* This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating

Procedure 6(b). After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See

F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 2, 2008 *

Decided October 21, 2008

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 08

‐ 2681

KIMBERLY SCHOB,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellant,

v.

NANCY REILLY, et al.,

Defendants

‐ Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 02 C 2305

James B. Moran,

Judge

.



### O R D E R

Donald Parrillo and Nancy Reilly were divorced in 1970. In the nearly forty years

since then, they and their children—Kimberly Schob, Parrillo’s daughter, is the appellant in

this case—have woven an increasingly complicated web of litigation through numerous

lawsuits in various federal courts and in the courts of three different states. We untangled a NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 08

‐ 2681 Page 2

section of that web in an earlier appeal, Parrillo v. Reilly

, 59 Fed. App’x 129 (7th Cir. 2002),

but new parts have been added since then. Thankfully, we need not untangle the web

much further because, as we will explain, Schob was not harmed by the ruling she wishes to

challenge and, therefore, she does not have standing to appeal.

In one of the six district court cases that we considered in our earlier order, Parrillo

and Schob sued in the Northern District of Illinois seeking to attack a decision of the United

States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Judge Moran dismissed that

suit, and we affirmed because “concerns about how the bankruptcy case was handled

should have been addressed through a bankruptcy appeal, not by a new civil suit.” Parrillo

,

59 Fed. App’x at 133; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Judge Moran thought dismissal insufficient,

though, because Parrillo and Schob intended to bring identical and equally frivolous suits in

different courts. Thus, Judge Moran enjoined Parrillo and Schob from “initiating any action

anywhere relating to the assets included in the Indiana bankruptcy estate or to the

enforcement of Reilly’s judgments against [Parrillo], without first having obtained leave of

this court.”

Nearly six years later, Schob returned to Judge Moran and sought leave to proceed in

bankruptcy court to vacate the earlier judgment. Parrillo was not involved because after the

2002 appeal, we entered an order directing that all federal courts in this circuit return

unfiled any papers he submits directly or indirectly unless and until he pays a $5,000 fine

we imposed against him for filing frivolous appeals. We had entered a similar order against

Schob for failing to pay a $4,000 fine, but we later vacated it when she paid the fine. Schob

told the district court that she had obtained a judgment from an Illinois state court that she

believed showed that the initial bankruptcy judgment was invalid. Believing that Judge

Moran’s injunction barred her from returning to the bankruptcy court to have the judgment

vacated, Schob sought leave to do so. (She also sought leave to proceed in an Illinois state

proceeding, but she has not appealed the district court’s ruling on that request.) Judge

Moran explained that returning to the bankruptcy court to move that an earlier judgment be

vacated was not the “initiating” that was barred by the injunction, and he dismissed Schob’s

request as moot.

Schob’s next step should have been to return to bankruptcy court, as Judge Moran

told her she could without running afoul of his injunction, but instead she appealed.

Schob’s appeal is, however, premised on a colossal misunderstanding of the district court’s

order. According to her brief, “the district court erred when it denied SCHOB leave to

proceed back to the Indiana Bankruptcy Court

. . . on the grounds that the issue was moot.”

Not so. Far from denying Schob leave to return to bankruptcy court, the district court held

that Schob could return to the bankruptcy court without any leave

. And far from ruling that

the issue Schob wishes to argue before the bankruptcy court is moot, the only thing theNo. 08

‐ 2681 Page 3

district court held to be moot was Schob’s motion seeking the district court’s permission to

take that argument to the bankruptcy court. The district court’s ruling, when it is properly

understood, did not harm Schob in any way. She sought leave from Judge Moran to go to

bankruptcy court and Judge Moran told her the request was unnecessary because she was

free to go to bankruptcy court without leave. That ruling has no adverse effect on Schob

that we could possibly redress. Thus, she lacks standing to appeal, see Chase Manhattan

Mortgage Corp. v. Moore

, 446 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006), and the appeal is

DISMISSED.