2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-13-2013

USA v. Donald Hellinger

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-4222

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Donald Hellinger" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 227.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________

No. 12-4222, 12-4223, 13-1141

_________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DONALD M. HELLINGER, 

Appellant in 12-4222

RONALD HELLINGER,

Appellant in 12-4223

MICHAEL WEISBERG,

Appellant in 13-1141

________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00083)

District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick

_______

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 12, 2013

Before: MCKEE, SMITH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 13, 2013)

_______________

O P I N I O N

_______________
2

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Donald Hellinger, Ronald Hellinger, and Michael Weisberg (“Appellants”) each 

appeal the sentences imposed on them following their guilty pleas to operating an illegal 

money-transmitting business. For the following reasons, we will affirm.1

I.

In 2011, a grand jury returned a fourteen-count indictment charging Appellants 

and three others – Jami Pearlman, Michele Quigley, and Randy Trost – in all counts. 

Appellants pled guilty to Count Two of the indictment, which alleged that between 

January 2005 and February 2006, they and their codefendants operated a moneytransmitting business without complying with federal registration requirements, thereby 

violating 18 U.S.C. § 1960. 

Appellants were owners and managers of Payment Processing Center, Inc. 

(“PPC”). They stipulated that PPC processed payments on behalf of offshore internet 

gambling companies. Appellants set up bank accounts through which PPC would receive 

wire transfers from these gambling companies. The gambling companies would then 

email to PPC the amount of money owed to certain bettors, and PPC would prepare and 

deliver checks from its accounts to the bettors. PPC would also prepare and deliver 

checks to local vendors of the gambling companies. PPC did not participate in the 

gambling business except for its transmission of money from the gambling companies to 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and this court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

the bettors and vendors. PPC did not register with the United States Department of the 

Treasury as a money-transmitting business, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5330. 

After Appellants pled guilty, the District Court determined that U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3 

was the appropriate offense guideline. The Court also applied a sentencing enhancement 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(a) for all three Appellants.2 It sentenced Donald Hellinger 

to thirty six months imprisonment and ordered him to pay a $10,000 fine; sentenced 

Ronald Hellinger to twenty seven months imprisonment; and sentenced Weisberg to 

twenty two months imprisonment. 

II

A. Offense Guideline

Appellants argue that the District Court erred in identifying § 2S1.3 rather than § 

2S1.1(a)(1) as the applicable offense guideline. We review an “application of the 

Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 

118 (3d Cir. 2009).

3

 

Appendix A of the Sentencing Guidelines lists both § 2S1.3 and § 2S1.1 as 

applicable offense guidelines for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. See U.S.S.G. app. A. 

“If more than one guideline section is referenced for the particular statute,” Appendix A 

 

2

 Although the District Court did not explicitly state that it was applying the §3B1.1(a) 

enhancement, the Court adopted the Presentence Investigation Reports (“PSRs”) which 

applied the enhancement for each Appellant. Neither Appellants nor the Government 

dispute that the Court applied this enhancement.

3

 Appellants contend that we should apply de novo review. However, the interpretation 

of a guideline provision is not at issue here. Rather, the issue is which offense guideline 

better fits the facts in this case.
4

instructs courts to “use the guideline most appropriate for the offense conduct charged in 

the count of which the defendant was convicted.” Id. 

Section 2S1.3 applies to the operation of a money-transmitting business without 

complying with state and federal registration requirements in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1960(b)(1)(A) and (B). See id. §2S1.3 cmt. Section 2S1.1, on the other hand, applies to 

money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C). See id. at § 2S1.1 cmt.; see 

also § 1960 (b)(1)(C) (referring to “the transportation or transmission of funds that are 

known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to 

be used to promote or support unlawful activity”). Appellants argue that § 2S1.1(a)(1) is 

the applicable offense guideline because it more closely tracks the offense conduct 

charged against them. Although Appellants admit that the operation of an unlicensed 

money-transmitting business “is certainly a central allegation of Count Two,” they 

maintain that “the overwhelming weight of the alleged conduct describes service as the 

money laundering arm of illegal internet gambling businesses, through collection of bets 

and payment of winners, and through payment of invoices to vendors.” Appellants’ Br. 

at 37. 

Appellants’ offense conduct involved both the operation of an unlicensed moneytransmitting business and money laundering. The District Court relied on the formal 

charging language of Count Two of the Indictment and Appellants’ conduct in 

determining which offense guideline was more applicable. The language of Count Two –

“knowingly conducted, controlled, managed, supervised, directed, and owned all or part 

of a money transmitting business . . . while failing to comply with the money transmitting 
5

business registration requirements under Title 31, United States Code, Section 5330” –

charges a violation of § 1960(b)(1)(B), which corresponds with offense guideline § 

2S1.3. App. at 94. The Court’s reliance on the charging language was proper. Thus, the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing § 2S1.3 as the more appropriate

offense guideline.

B. Sentencing Enhancement

Appellants allege that the District Court erred in increasing the offense levels of 

Ronald Hellinger and Weisberg by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).

4

 We 

have held that because “the question of a defendant's aggravating role . . . is ‘essentially 

factual,’ we will reverse the district court . . . only if its conclusion is clearly erroneous.” 

United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, the Court did not make 

independent factual findings, but instead adopted the findings in Appellants’ PSRs.5 In 

such a case, we also apply the clear error standard of review. See United States v. 

Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 969 (3d Cir. 1992). The application of the enhancement is 

clearly erroneous “if, after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with a firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

 

4

 The four-level enhancement was also applied to Donald Hellinger’s sentence, but he 

does not appeal his sentence on this issue.

5

 Appellants allege that because the Court did not make findings of fact on a contested

issue, we must remand. However, failure to make findings on a contested issue does not 

require remand where the findings of fact “are implicit in the record.” United States v. 

Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 362 (3d Cir. 2002) overruled on other grounds as stated in United 

States v. Cesare, 581 F.3d 206, 208 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). Appellants do not dispute that the 

District Court adopted the findings from Appellants’ PSRs. 
6

Under § 3B1.1(a), a defendant’s offense level is increased by four levels if a court 

finds that the defendant “was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved 

five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). If the

defendant “was a manager or supervisor” of such a criminal activity, the offense level is 

increased by three levels. Id. § 3B1.1(b). The commentary to this section further 

requires the defendant to whom an enhancement under § 3B1.1 applies to “have been the 

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” Id. § 

3B1.1(a) cmt. n.2. 

Appellants do not dispute that the criminal activity involved five or more 

participants or was otherwise extensive. Instead, they argue that there is no evidence on 

the record of Weisberg or Ronald Hellinger exercising control over another participant. 

We disagree. According to the PSRs, Jami Pearlman, one of the Appellants’ codefendants “informed the attorney who PPC hired to research the legality of their 

gambling payout business that PPC decided not to comply with the legal requirements for 

money transmitting businesses” and she did so “on behalf of Donald Hellinger, Ronald 

Hellinger, and Michael Weisberg.” Weisberg PSR ¶ 33; Ronald Hellinger PSR ¶ 33. 

Appellants alternatively argue that even if an enhancement under § 3B1.1 applies 

to Weisberg and Ronald Hellinger, it should be the three-level enhancement for managers 

and supervisors under § 3B1.1(b). The commentary to § 3B1.1 states: 

In distinguishing a leadership and organizational role from one of mere 

management or supervision . . . [f]actors the court should consider include 

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the 
7

commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed 

right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation 

in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal 

activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.

§ 3B1.1 cmt. n.4.

The extensive involvement of Weisberg and Ronald Hellinger in PPC’s activities

supports the four-level enhancement. Weisberg and Ronald Hellinger each owned 22.5% 

of PPC. Both were PPC account representatives for client companies and received 

commissions from the activity on these accounts. According to his PSR, Ronald 

Hellinger “negotiated an agreement between PPC and a trade association for foreign 

internet gambling companies . . . so that PPC could be introduced to the companies and 

offer them payment services in the U.S.” Ronald Hellinger PSR ¶ 30. Weisberg signed 

the agreement between PPC and the trade association. Weisberg formed PPC. He, along 

with a co-defendant, opened several bank accounts into which offshore gambling 

companies could make deposits and was a signatory on those accounts. He established 

business agreements and controlled bank accounts into which proceeds of PPC’s 

activities were deposited. On these facts, the District Court did not clearly err in applying 

the four-level enhancement.

III.

The District Court did not err in determining that U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3 was the 

appropriate offense guideline and in applying the leadership enhancement to determine 
8

the sentences of Ronald Hellinger and Weisberg. We will affirm the judgments of

sentence.