This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 U.S. BANK NATIONAL 2 ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE 3 FOR STRUCTURED ASSET 4 SECURITIES CORPORATION 5 MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 6 MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH 7 CERTIFICATE SERIES 2006-BC2, 8 BY BAC AS SERVICER WITH 9 DELEGATED AUTHORITY UNDER 10 THE TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS, 11 Plaintiff-Appellee, 12

v. NO. 35,638 13 MARCUS D. CHAVEZ, 14 Defendant-Appellant, 15 and 16 LORRAINE D. CHAVEZ, THE STATE 17 OF NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF 18 TAXATION & REVENUE, NEW 19 MEXICO EDUCATORS FEDERAL 20 CREDIT UNION AND MIDDLE RIO 21 GRANDE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 22 Defendants. 232 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 1 Cindy M. Mercer, District Judge 2

Karen Howden Weaver 3 Joshua T. Chappell 4 Albuquerque, NM 5 for Appellee 6 Marcus Chavez 7 Belen, NM 8 Pro Se Appellant 9 MEMORANDUM OPINION 10 GARCIA, Judge. 11 {1} This appeal arises from the district court’s order denying Marcus D. Chavez and 12 Lorraine D. Chavez (referred to collectivel y as Defendants) motion to vacate the 13 judgment and dismiss for lack of standing. [RP 267] Initially, we note that it has come 14 to this Court’s attention that in the acti on below, Defendants acted as self-represented 15 litigants, both signing the answer to the co mplaint. [RP 59] However, Marcus D. 16 Chavez (Appellant), alone, filed and signe d the notice of appeal and docketing 17 statement. [RP 264, 274-275] It does not app ear that Lorraine D. Chavez filed a notice 18 of appeal from the judgment, and the time for doing so has expired. Appellant cannot 19 represent the interests of Lorraine D. Chav ez on appeal in his capacity as a self- 203 represented litigant because he does not appear to be a licensed attorney in the state 1 of New Mexico. See Chisholm v. Rueckhaus , 1997-NMCA-112, ¶¶ 5-6, 124 N.M. 2 255, 948 P.2d 707 (holding that a non-attorney may not represent another person in 3 a legal proceeding). We note that while Appellant may not represent Lorraine D. 4 Chavez, the outcome of this appeal applies equally to her, as both parties signed the 5 mortgage and related agreements at issu e as husband and wife. [RP 8, 11, 23, 31]. 6 {2} As to the merits of the appeal, this Court’s calendar notice proposed to 7 summarily affirm. Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the proposed 8 disposition, and raised what appears to be a new issue that we construe as a motion 9 to amend the docketing statement. Appell ee filed a memorandum in support of the 10 proposed disposition. Because we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments, we 11 deny the motion to amend as non-viable, and affirm. 12 {3} Appellant’s docketing statement argue d that Plaintiff U.S. Bank (Appellee) 13 failed to show standing, pursuant to Bank of N.Y. v. Romero , 2014-NMSC-007, 320 14 P.3d 1, and Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, 369 P.3d 15 1046. [DS 3-4] This Court’s calendar noti ce determined that at the time of the 16 complaint: (1) Appellee asserted that De fendants executed a mortgage and note with 17 the original lender [RP 1 (¶¶ 2-3)]; (2) De fendants entered into a loan modification 18 agreement [RP 2-3 (¶ 4)]; (3) Appellee asserted that it was assigned the mortgage and 194 that it was the holder in due course of th e note and mortgage [RP 3 (¶ 5)]; (4) a copy 1 of the note, indorsed in blank, was attachedto the complaint [RP 8-10]; and (5) copies 2 of the mortgage and assignment of mortgage , as well as a loan modification agreement 3 were also attached to the complaint [RP 11, 23, 31]. We therefore proposed to 4 conclude that because Appell ee was in possession of bearerpaper, indorsed in blank, 5 when the foreclosure action was filed, Appellee was the holder of the note, entitled to 6 enforce it, and accordingly had standing to bring the foreclosure action. See NMSA 7 1978, § 55-3-104(a) (1992) (stating that a promissory note can be enforced by the 8 holder of the instrument); NMSA 1978, § 55-1-201(b)(21)(A) (2005) (stating that the 9 holder of the instrument is the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is 10 payable either to bearer (i n blank) or to an identified person that is the person in 11 possession); see also Romero , 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 21 (stating that a person is entitled 12 to enforce a note when they are the holder of the instrument); id. ¶ 26 (“[I]f the . . . 13 note contained only a blank indorsement fro m [the original lender], that blank 14 indorsement would have established the [b ]ank as a holder because the [b]ank would 15 have been in possession of bearer paper[.]”). 16 {4} Appellant argues that physical possession of the note does not in itself 17 demonstrate a perfected security interest as a holder of the note [MIO 1], and the 18 assignment of the mortgage to Appellee by Mortgage Electronic System (MERS) was 195 ineffective under Romero . [MIO 2-3] Appellant is misgui ded in his application of that 1 case. In Romero , the bank attempted to establish itsel f as the holder of the note simply 2 by possession, but the note was not indorsed or otherwise transferred to the bank. See 3 id. ¶¶ 26, 33. The bank therefore alternativel y asserted that it could enforce the note 4 because it was assigned the mortgage by MERS. Id . ¶ 34. Our Supreme Court rejected 5 the argument and determined that becausethe bank did not introduce any evidence 6 demonstrating that it was a party with the right to enforce the note either by an 7 indorsement or proper transfer, the bank lacked standing to foreclose on the mortgage. 8 Id . ¶¶ 35, 38. We recognize that an assi gnment of mortgage has no effect on an 9 assignment of a note, or that an assignment of mortgage doe s not prove transfer of the 10 note. Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 30. In contrast, here there was evidence both that 11 Appellee was assigned the mortgage prior tothe filing of the foreclosure action and 12 that Appellee was the holder of the note, wh ich was indorsed in blank. [RP 3 (¶ 5); RP 13 12, 23, 31] Appellee therefore had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. 14 {5} Insofar as Appellant argues that the MERS assignment of the mortgage to 15 Appellee was ineffective to establish its right to enforce the note, we disagree. [MIO4] 16 We recognize the separate functions of a note and mortgage in a foreclosure action. 17 See Romero , 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 35 (“A mortgage securing the repayment of a 18 promissory note follows the note, and thus, only the rightful owner of the note has the 196 right to enforce the mortgage.” (internal quotation marks an d citation omitted)). 1 Unlike the bank in Romero , however, here there was no a ssertion by Appellee that the 2 assignment of mortgage also attempted to assign the note. See id. The assignment of 3 the mortgage occurred in August 2012, prior to the date Appellee filed its complaint 4 for foreclosure in December of 2012, establis hing the proper transfer prior to the filing 5 date of the foreclosure action. See id . ¶36 (concluding that the MERS assignment 6 failed not only because the note was not properly indorsed, but also because the 7 assignment of the mortgage to the bank three months after the complaint for 8 foreclosure was filed did not establish the proper transfer before the filing date of the 9 foreclosure action). Additionally, to the ex tent Appellant argues that Appellee did not 10 establish that it owned the note at the time of the filing, we disagree. Appellee 11 established it was the holder in due courseof the note by presenting a note indorsed 12 in blank, attached to the complaint, at the time foreclosure action was filed. [RP 3 13 (¶ 5)] Appellee established both that it owne d the note at the time of filing and that, 14 as the holder of the note, indorsed in blank, it could enforce the note. See Johnston , 15 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 25. Therefore, Appellee not only satisfied pleading requirements 16 solely by alleging it was the holder of th e note, it also established standing by 17 asserting that it was the holder of the note atthe time of filing, and attaching the note 18 to the complaint with an indorsement in blank. [RP 10] See id . ¶ 27 (distinguishing 197 pleading standards from issues of proof for standing). 1 {6} Lastly, insofar as Appellant raises for the first time on appeal the issue of 2 whether Appellee’s status as a trustee aff ects its capacity as holder of the note, [MIO 3 5] we construe this as a motion to amend the docketing statement and deny it as non4 viable. 5 In cases assigned to a summary calendar, a motion to amend the 6 docketing statement (when asserting other than fundamental error or 7 jurisdictional issues) will be granted only if: 1. It is timely; 2. It states all 8 facts material to a consideration of th e new issues attempted to be raised; 9 3. It states those issues and how th ey were preserved or shows why they 10 did not have to be preserved; 4. It states the reason why the issues were 11 not originally raised and shows just cause or excuse for not originally 12 raising them; and 5. It complies in other respects with th e appellate rules 13 insofar as necessary under the circumstances of the case. 14 State v. Rael , 1983-NMCA-081, ¶ 15, 100 N.M . 193, 668 P.2d 309 (alteration 15 omitted). Not only does Appellant fail to meet these requirements, he cites no 16 authority in support of his assertion. See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co. , 2014-NMCA17 031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we 18 may assume no such authority exists.”). We deny motions to amend the docketing 19 statement if the issue that the appellantis seeking to raise is not viable. See State v. 20 Munoz , 1990-NMCA-109, ¶ 19, 111 N.M. 118, 802 P.2d 23 (stating that if counsel 21 had properly briefed the issue, we “woul d deny [the] defendant’s motion to amend 22 because we find the issue he seek s to raise to be so without merit as not to be viable”). 238 We therefore deny the motion to amend as non-viable. 1 {7} For all of the reasons set forth above , and in the proposed disposition, we 2 affirm. 3 {8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

__________________ ______________ 5 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 6 WE CONCUR: 7

_______________________________ 8 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 9

_______________________________ 10 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 11