The HONORABLE MICHAEL J. MELLOY, Chief Judge of the United States 1 Dis trict Court for the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the Report an d Recommendation of the HONORABLE JOHN A. JA RVEY, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1930

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Northern District of Iowa. Carlos Williams, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 21, 1997 Filed: March 20, 1998

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, LOKEN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
After conditionally pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack
coc aine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), Carlos Williams appeals the denial of his motion to suppress narcotics seized during a warrantless search. Reviewing the distric t court’s Fourth Amendment conclusions of law de novo , see United States v. Martinez ,

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78 F.3d 399, 401 (8 th Cir. 1996), we conclude the police had reasonable suspicion of drug tra fficking to conduct an investigative stop of the car in which Williams was a passenger , and that they acquired probable cause to arrest Williams and seize th e cocaine during a protective pat-down search. We therefore affirm.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Dominic Wibe testified that he served a s spot ter for the Cedar Rapids Police Department’s street interdiction detail on th e evening of June 20, 1995. Using high-powered binoculars from an elevated position abo ut seventy-five yards away, Officer Wibe observed the front of the CIO Tavern , locate d in an area where citizens had complained of drug trafficking. At 9:15 p.m. , Wi be saw Charles Cook and Williams park a car in front of the tavern and go inside. Minutes later, Perry Harris and George Ratliff arrived in a second car and parked i n front of the tavern. Harris entered the bar and soon r eturned to speak with Ratliff, who was now standing outside the car. Ratliff handed Harris money, and Harris re-entered the taver n. Cook soon exited the tavern, spoke to Ratliff, and went to his car

. Williams followed Cook out of the tavern and a pproached Ratliff, and Harris came out and joined them. Williams took some items from his right front pants pocket and held them out to Ratliff, who selected from the offering. Williams returned the remaining items to his pocket, while Ratliff and Harris looked at what Ratliff had selected. All four then drove away in the two vehicles.

Of ficer Wibe, an experienced narcotics officer who had once attempted t o purchase narcotics from Williams while working under cover, testified that he wa s “100 percent certain” that this ten-minute sequence of events was an illegal dru g transaction. Wibe inferred that Harris had acted as intermediary be cause Ratliff did not kn ow Williams and Cook well enough to buy from them directly, that Harris ha d del ivered Ratliff’s money to Williams or Cook in the tavern, and that Williams ha d completed the

exchange by offering Ratliff a choice of the illegal drugs Williams was carrying in his pants pocket. Wibe immediately radioed fellow officers that he had just observed a drug transaction and that the passenger in Cook’s car was likely carrying-3-

narcotics in his pants pocket. Wibe provided licen se plate numbers, described the cars and the clothing worn by their occupants, and directed that the two cars be stopped.
Officer Scott Syverson, the other government witness at the su ppression hearing, testified that he and Officer McDaniel received W ibe’s radio transmission and stopped the car driven by Cook. Syverson approached passenger Williams and reviewed the identification he provided. Syverson told Williams the reason for the stop and asked him to exit the car. Syverson radioed Wibe, who confirmed that W illiams was the right person to be questioned about the events Wibe had observed. Syverson then patte d Williams down for weapons. When Syverson felt a bulge in the pants pocket where Wibe said narcotics w ould likely be found, Syverson reached in that pocket, removed crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and marijuana from the pocket, and arrested Williams. This prosecution followed.

On ap peal, Williams first argues that Officer Wibe lacked probable cause t o order the stop of the car in which Williams was riding because Wibe could not see well enough -- by street light, from a distance, and through binoculars -- to determine that Williams, Ratliff, Harris, and Cook were engaged in an illegal drug transaction

. However, the issue at this point in the scenario is whether Wibe saw enough to form
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thereby justifying an investigative stop of the car. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 25-31 (1968). Wibe’s decision to order an investigative stop was unquestionably justified. Wibe observe d behavior consistent with his knowledge of illega l narcotics street sales outside a tavern in a suspected drug trafficking area, and the behavior involved Williams, whom Wibe had suspe cted of drug trafficking in the past. Although the interplay could have been innocent, Wibe had reas onable suspicion that both Williams and Ratliff left this scene wi th drugs in their possession, evidence of criminal activity that might be uncovere d by a prompt investigative stop of the highly mobile participants. Officer Wibe violated no Fourth Amendment rights by directing an investigative stop of the two cars.-4-

The scene now shifts to Officer Syverson’s discovery of the incriminatin g narcotic s in Williams’s pants pocket. Syverson was of course entitled to rely o n information provided by Officer Wibe in stopping the car in which Willi ams was riding. See United States v. Robinson , 119 F.3d 663 , 666-67 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Riley , 927 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 1991). Once an investigative stop has been initiated, a police officer who has reason to believe that the person stopped may b e armed and dangerous may conduct a pat-down search for weapons to protect officer safety

. See Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); United States v. Menard , 95 F.3d 9, 11 ( 8th Cir. 1996), and cases cited. In this case, Williams concedes tha t Officer Syverson’s decision to conduct a pat-down search was reasonable.
Williams argues, however, that Officer Syverson exceeded the perm issible scope of a pat-down search when he removed the bulge from Williams’s pocket. W e disagree. When an officer discovers contraband during the cou rse of a legitimate Terry search, “the Fourth Amend ment does not require its suppression.” Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983). Typically, such discoveries are made when contraband comes into pl ain view of the officer conducting a protective search. But the principle is not limited to what can be seen. “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s oute r clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identit y immediately apparent, there has b een no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search fo r weapons.” Minnesota v. Dickerson , 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993); see United States v. Craft , 30 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) ; United States v. Hughes , 15 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1 994). Here, Williams argues that Syverson went too far because the incriminating nature of the bu lge in Williams’s pants pocket was not

“immediately apparent.” But that ignores the very basis for the Terry stop -- the fact that Officer Wibe had seen Williams put what Wibe reaso nably believed to be illegal narcotics in that very pocket only minutes before the stop. Based upon the information Wibe had supplied, t he reasonable suspicion that justified an investigative stop rose to probable cause when Officer Syverson felt the confirming bulge i n Williams’s pocket. See United States v. Rogers , 129 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir.-5-

1997) (immediately apparent under Dickerson means “anytime in the course of a search cond ucted within the bounds of Terry”). Therefore, Syverson lawfully arreste d Williams and removed the incriminating evidence from his pocket incident to tha t
ar rest, and Williams’s motion to suppress was properly denied. See United States v. Turpin , 920 F.2d 1377, 1386 (8th Cir. 1990) (substantially contemporaneous searc h may precede arrest so long as probabl e cause to arrest existed before the search), cert. denied , 499 U.S. 953 (1991).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH CIRCUIT.