alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2186 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for U.S. Department 

of Interior, Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration, 

Working Capital Fund for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for U.S. 

Department of Interior, Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration, Working Capital Fund for 

fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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2 

•HR 2186 IH

1 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, NATURAL 

3 RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RES4 TORATION, WORKING CAPITAL FUND FOR 

5 FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail8 able for U.S. Department of Interior, Natural Resource 

9 Damage Assessment and Restoration, Working Capital 

10 Fund for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $55,735,000. 

Æ 


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Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed February 9, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

Nos. 3D21-0247 & 3D21-0282

Lower Tribunal Nos. 20-0224 AP, 18-11106 SP, 20-0246 AP, 18-11112 SP

________________

All Insurance Restoration Services, Inc., 

a/a/o Cindy Arnaes Rojas,

Appellant,

vs.

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,

Appellee.

 Appeals from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence D. 

King and Gloria Gonzalez-Meyer, Judges.

Giasi Law P.A., and Melissa A. Giasi, and Erin M. Berger (Tampa), 

for appellant.

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and David C. Borucke (Tampa), for 

appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
(January 15, 2009)

#### In the Matter of Tacos Ricos Corp., Petitioner, v New York State Liquor Authority, Respondent.

[870 NYS2d 346]

Petition in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (transferred to *483this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Shirley Warner Kornreich, J.], entered on or about June 19, 2008), unanimously granted, the administrative order of respondent, dated March 17, 2008, which approved a determination to cancel petitioner’s liquor license, direct forfeiture of its $1,000 bond and exact a $5,000 civil penalty, and the decision dated March 24, 2008, which rejected petitioner’s license renewal application on procedural grounds, annulled, without costs, and the matter remanded to respondent for further proceedings.

Substantial evidence did not support the finding that petitioner had suffered or permitted the premises to become disorderly, in violation of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 106 (6). Respondent did not adduce more than a scintilla of evidence as to how the importation of women to dance with patrons and serve as waitresses led to disorderly premises within the meaning of the statute and rules promulgated thereunder *(see*9 NYCRR 53.1 [q]; *Matter of Mal Rest. v New York State Liq. Auth.,*74 AD2d 750 [1980], *lv denied*54 NY2d 602 [1981]). Respondent failed to demonstrate that the one reported incident was more than an isolated event.

In light of the revocation of petitioner’s license, the matter is remanded for reconsideration of the renewal application in accordance with Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 109. Concur— Tom, J.P., Gonzalez, Nardelli, Moskowitz and Renwick, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7623

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus THERON JOHNNY MAXTON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge. (CR-97-490) Submitted: January 21, 1999 Decided: February 9, 1999 Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Theron Johnny Maxton, Appellant Pro Se. Deborah Brereton Barbier, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Theron Johnny Maxton appeals the district court’s order denying his “Petition for a Hearing to Have Joyce Brown Charge [sic] For Perjury” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Maxton , No. CR-97-490 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 25, 2018

No. 04-18-00721-CV

HARVEY V. RISIEN, LLC and Harvey V. Risien,

Appellants

v.

MISSARK INVESTMENTS GP, LLC, Missark Investments LP, JH Design LP, and GM GP 

Management, LLC,

Appellees

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CI15535

Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

A filing fee of $205 was due when this appeal was filed, but it was not paid. See Tex. 

Sup. Ct., Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, In Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, and 

Before the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, Docket No. 15-9158 (Aug. 28, 2015). The 

fee remains unpaid, and appellants have not filed a sworn statement of inability to afford 

payment of court costs. 

We therefore order appellants, by November 5, 2018, to either: (1) pay the filing fee; or 

(2) provide written proof to this court that appellants are indigent or otherwise excused by statute 

or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure from prepaying fees and costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

20.1 (providing that indigent party who complies with provisions of that rule may proceed 

without advance payment of costs). 

If appellants fail to respond satisfactorily within the time ordered, this appeal may be 

dismissed without further notice. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5 (providing appellate courts may enforce 

rule requiring payment of costs “by any order that is just”), 42.3(c) (permitting appellate courts 

to dismiss an appeal when appellant fails to comply with a court order).

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 25th day of October, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

ROBERT DESHIELDS

,

Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL

. ,

Appellee :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 18 EAP 2016

Appeal from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court dated 2/29/16, exited 3/1/16, at No. 526 MD 2015

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 28th day of March

, 2017 the Order of the Commonwealth Court

is hereby AFFIRMED

.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2133 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Independent Agencies, 

Office of Government Ethics for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Independent Agencies, Office of Government Ethics for fiscal 

year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, OFFICE OF GOV5 ERNMENT ETHICS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise availVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:07 Apr 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2133.IH H2133

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2 

•HR 2133 IH

1 able for Independent Agencies, Office of Government Eth2 ics for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $17,019,000. 

Æ 


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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1049

_____________________________

HERBERT LEE BUTLER,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

August 15, 2018

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED.

MAKAR, OSTERHAUS, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Herbert Lee Butler, pro se, Petitioner.
2

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

RUDY W. MOORE,

Petitioner

v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, AND MR. M. D. OVERMYER, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI FOREST,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 27 EM 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 27th day of April

, 2018, the Application for Leave to File Original

Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus , the “Motion to Add

Additional Complaint” and the “Motion for Order of Default and Order of Discharge” are

DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR PRIMA ENERGY CORPORATION FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                      25,623,000
<SECURITIES>                                 2,060,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,620,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (47,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    570,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            33,346,000
<PP&E>                                      77,421,000
<DEPRECIATION>                            (39,709,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              71,315,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,298,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        89,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  56,038,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                71,315,000
<SALES>                                     15,943,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            20,810,000
<CGS>                                        9,121,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               11,449,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              7,590,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,910,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          5,680,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 5,680,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.99
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.98


</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1
                          DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS
                                 (IN THOUSANDS)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                               QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31,
                                                               ----------------------- 
                                                                       1999
                                                               
<S>                                                            <C>
INCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

EARNINGS:
   Pre-tax income from continuing operations                          $17,804
Plus:
   Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)                      32,214

TOTAL EARNINGS                                                        $50,018
                                                                      =======

FIXED CHARGES:
   Interest expensed and capitalized                                  $31,764
   Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
      expenses related to indebtedness                                    148
   An estimate of the interest component within rental expense            338

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES BEFORE PREFERRED DIVIDENDS                         32,250

Preferred dividend requirements                                           707
Ratio of pre tax income to net income                                   1.133
              
PREFERRED DIVIDEND FACTOR                                                 801

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS                     $33,051
                                                                      =======

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS 
  (including interest on deposits)                                       1.51

EXCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

EARNINGS:            
   Pre-tax income from continuing operations                          $17,804
Plus:
   Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)                      25,562

TOTAL EARNINGS                                                        $43,366
                                                                      =======

FIXED CHARGES:
  Interest expensed and capitalized                                   $25,112
  Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
     expenses related to indebtedness                                     148
  An estimate of the interest component within rental expense             338

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES BEFORE PREFERRED DIVIDENDS                         25,598

Preferred dividend requirements                                           707
Ratio of pre tax income to net income                                   1.133

PREFERRED DIVIDEND FACTOR                                                 801

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS                     $26,399
                                                                      =======

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS 
  (excluding interest on deposits)                                       1.64
</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED APRIL 18, 2019

NO. 03-18-00052-CV

Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; and 

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Appellants

v.

Centex Business Consultants, L.C., Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES KELLY AND SMITH

DISMISSED ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the interlocutory order signed by the trial court on January 23, 2018. 

Appellants have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, and having considered the motion, the 

Court agrees that the motion should be granted. Therefore, the Court grants the motion and 

dismisses the appeal. Appellants shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and 

the court below.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2487 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2487

 To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 
 consider nuclear power to be a green source of energy, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 6, 2023

 Mr. Donalds introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to 
 consider nuclear power to be a green source of energy, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR POWER AS A GREEN SOURCE OF ENERGY UNDER 
              THE GREEN POWER PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) In General.--In carrying out the Green Power Partnership, the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall consider 
nuclear power to be a green source of energy for purposes of 
determining whether a participant meets the minimum electricity use 
requirement of the Green Power Partnership.
    (b) Use of Funds.--No Federal funds may be made available to carry 
out the Green Power Partnership unless the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency includes nuclear power as a green 
source of energy as required under subsection (a).
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Cesar Alfonso Saldivar, Appellant, v Nikens Cabrera, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Nikens Cabrera, Respondent, v Cesar Alfonso Saldivar, Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[971 NYS2d 310]—

In two related family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Cesar Alfonso Saldivar appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Lebwohl, J.), dated March 20, 2012, which, after a hearing, dismissed his petition, and (2) an order of protection of the same court dated March 30, 2012, which, after a hearing, and upon a finding that he committed the family offenses of disorderly conduct and harassment in the second degree, directed him, inter alia, to refrain from harassing Nikens Cabrera.

Ordered that the order and the order of protection are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Although the order of protection expired by its own terms on March 20, 2013, the appeal therefrom has not been rendered academic in light of the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from a finding that the appellant committed the subject family offenses *(see Matter of Hohn v Guirand,*97 AD3d 578 [2012]; *Matter of Scioscia v Scioscia,*89 AD3d 739, 740 [2011]).

A family offense must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence *(see*Family Ct Act § 832; *Matter of Bazante v Bazante,*107 AD3d 707 [2013]; *Matter of Salazar v Melendez,*97 *832AD3d 754, 755 [2012]). The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and that court’s determination regarding the credibility of *witnesses is*entitled to great weight on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see Matter of Winfield v Gammons,*105 AD3d 753 [2013]; *Matter of Jackson v Idlett,*103 AD3d 723 [2013]; *Matter of Kanterakis v Kanterakis,*102 AD3d 784, 785 [2013]). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supports the Family Court’s determination that he committed acts constituting the subject family offenses *(see*Family Ct Act § 812 [1]; Penal Law §§ 240.20 [1]; 240.26 [1]; *Matter of Cabeza v Cabeza,*107 AD3d 793 [2013]; *Matter of McCauley v Galante,*106 AD3d 1089 [2013]; *Matter of Kanterakis v Kanterakis,*102 AD3d at 785; *Matter of Baginski v Rostkowski,*96 AD3d 1051 [2012]; *Matter of Miriam M. v Warren M.,*51 AD3d 581 [2008]).

Moreover, the Family Court was presented with sharply conflicting accounts by the parties regarding the subject events, and chose to credit the testimony of the complainant, Nikens Cabrera *(see Matter of Amato v Amato,*100 AD3d 988, 989 [2012] ). We discern no basis to disturb the Family Court’s determination to dismiss the appellant’s family offense petition.

The appellant’s remaining contention is not properly before this Court, as it raises an issue not determined by the orders appealed from *(see Matter of Padin v Padin,*103 AD3d 729, 730 [2013] ; *Matter of Joseph A. [Fausat O.],*78 AD3d 826, 827 [2010]; *Matter of Tishauna Patricia N. [Tee Tee Ann W],*68 AD3d 1119, 1120 [2009]). Rivera, J.R, Balkin, Leventhal and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario RAMIREZ-LEANDRO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-6500.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 22, 2006.

Decided: Oct. 16, 2006.

Mario Ramirez-Leandro, Appellant Pro Se. Steve R. Matheny, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Mario Ramirez-Leandro seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ramirez-Leandro has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appeala-*432bility and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-17-0000656

12-MAR-2019

09:42 AM