[Cite as State v. Collins, 2020-Ohio-317.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JAMES (JAMIE) COLLINS 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 19CA011462 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 16CR95076 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: February 3, 2020 

 

CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant James Collins appeals from the judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} In November 2016, an indictment was filed charging Collins with one count of 

felonious assault, four counts of endangering children, and one count of domestic violence. In 

December 2017, a supplemental indictment was filed charging Collins with three additional 

counts of felonious assault, three additional counts of endangering children, and three additional 

counts of domestic violence. It was alleged that, during 2016, Collins had repeatedly abused her 

boyfriend’s three-year old daughter. 

{¶3} In October 2018, Collins entered a guilty plea to the indictment. A presentence 

investigation (“PSI”) report was ordered. Both the State and Collins filed a sentencing 

memorandum. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from Collins, Collins’ counsel, the 
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State, the victim’s caseworker, the victim’s maternal grandfather, and the victim’s mother. The 

trial court sentenced Collins to an aggregate term of 26 years in prison. 

{¶4} Collins moved for leave to file a delayed appeal, which this Court granted. 

Collins has raised four assignments of error for our review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ACCEPTED APPELLANT’S GUILTY 

PLEA AFTER IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING ON THE EFFECT OF SAID 

PLEA DURING THE CRIMINAL RULE 11 COLLOQUY[.] 

{¶5} Collins argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court erred in accepted 

her guilty plea as the trial court failed to inform her that her guilty plea was a complete 

admission of her guilt. See Crim.R. 11(B); see also Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). 

{¶6} “To satisfy the requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial 

court must inform the defendant of the appropriate language under Crim.R. 11(B).” (Internal 

quotations and citation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27550, 2016-Ohio-480, 

¶ 7. Because Collins pleaded guilty to the charges in this matter, the trial court consequently had 

to inform her, that “[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Id., 

quoting Crim.R. 11(B). “While [l]iteral compliance with Crim.R. 11 is preferred, such 

compliance is not required when the trial court informs the defendant of a nonconstitutional 

right, such as [t]he right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt[.]” 

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. “Consequently, in cases involving the trial 

court’s explanation of the effect of a guilty plea, we must only engage in ‘a substantial 

compliance analysis.’” Id., quoting State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 12. 
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{¶7} “Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so 

long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the defendant subjectively understands the 

implications of h[er] plea and the rights [s]he is waiving, the plea may be upheld.” (Internal 

quotations and citation omitted.) State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 31. 

“When the trial judge does not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 in regard to a 

nonconstitutional right, reviewing courts must determine whether the trial court partially 

complied or failed to comply with the rule. If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by 

mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be vacated only if 

the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at ¶ 32. “If the trial 

judge completely failed to comply with the rule, e.g., by not informing the defendant of a 

mandatory period of postrelease control, the plea must be vacated.” Id.

{¶8} At the plea hearing, the trial court asked Collins if she wished to change her plea 

to guilty to the charges in the indictment. Collins responded that she did. Contrary to Collins’ 

argument on appeal, the trial court then described each of the 15 counts and listed the possible 

penalties. After a discussion of Collins’ constitutional rights, the trial court had the following 

colloquy with Collins: 

[Trial court:] Now, since you are entering a plea of guilty, we are not going to 

have a trial obviously. And if there’s no trial, your rights to appeal a sentence that 

I impose, those rights are more limited now. Do you understand that? 

In other words, you can’t say, well, I’m going to appeal because I’m not guilty, 

because you are making an admission here today of guilt. Do you understand 

that? 

[Collins:] Yes, Your Honor. 

* * * 

[Trial court:] When someone comes to court, Ms. Collins, and says, Judge, I want 

to change my plea from not guilty to guilty, you are making an admission to me 

on the record. You are saying, you know, Judge, I am taking responsibility for 
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violating the law and I am willing to give up my constitutional right to have a trial 

and all these other rights you have just gone over on the record with me. I just 

want to get the case over with, put it behind me and try to move on with my life. 

Is that a pretty fair summary of what you understand? 

[Collins:] Yes, Your Honor. 

{¶9} The trial court then discussed the written plea form, which Collins acknowledged 

signing. Collins stated that she reviewed the agreement with counsel, that counsel explained it to 

her, and that she read every word of it. That agreement included a statement that Collins’ 

counsel explained the consequences of her plea. At the end of the colloquy, the trial court 

accepted Collins’ plea and found that Collins “underst[ood] the nature of the charges, the effect 

of her plea, as well as the maximum penalties which could be imposed.” 

{¶10} Here, while the trial court did not use the exact language from Crim.R. 11(B), we 

conclude that it substantially complied with the required notification. See Clark at 31. The trial 

court informed Collins that she was “making an admission here today of guilt[,]” while Crim.R. 

11(B) provides that “[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Collins subjectively understood 

the implications of her plea and the rights she was waiving. See id. Moreover, even if we were 

to conclude that the trial court only partially complied with the required notification, Collins has 

not set forth any argument demonstrating that she was prejudiced. See id. at ¶ 32. 

{¶11} Collins’ first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ALLOW APPELLANT 

TO RESPOND TO OR REBUT THE NEW MATERIAL INTRODUCED 

DURING THE VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AS REQUIRED UNDER R.C. 

2930.14(B)[.] 
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{¶12} Collins argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred in failing 

to allow her to respond to new information introduced during the victim impact statement at the 

sentencing hearing. Collins argues that the trial court improperly relied upon statements made 

by the victim’s caseworker. 

{¶13} In support of her argument, Collins points to R.C. 2930.14(B), which states: 

The court shall consider a victim’s statement made under division (A) of this 

section along with other factors that the court is required to consider in imposing 

sentence or in determining the order of disposition. If the statement includes new 

material facts, the court shall not rely on the new material facts unless it continues 

the sentencing or dispositional proceeding or takes other appropriate action to 

allow the defendant or alleged juvenile offender an adequate opportunity to 

respond to the new material facts. 

{¶14} “[A]n appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it 

determines by clear and convincing evidence” that: (1) “the record does not support the trial 

court’s findings under relevant statutes,” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State 

v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. This Court is unable to properly review 

this assignment of error, however, as the record does not contain the PSI report, which the trial 

court considered in imposing sentence. Accordingly, we cannot determine whether the facts 

allegedly relied upon by the trial court were in fact “new material facts” as required by the 

statute. See R.C. 2930.14(B). “It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the record on 

appeal contains all matters necessary to allow this Court to resolve the issues on appeal. [If] an 

appellant does not provide a complete record to facilitate our review, we must presume regularity 

in the trial court’s proceedings and affirm.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. 

Shelton, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011368, 2019-Ohio-1694, ¶ 7. Given the foregoing, Collins 

has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in imposing the sentence. 

{¶15} Collins’ second assignment of error is overruled. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 

PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.11, AND WHEN 

IT FAILED TO BALANCE THE FACTORS OF SERIOUSNESS AND 

RECIDIVISM PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.12(D) AND R.C. 2929.12(E) PRIOR 

TO SENTENCING[.] 

{¶16} Collins argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court failed to 

consider the principles and purposes of sentencing and failed to balance the seriousness and 

recidivism factors in sentencing her. 

{¶17} First, the sentencing transcript makes it clear that the trial court considered the 

principles and purposes of sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11. The trial court, prior to 

sentencing Collins, specifically listed several of the considerations set forth in R.C. 2929.11. As 

to Collins’ claim that the trial court failed to appropriately balance the recidivism factors in R.C. 

2929.12, this Court is unable to properly review this assignment of error as well. As discussed 

above, the trial court utilized the PSI report in fashioning Collins’ sentence and that report is not 

part of this Court’s record on appeal. “[W]ithout the context that the PSI report might provide, 

we cannot conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that [Collins’] 

sentence is contrary to law.” Shelton, 2019-Ohio-1694, ¶ 8. Given the incomplete record before 

us, we are required to presume regularity in the trial court’s proceedings and overrule this 

assignment of error. See id. at ¶ 7. 

{¶18} Collins’ third assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESENT 

MITIGATION AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING[.] 

{¶19} Collins argues in her fourth assignment of error that her trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to present mitigation evidence at the time of sentencing. 
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{¶20} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Collins must 

show that trial “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 

that prejudice arose from counsel’s performance.” State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 674 

(1998), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Collins must show that 

counsel’s performance was objectively deficient by producing evidence that counsel acted 

unreasonably. State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534 (1997), citing Strickland at 687. Second, 

Collins must demonstrate that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the 

results of the trial would have been different. Keith at 534. 

{¶21} Collins alleges that “[t]rial counsel failed to mitigate any of the factors set forth in 

R.C. 2929.12 or present any evidence in mitigation prior to the trial court imposing sentence.” 

Additionally, she asserts that, “[a]lthough trial counsel mentioned that Appellant had completed 

programs, he did not highlight any of the factors that showed that Appellant’s recidivism was 

low and that community control would not demean the seriousness of the offense and would 

adequately protect the public.” 

{¶22} Collins fails to acknowledge that her trial counsel submitted a sentencing 

memorandum on her behalf that contained numerous attachments including, inter alia, letters of 

support, certificates from programs that she had completed, employment records, and records 

demonstrating that Collins paid child support for her own children. When trial counsel was 

given the opportunity to speak at the hearing, he brought this filing to the trial court’s attention. 

In addition, at the beginning of the hearing, the trial court noted that it had just received a packet 

of additional information from trial counsel that the trial court took the time to review prior to 

commencing the hearing. Assuming that packet is different from trial counsel’s sentencing 
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memorandum, which was filed a couple days before the sentencing hearing, that packet is also 

not part of this Court’s record. 

{¶23} Collins has not detailed what additional information trial counsel should have 

presented on her behalf nor has she developed an argument as to how trial counsel’s behavior 

prejudiced her. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Further, in light of the absence of the PSI report, which 

the trial court considered during sentencing, this Court cannot properly review whether anything 

trial counsel did or did not do prejudiced Collins. See Shelton, 2019-Ohio-1694, at ¶ 8. 

{¶24} Collins’ fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶25} Collins’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

CALLAHAN, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

JOSEPH C. PATITUCE, BETHANY R. STEWART, and CATHERINE R. MEEHAN, 

Attorneys at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRIAN P. MURPHY, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.