United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JUAN ROMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2022-1015

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:20-cv-00040-BAF, Senior Judge Bohdan A. Futey.

______________________ 

Decided: March 9, 2023

______________________ 

JUAN ROMAN, Butner, NC, pro se. 

 BETHANY HAUSER, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant. 

Also represented by DAVID A. HUBBERT, JOAN I.

OPPENHEIMER. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Hughes, Circuit Judge.

This is a tax refund case. Pro se Plaintiff-Appellee Juan 

Roman sued the government in the United States Court of 

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2 ROMAN v. US

Federal Claims alleging, among other things, that he was 

entitled to a refund on taxes that he paid but that were

assessed against his ex-wife. Before the government filed 

its Answer, the Court of Federal Claims denied the government’s motion to dismiss Mr. Roman’s third-party refund 

claim, granted the government’s motion to dismiss Mr. Roman’s other claims, and entered judgment in the amount 

of $50,002.04 in Mr. Roman’s favor. For the reasons provided below, we vacate the trial court’s judgment as it pertains to Mr. Roman’s third-party refund claim and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I 

A 

Mr. Roman and his ex-wife, Iris Gabriela Espinosa, entered into a property settlement agreement in 2009 as part 

of their divorce. In exchange for $150,000 from Mr. Roman, 

Ms. Espinosa transferred to him her interest in the home 

that they shared. In an amendment to the agreement, Mr. 

Roman agreed to pay any taxes assessed on Ms. Espinosa 

for her receipt of the $150,000. Ms. Espinosa reported the 

$150,000 payment on her tax return as income for the 2010 

tax year. The IRS then assessed $50,002.04 in taxes and 

penalties and mailed Ms. Espinosa a notice of intent to take 

possession of her property, including the previously shared 

home, if the assessment was not satisfied. 

Mr. Roman and Ms. Espinosa met with an IRS officer

to discuss the matter. Mr. Roman asked if the notice to Ms. 

Espinosa indicated that the IRS had already placed a lien 

on his home. Mr. Roman explained that Ms. Espinosa no 

longer had any ownership rights in the previously shared 

home. While the lien had apparently not been placed, the 

IRS officer consulted with a supervisor and told Mr. Roman

that Ms. Espinosa’s tax liability must be paid to stop a levy 

against Mr. Roman’s home. Mr. Roman claims that he believed that he “ha[d] no realistic alternative to payment of 

a tax that he did not owe.” J.A. 19–20 (Complaint at 2–3).

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ROMAN v. US 3

The IRS officer also told Mr. Roman that he could appeal 

the assessment once the tax was fully paid. 

The IRS officer prepared an installment agreement for 

paying the tax liability that listed Ms. Espinosa as the taxpayer, identifying Mr. Roman’s checking account and financial institution. Although Mr. Roman did not agree to 

sign the installment agreement, Mr. Roman made an initial large payment towards the amount due on his ex-wife’s 

account and then began sending monthly payments to the 

IRS in accordance with the installment agreement. The 

$50,002.04 tax obligation was satisfied on March 8, 2017.

Mr. Roman asserts that he paid the tax under protest. 

B 

On January 13, 2020, Mr. Roman filed a refund suit in 

the Court of Federal Claims.1 Mr. Roman argued that the 

IRS wrongfully assessed the income tax on the $150,000 

transfer because 26 U.S.C. § 121(a) provides for an exclusion from gross income of gain for certain sales of a principal residence. He argued that his payment to Ms. Espinosa 

qualified for exclusion under 26 U.S.C. § 121; thus, no 

taxes were legitimately owed on the $150,000 sum, and he 

was entitled to a refund of his $50,002.04 payment.

Mr. Roman asserted that he had standing to contest 

Ms. Espinosa’s tax liability in the Court of Federal Claims

under two theories. First, he argued he could bring a thirdparty refund claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), relying on

1 Mr. Roman also brought a personal refund claim 

and various claims for wrongful collection, tort, criminal 

misconduct, and due process violations. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Mr. Roman’s personal refund claim 

and various other claims for damages. Roman v. United 

States, No. 20-40 T at J.A. 13 (Aug. 2, 2021) (unreported) 

(available at J.A. 2–13). Mr. Roman does not contest the 

Court of Federal Claims rulings in this respect.

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4 ROMAN v. US

the Supreme Court’s discussion of the meaning of the term 

taxpayer in United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995). 

Second, Mr. Roman contended that, even if he were not 

deemed a taxpayer, he had a cause of action under the implied contract clause of the Tucker Act because he paid Ms. 

Espinosa’s taxes under duress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

The government moved to dismiss Mr. Roman’s thirdparty refund claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The government argued that Mr. Roman was not in the 

class of persons who could bring an action under

§ 1346(a)(1) because 26 U.S.C. § 6511 requires that the 

claimant in such case be the “taxpayer.” Citing Court of 

Claims and Court of Federal Claims case law, the government contended that Ms. Espinosa alone was the “taxpayer” who could file a refund suit for the $50,002.04 

because she was the person against whom the tax was assessed. The government also argued that the Williams decision could not support Mr. Roman’s position because it 

had been superseded by statute. 

The Court of Federal Claims denied the government’s 

motion as to Mr. Roman’s third-party tax refund claim. The 

court determined that it had jurisdiction under § 1346(a)(1) 

over Mr. Roman’s third-party refund claim as an action for 

the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have 

been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected based on 

his claim that the income tax was not legally owed under 

26 U.S.C. § 121. See Roman v. United States, No. 20-40 T,

at J.A. 9–10 (Aug. 2, 2021) (unreported) (available at 

J.A. 2–13) [Decision]. According to the trial court, Mr. Roman was a “taxpayer.” Id. The court noted that the government did not address the merits of Mr. Roman’s claim that 

the $150,000 was not taxable income under 26 U.S.C. 

§ 121. Id. The court then found that all of Mr. Roman’s payments to the IRS were documented in the record and 

granted Mr. Roman’s third-party refund claim in the 

amount of $50,002.04. Id. at J.A. 13.

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ROMAN v. US 5

The government appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

II

Resolution of this appeal rests on two issues. First, we 

must decide whether Mr. Roman was a “taxpayer” as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). For the reasons explained 

below, we hold that he is not and that the Court of Federal 

Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Roman’s third-party 

refund claim under § 1346(a)(1). We then turn to whether 

Mr. Roman has nevertheless pled an implied contract claim 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). We hold that he has. 

We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ grant 

or denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, and we accept well-pleaded factual allegations 

as true. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. v. United States, 

956 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Findings of fact relating to jurisdictional issues are reviewed for clear error.

Banks v. United States, 314 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). Mr. Roman, as the plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). 

We give pro se plaintiffs more latitude in their pleadings than a party represented by counsel, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and we may search the 

complaint and record “to see if plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere displayed,” Ruderer v. United States, 412 

F.2d 1285, 1292 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Such leniency, however, 

does not relieve a plaintiff of jurisdictional requirements. 

Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. 

Cir. 1987).

A 

We first address whether the Court of Federal Claims

erred in holding that it had jurisdiction over Mr. Roman’s 

third-party tax refund claim under § 1346(a)(1). 

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6 ROMAN v. US

The government argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because one who pays the tax liability of another, 

as Mr. Roman did for Ms. Espinosa, is not a “taxpayer.” We 

agree. 

Section 1346(a)(1) provides that: 

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, 

concurrent with the United States Court of Federal 

Claims, of [] [a]ny civil action against the United 

States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax 

alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have 

been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner 

wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue 

laws.

Section 6511(a) provides that a “[c]laim for credit or refund 

of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return 

shall be filed by the taxpayer . . . .” (emphasis added). 

And 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14) defines a taxpayer as “any person subject to any internal revenue tax.” In short, 

§ 1346(a)(1) gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction 

to hear tax refund cases; § 6511(a) requires that the claimants in such cases be the taxpayer; and § 7701 defines who 

is the taxpayer. 

Generally, we are bound by statutory interpretations 

of our predecessor court, the Court of Claims. S. Corp. v. 

United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en 

banc). In the context of refund claims, the Court of Claims 

has construed the term “taxpayer” in a “strict or narrow 

sense . . . [to] mean[] a person who pays, overpays, or is 

subject to pay his own personal income tax.” Econ. Plumbing & Heating Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 585, 590 n.3 

(Ct. Cl. 1972) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Collins v. 

United States, the Court of Claims held that “[i]n order to 

maintain an action for the refund of taxes . . . , the plaintiff 

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ROMAN v. US 7

must be the taxpayer who has overpaid his own taxes.” 

532 F.2d 1344, 1347 n.2 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (emphasis added). In 

other words, to be a “taxpayer” for refund purposes, a party 

must be the one against whom the tax liability was assessed. 

The Court of Federal Claims here cited Economy 

Plumbing and Collins, yet still found Mr. Roman to be a 

taxpayer even though the tax was assessed against Ms. Espinosa. The trial court appears to base this conclusion on a 

distinction between a tax that is overpaid versus one that 

is not actually due. The court stated: 

However, there were no claims that the amounts 

paid [in Economy Plumbing and Collins] were not 

actually due from the assessed taxpayers in either 

of those cases. For this reason, the Court concluded 

that “the plaintiff, a nontaxpayer, [had to] establish independent jurisdictional grounds for his action.” [Collins, 532 F.2d at 1347 n.2.] Here, Plaintiff 

does claim that the amount paid was not actually 

due; that is his basis for requesting a refund, not 

overpayment. Therefore, Plaintiff is in the category 

of taxpayer.

Decision at J.A. 9–10. While it is true that both Economy 

Plumbing and Collins considered plaintiffs who overpaid 

taxes owed by another, that fact does not support the trial 

court’s conclusion. There is simply nothing in either case to 

suggest that this is a distinction with a difference. The two 

cases simply stand for the proposition that a party seeking 

a refund must be the one against whom the tax liability 

was assessed. Indeed, that understanding accords with the 

language of § 7701, which limits taxpayers to the person 

“subject to any internal revenue tax.” 

Nor does the Supreme Court’s decision in United States 

v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995), provide a jurisdictional 

basis for Roman’s third-party refund suit. In Williams, the 

Supreme Court allowed a woman to challenge a lien on her 

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8 ROMAN v. US

property by means of a refund suit under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(a)(1) even though it resulted from an assessment 

only against her ex-husband, making her a third party. See 

id. at 529. In EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, however, the Court emphasized the limitations of Williams, 

noting that its holding “that § 1346(a)(1) authorizes a taxrefund claim by a third party whose property was subjected 

to an allegedly wrongful tax lien” was based “on the specific 

understanding that no other remedy . . . was open to the 

plaintiff in that case.” 550 U.S. 429, 434–35 (2007). 

Congress, however, has since provided such a remedy. 

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 

105-206, § 3106, 112 Stat. 685, added I.R.C. §§ 6325(b)(4) 

and 7426(a)(4). Section 6325(b)(4)(A) allows a third-party 

owner whose property is subject to a lien to obtain a certificate of discharge after either depositing cash or furnishing 

a bond sufficient to protect the lien interest of the United 

States. Section 7426(a)(4) then provides a judicial remedy 

to “bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States for a determination of 

whether the value of the interest of the United States (if 

any) in such property is less than the value determined by 

the Secretary.” Section 7426(a)(4) also provides that “[n]o 

other action may be brought by such person for such a determination.” That § 7426(a)(4) provides that it is the exclusive remedy for a third-party property owner to dispute 

the propriety of the lien is further evidence that Mr. Roman 

is not a “taxpayer” for purposes of § 1346(a)(1). 

Our sister circuits have also interpreted Williams narrowly. E.g., JetPay Corp. v. U. S. Internal Revenue Serv., 

26 F.4th 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[Section] 7426 is now 

the only avenue for third party actions.” (citation and quotation mark omitted)); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. United 

States, 520 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (“EC Term of 

Years Trust v. United States narrows the permissible interpretation of Williams and there can no longer be a good argument for allowing a third-party challenge to an 

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ROMAN v. US 9

assessment, barred by § 7426, to be made under § 1346.”

(footnote omitted)). 

In short, Mr. Roman was not a “taxpayer” as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) because he was not the person 

against whom the tax liability was assessed. The tax here 

was assessed against Ms. Espinosa, not Mr. Roman. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear 

Mr. Roman’s third-party refund claim and the trial court’s 

judgment in Mr. Roman’s favor is vacated. 

B 

Next, we turn to whether Mr. Roman’s complaint 

pleads a contractual claim over which the trial court has 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The government 

recognizes that our precedent establishes that “a party who 

pays a tax for which he is not liable may sue to recover that 

tax if it was paid under duress because the duress creates 

an ‘implied in fact contract.’” Appellant’s Br. 26 (citing Collins, 532 F.2d at 1347; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). This jurisdiction comes from the Tucker Act, which confers on the 

Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to hear contractual 

claims against the government, including implied-in-fact 

contracts. Kirkendall v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 766, 769 

(Ct. Cl. 1940); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United 

States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to 

render judgment upon any claim against the United States 

founded . . . upon any . . . implied contract with the United 

States . . . .”); DaCosta v. United States, 393 F. App’x 712, 

714 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential) (explaining that an 

implied contract is “a fiction of law where a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty, as to repay money obtained 

by fraud or duress” (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Hercules Inc. v. United States , 516 U.S. 417, 424 

(1996))). 

Duress is a fact-specific inquiry; it requires (1) involuntary acceptance, with (2) no alternative, and (3) coercive 

acts by the government. Collins, 532 F.2d at 1348. Whether 

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10 ROMAN v. US

a plaintiff has established duress “depend[s] upon the circumstances of each individual case.” Fruhauf Sw. Garment

Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953); 

see also Document Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 11 Cl. 

Ct. 463, 466 (1987) (“In deciding defendant’s motion to dismiss, all of the plaintiff’s findings of uncontroverted fact

are assumed to be true. These findings include plaintiff’s 

assertion of involuntariness and duress.” (citation omitted)); 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71:5 (4th ed.) 

(“Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish any one of 

the elements of duress is generally a question of fact.”).

Mr. Roman argues that the IRS agent’s action “put Roman under duress to pay his ex-wife’s taxes.” Appellee’s Br. 

2. Supporting that argument are factual allegations that 

(1) Roman paid the tax “in protest,” suggesting involuntary 

acceptance, J.A. 27–28; (2) Roman advocated for his position to the IRS agent, who told him that he nonetheless had 

to pay, suggesting no alternative; and (3) the IRS threatened to levy his home, suggesting a coercive act. We intimate no view on the merits of Mr. Roman’s claims of 

duress, nor do we decide what bearing Mr. Roman’s promise to his ex-wife would have on the inquiry. We only hold 

that these factual allegations are sufficient to support a 

claim of an implied contract and survive a motion to dismiss. In light of that conclusion, we remand to the trial 

court for further proceedings on Mr. Roman’s implied contract claim. 

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in favor of Mr. 

Roman’s third-party refund claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(a)(1) is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on Mr. Roman’s implied contract claim. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

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