IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10446

Summary Calendar

JILLIAN IZZIO, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, 

HEATHER ZOELLER, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly 

Situated, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellees

JILLIAN BRANA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CENTURY GOLF PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, L.P., 

 Defendant - Appellee

v.

ANTHONY METZGER,

 Movant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CV-3194

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 15, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-10446

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Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case is one of several filed against appellee Century Golf Partners 

Management, L.P., (Century Golf), alleging violations of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (FLSA) and New York labor law at New York catering facilities 

operated by Century Golf. In this case, plaintiffs’ counsel and Century Golf 

asked the district court to certify an FLSA class and a state law class for 

settlement purposes. The district court certified the classes and approved the 

settlement. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the district court’s 

class-certification order and REMAND for an appropriate analysis of the Rule 

23(a) factors.

Plaintiff-appellant Jillian Brana and movant-appellant Anthony 

Metzger objected below and argue here (1) that the district court incorrectly 

certified the classes and (2) that the district court abused its discretion by 

approving the settlement. Because we agree that the district court did not 

conduct the proper class-certification analysis, we do not reach appellants’ 

second argument.

“We review a district court’s class certification decisions for abuse of 

discretion.” Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 2000). 

“Rule 23 governs whether a proposed class falls within the limited exception to 

‘the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 

named parties only.’” Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). Four prerequisites to 

class certification “must be met by all classes: numerosity, commonality, 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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typicality, and adequacy of representation.” Id. at 14–15 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)). Because of the due process concerns inherent in class-certification 

decisions, “the Supreme Court requires district courts to conduct a rigorous 

analysis of Rule 23 prerequisites.” Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320 

(5th Cir. 2005). It is not enough that both sides may have stipulated to 

certification, because “the court is bound to conduct its own thorough rule 23(a) 

inquiry.” Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 563 n.7 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(emphasis added). 

Appellants claim that class certification was improper because there are 

serious questions as to whether the commonality factor is satisfied. They point 

to the settling parties’ representation below that “the [four] catering facilities 

changed their practices at different times in different ways at different 

facilities during the class period by making changes to their contracts, menus 

and customer documents . . . [and] sorting out the legal implications of each 

language change might be challenging.” They also highlight the settling 

parties’ “admi[ssion]” that “an evaluation of the claims of the Settlement Class 

members would require an analysis of change in fact or law . . . giv[ing] rise to 

many different analyses which could prove difficult for a jury and might have 

implications for a contested class certification motion.” Neither Century Golf 

nor the settling plaintiffs offer any response to appellants’ argument on 

commonality. 

In addition, appellants argue that class certification was improper 

because the district court did not conduct an adequate analysis of the Rule 

23(a) factors. At an oral hearing, the district court only said, “I’ll certify the 

class for purposes of this – of this settlement.” They further emphasize that 

the district court’s subsequent order stated conclusionally, “The settlement 

classes are hereby satisfied.” In each instance, appellants contend, the district 

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court conducted no analysis, much less a rigorous analysis, of the Rule 23(a) 

factors in accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent.

Having reviewed the record and the briefs, we agree with appellants. 

Prior to certifying a class, the district court must conduct its own rigorous 

analysis of the Rule 23(a) factors, especially when, as is true here, satisfaction 

of those factors is seriously contested. See Stirman, 280 F.3d at 563 & n.7 

(holding that the district court’s assertion that “no conflicts exist to preclude 

certification” was “not a sufficiently ‘rigorous’ analysis” to demonstrate 

satisfaction of the factors); compare Ibe, 836 F.3d at 530–33 (rigorous analysis 

characterized district court’s reasoning). Because the district court did not 

conduct the requisite rigorous analysis, we VACATE the district court’s classcertification order and REMAND the case for appropriate Rule 23 findings.

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