UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. CHAELYN NICHOLE AARON, Defendant - Appellant. No. 18-3232 (D.C. No. 6:18-CR -10045-EFM-1) (D. Kansas)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , SEYMOUR , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ On March 28, 2018, Chaelyn Nic hole Aaron committed her latest in a long string of thefts by st ealing seven nine-mi llimeter handguns fro m a store in Park City, Kansas. Ms. Aaron pleaded guilty t o theft of firearms in violat ion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). At sentencing, the dis trict court departed upward fro m the Guidelines’ 77– 99 month range and imposed a sente nce of 110 months’ imprisonme nt, followed by a

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel de termined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case was therefore ordered subm itted without oral argument. This order a nd judgment is not binding precedent, except under th e doctrines of law of the cas e, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be c ited, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Proce dure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 7, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 three-year term of supervised r elease. Ms. Aaron appeals. Exerc ising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND On March 28, 2018, Chaelyn Nichol e Aaron entered an Atwoods Ran ch & Home store in Park City, Kansas , and made her way to a large gl ass case displaying firearms for sale. She took a sm all crowbar from a nearby store display, pried open the glass case, took seven nine -millimeter handguns, and carrie d them out of the store without paying. On April 2, 2018, Ms. Aaron was ar rested after a “short chase” on foot, and she admitted to police that she h ad stolen the seven firearms. ROA, vol. II, at 9. After being released from custody, Ms . Aaron evaded arrest by ATF age nts on April 12, 2018, by “driving at a high rate of speed and using the oncomin g traffic lanes.” Id. at 11. She was again arrested on April 19, 2018, and on April 25, 2018, a grand jury indicted Ms. Aaron on two counts: being a felon in possession o f a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 922(g)(1) (“Count One”), and theft of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (“Count Two”). Ms. Aaron entered a plea agreemen t under which she pleaded guil ty to Count Two. For its part, the Governmentagreed to move to dismiss Cou nt One, recommend that Ms. Aaron be sentenced “atthe low end of the Guideline ra nge,” recommend a two-level reduction in calculati ng Ms. Aaron’s offense level fo r acceptance of responsibility, and recommend an a dditional one-level reduction for timely notifying authorities of the intention to enter a guilty plea. See id. , vol. I, at 31–32.3 Using the 2016 edition of the Sen tencing Guidelines, Ms. Aaron’ s presentence investigation report (“PIR”) calc ulated a criminal history scor e of 26 and a criminal history category of VI. The PIRdetailed Ms. Aaron’s extensive criminal history: “from 2004 to 2012, [she] had b een convicted of numerous theft- type crimes, including theft, criminal depriv ation of property, and possessi on of stolen property, on seven occasions.” Appellee’s Br . at 3. The PIR noted seven a dditional instances of criminal conduct: five instances of theft and two instances of smuggling contraband into correctional faci lities. It also noted eight pending charg es against Ms. Aaron (along with three cases where ch arges had not yet been brought) , including traffic offenses, car theft, several in stances of possession of stolen property, and at least three instances of burglary. Fin ally, the PIR listed ten additi onal arrests, including one for felony theft and two fo r misdemeanor possession of stol en property. Citing Ms. Aaron’s extensive crim inal history, the PIR identifi ed U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (Criminal History Adequacy) as “potential grounds for d eparture,” noting: [Ms.] Aaron has 26 criminal histo ry points. The highest crimina l history category of VI is achieved by ha ving 13 criminal history points

. [Ms.] Aaron has twice the amount of points needed to be in the highest category. The defendant has bee n involved in criminal activity since the age of 14 . . . . The defendant’s criminal history category sub stantially under-represents the likelihood th at the defendant will commit other crimes, therefore an upward departure may be warranted. ROA, vol. II, at 45. Ms. Aaron objected to the PIR’s § 4A1.3 recommendation, arguing “[t]he crimes she committed as a juve nile and young adult were committ ed while she was under the influence of addicti on” and “[s]he has never been arr ested or convicted for4 a crime of violence or an offens e involving the use of a firear m or weapon.” Id. at 48. Ms. Aaron claimed she “suffered from severe, persistent mental illness,” had a “long history of suicidal ideation and attempts,” and was severely ad dicted to drugs. Id. , vol. III, at 17. She argued she co mmitted the instant offense u nder the influence of heroin and for the purpose of “pa y[ing] off an antecedent drug debt,” and that “an upward departure [would] not ach ieve anything and [would] punis h her because of her organic mental health issue s and drug addiction from childh ood.” Id. , vol. I, at 35. Accordingly, Ms. Aaron reques ted the district court impose a sentence within the Guidelines range. The district c ourt then notified the parties in writing that it “was considering [imposing] a n above-guideline range.” Id. , vol. III, at 14. At her sentencing hearing on Oc tober 22, 2018, the Government r ecommended a 77-month sentence, at the low end of the 77–96 month Guidelin es range calculated in the PIR. Over Ms. Aaron’s re newed objection, the district co urt announced that it would depart upward from the Gu idelines range and impose a grea ter sentence than the Government recommended. Discussing the factors enumerat ed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the d istrict court concluded, given that Ms. Aaron broke a display case, told conf licting stories about why she stole the firearms, and fled from the police, that “the nature and circumstances of her offens e [are] quite serious.” Id. , vol. III, at 27. The court further observed that Ms. Aaron’s crimin al history included “an incredi ble string, perhaps not of violent offenses, but stil l of disruption of the peace o f the community with the number of theft and other o ffenses that she’s had.” Id. at 28. Despite expressing5 sympathy for Ms. Aaron’s addicti on issues, the district court m aintained that “[a]ddiction is disfavored as a grounds to consider a downward factor on a sentence, and . . . that’s not just downwar d below the guideline but [als o] in considering it in contravention to upward factors.” Id. at 28–29. Considering opti ons for rehabilitation, the court observed that Ms. Aaron had “not fully participated i n” treatment options in the past. Id. at 29. The court also considered the “need to impose a sentenc e that protects the public from further crimes” by Ms. Aaron, noting: [F]rankly, this defendant is a r olling series of crimes. In her youthful age, she has scored an incredi ble number of crimes. And not disregarding the need to provide t reatment to her, I also have to consider the need for protecting the public from the continued crimes th at she’s committing. And that’s, I think, a serious factor, given how mu ch criminality she’s ranked [sic] up in what a short period of tim e. And those are the factors that have led me to really seriously cons ider an upward departure on her sentencing.
Id. at 29–30. The district court then imposed a sentence of 110 months’ impr isonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release, along with a “strong recommendation to the BOP . . . t hat [Ms. Aaron] be placed in a medical facility” for the duration of her sentence. Id. , vol. II, at 34, 36–38. Ms . Aaron timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 allows an upwar d departure from the Guidelines ’ recommended sentence where “reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category subs tantially under-represents the se riousness of the defendant’s criminal history orthe likelihood that the defenda nt will commit other6 crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). I n general, we review a distri ct court’s decision to depart from the Guidelines’ re commended sentence for abuse of d iscretion. Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). When re viewing an upward departure, we consider four factors: “(1) whet her the district court relied o n permissible departure factors, (2) whether those factor s removed a defendant from the applicable Guidelines heartland, (3) wheth er the record supports the distr ict court’s factual bases for a departure, and (4) whether the degree of departure is rea sonable.” United States v. Robertson , 568 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2009). We apply a “unitary abuse of dis cretion standard” to each of th ese four prongs, but in applying that standard, the degree of deference depends on the type of question presented on appeal. United States v. Munoz-Tello , 531 F.3d 1174, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted) . “That is, if the question on a ppeal has the hue of a factual question, we accord the d istrict court greater deferenc e, whereas we undertake plenary review of questions t hat are in essence legal.” Id. Ms. Aaron raises four issues on appeal, corresponding to the f our prongs of our upward-departure review: (1) whether the district court rel ied on impermissible departure factors; (2) whether t he district court erred in find ing Ms. Aaron’s criminal history removed her from the a pplicable Guidelines heartland; ( 3) whether the record supports the district court’s fa ctual basis for an upward depar ture; and (4) whether the degree of departure was reas onable. We address each issue i n turn, ultimately concluding that none entitl es Ms. Aaron to relief.7 A. Did the District Court Rely on Impermissible Departure Factors?
1. Standard of Review Because it is a question of law, w e generally review whether a district court relied on impermissible de parture factors de novo. Id. at 1188. Here, however, Ms. Aaron concedes she forfeited her argument by failing to rai se it to the district court. “[W]hen an appellant raise s a forfeited argument or issu e for the first time on appeal, we will reverse only if t he appellant can satisfy our r igorous test for plain
error.” United States v. Johnson , 732 F. App’x 638, 644 –45 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished); see also United States v. Kearn , 863 F.3d 1299, 1305 (10th Cir. 2017). To prevail on plain error, a defe ndant must show “(1) the distr ict court committed error; (2) the error wa s plain—that is, it was obviou s under current wellsettled law; (3) the error affect ed the Defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affect[ed] the fairnes s, integrity, or public reputat ion of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gantt , 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10t h Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Becaus e all four requirements must b e met, the failure of any one will foreclose relief a nd the others need not be addres sed.” Id.
2. Analysis The Government argues that becau se Ms. Aaron failed to argue pl ain error in her opening brief “this issue is waived, meaning [she] is not e ntitled to even plainerror review.” Appellee’s Br. at 13. Indeed, where an appellant fails to properly argue plain error on appeal, she is notentitled to plain error revie w. See, e.g. , Johnson , 732 F. App’x at 644. However, we ha ve left open the possibility tha t a criminal defendant8 could simply allege er ror in her opening br ief, then argue the other three plain-error factors in her reply brief after the Government argues forfeitu re. United States v. MacKay , 715 F.3d 807, 831 n.17 (10th Cir. 2013) (“An appellant certai nly would benefit from a more developed argument if he acknowledged forfe iture in his opening brief, but we do not discount the possibility that we may consi der a plain error argument made for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief. ”); see also United States v. Courtney , 816 F.3d 681, 683 (10th Cir. 2016). Here, Ms. Aaron failed to argue p lain error in her opening brie f. In her reply brief, despite acknowledging she had forfeited this argument be low, Ms. Aaron argued only that the district c ourt erred, and she never addres sed the other three prongs of plain error. Therefo re, even applying the lenient MacKay standard, she has waived plain error review. 1

1 Even if we reached t he merits of Ms. Aaron’s argument, the dis trict court did not impermissibly rely on her age to depart upward fr om the Guidelines range. The district court mentioned Ms. Aaron’s age simply to highlight the fact that she had ac cumulated an extensive crimin al history in a short period of time. See ROA, vol. III, at 15 (“[O] bviously, 26 points itself would be grounds foran upward departure because it’s double wh at category VI is. But the fact that she’s done so many in s uch a youthful age further exacerbates that.”). This interp retation of the district court’ s language at sentencing is further supported by the fact that the district c ourt checked the box marked “Criminal History Ina dequacy” in the Statement of Re asons for Departure, but did not check the box marked “Age” (or any other box). Such an approach is entirely permi ssible under the Guidelines. See, e.g. , United States v. Collins , 122 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir. 1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Andrews , 76 F. App’x 244, 245 (10th Cir. 2003) ( unpublished) (noting that “a district cou rt may rely on offender characteristics such as age . . . only in combination with other circumstances of a defendant’s c riminal history”); U.S.S.G. § 4 A1.3 cmt. background (2016) (describing “y ounger defendants . . . who are more likely9 B. Did the District Court Err in Finding Th at Ms. Aaron’s Criminal History Removed Her From the ApplicableGuidelines Heartland?
1. Standard of Review The parties dispute whether Ms. A aron preserved this argument. Our review of Ms. Aaron’s sentencing memorandum reflects she disputed the Pro bation Office’s statement that an upward departure may be warranted by noting that Ms. Aaron “has never been arrested or convictedfor a crime of violence or an offense involving the use of a firearm or weapon.” SeeROA, vol. II, at 48. Her attorn ey also argued at the sentencing hearing that Ms. Aaron’ s criminal history did not warrant an upward departure. Although the argument there focused on Ms. Aaron’s drug addiction and mental health issues, Ms. Aaron’s attorney did seek to distingu ish her prior criminal offenses from the instant offense. See id. , vol. III, at 20 (“I don’t see where she’s ever been convicted of a crime of vio lence or any other offense invo lving the use of a firearm or weapon other than this theft.”); see also id. (arguing Ms. Aaron was not “going around stealing as a true profession”). From these objections, we can fair ly conclude Ms. Aaron attempt ed to distinguish her prior offenses from her instant offense. This suffices to p reserve her argument on appeal that the district court improperly “lumped all of her re levant and irrelevant criminal conduct togethe r.” Aplt. Op. Br. at 24.

to have received repeated leni ent treatment, yet who may actual ly pose a greater risk of serious recidiv ism than older defendants”).10 When applying our abuse-of-discr etion standard to this prong, “ [s]ubstantial deference is due the district c ourt’s determination that unique factors place a defendant outside of the Guidelines heartland.” Robertson , 568 F.3d at 1213. Because we “[a]cknowledg[e] the district court’s special ability to jud ge the ‘ordinariness or unusualness of a particular case,’” United States v. Osborne , 593 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Koon , 518 U.S. at 98), we “limit our review to determining whether the factual circumstance s from the vantage point of the district court make this the atypical case.” Robertson , 568 F.3d at 1213 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Koon , 518 U.S. at 98 (describing the district court’s “institutiona l advantage” in making “these s orts of determinations”).
2. Analysis “The Guidelines encourage upward departure if reliable informat ion indicates that the criminal history cate gory does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the de fendant will commit other crimes.” United States v. Akers , 215 F.3d 1089, 1104 (10th Cir. 2000). Ms. Aaron claims the district c ourt wrongly relied on her entir e criminal history to support an upward departure, w ithout determining whether her cr iminal history was sufficiently similar to her insta nt offense. She argues that “[ a]n upward departure . . . is only befitting if a defendant ’s prior, adult, criminal condu ct is sufficiently similar to that underlying the instant offense.” See Robertson , 568 F.3d at 1213. While Ms. Aaron is correct that crimin al history must be “sufficientl y similar to [the11 conduct] underlying the instant offense,” the district court di d not err in determining that her criminal histor y meets that threshold. To remove a defendant from the Guidelines heartla nd, past crimi nal conduct need not be identical to the in stant crime of conviction. Rathe r, it must simply be similar enough to suggest highe r culpability or likelihood to r ecidivate than the typical case. Id. In Robertson , the only case relied upon by Ms. Aaron, the defendant was convicted of being a fel on in possession of a firearm. Id. at 1207. His criminal history “began at age 14” and mo st of his “criminal convictions involved drugs or guns.” Id. Relying primarily on prior crim inal charges that the “Governme nt [had been] compelled to d ismiss . . . because k ey prosecution witnes ses [had] failed to appear,” 2 the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence, reaso ning that the defendant’s criminal history rem oved him from the Guidelines he artland. Id. at 1208– 09. On appeal, this court rejecte d the defendant’s challenge to that conclusion, accepting the district court’s re asoning that the “[d]efendant’ s unconvicted conduct involving firearms—some of it rem arkably violent . . . giv[es] him greater culpability for being a felon in possession of a firearm than a defendant i n the run-of-the-mill
case.” Id. at 1214. Thus, although the defenda nt had not before been char ged with, or convicted of, the specific federa l crime of being a felon in po ssession of a firearm, his history of crimes involving firearms and violence was suffi cient to remove him

2 These charges involved threat ening people with firearms, shoot ing randomly at a house, and shooting at the occupants of a car. See United States v. Robertson , 568 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2009).12 from the Guidelines heartland. Id. ; see also United States v. Proffit , 304 F.3d 1001, 1011–12 (10th Cir. 200 2) (affirming distri ct court’s reliance o n “[d]efendant’s failure to pay any restitution or the spe cial assessment, his passing o f bad checks . . . and submission of false medical docum entation in an at tempt to dela y sentencing” as sufficient “evidence [of his] pot ential for recidivism” to remo ve him from the heartland for mail fraud conviction). Likewise, the district court he re relied primarily on Ms. Aaron ’s extensive history of theft. Although the se ntencing judge did note Ms. Aa ron’s sheer number of criminal history points, see, e.g. , ROA, vol. III, at 15, h e also emphasized her recurring pattern of theft crim es and its impact on the communi ty, see id. at 20 (“[S]he’s made a criminal livel ihood of theft a nd burglary.”); id. at 28 (referring to “an incredible string, perhaps n ot of violent offenses, but sti ll of disruption of the peace of the community with the number of theft and other offen ses that she’s had”);
id. (“[T]here’s no indication thatshe’s developed a respect for t he law, as in her youthful age she’s jus t continued on repeated and repeated occa sions to violate the peace of the community”); see also ROA, vol. II, at 51 (givi ng as a reason for upward departure “defendant’s lack of respect for the law, extensive h istory of theft crimes in a short period of time, the insta nt offense involve[ing] the th eft of firearms, a need to protect the community, and a hi gh likelihood of recidivism”). Nonetheless, Ms. Aaron argues he r prior “theft convictions were dissimilar from the present case” because one “involved two counts of auto theft,” another “involved theft of purses and pr operty from two churches,” and on “two [other]13 occasions, she stole purses from a locker at the YMCA.” Aplt. O p. Br. at 25. But the fact that none of these past ins tances specifically involve the theft of firearms does not prevent the district court fro m considering them as evidenc e of her likelihood to recidivate. To be sure, the district court must draw some connection betwee n criminal history and the instant offense. And if the district court had merely “lumped all of [Ms. Aaron’s] relevant and irre levant criminal conduct together ,” id. , regardless of the connection between past crim inal conduct and the instant of fense, that probably would not have adequately sugges ted the elevated culpability orlikelihood of recidivism needed to justif y an upward departure. See Robertson , 568 F.3d at 1207– 08. But the district court did not, in fact, “lump all of” Ms. Aaron’s criminal history together. See Aplt. Op. Br. at 25. R ather, it emphasized the likelihood of re cidivism given that this crime—theft of f irearms—followed on the heels o f many past theft crimes driven by similar motives. Ms. Aaron also argues the distri ct court failed to consider as mitigating factors her mental illness and drug addi ction. But although the court d id not change its conclusion that Ms. Aaron fell out side the “heartland” of the S entencing Guidelines, it did adequately consider these factors. First, the court acco unted for Ms. Aaron’s mental illness by recommending th at she serve her sentence at amedical facility. Second, the district court cons idered Ms. Aaron’s drug addictio n and expressed sympathy for Ms. Aaron’s addicti on. But it ultimately concluded that “[a]ddiction is disfavored as a grounds to consider a downw ard factor on a sent ence.” ROA, vol. III,14 at 28. That conclusion was correct. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (“Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse ordinarily i s not a reason for a downward d eparture. Substance abuse is highly correlated to a n increased propensity to commit crime.”); United States v. Ziegler , 1 F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir . 1993) (noting “the Sentencing Commission’s desire not to reward drug dependency through depar tures”). In sum, the district court did not fail to consider Ms. Aaron’s mental illness and drug addiction; rathe r, it “took into account all of the 3553(a) factors, including the seriousness of [her] offense, [her] repeated offenses, the need for adequate deterrence, and protecting the pub lic from further crimes by [M s. Aaron].” United
States v. Liner , 365 F. App’x 150, 153 (10th Cir . 2010) (unpublished). Thus, t he district court did not abuse its d iscretion in finding that Ms. Aaron’s criminal history removed her from the Guidelines heartland.
C. Does the Record Support the District Court’s Factual Basi s for an Upward Departure?
1. Standard of Review Both parties agree Ms. Aaron pres erved this issue for review. W here the issue is preserved, “[w]hether the re cord sufficiently supports the f actual basis underlying the departure is a question we review for clear error.” United States v. Utley , 62 F. App’x 833, 837 (10th Ci r. 2003) (unpublished); see also United States v. MaldonadoCampos , 920 F.2d 714, 720 (10th Cir. 199 0). If a fact is contested at the sentencing hearing, however, that fact mus t be established by a prepondera nce of the evidence. United States v. Yates , 22 F.3d 981, 989 (10th Cir. 1994).15 2. Analysis Ms. Aaron’s argument on this pointis brief and somewhat unclea r. She makes two claims: (1) “the majority of the criminal history points” t he district court relied upon “were not for convi ctions on charges of theft or related t o any criminal livelihood”; and (2) “[t]he four t heft convictions identified i n the PIR arose during a 16-month period.” 3 Aplt’s Op. Br. at 26. Her first point is unavailing. The fact that only fifteen of he r criminal history points arose from theft-related crimes does not undermine the d istrict court’s conclusion that she had “an exten sive history of theft crimes i n a short period of time.” ROA, vol. II, at 51. Nor does it compromise the court’s conclusions about Ms. Aaron’s recidivist tendencies. As for her second point, Ms. Aaron never explains the significa nce of the fact that “four [of her] theft convi ctions . . . arose during a 16-m onth period.” Aplt’s Op. Br. at 26. And, as the Government observes, the record amply su pports the district court’s conclusion that repeated interventions from the crimina l justice sy stem have failed to deter Ms. Aaron fro m committing more crimes.

3 It is not clear these issues properly fall under the third pro ng of our departure analysis. Ms. Aaron does not disput e “the factual accuracy of s tatements in the presentence report” or th e sentencing hearing. United States v. Warren , 737 F.3d 1278, 1280 (10th Cir. 2013). Tha t is, she never argues the arre sts, charges, and convictions at issue did not tak e place, or that t he district c ourt mischaracterized how or when they took place. Rather, s he challenges the district co urt’s interpretation of the significance of those events. Thus, her “fact ual basis” arguments seem more like restatements of the arguments she makes under prong two. Nevert heless, we address these arguments’ significance to the prong three analysis becau se that is how Ms. Aaron presented them.16 Therefore, the district court di d not err, let alone commit cle ar error, in its factual basis for an upward departure. D. Was the Degree of Upward Departure Reasonable?
1. Standard of Review “In determining whether the degr ee of departure is reasonable . . . the appellate court should afford the trial c ourt some discretion, as we shou ld not lightly overturn determinations of the appropr iate degree of departure.” United States v. Goldberg , 295 F.3d 1133, 1138 ( 10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, Ms. Aaron and the G overnment agree that this issue was not preserved below. Therefore, we rev iew for plain error.
2. Analysis Ms. Aaron argues the district cour t erred in determining the de gree of its upward departure. “In calibrati ng the degree of departure, a di strict court must provide an explanation that does more than restate the justific ation for the upward departure.” United States v. Shores , 45 F. App’x 854, 8 58 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s explanation can rest on “any reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines , including extrapolation from or ana logy to the Guidelines.” Goldberg , 295 F.3d at 1138 (quotation marks omitted). The d istrict court may not, however, simply employ the language of the Guidelines to achi eve its own desired results i n sentencing. See, e.g. , id. at 1139–40 (holding di strict court erred in applying eight-ste p reduction where “it [was] apparent it chose a downwar d departure of eight levels be cause such a17 departure was the minimum necess ary to render the defendant eli gible for a sentence that did not involve incarceratio n”). Likewise, the district co urt’s methodology may not be arbitrary. See United States v. Walker , 284 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting district court’s rati onale for seven-level upward de parture where “the district court decided to depar t one offense level for each of Defendant’s seven prior convictions in excess of those n eeded to accumulate the crimina l history points required for his placement in crim inal history category VI”). As Ms. Aaron observes, the Sentenc ing Guidelines prescribe a me thod for district courts to follow when d eparting upward in category VI cases: In a case in which the court dete rmines that the extent and nat ure of the defendant’s criminal history, tak en together, are sufficient to warrant an upward departure from Criminal History Category VI, the court s hould structure the departure by movi ng incrementally down the senten cing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal History Cate gory VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B). Here, the district court explai ned its reasoning for the two-le vel departure as follows: Well, I [have a copy of the sente ncing table] and if I went up— she’s 21- VI. If I went up to 22-VI, the r ange would be 84 to 105 [months ], and 23-VI would be 92 to 115. Given t hat she has double the crimina l history points necessary to get to a category VI, if I followed that approach I don’t think a mere adj ustment of a[n] offense level of one level would be sufficient. And if I did even just two levels, m y proposed sentence is within that gui deline range of 92 to 115.18 ROA, vol. III, at 35. 4 Thus, the district court followe d the procedure described in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B): it m oved up one offense level, deter mined the resulting guideline range was still inappropr iate given the factors previ ously discussed, then moved up another offense level , and determined the resulting gu ideline range was appropriate. The substance of the district c ourt’s explanation for moving u p a second offense level—“[g]iven that sh e has double the criminal history points necessary to get to a category VI, . . . I don’t think a mere adjustment of . . . one level would be sufficient”—is adequate. Id. It “expressly articulate[s] . . . the logical foundation for the degree of departure selected.” United States v. Begaye , 635 F.3d 456, 470 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted ). The district court consid ered Ms. Aaron’s criminal history suffi ciently in excess of a “heartland” case t hat a one-level departure would not adequately reflect it, but a two-level departure woul d. In addition, the district court’s extensive explan ation of the seriousness of Ms . Aaron’s criminal history lends some additional we ight to the court’s choice to d epart by two levels, rather than just one. See, e.g. , United States v. Martinez , 418 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s explanation where the “d egree of departure also advance[d] the goals of deterren ce and protecting the public”); see also United States

4 The district court originally announced only “a sentence that includes an upward variance of 110 months’ incarceration,” citing only Ms. Aaron’s “long string of criminality,” the statutory m aximum of 120 months, and “the inadequacy of the criminal history characteriza tion.” ROA, vol. III, at 30–31. Ms . Aaron’s counsel pointed out the commentary to U.S .S.G. § 4A1.3 later in the sen tencing hearing, and the district court then explaine d its sentence as the result of a two-step departure.19 v. McGowan , 6 F. App’x 806, 810 (10th Cir . 2001) (unpublished) (noting “t he district court is not required to justif y the degree of departure with m athematical precision”). Although the district court’s expl anation of its two-level depa rture could have been more detailed, it followed the Guidelin es’ prescribed meth od for determining the degree of departure and was grounded in relevant facts. The refore, the district court did not abuse its discreti on in calculating the degree of departure from the Guidelines’ range. Because Ms. Aaron has failed to es tablish the first prong of pl ain error review—error—her claim fails. 5
II. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the sentence impos ed by the district court. Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge

5 Even if Ms. Aaron could establ ish error, she cannot show that such error was plain. See United States v. Garcia-Damian , 702 F. App’x 743, 7 46 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding district c ourt’s explanation of degree o f departure, although incomplete, was not p lain error). Nor is there any indication t hat the alleged error affected Ms. Aaron’s substantia l rights because Ms. Aaron has n ot shown “that the district court’s failure to ela borate on its reasoning impacted the outcome of [her] sentencing and therefore affect ed [her] substant ial rights.” United States v. GamezTapia , 501 F. App’x 780, 782–83 (10t h Cir. 2012) (unpublished); see also Begaye , 635 F.3d at 471 (rejec ting defendant’s chall enge on plain-error review where defendant “fail[ed] t o advance any argumen t as to how this erro r affected his sentence, and thus utterly fails to carry his burden”). Finally , Ms. Aaron advances no argument on whether any error in explaining the degree of upwar d departure “affect[s] . . . the f airness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas , 477 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).