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SJC-11858

COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBINSON TEJEDA.

Suffolk. September 10, 2015. - December 2, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 

Hines, JJ.

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Joint Enterprise. Robbery.

Home Invasion. Practice, Criminal, Required finding,

Motion for a required finding.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on April 27, 2012.

The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a 

motion for a required finding of not guilty was heard by her.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 

direct appellate review. 

Dana Alan Curhan (Robert S. Sinsheimer with him) for the 

defendant.

Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.

GANTS, C.J. The primary issue in this appeal is whether a 

defendant who joins with others to commit an armed robbery may 
2

be found guilty of murder on the theory of felony-murder for the 

killing of his accomplice by someone resisting the armed 

robbery. We conclude that he may not.

Background. We recite the facts in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our 

analysis of the issues raised on appeal. On January 14, 2012, 

the defendant and two friends, Christopher Pichardo and Stephane 

Etienne, met with Frederick Reynoso, who was to sell them onehalf pound of marijuana for $2,200. Together, they traveled in 

a vehicle the defendant had borrowed from his girl friend to a 

residence in the Dorchester section of Boston, where the 

transaction was to take place. Pichardo, Etienne, and Reynoso 

entered the home through a basement door; the defendant remained 

outside in the parked vehicle. Reynoso's cousin, Jonathan 

Santiago, was waiting for them in the basement. Once inside, 

Santiago weighed the marijuana, placed it into eight one-ounce 

bags, and handed the bags to Pichardo. Pichardo told Santiago 

that Etienne would pay him for the marijuana. Etienne dropped 

his cellular telephone to distract Santiago, and Pichardo then 

pulled out a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun from his 

waistband and told Santiago, "You know what time it is." 

Reynoso responded by pulling out his own .32 caliber revolver,

and a gun battle between Pichardo and Reynoso followed in which 
3

shots were fired from both weapons. A bullet struck Pichardo on 

the right side of his chest.

Etienne and Pichardo attempted to leave the basement, but 

Pichardo collapsed while still inside. Etienne took Pichardo's

firearm and cellular telephone, as well as the marijuana, and

ran to the defendant's vehicle, which was parked around the 

corner. Etienne and the defendant then returned to the basement 

and attempted to carry Pichardo back to the vehicle, but they 

were unable to lift his body. They ran back to the vehicle and 

left the scene. The defendant telephoned 911 from Pichardo's 

cellular telephone shortly thereafter to inform the police that 

Pichardo had been shot. Pichardo was taken from the scene by 

ambulance and was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at 

Boston Medical Center.

The police executed a search warrant on the Dorchester 

residence and recovered a home surveillance system that had 

captured a video recording of the exterior of the house, which 

showed the arrival of the defendant, Pichardo, Etienne, and 

Reynoso, and the aftermath of the shooting. The police later 

also executed a search warrant on the defendant's girl friend's 

vehicle and found approximately thirty bags of marijuana in the 

trunk.

A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in 

the second degree on the theory of felony-murder, with armed 
4

robbery as the underlying felony.1 The jury also convicted the 

defendant of the armed robbery of Santiago, in violation of 

G. L. c. 265, § 17; home invasion, in violation of G. L. c. 265,

§ 18C; and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in 

violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a).

2

The defendant, having earlier moved for a required finding 

of not guilty at the close of the evidence, moved after trial 

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on all his convictions. 

The judge allowed the motion for a required finding of not 

guilty on the felony-murder conviction, but denied the motion as 

to the remaining convictions, and later issued a carefully 

researched and reasoned memorandum of decision and order 

explaining her ruling. The Commonwealth appealed the judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict as to the felony-murder conviction; 

the defendant cross-appealed as to the surviving convictions.3 

 

1 The indictment alleged murder in the second degree, even 

though armed robbery is punishable by life in prison, G. L. 

c. 265, § 17, and, as the underlying felony, would support a 

conviction of felony-murder in the first degree. The judge 

ruled that the Commonwealth's decision to charge the defendant 

with murder in the second degree did not preclude armed robbery 

as the underlying felony. The defendant does not challenge this 

ruling on appeal.

2 The defendant was found not guilty of the armed robbery of

Frederick Reynoso, and of carrying a firearm without a license.

3 Although the defendant's cross appeal encompasses all 

three of the surviving convictions, the defendant does not 

challenge in his brief his conviction of possession of marijuana 
5

We allowed the parties' joint application for direct appellate 

review.

Discussion. 1. Felony-murder. Under our common law of 

joint venture, a defendant is guilty of armed robbery if he or 

she knowingly participated in the commission of the crime with 

the required intent, and either was armed himself or herself or 

knew that an accomplice was armed. See Commonwealth v. Benitez, 

464 Mass. 686, 689 & n.4 (2013). See generally Commonwealth v. 

Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466-468 (2009). If, during the course 

of that robbery, for instance, an accomplice were to shoot at a 

police officer who arrived on the scene but not kill the 

officer, the defendant could not be found guilty of the crime of 

assault with intent to murder a police officer unless the 

defendant knowingly participated with the accomplice in the 

shooting with the intent to kill, even if the assault were the 

natural and probable consequence of the armed robbery. See 

Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 308-309 (2013), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 306 (1973) ("We 'firmly 

rejected' the argument that a joint venturer should be liable 

for 'any crime committed by any of his partners which follows 

naturally and probably from the carrying out of the 

enterprise'"). However, if that same accomplice had shot and 

 

with intent to distribute. Therefore, we do not address that 

conviction.
6

killed the police officer during the course of the robbery, our 

common law recognizes an exception to the ordinary rule of joint 

venture criminal liability: the defendant could be found guilty 

of the police officer's murder on the theory of felony-murder,

even if the defendant did not knowingly participate in the 

shooting or intend to harm the police officer.

4 See Hanright, 

supra at 308-309; Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 

(1978), quoting Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 387, 392 

(1926) ("it is no defence for the associates engaged with others 

in the commission of a robbery, that they did not intend to take 

life in its perpetration, or that they forbade their companions 

to kill").

The felony-murder exception to the ordinary rule of joint 

venture liability incorporates two implicit premises. The first 

is constructive malice: the substitution of "the intent to 

commit the underlying felony for the malice aforethought 

required for murder." See Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 

 

4 Felony-murder liability also extends to accidental deaths 

occurring during the course of an underlying felony so long as 

the death was a natural and probable consequence of the unlawful 

activity. For example, if the police officer in the 

hypothetical scenario above were to suffer a fatal heart attack 

from the stress of being confronted by armed robbers, the joint 

venturers could be found guilty of felony-murder. See 

Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 668 (2004) ("If [the 

victim] had died of fright while the defendant was robbing him, 

the defendant would be responsible for murder"); Commonwealth v. 

Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151-52 (1983) (felony-murder applies where 

victim was killed by accidental discharge of gun).
7

259, 271 (1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480 

(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 

(1982). The second is vicarious criminal liability for every 

act resulting in death committed by a joint venturer in 

furtherance of the joint venture, that is, the act of one is 

treated as the act of all. See Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 

Mass. 658, 668 (2004); Commonwealth v. Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 

93-94 (1955). These two legal constructions have defined 

felony-murder since it was first articulated in English common 

law in the Eighteenth Century. See Rex v. Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 

1103, 1105 (K.B. 1701) ("if divers persons be engaged in an 

unlawful act, and one of them kills another, it shall be murder 

in all the rest" provided that "[t]he killing must be in 

pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral to it"); 4 W.

Blackstone, Commentaries *200 (" if two or more come together to 

do an unlawful act against the king's peace, of which the 

probable consequence might be bloodshed; . . . and one of them 

kills a man; it is murder in them all, because of the unlawful 

act, . . . or evil intended beforehand"). See generally Binder, 

The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 

59, 88-98 (2004).

In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541, 543 (1863), the 

Commonwealth sought to expand the scope of felony-murder by 

claiming that a defendant should be vicariously responsible for 
8

the act of someone who was not a joint venturer during the 

commission of the underlying felony. In Campbell, the defendant 

had participated in a draft riot during the Civil War where a 

person was shot and killed, but the evidence was unclear whether 

the fatal shot had been fired by one of the rioters "with whom 

the prisoner was acting in concert," or by a soldier inside the 

armory who was resisting the attack by the rioters. Id. The 

Commonwealth sought a jury instruction that the defendant may be 

found guilty of homicide regardless of who fired the shot. Id. 

We rejected the Commonwealth's argument, declaring, "[n]o person 

can be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually 

or constructively his, and it cannot be his act in either sense 

unless committed by his own hand or by some one acting in 

concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or 

purpose." Id. at 544. We explained:

"The real distinction is between acts which a man does 

either actually or constructively, by himself or his agents 

or confederates, and those which were done by others acting 

not in concert with him or to effect a common object, but 

without his knowledge or assent, either express or implied. 

For the former the law holds him strictly responsible, and 

for all their necessary and natural consequences, which he 

is rightfully deemed to have contemplated and intended. 

For the latter he is not liable, because they are not done 

by himself or by those with whom he is associated, and no 

design to commit them or intent to bring about the results 

which flow from them can be reasonably imputed to him."
9

Id. at 546.5

A century later, this court reaffirmed the principle that 

vicarious liability in felony-murder is limited to the acts 

resulting in death committed by a joint venturer. Commonwealth

v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 515 (1965), S.C., 370 Mass. 585 

(1976). In Balliro, the defendants broke and entered a home in 

the night with the intent to commit an assault with a dangerous 

weapon, but the police were waiting for them inside, and a 

gunfight resulted in which a mother and her son were killed. 

Id. at 508-510. Over the defendants' objection, the judge 

instructed the jury that, if the defendants "entered and shot 

first," the death of the two victims was "imputable to these 

defendants and they are guilty of murder." Id. at 511. The 

judge denied the defendants' request for an instruction that 

they could not be found guilty unless it were proved that the 

 

5 The principle that a defendant is responsible for the acts 

of a joint venturer that are committed in furtherance of the 

joint venture has an evidentiary counterpart in our law of 

vicarious admissions, which admits in evidence the statements of 

a joint venturer that are made during the course of and in 

furtherance of the joint venture, and treats them as if they 

were statements made or adopted by the defendant. See

Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 (2012). See 

generally Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2015). The 

justification for admitting what would otherwise be hearsay is 

that each joint venturer is an agent of the others in seeking to 

accomplish the goals of the joint venture, see Bright, supra, 

and there is a "community of activities and interests" within 

the agency relationship that "justifies exposing one coventurer 

to the risk of being incriminated by the utterances of another." 

Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 712 (1976).
10

bullets that caused the deaths of the victims were fired by one 

of the defendants, and not by the police. Id. at 511-512. We 

noted that our Campbell opinion "appear[ed] to have become the 

leading case on the subject and has generally been followed in 

other jurisdictions." Id. at 513, citing People v. Washington, 

62 Cal. 2d 777 (1965); Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641 (1888); 

Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97 (1905); People v. Wood, 8 

N.Y.2d 48 (1960); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658 (1924). After 

carefully examining the relevant case law, we reaffirmed the 

rule in Campbell, "which has been the law of this Commonwealth 

for more than one hundred years," and declared that a defendant 

cannot be found guilty of felony-murder "for the death of any 

person killed by someone resisting the commission of the 

felony." Id. at 515. We therefore concluded that the judge 

erred in his instructions to the jury and in declining to give 

the defendants' requested instructions. Id.

Now, more than fifty years after our Balliro opinion, the 

Commonwealth again asks us to expand the scope of felony-murder 

by expanding the scope of vicarious liability to make every 

joint venturer criminally responsible for every act that results 

in death that is proximately caused by the underlying felony. 

Under the Commonwealth's "proximate cause theory," a joint 

venturer would be vicariously liable for an act resulting in 

death even if it were committed by a person who was resisting 
11

the underlying felony or attempting to apprehend the persons 

committing it, provided that resistance or an attempt to 

apprehend would be reasonably foreseeable by a person initiating 

the underlying felony, which it always would be. The 

Commonwealth concedes, correctly, that the majority of other 

States follow what has become known as the "agency theory" of 

felony-murder under which the act causing death must be 

committed in furtherance of the joint venture by the defendant

or someone acting in concert with him or her.6 See W.R. LaFave, 

Criminal Law § 14.5(d), at 793-794 (5th ed. 2010) (citing cases 

and noting that "it is now generally accepted that there is no 

felony-murder liability when one of the felons is shot and 

killed by the victim, a police officer, or a bystander"

[footnotes omitted]). The Commonwealth asks that we join the 

minority of jurisdictions that impose felony-murder according to 

the "proximate cause theory." See, e.g., State v. Wright, 379 

So. 2d 96, 96 (Fla. 1979); People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 

465 (1997); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 434-436 (1994).7

 

6 We note that, in contrast to Massachusetts, many States 

set out the substantive definition of felony-murder by statute, 

requiring, at least in part, a statutory analysis not applicable 

in Massachusetts. See, e.g., Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 337-

342 (Del. 2009); People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309, 315-317 

(1993); State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 435, 436 (1994).

7 The Commonwealth also notes that, in Santiago v. 

Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 39, 43-44 & n.5 (1998) (Santiago II), we 

expressed "grave doubt as to the continuing validity of the 
12

As noted earlier, the common law of felony-murder is 

already an exception to our law of joint venture in that it 

deems the intent to commit the underlying felony as a substitute 

for the intent generally required for murder, and makes every 

joint venturer vicariously liable for the acts of his or her 

accomplices that result in death and that are committed in 

furtherance of the joint venture. Indeed, for these reasons the 

common law of felony-murder is an exception to two basic 

principles of our criminal jurisprudence. See Hanright, 466 

Mass. at 309 ("the felony-murder rule operates according to a 

unique set of principles"). First, generally we require proof 

of a defendant's intent to commit the crime charged, and do not 

conclusively presume such intent from the intent to commit 

 

principle set forth in [Commonwealth v.] Campbell," 7 Allen 541 

(1863), that a defendant may not be found guilty of murder 

unless the defendant or a joint venturer committed the killing. 

In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 503 (1997), S.C.,

427 Mass. 298 (1998) and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 

1003 (1998) (Santiago I), we held that "where the defendant 

chooses to engage in a gun battle with another with the intent 

to kill or do grievous bodily harm and a third party is killed, 

the defendant may be held liable for the homicide even if it was 

the defendant's opponent who fired the fatal shot." In Santiago 

I, however, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of murder in 

the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, not 

on the theory of felony-murder. See id. at 502, 505. The court 

in Santiago II specifically emphasized that "Santiago I does not 

contemplate holding the juvenile liable for his opponent's acts 

on a joint venture theory," but rather states that "the juvenile 

may be found delinquent for his own act, namely, engaging in the 

shootout that caused the victim's death" (emphasis in original). 

Santiago II, supra, at 44 n.4. The "grave doubt" expressed by 

the Court in Santiago II must be considered in this context.
13

another crime. See, e.g., id. at 308-309 ("The intent to commit 

armed robbery, although sufficient to support liability for 

felony-murder on a theory of joint venture, is insufficient to 

support liability for" additional offenses against other 

surviving police officers who attempted to apprehend

accomplice); Richards, 363 Mass. at 302, 307-308 (defendant who 

was waiting near getaway car in armed robbery may be found 

guilty of assault with intent to murder police officer committed 

by accomplice only if defendant had specific intent to kill 

police officer).

Second, generally "[o]ne is punished for his own 

blameworthy conduct, not that of others." Richards, supra at 

306, quoting Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 48 (1965). 

Only where a dangerous felony results in death do we adopt a 

principle that we otherwise have "firmly rejected" -- that a 

person who knowingly participates in one crime as part of a 

joint venture is "ipso facto also guilty" of all other crimes

committed by an accomplice in furtherance of the joint venture. 

Richards, supra. See Hanright, 466 Mass. at 307-310, quoting 2 

W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.3(b), at 362-363 (2d 

ed. 2003) ("we remain committed to the view that . . . A's guilt 

as an accomplice to one crime should not per se be a basis for 

holding A accountable for a related crime merely because the 

latter offense was carried out by A's principal"). Contrast 
14

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-647 (1946)

(conspirator is criminally responsible for all substantive 

offenses committed by coconspirators in furtherance of 

conspiracy).

Adoption of the Commonwealth's proximate cause theory would 

essentially cause our law of felony-murder to depart even 

further from the second basic principle: it would extend 

vicarious accomplice liability to acts that were not committed 

by accomplices, and that were committed not to further the joint 

venture but to thwart it. We need not decide here whether our 

common law of felony-murder should continue to be an exception 

to our basic principles of criminal jurisprudence, or whether we 

should join those who have abolished or redefined felonymurder.8,9 But we would need persuasive reasons to justify an 

 

8 We have criticized the felony-murder rule in the past for 

divorcing moral culpability from criminal liability and for the

harsh consequences it imposes for unintended or accidental 

killings. Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 

506-507 (1982) (noting that common-law felony-murder rule is of 

"questionable origin" and detailing limitations placed on 

doctrine by other jurisdictions).

9 Great Britain, the nation where the common law of felonymurder was born, has abolished felony-murder by statute, 

providing that "[w]here a person kills another in the course or 

furtherance of some other offence, the killing shall not amount 

to murder unless done with . . . malice aforethought . . . ." 

Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1. So have Hawaii 

and Kentucky. See 7A Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 707-701 commentary; 

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 1974 commentary. Michigan has 

abolished felony-murder under its common law. People v. Aaron, 

409 Mich. 672, 727-729 (1980). Other States have not abolished 
15

expansion of what is already an unusual doctrine. The reasons 

offered by the Commonwealth are not persuasive.

First, the Commonwealth contends that the proximate cause 

theory should be applied to the common law of felony-murder 

because it comports with the scope of liability in civil cases

and reflects the causation standard that would apply in a civil 

case brought by the decedent against the joint venturers.10 The 

purpose of civil liability, however, is to fairly compensate a 

plaintiff for injuries caused by the wrongful or negligent 

 

the doctrine but have significantly departed from the 

traditional formulation. See, e.g., State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 

573, 582 (1983) (holding that felony-murder requires proof of 

malice, but that malice can be inferred "from evidence presented 

that the defendant intentionally set in motion a chain of events 

likely to cause death or great bodily injury, or acted with 

extreme indifference to the value of human life"); Del. Code 

Ann. tit. 11, §§ 635, 636 (2007) (requiring defendant to act 

with recklessness, for murder in the first degree, or criminal 

negligence, for murder in the second degree); N.Y. Penal Law 

§§ 125.25(3), 125.27 (McKinney 2009) (setting forth affirmative 

defense where joint venturer rather than defendant commits act 

causing death). The Model Penal Code also has abandoned the 

traditional doctrine of felony-murder, requiring the homicide to 

be purposeful, knowing, or reckless in order to constitute 

murder, but providing for a rebuttable presumption of 

recklessness where the homicide occurred during the commission 

of certain felonies. Model Penal Code §§ 1.12(5), 210.2(1)(b) 

(1985). See also Matchett, 386 Mass. at 503 n.12.

10 We note that causation may also be an issue under the 

agency theory of felony-murder. To return to an earlier 

hypothetical scenario, if a police officer suffered a heart 

attack attributable to the stress of confronting armed robbers 

and died after receiving negligent medical care, the question 

whether there was a sufficient causal relationship between the 

joint venturers' act and the resulting death would arise under 

both the agency and proximate cause theories.
16

conduct of another. In light of that purpose, it is reasonable 

that, where a person is killed during the course of an armed 

robbery by someone seeking to resist it, the burden of loss 

should be imposed on those who committed the armed robbery and 

thereby set in motion the chain of events that proximately 

caused the death. In contrast, the purpose of criminal 

liability is to punish persons found culpable for their wrongful 

conduct, and that punishment is most severe when a person is 

found guilty of murder. Given the "fundamentally different 

purposes of criminal law and tort law," Commonwealth v. Godin, 

374 Mass. 120, 127 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978), 

and the extreme penalties and infamy associated with a 

conviction of murder, it is not reasonable to expand the scope 

of felony-murder to punish a defendant for conduct that neither 

the defendant nor an accomplice committed or intended. See 

Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 450-451 (1982) ("Tort law is 

primarily concerned with who shall bear the burden of loss, 

while criminal law is concerned with the imposition of 

punishment"); State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 226 (1977) ("Tort 

concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause have shallow 

relevance to culpability for murder in the first degree").

Second, the Commonwealth argues that, "[b]y holding 

defendants responsible for deaths caused when they engage in 

activities which are 'inherently dangerous to human life,' 
17

Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 651 (1982), we deter 

individuals from creating scenarios which may result in death." 

We doubt that persons contemplating a dangerous felony would be 

significantly deterred by the possibility that, if a person were 

to be killed by someone seeking to thwart or apprehend them, 

they might be found guilty of felony-murder. If they thought 

that they likely faced the risk of death from someone seeking to 

resist or arrest them, that risk would be the more potent 

deterrent. See Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781 ("An additional 

penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter 

robbery haphazardly at best").

Third, the Commonwealth contends that someone should be 

found guilty of murder for a violent death and, without the 

proximate cause theory of felony-murder, there is the risk that 

no one will be punished for the death of a bystander mistakenly 

shot by an armed robbery victim or by a police officer, because 

the victim and the police officer may have been justified in 

their use of force against the robbers. It is true that, in 

these circumstances, it is likely that no one will be found 

guilty of murder.

11 But that does not mean that the joint 

 

11 We acknowledge the possibility that, in circumstances

where a defendant committing an underlying felony engages in 

conduct so dangerous that "a reasonably prudent person would 

have known that, according to common experience, there was a 

plain and strong likelihood that death would follow," the 

Commonwealth might obtain a murder conviction based on the third 
18

venturers will escape punishment. Armed robbery is a life 

felony under Massachusetts law, see G. L. c. 265, § 17, and the 

death is likely to be treated as an aggravating factor by a 

judge imposing sentence on the armed robbery conviction. 

Moreover, a tragic death does not always justify a murder 

conviction; the law recognizes that a person is guilty of 

manslaughter, not murder, punishable by up to twenty years in 

prison rather than a life sentence, where the killing is 

committed intentionally under mitigating circumstances or 

unintentionally but recklessly. See G. L. c. 265, § 13. See 

also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 64-79 (2013). In 

circumstances where a defendant committing an underlying felony 

engaged in reckless conduct that "created a high degree of 

likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person," 

the Commonwealth might obtain an involuntary manslaughter 

conviction. Id. at 74.

More than fifty years ago, in Balliro, 349 Mass. at 515, we 

were presented with the same question that we are presented with 

today:

"The basic question is whether a felon can be held 

criminally liable for the death of any person killed by 

someone resisting the commission of the felony."

 

prong of malice. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 

669 n.14 (1998).
19

For the reasons stated, our answer is the same as it was in 

Balliro: "We hold that he cannot be." Id. We therefore affirm 

the judge's allowance of a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding 

the verdict regarding the conviction of felony-murder in the 

second degree.12

2. Sufficiency of the evidence of armed robbery and home 

invasion. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his convictions of armed robbery and home 

invasion, claiming that no reasonable jury could find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he knew that Pichardo and Etienne intended 

to rob the sellers of the marijuana or that either was armed. 

See Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 100 (2013) (where 

 

12 We recognize that the current model jury instructions 

regarding felony-murder promulgated by this court do not provide 

adequate guidance to a jury in the circumstances presented in 

this case. The trial judge in this case appropriately provided 

the jury with, in essence, the current model jury instruction on 

felony-murder, which instructs the jury that the Commonwealth 

must prove the defendant committed a felony, that the felony was 

inherently dangerous or committed with conscious disregard to 

human life, and that "the killing occurred during the commission 

or attempted commission of the underlying felony . . . [and] in 

connection with the felony and at substantially the same time 

and place." Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 54-56 (2013). 

Such an instruction would allow a jury to convict a defendant 

where, as here, a joint venturer is killed during the commission 

of a felony by a victim or other person resisting the felony, 

and therefore does not accurately state the law of felony-murder 

in the Commonwealth where there is an issue whether the victim 

was killed by a joint venturer or by a person seeking to resist 

or arrest. We shall revise the model jury instructions to 

address this issue. Until the revised instructions are 

published, we direct judges to depart from the model jury 

instruction regarding felony-murder to reflect the law as stated 

in this opinion.
20

element of offense is that perpetrator is armed, Commonwealth 

must prove that defendant knew that at least one joint venturer 

was armed); Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 466-467 (2009) (Commonwealth 

required to prove that defendant knowingly participated in crime 

charged with intent required for that offense). Rather, the 

defendant argues, the evidence was sufficient only to show that 

the defendant knew that he was driving Pichardo and Etienne to 

purchase marijuana.

When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required 

finding of not guilty, we must determine "whether the evidence 

offered by the Commonwealth, together with reasonable inferences 

therefrom, when viewed in its light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, was sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond 

a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the 

crime charged." Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005)

S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007), and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686 (1979), S.C.,

Commonwealth v. Doherty, 411 Mass. 95 (1991), cert. denied, 502 

U.S. 1094 (1992). Here, Alvin Bernardez, who described himself 

as Pichardo's "best friend" and "at one point" a friend of the 

defendant, testified that the defendant informed Bernardez of 

the circumstances surrounding Pichardo's death during a 

telephone call initiated by the defendant on the day after the 

killing and a subsequent in-person conversation. Bernardez 
21

testified that the defendant said that the defendant, Pichardo, 

and "another kid named Stephan" went to Dorchester "to catch a 

lick," and "it went wrong and [Pichardo] was shot." Bernardez 

explained that "catch a lick" was a slang term for a robbery. 

See Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 721, 729 (2002) 

(witness allowed to testify that he understood defendant's use 

of term "wet them up" to describe desire to kill). Bernardez 

testified that the defendant told him that "[t]hey went to rob 

someone for a couple of O's," which Bernardez later explained 

meant ounces of "weed." The defendant told Bernardez that 

"Stephan" set up the robbery, Pichardo was the "robber," and the 

defendant was the driver. Further, the defendant, in a 

videotaped interview with police, stated that he knew that 

Pichardo "ripped people off" to supplement his income from work, 

and that he had seen Pichardo with a few guns, although he 

denied seeing Pichardo with a gun on the day of the shooting.

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that the 

defendant knew that the plan to purchase marijuana from Reynoso 

was, in fact, a ruse to steal the marijuana and that he would be 

driving Pichardo and Etienne to and from the robbery. A 

reasonable jury could also infer that the defendant knew that 

Pichardo was armed, because he had earlier seen him with guns 

and knew that Pichardo's role was to be the "robber" who might 

need to use force to overcome any resistance by the drug 
22

sellers. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in 

the armed robbery and home invasion with the intent required for 

these offenses, and knew that Pichardo would be armed. See 

Commonwealth v. Chay Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 608-610 (1988) 

(knowing participation could be inferred from surrounding 

circumstances where defendant served as getaway driver). The 

defendant claims that his conversations with Bernardez only 

reflected what he knew after the shooting, not what he 

understood at the time of the offenses, but a jury reasonably 

could have rejected this interpretation based on Bernardez's 

description of the conversation, including Bernardez's assertion 

that the defendant "knew what the ride was for."

Conclusion. The judge's order allowing the defendant's 

motion for a required finding of not guilty on the indictment 

charging felony-murder in the second degree is affirmed, as is 

the judge's order denying the defendant's motion for a required

finding of not guilty on the remaining convictions.

So ordered.