NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 18-1215

____________

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE; 

NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE; 

VIRGINIA L. FEGGINS; 

LYNETTE MONROE

v.

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE; 

NEW JERSEY REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; 

ALEX HURTADO; 

RONALD C. KAUFMAN; 

JOHN KELLY

 Democratic National Committee,

 Appellant

____________

On Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.N.J. No. 2-81-cv-03876)

District Judge: Hon. John M. Vazquez

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

October 2, 2018

Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 7, 2019)
2

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OPINION*

____________

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

The Democratic National Committee and Republican National Committee entered 

into a Consent Decree on November 1, 1982 to resolve a 1981 lawsuit. Less than two 

weeks prior to the 2016 presidential election, the DNC filed a motion to hold the RNC in 

contempt for an alleged violation of the Decree. After fifteen months of discovery, the 

District Court determined that the DNC had not shown a violation of the Consent Decree. 

The DNC appeals several discovery orders and the order declaring the Decree expired. 

We will affirm.

I.

A. The Consent Decree

Following the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the DNC sued the RNC 

and the New Jersey Republican State Committee (NJRSC) for intimidation of minority 

voters. The suit was resolved by a settlement that included the Consent Decree at the 

center of this case.

1 This Court has acknowledged that the prevention of intimidation and 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

1 App. 514 (Consent Order, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 

No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982)).
3

suppression of minority voters is the “central purpose” of the Consent Decree and its later 

modifications.

2

The Consent Decree prevents the RNC and NJRSC from engaging in “ballot 

security” programs, defined as “any program aimed at combatting voter fraud by 

preventing potential voters from registering to vote or casting a ballot.”3It does not ban

“normal poll watching functions.”4 The Decree was modified in 2009 to state that it

would expire on December 1, 2017, unless the DNC proved a violation of the Decree. If 

the DNC proved a violation, the Decree would be extended eight years.

B. The Trump Campaign and Alleged RNC Coordination

Less than two weeks before the 2016 presidential election, the DNC filed an 

emergency motion to hold the RNC in contempt, alleging that the RNC was violating the 

Decree by coordinating ballot security efforts with the campaign of then-candidate 

Donald Trump. The motion requested that the District Court issue a preliminary 

injunction to enjoin the RNC from participating in or encouraging ballot security 

activities. 

 

2 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 

2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1138 (2013).

3 App. 18 (D. Ct. Op.).

4 App. 17-18.
4

The DNC alleged that the RNC actively supported voter suppression tactics 

endorsed by the Trump campaign.

5 Then-RNC Chair Reince Priebus made statements 

that the RNC was in “full coordination” with the Trump campaign in the weeks and 

months leading up to the election.6 The DNC alleged that the RNC’s coordination with 

the campaign included efforts to intimidate and suppress minority voters. In response, the 

RNC repeatedly asserted it did not engage in any poll watching activities, even activities 

that would be permitted by the Decree. The DNC concedes that RNC lawyers informed 

RNC staff that the RNC could not engage in ballot security activities.

The DNC made a discovery request the day after it filed its initial motion. The 

District Court issued two discovery orders in quick succession, ordering the RNC to 

produce agreements between it and the Trump campaign related to voter fraud, ballot 

security, and RNC poll-watching. Three days before the election, the District Court 

denied the DNC’s requested preliminary injunction but permitted discovery to continue.

Discovery continued until January 2018, when the District Court determined that 

the DNC had not shown a violation of the Consent Decree by a preponderance of the 

 

5 At rallies, Trump made statements such as: “[G]o around and watch other polling 

places,” App. 536; “[It’s] so important that you watch other communities, because we 

don’t want this election stolen from us,” App. 538; and “You’ve got to get everybody to 

go out and watch . . . . And when I say ‘watch,’ you know what I’m talking about. 

Right?” App. 546. The Trump campaign website contained a form allowing supporters to 

register as “Trump Election Observers.” App. 548.

6 App. 599.
5

evidence. The court issued orders denying a final discovery request and declaring the 

Consent Decree expired. The DNC appeals. 

II.

The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the original suit.

7

It 

retained jurisdiction to review and enforce the Consent Decree.8 This Court has appellate 

jurisdiction over an appeal from the Consent Decree by its terms.9“We review a district 

court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb such an order absent 

a showing of actual and substantial prejudice.”10 We review a district court’s decisions on 

whether to modify or vacate a consent decree for abuse of discretion.11

 

7 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

8 Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 440 (2004) (“Federal courts are not reduced to 

approving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, a consent decree 

may be enforced.”).

9 The Decree contained an explicit reservation of appellate jurisdiction over the 

enforcement of the settlement terms, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Keefe v. 

Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Halderman v. 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that courts have 

jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements incorporated into orders).

10 Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010).

11 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 201 (citing Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel 

for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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III.

The DNC argues that the District Court abused its discretion in entering eight 

orders limiting discovery12 and one order declaring the Decree expired.

13 However, 

looking at the scope of discovery in its totality and at the individual orders that the DNC 

challenges, it is clear that the court acted within its broad discretion. 

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the general scope 

for discovery. However, that scope is prefaced by language giving district courts 

discretion to limit discovery: “Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 

discovery is . . . .”14 The court may limit discovery to ensure its scope is proportional to 

the needs of a case, and the court considers, among other factors, “whether the burden or 

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”15 Whether a court 

reasonably limited the scope of discovery is necessarily a fact-based inquiry. 

Because district courts have their eyes and ears on a case from start to finish, they 

are in the best position to “reach[] a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope 

of discovery.”16 For that reason, we choose not to second-guess discovery orders except 

 

12 The DNC challenges discovery orders dated October 31, 2016 (Dkt. No. 113); 

November 2, 2016 (Dkt. No. 118); November 5, 2016 (Dkt. Nos. 139); January 4, 2017 

(Dkt. No. 146); July 7, 2017 (Dkt. No. 167); September 29, 2017 (Dkt. No. 182); 

November 29, 2017 (Dkt. No. 197); and January 8, 2018 (Dkt. No. 212).

13 Order dated January 8, 2018 (Dkt. No. 213).

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

15 Id.

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
7

where the court has abused its discretion.17 “To demonstrate that a district court abused 

its discretion, an appellant must show that the court’s decision was ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or 

clearly unreasonable.’”18

The District Court reasonably limited the scope of the DNC’s individual discovery 

requests. The DNC isolates instances where discovery was denied as evidence of an 

abuse of discretion. For example, it highlights the court’s refusal of its request to depose 

Reince Preibus. But in denying that request, the court concluded that Preibus’s statements 

about knowing the Trump campaign’s position on voter fraud did not suggest any 

discussions of ballot security efforts. After the court allowed the DNC to depose thenRNC Communications Director Sean Spicer, the DNC requested to depose Mike Roman, 

the alleged “front man for the Trump Campaign’s efforts against voter fraud.”19 In 

denying that request, the court determined that there was no evidence from Spicer’s 

deposition or at any point on the record that the RNC was working with Roman. 

 

17 The DNC relies upon an inapposite case from the Ninth Circuit to try to soften 

the standard. Appellant’s Br. 29-31 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 

1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Leavitt court exercised de novo review rather than 

reviewing for an abuse of discretion because “the district court only implicitly denied the 

request to authorize discovery” and therefore failed to exercise its discretion at all. 

Leavitt, 523 F.3d at 1031-32. This case involves thorough, explicit rulings on discovery

disputes by the District Court, so Leavitt’s reasoning is not applicable. 

18 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 201 (quoting Moyer v. United Dominion 

Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)).

19 App. 479.
8

The DNC also points to its denied request to depose Pennsylvania State 

Republican Party officials Tommy Knepper and Rob Gleason. However, the court 

correctly noted that the emails in support of the request regarding Tommy Knepper were 

related to voter turnout rather than ballot security activities, and Rob Gleason submitted a 

declaration that he was acting in his capacity as Chair of the Pennsylvania State 

Republican Party, not as a member of the RNC.20

The DNC additionally asserts that the District Court erred in not allowing them to 

depose Nevada poll watchers and a representative from Stampede. The District Court had 

good reason for not permitting the depositions. The District Court was provided with a 

declaration that stated that the RNC had no poll-watching operation in Nevada, and 

discovery revealed that Stampede was performing permissible, non-ballot security work 

in Florida and no services for the RNC in Nevada. The District Court also had evaluated 

information presented to it concerning the DNC's need for a document demand for 

communications between the RNC and JTD Strategies and determined the information 

was insufficient to require production of the information the demand sought. The DNC 

 

20 The District Court stated that to hold Rob Gleason accountable to the Decree 

would require the conclusion that all fifty state party chairs are subject to the Decree. 

App. 38-39. The court noted that there is no support for that broad a reading in the 

Decree or opinions interpreting it; rather, Judge Debevoise, the presiding judge for 

previous Decree disputes, expressly rejected that interpretation. Accordingly, Gleason’s 

alleged actions were and are irrelevant and thus did not warrant a deposition.
9

did not raise a single challenge that was not carefully and appropriately considered by the 

District Court.

The District Court’s handling of discovery on the whole suggests anything but 

“arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable” decision making. In total, the court reviewed

more than thirty filings in fifteen months. It heard on-the-record argument in nine 

separate instances, issuing nine written orders in response. The court afforded the parties 

the opportunity to be heard, thoughtfully considered their arguments, and provided 

detailed explanations of its decisions. Those decisions were couched within the burden 

versus benefit framework of Rule 26(b)(1). Further, the court required the RNC to review 

tens of thousands of pages of its own records, which resulted in the production of 

thousands of pages to the DNC. The court neither abused its discretion in its handling of 

discovery as a whole, nor abused its discretion with regard to any individual discovery 

request.

The DNC fails to support its challenge of the District Court's order declaring the 

Decree expired by its terms with any argument that the court abused its discretion. The 

DNC hangs its hat on its challenges to the discovery orders, arguing that if we find that 

the court abused its discretion on discovery, then we should also find that the Decree 

could not be ordered expired. However, because the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion on discovery, it follows that it did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the 

Decree had expired.
10

While it is possible that another court would have allowed further discovery or 

managed the case differently, we review only for abuse of discretion. The District Court 

did not abuse its discretion, and we will not upset its thoughtful adjudication of the 

matter. 

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm.