J-S33024-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PAUL MITCHELL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2787 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 2, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008193-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2018

Appellant Paul Mitchell appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

following his convictions for Unlawful Contact with a Minor, Criminal Trespass, 

and Simple Assault.1 Mitchell contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction for Unlawful Contact with a Minor. We affirm.

Mitchell’s non-jury trial took place on February 23, 2016. The evidence 

established the following:

On June 16, 2015 at approximately 9:45[]pm, sixteen-yearold [S.T.] was at home with her brother on the block of 3100 Rorer 

Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The two were waiting for 

their parents, who left the home to pick up pizza.

At that same time, Paul Mitchell (“Defendant”) was walking 

to his friend Erika's house, which is located at the intersection of 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6318(a)(1), 3505(a)(1), and 2701, respectively.
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Broad and Allegheny. Defendant testified that when he reached 

the 3100 block of Rorer Street, he saw [S.T.] and mistakenly 

believed that she was his friend Erika. Defendant approached the 

house, then knocked on the door. Upon hearing a knock on the 

door, [S.T.] believed that it was her parents in need of assistance 

while they were carrying food; however, the person at the door 

was not her parents, but the Defendant. When she opened the

door and saw Defendant, [S.T.] greeted him with “God Bless You,”

which she says, as a Christian, she does all the time. Defendant 

reciprocated the greeting saying ‘God Bless You” as well.

At this point, the Defendant was one step into the doorway 

leading into the home. [S.T.] noticed Defendant was on 

something, or possibly drunk. The contact was made immediately 

after greeting each other at the door. [S.T.] testified that 

Defendant, at that moment, tried to enter the house, but she 

pushed him back by the shoulders, after which Defendant began 

to rub her breasts. The push from [S.T.] knocked Defendant back 

a step, and Defendant, then, made a second attempt to enter the 

home, and began to touch her butt with his hand, but again [S.T.] 

rejected his advance.

[S.T.], at that point, began knocking on the screen door, 

while remaining in the doorway, in order to get her neighbor's 

attention so that her neighbor could come help her. Her neighbor 

then approached, pulled and talked [sic] the Defendant away from 

the door, after which [S.T.] quickly shut the door behind her and 

called her parents. Once off the porch, Defendant stood on the 

northeast comer of the 3100 block of Rorer Street in front of a 

corner store until police arrived. Defendant alleged he stood there 

to avoid making a scene or making people think he had done 

something wrong because he understood there could have been 

an issue. He said if someone thought “[he] was trying to touch 

her . . . in the wrong way [it] could have basically got way 

serious.” One of the officers at the scene, Officer Patrick Quinn 

(“Quinn”), testified that Defendant was standing on the corner, 

and was just “looking at the store.” Quinn approached the 

Defendant, but Defendant was “spacey” and not really articulate 

or communicating with the officers. Quinn asked for identification, 

and Defendant gave it to him. Officer Quinn and his partner then 

got a squad car in order to transport Defendant to the Special 

Victims Unit for questioning.
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Trial Court Opinion, filed December 18, 2017, at 1-3 (unpaginated) (some 

alterations in original; citations to Notes of Testimony omitted).

The trial court found Mitchell guilty of the above-listed crimes, but found 

him not guilty of Indecent Assault or Burglary.2 The court sentenced him to 

serve and aggregate of 17-40 months’ incarceration and seven years’ 

consecutive probation.

Mitchell filed a timely notice of appeal, and raises a single issue:

Was not the evidence insufficient to support the verdict of guilty 

of Unlawful Contact [w]ith a Minor?

Mitchell’s Br. at 3.

“Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). Specifically, we must 

determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict 

winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are 

sufficient for the trier of fact to find that the Commonwealth proved each 

element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 

150, 152 (Pa.Super. 2003). Further, “[a]s an appellate court, we do not assess 

credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the testimony of record.”

Commonwealth v. Kinney, 863 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, we will not disturb the verdict “unless the evidence is so 

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(2), and 3502(a)(1), respectively.
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weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 

A.2d 657, 661 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

A person may be found guilty of Unlawful Contact with a Minor if the 

Commonwealth establishes that the person was “intentionally in contact with 

a minor . . . for the purpose of engaging in an activity prohibited under . . .

Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1). The statute defines “Contacts” as “Direct or 

indirect contact or communication by any means . . . .” Id. at (c). Here, the 

Commonwealth argued, and the trial court accepted, that Mitchell was guilty 

of Unlawful Contact with a Minor “on the basis that he was in contact with 

[S.T.] for the purpose of committing Indecent Assault,” Trial Ct. Op. at 6 

(unpaginated). Indecent Assault is an offense enumerated in Chapter 31. See

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126. 

Mitchell argues that because he was found not guilty of Indecent 

Assault, the evidence is insufficient to prove that he contacted S.T. for the 

purpose of committing Indecent Assault. See Mitchell’s Br. at 9-11. However, 

our Supreme Court has established that “the Chapter 31 offenses are not 

predicate offenses for 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6318” and that “a defendant need not 

be successful in completing the purpose of his communication with a minor in 

order to be found guilty of § 6318(a).” Commonwealth v. Reed, 9 A.3d 

1138, 1146 (Pa. 2010). “[R]ather[,] a defendant is guilty if he contacts a 
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minor for the purpose of engaging in that prohibited behavior.” Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 910 (Pa.Super. 2006); 

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 537 (Pa.Super. 2006). Mitchell’s 

acquittal for Indecent Assault does not render the evidence insufficient to 

prove that he made contact with S.T. for the purpose of committing Indecent 

Assault.3

Mitchell argues that the “legal reasoning” in two cases dealing with the 

Corruption of Minors,

4 “extends to the instant case.” Mitchell’s Br. at 11 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 313 A.2d 300 (Pa.Super. 1973) and 

Commonwealth v. March, 551 A.2d 232 (Pa.Super. 1988)). We find these 

cases inapposite, as they state only that if the prosecution charges that a 

defendant is guilty of corruption of minors because the defendant committed 

a particular act, the prosecution cannot obtain a conviction by proving that

the defendant committed some other act. See March, 551 A.2d at 236 

(“[W]here an accused is charged with corruption by one act, and the 

Commonwealth does not prove that act, but proves some other act, a 

conviction for corruption based upon the other act cannot stand”); Lambert, 

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In Reed, the Court determined that where a defendant had been acquitted 

of attempted Chapter 31 offenses, those offenses could not be the basis under 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(b) for grading Unlawful Contact. Reed, 9 A.3d at 1148. 

Here, however, Mitchell is not challenging the grading of his offense and 

moreover, he was not charged with, and therefore not acquitted of, Attempted 

Indecent Assault. 

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301.
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313 A.2d at 301 (where Commonwealth charged corrupting the morals of a 

minor on the basis of defendant’s furnishing minors with drugs, defendant 

could not be found guilty of corrupting the morals of a minor if he was found

not guilty of corresponding drug charges). 

In contrast, the crime of Unlawful Contact with a Minor requires only 

proof of intentional contact with a minor for the purpose of committing activity 

prohibited under a Chapter 31 offense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1); Reed, 9 

A.3d at 1146. The evidence here was sufficient under that standard to prove 

each element of Unlawful Contact beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore

hold that Mitchell’s argument lacks merit and affirm the trial court’s judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/18