J-A03002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MARK SYLVESTER AND 

ALVERA SYLVESTER, HUSBAND AND 

WIFE

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

ALVIN ZIEGLER SNOW REMOVAL AND 

ALVIN ZIEGLER

Appellees No. 1110 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered April 6, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Civil Division at No.: 2933-CV-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 6, 2022

Appellants Mark Sylvester (“Mr. Sylvester”) and Alvera Sylvester

(“Mrs. Sylvester”), husband and wife, appeal from the April 6, 2021 order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (“trial court”), which granted 

summary judgment in favor of Appellees Alvin Ziegler Snow Removal and 

Alvin Ziegler (“Mr. Ziegler”) and dismissed Appellants’ negligence complaint. 

Upon review, we affirm.

Unless otherwise specified, the facts of this case come from the trial 

court’s April 6, 2021 opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/21, at 1-5. 

Briefly, on April 12, 2019, Appellants filed a complaint sounding in 

negligence against Appellees. On January 9, 2020, they amended the 

complaint, alleging that Mr. Sylvester was injured by snow and ice falling 
J-A03002-22

- 2 -

from the roof of Building No. 7 when he was leaving work at the Tobyhanna 

Army Depot (“Depot”) on March 2, 2018. Amended Complaint, 1/9/20, at 

¶ 8. Specifically, Appellants alleged that Mr. Sylvester “was suddenly and 

forcefully, without warning, hit with a large and heavy amount of snow and 

ice falling from the roof of Building 7,” knocking him from his feet and 

striking him directly in the right eye. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. As a result, Appellants 

alleged that Mr. Sylvester “suffered serious and permanent injuries, 

including, inter alia, a detached retina requiring surgical repair, and 

permanent loss of vision.” Id. at ¶ 14. Appellants alleged that Appellees

were liable for Mr. Sylvester’s injuries because they were negligent in failing

to clear the snow and ice from the roof in a timely manner and thus allowed 

the same to accumulate for an unreasonable amount of time.

1

 Id. at ¶¶ 11-

12. Thus, according to Appellants’ allegations, Appellees’ action or inaction 

created an increased risk of harm to persons lawfully present at the Depot

that day. Id. at ¶ 13. 

On April 13, 2020, Appellees filed an answer, denying the averments 

of the amended complaint and asserting new matter. On April 20, 2020, 

Appellants replied to Appellees’ new matter. On June 11, 2020, Appellees 

moved for summary judgment, as a matter of law, against Appellants, 

claiming that Mr. Sylvester’s injury occurred during an ongoing snowstorm. 

____________________________________________

1 Separately, Mrs. Sylvester brought an action for loss of consortium against 

Appellees. 
J-A03002-22

- 3 -

They further claimed that, because of the active storm, a reasonable period 

of time within which they were expected to clear the snow and ice could not 

have expired. Thus, according to Appellees, they did not owe a duty to Mr. 

Sylvester to clear the snow and ice from the roof of Building 7 during the

active storm. Based on this argument, Appellees noted that Mr. Sylvester 

was not entitled to relief. 

On April 6, 2021, the trial court granted Appellees’ summary judgment

motion, concluding that, because Pennsylvania law permits landowners a 

“reasonable time” to remove dangerous snow and ice following a severe and 

ongoing storm, Appellees could not have been expected to clear the snow 

and ice from the roof of Building 7 by the time Mr. Sylvester was injured. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/21, at 5-8. In so doing, the court recounted:

Mr. Sylvester testified in his deposition that he left his house on 

March 2, 2018 at 6 a.m. to drive to work. There was no snow on 

the road during his 45-minute commute to the Depot. When he 

arrived at his workplace, Building No. 7 at the Depot, he had no 

difficulty walking from his truck to the building in the light snow 

that had accumulated on the ground.

During the workday, heavy snow piled up, and five of the seven 

employees in Mr. Sylvester’s building went home early due to 

the increasingly dangerous road conditions. Mr. Sylvester 

testified that he “should have did the smart thing and went 

home at half the day. I wish I did that now, but I didn’t.” At the 

end of his shift at 5:00 [p.m.], Mr. Sylvester and the other 

remaining employee attempted to leave the building, but were 

not able to open the door “more than an inch” because it was 

blocked by snow. He used an ice chopper to push some of the 

snow out of the way, got his arm out “and it took a long time, 

but I finally got it where we could get the door open enough to 

get ourselves through the door.” Before leaving through that 

door, they had attempted to get out through the bay of the 
J-A03002-22

- 4 -

building adjoining theirs, but that door was completely blocked 

by snow that had fallen off the roof, and it would not open at all 

despite their best efforts.

When Mr. Sylvester and his coworker were finally able to leave 

the building, it was still snowing. The parking area had not been 

cleared, but the road had been plowed. While they were 

descending the three or four steps from the building to the 

ground, the two men heard a noise which Mr. Sylvester knew to 

be snow falling off the roof. He looked up to see where the noise 

was coming from, and was struck and knocked down by ice and 

snow falling from the roof. He testified that he couldn’t say for 

sure whether there had been snow or ice on the roof before the 

March 2 snowstorm.

After he walked to his car, Mr. Sylvester was not able to leave 

the Depot because Route 380 was impassible—there were 

several wrecks, and it was still snowing. At that time, Mr. 

Sylvester went back into the Depot and slept in Building No. 7, 

although the two men struggled to be able to open the door 

again due to the heavy buildup of snow. 

According to the CompuWeather report, 20 inches of snow fell on 

March 2, 2018, with snowfall occurring from 3:45 a.m. until 

between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m. Before March 2, snow had not 

fallen since at least February 24, 2018.

At the time of the incident, [Appellees] had a contract with the 

Depot under which [they] performed ice and snow removal on 

the Depot premises. The contract provided:

Snow and ice removal services throughout 

Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD), Tobyhanna, PA 

18466. Contractor shall provide all supervision, 

labor equipment and materials necessary for 

performance of all operations in connection with the 

removal of snow and ice from various sites in the 

secure, unsecure and roof areas throughout 

Tobyhanna Army Depot (TYAD) on an as needed 

basis. Year period of performance 01 October 2017 

through 30 September 2018. Services shall be 

performed in accordance with the performance work 

statement.
J-A03002-22

- 5 -

Alvin Ziegler testified during his deposition that on March 2, 

2018, fourteen of his employees worked to remove snow at the 

Depot, which was their only job for the day. [Mr.] Ziegler did 

not have sufficient manpower to inspect the roofs of buildings at 

the Depot on March 2, due to the heavy snow. He would have 

had to hire 250-300 people to adequately clear all the Depot 

roofs given the severity of the storm. [Mr. Ziegler] began at 

7:00 a.m. and worked approximately eight and a half hours, 

before deciding that further attempts at snow removal were 

“futile” and sending his employees home.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/21, at 2-5 (record citations omitted) (sic). 

Appellants appealed. Both Appellants and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

On appeal, Appellants present three issues for our review, which we 

reproduce verbatim:

[I.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed 

an error of law failing to conclude that there was a duty 

incumbent upon Appellees when evidence showed Appellees 

were aware that snow and ice tended to fall off of the roof where 

[Mr. Sylvester] was injure, and cause damage.

[II.] Whether the court abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by granting Appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment and concluding that Appellee[s were] not required to 

remove ice and snow from the roof during an ongoing storm 

when Appellees were working on location performing snow and 

ice removal during said active storm.

[III.] Whether the court abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law by granting Appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment and determining that the hills and ridges doctrine 

applied to the facts of this case.
J-A03002-22

- 6 -

Appellants’ Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2 

At the core, Appellants challenge the trial court’s conclusion that

Appellees did not owe Mr. Sylvester a duty to clear snow and ice from the 

roof of Building 7 during an active snowstorm because Pennsylvania law 

affords landowners a reasonable amount time to remove snow and ice. 

Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is 

well-settled.

[We] may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is 

established that the court committed an error of law or abused 

its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2. The rule 

[provides] that where there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, 

summary judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving 

party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely 

rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary 

judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient 

evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears 

the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving 

party to judgment as a matter of law. Lastly, we will review the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and 

____________________________________________

2 Based on our disposition of this appeal, we need not address separately 

Appellants’ first two issues. Nonetheless, as Appellees observe, see 

Appellees’ Brief at 27, Appellants’ first two issues are devoid of any legal 

authority, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). It is well-established that the 

failure to develop an argument with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent 

authority results in waiver of that issue on appeal. Giant Food Stores, LLC 

v. THF Silver Spring Development, L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 444 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (holding that failure to support an argument with citation to authority 

results in waiver), appeal denied, 972 A.2d 522 (Pa. 2009).
J-A03002-22

- 7 -

all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

must be resolved against the moving party.

E.R. Linde Const. Corp. v. Goodwin, 68 A.3d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation omitted; brackets in original). 

Pennsylvania law burdens a plaintiff on a negligence claim to 

successfully establish the proverbial four elements: “(1) a duty or obligation 

recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 

between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” 

Estate of Swift by Swift v. Northeastern Hosp., 690 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. 

Super. 1997), appeal denied, 701 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997). “The burden of 

proving the existence of negligence rests upon the party who has asserted 

it.” Schmoyer by Schmoyer v. Mexico Forge, Inc., 649 A.2d 705, 707 

(Pa. Super. 1994). “The mere fact that an accident has occurred does not 

entitle the injured person to a verdict. A plaintiff must show that the 

defendant owed a duty of care, and that this duty was breached.” Rauch v. 

Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 824 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal citations 

omitted), appeal denied, 793 A.2d 909 (Pa. 2002).

Section 324(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes, inter 

alia, a duty on a defendant to third parties when the defendant has 

“undertaken” an obligation to provide certain services.

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 

services to another which he should recognize as necessary for 

the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to 

liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his 

failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
J-A03002-22

- 8 -

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases 

the risk of such harm, or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed 

by the other to the third person, or

(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the 

other or the third person upon the undertaking.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324(A) (emphasis added);

3 see Cantwell 

v. Allegheny Cnty., 483 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. 1984) (concluding that 

Section 324(A) correctly states Pennsylvania law). Applying Section 324A, 

our Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is not the contract per se which 

creates the duty; it is the law which imposes the duty because of the nature 

of the undertaking in the contract.” Farabaugh v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 911 

A.2d 1264, 1283 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). Therefore, in analyzing 

whether a defendant undertook a legal duty under Section 324A, we look at 

the specific contractual obligations or particular undertakings that the entity 

agreed to perform. See Beury v. Hicks, 323 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. 1974)

(utility provider undertook duty to maintain trees around its power lines by 

doing so for 24 years). Thus, pursuant to Section 324A, an entity that 

assumes a landowner’s responsibility to remove snow and ice from its roads 

and walkways has a duty toward invitees to exercise reasonable care in that 

undertaking. See Hoffmaster v. Cty. of Allegheny, 550 A.2d 1023, 1026 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (holding township that had assumed county’s 

____________________________________________

3 Appellants do not identify the subsection of Section 324A that would apply 

sub judice. 
J-A03002-22

- 9 -

responsibility to remove snow and ice from county roads pursuant to a 

contract could be held liable for negligence under Section 324A); cf. Barnes 

v. Alcoa, Inc., 145 A.3d 730, 737 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding no evidence 

that defendant was liable for snow removal under Section 324A when 

testimony established that defendant’s subsidiary company, not defendant, 

had undertaken removal of snow and ice from parking lot).

Here, the evidence is uncontroverted that Appellees undertook or 

assumed the Depot’s duty to its invitees to remove snow and ice under 

Section 324A(b). Therefore, under Section 324A(b), Appellees owed the 

same duty to exercise reasonable care in performing snow and ice removal

as the Depot vis-à-vis third parties. As the trial court aptly noted, there 

exists a seminal case in this jurisdiction where a plaintiff was injured by 

snow and ice falling from a roof. In Hutchison v. Montgomery Ward & 

Co., 70 A.2d 838 (Pa. 1950), the plaintiff was walking on Main Street in 

Butler, Pennsylvania, at 2:00 p.m. on December 29, 1945, during a thawing 

temperature, when “snow and ice, perhaps a bushel in quantity, fell upon 

[the plaintiff] from the roof of the building occupied by the defendant.” 

Hutchison, 70 A.2d at 838-39. Eventually, a jury found in favor of the 

plaintiff, but the trial court entered judgment non obstante veredicto in favor 

of the defendant. Following the plaintiff’s appeal, our Supreme Court 

affirmed the entry of judgment in the defendant’s favor. In so doing, the 

Court explained:

To permit a recovery under these circumstances would be to 

hold that the owner or occupier of a property must prevent 
J-A03002-22

- 10 -

falling ice and snow at his peril. No Pennsylvania case has been 

cited, however, to support such a proposition. Our law imposes 

no absolute duty on an owner or occupier of property to 

keep his premises free from ice and snow at all times. The 

question is not one of safety but of negligence. As recognized by 

this Court . . . Gutters along the edges of eaves will clog up from 

ice and snow and overflow under certain weather conditions. 

This is inherent in the nature of eaves and gutters, just as it is in 

roofs without them, and their maintenance could not ordinarily 

be held negligent. To charge the owner or occupier with 

culpability in such a case it must not only appear that the 

condition existed for so long a time as to visit him with 

knowledge of it, but must also appear that the danger was 

sufficiently obvious that he should have realized that someone 

might be injured because of it. Clearly the mere fact that snow

or ice fell from the roof is not of itself sufficient proof of 

negligence. It was incumbent on appellant to show some 

unusual condition existing before the accident that would lead 

appellee, through its employees, in the exercise of reasonable 

and ordinary care, to believe that additional precautions were 

required.

Id. at 840 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 

concluded that “the presence of snow on the roof of the building occupied by 

[the defendant] was not caused by any act or omission on its part, but was a 

natural phenomenon incident to our climate.” Id.

Moreover, in slip-and-fall cases factually distinguishable from this 

case,4 we have fleshed out the contours of liability a landowner faces as a 

____________________________________________

4 The cases applied the hills and ridges doctrine, which “is a long standing 

and well entrenched legal principle that protects an owner or occupier of 

land from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from ice and 

snow where the owner has not permitted the ice and snow to unreasonably 

accumulate in ridges or elevations.” Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban 

Development Corporation, 179 A.3d 69, 72 (Pa. Super. 2018); accord

Morin v. Traveler’s Rest Motel, Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Pa. Super. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A03002-22

- 11 -

result of injury caused to another by snow and ice on his or her property. In 

Rinaldi v. Levine, 176 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1962), our Supreme Court explained 

that “[t]here is no absolute duty on the part of a landowner to keep his 

premises and sidewalks free from snow and ice at all times. These 

formations are natural phenomena incidental to our climate.” Rinaldi, 176 

A.2d at 625. Additionally, it is settled that a landowner’s duty to remove 

snow and ice is triggered only “a reasonable time after” the landowner

becomes aware of the dangerous conditions created by the snow and ice. 

Id. (emphasis added); see also Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 124-

25 (Pa. 1983) (explaining that a landowner has a duty to protect invitees 

from unknown, unforeseeable hazards on the premises, but not from 

hazards which are known or obvious to the invitees). 

In Biernacki v. Presque Isle Condominiums Unit Owners Ass’n, 

Inc., 828 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. 2003), we explained that an owner or 

occupier of land has a duty to remove a dangerous condition caused by snow 

or ice within a reasonable time after receiving notice of that condition. 

Biernacki, 828 A.2d at 1116 n.1. There, the plaintiff slipped and fell 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

1997). Under the hills and ridges doctrine, an owner of land is protected 

from liability for “generally slippery conditions resulting from ice and snow 

where the owner has not permitted the ice and snow to unreasonably 

accumulate in ridges or elevations.” Collins, 179 A.3d at 72 (citations 

omitted). However, “proof of hills and ridges is not required when the 

hazard is not the result of a general slippery condition prevailing in the 

community, but of a localized patch of ice.” Harmotta v. Bender, 601 A.2d 

837, 842 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citations omitted). 
J-A03002-22

- 12 -

between parked cars in the parking lot of the condominium she leased. On 

appeal, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 

defendant, concluding that it would be totally unreasonable to require the 

defendant to clear snow from a parking lot by 7:45 a.m. the morning after a 

snowfall had occurred overnight. Id. at 1117.

Relatedly, in Collins, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the defendant, concluding that “a landowner has no obligation to 

correct the conditions until a reasonable time after the winter storm has 

ended.” Collins, 179 A.3d at 75. We noted that it was undisputed that the 

plaintiff “slipped and fell on ice/snow during an active blizzard; that is, at a 

time when ‘generally slippery conditions’ prevailed in the community.” 

Collins, 179 A.3d at 75 (citation omitted). Thus, we explained that the 

defendant “had no duty to remove the ice and snow, which began at 

approximately 8:30 a.m., from the sidewalk at the time [the plaintiff] fell 

between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., particularly in light of the fact that the 

blizzard was still occurring at this time.” Id. (citation omitted). 

With the foregoing principles in mind, we conclude that the 

reasonableness standard enunciated in the slip-and-fall cases applying the 

hills and ridges doctrine is equally applicable to the case sub judice. As the 

trial court reasoned:

[U]nder Pennsylvania law a landowner is given a reasonable time 

to clear public areas, at least while the storm is continuing as it 

was here. Mr. Sylvester could not get out of the door because of 

deep snow. The roads had been plowed, but the waist-deep 

snow in the parking area had not. The heavy storm, which, 
J-A03002-22

- 13 -

according to [weather] reports, deposited over twenty inches of 

snow, had resulted in Route 380 becoming impassible, so that 

Mr. Sylvester had to stay overnight in his workplace.

It would be unreasonable to impose liability on [Appellees] for 

not removing snow from the rooftops of the Depot during this 

severe, ongoing storm. Because Pennsylvania courts allow 

landowners a “reasonable time” to remove dangerous snow and 

ice, [Appellees could not] have been expected to clear the snow 

from the roof of Building 7 by the time Mr. Sylvester was hurt. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/21, at 7-8. Mr. Sylvester suffered an injury during a 

severe and active snowstorm, dumping approximately 20 inches of snow. 

During such circumstances and, especially when the storm was active, it

would have been totally unreasonable to require Appellees to clear snow and 

ice from the roof of Building 7. Thus, upon careful review of the entire 

record, viewed in the light most favorable to Appellants as the non-moving 

party, we must agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants failed 

to make out a prima facie case for negligence, as Appellees did not owe a 

duty to Mr. Sylvester to clear snow and ice from the roof of Building 7 during 

an ongoing storm. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting 

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

Finally, to the extent Appellants argue that the trial court erred in 

extending the holding of cases involving the hills and ridges doctrine, we 

disagree. The trial court did not apply per se the hills and ridges doctrine, 

as employed in slip-and-fall cases, to this case where snow and ice falling 

from the roof of Building 7 caused Mr. Sylvester’s injury. On the contrary, 

the trial court simply borrowed the reasonableness standard from those 
J-A03002-22

- 14 -

cases to explain that an owner of land does not owe a duty to clear 

dangerous snow and ice until a reasonable time after a snowstorm ends. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/21, at 7 (“The same standard of 

reasonableness applies, whether the snow to be removed is on the ground 

or on the roof.”). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/06/2022