COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-09-00386-CR

ANTHONY GERALD DANKO A/K/A 

ANTHONY DANKO

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Anthony Gerald Danko a/k/a Anthony Danko appeals his 

convictions for three counts of aggravated assault on a public servant with a 

deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm. In three issues, Danko argues that the 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the prosecutor engaged

in improper argument during the State‘s closing argument. We will affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Danko was going through a divorce. He sent his sister a disturbing text 

message suggesting that he was contemplating suicide. She went to his home 

to check on him, but he would not answer the door or his phone. Fearing the 

worst, she called 911. The Fort Worth fire department was dispatched to 

Danko‘s home regarding an attempted suicide. Four firefighters arrived at 

Danko‘s home at around 9:00 p.m.; all the lights in the house were off and 

Danko‘s car was not in the driveway, but Danko‘s sister insisted that he was 

inside the house. She told Fort Worth Fire Department Lieutenant Mark Keller 

that Danko owned a gun.

Fort Worth Police Officers Craig Thomas, Julio Argueta, and John David 

Riggall arrived shortly and knocked on Danko‘s door, identifying themselves as

Fort Worth police officers. When no one answered, they used flashlights to look 

into the windows of the house to determine if anyone was inside. They did not

see anyone inside the house. Officer Thomas called his supervisor and received 

permission to force entry into Danko‘s house. Officer Argueta volunteered to kick 

in the door, but after two unsuccessful attempts, the men decided to use a 

sledgehammer. The four firefighters and the three police officers stood outside 

the front door, the police officers drew their weapons and shouted, ―[P]olice,‖ and 

one firefighter, Daniel Terrell, struck the door nine or ten times with a
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sledgehammer before the lock gave way. When the door swung open, Danko 

was standing in the entranceway; he was holding a drinking glass in one hand 

and a revolver in the other. He was holding the revolver down to his side, with it 

pointed to the floor. The police officers began yelling for him to ―drop the gun, 

drop the gun.‖ Instead, Danko raised the gun toward the officers and the 

firefighters, and Officer Thomas responded by raising his own gun. Afraid that 

Danko would pull the trigger, Officer Thomas fired his gun at Danko four times, 

until Danko dropped to the ground. Danko was shot in the hand and the chest, 

but he survived.

Fort Worth Officer Lori Scheiern, who works the crime scene search unit, 

and Dorsa Meter, who is the range master for the Fort Worth Police Department, 

inspected Danko‘s gun and determined that it was fully loaded and that one of 

the bullets from Officer Thomas‘s gun hit the barrel of Danko‘s gun and entered 

the chamber of that gun. Officer Scheiern concluded that, based on the damage 

to Danko‘s gun, both guns were pointed directly at each other when the bullet 

from Officer Thomas‘s gun struck Danko‘s gun.

Danko was charged with three counts of aggravated assault on a public 

servant, one for each of the three officers involved. The jury convicted him of 

each count and assessed his punishment at five years‘ imprisonment for the first 

count and at ten years‘ imprisonment for the second and third counts; the jury 

recommended that the ten-year sentences for counts two and three be 

suspended and that Danko be placed on community supervision. The trial court 
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sentenced Danko accordingly, ordering that the ten-year sentences in counts two 

and three be suspended for ten years.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

In his first issue, Danko argues that the evidence is factually insufficiency

to support his conviction. After Danko filed his brief but before oral argument in 

this court, the court of criminal appeals handed down its decision in Brooks v. 

State, holding that there is no meaningful distinction between the factual 

sufficiency standard and the legal sufficiency standard. See 323 S.W.3d 893, 

902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). During oral argument, Danko‘s appellate counsel 

stated that Brooks ―foreclosed‖ Danko‘s factual sufficiency complaint, and he 

requested that we not address his first issue. [oral] Consequently, we overrule 

Danko‘s first issue.

In his third issue, Danko argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

sustain his conviction for aggravated assault on Officer Argueta, a public servant,

because no evidence showed that the officer perceived a threat.

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, 

we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order 

to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to 

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 

at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the 

weight and credibility of the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 

(Vernon 1979); Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), 

cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2075 (2009). Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency 

review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 

735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000). Instead, 

we Adetermine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the 

combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the verdict.@ Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences 

in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 

99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The standard of review is the 

same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases; circumstantial evidence is as 

probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Clayton, 235 

S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
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B. Law on Aggravated Assault on a Public Servant

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault on a public servant 

with a deadly weapon if he (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) threatens a person 

(3) that the actor knows to be a public servant (4) with imminent bodily injury (5) 

while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty and (6) employs a 

deadly weapon in the assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 

22.02(a)(2), 22.02(b)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2010).

― ̳The display of a deadly weapon of and within itself constitutes a threat of 

the required imminent harm.‘‖ Sosa v. State, 177 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (quoting Robinson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 130, 

133 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)); cf. Peterson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (holding that ―implicit in the allegation that a  ̳Deadly 

Weapon‘ was used to threaten the complainant is the possibility that the 

complainant was threatened with death as well as bodily injury‖).

C. Sufficient Evidence of Threat

Officers Riggall and Thomas, the complainants named in counts one and 

three of the indictment, both testified at trial, but Officer Argueta was unavailable 

to testify. Consequently, Danko argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain 

his conviction for aggravated assault on Officer Argueta (count two) because no 

evidence shows that Officer Argueta ―saw Mr. Danko‘s gun or that he ever 

perceived a threat.‖
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The testimony at trial established that Officers Riggall, Thomas, and 

Argueta, in addition to four firefighters, were all standing in close proximity to 

Danko‘s front door when Terrell broke down the door, that Danko was standing 

just inside the entrance and facing the door when the door swung open, and that 

he raised his gun and pointed it directly at the firefighters and police officers. 

Officer Thomas testified that Officer Riggall and Officer Argueta were standing a 

little in front of him and to the left when the door swung open and that the three 

officers ―kind of made a semicircle‖ around two of the firefighters. Officer Riggall 

and Officer Thomas both testified that they saw Danko raise and point his gun at 

them and that they felt threatened by that action. Lieutenant Keller testified that 

Danko raised the gun ―point blank‖ toward the officers and firefighters and that he 

immediately thought, ―One of us is going to get shot right now . . . .‖ Terrell 

testified that Danko pointed his gun ―directly at me and the three officers that 

were standing to my immediate right,‖ that all of the officers and the firefighters 

were ―within a few feet of a gun pointed at us,‖ and that he thought he was going 

to get shot. And significantly, Officer Riggall recalled hearing Officer Argueta yell 

at Danko to ―drop the gun‖ when Danko raised the gun, and Officer Riggall 

testified that he believed Officer Argueta saw the gun before he did.

This testimony establishes not only that Danko pointed a gun at the 

officers and firefighters but also that Officer Argueta saw the gun; Danko‘s 

display of a gun was sufficient to establish the required threat of imminent bodily 

harm. See Robinson, 596 S.W.2d at 133 n.7; Sosa, 177 S.W.3d at 231 (holding 
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sufficient evidence of threat when two eyewitnesses, but not victim, testified that 

defendant held gun in his hands, demanded money, and walked in and out of 

bedroom where victim was laying on the floor); Villatoro v. State, 897 S.W.2d 

943, 945 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, pet. ref‘d) (―Since firearms are deadly 

weapons, . . . the testimony revealing that Appellant pointed such a weapon at 

Jones was enough to support his conviction beyond reasonable doubt.‖ (citation 

omitted)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Danko committed aggravated assault on Officer Argueta, a public servant.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), 22.02(b)(2)(B); Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Accordingly, we 

overrule Danko‘s third issue.

IV. IMPROPER JURY ARGUMENT

In his second issue, Danko argues that the State‘s closing arguments 

during the guilt/innocence stage of trial improperly urged the jury to convict him of 

aggravated assault so it could assess a greater punishment than the punishment 

available if the jury found him guilty of the lesser offense of deadly conduct. The 

trial court‘s charge to the jury included instructions on the lesser offense of

deadly conduct. During the State‘s closing argument, the first prosecutor argued:

[Prosecutor]: Now, with regard to the charge, what you have 

here is three counts of aggravated assault on a public servant, and 

in each one of those three counts, you have a lesser offense, a 

lesser misdemeanor offense of deadly conduct.
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[Defense Counsel]: I object to the characterization that it‘s a 

lesser misdemeanor offense. That‘s improper, and I object.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[Defense Counsel]: And I ask for an instruction to disregard.

THE COURT: Well, you know that you are not to consider 

anything that‘s sustained.

[Defense Counsel]: Move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: Denied.

[Prosecutor]: You have a lesser offense of deadly conduct.

[Defense Counsel]: I object. I object, the repeated 

characterization of ―lesser‖ –

THE COURT: Overruled.

At the end of the State‘s rebuttal closing argument, the second prosecutor 

argued, ―And Lieutenant Keller, I think from this witness stand, sums up what 

was going through those seven individuals‘ minds, and this will tell you why it‘s 

not just deadly conduct. Deadly conduct sounds bad in the charge, but it‘s not 

nearly as bad as aggravated assault.‖ Defense counsel objected, arguing that 

the trial court had previously sustained his objection to the same argument by the 

first prosecutor, and the trial court overruled the objection.
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A. Standard of Review

To be permissible, the State‘s jury argument must fall within one of the 

following four general areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable 

deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; or 

(4) plea for law enforcement. Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94–95 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 (1993); Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 

230, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

When a trial court sustains an objection and instructs the jury to disregard 

but denies a defendant‘s motion for a mistrial, the issue is whether the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying the mistrial. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72,

76–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Only in extreme circumstances, when the 

prejudice caused by the improper argument is incurable, i.e., ―so prejudicial that 

expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile,‖ will a 

mistrial be required. Id.; see also Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 905 (2004).

B. Argument Not Improper

Danko argues that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals‘s decision in 

McClure v. State is ―on  ̳all fours‘ with this case.‖ See 544 S.W.2d 390, 393–394 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1976). In McClure, the court of criminal appeals reversed and 

remanded a conviction based on the prosecutor‘s repeated argument that the 

jury should convict the defendant of murder because it had a greater punishment 

range than that available for manslaughter. Id. at 393–95. The court of criminal 
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appeals held that the argument was improper because it ―was a plea to the jury 

to consider the amount of punishment, rather than the facts, in determining the 

offense for which appellant should be convicted.‖ Id. at 395.

Here, unlike in McClure, the complained-of arguments—that deadly 

conduct is a lesser misdemeanor offense and is not as bad as aggravated 

assault—did not urge the jury to convict Danko based on a punishment range 

instead of the facts. The complained-of comments are more analogous to the 

prosecutor‘s argument in Hart v. State, in which the prosecutor informed the jury 

that one of the lesser included offenses was a misdemeanor. See 581 S.W.2d 

675, 678–79 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). In Hart, the court of criminal 

appeals held that the prosecutor‘s argument was proper and explained that ―[t]he 

harm is not in informing the jury concerning punishment, but argument for 

conviction based on punishment.‖ See id. (distinguishing McClure).

In Danko‘s case, the first prosecutor mentioned the classification of the 

deadly conduct offense in the context of explaining how to read the charge. She 

explained that ―the way it works‖ is that the jury must first determine whether the 

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Danko committed aggravated 

assault on a public servant and, if not, ―move to the next part, which is deadly 

conduct.‖ The prosecutor argued that the facts of the case show that Danko 

committed aggravated assault on a public servant, rather than deadly conduct, 

and she urged the jury to read the charge in its entirety and apply the law to the 

facts. The second prosecutor built onto the first prosecutor‘s argument and 
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explained why the facts of the case showed that Danko had committed the 

greater offense of aggravated assault. The prosecutors did not comment on the 

punishment assigned to the offenses, did not refer to the classification for the 

greater aggravated assault offense, and did not argue that certain convictions 

would carry heavier sentences. See id.; see also Matini v. State, No. 05-03-

00686-CR, 2004 WL 1089197, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 17, 2004, no pet.)

(not designated for publication) (distinguishing McClure because State‘s 

comment—―This is not a misdemeanor trespass. This is a burglary of a 

habitation.‖—did not refer to any differences in the range of punishment); 

McCullen v. State, 659 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no pet.)

(holding argument that informed jury of different ranges of punishment for 

aggravated robbery and aggravated assault not improper when made in the 

course of explaining why facts showed defendant committed the greater offense).

In reviewing the record and in considering the arguments from the 

viewpoint of the jury, we do not conclude that the prosecutors‘ arguments urged 

the jury to convict Danko of one offense over another because of the difference 

in punishment. See Hart, 581 S.W.2d at 678–69. Consequently, we hold that 

the State‘s comments were proper, and we overrule Danko‘s second issue.
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V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Danko‘s three issues, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: January 20, 2011