96-553

 No. 96-553

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v.

 

 JIMMY RAY BROMGARD, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 William F. Hooks, Appellate Defender Office, Helena, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, John Paulson, Assistant Attorney

 General, Helena, Montana; Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney,

 Josh Van De Wetering, Deputy Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings,

 Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: April 17, 1997

 Decided: October 21, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

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 Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Jimmy Ray Bromgard (Bromgard), appeals an order of the District Court for the

Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, denying his second petition for 

postconviction relief. We affirm.

 We address the following issues on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err in determining that Bromgard could have raised 

his

claim of jury misconduct in his original petition for post-conviction relief?

 2. Did the District Court err in failing to determine whether Bromgard's claim 

of

ineffective assistance of counsel could have been raised in his original petition 

for postconviction relief?

 Factual and Procedural Background

 On November 19, 1987, Bromgard was convicted by a jury of three counts of

felony sexual intercourse without consent. He was sentenced by the District Court on

December 11, 1987, to three concurrent terms of 40 years at the Montana State 

Prison. 

 Bromgard was represented by appointed counsel throughout the proceedings.

 Bromgard's counsel filed a notice of appeal on December 28, 1987, however, no

brief was ever filed. This Court dismissed the appeal on August 30, 1988, for 

failure to

file appellant's brief or a memorandum in compliance with Anders v. California 

(1967),

386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493.

 On March 29, 1991, Bromgard filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief

with this Court. The petition was a fill-in-the-blank document available to inmates 

at the

prison. In his petition, Bromgard raised seven grounds for relief including a claim 

that

his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to perfect his appeal. 

Bromgard

also alleged that several jurors were prejudiced against him. In support of this 

claim he

referred to a Billings Gazette article, published the day after his trial, which 

claimed that

several jurors were convinced of his guilt on the second day of the three-day trial 

after

they heard evidence relating to hair samples.

 On May 15, 1991, this Court issued an order denying relief on six of the seven

claims alleged in Bromgard's petition and remanding the case to the District Court 

on the

seventh claim, ineffective assistance of counsel. Complying with this Court's 

instructions

to appoint counsel to review the records and determine if there were any meritorious

issues, the District Court appointed new counsel on June 5, 1991. However, on August

24, 1992, by order of this Court, counsel from the Montana Appellate Defender's 

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office

was substituted as counsel of record. On November 10, 1992, counsel moved this Court

to set aside the August 30, 1988 order dismissing Bromgard's appeal. We granted

counsel's motion to file an out-of-time direct appeal.

 On December 11, 1992, while Bromgard's appeal was pending, counsel filed a

second petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the jury had engaged in 

misconduct

during deliberations and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect

Bromgard's rights with regard to the jurors' actions. The misconduct allegation 

stemmed

from the same newspaper article that formed a basis for Bromgard's original petition 

for

post-conviction relief. In that article, the Billings Gazette reported that during

deliberations the jurors conducted an experiment intended to recreate the lighting

conditions existing at the time of the attack. The victim had testified that even 

though

it was dark in her room, she could see that her assailant was wearing brown pants. 

Bromgard had asserted throughout the trial that he did not own a pair of brown pants 

and

that he usually wore jeans. The purpose of the jurors' experiment was to test 

whether

they could discern a difference between a pair of brown pants worn by one juror and 

the

jeans worn by another juror in lighting conditions similar to those described by the

victim. 

 Bromgard alleged in his petition that the conduct of the jury in experimenting

during deliberations constituted jury misconduct which entitled Bromgard to a new 

trial. 

In addition, Bromgard alleged that trial counsel's failure to take any action with 

regard

to this experimentation denied Bromgard the opportunity to present this misconduct 

to the

court by way of a motion for a new trial or other appropriate relief.

 On November 2, 1993, this Court affirmed Bromgard's conviction. State v.

Bromgard (1993), 261 Mont. 291, 862 P.2d 1140 (Bromgard I). The post-conviction

matter, which had been held in abeyance in the District Court pending resolution of 

the

appeal, was resumed. On September 21, 1994, the District Court entered an order

denying post-conviction relief. The court concluded that Bromgard's petition was

procedurally barred because Bromgard knew about the jury experimentation before he

filed his direct appeal and the issue could have been raised at that time.

 Bromgard appealed and this Court vacated the District Court's order holding that

the issues raised in Bromgard's second petition for post-conviction relief could 

not have

been raised in the direct appeal as evidence of the jury's misconduct was not part 

of the

District Court record and we do not consider on appeal facts that are not found in 

the

record. State v. Bromgard (1995), 273 Mont. 20, 901 P.2d 611 (Bromgard II). We

remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 

whether

Bromgard could reasonably have raised in his original petition for post-conviction 

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relief

the claims that were alleged in his second petition. 

 An evidentiary hearing was held on November 9, 1995. On June 6, 1996, the

District Court denied Bromgard's second petition determining that, under õ 46-21-105

(1),

MCA, Bromgard was procedurally barred from raising the issue of jury misconduct in

his second petition for post-conviction relief as he could reasonably have raised 

that issue

in his original petition. Bromgard now appeals the District Court's Order.

 Issue 1.

 Did the District Court err in determining that Bromgard could have

 raised his claim of jury misconduct in his original petition for post-

 conviction relief?

 The standard of review of a district court's denial of a petition for postconviction

relief is whether substantial evidence supports the court's findings and 

conclusions. State

v. Christensen (1995), 274 Mont. 326, 328-29, 907 P.2d 970, 971 (citing State v. 

Baker

(1995), 272 Mont. 273, 280, 901 P.2d 54, 58; State v. Coates (1990), 241 Mont. 331,

336, 786 P.2d 1182, 1185). Moreover, we will not overturn a district court's legal

conclusions if its interpretation of the law is correct. Mothka v. State (Mont. 

1997), 931

P.2d 1331, 1332, 54 St.Rep. 122, 123 (citing Wagner v. State (1995), 270 Mont. 26, 

28,

889 P.2d 1189, 1190, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 101, 133 L.Ed.2d 55). 

 The District Court determined that, pursuant to õ 46-21-105, MCA, Bromgard was

procedurally barred from raising the issue of jury misconduct in his second petition 

for

post-conviction relief as he could reasonably have raised that issue in his original 

petition. 

At the time Bromgard filed his original petition, õ 46-21-105, MCA, provided, in

pertinent part:

 All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under this chapter must

 be raised in his original or amended petition. Any grounds not so raised

 are waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds

 for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in

 the original or amended petition.

Other than some minor changes in style made by the 1991 Legislature, the statute 

quoted 

above is essentially the same as the statute in effect when Bromgard filed his second

petition for post-conviction relief. The Commission Comments to õ 46-21-105, MCA,

provide:

 The object of this section is to eliminate the unnecessary burden

 placed upon the courts by repetitious or specious petitions. It is highly

 desirable that a petitioner be required to assert all his claims in one 

petition. 

 Unless good cause is shown why he did not assert all his claims in the

 original petition, his failure to so assert them constitutes a waiver. The

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 way is left open, however, for a subsequent petition if the court finds

 grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the original

 petition. [Emphasis added.]

 Bromgard argues that the issue of jury misconduct could not reasonably have 

been 

raised in his original petition for post-conviction relief because, although he had 

read the

Billings Gazette article the day after his trial and thus knew of the jurors 

experiment prior

to the time he filed his original petition, he was not aware of the legal 

significance of that

experimentation. He maintains that since he was housed in the maximum security unit

at the prison, he did not have direct access to legal materials and that his lack of 

legal

awareness was sufficient to establish "good cause" for failing to include the claim 

in his

original petition. He asserts that his failure to include his claim of jury 

misconduct in his

original petition for post-conviction relief should be excused because he was not

represented by counsel at the time he filed his original petition.

 The District Court likened the operation of õ 46-21-105, MCA, to civil statutes 

of

limitation wherein the accrual of a claim, for purposes of commencing the limitations

period, often occurs when the claimant has (or reasonably should have) knowledge of 

the

facts which would support the claim, without regard to whether the claimant is aware 

of

the legal significance of the facts. See Title 27, chapter 2, Montana Code 

Annotated. 

The court found that Bromgard's lack of knowledge of the law did not excuse his 

failure

to include the issue of jury misconduct in his original petition for post-conviction 

relief. 

 A post-conviction relief procedure is civil in nature and there is no 

constitutional

requirement that counsel be appointed. Petition of Martin (1989), 240 Mont. 419, 

420,

787 P.2d 746, 747 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987), 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 

1990,

95 L.Ed.2d 539). An appellant appearing pro se in appealing the denial of his 

petition

for post-conviction relief will be held to the same standards as any appellate 

attorney. 

State v. Henricks (1983), 206 Mont. 469, 474, 672 P.2d 20, 23, overruled on other

grounds by Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32, 901 P.2d 1368. 

 At the evidentiary hearing, Bromgard admitted having read the newspaper article

the day after his trial and remembering it clearly enough to assert a claim of juror 

bias

in his original petition for post-conviction relief. Moreover, the fill-in the 

blank

document that Bromgard used for his original petition for post-conviction relief 

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clearly

cautions pro se petitioners that if they fail to set forth all grounds for relief in 

their

petition, they "may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date." 

A postconviction relief petitioner bears the risk of waiving a claim by failing to comply 

with the

procedural obligations arising from knowledge of that claim's underlying factual 

basis. 

See õ 46-21-105(1), MCA; Blaney v. Gamble (1994), 266 Mont. 51, 53, 879 P.2d 51,

52-53.

 We agree with the District Court's conclusion that Bromgard failed to show good

cause why he could not reasonably have included his claim of jury misconduct in his

original petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we hold that the 

District Court

did not err in determining that Bromgard was procedurally barred from raising the 

issue

of jury misconduct in his second petition for post-conviction relief as he could 

reasonably

have raised that issue in his original petition.

 Issue 2.

 Did the District Court err in failing to determine whether Bromgard's

 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been raised in his

 original petition for post-conviction relief?

 Bromgard contends that since the District Court failed to consider whether his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could reasonably have been raised in his 

original

petition for post-conviction relief, this case should be remanded for consideration 

of this

issue. Bromgard argues that, in the alternative, we should find that this claim 

could not

reasonably have been raised in the original petition and remand the case for 

consideration

of the merits of Bromgard's claim.

 Since Bromgard's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is derived entirely 

from

his claim of jury misconduct, the District Court's ruling on the ineffective 

assistance of

counsel claim is implicit in the court's order. Nevertheless, in his original 

petition for

post-conviction relief, Bromgard raised other instances of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Because Bromgard was aware at the time he filed his original petition that 

his

trial attorney did not challenge the jury misconduct claim in any post-trial 

motions, 

Bromgard could have and should have raised this claim in his original petition for 

postconviction relief along with the other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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 Affirmed.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

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