Present: All the Justices 

CAROLINA BUILDERS CORPORATION 

v. Record No. 980519 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 February 26, 1999 

CENIT EQUITY COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 

Thomas B. Hoover, Judge 

 In this appeal, we decide two issues: (1) the date 

from which the 150-day limitation period in Code § 43-4 is 

calculated for purposes of determining what sums can be 

included in a memorandum of mechanic’s lien; and (2) 

whether including only sums due for labor performed or 

materials furnished during the 150-day limitation period is 

a prerequisite for perfecting a mechanic’s lien, thereby 

invalidating a lien that includes sums due for labor 

performed or materials furnished prior to the 150-day 

period. Because we conclude that the 150-day limitation 

period is computed from the last day that labor is 

performed or material is furnished to a job preceding the 

filing of a memorandum of mechanic’s lien and that 

including only labor and materials furnished during the 

150-day limitation period is a prerequisite for perfecting 

the lien, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court 

invalidating a mechanic’s lien. 

I. 
 Carolina Builders Corporation (Carolina Builders) 

filed a memorandum of mechanic’s lien on July 29, 1996, 

against a certain tract of real estate located in York 

County for sums owed to Carolina Builders for materials 

that it had furnished for construction of a residential 

dwelling on the property. Subsequently, on January 27, 

1997, Carolina Builders filed a bill to enforce the 

mechanic’s lien and named Cenit Equity Company (Cenit) as 

one of the defendants. 

 After conducting discovery, Cenit filed a petition to 

declare the mechanic’s lien invalid pursuant to Code § 43-

17.11 and a motion for summary judgment. Cenit asserted 

that the mechanic’s lien sought to be enforced by Carolina 

Builders was invalid under Code § 43-4 because it included 

sums due for materials furnished more than 150 days prior 

to the last date on which labor was performed or material 

was furnished to the job preceding the filing of the 

memorandum. 

 1

 Code § 43-17.1 provides, in pertinent part: 

 

 Any party, having an interest in real property 

against which a lien has been filed, may . . . 

petition the court of equity having jurisdiction . . . 

to hold a hearing to determine the validity of any 

perfected lien on the property. . . . If the court 

finds that the lien is invalid, it shall forthwith 

order that the memorandum or notice of lien be removed 

from record. 

2
 At a hearing on November 6, 1997, the parties 

stipulated the following facts: 

1. Carolina Builders filed the memorandum of 

mechanic’s lien on July 29, 1996. 

2. The memorandum of mechanic’s lien included sums 

due for materials furnished by Carolina Builders from 

December 6, 1995, through April 16, 1996. 

3. May 23, 1996, was the last day that Carolina 

Builders furnished materials to the job prior to 

filing the memorandum of mechanic’s lien. 

4. Counting back from May 23, 1996, the 150-day 

period ended on December 25, 1995. 

5. The memorandum of mechanic’s lien included amounts 

owed for materials furnished prior to December 25, 

1995, specifically from December 6 through 15, 1995. 

 After considering memoranda and argument by the 

parties, the circuit court determined that the 150-day 

period must be calculated back from May 23, 1996, the last 

day that Carolina Builders furnished materials to the job 

immediately preceding the date that it filed the 

memorandum. Thus, the court concluded that the mechanic’s 

lien violated Code § 43-4 because it included amounts owed 

to Carolina Builders for materials provided to the job 

prior to the 150-day period. In a final decree dated 

December 18, 1997, the court held that the mechanic’s lien 

was invalid and unenforceable, and granted summary judgment 

in favor of Cenit. Carolina Builders appeals. 

II. 

3
Code § 43-4 contains two distinct time limitations. 

The first one requires that a memorandum of mechanic’s lien 

be filed “not later than ninety days from the last day of 

the month in which [the lien claimant] last performs labor 

or furnishes material, and in no event later than ninety 

days from the time such building, structure, or railroad is 

completed, or the work thereon otherwise terminated.” Code 

§ 43-4. No one disputes that Carolina Builders complied 

with this 90-day rule. It is the second limitation that is 

at issue in this appeal. That provision specifies that 

“[t]he lien claimant may file any number of memoranda but 

no memorandum . . . shall include sums due for labor or 

materials furnished more than 150 days prior to the last 

day on which labor was performed or material furnished to 

the job preceding the filing of such memorandum.” Code 

§ 43-4. 

 Carolina Builders’ memorandum of mechanic’s lien 

included sums due for materials furnished from December 6, 

1995, through April 16, 1996. Therefore, it argues that 

the 150 days should be counted back from April 16 rather 

than from May 23, 1996, even though the latter date was 

when Carolina Builders last delivered materials before 

filing the memorandum. In other words, Carolina Builders 

asserts that the last date actually included in the 

4
mechanic’s lien for materials furnished to the job should 

be the operative date from which to calculate the 150-day 

limitation period set out in Code § 43-4. We do not agree. 

 We have previously stated that Code § 43-4 is “clear 

and unambiguous.” Dominion Trust Co. v. Kenbridge Constr. 

Co., Inc., 248 Va. 393, 396, 448 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1994). 

If the statute as written is clear on its face, this Court 

will look no further than the plain meaning of the 

statute’s words. City of Winchester v. American Woodmark 

Corp., 250 Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995). In 

applying the plain meaning rule, this Court constantly 

strives to determine and give effect to the intention of 

the legislature. Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 

240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). 

 The statute plainly states that the memorandum of 

mechanic’s lien shall not include sums for materials 

furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day that 

material was furnished to the job preceding the filing of 

the memorandum. In the present case, Carolina Builders 

filed its memorandum of mechanic’s lien on July 29, 1996. 

The last day that Carolina Builders delivered materials to 

the job immediately before it filed its memorandum was May 

23, 1996. Thus, under the clear terms of the statute, the 

150 days must be counted back from May 23, 1996. To adopt 

5
Carolina Builder’s interpretation of the statute would, in 

effect, rewrite the statute. 

A correct application of the statutory 150-day 

limitation period does not render meaningless the 90-day 

filing limitation, as hypothesized by Carolina Builders, 

but instead comports with the General Assembly’s desire to 

prevent undisclosed or inchoate liens. Recognizing that 

the 150-day limitation period might necessitate that a 

claimant file multiple liens during the course of a 

construction project, the General Assembly specifically 

authorized the filing of “any number of memoranda.” Code 

§ 43-4. The statute also allows a lien claimant to include 

amounts that are “or will be due and payable.” Code § 43-

4. 

 The remaining issue is whether Carolina Builder’s 

violation of the 150-day limitation rule renders its entire 

mechanic’s lien unenforceable. The circuit court so held, 

but Carolina Builders argues that the 150-day requirement 

limits only the sums that can be recovered and is not a 

prerequisite for perfecting the mechanic’s lien. Relying 

on this Court’s decisions in West Alexandria Properties, 

Inc. v. First Va. Mortgage & Real Estate Inv. Trust, 221 

Va. 134, 267 S.E.2d 149 (1980); and First Nat’l Bank of 

Martinsville v. Roy N. Ford Co., Inc., 219 Va. 942, 252 

6
S.E.2d 354 (1979), Carolina Builders contends that, rather 

than invalidating a lien, a trial court can reduce the 

amount of a mechanic’s lien when the memorandum contains 

excess sums. 

 Conversely, Cenit argues that all the requirements in 

Code § 43-4, including the 150-day limitation period, are 

prerequisites for perfecting a mechanic’s lien and must, 

therefore, be strictly construed. According to Cenit, 

Carolina Builders had an affirmative duty not to include 

sums owed for materials furnished prior to the 150-day 

“look back” period in its memorandum of mechanic’s lien. 

Cenit also asserts that the decisions in West Alexandria 

Properties and Bank of Martinsville are inapposite. We 

agree with Cenit. 

 This Court has repeatedly stated that a mechanic’s 

lien is in derogation of the common law and that the 

statutes dealing with the existence and perfection of a 

mechanic’s lien must, therefore, be strictly construed. 

American Standard Homes Corp. v. Reinecke, 245 Va. 113, 

119, 425 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1993); Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 

572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989). “[U]nless [a 

mechanic’s lien] is perfected within the proper time and in 

the proper manner, as outlined by the statute, it is lost.” 

Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 40, 12 S.E.2d 801, 802 

7
(1941). In American Standard Homes, this Court 

distinguished between perfection of a mechanic’s lien under 

Code § 43-4 and enforcement of the lien pursuant to Code 

§ 43-17. In doing so, we stated that the “provisions of 

the enforcement statutes are to be construed liberally 

while the requirements of the perfection statute are to be 

construed strictly.” 245 Va. at 119, 425 S.E.2d at 518. 

 Code § 43-4 contains specific conditions that a lien 

claimant must fulfill “in order to perfect the lien given 

by § 43-3.” For example, the claimant must file the 

memorandum within a specified time (the 90-day rule) in the 

clerk’s office where the property is located and must 

include certain information in the memorandum. The 150-day 

limitation is included in these conditions. In contrast to 

the 90-day rule, the 150-day requirement is not a filing 

deadline. Instead, it is a limitation on how far back in 

time a lien claimant can reach in any given memorandum for 

sums owed. Therefore, we conclude that the 150-day 

limitation period is one of the prerequisites required by 

Code § 43-4 in order to perfect a mechanic’s lien.2 Thus, 

 2

 Code § 43-15, which pertains to inaccuracies in the 

memorandum or in the description of the property to be 

covered by the lien, is not applicable to the present 

situation. 

8
the circuit court did not err when it held that Carolina 

Builders’ mechanic’s lien was invalid and unenforceable. 

 In reaching this result, we are mindful that we 

allowed excess sums to be excluded without invalidating the 

mechanic’s liens in West Alexandria Properties and Bank of 

Martinsville. In each of those cases, the memorandum of 

mechanic’s lien included amounts attributable to labor 

performed and materials furnished not only for improvements 

on the liened land but also for improvements on additional 

property. However, the excess sums claimed in the 

memoranda did not violate any specific statutory provision 

in effect at that time with regard to perfecting a lien.3

 In contrast, we invalidated the mechanic’s liens in 

Woodington Elec., Inc. v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 238 

Va. 623, 385 S.E.2d 872 (1989), and in Rosser, 237 Va. 572, 

379 S.E.2d 323. In those cases, the lien claimants had 

described property in the memoranda for which no labor or 

materials had been furnished. There was excess property 

 3

 When this Court decided Kenbridge Constr., the 150-

day requirement was in effect, but it was not at issue in 

that case. Although we acknowledged “that a trial court, 

in certain limited circumstances, may reduce the amount of 

a mechanic’s lien rather than invalidate the lien,” we did 

not afford Kenbridge that relief. 248 Va. at 399, 448 

S.E.2d at 662. Kenbridge had not requested that the trial 

court reduce the lien so as to include only the value of 

labor and materials furnished to the liened property, and 

9
rather than excess sums included in the memoranda. Noting 

that Code § 43-4 requires the lien claimant to include in 

the memorandum a brief description of the property on which 

the lien is claimed, we stated in Woodington that “[i]t is 

the mechanic’s duty to place his lien upon the property on 

which he worked and no more.” 238 Va. at 634, 385 S.E.2d 

at 878. In other words, the lien claimant had violated one 

of the specific provisions contained in Code § 43-4. 

 Carolina Builders did not merely claim a larger sum 

than its proof would perhaps support. That kind of overinclusiveness is a traditional problem faced by a landowner 

and one that a trial court resolves when determining how 

much of a claimed lien should be allowed. Id. at 633-34, 

385 S.E.2d at 877-78. Instead, Carolina Builders violated 

the explicit statutory requirement that its memorandum 

shall not include sums for materials furnished more than 

150 days prior to the last day on which material was 

furnished to the job preceding the filing of the 

memorandum. Code § 43-4. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court. 

Affirmed. 

_____________________ 

we doubted that it would have been able to make that 

allocation. Id.

10