RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 22, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1204-MR

GLEN R. HALL, II APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE TERESA WHITAKER, SPECIAL JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CI-00601

MELINDA O. HALL, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

GLEN R. HALL; ESTATE OF GLEN 

R. HALL; ESTATE OF GLENNA M. 

WOODS; JEFFREY K. HILL, IN HIS 

CAPACITY AS THE PUBLIC 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 

OF GLENNA M. WOODS; AND 

TRISTAN J. HALL APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Glen R. Hall, II (“Appellant”) appeals from an 

order of the Whitley Circuit Court granting the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 
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(“CR”) 12.02 motion of Melinda O. Hall, et al. (“Appellees”) to dismiss 

Appellant’s action. Appellant also appeals from an order denying his motion to 

alter, amend, or vacate the order granting CR 12.02 relief. He argues that the 

circuit court erred in concluding that he lacked standing to challenge his 

grandmother’s will. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on 

appeal.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1992, Glenna Mae Woods (“Ms. Woods”) executed a will referred 

to in the record as “the old will.” This will devised her estate equally between her 

son, Glen Ray Hall (“Mr. Hall”), and her stepdaughter, Patsy Perkins. In 2019, 

Ms. Woods executed another will (“the new will”), which designated Mr. Hall as 

the sole beneficiary. 

Ms. Woods died about 10 days after the new will was executed in 

2019. Mr. Hall served as executor of his mother’s estate until his death, at which 

time a third party was appointed as public administrator. Mr. Hall’s wife, Melinda

Hall (“Ms. Hall”), was executrix of his estate.

1

In his Amended Notice of Appeal, Appellant appeals from both the order granting CR 12.02 

relief, and from the order denying his CR 59.05 motion to alter, vacate, or set aside the order of 

summary judgment. Orders denying CR 59.05 motions “are interlocutory, i.e., non-final and 

non-appealable and cannot be made so by including the finality recitations.” Tax Ease Lien

Investments 1, LLC v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App. 2011) (footnote omitted). 

Accordingly, we will address only the order granting Appellees’ CR 12.02 motion.
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Appellant is the son of Mr. Hall. On December 3, 2019, Appellant

filed the instant action in Whitley Circuit Court to contest the validity of the new 

will. He argued that Ms. Woods did not have the mental capacity to execute the 

new will and that she was under undue influence. He also asserted that Ms. Woods 

had executed a third will, referred to in the record as “the lost will,” which devised 

her estate to Appellant and his brother, Tristan Hall. Appellant alleged that his 

father destroyed the lost will prior to the death of Ms. Woods. Appellant, however,

was not able to produce either the original lost will, nor any copy thereof. He did 

produce affidavits in support of his claim.

After discovery was conducted, Ms. Hall filed a CR 12.02 motion to 

dismiss Appellant’s action. In support of the motion, she argued that the circuit 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that Appellant had no standing 

because he was not a beneficiary of either the old or new wills. On September 6, 

2022, the Whitley Circuit Court rendered an order granting the motion. The court 

found in relevant part that though it had jurisdiction over the proceeding, Appellant

lacked standing because he could not demonstrate that he would benefit even if the 

new will were found to be invalid. Appellant’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate 

was denied, and this appeal followed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A CR 12.02 motion to dismiss is a pure question of law; therefore, an 

appellate court reviews the issue de novo. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 

2010). 

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Appellant, through counsel, argues that the Whitley Circuit Court 

erred in granting Ms. Hall’s motion to dismiss. He first directs our attention to the 

difference between a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the type of case before it and 

a plaintiff’s standing to prosecute such an action. He asserts that since the Whitley 

Circuit Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate an action contesting a will, it 

necessarily follows that he must have standing to vindicate that right. The focus of 

his argument is that the circuit court improperly determined that he had no standing 

to prosecute his action against the Appellees, and that CR 12.02 relief in favor of 

Appellees was improper. 

The Whitley Circuit Court expressly determined that it had

jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate Appellant’s action challenging the validity of 

the new will. This conclusion is supported by the Kentucky Constitution and the 

statutory law, which grant the circuit courts general jurisdiction not vested in
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another court.2 While district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over probate 

proceedings, adversary proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. 

KRS 24A.120(2). The Whitley Circuit Court properly so ruled.

The question then becomes whether the circuit court correctly 

determined that Appellant lacked standing to maintain an action contesting the new 

will. After closely examining the record and the law, we find no error in the circuit 

court’s conclusion that Appellant lacked standing to challenge the new will. The 

circuit court properly applied the doctrine of testatorial absolutism to Appellant’s 

claim. This doctrine holds that a citizen of the Commonwealth may freely dispose 

of his or her estate assets via a valid will, and that such disposition “is zealously 

guarded by the courts and will not be disturbed based on remote or speculative

evidence.” Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted). 

Appellant’s claim is properly characterized as speculative per Bye. In 

order to have standing to challenge the validity of the new will, Appellant must

first demonstrate that he would be entitled to a distributive share if the new will 

were found not to be valid. See Rogers v. Leahy, 296 Ky. 44, 48, 176 S.W.2d 93, 

95 (1943) (citations omitted). Appellant cannot prove such entitlement because he 

cannot produce the lost will; the persons he claims executed the lost will and 

2

See KY. CONST. § 109; KY. CONST. § 112(5); Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 23A.010; 

and, Gordon v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Ky. 1994). 
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subsequently destroyed it are deceased; and, the old will does not designate him as 

a beneficiary. Thus, even if Appellant could demonstrate that Ms. Woods lacked 

the mental capacity to execute the new will or that she signed it under undue 

influence, he could not recover. “In order to confer standing, an injury cannot be 

speculative but instead must be direct and imminent.” Kentucky Unemployment

Insurance Commission v. Nichols, 635 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Ky. 2021) (footnote and 

citation omitted). Because Appellant cannot produce the lost will, he cannot prove 

that the new will directly and imminently injures him.

CONCLUSION

 Per Bye, supra, the circuit court zealously guarded the known, 

probated will of Ms. Woods, and properly refused to go beyond the facts of record 

and act on remote or speculative evidence. We find no error. For these reasons, 

we affirm the Whitley Circuit Court’s order granting CR 12.02 relief.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Larry E. Conley

Corbin, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MELINDA 

O. HALL:

Brittany N. Riley

London, Kentucky