IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHERRY PACE, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0157-WS-B

 )

NICK WILLIAMS, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Probate Judge Nick Williams’ Motion 

to Dismiss (doc. 7) and his Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (doc. 14). Both Motions 

have been briefed and are now ripe for disposition.1

I. Relevant Background.

On March 24, 2015, plaintiff, Sherry Pace (proceeding by and through counsel), filed her 

Complaint (doc. 1) in this District Court against Nick Williams (Probate Judge of Washington 

County, Alabama), Michael Goldman (the “Mental Health Representative” of Washington 

County, Alabama), Johnny Pace (plaintiff’s ex-husband), and Jason Pace (plaintiff’s exhusband’s son). The crux of the Complaint is Ms. Pace’s contention that “one or more of the 

Defendants act[ed] wrongfully to involuntary commit her” without complying with proper 

procedures, without investigating the matter, without a factual basis, and with an improper 

 1 For purposes of its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded factual allegations of the Complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (in 

reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motion, court must “accept[] the facts alleged in the complaint as true,” 

“draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” and “limit[] our review to the four 

corners of the complaint”). Of course, “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are 

entitled to no assumption of truth.” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011).

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purpose (namely, her ex-husband’s desire “to gain an unfair tactical advantage in an ongoing 

domestic relations dispute”). (Doc. 1, at 1.)2

With regard to defendant Nick Williams, the Complaint identifies him as Probate Judge 

of Washington County, Alabama, and sharply criticizes his handling of a petition for involuntary 

commitment filed by defendant Johnny Pace on or about August 29, 2014. According to the 

Complaint, Judge Williams “wrongfully involuntarily committed [plaintiff] to a mental health 

facility summarily without any due process hearing or any investigation and without any attempt 

to comply with the statutory mandate for such issues.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 10.) The Complaint further 

alleges that Judge Williams “could have easily ... discovered” that “there was no actual need to 

commit the Plaintiff who did not then and does not now suffer from any mental health 

condition,” had he “conducted any investigation or a pre-commitments due process hearing as is 

set out by state law.” (Id., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s pleading repeatedly characterizes this alleged 

conduct as an “abuse of governmental power.”

In sum, Ms. Pace seeks to hold Judge Williams liable for compensatory, consequential 

and punitive damages exceeding $1 million because he ordered her to be involuntary committed, 

allegedly without conducting a due process hearing, performing an investigation, or otherwise 

complying with Alabama law and procedure. According to the Complaint, Judge Williams’

conduct amounts to “violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, abuse of governmental power, trespass 

and the wrongful taking of the Plaintiff’s person” (doc. 1, ¶ 15); as well as “violation(s) of 

federal, state and municipal rights of private citizens to be free from unlawful and unauthorized 

governmental interference and ‘taking’ of private property for tactical advantage in a divorce and 

taking of the Plaintiff’s person without due process of law” (id., ¶ 19); and “retaliation against 

the Plaintiff SHERRY PACE’s exercise of her First Amendment rights and vocal criticism of the 

Defendant(s) in the recent past” (id., ¶ 22); and at least 15 separately enumerated state-law torts 

(id., ¶ 25).

 2 As framed, the Complaint is a textbook example of an impermissible shotgun 

pleading, asserting each of at least three federal claims and at least 15 state-law tort claims 

against each of four defendants in an undifferentiated mass, without identifying which facts go 

with which claims and which claims go against which defendants. For purposes of the instant 

Order, the Court sets this pleading defect aside, to be revisited at an appropriate time.

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Judge Williams’ response to the Complaint has been two-fold. First, he filed a Motion to 

Dismiss (doc. 70) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., citing the doctrine of judicial 

immunity. Second, he filed a Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (doc. 14) based on a 

conflict of interest, in that Ms. Pace’s counsel had previously represented defendant Johnny Pace 

in connection with the underlying facts at issue in this litigation. Plaintiff has denied that judicial 

immunity applies and has further denied that counsel labors under any conflict.

II. Analysis of Motion to Dismiss.

Judge Williams’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion hinges on the doctrine of judicial immunity. It is 

hornbook law that “[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those 

acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of 

all jurisdiction.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(“Since the seventeenth century, common law has immunized judges from suit for judicial acts 

within the jurisdiction of the court.”). “The rationale is that judges should not have to fear that 

unsatisfied litigants will hound them with litigation.” Weinstein v. City of North Bay Village, 

977 F. Supp.2d 1271, 1281-82 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citation and internal marks omitted).3

In applying the two-pronged test for judicial immunity, “the first question is whether the 

judge dealt with the plaintiff in his judicial capacity.” William B. Cashion Nevada Spendthrift 

Trust v. Vance, 552 Fed.Appx. 884, 886 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2014). “If he did act in his judicial 

capacity, then we ask whether the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. If the 

judge acted in his judicial capacity, and if he did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, 

then he is entitled to judicial immunity, as a matter of law. See Washington Mut. Bank v. Bush, 

220 Fed.Appx. 974, 975 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007) (“Judicial immunity applies when (1) the judge

 3 As Justice White observed some 35 years ago, “Judicial immunity arose because 

it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent 

judgment about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an 

unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted not only mistakenly 

but with malice and corruption.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 

185 (1980); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (a 

judge’s “errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied 

litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden 

on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.”).

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dealt with the plaintiff in his judicial capacity and (2) the judge did not act in the clear absence of 

all jurisdiction.”) (citation and internal marks omitted).

Beginning with step one, the allegations of the Complaint leave no doubt that Judge 

Williams dealt with Sherry Pace in his capacity as Probate Judge of Washington County. 

“Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: 

(1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the 

judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; 

and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” 

Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070. Well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint reflect that Judge 

Williams’ alleged wrongful act was his entry of an order of involuntary commitment and 

accompanying writ on August 29, 2014, directing that Sherry Pace be taken into custody and 

delivered to Eastpointe Hospital for mental health treatment. The Complaint confirms that Judge 

Williams took such measures only after Johnny Pace filed a Petition for Involuntary 

Commitment. Review and disposition of petitions for involuntary commitment is a normal 

judicial function of an Alabama probate judge.4 Because it is an Alabama probate judge’s job to 

review and decide petitions for involuntary commitment, the complained-of conduct by Judge 

Williams is the embodiment of a “normal judicial function.” Plaintiff does not suggest 

otherwise. Under any reasonable application of the concept, Judge Williams was acting in his 

judicial capacity.

The first prong of the judicial immunity test having thus been satisfied, the analysis 

proceeds to step two, which provides that judicial immunity bars Ms. Pace’s claims unless Judge 

Williams acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. This is a high bar. Indeed, “[j]udges do 

not lose their judicial immunity even if they act in absence of jurisdiction as long as they do not 

have knowledge that they lack jurisdiction or act in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law 

expressly depriving them of jurisdiction.” Franklin v. Arbor Station, LLC, 549 Fed.Appx. 831, 

 4 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-52-2(a) (“[w]hen any petition is filed seeking the 

involuntary commitment of a respondent, the probate judge shall immediately review the 

petition”); Ala. Code § 22-52-10.1 (delineating circumstances under which probate judge may 

enter an order for involuntary commitment); Ala. Code § 12-13-40(3) (specifying that probate 

judges “shall have authority ... [t]o appoint guardians ad litem for minors and persons of 

unsound mind, when necessary”).

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834 (11th Cir. Sept. 27, 2013) (citation and internal marks omitted). Neither in her Complaint 

nor in her briefing has Ms. Pace identified facts showing that Judge Williams knew he lacked 

jurisdiction, much less that any Alabama statute or case law clearly deprived him of jurisdiction 

to rule on Johnny Pace’s Petition for Involuntary Commitment filed against his wife in August 

2014. There being no facts or circumstances presented that might support an inference that 

Judge Williams acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, the Court concludes that the 

doctrine of judicial immunity applies. Accordingly, Judge Williams is absolutely immune from 

all claims asserted against him in this lawsuit.

In so determining, the Court has considered and rejected plaintiff’s counterarguments. 

Principally, Ms. Pace asserts that judicial immunity does not apply because Judge Williams 

violated state law in his handling of the Petition for Involuntary Commitment. This argument 

misapprehends the breadth and scope of judicial immunity. A judge’s judicial acts are not 

removed from the protections of judicial immunity merely because they are erroneous, unlawful, 

or even corrupt or malicious. See, e.g., Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(“This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of 

his or her jurisdiction.”).5 So merely saying that Judge Williams contravened state or even 

constitutional law does not override his protections under the doctrine of absolute judicial 

immunity. For judicial immunity purposes, it makes no difference whether Judge Williams “got 

it right,” or even whether he followed the law. Nor is plaintiff’s case strengthened by her 

apparent allegation that Judge Williams persuaded Johnny Pace to file the Petition for 

Involuntary Commitment in the first place, particularly where (as here) there is no allegation that 

Judge Williams possessed any personal interest in the Paces’ domestic dispute. See Harris v. 

Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 916 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Judges must be free to act on their convictions. 

Judge Deveaux may have acted improperly in ordering the charges against Harris. We cannot 

 5 See also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 

(1978) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of 

authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); Conard v. Evans, 193 

Fed.Appx. 945, 948 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (“a judge is immune from suit even when her 

exercise of authority is flawed by grave procedural errors”) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted); In re Lickman, 304 B.R. 897, 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (judicial immunity 

“applies however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences”) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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say, however, that he was not acting in his judicial capacity.”).6 Finally, plaintiff’s reliance on 

Alabama cases interpreting and delineating the limitations of other forms of immunity (such as 

state-agent immunity) is unilluminating in the context of a judicial immunity analysis.

In short, the Court readily concludes that the doctrine of judicial immunity bars all of 

Sherry Pace’s claims asserted against Judge Williams.

7

III. Analysis of Motion to Disqualify.

Notwithstanding the dismissal of defendant Judge Williams, the Court now turns to his 

Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel (doc. 14). Ordinarily, such a motion would be rendered 

moot by the dismissal of all claims against the movant; however, given the seriousness of the 

allegations contained in that Motion and their obvious ramifications for plaintiff’s counsel’s 

ability to proceed against the remaining defendants, the Court will consider that motion on the 

merits.

 6 Elsewhere, the Harris panel restated the point as follows: “Judge Deveaux 

contends that Jones wanted to press charges, while Harris claims that only Judge Deveaux 

wished to do so. This dispute, however, is irrelevant to our consideration of Judge Deveaux’s 

claim of absolute immunity.” Id. at 914. The same is true here.

7 In addition to seeking dismissal of the claims against him on judicial immunity 

grounds, Judge Williams requests an award of attorney’s fees. In § 1983 suits such as that 

brought by Ms. Pace, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable 

attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). This section “authorizes a district court 

to award attorney’s fees to a defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation.” Fox v. Vice, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2213, 180 

L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant’s entire argument 

for a fee award is “that the relevant law regarding Judge Williams’s judicial immunity has been 

established since at least 1970.” (Doc. 8, at 7.) In its discretion, the Court declines to award 

attorney’s fees here. To be sure, plaintiff appears not to have considered the doctrine of judicial 

immunity; however, the Court cannot determine with any confidence that no colorable factual or 

legal arguments could have been asserted to oppose application of judicial immunity. Stated 

differently, it appears that Ms. Pace could have raised non-frivolous (albeit not successful) 

counterarguments against application of judicial immunity in this case. For example, as the 

Harris v. Deveaux line of authorities shows, where a judge actively becomes involved in the 

charging process (which is akin to what Ms. Pace says Judge Williams did in initiating the 

commitment proceeding), there may be cases where judicial immunity is called into question. 

This is not one of those cases, but the Court cannot say (particularly given defendant’s 

conclusory, afterthought treatment of the fee request) that it was frivolous for Ms. Pace to sue 

Judge Williams in these circumstances.

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The basic problem identified in the Motion to Disqualify Counsel is that plaintiff’s 

counsel has a conflict of interest in this case. As noted, Ms. Pace is suing her ex-husband, 

Johnny Pace, on the theory that he “wrongfully ha[d] her involuntarily committed in order to 

gain a tactical advantage in an on-going Domestic Relations dispute.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 4.) The 

Complaint alleges that Johnny Pace “file[d] a false report” against Ms. Pace, then submitted “a 

vindictive Petition for Involuntary Commitment.” (Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) Ms. Pace imputes a nefarious 

motive to Johnny Pace, alleging that he “had planned to file for divorce agents [sic] her from her 

[sic] while she was Involuntarily Committed.” (Id., ¶ 14.)

The rub is this: Back on November 24, 2014, plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand letter to 

Judge Williams, seeking compensation from him on the ground that he “wrongfully committed 

[Sherry Pace] to a mental health facility.” (Doc. 14, Exh. A.) The November 24 demand letter 

states that plaintiff’s counsel had “spoken with both Mr. and Mrs. Pace, and each assert that this 

abuse of governmental power has caused them tremendous anxiety and stress.” (Id.) The letter 

proceeds with counsel’s statement that “[m]y clients have informed me that they are willing to 

settle this matter” for a particular sum, barring which “the Pace family shall be forced to take 

further steps to protect their legal rights.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Below the signature line is 

the legend “cc: Mr. and Mrs. John Pace.” (Id.) Attached to that letter was an Affidavit of Sherry 

Pace dated October 29, 2014 (and notarized on November 12, 2014), which by all appearances 

was prepared by (or at least with the assistance and legal advice of) plaintiff’s counsel. (Id.) In 

this lawsuit, plaintiff has offered as an exhibit a companion affidavit signed by John Pace, also

dated October 29, 2014 and notarized on November 12, 2014 by the same person as the Sherry 

Pace Affidavit. (Doc. 12, Exh. 6.) Side-by-side inspection of the John Pace Affidavit and the 

Sherry Pace Affidavit makes plain that they were prepared at the same time by the same 

person(s). All signs point to plaintiff’s counsel.

The John Pace Affidavit delineates a version of the events leading to Sherry Pace’s 

involuntary commitment which plaintiff (by and through the same attorney who represented both 

Mr. and Ms. Pace in November 2014) now claims is a lie. Specifically, the John Pace Affidavit 

contains averments that Johnny Pace “felted [sic] forced by the Probate Judge Nick Williams 

into filing a Petition for Involuntary Commitment against my wife, even though I told him this 

was not what I wanted to do;” that Johnny Pace repeatedly said “that I just wanted to have a 

report or a record;” and that “at no time did I request this.” (Doc. 12, Exh. 6, ¶¶ 6-7, 9.) The 

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John Pace Affidavit concludes, “I believe both mine and my wife’s civil rights have been 

violated.” (Id., ¶ 12.) By contrast, Ms. Pace’s Complaint alleges that Johnny Pace rigged the 

entire involuntary commitment petition in a “vindictive” attempt to get her involuntarily 

committed so that he could file for divorce and obtain a strategic advantage. (Doc. 1.)

In the aggregate, then, the pertinent facts are these: Plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand 

letter to Judge Williams concerning the subject matter of this lawsuit back in November 2014, 

wherein she indicated that Ms. Pace and Johnny Pace were her clients. At around the same time, 

plaintiff’s counsel oversaw, assisted, or otherwise participated in preparation of affidavits by 

both Ms. Pace and Johnny Pace concerning the subject matter of this action. Now, the very same 

attorney is representing Ms. Pace in a federal lawsuit against Johnny Pace predicated on the 

theory that everything in the Johnny Pace Affidavit is a lie. If the case goes forward, plaintiff’s 

counsel will no doubt examine Johnny Pace via deposition and/or trial testimony about the 

contents of an affidavit that (by all appearances) she helped him prepare, and that he signed at a 

time when she was holding herself out as his lawyer. In short, plaintiff’s counsel represented 

Johnny Pace in connection with a particular dispute last fall, yet she now represents his ex-wife 

in a lawsuit filed against him in connection with that very same dispute.

The resulting ethical dilemma is readily apparent. Rule 1.9 of the Alabama Rules of 

Professional Conduct provides that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 

shall not thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in 

which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless 

the former client consents after consultation; or (b) use information relating to the representation 

to the disadvantage of the former client.” Id. The present legal relationship implicates both 

aspects of Rule 1.9. Unquestionably, counsel is representing Ms. Pace in a manner that is 

materially adverse to Johnny Pace’s interests, in the very same (or at least a substantially related) 

matter in which she previously represented him. There has been no showing that Johnny Pace 

has consented to this arrangement after consultation. Moreover, counsel could not possibly 

represent Ms. Pace in her suit against Johnny Pace without leveraging and utilizing confidential 

information that he provided in the course of their previous attorney-client relationship. Using 

that confidential information would violate Rule 1.6’s prohibition on revealing attorney-client 

privileged information. But not using that confidential information would violate Rule 1.7(b)’s 

provision that “[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 

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materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person.” Id.

Thus, if plaintiff’s counsel uses information that Johnny Pace provided during their prior 

attorney-client relationship, then she is violating the prohibitions against revealing privileged 

communications and using information relating to a previous representation to the disadvantage 

of the former client. If she does not use that information, however, then the resulting limitation 

on her representation of Ms. Pace would run afoul of Rule 1.7(b)’s prohibition against 

representing a client when that representation is materially constrained by obligations to 

someone else. This is an ethical minefield through which there can be no safe passage.

Faced with these allegations in the Motion to Disqualify, counsel’s response is to deny 

having ever represented Johnny Pace. According to plaintiff’s counsel, Johnny Pace was simply 

“a witness to verify that [Ms. Pace] had been mistreated by” Judge Williams. (Doc. 15, ¶ 3.) 

She insists that Johnny Pace has never “asked her to represent him verbally or by written letter of 

contract.” (Id.) The November 12, 2014 demand letter is unequivocal. It references anxiety and 

stress that Judge Williams’ conduct has caused “both Mr. and Mrs. Pace.” It professes to make a 

specific monetary demand on behalf of “[m]y clients.” It states that, in the absence of amicable 

resolution, “the Pace family shall be forced to take further steps to protect their legal rights.” 

And it reflects that courtesy copies were sent to “Mr. & Mrs. John Pace.” There is no rational 

way to read the November 12 demand letter except as one made on behalf of both Sherry Pace 

and Johnny Pace. Plaintiff’s counsel held herself out as Johnny Pace’s lawyer. She must live 

with the consequences of that representation today.8

The remaining question is what is to be done. It is well settled that “a District Court is 

obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in connection with any proceeding 

before it.” Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Sahyers 

v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., 560 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 

“court has power to supervise professional conduct of lawyers who practice before it”) (citation 

omitted). The Court therefore will not pretend that the conflict does not exist merely because 

 8 Furthermore, it is inconceivable that counsel could have supervised / assisted / 

participated in preparation of the Johnny Pace Affidavit notarized on November 12, 2014 (the 

same day as the demand letter) without giving him legal advice. In that event, whether he had 

signed a formal retainer agreement or not, Johnny Pace received legal advice from plaintiff’s 

counsel about the very matter in which she is now suing him on behalf of his ex-wife.

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Johnny Pace has not raised the issue himself. Instead, the Court will allow plaintiff’s counsel to 

select from three options, any one of which appear adequate to cure the ethical violation. Option 

One is that plaintiff’s counsel and her law firm (under the imputed disqualification principles 

found at Rule 1.10) withdraw from representing Ms. Pace in this matter. In that event, the Court 

would afford Ms. Pace a window of time to retain substitute counsel, or to elect to proceed pro 

se. Option Two is that counsel obtain knowing, voluntary, valid consent from both Ms. Pace and 

Johnny Pace to proceed with this representation in its present form. Such consent would not be 

sufficient unless it specifically encompassed all of the sub-issues identified supra, and plaintiff’s 

counsel would need to file appropriate, sufficient proof of such consent for both persons. Option 

Three is that plaintiff keeps counsel as her lawyer, dismisses all claims against Johnny Pace 

without prejudice, and proceeds only against the remaining defendants, Michael Goldman and 

Jason Pace (as to whom there is, at present, no indication of any conflict). Plaintiff’s counsel 

must notify the Court in writing within two weeks of which option she intends to pursue.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Defendant Probate Judge Nick Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 7) is granted

pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge 

Williams are dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to 

terminate him as a party defendant;

2. Judge Williams’ request for attorney’s fees embedded in his Motion to Dismiss is 

denied in the Court’s discretion for lack of the requisite showing by movant; and

3. Defendant Probate Judge Nick Williams’ Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel 

(doc. 14) is granted in part. To remedy the ethical quandary identified in the 

Motion, plaintiff’s counsel must notify the Court in writing, on or before June 30, 

2015, as to which of the three options delineated above she intends to pursue. 

Upon receiving such notice, the Court will enter an appropriate follow-up order.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of June, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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