14-4414-cv Cancel v. New York City Human Resources Administration UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PR OCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS CO URT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMEN T FILED WITH THIS CO URT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMM ARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the Un ited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Fo ley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23 rd day of December, two thousand fifteen. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

___________________ __________________ FRANKIE CANCEL, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. 14-4414-cv
NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION/DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. , Defendants-Appellees

.

___________________ __________________ APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: FRANKIE CANCEL, pro se , New York, New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: TAHIRIH M. SADRIEH, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, New York.2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, Judge ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment deemed to have been entered on July 6, 2015, is
AFFIRMED. 1 Plaintiff Frankie Cancel appeals pro se from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Cancel’s claim that defendants violated his federal right to procedural due process and parallel state law ri ghts in rescinding an offer of employment based on his criminal record. Cancel furthe r appeals from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the cas e, and the issues on appeal. We review an award of summary judgment de novo and will affirm only if the record, viewed in favor of the non-moving party, shows no genu ine issues of material fact and the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Jackson v. Federal Express, 766 F.3d 189, 193

− 94 (2d Cir. 2014). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of reconsideration and the district c ourt’s decision not to ex ercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 2 49, 253 (2d Cir. 2015)

1 Because no separate judgment was entered in th is matter as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), a judgment is deemed to have been entered 150 days af ter the February 6, 2015 entry of the district court’s dispositive order. See Fe d. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B ); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).3 (reconsideration); Federal Treasury Enter. So juzplodoimport v. SPI Spirits Ltd., 726 F.3d 62, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (suppl emental jurisdiction). Upon such review, we conclude that the di strict court correctly granted defendants summary judgment on Cancel’s procedural due process claim because, under New York law, Cancel’s appointment wo uld have been probationary and New York does not afford probationary employees property rights in th eir positions protected by due process. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1297

− 98 (2d Cir. 1996) (collec ting cases). Insofar as Cancel claims that his intervie wers appointed him to a non-pr obationary position, such an action would have been unauthori zed and, thus, insufficient to bind defendants or to confer a property interest in th e position on Cancel. See Sa fway Steel Prods. v. Craft Architectural Metals Corp., 183 A.D.2d 452, 452, 583 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (1st Dep’t 1992). Further, on the record presen ted, we identify no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In general, where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, th e state claims should be dismissed as well.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We also identify no abuse of discretion in the decision not to grant reconsideration. See An alytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (“It is we ll-settled that [a motion for reconsideration] is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under ne w theories, securing4 a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple . . . .” (ellipses original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore affirm for substantially the re asons stated by the district court in its thorough October 31, 2014 and February 6, 2 015 decisions. We have considered all of Cancel’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court