* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P.

34(a)(2)(C). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 8, 2010 *

Decided September 9, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 09

‐ 3893

JAMES E. JANSSEN,

Petitioner

‐ Appellant

,

v.

JEFFREY PUGH,

Respondent

‐ Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 09

‐ cv

‐ 34

‐ bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge

.

O R D E R

The district court dismissed James Janssen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

because he failed to file it within the statute of limitations. On appeal he argues that his

untimely filing should have been excused by application of equitable tolling. Because we

agree with the district court that Janssen did not diligently pursue his postconviction claims,

we affirm the judgment. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 09

‐ 3893 Page 2

Janssen’s conviction for first

‐ degree intentional homicide, see W IS

. S TAT

. § 940.01,

became final in December 1997. In September 1998 he filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. At the same time he moved the court to

hold his petition in abeyance while he pursued postconviction relief in state court. The

district court, without acknowledging that motion, instead dismissed the petition in

February 1999 on the ground that Janssen had not exhausted his state

‐ court remedies. See

id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The court reassured Janssen that, if his pursuits in state court proved

unfruitful, he could file a new petition in federal court without running afoul of the ban on

successive petitions. See id. § 2244(b)(1)

. What the court overlooked, however, was that the

statute of limitations had expired in December 1998, one year after his conviction became

final. See id. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Duncan v. Walker

, 533 U.S. 167, 181

‐ 82 (2001) (holding that

filing § 2254 petition does not toll statute of limitations).

Janssen did not ask for reconsideration or remind the district court about his

overlooked request to hold the petition in abeyance. Nor did he appeal the dismissal.

Instead he did nothing for more than five years before finally seeking relief in state court in

September 2004. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 974.06. That process continued through April 2008, but

Janssen then waited nine more months before refiling his § 2254 petition in January 2009.

The state moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was more than 10 years

too late. Looking back at the 1999 dismissal, the district court realized that it had overlooked

both the statute of limitations and Janssen’s motion to hold the § 2254 petition in abeyance.

The court assumed that its order could have misled Janssen into thinking he would be free

to refile his petition unimpeded by the statute of limitations, and thus the court evaluated

whether to invoke equitable tolling and excuse his untimely filing. But the court reasoned

that, even if its mistakes constituted extraordinary circumstances that prevented Janssen

from timely filing his petition, he was not entitled to equitable tolling because he did not act

diligently after his first petition was dismissed.

Janssen appeals, but we agree with the district court that he was not entitled to

proceed with his long

‐ overdue petition. Although equitable tolling is available to a

petitioner who can show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his

§ 2254 petition within the statutory time limits, Holland v. Florida

, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560, 2562

(2010); Griffith v. Rednour

, No. 09

‐ 2518, 2010 WL 2852631, at *3 (7th Cir. July 22, 2010), the

petitioner must also show that he diligently pursued relief despite the obstacles placed in

his way, Pace v. DiGuglielmo

, 544 U.S. 408, 418

‐ 19 (2005); Tucker v. Kingston

, 538 F.3d 732, 734

(7th Cir. 2008). Janssen insists that he was diligently pursuing his state

‐ court remedies

during the five years after the 1999 dismissal; he took so long to file his § 974.06 petition, he

explains, because he is not well

‐ educated in the law and had to navigate burdensome prisonNo. 09

‐ 3893 Page 3

policies. But these run

‐ of

‐ the

‐ mill difficulties do not excuse his lengthy delay. See Tucker

,

538 F.3d at 735 (holding that lack of legal experience is not an extraordinary circumstance

justifying equitable tolling); Johnson v. McCaughtry

, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding

that incarceration is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling).

Moreover, even after the state proceedings had ended, Janssen dallied for months before

refiling his petition in federal court. The district court was well within its discretion to

conclude that he did not act diligently to overcome any obstacles placed in his way by the

dismissal of his first petition. See Guillory v. Roe

, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding

that petitioner who waited 27 months to pursue state

‐ court remedies was not entitled to

equitable tolling).

A FFIRMED

.