MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 28 Docket: SRP

- 15

- 628 Argued : October 27 ,	2016 Decided: February	14,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER ,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR, HJELM, and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. WALTER A.	PARKER
ALEXANDER,	J. [¶1] Walter	A.	Parker	appeals the sentence	imposed on	him	by	the	trial
court (Cumberland	County, Warren,	J .) following	a	resentencing	hearing.		The sentence	 was	 imposed	 following	 Parker’s	 plea	 of	 guilty to	 three	 counts	 of gross	sexual	assault	(Class	A), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	253(1)(C)	(2016 ) ,	and	two	counts of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 255

- A(1)(E

- 1) ( 2016 )

. All charges	 involved	 sexual	 assaults	 on	 a	 nine

- year - old	 girl	 over	 an	 extended peri od	of	time

. The	court ultimately sentenced	Parker	to a	twenty
- year	term of	 imprisonment	 followed	 by	 fifteen years	 of	 supervised	 release,	 in accordance	with 17

- A	M.R.S	§	1231(2)(C) (2016 ) and 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1252(4

- E) (2016 )

.2 [¶2 ] P arker	contends	that	the supervised	release	sentencing,	mandated by	law,	is	unconstitutional,	as	a	violation	of	the	due	process	clause,	because	it “punishes	[the]	defendant	for	his	status	and	particular	characteristics,	and	not f

or	 substantive	 criminal	 conduct ” ; and	 as	 a	 violation of	 the	 double	jeopardy clause	 because	 it	 “may	 incarcerate	 [the]	 defendant	 twice	 based	 upon	 his substantive	 criminal	 conduct	 and	 not	 for	 his	 status	 and	 particular characteristics.” Parker	also	contends	that	imposition	of	a	mandatory	term	of supervised	rel ease	resulted	in	a	sentence	 to	 “more	prison	 time	 than	under	a traditional Hewey 1 analysis.” We	affirm	the	sentence.
I.		CASE	HISTORY [¶3 ] The	 sentencing	 court	 found	 the	 following	 facts,	 whic h	 are supported	by	the	record. Prior	to	the	events	leading	to	t his	appeal,	Parker	had a	 “lengthy	 criminal	 history”	 including	 “a	 few	 felon ies	 and	 a	 lot	 of misdemeanors.” The	 prior	 felonies	 included	 burglary,	 criminal	 threatening with	 a	 dangerous	weap on,	 and	 operating a	motor	 vehicle in	 violation	 o f	 the habitual	 offend er	law. Parker’s	 probations	 on	 his	 prior	 sentences	 had	 been “violated	on	numerous	occasions.”

1 State	v.	Hewey ,	622	A.2d	1151,	1154

- 1155	(Me.	1993),	incorporated	into	the	sentencing	statute at	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1252

- C	(2016).3 [¶4 ] The	 court	 further	 found	 that	 Parker	 had sexually	 assaulted	 the
nine

- year - old	 victim	 on	 several	 occasions over	 an	 extended	 period	 of time, and that Parker was	 in	 a	 pos ition	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 household and	 acted	 as	 a parental	figure	to	the	victim. [¶5 ] As	a	result	of	 this	conduct,	Parker	was	indicted	on	 two	counts	of unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 (Class	 B) 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 255

- A(1)(E

- 1) and	 three counts	of	gross	sexu al	assault	(Class	A) 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	253(1)(C),	all	involving	a victim	under	twelve	years	of	age. [¶6 ] On	 July	 13,	 2015,	 Parker	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 all five	 counts	 in	 the indictment. The	court	( Clifford , J .)	accepted	 the	plea	of	guilty,	and	continued the	m atter	for	sentencing	before	any	judge. [¶7 ] Parker	 appeared	 before	 the	 court	 ( Warren, J .) for sentencing	 on November	20,	2015. At	the	sentencing	hearing,	the	State outlined	the	facts	of Parker’s	 sexual violence	 against	 the	 victim,	 which had occurred	 over	 th e course	of	more	 than	one	year. During	 the	 first	sentencing	hearing,	 the	State and	Parker	argued	for	different	sentences,	but	each	argued	for	a	sentence	that would	include	a	 significant	 underlying	 sentence,	with	 part	 of	 the	 underlying

sen tence	 suspended	 and	 Parker	 being	 placed	 on	 probation	 for	 a	 significant period	of	time	following	release	from	imprisonment.4 [¶8 ] For	 a	 gross	 sexual	 assault	 committed	 against	 a	 person	 under twelve	 years	 of	 age,	 the	 basic	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 to	 begin	 the analysis requir ed	by	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1252

- C	(2016 )	is	set	at	“a	term	of	at	least	20	years. ”
17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1252(4

- E)	(2016 ). As	a result , the	court , in calculating	the	basic term	 of	 imprisonment pursuant	 to	 section	 1252 (4

- E)	 and	 step	 one	 of	 its section	1252

- C analysis , began	with the	mandated basic	term	of	imprisonment of twenty	 years. The	 court	 stated	 that	 Parker	 was	 a	 parental	 figure	 in	 the hou sehold	 and	 that	 the frequency	 of	 the sexual	 violence was	 a	 sentence aggravating	factor,	particularly because	it	was committed	against	a nine

- year old

. The	 court	 concluded that this	 conduct	 raised	 the	 basic	 sentence	 to twenty
- two	years. [¶9 ] In	step	two	of	its	section	1252

- C analysis,	the	court	addressed	the aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 factors.	 	 The	 cou rt	 found	 that	 the	 victim	 impact was	significant	in	that	she	was	continuously	subjected	to	this	conduct	and	had been	afraid	to	tell	anyone	until	a	 few	years	after the	sexual	assaults stopped. The	 court	 also	 found	 that	 Parker’s	 lengthy	 criminal	 history	 and repeated violations	 of	 probation were aggravating	 factor s . Addressing	 mitigating factors,	the	court	stated	that	Parker had accepted	responsibility	from	the	very beginning. In	 doing	 so , he	 avoided	 a	 trial,	 and	 the	 victim	 would	 not	 be	 put5 through	 that	 “extraordinarily	 unpleasant”	 experience. The	 final	 mitigating factor	 the	 court	 found	 was	 that	 Parker	 wants	 help	 and	 counseling,	 and understands	 that	he	presents	a	public	safety	issue. The	court	noted	 that	 the aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 facto rs	 were	 “in	 exact	 equipoise”	 and	 therefore determined	that	the	maximum period	of	incarceration was	twenty
- two	years. [¶1 0 ] At	step	 three	of	 the	section	1252

- C	analysis,	and	addressing	 the issue	 of	 probation,	 the	 court	 noted , based	 on	 Parker’s	 psychologi cal evaluation, that	 Parker	 was	 in	 need	 of	 “not	 just	 treatment	 but	 supervision, given	th at	he	is	at	risk	of	reoffending. ” As	a	result,	the	court	determined	that all	but	 fourteen	years	of	Parker’s	term	of	imprisonment	would be suspended with	an	eighteen

- ye ar	probation	period	to	follow. [¶1 1 ] Parker’s	ultimate	sentence	was	twenty

- two	years ’	imprisonment , with	all	but	fourteen	years	suspended,	and	probation	for	eighteen	years.		This sentence	contemplated	at	least	 thirty

- two	years	of	State	supervision throug h incarceration	or	probation. [¶1 2 ] Four	days	later,	on	November	24,	2015,	the	court	issued	an	order for	resentencing. The	order	stated	 that	after	reviewing	 the	relevant	statutes and State	 v.	 Cook ,	 2011	 ME	 94,	 26	 A.3d	 834 ,	 the	 court	 realized	 that the

se ntence	 it	 had	 imposed	 was	 not	 authorized	 by	 law. On	 its	 own	 motion,6 pursuant	 to	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 35(a),	 the	 court	 ordered	 a	 further	 hearing	 for resentencing. [¶1 3 ] The	resentencing	hearing	was	held	on	December	15,	2015. At	the outset,	the	court	acknowl edged	that	it	had	imposed	an	unauthorized	sentence by	including	a	term	of	probation,	because	when	a	defendant	is	sentenced	 for gross	sexual	assault	of	a	child	under	the	age	of	twelve	pursuant	to	17

- A	M.R.S. §	 253(1)(C)

— as	 was	 the	 case	 here

— probation	 is	 not available,	 and supervised	release	must	be	imposed. For	gross	sexual	assault	of	a	child	under the	age	of	twelve ,	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1231 (1

- A)	(201 6 )	requires	that: Notwithstanding	 subsection	 1,	 the	 court	 shall	 impose	 as	 part	 of the	sentence	a	requirement	that a	defendant	convicted	of	violating section	 253,	 subsection	 1,	 paragraph	 C	 be	 placed	 on	 a	 period	 of supervised	release	after	imprisonment.	The	period	of	supervised release	 commences	 on	 the	 date	 the	 person	 is	 released	 from confinement	pursuant	 to	section	125 4	and	must	include	 the	best available	monitoring	 technology	 for	 the	duration	of	 the	period	of supervised	release. [¶1 4 ] Subsection	 1

- A	 in	 effect	 bars a	 probation	 alternative that	 is provided in 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1231(1)	(2016) ,	and	requires,	instead,	“a	peri od	of supervised	 release”	 to	 commence	 immediately	 upon	 release	 from confinement	 and	 to	 include	 utilization	 of	 “the	 best	 available	 monitoring technology.”	 	 The	 requirement	 for imposition	 of	 “a	 period	 of	 supervised7 release”	 foll owing	 release	 from	 imprisonmen t is	 repeated in	 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 1252(4

- E), which	states: If	the	State	pleads	and	proves	that	a	crime	under	section	253	was committed	against	a	per son	who	had	not	yet	attained	12 years	of age,	 the	 court,	 notwithstanding	 subsection	 2,	 shall	 impose	 a definite term	 of imprisonment	 for	 any	 term	 of	 years.	 In determining	 the	 basic	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 as	 the	 first	 step	 in the	 sentencing	 process,	 the	 court	 sha ll	 select	 a	 term	 of	 at	 least 20 years. The	 court	 shall	 also	 impose	 as	 part	 of	 the	 sentence	 a period	 of supervised	 release	 to	 immediately	 follow	 that	 definite term	of	imprisonment	as	mandated	by	section	1231. [¶1 5 ] Subsection	4

- E,	by	exempting	sentencing	for	gross	sexual	assault upon	 a	 child	 under	 age	 twelve	 from	 the thirty

- year maximum	 sentence	 for Class A	crimes	specified	in	section	1252(2),	authorizes	a	“definite”	sentence	of imprisonment	 for	 “any	 term	of	years.”		Subsection	4

- E	also requires	 that the basic	 term	 of	imprisonment	 to	 begin	 the	 section	 1252

- C	 sentencing	analysis be at least twenty	 years	 and requires	 imposition	 of	 “a	 period	 of	 supervised release”	to	immediately	follow	release	from	imprisonment. 2

2 Title	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1231(2)(C)	(2016)	states	that	the	authorized	period	of	supervised	release	is “[l]ife	for	a	person	sentenced	under	section	1252,	subsection	4

- E.”		The	parties	and	the	trial	court, in	addressing	resentencing,	appeared	to	infer	that	the references	in	17

- A	M.R.S.	§§	1231(1

- A)	and 1252(4

- E)	(2016)	to	“a	period	of	supervised	release”	allowed	some	matter	of	choice	in	the	length	of the	period	of	supervised	release	to	be	imposed.		To	the	extent	that	the	reference	section	1231(2)(C) is	 ambiguous ,	 the	 rule	 of	lenity	 authorizes	 resolution	 of ambiguities	in	 favo r	 of	 the	more	lenient sentencing	choice. State	v.	Harrell ,	2012	ME	82,	¶	5,	45	A.3d	732; State	v.	Stevens ,	2007	ME	5,	¶	5, 912	A.2d	1229.8 [¶1 6 ] In	redetermining	the	basic	term	of	imprisonment	under	the	first step	 of	its	statutory	analysis,	 the	court	stated	 that	it	was	 “handcuffed	by the statute	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 sentence	 should	 be	 given , ”	 and	 that	 it	 was “constrained	by	the	sentencing	statutes	to	arrive	at	a	sentence	that	is	different from	the	one	.	.	.	[it]	previously	imposed.” Nonetheless,	the	court	stated	that	it was	starting	with the	statutorily	mandated	basic	term	of	at	least	twenty	years, and	 that	 for	 the	 same	 reasons	it	 had	 found	at	 the	initial	 sentencing	 hearing, that	number	was	increased	to	twenty

- two	years. [¶1 7 ] Addressing	the	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors	under	step two of	 the	 statutory	 analysis,	 the	 court	 referred	 to	 its	 findings	 at	 the	 November sentencing	hearing. It	found	that	the	aggravating	factors	were	the	impact	on the	 victim	 and Parker’s lengthy	 criminal	 history. For	mitigating	 factors,	 the court	 found	 the early	 acceptance	 of	 responsibilit y	 and	 the	 desire	 for
treatment. The	court	again	noted	that	the	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors “basically	were	in	 equipoise”	 and	 that	it	would	 adhere	 to	 the	 determination that it	had	made	in	the	November	hearing

. The court	then	stated	that	it	was “discomforted	by	the	 fact	that [it]	was	imposing	a	22 year	sentence	where	in the	 past	 [it]	 was	 imposing	 a	 22	 all	 but	 14

- year	 sentence.” With	 no	 “escape clause”	and	unable	to	use	probation	to	lower	the	basic	twenty

- two
- year	te rm9 of	imprisonment,	the	court	reevaluated	the	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors , finding	 that	it	 had	 placed	 too	much	 weight	 on	 Parker’s	 evasiveness	 and	 not enough	weight	on	his	ultimate	acceptance	of	responsibility. Finding	 that	 the mitigating	 factors	 ou tweighed	 the	 aggravating	 factors	 “slightly , ”	 the	 court reduced	the	sentence	to	twenty	years. [¶1 8 ] Where	 the	court	would	 typically	engage	in	 the	 third	step	of	 the statutory analysis,	it	acknowledged	that	pursuant	to 17

- A	M.R.S

. §	1231(2)(C) , 17

- A M.R.S. § 1252(4

- E) ,	and	our	holding	in Cook ,	it	instead	had	to	determine	a period	 of	 supervised	 release	 to	 impose	 following	 Parker’s	 term	 of imprisonment.	 In	making	such	a	determination,	 the	court	stated	 that	it	must consider	 the	purposes	of	sentencing	li sted	in 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	1151	 (201 6 )	and the	factors	addressed	in	section	1252

- C(2). Reviewing	section	1151,	the	court noted	that	the	“purpose	of	supervised	release	would	focus	on	rehabilitation	as opposed	 to	 deterrence.” After	 discussing	 the	 factors	listed	in	 sec tions	 1151 and	1252

- C(2),	and	in	accord ance	with	 the	analysis	stated in Cook ,	 the	court determined	 that	a	 fifteen

- year	period	of	sup ervised	release	was	appropriate. The	court	then set supervised	release conditions	prohibiting contact	w ith	the victim	or	he r	 family, being	in	places	where	children	congregate , and us e	and10 possession	of	pornography ; and	requiring monitoring , sex	offender treatment, and	that	Parker	live	at	a	residence	approved	by	probation

. [¶1 9 ] Parker	 filed	 a	 timely	 application	 to	 per mit	 the	 appeal	 of	 his sentence.		M.R.	App.	P.	2(b)(2)(A),	20. The	Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	the application	 to	 appeal	 the	 sentence,	 and	 the	 appeal	 is	 properly	 before	 us pursuant	to	M.R. App.	P.	2,	20(g),	(h).
II.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS
A. Due	Process. [¶20 ] Parker	 argues	 that	 the	 supervised	 release	 sentencing	 scheme,
17

- A M.R.S.	§	1231(2)(C) ,	violates	his	due	process	rights	because	it	punishes him	 for	 his	 status	 and	 characteristics,	 and	 not	 his	 substantive	 criminal conduct. He	 asserts	 that	 the	 statutory scheme	 targets	 a	 distinct	 class	 of persons,	 violent	 sex	 offenders,	 for	 open

- ended	 sanctions	 of	 incarceration, which,	 he	 asserts,	 exceed s the	 bounds	 of	 criminal	 sentencing	 and	implicate s due	process	concerns. [¶ 2 1] Parker’s	 actual	 complaint	 focuses	 not	 on his status	 or characteristics

— such	 as	 gender,	 age,	 race,	 or	 economic	 status

— but	 on	 the application	of	statutory	requirements	aggravating	his	sentence	because	of	the nature	of	his	crime,	gross	sexual	assault,	and	the	age	of	his	victim,	under	age11 twelve.		T hese	statutory	aggravating	factors	direct	that	any	adult	convicted	of committing	gross	sexual	assault	upon	a	child	under	age	twelve	face	a	definite term	of	imprisonment	of	a t	least	twenty years,	to	be	immediately	followed	by a	 period	 of	 supervised	 release. The	 combination	 of	 imprisonment	 and supervised	 release , which,	 if	 conditions	 are	 violated,	 may	 result	 in	 further imprisonment,	can,	under	the	law,	extend	for	a	convicted	person’s	life. [¶22 ] As	applied	 to	Parker, the	 trial	judge’s	statement	at	resentenc ing indicated	 that	 the	 court	 contemplated	 that	 Parker’s maximum	 time	 in State custody	 or	 supervision	 c ould	 be limited	 to	 thirty

- five	 years:	 twenty years’ imprisonment	 and	 fifteen	 years	 of	 supervised	 release	 which	 can	 lead	 to imprisonment	 if	 re lease	 conditi ons	 are	 violated. However, the	 court	 also understood	 the	 possibility that	 Parker’s	 maximum	 time	 in	 State	 custody	 or supervision	could	approach	fifty	years. 3

3 Title 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1231(6) (2016) ,	addressing	po ssible	revocation	of	a	period	of	supervised release,	directs	that [i] f	 the	 court	 revokes	 a	 period	 of	 supervised	 release,	 the	 court	 shall	 require	 the person	to	serve	time	in	prison	under	the	custody	of	the	Department	of	Corrections. This	time	in	prison	may equal	all	or	part	of	the	period	of	supervised	release,	without credit	 for	 time	 served	 on	 post

- release	 supervision. The	 remaining	 portion	 of	 the period	of	supervised	release	that	is	not	required	to	be	served	in	prison,	if	any,	may not	run	during	the	time in	prison	and	mus t	resume	again	after	the	person’ s	release and	is	subject	to	revocation	at	a	later	date. Because,	as	the	trial	judge	referenced,	a	person	serving	time	in	prison	following	a	revocation	of a	period	of	supervised	release	may	not	receive	credit for	the	time	served	on	supervised	release,	and any	remaining	time	on	supervised	release	may	not	run	during	time	in	prison	and	must	resume	after12 [¶23 ] In	 addressing	 a	 claim	 that	 factors	 considered	 at	 sentencing violated	 a	 defendant’s	 due process	 rights,	 we	 have	 held	 that	 courts	 are accorded	wide	discretion	in	the	sources	and	types	of	info rmation	that	may	be relied	upon at	sentencing

. State	v.	Bennett ,	2015	ME	46,	¶	22,	114	A.3d	994; State	v.	Farnham ,	479	A.2d	887,	890	 (Me.	1984).		The	cou rt’s	considerations

“ are	limited	only	by	the	due	process	requirement that	such	information	must be f actually	reliable	and	relevant. ” Bennett , 2015	ME	46, ¶	22 ,	114	A.3d	994 (quoting State	v.	Grindle ,	2008	ME	38,	¶	18,	942	A.2d	673 ). [¶24 ] “ Federal	 cases have	 interpreted	 the	 due	 process	 c lause	 as requiring	 a	 defendant	 ‘ not	 to	 be	 sentenced	 on	 false	 information	 .	 .	 .	 [and] requir[ing]	 that	 the	 defendant	 be	 given	 an	 adequate	 opportunity	 to	 refute information	relied	on	at	sentencing. ’ ” Bennett , 2015	ME	46, ¶ 23 , 114	A.3d	994 (quoting United	States	v.	Wilfred	Am.	Edu c .	Corp. ,	953	F.2d	717,	722	 (1st	Cir. 1992)	(citation	omitted) ). [¶25 ] Here , there	is	no	claim	that	Parker	was	sentenced	based	on	false or	inadequate	information.		Other	than	complaints	about	sentencing	based	on

a	 release	 from	 prison,	 Parker’s	 maximum	 period	 in	 State	 custody	 or	 supervision	 could	 be approximately	fifty	yea rs. We	express	no	opinion	on	whether	an	application	of	the	supervised	release	law	that	resulted	in a	 time	 in	 State	 supervision	 considerably	 longer	 than	 that	 might	 present	 a	 constitutional proportionality	issue.13 his	“status”	or	“characteristics,”	Parker	has	identified	no	process	 that	he	was due	 and	 of	 which	 he	 has	 been	 depr ived. His	 due	 process	 argument really
ap pears	to	address	the length	of	his	total	sentence, assuming	his	prospective compliance	 with	 the	 conditions	 of	 his	 supervised	 release , which	 is	 a constitutional	proportionality	claim. [¶26 ] The	 Eighth	 Amendment	 to	 the	 Uni ted	 States	 Constitution provides	 that	 “[e]xcessive	 bail	 shall	 not	 be	 required,	 nor	 excessive	 fines imposed,	 nor	 cruel	 and	 unusual	 punishments	 inflicted.” U.S.	 Const.	 amend.
VIII. Article	1,	section	9	of	the	Maine	Constitution	explicitly	provides	that	“al l penalties	 and	 punishments	 shall	 be	 proportioned	 to	 the	 offense.”	Me.	 Const. art.	I,	§	9. In Bennett ,	2015	ME	46,	¶	15,	114	A.3d	994,	we	observed	that	“o nly the	most	extreme	punishment	decided	upon	by	the	Legislature	as	appropriate for	an	offense	could	s o	offend	or	shock	the	collective	conscience	of	the	people of	Maine	as	 to	be	unconstitutionally	disproportionate,	or	cruel	and	unusual.” (quoting State	v.	Ward ,	2011	ME	74,	¶	18,	21	A.3d	1033 ( alterations	om itted) )

. [¶27 ] We	have	approved	prison	sentences	of	sixty

- five	years	and	forty years	in	 cases	 where	 the	 facts	indicated	multiple	 sexual	 assaults	 committed against	minors. See,	e.g. , State	v.	Sweet ,	2000	ME	14,	745	A.2d	368.		As	applied in	 this	 case,	 t he	 sentences	 for	 mu ltiple	 Class A	 gross	 sexual	 assaults14 committed	 on	 a	 nine

- year - old	 victim

— twenty years’ imprisonment	 followed by	 fifteen	 years	 of	 supervised	 release with	 the	 possi bility	 of	 fifteen	 years	in pris on	 for	 violation	 of	 supervised	 release

— are	 not	 constitutionally disproportionate	 and	 are	 not	 cruel	 or	 unusual	 punishment. See Cook , 2011 ME	 94,	 ¶	 19	 n. 9,	 26	 A.3d	 834	 ( addressing	 sentencing	 for	 gross	 sexual assault	committed	on	minors	under	the	age	of	twelve	and noting	that	a	term	of supervised	release	may	be appropriate,	even	if	the	combination	of	the	term	of imprisonment	 and	 the	 term	 of	 supervised	 release	 exceed	 the	 statutory maximum	sentence	for	the	crime).
B. Double	Jeopardy [¶28 ] Parker also argues	 that	 the	 supe rvised	 release	 sentencing
process , 17

- A M.R. S.	 §	 1231(2)(C) ,	 violates	 the Double	 J eopardy C lause because	it	seeks	to	punish	him	twice	for	the	same	conduct. He	further	alleges that	the	imposition	of	supervised	release	is	punitive	in	nature,	and	not	civil	or regulatory. [¶29 ] The	 Double	 Jeopardy	 C lauses	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution and	 Maine	 Constitution	 protect	 a	 criminal	 defendant	 from	 a	 second prosecution	 for	 the	 same	 offense	 after	 a	 conviction,	 and	 from	 multiple punishments	 for	 the	 same	 offense. State	 v.	 Savard ,	 659	 A.2d	 1265,	 126615 (Me. 1 995) .	 	 T o	 prevail	 on	 his	 double	 j eopardy	 claim,	 Parker	 must demonstrate	 that	 the	 term	 of	 supervised	 release	 punishes	 him	 twice	 for	 the same	offense,	or	was	imposed	as	the	result	of	a	separate	proceeding	but	based on	 the	 same	conduct. Id. Parker	argues	 th at	he	is	 subject	 to	punishment	in two	different	proceedings

— the	sentencing	hearing,	and , should	it	happen,	the supervised	 release	 revocation	 hearing .	 	B ecause	any	 sanction	 resulting	 from violation	of	supervised	release ,	like	a ny sanction	 for	a	violation	of probation, is	 based	 on violation	 of	 the	 conditions	 imposed,	 and	 not	 the	 subst antive criminal	 conduct	 that	 le d	 to	 the	 imp osition	 of	 supervised	 release,	 double j eopardy	concerns	are	not	implicated. [¶30 ] The	 nature	 of	 supervised	 release	 and	 imposition	 of supervised release	as	part	of	the original	sentencing	process	were addressed	in	detail	in Cook ,	2011	ME	94,	¶¶	21

- 30,	26	A.3d	834. “[A] lthough	incarceration	following the	 revocation	 of	 a	 term	 of	 supervised	 release	 is	 punishment,	 it	 punishes	 a defendant’s failure	to	abide	by	conditions	of	release	imposed	by	the	court	and the	 resulting	 breach	 of	 trust,	 not	 a	 defendant’s	 original,	 or	 new,	 criminal conduct. ” Id

. ¶	26.		Parker’s double	j eopardy	claim	fails.16 C

. Three

- Step	Sentencing	Analysis [¶ 3 1] Parker asserts that the supervised	 release	 statutory	 scheme abrogates	the	typical Hewey analysis,	by	mandating	“at	least	20	years” as	the first	 step and	 completely	 removing	 step	 three	 by	 eliminating	 probation	 and mandating	supervised	release,	and that as	a	result he	was	se ntenced	to	more prison	time	than he	would	have	been	under	a	traditional Hewey analysis. As	a result,	Parker	contends,	he	was	denied	a	meaningful	proportionality	review. [¶32 ] A	sentencing	cou rt	typically	engages	in	a	three

- step	process	when
i mposing	a	sentence that	will	include	time	in	prison :	(1) it det ermines a	bas ic period	 of	 incarceration,	 which	 is	 set solely	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 offender’s criminal	conduct	and	the	nature	and	seriousness	of	the	offense;	(2)	in	order	to individualize	 each	 se ntence	 and	 set	 the	 maximum	 term,	 the	 court	 next considers	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors	that	will	either	reduce,	enhance , or	have	no	effect	on	the	maximum	sentence;	and	(3)	once	the	sentencing	court has	 determined	 the	 maximum	 period	 of	 incarceration , it	 may	 suspend	 a portion	 of	 that period	 and	 supplement	 it	 with	 a	 period	 of	 probation.	 	 17

- A
M.R.S. § 1252

- C; State	v.	Hewey ,	622	A.2d	1151,	1154

- 55	(Me.	1993)

. [¶33 ] In	 determining	 the	length	and	 conditions	 of	 supervised	 release, we	 have	 recognized	 that	 the	 usual	 three

- step	 analysis	 cannot	 apply	 because17 the	 court	 is	 barred	 from	 suspending	 any	 portion	 of	 the	 sentence	 of imprisonment and	 is	 instead	 required	 to	 impose a	 p eriod	 of	 supervised release. Cook ,	2011 ME	94,	¶	21,	26	A.3d	834.		With	that	limitation,	we	have instructed	 the	 sentencing	 court	 to	 “consider	 statutory	 sentencing	 factors appropriate	 to	 its	 primary	 purpose	 of	 supervision	 and	 rehabilitation ”	 after which	 it may “ impose	 any	 conditions	 of	 supe rvised	 release	 authorized	 by
17

- A M.R.S.	§	1232 that	it	deems	reasonable	and	appropriate.” Id

. ¶	29

. [¶34 ] Here,	t he	court did	not	misapply	the	law	in setting a	twenty
- year bas ic	term	of	imprisonment,	as	the	basic	ter m was	statutorily	mandated. State v.	Holland ,	2012	ME	2,	¶	38,	34	A.3d	1130 (noting	that our review	of	the	first step	is	de	novo,	 for	misapplica tion	of	 the	law);	17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 1252(4

- E).		The court’s	discussion	of	the	second	step reveals	no	abuse	of	discretion	in setting the	 twenty

- year	 maximum	 sentence ,	 two	 years	 less	 than	 the	 original determination	 made	 by	 the	 court,	 after	 reevaluating the aggravating	 and mitigating	 factors. Cook ,	 2011	ME	 94,	 ¶	 8,	 26 A.3d	 834	 (observing	 that our review	at	step	two	is	for	an	abuse	of	discretion).		Because	it	recognized	that	its original	sentence	was affected	by an	error	of	law,	the	court’s	original	analysis did	 not	 bind	 the	 court and prevent	 it	 from	 changing	 its	 analysis	 of	 the discretionary	choic es	it	was	making.18 [¶35 ] In	imposing	supervised	release , the	sentencing	court	followed	the analysis we required in Cook ,	considered	the	factors	set	forth	in	section	1151 and	1252

- C(2) , and	imposed	conditions	authorized	by	section	1232. Id. ¶	29. The	sentencing	court	properly	engaged	in	the	analysis	required	for	imposing a
sentence that	included supervised	release,	and	the	resulting	sentence	does	not reflect	any	misapplication	of	principle	or	error	of	law. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Merritt	 T.	 Heminway,	 Esq.	 (orally), H&H	 LawCenter,	 P.A.,	 Portland,	 for appellant	Walter	A.	Parker Stephanie	 Anderson,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Meghan	 E.	 Connelly,	 Asst.	 Dist. Atty.	 (orally),	 and	 Trevor	 Savage,	 Stud.	 Atty.,	 District	 Attorney’s	 Office, Por tland,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine Lawrence	C.	Winger,	Esq.,	amicus	curiae	pro	se

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2015

- 723 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY