IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LATROY MOORE, *

*

 Plaintiff, * CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00070-B

 *

vs. *

*

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

ORDER

Plaintiff LaTroy Moore (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security denying his claim for a period of disability, 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income 

under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

401, et seq., and 1381, et seq. On October 9, 2015, the parties 

consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all 

proceedings in this case. (Doc. 19). Thus, the action was 

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order 

the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful consideration 

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, 

it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be 

AFFIRMED.

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his applications for benefits on August 16, 

2011. (Tr. 166-68). Plaintiff alleged that he has been 

disabled since December 30, 2009, due to “right knee, right leg, 

right ankle, [and] depression.” (Id. at 209, 214). Plaintiff 

did not allege any intellectual limitations in his disability 

applications, nor did he claim any intellectual limitations at 

his hearing.1 (Id. at 48, 214, 408). 

Plaintiff’s applications were denied and upon timely 

request, he was granted an administrative hearing before 

Administrative Law Judge Mary E. Helmer (hereinafter “ALJ”) on 

May 8, 2013. (Id. at 48). Plaintiff attended the hearing with 

his counsel and provided testimony related to his physical 

impairments. (Id. at 51). A vocational expert (“VE”) also 

appeared at the hearing and provided testimony. (Id. at 60). 

On June 13, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding 

that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 37). The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 16, 

2014. (Id. at 1-2). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated June 

13, 2013, became the final decision of the Commissioner. 

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff 

 1 After Plaintiff’s administrative hearing, his attorney 

submitted a report from Dr. Donald Blanton, Ph.D., containing a 

diagnosis of mild mental retardation and a Full Scale IQ score 

of 62. (Tr. 408-09).

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timely filed the present civil action. (Doc. 1). The parties 

waived oral argument on October 9, 2015 (Doc. 18), and agree 

that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly 

before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3).

II. Issues on Appeal

1. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to find 

that Plaintiff meets the criteria for 

Listing 12.05C and in rejecting the 

opinion and diagnosis of Plaintiff’s 

consulting psychologist, Dr. Donald 

Blanton, Ph.D.?

2. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the 

opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Perry Timberlake, M.D. 

regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s 

pain and physical limitations?

III. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on March 15, 1976, and was thirty-seven

years of age at the time of his administrative hearing on May 8, 

2013. (Tr. 48, 209). Plaintiff testified that he was enrolled 

in special education classes in high school and was unable to 

pass the high school graduation exam, but that he completed the 

twelfth grade. 2 (Id. at 265, 359). Plaintiff received his 

certificate of graduation. (Id. at 265).

 2 Plaintiff testified that he took the high school graduation 

exam three times but could not pass it. (Tr. 54). The record 

also shows that Plaintiff repeated the fifth grade. (Id. at 

359). 

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According to Plaintiff’s Disability Report, he last worked 

as a brick mason helper for various contractors for 

approximately eleven years, from 1995 to 2006. (Id. at 51, 201, 

359). In addition, he mowed lawns. (Id. at 60, 207). 

Plaintiff testified that he injured his knee playing 

football, that he has had knee problems his whole life, and that 

he can no longer work because of his knee and ankle pain and 

swelling. (Id. at 52-54, 284). An MRI taken in 2009 revealed a 

torn right lateral meniscus. (Id. at 54, 287). Plaintiff did 

not have surgery because he could not afford it. (Id.). His 

treatment has consisted of injections, draining fluid off of his 

knee once, and pain medications. (Id. at 56, 59). His 

medications make him drowsy, and he has to lay down for 

approximately three hours each day.3 (Id. at 57-58). Plaintiff 

reported that he has never sought mental health care because he 

had “no reason” to do so. (Id. at 358).

Plaintiff testified that he lives alone in a mobile home 

and that his mother does all of his cooking, cleaning, and 

shopping. (Id. at 52, 58). He can walk half of a football 

field, can stand for five minutes, and has problems sitting. 

(Id. at 57). In his Function Report, Plaintiff stated that he 

can take care of his personal needs such as bathing, feeding, 

 3 Plaintiff’s current medications include Lortab (for pain), 

Amitriptyline (for nerves and sleep), Prednisone (for 

arthritis), and Celebrex (for arthritis). (Tr. 56, 266). 

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and using the toilet, but needs help shaving. (Id. at 237). He 

does not use any assistive devices, such as a cane or walker. 

(Id. at 242).

Plaintiff stated that he can count change but cannot pay 

bills or handle a savings account or a check book; he can pay

attention for about thirty minutes; he does not follow written 

instructions well and cannot handle stress well; and he has 

never been fired from a job because of problems getting along 

with other people. (Id. at 239, 241-42). He has a driver’s 

license, which he obtained after taking the written driving test 

five times, but he no longer drives because he has nothing to 

drive. (Id. at 54, 239). He enjoys reading newspapers and 

books and writing poetry. (Id. at 359, 409). 

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s 

role is a limited one. The Court’s review is limited to 

determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is 

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct 

legal standards were applied. 4 Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may not decide the facts 

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that 

 4 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal 

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

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of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th 

Cir. 1986). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be 

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. 

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.”). In determining whether substantial 

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking 

into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the 

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4

(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).

B. Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability 

benefits must prove his or her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1512, 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations 

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provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for 

determining if a claimant has proven his disability.5 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 

30, 2009, the alleged onset date, and that he has the severe 

impairments of obesity and right knee meniscus tear. (Tr. 35). 

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any 

 5 The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the 

claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant 

proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets 

or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is 

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or 

work experience. If the claimant cannot prevail at the third 

step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the 

claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In 

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the 

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective 

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, 

education and work history. Id. Once a claimant meets this 

burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the 

fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy, given the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 

1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such 

jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability 

to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. 

Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

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of the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 38). 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retains the residual 

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to perform a range of 

light work, except that “he should be allowed to alternate 

between sitting and standing positions every sixty minutes;” he 

“cannot operate foot controls with his right leg;” he “cannot 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Kneel, crouch, or crawl;” 

he “should not be exposed to vibration, unprotected heights, or 

hazardous machinery;” he “is limited to performing simple, 

routine, and repetitive tasks, making simple, work-related 

decisions, and being exposed to few, if any, work place 

changes.” (Id. at 38). The ALJ also determined that while 

Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, his statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

the alleged symptoms are only partially credible for the reasons 

explained in the decision. (Id. at 40).

Given Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not 

capable of performing his past work as a brick mason helper 

(heavy, semi-skilled), lawn mower (medium, semi-skilled), 

construction laborer (very heavy, unskilled), or fish cleaner 

(medium, unskilled). (Id. at 40). However, utilizing the

testimony of a VE, the ALJ concluded that considering

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Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for a range of light 

work, as well as his age, education and work experience, there 

are also other jobs existing in the national economy that 

Plaintiff is able to perform, such as “cashier”, “storage 

facility rental clerk,” and “self-service attendant,” all of 

which are classified as light and unskilled. (Id. at 41). 

Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 

42).

The Court now considers the foregoing in light of the 

record in this case and the issues on appeal. 

1. Issues

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to find 

that Plaintiff meets the criteria for 

Listing 12.05C and in rejecting the 

opinion and diagnosis of Plaintiff’s 

consulting psychologist, Dr. Donald 

Blanton, Ph.D.?

In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 

failing to find that he meets the criteria for Listing 12.05C 

(mental retardation), that the ALJ erred in rejecting the 

opinion of Dr. Donald Blanton, Ph.D., that Plaintiff has 

deficits in adaptive functioning in the areas of communication, 

work, use of community resources, and functional academic 

skills, and that the ALJ erred in rejecting the diagnosis of Dr. 

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Blanton that Plaintiff is mildly mentally retarded.6 According 

to Plaintiff, his Full Scale IQ score of 62, combined with Dr. 

Blanton’s diagnosis of mild mental retardation and opinion that 

Plaintiff has deficits in adaptive functioning, satisfy the 

cognitive criteria of Listing 12.05C (mental retardation). 

(Doc. 12 at 2-3, 11). The Commissioner counters that the ALJ 

did not err in finding that Plaintiff does not satisfy the 

cognitive criteria for Listing 12.05C because Dr. Blanton’s 

opinions are inconsistent with the substantial evidence in the 

case and, thus, properly discredited, and because Plaintiff’s 

Full Scale IQ score of 62 is not an accurate reflection of his 

capabilities. To the contrary, Defendant argues, the 

substantial evidence (such as Plaintiff’s work history of semiskilled employment and his activities of daily living, which

include reading books and newspapers and writing poetry) reflect 

adaptive functioning much higher than his IQ score would 

indicate. (Doc. 15 at 9-10). Thus, Defendant maintains, 

Plaintiff does not have the requisite deficits in adaptive 

functioning needed to meet the criteria of 12.05C. (Id.). 

Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, the Court 

agrees that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.

In order for Plaintiff to meet Listing 12.05C (mental 

 6 Because these three issues are inextricably interwoven, the 

Court discusses them together.

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retardation), he must present evidence of “[a] valid verbal, 

performance or full scale IQ of 60-70 and a physical or other 

mental impairment imposing an additional and significant workrelated limitation of function.”7

 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1 § 12.05(C). In addition, he must satisfy the 

“diagnostic description” of mental retardation in Listing 12.05 

(the listing category for mental retardation/intellectual 

disability), 8 which provides that mental retardation “refers to 

 7 For purposes of Listing 12.05C, the second prong requirement is 

met once there is a finding that the claimant has an additional 

severe impairment because the requirement of “significant workrelated limitation of function” “involves something more than 

‘minimal’ but less than ‘severe.’” Johnson v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 13497, *7, 2014 WL 413492, *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 

2014) (quoting Edwards by Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 

1515 (11th Cir. 1985)). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s 

obesity and right knee meniscus tear to be severe, and the 

parties do not dispute that finding. (Tr. 35). Therefore, the 

second prong of Listing 12.05C, requiring a physical or other 

mental impairment imposing an additional and significant workrelated limitation of function, is not in dispute in this 

action.

8 On August 1, 2013, the Social Security Administration amended 

Listing 12.05 by replacing the words “mental retardation” with 

“intellectual disability.” See Hickel v. Commissioner of Soc. 

Sec., 539 Fed. Appx. 980, 982 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing 78 

Fed. Reg. 46,499, 46,501, to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

subpt. P, app. 1)). “This change was made because the term 

‘mental retardation’ has negative connotations, and has become 

offensive to many people. Id. (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The Social Security Administration 

stated that the change does not affect the actual medical 

definition of the disorder or available programs or services.” 

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As in 

Hickel, this opinion uses the term “mental retardation” and 

“intellectual disability” interchangeably. 

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significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with 

deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the 

developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or 

supports onset of the impairment before age 22.” 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, §§ 12.05; see also Perkins v. 

Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 F. Appx. 870, 873 (11th Cir. 

2014) (Listing 12.05(C) “requires a showing that the claimant 

meets the diagnostic criteria of Listing 12.05, including 

deficits in adaptive functioning; a qualifying IQ score; onset 

before age 22; and the requisite deficits in work-related 

functioning.”).

The law in this Circuit provides that a valid IQ score of 

60-70 creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant 

manifested deficits in adaptive functioning prior to the age of 

twenty-two. See Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1268-69 

(llth Cir. 2001). Thus, “a claimant meets the criteria for 

presumptive disability under section 12.05C when the claimant 

presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 to 70 inclusive, and evidence 

of an additional mental or physical impairment that has more 

than a ‘minimal effect’ on the claimant’s ability to perform 

basic work activities.” Smith v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 535 

Fed. Appx. 894, 897 (llth Cir. 2013)(quoting Lowery v. Sullivan, 

979 F. 2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992)). 

The presumption under 12.05C can be rebutted, however, when 

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the IQ score is inconsistent with record evidence of a 

claimant’s work history, daily activities, and behavior. 9 See

 9 In addressing the “adaptive functioning” aspect of Listing 

12.05C, the Eleventh Circuit has sustained the rejection of 

claims under this Listing where the claimant’s IQ score was 

significantly inconsistent with his/her adaptive functioning, 

despite a qualifying IQ score. For example, in Perkins v. 

Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 553 Fed. Appx. 870 (llth Cir. 

2014), the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ALJ’s finding that 

Listing 12.05C was not met where the plaintiff performed skilled 

jobs, including as a skilled cook, managed other workers, and 

made contradictory claims regarding his education and employment 

history. Also, in Hickel v. Commissioner, 539 Fed. Appx. 980, 

984 (llth Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit held that the ALJ did 

not err where he acknowledged that the claimant had a valid IQ 

score between 60 and 70, applied the presumption established by 

Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F. 3d 1265, 1268-69 (llth Cir. 2001), 

and found that the presumption was rebutted by other evidence 

that showed that the claimant did not have “deficits in adaptive 

functioning.” In reaching that decision, the court noted that, 

although the claimant had been enrolled in special education 

classes, she worked part-time in a nursery, was a high school 

graduate, prepared simple meals, dressed herself, drove herself 

to work, attended church regularly, and socialized with friends. 

Id. at 984-985. See also Popp, 779 F.2d at 1499-1500 (affirming 

finding that Listing 12.05C was not met where the plaintiff had 

worked skilled jobs, obtained a college degree, and had 

exaggerated his deficits when examined); White v. Colvin, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28277, 2015 WL 1013117, *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 

2015) (The ALJ properly found that, despite a Full Scale IQ 

score of 63, the plaintiff did not have significant limitations 

in adaptive functioning where the record reflected that, 

although the plaintiff had been in special education classes, he 

lived alone, maintained his financial affairs, and consistently 

worked at several different jobs); Robinson v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 43338, 2015 WL 1520431, *11 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 2, 2015) 

(where the plaintiff lived independently without a highly 

supportive living arrangement, cared for her personal needs, and 

had a significant work history, the ALJ properly found that her 

Full Scale IQ score of 60 was inconsistent with the record 

evidence regarding her daily activities); Johnson, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 13497, 2014 WL 413492, at *4 (although the ALJ never 

stated that the claimant failed to meet Listing 12.05C, the 

ALJ’s finding that, despite a Full Scale IQ score of 62, the 

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Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (llth Cir. 1986). 

Indeed, neither a diagnosis of mental retardation nor a valid IQ 

score is conclusive of mental retardation where the diagnosis 

and IQ score are inconsistent with other record evidence 

regarding the claimant’s daily living activities and behavior. 

See Robinson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43338 at *32, 2015 WL 

1520431 at *11; Perkins, 553 Fed. Appx. at 873-74. Accordingly, 

the ALJ is tasked with determining whether there is sufficient 

evidence (relating to plaintiff’s daily life) to rebut the 

presumption. See Grant v. Astrue, 255 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (llth 

Cir. 2007); Hartman v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91467, *7, 

2014 WL 3058550, *3 (S.D. Ala. July 7, 2014).

In addition, as part of the disability determination 

process, the ALJ is tasked with weighing the opinions and 

findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians. 

In reaching a decision, the ALJ must specify the weight given to 

 

claimant had high adaptive skills, i.e., he had the capacity to 

take care of his own needs, perform activities of daily living, 

and had successfully performed four different jobs since leaving 

high school, was sufficient to support his decision that the 

claimant was not mentally retarded); Lyons v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 128950 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2009), adopted by 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48535, 2009 WL 1657388 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 

2009)(The ALJ’s finding that the claimant did not meet Listing 

12.05(C) was supported by substantial evidence that demonstrated 

that the claimant had a high school diploma, was not in special 

education classes, completed his own social security forms, and 

had earnings from 1983 – 1990 between $13,696 and $18,408 per 

year). 

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different medical opinions and the reasons for doing so. See

Winschel v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th 

Cir. 2011). The failure to do so is reversible error. See

Williams v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12010, *4, 2009 WL 

413541, *1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 

Whether considering the opinions of treating, examining, or 

non-examining physicians, good cause exists to discredit the 

testimony of any medical source when it is contrary to or 

unsupported by the evidence of record. Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004). “Good cause may also 

exist where a doctor’s opinions are merely conclusory, 

inconsistent with the doctor’s medical records, or unsupported 

by objective medical evidence.” Hogan v. Astrue, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 108512, *8, 2012 WL 3155570, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2012). 

The ALJ is “free to reject the opinion of any physician when the 

evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Sryock v. Heckler, 

764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted); Adamo v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 365 Fed. Appx. 

209, 212 (11th Cir. 2010) (The ALJ may reject any medical 

opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.).

In the present case, Plaintiff has presented a diagnosis of 

mild mental retardation from examining psychologist Dr. Blanton, 

as well as Dr. Blanton’s opinion that Plaintiff has deficits in 

adaptive functioning due to mental retardation that manifested 

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prior to age 22 in the areas of “communication, work, use of 

community resources, [and] functional academic skills.” (Tr. 

409). However, as the ALJ found, these opinions are

inconsistent with Dr. Blanton’s own findings, including his 

notations in his evaluation notes that Plaintiff’s “thoughts and 

conversations were simple but logical;” his “[a]ssociations were 

intact;” his “affect was flat but appropriate;” “[n]o confusion 

was noted;” he was “obsessing about his pain;” he was “alert and 

oriented to time, place, person, and situation;” and “[h]is 

judgment was good for work and financial type decisions.” (Id.

at 408). In addition, Dr. Blanton documented that Plaintiff’s 

activities of daily living include living alone, having a 

drivers license, being able to shop and handle his own money, 

going to church, and reading the newspaper. (Id. at 409). 

Also, while Dr. Blanton opined that Plaintiff has marked 

limitations in his ability to “understand detailed or complex

instructions, carry out detailed or complex instructions, 

remember detailed or complex instructions, [and] use judgment in 

detailed or complex work-related decisions” (emphasis added), he 

did not find similar limitations with respect to simple, routine

instructions or decisions.10 (Id. at 410).

 10 The Court notes that Dr. Blanton also opined that Plaintiff “is 

likely to deteriorate emotionally if [he] is placed under 

additional stress[,] especially that of a job.” (Tr. 409-10). 

Dr. Blanton appears to base this opinion on a diagnosis of 

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In addition to being inconsistent with his own findings, 

Dr. Blanton’s opinions are inconsistent with the remaining 

substantial evidence in this case, including the following:

Plaintiff reported to the Agency that he worked for 

approximately eleven years (from 1995 to 2006) in semi-skilled 

jobs (id. at 51, 60, 201, 207, 359). Plaintiff reported to both

consultative psychologists Dr. Blanton and Dr. Reynolds that he 

enjoys reading newspapers and books and writing poetry (id. at 

359, 409). Plaintiff lives alone and takes care of his own 

personal needs. (Id. at 52, 58, 237). Although it took 

multiple attempts, Plaintiff completed the written driving test

and has a driver’s license and is able to drive. (Id. at 54, 

239). Plaintiff was enrolled in special education classes and 

did not pass the high school graduation exam; however, he 

successfully completed the twelfth grade. (Id. at 265, 359). 

In addition, psychological consultant, Dr. Richard Reynolds, 

Ph.D., examined Plaintiff on October 31, 2011, and documented 

that Plaintiff reported last working in 2009 and doing masonry 

work (semi-skilled work) for years. (Id. at 359). Plaintiff 

 

depression. (Id.). However, his own testing conducted during 

his consultative evaluation of Plaintiff on May 1, 2013, 

revealed that Plaintiff was only “moderately” depressed, which 

does not support the severity of limitations expressed in this 

opinion. In any event, whether based on the diagnosis of 

depression or the diagnosis of mild mental retardation, this 

opinion is inconsistent with the substantial evidence in this 

case, as discussed herein.

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also reported to Dr. Reynolds that he “conducts [his] activities 

of daily living without assistance,” that he has friends and 

gets together with his friends regularly, that he attends 

church, that he has never sought mental health treatment because 

there is “no reason,” and that his primary reason for seeking 

disability is problems with his right knee and ankle. (Id. at 

358-60). While Dr. Reynolds noted that Plaintiff’s answers to

some questions that he posed were inconsistent with a person who 

had graduated from high school, he nonetheless observed that

Plaintiff was cooperative, alert, and oriented to all spheres, 

that his speech was within normal limits, that his behavior was 

unremarkable, that his thought content was logical, that his 

thought associations were tight, that his insight was 

appropriate, and that his judgment was appropriate. (Id. at 

359-60). Dr. Reynolds opined that Plaintiff “likely presents 

with no deficits in ability [to] understand and remember,” that 

“[h]e may have mild difficulty in carrying out instructions due 

to Major Depressive Disorder,” that he is likely to have mild

difficulties in responding appropriately to supervisors, coworkers, and the public, or work stressors, in a work setting 

due to issues[/]problems related to Major Depressive Disorder 

and Generalized Anxiety Disorder,” and that Plaintiff “would not 

need assistance with any awarded funds.” (Id. at 360) (emphasis 

added).

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Dr. Blanton’s 

opinions related to Plaintiff’s deficits in adaptive functioning 

are inconsistent with the substantial evidence in this case, 

including Plaintiff’s work history, Plaintiff’s activities of 

daily living, and the medical opinions of consultative 

psychologist Dr. Reynolds. Therefore, they were properly given 

“little weight” by the ALJ. (Id. at 37, 410).

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s evidence that he was 

in special education classes in high school, that he failed the 

high school graduation examination after taking it three times, 

that he repeated the fifth grade, and that his math, reading, 

and spelling scores on tests conducted by Dr. Blanton were on 

the fourth and fifth grade levels. (Doc. 12 at 2-3, 9-11). 

However, given the substantial evidence in this case that 

Plaintiff’s adaptive functioning is well above that of a person 

with mild mental retardation, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 

rebuttal of the Hodges presumption is supported by substantial 

evidence. See Johnson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13497, 2014 WL 

413492, *4 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2014)(where claimant had a Full 

Scale IQ score of 62, placing him in the range of mild mental 

retardation, and tested at the fourth grade level in math, 

reading and spelling, the ALJ’s finding that claimant had high 

adaptive skills, including the capacity to take care of his own 

needs, perform activities of daily living, and successfully 

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 19 of 26
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perform four different jobs after leaving high school, was 

sufficient to support the decision that the claimant did not 

meet the requirements for Listing 12.05C). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s claim must fail.

B. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the 

opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Perry Timberlake, M.D. 

regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s 

pain and physical limitations?

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the 

opinions of his treating physician, Dr. Perry Timberlake, M.D., 

that he is unable to work because of his upper extremity 

problems, knee problems, and associated pain. (Doc. 12 at 13-

14). The Commissioner counters that the ALJ did not err in 

rejecting Dr. Timberlake’s opinions because those opinions are 

inconsistent with the substantial evidence in this case. (Doc. 

15 at 11). Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, 

the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. 

Generally speaking, “[i]f a treating physician’s opinion on 

the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with the other 

substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ must give it 

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 20 of 26
21

controlling weight.” 11 Roth v. Astrue, 249 Fed. Appx. 167, 168 

(11th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). “An 

administrative law judge must accord substantial or considerable 

weight to the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician unless 

good cause is shown to the contrary.” Broughton v. Heckler, 776 

F.2d 960, 961 (11th Cir. 1985)(citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

As discussed above, “[t]he requisite ‘good cause’ for 

discounting a treating physician’s opinion may exist where the 

opinion is not supported by the evidence,” “where the evidence 

supports a contrary finding,” or where the doctor’s opinions are 

merely conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical 

records. Hogan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108512 at *8, 2012 WL 

3155570 at *3. “[T]he weight afforded a treating doctor’s 

opinion must be specified along with ‘any reason for giving it 

no weight, and failure to do so is reversible error.’” 

Williams, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12010 at *4, 2009 WL 413541 at

*1.

In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of obesity and right knee meniscus tear; however,

the ALJ found, Plaintiff is able to perform a range of light

 11 “Controlling weight” is defined as a medical opinion from a 

treating source that must be adopted. See SSR 96–2P, 1996 SSR 

LEXIS 9, *3, 1996 WL 374188, *1 (1996). 

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 21 of 26
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work, with restrictions, such as being allowed to alternate 

between sitting and standing positions every sixty minutes, not 

operating foot controls with his right leg, and no climbing, 

kneeling, crouching, or crawling. (Id. at 35, 38, 40-41). As 

Plaintiff points out, the ALJ assigned “very little weight” to 

the opinions of his treating physician, Dr. Timberlake, that 

Plaintiff cannot engage in any form of gainful employment 

because of upper extremity problems, right knee problems, and 

associated pain. (Id. at 40, 393-94, 397). Having reviewed the 

record at length, the Court finds that Dr. Timberlake’s opinions 

are inconsistent with the substantial evidence in this case and, 

thus, were properly discredited by the ALJ. 

The record reveals that on April 25, 2012, Dr. Timberlake 

completed a Clinical Assessment of Pain form opining that 

Plaintiff’s pain is “intractable” and “virtually 

incapacitating,” that physical activity would increase his pain 

to an extent that bed rest would be necessary, and that his

medication would place severe limitations on even the simplest 

of tasks. (Id. at 393). In addition, on that same date, Dr. 

Timberlake opined in a Medical Source Statement (Physical)

(“MSS”) that Plaintiff can sit and stand/walk for only one hour 

in an eight-hour workday, can lift/carry no more than one pound 

frequently and five pounds occasionally, can never climb, bend,

or reach overhead, can rarely grasp or handle, and can rarely 

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 22 of 26
23

push or pull with his arms or legs. (Id. at 394). Also, in his 

treatment notes dated February 3, 2012, Dr. Timberlake noted, 

“this patient is completely and totally disabled to do gainful 

work now or in the future.” (Id. at 397). 

As the ALJ found, although Dr. Timberlake treated Plaintiff 

from August 2009 to the date of the hearing in May 2013, his 

opinions, which render Plaintiff unable to sit, stand, or walk 

for more than one hour a day and unable to lift or carry more 

than one pound frequently, are inconsistent with Dr. 

Timberlake’s own treatment notes, which do not document this 

severe level of functional limitations. 12 For example, as 

stated, Dr. Timberlake opined in the Medical Source Statement 

(Physical) that Plaintiff can lift/carry no more than one pound 

frequently and five pounds occasionally, can rarely grasp or 

handle with his fingers, can rarely push or pull with his arms, 

and can never reach overhead. (Id. at 394). However, at the 

time that Dr. Timberlake rendered those opinions on April 25, 

2012, he had never noted complaints by Plaintiff regarding his 

upper extremities, with the one exception of a single reference 

to Plaintiff complaining of right hand pain on August 8, 2012. 

(Id. at 380-97, 412-20). Two years after Dr. Timberlake

rendered these opinions, the record shows that in July and 

 12 The ALJ found Dr. Timberlake’s opinions to be “grossly 

inconsistent” with the objective evidence. (Tr. 40).

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 23 of 26
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September, 2014, Plaintiff complained of bilateral arm and 

shoulder pain, for which Dr. Timberlake treated him with 

Hydrocodone, Cymbalta, and Celebrex. (Id. at 10-12). In 

addition, Dr. Timberlake’s opinions regarding the severity of 

Plaintiff’s knee problems and pain are contradicted by his 

contemporaneous note in the MSS that Plaintiff requires no 

assistive device to ambulate (id. at 394). Moreover, all of Dr. 

Timberlake’s opinions (including Plaintiff’s severe and 

disabling limitations in both his upper and lower extremities) 

are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s own statements that he lives 

alone, that he takes care of all of his own personal care needs, 

and that he conducts his activities of daily living without 

assistance. (Id. at 237, 359). 

Dr. Timberlake’s opinions are also inconsistent with the 

remaining medical evidence in this case, including the treatment 

notes of orthopedist, Dr. Anthony Tropeano, M.D., who treated 

Plaintiff on August 31, 2009, for right knee pain. Dr. 

Tropeano’s notes reflect that he ordered an MRI, which showed a 

lateral meniscus tear; however, it does not appear that 

Plaintiff ever returned to Dr. Tropeano for any further 

treatment. (Id. at 284-87). Although Plaintiff testified that 

Dr. Tropeano wanted to perform surgery to repair the knee and 

that Plaintiff could not afford it, there is no notation in Dr. 

Tropeano’s records or any other physician’s records (including 

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 24 of 26
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Dr. Timberlake’s) recommending surgery. (Id. at 54).

In addition, consultative physician, Dr. John Mitchell, 

M.D., examined Plaintiff two years later, on October 28, 2011, 

and noted full range of motion in upper extremities (“arms, 

hands, and fingers”), normal dexterity, normal grip strength, 

normal balance, “mild” limp on right leg, reduced range of 

motion and tenderness over the right knee, “mild crepitus” upon 

flexion of the right knee, normal heel/toe walk, normal 

reflexes, and no assistive device used. (Id. at 350-54). Dr. 

Mitchell concluded “need further work up for his right knee 

pain.” (Id. at 355).

As the ALJ found, the record shows that Plaintiff suffers 

from the severe impairment of a right knee meniscus tear that 

has required medication and injection treatment in a physician’s 

office and in a hospital emergency room (id. at 293, 334) with 

pain medication. However, neither the substantial medical 

evidence, nor the evidence of Plaintiff’s activities of daily 

living, supports Dr. Timberlake’s opinions that Plaintiff is 

unable to engage in any form of gainful employment because of 

his upper extremity and right knee problems and associated pain. 

(Id. at 393-94, 397). Therefore, the ALJ had good cause to 

discredit those opinions. In addition, the Court finds that the 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a range of light work, with the 

Case 2:15-cv-00070-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 25 of 26
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stated restrictions. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is without 

merit.

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful 

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the 

parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a 

period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income be AFFIRMED.

DONE this 29th day of March, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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