The Honorable Rober t Allan Edg ar, Senior Judge , United States District Court for the * Easter n District of Tenne ssee, sitting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0383n.06 F iled: Jun e 11, 2007 No. 06-3906 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
C e n t r a l W e s tV i r g i n i a

E n e r g y C o mp an y, Ap pe lla nt,
v. Wheeling- Pitt sburg h Steel Corporation, Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R THE N O RT H E RND I ST RI CT OF O H IO O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COOK and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and E DG AR, Distr ict Judge. *
McK eague, Circ uit Jud ge. Appellant C entra l West Virg inia Energy Company

appea ls the decision af

firming the orde rs of the ba nkruptcy court that permitted assig nments of rig hts under a coal supply

ag ree ment and enjoined A ppellant from reduc ing the amount of coa l it suppl ied under the a g re e me nt. F or

the re a so ns state d b e low , w e AF F I RM the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUND Wheeling- Pitt sburg h Steel Corporation (“ Wheeling- Pitt ”) owns and oper ates the F ollansbee Coke Plant in Follansbee, West Virg inia (the “ Coke Plant”) whe re se vera l ty pes of m etallurg ical coa l
are us e d as ra

w ma te ri a ls in the pr od

uc tio n of co ke , whi c h in tur n is use d in

the pr od uc tio n o f s te e l.No. 06-3906

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est Virginia Energy v. W

heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 2 - Wheeling- Pitt also owns and ope rate s a steel manufa cturing plant in Steube nville, Ohio (the “Stee l Plant” ). Th e Cok e Plant pr od uc e s c ok e to b e us e d to make ste e l at th e Ste e l Pla nt. Ce ntr a l We st Virg inia Energ y

Company (“CWVEC”) and Wheeling- Pitt are parties to a Coal Supply Ag ree ment date d N ov e mbe r 1 5, 19 93 (t he “ CSA ” ). Un de r the CSA , whic h h a d a n o ri g ina l te rm

of te n y e ars , Whe e lin g -P itt

wa s to ob ta in 1 00 % o f i ts h ig h v olatil e c ok ingc oa l f ro m CWV EC. On Novembe r 16, 2000, Wheeling- Pitt and seve ral of its af filiates filed voluntary

petitions for r eorg anization unde r Chapter 11. J ust prior to that date, CWVEC had suspended shipments of coal due to Wheeling- Pitt ’s fa ilure to pay for pa st shipments. At t he time, Wheeling -Pitt owed CW VEC approximately

$7.2 milli on. On September

13, 2 0 0 1, afte r Wheeling -Pitt obt ained se vera l ext ensions of time for f iling its ba nk ru ptc y r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p lan, CWVE C f

ile d a mot ion to c omp e l Whe e lin g -P itt

to e ith e r a ssume
or re ject the CS A, which was ex ecutor y in nature
. Wheeling- Pitt had the r ight unde r § 365(a ) and (d)( 2) of the B ankruptc y

Code to either a ssume or reje ct the CSA as part of the r eorg anization plan. Since the re org anization plan did not seem to be forthc oming, CWVEC, a s it ha d the rig ht, moved the bankr uptcy court t o fo rc e Wheeling- Pitt to make a de cision. CW VEC was unha ppy with the
arr ang ement under

which it had to supply

Wheeling- Pitt with coal at the c ontrac t rat e, wh ich was signific antly

less than the then-curr ent m arke t price . The motion was denie d on Dec ember 6, 2001, be c a us e Whe e lin g -P itt , a s d e bto r- in- po sse ssi on , w a s n ot ye t in a po sit ion to k no w whe the r t

he CSA
was a benef it to the bankruptcy estate and whether the estate could make a cure pay ment of over

$7 milli on, which would be r equire d if the CSA were incorporated into the reor g anization plan. On Marc h 30, 2002, CW VEC and Wheeling -Pitt entered into a L etter A g ree mentNo. 06-3906

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- 3 - a me nd ingthe CSA
. A ma jor po rt ion of the dis pute in thi s a pp e a l inv olv e s the me anin g of Ar tic le XX o f th e CS A , e n ti tl e d

“ A s s ig n a

b il it y , ” a s a me n d e d

b y th e L e tt e r

A g r e e me n t. A rti c le XX,
c on sis tin g of

tw o p ara g ra

ph s, state s in

re le va nt p art : . . . this Agr eeme nt may

not be assig ned by

either pa rty , except as indicated be low, without the prior written c onsent of the other , except that either party may without the wr itt e n c on se nt o f t he o the r a ssi g n o r p le dg e fo r f ina nc ingpurp os e s th is Agr ee m en to r a n y

m o n i es d u e o r t o b ec o m e d

u e h er eu n d er . . . . C u s t o m er [ W h ee l i n gPitt ] may a lso wi tho ut t

he c on se nt o f t

he Se lle r [CWV EC] a ssi g n th is A g re e me nt ( in whole or in pa

rt) to any of its wholly

owned subsidiarie s to which it ha s conveyed the Plant or its operations, p ro v i d ed that any assig nment of this Ag ree ment shall not relieve Customer from its obligations her eunder . Customer shal l n o t sell, lease, tr ans fe r o r c on ve y

a ll o r a ny su bs tanti a l po rt ion

of the P lan t, or

lic e ns e out it s operation, to any

person or entity unless such person or entity assumes the oblig ations of the Customer her eunder . Any such assignment of this Agr eeme nt shall not relieve Customer from its obligations her eunder
. I n the eve nt of any

such sale, le ase, tra

nsfer , conveyance or licensing to any person or entit y o th e r th ana w h o ll y - o w n e d

s u b s id ia r y o f c u s to me r , Se ll e r

s h a ll h a v e the ri g ht, a t it s o pti on , to te rm inate thi s A g re e me nt. J.A. a t 10 0- 01 , 2 27 . T he L e tte r A g re e me nt, date d M a rc h 3 0, 20 02 , s tate s in

re le va nt p art : Contract Assig nment: Wheeling- Pitt may assig n this Agr eeme nt to any corpor ation, partne rship or other e ntity or per son p ro v ided that such a ssigne e assumes a ll of Wheeling- Pitt ’s obligatio n s under the Ag ree ment, as ame nded her ein. I f such assig nment is made duringthe pende ncy of the c urre nt bankruptcy case , such assig nment is subject to the approva l by the Bankruptcy Court, and may be opposed by CW VEC if CWVEC believes that the assig nee doe s not provide assura nce of pe rf or manc e that is e qu a l to , o r s up e ri or to, the a ssu

ra nc e pr ov ide d by

Whe e lin g -P itt
. I f such a ssignment oc curs whe n the C hapter 11 case is no longe r pending , then such assig nment shall be subject to appr oval by CW VEC’s cred i t co m mittee, which a pp ro va l sh a ll n ot b e unre a so na bly wi thh e ld. Any

su c h a ssi g nme nt s ha ll b e se t f or th in a forma l letter ag ree ment executed by CW VEC, Wheeling- Pitt , and such assigne e. J .A. at 109-10, 227.No. 06-3906

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heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 4 - On May 2, 2002, the bankr

uptc y court issued a

n order approvingWheeling- Pitt ’s assumption of the CSA, as ame nded by the L etter Ag ree ment. On Dec ember 28, 2004, Wheeling- Pitt announce d that it had enter ed int o a non-binding l etter of intent to enter into a joi nt venture ( the “Joint Venture ”) with flat rolled shee t steel produce r Sever stal North Amer ica, I ncorpor ated (“Sever stal”). Under the ag ree ment, Severstal would c ontribute $140 milli on over four y ear s to r ebuild the Coke Plant and would pay

Wheeling- Pitt $20 milli on; in r eturn, Seve rstal would own 50% of the Coke Plant (which Wheeling- Pitt would continue to oper ate) and would be entitled to 50% of the c oke produc ed at the Coke Plant. The CSA, a s amende d, would be assig ned to the J oint Venture, making both Seve rstal
a n d W h e e l i n g - P i t tl i a

b l e t o C W V E C f

o r a l l o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r

t h e C S A
. C W V E C o p p o s e d t h is
a ssi g nme nt. On Fe bruar

y 10, 2005, Wheeling- Pitt moved for bankruptcy court a pproval of this propose d J oint Venture a

nd for lea

ve to assig n the CSA t o t h e J o i n t Ve n ture. It also filed an a dversa ry proce eding (the “ Adver sary Procee ding” ) in bank

r u p tc y c o u r t a g a in s t C WV E C, s e e k in g a dec laration of the pa rties’ re spective rig hts. Whee ling- Pitt ’s complaint for de clar atory judgme nt set out what Wheeling- Pitt believed to be the controversy betwee n it and CW VEC, the bac kg round of that controve rsy , and the r equeste d relief . R el ev ant porti ons of the dec laratory judgme nt complaint include: 6. For a number

of y ea rs [W heeling -Pitt] has owne d and oper ated c oke-making fac iliti es that ar e located in Follansbe e, West Virg inia. . . . 7.
. . . Se c tio n 3 of

the Coa l Su

pp ly Ag re e me nt r e qu ir e s CWV EC to d e liv e r c oa l to [W heeling -Pitt’s] coke- making fac iliti es in Follansbe e, West Virg inia, which we re de fi ne d a s th e “ Plant” fo r p ur po se s o f t he Coa l Su

pp ly Ag re e me nt.No. 06-3906

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heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 5 - J .A. at 17. The P r opo se d As sig nm e nt 15. On Dec ember 28, 2004, [W heeling -Pitt] announce d it had signe d a nonbinding letter of intent to enter a joint ventur e with f lat rolled sheet stee l produce d Severstal No rt h A me ri c a

I nc. (“Se ve rs ta l” ) i nv olv ingthe c ok e fa c ili tie s in F oll ans be e , We st Vi rg ini a . I f c on summate d, the a g re e me nts wo uld re qu ir e Se ve rs ta l to c on trib ute $1 40 mil lio n o ve r f

our y e ars to re bu ild

the c ok e -m a kin g fa c ili tie s. Se ve rs ta l w ou ld also pay [W heeling -Pitt] $20 milli on when a joint venture dea l closes. In return, a fter making its capital c ontributions, S ever stal would own 50 perc ent of the joint venture and wo uld be e nti tle d to 50 pe rc e nt o f t he c ok e pr od

uc e d b y it. [Whe eling -P itt ] would continue to oper ate the c oke-making f acilities for the joint venture.

. . . 17. . . . I n addition, the planned re p ai rs t o the Plant will not i ncre ase the Plant’s c a pa c ity and the re fo re wi ll n ot i nc re a se the Pla nt’ s c oa l r e qu ir e me nts
. J .A. at 20-21. Exi st e nc e of A n Ac tu al C ont r ov e r syRe ga r ding The P r opo se d As sig nm e nt 19. [W heeling- P i t t ] has informe d CW VEC of the propose d joint venture and of [W heeling -Pitt’s] desire a nd int en t i on to assign [Wheeling -Pitt’s] rig hts under the Coa l Su pp ly Ag re e me nt t o th e joi nt v e ntu re . T he ass ignmen t of

the Coa l Su

pp ly Ag ree ment is a critica l part of the pr oposed joint venture.

. . . 21. An ac tu al controve rsy exis ts betwee n [W heeling -Pitt] and CWVEC reg arding the pr op os e d a ssi g nme nt o f [Wh e e lin g -P itt’s] ri g hts un de r t he Coa l Su

pp ly Ag ree ment in connec tion with the joint venture descr ibed above
. J .A. at 21. WHEREFORE, [W heeling -Pitt] here by reque sts entry

of judg ment in its favor: (1) De clar ing that [ Wheeling- Pitt ] i s entitled t o assig n its rights under the Coal Supply Ag ree ment to any

entity that is created to implement t h e p roposed jointNo. 06-3906

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heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 6 - ve ntu re wi th re sp e c t to [Whe e lin g -P itt ’s ] co ke -m a kin g fa c ili tie s in F oll ans be e , We st Virg inia; (2 ) D e c lari ngthat CWV EC m ay op po se su c h assig nme nt b e fo re thi s Co ur t if CWVE C be lie ve s the assi g ne e do e s n ot p ro vid e a ssu ra nc e of pe rf or manc e tha

t is equal to, or superior to, the a ssuranc e provide d by [W heeling -Pitt] , but that CW VEC ha s n o o the r r ig hts to o pp os e a ssi g nme nt; (3) Dec laring that such assig nment of the Coal Supply Ag ree ment will not aff ect the continuing va lidity

and enf orce ability

of the Coal Supply

Ag ree ment and will not entitle CW VEC t o t er m inate the Coal Supply Ag ree ment or re nounce CWVEC’s obligations thereunder ; . . . J .A. at 22-23. I n the Adver sary

Procee ding, CWVEC claimed that the sec ond para g raph of Article X X of the CSA had bee n unaff

ecte d by the L etter A g ree ment and that the f ormation of the Joint Venture constituted a “tra

nsfer ” under

that second pa

rag raph. CW VEC contende d, there fore , that it had the rig ht to terminate the CSA, and it stated that it wa nted to do so. Wheeling- Pitt argued the L etter Ag ree ment’s provision for “ Contract Assig nment” per mitted assig nment of t he C SA, as ame nded, to the J oint Venture a

nd eliminated CWVEC’s opti on to terminate the CSA. On May 4, 2005, the bankr uptcy court issued a

Memorandum Opinion and O rder (c oll e c tiv e ly , the “ De c larator y Judg me nt O rd e r” ), ru lin g tha t Whe e lin g -P itt

is e nti tle d to a ssi g n it s rig hts under the CSA to a joint venture y et to be for med; that CW VEC may

challeng e the a ssignment if it believes the ne w ar

rang ement would not provide e q u al or super ior perf ormanc e; and that a

ny approve d assig nment would not affe ct the continued va lidity o f t h e C S A, as ame nded–that is, the assig nment would not constitute gr ounds for CWVEC to terminate the CSA. I n so hol ding, the bankruptc y

court found the “the [C SA] , as modified, and the L etter A g ree ment, are not ambiguousNo. 06-3906

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heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 7 - and do not nee d parol e vidence to be interpre ted.” J.A. at 232. The bankruptc y court rea soned that the wh ole of

Ar tic le XX(p ri or

to a me ndme nt) wa s a re str ic tio n on ass ig nme nt of the CSA , a

nd thu s, “whe n the parties modified the contra ct assig nment rig hts in the L etter Ag ree ment, the pr o v ision reg ardingtermination upon the sale of the Coke Plant was eliminated.” J .A. at 233. The bankruptc y court a lso held that “[b] eca use the Coal Supply

Ag ree ment

is a requirements contrac t for the Coke Plant , the obligations of CW VEC would not chang e in the event of a sa le or tra nsfer of the Coke Plant.” J .A. at 232-33 ( emphasis adde d). Whil e the ba

nkruptcy court stated that no pa

rol evidenc e wa s neede d to interpret the me aning of the CSA as ame nded bec ause its provisions were unambig uous, that court did consider parol
e vid e nc e in its De c larator y Judg me nt Or de r. F or e xamp le , the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt dis c us se d e xtri ns ic evidenc e in the for

m of discussions betwee n CW VEC and Wheeling -Pitt when the parties ne g otiated the L etter A g ree ment. CW VEC appea led this order. After the bankr

uptcy court i s s u ed its Declar atory J udg ment Orde r, Wheeling -Pitt filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Br ooke Cou n t y , West Virginia ( the “West Virg inia L itigation”) alleg ing br eac h of contra ct and se eking damag es for CW VEC’s continued post-conf irmation ref

usal to deliver c oal to Wheeling- Pitt . CW VEC re m o v ed the ac tion to the United States District Court for the Norther

n District of West Virg inia. CW VEC answe red a nd counter claimed f

or a de clar atory judgme nt conce rning how much coa l and to whom it must provide unde r the CSA. CWVE C’ s argume nt c on c e rn ingre qu ir e me nts wa s b ased primar ily on langua g e fo un d in Article I I , Sections 1 and 3 of the CSA, a ddressing“Tonna g e and D eliverie s.” Section 1 provides that “the qua

ntity of coa l to be sold and purchased during the t erm of this Agr eeme nt is one hundredNo. 06-3906

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heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 8 - perc ent (100%) o f

the hig h volatile cokingcoal r equire d (the Require ments) for Customer’ s fac iliti es exis ting on the date of this Ag ree ment.” J.A. at 74. Section 3 provides, “The coal sha ll be delivere d to Custom er’ s Follansbee Coke Plant (“Plant”) in B rooke County , West Virginia.” J
. A. at 75. Ac c or din g to C WVE C, the ph ra se “ fa c ili tie s e xistin g on the date of the Ag re e me nt” re fe rs to b oth Whe e lin g -Pit t’ s Co ke Plant and Wheeling- Pitt ’s Steel Plant, not just Wheeling- Pitt ’s Coke Plant wh i c h i s d e f

i n e d a s “ P l an t ” i n A rt i c l e I I , S e c t i o n 3
. T h e r e f o r e , C W V E C c o n t e n d e d t h a t itmus t supply only the amount of coal require d by the Coke Plant to provide coke to Wheeling- Pitt ’s Steel Plant; it i s n ot r e qu ir e d to pr ov ide any c oa l us ed to p ro du c e c ok e fo r S e ve rs ta l. I n o the r w or ds , CWV E C c o n t e n d e d

t h a tt h e C S A , e v e na s am e n d e d b y t h e L e t t e r

A g r e e m e n t , i s a

r e qu i r e m e n ts
c on tr a c t f or the c oa l ne c e ssa

ry for th e Coke Plant t o p ro du c e c ok e on ly fo r t he Ste e l Pla

nt, no t a require ments contrac t to provide coa l for the Coke Plant itself. Whe e lin g -P itt

mo ved th e ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt to e njo in C WVE C f

ro m pr oc e e din g wi th i ts counter claim in the West Virg inia L itigation. F ollow i n g a h ea ring on Aug ust 16, 2005, the bankruptc y

court issued a

perma nent injunction on September 8, 2005 (the “Injunction Order ”), prohibiting CWVEC from proce eding with its counterclaim and further prohibiting CW VEC from reduc ing the amount of coa l it was to supply under the CSA as amended. Whil e the Se pte mbe r 8 , 2 00 5 o rd e r w a s ve ry br ie f, the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt g a ve re a so ns fo r i ts ruling orally

following the August 16, 2005 hearing . The c ourt found that it had jurisdi ction to issue the i njunction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. I t held that CW VEC’s appe al of the M ay 4, 2005 Dec laratory J udg ment Orde r did not divest it of jurisdiction to issue the injunction because the purpose of the injunction wa s simply to enforc e the De clar atoryNo. 06-3906

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heeling-Pittsburgh Steel

- 9 - J udg ment Orde r, and CWVEC’s counter claim was a collateral attack on that order . The c ourt furthe r he ld t h a t C W V E C ’ s c o u n t e r c l a i m w a s a c o mp u l s o r y c o u n t e r c l a i m an d t h u s w a s a c l a i m t h a tit waived by failing to a ssert it in the Adver sary Procee ding. I n so holding, the bankrupt cy co u rt emphasized that the decla ratory judgme nt c omplaint “ g ives a whole descr iption” of t h e p ro p o sed joi nt v e ntu

re and the a ssi gnmen t to that jo int ve ntu re , a nd it a sk s f or a de c larator

y jud g me nt “ to assig n its rights under

the Ag ree ment to a

ny entity that is crea

ted to implement the proposed joint venture .” J.A. at 668. The c ourt also noted that it had spec ifically found in its Declar atory

J udg ment Orde r that the CSA was a re quirements contr act f or the Coke Plant itself. The c ourt thus concluded that the issue befor e the it in the Adver sary Procee ding was not limited to CWVEC’s termination rig hts, but the matter also encompa ssed the re quirements issue as w ell beca use that issue re lated to the continuing validity and enf orce ability of t he C SA should it be assigned to the J oint Venture. The bankruptc y court ex plained that the r equire ments issue was not spec ifically addre ssed in the Adver sary Proc e e d in g , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e , “ [t ]h e r e qu ir e me n ts is s u e , a s f ar a s th is Co u rt w a s c o n c e r n e d, was not in disput e.” J.A. at 669. CWVEC appealed the I njunction Order
. On September

29, 2005, the bankr

uptcy court issued a

n order in the bankruptc y

proce eding (the “ Assignme nt Order ”) g rantingWheeling- Pitt ’s motion for an or der spe cifica lly approvingthe
a ssi g nme nt of the CSA to M ounta in S tate Carb on , L L C, the joi nt v e ntu re fo rm e d b y

Whe e lin g -P itt and Sever stal. CW VEC appea led the Assig nment Orde r. All three a

ppeals, the a

ppeal of the Dec laratory

J udg ment Orde r of Ma y 4, 2005, the I njunction Order

of September

8, 2005, and the Assig nment Orde r of September 29, 2005, we reNo. 06-3906

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- 10 - consolidated by

the district court for

revie w. The district court issued its final judg ment aff irming the bankr uptcy court on May

24, 2006. The district cour

t concluded, ba sed on the plain lang uag e of A rticle XXof the CSA and the L etter A g ree ment, that Wheeling- Pitt may assig n the C SA to any person or entity
. The amendment als o re m o v edC W VE C ’s t erm i n at i o nri gh t s , s u b j ec t i n g an y

as s i gn m en tt o ap p ro v al of the ba nkruptcy
c ourt or , if Whe e lin g -P itt

is n o lo ng e r i n b ank

ru ptc y , to app ro va l by

CWVE C’ s d e sig nate d c re dit
c omm itt e e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a g re e d w ithCWVE C th a t the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt may

have imp ro pe rl y
c on sid e re d s ome pa

ro l e vid e nc e on

thi s is su e but fo un d su c h c on sid e ratio n to be ha rm le ss b e c a

us e (1) the ba nkruptcy court did so af

ter e x amining a

nd interpre ting the f

our cor ners of Article X X and the L etter A g ree ment and (2) the di strict court reac hed the same conclusion based on its own de novo revie w of the la

ng uag e of the documents. Next, the district c ourt reje cted CW VEC’s argument that the bankruptc y court la ck ed jurisdiction when it enjoined CWVEC from pursuing its c o u nte r c la im in th e West Virginia L itigation on the g round that “CWVEC’s c ounterc laim w as esse ntially asking another

court to rule on a

n issue alre ady resolved by

the bankr uptcy court” and that the require ments issue was “inhe rently contained in the claims of the a dversa ry complaint.” J.A. at 396. The district court also found the require ments issue was a c ompuls o r y c o u nte r c la im which should have be en broug ht in the Adversa ry Procee ding. Yet the district c ourt reje cted Wheeling- Pitt ’s argument that CW VEC had wa ived the require ments issue b y fa i l i n g t o raise it in its appea l of the bankr uptcy court’s Ma

y 4, 2005 Dec laratory J udg ment Orde r, st ating simply that “[i] t does appe ar possible that CWVEC was blind-No. 06-3906

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- 11 - sided and attempted unsucce ssfully to raise its arguments befor e the ba nkruptcy court on August 16, but was re buffe d.” J.A. at 398. Reac hing the require ments issue, the district court concluded that the CSA, as amende d, was ambig uous but that there wa s sufficient e vidence in the rec ord to a ddress the issue. The district cour t found that “[s]i nce pa

rol evidenc e esta

blished that the Follansbe e Plant was the only location that had any require ments for the high volatil e coking coal, i t follows that the Follansbe e Plant was the ‘fa cilities’ ref

err ed to in [Article I I , Section 1 of] the [ C S A]
. ” J
. A. at 400-01. The district c ourt
c on c luded th at the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt did no t e rr in f ind ingthat th e CSA , a s ame nd e d, “ wa s a
re qu ir e me nts c on tr a c t f

or the F oll ans be e [ Co ke] P lant a nd , b y e xten sio n, be c a me a

re qu ir e me nts contra ct for the joint venture for med betwe en the F olla

nsbee Plant and Seve rstal once the assig nment of t he Agr eeme nt to the j oint venture was approved by the bankruptcy court.” J .A. at 401-02. The district court also aff

irmed the ba

nkruptcy court’s Septe mber 29, 2005 Assig nment Orde r. CWVEC timely appea led the district cour t’s decision. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review This Court wi l l re view the ba nkruptcy court’s de cision directly , and it will accor d no defe renc e to the district cour t. In re 5900 Assocs., Inc. , 468 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 2006) (c itation omitted). The bankruptc y court’s finding s of fa ct ar e re viewed unde r the c lear err or standar d, and questions of law a

re re v i ew ed d e novo. Id. A fa ctual findingis clear ly err oneous “when the revie wing court on the e ntire evidence is left wit h the definite and firm c onviction that a mistake has been c ommitt ed.” Tran v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 937, 943 ( 6th Cir. 2006).No. 06-3906

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- 12 - The issuanc e by

the fe dera l court of a

n injunction pursuant to the All Writ s Act is revie wed unde r the abuse of discre tion standard. Un ite d Sta te s v . City of D e tro it , 329 F.3d 515, 524 ( 6th Cir. 2003). Thi s Court finds an abuse of discretion whe n it is l eft with a f irm and def

inite conviction that the lower c ourt committed a cle ar e rror o f j udg ment. Se e Su rle s e xre l. J oh ns on v . G re

y ho un d Li ne

s, Inc. , 474 F.3d 288, 293 ( 6th Cir. 2007). B. C WV EC ’s Ri ghtto Te r m ina te th e CSA The pa rties ag ree that West Virginia la w appl ies to their contra ctual dispute. Whether the contra ct is ambig uous is a question of law that is s u b j ect to de novo review
. Estate of Taw ney v . Colum bia Natural R es. , LLC , 633 S.E.2d 22, 28 (W. Va
. 2006). “The mere fac t that parties do not ag ree to the construction of a contra ct does not re nder it ambiguous.” Flanagan v. Stalnaker , 607 S.E .2 d 7 65 , 7 69 (W. Va . 2 00 4) . Rathe r, Wes t Vir g ini a law pr ov ide s th a t “ the te rm ‘a mbi g uit y ’ i s define d as languag e ‘r eason a b ly s u s c e p tible of two diffe rent mea nings’ or languag e ‘of

such doubtful meaningthat rea sonable minds might be unc erta i n o r d i s agr ee as to its meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Payne v. W

eston , 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (W. Va. 1995)). However, a latent ambig uity

“ar ises when the in s tr u me n t u p o nit s f a c e a p p e ar s c le ar

an d u n a mb igu o u s , b u t t

h e r e is s o me c o ll a te r a l ma tter which make s the meaninguncer tain.” Flanagan , 6 0 7 S
. E
. 2 d at 7 6 9 n . 4 (q u o t i n g Colli ns v. Treat , 152 S.E. 205, 206 (W. Va. 1930)). I f a contra ct contains unambig uous lang uag e, it must be construed a ccor ding to the pla in and natura l meaning of that languag e. Ba ss v . Co lte lli -R os e , 536 S.E.2d 494, 497 (W. V a. 2000); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 69 v. City of Fairmont , 468 S.E.2d 712, 716 ( W. Va. 1996).

“ Extr ins ic e vid e nc e may

be us e d to a id i n th e c on str uc tio n of a c on tr a c t if the matte r i n c on tr ov e rs yNo. 06-3906

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- 13 - i s n o tc l e ar l y e x p r e s s e d

i nt h e c o n t r a c t , an d

i ns u c hc a s e t h e i n t e n t i o no f t h e p art i e s i s a l w ays important and the c ourt may consider pa

rol evidenc e.” Supervalu Ope rations, Inc. v. Center D esign, Inc. , 524 S.E.2d 666, 670 (W. Va. 1999). Parol evidenc e also may be admitted in re solving late nt ambig uities. Kopf v. Lacey , 540 S.E.2d 170, 175 (W. Va. 2000). Fi n al l y , West Virginia la w pr ov ide s th a t w he n p art ie s e nte r i nto a c on tr a c t th a t mo dif

ie s an e xistin g c on tr a c t, t

he pr ov isi on s in the orig inal contra ct that are inconsistent w ith the modifications will be abrog ated a nd discharg ed; on the other ha

nd, the terms and c onditions of t h e o ri g inal contra ct, so long as they are consistent with the modified co ntrac t, “will remain in full forc e and e ffe ct and be come incor porate d in the modified contra ct.” Consol. Coal Co. v

. Mineral Coal Co. , 126 S.E.2d 194, 201 (W. Va. 1962). On appe al, CWVEC cla i m s t h at althoug h Article X X provides that Wheeling -Pitt cannot transfe r the Coke Plant unless the tra nsfer ee a ssumes W h eeling -Pitt’s obli g ations under the CSA, the CSA does not prohibit W heeling -Pitt from assigningthe CSA without t ransf err ing the Coke Plant. This, accor ding to CWVEC, proves that the assignment of the C SA and a transfe r of the Coke Plant a re tw o d if fe re nt t hin g s. CWVE C a lso emp has iz es th a t th e L e tte r A g re e me nt i s si le nt w ith respe ct to the transf

er pr ovisions. There fore , acc ording to CW VEC, the CSA’s transfe r provisions
rema in unaffe cted by

the L etter A g ree ment. CW VEC also contends that the bank ru ptcy court’s conside r a tion of parol e vidence was not har mless error , beca

use that consider ation “wa s so perva sive that it cannot be de emed ha rmless.” The ba nkruptcy court did not err

in concluding that CW VEC lacks the r ight to terminate the CSA upon a transfe r of the Coke Plant to the J oint Venture. I ndeed, the CSA as modified and theNo. 06-3906

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- 14 - L e tte r Ag re e me nt are un ambi g uo us , and CWVE C’ s int e rp re tatio n of tho se do cum ent s is
unrea sonable. Article X X

o f th e CS A , e nti tl ed “A ssignment,” consists of two para g raphs. The se par ag raphs place a limitation on the assig nability of t he C SA. The fir st paragraph of Article X X provides that (1) W heeling -Pitt may assig n the C SA to another entity with CW VEC’s prior written conse nt; (2) Wheeling- Pitt may

not assig n the CSA without C WVEC’s consent unless the assig nment is to a wh oll y -o wn e d s ub sid iary

of Whe e lin g -P itt

t o wh i c h W h e e l i n g - P i tt

h a s a l s o c on ve y e d th e Cok e Plant;
and (3 ) i f Wh e e lin g -P itt

se lls or tr ans fe rs the Cok e Plant t o a ny e nti ty , Wh e e lin g-Pi tt mu st a lso assig n the CSA to that entity
. The second para g raph of Article X X of the CSA provides that in the event of “any such” tra nsfer or conve y ance to an en tity other than a

wholly -owne d subsidiary of Wheeling- Pitt , CW VEC shall have the rig ht to terminate the CSA. Readingthe par ag raphs tog ether , Farley v . Farley , 600 S.E.2d 177, 181 (W. Va. 2004) , the “any such” la ng uag e in the sec ond para g raph cl ear ly ref ers to the tra

nsfer contemplated in the previous p ar agr ap h , namely a tra nsfer of the Coke Plant and the a ssignment of the CSA to the t ra n s fe re e. T h u s , t o t h e ex t en t t h at W h ee l i n g-P i t t ’s t ra n s fe r o f t h e C o k e P l an tre qu i re d i tt o as s i gn the contra ct to the plant’s tra nsfer ee, A rticle XXpermits CW VEC to preve nt the assig nment of the contra ct to a tra

nsfer ee of the plant by providing CW VEC the option of terminatingthe ag ree ment in th e case th a t th e tr ans fe re e /a ssi g ne e is n ot a wh oll y -o wn e d s ub sid iary of Whe e lin g -P itt
. Ac co rd i n gl y , t h e t erm i n at i o nri gh twa s , i nes s en ce , a r es t ri ct i o no nW h ee l i n g-P i t t ’s ab i l i t y t o as s i gn the CSA. I n no way

did Article XX p ro h i b i t a tra nsfer or conve y ance of the Coke Plant. As theNo. 06-3906

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- 15 - district court no t ed, Article XX must be re ad as a whole, and the article is one dea ling with a lim itatio n o n a ssi g nme nt. Th e L e tte r A g re e me nt, in c on tr a st, pr ov ide d th a t Whe e lin g -P itt may a ssi g n th e a g re e me nt t o “any” entity provided that the assig nee assumes all of Wheeling- Pitt ’s obligations ther ein. Only two exceptions were provided to that provision: (1) if the a ssignment is made during the pende ncy of the bankr uptcy case , the assig nment is subjec t to the approva l of the bankruptc y court and it may be opposed by

CW VEC if CWVEC believes that the assig nee doe s not provide assura nce of p er fo rm an ce at l ea s tas ad eq u at e W h ee l i n g-P i t t ; an d (2 ) i f t h e b an krup t cy ca s e i s n o l o n ger p en d i n g, the assig nment is subject to the approva l of CWVEC’s cr edit committee, and that approva l sha ll not be unre asonably

withheld. Thus, the L etter A g ree ment no longe r allowe d CW VEC to terminate the agr eeme nt as a re striction on assigna bility
. Expressio unius est ex clusio alterius
. S e e Savilla v. Sp e e dwa ySu pe ra me ric a, LLC , 639 S.E.2d 850, 854 (W. Va. 2006). Th e re fo re , b ecaus e (1 ) t

he a ssi g nme nt p ro vis ion

in t he CSApr ov ide d th a t CWV EC c ou ld terminate the ag ree ment if Wheeling- Pitt transfe rre d the Coke Plant to a n o n -w h o lly -owne d subsidiary

and (2) the assignment provisi on in L etter A g ree ment modifying the CSA is i nconsistent with that provision in the CSA, the orig inal provision is no longe r g iven ef fec t. Consol. Coal Co. , 12 6 S. E. 2d

a t 20 1. CW VEC ’s argume nt, se t f or th a bo ve , is unre a so na

ble in t his c on te xt, a s it rende rs illusory the broad assig nment rig hts pr esent in the L etter Ag ree ment. Any consideration of pa ro l e vid e nc e by

the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt wa s har mle ss, to t

he e xten t th a t w e have re a c he d th e same conclusion on de novo r evi ew , or invited, as CWVEC will not be hea rd to complain of the bankruptc y

court’s c onsideration of pa rol evidenc e bec ause it made parol e vidence arguments to thatNo. 06-3906

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- 16 - court. CWVEC thus di d not have the r ight to terminate the CSA upon a transfer of the Coke Plant to the J oint Venture. C. CWVEC’s C ounterclaim in the West Virginia Litigation The F e d e r a l Ru le s o f B an kr u p tc y Pr o c e d

u r e s tate th a t F e d e r a l Ru le o f Ci v il Pr o c e dure 13
a pp lie s in a dv e rs ary

pr oc e e din g s. F e d. R. B ank r. P. 7 01 3. Rul e 13 (a ) p ro vid e s th a t [a] pleadingshall state as a counter claim any claim which at the time of servingthe pleading the pl eade r has ag ainst any opposing party , if it arises out of the tra nsaction or occ urre nce that is the subje ct matter of the opposing pa rty ’s claim and doe s not require for its adjudication the presenc e of third pa rties of whom the cour

t cannot acquir e jurisdiction. Fe d. R. Civ. P. 13( a). An opposing party ’s fa ilure to plead a compulsory

counter claim “f

oreve r bar s that party from ra ising the c laim in another a ction.” Bluegrass Hosiery, I nc. v. Spe izman Indus., Inc

. , 214 F.3d 770, 772 (6th Cir. 2000); Sanders v. First Nat’l Bank &Trust Co. in Great Bend , 936 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1991). We have r ecognized that this rule “ serve s the desira ble g oal of bring ing all claims arisingout of the same tr ansac tion or occur ren ce b efore the c ourt in a sing le ac tion.” Bl ue gras s H os ie ry , 214 F.3d at 772. We a pply the “log ical relationship” test in determining w hether a cla im is a c ompulsory counter claim; under that test, the court “dete rmine[s] whether the issues of law and f act r aised by

the claims are larg ely the same and whether substantially the same e vidence would support or re fute both cla ims.” Sa nd e rs , 936 F.2d at 277. On appe al, CWVEC claims that the requireme nts i s s u e and the decla ratory judgme nt litigation ra ise “c ompletely differ ent” issues of law and fac t be cause the require ments issue “has no
a ff e c t on , a nd is n ot a ff

e c te d b y ,” the de c larator

y jud g me nt l iti g a tio n. I n s uppo rt of this c la im, CW VEC contends that in the West Virg inia L itigation, it did not claim that th e C SA wasNo. 06-3906

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- 17 - unenfor cea

ble, as it contende d in the Adver sary Procee ding; r ather , it claimed that the CSA applies only to Wheeling- Pitt , not to Severstal. CW VEC thus argues t hat t here was no need to addre ss the parties’ rig hts under the CSA’s quantity provision in the Adversa ry Procee ding be cause upon
a ssi g nme nt o f t

he CSA , CWV EC’ s o bli g a tio ns re g ard ing the qu anti ty du e un de r p e rf or manc e wo uld
re ma in t he same a s bef

or e the a ssi g nme nt. CWVE C also argue s th a t di sc ov e ry in c onne c tio n w ith the re quirements issue would have delay ed the r esolution of the Adver sary Procee ding. The ba nkruptcy court did not err

in holding that the r eq u i re ments issue was a c ompulsory counter claim that CWVEC waived by not pursuing when it raised its assig nability claim in the Adver sary

Procee ding. Substantially the same issue is presente d in the West Virginia L itigation as was pre sented in the Adve rsar y Procee ding, na

mely the ong oing validity and enf orce ability

of the CSA . In th e Wes t V ir g ini a L itigati on , CW VE C pr op os e d th a t th e CSAis o nly bin din g a s to Whe e lin g -P itt ’s c oa l r e qu ir e me nts , n ot t o th os e of the Joint Ve ntu re . T his int e rp re tatio n c a lls int o quest i o n C W VEC’s contra ctual oblig ations to the J oint Venture unde r the CSA, just as in the Ad ve rs ary Pr oc e e din g in whic h CWV EC a rgue d th e fa c t th a t th e Joint Ve ntu re wa s n ot a

wh oll y
ow ne d s ub sid iary

of Whe e lin g -P itt

g ave ri se to CWVE C’ s rig ht to ce a se pe rf or manc e of the CSA entirely
. Sub sta nti a lly the same e vid e nc e wo uld

have be e n n e c e ssa

ry to d e c ide the tw o c la ims a s w e ll. As demonstrate d b y t h e d i s t rict cour t opinion, which actually

rea ched the require ments issue, the
e vi d e n c e n e c e s s ar

y t o r e s o l v e t h a t i s s u e c o n s i s t s o f t h e C S A an d t h e L e t t e r A g r e e m e nt, the sa me eviden ce that we use d above to r esolve the a ssigna bility issue. Fur

thermore , in the Adver saryNo. 06-3906

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- 18 - Procee ding CWVEC reque sted projec tions of the J oint Venture’ s future total coke produc tion and
c oa l r e qu ir e me nts a s w e ll a s Whe e lin g -P itt ’s pr oje c te d f utu re c ok e re qu ir e me nts
. CWV E C’ s ar g u me n t b e f o r e th is Co u rt i g n o r e s th e e n ti r e c o n te xt o f th e A dv e r sary Pr oc e e din g . As th e ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt no te d, the de c lara

tor y jud g me nt c omp la int

“ g ive s a wh ole descr iption” of the proposed j o i n t venture and the a ssignment to that joint venture a nd asks for a de c larator y jud g me nt “ to a ssi g n it s r ig hts un de r t he Ag reem ent to any

e nti ty tha t is c re a te d to implement the proposed joint venture .” J .A. at 668. Acc ording ly , there is absolutely no merit to the
asser tion that CW VEC was “ blindsided” by the re quirements issue. An ex amination of the de c l ar a t o r y j u d g m e n t c o mp l a i n t r e v e a l s t h a t t h i s r e s u l t “ s e r v e s t h e d e s i r a

b l e g o a l o f b r ing ing a ll claims arisingout of the same tr ansac tion or occur renc e bef ore the court in a sing le ac t i o n ,” Bl ue gras s H os ie ry , 214 F.3d at 772, notwithst andingCW VEC’s unsupported c ontent i o n t h at the
re qu ir e me nts iss ue wo uld have de lay e d th e Ad

ve rs ary Pr oc e e din g . T he pr op ri e ty of thi s r e su lt i s further appar ent g iven that a de clar atory judgme nt is de signe d to settle the entire c ontroversy set out in a dec laratory

judgme nt complaint, see Adrian Ene rgy Assocs. v. Mic h. Pub. Serv. Comm ’n , 481 F .3 d 4 14 , 4 22 (6 th C ir
. 20 07), and that th e de c lara

tor y jud g me nt c omp la int

e nc omp a sse d b oth CW VEC’s rig ht to terminate and the amount of coal CW VEC was re quired to supply to the Coke Plant. D. CW VE C’ s Re mai n i n g Cl a i ms CW VEC’s re maining a

rguments are dismiss ed in shor t order. F irst, its contention that the counter claim should be allowed to proce ed because the requirements i ssue was not at issue, lit igated, or dec ided, is unconvincing . As stated above , the issue was substantially the s ame as the issue in theNo. 06-3906

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Procee ding, CWVEC’s attempt to narrow ly descr ibe the Adve rsar

y Procee ding issue
no tw ith sta

nd ing . Se c on d, a s Whe e lin g -P itt po int s o ut, CWVE C c on fu se s c omp uls or y c ounte rc la im law with the law of

prec lusion with re s p ect to whe ther the r equire ments issue was litigated or decide d. As set forth a

bove, applic ati on of the c ompulsory counter claim rule doe s not depend on whether the re quirements issue wa s actua lly litigated or

decide d. CW VEC also claims that the require ments issue was not mature during the de claratory judgme nt liti g ation. I t argues th a t n o a ctual contr oversy

then exist ed re g ardingthe quantity provision of the CSA beca

use at the time of the Adver sary Proceeding , Wheeling- Pitt had not y et consummated the J oint Venture
. The ripeness doctrine, howeve r, does not re quire the ha rm to have actua lly occur red. See Pac. Gas &Elec. Co. v. State E nergy Re s. Conservation , 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983) ( “One does not have to await the c on s u m m at i o n o f threatened injury to obtain preve ntive
re lie f. ” ). Th a t pr op os iti on is p art ic ula

rl y app li cable in

the ins tant c a se , a s Whe e lin g -P itt so ug ht a decla ratory judgme nt, the useful purpose of which is the clar ification of leg al duties for the future. Am So uth Ba nk

v . D ale , 386 F.3d 763, 786 (6th Cir. 2004). I ndeed, at the time Wheeling- Pitt filed its c omp la int

fo r d e c larator

y re lie f, it w a s in ba

nk ru ptc y , and it state d that it “ c ou ld no t c on summate its proposed joint venture without assura nce the Ag ree ment may

be assig ned in conne ction with the joint venture, bec ause a

ny uncer tainty as t o the ef

fec t of the assig nment signific antly aff ects the va lue of the pr op os e d joi nt ve ntu

re .” J.A. a t 22
. Ac c or din g ly , CWVE C’ s ri pe ne ss a rgume nt l a c ks me ri t. CW VE C a ls o c o n te n d s th a t R u le 1 3 ( a ) d o e s n o t a

p p ly to e xp e d it e d

matt e r s an d

th a t t he decla ratory judgme nt liti g ation in the i nstant case was held on an expedited basis. CWVEC relies
on United States v. Snider , 7 7 9 F
. 2 d 1 1 5 1 ( 6 t hC i r . 1 9 8 5 ) , b u tt h a tc a s e i s i n ap p l i c a b l e h e r e . InNo. 06-3906

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- 20 - Snider , we state d that Rule 13(a) require s compulsory counter claims only if the party who desire s to a sse rt a c la im h a s served a pl eadi ng , b e c a us e the Rul e re qu ir e s th e a dv e rs e pa rt y to s tate its
c ounte rc la ims “ a t th e tim e of se rv inga ple a din g .” 77 9 F .2 d at 11 57 . Our su bs e qu e nt c a se s h a ve so interpre ted Snider
. Se e Bl ue gras s H os ie ry , 2 14 F .3 d at 77 2; United States v. Erie Indus., I nc. , No. 95-2075, 1996 WL 692092, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 1996); Puky rys v. Olson , N o . 9 5
- 1 7 7 8 , 1 9 9 6 WL 636140, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996). CWVEC cites no authority for its extension of Sn ide r to a ll “expedited matters,” and we decline its invitation to so ex tend our pre cede nt. Finally , CW VEC argues that the ba nkruptcy court lacke d jurisdiction a nd the power

to issue the injunction. I t claims that in doing so, the ba nkru p t cy co u rt went be y ond enfor cingits ini tial ruling s and that the All Writs Act shoul d not have been invoked be cause the counter claim was not a collate ral at tack on the ba nkruptcy court’s r uling. The se ar g uments are unpersua sive. We have
c on sis te ntl y

state d th a t a lth ou g h d istri c t c ourt s may no t alte r or e nla rg e the sc op e of

the ir jud g me nts pending appea l, they

do reta in jurisdiction to enforce their judgme nts. See, e .g. , City of Cookeville, Te nn . v . U

pp e r Cu mb e rla nd

El e c . M e mb e rsh ip , _

_ _ F
. 3 d _ _ _ , N o s . 0 5
- 5 8 8 6 , 0 6

- 5 3 6 3 , 2 0 0 7 WL 11 46 45 6, a t *1 0 ( 6th

Cir . Apr . 1 9, 20 07 ); Am . Town Ctr. v . Hal l 83 A sso cs. , 9 12 F .3 d 1 04 , 1 10 (6 th Cir. 1990) (re cog nizi ng “the c rucia l disti nction betwee n expansion and e nfo rc e me nt of judg ments”). F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , CWV EC’ s c ounte rc la im in the Wes t Vi rg ini a L iti g a tio n is a

c la im i t waived. T hus, the bankruptc y court not only had the authority to issue the i njunction pursuant to our
case law, but it also had such authority pursuant to the All Writs Act, Sable v. Ge n. Motors Corp. , 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasizi ng that the S upreme Court has “re peate dly rec og nizedNo. 06-3906

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- 21 - the power of a f eder al cour

t to issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be nec essar

y or appr opriate to e ffe ctuate a nd preve nt the frustration of order s it has previously issued”). III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e AF F I RM the or de rs of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.