Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

AMY KAROZOS PATRICK M. RHODES

Greenwood, Indiana Marion County Department of Child Services

Indianapolis, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

DCS Central Administration

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION )

OF THE PARNET-CHILD RELATIONSHIP )

OF: F.R. and Z.R. (Minor Children), )

)

And )

)

P.R. (Father), )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1110-JT-1007

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )

SERVICES )

)

Appellee-Petitioner, )

)

And )

)

CHILD ADVOCATES, INC. )

)

Guardian Ad Litem. )
2

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge Pro Tem

The Honorable Larry Bradley, Magistrate

Cause Nos. 49D09-1104-JT-14848

49D09-1104-JT-14849

May 14, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Chief Judge

Case Summary and Issues

P.R. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his 

children, F.R. and Z.R., alleging there is insufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s 

judgment. Father also claims he was denied due process of law during the underlying child 

in need of services (“CHINS”) proceedings and that the juvenile court committed reversible 

error by admitting improper hearsay evidence over Father’s timely objection. Concluding 

that (1) clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s judgment; (2) Father was 

not denied due process of law; and (3) the challenged hearsay testimony was cumulative of 

Father’s own, properly admitted testimony and therefore harmless, we affirm. 
3

Facts and Procedural History1

Father is the legal father of F.R., born in August 2005, and Z.R., born in July 2007.2 

The facts most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment reveal that in March 2010 both 

children were removed from their mother’s care and placed in the care of their maternal aunt 

due to the mother’s failure to successfully complete an ongoing Informal Adjustment3

(“I.A.”) with the local Marion County office of the Indiana Department of Child Services 

(“MCDCS”), coupled with the mother’s lack of stable housing.4 At the time, Father was no 

longer living in Indiana. At the time the children were removed, MCDCS family case 

manager Amanda Klene obtained Father’s telephone number and called him in Chattanooga, 

Tennessee. Klene informed Father that the children had been detained and that MCDCS 

planned to file petitions with the juvenile court alleging both F.R. and Z.R. were CHINS. 

When Father told Klene he intended to return to Indiana the following weekend and take the 

children back to Tennessee with him, Klene advised Father that the children could not be 

 

1

 Father has filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Reply Brief of Respondent/Appellant by Retrieving 

Brief and Substituting Pages, pointing out an error in the caption on the cover page and a typographic error in 

the body of the brief. The motion is granted and the errors are considered corrected without the necessity for 

physically amending the brief.

2 Although paternity testing was never performed and the parents were never married, Father was in a 

relationship with the mother at the time of the children’s births and signed both children’s birth certificates. 

3 A program of Informal Adjustment is a negotiated agreement between a family and a local office of 

the Indiana Department of Child Services whereby the family agrees to participate in various services provided 

by the county in an effort to prevent the child/children from being formally deemed CHINS. See Ind. Code §

31-34-8 et seq.

4 The parental rights of the children’s biological mother, M.F., were also involuntarily terminated by 

the juvenile court’s October 2011 termination order. Although M.F. initially participated in reunification 

services following the children’s removal, she soon disengaged from services and eventually ceased all 

communications with MCDCS case managers. In addition, M.F. failed to appear for the termination hearing 

and does not participate in this appeal. Consequently, we limit our recitation of the facts to those pertinent 
4

removed from the State of Indiana while there was an open case with MCDCS. Klene 

further explained that Father needed to return to Marion County to attend any court hearings 

and that upon returning to Indiana he could contact MCDCS to request visitation privileges 

and/or reunification services if needed. Klene then provided Father with all of her contact 

information. When Klene, in turn, asked for Father’s current mailing address, he refused to 

provide it.

On March 10, 2010, CHINS petitions were filed as to both children. Both children 

were so adjudicated later the same month. Although Klene and Father had exchanged 

multiple voicemail messages following their initial conversation, she was never able to have 

another live telephone conversation with Father, nor obtain his address. Klene did, however, 

speak with Father’s girlfriend in Tennessee, as well as Father’s mother (“Grandmother”), 

who continued to reside in Indiana and exercise visitation with the children.

A dispositional hearing was held in April 2010. Father failed to appear. Following 

the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order formally removing the children from their 

mother’s custody and adjudicating them wards of MCDCS. As for Father, the juvenile court 

ordered the dispositional hearing continued and scheduled a default hearing for July 2010. 

MCDCS thereafter attempted service on Father by publication on April 16, April 23, and 

April 30, 2010.

The default hearing was held on July 15, 2010. Father failed to appear, and the 

juvenile court entered a default judgment against Father. Father subsequently failed to 

 

solely to Father’s appeal.
5

appear for the continued dispositional hearing held on September 2, 2010, and the juvenile 

court entered an order formally removing both children from Father’s custody. The court’s 

dispositional order further directed that no services were to be provided to Father “until he 

appears” in court. Ex. at 29. 

Throughout the remainder of the CHINS case, Father failed to initiate any contact 

with MCDCS and declined to request visitation with the children. In addition, the children’s 

mother continued to struggle with her addiction to cocaine and eventually ceased all contact 

with MCDCS and service providers. Consequently, MCDCS requested that the juvenile 

court change the children’s permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental 

rights. The court granted MCDCS’s request on April 14, 2011, and MCDCS filed a petition 

seeking the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to F.R. and Z.R. the same day.

Meanwhile, Father returned to Indiana sometime in March 2011. Although Father 

was living with Grandmother, he made no attempt to contact MCDCS until after the filing of 

the involuntary termination petition. In May 2011, Father appeared in court for the first time 

during a pre-trial conference. Father was appointed counsel at that time. Immediately 

following the hearing, MCDCS family case manager Elizabeth Waskom-Sisco asked Father 

if he would submit to a drug screen. Father agreed to be tested the next day. He informed 

Waskom-Sisco, however, that the test would be positive for marijuana. Test results later 

confirmed Father tested positive for Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), the active 

hallucinogenic chemical found in marijuana.
6

During a termination pre-trial hearing in July 2011, Father requested reunification 

services. Father’s request for services was denied by the juvenile court. Father was 

informed, however, that he could seek services on his own. To that end, case manager 

Waskom-Sisco advised Father that he should complete (1) a substance abuse assessment, (2) 

a parenting assessment, and (3) home-based counseling services if he wished to work toward 

regaining custody of the children. Approximately one week later, Waskom-Sisco reiterated 

these recommendations in a letter mailed to Father at the home he shared with Grandmother. 

In the letter, Waskom-Sisco also provided Father with her contact information and offered to 

meet with Father to help him identify and obtain appropriate service providers should he 

decide to seek services on his own. Father never contacted Waskom-Sisco.

An evidentiary hearing on the termination petition concerning both children was 

eventually held in October 2011. At the time of the termination hearing, Father was 

unemployed, continued to live with Grandmother in a two-bedroom apartment that did not 

have beds for the children, and had failed to participate in any of the recommended 

reunification services. During the hearing, MCDCS also presented evidence regarding 

Father’s refusal to return to Indiana and/or to maintain contact with MCDCS for 

approximately one year despite his actual knowledge that F.R. and Z.R. had been removed 

from their mother’s care and that MCDCS planned to initiate CHINS proceedings.

Additional evidence submitted during the termination hearing established Father had 

left the children with their mother in Indiana and moved to Tennessee in 2008 

notwithstanding his knowledge that the mother was struggling with significant substance 
7

abuse issues. Father also never sought visitation privileges with the children, even after 

returning to Indiana, and the children did not possess any significant relationship and/or bond 

with Father, who left Indiana when Z.R. was eight-months-old.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement. 

On October 7, 2011, the court issued an order terminating Father’s parental rights to F.R. and 

Z.R. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly 

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re 

K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When reviewing the termination of parental 

rights, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. In re D.D., 804 

N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the 

juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment 

terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 

204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1161 (2002). 

Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights, the juvenile court entered specific 

findings and conclusions. When a juvenile court’s judgment contains specific findings of 

fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. 

Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether 
8

the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support 

the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 

1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s decision, we must affirm. 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. 

“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 

N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must 

subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances 

surrounding a termination. K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 837. Termination of a parent-child 

relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. 

Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a 

better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable 

or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836. 

In Indiana, before parental rights may be involuntarily terminated, the State is required 

to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

well-being of the child . . . .
9

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). “The State’s burden of proof in termination of parental rights 

cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 

2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). If the court finds the allegations in a petition for 

termination are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-

35-2-8(a). Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s 

findings as to subsection (b)(2)(B) of Indiana’s termination statute quoted above. See Ind. 

Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). Father also claims he was denied due process of law during the 

underlying CHINS proceedings and that the juvenile court committed reversible error in 

admitting certain hearsay statements over his timely objection. We shall address each 

allegation of error in turn.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first observe that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires the juvenile 

court to find that only one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established 

by clear and convincing evidence before an involuntary termination of parental rights may 

occur. Here, the court determined that subsections (b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) were both proven. 

Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we consider only whether 

MCDCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, subsection (b)(2)(B)(i), namely, that 

there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the children’s removal or 

continued placement outside Father’s care will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i).
10

In making such a determination, a juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care 

for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence 

of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. 

The juvenile court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine 

the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts 

have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol 

abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and 

employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Moreover, a county department of child services is not 

required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish 

only that there is a reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change. In re Kay L., 

867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights, the juvenile court made detailed findings 

regarding Father’s historical lack of involvement in the children’s lives and ongoing inability 

to meet the children’s basic needs. In so doing, the juvenile court found Father had 

“abandoned his children to their substance[-]abusing mother with whom [Father] did not feel 

safe,” in April of 2008 to reside in Tennessee, that he did not return to Indiana until 

approximately March 2011, and that he had “paid no support during this time.” Appellant’s 

Appendix at 20-21. The juvenile court further described Father’s employment as not being 

“stable” or “adequate to meet the children’s needs,” noting that Father characterized his 

employment as “seasonal,” and did not present any evidence during the termination hearing 
11

of trying to obtain other employment, either as a supplement or replacement. Id. at 20. In 

addition, the court specifically found that, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary, 

Father had actual knowledge of the CHINS matter and hearings. The court further found 

Father had “ignored the CHINS proceedings until returning to Indiana, and since his return 

has taken no steps to participate in services designed to ensure that he could provide a safe 

environment free from substance abuse, adequate housing[,] and an ability to meet the 

children’s needs.” Id. at 21. 

A thorough review of the record makes clear that F.R. and Z.R. were removed from 

their mother’s care due to her housing instability and failed I.A. Although Father no longer 

lived in Indiana, he was immediately contacted by MCDCS case manager Klene who 

informed Father of the children’s removal. Klene testified during the termination hearing 

that she personally telephoned Father in March 2010 and explained to him that the open I.A. 

with MCDCS was being “switched over to a CHINS [case]” and that Father “needed to come 

to [c]ourt in order to see his children and be offered any services,” but that Father failed to do 

so. Transcript at 30. Klene also confirmed that apart from an initial game of “phone tag” 

during which she and Father exchanged several voicemail messages in April and May of 

2010, Father never again contacted Klene, never appeared in court, and never showed “any 

indication that he was ready, willing, and able to parent his children.” Id. at 21, 23.

Similarly, current MCDCS family case manager Waskom-Sisco informed the juvenile 

court that Father made no attempts to contact MCDCS prior to the permanency hearing in 

April 2011. Waskom-Sisco also testified that although she “offered to meet with [Father]” 
12

and “locate providers” if he was willing to pursue reunification services on his own during 

the termination case, Father never contacted her and never participated in any services on his 

own. Id. at 53. In addition, Waskom-Sisco stated Father never asked for visitation 

privileges, failed to obtain stable employment once returning to Indiana, and continued to 

live with Grandmother in a two-bedroom home where he slept on an air mattress and did not 

have beds for the children.

Father’s own testimony lends further support to the juvenile court’s findings. During 

the termination hearing, Father admitted that he spoke with case manager Klene at the time 

the children were removed from the family home in March 2010. He also confirmed that 

MCDCS did not have “an address to call [sic]” during the CHINS case. Id. at 82. In 

addition, Father acknowledged that he failed to initiate any contact with MCDCS upon 

returning to Indiana in March 2011 and never accepted Waskom-Sisco’s offer of assistance 

in locating providers for the recommended reunification services. Finally, when asked 

whether she believed Father should be provided more time to demonstrate his ability to 

parent the children, Guardian ad Litem Alane Singleton answered, “No, I believe [MCDCS] 

gave [Father] sufficient time to get involved with the case and to step up and be a parent to 

his children . . . .” Id. at 73.

As noted earlier, a juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her 

child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the parent’s habitual 

patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. 

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266. Moreover, where a parent’s “pattern of conduct shows no overall 
13

progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic 

situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Father’s 

arguments to the contrary amount to an impermissible invitation to reweigh the evidence, 

which we decline to accept. See D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267. Our review of the record leaves 

us satisfied that MCDCS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s findings cited above. 

III. Due Process

Next, we consider Father’s contention that he was denied due process of law during 

the underlying CHINS proceedings. A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of 

his or her children is arguably one of the oldest of our fundamental liberty interests. Bester, 

839 N.E.2d at 147. Hence, “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise 

their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” 

M.B., 666 N.E.2d at 76. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution likewise 

“prohibits state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair 

proceeding.” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted), trans. 

denied. To be sure, the right to raise one’s child is an “essential, basic right that is more 

precious than property rights.” In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. 

denied. Thus, when the State seeks to terminate a parent-child relationship, it must do so in a 

manner that meets the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause. Hite v. 

Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 845 N.E.2d 175, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
14

Although due process has never been precisely defined, the phrase embodies a requirement 

of “fundamental fairness.” Id. (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding the significance of the rights involved herein, it is well-established, 

however, that a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. 

Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In particular, we 

have previously held that a parent may waive a due process claim in a CHINS or involuntary 

termination case when it is raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 194-95; see also K.S., 

750 N.E.2d at 834 n.1 (concluding mother waived claim that trial court violated her due 

process rights in failing to follow statutory requirements governing permanency hearings, 

case plans, and dispositional orders because she raised constitutional claim for first time on 

appeal). This is consistent with the long-standing general rule that an issue cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 194.

Here, Father asserts for the first time on appeal that MCDCS failed to “follow 

statutory requirements to provide notice to [Father].” Brief of Appellant at 18. Father also 

complains that he never received a case plan and that these procedural irregularities 

combined to deprive him of procedural due process in the termination case. Although Father 

acknowledges that the termination statute does not require MCDCS to provide reunification 

services, he nevertheless asserts the juvenile court erred in denying his request for services 

during a pre-trial conference in July 2011.

A review of the record makes clear that Father did not object to any of these alleged 

deficiencies during the CHINS case. Moreover, although Father was appointed counsel 
15

during the termination proceedings and attended the evidentiary hearing, he never argued 

during the termination proceedings that the alleged deficiencies during the CHINS case 

constituted a due process violation in the termination case. Rather, Father has raised his 

procedural due process claim for the first time on appeal. We therefore conclude that Father 

has waived his constitutional challenge. 

Waiver notwithstanding, we pause to note that by refusing to provide MCDCS with 

his address and failing to maintain contact with case manager Klene for over one year despite 

his knowledge in March 2010 that the children had been removed from their mother and that 

CHINS petitions were being filed, Father has invited, at least in part, the alleged error of 

which he now complains. Error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error. See, 

e.g., Breining v. Harkness, 872 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that the 

doctrine of invited error, grounded in estoppel, provides that a party may not take advantage 

of an error that he commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his own neglect 

or misconduct), trans. denied.

Nor can we agree with Father’s assertion that the alleged procedural irregularities 

which occurred in the CHINS proceedings operated to deprive Father of procedural due 

process in the termination case. In the present case, Father was represented by counsel 

throughout the termination proceedings, attended the termination evidentiary hearing in 

person, and was provided with an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine witnesses. 

Moreover, during the termination hearing Father confirmed that he attended virtually all of 

the pre-trial hearings in the termination case, was informed of the reunification services 
16

recommended by MCDCS, and was offered assistance in locating service providers. For all 

these reasons, we cannot conclude Father’s rights were fatally compromised. See, e.g., Hite, 

845 N.E.2d at 184 (concluding that failure to provide father with notice during initial stages 

of the CHINS action and copies of case plans did not substantially increase risk of error in 

termination proceedings). 

IV. Admission of Evidence

Finally, we consider Father’s assertion that the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

admitting hearsay testimony alleging Father never paid any child support to the children’s 

mother. Specifically, Father contends that because the juvenile court relied on this improper 

hearsay evidence in its findings to support termination of Father’s parental rights, he is 

entitled to reversal. We disagree.

The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the juvenile court. 

In re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. We will find an abuse of 

discretion only where the juvenile court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before the court. Id. If a juvenile court abuses its discretion by admitting 

the challenged evidence, we will only reverse for that error if the error is inconsistent with 

substantial justice or if a substantial right of the party is affected. In re S.W., 920 N.E.2d 

783, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Moreover, any error caused by the admission of evidence is 

harmless error, for which we will not reverse, if the erroneously admitted evidence was 

cumulative of other evidence properly admitted. Id.
17

During the termination hearing, when asked, “[A]fter you moved to Tennessee, uh, 

did you send child support payments to [Mother],” Father answered, “No, sir.” Tr. at 86. 

Thus, even assuming without deciding that the challenged testimony was improperly 

admitted into evidence, such evidence was merely cumulative of Father’s own, properly 

admitted testimony. We therefore find no error.

Conclusion

This court will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear 

error’– that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Egly v. Blackford 

Cnty. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). We find no such error 

occurred in this case. The judgment of the juvenile court terminating Father’s parental rights 

to both F.R. and Z.R. is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.