This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 53

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN DOWNS,

Petitioner,

v.

BRYAN THOMPSON, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH 

COUNTY, and UTAH COUNTY,

Respondents.

No. 20180696

Filed August 27, 2019

On Certification from the

United States District Court for the District of Utah

The Honorable Dale A. Kimball

Case No. 2:17-cv-00330

Attorneys:

J. Brady Brammer, Pleasant Grove, Steven C. Earl, Orem, for

petitioner

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr., Jackie Bosshardt, Ryan R. Beckstrom, Salt 

Lake City, for respondents

JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE PEARCE, and 

JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The United States District Court for the District of Utah 

certified three questions to be answered by this court: (1) “Does a 

Utah [state] district court have jurisdiction to review the Utah 

County Board of Commissioners’ decision upholding a fine levied 

pursuant to Utah Code Section 20A-11-1205?”; (2) “Does the term 

‘ballot proposition’ as used in Utah Code Section 20A-11-1205(1) 

include a referendum during the period of time before its sponsors 

have obtained the requisite number of signatures on the referendum 
DOWNS v. THOMPSON

Opinion of the Court

2

petition?”; and (3) “Does the term ‘ballot proposition’ as used in 

Utah Code Section 20A-11-1205(1) include a referendum during the 

signature gathering phase if the challenged local government action 

is later found to be administrative in nature and therefore not subject 

to a referendum?”

¶2 With respect to question one, we answer that a Utah state 

district court does not have appellate jurisdiction to review the Utah 

County Board of Commissioners’ decision upholding a fine levied 

under Utah Code section 20A-11-1205. In doing so, we are obligated 

to clarify the difference between a district court’s original jurisdiction 

and its appellate jurisdiction—specifically the source and 

authorization of these powers. And we are also obligated to note that 

the certified question does not implicate, and therefore we do not 

opine on, whether the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ review 

process is constitutional, a query about which we harbor some 

serious reservations.

¶3 We answer the second question by defining a “ballot 

proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1)(b) to 

encompass the entirety of the referendum process, including the 

period of time before sponsors have obtained the requisite number 

of signatures on the referendum petition.

¶4 Lastly, in response to the third question, we answer that a 

“ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1)(b)

encompasses the entirety of the referendum process—including the 

signature gathering phase—even if the challenged local government 

action is later found to be administrative in nature and therefore 

ultimately not subject to a referendum. 

BACKGROUND

¶5 In April 2016, Orem City passed Resolution No. 

R-2016-0012, which authorized the mayor of Orem to sign a lease 

agreement and an interlocal cooperation agreement in connection 

with the implementation of the Utah Transit Authority’s Bus Rapid 

Transit (BRT) program.1 In response, several citizens filed a petition 

for referendum against the resolution. The citizens circulated

referendum packets and collected the necessary signatures for a 

referendum before submitting their petition to the City Recorder.

The City Recorder rejected the referendum petition because the City 

Recorder believed Resolution No. R-2016-0012 concerned an 

_____________________________________________________________

1 Orem had already approved the BRT program through 

resolutions passed in 2008 and 2015.
Cite as: 2019 UT 53

Opinion of the Court

3

administrative action and was therefore not subject to a referendum. 

The City Recorder’s decision was upheld by the Fourth District 

Court. As a result, the referendum vote sought through the petition 

was never put on the ballot.

¶6 Steven Downs, in his role as the Public Information Officer

for Orem, circulated an email—using his work email account—

announcing a public meeting to discuss the BRT program with the 

entities charged with its implementation. This email was sent after 

the petition had been submitted but before all necessary signatures 

had been gathered. The email contained only information from 

opponents of the BRT referendum, invited recipients to attend a 

meeting held by opponents of the referendum, distributed a link to 

an anti-petition website, and did not contain any information 

summarizing arguments in favor of the BRT project. In response,

Bryan Thompson, the Utah County Clerk, fined Downs $250 for 

violating the Political Activities of Public Entities Act—specifically, 

Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1)(b), which stated that “a person 

may not send an email using the email of a public entity . . . to 

advocate for or against a ballot proposition.”2

¶7 Downs demanded a review of the fine before an impartial 

tribunal. In response, Utah County passed chapter 31 of the Utah 

County Code, which delegates the review of any civil fine issued 

under the Political Activities of Public Entities Act to the County 

Commission, and purports to make any decision by the Board of 

Commissioners appealable to the Fourth District Court in Utah 

County. After the Board of Commissioners voted to uphold the fine,

Downs filed a petition in the Fourth District Court challenging the 

ruling on several grounds. Respondents removed the case to federal 

court. The federal court found that Downs had standing to bring his 

claim in federal court but reserved ruling on a number of motions 

until receiving guidance on the three questions certified to this court.

¶8 We have original jurisdiction to answer these questions of 

state law under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(1).

_____________________________________________________________

2 While this case has been pending, Utah Code section 20A-11-

1205(1)(b) has been amended to state that “a person may not send an 

email using the email of a public entity . . . to advocate for or against 

a proposed initiative, initiative, proposed referendum, or 

referendum.” Throughout this opinion we refer to section 20A-11-

1205(1)(b) and any other sections of the Utah Code as they existed at 

the time Downs was fined.
DOWNS v. THOMPSON

Opinion of the Court

4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 “A certified question from the federal district court does not 

present us with a decision to affirm or reverse a lower court’s 

decision; as such, traditional standards of review do not apply.” U.S. 

Fid. & Guarantee Co. v. U.S. Sports Specialty Ass’n, 2012 UT 3, ¶ 9, 270 

P.3d 464 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Accordingly, we merely answer the question presented, leaving 

resolution of the parties’ competing claims and arguments . . . up to 

the federal courts, which of course retain jurisdiction to decide [the]

case.” Garfield Cty. v. United States, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 6, 424 P.3d 46 

(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. UTAH CODE SECTION 20A-11-1205 DOES NOT CONVEY

APPELLATE JURISDICTION ON STATE DISTRICT COURTS

¶10 The first question certified to this court is narrow in scope: 

“Does a Utah [state] district court have jurisdiction to review the 

Utah County Board of Commissioners’ decision upholding a fine 

levied pursuant to Utah Code Section 20A-11-1205?” Or in other 

words, does a state district court have jurisdiction to conduct an 

appellate review of the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ 

decision to uphold a fine levied by a county clerk? It does not. But

we make clear that this statement of law does not implicate or 

abridge the wide scope and authorization the district courts

maintain under their grant of original jurisdiction.

¶11 We have stated that “[i]t is the essential criterion of 

appellate jurisdiction[] that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a 

cause already instituted[] and does not create that cause.” State v. Johnson, 

114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1941) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Boyer v. Larson, 

433 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1967). In this case, the “proceeding [] in a cause 

already instituted” is the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ 

decision to uphold Downs’s fine. Id.

¶12 In Utah, jurisdiction to decide a case “derives from the Utah 

Constitution, state statute, or a combination of the two.” Carter v. 

State, 2015 UT 38, ¶ 19, 345 P.3d 737. And the Utah Constitution 

makes clear that “[t]he district court shall have appellate jurisdiction 

as provided by statute.” UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (emphasis added). 

¶13 Chapter 31 of the Utah County Code provides that an 

appeal of the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ decision can be 

taken in a state district court. UTAH COUNTY CODE § 31-1-5. But 
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Opinion of the Court

5

section 31-1-5 is a county ordinance; a county ordinance is not a state

statute. Therefore, the Utah County Code cannot convey appellate 

jurisdiction to the district court or regulate procedures for an appeal.

Section 31-1-5 pretends to powers the county does not have. Put 

succinctly, counties do not have the authority to grant appellate 

jurisdiction to state district courts.3

¶14 This statement of law is necessarily narrow and pertains 

only to grants of appellate jurisdiction by statute. The district court 

retains original jurisdiction “in all matters civil and criminal, not 

excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.” UTAH 

CODE § 78A-5-102(1). Additionally, Utah Code section 78B-6-401(1)

affirmatively provides that “[e]ach district court has the power to 

issue declaratory judgments determining rights, status, and other 

legal relations within its respective jurisdiction.” We acknowledge 

that these broad jurisdictional grants beg an answer to the question 

as to whether the county ordinance is constitutional. Because we are 

not asked to resolve this question, we decline to comment on the 

matter. We are simply asked whether state district courts have 

jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah County Board of 

Commissioners. It is sufficient to say that a county lacks the ability to 

_____________________________________________________________

3 There is also no statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction located 

in the Utah Code that would vest district courts with appellate 

jurisdiction over fines imposed under this county ordinance. Utah 

Code section 78A-5-102 articulates multiple grants of appellate 

jurisdiction to the district court. The only potentially relevant 

section, section 7, states that the “district court has jurisdiction to 

review . . . municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with 

Section 10-3-703.7.” UTAH CODE § 78A-5-102(7)(b). Utah Code section 

10-3-703.7, in turn, cabins this review by referring exclusively to

proceedings established by a “municipality.” Id. § 10-3-703.7(1). For 

the purposes of this section, a municipality is defined as “(a) a city of 

the first class, city of the second class, city of the third class, city of 

the fourth class, city of the fifth class; (b) a town . . .; or (c) a metro 

township. . . .” Id. § 10-1-104(5)(a)–(c). Notably, there is no mention 

of a county. Additionally, article XI section 1 of the Utah 

Constitution recognizes counties of the State of Utah “as legal 

subdivisions of this State.” This makes clear that the term “county” is 

a legally distinct term whose meaning is not to be merged with that 

of cities or townships. There is therefore no grant of appellate 

jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-5-102 that would permit a 

district court to conduct an appellate review of a county 

commission’s decision. 
DOWNS v. THOMPSON

Opinion of the Court

6

create appellate jurisdiction via a county ordinance. We say nothing 

as relates to the district court’s original jurisdiction. 

II. THE TERM “BALLOT PROPOSITION” AS USED IN UTAH 

CODE SECTION 20A-11-1205(1) INCLUDES THE ENTIRE 

REFERENDUM PROCESS

¶15 The next question certified to us by the federal district court 

involves reading several statutory provisions in conjunction with 

each other: “Does the term ‘ballot proposition’ as used in Utah Code 

Section 20A-11-1205(1) include a referendum during the period of 

time before its sponsors have obtained the requisite number of 

signatures on the referendum petition?” We answer that it does. 

¶16 Downs was fined for violating Utah Code section 

20A-11-1205(1)(b), which prohibits a person from sending “an email 

using the email of a public entity . . . to advocate for or against a 

ballot proposition.” Although section 1205 does not define “ballot 

proposition,” the term is defined in both Utah Code section 

20A-1-102(5) of the Election Code and Utah Code section 

20A-11-1202(2) of the Political Activities of Public Entities Act—the 

act Downs is alleged to have violated.

¶17 Our primary task when interpreting these provisions is to 

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box 

Elder Cty., 2011 UT 18, ¶ 18, 251 P.3d 804. We “presume that the 

legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according 

to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 

20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Additionally, “[w]herever possible, we give effect to every 

word of a statute, avoiding [a]ny interpretation which renders parts 

or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous.” Turner v. Staker & 

Parson Cos., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (second alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. 

Arave, 2011 UT 84, ¶ 28, 268 P.3d 163).

¶18 It is admittedly difficult to interpret the language in 

section 20A-11-1202(2). Specifically, when section 20A-11-1202(2) 

defines “ballot proposition” as “constitutional amendments, 

initiatives, referenda, judicial retention questions, opinion questions, 

bond approvals, or other questions submitted to the voters for their 

approval or rejection,” does the phrase “submitted to the voters for 

their approval or rejection” apply only to “other questions” or to 

every term in the preceding list? This is a familiar problem. The two 

most relevant canons of statutory interpretation, the last-antecedent 

canon and the series-qualifier canon, often compete with each other. 

But context guides which canons we apply. 
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Opinion of the Court

7

¶19 The rule of the last antecedent is a canon of statutory 

interpretation stating that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should 

ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it 

immediately follows.” Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962

(2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In Lockhart, the United States Supreme Court 

analyzed 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), which prescribes a mandatory 

sentencing range for persons with a prior conviction “relating to 

aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct 

involving a minor or ward.” Relying on the last-antecedent canon, 

the Court held that “‘involving a minor or ward’ modifies only 

‘abusive sexual conduct,’ the antecedent immediately preceding it.” 

Id. at 962. In this case, an application of the last-antecedent canon to 

section 20A-11-1202(2) would mean that “submitted to the voters” 

would apply only to “other questions.”

¶20 The series-qualifier canon, on the other hand, provides that, 

“[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that 

involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive 

modifier normally applies to the entire series.” ANTONIN SCALIA &

BRYAN A. GARNER, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147

(2012). The classic example involves the text of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The relevant text 

reads “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Applying the series-qualifier canon, we and others read this text as 

barring both unreasonable searches and unreasonable seizures. In 

other words, both nouns in the series are qualified by the preceding 

adjective “unreasonable.” This canon can also be applied when, as 

with Utah Code section 20A-11-1202(2), the modifier is positioned 

after what it modifies. To apply this canon to section 20A-11-1202(2) 

would mean that “submitted to the voters” modifies the entire list of 

preceding terms, not just “other questions.”

¶21 We have applied this canon before and said that 

“[q]ualifying words and phrases are generally regarded as applying 

to the immediately preceding words, rather than to more remote 

ones.” LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d 135 (alteration 

in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

This is of course not an iron-clad rule as we have also said “the rule 

of the last antecedent does not mandate that qualifying rules and 

phrases only apply to the immediately preceding words; rather[,]

when given a choice between the immediately preceding words and 

more remote words, we prefer the words closer in proximity.” Id. 

Such a choice is given us here and context makes clear that 
DOWNS v. THOMPSON

Opinion of the Court

8

application of the last-antecedent canon yields the better reading of 

the statute. 

¶22 Reading section 20A-11-1202(2) in context necessitates that 

we apply the last-antecedent canon. We read the phrase “or other 

questions submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection” in 

Utah Code section 20A-11-1202(2) as a catchall addition to the 

statute’s text, meant by the legislature to include any other type of 

question, not necessarily included by name in the preceding list, 

submitted to voters. “[O]ther questions submitted to the voters” 

merely reflects the legislature’s desire to include any categories of 

questions submitted to the voters that were not explicitly included in 

the list in section 1202(2). This reading—an application of the 

last-antecedent canon—gives meaning to the entire text, as every

term in the preceding list—constitutional amendments, initiatives, 

referenda, judicial retention questions, opinion questions, bond 

approvals—is already something that ends up submitted to the 

voters. In other words, “submitted to the voters” would be entirely 

superfluous as applied to all the preceding terms in the list because 

all of those things are already submitted to the voters. Therefore, in 

context, the better reading of the statute is reached through the use 

of the last-antecedent canon.

¶23 Having determined that the term we must interpret is 

“referenda”—as opposed to “referenda submitted to the voters”—it 

seems obvious to us that a referendum encompasses the totality of 

the referendum process. The Election Code defines a referendum as 

“a process by which a law passed by the Legislature or by a local 

legislative body is submitted or referred to the voters for their 

approval or rejection.” UTAH CODE § 20A-7-101(18) (emphasis 

added)4; see also Referendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 

(“The process of referring a state legislative act, a state constitutional 

amendment, or an important public issue to the people for final 

approval by popular vote.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, to speak 

of a referendum is to speak of the entire ordered process by which 

citizens submit questions to voters—a process initiated by the filing 

of an application with the local clerk. See Tobias v. S. Jordan City 

Recorder, 972 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1998) (“Sponsors who wish to 

circulate a referenda petition start the process by filing an 

application with the ‘local clerk’ . . . .”). Indeed, a close reading of 

Utah Code section 20A-7-609(2)(a) confirms that the legislature has 

_____________________________________________________________

4 Utah Code section 20A-7-101(18) has since been renumbered as 

section 20A-7-101(20). The text of the two provisions is identical.
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Opinion of the Court

9

also understood referenda to be a process: “[T]he county clerk shall 

ensure that county referenda that have qualified for the ballot appear 

on the next regular general election ballot.” UTAH CODE

§ 20A-7-609(2)(a). This statutory language marks a clear delineation 

between referenda that have qualified for a ballot and referenda that 

have not—but both are still referenda.5 A referendum is the total 

process, not just the question that is ultimately submitted to a 

democratic vote. Therefore, the term “ballot proposition” as used in 

Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1) includes all phases of the 

referendum process, including the signature gathering phase.

III. A “BALLOT PROPOSITION” AS USED IN UTAH CODE 

SECTION 20A-11-1205(1) INCLUDES THE ENTIRETY OF THE 

REFERENDUM PROCESS EVEN IF THE CHALLENGED LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT ACTION IS LATER FOUND TO BE 

ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE AND THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT 

TO A REFERENDUM

¶24 The last question certified by the federal district court asks 

us whether “the term ‘ballot proposition’ as used in Utah Code

Section 20A-11-1205(1) includes a referendum during the signature 

gathering phase if the challenged local government action is later 

found to be administrative in nature and therefore not subject to a 

referendum.” Because we define a referendum as the entire 

referendum process, it logically follows that an attempted 

referendum process that is later found to pertain to an 

administrative action—and is therefore not properly subject to a 

referendum—is still a referendum and therefore a “ballot 

proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1). 

_____________________________________________________________

5 Although we have never explicitly said this with regard to 

referenda, we have articulated this total process based definition in 

regards to initiative processes: 

The voters’ right to initiative does not commence at the 

ballot box: The voters’ right to legislate via initiative 

includes signing a petition to get the proposed initiative 

on the ballot. Signing a petition is inextricably 

connected to the voters’ right to vote on an initiative 

because it serves a gatekeeping function to the right to 

vote. Accordingly, [t]he use of . . . petitions . . . to obtain 

a place on the [state’s] ballot is an integral part of [its]

elective system. 

Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 26, 54 P.3d 1069 (alterations in 

original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DOWNS v. THOMPSON

Opinion of the Court

10

¶25 “Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution vests 

‘Legislative power’ in ‘the people of the State of Utah’ and provides 

for its exercise through ballot initiatives and referenda.” Carter v. Lehi 

City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 17, 269 P.3d 141 (quoting UTAH CONST. art VI, § 1). 

However, the legislative power may not trammel the executive 

power and there are limits to the people’s power of initiative and 

referenda. Id. An initiative or referendum is only permissible if it is 

legislative in nature and is conversely forbidden if it is 

administrative. See, e.g., Baker v. Carlson, 2018 UT 59, 437 P.3d 333. 

“This legislative/administrative distinction is a reflection of our 

constitution’s explicit and strict separation of powers, which is set 

forth in article V.” Carter, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 17.

¶26 Under Utah Code section 20A-7-602(1), “[p]ersons wishing 

to circulate a referendum petition shall file an application with the 

local clerk.”6 The petition shall include “at least five sponsors” and 

explain what law or laws are challenged by the referendum petition. 

Id. Utah Code section 20A-7-604(2) mandates the duties of the local 

clerk: “Within five days after the day on which a local clerk receives 

an application that complies with the requirements of Section 

20A-7-602, the local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors (a) five copies 

of the referendum petition; and (b) five signature sheets.”7 At this 

stage in the referendum process, the local clerk has no discretion to 

refuse to supply citizens with the packets for a referendum petition 

or to make an authoritative determination as to whether the petition 

may ultimately reach the ballot.8

_____________________________________________________________

6 Utah Code section 20A-7-602(1) has since been amended to 

state: “An eligible voter wishing to circulate a referendum petition 

shall file an application with the local clerk.”

7 Utah Code section 20A-7-604(2) has since been amended to 

read: “Within five days after the day on which a county, city, town, 

metro township, or court determines, in accordance with 

Section 20A-7-602.7, that a proposed referendum is legally referable 

to voters, the local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors a copy of the 

referendum petition and a signature sheet.”

8 Upon receipt of the citizens’ application in this case, the Orem 

City Attorney advised them that the 2016 Resolution was an 

administrative act and would therefore not be referable. But, as 

required by law, the local clerk furnished the citizens with 

referendum packets and the process continued. 
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Opinion of the Court

11

¶27 The local clerk’s discretion to reject a referendum petition 

does not vest until the requisite number of signatures has been 

gathered and the completed application is submitted for approval. 

As we said in Taylor v. South. Jordan City Recorder, “Any 

determination [by the local clerk] of whether the subject matter is 

appropriate for the initiative process is proper only after the petition 

has been issued, completed, and returned.” 972 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 

1998). In this case, Orem rejected the citizens’ completed petition 

because, in its estimation, the 2016 Resolution concerned an 

administrative action and was therefore not referable. But any 

decision made by the local clerk on the administrative/legislative 

nature of the subject of a referendum is subject to review by the 

courts. See, e.g., Baker, 2018 UT 59, ¶ 7 (citizens seeking judicial 

review of local clerk’s determination that city’s action was 

administrative in nature and therefore not referable).9

¶28 We take the time to recount all the steps in the referendum 

process because it is important to our answer to the certified 

question. As we have just detailed, the entire referendum process is 

part and parcel to the definition of “referendum.” Indeed, a 

referendum cannot exist in the absence of the many necessary steps 

taken along the way. The fact that a referendum ultimately turns out 

to be a doomed referendum does not alter its fundamental character

throughout the process. We see no prudence in creating a twilight 

zone in which an action taken by citizens, in full compliance with the 

statutory guidelines for referenda, is not considered a referendum 

until later definitively proven to be legislative in nature. The 

opposite is the case. A referendum may be destined to ultimately fail 

because it pertains to an administrative action, but it nonetheless 

remains a referendum at every stage along the way and, therefore, a 

referendum in the signature gathering phase is a “ballot 

proposition” under Utah Code section 20A-2-1205(1).

CONCLUSION

¶29 We state as matters of law in answer to the federal district 

court’s certified questions that: (1) without saying anything about 

Utah state district courts’ original jurisdiction, Utah state district 

courts do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the 

Utah County Board of Commissioners upholding a fine levied under 

_____________________________________________________________

9 In this case, no judicial determination has been made as to 

whether Resolution 2016-0012 is administrative or legislative in 

nature.
DOWNS v. THOMPSON

Opinion of the Court

12

Utah Code section 20A-11-1205; (2) the term “ballot proposition” as 

used in Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1) includes the entire

referendum process and therefore encompasses the period of time 

before a referendum’s sponsors have obtained the requisite number 

of signatures on the referendum petition; and (3) the term “ballot 

proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A-11-1205(1) includes

the signature gathering phase of the referendum process, regardless 

of whether the challenged local government action is later found to 

be administrative in nature and therefore not subject to a 

referendum.