The Honor able Edmund A. Sar g us, J r., United States District Judge f or the Southern * District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0296n.06 Filed: Apr il 27, 2007 Case Nos. 05- 5705/5823 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT ) MARK W. BRYAN, ) ) P e ti ti one r -A ppe lle e / ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED Cr os s- App e lla nt , ) STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR ) THE W ESTER

N D ISTRIC T OF v. ) TEN NE SSEE A T M EM P HIS ) WA YN E BR

AN DO N, Wa r de n, )

) Respondent-Appellan t/ ) Cross-A ppellan t. )

Before: BOGG S, Chief Judge and MOORE, Circuit Judge; and S ARG US, District Judge. * SARGU S, District Judge . Pursuant to a 1986 neg otiated p l ea a g ree ment, PetitionerAppellee Mark Br

y an pled g uilty

to a re duced c harg e of se cond deg ree murder. H e wa s sentence d to 60 y ears o f i m prisonment as a r esult of his classification under Tenne ssee law as a pe rsistent of fe nd e r, me anin g , f

or purp os e s o f t

his c a se , h e ha d b e e n c on vic te d o f t wo or mor e fe lon ie s w ith in five y ear s of the instant offe nse. B ry an later filed a pe tition for a wri t o f h abeas corpus in fe dera l district court cha lleng ing the constitutionalit y of hi s plea. Br y an asse rted that be cause the three 1983 convictions that supported the persistent-of fende r desig nation had since been va cate d, his sentence

was no longe r consistent with Tenne ssee law and violated the f

eder al constitution. The district courtNos. 05-5705/5823 -2-

Th e re lie f s ou g ht o n th e c ro ss- a pp e a l, b a se d o n a

br e a c h o f t

he ple a a g re e me nt w ou ld, if 1 g rante d, be coe x tensive with the re lief orde red by the district court on the due -proc ess claim. Be cause we a ffirm the ha beas r elief g rante d by

the district court, we need not de cide the issues raised on c ross-appe al. ag ree d, concludingthat the per si s tent-off ender desig nation was pre dicated on the vacated 1983 convictions. Be cause such convic tions were va cated, the sentenc e wa s subsequently rende red unconstitutional, in vi olation of the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. The cour t

acc ording ly

g rante d Br

y an’s pe tition for a writ of ha beas c orpus and vacate d his 1986 conviction for second de g ree murder. O n cross-a ppeal, B ry an conte nds that the s tate failed to fulfill the terms of his plea ag ree ment. The dis t ri ct co u rt d enied r elief on this claim but g rante d a Certific ate of Ap pe a la bil ity fo r r e vie w b y

thi s c ourt

. 1 For the following rea sons, the judgme nt of district c ourt g ranting the writ of habea s corpus is affirme d. I. Pr ior to h is 1 98 6 c on vic tio n, on wh ic h th is a pp e a l is ba se d, B ryan h a d b e e n c on vic te d in Aug ust 1983 of three criminal offe nses (the “1983 convictions”). Br y an was sentenc ed to one to five y e ars by the tr ia l ju dg e . T he re a ft e r, on Marc h 29 , 19 85 , Ti mo thy J. Ros s w a s f

a ta lly sta bb e d in Shelby County , Tenne ssee. B ry an was i n d i ct ed and charg ed with the murde r, but enter ed a neg otiated plea of

g uilty for a six ty -y ear sentenc e to be se rved a s a Rang e I I“per sistent offende r.” I n th e do c ume nt m e mo ri ali z in g the ne g oti a te d p le a a g re e me nt, the ans we r “ y e s” wa s c ir c le d in response to the statement “The defe ndant is a PERS I STENT OFF ENDER.” The for m offer ed two

o p t i ons to support that designation and the word “ y es” is cir cled with re spect to the fir st option:

“ [t]wo or mor e pr ior

fe lony c on vic tio ns fo r o ff

e ns e s c omm itt e d w ith in f ive (5 ) ye ars imm e diate lyNos. 05-5705/5823 -3-

Acc ording to Tennesse e law in e ffe ct at the time, a de fenda nt could be a “ persistent 2 offe nder” if he or she had re ceive d “[t] wo (2) or more prior

felony convictions for of

fense s the convictions for w hich occ urre d within five (5) y ear s immediately prec eding the commission of the instant offe nse.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 106(a) (1)( repe aled) . Persistent offe nders we re sentenc ed within Rang e I Iof the state se ntencingg uidelines. Id . § 40-35-106( c). Mor eover , Br y an plea ded to sec ond deg ree murder, a Class A felony . The full, author ized term of imprisonment for a Class A fe lony is not less than fifteen y ear s nor more tha n six ty y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 111(b)( 1). The Class X F elonies Ac t of 1979, which wa s repe aled by the State of Te nnessee in 1989 3 but applicable to B ry an at the time of his sentencing , dictated that a ny felony desig nated a s “ Cla ss X ” wo uld

c arr y a se nte nc e that c ou ld n ot b e re du c e d b a se d o n th e inm a te ’s po stc on vic tio n b e havio r. I t pr oh ibi te d a re du c tio n in

a se nte nc e fo r “ g oo d ti me ” and mand a te d th a t a felon ser ve the e ntire sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-1- 703 (re peale d). prec eding the commission of the instant offense .” Following a hear ing, the trial court a cce pted the plea a nd sentenc ed B ry an to six ty y ear s of imprisonment on Fe bruar y 27, 1986. Under

Tenne ssee law, a se ntence of six ty y ear s of imprisonment on this charg e wa s authorized only if appe llee wa s a per sistent offende r. 2 I n Au g us t 19 88 , Ap ri l 19 89 , and No ve mbe r 19 89 , B ryan fi le d in s tate c ourt pro se petitions fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, wh ic h we re late r co ns oli date d. B ryan ass e rt e d that th e State br e a c he d h is ple a a greemen t by

se nte nc inghim

a s a “ Cla ss X ” fe lon and

that th e ple a

he ari ngdid

no t c omp ly 3 wi th the require ments of Boyk in v. Alabama , 3 9 5 U

. S. 2 3 8 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , o r o f s tate la w . F o ll owing an evidentiar y hear ing, the trial court de nied re lief. In Marc h 1991, the Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls a ffi rm e d. Th e a

pp e llate c ourt

fo un d th a t avo ida

nc e of the Cla ss Xde sig natio n w a s n ot a materia l component of, or a n inducement f

or, the plea

agr ee ment, as B ry an ar g ued, but rather the Class X desig nation was mandated by state law , an d n o deviation from that de signation was permitte d. Br

y an’s a pplication for pe rmission to appeal to the Tenne ssee Supre me Court was de nied in J une 1991.Nos. 05-5705/5823 -4-

The pe tition was subsequently transfe rre d to J udg e May s in the United States District 4 Court for the Western D istrict of Tenne ssee. B e fo re the re so lut ion

of the 19 86 po st- c on vic tion p ro c e e din g s, B ryan f ile d a no the r p os tconviction petition in J une 1989 cha lleng ing his g uilty pleas to the three criminal off enses in 1983. Bryan v. State of Tenn. , 848 S.W .2d 72 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). B ry an conte nded that the plea s

wer e not voluntarily , knowing ly , and intellige ntly enter ed and thus constituti onally defe ctive under Bo y k in . T he tr ia l c ourt

de nie d p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, bu t th e Te nn e sse e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls

reve rsed a

nd rema nded the case to the trial court for a new hear ing on the voluntariness of B ry an’s 1983 pleas. On r emand, the post-c onviction court voided the 1983 ple as as having be en obtained in violation of his constit utional rig hts and order ed the 1986 guilty plea be revie wed by

the state a

nd set for r e tr ia l o r r e s e n te n c in g w it h in o n e y e ar . O n a

p p e a l in Janu ar

y 1 9 9 9 , th e Co u rt o f Criminal Appea ls affirme d the trial cour t’s post-conviction finding s as to the 1983 convictions, but reve rsed the c ourt ’s or de r w ithre g ard to the 1 98 6 p le a , f

ind ingthat th e tr ia l c ourt ha d n o ju

ri sd ic tio n to enter tain a cha lleng e to that conviction. T h e C o u rt of Criminal Appea ls found that Br y an had alre ady soug ht post-conviction relief on the 1986 g uilty plea, and that Tenne ssee law allows only

one petition for post-conviction relief to be filed attacking a sing le judg ment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102( c). The court there fore reve rsed the trial court’s order directing a rehea ring on the 1986 conviction. On J une 25, 2001, B ry an filed a petition for a wr it of habea s corpus i n t h e United St ates District Court f

or the Middle District of Tenne ssee c halleng ing the constitutionalit y of his 1986 plea ag ree ment, the petition at issue here

. Br y an’s ha beas pe tition raised three claims for r elief: 4 1. Whether B ry an’s 1986 plea neg otiation, guilty plea, conviction, and se ntenceNos. 05-5705/5823 -5-

a s a “ pe rs ist e nt o ff

e nd e r” vio late s th e Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment where t h e s ole basis of the “ persistent off ender ” status is the vo id 1 98 3 c on vic tio ns ; 2. Whether B ry an’s guilty plea a nd conviction base d u p o n a wr itten neg otiated plea a g re e me nt, the te rm s o f wh ic h we re no t ful fi lle d by the State , viol a te s due pr oc e ss; and 3. Whether the totality of the c ircumstance s of the 1986 guilty -plea proce eding s failed to meet the re quirements of Boyk in v. Alabama , 385 U.S. 238 (1969). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e nte re d a n o rd e r i n F e br

ua ry 20 04 grant in g th e re sp on de nt’ s mo tio n to dis mis s Cla ims Tw o a

nd Th re e . In th a t sa

me or de r, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e re sp on de nt’ s mo tio n to dismiss Claim One—Br

y an’s c laim that the 1986 plea a n d s en t en ce as a pe rsistent offe nder w ere ba se d o n th e va c a te d 1 98 3 co nv ic tio ns and the re fo re in v iol a tio n o f d ue pr oc e ss— a s p ro c e dura lly defa ulted. I n Marc h 2005, the district co u rt found with reg ard to Claim One that “ [t ]he evidence

su bmi tte d b y

B ryan a nd , in pa rt ic ula r, the re fe re nc e s to the 19 83 c on vic tio ns in t he do c ume nts

conce rning the 1986 g uilty plea, a re suf ficient to per

mit the Court to conclude that the per sistent offe nder de signation wa s based on the 1983 convictions. Respondent ha s offe red no e vidence to the contra ry .” The court accor dingly found t hat t he sentence was not valid under Te nnessee law. The district court fur

ther found that Supreme Court prec edent supporte d the proposition that a sentenc e imposed on the basis of invalid prior c onvictions is unconstit utional. The cour t theref ore he ld that Br y an’s se ntence as a pe rsistent offe nder w as constitutionally invalid and g rante d his petition for a writ of habe as cor

pus vacating B ry an’s 1986 c onviction for sec ond deg ree murder. On May 2, 2005, responde nt filed a timely notice of a

ppeal f rom the orde r g rantinghabea s corpus r elief on Claim One. B ry an filed a cross-a ppeal, claiming that the State fa iled to fulfill theNos. 05-5705/5823 -6- te rm s o f h is p le a

a g re e me nt. II. Br ya n’ s P e r sis te nt Offen de r St at us B ryan a sse rt s th a t hi s 1 98 6 p le a ne g oti a tio n, g uil ty pl ea, convic tio n, and se nte nc e a s a

“ pe rs ist e nt of

fe nd e r” vio late d the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt wh e re the so le basis of hi s “per sistent offe nder” status is his voi ded 1983 convic tions. Respondent asserts that: (1) the district court e rre d in holding that Br y an did not proce durally defa ult his challeng e to his 1986 plea a g ree ment; and (2) the district court err ed in concluding that Br y an’s se ntence was inconsistent with Tennesse e law a

nd violated the fe dera l Consti tution. A. P r oc e dur al D e fault A c la im that ha s n ot b e e n p re sent ed to the state c ourt s a nd is s ub se qu e ntl y

ba rr e d b e c a us e of a pr ocedur al rule is pr eclude d from fede ral habea s corpus revie w, abse nt a showing of ca use and prejudice

. Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 751- 53 (1991). Responde nt asserts that by limit ing his constituti onal cha lleng es to his 1986 plea in t h e st ate post-c onviction proce eding , Br y an proce durally

defa ulted any claim that his sentence as a pe rsistent offe nder is unconstitutional. The dist rict court addre ssed t his issue in two separ ate orders, first in Februa ry 2004 and later in March 2005. I

n both orders, the district court conc luded that B ry an had not proce durally defa ulted the issues raise d in Claim One. The court acknow ledg ed that Bry an had ne ver f iled an application to reope n the post-conviction proc eeding a s to his 1986 conviction in order to obtain a r uling that his a pp lic a tio n w a s b arr e d b y the Te nn e sse e law, bu t ul tim a te ly fo un d th is d id n ot p re se nt a proce dural ba

r.Nos. 05-5705/5823 -7- Th is c ourt

ha s e xpla ine d th e do c tr ine of pr oc e dura l de fa

ult a s f oll ow s: Whe n a habea s p e tit ion e r f

a ils to o bta in c on sid e ra

tio n o f a c la im b y a state c ourt , e ith e r d ue to t he pe tit ion e r’ s fa ilure to ra ise that c la im be fo re the state c ourt s w hil e state -c ourt

re me die s are sti ll ava ila

ble or du e to a state pr oc e dura l r

ule that pr e ve nts the state c ourt s f

ro m r e a c hin g the me ri ts o f t he pe tit ion e r’ s cla im, that c la im i s proce durally

defa ulted and may

n o t b e considered by

the fe dera l court on habe as revie w. Seym our v. W

alker , 224 F.3d 542, 549- 50 (6th Cir. 2000). Pr oc e dura l de fa

ult argum ents are ana ly

zed un de r t his c ourt ’s thr e e -p art

te st a rt ic ulate d in Ma up in v . S

mi th , 785 F.2d 135, 138 ( 6th Cir. 1986). Under Ma up in , the cour t must determine: (1) if there is a state proc edura l rule that applies and petitioner failed to comply with that rule; (2) if the state c ourt

a c tua lly e nf or c e d th e state pr oc e dura l sa nc tio n; and

(3 ) i f t he state pr oc e dura l g ro un d is an “a dequate and indepe ndent” g round to ref use re view. See J

ames v . Brigano , 470 F.3d 636, 640 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) . T o b e “ a de qu a te ,” a state pr oc e dura l rul e mus t be “ fi rm ly e sta bli sh e d a nd re g ula rl y followed.” Sm ith v . O hio De p’ t of Re ha b. & Cor

rs. , 463 F.3d 426, 43 0 -3 1 (6 t h C i r. 2006). An “indepe ndent” state proce dural rule is one not rely ing on fede ral law

. Id. I f these thr ee f actor s are satisfied (thus i mposing the proce dural bar), the petitioner can ove rcome the proc edura l defa ult by either “ demonstrating cause for the pr ocedur al def ault and ac tual prejudice as a result of the a lleg ed violation of fede ral law , or demonstrating that f ailure to c onsi d er t h e claims will result in a fundame ntal miscarr iag e of justice.” Id. at 4 3 1 (c i t i n g Coleman , 501 U.S. at 732). The district cour

t expl icitly

ref ere nced Maupin and

dir e c tly a pp lie d it s thre e - p a

r t t e s t , b ut a lso approa ched the responde nt’s proce dural defa ult a rg ument as one of

exhaustion. The district court partially relied on the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)( B) (i) except i o n to the exhaustion re qu ir e me nt i n concluding that Br

y an’s claim was not proce durally defa ulted. The c ourt conc luded that bec ause ofNos. 05-5705/5823 -8- the c ha ng e s in the Pos t- Convic tio n Pr oc e dure Ac t th a t oc c ur re d w hile Bry an was a tte mpt ingto exhaust thi s claim, his case fits within 28 U.S.C . § 2254(b)( 1)(B )(i)’ s exception if “there is an absenc e of a

vailable State c orre ctive proc ess.” Ef fe c tiv e May

13 , 1 99 6, Te nn e sse e law d ir e c tly pr oh ibi te d th e re op e nin g of c lo sed p os tconviction proc eeding s to lit igate claims of this nature

. See Te nn . Co de Ann. §§ 40 -3 0- 10 2( c ) ( on ly

on e po st- c on vic tio n pe tit ion may be fi le d atta c kin g a

sin g le jud g me nt) ; 40 -3 0- 10 2( b) (e xce pti on to one-y ear s t at ute of limitations does not apply to “a guilty

plea with an a g ree d sentenc e”) ; 40-30- 117(a) (3) ( author i z ing the reope ning of a post-convic tion petition t o obtain relief from a se ntence that was e nhance d beca

use of a previous co n v iction that was later invalidated, but only

if the “convic tion in the case in whic h the claim is asser ted is not a g uilty

plea with an a g ree d sentenc e”)

. The state court also “ac tually enfor ced” the state proc edura l rule, finding that “[b] eca use there was no motion to reope n the post-conviction petition or any post-conviction proc eedingbefor e the tria l court g iving the c ourt jurisdiction to rule on the 198 6 gu i l ty plea, the c ourt was utter ly without jurisdi cti on to rende r any order s conce rning the 1986 conviction.” ( Marc h 15, 2000 Orde r of Te nn e sse e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls r e ve rs ingtr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin gon

19 86 c on vic tio ns .) I n this Or d er , t h e Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, while a ffirmingthe vac ation of the 1983 prior felonies, f ound that § 40-30-102( c) ba rre d any revie w of the 1986 sentenc e, since Br y an had a lrea dy soug ht and was de nied post-conviction re lief on matters unr elated to the va cate d convictions. The district cour

t concluded tha

t Bryan’s c laim was n o t p r o c e d u r a ll y d e f a ulted under the third prongof the Maupin te st be c a us e the state pr oc e dura l gr ound wa s n ot a n “ a de qu a te and

ind e pe nd e nt” g round to ref

use re view. The district court did not err in this conclusion. Respondent a rg ues thatNos. 05-5705/5823 -9- B ryan f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th t he po st- c on vic tio n pr oc e dure s art ic ulate d in the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court’s decisions in State v. Mc Clint ock, 732 S.W .2d 268 (Tenn. 1 9 8 7 ), and State v. Prince , 781 S.W .2d 846 (Tenn. 1989). Howe ver, a s the district court empha siz ed, McClintock did not require that Br y an, befor e his 1983 convictions had be en invalidated, inc lude a c laim challeng ing the 1986 conviction on the basis that his sentence enhanc ement wa s unlawful. F urther, McClintock did not establish any

require ment that Br

y an move to consolidate his post-conviction petitions challeng ing the 1983 a n d 1 9 8 6 convictions. Fina lly , the district court found that “[t] o the extent respondent contends that B ry an’s f

ailure to obtain c onsolidation of the 1983 and 1986 postconviction petitions means that his claim has be en proc edura ll y d efaulted, the Court is unable to conc lude that the proce dure se t forth in Prince was ‘f irmly established and r egularly fo l l o we d ’ when both petitions

we re p en d i n g i nt h e S h el b y C o u n t y C ri m i n al C o u rt

. (J A a t2 2 4 (c i t i n g Fo rd v . G e or gia , 4 98 U. S. 41 1, 42 3- 24 (1 99 1) ). As a re su lt, the pr oc e dura l g ro un d w a s n ot a n “ a de qu a te and

ind e pe nd e nt” g round to ref

use re view and the ref

ore B ry an’s c laim was not proce durally barr ed under Ma up in

. Simpl y put, the facts on which B ry an’s c laim is based--the vaca tion of the three prior fe lony

c o n v ic ti o n s lo n g a f

te r h is s e n te n c in g a s a p e r s is te n t o f f e n d e r - - ar o s e u n d e r c ir c u ms ta n c e s wher e Tenne ssee law permitted no further eff ort at pos t conviction relief. Bry an wa s barr ed by Tenne ssee law fr om seeking re l i ef i n state cour t. The district court c orre ctly deter mined that Claim One of Br y an’s pe tition was not procedur ally defa ulted. B. M e r it s o f Cla im One A fe dera l court is authorized to issue a wri t o f h ab eas c orpus on beha lf of a state prisoner “only on the g round that he is in custody in violation of the Consti tution or laws or treat i es o f t heNos. 05-5705/5823 -10- United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)

. The district c ourt relied on Townsend v. Burke , 334 U.S. 736 (1948), a nd United States v. Tuck

er , 404 U.S. 443 (1972), for the proposition that a sente nce ba sed on invalid prior convictions is unconstitutional. Respondent asserts that the district cour t’s holding that B ryan’ s se nte nc e is i nc on sis te nt w ithTe nn e sse e law i s in e rro r, and ev e n if inc on sis te nt w ith Tenne ssee law , the sentenc e did not violate the fe dera l constituti on. Fe dera l habea s relief

is available only

if a de fenda

nt is in custody

in violation of feder al law;

err or in the application of state law is not cogniz able in a f eder al habe as proc eeding . 28 U.S.C. § 22 54 (a ); Es te lle v . M

c Gu ire , 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (empha siz ing that “it is not t he provinc e of a fed e r a l h a

b e a s c o u rt t o r e e xa mi n e s tate

- c o u rt d e te r mi n a ti o n s o ns tate

- la

w qu e s ti o n s ” ). Ac c or din g ly , th is c ourt

mus t e va luate wh e the r B ryan’ s se nte nc e a s a pe rs ist e nt o ff e nd e r i s constitutionally

invalid. Both Tucker

and Townsend support the district c ourt’s conclusion that a sente nce imposed

on the basis of prior felony convictions that have since been found i nvalid is unconstitutional. As noted by the district court, the Townsend Co u rt em phasized that “it is the car eless or de signe d pronounce ment of sentenc e on a f oundation so ext ensively and materia lly false, which the pr isoner had no opportunity

to corre ct by

the servic es which c ounsel would provide, t hat re nders the p r o c e e d in g s la c k in g in d

u e p r o cess.” Townsend , 334 U.S. at 741 (finding that “this prisoner wa s

se nte nc e d o n th e ba sis of a ssumpt ion s c on c e rn inghis c ri min a l record wh ic h w e re mate ri a lly untrue” ). Relying on Townsend , the Tuc k e r Court gr anted the pe titioner’s writ of habeas c orpus on fi nd ingthat th e se nte nc ingc ourt e rr on e ou sly re lie d u po n d e fe nd ant’ s thre e pr ior fe lony c on vic tio ns , two of which wer e constitutionally invalid. Tucker , 404 U.S. at 446-49 (noting that “we deal he re,Nos. 05-5705/5823 -11-

Couns e l f or bo th B ryan a

nd B ra nd on a c kn ow le dg e d d

ur ingor a l argume nt t

hat, b e c a us e 5 the se nte nc e wa s im

po se d p ur su ant t o a

ple a a g re e me nt, a

va c a tio n o f t

he se nte nc e a lso re su lts in a vac ation of the plea

. not with a sentence imposed in the i nformed discretion of a trial judge , but with a sente nce f ounded at least in par

t upon misi nformation of c onstitut ional mag nitude”). The Tuc k e r Court emphasized that “the r eal que stion here is . . . whe ther the se ntence . . . m i gh t h ave be en diffe rent if the sentenc ing c ourt [had not relied on er roneous infor

mation] .” Id. at 448. Re sp on de nt s e e ks to dis tin g uis h Br y an’ s si tuatio n f

ro m th os e fo un d c on sti tut ion a lly inv a lid in Townsend and Tucker . Respondent contends that this court’s decision in Arnett v. Jac kson , 393 F.3d 681 ( 6th Cir. 2005), char acte rized the Townsend and Tuc k e r decisions as “ case s which provide the g ener al rule that a violation of due proce ss e x ists whe n a sentenc ing judge relies upon ‘ err oneous inf or ma tio n. ’” Re sp on de nt a sse rt s that th e c ir c ums tanc e s f ound to b e c on sti tut ion a lly

re pu g na nt i n Townsend and Tuc k

e r simply do not exis t in this case , beca use the sente nce is a ctually “base d” on the g uilty plea rathe r than any previous information. Respondent’s rea ding of Townsend and Tuc k e r, howeve r, is f

lawe d. Al tho ug h th e fa c ts o f b oth c a se s d if fe r so me wh a t fr om tho se a t iss ue he re , b oth

case s stand for the proposition that a sentence imposed on the basis of an err oneous prior c onviction is constituti onally

invalid. I t is appare nt from the re cord that Bryan’s se ntence as a pe rsi stent of fe nd e r w a s p re dic a te d o n h is i nv a lid 19 83 g uil ty

ple a s. As a con se qu e nc e , h is s e nte nc e is unconstitutional under Townsend and Tuc k e r. 5 III . Th e de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nti ngha be a s r e lie f o n Cl a im O ne is AF F IRMED in a ll

re sp e c ts. Th e pe tit ion e r s ha ll b e re le a sed fro m cus tod y wi thi n f ou rt e e n d a y s f ro m th e date of

thi sNos. 05-5705/5823 -12- decision, unless the state pr osecutor initiates fur ther leg al proc eeding s reg ardingthe u n d e r ly ing 1986 offe nse wit hin that time period. I n the event the s tate prosecutor ini tiates such proc eeding s, it is l eft to the state cour

ts of Tenne ssee to addr ess i ssues of bail which petiti oner has raised in the c ourse of thi s a pp e a l.