Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1405-JV-298 | March 11, 2015 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patricia Caress McMath

Michelle C. Langdon, Certified Legal Intern

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

D.Y.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 11, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

49A02-1405-JV-298

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

Lower Court Cause No. 

49D09-1402-JD-339

The Honorable Marilyn Moores, 

Judge

The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, 

Magistrate

Pyle, Judge

Statement of the Case

[1] Defendant/Appellant, D.Y., appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child, 

which was based on the juvenile court’s true finding that he had committed 
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dangerous possession of a firearm1 and carrying a handgun without a license.2 

D.Y. was a potential suspect in a burglary, and a police officer told him that he 

was going to transport him to police headquarters for the burglary investigation. 

Prior to putting D.Y. into the police vehicle, the officer patted him down and 

discovered a firearm in D.Y.’s jacket. Subsequently, the State filed a petition 

alleging that D.Y. was a delinquent child for committing dangerous possession 

of a firearm and carrying a handgun without a license, both of which would be 

Class A misdemeanors if committed by an adult. D.Y. filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence of the firearm, arguing that it was the result of an illegal 

search. The juvenile court denied the motion and adjudicated D.Y. a 

delinquent child. 

[2] On appeal, D.Y. now argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

admitting the firearm because it was the result of an unlawful search. He 

asserts that the search was unlawful because: (1) it was incident to an unlawful 

arrest; (2) it was incident to an unlawful investigatory stop; and (3) the officer 

did not have reasonable concerns for safety to justify the search. We conclude

that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting the firearm because it 

was obtained through a search incident to an unlawful arrest. Because the 

evidence of the firearm was an essential element of D.Y.’s charges, we reverse 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-47-10-5.

2

I.C. § 35-47-2-1.
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and remand to the juvenile court with instructions to vacate its true findings and 

D.Y.’s adjudication as a delinquent child.

[3] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issue

[4] Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of a 

firearm found in D.Y.’s pocket during a pat down.

Facts3

[5] On February 17, 2014, Officer Sydney McDaniel (“Officer McDaniel”) of the 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) was dispatched to the 

scene of a disturbance near 12th Street and Concord Street in Indianapolis. 

When he arrived, he found two males confronting a juvenile, A.I., about a 

burglary that they believed he had committed the previous month (“First 

Burglary”). Another male, Brian Smith (“Smith”), was also at the scene and 

was confronting A.I. about a separate burglary of his house that had occurred 

the prior weekend (“Second Burglary”). Officer McDaniel questioned the three 

alleged victims and, based on the information they gave him, detained A.I. and 

transported him to the police department’s roll call for questioning. Officer 

 

3 We held an oral argument in this case on February 11, 2015 in the Court of Appeals Courtroom. We thank 

counsel for their preparation and presentation.
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McDaniel then followed Smith to his house to make a report of the Second 

Burglary.

[6] At Smith’s house, Smith told Officer McDaniel that he and his wife had gone 

on a short vacation the previous weekend. When they returned, they found 

that someone had kicked in their back door and ripped the plastic that had been 

over the door. They also discovered that Smith’s big screen television and 

Xbox were missing, although a broken Xbox in another room was still there. 

Smith told Officer McDaniel that he suspected that A.I., D.Y., and/or one 

other individual had been involved in the burglary because they had frequently 

played video games at his house and knew which Xbox was broken.4 

[7] Officer McDaniel made a report of the burglary and called IMPD Detective 

Mark Howard (“Detective Howard”), who also came to the scene and spoke to 

the Smiths. Afterwards, both officers left Smith’s house, and Detective Howard 

returned to the IMPD’s southwest district headquarters. There, another 

detective contacted Detective Howard and told him that there was a possibility 

that D.Y. was also a suspect in the First Burglary. However, Detective Howard 

never communicated this information to Officer McDaniel.

[8] Later that day, Officer McDaniel received a dispatch that Smith’s wife had 

called to say that D.Y. was on the way to Smith’s house to talk to Smith about 

 

4 Officer McDaniel also testified that D.Y. had known that Smith was going to be out of town for the 

weekend. Later, however, Smith himself testified that D.Y. “might have known” he was going to be out of 

town, but he could not remember. (Tr. 53). 
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his suspicions. Officer McDaniel called Detective Howard with the 

information, and Detective Howard told Officer McDaniel to “detain” D.Y. 

and bring him into roll call so that he could give a statement. (Tr. 24).

[9] When Officer McDaniel arrived at Smith’s house, Smith and D.Y. were sitting 

on the couch talking. Officer McDaniel explained to D.Y. “why it [was] that 

[he] was there and that [he] would be transporting [D.Y.] to [IMPD’s] district 

roll call for some burglary investigation that he was a possible suspect in.” (Tr. 

38). Officer McDaniel then “told [D.Y.] that [he] would have to search him to 

put him in [the] police vehicle so that he could be transported.” (Tr. 38). 

Thereafter, Officer McDaniel conducted a pat down search of D.Y. and found a 

gun in his jacket pocket.5 Because Officer McDaniel was aware that D.Y. was 

under the age of eighteen, he secured the weapon, placed D.Y. in handcuffs, 

and transported him to the police headquarters. 

[10] The next day, on February 18, 2014, the State filed a petition alleging that 

sixteen-year-old D.Y. was a delinquent child for committing one count of 

dangerous possession of a firearm and one count of carrying a handgun without 

a license, both of which would have been Class A misdemeanors if committed 

 

5 The record revealed that the gun was not loaded.
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by an adult. Subsequently, D.Y. moved to suppress the evidence of the firearm 

that Officer McDaniel had found as a result of his pat down.6 

[11] On March 13, 2014, the juvenile court held a denial and suppression hearing 

concerning the State’s petition and D.Y.’s motion to suppress. During the 

hearing, D.Y. argued that Officer McDaniel’s pat down had violated his 

constitutional rights under the United States and Indiana constitutions and that, 

as a result, the juvenile court should suppress the firearm discovered during the 

search. The State argued that the pat down did not violate D.Y.’s 

constitutional rights because Officer McDaniel had probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion that D.Y. had committed a burglary, as well as reasonable 

concerns for his safety. D.Y. disputed each of these arguments. Ultimately, the 

juvenile court denied D.Y.’s motion to suppress and entered a true finding on 

both of D.Y.’s charges, thereby adjudicating him a delinquent child. On April 

3, 2014, the court held a dispositional hearing and placed D.Y. on probation to 

last until July 31, 2014, for the dangerous possession of a firearm finding. The 

juvenile court dismissed the finding of carrying a handgun without a license. 

D.Y. now appeals.

 

6 There is no evidence of a written or oral motion to suppress evidence in the record, but it is clear from the 

transcript of the suppression hearing that D.Y. filed such a motion prior to the hearing.
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Decision

[12] On appeal, D.Y. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

admitted the evidence of the firearm because the firearm was obtained pursuant 

to an illegal search. He asserts that the search was illegal because Officer 

McDaniel arrested him without a warrant or probable cause and, thus, the 

subsequent search violated his right to be free from search and seizure under the 

United States and Indiana constitutions. Alternately, D.Y. argues that, even if 

Officer McDaniel’s actions did not constitute a seizure or arrest, Officer 

McDaniel still conducted an investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion 

that he had committed a burglary. Finally, D.Y. contends that, even if Officer 

McDaniel had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop, the officer could not 

justify his pat down of D.Y. based on concerns for officer safety because he did 

not have a reasonable fear of danger. 

[13] Preliminarily, we note that the juvenile court here held a hearing on D.Y.’s 

motion to suppress in conjunction with his denial hearing and ruled on the 

matter as a question of admissibility. We review a ruling concerning the 

admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 

668, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. We will find that a juvenile court 

has abused its discretion only when its decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Holbert v. State, 996 N.E.2d 396, 

399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In making this determination, we 

cannot reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we must consider 

conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling. 
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Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

Further, it is well-settled that when reviewing the constitutionality of a search or 

seizure, we must examine “‘any uncontested evidence favorable to the 

appellant.’” Id. (quoting Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind. 1993)). 

“‘Although a trial court’s determination of historical facts is entitled to 

deferential review, we employ a de novo standard when reviewing the trial 

court’s ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.’” 

Id. (quoting Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied). 

[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects both privacy 

and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.7 

N.W. v. State, 834 N.E.2d 159, 161-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. As a 

general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches. Id. at 162. 

However, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is subject to a 

few well-delineated exceptions. Johnson v. State, 710 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the 

burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the 

time of the search. Holbert, 996 N.E.2d at 399. Generally speaking, we must 

exclude evidence directly obtained via an illegal search under the fruit of the 

poisonous tree doctrine. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 266 (Ind. 2013). 

 

7

It is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
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[15] Here, the State argues that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at 

the time of the search because Officer McDaniel had reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigatory stop of D.Y., as well as reasonable concerns for his 

safety to justify a pat down search. In support of this argument, the State cites 

our precedent that, in the case of a lawful investigatory stop, an officer may 

conduct a 

[r]easonable search for weapons for the protection of the police 

officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an 

armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has 

probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer 

need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the 

issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 

would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others 

was in danger. 

Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 27

(1968)). In response, D.Y. argues that Officer McDaniel’s stop was so intrusive 

that it constituted a “seizure”, or arrest, without probable cause or a warrant, 

rather than a lawful investigatory stop. The State acknowledges that Officer 

McDaniel did not have probable cause or a warrant to arrest D.Y., so we must 

first determine whether Officer McDaniel’s stop of D.Y. constituted an 

investigatory stop or an arrest. 

[16] Under the Fourth Amendment, a full-blown arrest or a detention that lasts for 

more than a short period must be justified by probable cause. Reinhart v. State, 

930 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). However, the United States Supreme 

Court held in Terry, that an officer may make a brief investigatory stop without 
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probable cause if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person detained 

is involved in criminal activity. 392 U.S. at 88. A Terry stop is a lesser 

intrusion than an arrest, and the scope of an investigatory stop accordingly 

involves only “‘inquiry necessary to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions.’” 

Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 46 (quoting Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 

2006)). A Terry stop may qualify as an arrest if it becomes so intrusive that it 

“‘interrupts the freedom of the accused and restricts his liberty of movement.’” 

Id. (quoting Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. 1996)) (explaining the 

difference between an investigative stop and an arrest). 

[17] There is no “‘bright line’” test for evaluating whether a stop is investigatory in 

nature or an arrest, and we have held that “‘common sense and ordinary 

human experience must govern over rigid criteria.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. 

State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 2001)). In Terry, the United States Supreme 

Court suggested that a person has been “seized”, or arrested, for Fourth 

Amendment purposes only when “the officer, by means of physical force or 

show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” 392 

U.S. at 19, n.16. In U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), the Supreme 

Court adhered to this standard, but added that “a person has been ‘seized’ 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the 

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 

believed that he was not free to leave.” The Court gave examples of situations 

in which a reasonable person may not feel free to leave, including where there 

has been “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 
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by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of 

language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s requests 

might be compelled.” Id. The Court also indicated that factors such as age, 

race, lack of education, and gender might be relevant, although not dispositive, 

to determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Id. at 558 

(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).

[18] D.Y. compares the instant case to Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), 

where the United States Supreme Court held that police officers had “seized” a 

murder suspect when they transported him to police headquarters in a police 

car without probable cause to arrest him and then placed him into an 

interrogation room. In its opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that 

investigatory stops based on Terry are only allowed because the “narrow 

intrusions” associated with investigatory stops fall “far short of the kind of 

intrusion associated with an arrest.” Id. at 211. The Court reasoned that:

In contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions 

involved in [Terry and its progeny], the detention of [Dunaway] 

was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional 

arrest. [Dunaway] was not questioned briefly where he was 

found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home to a police 

car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation 

room. He was never informed that he was “free to go”; indeed, 

he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to 

accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody. The 

application of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable 

cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude 

is termed an “arrest” under state law. The mere facts that 

[Dunaway] was not told he was under arrest, was not “booked,” 
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and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had 

proved fruitless, while not insignificant for all purposes, 

obviously do not make [Dunaway’s] seizure even roughly 

analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry

and its progeny. Indeed, any “exception” that could cover a 

seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow 

the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 

“reasonable” only if based on probable cause.

Id. at 212 (internal citations omitted).

[19] Likewise, in Indiana we have found that involuntary transportation to police 

headquarters may be a factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred. In 

Buckley v. State, 886 N.E.2d 10, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), this Court concluded 

that a seizure had occurred where police officers had transported a murder 

suspect involuntarily to the police station and towed his car to a secure facility. 

Id. We noted that it was “not a case where a suspect voluntarily appeared at 

police headquarters in response to a request from investigators.” Id. Rather, 

“Buckley was clearly seized in the constitutional sense when he was taken 

involuntarily to the police station and his car was towed.” Id. 

[20] In contrast, in Barber v. State, 418 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), we held that 

a police officer had not seized Barber when Barber voluntarily accompanied an

officer to the police station for questioning regarding robberies in the 

community. There, we found it significant that:

Barber had previously been arrested twice. He testified that each 

time he was arrested he was told he was under arrest, 

handcuffed, and physically placed in the rear seat of a police car. 
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But when [O]fficer Sorrell drove Barber to the police station to 

talk to Captain Mowery, the defendant rode in the front seat of 

the squad car without handcuffs. Sorrell was the only officer in 

the automobile. The police never touched the defendant’s 

person. Defendant Barber also knew [O]fficer Mowery and had 

provided him with information about a crime on a previous 

occasion.

[21] Id. at 567. Ultimately, we noted that “[w]ere it not for defendant Barber’s 

experience with law enforcement and his relationship with Captain Mowery, 

we would [have been] drawn to an opposite result” and would have found that 

Barber had been seized. Id. However, based on those factors we concluded 

that the officers’ actions did not constitute a seizure. Id.

[22] Similarly, in Laster v. State, 918 N.E.2d 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), we found that 

a police officer’s actions did not constitute a seizure. There, the officer gave 

Laster the option of riding with him or driving himself to the police station, and 

Laster opted to ride with the officer. Id. at 433. He rode in the front passenger 

seat of the police vehicle and was not restrained in any way. Id. Also, once he 

reached the station, the officer interviewed Laster in his personal office rather 

than an interrogation room and told him he was free to leave at any time. Id. 

We compared the officer’s initial actions to those of the officer in Faris v. State, 

901 N.E.2d 1123, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, who allowed a 

suspect to drive himself to the station separately from the officer and who told 

the suspect that he was free to leave at any time. In both Laster and Faris, we 

found that the officers’ actions did not lead to a seizure of their respective 

suspects. 
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[23] Although there is not a bright line standard for determining when an arrest has 

occurred, the above cases demonstrate that when a police officer transports a 

suspect to a police station, the voluntariness of the transportation may be a 

significant factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred. In Buckley, 

where the police involuntarily transported Buckley to the police station, we 

concluded that a seizure had occurred. In contrast, we found that evidence of 

the defendants’ voluntary actions in Barber, Laster, and Faris demonstrated that 

the defendants had not been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 

The evidence of voluntary conduct in those cases included: a pre-existing 

relationship with law enforcement, a suspect riding in the front seat of the 

police vehicle, an officer giving a suspect the option to drive separately, and an 

officer telling a defendant he is free to leave at any time.

[24] Here, the State argues that Officer McDaniel merely conducted an investigatory 

stop and not an arrest because he intended to question D.Y. but not to take 

D.Y. into custody to “answer for a crime.” I.C. § 35-33-1-5 (“Arrest is the 

taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime.”). 

However, the above cases demonstrate that whether a seizure has occurred is 

dependent on whether a reasonable person would believe that “he [is] not free 

to leave,” rather than the police officer’s intent. 

[25] Instead, when we compare the instant case to the above cases, we conclude that 

Officer McDaniel’s actions amounted to a seizure of D.Y. Officer McDaniel 

did not ask D.Y. if he would accompany him to the station, and he did not give 

him the option to meet at the police station independently. Instead, he 
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explained to D.Y. “why it [was] that [he] was there and that [he] would be 

transporting [D.Y.] to [IMPD’s] district roll call for some burglary investigation 

that he was a possible suspect in.” (Tr. 38). Based on Officer McDaniel’s 

language that he “would” be transporting D.Y. to district roll call, a reasonable 

person could have concluded that this transport was mandatory, rather than 

optional. (Tr. 38). This is especially true in light of D.Y.’s young age, which as 

the Supreme Court noted in Mendenhall, was a relevant factor. 446 U.S. at 558. 

[26] Because D.Y. was a juvenile, there was no indication that Officer McDaniel 

had contacted D.Y.’s parents, and Officer McDaniel did not give any indication 

to D.Y. that his transportation to the police station was voluntary, we conclude 

that Officer McDaniel did “seize” D.Y., such that he would not have felt free to 

leave, even though the transportation did not occur prior to the pat down. Id. at 

554. As the State admits that Officer McDaniel did not have probable cause or 

a warrant to arrest D.Y., his seizure of D.Y. violated the Fourth Amendment, 

and his subsequent pat down was unlawful. Officer McDaniel therefore 

discovered the firearm pursuant to an unlawful search, and it was inadmissible 

at D.Y.’s hearing. See Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 266 (noting that we must exclude 

evidence directly obtained via an illegal search). Because the firearm was an 

essential element of D.Y.’s charges, see I.C. §§ 35-47-10-5, 35-47-2-1, we reverse 
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and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to vacate its true findings 

and D.Y.’s adjudication as a delinquent child.8 See 

[27] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Barnes, J., and May, J., concur. 

 

8

Since we have found that Officer McDaniel violated D.Y.’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure 

under the Fourth Amendment by seizing him without probable cause, we need not address the remainder of 

D.Y.’s arguments.