alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[904 NE2d 811, 876 NYS2d 675]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andrew C. Small, Appellant.

Argued January 14, 2009;

decided February 12, 2009

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender,*Rochester *(William Clauss*of counsel), for appellant.

*Michael C. Green, District Attorney,*Rochester *(Wendy Evans Lehmann*and *Kelly Christine Wolford*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

*733While a defendant is not entitled as a matter of law to pretrial notice of the People’s intention to offer evidence pursuant to *People v Molineux*(168 NY 264 [1901]) or to a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of such evidence *(see generally People v Ventimiglia, 52*NY2d 350, 362 [1981]; *People v Torres,*300 AD2d 46, 46-47 [1st Dept 2002]; *cf.*CPL 240.43), we outlined in *People v Ventimiglia*a procedure to be followed in order to avoid unfairness to the defendant. We noted that a prosecutor seeking to introduce *Molineux*evidence “should ask for a ruling out of the presence of the jury” *(Ventimiglia, 52*NY2d at 362), and that any hearing with respect to the admissibility of such evidence should occur either before trial or, at the latest, “just before the witness testifies” *(id.).*Contrary to defendant’s contention, there is no requirement that such inquiry or ruling occur before trial commences.

Here, County Court granted the People’s application to allow the *Molineux*evidence midtrial in response to defendant’s attempt to establish an agency defense. Moreover, the court provided a proper limiting instruction, telling the jury that the evidence was “no proof whatsoever that [defendant] possessed a propensity or disposition to commit the crime charged in the indictment” but was offered “solely for rebutting the defense of agency on the issue of intent.” In these circumstances, County Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the People to present *Molineux*evidence.

Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur; Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.

Order affirmed in a memorandum.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No.
333-92769 and 333-95823 of Webvan Group, Inc. on Form S-8 of our report dated
January 26, 2000 (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes
an explanatory paragraph concerning restatement of the 1998 and 1997
consolidated financial statements) appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K
of Webvan Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1999.


/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE
----------------------

San Jose, California
March 27, 2000
#### In the Matter of Tamara A., Respondent, v Anthony Wayne S., Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 48]

Order of protection, Family Court, Bronx County (Monica Drinane, J.), entered on or about October 18, 2012, and in force until October 12, 2014, after a hearing, ordering respondent, inter alia, to stay away from petitioner and the subject child, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

A fair preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s finding that respondent committed acts that would constitute harassment in the second degree and disorderly conduct *(see*Family Ct Act §§ 812 [1]; 821 [1]; 832). A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person . . . [h]e . . . subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same” (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; *see e.g. McGuffog v Ginsberg,*266 AD2d 136 [1st Dept 1999]). A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, “with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,” he engages in “violent, tumultuous or threatening” behavior (Penal Law § 240.20 [1]; *see e.g. Matter of Clark v Ormiston,*101 AD3d 870, 870-871 [2d Dept 2012]). Petitioner testified that while she and respondent were sitting in the Family Court waiting room, respondent stood up, faced her, and said, “[S]omeone is going to *561get a bullet in their head.” Petitioner, the child’s maternal grandmother, testified that she believed respondent was talking about her, because she was preparing to adopt the child. She testified that she was afraid of respondent because they never got along, he had treated her with disrespect, and he had assaulted her daughter. Petitioner also testified that immediately after respondent made the statement, agency caseworkers who were in the waiting room entered the courtroom and informed the court. Petitioner’s testimony was undisputed. Although the court adjourned the hearing to allow respondent to testify, he later declined to do so.

Contrary to respondent’s contention, a single incident is legally sufficient to support a finding of harassment in the second degree *(see Matter of Victor S. v Kareem J.S.,*104 AD3d 405 [1st Dept 2013]). The court properly drew a negative inference from respondent’s failure to testify *(see Matter of Alford Isaiah B. [Alford B.],*107 AD3d 562 [1st Dept 2013]). The court properly questioned petitioner, who at the time was proceeding pro se *(see Matter of Krista I. v Gregory I.,*8 AD3d 696, 699 [3d Dept 2004]). Upon review of the available transcript of the July 23, 2012 hearing, we find that the court harbored no bias against respondent. Concur — Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ.
1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3268

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri

Lincoln Cardell Henderson, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 21, 2005

Filed: January 9, 2006

___________

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Lincoln Henderson appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court1

for the Western District of Missouri upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of

conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and possession with intent

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), 846. Henderson was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life

imprisonment. On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the sufficiency of the
-2-

evidence to support Henderson’s drug convictions. For the reasons stated below, we

affirm.

This court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable

to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and

accepting all reasonable inferences that support the jury’s verdict. See United States

v. Ramirez, 350 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 2003). We hold that the evidence was

sufficient to support Henderson’s convictions. Regarding the count for possession

with intent to distribute, the evidence sufficiently established that, on October 29,

2003, Henderson possessed a plastic bag containing a beige rock-like substance which

tested positive for cocaine base and weighed over 50 grams. Henderson’s intent to

distribute the substance was sufficiently established in light of the testimony of

cooperating witnesses regarding his extensive drug-dealing activities, the drug

quantity, and the cash recovered from him at the time of his arrest. See United States

v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.) (intent to distribute may be inferred from

circumstantial evidence such as quantity of drugs and large amount of cash), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989). The cooperating witnesses’ testimony also amply

supported Henderson’s conviction on the conspiracy count. See United States v.

Galaviz-Luna, 416 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir.) (evidence including cooperating

witnesses’ testimony regarding defendant’s drug-dealing activities held sufficient to

support drug conspiracy conviction), cert. denied, 2005 WL 3272276 (U.S. Dec. 5,

2005) (No. 05-7396).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the district court, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and deny Henderson’s

motions for appointment of new counsel.

______________________________
#### O. B. CROCKER and Jon A. Crocker, Administrators of the Estate of Ora Crocker, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

No. WC 6958-S.

United States District Court, N. D. Mississippi, W. D.

Nov. 6, 1970.

Armis E. Hawkins, Houston, Miss., Charles L. Brocato, of Dossett, Magruder & Montgomery, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs.

William N. Dye, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Oxford, Miss., Jack D. Warren, Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

ORMA R. SMITH, District Judge.

ORDER

This action is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for an order compelling defendant to produce and permit plaintiffs to inspect and copy the special agent’s report submitted to the Internal Revenue Service in connection with the agent’s investigation of the affairs of the plaintiffs, especially those portions of the report relating to the history of the taxpayer and facts uncovered in the investigation, including reference to the exhibits accumulated during the course of the investigation; also copies of statements taken by said agent of indi*156viduals who will be used by defendant in the trial of this cause.

The defendant resists the motion primarily on the ground that the special agent’s report consists mainly of the agent’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories in regard to the case, and that plaintiffs have failed to show substantial need of the material sought in preparation of their case and they are unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. The special agent’s report, with exhibits thereto, has been submitted to the court in camera and the court has examined the same, having in mind the need of plaintiffs for the materials and documents sought and the objections in opposition thereto by defendant.

The court is of the opinion and so finds that the special agent’s report covers in detail the results of his examination of the taxpayers’ affairs for the years involved in this action and necessarily discloses the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories of the special agent in connection with his investigation, and that it is impractical to lift from the report any substantial information for inspection and copying by plaintiffs which would not contain such mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories. The court is, therefore, of the opinion that defendant should not be required to disclose to plaintiffs the special agent’s report in this case.

With reference to the demand for copies of the statements taken from individuals having knowledge of plaintiffs’ financial affairs during the period involved, it is not shown to the satisfaction of the court that plaintiffs are unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials sought by other means. It is, therefore,

Ordered:

That the plaintiffs’ motion for an order compelling discovery by defendant which has been presented to the court shall be and the same hereby is denied and overruled.
sentence unless the amendment is made to correct a sentence that was 

based on untrue assumptions or mistakes that worked to the defendant's 

extreme detriment. Campbell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 114 Nev. 

410, 413, 957 P.2d 1141, 1142-43 (1998). 

The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on 

Boatwright's motion to correct an illegal sentence. The district court 

found, among other things, that the amended judgment was entered after 

Boatwright began to serve his sentence, it substantially increased 

Boatwright's sentence, and it was not made to correct a clerical error. The 

district court further found that the judgment was ambiguous and the 

amended information that it referenced was not determinative as to 

whether Boatwright was convicted of sexual assault or sexual assault of a 

child under 14 years of age. The district court concluded that the 

amended judgment was void because it was entered by a court that lacked 

jurisdiction and in violation of Boatwright's due process rights. The 

district court factual findings are not clearly wrong and we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to 

correct an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A cM1.0 
cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Karla K. Butko 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

OLIVIA RAYE MCCORMICK, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. * CIVIL ACTION NO.: 14-0399-C

*

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, *

Acting Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

*

Defendant. *

JUDGMENT

In	accordance	with	 the	memorandum	opinion	and	order	entered	on	 this	date,	it	is	

hereby	 ORDERED,	 ADJUDGED,	 and	 DECREED that	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Commissioner	 of	

Social	Security	 denying	 plaintiff	 benefits	 be	 reversed	and	 remanded	 pursuant	 to	 sentence	

four	of	42	U.S.C.	§	405(g),	see	Melkonyan	v.	Sullivan,	501	U.S.	89,	111	S.Ct.	2157,	115	L.Ed.2d	

78	 (1991),	 for	 further	 proceedings	 not	 inconsistent	 with	 this	 decision.	 The	 remand	

pursuant	to	sentence	four	of	§	405(g)	makes	the	plaintiff	a	prevailing	party	for	purposes	of	

the	Equal	Access	to	Justice	Act,	28	U.S.C.	§	2412,	Shalala	v.	Schaefer,	509	U.S.	292,	112	S.Ct.	

2625,	125	L.Ed.2d	239	(1993),	and	terminates	this	Court’s	jurisdiction	over	this	matter.	

DONE	this	the	6th day	of	August,	2015.

		s/WILLIAM	E.	CASSADY 																												

UNITED	STATES	MAGISTRATE	JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00399-C Document 28 Filed 08/07/15 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LISA CROOM, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 14-0585-C

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the memorandum opinion and order entered on this date, it 

is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff be awarded 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,385.79 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

representing compensation for 17.85 hours of service by William T. Coplin, Jr., Esquire, 

at the cost-of-living-adjusted rate of $189.68.

DONE this the 23rd day of May, 2016.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00585-C Document 27 Filed 05/23/16 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ERNEST BERNARD GUNN, SR., et al., :

Plaintiffs, :

v. : CA 15-00200-C

CITY OF SELMA, et al., :

Defendants. :

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the memorandum opinion and order entered on this date, it 

is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (Counts 8-14) set forth in the Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 10-19) are DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE and their state law claims (Counts 1-7) set forth in the Complaint 

(Doc. 1 at 3-7) are REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama from 

whence they came. Further, as conceded by the Plaintiffs, their excessive force claim

(Count 15), all claims against Defendant, Officer Toriano Neely, and all official capacity 

claims against Defendants, Detective Ray Blanks and former Chief of Police, William 

Riley, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE this the 22nd day of August 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:15-cv-00200-C Document 53 Filed 08/22/16 Page 1 of 1
# EXHIBIT 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Tellabs, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April
2, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Timothy J. Wiggins, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to and for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |     | 
| | --- | 
| | (1) | 
| | (2) | 

|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Timothy J. Wiggins 
|Timothy J. Wiggins     
|Chief Financial Officer
|May 11, 2004           

A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dolores Abreu, Appellant.

[972 NYS2d 139]

— An appeal having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Thomas A. Farber, J.), rendered on or about December 7, 2010, said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same is hereby affirmed. Concur— Friedman, J.E, Freedman, Richter, Feinman and Gische, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stephen Olmstead, Appellant.

[975 NYS2d 359]

Peters, P.J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered November 7, 2011, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of driving while intoxicated.

*1064In satisfaction of a three-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and waived his right to appeal. County Court thereafter sentenced him to 30 days in jail and three years of probation, and imposed a fine of $1,000 plus fees and surcharges. Defendant appeals.

Defendant asserts that the indictment is defective in that it incorrectly charged the misdemeanor counts of driving while intoxicated as class A, rather than unclassified, misdemeanors. Any such deficiency in the indictment would constitute a technical, nonjurisdictional defect that was waived by defendant’s guilty plea *(see People v Porath,*104 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2013], *lv denied 21*NY3d 1019 [2013]; *People v*Taylor, 82 AD3d 1291, 1291 [2011], *lv denied*16 NY3d 900 [2011]; *People v*Cullen, 62 AD3d 1155, 1157 [2009], *lv denied*13 NY3d 795 [2009]).

However, we are constrained to vacate that portion of defendant’s sentence that imposed a fine. Initially, we note that defendant’s challenge to the fine survives his waiver of the right to appeal inasmuch as it implicates his “right to be sentenced as provided by law” *(People v Fuller,*57 NY2d 152, 156 [1982]; *see People v Figueroa,*17 AD3d 1130, 1131 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 788 [2005]; *People v Fehr,*303 AD2d 1039,1040 [2003], *lv denied*100 NY2d 538 [2003]; *People v Moore,*212 AD2d 1062, 1062 [1995]). Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (b), County Court was authorized to impose a term of imprisonment, a fine or both upon defendant’s conviction for driving while intoxicated. However, the court improperly described the fine as “mandatory” during the plea colloquy and there is no indication that it understood otherwise when it imposed the fine at sentencing. On this record, it is unclear whether County Court misapprehended its ability to exercise discretion in determining whether to impose a fine *(see People v Bills,*103 AD3d 1149, 1149-1150 [2013]; *People v Duquette, 100*AD3d 1105, 1106 [2012]; *People v Barber,*31 AD3d 1145, 1146 [2006]; *People v Figueroa,*17 AD3d at 1131; *People v Fehr,*303 AD2d at 1040). Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the sentence that imposed a fine and remit the matter to County Court to exercise its discretion with respect to the imposition of such fine *(see People v Duquette,*100 AD3d at 1106; *People v Domin,*284 AD2d 731, 733 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 918 [2001], *amended*291 AD2d 580 [2002]).

Stein, McCarthy and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating that portion of the sentence as imposed a fine upon defendant; matter remitted to the County Court of St. Lawrence County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 247 (Wednesday, December 24, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77474-77475]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30051]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER15-634-000]


Cottonwood Solar, LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial Market-
Based Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 
Authorization

    This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding, 
of Cottonwood Solar, LLC's application for market-based rate authority, 
with an accompanying rate schedule, noting that such application 
includes a request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of 
future issuances of securities and assumptions of liability.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the 
Federal

[[Page 77475]]

Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 
20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Anyone filing a 
motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of that document on 
the Applicant.
    Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with 
regard to the applicant's request for blanket authorization, under 18 
CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of 
liability is January 6, 2015.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper, using the FERC Online links at http://www.ferc.gov. To facilitate electronic service, persons with Internet 
access who will eFile a document and/or be listed as a contact for an 
intervenor must create and validate an eRegistration account using the 
eRegistration link. Select the eFiling link to log on and submit the 
intervention or protests.
    Persons unable to file electronically should submit an original and 
5 copies of the intervention or protest to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    The filings in the above-referenced proceeding(s) are accessible in 
the Commission's eLibrary system by clicking on the appropriate link in 
the above list. They are also available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an eSubscription link 
on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive email notification 
when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For assistance with 
any FERC Online service, please email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bcfaf9eefff3d2d0d5d2d9efc9ccccd3cec8fcdad9cedf92dbd3ca"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3a7c7f687975545653545f694f4a4a55484e7a5c5f4859145d554c">[email protected]</span></a>. or 
call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For TTY, call (202) 502-8659.

    Dated: December 17, 2014.
 Kimberly D. Bose,
 Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-30051 Filed 12-23-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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