alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Robert McCREA, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Dorothy M. McCrea, deceased, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. No. 1945.

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division.

Nov. 8, 1971.

Robert J. Campbell, Missoula, Mont., for plaintiff.

Worden, Thane, Haines & Williams, Missoula, Mont., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

RUSSELL E. SMITH, Chief Judge.

In this diversity case the applicable Montana Statute of Limitations is three years.1 The cause of action accrued on November 4, 1967, and the complaint was filed on November 4, 1970. An order was made authorizing service by David Middlemass, Sheriff of Lewis & Clark County. Service was not made until seven months later although defendant was at all times available in Montana for service. The statute if not tolled would have run at the time of *385service. The reason for the delay does not appear and in the absence of any explanation I find the summons was not served with reasonable diligence.

 Actions are barred in Montana unless commenced within the times limited.2 We look to federal law for a definition of the term “commencement of an action in the federal courts.” 3 In the federal courts “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”4 I think that when the complaint was filed the statute of limitations was tolled and remained tolled notwithstanding the failure to serve the summons with diligence. I do not think that the very simple language of Rule 3 which tells a plaintiff what he must do should be altered by incorporating into it the requirements of Rule 4(a) which is cast in terms of the obligations of the clerk of court and the process server.

I prefer the certainty which a literal application of Rule 3 brings to limitations problems to the uncertainty created by a read-in requirement that there be reasonable diligence in the service of process. I think that a failure to serve process should be treated as a failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).5

I do not reach the law problems treated in the arguments as to the defendant’s liability for the allegedly defective design. It may be that on proof of the facts set out in defendant’s brief defendants will prevail but those facts are not in the complaint which, examined with liberality, states a cause of action.

The motion to dismiss is denied, and defendant given twenty (20) days within which to further plead.

1

. R.C.M.1947 § 93-2605, subd. 2.

2

. R.C.M.1947 § 93-2601.

3

. Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).

4

. Rule 3, F.R.Civ.Pro.

5

. The history of the rules supports this position. Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1956), 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 406-1 (2d ed. 1953). *Contra*Hukill v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 159 F.Supp. 571 (D.Alas.1958) and the dictum in Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., *supra*note 3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT LINDA C. MATEY, Respondent

v. JOHN G. MATEY, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 549 WAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 4th day of May, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 3 (Tuesday, January 6, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 504]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30941]



[[Page 504]]

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EXPORT-IMPORT BANK


Application for Final Commitment for a Long-Term Loan or 
Financial Guarantee in Excess of $100 Million: AP088936XX; Withdrawal

AGENCY: Export-Import Bank of the United States.

ACTION: Notice; withdrawal.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Notice is to inform the public of the withdrawal of an 
invalid notice published on December 30, 2014 at 79 FR 78433.

DATES: As of January 6, 2015 the notice published December 30, 2014 at 
79 FR 78433 are withdrawn.
    Reference: AP088936XX.

Lloyd Ellis,
Program Specialist, Office of the General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2014-30941 Filed 1-5-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6690-01-P
Exhibit 31.1  CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION  I, Ronald K. Williams, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of ForeverGreen Worldwide Corp.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.  4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:  (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of small business issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting.     Date: April 10 , 2007 /s/ Ronald K. Williams Ronald K. Williams Chief Executive Officer
#### William L. COOK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION; Lisa Hollingsworth, Warden, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-7278.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 10, 2007.

Decided Dec. 27, 2007.

William L. Cook, Appellant Pro Se. James A. Frederick, Goodell, Devries, Leech *&*Dann, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Allen F. Loucks, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William L. Cook, a District of Columbia Code offender housed in a federal prison, *566seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) petition. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); *see Madley v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,*278 F.3d 1306, 1310 (D.C.Cir.2002). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Cook has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lonnie Woods, Appellant.

[972 NYS2d 97]

Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Carter, J.), rendered October 13, 2010, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence, and (2) a resentence of the same court imposed October 28, 2010.

Ordered that the judgment and resentence are affirmed.

The defendant asserts that the Supreme Court erred in imposing restitution as part of the sentence, and requests that the restitution component of the sentence be vacated. The defendant’s contentions are unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Thompson,*105 AD3d 1067 [2013]; *People v Fields,*101 AD3d 1043 [2012]). The defendant does not contend that his plea of guilty was rendered involuntary or unknowing due to any failure to advise him about restitution at the plea proceeding, and he does not seek to withdraw his plea on that ground. Thus, the defendant is not excused from the preservation requirement due to any lack of opportunity at the sentencing proceeding to move to withdraw his plea *(see People v McAlpin,*17 NY3d 936 [2011]; *People v Louree,*8 NY3d 541, 545-546 [2007]). We decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to review the defendant’s contentions regarding the imposition of restitution.

The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court failed to fix the time and manner of performance of the restitution on the record at the time of sentencing also is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Nathan,*79 AD3d 910, 911 [2010]), and we decline to review that contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court was not obligated to make a “minimal inquiry” into the defendant’s request to substitute new counsel since his request was based on a conclusory statement and reflected only a delaying tactic *(People v Linares,*2 NY3d 507, 510-511 [2004]; *see People v Stevenson,*36 AD3d 634, 634-635 [2007]).

The defendant’s contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s alleged misstate-*749merits regarding the term of supervised release is without merit *(see Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review, and we decline to review it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Eng. P.J., Rivera, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Angeles
Partners X Third Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000317900
<NAME> ANGELES PARTNERS X
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                           1,172
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      221
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                           9,198
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,528
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4,421
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                          8,774
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (4,588)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     4,421
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,675
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,089
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 599
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,520
<EPS-BASIC>                                     125.42<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### In re HNRC DISSOLUTION COMPANY, formerly known as Horizon Natural Resources Company, et al., Debtors. Zurich American Insurance Company, Appellant, v. Lexington Coal Co., LLC, Appellee.

No. 07-5894.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: July 29, 2008.

Decided and Filed: Aug. 13, 2008.

ARGUED: Karen Lee Turner, Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Gregory R. Schaaf, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bing-ham McCutchen LLP, Hartford, Connecticut, for Amicus Curiae. ON BRIEF: Karen Lee Turner, Gary D. Bressler, Ec-kert, Seamans, Cherin *&*Mellott, LLC, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Douglas T. Logsdon, McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Gregory R. Schaaf, Margaret A. Miller, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, Barbara Reid Hartung, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee. G. Erie Brunstad, Jr., Collin O’Connor Udell, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Hartford, Connecticut, for Amicus Curiae.

Before: ROGERS and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; ADAMS, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable John R. Adams, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Zurich American Insurance Co. (“Zurich”) provided insurance coverage to Horizon Natural Resources Co., et aL, (“the Debtors”) during the pendency of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. The policies issued to the Debtors were “deductible policies,” meaning that Zurich would pay the entirety of any claims made and would later seek reimbursement from the Debtors for the deductible portion. After confirmation of the Debtors’ plans, but before the expiration of the date set for the filing of administrative expense claims, Zurich filed an administrative expense claim. Zurich’s administrative expense claim seeks payment of $14,593,567.79, which is an actuarial estimate of the deductible portion of the claims that Zurich believes it will pay in the future for injuries that occurred during the coverage period but were not the subject of insurance claims until after confirmation of the Debtors’ plans. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court denied Zurich’s administrative expense claim, holding that it does not constitute an “actual, necessary cost[ ] and expense! ] of preserving the estate” as is required by 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).

On appeal to this court, Zurich argues that the bankruptcy court and the district court misinterpreted 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Zurich argues that the lower courts should have permitted the estimation of Zurich’s ad*684ministrative expense claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(c). We find no merit in Zurich’s arguments. Because it would be difficult for us to add anything of substance to the district court’s comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, we AFFIRM for the reasons stated by Judge David L. Bunning in *Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Lexington Coal Co., LLC (In re HNRC Dissolution Co.),*371 B.R. 210 (E.D.Ky.2007).
----

----

|   | (1) | the      report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the      information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| August      14, 2009 | By:    | /s/ Thomas      J. Meaney                                                                              |   |
|----------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                 |   | Thomas      J. MeaneyPresident      (Principal Executive Officerand      Principal  Financial Officer) |   |
Exhibit 31.2
**Certifications**
I, Jon D. Greenwood, certify that:
  1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-QSB of MDI, Inc.;   2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;   3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;   4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
   a.  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;    b.  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and    c.  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarterthat has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
  5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):
   a.  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and    b.  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
Dated: May 13, 2005          By                      /s/ Jon D. Greenwood   Jon D. Greenwood   Chief Financial Officer
|   | · | The                Covered Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)                or                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;                and                    |
|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|   | · | The                information contained in the Covered Report fairly presents, in all                material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                of                the Company. |

| Date:  May                4, 2006 | /s/ John                F.                Sipics                                    |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                        | John                F. SipicsPresident                PPL                Electric Utilities Corporation                                                                                                                                                                 |
Order entered May 6, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-00413-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF M.O., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 256th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-13-19769-Z

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s April 19, 2019 motion for extension of time to file notice 

of appeal. Appellant explains the notice of appeal was electronically filed April 4, 2019, the 

twentieth day after the judgment was signed, but was rejected by a deputy district clerk because 

of a typographical error. As a result, a second notice of appeal was filed April 5th. That notice of 

appeal was subsequently amended on April 9th. Appellant asks the Court to deem the notice of 

appeal filed April 4th timely or, alternatively, extend the time for filing the notice of appeal to 

April 9th. 

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(5) deems an electronically filed document filed 

when transmitted to the electronic filing service provider. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(f)(5). 

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to the extent the appeal is deemed to have been filed April 

4

th

. 

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE