alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Angel Pantaleon, Appellant.

[825 NYS2d 374]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Adler, J.), rendered February 16, 2006, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Crane, J.P., Santucci, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2296 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2296

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Related Agency 
 and Food and Drug Administration, Buildings and Facilities for fiscal 
                               year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Related Agency 
 and Food and Drug Administration, Buildings and Facilities for fiscal 
                               year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RELATED AGENCY AND 
              FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES 
              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Related Agency and Food 
and Drug Administration, Buildings and Facilities for fiscal year 2024 
may not exceed $11,788,000.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50681

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN RODRIGUEZ-VASQUEZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CR-259-ALL

Before KING, DAVIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Rodriguez-Vasquez appeals his conviction and 84-month sentence for

aiding and abetting the importation of cocaine and aiding and abetting the

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Rodriguez-Vasquez argues that

our pattern jury instruction on the defense of duress places a constitutionally

impermissible burden on the defendant, and he asserts that the instruction

violates principles of equal protection because other circuits require a defendant

raising a defense of duress to make a less onerous showing. He contends that

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 2, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-50681

2

his sentence is excessive because the district court erroneously determined that

he was not entitled to a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility.

Rodriguez-Vasquez’s challenge to the burden of proof required to establish

the defense of duress is foreclosed by United States v. Dixon, 126 S. Ct. 2437,

2442-48 (2006). His contention that our pattern instruction on duress violates

principles of equal protection fails because he does not suggest that the

challenged instruction has a discriminatory purpose. See United States v.

Chavez, 281 F.3d 479, 486-87 (5th Cir. 2002). We affirm the sentencing court’s

determination that Rodriguez-Vasquez was not entitled to a reduction in offense

level for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 458

(5th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 250 (Wednesday, December 31, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 78911]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30606]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-85,617]


Day & Zimmermann, Inc.; Kansas Division; Parsons, Kansas; Notice 
of Affirmative Determination Regarding Application for Reconsideration

    By application dated December 2, 2014, the Kansas Department of 
Commerce requested administrative reconsideration of the negative 
determination regarding workers' eligibility to apply for worker 
adjustment assistance applicable to workers and former workers of Day & 
Zimmermann, Inc., Kansas Division, Parsons, Kansas. The determination 
was issued on November 24, 2014 and the Notice of Determination has not 
yet been published in the Federal Register.
    Pursuant to 29 CFR 90.18(c) reconsideration may be granted under 
the following circumstances:
    (1) If it appears on the basis of facts not previously considered 
that the determination complained of was erroneous;
    (2) If it appears that the determination complained of was based on 
a mistake in the determination of facts not previously considered; or
    (3) If in the opinion of the Certifying Officer, a 
misinterpretation of facts or of the law justified reconsideration of 
the decision.
    The initial investigation resulted in a negative determination 
based on the findings that imports of high explosive mortar rounds and 
demolition charges have not increased; the subject firm did not shift 
production to a foreign country; and the subject firm is not a Supplier 
or Downstream Producer to a firm that employed a group of workers who 
received a certification of eligibility under Section 222(a) of the 
Act, 19 U.S.C. 2272(a).
    The request for reconsideration asserts that the subject firm was 
impacted by foreign competition and supplied new information.
    The Department of Labor has carefully reviewed the request for 
reconsideration and the existing record, and has determined that the 
Department will conduct further investigation to determine if the 
workers meet the eligibility requirements of the Trade Act of 1974.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the application, I conclude that the claim 
is of sufficient weight to justify reconsideration of the U.S. 
Department of Labor's prior decision. The application is, therefore, 
granted.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 17th day of December, 2014.
Michael W. Jaffe,
Certifying Officer, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2014-30606 Filed 12-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
Kandi Technologies Group, Inc. - Exhibit 4.1 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com





Exhibit 4.1

WARRANT EXTENSION AGREEMENT

Kandi Technologies Group, Inc., a
Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby acknowledge and agree, with
respect to the outstanding warrant dated _____________ registered in the name of
________________ to purchase _________ shares of the Common Stock, par value
$0.001 per share, of the Company (Warrant No. ____________) (the “Warrant”),
that the date by which the Warrant must be exercised has been extended from
_________________ until _________________, and does hereby represent that such
extension of the exercise period of the Warrant has been duly authorized by the
Board of Directors of the Company. Except as specifically set forth herein, the
Warrant and all provisions thereof shall remain in full force and effect.

In consideration for the extension of
the exercise period of the Warrant, ____________, on behalf of itself and its
permitted assigns of the Warrant, forfeits all rights to compensation or other
damages, and to file lawsuits or other claims against the Company, regarding or
arising out of the late notice of the adjustment of exercise price of the
Warrant issued by the Company on July 27, 2015.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
undersigned has executed this agreement as of the ___ day of August, 2015.

KANDI TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.







By: ____________________________

Name:    Hu Xiaoming

Title:      Chief Executive Officer

 

Acknowledged and Agreed to as of

this ___ day of August, 2015 by:

 

By: ____________________________

Name: 

Title:    Authorized Signatory
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 20-0102

BRIAN D. SMITH,

Petitioner and Appelldnt,

v. STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee. 

# RLED MAR 26 2020

Bowen Greenwood Clerk df Supreme Court State of Montana ORDER

Brian D. Smith moves this Court to appoint counsel and to expand the record by including the Missoula County District Courtrecord for his underlying criminal case,Cause No.DC-11-161. The State ofMontana has not filed a response. As grounds, he provides that he is indigent and incarcerated. Smith states that he "needs access to files in possession ofthe public defender's office in Missoula, 0"in order to argue his case on appeal. He states that he believes he is entitled to those files and that he has not been provided these documents since 2012. In lieu of granting his motion for counsel,Smith offers,in the altemative,that this Court order theDistrict Courtto release the entire record for DC-11-161 from the public defender's office to him. Smith is appealing the District Court's denial of his second petition for postconviction reliefin Cause No.DV-16-698. This Court is familiar with Smith's criminal history. Smith pleaded guilty to felony aggravated assault, and in May 2012,the District Court sentenced him to atwenty-year prison term withoutparole. Smith did nottimely appealhis conviction and sentence. This Court denied his petition for an out-of-time appeal in July 2013. State v. Smith,No.

DA 13-0399,Order(Mont.July 10,2013). In 2016,Smith soughtpostconviction reliefin the District Court,and the courtdenied his petition in Cause No. DV-16-698. Smith appealed,and we affirmed. Smith v. State,No.DA 17-0146,2018 MT 115N,12, 11,2018 Mont.LEXIS 150. 03/26/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0102Smith is not entitled to representation from appellate counsel nor expansion ofthe

record. There is no right to the appointment of counsel in a proceeding on a motion for postconviction relief, although a court may order the assignment of counsel under the circumstances outlined in § 46-8-104, MCA. Smith represented himself in his postconviction proceeding before the District Court. Smith has not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify appointment of counsel, pursuant to § 46-8- 104(3), MCA. Smith is not entitled to his public defender's files now, some seven years later,when he did not have them in seeking postconviction relief. Smith presents no grounds to support his motion that this record on appeal needs to be supplemented with either these files from the public defender's office or from the underlying District Court record for his criminal conviction and sentence,given that his instant appeal concerns another denial ofhis petition for postconviction relief. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Smith's Motion for Appointment ofCounsel is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Smith's Motion to Expand the Record is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy ofthis Order to counsel ofrecord and to Brian D. Smith personally. DATED this May ofMarch, 2020. For the Court,

2 ChiefJustice
11688.

#### KAUFMAN METAL COMPANY *v.*ATLANTIC REFINING COMPANY.

Inspection and acceptance of a concrete mixer by an employee of a company which had ordered a “ one-yard” concrete mixer did not bind the company where the mixer so inspected was not a one-yard mixer but was merely a half-yard or three-quarters-yard mixer, and where the employee had no authority to accept the machine but his authority was limited to inspection and he had been sent to inspect as to its mechanical condition only, and did not attempt or know how to determine its capacity.

The court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.

Decided December 17, 1920.

Complaint; from city court of Brunswick — Judge Butts. May 6, 1920.

*Isaac & Isaac,*for plaintiff.

*Bennel, Twitty & Reese,*for defendant.

Broyles, C. J.

The Atlantic Refining Company' of Brunswick, Georgia, gave to the H. C. Weller Company of Jacksonville, Florida, an order for a one-yard No. 61 Ransome mixer (concrete mixer). The refining company, on the request of the Weller Company, sent A. J. Wright, one of its employees, to Jacksonville to inspect the mixer, which he did, and after the inspection he wrote across the order the following words: *“*Above inspected and accepted for Atlantic Refining Company, A. J. Wright, traffic manager. ” The machine was subsequently shipped by the Kaufman Metal Company of Jacksonville to the refining company, which refused to accept it, and the Kaufman company brought suit against the refining company for the agreed purchase-price of the machine.

Upon the trial of the case the undisputed evidence showed that the machine inspected by Wright and shipped to the refining company was not a one-yard mixer as ordered, but that it was either a half-yard or a three-quarters-yard mixer, and that the refining company wanted to buy a one-yard mixer only. There was also undisputed evidence that Wright, the employee of the refining company, had no authority to accept the machine for his company, but that his authority was limited to an inspection thereof, and further that he was sent to inspect the mechanical condition only of the machine, and that, replying upon the order which *101called for a one-yard mixer, lie inspected the machine only as to its mechanical condition and did not attempt to ascertain its capacity, and furthermore that he did not have the technical knowledge necessary to determine such capacity.

Under these circumstances we think the refining company was legally justified in refusing to accept the machine sent it, and that the court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodivorth, JJ., concur.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Wilfredo Rivera, Appellant.

[971 NYS2d 897]

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.), imposed May 29, 2012, on the ground that the sentence was excessive.

Ordered that the sentence is affirmed.

The defendant’s purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid *(see People v Bradshaw,*18 NY3d 257 [2011]; *People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248 [2006]; *People v Bookard,*68 AD3d 1128 [2009]) and, thus, does not preclude review of his excessive sentence claim. However, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Eng, P.J., Angiolillo, Balkin and Hall, JJ., concur.
#### OIEN ZHIN ZHENG, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Respondent.

No. 06-3252.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on Jan. 8, 2008.

Filed: Jan. 10, 2008.

Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Lyle D. Jentzer, Paul F. Stone, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before FISHER, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

Oien Zhin Zheng * seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen deportation proceedings. On November 3, 2004, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Zheng’s application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Con*513vention Against Torture. On January 9, 2006, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s order. Zheng did not file a petition for review of that order in this Court. Zheng filed a Motion to Reopen on April 5, 2006, which the BIA denied on June 5, 2006.

I.

We are not in a position to review the order of the BIA denying Zheng’s motion to reopen. Under Rule 28, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, “the appellant is required to list the issues raised on appeal and present an argument in support of them.” *Nagle v. Alspach,*8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir.1993). Pursuant to Rule 28, “the argument ... must contain ... appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them....” Rule 28(a)(9), Fed. R.App. P. In his brief, Zheng failed to identify the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen as an issue in his statement of the issues presented and provided no written argument regarding that denial. Accordingly, he has abandoned and waived the issue. *Nagle,*8 F.3d at 143 (“When an issue is either not set forth in the statement of issues presented or not pursued in the argument section of the brief, the Appellant has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.”).

II.

In addition, we do not have jurisdiction over Zheng’s petition for review to the extent he challenges the BIA’s January 9, 2006 order. Zheng did not file a timely petition for review of the January 9, 2006 order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (“The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”). Almost two months after the time to file a petition for review of the January 9, 2006 order had expired, Zheng filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. Zheng’s motion to reopen, however, does not revive his period to appeal the BIA’s January 9, 2006 order. *Garcia v. INS,*690 F.2d 349, 350 (3d Cir.1982) (“Timely filing as to one order does not vest this Court with jurisdiction to hear ‘stale’ challenges.”).

We have considered all contentions of the parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary.

Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied.

*

 Petitioner's name is given as “Oien Zhin Zheng” in the captions of the petition for review, oral decision of the immigration judge, and Respondent’s brief to this Court. It is given as "Qien Zhin Zheng” in the captions of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of the motion to reopen and Petitioner's brief to this Court.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2488 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2488

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make advanced nuclear 
 facilities eligible for the qualifying advanced energy project credit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 6, 2023

 Mr. Donalds introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make advanced nuclear 
 facilities eligible for the qualifying advanced energy project credit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ADVANCED NUCLEAR FACILITIES MADE ELIGIBLE FOR QUALIFYING 
              ADVANCED ENERGY PROJECT CREDIT.

    (a) In General.--Section 48C(c)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 is amended by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (ii), by 
striking the period at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ``, or'', 
and by adding at the end the following new clause:
                            ``(iv) which consists of an advanced 
                        nuclear facility (as defined in section 
                        45J(d)(2)).''.
    (b) Clarification of Continuation of Authority To Treat Other 
Nuclear Facilities as Qualifying.--Section 48C(c)(1)(A)(i)(VII) of such 
Code is amended by inserting ``, including nuclear energy technology,'' 
after ``greenhouse gas emissions''.
    (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 48C(c)(2)(A) of such Code is 
amended by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (ii), by inserting 
``or'' at the end of clause (iii), and by inserting after clause (iii) 
the following new clause:
                            ``(iv) a facility described in clause (iv) 
                        of such paragraph,''.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-03-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-29-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-27-1998
<CASH>                                         213,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,456,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                    32,000
<INVENTORY>                                  1,998,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,719,000
<PP&E>                                       4,330,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,710,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,358,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,803,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        2,583,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     3,107,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  31,269,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,358,000
<SALES>                                      2,438,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,438,000
<CGS>                                        1,275,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,064,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (6,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (625,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (625,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (625,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.02)
        


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
      32.1





CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Sparta Commercial Services, Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended October 31, 2007,
      as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified
      (the "Report"), the undersigned, Anthony L. Havens, as Chief Executive Officer
      of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      that:





(1)
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





(2)
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.





/s/
                Anthony L. HavensAnthony
                L. HavensChief
                Executive OfficerDate:
                December 21, 2007