Filed 1/20/23 Marriage of Dolkhani and Izadpanahi CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re Marriage of NAHID H. 

DOLKHANI and 

KOUROSH IZADPANAHI. 

 B314257

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 18CHFL02540)

NAHID H. DOLKHANI,

Respondent.

v.

KOUROSH IZADPANAHI,

Appellant,

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Sarah J. Heidel, Judge. Affirmed.

Kourosh Izadpanahi, in pro. per., for Appellant.

Ferguson Case Orr Paterson and Wendy C. Lascher for 

Respondent.

_________________
2

In 2017 Kourosh Izadpanahi and Nahid Dolkhani resolved

outstanding issues in their long-pending family law case, which 

Izadpanahi had initiated in 2010, through a stipulated judgment. 

Before the stipulated judgment was entered as a family court 

judgment, Izadpanahi and Dolkhani agreed to try to reconcile; 

the action was dismissed without prejudice. The attempted 

reconciliation was short-lived. In 2018 Dolkhani filed a new 

dissolution petition. She also filed a request for order to enforce 

the terms of the parties’ stipulated judgment. The family court 

ruled the stipulated judgment was a binding contract and 

thereafter entered a judgment of dissolution incorporating its 

terms. Izadpanahi has appealed, arguing the stipulated 

judgment did not survive dismissal of the first action and could 

not be enforced. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Initial Family Law Proceedings, Stipulated 

Judgment and Attempt at Reconciliation

Izadpanahi and Dolkhani married on September 23, 2005. 

They had one child, born several weeks before Izadpanahi, on 

December 9, 2010, filed a petition seeking an order for joint 

physical and legal custody of the infant.

1 On May 5, 2014 

Dolkhani filed a response to the petition and request for 

dissolution of marriage, citing December 1, 2013 as the parties’ 

date of separation. 

In May 2017 Izadpanahi and Dolkhani agreed to a 

stipulated judgment, stating in paragraph 5.04 their intent to 

1 We grant Izadpanahi’s request for judicial notice of

documents from the parties’ initial family law case. (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).)
3

“make a complete and final settlement of their rights and 

obligations pertaining to support; identification, characterization 

and confirmation of the parties’ respective community and 

separate property interest; custodial issues relating to the minor 

children; and any matters over which a Court of competent 

jurisdiction shall retain jurisdiction.” Paragraph 20.10 of the 

stipulated judgment provided, “The agreement of the parties, as 

evidenced by this Stipulated Judgment, shall be effective 

immediately upon execution . . . by Petitioner and Respondent” 

and “may only be modified by written agreement executed by 

both parties or by a Court of competent jurisdiction.” 

Contemplating a possible effort to reconcile, the stipulated 

judgment also provided in paragraph 20.03, if there was “a 

reconciliation of the parties hereto after the effective date of this 

Stipulated Judgment, this Stipulated Judgment shall 

nevertheless continue in full force and effect as an Agreement of 

the parties until it is modified or abrogated by another written 

instrument to that effect signed by both parties.” 

The stipulated judgment was submitted to the family court. 

Before it was entered as a judgment by the court, however, the 

parties agreed to attempt to reconcile and asked for the 

stipulated judgment’s return without the court’s signature. The 

court returned the stipulated judgment as requested.2 The case 

was dismissed without prejudice on November 23, 2017. 

2 A minute order dated November 16, 2017 states, “On 

November 8, 2017, Counsel for Respondent informed the clerk a 

proposed judgment had been submitted to the court which he 

would like returned. The judgment was still awaiting signature 

and it is returned. Parties have agreed to dismiss the case and a 

dismissal will be filed forthwith.” 
4

2. The New Dissolution Petition and Enforcement of the 

Stipulated Judgment

On December 28, 2018 Dolkhani filed a new petition for

dissolution of the marriage. The following day Dolkhani filed a 

request for order seeking entry of judgment “in accordance with 

written agreement of the parties” or, alternatively, to “bifurcate 

the issue of the validity and enforceability of the 2017 Stipulated 

Judgment.”3 Izadpanahi filed a responsive declaration, 

contending “the stipulated judgment presented to the court . . . 

was attached to, prepared for and intended solely for a prior case 

which was dismissed by the parties by mutual agreement and 

upon reconciliation. On its face, the document makes several 

references to the prior case. By operation of the law, the 

document is void.” 

On July 7, 2021 the court held a short cause trial on the 

issue whether judgment could be entered based on the parties’ 

2017 stipulated judgment. Izadpanahi and Dolkhani were each 

represented by counsel, who submitted trial briefs. Following 

argument, the family court ruled the stipulated judgment entered 

before the dismissal was still binding. Explaining its ruling, the 

court stated the parties had entered a marital settlement 

agreement, which they “called a stipulated judgment.” “If the 

parties had intended a written abrogation of the reconciliation 

provision or [of] the parties’ agreement that was memorialized in 

the stipulated judgment,” the court continued, “then they needed 

to say that. They needed to do more than just dismiss the case 

without any additional language.” Having failed to do so, the 

3 Dolkhani attempted to revise the stipulated judgment to 

include the new case number and to reflect Dolkhani’s status as

petitioner. Izadpanahi did not agree to the revisions. 
5

court ruled, the parties’ agreement was intended to be binding,

and “the marital elements of that agreement are enforceable.” 

The court directed Dolkhani to submit a proposed judgment 

to Izadpanahi for review and thereafter to submit it to the court 

for entry. The judgment of dissolution incorporating the terms of 

the stipulated judgment was entered on September 30, 2021.4

DISCUSSION

Izadpanahi presents several related arguments to support 

his contention the family court erred in ruling the 2017 

stipulated judgment was, in effect, a marital settlement 

agreement that survived dismissal of the initial family law 

proceedings. None has merit. 

1. The 2017 Stipulated Judgment Was Not Merged into a

Family Court Judgment

Izadpanahi initially contends the parties’ agreement, when 

submitted to the court for filing in the form of a stipulated 

judgment, “merged with and was incorporated in the judgment of 

dissolution.” This argument misapprehends the merger doctrine.

Izadpanahi is correct that, if the parties’ settlement 

agreement is incorporated into a judgment of dissolution, the 

“separation agreement is superseded by the decree, and the 

obligations imposed are not those imposed by contract, but are 

those imposed by decree, and enforceable as such.” (In re 

4 Izadpanahi filed his notice of appeal on July 7, 2021

following the court’s order finding the stipulated judgment 

enforceable. We treat the premature notice of appeal as timely 

filed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2) [“[t]he reviewing 

court may treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court 

has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered 

judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment”].)
6

Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1220; accord, 

Hough v. Hough (1945) 26 Cal.2d 605, 609; see also Flynn v. 

Flynn (1954) 42 Cal.2d 55, 58 [“[m]erger is the substitution of 

rights and duties under the judgment or the decree for those 

under the agreement or cause of action sued upon”].) But simply 

filing a stipulated judgment signed by the parties, as was done 

here, does not result in a merger.5 Rather, merger occurs when

the stipulated judgment becomes a judgment of the family 

court—that is, when it is signed and filed by the court. (See Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.411(a) [“[a] stipulated judgment . . . may be 

submitted to the court for signature as an uncontested matter or 

at the time of the hearing on the merits and must contain the 

exact terms of any judgment proposed to be entered in the case”];

see also Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 152 [“[i]n a 

court trial, rendition of judgment occurs when the court signs and 

files the findings, conclusions and the judgment”].) 

Here, although the parties initially intended their 

agreement resolving outstanding issues, presented to the court in 

the form of a stipulated judgment, would become the judgment of 

dissolution in the initial family law case, there never was a court 

judgment and, accordingly, no merger because the parties 

dismissed the case before the court acted. Moreover, the

dismissal was expressly without prejudice. As such, it did not

affect the rights of the parties and did not terminate the parties’ 

agreement by operation of law, as Izadpanahi suggests. (See 

5 “The question of whether or not a property settlement 

agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree so as to merge 

therein is one of law.” (Mitchell v. Marklund (1965) 

238 Cal.App.2d 398, 403; accord, Biagi v. Biagi (1965) 

233 Cal.App.2d 624, 628.) 
7

Wilkins v. Wilkins (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 611, 613 [“[t]he term 

‘without prejudice,’ in its general adaptation, means that there is 

no decision of the controversy on its merits, and leaves the whole 

subject in litigation as much open to another application as if no 

suit had ever been brought”]; Fleishbein v. Western Auto Supply 

Agency (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 424, 427 [“[d]ismissals of actions 

without prejudice ordinarily indicate that such judgments of 

dismissal affect no right or remedy of the parties and that there 

has been no decision of the case upon the merits”].)

2. Under Governing Principles of Contract Interpretation, 

the Stipulated Judgment Was Effective Unless Modified 

or Revoked by the Parties 

Even if not terminated by operation of law with the 

dismissal of the initial family law case, Izadpanahi contends by 

its own terms the stipulated judgment was not intended to have 

any effect following that dismissal. This argument

fundamentally misconstrues the document’s operative language.

“A stipulated judgment constitutes a written agreement 

between the parties as to all matters covered by the stipulation.” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.411(b).) Such agreements, if not 

merged into an interlocutory or final judgment, “are enforceable 

as a contract.” (In re Marriage of Jones (1987) 

195 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1104; see Fam. Code, § 2128, subd. (b) 

[“[n]othing in this chapter changes existing law with respect to 

contract remedies where the contract has not been merged or 

incorporated into a judgment”].)

Like all contracts, a marital settlement agreement “must be 

analyzed and interpreted in light of the parties’ mutual intent 

and according to statutory requirements for the interpretation of 

contracts.” (In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 
8

522; see In re Marriage of Schu (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 394, 399 

[“[w]e construe a marital settlement agreement that is 

incorporated into a stipulated judgment under the general rules 

governing the interpretation of contracts”]; In re Marriage of 

Gowan (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 80, 87 [“[w]e agree that the 

stipulation must be analyzed in light of the parties’ intent and 

according to statutory requirements for contract interpretation”].)

Absent any conflict in extrinsic evidence, we review de novo 

issues regarding the proper interpretation of a contract. (See 

City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 

43 Cal.4th 375, 395; Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1984) 

36 Cal.3d 426, 439; Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2021) 

66 Cal.App.5th 900, 915.) 

“Under statutory rules of contract interpretation, the 

mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed 

governs interpretation. [Citations.] In determining this intent, 

‘[t]he rules governing policy interpretation require us to look first 

to the language of the contract in order to ascertain its plain 

meaning or the meaning a layperson would ordinarily attach to 

it.’” (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 

59 Cal.4th 277, 288; accord, Wind Dancer Production Group v. 

Walt Disney Pictures (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 56, 69 [“[w]e 

ascertain ‘“the intent and scope of [an] agreement by focusing on 

the usual and ordinary meaning of the language used and the 

circumstances under which the agreement was made”’”].)

The stipulated judgment unequivocally stated the parties’ 

intent that their agreement to resolve outstanding issues would 

remain in effect in the event they reconciled unless they agreed 
9

in writing to modify or revoke it.6 As discussed, paragraph 20.03 

provided, “If there should be a reconciliation of the parties hereto 

after the effective date of this Stipulated Judgment, this 

Stipulated Judgment shall nevertheless continue in full force and 

effect as an Agreement of the parties until it is modified or 

abrogated by another written instrument to that effect signed by 

both parties.” The parties did reconcile (or, at least, attempted to 

do so) after the stipulated judgment’s effective date. There was 

no written instrument rescinding the agreement or modifying its

terms. Because neither party presented any extrinsic evidence to 

suggest paragraph 20.03 meant something other than what it 

actually said, the family court properly ruled it should be 

enforced.

7 

6 As the family court explained at trial, “These parties were 

always reconciling. I mean, that was part of this deal. . . . I 

think without spending too much time looking at extrinsic 

evidence, I think that the evidence would tend to show that there 

was a long history of these parties trying to reconcile. So that is 

a significant inclusion.” 

7 Izadpanahi acknowledges no parol evidence was presented 

and argues, correctly, “[i]t is the plain language of the document 

that governs its interpretation.” Yet in his reply brief Izadpanahi 

suggests for the first time his due process rights were violated 

because the family court stated the question of the continuing 

enforceability of the stipulated judgment was a legal, not a 

factual, matter and did not allow live testimony or additional 

evidence at the short cause trial on July 7, 2021 as required by 

Family Code section 217 and California Rules of Court,

rule 5.113. Izadpanahi did not make this objection in the family 

court, and he failed to include the argument in his opening brief. 

It has been forfeited on appeal. (See In re Marriage of Eben-King 

& King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117 [“party who fails to raise 
10

Notwithstanding paragraph 20.03, Izadpanahi contends 

the stipulated judgment was “expressly limited to the original 

case” because it identified the family court case number, provided 

that court retained jurisdiction to make all orders necessary to 

enforce the terms of the stipulated judgment and contained no 

severability clause. That the court in the original proceedings no 

longer had jurisdiction after the case was dismissed is technically 

correct but without significance. The family court in the case at 

bar did not enforce the stipulated judgment pursuant to a 

reservation of jurisdiction but on the basis the document was “a 

contract between the parties that they had negotiated and 

entered into.” As the court explained, “I don’t think this is an 

issue of jurisdiction at all. I’m not reaching back . . . and saying 

I’m enforcing a judgment . . . . I think the issue is whether or not 

that is an agreement that this court can enforce in this new 

matter, in which it does have jurisdiction.” 

In re Marriage of Daly & Oyster (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 505

is instructive.

8 In that case the parties entered into a stipulated 

judgment with the intention it would be “‘conformed as a 

Stipulated Judgement [sic] of the court.’” (Id. at p. 508.) 

However, the stipulated judgment was never filed, and the family 

court dismissed the petition for lack of prosecution. A second 

dissolution petition was filed, and the family court concluded the 

an issue in the trial court has therefore waived the right to do so 

on appeal”]; see also In re Marriage of Brandes (2015)

239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1484, fn. 10 [“‘appellant’s failure to raise 

an argument in the opening brief waives the issue on appeal’”].)

8 We deny as unnecessary Izadpanahi’s request to take 

judicial notice of documents filed in the family court in In re 

Marriage of Daly & Oyster, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 505. 
11

prior stipulated judgment was an enforceable marital settlement 

agreement. In affirming the judgment the court rejected the 

argument “a stipulated judgment created only for one case cannot 

become the basis for a judgment in a subsequent case,” holding

“nothing in the record suggests the stipulated judgment here was 

intended to be limited to the original divorce proceedings.” (Id. at

pp. 511-512.) 

Izadpanahi’s argument the written request for dismissal

was an express abrogation of the stipulated judgment is similarly

unpersuasive. The dismissal was not signed by Dolkhani, and, as 

the family court noted, “doesn’t state that it will unravel or undo

the terms that the parties already agreed to.” Far more was 

required: “[I]t is well settled that proof of reconciliation alone 

does not abrogate the agreement [citation]. To avoid the contract 

on this basis, there must be a clear indication that by reconciling 

the parties intended to annul the agreement and restore their 

earlier property rights. Such intent can be proven, for example, 

by the destruction of the document containing the agreement, 

execution of reconveyances or restoration of the control of the 

property to one who formerly exercised it.” (In re Marriage of 

Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 497-498; see also In re 

Marriage of Daly & Oyster, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 512 

[“[n]othing suggests the parties here intended that separation 

and independence not occur—and the settlement agreement 

become null—if the divorce took longer than five years”]; Crossley 

v. Crossley (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 627, 629 [“[t]he fact, standing 

alone, that the husband and wife in this case resumed marital 

relations, does not terminate the property agreement”].)
12

3. Dolkhani’s Acquisition of Additional Property Did Not 

Render the Parties’ Stipulated Judgment Unenforceable

Finally, Izadpanahi argues additional community property 

was acquired between 2017 and Dolkhani’s 2018 filing of her 

petition for dissolution and, therefore, the 2017 stipulated 

judgment “could not divide the community assets entirely.” 

Izadpanahi does not explain why a binding agreement that covers 

most of the parties’ assets and liabilities is rendered 

unenforceable because there are additional, after-acquired assets 

that need to be considered separately. If properly characterized 

as community property, the judgment of dissolution could have 

included division of the property or an offsetting payment, as well 

as all the terms of the 2017 stipulated judgment.

Aside from this fundamental flaw, Izadpanahi did not 

include the property he refers to—real estate in Calabasas 

acquired by Dolkhani after the 2017 stipulated judgment was 

executed—on his schedule of assets and debts (Judicial Council 

form FL-142) prepared under penalty of perjury in July 2019 in 

the case at bar; and the record includes an interspousal 

individual grant deed, as well as a quitclaim deed, signed by 

Izadpanahi, confirming the Calabasas property as the sole, 

separate property of Dolkhani. That characterization is fully 

consistent with the 2017 stipulated judgment, which provided in 

paragraphs 11.01 and 11.02 that “[a]ll post separation earnings, 

accumulations and investments” acquired by either party after 

the effective date of the agreement would be separate property.

The court properly excluded this real estate from its final 

judgment of dissolution.
13

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Dolkhani is to recover her costs 

on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur.

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.