alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### QIAN LI LIN, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION REVIEWS, Respondent.

No. 05-1701-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 12, 2006.

Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Drew H. Wrigley, United States Attorney, Rick L. Volk, Assistant United States Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for Respondent.

Present: JAMES L. OAKES, JON O. NEWMAN and ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Qian Li Lin petitions for review of an order of the BIA denying a motion to reopen Lin’s BIA proceedings. This Court reviews the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider for abuse of discretion. *See Kaur v. BIA,*418 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam); *Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

The BIA’s denial of Lin’s motion to reopen did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The BIA denied Lin’s appeal of the IJ’s decision in August 2000, and Lin filed his motion to reopen almost four years later, in June 2004. Because Lin’s second motion to reopen was filed over ninety days after “the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” the BIA correctly determined that the motion to reopen was untimely. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Furthermore, the BIA reasonably determined that it could not excuse the late filing of the motion to reopen because Lin failed to exercise due diligence on his own behalf. *See Iavorski v. U.S. INS,*232 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that a petitioner is required to demonstrate due diligence when seeking to toll the filing deadline for a motion to reopen). Lin argues on appeal that he had filed his motion to reopen shortly after implementation of the People’s Family Planning Law (“PFPL”), and the PFPL had only begun to be implemented in his hometown in early 2004. Although Lin asserted that he had been “told by [his] relatives in [his] hometown that since early 2004 the village cadres ha[d] held a number of meetings and [had] announced the new law several times,” Lin faded to submit any evidence or statements from relatives corroborating the 2004 date. The BIA, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in determining that, even if the enactment of the PFPL was considered a change in country conditions: (1) Lin should have filed his motion to reopen within a reasonable time after the PFPL’s September 2002 date of enactment; and (2) Lin’s filing of his motion to *72reopen in June 2004, almost two years after the PFPL had been enacted, was not reasonable.

Accordingly, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Having completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION**

 

I,George G. Usher, Chief Executive Officer of Polydex Pharmaceuticals Limited(the “Company”) do hereby certify that:

 

(1)           I have reviewed this quarterly reporton Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended October 31, 2003;

 

(2)           Based on my knowledge, this quarterlyreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

 

(3)           Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements and other financial information included in this quarterly report,fairly present in all material respects, the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the period presentedin this quarterly report;

 

(4)           The Company’s other certifyingofficer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a–14 and 15d–14)for the Company and we have:

 

(a)           designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material informationrelating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis quarterly report was being prepared;

 

(b)           evaluatedthe effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)           disclosedin this report any change in the Company’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the Company’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect theCompany’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

(5)           The Company’s other certifying officerand I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the Company’sauditors and the audit committee of the Company’s board of directors:

 

(a)           allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely 

 

----

 

affect the Company’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b)           anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the Company’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

Dated:  December 15, 2003

 

 
|   | /s/  George G. Usher        |   |
|--------|----------------------------------|--------|
|   | Chief  Executive Officer         |
|   | Polydex  Pharmaceuticals Limited |

 

----
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Tellabs, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the quarter ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Krish A. Prabhu, theChief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to and for purposesof 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)                                  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| ***/s/ Krish Prabhu***  |   |   |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|
| Krish Prabhu            |   |   |
| Chief Executive Officer |   |   |
| Date: May 9, 2006       |   |   |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Companyand will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

24

----
#### Clark *v.*The Ruth.

*(District Court, D. New Jersey.*

May 25, 1889.)

Pilots—Wages—Weight of Evidence.

Where the sole question arising upon a libel by a pilot for wages is as to when the charterers informed the libelant that he was to look to one of the charterers individually for payment, and the two charterers directly contradict the libelant, there being no other testimony on that point, the witnesses being equally worthy of credit, the weight of evidence is against the libelant.

In Admiralty. Libel for wages.

*Anson B. Stewart,*for libelant.

*Bedle, Muirheid & McGee,*for respondent.

Wales, J.

The libelant sues to recover a balance of wages alleged to be due to him for two months’ services as a pilot on board the Ruth. The contest is whether he has a lien on the vessel, or must look for payment to the person who employed him. He says that he was employed by Lamson, who acted as master, but that he did not sign any shipping articles, and that he rendered the services sued for. The defense is that he undertook the employment on a special contract, and on the personal credit of Lamson,—one of the charterers of the boat,—and without the knowledge of the owners. The testimony is made up of positive and contradicting assertions. The libelant admits that he knew before going on the boat the character of the business she was to be engaged in, but that he was ignorant of the precise terms of the agreement between Lamson and Leslie, who had jointly chartered her, until some time afterwards. Lamson and Leslie both, swear that before the libelant engaged as pilot, he was made fully acquainted with everything concerning the business, and that he was to receive his pay from Lamson. They also say that he was incompetent, and of no use as a pilot, except that the presence of a licensed pilot on board was required by law. The boat was unsuccessful, and her charterers ran in debt. The question of fact is narrowed to the single one as to the time when the libelant was informed of the terms of the agreement between Lamson and Leslie, and that he was to look to Lamson for his wages; and on this point, the parties to the contract, including Leslie, being the only witnesses, and all being entitled to equal credit, the weight of the evidence is against the libelant, and his libel must therefore be dismissed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  SYMBION, INC.
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Symbion, Inc. (the
"Company") for the year ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard E.
Francis, Jr., Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: March 14, 2006

                              /s/ Richard E. Francis, Jr.
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              Richard E. Francis, Jr.
                              Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
---

EXHIBIT 23.1

Consent of Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of Directors and
Stockholders of ACME Communications, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the registration statement (No. 333-86158) on Form S-8 of ACME
Communications, Inc. of our reports dated March 15, 2005, with respect to the consolidated
balance sheets of ACME Communications, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2004 and 2003, and the
related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders equity, and cash flows
for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2004, and all related
financial statement schedules, managements assessment of the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004, and the effectiveness
of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004, which reports
appears in the December 31, 2004, annual report on Form 10-K of ACME Communications, Inc

/s/ KPMG LLP Los Angeles, CaliforniaMarch
15, 2005
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2124 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Independent Agencies, 

Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation, Salaries and Expenses for 

fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Independent Agencies, Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation, Salaries and Expenses for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, HARRY S. TRUMAN 

5 SCHOLARSHIP FOUNDATION, SALARIES AND 

6 EXPENSES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

7 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

8 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail9 able for Independent Agencies, Harry S. Truman ScholarVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:04 Apr 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2124.IH H2124

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2124 IH

1 ship Foundation, Salaries and Expenses for fiscal year 

2 2024 may not exceed $1,000,000. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
PROMISSORY NOTE

Principal amount: $175,000                                  Date: March 26, 2001

FOR VALUE RECEIVED,  the undersigned hereby jointly and severally promise to pay
the order of Stratabase  the sum of One Hundred  Seventy Five  Thousand  Dollars
($). Said sum shall be paid in the following manner:

o        Upon sale of all or a portion  of the  undersigned's  stock  options in
         Stratabase,  proceeds shall immediately be payable to Stratabase, to be
         applied to the unpaid balance.

o        Outstanding  balance  shall be paid in full no later  than  April  1st,
         2003.

This note may be prepaid, at any time, in whole or in part, without penalty.

This note shall be at the option of any holder  thereof be  immediately  due and
payable upon the occurrence of any of the following:

1) Failure to make any payment due  hereunder  within on or before its due date.
2) Upon the death or incapacity of any of the undersigned.

The  undersigned  and all other  partied  to this note,  whether  as  endorsers,
guarantors  or  sureties,  agree to remain  fully bound until this note shall be
fully paid and waive demand,  presentment and protest and all notices hereto and
further  agree to remain  bound  notwithstanding  any  extension,  modification,
waiver,  or other indulgence or discharge or release of any obligor hereunder or
exchange,  substitution,  or release of any  collateral  granted as security for
this note. No  modification  or indulgence by any holder hereof shall be binding
unless  in  writing;  and any  indulgence  on any one  occasion  shall not be an
indulgence  for any other or future  occasion.  The rights of any holder  hereof
shall be cumulative and not necessarily successive.  This note shall take effect
as a sealed  instrument  and shall be  constructed,  governed  and  enforced  in
accordance with the laws of the province of British Columbia.

Witnessed:


/s/
-----------------------------------
Fred Coombs


-----------------------------------
Authorized signatory for Stratabase
#### In the Matter of State of New York, Respondent, v Terry P., Appellant.

[971 NYS2d 456]—

In a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 for the civil management of Terry E, a sex offender allegedly requiring civil management, Terry E appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), dated March 13, 2012, which, upon a finding that he suffers from a “mental abnormality” as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i), made after a nonjury trial, and upon a determination, made after a dispositional hearing, that he is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, granted the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The State of New York commenced this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 seeking civil management of the appellant. Following a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court found that the appellant suffers from a mental abnormality *935within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i). In addition, after a dispositional hearing, the Supreme Court determined that the appellant is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement.

The Supreme Court’s determination that the State demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the appellant suffers from a “mental abnormality” within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i) was warranted by the facts *(see Matter of State of New York v Kenneth T.,*106 AD3d 829 [2013], *lv granted*21 NY3d 863 [2013]; *Matter of State of New York v Robert B.,*106 AD3d 828 [2013]).

In addition, clear and convincing evidence supports the Supreme Court’s finding that the appellant is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement *(see Matter of State of New York v Kenneth T.,*106 AD3d 829 [2013]; *Matter of State of New York v Robert B.,*106 AD3d 828 [2013]; *Matter of State of New York v Brusso,*105 AD3d 1435 [2013]; *Matter of State of New York v Alfredo M.,*96 AD3d 1068 [2012]; *Matter of State of New York v Jemal M.,*91 AD3d 961 [2012]). Angiolillo, J.E, Chambers, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ, concur.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2334 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Bilateral Economic 

Assistance, Global Health Programs for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Bilateral Economic Assistance, Global Health Programs for 

fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, GLOBAL 

5 HEALTH PROGRAMS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail8 able for Bilaterial Economic Assistance, Global Health 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2334 IH

1 Programs for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed 

2 $3,117,450,000. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
#### Anthony Futia, Jr., et al., Appellants, v Westchester County Board of Elections et al., Respondents.

[971 NYS2d 704]—

In a hybrid action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that John Stipo is the elected “Town Committeeman, Republican Party, District #5, Town of North Castle, Westchester County, State of New York,” and proceeding pursuant to Election Law article 16, the plaintiffs/petitioners appeal, as limited by their brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Tolbert, J.), dated October 26, 2012, which, among other things, denied the declaratory relief requested with respect to John Stipo.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that John Stipo is not the elected Town Committeeman, Republican Party, District #5, Town of North Castle, Westchester County, State of New York.

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs/petitioners’ request for a judgment declaring that John Stipo is the elected “Town Committeeman, Republican Party, District #5, Town of North Castle, Westchester County, State of New York.” Under the circumstances of this case, Stipo’s designating petition was a nullity *(see Matter of Fischer v NYS Bd. of Elections,*98 AD3d 1067, 1068 [2012]). Although the plaintiffs/petitioners contend that the defendants/respondents violated their rights to, inter alia, due process and equal protection, those contentions were presented to the Supreme Court in a wholly conclusory manner *959
      *(see Huntington Yacht Club v Incorporated Vil. of Huntington Bay,*1 AD3d 480, 482 [2003]), and are without merit *(see Matter of Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs.,*13 NY3d 475, 494 [2009]). Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs/ petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of Election Law § 2-106 (3), nothing in the record indicates that they provided the requisite notice to the Attorney General *(see*Executive Law § 71 [3]; *Matter of McGee v Korman,*70 NY2d 225, 231-232 [1987]).

Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that John Stipo is not the elected Town Committeeman, Republican Party, District #5, Town of North Castle, Westchester County, State of New York *(see Lanza v Wagner,*11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], *appeal dismissed*371 US 74 [1962], *cert denied*371 US 901 [1962]). Mastro, J.P, Hall, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 31.1
 Certification
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15(d)-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a  15(f) and 15(d)  15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
    /s/  Charles KoppelmanPrincipal Executive Officer
1

The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 06-3139

________________

Richard Anthony Kaminsky, also

known as Richard Anthony

Kaminsky, D.O., also known as Dr.

Richard Anthony Kaminsky,

Appellant,

v.

Saint Louis University School of

Medicine,

Appellee.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Eastern District of Missouri.

 [UNPUBLISHED]

________________

Submitted: May 14, 2007

 Filed: June 26, 2007

________________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

________________

PER CURIAM.

Dr. Richard Kaminsky appeals the district court's1

 adverse grant of summary

judgment in his Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and Title VII
-2-

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17, suit against Saint

Louis University School of Medicine (SLU). Upon careful de novo review, see

Ferguson v. United States, 484 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 2007), we find no reversible

error of fact or law. Even if Dr. Kaminsky had been able to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination, SLU proffered sufficient nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions that Dr. Kaminsky failed to rebut as pretextual. See Freeman v. Fahey, 374

F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm based upon the district court's

well-reasoned and thorough order. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

______________________________