alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John L. EDGAR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gene JOHNSON, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-7318.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 20, 2007.

Decided: Dec. 28, 2007.

John L. Edgar, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*542PER CURIAM:

John L. Edgar seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Edgar has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### In the Matter of Richard D. Grisanti, Respondent, v Linda Smith-Gilsey, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[974 NYS2d 872]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Wyoming County (Michael F. Griffith, J.), entered March 28, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6. The order, among other things, changed respondent’s parenting time.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Same memorandum as in *Matter of Smith-Gilsey v Grisanti*(111 AD3d 1424 [2013]). Present — Smith, J.E, Centra, Garni and Whalen, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2276 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2276

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for US Department 
 of Agriculture, Rural Development Programs, Rural Housing Assistance 
                      Grants for fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for US Department 
 of Agriculture, Rural Development Programs, Rural Housing Assistance 
                      Grants for fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR US DEPARTMENT OF 
              AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, RURAL HOUSING 
              ASSISTANCE GRANTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for US Department of 
Agriculture, Rural Development Programs, Rural Housing Assistance 
Grants for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $4,800,000.
                                 <all>
```
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2166 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for U.S. Department 

of Interior, National Park Service, National Recreation and Preservation 

for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for U.S. 

Department of Interior, National Park Service, National 

Recreation and Preservation for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL 

5 PARK SERVICE, NATIONAL RECREATION AND 

6 PRESERVATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

7 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

8 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail9 able for U.S. Department of Interior, National Park ServVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2166.IH H2166

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2166 IH

1 ice, National Recreation and Preservation for fiscal year 

2 2024 may not exceed $64,138,000. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
(April 18, 2013)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Raheem Duncan, Appellant.

[962 NYS2d 918]

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.), rendered October 11, 2011, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the second degree.

In satisfaction of a one-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree and waived his right to appeal. In accordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced to five years in prison, to be followed by three years of post-release supervision. Defendant appeals.

Appellate counsel seeks to be relieved of his assignment of representing defendant on the ground that there are no nonfrivolous issues to be raised on appeal. Based upon our review of the record and counsel’s brief, we agree. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed and counsel’s application for leave to withdraw is granted *(see People v Cruwys,*113 AD2d 979, 980 [1985], *lv denied*67 NY2d 650 [1986]; *see generally People v Stokes,*95 NY2d 633 [2001]).

Rose, J.P, Lahtinen, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and application to be relieved of assignment granted.
#### Mayra Diaz Kalisch, Appellant, v Maple Trade Finance Corporation, Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[827 NYS2d 40]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane S. Solomon, J.), entered February 15, 2006, which, to the extent appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate her default and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, unanimously modified, on the law and the facts, to the extent of directing that the dismissal of the complaint be without prejudice, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

In order to vacate her default, plaintiff would be required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear at the conference and a meritorious cause of action *(Espinoza v Concordia Intl. Forwarding Corp.,*32 AD3d 326 [2006]). Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear at a scheduled conference, she wholly failed to establish a meritorious cause of action. No affidavit of merit was annexed to the motion papers.

Nevertheless, the adjudication was not for neglect to prosecute and was not on the merits *(Greenberg v De Hart,*4 NY2d 511, 516-517 [1958]). Therefore, the dismissal does not have res judicata effect *(Espinoza,*32 AD3d at 328). Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Andrias, Sullivan and Sweeny, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victor Daniel HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-40863

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John Riley Friesell, Bellaire, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Victor Daniel Hernandez, Three Rivers, TX, pro se.

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Counsel appointed to represent Victor Daniel Hernandez on appeal from the revocation of his term of supervised release has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as is required by *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Hernandez has not responded to counsel’s motion.

Our independent review of the brief filed by counsel and of the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities, and the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
##### 



Exhibit 99.5

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002


In connection with the report on Form 10-Q
of Hub International Limited (the Company) dated
November 6, 2003 containing the financial statements of the
Company for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2003
(the Report) filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Dennis J. Pauls,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as enacted, certify, pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|   |                                                                                                                                                             
|-- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements
    of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                            
|  
|2. | the information contained in the Report fairly
    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
    results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



| |     |                    
| | --- | -------------------
| | By: | /s/ DENNIS J. PAULS

| |                                                             
| | ------------------------------------------------------------
| | ______________________________________ 
     Dennis J. Pauls
| | Chief Financial Officer                                     

November 6, 2003
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-4203

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus STEVEN J. KEY, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Elizabeth V. Hallanan, Senior District Judge. (CR-95-195) Submitted: March 11, 1999 Decided: March 17, 1999 Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert F. Cohen, Jr., Natalie J. Sal, COHEN, ABATE & COHEN, L.C., for Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Philip J. Combs, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Steven Key appeals the district court’s order denying his Fed.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Key sought reconsideration of his criminal conviction and sentence while his direct appeal was still pending. Because Rule 60(b) is inapplicable to criminal cases and because the district court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider Key’s conviction while it was pending on appeal, we affirm the order of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

CONSENT 

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the RegistrationStatements on Forms S-3 (Nos. 333-52490 and 333-47764) and Forms S-8 (Nos. 333-63902,333-52488, 333-43220, 333-94817 and 333-92729) of our report dated February 21, 2001, relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedule of TheTriZetto Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31,2000, which appears in this Form 10-K. 

 

 

/s/    PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP

 

Orange County, California

March 28, 2003
#### Satrio YUDO, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-1481-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 2, 2006.

Marialarrie Alinsunurin, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Troy A. Eid, United States Attorney for the District of Colorado, Lisa A. Christian, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, CO, for Respondent.

Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROBERT A. KATZMANN and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Satrio Yudo, a citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of a March 1, 2006 order of the BIA affirming the October 15, 2004 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) William Van Wyck denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). *In re Satrio Yudo,*No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 2006), *aff'g*No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 15, 2004). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

While Title 8, Section 1158(a)(3) of the United States Code provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review the agency’s finding that an asylum application was untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or its finding of neither changed nor extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimeliness under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims. Here, we reject Yudo’s assertion that the plain language of section 1158(a)(2)(B) undermines congressional intent because that same language was necessarily approved by Congress when it passed the provision into law. We further reject Yudo’s argument that this statute of limitations violates his right to due process or equal protection under the law.

Furthermore, we agree that Yudo did not suffer sufficiently severe abuse to constitute persecution, where he was detained for a short time, threatened and harassed, but not otherwise mistreated. We note *387that Yudo offers only conclusory assertions that he qualifies for withholding of removal, and fails to show how the IJ erred in denying him that relief. Finally, we agree that Yudo does not qualify for CAT relief where (1) his reliance on the State Department’s Report on International Religious Freedom is misplaced because he fails to point to any part of the report that discusses the torture of Catholics in Indonesia and (2) he never testified that he had any fear of being tortured if he were returned to his country.

For the foregoing reasons the petition for review is DENIED. Having completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED. Any pending request for oral arguments in this case is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).
<PAGE>



                                                                    Exhibit 23.1




                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

         We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement
Number 333-93933, 333-111037, 333-105425, and 333-105424 of Civitas BankGroup,
Inc. on Form S-8 and Registration Statement Number 333-107352 of Civitas
BankGroup, Inc. on Form S-3 of our report dated March 5, 2004, incorporated
by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Civitas BankGroup, Inc. for
the year ended December 31, 2003.




                                       /s/ Crowe Chizek and Company LLC

Brentwood, Tennessee
March 30, 2004
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                   HOLLINGER INC. TO APPEAL DELAWARE DECISION


Toronto, Canada, March 12, 2004 - Hollinger Inc. (TSX: HLG.C; HLG.PR.B;
HLG.PR.C) today issued the following statement:

"As we previously indicated, Hollinger Inc. and Lord Black respectfully disagree
with Vice Chancellor Strine's view of the facts and equities in his decision.
Accordingly, we are exercising our right to seek review of the decision by the
Delaware Supreme Court. Notwithstanding our challenge to the decision, we
continue to support the efforts now underway by Lazard to achieve full value for
shareholders."

The company today filed an application for certification of its interlocutory
appeal of Vice Chancellor Strine's court order.

Hollinger's principal asset is its approximately 72.4% voting and 30.0% equity
interest in Hollinger International Inc. Hollinger International is a global
newspaper publisher with English-language newspapers in the United States, Great
Britain, and Israel. Its assets include The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday
Telegraph and The Spectator and Apollo magazines in Great Britain, the Chicago
Sun-Times and a large number of community newspapers in the Chicago area, The
Jerusalem Post and The International Jerusalem Post in Israel, a portfolio of
new media investments and a variety of other assets.

Media Contact:

Jim Badenhausen
646-805-2006

                              www.hollingerinc.com
#### ESTATE of Eugene Earl GOLDSTEIN, Deceased, by its Executrix Jeannette D. Goldstein, and Jeannette D. Goldstein, individually, Plaintiffs, v. The CELOTEX CORPORATION et al., Defendants.

No. 69 Civ. 3918.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

Nov. 3, 1971.

*497Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon, New York City, for plaintiffs; by David G. Miller, New York City, of counsel.

Alexander, Ash, Schwartz & Cohen, New York City, for defendant Washington Iron Works; by Joseph Arthur Cohen, New York City, of counsel.

GURFEIN, District Judge.

This is an unusual motion by *defendant*Washington Iron Works to amend the caption to change the *plaintiff’s*name, suing as Executrix, from “Gold-stein” to “Garner.” The plaintiff, widow of Eugene Earl Goldstein, who was killed in an accident in February 1968, sues as Executrix of his Estate. She has not remarried. Shortly after her husband’s death the plaintiff changed her name to Garner for reasons undisclosed. The defendant Iron Works wants her to sue it under her new name for reasons unexpressed.

Poets, since time immemorial, have conjured with the meaning of names. The Bard of Avon wondered: “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” It remains for jury lawyers in negligence cases in our own time to savor the full flavor of a woman’s name. They think that when she changes her name upon remarriage juries will be more reluctant to award her substantial damages for the death of her late husband. The Courts have agreed. Her new marital status is irrelevant both as to liability and damages. Juries are, therefore, carefully kept from learning that the widow has remarried.

Here the plaintiff has not remarried, but as she asserts, a juror might think she has if she appears as “Mrs. Garner” in an action that calls for the appearance of a “Mrs. Goldstein.”

If the plaintiff had actually remarried, the New York Courts have made it clear that she must be addressed upon the trial only by her former name, not by her new name. See Rodak v. Fury, 31 A.D.2d 816, 298 N.Y.S.2d 50 (3rd Dept. 1969), and cases there cited, a rule we apply in this diversity case. The reason for this is to avoid improper speculation by the jury with respect to damages.

Upon a trial of this action a jury might well be misled into thinking that the plaintiff’s change of name signifies a remarriage. To allow rebuttal of the inference would permit the trial needlessly to deal with the irrelevant. It is better, I think, to leave the matter as it stands. Since no harm to the defendant has been shown by letting the caption stand its motion is denied.

So ordered.
#### Rechide K. Cardia, Respondent, v Willchester Holdings, LLC, Appellant, and CVS Pharmacy, Respondent.

[825 NYS2d 269]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Willchester Holdings, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (LaCava, J.), entered May 22, 2006, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it is granted.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell over a concrete wheel stop in the parking lot of the defendant Willchester Holdings, LLC (hereinafter Willchester). A wheel stop or concrete parking lot divider which is clearly visible presents no unreasonable risk of harm *(see Bryant v Superior Computer Outlet, 5*AD3d 343, 344 [2004]; *Cupo v Karfunkel,*1 AD3d 48, 52 [2003]). Here, Willchester made a prima facie showing of *337entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting photographs depicting the condition of the parking lot at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, which demonstrate that the wheel stop over which the plaintiff tripped and fell was not an inherently dangerous condition, and was readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses *(see Zimkind v Costco Wholesale Corp.,*12 AD3d 593 [2004]; *Bryant v Superior Computer Outlet, supra; Murphy v Kissena*Drugs, 4 AD3d 401 [2004]; *Cupo v Karfunkel,*1 AD3d 48 [2003]; *Plessias v Scalia Home for Funerals,*271 AD2d 423 [2000]; *O'Leary v Saugerties Cent. School Dist.,*277 AD2d 662 [2000]). The affidavit of the plaintiff’s expert was insufficient to raise an issue of fact because he offered only a generalized, conclusory opinion that the wheel stops in the parking lot violated good and accepted engineering safety practices *(see Pirie v Krasinski,*18 AD3d 848, 850 [2005]; *Fitzgerald v Sears, Roebuck & Co.,*17 AD3d 522 [2005]; *Murphy v Kissena Drugs, supra; Billordo v E.P. Realty Assoc.,*300 AD2d 523, 524 [2002]). Accordingly, Winchester’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Florio, J.P., Adams, Krausman and Rivera, JJ., concur.