alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6449

MARCUS LE’SHAWN DIXON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cv-00114-HEH-EWH)

Submitted: September 22, 2022 Decided: September 27, 2022

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marcus Le’Shawn Dixon, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6449 Doc: 9 Filed: 09/27/2022 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Le’Shawn Dixon appeals the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b) motion for relief from the court’s prior judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

petition as successive and unauthorized. As Dixon’s Rule 60(b) motion sought to challenge 

the court’s order on the merits, it was an unauthorized successive § 2254 petition∗ and the 

district court thus correctly denied it as the court lacked jurisdiction because Dixon failed 

to obtain prefiling authorization from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); McRae, 

793 F.3d at 397-400. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. 

Consistent with our decision in United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th 

Cir. 2003), we construe Dixon’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to 

file a second or successive § 2254 petition. Upon review, we conclude that Dixon’s claims 

do not meet the relevant standard. See 28 U.S.C § 2244(b)(2). We therefore deny 

authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

∗ A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal a district court’s denial of a 

Rule 60(b) motion which is in substance an unauthorized, successive habeas petition. 

United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015).

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6449 Doc: 9 Filed: 09/27/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
---

EXHIBIT 32

WRITTEN STATEMENT PURSUANT
TO18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The
undersigned, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and the Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of ACME Communications, Inc. (the Company) hereby
certify that, to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350:

| | (i) the annual report on Form 10-K for the twelve months ending December 31, 2004
of the Company (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|Date: March 15, 2005 |  | /s/ Thomas D. Allen
Thomas D. Allen
Executive Vice President &
   Cheif Financial Officer
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  | /s/ Jamie Kellner
Jamie Kellner
Cheif Executive Officer &
   Chairman of the Board
#### Clorinda Pyros, Appellant, v Charles Dengel, Respondent. (Action No. 1.) Charles Capobianco et al., Respondents, v Charles Dengel, Respondent, and Clorinda Pyros et al., Appellants. (Action No. 2.)

[826 NYS2d 140]

In an action to impose a constructive trust on real property, and a related action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, Clorinda Pyros and Elizabeth Pyros appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated July 7, 2005, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, granted Charles Capobianco and Jennifer Capobianco specific performance of the contract of sale, imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale, and directed Charles Dengel to pay only one third of the proceeds of the sale to Clorinda Pyros.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

*425The trial court properly directed specific performance of the contract of sale between Charles Dengel, the seller of the subject property, and Charles Capobianco and Jennifer Capobianco, the purchasers *(see Tucek v Hoffman,*161 AD2d 588 [1990]). The trial court also properly imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the subject property *(see Nastasi v Nastasi,*26 AD3d 32, 38 [2005]; *cf. Spodek v Riskin,*150 AD2d 358 [1989]; *Levy v Moran,*270 AD2d 314 [2000]). The evidence at trial showed the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between Clorinda Pyros and Dengel, a transfer of an interest in the subject property to Dengel in reliance on a promise to reconvey the property, and unjust enrichment *(see Sharp v Kosmalski,*40 NY2d 119 [1976]; *Lipton v Donnenfeld,*5 AD3d 356 [2004]; *cf. Modica v Modica,*15 AD3d 635 [2005]). The trial court’s determination that Clorinda Pyros consented to the sale of the property should be accorded deference, since the court was in a position to assess the evidence and credibility of witnesses at trial *(see Faisal v Mayronne,*22 AD3d 634 [2005]; *Koslowski v Koslowski,*297 AD2d 784 [2002]). Furthermore, there is legally sufficient evidence to support the finding that Clorinda Pyros is entitled to only one third of the sale proceeds *(see Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). Moreover, in reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, “the power of the Appellate Division . . . is as broad as that of the trial court and ... it may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, taking into account tbat in a close case . . . ‘the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses’ ” *(Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford,*60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983] [citations omitted], quoting *York Mtge. Corp. v Clotar Constr. Corp.,*254 NY 128, 133-134 [1930]). The trial court’s determination is supported by the record, and we find no reason to disturb it *(see Tornheim v Kohn,*31 AD3d 748 [2006]; *Kahan v Sulaymanov,*24 AD3d 612 [2005]; *Bucci v Bucci,*231 AD2d 665 [1996]).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Adams, J.P, Ritter, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
Order filed February 8 , 2019

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 18

- 00953

- CV

____________ IN RE STEFANI BAMBAC E , Relator

O RIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 234th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2018

- 27762



### EN BANC ORDER

On October 31, 2018, relator Stefani Bambace filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking this court to compel the Honorable Wesley Ward, the then

presiding judge of the 234th District Court of Harris County
, to vacate his September 17, 2018 order compelling arbitration of the action below (the “ Arbitration Order ” )

.On November 13, 2018, a panel of this court issued an opinion denying
relator’ s petit ion for writ of mandamus. See In re Bambace
, No. 14

- 18

- 00953

- CV, 2018 WL 5914863, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2018, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.). The panel consisted of Justices Donovan, Wise, and Jewell.
Judge Ward ceased to ho ld office on the trial court on January 1, 2019. T he
Honorable Lauren Reeder is the successor judge of the 234 th District Court. The Honorable John Donovan ceased to hold office on this court on January 1, 2019.

This court granted relator ’s motions to extend time to file motion s for rehearing and en banc reconsideration, which relator timely filed on January 10,
2019. The panel DEN IED the motion for rehearing, but the motion for en banc reconsideration remains pending. Accordingly, this ma nda mus proceeding is still pending. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2 provides if a mandamus proceeding is pending when the trial judge that is the subject of the proceeding ceases to hold office, the court of appeals must abate the mandamus proceeding to allow the

successor judge to reconsider the original judge ’s decision

. See Tex. R. App. P. 7.2(b). We therefore ABATE this case until Judge Lauren Reeder has an opportunity

to reconsider the Arbitration Order and relator has provided this court with a record showing the evidence and argument presented to Judge Reeder and her ruling on
reconsider ation of the Arbitration Order , or relator moves to dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus as moot.

PER C URIAM 1

1 The en banc court consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher, Wise, Jewell, Bourliot, Zimmerer, Spain, Hassan, and Poissant. Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher, Wise, and Jewell dissent to the en banc court’s order of abatement and would not abate the case.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 0466 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER HORN,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including February 1 4, 2024, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 8 2024

01/08/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0466
Exhibit 32(c)

CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  FOR PPL ENERGY SUPPLY, LLC'S 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PPL Energy Supply,
  LLC (the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2003, as filed with
  the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Covered Report"),
  I, the principal executive officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
  1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
  hereby certify that:

| |  | The Covered Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
        or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                           
| | - | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |   |                                                                                                                                                                             
| |  | The information contained in the Covered Report fairly presents, in all
        material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
        the Company.





|Date: November 10, 2003 | /s/ William F. HechtWilliam F. Hecht
        President
        PPL Energy Supply, LLC
|----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
  provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
  the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2195 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2195

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Environmental 
  Protection Agency, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund for 
                           fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Environmental 
  Protection Agency, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund for 
                           fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
              PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAKING UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK TRUST 
              FUND FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Environmental Protection 
Agency, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund for fiscal year 
2024 may not exceed $91,941,000.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ROBERT COTTRELL, ) 

MAURICE FITCH, and ) 

LEE HENRY MCGREW, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) Civil Action No. 08-0646-CG-M 

 ) 

SHERIFF JAMES LOVETTE, and ) 

CHOCTAW COUNTY COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

JUDGMENT 

 In accordance with the court=s memorandum opinion and order entered on February 2, 

2010 (Doc. 76), it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that JUDGMENT be and is 

hereby entered in favor defendants, Sheriff James Lovette and Choctaw County Commission, 

and against plaintiffs, Robert Cottrell, Maurice Fitch and Lee Henry McGrew. Therefore, all 

plaintiff=s’ claims against the defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Costs 

are to be taxed against the plaintiffs. 

 Sheriff James Lovette and Choctaw County Commission having settled their 

counterclaims with counter-defendants Robert Cottrell and Maurice Fitch, said counterclaims 

against Robet Cottrell and Mauice Fitch are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 21st day of June, 2010. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:08-cv-00646-CG-M Document 96 Filed 06/21/10 Page 1 of 1
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1573

KAREN COX, Widow of George B. Cox, IV, Petitioner,

v. POND CREEK MINING COMPANY; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (05-6241-BLA; 08-0321-BLA)

Submitted: September 22, 2009 Decided: November 6, 2009

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Karen Cox, Petitioner Pro Se. Waseem Karim, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, William Steele Mattingly, JACKSON KELLY, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia; Steven D. Breeskin, Jeffrey Steven Goldberg, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM: Karen S. Cox (Cox), seeks to appeal the Benefits Review Board’s (Board) decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s decision denying survivor’s black lung benefits, and the Board’s subsequent decision denying reconsideration. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In a black lung benefits case, a party seeking review of a decision and order issued by the Board must file a petition for review in the court of appeals “for the circuit in which the injury occurred,” within sixty days after the order is issued. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2006). The sixty-day period for seeking review is jurisdictional, and a petition for review must be filed with the clerk of this court to stop the running of this period. Adkins v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 889 F.2d 1360, 1363 (4th Cir. 1989). “[T]he sixty day filing period begins to run with the filing of a Board opinion with the Clerk

of the Board.” Mining Energy, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 391 F.3d 571, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2004). In this case, the Board’s decision was issued and served on the parties on December 16, 2008. Cox filed a request for reconsideration with the Board on January 22, 2009. This request was not timely filed, however, and did not serve to toll the sixty-day period for filing a petition for review in this

court. See 20 C.F.R. § 802.406, .407 (2009) (establishing

23 thirty-day period for requesting reco nsideration by the Board and providing that timely reconsideration request tolls period for filing petition for review). Absent tolling, the sixty-day period for filing the petition for review expired on February 17, 2009. Cox’s petition for review was not filed until May 18,

2009. Although Cox’s petition was filed within sixty days of the Board’s order denying her request for reconsideration, that

order is not reviewable. Betty B. Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 194 F.3d 491, 495-96 (4th Cir. 1999). We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 32.2CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Sycamore Networks, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending July 31,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul F. Brauneis, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with
the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company, as of, and for the periods presented in the Report.



|                                                                                 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                 
|/s/    PAUL F.
BRAUNEIS                                                          
|Paul F. Brauneis                                                                 
|Chief Financial Officer,
Vice President Finance
and Administration, and Treasurer
|September 24, 2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,458,139
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,663,536
<PP&E>                                         114,736
<DEPRECIATION>                                  17,419
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,433,618
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          477,667
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,835
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,433,618
<SALES>                                         11,911
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,911
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,894,569
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,154
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,891,812)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,891,812)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,891,812)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.31)


</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Jazmone S., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Philip J., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Ashley J., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Philip J., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Zalika J., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Philip J., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 3.) In the Matter of Ethan J., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent; Philip J., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 4.)

Submitted November 26, 2008;

decided March 26, 2009

Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied *[see*11 NY3d 809 (2008)].

Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Rodriguez, Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 827]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Daniel J. Doyle, J.), rendered March 30, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant upon his plea of guilty of, inter alia, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of, inter alia, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75 [1] [b]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress statements that he made in his home to a police investigator who was executing a search warrant. We reject that contention. The court properly determined that *Miranda*warnings were not required because defendant was not in custody when he made the statements at issue *(see People v Witherspoon,*66 AD3d 1456, 1458 [2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 942 [2010]; *People v Nunez,*51 AD3d 1398, 1400 [2008], *lv denied*11 NY3d 792 [2008]; *People v Soroka,*28 AD3d 1219, 1220 [2006], *lv denied*7 NY3d 818 [2006]). Defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained during the interview or the execution of the search warrant, and he was free to move about the apartment *(see People v Cerrato,*24 NY2d 1, 8 [1969], *cert denied*397 US 940*1334[1970]; *People v Lavere,*236 AD2d 809, 809 [1997], *lv denied*90 NY2d 860 [1997]). Defendant was not told that he was under arrest and, indeed, the investigator left the apartment without arresting defendant *(see Cerrato,*24 NY2d at 8-9; *Soroka,*28 AD3d at 1220; *Lavere,*236 AD2d at 809). We conclude that, under those circumstances, a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would not have believed that he or she was in custody *(see People v Paulman,*5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005]; *People v Yukl,*25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], *cert denied*400 US 851 [1970]; *Lavere,*236 AD2d at 809). Present — Scudder, EJ., Peradotto, Garni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.