Filed 6/26/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CITY OF PASADENA,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

SANDRA REYES JAUREGUI et 

al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

B280805

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC596857;

JCCP No. 4674)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Steven J. 

Kleifield, Judge. Petition granted.

Foley & Mansfeld, Keith M. Ameele, Joseph V. Macha, 

M. Amadea Groseclose, Margaret I. Johnson; Office of the 
2

Pasadena City Attorney, Michele Beal Bagneris, City 

Attorney, and John Nam, Deputy City Attorney, for 

Petitioner. 

No appearance for Respondent.

Kazan, McClain, Satterley & Greenwood, Joseph 

Satterley, Denyse F. Clancy, and Ian A. Rivamonte, for Real 

Parties in Interest. 

___________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et 

seq.), before commencing an action against a public entity, a

plaintiff must present the claim to the entity within six 

months of “the date upon which the cause of action would be 

deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of 

limitations which would be applicable thereto.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 901.) In the underlying action, real parties in interest 

Sandra Reyes Jauregui and Mario Reyes Jauregui (the 

Jaureguis) filed a first amended complaint (FAC), alleging a

cause of action against petitioner City of Pasadena (the City)

arising from Sandra Jauregui’s mesothelioma. The City

demurred to the Jaureguis’ complaint, arguing that they had 

failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement of 

the Government Claims Act by not presenting their claim to 

the City within six months of the date of Sandra’s 

mesothelioma diagnosis. The Jaureguis opposed the 

demurrer, arguing that their claim presentation was timely 

because under the applicable statute of limitations -- Code of 
3

Civil Procedure section 340.2 -- their cause of action never 

accrued.

1 Thus, they asserted, the six-month claim 

presentation period never began to run. The trial court

overruled the demurrer, and the City now seeks a writ 

directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer. 

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that “the 

date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to 

have accrued within the meaning of the [applicable] statute 

of limitations” is the date on which a plaintiff discovers or 

should reasonably have discovered that she had suffered a 

compensable injury. In this case, that date was no later 

than the date Sandra was diagnosed with mesothelioma. 

Because the Jaureguis presented their claim to the City 

more than 10 months after that date, they failed to comply 

with the claim presentation requirement. Accordingly, we

grant the petition for writ of mandate. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY

On October 5, 2015, the Jaureguis filed a complaint for 

personal injuries and loss of consortium against numerous 

defendants, but not the City. The complaint alleged that 

Sandra was diagnosed with mesothelioma on or about 

September 25, 2015. She allegedly developed the disease as 

a result of exposure to airborne asbestos that her father “was 

 

1

All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure, unless otherwise indicated. 
4

exposed to and thereafter tracked into the family’s home and 

vehicles on his clothing, shoes, person, and personal effects.” 

The complaint also alleged that Sandra’s father was a 

mechanic who worked with asbestos-containing products at 

various sites, including at “The City of Pasadena from about 

1980 to 1987.” 

A year later, on October 14, 2016, the Jaureguis filed 

their FAC, adding the City as a defendant. The FAC alleged 

a single cause of action against the City for dangerous 

conditions of public property. According to the FAC, 

Sandra’s father worked for the City as a vehicle mechanic

and was exposed to asbestos at various vehicle repair 

facilities owned, controlled or managed by the City. The 

FAC further alleged that on August 22, 2016, the Jaureguis 

presented their claim to the City in compliance with the 

Government Claims Act.

2

On November 17, 2016, the City demurred to the FAC. 

It argued that the Jaureguis had failed to allege facts 

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim 

presentation requirement set forth in Government Code 

section 911.2, which requires that a claim be presented 

within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. The 

City asserted that the Jaureguis’ causes of action accrued on 

 

2

Although the FAC initially asserted Mario’s loss-ofconsortium claim against the City, the Jaureguis agreed to 

dismiss that claim. Thus, the only claim against the City at 

issue is the cause of action based on allegedly dangerous 

conditions. 
5

September 25, 2015, the date when Sandra was diagnosed 

with mesothelioma. However, the Jaureguis did not present 

a claim to the City until August 22, 2016, nearly 11 months 

later. Nor did they file a late-claim application. 

Accordingly, the City asserted, the Jaureguis failed to 

comply with the claim presentation requirement and thus, 

the demurrer should have been sustained without leave to 

amend. 

The City further argued that section 340.2, the 

applicable statute of limitations for the Jaureguis’ cause of 

action, did not render their claim presentation timely. 

Although the limitations period did not run because Sandra

was never disabled within the meaning of section 340.2, that 

section “says nothing about the accrual of the cause of 

action.” Accordingly, the City asserted, section 340.2 did not 

provide an accrual date other than the date of diagnosis. 

The Jaureguis opposed the City’s demurrer, contending 

there was no time limit on their claim presentation. They 

argued: “Sandra’s government claim had to be filed within 

six months of the ‘accrual’ of her underlying tort causes of 

action -- a date statutorily defined for this purpose as the 

trigger date for the underlying limitations period.” Because 

that date was never triggered, “Sandra’s claims never 

‘accrued’ for purposes of filing a government claim.” They 

further argued that “accrual” has two different meanings --

(1) “‘ripeness’” and (2) “‘beginning of the limitations period’” -

- and “accrual” as used in Government Code section 901

meant the latter. 
6

In reply, the City argued that section 340.2 did not 

equate “accrual” with the commencement of the limitations 

period. Although section 340.2 altered the limitations period 

-- the time during which a plaintiff may file a complaint -- it 

had no impact on when a cause of action accrued. The City 

also argued that nothing in section 340.2 reflects an intent 

on the part of the Legislature to modify the claim 

presentation deadline in the Government Claims Act. 

On December 15, 2016, the trial court overruled the 

demurrer without explanation. However, at the hearing on

the demurrer, the court stated its belief that the term 

“accrual” as used in Government Code section 901 is “not 

used in the sense of a case being ripe so that somebody can 

sue.” Rather, it is used to mean “when a person must sue or 

lose their right,” i.e., when the limitations period 

commences. 

The City filed its petition on February 21, 2017, 

seeking an immediate stay of all proceedings and a 

peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to set 

aside and vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to 

enter a new order sustaining the demurrer.3 In response to 

 

3 Writ review is proper because a “significant legal issue 

is presented, and the benefits of the claims act defense would 

be effectively lost if defendant[] [was] forced to go to trial.” 

(City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 

747, fn. 4; see also State of California v. Superior Court

(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245 [“failure to allege compliance or 

circumstances excusing compliance with the claim 
7

the petition, on March 16, 2017, we issued an order to show 

cause why the demurrer should not be sustained and an 

order for a temporary stay entered. The Juareguis filed 

their return to the petition on April 14, 2017, and the City

filed its reply May 5, 2017. 

DISCUSSION

“Government Code section 905 requires that ‘all claims 

for money or damages against local public entities’ be 

presented to the responsible public entity before a lawsuit is 

filed.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th 

at p. 734.) “Claims for personal injury and property damage 

must be presented within six months after accrual; all other 

claims must be presented within a year. ([Gov. Code,] § 

911.2.) ‘[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought 

against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim 

is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor 

 

presentation requirement subjects a complaint to a general 

demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a 

cause of action”].) We apply the same standard of demurrer 

review, that is, we review demurrer rulings de novo. (City of 

Stockton v. Superior Court, at p. 747; accord, K.J. v. Arcadia 

Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1237 

[“Our review is de novo.”].) 

The City also sought a stay of the trial, which had been 

scheduled for June 12, 2017. Subsequently, the City filed a 

letter brief informing this court that the trial court had 

granted its ex parte application to continue the trial to 

October 30, 2017.
8

has been presented to the public entity and has been acted 

upon . . . or has been deemed to have been rejected . . . .’

([Gov. Code,] § 945.4.) ‘Thus, under these statutes, failure to 

timely present a claim for money or damages to a public 

entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that 

entity.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 738.)

“The purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent 

surprise, but ‘to provide the public entity sufficient 

information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and 

to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation. [Citations.] It is well-settled that claims statutes 

must be satisfied even in face of the public entity’s actual 

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.’

[Citation.] The claims statutes also ‘enable the public entity 

to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to 

avoid similar liabilities in the future.’ [Citations.]” (City of 

Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738.)

Here, the Jaureguis were obligated to present their 

claims against petitioner “not later than six months after the 

accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2.)4 “For 

the purpose of computing the time limits prescribed by 

[Government Code section] 911.2 . . . , the date of the accrual 

of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon 

which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued 

 

4

For purposes of the Government Claims Act, six 

months means “six calendar months or 182 days, whichever 

is longer.” (Gonzales v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 199 

Cal.App.3d 601, 604.)
9

within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would 

be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a 

claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity 

before an action could be commenced thereon. . . .” (Gov. 

Code, § 901.) Thus, to calculate the claim presentation 

deadline, we must determine the date the cause of action 

accrued under the applicable statute of limitations. (Ovando 

v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 63 [“The 

date of accrual for purposes of the claim presentation 

requirement is the same date on which the cause of action 

would accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations in an 

action against a private party.”].)

Here, the statute of limitations applicable to the 

Juareguis’ claim is found in section 340.2. That section 

provides in relevant part:

“(a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon 

exposure to asbestos, the time for the commencement 

of the action shall be the later of the following:

“(1) Within one year after the date the plaintiff first 

suffered disability.

“(2) Within one year after the date the plaintiff either 

knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence 

should have known, that such disability was caused or 

contributed to by such exposure.

“(b) ‘Disability’ as used in subdivision (a) means the 

loss of time from work as a result of such exposure 

which precludes the performance of the employee’s 

regular occupation.” (§ 340.2, subd. (a).)
10

Under section 340.2, “the limitations period does not 

begin until the asbestos-related injuries cause a permanent 

termination of the plaintiff’s ability to perform his or her job, 

which actually forces the plaintiff off the job.” (Duty v. Abex 

Corp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 742, 750.) For retirees and the 

unemployed, the limitations period never commences. (Ibid.) 

In the instant matter, the parties agree that Sandra was 

never disabled within the meaning of section 340.2 and thus, 

the limitations period on the Juareguis’ claim has never 

begun to run. 

Section 340.2 does not use the term “accrued.” That 

term is used in section 312, which is found in the same title 

of the Code of Civil Procedure as section 340.2. Section 312

provides: “Civil actions, without exception, can only be 

commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after 

the cause of action shall have accrued . . . .” Thus, accrual is 

a prerequisite to the running of the limitation period. (Barr 

v. Acands, Inc. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1049, overruled 

in part on other grounds by Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. 

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 (Hamilton).) 

Under section 312, a cause of action accrues when “the 

party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute an action 

thereon.” (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, 

Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 596; see also Collins v. County of 

Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 454 (Collins) [“A 

cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it 

is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon.”].) 

“Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises 
11

immediately upon the commission of the wrong 

claimed . . . .” (Ibid.) Stated differently, a “cause of action 

accrues ‘when [it] is complete with all of its elements’ —

those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.” 

(Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 797 

(Pooshs).) 

An exception to the general rule regarding the initial 

accrual of a claim is the discovery rule. (Aryeh v. Canon 

Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192 

(Aryeh).) Under the discovery rule, the accrual of a cause of 

action is delayed until “the plaintiff ‘discovers, or has reason 

to discover, the cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Pooshs, supra, 

51 Cal.4th at p. 797; see also Seelenfreund v. Terminix of 

Northern Cal., Inc. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 133, 136 [“In some 

situations, . . . a cause of action does not accrue until the 

aggrieved party discovers, or should discover, the existence 

of the cause of action.”].)

5

Courts have applied a similar analysis when 

addressing statutes of limitations applicable to latent 

diseases such as mesothelioma. In Buttram v. Owens-

 

5

Other doctrines that alter the general accrual rule 

include: (1) the continuous violation doctrine which treats a 

series of wrongs or injuries as a single cause of action that 

accrues upon commission or sufferance of the last of them; 

and (2) the theory of continuous accrual, which segregates a 

series of wrongs or injuries into separate causes of action, 

each accruing on a separate date. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th 

at p. 1192.) 
12

Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520 (Buttram), 

our Supreme Court noted that “as a general proposition it is 

settled that a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues for purposes 

of the statute of limitations upon the occurrence of the last

element essential to the cause of action; that is when the 

plaintiff is first entitled to sue.” (Id. at p. 531, fn. 4, citing §

312.) However, the discovery rule applies to delay the 

accrual of a cause of action for an asbestos-related disease. 

Thus, the court observed, “for statute of limitations 

purposes, it is well settled that a cause of action for a latent 

injury does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or 

reasonably should have discovered that he has suffered a 

compensable injury.” (Id. at p. 530, citing Velasquez v. 

Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 881, 

887-888.) In Hamilton, the court reaffirmed Buttram, 

stating: “[A] cause of action for a latent injury or disease 

generally accrues, in the sense that it is ripe for suit, when 

the plaintiff discovers or should reasonably have discovered 

he has suffered a compensable injury.” (Hamilton, supra, 22 

Cal.4th at p. 1144.) 

As the foregoing demonstrates, in the context of 

statutes of limitations, “accrual” of an action is used in the 

sense of ripeness. This is also the ordinary and common 

understanding of the term “accrue.” In Webster’s Seventh 

New Collegiate Dictionary (1969) page 6, the first definition 

of “accrue” is “to come into existence as a legally enforceable 
13

claim.”6 Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “accrue” as 

“To come into existence as an enforceable claim or right; to 

arise <the plaintiff's cause of action for silicosis did not 

accrue until the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the 

disease>.” (Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014).)7 

In sum, we conclude that as used in Government Code 

section 901, “the date upon which the cause of action would 

be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute 

of limitations which would be applicable” is the date on 

which the cause of action became actionable. In the instant 

matter, the Jaureguis’ cause of action against the City 

accrued when Sandra discovered or reasonably should have 

discovered that she had suffered a compensable injury. That 

date was no later than the date she was diagnosed with 

mesothelioma, September 25, 2015. However, the Jaureguis 

did not present their claim to the City until August 22, 2016, 

more than 10 months after Sandra was diagnosed. Thus, 

they failed to comply with the six-month claim presentation 

deadline set forth in Government Code section 911.2.

 

6

The other definitions are: “to come by way of increase 

or addition” and “to be periodically accumulated whether as 

an increase or a decrease.” (Webster’s 7th New Collegiate 

Dict., supra, at p. 6.)

7

Black’s Law Dictionary has only one other definition of 

“accrue”: “To accumulate periodically; to increase over a 

period of time <the savings-account interest accrues

monthly>.” 
14

Accordingly, their action against the City is barred, and the 

City’s demurrer should have been sustained.

The Juareguis argue that under Government Code 

section 901, “accrue” does not mean ripeness. Rather, they 

contend, it means “commencement of the limitations period.” 

They note that in Nelson v. Flintkote Co. (1985) 172 

Cal.App.3d 727, the appellate court characterized section 

340.2 as a “delayed accrual rule.” (Nelson v. Flintkote Co., at 

p. 735.) We acknowledge that many courts have used 

“accrue” or “accrual” when referring to the commencement of 

the running of the statute of limitations. A likely reason for 

the conflation of the two concepts is that in the vast majority 

of cases, the date an action accrues is also the date the 

statute of limitations begins to run. Our Supreme Court has 

recognized, however, that “the accrual of a cause of action” is 

distinct from “the beginning of the limitations period.” 

(Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) Thus, in Hamilton,

the court observed that it would be a “mistake[]” to “equate[]

the accrual of a cause of action for asbestos-related injury 

with the beginning of the limitations period prescribed by 

section 340.2.” (Ibid.) The court explained: “Before the 

enactment of section 340.2, [the] accrual date was also the 

date of the beginning of the limitations period in cases in 

which the latent injury or disease arose from exposure to 

asbestos. [Citation.] But section 340.2 changed that rule, 

declaring a separate and distinct date for the beginning of 

the limitations period in asbestos cases, i.e., the date of 

disability as specially defined in the statute.” (Id. at pp. 
15

1144-1145, italics omitted.) Notably, the Hamilton court 

never used the term “accrual” when referring to the 

beginning of the limitations period. In short, “[a]lthough

commentators have referred to [section 340.2] as providing 

for a ‘postponed accrual’ date [citation], it is more accurately 

described as a statute of repose -- a time in the future after 

which a claimant may not file suit because the claim 

becomes stale.” (Barr v. Acands, Inc., supra, 57 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1049.)

The Jaureguis’ argument that “accrue” means only 

“commencement of the limitations period” would lead to the 

anomalous result that they could not bring the instant 

action. As noted, under section 340.2, the limitations period 

begins to run on the date of “disability.” Because Sandra 

never suffered a “disability,” the limitations period has never 

begun to run, and under the Jaureguis’ interpretation their 

cause of action has not -- and never will -- accrue. However, 

under section 312, “without exception,” an action may not be 

filed until the underlying claim “shall have accrued.” Thus, 

the Jaureguis could never bring a suit for an asbestosrelated injury or illness. Like other courts, we reject such an 

interpretation. (See Barr v. Acands, Inc., supra, 57 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1049 [“If a claim for personal injuries 

allegedly resulting from asbestos exposure could not accrue 

until disability occurred, it would lead to the anomalous 
16

result that plaintiffs who did not suffer disability as defined 

by the statute would be forever barred from filing suit.”].)8

The Jaureguis further argue that interpreting

“accrued” to mean when a cause of action is ripe would 

rewrite Government Code section 901 to excise any reference 

to statutes of limitations. We disagree. In the context of 

statutes of limitations, accrual refers to the settled common 

law accrual rules, including the discovery rule delaying 

accrual of a cause of action. (See Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 

p. 1193 [where statute of limitations uses term “accrued” but 

provides no definition, we may assume “the Legislature 

intended the well-settled body of law that has built up 

around accrual, including the traditional last element rule 

and its equitable exceptions, to apply fully here”].) In 

Buttram, the court noted that it was “well settled” that “for 

statute of limitations purposes,” a cause of action for a latent 

injury, such as asbestos-related mesothelioma, does not 

accrue “until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should 

have discovered that [she] has suffered a compensable 

injury.” (Buttram, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 530; accord, 

Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) Thus, construing

“accrual” in Government Code section 901 as our Supreme 

 

8 We note that the Legislature has not acted on Justice 

Brown’s suggestion to revisit and revise the “cumbersome 

and confusing” language of section 340.2, which has created 

several “anomalous,” “bizarre” and likely unintended results. 

(See Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1152 (conc. opn. of 

Brown, J.).)
17

Court has done “for statute of limitations purposes” is 

consistent with the statutory language. 

Finally, the Jaureguis contend that the intent and 

purpose of section 340.2 -- “to provide a unique and forgiving 

limitations period to those suffering from an asbestos-related

illness” -- warrants interpreting Government Code section 

901 to permit them to present an asbestos-related claim 

against the City at any time prior to filing their action 

against the City. However, the intent and purpose

animating section 340.2 must be balanced against the intent

and purposes animating the Government Claims Act. As 

noted, the purposes of the Government Claims Act are (1) to 

provide the public entity with sufficient information to 

enable it to adequately investigate and settle claims, and (2) 

to enable the entity to account for potential liabilities and to 

avoid similar liabilities in the future. (City of Stockton v. 

Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738.) “Moreover, the 

intent of the Government Claims Act is ‘not to expand the 

rights of plaintiffs against government entities. Rather, the 

intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability 

to rigidly delineated circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (DiCampliMintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991.) 

An unlimited claim presentation period expanding the rights 

of plaintiffs against government entities would frustrate the 

intent and purposes of the Government Claims Act. It could 

hamper a public entity from taking immediate remedial 

action -- such as using asbestos-free products -- and impede 

its fiscal planning. (See Johnson v. San Diego Unified 
18

School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 696-697 [“‘claims 

statute provides an opportunity to the public entity to 

quickly rectify a dangerous condition and . . . to take the 

potential claim into account in its fiscal planning’”].)

Moreover, the Juareguis have pointed to nothing in the 

language or legislative history of section 340.2 to suggest

that the Legislature intended, sub silencio, to amend the sixmonth claim presentation deadline in the Government 

Claims Act. On this point, we find the 2002 amendment to 

section 340.1 instructive. In 2002, the Legislature amended 

section 340.1 by adding, inter alia, subdivision (c) which 

provides that any claims for damages arising from childhood 

sex abuse that would otherwise be barred solely because the 

applicable statute of limitations has or had expired “is 

revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be 

commenced within one year of January 1, 2003.” (§ 340.1, 

subd. (c).) Subsequently, our Supreme Court was asked to 

determine whether a plaintiff who failed to present a timely 

claim to a public entity could thereafter bring a claim for 

childhood sex abuse against the entity under the amended 

section 340.1. The court concluded the answer was “no.” 

(Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 

205 (Shirk), superseded by statute as stated in A.M. v. 

Ventura Unified School Dist. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252.) 

The court observed that section 340.1, subdivision (c) revived 

only claims barred solely because of the applicable statute of 

limitations. However, “the government claim presentation 

deadline is not a statute of limitations.” Thus, section 340.1 
19

did not revive those claims barred by failure to comply with 

the claim presentation requirement. (Shirk, supra, at p. 

213.) 

Moreover, as the appellate court in S.M. v. Los Angeles 

Unified School Dist. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 (S.M.)

observed, although section 340.1 extended “the time during 

which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue, . . . it [did] 

not alter the cause of action’s accrual date, which is when 

the molestation occurred subject to any applicable delayed 

discovery. [Citation.] It is the date of accrual that triggers 

the government tort claim filing requirement, a predicate 

not addressed by section 340.1.” (Id. at p. 721.)

Following Shirk, the Legislature enacted Government 

Code section 905, subdivision (m), adding childhood sex 

abuse claims “arising out of conduct occurring on or after 

January 1, 2009” to those claims exempted from the 

government claim presentation requirement. (See Gov. 

Code, § 905 [listing exempted claims].) Notably, the 

Legislature did not overrule Shirk’s holding for childhood 

abuse claims arising from conduct occurring prior to 2009. 

(See S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 721, fn. 6.) Nor did 

the Legislature address the date of accrual for such claims. 

Here, in enacting section 340.2, the Legislature

extended the limitations period for asbestos-related actions. 

It neither exempted those causes of action from the claim 

presentation requirement nor altered when such actions 

accrued. (See Nelson v. Flintkote Co., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 730 [noting that prior to enactment of section 340.2, 
20

asbestos-related causes of action were “governed by the 

general one-year tort statute of limitations set forth in 

section 340, subdivision (3) . . .”].) Thus, while section 340.2 

modified the limitations period for commencing asbestosrelated causes of action against both public and nonpublic 

entities, it did not modify the claim presentation deadline

because it did not address the date of accrual for those 

actions. That date remains, as set forth in Supreme Court 

precedent, the date the Jaureguis “discover[ed] or should 

reasonably have discovered” that Sandra was suffering from 

mesothelioma. (Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) 

Lastly, we note our interpretation of Government Code 

section 901 does not bar an action by a plaintiff who, years 

after exposure to asbestos, discovers she has suffered a 

compensable injury. It requires only that after making such 

a discovery, she promptly present a claim to the 

governmental entity she seeks to hold responsible.

9

 

9 We note that pending before the Supreme Court is 

Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1037 [2016 

Cal.App. LEXIS 211], review granted June 15, 2016,

S234269. During oral arguments before the court, the 

parties disputed whether the discovery rule would delay the 

date of accrual of Rubenstein’s childhood sex abuse claim 

and thus render her claim timely under the Government 

Claims Act. No such issue is presented here, as the City 

concedes the Jaureguis are entitled to the benefits of the 

discovery rule. More important, our holding incorporates the 

discovery rule. Under our holding, the six-month claim 

presentation deadline for asbestos-related disease is 
21

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing that

respondent superior court vacate its order overruling

petitioner’s demurrer, and enter a new order sustaining 

petitioner’s demurrer in its entirety. The order to show 

cause, having served its purpose, is discharged, and the 

temporary stay is vacated effective upon the issuance of the 

remittur. Petitioner is entitled to its costs in this writ 

proceeding.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

MANELLA, J. 

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

 

calculated from the date of discovery, which in the instant 

case is no later than the date of diagnosis.