IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-40426

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DARWIN SIERRA-ARRAZOLA, also known as Darwin Omar Sierra-Arrazola,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:10-CR-2495-1

Before WIENER, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Darwin Sierra-Arrazola (Sierra) appeals the 24-

month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the district court erred in applying the 12

level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1) based on his 2010 Utah drug

conviction, arguing that the Utah conviction does not qualify as a “drug

trafficking offense” on which the enhancement can be based. He insists that the

Utah statute of conviction may be violated in ways that do not qualify as a drugUnited States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 11, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-40426 Document: 00511663239 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/11/2011
No. 11-40426

trafficking offense under the Guidelines and that the Utah judgment and docket

sheet submitted with the presentence report do not provide a sufficient basis

under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) for determining that his

conviction was for a drug-trafficking offense. 

Based on the Utah judgment of conviction, the district court ruled that

Sierra had been convicted of distribution of a controlled substance. At the

sentencing hearing, Sierra admitted that he had been charged and convicted in

Utah because he had sold crack cocaine to an undercover police officer. This

admitted conduct constitutes distribution of a controlled substance and falls

within § 2L1.2's definition of a drug trafficking offense. See § 2L1.2, comment.

(n.1(B)(iv)); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Sierra’s admission that he distributed crack

cocaine and the information in the Utah judgment are sufficient to establish his

prior conviction for a drug trafficking offense. See United States v. MendozaSanchez, 456 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Garcia-Arrellano,

522 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 2008). The district court did not err in applying the

12 level enhancement.

Sierra also argues claims he should not have been convicted and sentenced

under § 1326(b)(2) because his sole prior conviction in Utah has not been shown

to qualify as an “aggravated felony.” An aggravated felony is defined in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a) as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a drug

trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).” § 1101(a)(43)(B). 

Section 924(c) defines a drug trafficking crime as, inter alia, “any felony

punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).” 

Sierra’s prior Utah conviction for distribution of a controlled substance thus

qualifies as an aggravated felony. See § 841(a), and his contention to the

contrary is without merit. 

AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 11-40426 Document: 00511663239 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/11/2011