Slip O p. 12-121 UNITED STA TES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGACY CL ASSIC FURNITURE, INC.,

Plainti ff,

. v. UNITED STA TES, Defendan t. Before: Grego ry W. Carman, Judge Court No. 10-00352

OPINION & OR DER [Commerce’s Remand R esults are r emanded.] Dated: Sept ember 19, 2012 Mark E. Pardo, Andrew T. Schu tz, Max F. Schutzman, and Nikolas E. Ta kacs, Grunfeld, D esi derio, Lebowi tz, S i lver man & Klestadt, LLP, for Plainti ff.

Douglas G. Edelschic k

, Tri al Att or ney, Commercial L i tigati on Branch, Ci vil Di vis i on, Uni ted S tate s Department of Justi ce, of Washingto n, DC, for Defendan t, and Natha niel J. Halvorso n , Att or ney, Offi ce of the Chi ef Counsel f or ImportAdmini strat i on, Uni ted S tate s Department of Commerce, of counsel. Wi th them on the br i efs w ere Stuart F. Dele ry, Assi stant Att or ney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Di recto r, Claudia Burke, Assi stant Di recto r. C A R M A N , J U D G E : Plainti ff Legacy Class i c Furni ture, I nc. ( “Plainti ff” or “Legacy”) di sputes the results of the fi rst court -order ed remand to t he Uni ted S tate s Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) reg ardin g a scope deter minati on i n the antid umping duty

or der cov ering wooden bedroo m fu rniture from Chi na. Bedroom Furni ture from theCourt No. 10-00352 Page 2

People’s Repu blic of Chin a: Scope Rul ing on L egacy Classic F urn iture, Inc .’s Heri tage Court Bench (Nov. 22, 2010) (“ Fin al Scope Ru ling ”); Notice of Amended F inal Determi nation of Sales at Less Than Fair Valu e and Antidumpi ng Du ty Order: Woo den Bedroom Fur niture from the People’s Republi c of Chin a , 70 Fed. Reg . 329 (Jan. 4, 2005) (“ WBF Order ”). Pu rsuant to Plainti ff’s m otion for j udgment on the ag ency recor d chall engin g Co mmerce’s Fin al Scope Ru ling, the Cour t sustained in part and re manded in part t hi s cas e in Sli p Opi ni on 11-157. 1 In Legacy I

, the Cour t sustained Commerce’s determinati on that t he factors set fort h in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) are not di sposi tive but remanded for re consi derat i on 2 Commerce’s deter minati on that t he factors set fort h in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) are 3 di sposi tive. Accordi ngly, t he Courtset asi de Commerce’s deter minati on that t he Heritage Cour t Bench fell w i thin the scope of the WBF Orderand instructed Commerce to r econsi der each of the factor s li sted under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) and to tak e i nto

accoun t ini ts analysi s all of the eviden ce on the recor d. Commerce i ssu ed i ts Fin al Resu lts of Redetermin atio n Purs uant to Court Order (Mar. 26, 2012) (“ Remand R esults ”), affi rmi ng i ts or i gin al deter minati on that t he Heritage Court Bench i s wi thi n the scope of Legacy Cl assic Fu rnitur e v. Uni ted States , 35 CIT ___, 807 F. S upp. 2d 1353 ( 2011) 1 ( “Legacy I

” ). The Court pr esumes fa miliarity with Legacy I

. Refer red to a s “(k) (1) f

actor s” her einaf

ter. 2 Referr ed to as “(k)(2) fac tor s” herei nafter. 3Court No. 10-00352 Page 3

the WBF Order

. Upon re viewof the Remand R esults , upon further ex aminati on of the r ecord, and upon fu rt her consi derat i on of the uni que ci rcums tances presented i n thi s cas e, the Court reconsi ders i ts i ni tial d eci si on reg ardin g the (k)(1) factors and remands to Commerce to explaini ts poli cy where gener al language i n the scope sec tion of an anti dumping duty o rder can b e read t o in clud e the pro duct at i ssu e but other language i n the scope sec tion s peci fi cally excludesthe pro duct at i ssu e. The Court also r emands the (k)(2) fac tor s bec ause Commerce’s c onclus i on i n i ts Remand R esults that t he Heritage Court Bench i s more li ke a chest than a bench i s not supported by ev i dence on the

recor d. B A C K G R O U N D The product at is sue i s Legacy’s Heri tage CourtBench – a p i ece of furni ture that bot h si des agree ser ves si multaneously as a s eating bench and a s tor age uni t. It i s descri bed as “a b ackless w ooden seating bench measu ring 50 inches wi de by 19 i nches tall by 20 in ches deep.” Fin al Scope Ru ling at 2. The body of t he bench i s made fro m “soli d hardwood wi th Ok ume Mahogany v eneers and a cocoa brown wood fini sh.” Id. It has a to p that consi sts “enti rely of a padded leather surface,” i s attached by hinges to the base, and has a cedar-lined interior sto rag e area. Id. The sc ope of the WBF Order i nclu des only speci fi ed ches ts but expli ci tly ex clud es all s eating fu rniture, i nclu dingCourt No. 10-00352 Page 4

bench es. Id. at 3.

Commerce evaluate d whether the Her i tage Court Bench w as wi thi n the scope of the WBF Orderaccording to the factor s and procedure set out in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k). Fin al Scope Ru lingat 4. Thi s regulation spec i fi es that when Commerce i s “consi dering wh ether a particu lar pro duct i s inclu ded wi thin the scope of an order ,” i t wi ll “take into account” the following factors: “(1) The des cri ptions of the merchandi se contai ned in the petiti on, the ini tial investigati on, and the deter minati ons of the Secret ary (inclu di ng prior scope deter minati ons) and the Commi ssi on.” 19 C.F.R

. § 351.225(k)(1). Comm erce deter mined that the (k)(1) factors were not di sposi tive. Fin al Scope Ru ling at 6. Thus Comm erce pro ceeded to t he next subsec tion of fac tor s: “(i ) [t]he physi cal character i sti cs of the product; (i i ) [t]he expectations of the ultim ate purchasers; (i i i ) [t]he u ltim ate use of the pro duct; (i v) [t]he channels of trade inwhi ch the product i s sold; and (v) [ t]he manner i n whi ch the product i s advert i sed and di splayed.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2). In i ts Remand R esults , Commerce found that “the r ecord is mi xed wi th respect to the criterion u nder 19 C.F.R . § 351.225(k)(2) ( i v) and (v),” but “[di d] not fi nd that t hi s mi xed r ecord isenough to change the conclu si ons reached wi th respect to the cri ter i on under 19 C.F.R . § 351.225(k)(2)( i -i i i ).” Remand R esults at 18.Court No. 10-00352 Page 5 S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W The Court has jur i sdi cti on pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 1581(c) (2006). For scope deter minati ons, the Court sus tain s determin ations, findings or conclusi ons of Commerce unless they ar e “unsu pport ed by sub stanti al evidenc e on the r ecord, o r other wi se not in

accordance w i th law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) (B)( i ). Courts “loo k for a reasoned analysi s or ex planati on for an ag ency’s deci si on as a way to det ermin e whether a part i cular deci si on i s arbi tr ary , capri ci ous or an abuse of di screti on.” Wheat land Tube Co. v. Uni ted States , 161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“ Wheat land Tube ”). D I S C U S S I O N I. Redete rmination of the (k)(2) Factors Thi s Court r eviews Commerce’s Remand R esults and correspondin g comments. Commerce conceded that the r ecord is i nconcl usi ve for the two factor s of (i v) channels of tr ade and (v) manner dis played and adver tis ed. Remand R esults at 14-17. Therefor e Commerce made i ts redet ermin ation up on the three factor s of (i ) physi cal characteris tic s, (i i ) cu stomer ex pectations, and (i i i ) ulti mate use. Th i s Court r eviews all the factor s upon whi ch Commerce bas ed i ts redet ermin ation. Each fac tor wi ll be addressed in turn.Court No. 10-00352 Page 6 A. PhysicalCharact erist ics of the Product Regar di ng the factor of physi cal character i sti cs of the product, Commerce deter mined that “the pr i mary element o f the product is i ts box str ucture and li d, elements cons i stent wi th certain s tor age chests.” Remand R esults at 7. Plai nti ff countered t hat “[t]he shape an d hei ght o f the Heritage Cour t Bench and i ts other physi cal character i sti cs are enti rely consi stent wi th those o f a bench.” Pl.’s Comments i n Opp’n to F i nal Results of Redetermin ation P ursuant to Co urt O rder (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 5. Furt her, Plai nti ff advanced that “[t]he fac t that the Heritage Co urt Bench would conti nue to fulfi ll i ts prim ary func tion as a bencheven wi thout its storag e component supp or ts the contr ary posi tion that i ts func tion as a benchi s the prim ary element.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. While i t has a rectangular shape and the seat does func tion as a li d for t he stor age ar ea, the r ecord clearly i ndi cates that the Her i tage Court Bench—c ase in point, the name of the pro duct—i s un di sputedly a bench. Commerce conceded that the Heritage Cour t Bench “has some, albei t lim i ted, att rib utes of an excluded product” ( e.g ., a bench ) bu t neve rt heless conclu ded that t he product “possess es all of the physi cal characteris tic s of a subject chest.” Remand R esults at 7. Upon re viewof the numerous defini tions of the subject chests in the WBF Order, contrar y to Commerce’s conclu si on, the Her i tage Court Bench d oes not po sses s all of the physi cal character i sti cs of any of t he subject chests. In fact, the Heritage CourtCourt No. 10-00352 Page 7

Bench only arguably fi ts i nto t he resi dual provisi on of a foot noted defin i tion of a gener al ches t. See WBF Orde r at 332, n.5. In contr ast, the Heritage Co urt Bench not only unamb i guously falls under the ex pli ci t ex clus i on for a “bench” but als o the basket prov i si on for all “seating furni ture” under t he li st of i tems that is excluded from the scope. Id . (“The s cope of the Petiti on excludes . . . ben ches . . . and other seating furni ture.”)

In support o f i ts conclu si on, Commerce state d that si mply becau se one could si t on the prod uc t d oes not mean i t should prin ci pally be view ed as seating furni ture t hat i s ex clud ed from the scope. If that were the case, the language i n t he sc o p e cover ing a large box wi th a li d would be nulli fi ed becau se many boxes wi th a flat li d could be used for seati ng eve n i f they do no t come wi th a padded leather cov ering. Remand R esults at 6. Co mmerce’s s peculati on i s sp eci ous. Fi rst, t he product at iss ue does i ndeed have a padded leather cov ering so speculati ng that t he sc ope language would be nulli fi ed i f a product di d not have a padded leather cov ering i s fall aci ous. Determin ing that t he Heritage CourtBench i s outsi de of the scope wi ll not open t he floodgat e of exclusi ons to any pr oduct that can be sat upon. For example, a mi lk crate can b e sat upon but that does notmake i t seating fu rniture. The determi nati ve factor i s that t he furni ture is d esi gned for seat i ng. The Heri tage Court Bench i s seating furni ture preci sely and si mply becau se i t is desi gned wi th padded leather cov ering for seatin g. The seating func tion i s not i nci dental as Commerce insinuated in i ts conclu si on. TheCourt No. 10-00352 Page 8

recor d clearly in di cates that seatin g is one of the mainfunc tions of the Heritage Co urt Bench. Furthermor e, the r ecord also demonstrat es that the padded leather cover i ng i s one of the maindesi gn features of the pr oduct. The Court fin ds Commerce’s reasoni ng that t he seati ng func tion i s inci dental or secondary to the Heritage Co urt Bench to be arbi tr ary and capri ci ous. Therefore, Co mmerce’s c onclus i on that t he most prominen t physi cal character i sti c i s the box wi th the lid m ust be remanded for further consi derat i on. B. Expectati ons of the Ultimat e Purchas ers Regar di ng the factor of cus tomer expectat i ons of the pro duct, Commerce admi tte d that t here is“no di rect ev i dence on the recor d reg ardin g the ex pectations of the ultim ate purchasers.” Remand R esults at 8 (quoting Fin al Scope Ru ling at 10). Using the same analysi s from the Fin al Scope Ru ling, Commerce subm i tte d that

recor d evidenc e does not de mo ns t r ate that the oblong (rectangular) shape and hei ght o f the product under consi derat i on i s nec essari ly atypi cal of the type of stor age chest that mi ght be used at the end of a bed .

. . . Mor eov er, i t i s reasonable to beli eve that bedroo m stor age ches ts wi th li ds that are used at the end o f beds would be wi der than tall to be flu sh with t he hei ght and wi dth of ty pi cal beds

. Id. at 8-9. Plainti ff c ounter ed that Co mmerce i gnor ed i ts adver tis ement stating “[t]he Heritage Cour t S tor age Bench offers ti meless style and valuable storag e for any ro om. Plac e at t he foot o f your bed, ina hallway, or make t hi s bench a part o f your livi ng ro om ensemb le.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 9 (quoti ng Scope Request, Ex . 9). Commerce clai med thatCourt No. 10-00352 Page 9

“consu mers can vi ew the product on websi tes under a tab labeled ‘Seat i ng’ or a tab labeled ‘Bedroo m.’” Remand R esults at 9. Plai nti ff c ounter ed, however , that under t he “Bedroo m” tab, there is a “B enches ” sub -tab, where the Heritage Co urt Bench i s located. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. Plainti ff f urther poin ted outthat t here isa separate t ab for “Bedro om Chests” and the Heri tage Court Bench i s not located t here. Id . The Court ag rees wi th Plainti ff that Commerce di sregar ded evidenc e placed on the recor d by Plainti ff. From a plain readin g of t he sc ope language, t he Court recog ni zes that mere placement of seati ng furni ture in a b edro om does not r emove it from the scope exclusi on of the WBF Order

. Plainti ff c ontended thatthe Heritage Co urt Bench has the di mensi ons typic al of a benchbut atypic al of a ches t. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. The Court agr ees. The di mensi ons li sted i n the scope of the WBF Orderdescribe the subject chest as “a cas e pi ece taller t han i t is wi de,” but the Heritage Cour t Bench i s just the opposite: a bench wi der (50 i nches ) than i t is tall (19 i nches ). WBF Orderat 332, n.5. Thus, Commerce’s conclu si on that t he Heritage Cour t Bench has the di mensi ons typic al of a subject chest i s not supported by the re cord. Rat her ther e appears to be ample s upport o n the recor d for Plai nti ff’s propo si tion that the Heritage Co urt Bench’s most promi nent features are t he “padded leather t op, the o blong shape and di mensi ons that make it sui table for o ne or mo re i ndi vidu als to si t.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. Therefor e, the Co urt fin ds that the r ecordCourt No. 10-00352 Page 10

evidenc e does not support Commerce’s conclu si on that t he cus tomer expectat i ons i s for stor age o ver seati ng. Commerce’s deter minati on must be remanded f or further consi derat i on.

C

. Ultimat e Use of the Product Regar di ng the factor of ulti mate use of the product, si mi lar to the prev i ous factor, Co mmerce agai n admi tte d that t here is “no di rect ev i dence on the recor d reg ardin g how purchasers are actually using the Her i tage Court Bench.” Remand Resu lts at 10. In lieuof ulti mate use, Commerce “exami ned the recor d for ev i dence of the use for whi ch the product was des i gned.” Id . Noting that it “i s tasked wi th deter mining whether t he product inquesti on i s su ffi ci ently si mi lar to subject merchandi se and thus subject t o the o rder —not whether the pro duct has absolutely no features i n common w i th non-subject o r ex clud ed merchandi se,” Commerce conclu ded that “[w]hi le the Heritage Co urt Bench does have a padded leather lid and could be used f or seati ng, this one ultim ate use does not negat e the ultim ate uses of the Heritage Court Bench that are si mi lar to those of subject chests.” Remand R esults at 12, 13. As noted inthe Cour t’s fi rst deci si on, Commerce’s conclus i on i s bas ed on an “i mpressi on.” Legacy I

, 807 F. S upp. 2d at 1359. It appear s that Commerce has not fully consi dered t he recor d, as instructed, but rather remain s mi red in i ts posi tion regar di ng thi s fac tor . Plainti ff as serted t hatCourt No. 10-00352 Page 11

Commerce once again i gnor es sub stanti al recor d evidenc e that the Heritage Court Bench i s desi gned to be used as a bench , whi ch could be placed at the foot of t he bed or elsewh ere i n the house. Commerce presumes that the stor age capabi li ty of the Heritage Court Bench i t i s prim ary func tion wi th no recor d sup port . Pl.’s Opp’n at 14 (emph asi s in origi nal). Commerce even admi tte d that t here is a “lack of di rect r ecord ev i dence regar di ng the ultim ate use of the pro duct,” yet pr oceeded to declare that t he storag e func tion s upersedes the seati ng func tion of the product inthe absenc e of recor d evidenc e pert i nent to thi s fac tor . Remand R esults at 10. In t he absen ce of di rect ev i dence of how c ustomers actually use thi s product, the only r easonable way to analy ze this factor is to infer from the mark eting evi dence. Th e pro duct i s marketed as a “bench” or “seating furni ture” t hat can be plac ed in the bedroo m. Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. The fac t that seati ng furni ture can, and often i s, located in the bedroo m does not place i t wi thi n the scope of the WBF Order . It is u nreasonable to conclude that customers seeing a product mark eted as a “bench ” or “seati ng furni ture” would primari ly expect t o use i t as a bedroom chest. Commerce apparently made i ts conclu si on based on conjecture and not o n eviden ce, or ev en logic al i nference from the ev i dence. Th e Court finds that Commerce’s conclu si on that t he Heritage Court Bench’s prim ary use i s as a b edro om ches t is not support ed by sub stanti al evidenc e and mus t be remanded for furt her consi derat i on.Court No. 10-00352 Page 12 D

. Channels of Tr ade in Whi ch th e Product Is Sold Regar di ng the factor of chann els of trade in whi ch the product i s sold, Commerce deter mined that “the ev i dence regar ding this cri ter i on by itself i s not di sposi tive on the is sue” b ecaus e recor d evidenc e demonstrat es that the Her i tage Court Bench an d si mi lar pro ducts “are sold through different channels of trade from t hose used f or subject mer chand i se as w ell as through identi cal channels of tr ade as those used f or subject mer chand i se.” Remand R esults at 14-15. Plainti ff c lai med that “[w]hi le there may be some over lap between thi s ch annel of trade and the channel of trade for subject bedr oom furni ture, t he recor d establi shes that t he channels are not t he same” and that the Her i tage Court Bench an d si mi lar pro ducts are “ neveri denti fi ed as bedroo m ch ests and [ are], in stead, always grouped wi th ot her seating fu rniture.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 18 (emphasi s in origi nal). The Court agr ees wi th Plainti ff that, even if the Heritage Cour t Bench i s sold through ov erlappin g channels of tr ade for subject wooden bedroo m fu rniture, i t is sti ll seati ng furni ture, all o f wh i ch i s excluded. Therefor e, the Court remands thi s fac tor of the channels of tr ade to C ommerce to consi der all of the

recor d evidenc e.

E

. The Manner in Whic h the Product Is Dis played and Advertised Regar di ng the factor of the manner inwhi ch the product i s di splayed and adver tis ed, Commerce also deter mined that the r ecord was inconcl usi ve and thus not aCourt No. 10-00352 Page 13

di sposi tive factor. Remand R esults at 17. Co mmerce found that “the major i ty o f features adver tis ed about the Her i tage Court Bench are the ones of a subject chest” but acknowledged that “t he abi li ty t o use the chest for seatin g isalso adver tis ed and the product is labeled as a s tor age bench.” Id. at 17. Plainti ff advocated that “t he Heritage Court Bench i s mu ch m or e pro minently adve rt i sed as a b ench, an d not a chest,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11, and asserted t hat “the r ecord shows that stor age benches are a wi dely recog ni zed type o f bench that must be wi thi n the unquali fi ed exclusi on for all benches and seating furni ture,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 18. F urther , Plainti ff dec lared that“Commerce atte mpts to mi ni mi ze recor d evidenc e showing that t he Heritage Court Bench i s market ed and advert i sed as a b ench.” Id. The Court ag rees wi th Plainti ff. The subject ches t was never adv ert i sed as a chest; i t was advert i sed as s eating fu rniture or a sto rag e bench . Parsing the phrase “stor age bench,” the Courtanalyzes that “stor age” is merely an adjective that modifi es the noun “bench,” whi ch i s the focus of the phrase. The

recor d evidenc e supports Plainti ff’s as sertion that the Her i tage Court Bench i s i ndi sputably a bench in terms of i ts market ing. Consequently, t he Courtremands thi s factor o f the manner in whi ch the product i s di splayed and advert i sed for Commerce to fully reconsi der.

F. Remand of the (k) (2) Fact ors In i ts Remand R esults , Commerce conclud ed that t he recor d i s inconcl usi ve forCourt No. 10-00352 Page 14

the two factor s of (iv) channels of tr ade and (v) manner dis played and adver tis ed and there fore made its redeter minati on upon the thr ee factors of (i ) physi cal character i sti cs, (i i ) cu stomer ex pectations, and (i i i ) ulti mate use. Remand R esults at 17-18. However , Commerce conceded that ther e was “n o direct eviden ce on the recor d”for t he factors of (i i ) cu stomer ex pectations and (i i i ) ulti mate use. Remands R esults at 8, 10. The Court finds that Commerce’s Remand R esults reg ardin g the (k)(2) factors are based on conjecture and assum ption, not based on evi dence in the recor d. Contr ary to its asserti on that it “pro vided a robust explanati on concerni ng how i t wei ghed the confli cti ng evidenc e i n thi s cas e,” Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Comments Concerni ng Remand Results (“D ef.’s Reply”) at 6, the Co urt fin ds that Commerce merely reg urgitated its

or i gin al conclu si ons from the Fin al Scope Ru ling wi thout t he requi si te “r easoned analysi s

or explanation for [i ts] deci si on” or dered by t he Courti n Legacy I and requi red by Wheat land Tube, 161 F.3d at 1369. Accordi ngly, si mi lar to the re sults in Legacy I , the Cour t finds that the recor d evidenc e does not support Commerce’s conclu si ons that the factor s un der 19 C.F .R. § 351.225(k)(2)( i -i i i ) are wi thi n the scope of the or der. F urther , consi dering the (k)(2) factors—19 C.F.R . § 351.225(k)(2)( vi- v)—that C ommerce found to be i nconcl usi ve, the Court cannot find that Commerce t ook i nto account “the breadt h of the recor d evidenc e” as instructed i n Legacy I, 807 F. S upp. 2d at 1358. Therefore, Co mmerce’sCourt No. 10-00352 Page 15

redet ermin ation that the Heritage Co urt Bench i s wi thi n the scope bas ed on the (k)(2) factors i s un sus tain able and m ust be s et asi de. The cas e i s remanded for a second ti me for consi derat i on of the (k)(2) fac tor s. II. Rec onsideration of the (k)(1) Factors Gi ven that the Heritage Co urt Bench appears to fall both in and out of the scope language, maki ng scope determinati on a vex ed questi on for C ommerce, the Co urt ret urns to the basi cs of a s cope deter minati on and reconsi ders the fi rst step, t he (k)(1) factors, speci fi cally taking another lo ok at the scope language of the antidum ping or der. The Court’ s goal is to e nsu re t hat the fi nal determin ation i s arrived at thr ough tho ro ugh and proper consi derat i on of the r ecord, whi ch di d not happen here, by bot h thi s Court i n i ts or i gin al deci si on and by Commerce i n i ts prev i ous determin ations . The Court may reconsi der its dec i si on i n an interim order “pur suan t to i ts gener al authority, whi ch i s recognized b y US CIT Rule 54, to r econsi der a non-final order prior to enter i ng fi nal judgment.” Union S teel v. Uni ted States , 36 CIT ___, 836 F. S upp. 2d 1382, 1394 ( 2012); USCI T R. 54(b)

. Upon further consi derat i on, part i cularly the way the speci fi c exclus i on 4 i nteracts wi th the g eneral in clus i on, the Co urt is no longer convin ced that the (k)(1)

USCI T Rule 54(b), in per tinent part, provides: 4 [A] ny order or other decision, howeve r designated, that adjudicate s few er than all the claims or the rights and liabiliti es of few er than all the parties does not end the action as to a ny of the claims or pa

rties and may be revised at any time be fore the entry of a judgment adjudicatingall the claims and theparties rights a nd liabiliti es.Court No. 10-00352 Page 16

factors are no n-di sposi tive.

In a scope determin ation, the plain language of the o rder clari fi es wh ether the i tem at is sue i s un ambi guously i nclu ded or e xcluded in the scope. Novosteel SA v. United S tat es , 284 F.3d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It is well-es tabli shed that the

corner stone inany scope determinati on i s the language of the o rder i tself. Walgreen Co. of Deerfiel d, IL v. Uni ted States , 620 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Commerce may not i mpermi ssi

bly expand the scope of the or der. Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. Un ited States , 254 F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Iss ues regar ding scope aris e becaus e “the descri ptions of subject mer chand i se contai ned in [Commerce’s] d eter minati ons mus t be written i n gener al ter ms.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a). Acc or dingly, scope i nclu si ons are written i n gener al ter ms an d then speci fi c exclus i ons are carv ed out fro m the gener al ter ms. Some exclusi ons are quali fi ed and some are not. In Legacy I

, thi s Court no ted that the Fin al Scope Ru lingdeter mined that the “Heritage Cour t Bench had character i sti cs of b oth a chest—whi ch w ould be inclu ded wi thi n the scope of the or der—and also a bench —whi ch w ould be excluded fro m the

or der.” Legacy I

, 807. F. S upp. 2d at 1356. Whi le arg uably falling under a residu al defini tion of a ch est wi thi n the gener al sc ope language, t he Heritage Court Bench i s unamb i guously a bench or seati ng furni ture as li sted i n the scope exclus i ons. WBF Orderat 332; see also Remand Res ults at 3, Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Commerce acknowledged t hatCourt No. 10-00352 Page 17

the WBF Orderdefines chests bu t not bench es. Remand R esults at 3. Analyzing the scope language, only cer tainspeci fi ed ches ts are inc luded in the scope, bu t all benches —i n fac t all seati ng furni ture—ar e unequi vo cally excluded fro m the scope. WBF Order at 332. Becaus e the scope language of an or der star ts wi th gener al inclu si ons and then carves out speci fi c exclus i ons, whena product is gener ally i nclu ded i n a resi dual prov i si on but yetspeci fi cally excluded fro m the scope, the spec i fi c sh ould trump the gener al. The pu rpose o f the explic i t ex clus i ons i s to narr ow the expanse of the g eneral scope. Unequi vo cal exclus i ons are notloopholes; they are ar gued for and in tentionally omi tte d from the scope. Wheat land Tube, 161 F.3d at 1371. To “allo w Commerce to

asses s anti dumping duti es on products intentionally omi tte d from the ITC’s in jury i nvestigati on” would “frustrate t he purpose of the antidu mping laws.” Id . (ci tin g 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994) (requi ring an injury deter minati on by the I TC before the imp osi tion of antid umping duti es). In the in stant case, P lai nti ff as serts that t he product at iss ue i s a “storag e bench ” whi le Commerce aver s that i t is a “bedroo m ch est.” The sc ope language i nclu des various types of “ch ests.” Commerce argues the Her i tage Court Bench f alls under the gener al categor y of chest, whi ch i s the fi fth enumerated i tem of subject merchandi se und er t he sc ope language in the WBF Order : (5) chests-on- ches ts, hi ghboys, lowboys, ches ts of drawers, chests, door chests, ch i ffoni ers, hutches an d armoires. WBFCourt No. 10-00352 Page 18

Orderat 332 (emphasi s added) . Ever y chest li sted under numb er five inclu des a foot note, whi ch provides a n arr ative defini tion of the type o f ch est that is c ov ered. Commerce deter mined that the Her i tage Court Bench fi ts under the followi ng defini tion: A ches t i s typical ly a case pi ece taller th a n it is wid e featurin g a seri es of drawers and wi th or wi thout o ne o r mo re door s for stor ing clothi ng. The pi ece can ei ther i nclu de drawers or be desi gned as a large box i ncorpor atin g a li d. Id . at 332, n.5. Loo kin g at t he plain language, the Co urt not es that the Her i tage Court Bench i s not “a case pi ece taller t han i t is wi de featurin g a series of drawers.” Commerce deter mined, however, t hat the Her i tage Court Bench fi ts squarely i n the last phrase “desi gned as a large box i ncorpor atin g a lid .” Remand R esults at 4. Whi le the Court agr ees that the shape of the Her i tage Court Bench resemb les a large box , Plainti ff has plac ed on the r ecord t hat the Her i tage Court Bench i s desi gned as seati ng furni ture i n the shape of a large box . Furt her, the Co urt not es that the plainreading of footnot e 5 requires that a “case pi ece” be taller than it i s wi de, whi ch does not encompas s the Heritage Cour t Bench, and then b e desi gned as a large box i ncorpor atin g a lid , whi ch gener ally describes the Heri tage Court Bench. Moreo ver , the Cour t not es that the “lid” i s actuall y a padded leather benchdesi gned as seating furni ture. Whi le i t ambi guously fi ts under the quali fi ed defini tion of ch est found in foot note 5, t he Heritage Court Bench u nambi guously fi ts under the unquali fi ed ter mCourt No. 10-00352 Page 19

“bench es.” The s cope speci fi cally excludes bench es, li sted as the thi rd item un der t he fi rst ex clus i on: “(1) Seats, chai rs, bench es, couches, s ofas, sofa b eds, stools and other seati ng furni ture.” WBF Orderat 332 (emphasi s added) . The thi rd enumerated item under the fi rst ex clus i on i s “benches” and there i s even a basket pro vis i on for all o ther kin ds of “seating furni ture” under t he sc ope ex clus i ons, whi ch hi ghli ghts the intenti on that all seating fu rniture i s to be excluded from the scope. Id. The exclus i on of sofabeds prov i des insi ght t hat the k ey t o the seating furni ture ex clus i on i s that an i tem—whether

or not it has a typi cal bedroom-type functi on—have a seating fun cti on. Plainti ff pointed out t hat “the ex clus i on for benches (an d other seati ng furni ture) wi thi n the scope of the WBF Or der is unqual i fi ed” and argued that“Commerce cannot seek now to i nterpr et the WBF O rder contrar y to i ts plain terms.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Plainti ff proffered that “all the physi cal features of the Heritage Cour t Bench are consi stent wi th that o f a bench, and that the cedar-lin ed stor age ar ea i s merely one featur e i t shares i n common w i th some storag e furni ture.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The Cour t agr ees. Commerce stated t hat i t “has determined in the past that additi onal features that do not change the pr i mary natur e of an ‘i n-s cope’ pro duct do not serv e to move that pr oduct outsi de of the scope of the or der.” Remand R esults at 5 (quotat i ons omi tte d) (c i tin g Color Television R eceiver s from Taiwan: Notice of Final Sc ope Rulin g Couch Mast er International Corporat ion , 63 Fed. Reg . 805, 806 (Jan. 7, 1998) (“ Color TVs ”)).Court No. 10-00352 Page 20

However , Color TVs involv ed a product that was “n ei ther speci fi cally inclu ded . . . nor excluded” wh i le the pro duct in the i nstant case i s sp eci fi cally excluded fro m the scope. 63 Fed. Reg . at 806. Therefor e, Color TVs does not support Commerce’s posi tion. When a product is “speci fi cally excluded fro m the anti dumping duty o rder , that o rder could not be in ter pret ed to cov er it.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United S tates , 219 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Ci r. 2000) (explai ning the holding of Wheat land Tube ). Whi le thi s Court o riginally sus tain ed Commerce’s deter minati on that t he (k)(1) factors are no t dis posi tive i n Legacy I , upon rev i ew of the Remand R esults and upon further consi derat i on, this Court remands thi s cas e for Co mmerce to r econsi der t he appli cati on of both t he (k)(1) and (k)(2) factors becaus e Commerce’s Remand R esults that the Heritage Co urt Bench falls wi thi n the scope are notsupp or ted by ev i dence on the

recor d. The Court ins tr ucts Commerce to fully and objectively reconsi der t he recor d, make redet ermin ations based on the eviden ce in the recor d, and cons i stent wi th this opin i on, and not mere ly re peat the o riginal conc lusi ons from the Fin al Scope Ru ling

. C O N C L U S I O N For the for ego ing reasons, i t is hereby ORDERED that Co mmerce’s determi nati on that Leg acy’s Heri tage Court Bench f alls w i thi n the scope of the WBF Orderi s SET ASIDE, and i t is further

ORDERED that Co mmerce’s determi nati on that t he factors set out in 19 C.F.R.Court No. 10-00352 Page 21

§ 351.225(k)(1) are not dis posi tive of thi s sc ope dete rmi nati on i s reopened for reconsi derat i on, and i t is further

ORDERED that t hi s cas e i s remanded to Co mmerce wi th i nstructi ons to make a redet ermin ation that reconsi ders scope language under 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) in li ght o f the Court ’s opini on, and i t is further

ORDERED that t hi s cas e i s remanded to Co mmerce wi th i nstructi ons to make a redet ermin ation that reconsi ders each of the factors set out in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) i n li ght o f the Court ’s opi ni on, and i t is further

ORDERED that t he results of thi s redeter minati on on r emand s hall be fi led no later than Thursday, November 15, 2012 , and i t is further

ORDERED that Plai nti ff m ay fi le comments on s uch Remand R esults , not t o exceed 20 pages, and that such c omments sh all be fi led no later than Thursday, December 13, 2012, and i t is further

ORDERED that Defendant may fi le a reply t o Plai nti ff’s c omments, not to exceed 15 pages, and that such reply shall b e fi led no later than Thursday, January 10, 2013. /s/ Gregor y W. Car man Grego ry W. Carman, Judge Dated: Sept ember 19, 2012

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