[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as O’Neal v. State , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3663.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -3663
O’N EAL , A PPELLANT , ET AL
. v . T HE S TATE OF O HIO ET AL ., A PPELLEES
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as O’Neal v. State , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3663.] Execution protocol— R.C. 111.15—Ohio’s execution protocol is not a rule having a general and uniform operation—Cour t of appeals’ judgment affirmed.
Nos. 2020-0676 and 2020-0683—Sub mitted June 30, 2021—Decided Oc tober 19,
2021.
A PPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 19AP-260 a nd 19AP-289, 2020-Ohio-506.

______________ F ISCHER , J. {¶ 1} The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) is responsible for carrying out death sentences in Ohio. See R.C. 2949.22(A) and (B). In furtherance of its duty, DRC has adopted a written execution protocol: a document that sets forth the specific process by which DRC pers onnel are to carry out death sentences by lethal injection.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 2} In these appeals, two condemned inmates contend that DRC may adopt the execution protocol only by following the procedures f or promulgating it as an administrative rule in accordance with R.C. 111.15(B), an d that until this is done, the protocol is invalid a nd may not be used to carry out death sentences. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 3} Both appellants, Cleveland Jack son (case No. 2020-0676) and Jam es D. O’Neal (case No. 2020-0683) (co llectively, “the inmates”) ha ve been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. See State v. Jackson , 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173; State v. O’Neal , 87 Ohio St.3d 402, 721 N.E.2d 73 (2000). The appellees in both cases are the state of Ohio and DRC (collectively, “the state”). {¶ 4} DRC has maintained a written execution protocol since 1994. Th e protocol has gone through 20 vers ions; the current one, designa ted DRC policy 01- COM-11, took effect on October 7, 2016. See Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, https://drc.ohi o.gov/LinkClick.as px?fileticket= -r0rnCS3AGc% 3d&portalid=0 (accessed Aug. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N8UU-C9 EF]. In adopting 01-COM-11, DRC did not follow Ohio’s procedures for fo rmal rulemaking set forth in R.C. 111.15. Specifically, DRC “did no t file the protocol with any State entity.” O’Neal v. State , Franklin C.P. No. 18CVH-01-758, at 2 (Apr. 4, 2019). {¶ 5} In 2018, O’Neal filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking an injunction halting his execution and a declaration that the protocol is invalid. The trial court subsequently permitte d Jackson to intervene
in the lawsuit. The inmates and t he state filed m otions for su mmary judgment; the trial court granted the state’ s motion, denied those of the inm ates, and entered summary judgment in the state’s favor. O’Neal , Franklin C.P. No. 18CVH-01-758, at 1. The court of appeals affi rmed the trial court’s judgment . 2020-Ohio-506, 146
N.E.3d 605.January Term, 2021

3 {¶ 6} Jackson and O’Neal each filed discretionary appeals in this cou rt. We granted review of Jackson’s a nd O’Neal’s first propositions of law. See O’Neal v.
State , 160 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2020-Ohio-4811, 154 N.E.3d 97; O’Neal v. State , 160 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2020-Ohio-4811, 154 N.E.3d 98. {¶ 7} Jackson’s first proposition of law is: “Ohio’s execution protoc ol 01- COM-11 governs the day-to-day s taff procedures and operations b y which DRC carries out a core statutory function—the execution of condemne d persons—and thus is a ‘rule’ subject to R.C. 111.15.” O’Neal’s first propo sition of law is: “DRC’s execution protocol 01-COM-11 is s ubject to the rule-making requ irements of R.C.
111.15 and is invalid for f ailing to comply with the statute.” II. Standing {¶ 8} Before examining those issues, we will consider t he state’s cha llenge to the inmates’ standing. {¶ 9} The state contends that the inma tes lack standing to sue over t he validity of DRC’s execution prot ocol. Standing is a “ ‘jurisdi ctional requirement’ that must be met for a party to maintain a lawsuit.” Ohioans for Concealed Carry,
Inc. v. Columbus , 164 Ohio St.3d 291, 2020-Ohio-6724, 172 N.E.3d 935, ¶ 42, quoting State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 179, 298 N.E.2d 515 (1973). {¶ 10} “[S]tanding depends on whether th e plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a
court hear their case.” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio , 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, ¶ 7. Standing has three elemen ts: injury, causation, and redressability. Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012- Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.3d 977, ¶ 22. Thus, to establish standing, the inmates must show that they suffered an injur y that is fairly traceable to t he state’s allegedly illegal conduct and that their injury is likely to be redressed by the relief they areS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 requesting. See id. The state contends that the inmates’ standing fails on the thir d element: redressability. {¶ 11} As the inmates point out, they t hemselves are the objects of th e injurious state action: their executions will be carried out un der an assertedly invalid protocol. Tha t makes their cla im to standing a strong one.

When the suit is one challe nging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature a nd extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) o r proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether t he plaintiff is himself an object o f the action (or forgone action ) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the acti on will redress it.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561-562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). {¶ 12} However, the state points out t hat an alleged injury is not red ressable when a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor would leave the plaintif f subject to the same injury from which he seeks relief. See State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich , 147 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-1176, 59 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 27 (lead opinion) (h olding that an injury was nonredressable because “[e]ven if the state’s action s were nullified,” the alleged injury “would c ontinue to exist”). {¶ 13} The state contends that the in jury alleged by the inmates is th at they “do not want to be executed in the manner provided for by the p rotocol.” According to the state, because DRC has st atutory authority to carry out death sentences and no statute requires that it a dopt an execution protocol, winnin g this case would not actually benefit the inmates. Hence, the state argues, if the execution protocol, 01-January Term, 2021

5 COM-11, is declared invalid, DRC could simply execute the inmat es pursuant to its statutory authority “in precisely the same manner provided for by the protocol.” {¶ 14} But “standing turns on the nature and source of the claim asser ted by the plaintiffs.” Moore , 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.3d 977, at ¶ 23. And the state’s argument, we think, misconceives the nat ure of the inmates’
claim. {¶ 15} Contrary to the state’s asserti on, the injury alleged in this c ase is not
that the inmates are to be ex ecuted in any particular fashion. It is alleged that they are to be executed in accordance with a protocol that is legall y invalid because it was not promulgated as an admin istrative rule under R.C. 111.15 (B). That alleged injury could be redressed by a decl aration that the protocol is invalid. {¶ 16} Although the state does not raise the point, we acknowledge tha t a declaratory-judgment action is not a proper means to litigate s ome of the challenges to the protocol’s validity. Indeed, we have held: “There is no state postconviction relief or other state-law mode of action to litigate the issue of whether a specific lethal-injection protoc ol is constitutional under Baze v. Rees , 553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1250, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008), or under Ohio law.” Scott v. Houk , 127 Ohio St.3d 317, 2010-Ohio-5805, 939 N.E.2d 835, ¶ 4. But “ Scott does not foreclose every possible avenue for raising a pr otocol challenge in Ohio courts .” State v. Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 75. The i nstant case does
not involve a state or federal constitutional challenge to the protocol, and Scott does not address whether a state-law cause of action, such as declar atory judgment, may be used to challenge an execu tion protocol on nonconstitutional grounds. {¶ 17} In any event, the availability of declaratory judgment goes to the merits of the action; it does not affect the inm ates’ standing. The fact remains that should the inmates obtain the judgment they seek, it will provi de them with redress, which disposes of the state’s redressability argument.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 18} We also reject the state’s contention that because no Ohio stat ute requires DRC to adopt an executi on protocol, it may execute con demned inmates without a protocol yet in the same manner that is specified in the protocol. This argument draws an empty distinction between the protocol and th e procedures specified in the protocol. Those procedures are the protocol, and in following them,
DRC would be follo wing the protocol. {¶ 19} In any event, DRC’s execution procedures have been the subject of frequent Eighth Amendment litigation. In that litigation, fede ral courts have required DRC not only to have an e xecution protocol, but to fol low it consistently. Indeed, federal courts have stayed scheduled executions because of DRC’s failures to consistently follo w its own protocol. See , e.g ., Reynolds v. Strickland , 583 F.3d 956, 957 (6th Cir.2009) (staying execution in light of serious questions about “whether Ohio is fully and competently adhering to the Ohio let hal injection protocol”); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation , 671 F.3d 601, 602 (6th Cir.2012) (denying the state of O hio’s motion to vacate the dis trict court’s order staying an execution due to the state’s “persistent failure or refusal * * * to follow its own written execution protocol”). Given this history, we d o not see how DRC
would be able to execute condemn ed inmates without an execution protocol. {¶ 20} We conclude that the injury alleged by the inmates is redressab le and that they “have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.” ProgressOhio.org , 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 7. The inmates have standing to challenge the legality of the execution protocol. Accordingly, we now proceed to
address the merits of their arguments.
III. Merits {¶ 21} In most circumstances, R.C. 111.15 creates a procedure that sta te agencies must adhere to when pro mulgating rules. Of specific r elevance to this case, R.C. 111.15(B)(1)(a) provide s that a rule adopted pursuan t to R.C. 111.15January Term, 2021

7 may take effect only after the adopting agency has filed it wit h the secretary of state and the director of the Ohio Leg islative Service Commission (“L SC”):

Any rule * * * adopted by any agency pursuant to this
section shall be effective on th e tenth day after the day on wh ich the rule in final form and in compliance with division (B)(3) of th is
section is filed as follows: (a) The rule shall be filed in electronic form with both the secretary of state and the director of the legislative service
commission * * *.

The rule must also be filed with the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review (“JCARR”), R.C. 111.15(B)(1)(b), unless it is exempt from legis lative review under R.C. 111.15(D)(1) through (7). {¶ 22} R.C. 111.15(B)(1) applies to “any rule” adopted by “any agency. ” R.C. 111.15(A) supplies definitions of both “rule” and “agency” :

(A) As used in this section: (1) “Rule” includes any rule, regulation, bylaw, or standard having a general and uniform operation adopted by an agency und er the authority of the laws governing the agency; any appendix to a rule; and any internal managemen t rule. “Rule” does not includ e * * * any order respecting the duties of employees * * *. (2) “Agency” means any governme ntal entity of the state and includes * * * any * * * de partment * * *. (3) “Internal management rul e” means any rule, regulation, bylaw, or standard governing the day-to-day staff procedures an d operations within an agency.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 23} The parties do not dispute that DRC is an “agency” within the meaning of R.C. 111.15(A)(2) or that the protocol was adopted b y DRC under the authority of the laws governing DRC. Thus, the dispositive iss ue is whether the execution protocol constitutes a “rule” as defined in R.C. 111. 15(A)(1). {¶ 24} If the execution protocol is eith er a “rule, regulation, bylaw, or standard having a general and uniform operation” or an “interna l-management rule,” then it fits under the de finition of a “rule” under R.C. 111.15(A)(1). If the protocol does not fit into either one of those categories or if it is an “order respecting the duties of employees,” id ., then it is not a “rule” and is therefore not subject to the statute’s rule-filing requirements. {¶ 25} The inmates contend that DRC s hould have filed the execution protocol with the secretary of st ate and LSC’s director because the protocol is a “rule * * * having a general and uniform operation” in accordan ce with R.C. 111.15(A)(1) or, alternatively, b ecause it is an internal-manag ement rule as defined by R.C. 111.15(A)(3). We will ex amine both contentions. A. Is the execution protocol a rule having a general and uniform operation? {¶ 26} There is little authority interpreting the meaning of “rule” in R.C. 111.15(A)(1). However, Ohio’s Administrative Procedure Act, R. C. Chapter 119,
defines the word “rule” with similar language: “any rule, regul ation, or standard, having a general and uniform ope ration, adopted, promulgated, a nd enforced by any agency under the authority of the laws governing such agenc y.” R.C. 119.01(C). We will therefore look to our precedents applying R .C. 119.01(C) to help us construe R.C. 111.15(A). {¶ 27} In applying the definition of “rule” in R.C. 119.01(C), we have distinguished between an administrative action that establishes a policy or standard and one that merely implements or interprets a rule or statute that already exists.
See Adams v. Testa , 152 Ohio St.3d 207, 2017-Ohio-8853, 94 N.E.3d 539, ¶ 37;January Term, 2021

9 State ex rel. Saunders v. Indus. Comm ., 101 Ohio St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-339, 802 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 27. An action that establishes a new policy or s tandard is a rule under R.C. 119.01(C); one that implements or interprets a pre-existin g rule or statute is

not. See Saunders at ¶ 27 (“The pivotal issue in determining the effect of a document is whether it enlarges the scope of the rule or statut e from which it derives rather than simply interprets it”). {¶ 28} Indeed, in Ohio Nurses Assn., Inc. v. State Bd. of Nursing Edn. & Nurse Registration , 44 Ohio St.3d 73, 540 N.E.2d 1354 (1989), we held that the Ohio State Board of Nursing Edu cation and Nurse Registration’s decision, which was issued in a “position paper, ” to greatly expand the authori ty of licensed practical nurses (“LPNs”) to administer intravenous fluids fell within the statutory definition of a “rule.” The pos ition paper “enlarge[d] the sco pe of practice for LPNs” beyond what any existing s tatute or rule authorized. Id . at 75. Hence, “the [position] paper [did] not purpor t merely to interpret an extan t statute or rule, but rather to establish a new rule, s tandard or regulation regardin g LPN practice.” Id

. {¶ 29} Likewise, in Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Nally , 143 Ohio St.3d 93, 2015-Ohio-991, 34 N.E.3d 873, we held that a limitation on phosphorus discharge imposed by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency w as a “standard” having a “general and uniform ope ration” and was therefore a “r ule” that had to be
filed in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. We explained that the discharge limit “prescribe[d] a legal standard that did not pre viously exist,” id . at ¶ 29, and “create[d] new legal obligations,” id . at ¶ 32. Moreover, it “applie[d] to a large segment of the public r ather than a narrow group” and w as thus “generally and uniformly applicable.” Id . at ¶ 30. {¶ 30} By contrast, “[d]ocuments that explain, rather than expand, fal l outside [the definition of ‘rule’ contained in] R.C. Chapter 11 9.” Saunders , 101 Ohio St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-339, 802 N.E.2d 650, at ¶ 33. To ill ustrate this principle, Saunders examined Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio StateS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 Bd. of Edn ., 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 645 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.1994). Princeton involved a legislatively created statewide computer-information network for public
schools. The state board of edu cation established “guidelines” for the compilation, collection, and reporting of dat a in conjunction with the netwo rk. The First District
held in Princeton that the guidelines were not rules and did not have to be form ally promulgated in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act because

[t]he guidelines * * * are a kind of instruction manual showing
methods and alternativ es to identify, comp ile, collect and repo rt the data. * * * [T]hese guidelines merely control the procedure by
which the duties in the statute and rule must be performed * * *.

Princeton at 563-564. {¶ 31} The execution protocol in 01-COM-11 has little in common with t he kind of edicts that we have found that fit within the statutory definition of “rule.” It creates neither a “legal standard,” Nally at ¶ 29, nor a “legal obligation[],” id . at ¶ 32. Unlike the position paper in Ohio Nurses , 01-COM-11 does not expand anyone’s functions or abilities; the obligation to execute deat h sentences by lethal injection is already conferred on DRC by statute, and the proto col “is merely the implementation * * * of a rule already in existence.” Adams , 152 Ohio St.3d 207, 2017-Ohio-8853, 94 N.E.3d 539, at ¶ 37. And unlike the dischar ge limit in Nally , the execution protocol applies only to “a narrow group” rather than to “a large segment of the public,” Nally at ¶ 30; thus, while it is int ended to operate uniformly
to “all individuals involved in carrying out a court-ordered de ath sentence,” 01- COM-11 at 1, it does not have a “ general and uniform operation [emphasis added],” R.C. 119.01(C). {¶ 32} Like the guidelines at issue in Princeton , the execution protocol
described in 01-COM-11 amounts to an instruction manual: it is a 21-page, step-January Term, 2021

11 by-step, minutely detailed direc tive explaining precisely how D RC personnel are to administer a lethal injecti on to a condemned inmate, from st art to finish. {¶ 33} The execution protocol in 01-COM-11 provides for (1) the select ion of specific drugs to be used in an execution, (2) ordering and testing the drugs before an execution, (3) securely storing and handling the drug s before and after an execution, (4) physical- and mental -health evaluations of the p risoner, (5) training and rehearsal by the personnel involved in an execution, (6) ho w and when to inventory the prisoner’s effects, (7) allowing visitors, (8) th e prisoner’s “special meal,” id . at 11, (9) reading the death warrant aloud, and (10) the pris oner’s last words. The protocol lays out what is to take place 30 days, 14 days, and 24 hours
before a scheduled executi on and on the day of the execution. {¶ 34} The step-by-step procedure for p reparing the lethal-injection d rugs consists of two and a half pages. The procedure for the execut ion itself, i.e., the
establishment of intravenous s ites, insertion of the needles, c onsciousness checks, and administration of the drugs, consists of five pages. The p rotocol precludes deviation from some provisions and specifies that only DRC’s di rector may authorize deviations from others . It also requires that certai n actions be documented. Finally, it provide s for post-execution debriefing s and performance
reviews of the execution team. S pecific duties are assigned to DRC’s director, the warden, the execution team, the e xecution-team leader, the medi cal team, the drug administrators, and others. {¶ 35} In short, 01-COM-11 “control[s] the procedure by which the duti es [imposed] in the statute * * * must be performed.” See Princeton , 96 Ohio App.3d at 564, 645 N.E.2d 773. Accordingly, we hold that the executio n protocol is not a “rule * * * having a general a nd uniform operation,” R.C. 111.1 5(A)(1). {¶ 36} The inmates support their argument that 01-COM-11 is a rule and that “[t]he failure to comply with R.C. 111.15 filing requireme nts invalidates the proposed rule” with two cases that applied a former version of R.C. 111.15: StateS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 ex rel. N. Canton Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Holt , 174 Ohio St. 55, 186 N.E.2d 862 (1962), and State ex rel. Ryan v. State Teachers Retirement Sys ., 71 Ohio St.3d 362, 643 N.E.2d 1122 (1994). Both Holt and Ryan held that certain resolutions adopted by th e School Employees Retirement Board were
invalid and could not be i mplemented because those resolutions had not been filed with the secretary of state pursuant to the versions of R.C. 11 1.15 in effect at that
time. Holt at 56-57 (applying Am.Sub.H.B. No. 317, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II , 2399, 2400-2401); Ryan at 365-366 (applying Sub.S.B. No. 359, 144 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2391, 2398-2401). {¶ 37} But it is the current version of R.C. 111.15 that concerns us today,
and Holt and Ryan provide little help in construing it. Neither Holt nor Ryan applied the current definition of “rule” in R.C. 111.15(A)(1), because the resolutions at issue in those cases were adopted before the General Assembly enacted that definition. In fact, the versions of R.C. 111.15 that we applied in Holt
and Ryan did not define the word “rule.” See Ryan at 366 (discussing and applying
Holt ). Rather, in Ryan , the court used Black’s Law Dictionary to define the word “rule”: “A ‘rule’ is ‘[a]n estab lished standard, guide, or regu lation’ and a ‘regulation’ is a ‘[r]ule of order prescribed by superior or co mpetent authority relating to action of those under its control.’ ” (Brackets ad ded in Ryan .) Ryan at 366, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1331, 1286 (6th Ed.1990). This definition is significantly broader than the de finition adopted by the Genera l Assembly. Therefore, we do not fin d the analyses in Holt or Ryan persuasive. {¶ 38} In support of his argument that t he execution protocol in 01-CO M11 is a rule having a general and uniform operation, Jackson al so relies heavily on two cases construing R.C. 111.15: Ohio Assn. of Cty. Bds. of Mental Retardation
& Dev. Disabilities v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys ., 61 Ohio Misc.2d 836, 585 N.E.2d 597 (C.P.1990) (“ Assn. of MRDD Bds .”), and B&T Express, Inc. v. Pub.
Util. Comm ., 145 Ohio App.3d 656, 763 N.E.2d 1241 (10th Dist.2001).January Term, 2021

13 {¶ 39} In Assn. of MRDD Bds ., the common pleas court interpreted the phrase “general and uniform operation” from R.C. 111.15 as foll ows: “The statute does not require that the rule be broadly applied statewide. I t is only required that the proposed rule be uniformly applied by the promulgating agen cy to those affected by the rule .” (Emphasis added.) Assn. of MRDD Bds . at 842-843; accord B&T Express at 665. {¶ 40} But we have not adopted any such i nterpretation of the phrase “general and uniform operation.” To the contrary, in Nally , one of the factors we considered in determining whethe r a rule was generally and unif ormly applicable was whether it “applie[d] to a large segment of the public rath er than a narrow group.” Id ., 143 Ohio St.3d 93, 2015-Ohio-991, 34 N.E.3d 873, at ¶ 30. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the reading of R.C. 111.15(A)( 1) that was set
forth in Assn. of MRDD Bds

. B. Is the execution protocol an internal-management rule? {¶ 41} Even if the execution protocol is not a “rule * * * having a ge neral and uniform operation,” R.C. 111.15(A)(1), it still must be fil ed in accordance with the statute if it is an internal-management rule, because R.C. 111.15(A)(1) includes internal-management rules with in the definition of the word “ru le.” {¶ 42} R.C. 111.15(A)(3) defines the term “internal-management rule” a s “any rule, regulation, bylaw, or s tandard governing the day-to- day staff procedures and operations within an agency.” In this case, the trial cour t concluded that the protocol is an interna l-management rule be cause it “governs the operations of”
DRC. 1 But the Tenth Distr ict held otherwise:

1. The trial court nonetheless concluded that the protocol was not a rule, because that court mistakenly thought that internal-management rules were exempt f rom the rule-filing requirements of R.C. 111.15(B). In fact, R.C. 111.15(A)(1)’s definition of “rule” includes internal-management rules. Internal-management rules are exempt from filing with J CARR, see R.C. 111.15(D)(4), but must still be filed with the secretary of state and LSC. Compare R.C. 119.01(C) (defining “rule” to generally exclude internal-management rules).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 01-COM-11 is not “an internal ma nagement rule” as defined in R. C. 111.15(A)(3), as it does not govern “the day-to-day staff proce dures and operations within an agency.” Executions are not day-to-da y procedures or operations. They do not occur on a regular or fr equent basis, nor are they routine.

2020-Ohio-506, 146 N.E.3d 605, at ¶ 19. {¶ 43} The inmates argue that the court of appeals was wrong to hold t hat an internal-management rule must govern operations that occur d aily. 2 According to the inmates, the “only require ment is that the Agency intend [s] to apply the standard uniformly in those circum stances where the standard ap plies at all.” {¶ 44} However, this argument incorrectly conflates rules “having a ge neral and uniform operation” with inter nal-management rules. Under R .C. 111.15(A), these are two distinct categories and both must comply with the statute to take effect. Thus, whether a directive is to be applied uniformly i s irrelevant to whether it is an internal-management rule; to qualify as an internal-ma nagement rule, the directive must satisfy the definition contained in R.C. 111.15( A)(3). {¶ 45} The inmates cite Assn. of MRDD Bds ., 61 Ohio Misc.2d 836, 585 N.E.2d 597, and B&T Express , 145 Ohio App.3d 656, 763 N.E.2d 1241, in support of their argument that the protocol is an internal-management r ule. But neither case supports their argument, because n either case addressed whether the administrative edict before the court fits the statutory definition of an inte rnal-management rule. Instead, as we discuss above, bot h cases held that the edicts i n question had a

2. The inmates misstate the Tenth District’s conclusion here, as it did not limit internal-management rules to procedures and operations that occur “daily,” but thos e that are “regular,” “frequent,” and “routine.” 2020-Ohio-506, 146 N.E.3d 605, at ¶ 19.January Term, 2021

15 general and uniform operation. See Assn. of MRDD Bds . at 842-843; B&T Express
at 665. {¶ 46} The court of appeals had it right . “Day-to-day” is defined as “a day at a time in unbroken succession; daily.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 578 (1993). 3 See also Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc ., 259 Neb. 407, 414, 610 N.W.2d 420 (2000), quoting Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 370 (1989) (“ ‘[d]ay-to-day’ ” means “ ‘occurring each day; daily’ ”); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 510 (2d Ed.1987). {¶ 47} As used in R.C. 111.15(A)(3), “day-to-day” is perhaps best understood as not literally meaning daily operations and procedures. However, the court of appeals’ reading of “day-to-day” as “frequent” or “rou tine,” 2020-Ohio506, 146 N.E.3d 605, at ¶ 19, preserves the core of the phrase’ s meaning. And other courts have similarly construed “day-to-day.” See Hall at 414 (“day-to-day labor and management” of a farm or ranch means “those activitie s that occur as a routine part of the farm or ranch operation”); Enix v. Burrell , 572 F.Supp. 1364, 1369-1370 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (“day-to-da y management” of a pension plan includes “ordinary administration” but not “extraordinary” matters). In deed, the inmates’ argument simply misconstrues th e statutory language of R.C. 111 .15. {¶ 48} And as the court of appeals said, executions are not routine occurrences. Since 1999, Ohio has carried out or attempted to carry out 58 death

sentences. See Ohio Attorney General, 2020 Capital Crimes Report, at 34 (identifying 56 executions), http s://www.ohioattorneygeneral.go v/ 2020CapitalCrimesRepor t (accessed Aug. 12, 2021) [https://perma .cc/7CXTECK7]; Broom v. Shoop , 963 F.3d 500, 504-506, 513 (6th Cir.2020) (discussing

3. “Day-to-day” may also mean “a day at a time without provisi on for continuance thereafter,” as in “life * * * lived on an aimless, day-to-day basis.” Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language 370 (1989). But it is hard to see how that definition could a pply to “staff procedures and operations within an agency,” R.C. 111.15(A)(3).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 the two unsuccessful attempts). An operation or procedure that is performed on average fewer than three times a year is hardly a “day-to-day” occurrence under any definition. It follows that the execution protocol in 01-C OM-11 is not an “internal-management rule” as defined in R.C. 111.15(A)(3). C. Is the protocol an “order respecting the duties of employees”? {¶ 49} Finally, if the execution protoc ol is an “order respecting the duties of employees,” R.C. 111.15(A)(1), then it is not a “rule.” The court of appeals held that the protocol is an order respecting the duties of employee s. As that court explained:

01-COM-11 is an “order respecting the duties of employees” because it establishes the methods, processes, and procedures t o be employed by ODRC personnel in carrying out the execution of a
condemned inmate. 01-COM-11 is a 21-page document setting forth detailed instructions, pr ocedures, and guidelines to be f ollowed by “all individuals involved in ca rrying out a court-ordered de ath sentence.” (01-COM-11, Section III.) It stands to reason that ODRC employees are the “individuals involved in carrying out a
court-ordered death sentence.” T he policy sets forth numerous procedures to be accomplished by ODRC personnel 30 days, 14 days, 24 hours, and 15 minutes prior to a scheduled execution, as well as procedures to be employed post-execution. The policy a lso
includes extensive instructi ons directing employees in the procurement, preparation, and ad ministration of the drugs to be utilized in the execution process.

2020-Ohio-506, 146 N.E.3d 605, at ¶ 21.January Term, 2021

17 {¶ 50} This analysis is correct. It is true, as the inmates argue, th at certain provisions of the protocol affect people who are not DRC employ ees—most obviously, the inmate being executed, but also the inmate’s fam ily, clergy, counsel, and the news-media personnel covering the execution. Neverthel ess, as we discussed above, the protocol a mounts to an instruction manual on how to perform an execution. As one would expect of such a manual, nearly all of it deals with the duties of DRC personnel par ticipating in an execution. D. Is the protocol a “rule” bec ause it was adopted under the authority of
R.C. 5120.01? {¶ 51} R.C. 5120.01 provides, in part:

The director of rehabilitation and correction is the executive head of the department of reha bilitation and correction. All d uties conferred on the various divisions and institutions of the depa rtment by law or by order of the director shall be performed under the rules and regulations that the director prescribes and shall be under the
director’s control.

{¶ 52} The inmates point to the provision of R.C. 5120.01 that require s DRC to carry out all its duties “under the rules and regulation s that the director prescribes” to argue tha t this language requires whatever DRC does to fulfill its
duties to be done under a “rule or regulation.” And their argu ment implicitly assumes, without attempting to dem onstrate, that “rules and reg ulations” as used in R.C. 5120.01 means only those rules that have been adopted in a ccordance with the rule-filing procedures of R.C. 111.15. {¶ 53} The inmates further note that while R.C. 5120.01 applies specif ically to DRC, R.C. 111.15 applies genera lly to state agencies that ar e not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Citing the principle that “speci fic statutoryS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 provisions prevail over conflic ting general statutes,” State v. Chippendale , 52 Ohio St.3d 118, 120, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990), they contend that R.C. 5120.01 prevails over the provision of R.C. 111.15(A) that “orders regarding the duties of employees” are not “rules” and are therefore not subject to the filing requirement of R.C. 111.15(B). {¶ 54} Generally, when there is a conflic t between a general statutory provision and a more specific st atutory provision, the specific provision controls. MacDonald v. Cleveland Income Tax Bd. of Rev ., 151 Ohio St.3d 114, 2017-Ohio7798, 86 N.E.3d 314, ¶ 27, citing Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012). But when two statutes are capable of coexisting, it is the duty of the courts to regard each as effe ctive and, when possible, to interpret them in a way t hat gives effect to both. Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). Thus, if we ca n, we must construe R.C. 5120.01 so that it does not conflict with R.C. 111.15( A). If the conflict between the two statutes is irreconcilable, then may we decide that one prevails
over the other. See State v. Pribble , 158 Ohio St.3d 490, 2019-Ohio-4808, 145 N.E.3d 259, ¶ 13. {¶ 55} R.C. 5120.01 conflicts with R.C. 111.15(A) only if we adopt the inmates’ proposed reading of R .C. 5120.01, i.e., that the direc tor of DRC must formally promulgate an administrative rule to govern every duty carried out by DRC personnel. As the state points out, that covers a lot of t erritory—from deciding the direction in which the lunch line should move to d ealing with an inmate’s unforeseen medical emergency. And the inmates cite no language in R.C.
5120.01 or elsewhere that indicates that the term “rules and re gulations” in that statute refers only to “rules adopted through the rule-filing p rocedures of R.C. 111.15.” Thus, the two statutes are reconcilable and we thus r eject the argument that R.C. 5120.01 requires that all of DRC’s duties be carried out pursuant to formally promulgated rules.January Term, 2021

19 E. The inmates’ other arguments {¶ 56} The inmates’ remaining arguments take us away from the controll ing statutes and may be disposed of quickly. {¶ 57} The inmates argue that when an administrative agency engages in filling in legislative “gaps,” it must do so by adopting rules. Thus, they contend that 01-COM-11 was required to be rule-filed because it specifi es details that are not prescribed by legislation. T hey cite no statute to support this argument, and instead quote the following language from N.W. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Conrad , 92 Ohio St.3d 282, 289, 750 N.E.2d 130 (2001), quoting Morton v. Ruiz , 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974): “As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ‘[t]he power of an administrati ve agency to administer a * * * program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, ’ by the legislature.” (Brackets, ellipsis, a nd emphasis added in N.W. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades .) {¶ 58} But this unremarkable general observation does not mean that al l legislative gaps must be filled by formal rulemaking. That que stion was not before
us in N.W. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades , because the rules challenged in that case were formally promulgated as provisions of the Administrative C ode. Id . at 285-
292. {¶ 59} Indeed, the great majority of directives that agencies issue, w hether formally promulgated or not, fill in legislative gaps by solvin g matters that have not been specified by statutes. Accordingly, this argument doe s not help to distinguish between administrativ e edicts that must be rule-fil ed under R.C. 111.15(A) and those that need not be. {¶ 60} The inmates also argue that th e protocol should have been promulgated under R.C. 111.15 beca use the drafting, filing, and reviewing requirements of R.C. 111.15 are esse ntial to prevent agencies f rom crossing “theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 line between legislation and rulemaking.” However, this policy argument is quite untethered from the language of R.C. 111.15. {¶ 61} Finally, the inmates note that outside the death-penalty contex t, DRC has promulgated administrative ru les dealing with some of the m atters that are also covered by 01-COM-11, such as atto rney-client access and the tr ansfer of prisoners between institutions. From this, they infer that DRC has “reco gnized that these matters are subject to the rulem aking requirements of R.C. 111. 15.” But of course,
the fact that DRC has used forma l rulemaking in the past to add ress certain subjects in no way amounts to an admission that it must do so when it addr esses those same subjects in the future.
IV. Conclusion {¶ 62} We hold that the inmates have st anding to challe nge the validit y of the execution protocol described in 01-COM-11. We reject the i nmates’ arguments, however, on their merits. We hold that 01-COM-11 is neither a rule having a general and uniform application nor an internal-management rule and that it is an order dealing with the duties of DRC’s employees. Therefore, D RC was not required to file 01-COM-11 pursu ant to R.C. 111.15. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 4 Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and
B RUNNER , JJ., concur.

_________________ Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor Ge neral, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deput y Solicitor General, Charles A. Schneider,

4. Counsel for O’Neal has called this court’s attention to an inadvertent misstatement that counsel had made during oral argument. We note the correction, and we further note that the misstatement in no way affects our disposition of this case.January Term, 2021

21 Criminal Justice Section Chief, and Brenda S. Leikala, Senior A ssistant Attorney General, for appellees. Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Richard A. Cline and Randall Porter, Assistant State Public Defenders; Dale A. Baich, Assist ant Federal Public Defender; and Porter, Wright, Mo rris & Arthur, L.L.P., and L. B radfield Hughes, for appellant Cleveland Jackson in case No. 2020-0676. S. Adele Shank and Lawrence J. Greger, for appellant James D. O’Neal in
case No. 2020-0683.

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