IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CASSANDRA L. ALDRIDGE, *

 *

 Plaintiff, * CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00006-B

 *

vs. *

 *

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, *

Commissioner of Social Security,*

* 

Defendant. *

ORDER

Plaintiff Cassandra L. Aldridge (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

brings this action seeking judicial review of a final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for a 

period of disability and disability insurance benefits under 

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. 

On October 15, 2015, the parties waived oral argument and

consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all 

proceedings in this case. (Docs. 15, 16). Thus, the action was 

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order 

the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful consideration 

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, 

it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be 

AFFIRMED.

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application seeking a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits on August 26, 2011 

alleging disability due to rheumatoid arthritis in all joints, 

severe edema, thyroid issues, diabetes, chronic sinus and lung

issues, potassium deficiency, and severe fish allergy. (Tr. 11). 

The application was initially denied on November 4, 2011, and 

Plaintiff timely filed a Request for Hearing on November 28, 

2011. (Id. at 63, 71-72). While Plaintiff’s Request for Hearing

(on her application for disability and disability insurance 

benefits) was pending, she filed an application for Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”) on September 24, 2012. (Id. at 133-

140). The SSI claim was forwarded to the Office of Disability 

Adjudication and Review, and a hearing on both claims was held 

before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Thomas M. Muth II in 

Mobile, Alabama on January 1, 2013. (Id. at 37-61). Plaintiff 

testified at the hearing as did a vocational expert (“VE”). 

(Id.). 

On June 24, 2013, the ALJ issued a partially favorable 

decision. (Id. at 18-36). With respect to Plaintiff’s claim 

for disability and disability insurance benefits, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff had sufficient quarters of coverage to remain 

insured through December 31, 2010; thus, she had to establish

that she was disabled on or before that date in order to be 

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entitled to disability and disability benefits. The ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to September 13, 

2012, and that she became disabled on that date and continued to 

be disabled through the date of his decision. (Id. at 22). As 

a result of said findings, Plaintiff was not entitled to 

disability and disability benefits; however, she was entitled to 

receive SSI benefits. Plaintiff sought review, and the Appeals 

Council denied her request on November 21, 2014. (Id. at 1-7). 

Thus, the ALJ’s decision dated June 24, 2013 became the final 

decision of the Commissioner.

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff 

timely filed the present civil action. (Doc. 1). The parties 

agree that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is 

properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3).

II. Issue on Appeal

Whether the ALJ erred by failing to 

enlist the services of a medical advisor 

to determine the onset date of 

Plaintiff’s disability. 

III. Factual Background 

Plaintiff was born on July 10, 1978, and was thirty-four

years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on 

January 22, 2013. (Tr. 28, 41). She testified that she 

completed her college education in May of 2008. (Id. at 41-42, 

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54). Plaintiff has past employment as a cashier, receptionist, 

and teacher. (Id. at 42-43, 46, 144-146, 160-161). 

Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of disability is May 12, 

2007. (Id. at 148). According to Plaintiff, she began having 

ongoing problems with edema in 2006. Her doctors believed it 

was caused by hyperaldosteronism.1 (Id. at 51). Around March of 

2006, Plaintiff also began having problems with her thyroid

(which caused her to gain weight), and she began suffering from 

severe allergies, sinus problems, infections, pneumonia, and a 

potassium deficiency. (Id. at 52-54). In 2007, Plaintiff also 

began having severe problems with rheumatoid arthritis. (Id. at 

47). Plaintiff testified that she is currently unable to work 

due to rheumatoid arthritis, massive amounts of edema, potassium 

deficiency, allergies, chronic pneumonia, sinus issues, and 

thyroid difficulties. (Id. at 45). 

Plaintiff lives with her husband and two small children, 

ages twelve and three.(Id. at 45-46). Plaintiff testified that

she homeschools both children, and that her husband was staying 

home to assist her. (Id. at 46). 

IV. Analysis

 1 Hyperaldosteronism is a disorder in which the adrenal gland 

releases too much of the hormone aldosterone into the blood. 

See https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000330.htm.

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A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s 

role is a limited one. The Court’s review is limited to 

determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is 

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct 

legal standards were applied. 2 Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may not decide the facts 

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that 

of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th 

Cir. 1986). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be 

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. 

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.”). In determining whether substantial 

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking 

into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the 

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4 

(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999). 

 2 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal 

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

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B. Discussion 

An individual who applies for Social Security disability 

benefits must prove his or her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1512, 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations 

provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for 

determining if a claimant has proven his disability.3 20 C.F.R. 

 3 The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the 

claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant 

proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets 

or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is 

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or 

work experience. If the claimant cannot prevail at the third 

step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the 

claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In 

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the 

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective 

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, 

education and work history. Id. Once a claimant meets this 

burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the 

fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy, given the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 

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§§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 12, 

2007, the alleged onset date, and that she has the severe 

impairments of obesity, right Baker’s cyst, bilateral lower 

extremity pedal edema, rheumatoid arthritis, cholecystitis s/p 

cholecystectomy, muscle tension headaches, bronchitis, 

sinusitis, and depression. (Tr. 24, 148). The ALJ further 

found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 

any of the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 31). 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s last insured date was

December 31, 2010, and that based on the evidence before him, on 

said date, she had the residual functional capacity (hereinafter 

“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, except that she:

“could lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and 

items of negligible weight frequently. She could 

stand and/or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday and sit 

6 hours in an 8-hour workday but required the option 

to sit/stand every 45 minutes. She could perform 

occasional pushing and/or pulling with the upper 

extremities, bilaterally, and occasional pushing 

 

1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such 

jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability 

to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. 

Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

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and/or pulling with the lower extremities, 

bilaterally. She could perform occasional balancing, 

occasional stooping, occasional kneeling, occasional 

crouching, occasional crawling, and occasional 

climbing of ramps and stairs. She could perform no 

climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She could 

perform frequent reaching, bilaterally; frequent 

handling, bilaterally; frequent fingering, 

bilaterally; and frequent feeling, bilaterally. She 

could tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold, 

occasional exposure to extreme heat, and occasional 

exposure to pulmonary irritants. She was required to 

avoid all exposure to unprotected heights and avoid 

all exposure to dangerous machinery. She would have 

had one unplanned absence per month.” 

(Id. at 25-26). 

The ALJ also determined that while Plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce 

the alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms were

not entirely credible to the extent that they were inconsistent 

with the RFC assessment. (Id. at 27). Utilizing the testimony 

of a VE, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity for a range of sedentary work, with the 

stated restrictions, as well as her age, education and work 

experience, Plaintiff is capable of performing her past work as 

a data entry clerk (sedentary, skilled) and as a receptionist

(sedentary, semi-skilled). (Id. at 31). Thus, the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability or 

disability insurance benefits because she was not disabled on or 

before her last insured date of December 31, 2010. (Id. at 31-

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32). 

In addition, based on the evidence related to Plaintiff’s 

medical condition through September 13, 2012 (the date that she 

filed her application for SSI benefits), the ALJ modified 

Plaintiff’s RFC and determined that she could no longer perform 

her past work and in fact could not perform any jobs in the 

national economy. (Id. at 30-32). Therefore, the ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff has been disabled beginning September 13, 2012,

and has continued to be disabled through the date of the 

decision. (Id. at 32). 

The Court now considers the foregoing in light of the 

record in this case and the issues on appeal.

1. Issue

Whether the ALJ erred in failing to 

enlist the services of a medical advisor 

to determine the onset date of 

disability?

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred 

in failing to utilize the services of a medical advisor to 

determine the onset date of her disability. Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision does not provide a 

sufficient explanation of why he selected the September 13, 2012 

onset date, and that he was required, under SSR 83-20, to enlist 

the services of a medical advisor to aid in making this 

determination. (Doc. 12 at 2-3). The Commissioner counters 

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that Plaintiff does not point to any relevant evidence 

contradicting the ALJ’s finding that she was not disabled prior 

to December 31, 2010, and that SSR 83-20 requires medical expert 

testimony only where the evidence of onset is “ambiguous or 

inadequate.” (Doc. 13 at 3-4) (internal citations omitted). 

Having reviewed the record at length, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. 

The undersigned observes, as a preliminary matter that in 

order to be eligible for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits, the onset date of Plaintiff’s disability 

must have occurred on or before her date last insured, which is 

December 31, 2010. (Tr. 22). The ALJ clearly found that 

Plaintiff’s onset date did not occur on or before her date last 

insured. Instead, he fixed her onset date as September 13, 

2012, the date that Plaintiff filed her application for SSI 

benefits. (Tr. 133-40). As explained herein, in this case, the 

precise date that Plaintiff’s impairments became disabling is 

not important, as long as it did not occur prior to her date 

last insured. In other words, Plaintiff was not eligible for a 

period of disability and disability insurance benefits at any 

time after December 31, 2010, nor was she eligible for SSI at 

any time before September 13, 2012, the date of her SSI 

application. So, if her disability onset date occurred at any 

time after December 31, 2010, and September 13, 2012, it is of 

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no consequence to her appeal. Thus, the Court will review this 

case to determine if there is substantial evidence to support 

the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s disability did not 

begin prior to December 31, 2010 or whether, as Plaintiff 

argues, the evidence was ambiguous or inadequate and, thus, 

required a medical expert to answer that question. 

While it is undisputed that the ALJ did not utilize a 

medical professional at the hearing to determine Plaintiff’s

onset date, the undersigned finds that there was sufficient 

evidence in the record to enable the ALJ to make the 

determination. Social Security Ruling 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25,

prescribes the policy and procedure by which the Commissioner 

should determine the onset date of a disability. See SSR 83-20, 

1983 SSR LEXIS 25. It defines the onset date as "the first day 

an individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the 

regulations." SSR 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25. "In addition to 

determining that an individual is disabled, the decisionmaker 

must also establish the onset date of disability," which may be 

critical to determinations such as the period for which the 

individual will be paid. Id.

SSR 83-20 also provides, in relevant part, that:

In some cases, it may be possible, based on the medical 

evidence to reasonably infer that the onset of a 

disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to the 

date of the first recorded medical examination, e.g., 

the date the claimant stopped working. How long the 

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disease may be determined to have existed at a disabling 

level of severity depends on an informed judgment of the 

facts in the particular case. The judgment, however, 

must have a legitimate medical basis. At the hearing, 

the [ALJ] should call on the services of a medical 

advisor when onset must be inferred. If there is 

information in the file indicating that additional 

medical evidence concerning onset is available, such 

evidence should be secured before inferences are made. 

SSR 83-20. 

In discussing SSR 83-20, the court, in Caces v. Comm’r, 

SSA, 560 Fed. Appx. 936 (llth Cir. 2014), held that “the plain 

language of SSR 83-20, 1983 SSR LEXIS 25, indicates that it is 

applicable only after there has been a finding of disability and 

it is then necessary to determine when the disability 

began.”(citation omitted)(emphasis added). The Court held that 

where the ALJ found that the claimant was not disabled prior to 

the date last insured based on “ample, unambiguous medical 

evidence from both before and after the date last insured”, and 

said finding was supported by the evidence, the ALJ did not err 

in failing to call a medical expert to determine an onset date 

of such a disability. Id. at 939; See also McManus v. Barnhard, 

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27748, 2004 WL 3316303, *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 

14, 2004)(court held that SSR 83–20 applies “to situations where 

the ALJ is called upon to make a retroactive inference regarding 

disability involving a slowly progressive impairment, and the 

medical evidence during the insured period is inadequate or 

ambiguous). Thus, SSR 83-20 applies in situations where the ALJ 

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must make a retroactive inference regarding the claimant’s 

disability during the insured period, and the medical evidence 

covering the insured period is simply inadequate or ambiguous to 

enable the ALJ to made the determination. 

Having reviewed the evidence in this case at length, the 

Court finds that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not 

disabled before December 31, 2010 is supported by substantial 

evidence that is neither ambiguous nor inadequate. The record 

evidence reflects in 2006, Plaintiff received treatment at 

Thomas Hospital for bilateral lower extremity swelling, and she 

initially reported a pain level of 7/10, but it was later 

reduced to 3/10. (Tr. 26, 207-224). In 2007, Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, Dr. Sullivan, noted during a new patient 

physical, that Plaintiff had mild arthritis, and some swelling 

in the hands. (Id. at 369). He further noted that these 

conditions had been on an “approximately 10 year course without 

significant synovitis or progression”. (Id.). He further noted 

that that her conditions had not limited her activities; that 

her health had otherwise been good; and that she had a good 

range of motion (ROM) in her joints. (Id.).

In 2008, while Plaintiff was being treated for pregnancy, 

the medical records contain various references to rheumatoid 

arthritis, thyroid disorder, and high potassium; however, there 

is nothing in the records documenting any significant problems 

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arising from any of these conditions. (Id. at 255-256). 

Indeed, in 2009, Dr. Sullivan noted that while Plaintiff had 

some swelling and tenderness in areas of her body, she 

demonstrated a good ROM in her joints, and she had 5/5 strength 

in her upper and lower extremities. (Id. at 368). Dr. 

Sullivan’s treatment notes between June and August of 2009

reflect that the Prednisone prescribed to treat Plaintiff’s 

joint pain and swelling was decreased. (Id. at 367).

In 2010, Plaintiff’s medical records include lab results 

from a heart scan, diabetes screening, a uterine scan, a thyroid 

scan, and an abdominal scan. The only tests relevant to her 

impairments are the thyroid scan, which was “normal” (id. at 

377-86) and the abdominal scan, which was noted as 

“unremarkable,” but for an obscuring of the pancreas and hepatic 

steatosis (fatty liver disease). (Id. at 385).

After Plaintiff’s date last insured, December 31, 2010, the 

evidence reflects that Plaintiff had several appointments with 

Dr. Thomas Sapp, M.D., in 2011. (Id. at 396). The June 2011 

notes reflect that Plaintiff expressed concern regarding 

continued weight gain, and Dr. Sapp diagnosed Plaintiff with 

hypothyroidism, obesity, weight related diabetes mellitus, 

hormone deficiency, marked libido decrease, and 

hypercholesterolemia. (Id. at 395). Dr. Sapp instructed 

Plaintiff to start walking, and Plaintiff reported that she was 

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capable of walking two miles a day, which was the course of 

action then prescribed by Dr. Sapp. (Id.) Medical records from 

later in 2011 list acute generalized myositis (inflammation and 

degeneration of muscle tissues), pain due to a proximal Achilles 

tear, respiratory illnesses, and continued hypothyroidism.(Id. 

at 390-394).

While Plaintiff argues that the evidence in this case 

related to her onset date is insufficient or ambiguous, she does

not indicate in what respect the records are insufficient or 

ambiguous. The only document Plaintiff appears to rely upon to 

support her assertion is a July 30, 2012 assessment prepared by 

her treating physician, Dr. Sapp. In the document, Dr. Sapp 

avers that he had been seeing Plaintiff for over two years, and 

that it was his opinion that Plaintiff could not engage in any 

form of gainful employment “on a repetitive, completive, and 

productive basis over an eight hour work day, forty hours a 

week, without missing more than 2 days of work per month or 

experiencing frequent interruptions to his/her work routine” due 

to her condition. (Tr. 508). There is nothing in Dr. Sapp’s 

letter, nor in the record evidence, that indicates that 

Plaintiff’s inability to work began nineteen months earlier, on 

or before December 31, 2010. To the contrary, the record 

evidence reflects that while Plaintiff claims a disability onset 

date of 2007, in 2008, she was able to obtain her college 

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degree, and in June 2011, she reported to Dr. Sapp that she was 

still capable of walking two miles a day. (Id. at 54, 395). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the 

record contains substantial evidence, that is both adequate and 

unambiguous, and that enabled the ALJ to make the disability 

determination; thus, he was not required to consult a medical 

advisor on the question of whether Plaintiff was disabled 

ability prior to December 31, 2010, the date last insured. See

Caces v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 560 Fed. Appx. 936, 

937-939 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (holding that the ALJ did not 

err in failing to consult a medical advisor where the medical 

records showed that the plaintiff’s condition improved after his 

surgery, that medication and physical therapy proved successful 

in improving the plaintiff’s condition, and no additional relief 

was sought until after the date last insured); Wright v. Colvin, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38182, 2015 WL 1346043, *6 (S.D. Ala. 

March 24, 2015) (holding that the ALJ did not err in failing to 

consult a medical advisor where the plaintiff only required 

treatment for his condition for a few weeks prior to the date 

last insured; no serious complaints related to the condition 

were discussed in follow up appointments; and the plaintiff did 

not take any medication for the relevant condition); Gregory v. 

Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37106, 2011 WL 1100292, *6 (M.D. 

Fla. Mar. 23, 2011) (holding that the ALJ did not err in 

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discounting retrospective opinions by the treating physician or 

failing to consult a medical advisor where the evidence showed 

only “intermittent acute symptoms” relating to the plaintiff’s 

condition through the date last insured). 

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful 

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the 

parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a 

period of disability and disability insurance benefits be 

AFFIRMED.

DONE this 23rd day of March, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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