ORNEP GENERAL 

OF EXAS 

May 2, 1962 

Honorable Don Cain Opinion No. NW-1323 

County Attorney 

Gray County Courthouse Re: Authority of an election 

Pampa, Texas judge to stamp the back 

side of ballots with the 

election judge's facsimile 

signature made with a rubber 

stamp, or to sign his initials, 

in lieu of his actual signature 

as required by Art. 8.11 of 

Dear Mr. Cain: the Texas Election Code. 

You have asked the following questions: 

"A . Can an election judge In a general, 

special, or primary election, use 

a rubber stamp containing his signature to place on the back of each 

ballot in such election? 

"B. If the answer to Question A is in 

the negative, must such election 

judge actually sign his signature 

on the back of each ballot, or may 

he actually sign his initials?" 

Art. 8.11, Texas Election Code, reads in part as follows: 

"After fixing his signature on the back 

of each ballot, the election judge shall 

check all ballots to see that they are 

properly numbered, . . ., and then place 

the ballots face down in a stack or stacks 

from which each voter shall be allowed to 

take his own ballot . . .' @phasis addedJ 

Art. 8.20, Texas Election Code, reads in part as follows: 

"NO officer of election shall unfold or 

examine the face of a ballot when received 

from an elector, nor the endorsement on 

e ballot, except the signature of the 

&.y , or the words stamped thereon, nor 

sha 1 he permit the same to be done;. . .' 
, . 

Honorable Don Cain, Page 2 Opinion No. WW-1323 

Art. 8.21, Texas Election Code, reads in part as follows: 

"The counting judges and clerks shall 

familiarize themselves with the signature 

of the judge who writes his name on each 

ballot that is voted, no ballot shall 

be counted if it is fodd'to be fraudulent. 

but in the absence of a showing of fraud 

the mere failure of the presiding judge to 

sign the ballot shall not make any such 

ballot illegal." 

This provision in Art. 8.11 of the Election Code of 1951 

is derived from Article 3008, V.C.S., which reads as follows: 

"When the judges are satisfied as to 

the right of the citizen to vote, the judge 

shall stamp in legible characters with a 

stamp of wood or rubber the poll tax receipt 

or certificate of exemption with the words: 

'Voted . . . . . ..day of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.D. 

lg.....' Or write the same words in ink 

and then return said receipt or certificate 

to the voter, and shall at the same time 

deliver to him one official ballot on the 

blank side of which P the residi 

shall have previously written his signature. 

The voter shall then immediately repair to 

a voting booth OP a place prepared for voting 

by the election officers, and there prepare 

his ballot in the manner provided by law." 

Rphasis addedJ 

In Clark v. Hardison, 90 S.W. 342 (Civ.App. 1905), Appellants 

contended that the ballots cast at the election should not be 

counted, since the election judge affixed his signature on the 

back of the ballot after the ballots had been delivered to him 

by the voters to be placed in the ballot box. The Court stated 

at page 343: 

"Section 72 of the Terre11 Law (Acts 

Leg. 1903, p. 147, c. 101) provides that 

the election officers 'shall count no 

ballots that do not bear his ,@esiding 

judge'g signature, or if, on examination 

by the judges, such signature is found to 

be a forgery.'. . . 

So the allegation that ballots 

deli&id to the voter were indorsed by 
, . 

Honorable Don Cain, Page 3 

the presiding judge 

to him by the voter 

Opinion No. WW-1323 

after being returned 

presents no ground for . . 

contest; such procedure being an irregularity, 

in the absence of fraud, that will not defeat 

the election." ephasis addedJ 

Turner v. Teller, 275 S.W. 115 (Civ.App., 1925) arose 

because an election judge endorsed the backs of ballots with 

his initials "F. A. W." instead of writing his entire name. 

At that time Art. 3011, R.S. of 1911 (later, Art. 3018, V.C.S., 

and now~ Art. 8.21, Election Code) contained the words: 

"The counting judges and clerks . . . 

shall count no ballots that do not bear 

his @esiding judge'g signature. , . .' 

The requirement for the presiding judge's signature was mandatory 

at that time, while Art. 8.21, Election Code, removes 

this strict requirement. Although the strict pena 9 ty for failure 

to have the presiding judge's signature has now been removed, 

the Turner v. Teller case is still good for the purpose of 

telling us why the Legislature required the election judge's 

signature in the first place, and the Courtstated at page 116: 

"This and similar requirements in our 

statutes were enacted in order to prevent 

fraud. . . . 

1) 

. . . 

"The specific purpose of the requirement in question is to make certain the 

identity of the ballot cast with that of 

the ballot handed to the voter at the time 

of voting. Identity may be said to be 

'of the essence' of the provision. . . . 

"Of course, the better practice is 

for election judges to indorse their full 

names upon the ballots, and they should 

not jeopardize the validity of those 

ballots and provoke election contests by 

doing less. Yet, when through indolence 

or by design, they adopt their initials 

only as their signatures, and indorse them 

on the ballots as their signatures, and 

the counting officials, looking upon them 

as such, 'familiarize themselves' therewith 

so as to enable them to identify the ballots 

passed out with those handed in, then the 
Honorable Don Cain, Page 4 Opinion No. WW-1323 

provision in question has been substantially complied with, the sole and 

full purpose and intention of the Legislature have been accomplished, and therefore ;qhe ballots should be counted as cast. 

. . . 

In Bass v. Lawrence, 300 S.W. 207 (Civ.App., Error Dismissed, 

1927), the question was raised about the election judge endorsing 

the ballots with his initials only. The court quoted from the 

Turner case, and stated at page 211: 

"Therefore, if the signature of the 

presiding judge was, as here appears, 

actually on the ballot at a time before 

the ballot was deposited by the voter in 

the voting box and it was an official 

ballot, the purposes and ends of the 

statute were accomplished. . . ." 

In State v. Fletcher, 52 S.W.2d 450 (Civ.App., 1932) the 

Court stated at page 453: 

"The failure of Will Blanchette, as 

judge of the election, to write his name 

on the back of the ballots before handing 

them to the voters, did not render such 

ballots illegal when it was shown that 

after the voters had marked their ballots 

and returned them to Will Blanchette as 

judge of the election, he wrote his name 

thereon before depositing them in the ballot 

box. . . ." ,&Emphasis addedJ 

In Arnold v. Anderson, 93 S.W. 692 (Civ.App., 1906) the 

question was raised as to whether the presiding election judge 

could authorize one of the other judges or clerks to sign the 

presiding judge's name. The presiding judge had signed his 

signature to 25 of the ballots, when he asked two other election 

officials to sign his name to the remainder of the ballots. 

Since the signature of the presiding judge was mandatory at that 

time, the trial court held that the ballots signed by persons 

other than the presiding judge were illegal ballots. The appellate 

court affirmed the trial court and stated at pages 696 and 697: 

11 

cakoi be 

The wisdom of these statutes 

doubted, for the theory that 

as civilization progresses beneficial 

conditions correspondingly improve, does 

not, in its relation to this subject, ob- 
, - 

Honorable Don Cain, Page 5 Opinion No. WW-1323 

tain; for the recent history of the country indicating frauds in elections detnonstrates that the more enlightenment possessed by the corrupt political boss, ward 

heeler, and striker, the more resourceful 

and successful he is in perpetrating fraud 

and defeating an honest count in elections. 

And evidently, as a check upon skilled 

methods of this class, the Legislature 

wisely enacted section 72. One of the 

methods of fraud perpetrated, which may 

be ascertained from reading the history 

of elections in recent years in many of 

our states, was what is known as 'stuffing' 

the ballot box--adding spurious votes. To 

correct or to prevent this evil, it is 

difficult to imagine a means that could be 

better adapted than that provided for in 

section 72. The presiding judge is required to write his personal signature on 

the ballot. . . . The ballot box might be 

'stuffed' with spurious tickets which 

might, in the absence of this check, mislead and deceive; but if this law was complied with, it would be a difficult matter 

to perpetrate fraud, because out of the 

number of witnesses provided by law who 

must have a knowledge of the signature of 

the presiding judge, it would be easy to 

detect whether the signature was genuine 

or forged. 

11 

. . . The language used indicates 

clearly that he must, in person, sign his 

and that any ballot which does not 

Es'his signature should not be counted. 

This duty being so imperative as demanded 

by the terms of the statute, in order that 

its purpose and effect might be accomplished 

--that is, making the personal signature of 

the presiding judge the final test of the 

verity and legality of the ballot, we do 

not believe that it was the intention of 

the law to permit him to delegate the 

authority to some one else to sign his 

name to the ballots. . . .' 

In McCharen v. Mead, 275 S.W. 117 (Civ.App., 1925) the 

Court held that ballots which bore the initials only of the 

presiding judge were valid ballots, and cited the Turner case 
- . 

Honorable Don Cain, Page 6 Opinion No. ,WW-1323 

as authority, There are other cases on the subject of the 

election judge's signature. 

(Civ.App. 1939). 

Bego v. Abrameit, 130 S.W.2d 912 

:&(1929). 

Miller v. Coffee, 118 Tex. 381, 15 S.W.2d 

Nesbitt v. Coburn, 143 S.W.2d 229 (Civ.App. 

As pointed out above, Art. 8.21, Election Code, no 

longer makes the presiding judge's signature mandatory in 

order for the ballot to be a valid ballot "in the absence of 

a showing of fraud." But the la$guage of the Turner case 

still makes sense when it says, the bet-practice 

is for elections judges to indorsi Ehiir full names upon the 

ballots, and they should not jeopardize the validity of those 

ballots and provoke election contests by doing less." This 

brings us to the question of the use of the rubber stamp 

facsimile signature. A rubber stamp signature can be impressed 

on the ballot by whoever is holding the rubber stamp in his 

hand. During the 12 hours that the polls are open, the presiding judge may leave his seat at least temporarily for a few 

minutes at various times. Who wields the rubber stamp while 

he is gone? The Arnold v. Anderson case holds that a written 

name is not the signature of the presiding judge unless written 

by such judge, himself. Of course, if the rubber stamp signature 

should be held to be the same as no signature at all, the ballots 

are still valid, "in the absence of a showing of fraud." We 

hold, therefore, that a rubber stamp facsimile signature of the 

presiding jud e at an election does not comply with the requirement of Art. 8 .ll, Election Code, which states that the ballots 

are to be signed with the signature of the presiding judge. In 

answer to your second question , we hold that although the better 

practice is for the election judge to sign his name in full, his 

initials will meet the requirements of the statute.. 

SUMMARY 

A rubber stamp facsimile signature 

of the presiding judge at an election 

does not comply with the requirements 

of Art. 8.11, Election Code, which states 

that such election judge shall affix his 

signature on the back side of all ballots. 

The better practice is for the 

election judge to sign his full name in 

affixing his signature to the back side 

of the ballots, but signing with his 
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Honorable Don Cain, Page 7 Opinion No. 

Initials only will meet the requirements 

of the statute. 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

WW-1323 

Attorney General of Texas 

Riley Eugene Fletcher 

Assistant 

REF/cm 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Marietta McGregor Payne 

Henry Braswell 

J. C. Davis 

F. C. Jack Goodman 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

By: Houghton Brownlee, Jr.