1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v . SOMERS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–1276. Argued November 28, 2017—Decided February 21, 2018

Endeavoring to root out corporat e fraud, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).
Both Acts shield whistleblowers fr om retaliation, but they differ in important respects. Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all “employees” who report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1 ). Dodd-Frank defines a “whistle

blower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner estab

lished, by rule or regulation, by th e Commission.” 15 U. S. C. §78u– 6(a)(6). A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award if original information provided to the SEC leads to a successful enforcement action. §78u–6(b)–(g). And he or she is protected from retaliation in three situations, see §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), including for “making disclosures that are required or protected under” Sarbanes-Oxley or other specified laws, §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Sarbanes-Oxley’s antiretaliation provision contains an administrative-exhaustion require

ment and a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18

U. S. C. §1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), whereas Dodd-Frank permits a whis

tleblower to sue an employer directly in federal district court, with a default six-year limitation period, see §78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa).

The SEC’s regulations implem enting the Dodd-Frank provision
contain two discrete whistleblower de finitions. For purposes of the award program, Rule 21F–2 requires a whistleblower to “provide the
Commission with information” relating to possible securities-law vio

lations. 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)(1). For purposes of the antiretaliation protections, however, the Rule does not require SEC re

-2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Syllabus

porting. See §240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii).

Respondent Paul Somers alleges that petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) terminated his employment shortly after he reported to senior management suspected securities-law violations by the company. Somers filed suit, alleging, inter alia , a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty movedto dismiss that claim on the ground that Somers was not a whistleblower under §78u–6(h) because he did not alert the SEC prior to his
termination. The District Court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that §78u–6(h) does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistle

blower” status, and it accorded de ference to the SEC’s regulation un

der Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

, 467 U. S. 837.

Held : Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation pr ovision does not extend to an

individual, like Somers, who has not reported a violation of the secu

rities laws to the SEC. Pp. 9–19.

(a) A statute’s explicit definition must be followed, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning. Burgess v. United States , 553 U. S. 124, 130. Section 78u–6(a) instructs that the statute’s definition of “whistleblower” “shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is, throughout §78u–6. The Court must therefore interpret the term “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), the anti-retaliation provision, in accordance with that
definition.

The whistleblower definition operat es in conjunction with the three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell ou t the provision’s scope. The def

inition first describes who is eligible for protec tion—namely, a “whis

tleblower” who provides pertinent information “to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). The three clauses then describe what conduct , when engaged in by a “whistleblower,” is shielded from employment dis

crimination. An individual who meets both measures may invoke Dodd-Frank’s protections. But an individual who falls outside the protected category of “whistleblower s” is ineligible to seek redress under the statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual engages. This reading is reinforced by another whistleblower

protection provision in Dodd-Frank, see 12 U. S. C. §5567(b), which imposes no requirement that information be conveyed to a govern

ment agency. Pp. 9–11.

(b) The Court’s understanding is corroborated by Dodd-Frank’s purpose and design. The core obje ctive of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblow

er program is to aid the Commission’s enforcement efforts by “moti

vat[ing] people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC .”
S. Rep. No. 111–176, p. 38 (emphasis added). To that end, Congress provided monetary awards to whistleblowers who furnish actionable3 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Syllabus

information to the Commission. Congress also complemented the fi

nancial incentives for SEC report ing by heightening protection against retaliation. Pp. 11–12.

(c) Somers and the Solicitor Ge neral contend that Dodd-Frank’s “whistleblower” definition applies only to the statute’s award pro

gram and not, as the definition plainly states, to its anti-retaliation provision. Their concerns do not support a departure from the statu

tory text. Pp. 12–18. (1) They claim that the Court’s reading would vitiate the protec

tions of clause (iii) for whistleblo wers who make disclosures to per

sons and entities other than the S EC. See §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). But the plain-text reading of the statut e leaves the third clause with sub

stantial meaning by protecting a whistleblower who reports miscon

duct both to the SEC and to another enti ty, but suffers retaliation be

cause of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. Pp. 13–15. (2) Nor would the Court’s reading jettison protections for audi

tors, attorneys, and other employees who are required to report in

formation within the company before making external disclosures. Such employees would be shielded as soon as they also provide rele

vant information to the Commission . And Congress may well have considered adequate the safeguards already afforded to such employ

ees by Sarbanes-Oxley. Pp. 15–16. (3) Applying the “whistleblower” definition as written, Somers and the Solicitor General further pr otest, will allow “identical mis

conduct” to “go punished or not bas ed on the happenstance of a sepa

rate report” to the SEC. Brief for Respondent 37–38. But it is under

standable that the statute’s retaliati on protections, like its financial rewards, would be reserved for em ployees who have done what DoddFrank seeks to achieve by reporting information about unlawful ac

tivity to the SEC. P. 16. (4) The Solicitor General observ es that the statute contains no apparent requirement of a “tempo ral or topical connection between the violation reported to the Commis sion and the internal disclosure for which the employee suffers retalia tion.” Brief for United States

as Amicus Curiae 25. The Court need not dwell on related hypotheti

cals, which veer far from the case at hand. Pp. 16–18. (5) Finally, the interpretation adopted here would not undermine clause (ii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A), which prohibits retaliation against a whistleblower for “initiating, testifyi ng in, or assisting in any investi

gation or . . . action of the Co mmission based upon” information con

veyed to the SEC by a whistleblower in accordance with the statute. The statute delegates authority to the Commission to establish the
“manner” in which a whistleblower may provide information to the SEC. §78u–6(a)(6). Nothing prev ents the Commission from enumer

-4 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Syllabus

ating additional means of SEC repo rting, including through testimo

ny protected by clause (ii). P. 18.

(d) Because “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842, deference is not accorded to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule 21F–2. Pp. 18–19.

850 F. 3d 1045, reversed and remanded.

G INSBURG

, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS

, C. J., and K ENNEDY , B REYER , S OTOMAYOR , and K AGAN , JJ., joined. S O

TOMAYOR , J., filed a concurring opinion, in which B REYER

, J., joined.

T HOMAS , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which A LITO and G ORSUCH , JJ., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16–1276

DIGITAL REALTY TRUS T, INC., PETITIONER v. PAUL SOMERS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2018]

J USTICE G INSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Endeavoring to root ou t corporate fraud, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (Sarbanes-Oxley), and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (Dodd-Frank). Both Acts shield whistleblowers from retaliation, but they differ in important respects. Most notably, Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all “employees” who report misconduct to the Se curities and Exchange Com

mission (SEC or Commission), any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1). Dodd-Frank delineates a more circum

scribed class; it defines “whi stleblower” to mean a person who provides “information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” 15 U. S. C. §78u– 6(a)(6). A whistleblower so de fined is eligible for an award if original information he or she provides to the SEC leads to a successful enforcement action. §78u–6(b)–(g). And, most relevant here, a whistleblower is protected from retaliation for, inter alia , “making disclosures that are required or protected under” Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securi

-2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

ties Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal anti-retaliation proscription at 18 U. S. C. §1513(e), or any other law subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction. 15 U. S. C. §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). The question presented: Does the anti-retaliation provi

sion of Dodd-Frank extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC and
therefore falls outside the Act’s definition of “whistleblow

er”? Pet. for Cert. (I). We answer that question “No”: To sue under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, a per

son must first “provid[e] . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6).

I
A
“To safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron Corporation,” Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in

2002. Lawson v. FMR LLC , 571 U. S. 429, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 1). Most pertinent here, Sarbanes-Oxley created new protections for employees at risk of retaliation for reporting corporate misconduct. See 18 U. S. C. §1514A. Section 1514A prohibits certain companies from discharg

ing or otherwise “discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because” the employee “provid[es] information . . . or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation regarding any conduct which the em

ployee reasonably believes cons titutes a violation” of cer

tain criminal fraud statutes, any SEC rule or regulation, or “any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.” §1514A(a)(1). An employee qualifies for protection when he or she provides information or assis

tance either to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, Congress, or any “person with supervisory author

-3 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

ity over the employee.” §1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C). 1 To recover under §1514A, an aggrieved employee must exhaust administrative remedies by “filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.” §1514A(b)(1)(A); see Law

son , 571 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). Congress prescribed a 180-day limitation period for filing such a complaint. §1514A(b)(2)(D). If the agency “does not issue a final decision within 180 days of the filing of [a] com

plaint, and the [agency’s] delay is not due to bad faith on the claimant’s part, the claimant may proceed to federal
district court for de novo review.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 6) (citing §1514A(b)). An employee who prevails in a pro

ceeding under §1514A is “entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole,” including reinstatement, backpay with interest, and any “special damages sus

tained as a result of the discrimination,” among such damages, litigation costs. §1514A(c).

B

1

At issue in this case is the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision enacted in 2010, eight years after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Passed in the wake of the 2008 finan

cial crisis, Dodd-Frank aime d to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system.” 124 Stat. 1376. Dodd-Frank responded to numerous perceived short

comings in financial regulation. Among them was the SEC’s need for additional “power, assistance and money at its disposal” to regulate securities markets. S. Rep. No. 111–176, pp. 36, 37 (2010). To assist the Commission “in

——————

1 Sarbanes-Oxley also prohibits retaliation against an “employee” who “file[s], . . . testif[ies], participat e[s] in, or otherwise assist[s] in a proceeding filed or about to be filed . . . relating to an alleged violation of” the same provisions of federa l law addressed in 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1). See §1514A(a)(2).4 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

identifying securities law violations,” the Act established “a new, robust whistleblower program designed to moti

vate people who know of securities law violations to tell
the SEC.” Id., at 38. And recognizing that “whistleblow

ers often face the difficult choice between telling the truth and . . . committing ‘career suicide,’” Congress sought to protect whistleblowers from employment discrimination. Id., at 111, 112. Dodd-Frank implemented these goals by adding a new provision to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 15

U. S. C. §78u–6. Section 78u–6 begins by defining a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . in

formation relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission , in a manner established, by rule or regu

lation, by the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). That definition, the statute directs, “shall apply” “[i]n this section”— i.e., throughout §78u–6. §78u–6(a).
Section 78u–6 affords covered whistleblowers both incentives and protection. First, the section creates an award program for “whistle blowers who voluntarily provid[e] original information to the Commission that le[ads] to the successful enforce ment of [a] covered judicial or administrative action.” §78u–6(b)(1). A qualifying whistleblower is entitled to a cash award of 10 to 30 per

cent of the monetary sanctions collected in the enforce

ment action. See §78u–6(b)(1)(A)–(B). Second, §78u–6(h) prohibits an employer from discharg

ing, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against a “whistleblower” “because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” in three situations: first, “in providing information to the Commission in accordance with [§78u– 6],” §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i); second, “in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the Com

mission based upon” information provided to the SEC in accordance with §78u–6, §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii); and third, “in making disclosures that are required or protected under”5 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

either Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal anti-retaliation prohibition at 18

U. S. C. §1513(e), 2 or “any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Clause (iii), by cross-referencing SarbanesOxley and other laws, protects disclosures made to a variety of individuals and entities in addition to the SEC. For example, the clause shields an employee’s reports of wrongdoing to an internal su pervisor if the reports areindependently safeguarded from retaliation under SarbanesOxley. See supra, at 2–3. 3 The recovery procedures under the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley differ in critical respects. First, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, which contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement and a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18

U. S. C. §1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), Dodd-Frank permits a
whistleblower to sue a current or former employer directly

——————

2 Section 1513(e) provides: “Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interfer

ence with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for provid

ing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”

3 Section 78u–6(h)(1)(A) reads in full: “No employer may discharge, de mote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and cond itions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—

“(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section;

“(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such information; or

“(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U. S. C. §7201 et seq.), this chapter, including section 78j–l(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation su bject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.”6 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

in federal district court, with a default limitation period ofsix years, see §78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa). Second, DoddFrank instructs a court to award to a prevailing plaintiff double backpay with interest, see §78u–6(h)(1)(C)(ii), while Sarbanes-Oxley limits re covery to actual backpaywith interest, see 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(2)(B). Like SarbanesOxley, however, Dodd-Frank authorizes reinstatement and compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Compare §78u– 6(h)(1)(C)(i), (iii), with 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(2)(A), (C). 4

2
Congress authorized the SEC “to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to imple

ment the provisions of [§78u–6] consistent with the pur

poses of this section.” §78u–6(j). Pursuant to this authority, the SEC published a notice of proposed rulemaking to“Implemen[t] the Whistleblower Provisions” of DoddFrank. 75 Fed. Reg. 70488 (2010). Proposed Rule 21F– 2(a) defined a “whistleblower,” for purposes of both the award and anti-retaliation provisions of §78u–6, as one or more individuals who “provide the Commission with in

formation relating to a potentia l violation of the securities
laws.” Id., at 70519 (proposed 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)). The proposed rule, the agency noted, “tracks the statutory
definition of a ‘whistleblower’ ” by requiring information reporting to the SEC itself. 75 Fed. Reg. 70489. In promulgating the final Rule, however, the agency changed course. Rule 21F–2, in finished form, contains
two discrete “whistleblower” definitions. See 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)–(b) (2017). For purposes of the award program, the Rule states that “[y]ou are a whistleblower if

——————

4 Unlike Dodd-Frank, Sarban es-Oxley explicitly entitles a prevailing employee to “all relief necessary to make the employee whole,” includ

ing “compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination.” 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(1), (2)(C).7 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

. . . you provide the Commission with information . . . relat[ing] to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws.” §240.21F–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The infor

mation must be provided to the SEC through its website or by mailing or faxing a specified form to the SEC Office
of the Whistleblower. See ibid. ; §240.21F–9(a)(1)–(2). “For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections,” how

ever, the Rule states that “[y]ou are a whistleblower if . . . [y]ou possess a reasonable belief that the information you are providing relates to a possible securities law violation” and “[y]ou provide that inform ation in a manner described in” clauses (i) through (iii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A). 17 CFR §240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii). “The anti-retaliation protections apply,” the Rule emphasizes, “whether or not you satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.” §240.21F–2(b)(1)(iii). An individual may therefore gain anti-retaliation protection as a “whistle

blower” under Rule 21F–2 without providing information to the SEC, so long as he or she provides information in a manner shielded by one of the anti-retaliation provision’s three clauses. For example, a report to a company super

visor would qualify if the report garners protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision. 5

C
Petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) is a real estate investment trust that owns, acquires, and develops data centers. See Brief for Petitioner 3. Digital Realty employed respondent Paul Somers as a Vice Presi

dent from 2010 to 2014. See 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 (ND Cal. 2015). Somers alleges that Digital Realty termi

nated him shortly after he reported to senior management suspected securities-law violations by the company. See

——————

5 In 2015, the SEC issued an interpretive rule reiterating that antiretaliation protection is not continge nt on a whistleblower’s provision of information to the Commission. See 80 Fed. Reg. 47829 (2015).8 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

ibid. Although nothing impeded him from alerting the SEC prior to his termination, he did not do so. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. Nor did he file an administrative complaint within 180 days of his termination, rendering him ineligi

ble for relief under Sarbanes-Oxley. See ibid. ; 18 U. S. C. §1514A(b)(2)(D). Somers brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging, inter alia

, a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismi ss that claim, arguing that “Somers does not qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ under [§78u– 6(h)] because he did not repo rt any alleged law violations to the SEC.” 119 F. Supp. 3d, at 1094. The District Court denied the motion. Rule 21F–2, the court observed, does
not necessitate recourse to th e SEC prior to gaining “whis

tleblower” status under Dodd-Frank. See id., at 1095– 1096. Finding the statutory scheme ambiguous, the court
accorded deference to the SEC’s Rule under Chevron

U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

, 467 U. S. 837 (1984). See 119 F. Supp. 3d, at 1096–1106. On interlocutory appeal, a di vided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 850 F. 3d 1045 (2017). The majority acknowledged that Dodd-Frank’s definitional provision descri bes a “whistleblower” as an individual who provides information to the SEC itself. Id.,at 1049. But applying that definition to the antiretaliation provision, the majority reasoned, would narrowthe third clause of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) “to the point of absurdity”: The statute would protect employees only if they “reported possible securities viol ations both internally and
to the SEC.” Ibid. Such dual reporting, the majority believed, was unlikely to occur. Ibid. Therefore, the majority concluded, the statute should be read to protect employees who make disclosures privileged by clause (iii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A), whether or not those employees also provide information to the SEC. Id., at 1050. In any9 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

event, the majority held, the SEC’s resolution of any stat

utory ambiguity warranted deference. Ibid. Judge Owensdissented. In his view, the statutory definition of whistleblower was clear, left no room for interpretation, and plainly governed. Id., at 1051. Two other Courts of Appeals have weighed in on the question before us. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that employ ees must provide information
to the SEC to avail themselves of Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation safeguard. See Asadi v. G. E. Energy (USA),

L. L. C. , 720 F. 3d 620, 630 (2013). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the oppo

site conclusion, over a dissent by Judge Jacobs. See Ber

man v. NEO@OGILVY LLC , 801 F. 3d 145, 155 (2013). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), and now reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

II
“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition,” even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning. Burgess v. United States , 553 U. S. 124, 130 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle resolves the question before us.

A
Our charge in this review proceeding is to determine the meaning of “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision. Th e definition section of the statute supplies an unequivocal answer: A “whistleblower” is “any individual who provides . . . information relating to
a violation of the securities laws to the Commission .” §78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Leaving no doubt as to the definition’s reach, the statute instructs that the “defi

nitio[n] shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is

, throughout §78u–6. §78u–6(a)(6)

. The whistleblower definition operates in conjunction10 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

with the three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell out the provision’s scope. The definition first describes who is eligible for protection—namely, a whistleblower who provides pertinent information “to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). The three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) then
describe what conduct , when engaged in by a whistleblower, is shielded from employment discrimination. See §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). An individual who meets both measures may invoke Dodd-Frank’s protections. But an individual who falls outside the protected category of “whistleblowers” is ineligible to seek redress under the statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual

engages. Reinforcing our reading, another whistleblower

protection provision in Dodd-Frank imposes no require

ment that information be convey ed to a government agency. Title 10 of the statute, which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), prohibits discrimina

tion against a “covered employee” who, among other things, “provide[s] . . . information to [his or her] employer, the Bureau, or any other State, local, or Federal, govern

ment authority or law enforcement agency relating to” a violation of a law subject to the CFPB’s jurisdiction. 12

U. S. C. §5567(a)(1). To qualify as a “covered employee,” an individual need not provide information to the CFPB, or any other entity. See §5567(b) (“covered employee” means “any individual perfor ming tasks related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service”). “[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another[,] . . . this Court presumes that Congress intended a difference in mean

ing.” Loughrin v. United States , 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Congress placed a government-reporting re

quirement in §78u–6(h), but not elsewhere in the same11 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

statute. Courts are not at liberty to dispense with the condition—tell the SEC—Congress imposed.

B
Dodd-Frank’s purpose and design corroborate our com

prehension of §78u–6(h)’s reporting requirement. The “core objective” of Dodd-Frank’s robust whistleblower program, as Somers acknowledges, Tr. of Oral Arg. 45, is “to motivate people who know of securities law violations

to tell the SEC ,” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38 (emphasis added). By enlisting whistleblowers to “assist the Gov

ernment [in] identify[ing] and prosecut[ing] persons who have violated securities laws,” Congress undertook to improve SEC enforcement and facilitate the Commission’s “recover[y] [of] mo ney for victims of financial fraud.” Id., at 110. To that end, §78u–6 provides substantial mone

tary rewards to whistleblowers who furnish actionable information to the SEC. See §78u–6(b). Financial inducements alone, Congress recognized, may be insufficient to encourage certain employees, fearful of employer retaliation, to come forward with evidence ofwrongdoing. Congress therefore complemented the DoddFrank monetary incentives for SEC reporting by heighten

ing protection against retaliation. While Sarbanes-Oxley
contains an administrative -exhaustion requirement, a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, and a remedial scheme limited to actual damages, Dodd-Frank provides for immediate access to federal court, a generous statute of limitations (at least six years), and the oppor

tunity to recover double backpay. See supra, at 5–6. Dodd-Frank’s award program and anti-retaliation provi

sion thus work synchronously to motivate individuals with knowledge of illegal activity to “tell the SEC.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38.

When enacting Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower regime, in comparison, Congress had a more far-reaching objec

-12 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

tive: It sought to disturb the “corporate code of silence” that “discourage[d] employees from reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, but even internally.” Lawson , 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision covers employees who report fr aud not only to the SEC, but also to any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. See 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1).

C
In sum, Dodd-Frank’s text and purpose leave no doubt that the term “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h) carries the meaning set forth in the section ’s definitional provision. The disposition of this case is therefore evident: Somers did not provide information “to the Commission” before his termination, §78u–6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a “whis

tleblower” at the time of the alleged retaliation. He is therefore ineligible to seek relief under §78u–6(h).

III

Somers and the Solicitor Gene ral tender a different view of Dodd-Frank’s compass. The whistleblower definition, as they see it, applies only to the statute’s award program, not to its anti-retaliation provision, and thus not, as the definition plainly states, throughout “this section,” §78u– 6(a). See Brief for Respondent 30; Brief for United States

as Amicus Curiae 10–11. For purposes of the antiretaliation provision alone, they urge us to construe the term “whistleblower” in its “ordinary sense,” i.e., without any SEC-reporting requirement. Brief for Respondent 18. Doing so, Somers and the Solicitor General contend, would align with our precedent, specifically Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co. , 336 U. S. 198 (1949), and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573 U. S. ___ (2014). In those decisions, we declined to apply a statutory defini

-13 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

tion that ostensibly governed where doing so would have been “incompatible with . . . Congress’ regulatory scheme,”
id ., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (internal quotation marks omit

ted), or would have “destroy[ed] one of the [statute’s] major purposes,” Suwannee Fruit , 336 U. S., at 201

. This case is of a piece, Somers and the Solicitor General maintain. Applying the statutory definition here, they variously charge, would “create obvious incongruities,”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (internal quotation marks omitted), “produce anomalous results,” id., at 22, “vitiate much of the [statute’s] protection,” id., at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, as the Court of Appeals put it, narrow clause (iii) of §78u– 6(h)(1)(A) “to the point of absurdity,” Brief for Respondent 35 (quoting 850 F. 3d, at 1049). We next address these concerns and explain why they do not lead us to depart from the statutory text.

A
It would gut “much of the protection afforded by” the third clause of §78u–6(h)(1)(a), Somers and the Solicitor General urge most strenuously , to apply the whistleblower definition to the anti-retaliation provision. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 20 (internal quotation marks omitted); Brief for Respondent 28–29. As earlier noted,

see supra, at 4–5, clause (iii) prohibits retaliation against a “whistleblower” for “making disclosures” to various persons and entities, including but not limited to the SEC, to the extent those disclosures are “required or protected under” various laws other than Dodd-Frank. §78u– 6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Applying the statutory definition of whis

tleblower, however, would limit clause (iii)’s protection to “only those individuals who report to the Commission.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. The plain-text reading of the statute undoubtedly
shields fewer individuals from retaliation than the alter

-14 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

native proffered by Somers and the Solicitor General. But we do not agree that this consequence “vitiate[s]” clause (iii)’s protection, id ., at 20 (internal quotation marks omit

ted), or ranks as “absur[d],” Brief for Respondent 35 (in

ternal quotation marks omitted). 6 In fact, our reading leaves the third clause with “substantial meaning.” Brief
for Petitioner 32. With the statutory definition incorporated, clause (iii) protects a whistleblowe r who reports misconduct both to the SEC and to another entity, but suffers retaliation because of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. That would beso, for example, where the retaliating employer is unaware that the employee has alerted the SEC. In such a case, without clause (iii), retaliation for internal reporting would not be reached by Dodd-Frank, for clause (i) applies only where the employer retaliates against the employee“because of ” the SEC reporting. §78u–6(h)(1)(A). Moreover, even where the employer knows of the SEC reporting, the third clause may operate to dispel a proof problem: The employee can recover under the statute without hav

ing to demonstrate whether th e retaliation was motivated by the internal report (thus yielding protection under clause (iii)) or by the SEC disclosure (thus gaining protec

tion under clause (i)). While the Solicitor General asserts that limiting the protections of clause (iii) to dual reporters would “shrink to insignificance the [clause’s] ban on retaliation,” Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks omitted), he offers scant evidence to support that assertion. Tugging in the opposite direction, he reports that approximately 80 percent of the whistleblowers who received awards in 2016 “repo rted internally before report

-

——————

6 The Solicitor General, unlike Some rs, acknowledges that it would not be absurd to apply the “whist leblower” definition to the antiretaliation provision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52.15 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

ing to the Commission.” Id., at 23. And Digital Realty cites real-world examples of dual reporters seeking DoddFrank or Sarbanes-Oxley recovery for alleged retaliation. See Brief for Petitioner 33, and n. 4 (collecting cases).Overlooked by Somers and the Solicitor General, in dualreporting cases, retaliation not prompted by SEC disclo

sures (and thus unaddressed by clause (i)) is likely com

monplace: The SEC is required to protect the identity of whistleblowers, see §78u–6(h)(2)(A), so employers will often be unaware that an employee has reported to the Commission. In any event, even if the number of individ

uals qualifying for protection under clause (iii) is relatively limited, “[i]t is our function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however modest that may be.”

Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. , 561 U. S. 247, 270 (2010).

B
Somers and the Solicitor General express concern that our reading would jettison protection for auditors, attor

neys, and other employees subj ect to internal-reporting requirements. See Brief for Respondent 35; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 21. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, requires auditors and attorneys to report certain information within the company before making disclosures externally. See 15 U. S. C. §§78j–1(b), 7245; 17 CFR §205.3. If the whistleblower definition applies, Somers and the Solicitor General fear, these professionals will be “le[ft] . . . vulnerable to discharge or other retaliatory action for complying with” their internal-reporting obliga

tions. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). Our reading shields employees in these circumstances, however, as soon as they also provide relevant information
to the Commission . True, such employees will remain ineligible for Dodd-Frank’s protection until they tell the16 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

SEC, but this result is cons istent with Congress’ aim to encourage SEC disclosures. See S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38; supra, at 3–4, 11. Somers worries that lawyers and
auditors will face retaliation quickly, before they have a chance to report to the SEC. Brief for Respondent 35–36. But he offers nothing to show that Congress had this concern in mind when it enacted §78u–6(h). Indeed, Con

gress may well have considered adequate the safeguards already afforded by Sarbanes- Oxley, protections specifically designed to shield lawyers, accountants, and similar professionals. See Lawson , 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).

C
Applying the whistleblower definition as written, Som

ers and the Solicitor General further protest, will create “an incredibly unusual statutory scheme”: “[I]dentical
misconduct”— i.e., retaliating against an employee for internal reporting—will “go punished or not based on the happenstance of a separate report” to the SEC, of which the wrongdoer may “not even be aware.” Brief for Re

spondent 37–38. See also Brief for United States as Ami

cus Curiae 24. The upshot, the Solicitor General warns, “would [be] substantially diminish[ed] Dodd-Fran[k] de

terrent effect.” Ibid. Overlooked in this protes t is Dodd-Frank’s core objec

tive: to prompt reporting to the SEC. Supra, at 3–4, 11. In view of that precise aim, it is understandable that the statute’s retaliation protections, like its financial rewards, would be reserved for employees who have done what Dodd-Frank seeks to achieve, i.e., they have placed infor

mation about unlawful activity before the Commission to
aid its enforcement efforts.

D
Pointing to another purp orted anomaly attending the17 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

reading we adopt today, the Solicitor General observes that neither the whistleblower definition nor §78u–6(h) contains any requirement of a “temporal or topical connec

tion between the violation reported to the Commission and the internal disclosure for which the employee suffers
retaliation.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. It is therefore possible, the Solicitor General posits, that “an employee who was fired for reporting accounting fraud to his supervisor in 2017 would have a cause of action under [§78u–6(h)] if he had reported an insider-trading violation by his previous employer to the Commission in
2012.” Ibid. For its part, Digital Realty agrees that this scenario could arise, but does not see it as a cause for concern: “Congress,” it states, “could reasonably have made the policy judgment that individuals who report
securities-law violations to the SEC should receive broad protection over time against retaliation for a variety of disclosures.” Reply Brief 11.
We need not dwell on the si tuation hypothesized by the Solicitor General, for it veers far from the case before us. We note, however, that the in terpretation offered by Som

ers and the Solicitor General— i.e., ignoring the statutory definition when construing the anti-retaliation provision— raises an even thornier question about the law’s scope. Their view, which would not require an employee to pro

vide information relating to a securities-law violation to the SEC, could afford Dodd-Frank protection to an em

ployee who reports information bearing no relationship whatever to the securities laws. That prospect could be imagined based on the broad array of federal statutes andregulations cross-referenced by clause (iii) of the antiretaliation provision. E.g., 18 U. S. C. §1513(e) (criminal

izing retaliation for “providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission . . . of any Federal offense ” (emphasis added)); see supra, at 5, and n. 2. For example, an employee fired for reporting a18 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of the Court

coworker’s drug dealing to the Federal Bureau of Investi

gation might be protected. Brief for Petitioner 38. Itwould make scant sense, however, to rank an FBI drugtrafficking informant a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, a law concerned only with encouraging the reporting of

“ securities law violations.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38 (emphasis added).

E
Finally, the interpretation we adopt, the Solicitor Gen

eral adds, would undermine not just clause (iii) of §78u– 6(h)(1)(A), but clause (ii) as well. Clause (ii) prohibits retaliation against a whistleblo wer for “initiating, testify

ing in, or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the Commission based upon” information conveyed to the SEC by a whistleblower in accordance with the statute. §78u– 6(h)(1)(A)(ii). If the whistleblower definition is applied to §78u–6(h), the Solicitor General states, “an employer could fire an employee for giving . . . testimony [to the SEC] if the employee had not previously reported to the Commis

sion online or through the specified written form”— i.e., themethods currently prescribed by Rule 21F–9 for a whistleblower to provide information to the Commission. Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 20–21 (citing 17 CFR §240.21F–9(a)(1)–(2)). But the statute expressly delegates authority to the SEC to establish the “manner” in which information may be provided to the Commission by a whistleblower. See §78u–6(a)(6). Nothing in today’s opinion prevents the agency from enumerating additional means of SEC report

ing—including through testimony protected by clause (ii).

IV
For the foregoing reasons, we find the statute’s defini

tion of “whistleblower” clear and conclusive. Because “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at19 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

issue,” Chevron , 467 U. S., at 842, we do not accord defer

ence to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule 21F–2. See 17 CFR §240.21F–2(b)(1); supra, at 6–7. The statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition, in short, precludes the Commission from more expansively inter

preting that term. See Burgess , 553 U. S., at 130.

* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

S OTOMAYOR

, J., concurring



## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16–1276

DIGITAL REALTY TRUS T, INC., PETITIONER v. PAUL SOMERS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2018]

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , with whom J USTICE B REYER joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately only to note my disagreement with the suggestion in my col

league’s concurrence that a Senate Report is not an appro

priate source for this Court to consider when interpreting

a statute. Legislative history is of course not the law, but that does not mean it cannot aid us in our understanding of a law. Just as courts are capable of assessing the reliability and utility of evidence generally, th ey are capable of assessing the reliability and utility of legislative-history materials. Committee reports, like the Senate Report the Court discusses here, see ante, at 3–4, 11–12, 16–18, are a par

ticularly reliable source to which we can look to ensure our fidelity to Congress’ intended meaning. See Garcia v. United States , 469 U. S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legis

lative history we have repeatedly stated that the authori

tative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Con

gressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation’ ” (quoting Zuber v. Allen , 396 U. S. 168, 186 (1969))). Bills presented to Congress for consideration are generally accompanied by a committee report. Such re

-2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

S OTOMAYOR

, J., concurring

ports are typically circulated at least two days before a bill is to be considered on the floor and provide Members of Congress and their staffs with information about “a bill’s context, purposes, policy imp lications, and details,” along with information on its supporters and opponents. R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 20, and n. 62 (2014) (citing A. LaRue, Senate Manual Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 107–1, p. 17 (2001)). These materials “have long been important means of informing the whole chamber about proposed legislation,” Katzmann, Judging Statutes

, at 19, a point Members themselves have emphasized over the years.* It is thus no surprise that legislative staffers view committee and conference reports as the most reliable type of legislative history. See Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan.

L. Rev. 901, 977 (2013). Legislative history can be particularly helpful when a

——————

* See, e.g., Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, To
Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 65–66 (1986) (Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (“ [A]s one who has served in Congress for 12 years, legislative history is ve ry important to those of us here who want further detailed expression of that legislative intent”); Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. Tex. L. Rev. 181, 184 (1986) (“The committee report is the bone structure of the legislation. It is the road map that explains why things are in and things are out of the statute”); Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1994) (compiling the views of fo rmer Members on “the central im

portance of committee reports to th eir own understanding of statutory text”). In fact, some Members “are more likely to vote . . . based on a reading of the legislative history than on a reading of the statute itself.” Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Dr afting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 968 (2013).3 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

S OTOMAYOR

, J., concurring

statute is ambiguous or deals with especially complex matters. But even when, as here, a statute’s meaning can clearly be discerned from its text, consulting reliable legislative history can still be useful, as it enables us to corroborate and fortify our understanding of the text. See, e.g., Tapia v. United States , 564 U. S. 319, 331–332 (2011);
Carr v. United States , 560 U. S. 438, 457–458 (2010). Moreover, confirming our construction of a statute by considering reliable legislative history shows respect for and promotes comity with a coequal branch of Govern

ment. See Katzmann

, Judging Statutes, at 35–36. For these reasons, I do not think it wise for judges to close their eyes to reliable legislative history—and the realities of how Members of Congress create and enact
laws—when it is available._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of T HOMAS

, J.



## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16–1276

DIGITAL REALTY TRUS T, INC., PETITIONER v. PAUL SOMERS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2018]

J USTICE T HOMAS , with whom J USTICE A LITO and

J USTICE G ORSUCH join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent it relies on
the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con

sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. The question in this case is whet her the term “whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision, 15 U. S. C. §78u–6(h)(1), includes a person who does not report infor

mation to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The answer is in the definitions section of the statute, which states that the term “whistleblower” means a person who provides “information relating to a violation of the securi

ties laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). As the Court observes, this statutory definition “resolves the question
before us.” Ante , at 9. The Court goes on, however, to discuss the supposed “purpose” of the statute, which it primarily derives from a single Senate Report. See ante

, at 3–4, 11–12, 16–18. Even assuming a majority of Con

gress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for Dodd-Frank with the same intent, “we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.”* Lawson v.

——————

* For what it is worth, I seriously doubt that a committee report is a2 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. v. SOMERS

Opinion of T HOMAS

, J.

—————— “particularly reliable source” for discerning “Congress’ intended mean

ing.” Ante , at 1 (S OTOMAYOR

, J., concurring). The following exchange on the Senate floor is telling:

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or not he wrote the committee report?

“Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report?
“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. “Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the com

mittee report.

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report?
“Mr. DOLE. I have to check. “Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote the committee report?

“Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to search. I was here all during the time it was written, I might say, and worked carefully with the staff as they worked. . . .

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas,
the chairman of the Finance Committ ee, read the committee report in its entirety?

“Mr. DOLE. I am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am work

ing on it.

“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, did members of the Finance Committee vote on the committee report?

“Mr. DOLE. No. “Mr. ARMSTRONG. . . . The report itself is not considered by the
Committee on Finance. It was not subject to amendment by the Com

mittee on Finance. It is not subject to amendment now by the Senate.
. . . If there were matter within this report which was disagreed to by the Senator from Colorado or even by a majority of all Senators, there would be no way for us to change the report. I could not offer an amendment tonight to amend the committee report. . . . [ L]et me just make the point that this is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not subject to amendment, and we should discipline ourselves to the task of expressing congressional in tent in the statute.” Hirschey v. FERC , 777
F. 2d 1, 7–8, n. 1 (CADC 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 128 Cong. Rec. 16918–16919 (1982)). See also Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (A lmost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 315, 317–318 (2017) (describing his experience as a Senate staffer who drafted legislative history “like being a teenag

er at home while your parents are away for the weekend: there was no supervision. I was able to write mo re or less what I pleased. . . . [ M ]ost members of Congress . . . have no idea at all about what is in the legislative history for a particular bill”).3 Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of T HOMAS

, J.

FMR LLC , 571 U. S. 429, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1). And “it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to stat e in committee reports . . .
that which is obvious on the face of a statute.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980). For these reasons, I am unable to join the portions of the Court’s opinion that venture beyond the statutory text.