J-A29022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

LORI A. SCHMITT

v.

ROBERT T. SCHMITT (DECEASED) 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 424 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered March 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Domestic Relations at 

No(s): F.C. No. 16-90773-D

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: April 25, 2024

Carol A. Schmitt (Appellant), on behalf of her deceased son, Robert T. 

Schmitt (Decedent), appeals the order dismissing Decedent’s complaint in 

divorce against his wife, Lori A. Schmitt (Appellee). Appellant claims the trial 

court erred when it granted Appellee’s petition to abate the divorce action, 

pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375 (“Abatement of action for failure to take out 

letters”). After careful review, we affirm.

In a thorough opinion, the Honorable William C. Robinson, Jr. of the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas set forth the following history of this 

case:

Robert T. [Schmitt] (“Husband”) [(Decedent)] commenced 

a divorce action against Lori A. [Schmitt] (“Wife”) [Appellee] 

on February 23, 2018. Appellee filed an answer and 

counterclaims against Decedent on March 8, 2018. A 

economic claim raised by the pleadings included equitable 

division of marital property. Decedent died on May 31, 

2020. A decree in divorce was not entered at the time 
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Decedent passed away. On August 13, 2020, Decedent’s 

mother, Carol A. [Schmitt] (“Plaintiff’s Mother”) 

[(Appellant)], filed a Notice of Death with the Butler County 

Prothonotary.

Soon after Decedent’s death, Appellee filed a motion for 

special relief, docketed June 22, 2020, asserting the divorce 

action abated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1) due to 

Husband’s death. A reply was filed on behalf of the 

Decedent, despite there being no proper party substitution. 

An estate administration was not open, such as by a 

fiduciary named in Decedent’s will, if one existed, or by the 

appointment of an administrator duly qualified by statute.

Also on August 13, 2020, oral argument was held on 

Appellee’s motion seeking abatement of the divorce action 

and on Decedent’s reply opposing abatement. By order of 

court issued October 15, 2020, the trial court denied 

Appellee’s request to abate the divorce action and the 

ancillary economic issue of equitable distribution. Wife filed 

a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On 

January 14, 2021, the appeal was quashed sua sponte on 

the basis that the trial court’s order was not a final order or 

otherwise appealable, as of right. A fiduciary or other 

appropriate third-party had yet to be appointed to substitute 

as a party on behalf of Decedent in the divorce action.

[On May 2, 2022 with the certificate of death finally in hand, 

Appellant presented a petition for Letters of Administration 

to the Orphans’ Court Division in the Allegheny County Court 

of Common Pleas [...]. However, she was informed Appellee 

lodged a caveat, requesting notice in the event Letters 

Testamentary or Letters of Administration were to be issued 

to open an estate administration for Decedent. Appellant 

subsequently filed a petition for citation to show cause why 

letters of administration should not be granted to her. The 

posture of this litigation is unknown.]

On May 31, 2022, approximately 14 months after remand 

by the Superior Court, counsel for Appellee filed a motion to 

dismiss the complaint in divorce. Appellant, while not a 

properly substituted party in the divorce action, filed an 

answer and later, an amended answer to Appellee’s motion. 

In an effort to bring finality to the divorce action commenced 

in 2018, and in view of Decedent’s intervening passing on 
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May 31, 2020, Appellee filed a petition to abate the divorce 

action pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375 on June 21, 2022.

An evidentiary hearing was held on September 26, 2022. 

Appellant in her own right and not as a fiduciary for 

Decedent’s estate, and James R. Jobe, the funeral director 

handling the arrangements for Decedent’s family, both

testified remotely. Appellee testified in-person. Briefs in 

lieu of oral argument were filed post-hearing on behalf of 

Decedent and Appellee.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/13/2023, at 1-3 (style adjusted) (paragraph 

reordered).

On March 13, 2023, the trial court granted Appellee’s abatement petition

and dismissed the divorce action with prejudice. Appellant timely filed this 

appeal. She presents two issues for our review:

1. Did [Appellee] waive grounds for abatement by 

waiting to file her “Petition to Abate Divorce Action 

Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375” [...] ?

2. Did [Appellant] reasonably explain the delay in taking 

out Letters of Administration [...]?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.1

A brief explanation of abatement vis-à-vis the Divorce Code is helpful to 

address Appellant’s claims. Traditionally, Pennsylvania courts have long held 

that an action in divorce abates upon the death of either party. See, e.g., 

Berry v. Berry, 197 A.3d 788, 802-03 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Estate of 

____________________________________________

1 We remind counsel that “the statement of the questions involved must state 

concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances 

of the case but without unnecessary detail.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis 

added).
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Pinkerton v. Pinkerton, 646 A.2d 1184 (Pa. 1994)). “The primary purpose 

of divorce is to change the relation of the parties; and, when the death of a 

party occurs, that purpose can no longer be achieved because the marital 

relationship has been ended by death.” Berry, 197 A.3d at 803 (citing

Drumheller v. Marcello, 532 A.2d 807, 808 (Pa. 1987)). “However, this 

created the possibility that although spouses may be in the process of dividing 

their marital estate, a surviving spouse could receive an unintended windfall 

(to the detriment of the deceased spouse’s estate and natural objects of his 

or her bounty) not only laying claim to all marital property but also exercising 

the right to the elective share of one-third of decedent’s non-marital 

property.” In re Estate of Easterday, 209 A.3d 331, 339 n.8 (Pa. 2019) 

(citations omitted). 

The Divorce Code was amended in 2005 to provide an exception to this 

common law rule. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1) (“Death of a party.”).2 Under 

this amendment, a divorce action will not abate upon the death of a party, if

the grounds for divorce have been established prior to the death, as provided 

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2 Section 3323(d.1) provides :

In the event one party dies during the course of divorce 

proceedings, no decree of divorce has been entered and 

grounds have been established as provided in subsection 

(g), the parties' economic rights and obligations arising 

under the marriage shall be determined under this part 

rather than under 20 Pa.C.S. (relating to decedents, estates 

and fiduciaries).

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1).
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in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(g) (“Grounds established.”).3 Id. If the grounds

enumerated in Section 3323(g) have been met, then the parties’ economic 

rights and obligations will be determined under the Divorce Code rather than 

the elective share provision of the Probate Code. § 3323(d.1); see also 

Berry, 197 A.3d at 803).

Initially, Appellee sought to abate the divorce action under the Section 

3323(d.1) by filing a motion for special relief. However, the trial court 

determined that abatement was improper because grounds for the divorce

were established, prior to Decedent’s death, under Section 3323(g). Appellee 

____________________________________________

3 Section 3323(g) provides: 

For purposes of subsections [(d.1.)(“Death of a party”)], 

grounds are established as follows: 

(1) In the case of an action for divorce under section 

3301(a) or (b) (relating to grounds for divorce), the court 

adopts a report of the master or makes its own findings 

that grounds for divorce exist.

(2) In the case of an action for divorce under section 

3301(c), both parties have filed affidavits of consent or, 

if the presumption in section 3301(c)(2) is established, 

one party has filed an affidavit of consent.

(3) In the case of an action for divorce under section 

3301(d), an affidavit has been filed and no counteraffidavit has been filed or, if a counter-affidavit has been 

filed denying the affidavit's averments, the court 

determines that the marriage is irretrievably broken and 

the parties have lived separate and apart for at least one 

year at the time of the filing of the affidavit.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(g).
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appealed, and this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory. After our 

remittal, Appellee and the Decedent’s estate were poised to litigate the parties’ 

economic rights and obligations under the Divorce Code. However, a personal 

representative needed to step in for the decedent’s estate. See Salvadia v. 

Ashbrook, 932 A2d 436, 440 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“all actions that survive a 

decedent must be brought by or against the personal representative” and “a 

decedent’s estate cannot be party to litigation unless a personal 

representative exists.”) (citation omitted); see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3371-

3377 (“Abatement, Survival and Control of Action”); and see Pa.R.C.P. 2351-

2374 (“Substitution of Parties”). 

Over the next 14 months, no one took any action to advance the parties’ 

claims under the Divorce Code. Significantly, there was no proper substitution 

of a personal representative for Decedent’s estate as the plaintiff in the divorce 

action. Finally, in May 2022, Appellee again sought abatement, this time 

under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, specifically 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3375 (“Abatement of action for failure to take out letters”). Section 3375 

provides for abatement in any action involving a deceased plaintiff:

If a plaintiff or petitioner in any action or proceeding now 

pending or hereafter brought dies and a personal 

representative is not appointed within one year after a 

suggestion of such death is filed in the action or proceeding, 

any defendant or respondent may petition the court to abate 

the action as to the cause of action of the decedent. Copies 

of the petition shall be served upon the executor named in 

the will, if known to the defendant, and otherwise upon all 

known next of kin entitled to letters of administration. The 

court shall abate the action as to the cause of action of the 
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decedent if the delay in taking out letters is not reasonably

explained.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375 (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the statute, Appellee provided proper notice of the 

abatement petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

determined that the requisite amount of time had elapsed to enable Appellee 

to petition for abatement under Section 3375. The trial court then determined 

that Appellant’s delay in taking out letters was not reasonably explained. As 

such, the trial court granted Appellee’s abatement petition and dismissed the 

divorce action with prejudice.

On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court misapplied Section 3375. 

Specifically, Appellant claims Appellee waived her ability to bring the 

abatement petition because she waited so long to file. Alternatively, Appellant 

claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that her 

delay was unreasonable.

We begin with Appellant’s first issue concerning waiver, which implicates 

the interpretation of Section 3375 and turns on a question of law. The 

following precepts guide our review. Issues involving statutory interpretation 

present questions of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary. Salvadia, 923 A.2d at 439 (citing Kopko v. 

Miller, 892 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2006)). 

Both Appellant and Appellee rely on our decision in Salvadia. There, 

the plaintiffs were parents who filed an action for medical malpractice on 
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behalf of their child against the child’s pediatrician group. While the action 

was pending, the child died. In April 2003, the plaintiffs’ attorney filed a notice 

of death, but the attorney did not take out letters of administration at that 

time. Over a year later, in July 2004, the defendants filed a petition for 

abatement under Section 3375. In August 2004, almost a year and four 

months from the filing of the notice of death, plaintiffs requested and were 

granted letters of administration. The court ultimately granted the 

defendants’ abatement petition. Id., 923 A.2d at 441.

On appeal, the plaintiffs in Salvadia argued that the defendants waived 

their grounds for abatement, because they actively litigated the malpractice 

case after the notice of death was filed. Id. at 442. The plaintiffs relied on a 

similar malpractice case from the Washington County Court of Common Pleas

for the proposition that grounds for abatement can be waived if the defendant 

“tak[es] any step towards the determination of the cause on its merits, such 

as participating in arbitration, appearing generally, participating in the trial, 

or permitting the entry of judgment without objection...” See id.; see also 

Berdine v. Washington Hospital, 17 Pa. D. & C. 3d 26, at *29-30

(Washinton Cty. 1980)(citing 1 P.L.E., Abatement and Revival § 10). 

In Salvadia, we distinguished Berdine, notwithstanding its limited 

value as a common pleas decision. First, we clarified that waiver was not the 

primary basis for the holding in Berdine. Abatement failed in Berdine, 

because the abatement petition was filed after the estate was substituted as 

a party plaintiff. In Salvadia, by contrast, the petition for abatement was 
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properly filed before the parents took out letters of administration. Salvadia, 

923 A.2d at 443. Even if a defendant could waive abatement under Berdine, 

we concluded that abatement in Salvadia was still proper. Id. If waiver 

occurs when a defendant takes “steps toward the determination of the cause 

on its merits,” we reasoned that the defendants did not take steps toward 

determining the medical malpractice action; rather, they merely engaged in a 

single act of discovery – specifically, the filing of a certificate prerequisite to 

filing a subpoena. Id. Under these facts, we found that the defendants did 

not waive abatement. Id.

Returning to the instant case, Appellant argues that Appellee waived 

grounds for abatement of the divorce case, not because she took active “steps

toward determination of the cause on its merits,” but because she took no 

steps for too long. Instead of filing for abatement immediately after one year 

passed, per Section 3375, Appellee waited nearly two calendar years. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. 

We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. First, Appellee took no 

steps in the divorce litigation after Decedent’s death, other than seeking 

abatement under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 3323(d.1) and filing the previous appeal. In 

that sense, Appellee did even less than the defendants in Salvadia, who 

participated in a single act of discovery prior to filing their abatement petition. 

Second, as we noted in Salvadia, the use of the word “may” in Section 3375

(“may petition the court to abate the action”) means that Appellant had the 
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option to decide whether to file an abatement petition. Salvadia, 923 A.2d 

at 440.

For a time, it seems that neither Appellee, nor Appellant was aware of 

her rights and responsibilities. Appellee could have filed for abatement 

sooner, but instead she waited. She waited even as Appellant attempted to 

obtain a substitution of personal representative.

4

 Appellee waited to file an 

abatement petition, even though she filed a caveat with the Allegheny County 

Register of Wills. Appellant would have us hold that Appellee’s failure to file 

for abatement at the first possible moment of eligibility constitutes waiver. 

However, to rule this way would be to rewrite the statute’s unambiguous plain 

language. See id. at 444. We will not replace the word “may” with the word

“shall,” to make something that is permissive under the statute, mandatory. 

See id. at 440-41.

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4 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2355(a) provides: “If a named party 

dies after the commencement of an action, the attorney of record for the 

deceased shall file a notice of death with the prothonotary. The procedure to 

substitute the personal representative of the deceased party shall be in 

accordance with Rule 2352. 

Rule 2352 provides: “The successor may become a party to a pending action 

by filing of record a statement of the material facts on which the right to 

substitution is based.” Pa.R.C.P. 2352(a).

On April 20, 2022, in attempting to comply with these rules, Appellant filed a 

handwritten pleading, titled “Notice of Death, Substitute of Personal 

Representative.” The pleading was stricken, without prejudice, for failure to 

set forth material facts on which the right to substitution is based. See Order 

of Court, 4/25/22.
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We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that Appellee 

“blocked” her from taking out letters. Appellant maintains that she attempted

to take out letters of administration prior to Appellee filing for abatement, but

she was blocked from doing so by Appellee’s filing of a caveat. Appellant

concludes that she beat Appellee to the courthouse doors, only for Appellant

to block her entry. See Appellant’s Brief at 12.

We agree with Appellant that the inaction of both parties created a “race 

to the courthouse.” For a time, either party could have prevailed, depending 

on who filed their respective pleading first. But we dispute the premise of 

Appellant's argument - that Appellee’s filing of a caveat blocked Appellant from 

taking out letters. Appellee had legitimate reasons for filing a caveat, i.e., so 

she would receive notice of any filing regarding Decedent’s estate. As 

Appellant recognizes, Appellee could not serve as administrator for Decedent’s 

estate, but she still had an interest in the estate. If the caveat had the effect 

of preventing Appellant from immediately obtaining letters, the same does 

not excuse Appellant’s failure to obtain letters earlier. Appellant could have 

taken out letters at any time during the preceding two years. Moreover, it 

cannot be said that Appellee filed the caveat to buy time to beat Appellant to 

the courthouse. Appellee could have filed for abatement at the same time she 

filed the caveat, and Appellee waited an additional four weeks before 
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petitioning for abatement.5 For these reasons, we conclude Appellant’s first 

issued is without merit.

In her second issue, Appellant argues that her delay in taking out letters 

was not unreasonable under Section 3375. This section provides, the court 

“shall” abate the action unless the plaintiff presents a reasonable explanation 

for their delay in taking out letters of administration. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3375. “The use of ‘shall’ in the context of this statute reveals the legislature’s 

mandatory directive to the court, i.e., the court must abate the action if the 

plaintiff fails to present a reasonable explanation for the delay in taking out 

letters.” Salvadia, 923 A.3d at 441 (emphasis original) (citation omitted).

Before we discuss Appellant’s claim any further, we note the shift in our 

standard of review. Under Section 3375, the trial court has discretion to 

determine whether the explanation for delay in taking out letters was 

reasonable. On appeal, we review whether the trial court abused that 

discretion:

The findings of [the trial court] must be accorded the same 

weight and effect as a jury verdict. This Court can modify 

the [trial court’s decision] only if it is unsupported by 

competent or adequate evidence or if an error of law, abuse 

of discretion or capricious disbelief of competent evidence 

has taken place.

Salvadia, 923 A.2d at 441 (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

5 Under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, the caveat would have delayed the grant of letters 

10 days.
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During the abatement hearing, Appellant provided several explanations 

for the delay. In its opinion accompanying the order, the trial court thoroughly 

discussed Appellant’s excuses and explained why it deemed them 

unreasonable:

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in March 

of 2020 were unquestionably devastating to everyone. 

Appellant offers COVID-related delays as a reasonable 

explanation for her inaction. Specifically, she asserts the 

disruption in U.S. mail service and other unspecified matters 

caused by the pandemic as a reasonable basis to deny 

Appellee’s request for abatement under Section 3375 of the 

divorce action. However, there is no credible evidence to 

support this assertion. On the other hand, on June 14, 

2020, Appellee ordered a certificate of death issued on her 

estranged husband’s passing on May 31, 2020 (see 

Appellee’s trial exhibit #5). Appellee received the certificate 

from the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Division of 

Vital Statistics, via U.S. Mail by letter postmarked 

September 1, 2020 (see Appellee’s trial exhibit #6). While 

mail delivery may have been somewhat delayed or 

interrupted by the COVID pandemic’s fallout, Appellee’s 

diligence clearly shows Appellant reasonably could have 

used the same process [that Appellee used] to obtain a 

death certificate, namely by ordering it online and receiving 

delivery by U.S. Mail.

A second reason set forth by Appellant to justify the over 

one year delay substituting a fiduciary for Decedent focuses 

upon the specific language under this court’s order issued 

October 15, 2020. In granting Decedent’s requested relief 

denying abatement of the divorce action pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1), this court ordered Appellee, “...to 

preserve any and all assets acquired during the course of 

her marriage to [Decedent] regardless of title, pending the 

substitution of the appropriate fiduciary to proceed 

on behalf of the estate of [Decedent] for equitable 

division of marital property until further order of court.

([emphasis in the original trial court opinion]). Appellant 

unreasonably believed that, since there was no specific 

deadline stated in this order to appoint a personal 
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representative to substitute as a party fiduciary in the 

divorce action, then a reasonable basis exists to explain her 

inaction. She unreasonably believed the relevant language 

stated in the order dated October 15, 2020 usurped the 

statutory mandate under Section 3375. This basis for 

denying abatement is unreasonable and not supported by 

existing law. This argument will result in litigation involving 

a deceased claimant grinding to a halt without any remedy 

available to a defendant to move a case forward.

[A third] reason advanced by Appellant is best described as 

the “complexity of circumstances surrounding [Decedent’s] 

death, the number of people involved, and the existence of 

two women named [‘Mrs. Schmitt.’]

[6]

factors into the 

reasonableness of the matter.” [Appellant’s trial brief at 3]. 

The funeral arrangements involved James R. Jobe of the 

Jobe Funeral Home & Crematory, Inc. located in Turtle 

Creek, Pennsylvania communicating with Appellant residing 

in Prosper, Texas. The unique feature of this particular 

funeral arrangement involved transporting Decedent’s body 

by air from Pennsylvania to Texas, but Mr. Jobe was familiar 

with this circumstance. He sent Appellant an email on June 

5, 2020 requesting her to, “Please review the death 

certificate and email back approved or call me with any 

corrections.” To which Appellant promptly replied, 

“Everything looks in order on the death certificate.” (See 

Appellee’s trial exhibit #2). Five certified copies of the death 

certificate were requested, as shown on the funeral 

purchase agreement (Appellee’s trial exhibit #1).

Appellant repeatedly testified that she never received any 

of the death certificates from the Jobe Funeral Home. She 

speculates the death certificates have been sent to 

Decedent’s Brother, Dan [Schmitt], who also lives in 

Prosper, Texas. There was no testimony indicating whether

Dan [Schmitt] received any death certificates and, if he 

received them, then it is unreasonable to believe he would 

not communicate his receipt of the death certificates to his 

mother [(Appellant)] residing in the same Texas town. 

While Dan [Schmitt] is named as the party on the funeral 

purchase agreement as the ”person making arrangements,” 

____________________________________________

6

In an apparent typographical error, the trial court spelled the parties’ 

surname as “Schmidt.” Their surname is “Schmitt.” 
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Mr. Jobe credibly testified his dealings were with [Appellant]

because she is technically the next of kin, as opposed to 

Decedent’s brother, Dan [Schmitt]. Appellant failed to offer 

any reasonable explanation for not following up with Mr. 

Jobe in order to procure the certificates of death.

[As a fourth reason,] Appellant argues the one-year

limitation under Section 3375 was tolled by Appellee’s 

appeal to the Superior Court from the [trial court’s order 

denying abatement under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1)] dated 

October 15, 2020. This argument, too, is unreasonable on 

its face. On August 13, 2020, the notice of death was filed 

by Appellant. Appellee’s notice of appeal was filed on 

November 6, 2020. The Superior Court’s remittal/remand of 

record was effective March 1, 2021. Under this theory of 

reasonableness, and in view of the plain language set forth 

at Section 3375 (“...within one year after a suggestion of 

death is filed in the action...”), the substitution of the 

personal representative for deceased Husband should have 

been accomplished no later than March 1, 2022. Appellant 

had plenty of time to obtain the certificate of death, petition 

the Allegheny County Register of Wills for Letters of 

Administration, and proceed to substitute the personal 

representative in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

T.C.O. at 4-6 (style adjusted) (footnote added).

As noted above, the trial court had discretion to determine the 

reasonableness of Appellant’s delay. Our standard of review permits us to 

modify the trial court’s decision only if the court abused its discretion. See 

Salvadia, supra at 441. “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable exercise 

of judgment.” Johnson v. Johnson, 222 A.3d 787, 789 (Pa. Super. 2019). 

In mounting an abuse-of-discretion challenge, an appellant must demonstrate 

how the trial court’s ruling “overrode the law, was manifestly unreasonable, 
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or the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality.” Commonwealth v. 

Rogers, 259 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Under our standard of review, it is incumbent upon Appellant to explain 

how the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that her delay in 

taking out letters was unreasonable. For instance, were the court’s findings 

based on incompetent or inadequate evidence of record, or did the trial court 

commit an error of law, or was the trial court’s decision a product of bias or 

ill-will, etc. Appellant’s de novo arguments on this issue do not answer those

questions. Instead, Appellant invites us to substitute our judgement for that 

of the trial court. It is not the role of the Superior Court to re-find facts, reweigh evidence, and re-assess credibility. See, e.g., D.R.L. v. K.L.C., 216 

A.3d 276, 285-86 (Pa. Super. 2019). Even if we disagreed with the trial 

court’s judgment, we have long held that “an abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment. Johnson, 222 A.3d at 789. Because Appellant has not 

persuaded us that an abuse of discretion occurred, we conclude that her 

second appellate issue is meritless.

In sum, the trial court did not err when it granted Appellee’s petition for 

abatement under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375. Appellee did not waive these grounds

by taking steps toward the determination of the equitable distribution of the 

marital estate under the Divorce Code, or by failing to petition for abatement 

sooner. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it determined that Appellant’s explanations for her delay in the taking 

out of letters were unreasonable.
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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Murray joins.

Judge Bowes concurs in result.

DATE: 04/25/2024