alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7122

WILLIAM LEBRON CHURCH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; EDWARD W. MURRAY, Director; VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD; COUNTY OF AMELIA, VIRGINIA; THOMAS V. WARREN, Judge; COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge. (CA-95-612) Submitted: September 30, 1998 Decided: November 16, 1998 Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.William Lebron Church, Appellant Pro Se. William W. Muse, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* This case was decided by a magistrate judge exercising jurisdiction upon consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). 2 PER CURIAM: William Lebron Church appeals the magistrate judge’s ordersdenying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) complaint and his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. * We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge’s opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. Church v. Attorney Gen. , No. CA-95-612 (E.D. Va. Apr. 14 & May 7, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7634
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus WILLIAM ERNEST LEWIS, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge. (CR-99-8) Submitted: January 17, 2002 Decided: January 29, 2002 Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William Lewis, Appellant Pro Se. James Ashford Metcalfe, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: William Lewis appeals from the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2000) motion. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Lewis , No. CR-99-8 (E.D. Va. July 23, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**EXHIBIT 11**

**TELLABS, INC.COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS**Inmillions, except per share amounts
| ** **                                                            | ** ** | **First Quarter** | ** ** |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------|------------|
| ** **                                                            | ** ** | **3/31/06**            | ** ** | **4/01/05** | ** ** |
| Numerator:                                                            |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Net earnings                                                          |       | $                      | 52.4       |   | $ | 0.7 |   |
|                                                                  |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Denominator:                                                          |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Denominator for  basic earnings per share-                            |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Weighted average shares outstanding                                   |       | 449.6                  |       | 455.8 |   |
|                                                                  |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Effect of  dilutive securities:                                       |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Employee stock  options and awards                                    |       | 10.4                   |       | 3.0 |   |
|                                                                  |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Denominator for  diluted earnings per share-                          |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Adjusted weighted average shares outstanding and  assumed conversions |       | 460.0                  |       | 458.8 |   |
|                                                                  |       |                   |       |   |   |
| Net earnings per share  — basic                                  |       | $                      | 0.12       |   | $ | 0.00 |   |
| Net earnings per share — diluted                                 |       | $                      | 0.11       |   | $ | 0.00 |   |

 

21

----
#### Jose VANEGAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gene M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-7033.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2007.

Decided Dec. 27, 2007.

Jose Vanegas, Appellant Pro Se. John Michael Parsons, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jose Vanegas seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Vane-gas has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court *557and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       4,592,379
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  584,270
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,268,088
<PP&E>                                       1,693,287
<DEPRECIATION>                                 713,903
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              23,451,627
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,292,512
<BONDS>                                      8,733,333
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,844
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,420,938
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                23,451,627
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,831,982
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,995,746
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             237,500
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,275,800
<INCOME-TAX>                                   858,364
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,417,436
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .30


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this amendment # 3 to the
Registration Statement on Form S-4 (No. 333-113141) of IMAX Corporation of our
report dated February 27, 2004 relating to the financial statements, which
appears in the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31,
2003. We also consent to the reference to use under the heading Experts in such
Registration Statement.




/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
---------------------------------
Chartered Accountants
September 14, 2004
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 29, 2024

NO. 03-23-00135-CV

Jesse James, Appellant

v.

Lucee Peterson, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES BAKER, TRIANA, AND SMITH

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER

This is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on February 15, 2023. Having 

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error 

in the judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s final judgment. Because appellant 

is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2366 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2366

To establish a 90-day limit to file a petition for judicial review of a 
  permit, license, or approval for a highway or public transportation 
                    project, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mrs. Boebert (for herself, Mr. Nehls, Mrs. Miller of Illinois, Mr. Fry, 
  Mr. Norman, Mr. Higgins of Louisiana, and Mr. Gosar) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 
                           and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To establish a 90-day limit to file a petition for judicial review of a 
  permit, license, or approval for a highway or public transportation 
                    project, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``90-Day Review Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON CLAIMS.

    (a) In General.--Section 139(l) of title 23, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``150 days'' each place it appears and inserting 
``90 days''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Section 330(e) of title 23, United States Code, is 
        amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``150 days'' 
                and inserting ``90 days''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (3)(B)(i), by striking ``150 
                days'' and inserting ``90 days''.
            (2) Section 24201(a)(4) of title 49, United States Code, is 
        amended by striking ``of 150 days''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Travers *v.*Buckley *et al.*

*(Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts.*

August 19, 1889.)

Patents foe Inventions—Prior Condition of Art.

In view of the prior use of detachable blocks notched at the end and under the edge for spreading hammocks, there is no invention in the second claim of letters patent granted to Travers November 18, 1819, in “the novel use of detachable notched distending blocks” in improved hammocks.

In Equity. Bill to enjoin infringement of patent.

*Briesen, Steele & Knauth,*for complainant.

*Browne &*Browne, for defendants.

Colt, J.

This case now comes before the court on final hearing. Since the hearing upon motion for an injunction (35 Fed. Rep. 133) the defendants have strengthened their position as to the prior condition of the art. The evidence now before me proves, I think, the prior use, for spreading a hammock, of a detachable straight block notched at both ends, a detachable straight block notched at both ends and on the under edge, a curved block, in the form of a barrel stave, notched at both ends, and a curved block Having properly spaced holes in it through which the lanyards passed. The Travers patent was for an improved hammock, and the invention consisted of several distinct improvements, among which, as the specification states, “is the novel use of detachable, notched distending blocks.” It may be that in the patent, considered as a whole, there was invention. The only point in controversy here is whether there was invention in the use of the detachable block which is made the subject of the second claim, and 1 am satisfied, in view of what the prior *606art discloses, that there was no exercise of the inventive faculty in the production of this block. An examination of the records in the two cases shows that the evidence before Judge Wallace in the case of *Travers v. Beyer,*26 Fed. Rep. 450, was not the same as in this case. It follows that the bill should be dismissed.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 15, 2024

NO. 03

- 24

- 00074

- CV

Trivista Operating LLC and Trivista Oil Company LLC , Appellant s

v.

ERC Acquisitions II LLC , Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT O F FAY ETTE COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JUSTICES SMITH AND THEOFANIS

DISMISSED ON APPELLANT S ’ MOTION

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE THEOFANIS

This is an appeal from the orders signed by the tr i a l court on December 28, 2023

. Trivista

Operating LLC and Trivista Oil Company LLC ha ve filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, and

having considered the motion , the Court agrees that th e motion should be granted . There fore, the

Court grants the motion and dismiss es the appeal

. The appellant s shall pay all costs relating to

this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0474

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

BENJAMIN PITKANEN III,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including April 1, 2021, within which to prepare, file, and 

serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 25 2021

03/25/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0474
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXAS NO. WR-83,930-01
EX P ARTE EDRICK D UNN, Applicant
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 2011-432,529 IN THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT

F ROM LUBBOCK COUN TY
Per curiam . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Ar t i cl e 1 1
. 07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim
. Ap p . 1 9 6 7). Applicant was convicted of ag g ravated robber y and sentenc ed to fifty year s’ imprisonm en t
. The Seventh Court of Appea ls aff irmed his
co nviction. Dunn v. State , No. 07-13-00378- CR (Tex. App. — Lubbock, August 11, 2014) (n o t designated f

or publication). Applicant contends that his a p p e ll a te c o u n s e l re n d e r e d ineffe ctive assistance beca use counsel failed to timely

notify Applicant that his conviction had be en af firmed and failed to advise himof2

his right to petition pro sefor discr etionary revie w. Appellate counsel filed an aff idavit with the trial court. Ba sed on that aff idavit, the trial court has enter ed finding s of fa ct an d co n clus ions of law that appellate counsel failed to timely notify Applicant that his conviction had been aff irmed and failed to a dvise him of his right to petition for discretionar

y revie w pro se . The trial court rec ommends that relief be g rante d. Ex parte W ilson , 956 S.W .2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We find, there fore , that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time petition for discretionar

y revie w of the judgme nt of the Seventh Court of Appea ls in Cause No. 07-13-00378- CR th at af

firmed his conviction in Cause No. 2011-432,529 from the 140th District Court of Lubbock County
. Applicant shall file his petition for discretionar y revie w with this Court within 30 day s of the dateon which this Court’s mandate issues.

Deliver ed: Octobe r 14, 2015 Do not publish
SCPW-13-0000038
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I
ANTOINETTE SMITH, Petitioner-Respondent,

vs. THE HONORABLE KEITH E. TANAKA, Judge of the Family Court of the Second Circuit of the State of Hawai # i, Respondent, and KENT SMITH, PAULA SMITH, TIFFANY SMITH and ALEXANDRIA HOECK, Respondents-Petitioners.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITION (By : R eck ten wal d, C.J ., Nak ayama, Ac oba , M cKe nna , a nd Pol lac k, JJ. )

On January 22, 2013, petitioner Antoinette Smith filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition seeking an order directing the respondent judge to dismiss the petition for third-party visitation filed in FC-M No. 12-1-0146 on the grounds that the family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and Hawai # i Revised Statutes § 571-46(a)(7) is unconstitutional. Petitioner also seeks an order staying the family court proceedings pending disposition of this original proceeding. Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCPW-13-0000038 06-MAR-2013 08:43 AM2 A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai # i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999). Such writs are not intended to supercede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they intended to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures. Id. Where a court has discretion to act, mandamus will not lie to interfere with or control the exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has acted erroneously, unless the judge has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before the court under circumstances in which he or she has a legal duty to act. Id. at 204-05, 982 P.2d at 338-39. Similarly, a writ of prohibition “is an extraordinary remedy the object of which is not to cure a mere legal error or to serve as a substitute for appeal, but to restrain a judge of an inferior court from acting beyond or in excess of his jurisdiction.” Honolulu Adv., Inc. v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 241, 580 P.2d 58, 62 (1978).

Upon consideration of the petition, the supporting documents, and the record, it appears that petitioner can seek3

relief by way of an appropriate appeal. Moreover, petitioner fails to demonstrate that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction, committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or refused to act on a subject properly before him under circumstances in which he has a legal duty to act sufficient to fall within the scope of mandamus and/or prohibition relief. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, March 6, 2013. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr. /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report of TransAtlantic Petroleum Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-K), I, Matthew McCann, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Form 10-K fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |                         |  | 
|--------------------- |  | ----------------------- |  | 
|Dated: March 30, 2010 |  | /s/ MATTHEW
MCCANN      |  | 
|                      |  | Matthew McCann          |  | 
|                      |  | Chief Executive Officer |  | 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
TransAtlantic Petroleum Ltd. and will be retained by TransAtlantic Petroleum Ltd. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The foregoing certification is being furnished as an exhibit to the Form 10-K pursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-K for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not
incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.