3 

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 

VEHICLE LAWS – LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – STATUTE BARRING 

THE SOLICITATION OF A “RIDE, EMPLOYMENT, OR 

BUSINESS” FROM ROADWAY NOT INTENDED TO 

ENCOMPASS CHARITABLE SOLICITATION

May 18, 2012

The Honorable Anne R. Kaiser 

Maryland Senate 

You asked for our opinion on whether the fire fighters’ 

annual “Fill the Boot” campaign to raise money for the Muscular 

Dystrophy Association is prohibited by § 21-507(a) of the 

Transportation Article, which prohibits any person from 

“stand[ing] in a roadway to solicit a ride, employment, or 

business.” Specifically, you have asked whether the General 

Assembly intended its use of the word “business” in § 21-507(a) to 

include charitable solicitations. After a thorough review of the 

legislative history of the provision, both before and after its 

enactment in 1970, we now conclude that the Legislature did not 

intend the term “business” to include charitable solicitations. In 

reaching this conclusion, we depart from the interpretation we 

adopted in a previous opinion, see 93 Opinions of the Attorney 

General 31, 35-36 (2008), but do so without disturbing its ultimate 

determination that the local ordinance at issue in the earlier 

opinion was preempted by State law. We also recognize that the 

interpretation we reach here raises First Amendment concerns that 

a reviewing court might choose to avoid with a broader reading of 

the word “business.” However, in our view, interpreting § 21-

507(a) to allow charitable solicitation within the roadway does not 

make the law clearly unconstitutional, although additional 

legislation may be advisable to ensure that charitable contributions, 

which would include panhandling, are solicited in a manner that is 

consistent with the public safety goals of the statute. 

I 

Background

The International Association of Fire Fighters (“IAFF”) is 

one of the national sponsors of the Muscular Dystrophy 

Association (“MDA”) and has since 1954 supported the MDA 
4 [97 Op. Att’y 

through a variety of volunteer and fund-raising activities. Perhaps 

the most recognizable aspect of the IAFF’s activities on behalf of 

the MDA is the annual Fill the Boot campaign, in which members 

of IAFF locals across the country invite the public at intersections, 

malls, and sporting events to fill a fire fighter’s boot with 

donations for the MDA. Here in Maryland, local chapters of the 

IAFF have carried out the Fill the Boot campaign since at least 

1986. In 2011, Fill the Boot campaigns helped fire fighters raise 

$27 million—the highest yearly contribution from an MDA 

sponsor. 

The Fill the Boot campaign involves fire fighters (or the 

professional fundraisers they employ) standing on the median strip 

at busy intersections and soliciting contributions from motorists 

when stopped at red lights. If the car is close enough to the median 

strip, the fire fighter can extend the boot and collect the 

contribution without ever leaving the median strip. More typically, 

however, the fire fighter must step into the roadway to collect the 

contribution, particularly when the car is in a lane that is not 

immediately adjacent to the median strip. The entire fundraising 

process—from soliciting from the median strip to entering the 

roadway to collect the contribution—is carried out pursuant to 

safety manuals that instruct fundraisers to wear orange vests or 

reflective material on their clothing, initiate all collections from the 

roadside or the median strip, and never stop traffic or approach a 

moving vehicle. 

Section 21-507(a) of the Transportation Article 

Section 21-507(a) of the Transportation Article sets forth the 

restrictions on roadside solicitations that are the subject of this 

opinion: “Except for the occupant of a disabled vehicle who seeks 

the aid of another vehicle, a person may not stand in a roadway to 

solicit a ride, employment, or business from the occupant of any 

vehicle.” Md. Code Ann., Transp. (“TR”) § 21-507(a) (2011 

Supp.). For purposes of § 21-507(a), the term “roadway” refers to 

the portion of a road designed for vehicular travel, while the term 

“highway” encompasses a wider area. See TR §§ 11-151.1, 11-

127 (2009 Repl. Vol.).1

 Additional subsections in § 21-507 

 

1

 Those definitions are as follows: “Highway” means: 

(1) The entire width between the boundary lines of any 

way or thoroughfare of which any part is used by the 

public for vehicular travel, whether or not the way or 

(continued . . .) 
Gen. 3] 5 

regulate solicitations along the highways in particular counties. 

TR § 21-507(c)-(k) (2011 Supp.). Violation of § 21-507 is 

punishable as a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than 

$500.2

This Office first addressed the scope of § 21-507 in a 2004 

legislative advice letter, which concluded that the statute clearly 

prohibited standing in the roadway for the purpose of selling 

things, but that it was a “closer question” whether the solicitation 

of donations was similarly banned. See Letter of Assistant 

Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe to Delegate David D. Rudolph 

(June 28, 2004) (“2004 advice letter”). The advice letter cited the 

public safety purpose of the statute, case law in which courts have 

treated the activities of nonprofit organizations under the rubric of 

“business,” and the conclusion that, “[f]rom the standpoint of 

public safety, there is little or no difference between a person 

standing in the roadway to sell things and one standing in the 

roadway to solicit money.” Reasoning that the term “business” 

could encompass a charitable transaction as well as a commercial 

transaction, the advice letter concluded that the reference to 

soliciting business should be “read broadly” in this context to 

include the solicitation of donations. 

 

thoroughfare has been dedicated to the public and 

accepted by any proper authority; and 

(2) For purposes of the application of State laws, the entire 

width between the boundary lines of any way or 

thoroughfare used for purposes of vehicular travel on 

any property owned, leased, or controlled by the United 

States government and located in the State. 

TR § 11-127. “‘Roadway’ means that part of highway that is improved, 

designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, other than the 

shoulder.” TR § 11-151(a). In relevant part, these definitions are 

unchanged since their initial enactment in 1970. Compare with 1970 

Md. Laws, ch. 534 at 1313 (§ 1-132), 1319 (§ 1-777). 

2

 TR § 27-101(a), (b). The 2011 District Court of Maryland 

“Schedule of Pre-Set Fines and/or Penalty Deposits,” used by law 

enforcement officers as a reference in issuing citations, lists the fine for 

violation of § 21-507(a) as $70 with no points. See http:// 

www.courts.state.md.us/district/forms/criminal/dccr090.pdf (last visited 

May 11, 2012). 
6 [97 Op. Att’y 

Subsequently, in 2008, we were asked to opine on the 

constitutionality of Gaithersburg’s anti-solicitation ordinance. The 

opinion concluded that the provisions of the ordinance addressing 

conduct in the roadway were preempted by State law. In the 

course of analyzing that issue, however, the opinion noted with 

respect to § 21-507(a) that “[t]his Office has taken the position that 

the ban on business solicitation in this statute should be interpreted 

broadly to encompass the solicitation of donations, given that its 

purpose is to promote public safety.” 93 Opinions of the Attorney 

General 31, 35-36 (2008) (citing with approval the 2004 advice 

letter). It is that subsidiary conclusion that we now revisit. 

II 

Analysis 

Familiar principles guide the interpretation of statutory 

provisions. The Court of Appeals has instructed that “[t]he 

cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and 

effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.” Gardner v. 

State, 420 Md. 1, 8 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To ascertain the intent of the General 

Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain 

meaning of the statute. If the language of the 

statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent 

with the statute’s apparent purpose, our 

inquiry as to the legislative intent ends 

ordinarily and we apply the statute as written 

without resort to other rules of construction. 

We neither add nor delete language so as to 

reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and 

unambiguous language of the statute, and we 

do not construe a statute with forced or subtle 

interpretations that limit or extend its 

application. 

Id. at 8-9. Other principles of statutory construction caution 

against “read[ing] statutory language in a vacuum” or confining an 

interpretation of a statute’s plain language “to the isolated section 

alone.” Id. at 9. Even when the words of a statute “are clear and 

unambiguous when viewed in isolation,” resort to legislative 

history is warranted if those words “become ambiguous when read 

as part of a larger statutory scheme. . . .” Id. At the same time, it 
Gen. 3] 7 

is important not to “disregard the natural meaning of the statutory 

words” or “rewrite statutes to reflect [one’s own] ideas of public 

policy.” BAA, PLC v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400 Md. 136, 158 

(2007). 

A. Ordinary Meaning of “Business” 

The plain language of § 21-507(a) limits its reach to roadway 

solicitations for “a ride, employment, or business.” The term 

“business” is not defined by statute and has a number of meanings, 

ranging from “any purposeful activity” (e.g., the business of 

learning) to connoting personal rights (e.g., “You had no business 

hitting him.”). Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 

(Merriam Webster, 1989). The more common meaning of the term 

“business,” however, is “commercial or mercantile activity.” Id. 

That, too, is the common meaning of the term “business” in legal 

parlance. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (listing first 

definition of “business” as “[a] commercial enterprise carried on 

for profit; a particular occupation or employment habitually 

engaged in for livelihood or gain”). Because neither the fire 

fighters nor the Muscular Dystrophy Association is a “business” in 

the sense of engaging in commercial activity for profit or gain, the 

plain language of § 21-507(a) would not appear to reach the fire 

fighters’ annual Fill the Boot campaign. 

B. Legislative History 

Although the term “business” does not ordinarily include 

“charitable solicitation,” there is at least some ambiguity as to its 

precise meaning. To that extent, it is appropriate to consider the 

legislative history of § 21-507 and other interpretive aids to 

ascertain legislative intent. For the reasons explained below, we 

find that these non-textual indicia of legislative intent also indicate 

that the General Assembly did not mean to prohibit charitable 

solicitation with its use of the term “business” in § 21-507(a). 

The Warnken Committee and the Uniform Vehicle Code 

The circumstances surrounding the adoption of § 21-507 

indicate that the General Assembly intended to prohibit solicitation 

of business, but not to bar all solicitation of contributions. The 

predecessor of § 21-507 was enacted following a 1968 report to the 

Legislature by the Committee to Study Revision of the Motor 

Vehicle Laws, sometimes referred to as the “Warnken Committee” 

after its chairman, Judge S. Ralph Warnken. The Committee was 

convened to compare existing Maryland law to the laws of other 
8 [97 Op. Att’y 

states and to the provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Code 

(“UVC”)3

 and recommend revisions to modernize Maryland’s 

vehicle laws. The Committee carried out its deliberations over an 

approximately four-year period, culminating in its “Proposed 

Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws of the State of Maryland” 

issued on September 1, 1968 (“Warnken Report”). The Legislative 

Council considered the Warnken Report in 1969, and the Judiciary 

Committee of that body appointed a special committee which 

“studied the matter and recommended adoption of the report of the 

Warnken [C]ommittee.” Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md. 322, 324-

25 (1977). The General Assembly accepted that recommendation 

and adopted the new motor vehicle code in 1970. See generally 

1970 Md. Laws, ch. 534. 

At the time the Warnken Committee began its deliberations, 

existing Maryland law appears to have prohibited only the 

placement of “any structure, building or vehicle on any State 

highway right-of-way for the purpose of selling or displaying any 

produce or merchandise in such a manner which shall constitute a 

traffic hazard. . . .” Md. Ann. Code Art. 661⁄2, § 248 (1967 Repl. 

Vol.). The Uniform Vehicle Code, by contrast, prohibited an 

individual from standing in a roadway to solicit “a ride, 

employment, or business from the occupant of any vehicle.”4 

 

3

 Unlike most other “uniform” laws, the Uniform Vehicle Code is 

not a product of either the National Conference of Commissioners on 

Uniform State Laws or the American Law Institute. Rather, it was 

developed, and is still updated from time to time, by the National 

Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (“NCUTLO”), a 

private, nonprofit organization which is located in Alexandria, Virginia, 

and has a website at www.ncutlo.org. The Uniform Vehicle Code has 

been adopted in full or in part by most states. 

4

 The complete text of § 11-507 of the Uniform Vehicle Code in 

place at the time provided as follows: 

(a) No person shall stand in a roadway to solicit a ride, 

employment or business from the occupant of any 

vehicle. 

(b) No person shall stand on or in proximity to a street or 

highway for the purpose of soliciting the watching or 

guarding of any vehicle while parked or about to be

parked on a street or highway. 

NCUTLO, Uniform Vehicle Code: Rules of the Road at 332 (1967); see 

Warnken Report at 147. A provision prohibiting a person from standing 

(continued . . .) 
Gen. 3] 9 

Although members of the Warnken Committee “considered and 

discussed at great length the respective merits of [existing] 

Maryland [law] versus UVC provisions,” Warnken Report at iv, 

the new motor vehicle code that the Warnken Committee proposed 

followed “very closely” the Uniform Vehicle Code. Id. at iii; State 

v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 486 (1981). With respect to roadside 

solicitation, the language the Committee proposed, and the General 

Assembly adopted, was substantively identical to the UVC 

provision and is identical to the current version of § 21-507(a). 

See 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 534 at 1475-76 (§ 11-507). 

Even as the Warnken Committee was carrying out its review, 

however, the anti-solicitation provisions of the Uniform Vehicle 

Code were themselves under revision. The result of that revision 

was to split the roadside solicitation provisions of what was § 11-

507 into two subsections. See NCUTLO, Uniform Vehicle Code: 

Rules of the Road at 120 (1970 Supp.). The first subsection 

prohibited the solicitation of a ride by a person standing in the 

roadway—i.e., the traveled portion of the highway. Id. The 

second subsection was broadened to apply to the entire highway 

and barred solicitation of “employment, business, or contributions” 

from drivers. Id. (emphasis added). The second subsection of the 

uniform code thus applied to a broader geographical area, and 

added the word “contributions” to the terms “employment” and 

“business” that had appeared in the model law for 16 years.5

 

in a roadway to solicit a ride had been included within the Uniform 

Vehicle Code since 1930, with the words “employment” and “business” 

added in 1952. NCUTLO, Uniform Vehicle Code: Rules of the Road at 

333. 

5

 The complete text of § 11-507 of the revised version of the 

Uniform Vehicle Code that was adopted in 1968 provided as follows: 

(a) No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of 

soliciting a ride. 

(b) No person shall stand on a highway for the purpose of 

soliciting employment, business, or contributions from 

the occupant of any vehicle. 

(c) No person shall stand on or in proximity to a street or 

highway for the purpose of soliciting the watching or 

guarding of any vehicle while parked or about to be

parked on a street or highway. 

NCUTLO, Traffic Laws Annotated 182 (1979). 
10 [97 Op. Att’y 

Although no legislative bill files are available for sessions 

prior to 1975, the Warnken Committee’s reports indicate that it 

was aware that the Uniform Vehicle Code was “undergoing 

substantial modification” as the Committee was preparing its 

report and recommendation to the General Assembly. Remarks of 

S. Ralph Warnken before the Legis. Council (Nov. 16, 1967) 

reproduced in Rep. to the Gen. Assembly of 1968, vol. 1, at 342. 

While the Committee reports do not specifically mention the 

changes to the roadside solicitation provisions of the uniform code, 

they do indicate that Committee members “had to evaluate the as 

yet tentative proposals for amendment of that Code.” Id. In the 

end, however, neither the committee, in making its 

recommendations, nor the General Assembly, in enacting 

legislation based on those recommendations, included the term 

“contributions” in the roadside solicitation provision that, after 

1968, appeared in the Uniform Vehicle Code. 

In our view, this history suggests that the legislative decision 

to adopt the phrase “ride, employment, or business” from the pre1968 Uniform Vehicle Code, and not the phrase “employment, 

business, or contributions” that appeared after 1968, was 

deliberate. Its various reports demonstrate that the Warnken 

Committee was aware of the proposed modifications to the 

Uniform Vehicle Code, evaluated those modifications for adoption 

in Maryland, and chose not to recommend them to the Legislature. 

Legislative Action Prior to the Attorney General’s 2004 

and 2008 Interpretation 

Legislative action and inaction since the enactment of § 21-

507 further supports the conclusion that the General Assembly did 

not understand charitable solicitation to be prohibited by the term 

“business” in § 21-507(a). It is significant, for example, that the 

anti-solicitation provision has not been amended subsequently to 

conform to the 1968 changes in the Uniform Vehicle Code. In this 

respect, Maryland is different from the many states that, based on 

our limited review, have adopted anti-solicitation provisions that 

are identical or functionally similar to the anti-solicitation 

provision in the post-1968 version of the Uniform Vehicle Code. 

See, e.g., Op. S.C. Att’y Gen., 1979 S.C. AG LEXIS 155 (Oct. 8, 

1979) (discussing state law prohibition on “soliciting employment, 

business, or contributions” from the highway). Indeed, NCUTLO, 

in its 1979 Traffic Laws Annotated, identified Maryland as one of 

only 12 states that, “[l]ike the [Uniform] Code prior to 1968,” 

prohibit the solicitation of “employment or business,” but not 
Gen. 3] 11 

charitable contributions. NCUTLO, Traffic Laws Annotated at 183 

(1979). 

The first time the Legislature revisited the issue of roadside 

solicitation came in 2001, when it amended §§ 21-507 and 21-313 

to authorize the Charles County Commissioners to prohibit a 

person from soliciting “money, donations of any kind, 

employment, business, or a ride from the occupant of any vehicle.” 

2001 Md. Laws, ch. 585. Three aspects of this legislation are 

noteworthy. First, an amendment to § 21-507(a) to prohibit the 

solicitation of “donations of any kind” would have been largely 

surplusage if § 21-507(a) had already prohibited the solicitation of 

donations by its use of the term “business.” Second, the legislative 

history indicates that the General Assembly was aware of the 

discrepancy between the proposed county-specific provisions and 

§ 21-507(a). The Fiscal Note for the 2001 bill states that State law 

at that time did “not specifically prohibit soliciting donations or 

money from a controlled access highway or from a median divider 

or intersection.” Revised Fiscal Note for S.B. 225, at 2 (2001).

Finally, the evolution of the bill’s language as it moved 

through the legislative process suggests strongly that the 

Legislature considered, but decided against, expanding the 

prohibition of § 21-507(a) to encompass charitable solicitation. 

When that bill was first introduced, the language proposed to 

amend § 21-507(a) in the following way: 

Except for the occupant of a disabled vehicle 

who seeks the aid of another vehicle, a person 

may not stand in a roadway, MEDIAN 

DIVIDER, OR INTERSECTION to solicit a 

ride, employment, [or] business, MONEY, 

OR DONATIONS OF ANY KIND from the 

occupant of any vehicle. 

S.B. 225, 2001 Gen. Assembly (first reader) (proposed 

amendments capitalized). In other words, the bill initially sought 

to broaden the statewide prohibition to include donations and 

extend the prohibited conduct beyond the roadway. As the bill 

moved through the legislative process, it was amended to make the 

broadened prohibition applicable only in Charles County and left 

§ 21-507(a) unchanged. The General Assembly, thus, was aware 

that § 21-507(a) did not specifically prohibit charitable 

solicitations, considered amending the provision to include such a 

prohibition, but in the end chose not to do so. 
12 [97 Op. Att’y 

In 2004, the General Assembly returned to § 21-507 to 

authorize Anne Arundel County to establish a licensing program 

for individuals and qualified charitable organizations—including 

fire companies—who wish to “solicit money or donations from the 

occupant of a vehicle by standing in a roadway, median divider, or 

intersection.” 2004 Md. Laws, ch. 156. The legislative history 

surrounding Ch. 156 is consistent with that surrounding the 2001 

legislation and also supports the conclusion that the Legislature did 

not believe that the term “business” included charitable 

solicitation. Specifically, the Fiscal Note draws a distinction 

between the then-current State law, which prohibited solicitation 

for “a ride, employment, or business,” and the law applicable 

within Charles, Harford, and Washington Counties, which by then 

prohibited a person from standing “in a roadway, median divider, 

or intersection to solicit money or donations of any kind.”6

 

Revised Fiscal and Policy Note for H.B. 187, at 3 (2004). More 

importantly, the Fiscal Note makes clear that “[n]othing in the bill 

should be construed as prohibiting individuals or organizations 

from roadway solicitation if the county council does not enact an 

ordinance to create a licensing program.” Id. This caveat provides 

further evidence that charitable solicitation was not believed to be 

prohibited under § 21-507(a) as a matter of State law, for if it were, 

such solicitation would have remained prohibited as a matter of 

State law whether or not the County enacted a licensing program. 

Legislative Action Subsequent to the Attorney 

General’s Advice 

The history of amendments to § 21-507(a) occurring after this 

Office made known its earlier interpretation—both in the 2004 

advice letter and in the 2008 opinion—do not compel the 

conclusion that the Legislature has adopted or ratified that 

interpretation. It is, of course, relevant that the General Assembly 

has not statutorily superseded the interpretation of § 21-507(a) 

provided by this Office in the 2004 advice letter and echoed in the 

2008 opinion. “The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the 

 

6

 As discussed above in text, Charles County was the first county in 

which this broader prohibition on the roadside solicitation of “donations 

of any kind” was prohibited, see 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 585. Harford 

County and Washington County were added in 2003. See 2003 Md. 

Laws, chs. 219 (Harford), 463 (Washington). Carroll County was 

subsequently added in 2005. 2005 Md. Laws, ch. 93.
Gen. 3] 13 

Attorney General’s statutory interpretation and, in the absence of 

enacting any change to the statutory language, to acquiesce in the 

Attorney General’s construction.” Potomac Valley Orthopaedic 

Assocs. v. State Board of Physicians, 417 Md. 622, 637 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the Legislature 

has amended § 21-507 on a number of occasions after 2004 to 

enact county-specific roadside solicitation provisions that 

expressly do apply to charitable donations without also amending 

subsection (a) to modify the statewide ban in a similar manner. 

Since 2004, the Legislature on several occasions has amended 

§ 21-507 to enact county-specific provisions—some that extend 

the solicitation ban beyond the roadway,7 others that relax the ban 

by adopting permit programs that impose conditions on 

solicitors8—and in each instance has expressly included 

“donations” in the scope of regulated roadway solicitations. Yet 

§ 21-507(a) has never been amended to include donations. And in 

each of the instances in which a county-specific bill was enacted, 

the Department of Legislative Services noted that the bill, if 

passed, “may affect some nonprofit organizations (e.g., local fire 

departments, advocacy groups, charities) . . . that conduct fundraising activities from median dividers.” Fiscal and Policy Note 

for H.B. 1429, at 2 (2005); see also Revised Fiscal and Policy Note 

for H.B. 392, at 3 (2009). Again, if State law had already 

prohibited the roadside solicitation of donations by fire fighters 

and other groups under the term “business,” the county-specific 

legislation making that prohibition express would have had little or 

no effect. The history of legislative action both before and after 

2004 simply does not support the proposition that the General 

Assembly intended its use of the word “business” in § 21-507(a) to 

encompass charitable solicitation. 

 

7

See 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 695 (Howard County); 2008 Md. Laws, 

ch. 436 (Prince George’s County); 2007 Md. Laws, ch. 537 (Anne 

Arundel County); 2006 Md. Laws, ch. 473 (broadening prohibition in 

Montgomery County to ban minors from standing on median divider or 

in intersection, as well as in roadway, and authorizing Anne Arundel to 

do the same); 2005 Md. Laws, ch. 93 (Carroll County). 

8

See 2011 Md. Laws, ch. 586 (Frederick County); 2009 Md. Laws, 

ch. 698 (Prince George’s County); 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 669 (Baltimore 

County); 2005 Md. Laws, ch. 311 (Cecil County). 
14 [97 Op. Att’y 

This understanding of the meaning of the term “business” 

appears to be consistent with the history of the Fill the Boot 

campaign here in Maryland. Without purporting to have made a 

detailed investigation or conclusive finding, we are unaware of any 

evidence that § 21-507(a) has ever been applied to prohibit fire 

fighters from carrying out the Fill the Boot campaign from the 

roadway, either before or after the 2008 opinion and the earlier 

advice letter. To the contrary, our limited inquiry indicates that the 

fire fighters have been conducting the Fill the Boot campaign here 

in Maryland at least since 1986 without restriction or citation by 

local law enforcement authorities. Indeed, as recently as August 

2011, the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office reassured 

the Montgomery fire fighters that their Fill the Boot campaign, if 

carried out in accord with internal fire department safety 

guidelines, “would be in compliance with Section 21-507. . . .” 

Letter from John D. Lalos, Assistant State’s Attorney, to Richard 

Bowers, Chief, Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service 

(August 17, 2011). 

C. Prior Interpretations of the Statutory Language 

Neither the 2004 advice letter nor 2008 opinion examined the 

legislative history to ascertain the intent behind the enactment of 

§ 21-507(a) and its subsequent application. Our prior advice was 

instead based primarily on the conclusion “that the term 

solicitation of business should be interpreted broadly in this 

context to accomplish the purposes of the statute, which are to 

promote the public safety.”9

 Based on a more complete analysis of 

 

9

 The larger statutory scheme relating to motor vehicles, although of 

little aid here, does not suggest a legislative intent to include charitable 

solicitation within the term “business.” To the contrary, provisions 

relating to special registration plates and excise tax exemptions—like the 

county-specific solicitation provisions discussed in text—suggest that the 

General Assembly knows how to craft legislation that reaches charitable 

organizations. See TR §§ 13-619(c) (providing for issuance of special 

plates to “member of a nonprofit organization”), 13-810(a)(24) 

(exemption vehicles acquired by certain “religious, charitable, or 

volunteer organization[s]” from excise tax). And that charitable 

organizations are regulated under the Business Regulation Article, as the 

2004 advice letter points out, says little about whether charitable 

solicitations were intended to qualify as “business” for purposes of 

traffic safety or other concerns. Cf., Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 712 

(2002) (Legislature’s placement of sex offender registry in the Criminal 

Procedure Article “does not necessarily indicate an intent on the part of 

(continued . . .) 
Gen. 3] 15 

§ 21-507 and its relevant history, we conclude that our 2004 advice 

was incorrect; the Legislature did not intend to ban charitable 

solicitations from the roadway.10

Consistency with statutory purpose is, of course, an important 

element of the interpretive process, but there are other rules of 

construction that cut the other way. For example, interpreting the 

word “business” to include charitable solicitations may raise 

vagueness concerns within the context of individual prosecutions 

under § 21-507(a). See Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614 

(2001) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to the analysis 

of penal statutes requires that the statute be sufficiently explicit to 

inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will 

render them liable to its penalties.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). More importantly, resort to the Legislature’s presumed

intent is not necessary here, where the extensive historical record 

indicates the General Assembly’s actual intent not to include 

charitable donations within the scope of § 21-507(a). 

Our conclusion here differs from that reached by the 

Louisiana Attorney General, the only other state attorney general 

who has addressed a state-law provision which, like § 21-507(a), 

 

the General Assembly to punish sex offenders”). The provisions of the 

Business Regulation Article are at least equivocal with respect to the 

status of charitable organizations as businesses. Compare Md. Code 

Ann., Bus. Reg. § 6-101(d)(2) (2010 Repl. Vol.) (addressing the 

“principal place of business” of a charitable organization), with id., § 6-

620 (drawing a distinction between the “charitable organization” to be 

benefitted by donations collected in a “vending machine, canister, or 

other device or container for the deposit of money” and the “business 

placing the device or container, if not the charitable organization”). 

Neither statute addresses charitable organizations as businesses in a 

manner that would overcome the presumption that the Legislature 

intended the term to have its commonly accepted meaning.

10 As explained in a 1987 opinion, “[w]e do not overrule a prior 

opinion simply because we might have resolved a close question the 

other way, were we first presented with it. At the same time, we will not 

perpetuate a significant mistake in legal reasoning.” 72 Opinions of the 

Attorney General 200, 202 (1987). The 2008 opinion is not overruled; it 

remains valid because it “correctly treated the questions actually 

presented in [it],” 76 Opinions of the Attorney General 287, 294 (1991), 

which was whether a Gaithersburg ordinance prohibiting a person from 

making roadway solicitations was preempted by § 21-507.
16 [97 Op. Att’y 

was based on the pre-1968 version of the Uniform Vehicle Code. 

He was asked whether charitable organizations, volunteer 

organizations, or school or other civic groups could legally solicit 

funds on public roadways and concluded that “it is clear that the 

practice of soliciting funds from vehicles is prohibited in the State 

of Louisiana on interstate highways and state roadways.” Op. La. 

Att’y Gen. No. 1998-487, 1998 La. AG LEXIS 545 at *4 (Dec. 29,

1998). The opinion does not analyze the specific issue, however, 

and does not indicate that the statutory provision in question—La. 

Rev. Stat. § 32:218 (2012)—had been addressed by the Louisiana 

Legislature in the same manner that the General Assembly has 

addressed § 21-507(a) here. Shortly after the opinion was issued, 

the Louisiana legislature amended the statute to permit solicitations 

by “a professional fire fighters association or other nonprofit 

organization . . . on behalf of bona fide charitable organizations,” 

subject to the permission of the local governing authority. La. 

Rev. Stat. § 32:218(b) (2012). The Louisiana Attorney General 

later recognized that the 1998 opinion had been “statutorily 

superseded.” Op. La. Att’y Gen. No. 03-0394, 2003 La. AG 

LEXIS 493 at *2 (Nov. 17, 2003). 

Other states that have adopted the newer version of the 

Uniform Vehicle Code language have added provisions that relax 

the anti-solicitation ban for contributions, sometimes by creating a 

permitting system for solicitations by non-profit organizations. 

Some of these provisions allowing specified charitable solicitations 

in the roadway have been determined to be invalid as violating the 

free speech guarantee of the First Amendment, while others have 

withstood constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Bischoff v. Florida, 

242 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (exemption in Florida 

statute permitting highway solicitations on behalf of registered § 

501(c)(3) charities violated U.S. Constitution); Op. Del. Att’y 

Gen., 2002 Del. AG LEXIS 12 (July 8, 2002) (exception in state 

motor vehicle law that allowed solicitations on roadway by some 

charitable organizations, but barred solicitations by others, was not 

content-neutral and therefore violated First Amendment); Op. Tex. 

Att’y Gen. No. DM-367, 1995 Tex. AG LEXIS 122 (Dec. 4, 1995) 

(state statute that permitted local governments to enact charitable 

exceptions to ban on roadway solicitations would be

unconstitutional unless local ordinance was narrowly tailored); but 

see People v. Tosch, 501 N.E.2d 1253 (Ill. 1986) (upholding 

statute that banned roadway solicitation except for charitable 

organizations engaged in statewide campaigns). 
Gen. 3] 17 

Your question, however, focused on whether, under § 21-

507(a), the fire fighters’ annual “Fill the Boot” campaign to raise 

money for the Muscular Dystrophy Association may continue. We 

answer that question in the affirmative, having concluded that, 

based on the plain language of the provision and its legislative 

history, the General Assembly did not intend its use of the term 

“business” to include charitable solicitation. You did not ask us to 

address the First Amendment issues thus presented and we 

consider those issues to be beyond the scope of this Opinion. 

Nevertheless, as the court decisions cited above suggest, giving 

effect to the plain language and legislative intent of § 21-507(a) 

does raise constitutional concerns. It is possible, therefore, that a 

reviewing court would elect to construe the term “business” 

broadly to avoid those issues. See VNA Hospice v. Dep’t of Health 

& Mental Hygiene, 406 Md. 584, 605-09 (2008) (“In light of the 

policy against deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily, we 

have consistently adhered to the principle that an interpretation 

which raises doubts as to a legislative enactment’s constitutionality 

should be avoided if the language of the act permits.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In our view, however, that type of 

“saving construction” may not be necessary. “[S]tatutes carry a 

strong presumption of constitutionality,” Koshko v. Haining, 398 

Md. 404, 426 (2007), and this Office will defend enactments of the 

Legislature unless “clearly unconstitutional.” 93 Opinions of the 

Attorney General 154, 161 n.12 (2008). Because we do not find 

that giving effect to the Legislature’s actual intent here would be 

clearly unconstitutional, it is our opinion that the fire fighters may 

conduct their annual Fill the Boot campaign and enter the roadway 

to collect contributions without violating § 21-507(a).11

 

 

11 Other types of solicitation, such as panhandling, would also be 

allowed by § 21-507(a), as we now construe it. See Henry v. City of 

Cincinnati, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94704, 16-20 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 

(“After [Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envir., 444 U.S. 

620 (1980)], lower federal courts and state courts have equated 

panhandling to charitable solicitations, and analyzed them under the 

same framework.”). We express no opinion herein about the 

constitutional permissibility of statewide legislation drawing a 

distinction between panhandling and charitable solicitations undertaken 

by public safety officials. 
18 [97 Op. Att’y 

III 

Conclusion

In our opinion, the General Assembly did not intend for its 

use of the term “business” in § 21-507(a) to extend the ban on 

roadside solicitations to the fire fighters’ annual Fill the Boot 

campaign and other solicitations for charitable donations. The 

plain language of the statute and its legislative history belie any 

such intent. However, a statute that prohibits solicitation for some 

purposes but not others does raise constitutional issues. We 

therefore recommend that the Legislature consider revising the 

statute should it wish to ensure that charitable solicitations 

continue and without compromising the public safety goals of the 

Transportation Article. 

Douglas F. Gansler 

Attorney General 

 Sandra Benson Brantley 

 Assistant Attorney General 

Adam D. Snyder 

Chief Counsel 

 Opinions & Advice