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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *

 * CRIMINAL ACTION: 16-00115-KD-N

v. *

 * 

STEPHEN COREY PEARCE and *

SAMANTHA CHELSEA LYONS *

Defendants. *

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant Stephen Corey Pearce’s Motion to 

Suppress and Dismiss the charges against him (Doc. 24) and Co-Defendant Samantha Chelsea 

Lyons Joinder thereof (Doc. 25). The Court held a hearing on July 18, 2016. Upon 

consideration, the Court finds that the motions are due to be DENIED.

I. Findings of Fact1

In the early morning hours of July 20, 2015, Samantha Lyons and Stephen Pearce were 

traveling by car through Louisiana on their way to Daphne, AL. Lyons was driver and owner of

the car. Pearce was the passenger. Louisiana Trooper Ryan Zimmerman observed the car 

crossing over the white line on two occasions. Trooper Zimmerman stopped the car on Interstate 

12. The stop was recorded. (Court Exh. 1). Trooper Zimmerman approached the passenger side 

of the car and requested Lyon’s drivers license and asked her to get out of the car so that he 

could explain why he had stopped them. Lyons complied and when she approached the back of 

the car, Trooper Zimmerman explained why he had stopped the car and asked her if she had been 

drinking. Lyons responded that she had not been drinking. Trooper Zimmerman immediately 

started to question her about where she had been, how long and the purpose of her trip. Trooper 

 1 The Court finds Trooper Zimmerman’s testimony at the hearing to be credible. 

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Zimmerman stood close to Lyons while she answered to determine whether she smelled of 

alcohol or marijuana and to see if her speech was slurred. Lyons said they were in Houston 

visiting for the weekend and had stayed with her relatives. This questioning lasted about 25 

seconds. Trooper Zimmerman testified that throughout the questioning Lyons appeared nervous 

and periodically failed to make eye contact. 

Trooper Zimmerman then approached Pearce, who was still in the vehicle, and asked 

similar questions. Pearce responded that they had visited his relatives and stayed in a hotel while 

in Houston. Trooper Zimmerman noted the discrepancies and asked for an ID. Pearce said he 

didn’t have any ID. Trooper Zimmerman asked Pearce to look for it. This questioning lasted 

approximately 1 minutes and 20 seconds. Trooper Zimmerman waited approximately an 

additional two minutes while Pearce searched for, then produced an ID. The Trooper testified 

that Pearce appeared very nervous and agitated throughout the questioning.2 Trooper 

Zimmerman then took the ID to his patrol car and ran a criminal check. Within a minute it was 

determined that Pearce had recently been released from jail on drug charges. At approximately 

5-6 minutes into the stop, Trooper Zimmerman returned to question Lyons and asks for 

permission to search the car, which she voluntarily granted. A search of the car resulted in 

finding cocaine in a gym bag in the trunk.

II. Conclusions of Law

A. Standing

As explained by the 11th Circuit:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. It is well-established, however, that only individuals who have a legitimate 

 2 The Court notes that later in the video the Trooper can be heard telling the backup 

officer that the passenger appeared very nervous during questioning.

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expectation of privacy in the area invaded may invoke the protections of the Fourth 

Amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 

(1979); see also United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir.1987) (per 

curiam) (“Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are personal and cannot be 

vicariously asserted.”).

We have held that a “passenger[ ] in a private car, ... who has no possessory interest in 

the automobile, does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the 

automobile because he does not have the right to exclude others from the car.” United 

States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (citing Rakas v. 

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 143 n. 12, 148, 99 S.Ct. 421, 429, 430 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 

(1978)); see also United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir.1998) (“A 

passenger usually lacks a privacy interest in a vehicle that the passenger neither owns nor

rents, regardless of whether the driver owns or rents it.”)....

United States v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2009).

In this case, there is no dispute that Lyons, not Pearce, was the driver and owner of the 

vehicle that was searched. Pearce has not asserted a property or possessory interest in the car, 

thus he has failed to meet his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 

trunk in which the cocaine was discovered. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-149 (1978)

(Passengers occupying a car they neither owned nor leased have no legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the trunk or the glove compartment of an automobile.) However, the government has 

waived the issue of standing by failing to raise the issue and, instead, addressing the merits of 

Pearce’s Fourth Amendment claims. United States v. Lightbourn, 357 Fed. Appx. 259, 264 (11th

Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the court will address the merits of Pearce’s Fourth Amendment 

claims.

B. Reasonableness of duration of stop

In United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001), the Court discussed the 

reasonableness of prolonged detentions for traffic violations. The Court held that a “traffic stop 

may not last ‘any longer than necessary to process the traffic violation’ unless there is articulable 

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suspicion of other illegal activity.” Id. at 1277. However, the Court also held that “only 

unrelated questions which unreasonably prolong the detention are unlawful: ‘detention not 

questioning, is the evil at which Terry’s [prohibition] is aimed.’” Id. at 1280 (emphasis added). 

First, the court finds that the initial questioning of Lyons, which lasted approximately 25 

seconds was not unrelated to the traffic stop. Lyons was driving in the early morning hours and 

was observed swerving across the white line. It was reasonable for the trooper to be concerned 

that she may be impaired. 25 seconds of questioning to determine whether she was impaired was 

not unreasonable. 

Next, it was reasonable for the Trooper to also determine the identity of the passenger

and obtain a criminal check. Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1278 (“The request for criminal histories [of 

occupants of the car] as part of a routine computer check is justified for officer safety. It is both 

reasonable and minimally intrusive[]”). The only possible questionable period of detention is 

when the trooper approached Pearce and questioned him about where he had been and why, 

before asking for an ID. However, within 15 seconds it was clear that Pearce was giving a 

different story from Lyons and was very nervous. Pearce also claimed not to have an id. The 

court does not find that 15 seconds of possibly unrelated questioning, before asking for an id,

unreasonably prolonged the detention. 

The court also finds that based on the inconsistent stories and the fact that both Lyons and 

Pearce were nervous, further questioning of approximately 1-2 minutes was warranted based on 

reasonable suspicion that illegal activity may be present. The officer then waited approximately 2 

minutes for the passenger to produce an ID.

The Trooper then went to his car to run a check on the ID. Within a minute he 

determined that Pearce had recently been released from jail due to a narcotics charge, which was 

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also inconsistent with Pearce’s statements and gave further support to his suspicion that illegal 

activity might be afoot.3 

Trooper Zimmerman then returned to question Lyons and within 30 seconds she 

consented to the search of the car. The totality of the stop at this point was approximately 6 

minutes, which is the only time period relevant to a determination of whether the duration of the 

traffic stop was reasonable. Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1279 (“[i]n this case, the district court 

determined that Shon Purcell consented to a search of his car approximately fourteen minutes 

into the traffic stop. These initial fourteen minutes, therefore, are the only ones relevant to a 

determination whether the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable[]”).

Upon consideration of the totality of the evidence, the court finds that the duration of the 

stop was not unreasonable and did not violate the defendants’ constitutional right to be free of 

unreasonable seizure. Specifically, a 6 minute seizure, when there is an initial suspicion of

driver impairment and within 2 minutes the driver and passenger are telling inconsistent stories, 

is simply not an unreasonable length of time for further inquiry. 

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of July 2016.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 3 The Trooper was unsure whether Pearce was convicted of the drug charge.

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