[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-12427

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cv-62836-BB

ANGEL LOPEZ, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(July 19, 2018)

Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Florida prisoner Angel Lopez appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. Lopez contends his trial counsel’s choice of 

an insanity defense was unreasonable. He asserts the evidence supported a theory 

of self-defense, and his counsel was ineffective in choosing a defense strategy.

1

 

After review,2

we affirm the district court. 

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be 

granted habeas relief unless the state court’s decision on the merits was 

(1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) . . . based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because the state 

appellate court affirmed without discussion Lopez’s claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to develop and utilize the defense of self-defense, we “look 

 1 The district court granted Lopez a certificate of appealability as to all of the grounds he 

raised in his § 2254 petition. On appeal, however, Lopez limits his arguments to his counsel’s 

ineffectiveness regarding his choice of defense. 

2

 We review the district court’s denial or grant of a § 2254 habeas petition de novo. 

McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claims are mixed questions of law and fact, which we review de novo. Id. The standard of 

review is “doubly deferential” when a Strickland claim is evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) 

standard. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). “The question is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect 

but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

 

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through” to the state post-conviction court’s denial of Lopez’s Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion as the state court decision on the merits. See 

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (explaining if the last state court to 

decide a prisoner’s federal claim does not set out its reasons for denying the 

prisoner’s claim, we “look through” to the last related state-court decision that 

provides a relevant rationale). We presume the unexplained state court decision 

adopted the same reasoning unless the State rebuts that presumption. Id. 

To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must 

show (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). “To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light 

of prevailing professional norms at the time the representation took place.” 

Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(quotation marks omitted). Prejudice is a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is one sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. It is not enough for the defendant to 

show the error had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Id.

at 693. 

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The district court did not err in denying Lopez’s § 2254 petition because the

state post-conviction court’s denial of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The state post-conviction trial 

court’s determination that trial counsel’s decision to argue both self-defense and 

insanity did not prejudice Lopez because the evidence did not support a 

meritorious self-defense theory alone was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The evidence Lopez points to on appeal does not establish he was in 

imminent fear of danger at the time of the shooting. See Pinkney v. Sec’y, DOC, 

876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Under Florida law a person is justified in 

using deadly force if he reasonably believes that it is necessary to prevent 

imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another.” (quotation marks 

omitted)). Even if the evidence supports that Lopez rationally believed he was in 

danger in the parking lot and while he was leaving the parking lot, he did not shoot 

Yahtavian Bellamy at that time. The evidence did not establish a rational fear of 

harm at the relevant time that Lopez pulled alongside Bellamy’s car, shooting into 

it several times. Lopez himself testified that he could not recall shooting into 

Bellamy’s car, thus making a self-defense theory nearly impossible to prove in the 

absence of Lopez’s inability to rationalize what he was thinking at the time of the 

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shooting. Additionally, in concluding the state court did not unreasonably apply 

Strickland, the district court did not err in ascribing more weight to Deputy Scott

Popick’s and Brandon Burton’s testimony over Erika Jayska’s testimony. Jayska’s

testimony, even if strongly credited, cannot overcome Burton’s and Popick’s, due 

to her limited visibility from the rearview mirror and her incomplete picture of the 

entire actual shooting. See id.

Lastly, counsel did present the self-defense theory to the jury. Despite 

counsel’s admission that Lopez had a delusional belief that he was in imminent 

fear of danger, counsel presented evidence of self-defense. The jury was exposed 

to all of the defense witnesses who testified they were in fear of Bellamy in the 

parking lot and received a self-defense instruction, but still rejected it. As the jury 

heard the self-defense theory and rejected it, there was not a reasonable probability 

that presenting a theory of self-defense alone instead of presenting both insanity 

and self-defense would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

As Lopez’s claim does not meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, we need 

not address whether his counsel’s performance was also deficient. See Holladay v. 

Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining if the defendant makes an 

insufficient showing on the prejudice prong, we need not address the performance 

prong, and vice versa). 

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In sum, there was a reasonable basis for the state court to conclude Lopez’s 

counsel’s choice of defense did not prejudice him, and the district court did not err 

when it determined the state-post-conviction court’s denial of Lopez’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

AFFIRMED.

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