha rg e with the EEOC, a

nd the automatic cr oss-filing of

a cla im with the DCOHR that follows, is sufficient to toll t he one- y ear statute of limitations for filing a claim under

the DCHRA.” Ellis v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp ., 631 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (c itations omi tted). When plaintiff filed he r complaint with the EEOC, she named CNMC as the e ntity believed to have discriminated a g ainst her. The one-year limit ations period ther efor e wa s tolled as to CNMC.

Def endants Sing h, Morrison-Quintana , Hulbert a nd Koepe nick wer e not named a s responde nts by

plaintiff in her EE OC complaint. They move to dismiss plaintiff’s DCHRA claims as untimely

– she filed he r lawsuit in Dec ember 2009, “more than 2 1⁄2 y ear s after the last possible date that the pur

ported discr imination or retaliation could have occur red.” Def s.’ Fir st Mem. at 9. Plaintiff counters that she timely filed her char g e of discr imination with t he EEOC, 4 and by doing so she “automatica lly co-f iled” with the DCOHR. Pl.’s First Opp’ n at 8; Pl.’s Second Opp’ n at 7-8. B ut plaintiff’s cha rg e of discr imination did not name the individual defe ndants as the pa

rties re sponsible for the discr imination and retaliation she suff ere d. Plaintiff cannot now pr ocee d as ag ainst the individual defenda nts on DCHRA claims that were neither broug ht within the one-y ear statute of limitations nor filed with the EEOC or the DCOHR. The Court will dis miss without prejudice plaintiff’s DCHRA cla ims ag ainst defe ndants Singh, Morrison-Quintana , Hulbert a nd Koepe nick; these c laims may proce ed as a g ainst CNMC only

. Although de fenda

nt Koepenic k does not move for dismiss al of plaintiff’ s 4 DCHRA claims on this gr ound, the others’ argument applies equa lly to her. 18C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Intentional infliction of emotional distress consists of “(1) extreme and outra g eous conduct on the pa

rt of the de fenda

nt which (2) e ither intentionally or re cklessly

(3) c ause[d] t he plaintiff seve re e motional dist ress.” Halcomb v . W oods , 610 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D .C. 2009) (citing Larij ani v. George town Univ. , 791 A.2d 41, 44 (D.C. 2002)) ; see also The Cuneo Law Group, P.C. v. Jose

ph , 669 F. Supp. 2d 99, 121 (D.D .C. 2009); Evans v. D istrict of Columbia , 391 F. Supp. 2d 160, 170 (D.D .C. 2005). “To e stablish the require d deg ree of outrag eousness [to sustain an I I ED cla im] , the plaintiff must alleg e conduc t so outrag eous in cha rac ter, a nd so extreme in deg ree , as to g o beyond all possible bounds of dece ncy , and to be r eg arde d as atroc ious, and utterly

intolerable in a

civiliz ed community .” Kerrigan v. Britches of George towne , 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C. 1997) ( internal c itations and quotation marks omitted). This “ver y demandingstandard” is “only infreque ntly

met.” Dale v. Thomason , 962 F. Supp. 181, 184 (D.D.C. 1997). “ Especia lly in the employ

ment context, the standard is exacting .” Evans v. D istrict of Columbia , 391 F. Supp. 2d at 170. “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoy ance s, petty

oppressions, or other

trivialities” cannot support a n I I ED cla im, Halcomb v

. W oods , 610 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (quotingRestatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 46 cmt. d (1965)), a

nd termination is not conduct so extreme and outra g eous that it exceeds the bounds of de cenc y . See Brown v. Sim , No. 03-2655, 2005 WL3276190, at *4 (D.D .C. Sept. 30, 2005); Elliott v. HealthcareCorp. , 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 1993); see also Dunc an v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr. , 702 A.2d 207, 211-12 (D .C. 1997) ( “[G]enera lly , employ er- employ ee c onflicts do not rise to the level of outra g eous conduc t.”).

19Plaintiff’s complaint includes a se ction titled “Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress,” seeCompl. at 28-31, in which she desc ribes how he r co- worke rs “we re w atching [her] movements” in orde r to deter mine whether

her be havior or de meanor violated the ter

ms of the Final Written Notice, suc h that she “a rrived at work ea ch day

expecting to be fired.” Id. at 28. Def endants move to dismiss the I I ED cla im because the complaint alleg es neither sever e emotional distress on plaintiff’s par t nor conduc t rising to the leve l of outrag eousness ne cessa ry to sustain an I I ED cla im. Defs.’ F irst Mem. at 9-11; Def s.’ Second Me m. at 10-12. That plaintiff “ was unde r a great deal of intentional pre ssure,” Compl. at 29, does not adequately

alleg e that she suf

fer ed seve re e motional dist ress. Ne ither the scr utiny she endure d nor the prospe ct of immediate te rmination for a violation of the terms of the F inal Writt en Notice comprises c onduct “so outra g eous in cha rac ter, a nd so ext reme in deg ree , as to g o beyond all possible bounds of dece ncy , and to be r eg arde d as atroc ious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community .” Bernstein v. Fe rnandez , 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991). The Court conclude s that the complaint fails to state an I I ED cla im. The claim there fore will be dismiss ed as ag ainst all defe ndants. See Darrow v. Dillingham & Murphy, LLP , 902 A.2d 135, 139 (D.C. 2006) (a lleg ations that office manag er w as stripped of he r duties, blocked f rom ac cess to billing softwar e, and e mploy er’ s place ment of an a dvertisement f or a ne w offic e mana g er did not state an I I ED cla im); Crowl ey v . N. Am. Telecomm . Ass’n , 691 A.2d 1169, 1172 (D.C. 1997) (alleg ations that employ ee “ was subjec ted to contempt, scorn a nd other indig nities in the workplac e by

his supervisor and a

n unwar rante d evalua

tion and discharg e” f

ail to state an I I ED claim); Elliott

v. He althcare Corp. , 629 A.2d at 9 (e mploy ee’ s discharg e wa s not ex treme a nd outrag eous as a

matter of la

w).

20D. Negligence The ba sic eleme nts of a neg lige nce c laim are that defe ndant owes pla intiff a duty of ca re, de fenda

nt brea ched this duty

and ther eby

cause d plaintiff har

m. See, e .g., District of Columbia v. Harris , 770 A.2d 82, 87 (D.C. 2001). D efe ndants argue that the c omplaint fails to state a ne g lige nce c laim ag ainst them beca use it lacks alleg ations reg ardinga duty of ca re ow ed to plaintiff. Def

s.’ Fir st Mem. at 12; Defs.’ Second Mem. at 13. Plainti ff c ounters that Singh “owe d at minimum[ ] a duty of fa ir treatment to [ p]l aintiff, Pl.’s First Opp’ n at 16, as did Koepe nick. Pl.’s Second Opp’n at 23. Plainti ff doe s not articulate what this duty entails, and instead appe ars to alleg e that, if ther e wa s neg lige nce at all, the actua l neg lige nt party was CNMC. SeeCompl. at 35-36.

Insofar as the c onduct g iving r ise to plaintiff’s neg lige nce c laims is the same conduct g iving r ise to her Title VI Iclaims, the neg lige nce c laims appea r to be duplicative. Acc ording ly , the Court will dism iss the neg lige nce c laims without prejudice. See W ade v. W ashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. , No. 01-0334, 2005 WL 1513137, at *6 (D.D .C. J une 27, 2005) (f inding that ne g lige nce c laim arisingfrom def endant’ s alleg ed fa ilure to assure that company ’s “se x ual har assment policies we re not violated, a nd more spec ifically , to assure that [p] laintiff was not subjec ted to a hostile work e nvironment . . . is pree mpted by Title VI Ias the injury arises out of the alleg ed har assment itself”) ; Crosten v. Kamauf , 932 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. Md. 1996) (dismissing common law ne g lige nce c laims “to impose liabilit y on [t he employ er] for its alleg ed fa ilure to confor m to the dictates of Title VI Iin its efforts to preve nt sex ual hara ssment, or to proper ly respond to a r eport of se x ual har assment” be cause they “mer ely restate the claim brought under Title VI I ”).

21E. W rongful T ermination in Violati on of Public Policy As noted ea

rlier, the Court pr esumes that plaintiff is an at-will employ ee. An employ er ma

y discharg e an a

t-will employ ee “ at any

time and for a

ny rea son, or for no r eason at all.” Holman v. W

illiams , 436 F. Supp. 2d 68, 76 (D.D .C. 2006) (quoting Adams v. Ge orge W

. Cochran &Co. , 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. 1991) ( citations omitt ed)) . Under District of Columbia law, howe ver, “ wrong ful termination in violation of a cle ar public policy is an exception to the traditional at-will employ ment doctrine.” Bowie v. Gonzales , 433 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.D .C. 2006) (c iting District of Columbia v. Bere tta, U.S.A. Corp ., 872 A.2d 633, 645 (D.C. 2005))

. “Whether a

discharg e violates public policy is determined on a

case -by -ca se basis, guided by the

conce pt that a wrong ful termination ca use of a ction must be ‘firmly anchor ed in the Constituti on or in a statute or

regulation which re flec ts the particular public policy

beingrelied upon.’ ” Id. (quoting W

arren v. Coastal Int’l Secs., I nc. , 96 Fe d. Appx. 722, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). For example, discharg e of a

n employ ee who ref

used to violate a statute – that is, forcingthe employ ee to c hoose betwe en bre akingthe law a nd keeping

her job – is consider ed a wrong ful discharg e in violation of public policy

. See A dams v. Ge orge W . Cochran &Co., Inc. , 597 A.2d at 32, 34. Def

endants maintain that to succ essfully invoke this ex ception, plaintiff must point to a “fundamental public policy expressed in a statute, r egulation, or constitution that supports her position that she was wrong ly terminated,” and she ha s failed to do so. De fs.’ Second Mem. at 14; seeDef s.’ Fir st Mem. at 13. Nor doe s plaintiff demonstrate a conne ction betwee n a public policy

and the c onduct which br oug ht about her te rmination. Defs.’ First Mem.

22at 13. For plaintiff’s fa ilure “to state a viable wr ong ful termination claim ag ainst [d] efe ndants, . . . such cla ims must be dismissed.” De fs.’ Sec ond Mem. at 14.

Def endants a re c orre ct that the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine must be “solidly

based on a

statute or re g ulation that refle cts the public policy to be applied or

(if appropr iate) on a

constitutional provision concrete ly applicable to the defe ndant’s conduc t.” Holman v. W

illiams , 436 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (quoting Carl v. Chil dren’s Hosp. , 702 A.2d at 163 (Ter ry , J ., concur

ring )); see also Riggs v. Hom e Builders Inst. , 203 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D .C. 2002). Review of

the complaint in this case r evea ls that the only policies alleg edly

violated wer e CNMC’s internal per sonnel policies re g ardingemploy ee disc ipline, gr ievanc es, equa l employ ment opportunity , hara ssment, and re taliation. Plainti ff identifie s no public policy the violation of which contra venes public policy , and ther efor e the c omplaint fails to state a wrong ful termination claim. See Davis v. G ables Residential/H.G. Smithy , 525 F. Supp. 2d 87, 102 (D.D.C. 2007) ( dismiss ing wrong ful dischar g e cla im “in the absenc e of a ny identified public policy ” or, a lternatively , absent a showing of a “ ‘close f

it’ betwee n the policy

and [plaintiff’s] conduct” ); Bowie v. Gonzales , 433 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (c oncluding that, while “attempts to strong -ar m plaintiff into supporting [an employ ee’ s] di smissal are not admira ble ac tions, they

do not rise to the level ne cessa ry for a public policy

violation supporting an e x ception to at-w ill employ ment doctrine in a

wrong ful termination claim”)

.

F. Defamation Plaintiff’s defa

mation claims arise pr incipally from the c omments MorrisonQuintana a lleg edly

made with re spect to plaintiff’s pe rfor mance and beha

vior issues occur

ring

23prior to J anuar y 2007, seeCompl. at 31-35, leadingto plaintiff’s suspension and the issuanc e of the Fina l Writ ten Notice, see id. at 33. I t appea rs, howeve r, that plaintiff intends to bring defa mation claims ag ainst all defe ndants. See id. at 34.

Under District of Columbia law, “the r ight to maintain [an] action acc rues . . . f or libel [ and] slander” in one y ear . D.C. Code §12-301(4) ; see M aupin v. Hayloc k, 931 A.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. 2007); Oparaugo v. W atts , 884 A.2d 63, 72 (D.C. 2005). D efe ndants argue that plaintiff’s def

amation claims ar e time-ba rre d, as all of the e vents g iving r ise to her de fama tion claim ar ose either

befor e January

3, 2007, or not later tha

n her post-te rmination exi t interview on Marc h 13, 2007. See Def s.’ Fir st Mem. at 11; Defs.’ Second Mem. at 12. Plainti ff c ounters that her de famation claims are timely for the sa me re asons that her

DCHRA claims are timely

. See Pl.’s Second Opp’n at 23. “Even thoug h the EEOC does not investig ate c laims of defa mation, those claims would fa ll under the DCHRA,” and the statute of limit ations is toll ed while the EEOC completes its investigation. Id.

Def amation is not an unlawful discr iminatory prac tice under

the DCHRA, and plaintiff offe rs no alter

native ar gument for the tolling of the one -y ear statute of limitations. Her defa mation claims, then, will be dismissed without prejudice as untimely

. See D iLella v. Univ. of the District of Col umbia David A. Clark Sch. of Law , 570 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D .C. 2008) (dismissing def

amation claim filed 13 months af ter it had a ccr

ued); Nevius v. Africa I

nland Mission Int’l , 511 F. Supp. 2d 114, 121 (D.D .C. 2007) (dismissing def amation claim filed ne arly seven months af

ter statute of

limit ations had run)

.

24G. Appointment of Counsel from the Civil Pro Bono Panel The Court’s rulingon defe ndants’ dispositive motions resolves some, but not all, of the leg al claims plaintiff ra ises. On the assumption that this case will proc eed to discove ry , the Court considers, sua sponte , whether counsel should be a

ppointed to repre sent this plaintiff. “The law is well established that there is no constitutional rig ht to appointment of counsel in a c ivil case,” Cookish v. Cunningham , 787 F.2d 1, 2 ( 1st Cir. 1986) (per c uriam) (citations omitted), and no indig ent civil litigant is g uara nteed c ounsel. W

illis v. Fe d. Bureau of Inve stigati on , 274 F.3d 531, 532 ( D.C. Cir. 2001). The Court has the disc retion, howe ver, to appoint counsel to re prese nt an indige nt pro se party under 28 U .S.C. § 1915(e)(1) . Pursuant to this authority , L ocal Civil Rule 83.11 provides:

When leave has been g rante d pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for a pro se litigant to pr ocee d in forma pauperis , the judge to whom the case is assi gn ed may , on application by the pro se party or otherwise, appoint an at t o rney from the Panel to repr esent such party
. The appointment should be made taking into ac count: (I ) the nature and complexity of the a ction; (ii) the potential merit of the pro se party ’s claims; (iii) the demonstrated inability of the pro se party to reta in counsel by other mea

ns; and (iv) the degr ee to which the interests of justice will be served by appointment of counsel, including the benef it the Court ma

y derive from the a ssistance of the appointed counse l. L CvR 83.11(b)(3); see W illis v. Fe d. Bureau of Inv estigation , 274 F.3d a t 532 (aff irming application of the fac tors set forth in the for mer L CvR 83.11(a)(4) (B ) to dec ide a motion for the appointment of counse l in a civil action broug ht under the F ree dom of Information Ac t). The Court has consider ed these fac tors and dete rmines that appointment of c ounsel is warr anted a t this ti me. All proce eding s will be stay ed pendingentry of counse l’s appea

ranc e. 25I I I . CONCL USI ON For the re asons discussed a

bove, plaintiff’ s Title VI Iand DCHRA cla ims ag ainst defe ndants Singh, Morr ison-Quintana, Hulbe rt and Koe penick in their individual ca pacities will be dismissed. Be cause the complaint fa ils to st ate c laims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and wr ong ful termination in violation of public policy , these c laims will be dismi ssed as ag ainst all defe ndants. Plaintiff’s defa mation claims as ag ainst all defe ndants will be dismissed as untimely , and her

neg lige nce c laims will be dismi ssed as duplicative of those brought ag ainst CNMC under Title VI I . Remaining , then, ar e plaintiff’ s Title VI Iand the DCHRA c laims ag ainst CNMC, and her Sec tion 1981 claims ag ainst all defe ndants. An appr opriate O rder

acc ompanies this Opinion.

/s/ PAULL . FRI EDMAN DATE: Mar ch 30, 2011 United States District J udg e

26