### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 178 -CR

The St at e of Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v. Am anda Griff

ey, Appellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 5 OF T R A V IS C OU N T Y NO. 740, 330 , HO NORAB LE NANCY WRI GHT H OH ENGARTEN , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
T h e St a te c h ar g e d

A ma n d a G r if f e y w it hth e Cl a s s B mi s d e me an o r o f driving while intox icated ( DWI ). See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04(a) (West 2003). Grif fey filed a pr etrial motion to s uppress, c ontending that the evidenc e of the offe nse wa s discovere d during an improper detention. Followi n g a h earing , the county court at law suppresse d the evidenc e, and the State appea ls. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann. art
. 44 .0 1( a )( 5) (We st 20 06 ). Th e iss ue on a pp e a l is whether the police lawfully detained Griff ey based on a repor

t f rom a fast-f

o o d restaurant
m an age r t h at a p er s o nwa s p as s edo u tb eh i n d t h e w h ee l o f av eh i cl e i nt h e r es t au ra n t ’s dri v e- t h ro u gh lane. B eca

use Grif fey ’s detention wa s not supported by rea sonable suspicion, we aff irm the trial court’s or der.I t is not cle ar from the rec ord whether the manag er provided any identifying inf ormation 1 during the initial phone call. At the hear ing on the motion to suppress, Nelson, when asked w hether he had the mana g er’ s name prior to arrivingat the sce ne, re sponded, “I don’t reme mber that. I ’m sure it’s in the ca ll.” 2 BACK GR OUND On J uly 15, 2006, at appr ox imately 3:00 a.m
. , Wil liam Nelson, an Austin police of fi c e r, wa s d isp a tc he d to the Whata burg e r r e sta

ur ant l oc a te d at 34 00 Wes t Slau ghter L ane in response to a ca ll from the manag er r eportinga per son “passe d out behind the whee l in the drivethroug h.” Nelson testified that he was not g iven any other infor

mation other than that someone was 1 passed out behind the wheel in the dr ive-throug h l an e. W hen Ne lson arrive d at the sce ne, an unidentified Whataburg er e mploy ee pointed to Gr iffey ’s ca r. Nelson testified that Gr iffey was a wake at the time he arr ived and that her ve hicle wa s sitti ng next t o the drive- throug h window. Nelson pulled his patrol car in front of Gr iffey ’s vehicle , blocking it f

rom the front, while the line of vehic les behind Grif fey in the drive-thr oug h lane blocke d her ve hicle fr om the rea

r. At the he aringon the motion to suppress, Nelson conc eded that he detained G riffe y

at the time he use d his v eh i cl e t o s t o p her f rom leaving . Nelson testified that he det ai n ed Gr i ff

ey based on the repor

t that someone wa s passed out behind the w heel in the dr ivethroug h lane. After detaining Griff ey , Nelson asked her to tur n off he r eng ine and step out of the vehi cl e. Af

t er she had done so, Nelson detec ted the odor of an alc oholic bever ag e comingfrom Griff ey . This w as Nelson’s first indication that alcohol wa s involved. Be cause Nelson wa s near ing the end of his shift, he called for another office r to c onduct the DWI investigation. Offic er James3

Strong a rrived on site a few

minutes later and, a fter a dminist eringfield sobriety tests, placed G riffe y
u n d e r ar r e s tf o r D W I. I n a pre trial motion, Griffey moved to suppress all evide nce obta ined as a result of the stop on the g round t hat her detention was improper because it was based sole ly on the manag er’ s repor t that so m eo ne wa s passed out behind the w heel in the dr ive-throug h lane. The trial court expressly ruled that the of

fice rs’ testimony was credible but that the i nitial detention of Griff ey was
unrea sonable a

nd not authorized by law. Acc ording ly , the t rial court suppressed a ll of the evidenc e obtained as a

result of the stop.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW W h e nr e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o no na m o t i o nt o s u

p p r e s s , w e a

p p l y a bif u rcated standar d of re view, g iving a lmost t otal defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s dete rmination of historical fa cts and re viewing the court’s application of sear ch and seizure l aw de novo. Ma x we ll

v . S tat e , 73 S.W. 3d

27 8, 28 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Sta te v . R os s , 3 2 S. W.3 d 8 53 , 8 56 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p . 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Car

mo uc hev . S

tate , 1 0 S. W.3 d 3 23 , 3 27 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 )) ; Guzman

v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 88-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997). The tria l co u rt i s t h e sole judg e of the
cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s and their testimony
. Ma x we ll , 73 S.W .3 d at 2 8 1. Where, a s in the prese nt case , the trial cour t did not make expli cit finding s of fa ct, we r eview the evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the trial cour

t’s ruling and assume that the trial court made “implicit findings of fac t supported in the re cord that buttress its conclusion.” Carmouche , 10 S.W .3d at 327-28.Whil e the State r aises these g rounds in three separ ate issues, t h e ar gu m en t s for a ll three 2 we re c omb ine d in to o ne , a nd thi s Co ur t w ill a dd re ss t he m to g e the r a s w e ll. 4 DI SCU SSIO N On a pp e a l, t he State c on te nd s th a t th e trial c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe mot ion

to suppress bec ause the detention did not violate Griff ey ’s rig hts under the F ourth Amendment to the United States Constit ution, under Article I , section 9 of the T exas Const i t u t ion, or under c hapter s 14 and 38 of the Texas Code of C riminal Procedur e. The State a rg ues that Ne lson’s conduct wa s 2
rea sonable in lig ht of the information he had from the ca ll made by the Whataburg er ma

nag er that
someone wa s passed out in the drive- throug h lane a nd that Nelson was justified in detaining G riffe y without further inve stigation.

A p oli c e of

ficer may condu c t a

br ie f i nv e sti g a tiv e de te nti on if he ha s a re a so na ble
s u s p i c i o nt o b e l i e v e t h a tani n d i v i d u a l i s i n v o l v e d

i nc r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. Carmouche , 10 S.W .3d at 32 8. Th e burd e n is on

the State to e lic it t e sti mon y sh ow ingsu ff

ic ie nt f a c ts t o c re a te a

re a so na ble suspicion. Ga rc ia v . S

tate , 4 3 S. W.3 d 5 27 , 5 30 (T ex . Cr im
. Ap p. 20 01 ); se e als o F or d v . S tate , 158 S
. W .3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that State has burden of establishing
rea sonablene ss of war

rantless sea

rch or seizure). A re as o n able suspicion must be base d on more than a mere hunch or non-spec ific suspicion of criminal ac tivity
. Tan ne r v. S tate , 228 S.W .3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet. ). The re asonable ness of a temporar y detention must be examined in terms of the totality of the c ircumstance s at its inception and will only be justified if the of fi c e r c an p oin t to sp e c if

ic art ic ula ble fa c ts that, whe n co mbi ne d with ratio na l in fe re nc e s f

ro m th os e fac ts, would lead him to reaso n ab l y suspect that a spe cific pe rson had e ng ag ed in or wa s or soonReasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the c ontent of the infor mation possessed 3 by the police and its deg ree of re liability
. See A labama v . W hite , 4 96 U. S. 3 25 , 3 30 (1 99 0) . “ B oth fa c tor s— qu anti ty

and qu a lit y —a re c on sid e re d in

the ‘t ota lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s—

the wh ole picture’ that must be taken into ac count when e valuating whether there is reasona

ble suspicion.” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)) ( citation omitted). 5 would be eng ag ing in c riminal activity
. Ga rc ia , 43 S.W .3d at 530. We lo ok on ly a t th os e fa c ts 3 known to the offic er at the inception of the stop—a stop or sear ch unlawful at its ince ption may not be validate d by

what it turns up. See W

ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). Reasonable suspicion may b e established based on infor mation give n to police office rs by

citizen informants, provided the facts are adequately corr oborate d by

the offic er. Brother

v . S tat e , 16 6 S. W.3 d 2 55 , 2 58 -5 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). Th e of fi c e r s ho uld

e va luate the re lia

bil ity of a c itiz en i n fo rm an t by examining “the ve ry

nature of the c ircumstance s under whic h the incriminating information bec ame known to him.” Id . at 258. A tip by an unname d informan t of
un dis c los e d r e lia

bil ity may jus tif y the ini tiat i o n

o f a n i nv e sti g a tio n; s tand inga lon e , h ow e ve r, it r are ly will establish the requisite level of rea sonable suspicion nec essar y to justi fy

an investig ative detention. Fl or ida v . J

.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000) (c iting Alab am a v . W hite , 496 U.S. 325, 329 (19 90 )); Da v is v . S

tate , 9 8 9 S
. W
. 2 d

8 5 9 , 8 6 3 ( T e x. A p p . —

A u s t i n1 9 9 9 , p e t
. r e f

’ d )
. “ T h e r e m u st be som e furth e r

in d ic ia o f r e li a b il it y , s o me a d d it io n a l f

a c ts f r o m wh ic h a

p o li c e o f

f ic e r ma y
rea sonably

conclude that the tip is reliable and a de tention is just ified.” State v. Fudge , 42 S.W .3d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). Fa ctors to be co n s i d er ed in determining how muc h
we ig ht t he ano ny mou s ti p d e se rv e s in c lud e an o ff ic e r’ s pri or kn ow le dg e and e xpe ri e nc e and

his
corr oboration of the de tails of the tip. Se e Da v is , 989 S.W .2d at 864.6 Th e c ir c ums ta

nc e s su rr ound inga c iti zen -i nf

or mant t ip— and

the re su lti ngre lia

bil ity of the infor

mation—can va

ry from a completely

anony mous phone ca ll to a fac e-to-f ace informant who is willing to be he ld acc ountable for his tip and whose only

contac t with the police re sults from h is witnessing a

criminal ac t. A completely anony mous tip, such as the one illustrated in S t e war t
v . S tat e , 22 S.W .3d 646 (Tex. App.—Aust i n 2 0 00, pet. re f’d) , is the least re liable and must be
corr oborate d by

additional fac ts. I n Ste war t , an off icer detained a

subject for

DWIbased solely

on
an a no ny mou s ti p f

ro m a c a lle r w ho state d th at th e dri ve r o f t he ve hic le a

pp e are d to be hig hly intox icated and “fe ll down a couple of times try ing to g et into the vehicle.” Id
. at 648. An off icer
arr ived o n t h e s ce n e and f ollowed the vehic le desc ribed by the unidentified c aller, but did not observe any traff

ic violations or other activity to corrobor ate the tip. Id
. Be cause the detention wa s ba se d s ole ly

on the ano ny

mou s ca lle r’ s tip, wh ic h wa s “un c or ro bo rate d in it s a sse rt ion

of po ssi ble illega lity ,” this Court held t hat t he detention was not sufficiently supported by

a re asonable suspicion that the driver

was intox icated. Id . at 650. In c o n t r a s t , t h e m o s tr e l i a

b l e f o r m o f c i t i z e n - i n f

o r m an tt i p i s i n f

o r m a t i o ng i v e nb y a fa c e -t o- fa c e inf

or mant w ho ha s no othe r co nta c t w iththe po lic e be y on d w itn e ssi nga c ri min a l a c t, such as the inf

ormants in Cor

ne jo v . S tate , 917 S.W .2d 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, pet. re f’d)
. There , the citizen informants spoke with police in per son, stating that two g angmembers had fire d a we apon at them f rom an a utomobile and pointing out the vehic le to the officers. The court he ld that when police r ece ive information fr om a citizen “whose only contac t with the police is a result of ha

ving w itnessed a c riminal act committed by another , the cr edibility

and re liability

of the information is inhere nt.” Id . at 48 3. B e c a us e of the inh e re nt r e lia

bil ity of the c iti zen

inf or mants ,“ Th e po ssi bil ity of an inno c e nt e xplanatio n d oe s n ot d e pr ive the of fi c e r o f the c a

pa c ity 4 to ent er t ai n re asonable suspicion of criminal conduc t.” W oo ds v . S tate , 956 S.W .2d 33, 37 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Ho we ve r, the burd e n is on the State to sho w tha

t th e of fi c e r h a d r e a so na

ble suspicion to believe that an individual was viol ating the law. Cas tro v . S tate , 227 S.W .3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Nelso n t es tified that he did not have any indication that alcohol wa s involved prior to detaining Griff ey . Thus, the State fa iled to meet its burden of showingthat Nelson, prior to the dete ntion, had rea sonable suspicion to believe that Griff ey was violating any

law. The State argues for

the first time on appe al that Griff ey “had be en and still was obstructing 5 a passag ewa

y .” There is, how ever , nothing in the rec ord that indicate s Griffe y obstructed the dr ivethroug h lane. 7 the information they

provided to police w as suffic ient to establish rea sonable suspicion to detain the driver of the vehicle without additional corrobor ation. I n the instant case , the citize n i n fo rm ant was not c ompletely anony mous in that he identified himself as the Whataburg er manag er. Howeve r, he was not a face -to-fa ce inf ormant, nor was he a witness to a crime beca use t he information that he provided to the police did not alleg e any criminal ac tivity . The mana g er simply repor ted that an individual was pa ssed out behind the whe el in the drive-thr oug h line, which does not constitute criminal beha vior. Significa

ntly , the manag er 4 did not report that the dr iver wa s intox icated or that sh e ex h i b i ted any

signs of intox ication. Fu rt h erm o re , t h e m an age r d i d n o t re p o rt t h at t h e d ri v er

h adb ee np as s edo u to r a s l ee p l o n g en o u gh to obstruct the passag ewa y or whe ther the dr ive-throug h was e ver obstruc ted. 5 The c ircumstance s that Nelson observe d when he arr ived on the sce ne—that Gr iffey
was a wake in he r vehicle at the drive -throug h window—not only failed to c orrobor ate the tip, but act u ally contra dicted the mana g er’ s repor t. Upon arr iving at the scene , Nelson would have been jus tif ie d in ini tiatin g a

c on se ns ua l e nc ounte r t o d e te rm ine if the re wa s a dd iti on a l in fo rm a tio n toAn investig ative dete ntion is di stinguishable from a conse nsual enc ounter, whic h does not 6 infring e on a constit utional rig ht and requires no justification. Florida v. Roye r , 460 U.S. 491, 497- 98 (1983). An of

fice r without r easona

ble suspicion of criminal ac tivity may question an individual duri nga c on se ns ua l e nc ounte r, “ a s lo nga s th e pe rson to who m qu e sti on s are pu t r e ma ins fr e e to disreg ard the questions and walk a way .” Un ite d S

tates v . M e nd e nh all , 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Howeve r, an inve stigative detention occ urs when a person’ s fre edom of mov em en t is restrained, either by phy sical force or a show of authority
. J oh ns on v . S

tate , 9 12 S.W. 2d

22 7, 23 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). An inv e sti g a tiv e de te nti on c on sti tut e s a sei zur e and inv ok e s c on sti tut ion a l sa fe g ua rd s. Me nd e nh all , 446 U.S. at 553. T h e St a te ar g u e s th a t b y th e ti me G r if f e y w a s d e ta in e d , N e ls o n h a d v e r if ied all of the 7 circ umstances of the manag er’ s repor t e x cept for the fa ct that the drive r wa s passed out behind the whee l. Ho we v er , whi le Griff ey ’s vehicle was still in the drive-throug h lane whe n Nelson ar rived, “the corr oboration of details that are easily obtainable at the time the informatio n i s p ro v i d ed, and which do not indicate cr iminal activity , will not lend s u p port to the tip.” Ste war t v . S tate , 917 S.W .2d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d). See, e.g. , B r o th e r v . Sta te , 166 S.W .3d 255, 256-57 (Te x . Crim. App. 2005) (upholding 8 sto p b a se d o n c iti zen ’s re po rt of e rr a tic dr ivi ng ); W

e bb v . S tate , 7 60 S.W. 2d

26 3, 27 3- 74 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1988) (upholding stop ba sed on citizen’s r eport that two subjects had just commit ted robbe ry ); Es c o v . S tat e , 668 S.W .2d 358, 360-61 (Te x . Crim. App. 1982) (holding that probable cause exis ted ba se d on inf

or matio n re c e ive d fr om w itn e sse s to a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

); W oo d v . S tate , 573 S.W .2d 207, 214 (Tex. Cr i m . Ap p . 1978) (holding that citizen informant’s tip that he had be en conta cted by ind ivi du a l pr omo tin g prostit uti on wa s su ff ic e nt t o e sta

bli shpr ob a

ble c a us e ); Fraz ie r v . S

tate , 4 8 0 S. W. 2 d 3 7 5 , 3 7 7
- 7 8 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 1 9 7 2 ) ( h o ld in g th a t p r o b a b le c a u s e e x isted where witness/victim identifi ed m an wh o drug g ed her ); Ga ns k yv . S tate , 180 S.W .3d 240, 247 (T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 5, pe t. r e f’ d) (h old ingtha t st op wa s r e a so na

ble wh e n b a se d o n c iti zen s’ re po rt that c ar w a s tr a ve lin g on wro ng si de of int e rs tate ); Pi

pk in v . S tate , 114 S.W .3d 649, 653 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2003, no pet.) (upholding st op wher e citiz en observed def endant dr iving e rr a tic a lly wh ile smo kin g c ra c k p ipe ); Ha wes v . S tate , 125 S.W .3d 535, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Di st. ] 200 2, no pe t.) (u

ph old ingsto p b a se d o n to w t ru c k d ri ver’s repo rt of

su bje c t’ s e rr a tic dr ivi ng ); Sta te v . G ar c ia , 25 S.W .3d 908, 913-14 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2000, no pet.) 8 corr oborate the manag er’ s tip. But instead, N elson init i ated an investigative detention without 6 obtaining a

ny additional corr oboration of the ma nag er’ s tip. 7 Whil e the State c ites to a number of case s in which citizen-informant tips wer e used to e s t a b l i s h r e a s o n a

b l e s u s p i c i o n , t h e s e c a s e s ar e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e b e c a u s e t h e y d e a l w i t h s p e c if

ic
r e p o rt s a b o u te r r a t i c dr i v i n g o r

o t h e r b e h a v i o r t h a ti n d i c a t e s c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. F or e xamp le , in 8(holdin g

th a t informant’s information that he had see n undera g ed individuals retrie ving a lcohol from c ar i n s tor e pa

rk inglot , w he n co rro bo rat e d w itha dd iti on a l f a c ts, wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh re a so na ble su sp ic ion ); Hi mev . S

tate , 998 S.W .2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pe t. r e f’ d) (u

ph old ingsto p b a se d o n ca ll f ro m c iti zen

wh o o bs e rv e d s ub

je c t dr ivi nge rr a tic a lly

); Sta te v . S tol te , 991 S.W .2d 336, 342-43 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 1999, no pet.) (holding that citiz en inf or mant’ s r e po rt

of e rr a tic dr ivi ngwa s su ff

ic ie nt t o e stab li sh re a so na ble su sp ic ion ); Rey nolds v . S tat e , 962 S.W .2d 307, 311-12 (Te x . App.—Hou s t o n [14t h Dist.] 1998, pet. re f’d) (holding that i nformant’ s tip was sufficie nt to establish reasona ble suspicion wher e informa nt saw subject dr ivi nge rr a tic a lly

); Cor ne jo v . S tate , 917 S.W .2d 480, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, pet. re f’d) (holding that information receive d from witnesses and victim s of shooting w as suffic ient to e sta bli shpr ob a

ble c a us e ); Sta te v . S

ailo , 910 S.W .2d 184, 189 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1995, pet. re f’d) (upholding detention based on c itiz en informa nt’s information that subject wa s driving e rr a tic a lly ); Gl ov e r v . S

tate , 870 S.W .2d 198, 200 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding detention was supporte d by rea sonable suspicion whe re c itiz en informa nt reporte d that driver w as weaving a ll over roa d). 9 Fudge , 42 S.W .3d 226 , t h i s Court upheld a stop based on a cab dr iver’s unsolicited f ace -to-fa ce report to the p o li c e th a t t h e dr iv e r o f a v e h ic le , w h ic h th e c a

b dr iv e r p o in te d o u t t o th e o f

f ic er, “couldn’ t stay

on the roa d” and that he believe d the driver was intox icated. Id . at 229 . B a se d s ole ly on the re port from the c itiz en informa nt, the office r s t o p p ed t h e vehicle, de taining the driver on a
rea sonable suspicion of DWI
. Id
. The c lear distinction between the a ctivity repor ted in Fudge wi th the ac tivity

in the prese nt case is that the citiz en informan t in Fudge, unlike the Whataburg er
m an a g e r , h a d

o b s e r v e d an d r e p o rt e d s p e c i f i c b e h a v i o r

c o n s i s t e n tw i t h c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. We find that the fa cts of the instant ca se ar e more simil ar to those in Ad am s v . S tate , No. 03-98-00615- CR, 2000 Tex . App. L EXI S 464 (Tex. App.—Austin J an . 21, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not de signated for publication), in which a police off icer was dispatche d to a Dair

y Quee n restaur ant base d on an anony mous tip t hat Adams ha d been in the D airy Quee n and that the employ ees be lieved he w as intox icated. T he off icer , who was f

amiliar with Adams and kne w that he ha d a his tor y of dr ivi ng wh ile int oxic a te d, arr ive d on the sc e ne and ob se rv e d A dams w a iti ngin10

the drive- throug h lane. Id . at *2. When Adams drove awa y , the offic er f

ollowed him for six blocks befor e initiating a tra ffic stop. Id
. The officer did not observe Adams driving er ratica lly or violating
an y tr a f f ic la w s . Id
. Th is Court

he ld t hat th e of fi c e r d id n ot h a ve re a so na ble su sp ic ion

to d e ta in Adams base d solely

on the tip of an anony

mous infor

mant without a dditional c orrobor ation, noting that “[w]hi le the off

icer ’s pre vious dealing s with appellant may have te nded to cor

roborate the anony mous caller’ s information, the first-ha nd evidenc e of his own ey es on the oc casion in question tended to contr adict that information.” Id . at *6. Simil arly , the circ umstances that Nelson witnessed upon arr iving at the Whataburg er te nded to contra dict the information he ha d rec eived that ther e wa s a drive r passe d out in the drive-thr o u gh l an e and, unli ke the of fice r in Adams , Nelson lac ked any
a dd iti on a l c or

ro bo ratio n of the tip —s uc h as kno wl e dg e that Gri ff e y ha d a hist or

y of dr ivi ngwh ile intox icated. F urthermor e , the re c or d d oe s n ot r e fl e c t th a t th e c iti zen inf or mant in t he pr e se nt c a se
ever repor ted that Griff

ey appea red intoxi cate d. I n lig h t o f

th e la c k o f c o r r o b o r a ti o no f

th e c it iz e n - in f

o r ma n t t ip an d th e f a c t tha t Nelson obser

ved fa cts that ac tually

contra dicted the i n fo rm ation in the tip, we hold that the manag er’ s repor

t that a driver

was pa ssed out behind the whe el in the drive-thr oug h lane, standing al o n e, wa s i n s u ff

i ci en t t o es t ab l i s h re as o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n t h at Gr i ff ey wa s i n t o x i ca t ed , o b s t ru ct i n g a pa ssa g e wa

y , o r i nv olv e d in

any oth e r c ri min a l a c tiv ity a t th e inc e pti on

of he r d e te nti on . A s a

re su lt,
we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt

and ho ld t hat G ri ff e y wa s unla wf ull y de ta ine d in vi ol ation o f h e r r ig hts
un de r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt.11 CO NC LU SION Ba sed on the totality

of the c ircumstance s, Nelson did not have r easona ble suspicion to de ta in Gr if

fe y . Th e re fo re , we ho ld that the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in its a pp lic a tio n o f t

he law t o the fa cts of this ca s e an d that the motion to suppress was prope rly g rante d. We affir

m the trial court’s or der.

___________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________ Diane H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Waldrop a nd Henson Affir med Filed: De cembe r 13, 2007 Pub lis h