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[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 2 (Monday, January 5, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 233-239]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30856]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

[Docket No. DHS-2014-0076]

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of Homeland Security 
Transportation Security Administration--DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight 
Records System of Records

AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice Privacy Act System of Records.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of 
Homeland Security proposes to update and reissue a current Department 
of Homeland Security system of records titled, ``Department of Homeland 
Security/Transportation Security Administration--DHS/TSA-019 Secure 
Flight Records System of Records.'' This system of records allows the 
Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration 
to collect and maintain records on aviation passengers and certain non-
travelers to screen such individuals before they access airport sterile 
areas or board aircraft, in order to identify and prevent a threat to 
aviation security or to the lives of passengers and others. TSA is 
reissuing this system of records to update the categories of records to 
include records containing risk-based assessments generated by

[[Page 234]]

aircraft operators using data in their Computer-Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening Systems (CAPPS). These CAPPS assessments are used in risk-
based analysis of Secure Flight and other prescreening data that 
produces a boarding pass printing result for each passenger. This 
change identifies additional passengers who may be eligible for 
expedited screening at airport security checkpoints. This updated 
system will continue to be included in the Department of Homeland 
Security's inventory of record systems. Additionally, this notice 
includes non-substantive changes to simplify the formatting and text of 
the previously published notice.

DATES: Submit comments on or before February 4, 2015. This updated 
system will be effective upon publication except that the change to the 
categories of records will be effective 30 days after date of 
publication in the Federal Register.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS-
2014-0076 by one of the following methods:
     Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-343-4010.
     Mail: Karen L. Neuman, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy 
Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments received will be 
posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov, including any 
personal information provided.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, please visit http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions, please contact: 
Peter Pietra, Privacy Officer, TSA-36, Transportation Security 
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598-6036; email: 
[email protected]. For privacy questions, please contact: Karen L. 
Neuman, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, Department of Homeland 
Security, Washington, DC 20528.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) proposes to update and reissue a current DHS 
system of records titled, ``DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records System of 
Records.'' This system of records notice was last updated on September 
10, 2013.\1\
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    \1\ 78 FR 55270 (Sept. 10, 2013).
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    TSA is modifying DHS/TSA-019 by adding Computer-Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System (CAPPS) assessments received from aircraft 
operators to the Categories of Records. CAPPS assessments are the 
product of a risk analysis of passenger name records (PNR) \2\ and 
other information associated with flight reservations that aircraft 
operators collect in the ordinary course of business. These PNRs and 
other data provide risk indications and are used to assess passenger 
risk on a per flight basis. The CAPPS assessment, in turn, is used in 
the risk-based analysis of Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) \3\ and 
other prescreening data that produce a boarding pass printing result 
for each passenger. The early use of CAPPS by aircraft operators was to 
identify passengers other than those on watch lists who merited 
additional screening. TSA now will incorporate the CAPPS assessment to 
identify low-risk passengers who may be eligible for expedited 
screening in airports with TSA Pre[check][supreg] lanes. By receiving a 
CAPPS assessment (as opposed to the underlying data used to arrive at 
that assessment), TSA obtains important security value from information 
without receiving all the underlying data that are generated when 
individuals make their flight reservations.
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    \2\ A PNR contains details about an individual's travel on a 
particular flight, including information provided by the individual 
when making the flight reservation. Though the content of PNRs 
varies among airlines, PNRs may include: (1) Passenger name; (2) 
reservation date; (3) travel agency or agent; (4) travel itinerary 
information; (5) form of payment; (6) flight number; and (7) seating 
location. See DHS/TSA-017 Secure Flight Test Records, 70 FR 36320 
(June 22, 2005). Some PNR data collected by aircraft operators 
provide evidence of potential security risks, and other data provide 
indications of low security risk. Other PNR data are security 
neutral.
    \3\ SFPD is full name, gender, date of birth, redress number or 
Known Traveler number, passport information (if applicable), 
reservation control number, record sequence number, record type, 
passenger update indicator, traveler reference number, and itinerary 
information. 49 CFR part 1560.
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    TSA established the Secure Flight system of records and published 
the System of Records Notice (SORN) in the Federal Register on August 
23, 2007.\4\ TSA updated and republished the SORN in the Federal 
Register on November 9, 2007,\5\ on November 19, 2012,\6\ and on 
September 10, 2013.
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    \4\ 72 FR 48392.
    \5\ 72 FR 63711.
    \6\ 77 FR 69491.
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Background on CAPPS

    In response to the changing threat of terrorism,\7\ President 
Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security (Commission) in 1996.\8\ In its final report,\9\ the 
Commission recognized that aviation security is a national security 
issue and recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
``work with airlines and airport consortia to ensure that all 
passengers are positively identified and subjected to security 
procedures before they board aircraft.'' \10\ Specifically, the 
Commission recommended that the FAA, ``based on information already in 
[air carriers'] computer databases,'' leverage that industry investment 
by separating passengers ``into a very large majority who present 
little or no risk, and a small minority who merit additional 
attention.'' \11\ The Commission supported the development and 
implementation of automated passenger screening systems such as the 
system then under development by the FAA and Northwest Airlines.
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    \7\ In addition to overseas threats from foreign terrorists, 
people and places in the United States were becoming targets, and 
Americans joined the ranks of terrorists. The 1993 and 1995 bombings 
of the World Trade Center in New York, and the Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, respectively, were clear examples of the shift, as 
was the 1996 conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb 
American airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
    \8\ Executive Order 13015, White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security, 61 FR 43937 (Aug. 22, 1996).
    \9\ White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, 
Final Report to President Clinton, February 12, 1997, found at 
www.fas.org/irp/threat/212fin~1.html (hereinafter Report).
    \10\ Id. at section 3.7.
    \11\ Id. at section 3.19. The Commission noted that the U.S. 
Customs Service (now U.S. Customs and Border Protection) 
successfully used such a system to better focus its resources and 
attention.
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    Following the Commission's report, CAPPS was created by the FAA 
\12\ to serve as a feasible alternative to conducting the Commission-
recommended 100 percent checked baggage matching and explosive 
detection screening.\13\ CAPPS was designed ``to exclude from the 
additional security measures the great majority of passengers who are 
very unlikely to present any threat and, conversely, to identify 
passengers to whom heightened security measures

[[Page 235]]

should be applied.'' \14\ The FAA evaluated whether PNR and other data 
associated with flight reservations that the aircraft operator 
collected in the ordinary course of business provided indicators of 
high security risk or low risk, or whether the data were risk 
neutral.\15\ Aircraft operators ran CAPPS in their reservation systems 
for originating passengers who checked bags prior to passenger boarding 
using the FAA-set standards for assessing these data.\16\ When a CAPPS 
assessment raised security concerns the aircraft operator either 
screened the passenger's checked baggage using FAA-certified explosives 
detection equipment, or matched the bag to the passenger to ensure that 
the passenger's checked baggage was not transported aboard an airplane 
unless that passenger was aboard the same airplane and flight.
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    \12\ The FAA implemented CAPPS pursuant to its general authority 
to prescribe regulations ``to protect passengers and property on an 
aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation against an act of criminal violence or aircraft 
piracy.'' 49 U.S.C. 44903(b).
    \13\ See Report at section 3.24.
    \14\ See FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Security of Checked 
Baggage on Flights Within the United States, 64 FR 19220, 19221 
(April 19, 1999).
    \15\ These evaluation criteria were reviewed by the Department 
of Justice, id. at 19224-25, and implemented in consultation with 
aircraft operators.
    \16\ Id. FAA funds subsidized a substantial portion of the 
aircraft operators' cost for development of the core CAPPS system, 
which was provided to eight lead operators (six separate Computer 
Reservation Systems), all smaller operators associated with the lead 
operators (e.g., regional feeder airlines), plus 19 other regional 
and national aircraft operators that collectively served 
approximately 95 percent of domestic airline passengers. Id. at 
19222.
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    TSA was created in 2001 with the enactment of the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA),\17\ and assumed responsibility for 
the CAPPS program from the FAA.\18\ CAPPS continued to be operated by 
U.S. aircraft operators pursuant to the TSA-mandated Aircraft Operator 
Standard Security Program (AOSSP). Under this program, and prior to the 
implementation of Secure Flight, airlines were required to check 
passenger reservation data against watch lists. A CAPPS assessment 
indicating risk above a pre-set threshold required enhanced screening 
for passengers who were not on a watch list. For those passengers 
requiring additional screening as a result of their CAPPS assessment, 
the aircraft operator added the additional screening instruction to the 
boarding pass and TSA would perform the additional screening. As with 
the FAA, TSA did not receive the underlying PNR or associated 
reservations information. The additional screening included enhanced 
physical searches of individuals and their carry-on bags at the 
checkpoint.
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    \17\ Pub.L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001).
    \18\ In section 136 of ATSA (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
44903(j)(2)(C)), Congress directed that aircraft operators use CAPPS 
or any successor system to screen all aircraft passengers, not just 
those who are checking bags. See also TSA Notice of rulemaking 
status, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the United 
States; Certification of Screening Companies, 67 FR 67382, 67383 
(Nov. 5, 2002). In addition, ATSA continued in effect all ``orders, 
determinations, rules, [and] regulations'' of the FAA ``until 
modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in 
accordance with law by the [TSA Administrator], any other authorized 
official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law.'' 
See ATSA, section 141(b). ATSA also explicitly recognized the 
continuance of CAPPS when it exempted CAPPS from the requirement 
that the screening of passengers and property before boarding 
flights originating in the United States be carried out by a Federal 
Government employee. See 49 U.S.C. 44901(a).
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    The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) was enacted in December 2004.\19\ Section 4012(a)(1)-(2) of 
IRPTA directed TSA and DHS to assume the function of comparing aircraft 
operator passenger information to data in the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) from 
aircraft operators.\20\ TSA promulgated its Secure Flight Program 
regulations consistent with this statutory directive.\21\ By November 
2010, TSA fully assumed the watch list matching function from aircraft 
operators and air carriers in Secure Flight. Since that time, CAPPS has 
not been used to determine whether additional screening is warranted 
for certain passengers. Notably, however, IRTPA did not remove or amend 
the statutory requirement for aircraft operators to use CAPPS. 
Accordingly, the statutory and regulatory authorities for the use of 
CAPPS remain.
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    \19\ Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004). A genesis 
for IRPTA was the report of the The National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which 
recommended that TSA perform watch list matching using the ``larger 
set of watch lists maintained by the Federal Government,'' and that 
screening issues associated with CAPPS be elevated for high-level 
attention and addressed promptly by the government. See Final Report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, page 393 (July 22, 2004).
    \20\ The TSC maintains the Federal Government watch lists, 
including the terrorism watch list known as the TSDB. The TSC was 
established by the Attorney General in coordination with the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
and the Secretary of Defense. The Attorney General, acting through 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
established the TSC in support of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 6 (HSPD-6), dated September 16, 2003, which required the 
Attorney General to establish an organization to consolidate the 
Federal Government's approach to terrorism screening and to provide 
for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in 
screening processes.
    \21\ 73 FR 64018 (Oct. 28, 2008).
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Use of CAPPS Assessments in Secure Flight Risk-Based Analysis

    TSA plans to incorporate a CAPPS assessment generated by aircraft 
operators into its Secure Flight risk-based analysis of passenger and 
other prescreening data as part of ongoing efforts to enhance aviation 
security by identifying appropriate security screening for aviation 
travelers.\22\ The CAPPS assessments are designed to enhance TSA's 
analysis of passenger security risk and enable TSA to make better 
passenger risk decisions. The incorporation of a CAPPS assessment into 
the Secure Flight risk-based analysis program with Secure Flight 
Passenger Data (SFPD) and other prescreening data is consistent with 
Congress's direction in ATSA to use CAPPS in passenger screening. CAPPS 
assessments generated by aircraft operators continue to rely on 
information collected by those operators in the ordinary course of 
business. Secure Flight does not receive the underlying data that are 
used for the CAPPS assessment.\23\
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    \22\ For a discussion of Secure Flight risk-based analysis, see 
the September 10, 2013 Secure Flight SORN update at 78 FR 55270, and 
the Privacy Impact Assessment for Secure Flight, DHS/TSA/PIA-018(f) 
(Sept. 4, 2013), found at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-tsa-secure-flight-update-09042013.pdf.
    \23\ TSA, however, remains authorized to obtain such data for 
transportation security purposes under TSA's general compliance and 
enforcement authorities, such as TSA's authority to inspect aircraft 
operators to ensure compliance with security programs and TSA 
regulations (49 U.S.C. 114(f)(7), 49 CFR 1544.3); and TSA's 
authority to issue subpoenas and orders for the production of 
information (49 U.S.C. 40113(a) and 46104, 49 CFR 503.203(a)). TSA 
also collects the SFPD required to be provided under the Secure 
Flight Rulemaking.
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    TSA has taken a number of steps to review the security value of 
CAPPS data including evaluating whether certain CAPPS data are 
indicative of low-risk passengers. First, TSA worked with its airline 
partners to re-assess the security value of the individual CAPPS data 
elements. This effort resulted in refining CAPPS data elements. Second, 
TSA engaged the Civil Aviation Threat Working Group (CATWG), which is 
composed of analysts from various Federal Government agencies and led 
by a representative from the National Counterterrorism Center, to 
provide its assessment of the security value of CAPPS data. The CATWG 
provided its report of findings and recommendations in September 2013, 
which further refined the security value assigned to CAPPS data 
elements. Third, TSA asked the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis 
Institute \24\ (a federally-funded research and development center) to 
review its approach to risk-based security screening including the use 
of CAPPS assessments. In March 2014, the Institute endorsed TSA's 
approach for

[[Page 236]]

conducting Secure Flight risk-based analysis and recommended that TSA 
continue to strengthen this analysis by including CAPPS assessments. 
Finally, TSA reviewed its plans to use CAPPS assessments with senior 
officials from the Department of Homeland Security Offices of Privacy, 
Civil Rights and Liberties, and General Counsel. TSA further refined 
the security value assigned to CAPPS data elements based on input from 
these offices. These offices found that CAPPS assessments may be used 
as part of the Secure Flight risk-based analysis while also protecting 
passengers' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. In addition, 
these DHS offices will review CAPPS operations on an on-going basis, 
including the risk value assigned to individual CAPPS data elements, to 
assure CAPPS's continued security value, its connection to evolving 
security threat information, and its adherence to privacy, civil 
rights, civil liberties, and legal principles.
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    \24\ See www.homelandsecurity.org.
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    Currently, the Secure Flight passenger prescreening system has 
watch lists of high-risk individuals and uses these lists to issue 
boarding pass printing results, e.g., selectee screening or ``do not 
board'' instructions. TSA also has lists of low-risk individuals who 
have been issued known traveler numbers (KTN) \25\ that makes them 
eligible for expedited screening. These individuals may receive a 
boarding pass printing instruction that enables them to use TSA 
Pre[check][supreg] lanes.\26\ TSA also uses risk-based analysis of SFPD 
and other prescreening data to make screening determinations (e.g., to 
determine whether a passenger is eligible for expedited screening). The 
addition of CAPPS assessments to existing Secure Flight risk-based 
analysis will strengthen the risk assessment and increase the 
confidence level in the determination that a passenger is a lower risk 
and eligible for expedited screening.\27\
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    \25\ A Known Traveler Number means ``a unique number assigned to 
an individual for whom the Federal government has conducted a 
security threat assessment and determined does not pose a security 
threat.'' 49 CFR 1560.3.
    \26\ Passengers who are eligible for expedited screening are 
referred to a TSA Pre[check][supreg] lane where they typically are 
permitted to leave on their shoes, light outerwear, and belt, to 
keep their laptop in its case, and to keep their 3-1-1 compliant 
liquids/gels bag in a carry-on. TSA Pre[check][supreg] lanes are 
available at more than 118 airports nationwide. See http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/airlines-airports.
    \27\ Another potential outcome of Secure Flight risk-based 
analysis is that the addition of a CAPPS score may result in a 
passenger receiving standard screening who otherwise may have been 
eligible for expedited screening, or receiving enhanced screening 
instead of standard screening.
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    The CAPPS assessment that a passenger receives for any given flight 
may change on the next flight because of the range of CAPPS data and 
the associated security risks and benefits.
    After these changes are implemented, passengers who are a match to 
a watch list will continue to receive appropriate enhanced screening. 
For all other passengers, the Secure Flight passenger prescreening 
computer system conducts a risk-based analysis of passenger data using: 
(1) The SFPD (including KTN) that TSA already receives from aircraft 
operators pursuant to Secure Flight regulations; (2) the CAPPS 
assessments; (3) frequent flyer designator codes that aircraft 
operators submit to TSA; and (4) other prescreening data available to 
TSA. The Secure Flight risk-based analysis determines whether 
passengers receive expedited, standard, or enhanced screening, and the 
results are indicated on the passenger's boarding pass.
    No one will be denied the ability to fly or to enter the sterile 
area of an airport based solely on the results of the Secure Flight 
risk-based analysis, including the use of a CAPPS assessment in that 
analysis.

II. Privacy Act

    The Privacy Act embodies fair information practice principles in a 
statutory framework governing the means by which the Federal Government 
agencies collect, maintain, use, and disseminate individuals' records. 
The Privacy Act applies to information that is maintained in a ``system 
of records.'' A ``system of records'' is a group of any records under 
the control of an agency from which information is retrieved by the 
name of an individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other 
identifying particular assigned to the individual. The Privacy Act 
defines ``individual'' as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. 
As a matter of policy, DHS extends administrative Privacy Act 
protections to all individuals where systems of records maintain 
information on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and visitors.
    Below is the description of the DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records 
System of Records.
    In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(r), DHS has provided a report of 
this system of records to the Office of Management and Budget and to 
Congress.
System of Records
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA)-019.

System name:
    DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records.

Security classification:
    Unclassified; Sensitive Security Information.

System location:
    Records are maintained at the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA, and at 
other secure TSA facilities in Annapolis Junction, Maryland and 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. Records may also be maintained at the 
secured facilities of contractors or other parties performing functions 
under the Secure Flight program.

Categories of individuals covered by the system:
    (a) Individuals who attempt to make reservations for travel on, who 
have traveled on, or who have reservations to travel on a flight 
operated by a U.S. aircraft operator; or a flight into, out of, or 
overflying the United States that is operated by a foreign air carrier; 
or flights operated by the U.S. Government, including flights chartered 
or leased by the U.S. Government;
    (b) Non-traveling individuals who seek to obtain authorization from 
an aircraft or airport operator to enter the sterile area of an 
airport;
    (c) For flights that TSA grants a request by the operators of 
leased or charter aircraft with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 
pounds to screen the individuals using Secure Flight, the following 
individuals: (1) Individuals who seek to charter or lease an aircraft 
with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 pounds or who are proposed 
to be transported on or operate such charter aircraft; and (2) owners 
or operators of such chartered or leased aircraft;
    (d)(1) Known or suspected terrorists identified in the Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center 
(TSC); and (2) individuals identified on classified and unclassified 
governmental databases such as law enforcement, immigration, or 
intelligence databases;
    (e) Individuals who have been distinguished from individuals on a 
watch list through a redress process or by other means; and
    (f) Individuals who are identified as Known Travelers for whom the 
Federal Government conducted a security threat assessment and 
determined that they do not pose a security threat.

Categories of records in the system:
    (a) Records containing passenger and flight information (e.g., full 
name, date

[[Page 237]]

of birth, gender, redress number, known traveler number, passport 
information, frequent flyer designator code or other identity 
authentication or verification code obtained from aircraft operators, 
and itinerary); records containing assessments generated by aircraft 
operators under the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
(CAPPS); records containing the results of risk-based analysis in the 
TSA passenger prescreening system including boarding pass printing 
results; records containing information about non-traveling individuals 
seeking access to an airport sterile area for a purpose approved by 
TSA; and records containing information about individuals who seek to 
charter, lease, operate or be transported on aircraft with a maximum 
take-off weight over 12,500 pounds if TSA grants the request of an 
aircraft owner or operator to use Secure Flight;
    (b) Records containing information from an individual's form of 
identification or a physical description of the individual;
    (c) Records obtained from the TSC of known or suspected terrorists 
in the TSDB; and records regarding individuals identified on classified 
and unclassified governmental watch lists;
    (d) Records containing the matching analyses and results of 
comparisons of individuals to the TSDB and other classified and 
unclassified governmental watch lists.
    (e) Records related to communications between or among TSA and 
aircraft operators, airport operators, owners or operators of leased or 
charter aircraft with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 pounds, 
TSC, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, and agencies 
responsible for airspace safety or security regarding the screening 
status of passengers or non-traveling individuals and any operational 
responses to individuals identified in the TSDB;
    (f) Records of the redress process that include information on 
known misidentified persons, including any Redress Number assigned to 
those individuals;
    (g) Records that track the receipt, use, access, or transmission of 
information as part of the Secure Flight program;
    (h) Electronic System for Travel Authorization status code 
generated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for international 
travelers; and
    (i) Records containing information about individuals who are 
identified as Known Travelers.

Authority for maintenance of the system:
    49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44901, 44903, and 44909.

Purpose(s):
    The Secure Flight Records system are used to identify and protect 
against potential and actual threats to transportation security and 
support the Federal Government's counterterrorism efforts by assisting 
in the identification of individuals who warrant further scrutiny prior 
to boarding an aircraft or seek to enter a sterile area or who warrant 
denial of boarding or denial of entry to a sterile area on security 
grounds. It is also used to identify individuals who are lower-risk and 
therefore may be eligible for expedited security screening at the 
airport checkpoints. These functions are designed to facilitate the 
secure travel of the public.

Routine uses of records maintained in the system, including categories 
of users and the purposes of such uses:
    (1) To the TSC in order to: (a) Determine whether an individual is 
a positive identity match to an individual identified as a known or 
suspected terrorist in the watch list; (b) allow redress of passenger 
complaints; (c) facilitate an operational response (if one is deemed 
appropriate) for individuals who are a positive identity match to an 
individual identified as a known or suspected terrorist in the watch 
list; (d) provide information and analysis about terrorist encounters 
and known or suspected terrorist associates to appropriate domestic and 
foreign government agencies and officials for counterterrorism 
purposes; and (e) perform technical implementation functions necessary 
for the Secure Flight program.
    (2) To contractors and their agents, grantees, experts, 
consultants, and others performing or working on a contract, service, 
grant, cooperative agreement, or other assignment for DHS, when 
necessary to accomplish an agency function related to this system of 
records. Individuals provided information under this routine use are 
subject to the same Privacy Act requirements and limitations on 
disclosure as are applicable to DHS officers and employees.
    (3) To aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, airport operators, 
the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Defense or 
other U.S. Government agencies or institutions to communicate 
individual screening status and facilitate an operational response 
(where appropriate) to individuals who pose or are suspected of posing 
a risk to transportation or national security.
    (4) To owners or operators of leased or charter aircraft to 
communicate individual screening status and facilitate an operational 
response (where appropriate) to individuals who pose or are suspected 
of posing a risk to transportation or national security.
    (5) To the appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 
or foreign, agency regarding or to identify individuals who pose, or 
are under reasonable suspicion of posing a risk to transportation or 
national security.
    (6) To the Department of Justice (DOJ) or other Federal agencies 
for purposes of conducting litigation or administrative proceedings, 
when: (a) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or (b) any 
employee or former employee of DHS in his or her official capacity, or 
(c) any employee or former employee of DHS in his or her individual 
capacity where the DOJ or DHS has agreed to represent the employee, or 
(d) the United States or any agency thereof, is a party to the 
litigation or proceeding or has an interest in such litigation or 
proceeding.
    (7) To the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or 
other Federal agencies pursuant to records management inspections being 
conducted under the authority of 44 U.S.C. 2904 and 2906.
    (8) To a congressional office in response to an inquiry from that 
congressional office made at the request of the individual.
    (9) To the Government Accountability Office or other agency, 
organization, or individual for the purposes of performing authorized 
audit or oversight operations, but only such information as is 
necessary and relevant to such audit and oversight functions.
    (10) To the appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 
or foreign agency responsible for investigating, prosecuting, 
enforcing, or implementing a statute, rule, regulation, or order 
regarding a violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law, 
regulation, or order when such disclosure is proper and consistent with 
the performance of the official duties of the person making the 
disclosure.
    (11) To international and foreign governmental authorities in 
accordance with law and formal or informal international agreements 
when such disclosure is proper and consistent with the performance of 
the official duties of the person making the disclosure.
    (12) To appropriate agencies, entities, and persons when (a) TSA 
suspects or has confirmed that the security or confidentiality of 
information in the system of records has been

[[Page 238]]

compromised; (b) TSA has determined that as a result of the suspected 
or confirmed compromise there is a risk of harm to economic or property 
interests, identity theft or fraud, or harm to the security or 
integrity of this system or other systems or programs (whether 
maintained by TSA or another agency or entity) that rely upon the 
compromised information; and (c) the disclosure made to such agencies, 
entities, and persons is reasonably necessary to assist in connection 
with TSA's efforts to respond to the suspected or confirmed compromise 
and prevent, minimize, or remedy such harm.
    (13) To appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign 
governmental agencies or multilateral governmental organizations, 
including the World Health Organization, for purposes of assisting such 
agencies or organizations in preventing exposure to or transmission of 
communicable or quarantinable disease or for combating other 
significant public health threats; appropriate notice will be provided 
of any identified health threat or risk.

Disclosure to consumer reporting agencies:
    None.

Policies and practices for storing, retrieving, accessing, retaining, 
and disposing of records in the system:
Storage:
    Records are maintained at the Transportation Security 
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA, and at other 
secure TSA facilities in Annapolis Junction, Maryland and Colorado 
Springs, Colorado. Records also may be maintained at the secured 
facilities of contractors or other parties that perform functions under 
the Secure Flight program. The records are stored on magnetic disc, 
tape, digital media, and CD-ROM, and may also be retained in hard copy 
format in secure file folders or safes.

Retrievability:
    Data are retrievable by the individual's name or other identifier, 
as well as non-identifying information such as itinerary.

Safeguards:
    All records are protected from unauthorized access through 
appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. The 
system is also protected through a multi-layer security approach. The 
protective strategies are physical, technical, administrative, and 
environmental in nature and provide role-based access control to 
sensitive data, physical access control to DHS facilities, 
confidentiality of communications, including encryption, authentication 
of sending parties, compartmentalizing databases; auditing software and 
personnel screening to ensure that all personnel with access to data 
are screened through background investigations commensurate with the 
level of access required to perform their duties.
    Information in this system is safeguarded in accordance with 
applicable rules and policies, including any applicable TSA and DHS 
automated systems security and access policies. The system will be in 
compliance with Office of Management and Budget and National Institute 
of Standards and Technology guidance. Access to the computer system 
containing the records in this system of records is limited to those 
individuals who require it to perform their official duties. The 
computer system also maintains a real-time audit of individuals who 
access the system.

Retention and disposal:
    Records relating to an individual determined by the automated 
matching process to be neither a match nor a potential match to a watch 
list are destroyed within seven days after completion of the last leg 
of the individual's directional travel itinerary. Records relating to 
an individual determined by the automated matching process to be a 
potential watch list match are retained for seven years after the 
completion of the individual's directional travel itinerary. Records 
relating to an individual determined to be a confirmed watch list match 
are retained for 99 years after the date of match confirmation.
    Lists of individuals stored in Secure Flight, such as individuals 
identified as Known Travelers and individuals who have been 
disqualified from eligibility to receive expedited screening as a 
result of their involvement in certain security incidents, are deleted 
or destroyed when superseded by an updated list.

System manager and address:
    Secure Flight Mission Support Branch Manager, Transportation 
Security Administration, TSA-19, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 
20598-6019.

Notification procedure:
    To determine whether this system contains records relating to you, 
write to the Freedom of Information Act Office, Transportation Security 
Administration, TSA-20, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598-
6020.

Record access procedures:
    Requests for records access must be in writing and should be 
addressed to the Freedom of Information Act Office, Transportation 
Security Administration, TSA-20, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 
20598-6020. Requests should conform to the requirements of 6 CFR part 
5, subpart B, which provides the rules for requesting access to Privacy 
Act records maintained by DHS. The envelope and letter should be 
clearly marked ``Privacy Act Access Request.'' The request should 
include a general description of the records sought and must include 
the requester's full name, current address, and date and place of 
birth. The request must be signed and either notarized or submitted 
under penalty of perjury. Some information may be exempt from access 
provisions. An individual who is the subject of a record in this system 
may access those records that are not exempt from disclosure. A 
determination whether a record may be accessed will be made at the time 
a request is received.
    Individuals who believe they have been improperly denied entry by 
CBP, refused boarding for transportation, or identified for additional 
screening may submit a redress request through the DHS Traveler Redress 
Program (``TRIP''). See 72 FR 2294 (Jan. 18, 2007). TRIP is a single 
point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution 
regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening 
at transportation hubs such as airports and train stations, or crossing 
U.S. borders. Through TRIP a traveler can correct erroneous data stored 
in Secure Flight and other data stored in other DHS databases through 
one application. Additionally, for further information on the Secure 
Flight program and the redress options please see the accompanying 
Privacy Impact Assessment for Secure Flight published on the DHS Web 
site at www.dhs.gov/privacy. Redress requests should be sent to: DHS 
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), TSA-901, 601 South 12th 
Street, Arlington, VA 20598-6036 or online at http://www.dhs.gov/trip.

Contesting record procedures:
    Same as ``Notification Procedure'' and ``Record Access Procedure'' 
above.

Record source categories:
    Information contained in the system is obtained from U.S. aircraft 
operators, foreign air carriers, the owners and operators of leased or 
charter aircraft with a maximum take-off weight over 12,500 pounds who 
request TSA screening, the TSC, TSA employees, airport operators, 
Federal executive

[[Page 239]]

branch agencies, Federal judicial and legislative branch entities, 
State, local, international, and other governmental agencies, private 
entities for Known Traveler program participants, and the individuals 
to whom the records in the system pertain.

Exemptions claimed for the system:
    No exemption will be asserted with respect to identifying 
information, or flight information, obtained from passengers, non-
travelers, and aircraft owners or operators.
    This system, however, may contain records or information recompiled 
or created from information contained in other systems of records, 
which are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. For these 
records of information only, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and 
(k)(2), TSA claims the following exemptions for these records or 
information from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); 
(e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f); and (g) of the 
Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as necessary and appropriate to 
protect such information. Certain portions or all of these records may 
be exempt from disclosure pursuant to these exemptions.

    Dated: December 10, 2014.
Karen L. Neuman,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2014-30856 Filed 1-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-05-P
```