### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-60373

MOHAMMAD ABUBAKAR KHALID, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge: M o h a m m a d A b u b a k a r K h a lid , a citize n o f P a k ista n , p e titio n s th is co u rt fo r re v ie w o f a B o a rd o f Im m ig ra tio n A p p e a ls ( B IA ) d e cisio n d ism issin g h is

a p p e a l o f a n Im m ig ra tio n J u d g e ’s (IJ ) d e cisio n o rd e rin g h im re m o v e d fro m th e U n i t e d S t a te s. We conclude that the plain language of the Child Stat u s Protection Act (CSPA) is unambiguous and that the BIA’s interpretation of the
statute in Matter of Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2009), contravenes the plain language of the CSPA. We decline to follow Matter of Wang i n this circuit; we GRANT the petition for review and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Sep tem ber 8 , 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373
I. K h a lid is a n a tiv e a n d citize n o f P a k ista n
. In J u n e 1 9 9 6 , K h a lid w a s i n sp e cte d a n d a d m itte d in to th e U n ite d S ta te s p u rsu a n t to a v isito r ’ s v i s a
. E a rlie r th a t y e a r, K h a lid ’s a u n t, a U n ite d S t a t e s citize n , h a d file d a fo u rth

p re fe re n ce v isa p e titio n fo r th e b e n e fit o f K h a lid ’s m o th e r. T h e p e titio n h a d a 1 J a n u a ry 1 2 , 1 9 9 6 p rio rity d a te

— a d a te lin k e d to th e tim e o f filin g to re se rv e th e
p e titio n ’s “p la ce in li n e
. ” A t th e tim e , K h a lid w a s e le v e n y e a rs o ld

. H a d h is 2

m o th e r’s p rio rity d a te b e co m e cu rre n t

— th a t is, re a ch e d th e “fro n t o f th e lin e ”— w ith in a p p ro x im a te ly te n y e a rs, K h a lid , a s h is m o th e r’s “ch ild ,” w o u ld 3 h a v e b e e n e lig ib le to b e co m e a L a w fu l P e rm a n e n t R e sid e n t (L P R ) a t th e sa m e tim e a s h is m o t h e r a s a d e riv a tiv e b e n e ficia ry o n h is a u n t’s p e titio n fo r h e r. U n fo rtu n a te ly , h is m o th e r’s J a n u a ry 1 9 9 6 p rio rity d a te d id n o t b e co m e cu rre n t

u n til F e b ru a ry 2 0 0 7 , ju st o v e r e le v e n y e a rs la te r. A s a re su lt, b y th e tim e h is

m o th e r b e ca m e a L P R b a se d o n h is a u n t’s p e titio n , h e w a s tw e n ty -tw o y e a rs o ld

. T h u s, w h e n h e a p p lie d to a d ju st h is sta tu s to t h a t o f a n L P R a s a d e riv a tiv e b e n e ficia ry o f h is a u n t’s p e titio n , th e D e p a rtm e n t o f H o m e la n d S e cu rity (D H S )

The Imm igrat ion a n d Na ti on a li ty A ct es ta b li sh es four pr efe renc e cat egori es for fam ily- 1 bas ed pet itio ns, 8 U. S. C. § 1 153( a):

• Firs t pr efe renc e: unm arr ied so ns and daught ers of U.S. cit izens (§ 1153( a)( 1))

• Sec ond pr efe renc e: sp ous es and c hild ren of LPRs (§ 1153( a)( 2)(A)) and unm arr ied so ns and daught ers of LPRs (§ 1153( a)( 2)( B))

• Third p ref

ere nce: mar ried s ons and d aughte rs of U .S

. cit izens ( § 1 153( a)( 3))

• Fourt h p ref

ere nce: brot hers and s ist ers of ad ult U. S. c itize ns (§ 1153( a)( 4))
“ Aft er a c itize n o r legal per man ent res ide nt has fil ed, on behalf of an alien rela tive, 2

a visa pet itio n
. . . , the Go vernm ent wi ll app rove the pet itio n aft er verif ying that the clai me d fam ilial rela tio nshi p is bona fid e. An app r o v e d pet itio n car ries wi th it both a pr efe renc e cat egory and a pr iori ty dat e.” Bolv ito v. Muk as ey , 527 F.3d 428, 430 (5t h Cir. 2008) (int erna l quot atio n m ark s om itt ed)

. The Imm igrat ion and Nat ionali ty Act use s the wo rd s “ch ild ” or “ch ild ren” to des cri be 3

unm arr ied p ers ons und er age t we nty- one. On ce a “ch ild ” reac hes age tw enty- one, he or s he beco me s a “ so n” or “d aughte r, ” and is no longer a “ch ild .” 8 U .S .C. § 1101( b).
2 Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373

d e n ie d h is a p p lica tio n b e ca u se h e w a s n o lo n g e r a “ch ild ” u n d e r t he im m ig ra tio n la w
. S e v e ra l m o n th s la te r, K h a lid ’s m o th e r, b y t h e n a n L P R , file d a se co n d

p re fe re n ce v isa p e titio n o n h is b e h a lf. T h e p e titio n w a s a ssig n e d a p rio rity d a te

o f N o v e m b e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 7

. B a se d o n th a t p rio rity d a te , a v isa w o u ld n o t b e co m e

a v a ila b le to K h a lid u n til a ro u n d 2 0 1 5

. S h o rtly a fte r D H S d e n ie d K h a lid ’s a p p lica tio n to a d ju st h is sta tu s u n d e r h is a u n t’s p e titio n , D H S issu e d h im a N o t i ce to A p p e a r (N T A ) fo r re m o v a l
p ro ce e d in g s. K h a lid a d m itte d th e fa ctu a l a lle g a tio n s in th e N T A a n d co n ce d e d th e ch a rg e o f o v e rsta y in g h is v isa u n d e r 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 2 7 (a )(1 )(B ). A t a Mar c h 2008 i mmi gr at i on c our t hear i ng, Khal i d re q u e ste d a d ju stm e n t

o f sta tu s, a m o n g o th e r th in g s. H e m a in ta in e d th a t h e w a s e lig ib le t o a dj u s t
sta tu s u n d e r th e n e w se co n d -p re fe re n c e p e titio n h is m o th e r h a d file d fo r h im b e ca u se h e co u ld re ta in th e J a n u a ry 1 9 9 6 p rio rity d a te o f t h e o rig in a l fo u rth

p re fe re n ce p e titio n file d b y h is a u n t. U sin g th a t p rio rity d a te , a v isa w a s im m e d ia te ly a v a ila b le

. B a se d o n th e B IA ’s re ce n t d e cisio n in M a tter o f W

a ng , 4
2 5 I. & N

. D e c. 2 8 (B IA 2 0 0 9 ), h o w e v e r, th e im m ig ra tio n ju d g e re je cte d K h a lid ’s

a rg u m e n t th a t h e co u ld re ta in th e e a rlie r p rio rity d a te

. R e l y i n g o n M

a tter o f W

a ng , th e im m ig ra tio n ju d g e d e n ie d K h a lid ’s

a p p lica tio n fo r a d

ju stm e n t o f sta tu s. T h e B IA , in tu rn , d ism isse d K h a lid ’s

a p p e a l: “[T ]h e re sp o n d e n t h a s n o t p e rsu a d e d u s th a t re co n sid e ra tio n o f M a tter

o f W a ng

. . . i s w a rra n te d .” K h a lid tim e ly p e titio n e d th is co u rt to re v ie w th e d e cisio n o f th e B IA

.

Subjec t to cer tain res tri cti ons , an alien wh o is phys ical ly pr es ent in the Unit ed Sta tes 4

ma y a p p l y t o a d

j u s t his st atus to that of an LPR if he is othe rw ise eligibl e to rec eive an im mi grant visa and an im mi grant visa is imm edi atel y availabl e to him at the tim e of the fil ing of the app lica tio n. 8 C.F. R. § 2 45.1 (a)

. 3 Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373
II. We review the BIA’s findings of fact for substantial evidence and its legal determinations de no v o
. L o pez-Gomez v. Ashcroft , 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001). As t o the BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes, we defer to the BIA to the extent prescribed by Chevron ’s two-step analysis. Singh v. Gonzales , 436 F. 3 d 4 8 4 , 487 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984 )). U n d e r C h ev ro n ste p o n e , w e m u st d e te rm in e w h e th e r th e sta tu te a t issu e i s a m b ig u o u s. “If th e in te n t o f C o n g re ss is cle a r,”— th a t is, th e sta tu te i s

u n a m b ig u o u s w ith re sp e ct to th e q u e stio n p re se n te d

— “th e co u rt, a s w e ll a s th e

a g e n cy , m u s t g i v e e ffe ct to th e u n a m b ig u o u sly e x p re sse d in te n t o f C o n g re ss.” C h ev ro n , 4 6 7 U .S

. a t 8 4 2 -4 3

. T o d e te rm in e w h e th e r a sta tu te is a m b ig u o u s, w e

e m p lo y th e “tra d itio n a l to o ls o f sta tu to ry co n stru ctio n .” Id

. a t 8 4 3 n .9

. C h ie f

a m o n g th e se , o f co u rse , is th e “ p l a in la n g u a g e o f th e sta tu te .” In re D a le , 5 8 2 F .3 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 3 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 9 ) (citin g B a rn h a rt v
. S ig m o n C o a l Co
. , 5 3 4 U .S

. 4 3 8 , 4 5 0 (2 0 0 2 )). A t th e sa m e tim e , th e S u p re m e C o u rt h a s ca u tio n e d th a t th e sta tu te m u st b e re a d a s a w h o le : “In d e te rm in in g w h e th e r C o n g re ss h a s

s p e cifica lly a d d re sse d th e q u e stio n a t issu e , a re v ie w in g co u rt sh o u ld n o t

co n fin e itse lf to e x a m in in g a p a rticu la r sta tu to ry p ro v isio n in iso la tio n .” F D A

v
. B ro w n & W

illia m so n T

o b a c c o C o rp
. , 5 2 9 U .S

. 1 2 0 , 1 3 2 -3 3 (2 0 0 0 ); see a lso B r o w n v
. G a rd n er , 5 1 3 U .S

. 1 1 5 , 1 1 8 (1 9 9 4 ) (“A m b ig u ity [in a sta tu te ] is a

c r e a t u r e n o t o f d e fin itio n a l p o ssib ilitie s b u t o f sta tu to ry co n te x t.”); D o le v
. U n ited S teelw o rk ers o f A m
. , 4 9 4 U .S . 2 6 , 4 2 (1 9 9 0 ) (“B e ca u se w e fin d th a t th e sta tu te , a s a w h o le , cle a rly e x p re sse s C o n g re ss’ in te n tio n , w e d e clin e to d e fe r to [th e a g e n cy ’s] in te rp re ta tio n .”). T h u s, a sta tu to ry p ro v isio n ca n n o t b e re a d in iso la tio n , b u t n e ce ssa rily d e riv e s m e a n in g fro m th e co n te x t p ro v id e d b y th e

su rro u n d in g p ro v isio n s, a s w e ll a s th e b ro a d e r co n te x t o f th e sta tu te a s a w h o le

.

4 Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373

If w e d e te rm in e th a t th e p ro v isio n is a m b ig u o u s a s to th e q u e stio n
p re se n te d , th e a n a ly sis p ro ce e d s to C h ev ro n ste p tw o , w h ich a sk s “w h e th e r th e

a g e n cy ’s a n sw e r is b ase d o n a p e rm issib le co n stru ctio n o f th e sta tu te .” C h ev ro n , 4 6 7 U .S

. a t 8 4 3

. In th is re g a rd , w e m a y co n sid e r “o n ly w h e th e r th e d e cisio n is

a rb itra ry , ca p ricio u s, o r m a n ife stly co n tra ry ” to th e sta tu te , a n d m a y n o t

su b stitu te o u r o w n ju d g m e n t “fo r a re a so n a b le a lte rn a tiv e fo rm u la te d b y th e B IA .” M o n tera -C ru z v
. G o n za les , 4 0 9 F .3 d 2 4 6 , 2 5 3 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 5 ). T h e re fo re , if w e fin d a m b ig u ity a s to C o n g re ss’s in te n t, re v ie w o f th e a g e n cy ’s co n stru ctio n

w ill b e h ig h ly d e fe re n tia l. A. C o n g re ss e n a cte d th e C h ild S ta tu s P ro te ctio n A ct, P u b

. L

. N o
. 1 0 7 -2 0 8 (A u g
. 6 , 2 0 0 2 ) , w h ich a m e n d e d th e Im m ig ra tio n a n d N a tio n a lity A ct (IN A ) to “p ro v id e a g e -o u t p ro te ctio n fo r a lie n s w h o w e re ch ild re n (u n d e r 2 1 ) a t th e tim e

a p e titi o n f

o r p e rm a n e n t re sid e n t sta tu s w a s file d o n th e ir b e h a lf.” O ch o a
A m a y a v
. G o n za les , 4 7 9 F .3 d 9 8 9 , 9 9 2 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ). T h e C S P A ’s a m e n d m e n ts

a d d re sse d “th e o fte n h a rsh a n d a rb itra ry e ffe cts o f th e a g e -o u t p ro v isio n s u n d e r th e p re v io u sly e x istin g sta tu te .” P a d a sh v
. IN

S , 3 5 8 F .3 d 1 1 6 1 , 1 1 7 3 (9 th C ir.
2 0 0 4 ). T h is a p p e a l co n ce rn s th e in te rp re ta tio n o f 8 U .S .C

. § 1 1 5 3 (h ), w h ich w a s

a d d e d b y t he CSPA

. S e ctio n 1 1 5 3 (h ) is e n title d “R u le s fo r d e te rm in in g w h e th e r 5

( h) Rules f

or det erm ining wh ethe r cer tain aliens ar e c hild ren 5 (1) In genera l For pur pos es of sub se cti ons (a) (2) (A) and (d ) of this se cti on, a det erm inati on o f w h e t h er an alien sat isf

ies the age requ irem ent in the mat ter pr ece ding sub p a r a g rap h (A) of se cti on 1101( b)( 1) of this t itle s hall be mad e u sin g— (A) the age of the alien on the dat e on wh ich an im mi grant visa num ber beco me s availabl e for
suc h alien (or , in the cas e of sub se cti on (d ) of this se cti on, the dat e on wh ich an im mi grant visa
num ber beca me availabl e for the alien’ s par ent) , but only if the alien has so ught to acqui re the st atus of an alien law full y adm itt e d f o r p e r m a nent res ide nce wi thin one year of suc h availabi lity; r educ ed by
5 Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373

ce rta in a lie n s a re ch ild re n .” It co n ta in s fo u r su b se ctio n s. S u b se ctio n (h )(1 ) is

e n t i t l e d “In g e n e ra l.” S u b se ctio n (h )(2 ) is e n title d “P e titio n s d e scrib e d .” S u b se ctio n (h )(3 ) i s e n t i t l e d “R e te n tio n o f p rio rity d a te .” S u b se ctio n (h )(4 ) is

e n title d “A p p lica tio n to se lf-p e titio n s,” w h ich is n o t re le v a n t to th is a p p e a l. W e d iscu ss e a ch o f th e th re e re le v a n t su b se ctio n s in tu rn
. S u b s e c t i o n (h )(1 ) p ro v id e s a fo rm u la fo r d e te rm in in g th e a g e o f a v is a
p e titio n b e n e ficia ry “[f]o r p u rp o se s o f su b se ctio n s (a )(2 )(A) a n d (d ) [o f § 1 1 5 3 ].” § 1 1 5 3 (h )(1 ). B o th o f th o se su b se ctio n s re fe r to ch ild re n . S u b se ctio n (a )(2 )(A )
p ro v id e s th e sta tu to ry a u th o rity to issu e v isa s to “ch ild re n o f a n a lie n la w fu lly

a d m itte d fo r p e rm a n e n t re sid e n ce .” § 1 1 5 3 (a )(2 )(A ). S u b se ctio n (d ), e n title d “T re a tm e n t o f fa m ily m e m b e rs,” p ro v id e s th e sta tu to ry a u th o rity to issu e a v isa
to a “ c h i l d

. . . if a cco m p a n y in g o r fo llo w in g to jo in , th e
. . . p a re n t.” § 1 1 5 3 (d ). T o d e te rm in e w h e th e r a n a lie n q u a lifi e s a s a “ch ild ” u n d e r th o se p ro v isio n s, C S P A p ro v id e s a n a g e fo rm u la th a t a llo w s fo r a n a d ju stm e n t to th e a lie n ’s b io lo g ica l a g e to a cco u n t fo r a g e n cy d e la y in p ro ce ssin g th e p e titio n
. S ee

(B) the n u m b e r of days in the per iod dur ing wh ich the app lica ble pet itio n des cri bed in par agrap h ( 2) wa s pend ing. (2) Pet itio ns des cri bed The pet itio n d es cri bed in t his p aragr aph is— (A) wi th res p e c t t o a r e lati ons hip des cri bed in sub se cti on (a) (2) (A) of this se cti on, a pet itio n fil ed unde r se cti on 1154 of this tit le for clas sif icat io n o f a n alien child unde r sub se cti on (a) (2) (A) of

t his s ect ion; or (B) wit h res pec t to an a lien child w ho is a d erivat ive benef icia ry u nder s ubs ect ion (d ) of this
se cti on, a p eti tio n f

iled und er se cti on 1154 of this t itle f or clas sif

icat ion of the alien’ s par ent unde r sub se cti on (a) , (b) , or (c ) of this s ect ion. (3) Ret enti on of pr iori ty dat e If the age of an alien is det erm ined unde r par agrap h (1) to be 21 years of age or old er fo r the pur pos es of sub se cti ons (a) (2) (A) and (d ) of this se cti on, the alien’ s pet itio n sha ll auto mat ical ly be conver ted to the app rop riat e c atego ry a nd the alien sha ll ret ain the or iginal pr iori ty dat e iss ued upon r ece ipt of t he origi nal pet itio n. (4) Ap pli cat ion to se lf- pet itio ns Paragr aphs ( 1) thr ough (3) sha ll app ly to se lf- pet itio ners and der ivative s of se lf- pet itio ners
. 6 Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373

§ 1 1 5 3 (h )(1 ). S p e cifica lly , th e fo rm u la re d u ce s th e a lie n ’s b io lo g ica l a g e b y “th e

n u m b e r o f d a y s in th e per io d d u rin g w h ich th e a p p lica b le p e titio n ” w a s p e n d in g , th u s a llo w in g a n a lie n to b e tre a te d a s a “ch ild ” e v e n th o u g h h is tru e b io lo g ica l

a g e m ig h t e x ce e d tw e n ty -o n e
. Id

. S u b se c t i o n (h )(2 ) d e lin e a te s tw o se ts o f v isa p e titio n s to w h ich th e

su b se ctio n (h )(1 ) fo rm u la a p p lie s. In th e ca se o f a ch ild o f a n L P R , su b se ctio n (h )(2 )(A ) re fe rs to a v isa p e titio n fo r cla ssifica tio n o f th e ch ild u n d e r su b se ctio n (a )(2 )(A ). § 1 1 5 3 (h )(2 )(A ). In th e ca se o f a ch ild “w h o is a d e riv a tiv e b e n e ficia ry

u n d e r su b se ctio n (d ),” su b se ctio n (h )(2 )(B ) re fe rs to a v i s a p e titio n fo r cla ssifica tio n o f t h e p a re n t— th e p rin cip a l b e n e ficia ry

— “u n d e r su b se ctio n (a ), (b ), o r (c).” § 1 1 5 3 (h )(2 )(B ). T h o se su b se ctio n s, in tu rn , re fe r to fa m ily -b a se d ,
e m p lo y m e n t

- b a s e d , a n d d i v e r s i t y - b a s e d v i s a p e t i t i o n s , r e sp e ctiv e ly

. C o n se q u e n tly , su b se ctio n (h )(1 )’s fo rm u la a p p lie s to a ch ild o f a n L P R , o r a ch ild

w h o is a d e r iv a tiv e b e n e ficia ry o f a n y fa m ily , e m p lo y m e n t, o r d iv e rsity v isa
p e titio n
. S u b se ctio n (h )(3 ) p r o v id e s a lte rn a te b e n e fits to a lie n s w h o , e v e n a fte r

u tilizin g th e C S P A fo rm u la , a re n o lo n g e r “ch ild re n .” It a p p lie s o n ly “[i]f th e

a g e o f a n a lie n is d e te rm in e d u n d e r p a ra g ra p h (1 ) to b e 2 1 y e a rs o f a g e o r o ld e r fo r th e p u rp o se s o f su b se ctio n s (a )(2 )(A ) a n d (d ) o f th is se ctio n .” § 1 1 5 3 (h )(3 ). In th a t ca se , th e su b se ctio n a ffo rd s tw o b e n e fits to th e a g e d -o u t a lie n

— a u to m a tic

co n v e rsio n a n d p rio rity d a te re te n tio n : “[T ]h e a lie n ’s p e titio n sh a ll

a u to m a tica lly b e co n v e rte d to th e a p p ro p ria te ca te g o r y a n d th e a lie n sh a ll

re ta in th e o rig in a l p rio rity d a te issu e d u p o n re ce ip t o f th e o rig in a l p e titio n .” Id

. B. T h e B IA h a s in te rp re te d th e se p ro v isio n s o f C S P A in M a tter o f W

a ng , 2 5 I. & N

. D e c. 2 8

. The facts of Matter of Wang are essentially identical to the facts of this case. Wang’s sister, a United States citizen, filed a fourth-preference visa

7 Case: 10-60373 Document: 00511596288 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/08/2011No. 10-60373

petition on his b e half in 1992, with his minor children as derivative beneficiaries. Id. at 29. By the tim e the 1992 priority date became current, however, one of his daughters no longer qualified as a “child,” and thus could no longer be a derivative beneficiary. Id. When Wang became an LPR in 2006, he file d a s e cond-preference visa petition on behalf of his daughter. Id. He requested that DHS allow the petition to retain the 1992 priority date from the prior petition. Id. DHS declined to do so, instead assigning the petition a 2006 priority date. Id. DHS certified its decision to the BIA. Id. at 30. The BIA agreed with DHS, concluding that § 1153(h)(3) does not apply to derivative beneficiaries, like Wang’s daughter and Khalid, who have aged out of

a fourth-pre ference visa petition. At the outset, the BIA determined that § 1153(h)(3) is ambiguous regarding whether it applies to fourth-preference petitions: Unlike sections [1153(h)(1)] and (2), which when read i n t a n dem clearly define the universe of petitions that qualify for the “delayed processing formula,” the language of section [1153( h )(3)] does not expressly state which petitions qualify for auto m a t ic conversion and retention of priority dates. Given this ambiguity, we must look to the legislative intent behind section [1153(h)(3)]. Id. at 33. After canvassing the legislative history of CSPA, the BIA seized upon two themes: first, that the leg i s l a t i o n was a response to the “then-extensive

a d m i nistrative delays in the processing of visa petitions,” id. at 36-37 , a n d second, that Congress intended “to allow for r e t e n t i o n of child status without displacing others who have been waiting patiently in other visa categories,” id.
at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). Putting these two ideas together, the BIA r e j e cted the idea that Congress intended a broad construction of § 1153(h)(3): While the CSPA was enacted to alleviate the conseq u e n c e s of administrative delay s , t here is no clear evidence that it was intended to address delays resulting from visa allocation issues,

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such as the long wait associated with priority dates. If we interpret section [1153(h)] as the petitioner advocates, the bene f iciary, as a new entrant in the secon d

- p reference visa category line, would displace other aliens who have al r eady been in that line for years before her. Id. at 38. The BIA also supported its construction based on the n o tion that “automatic conversion” and “priority date retention” have recognized meanings in immigration regulations. I d

. a t 3 4 -35. According to the BIA, the term “con v e r s i o n ” has “consistently been used to mean that a visa petition converts from o n e visa category to another

. . . without the need to file a new visa petition.” Id. at 35. Likewise, “priority date retention” has “always been limited to visa petitions filed by the same family member.” Id. The BIA provided se v eral examples from the regulations. For instance, the regul ations have long provided for “automatic conversion of preference classification” from one category to another when certain events occur, such as when the person who filed the petition naturalizes or when the ben e f i c i a ry’s marital status changes. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i). “ T h u s , a second-preference petition filed on behalf of the son or daughter of a pe t i t ioner who naturalizes would a u t omatically convert to a first-preference petition, and the newly converted petition would retain the original priority date.” Matter of Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec. at 34. As anothe r e x a mple, prior to CSPA’s enaction, the regulations provided for priority date retention for an aged-out child who was a derivative beneficiary of a second-preference spousal petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4). Under that regulation, the original p e t itioner would have to file

a new petition for the aged-out child, but the new petition would then retain the priority date from the original petition. Applying these principles to Wang’s case, the BIA determined that Wang’s d a u g h ter could not avail herself of automatic conversion or priority dat e

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retention. She was not entitled to automatic conversion because when she “aged out from her status as a derivative beneficiary on a fourth-preference petition, there was no other category to which her visa could convert because no category exists for the niece of a United States citizen.” Matter of Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec.
at 35. As for priority date retention, the BIA determined that she could not keep her priority date b e c a u se the new petition was filed by a different
p etitioner—her father, rather than her aunt. Id. Affording these bene f i t s i n such a case would repre s e n t a b r e a k with historical practice. Thus, the BIA concluded that Congress did not intend these benefits to apply to d e r i v a t ive beneficiaries of fourth-preference visa petitions, like Wang’s daughte r a nd Khalid. In so holding, the BIA acknowledged in a footnote that it was disregarding its prior unpublished opinion in Matter of Garcia , N o
. A 7 9 0 01 587, 2006 WL 2183654 (BIA June 16, 2006). Matter of Garcia reached the opposite conclusion on essentially identical facts: In this instance, the principal beneficiary of t h e o riginal petition
was the respondent’s mo t her, who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States once a visa number became available to her in 1996. The re s p ondent was (and remains) her mother’s unmarried d a u g h ter, and therefore the “appropriate category” to which her petition was converted is the second-preference category of family-based immigrants, i.e., the unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents. Furthermore, the respondent is entitled to retain the January 13, 1983, priority date that applied to the original fourth-preference petition, and therefore a visa number
u nder the second-preference category is immediately available to the respondent. I d

. I n M

a tter of Wang , the BIA declined to follow Matter of Garcia large l y because that decision did not discuss the “legislative framework of the statute.” See Matter of Wang , 25 I. & N. Dec. at 33 n.7.

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C. Before considering the BIA’s interpretation of the statute under Chevron ,
we must first determine whether the statute is ambiguous as to t h e question presented. The BIA identified what it believed to be the relevant ambiguity: “[T]he language of section [1153(h)(3)] does not expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion and retention of priority dates.” Id. at 33. The BIA is certainly correct that subsection (h)(3) does not explicitly delineate which petitions qualify. Subsection (h)(3) refers only to “the alien’s petition” and “the original petition.” If the statute said n o t h i ng more, the meaning of “petition” might be ambiguous because of the many possible types of petitions. Read as a whole, however, the statute does say more, a n d the other provisions of subsection (h) cla r i f

y t h e m e a n i n g o f t h i s otherwise-ambiguous term. See Brown , 513 U.S. at 118 (“Ambiguity [in a statute] is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statuto r y c o n t e xt

. . . .”). Indeed, subsection (h)(2) speaks directly to the question at issue and is entitled “Petitions described.” The BIA discounted subsection (h)(2) because (h)(3), unlike (h)(1), does not expressly reference it. Yet, the BIA’s analysis ignores the fact that (h)(3) expressly references (h)(1), which in turn expressly referen c e s ( h ) (2). The benefits of a utomatic conversion and priority date retention are explicitly conditioned on a particular outcome from the formula in (h)(1)—that the alien’s “age” is at least 21. § 1153(h)(3) (“ If the age of an alien is det e r m i n e d u n der paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older . . . .”). The formula itself operates on petitions described in (h)(2). Hence, (h)(3) must operate on this same set of petitions because the outcome that triggers the (h)(3) benefits can occur only if the formula applies. In light of the interrelated nature of the three provisions, 6 reading the subsect i on as a whole confirms that Congress intended (h)(3) to

Gi ven (h) (3) ’s dep ende ncy on (h) (1) , if Congres s inte nded (h) (3) to app ly to a dif fer ent 6

se t of pet itio ns than (h) (1) , it wo uld lik ely have sai d so exp lici tly.
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apply to any alien who “aged out” under the formula in (h)(1) with respect to the universe of petitions described in (h)(2). The correctness of this straightforwar d r e a ding is confirmed by the parallels between the three provisions. Subsection (h)(1) and (h)(3) both employ the phrase “for purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d),” while (h)(2) contains
two subparts—one discussing sub s e c tion (a)(2)(A) and one discussing subsection (d). Subsection (d), entitled “Treatment of f a m ily members,” provides the statutory authority to issue a visa to a “child” as a derivative beneficiary “if accompanying or following to j o in, the

. . . parent”—precisely the situation of Khalid and Wan g ’s daughter relative to their parents’ fourth-preference petitions. § 1153(d). No one disputes that (h)(1)’s formula o p e rates on Khalid and Wang’s daughter as derivative beneficiaries under subsection (d). N evertheless, under (h)(3), which uses the identical phrase—“for purposes of subsections (a)( 2 )(A) and (d)”—the BIA decided that these fourth-preference petitions were implicitly excluded. T h i s runs afoul of the traditional canon of construction that “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. , 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007 ). In short, subsection (h)(2) directly answers the que s t i on that the BIA found that Congress left unanswered. The t r a d i t ional canons of statutory construction, and the interdependency between subsections (h)(1), (h)(2), and (h)(3) compel the conclusion that the “[p]etitions described” in (h)(2) apply with equal force to (h)(1) and (h)(3). Thus, “the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress’ intention” about the universe of petitions covered by (h)(3). See Dole , 494 U.S. at 42. Hence, there is no ambiguity. “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and thus there is no room for the agency to impose its own answer to the question. Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-44.

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Even in the fac e o f t h i s direct answer, however, the BIA attempted to

c r e a te ambiguity by looking to the legislative history, and by assuming tha t Congress could not have intended such a break with prior practice regarding the concepts of conversion and retention. These arguments might have more force i f (h)(2) were not so precisely on point, but resort to these arguments c a n n o t make ambiguous what the statute’s plain language and structure make so clear. Th e B I A r e lied heavily on the legislative history to show that Congress

was concerned only with agency delays and not delays caused by visa demand. Here , “ [ t ] here is no reason to recite legislative history given the clarity of the statutory text.” Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc. , 626 F.3d 799, 804 n.9 (5th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, as is often the case with legislative history, statements can be pul l e d f

r om the record to support the contrary proposition as well. For example, Senator Feinstein, who introduced CSPA in the Senate, discussed the “age out” problem both in terms of agency delay and visa demand. See 147 Cong. Rec. S3275 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“As a
consequence, a family whose chi l d ’ s application for admission to the United States has been pending for years may be forced to leave that child behind either because the INS was unable to adjudicate the application before the child’s 21st b irthday, or because growing immigration backlogs in the immigration v i s a category caused the visa to be unavailable before the child reached h i s 21st birthday .” (emphasis added)). The BIA’s observations ab o u t past practices regarding conversion and retention have somewhat greater force. A g a i n , i f the text were more murky, such arguments might factor into the analysis. On the other hand, with statutes like this one, where Congress has spoken with such clarity, the fact that carrying
out the legislative will might require a break with past practices under the regulations does not make Congress’s intent ambiguous. “ I t is a fundamental precept of administrative law that an agency
. . . regulation ‘cannot overcome the

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plain text en a c t e d b y Congress.’” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs. , 627 F.3d 134, 141 n.9 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting New Jersey v. EPA , 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Moreover, satisfactory responses exist for the alleged problems t h e B I A i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e s t r aightforward construction Khalid advances. First, the B I A pointed out that there is no category to which a fourth-preference petitioner can “automatically convert” at the time he “ages out” but before the primary beneficiary’s visa becomes available. This argument mis r e a d s the plain language of (h)(3), however. Subsection (h)(3) provides that the “alien’s petition shall automatically be conve r t e d ” o nly “[i]f the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 y e a r s of age or older.” § 1153(h)(3). Thus, the conversion happens only after a determination under (h)(1). This determination
cannot be made at the moment the child “ages out,” because the (h)(1) formula requires “the age of the alien on the date on w h i c h an immigrant visa number becomes available .” § 1153(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Hence, ( h ) ( 3)’s 7 “automatic conversion” cannot be triggered until the primary beneficiary’s visa becomes available, because until that time (h)(1)’s formula cannot be computed. At that time, t h e re would be another category to convert to based on the derivative beneficiary’s relationship to the primary beneficiary, as the BIA itself suggested in Matter of Garcia

. See Matter of Garci a , 2006 WL 2183654 (“We
agree with the respondent that where an [alien] was cla s s i fied as a derivative beneficiary of the original petition, the ‘appropriate category’ for purposes of section [1153(h)(3)] is that which applies to the ‘aged-out’ derivative vis-a-vis the principal beneficiary of the original petition.”).

Arguably, it mi ght be up to a year late r than the dat e t he visa beco me s availabl e 7 bef ore the for mul a can be app lied

. This is so beca use the for mul a als o requ ires kn ow led ge of wh ethe r “th e alien has sought to acquir e” LPR st atus “w ithi n one year” of the visa bec om ing availabl e. § 1153( h)( 1)(A).
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Second, the BIA pointed out that, traditionally, retention of priority dates has req u i r e d t h a t the petitioner remain the same on both the old and new petitions. As already discussed, however, this tradition is no impediment to Congress enacting a law which provides retention of priority dates even where the petitioner is different, as it appears to have done here. Moreover, retention of p r i o rity dates despite a change in petitioner is not without precedent. For example, beneficiaries o f employment-based visa petitions retain the priority date of an approved petition for “any subsequently f i l e d petition for any classification” of a new job within thr e e m a j o r e m p l o y m e n t categories, regardless of a change in the employer who files the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(e). Finally, under the BIA’s in t e r p r e t a t ion of the statute, the retention benefit does not apply to new p e t i t i o n s , like the one filed by Khalid’s mother—only to

c o n v e r t ed petitions. Yet, if this benefit applied only to petitions th a t “automatically c onverted to the appropriate category,” there would b e no need for the statute to explicitly state that the alien “ r e tain[s] the original priority date issued upon the receipt of the original petition,” § 1153(h)(3), because there would always be only one petition, with an unchanged priority date. The BIA’s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e n d e r s the retention benefit provision redundant and reads it o u t of the sta t u t e
. T h i s construction should be avoided. See In re Crist , 632 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that courts should give effect, whenever possible, “to all parts of a statute and avoid an interpretation which makes a part redundant or superfluous”). Similarly, the retention benefit prov ision certainly contemplates the possibility of two separate p e t i t i ons when it states that the “alien shall retain the priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition,” § 1153(h)(3) (emphasis added), language which implies that there may be another , non-original, petition at issue. Even if the issues the BIA identified would create procedural difficulties, it is not this court’s responsibility to resolve them. The only question before us

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is whether Congress has plainly spoken to the question at issue in the statute. The only ambiguity t h e BIA has identified in the statute is the universe of petitions to which subsection (h)(3) applies. On this point, Congress has plainly spoken in subsec t i o n ( h )(2). Accordingly, we hold that the “automatic conversion” and “priority date retention” benefits in (h)(3) unambiguously apply to the entire universe of petitions described in (h)(2). D. In reaching thi s c onclusion, we recognize that the Second Circuit interpreted the statute differently in Li v. Renaud , No. 10-2560

- c v, 2011 WL 2567037 (2d Cir. June 30, 2011). Although the Li court conc l uded that § 1153(h)(3) was unambig u ous and that no deference was owed to the BIA’s interpretation in Matter of Wang , the Li court nevertheless held that “[s]ection 1153(h)(3) does no t e n t itle an alien to retain the priority date of an aged-out family preference petition if the aged-out family pref e r e n c e petition cannot be converted to [an] appropriate category” because a change in the petitioner would be required. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the court decided, beneficiaries like Khalid and Wang cannot retain th e i r p riority dates because the conversion would require changing the petitioner—in our case from K halid’s aunt to Khalid’s now-LPR mother. “Such a change would n o t b e a

conv e r s i o n t o the appropriate category.” Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted). We respectfully disagree. As the BIA explained in Matter of Garcia , “the ‘appropriate category’ for purposes of section [1153(h)(3)] is that which applies
to the ‘aged-out’ derivati v e v i s-a-vis the principal beneficiary of the original petition.” Matter of Garcia , 2006 WL 2183654. Nothi n g i n subsection (h)(3)
states or implies that the petitioner cannot change as a result of the conversion,

a n d, as we have already discussed, certainly nothing prevents Congres s f r o m

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allowing for such conversions even if it would represent a break with the prior regulations. Notably absent f

r o m t h e Li court’s analysis is any discussion of the universe of petitions described in s u bsection (h)(2) and its relationship with subsection (h)(3). Al t h o u g h t h e Li court’s reading of the statute is couched in
terms of a case-by-case test, in reality it operates as a c a t e g orical bar to all derivative beneficiaries o f m a n y types of family-based petitions, such as the fourth-preference p e t i t i on at issue in Khalid’s case. In such a case, the petitioner can never remain the same because there is simply no category for a niece or nephew of a U.S. citizen. Given that subsection (h)(2) expressly speaks of derivative beneficiarie s o f all family-based petitions, and that subsection 8 (h)(3) itself expre s s l y r e fers to derivative petitions by use of the phrase “for
purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) ,” it seems unlikely that Congress would exclude an entire class of derivative beneficia ries from subsection (h)(3)’s benefits by silent implication based on the unwritten assumption that the petitioner must remain the same. Rather, one would expect any such exclusion to be express, since it would effectively operate categorically. I n d e e d , under the Li court’s restrictive reading, the only derivativ e beneficiaries of family-based petitions wh o would qualify for the benefits of subsection (h)(3) would be those on seco n d-preference petitions—a child following to join a parent who was named as a principal beneficiary on a petition filed by the parent’s LPR spouse. In that case, the petitioner could remain the

same even if the child aged out before the beneficiary parent became an LPR: the

8 U. S. C. § 1153( h)( 2) (“ The pet itio n des cri bed in this par agrap h is—

. . . wi th res pec t 8 to an alien child wh o is a der ivative benef icia ry unde r sub se cti on (d ) of this se cti on, a pet itio n fil ed unde r se cti on 1154 of this tit le for clas sif icat ion of the alien’ s par ent unde r sub se cti on (a) , (b) , or (c ) of this se cti on. ”)

. Subs ect ion (a) , in tur n, enum erat es every fam ily-b ase d pr efe renc e cat egory, in clud ing the fou rth -p ref ere nce cat egory w hich fo rm ed the basis of Kh alid ’s aun t’s pet itio n—“ Brot hers and s ist ers of c itize ns. ” § 1153( a).

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spouse’s pet i tion would convert to one on which the child was a principal beneficiary under the preference category for unmarried adult children of LPRs. Yet, in the situation just described, priority date retention has been available under the regulations since 1987. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4). The regulation expressly requires that the same petitioner file a new petition in order to qualify. Id. Thus, the only difference between the regulation and the Li court’s reading of subsection (h)(3) is that the statute would relieve the spouse of the burden of filing a new petition, since the conversion would now be a u t o m atic. We are skeptical that this meager benefi t w a s a l l C o ngress meant to accomplish through subsection (h)(3), especially where nothing in the statute singles out derivative beneficiaries of second-preference petitions for special treatment

. F u r t h e rmore, if Congress only meant to codify the regulation with this minor adjustment, one would expect that the statute would closely track the language of the regulation. Yet unlike the regulation, which explicitly states that the petitioner cannot change, nothing in the statute requires that the petitioner remain the same.

9 In sum, the better view is the simpler one—the one that adds no unwritten requirements to the text. See Bates v. United States , 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) ( “[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not
appear on its face.”). Congress plainly made automatic conversion and priority date retention available to all petitions d e s c r i b e d in subsection (h)(2). Subsection (h)(2) expressly discusses derivative beneficiaries of all family-based petitions. Congress carved out no exception for fourth-preference petitions, like Khalid’s, or for any other preference category. In light of the clarity of the text, legislative history and past agency practices are irrelevant. “[T ]h e co u rt, a s w e ll

a s t h e a g e n cy , m u st g iv e e ffe ct to th e u n a m b ig u o u sly e x p re sse d in te n t o f C o n g re ss.” C h ev ro n , 4 6 7 U .S . a t 8 4 2 -4 3

.

See 8 C.F. R. § 204. 2(a) (4) ( “ [ T ] he origi nal pr iori ty dat e wi ll be ret ained if the 9 subs eque nt p etiti on is f il ed by the s am e pe titio ner .” ( em phas is add ed) ).

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III. Because we conclude that, contrary to the BIA’s interpretation in Matter of Wang , the benefits of 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 3 ( h)(3) unambiguously apply to all petitions described in § 1153(h)(2)—including t h e f o u r t h

- p r e f

e r e n ce visa petition of which Khalid was a derivative beneficiary—w e G R A N T K h a lid ’s p e titio n fo r

re v ie w a n d R E M A N D to th e B IAfo r fu rth e r p ro ce e d in g s.

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