alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly report of Venture Catalyst Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ending December
31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Kevin McIntosh, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Company.



By:

/s/    KEVIN MCINTOSHKevin McIntosh Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer






Dated: February 13, 2004
#### UNITED STATES of America for the Use and Benefit of EMPIRE CARPET CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. APPALACHIAN FLOORING COMPANY, Duncan Contracting Co., Inc. and Continental Casualty Company, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 63-998.

United States District Court D. Massachusetts.

Nov. 4, 1964.

Benjamin M. Gottlieb, Cohn Riemer & Pollack, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Herbert L. Crimlisk, Boston, Mass., Gregory Sullivan, Boston, Mass., for defendant Duncan Contracting Co. Inc.

John W. Blakeney, Blakeney & Blake-ney, Boston, Mass., for defendant Continental Casualty Co.

Irving Marmer, Boston, Mass., for intervenor Meco, Inc.

SWEENEY, Chief Judge.

This is an action on a payment bond executed by the defendants Duncan Contracting Co., Inc. and Continental Casualty Company in conformance with the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a et seq., brought by a supplier to a subcontractor of Duncan. Meco, Inc., another subcontractor of Duncan under the same contract with the United States, petitioned the court to permit it to intervene, which petition was denied. Meco, Inc., thereupon, orally moved the court for rehearing, which motion is allowed.

*453The original parties to the action object to the intervention on the grounds that 1) since Meco, Inc. is in receivership, the receiver, not the corporation is the proper party and 2) that this claim has no relation to the original complaint and should, therefore, be asserted in a separate action.

 Neither objection is well taken. Under the law of Massachusetts, the receiver must, in general, bring suits in the name of the corporation to recover debts due the corporation which arose prior to his appointment. Rochester Tumbler Works v. Mitchell-Woodbury Co., 215 Mass. 194, 102 N.E. 438 (1913); Wilson v. Welch, 157 Mass. 77, 31 N.E. 712 (1892). And Rule 24(b), F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C., permits intervention “ * * * when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” Both of these claims are against the same bond. That has been held sufficient to permit intervention. U. S. for the use of Albert Pipe Supply Co. v. Harris-Harmon Well Co., 7 F.R.Serv. 24b.2, Case 6 (D.C.N.Y. 1943).

The motion to intervene is accordingly allowed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Freddie O. Collins, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 890]

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Frank *1379E Geraci, Jr., J.), rendered December 9, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (four counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of four counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Fenal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]) and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, County Court properly instructed the jury on counts one through three of the indictment with respect to the automobile presumption *(see*§ 265.15 [3]). Those counts concerned the sawed-off shotgun recovered from the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger and, in this case, there was no “clearcut” evidence at trial that the shotgun was found in the possession of a specified passenger in the vehicle other than defendant *(People v Lemmons,*40 NY2d 505, 511 [1976]). In such circumstances, the “[automobile] presumption’s applicability is properly left to the trier of fact under an appropriate charge” *(id.*at 512).

We reject defendant’s further contention that the suppression court erred in determining that the traffic stop was permissible. It is well established that the police may lawfully stop a vehicle for a traffic infraction of excessively tinted windows *(see People v McGriff,*219 AD2d 829, 830 [1995]). In this case, the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing established that the police officers’ traffic stop was supported by the requisite probable cause to believe that there had been a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) *(see People v Estrella,*48 AD3d 1283, 1285 [2008], *affd*10 NY3d 945 [2008], *cert denied*555 US 1032 [2008]; *see also People v Binion,*100 AD3d 1514, 1515 [2012]). Specifically, one of the officers testified that the vehicle had “dark tinted windows” and that he could “just barely see that there was an occupant in the driver’s seat.”

As defendant correctly concedes, he failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred by instructing the jury with respect to constructive possession *(see People v Carr,*59 AD3d 945, 946 [2009], *affd*14 NY3d 808 [2010]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CEL 470.15 [6] [a]). We further conclude that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to object to the charge *(see generally People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).

*1380Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Present— Smith, J.P, Fahey, Sconiers, Valentino and Whalen, JJ.
Exhibit 31.2
**Certifications**
I, Jon D. Greenwood, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-Q of American BuildingControl, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flowsof the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared; b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected,or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Dated: August 16, 2004        By /s/ Jon D. Greenwood           Jon D. Greenwood     Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES/OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of iBasis, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the year ended December 31, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Richard Tennant, of iBasis, certify, pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, that this
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|Date: March 25, 2005 |  | /s/RICHARD TENNANTRichard Tennant
Chief Financial Officer
and Principal Accounting Officer
|-------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---



QuickLinks
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Raymond Velez, Respondent.

[974 NYS2d 784]

— Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Patricia Anne Williams, J.), entered on or about August 9, 2012, which dismissed a misdemeanor information in furtherance of justice, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the information in furtherance of justice. Contrary to the People’s assertions, the court fully considered all of the relevant factors set forth in CPL 170.40, and reached an individualized decision *(see People v Rickert,*58 NY2d 122, 126 [1983]; *People v Rivera,*108 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2013]). Concur — Tom, J.P, Mazzarelli, Freedman, Richter and Feinman, JJ.
[904 NE2d 499, 876 NYS2d 345]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dwayne Middleton, Appellant.

Decided February 17, 2009

*738APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau,*New York City *(Steven J. Miraglia*and *Steven Banks*of counsel), for appellant.

*Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney,*Brooklyn *(Maria Park*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed without costs.

Defendant’s constitutional arguments are unpreserved. The record supports the determination of the courts below that defendant is a level three sex offender.

Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur; Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) THE 
COMPANY'S 2ND QUARTER 10-Q FOR 1998. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY 
REFERENCE TO SUCH (B).
(A) IDENTIFY SPECIFIC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(B) IDENTIFY FILING
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**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**STATMON
      TECHNOLOGIES CORP.**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**19
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Statmon Technologies Corp. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2007 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
      Geoffrey Talbot, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
      to 18
      U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that to the best of my knowledge:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                Geoffrey P. Talbot**Geoffrey
                P. Talbot****Chief
                Executive Officer****February
                19, 2008**




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided to Statmon Technologies Corp. and will be
      retained by Statmon Technologies Corp. and furnished to the Securities and
      Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7429

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CURTIS LAKOY EDMONDS, a/k/a Rude Boy,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00368-BO-1)

Submitted: May 17, 2021 Decided: May 27, 2021

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jaclyn L. Tarlton, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Curtis Lakoy Edmonds appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act 

of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. After reviewing the 

record on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the motion for compassionate release. See United States v. High, __ F.3d __, __, No. 20-

7350, 2021 WL 1823289, at *6 (4th Cir. Apr. 21, 2021) (rejecting argument that district 

court must invariably address defendant’s arguments on record in denying motion for 

compassionate release). Accordingly, we affirm. United States v. Edmonds, No. 5:08-cr00368-BO-1 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2020). We deny as moot Edmonds’ motion to expedite 

and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 63 MM 2022

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 17 th day of October , 2022, in consideration of the “Application to

Proceed Pro Se ,” this matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of

Northampton County to determine whether Attorney Illon R. Fish should be relieved as

Petitioner’s counsel. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 120, Comment (providing that counsel’s duty to

represent a defendant continues until a court grants counsel leave to withdraw )

.

The Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County is ORDERED to enter its

order on remand within 90 days and to inform this Court promptly of its determination.
EXHIBIT 32.2

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Websafety, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Rowland W. Day II, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

By:  */s/ Rowland W. Day II.*

Rowland W. Day II

Chief Financial Officer

 

Dated: April 16, 2012

This certification accompanies this report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, another document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to WebSafety, Inc. fka Blindspot Alert, In. and will be retained and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**DEGOLYERAND MACNAUGHTON**

5001 SPRING VALLEY ROAD

SUITE 800 EAST

DALLAS TEXAS 75244 

**March 3, 2011**

Dune Energy, Inc. 

Two ShellPlaza 

777 Walker Street, Suite 2300 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We hereby consent to the use of the name DeGolyer and MacNaughton, and to the inclusion of our Letter Report datedFebruary 14, 2011 as exhibit 99.1 to the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010. We further consent to the inclusion of information from our “Appraisal Report as of December 31, 2010 on Certain Propertiesowned by Dune Energy Inc.”, our “Appraisal Report as of December 31, 2009 on Certain Properties owned by Dune Energy Inc.”, and our “Appraisal Report as of December 31, 2008 on Certain Properties owned by Dune EnergyInc.” in the sections “Item 1 and 2. Business and Properties – Natural Gas and Oil Reserves”, “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations-Estimated proved oil and gasreserves”, and “Note 13-Supplemental Oil and Gas Information (Unaudited)-Reserves”. 

We also hereby consent toall references to our firm included in the Company’s Form 10-K for the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and 2008 and to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Forms S-3, No. 333-151611 of such information.