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IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE ) 

AND TREATMENT OF ) 

KEVIN STRANG, ) No. SD36885 

a/k/a KEVIN D. STRANG, ) 

a/k/a KEVIN DAVID STRANG, ) Filed: June 8, 2021

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY 

Honorable Elizabeth A. Bock 

AFFIRMED 

Kevin David Strang (“Offender”) appeals his civil commitment as a sexually 

violent predator (“SVP”), under sections 632.480 – .525,1 on the ground that the trial 

court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case “due to the failure of the state to 

produce any witnesses or admissible, substantive evidence at the probable cause 

hearing[.]” Because Offender was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency, we affirm. 

Procedural Background 

Attached to the State’s petition was an end of confinement report prepared by 

Nena Kircher, Psy.D. (“Dr. Kircher”). The report concluded that Offender met the 

definition of a SVP, and Dr. Kircher referred Offender’s case to the Multidisciplinary 

Team. The members of the Multidisciplinary Team and the Prosecutor’s Review 

 

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 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 
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Committee provided sworn affidavits, all of which agreed with Dr. Kircher that Offender 

qualified as a SVP, and those affidavits were also attached to the petition. 

In his answer, Offender admitted some averments in the petition and denied 

others. 

At the probable cause hearing, the State announced that it would not be calling 

Dr. Kircher as a witness because “the statute doesn’t require it[. . . .] [The State is] 

proceeding on the petition under [section] 632.489.2.”2

 Offender argued that “the 

attachments . . . to the petition are not evidence, because the petition is not evidence, and 

by the rules of civil procedure the attachment of a document to a petition merely 

incorporates that into the petition itself. So, that in and of itself is not evidence of 

anything.” 

After hearing argument from the attorneys and conducting additional research, the 

trial court “allow[ed] the State to go forward on the pleadings” and found probable cause 

to believe that Offender was a SVP. The case was then tried to the court without a jury. 

The trial court found Offender to be a SVP and delivered him to the custody of the 

Department of Mental Health. 

Analysis 

Offender’s sole point claims the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion because it denied [Offender]’s motion to 

dismiss the petition in this case due to the failure of the state to produce 

any witnesses or admissible, substantive evidence at the probable cause 

hearing under [section] 632.489. This was error in that denying the 

motion to dismiss the petition denied [Offender] his due process rights, 

 

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 The statute provides that a person taken into custody upon the filing of an SVP petition is entitled to a 

probable cause hearing in which the court must determine the detainee’s identity and whether probable 

cause exists to believe that the person is a SVP. It further provides that “[t]he state may rely upon the 

petition and supplement the petition with additional documentary evidence or live testimony.” Section 

632.489.2(1), (2). 
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and right to present a defense, . . . in that although a respondent has 

limited rights at a probable cause hearing, he is not totally devoid of 

rights, and the procedures in this case amounted to a denial of a hearing in 

any meaningful sense. 

 We review the trial court’s denial of Offender’s motion to dismiss for an 

abuse of discretion. In re Care & Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 

S.W.3d 440, 450 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). 

In support of his point, Offender argues that allowing the State to proceed on the 

petition and its attachments alone: (1) deprived Offender of his statutory rights under 

section 632.489; (2) infringed his right to effective assistance of counsel; and (3) 

eliminated the State’s burden to demonstrate that it could make a submissible case, 

especially since Offender had denied some of the averments in the petition. 

Even if we were to presume, arguendo, that the probable cause hearing was 

deficient (a finding we do not make), Offender cannot prevail because, having been 

adjudged a SVP by trial, he did not suffer the prejudice necessary to demonstrate 

reversible error. 

If [Offender] received a meaningful hearing at trial, a deficiency at the 

probable cause determination cannot prejudice him . . . . The evidence 

necessary to establish probable cause was again presented, along with 

additional evidence, at trial, so [Offender] cannot say he did not receive a 

meaningful hearing during the SVP process. The probable cause 

determination based on the allegedly deficient evidence was supplanted by 

the jury’s verdict. That jury verdict came after opportunity to crossexamine witnesses, present his own evidence, and testify in his own 

defense.[3] 

 

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 The trial court’s findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict, and, as in a jury-tried case, we affirm 

its judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. McMeans, 201 S.W.3d 117, 118 (Mo. App. 

S.D. 2006). Here, Offender appeals only the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of 

probable cause – he does not claim that the judgment adjudicating him a SVP is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 
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In re D.N., 598 S.W.3d 108, 121-22 (Mo. banc 2020) (holding that “[t]he subsequent 

jury verdict finding [Offender] a sexual violent predator supplants the probable cause 

finding”). See also In re Care & Treatment of Martineau v. State, 242 S.W.3d 456, 460 

(Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (positing that the ultimate finding that the appellant is a SVP 

“beyond a reasonable doubt” would subsume an earlier probable-cause finding). 

Offender’s point is denied, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

JEFFREY W. BATES, P.J. – CONCURS 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCURS