UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1328

ROMODAN BEKIT ESMAEL,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: October 9, 2012 Decided: October 16, 2012

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Garfield, GARFIELD LAW GROUP, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, Kristin A. Moresi, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Romodan Bekit Esmael, a native and citizen of Eritrea, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

(“Board’s”) order dismissing his appeal of the immigration 

judge’s (“IJ’s”) order denying Esmael’s affirmative application 

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have thoroughly examined 

the record and deny the petition for review.

When assessing an alien’s petition for review, we must 

uphold the Board’s determination that an alien is not eligible 

for asylum or withholding of removal unless the Board’s 

determination is “‘manifestly contrary to [the] law and an abuse 

of discretion.’” Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391, 396 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2006)). Legal 

questions determined by the Board are reviewed de novo, see Li 

Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008), while 

the Board’s factual findings “are conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006); CrespinValladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011). In 

other words, the Board’s determination regarding eligibility for 

asylum or withholding of removal will be affirmed if it is 

supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a 

whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
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The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes 

the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 

8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012). It defines a 

refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to his native 

country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). An applicant for asylum

“bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility for asylum” based on 

refugee status. Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 

2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2011).

We have reviewed the record and the Board’s opinion, 

and we conclude that the Board’s determination is without legal 

error and is supported by substantial evidence. While we 

appreciate the apparent sincerity of Esmael’s fears of future 

persecution, we are constrained to conclude that the record 

would not compel every reasonable adjudicator to find Esmael’s 

apprehensions well-founded. See Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 

124. Because it is not our task to weigh the evidence anew or 

to substitute our judgment for that of the Board, we must defer 

to the Board’s dismissal of Esmael’s application for asylum and

withholding of removal. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 

(4th Cir. 2004); Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 

2004). We likewise conclude that the Board did not reversibly 
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err in denying Esmael protection under the CAT. See Lin-Jian v. 

Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). Finally, we note

that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Esmael’s 

motion to remand, given Esmael’s failure to demonstrate that he 

could not have submitted the proferred evidence prior to the 

hearing before the IJ. See Hussain v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 153, 

155 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting standard of review).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED