UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4518

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

STEPHEN J. WASHINGTON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior 

District Judge. (1:06-cr-00068-TSE) 

Submitted: July 10, 2009 Decided: July 24, 2009 

Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert L. Jenkins, Jr., BYNUM & JENKINS, PLLC, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States 

Attorney, Dennis M. Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 A jury convicted Stephen J. Washington of possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine base, possession with intent 

to distribute marijuana, and possession of firearms in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and the 

district court sentenced Washington to a total of 130 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Washington’s counsel contends that the 

district court erred in denying the motion to suppress drugs and 

firearms seized from the vehicle Washington was driving. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 We review the factual findings underlying the denial 

of a motion to suppress for clear error and the court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 

(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009). The 

evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 

704 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 Counsel does not challenge the propriety of the 

traffic stop initiated by law enforcement. Rather, he asserts 

that the officer improperly extended the traffic stop into an 

unauthorized Terry* stop. Counsel concludes that the officer’s 

 * Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

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entry into Washington’s vehicle to retrieve a partially consumed 

bottle of alcohol violated the Fourth Amendment and that 

evidence resulting therefrom should be suppressed. 

 “If a police officer wants to detain a driver beyond 

the scope of a routine traffic stop, . . . he must possess a 

justification for doing so other than the initial traffic 

violation that prompted the stop in the first place.” Branch, 

537 F.3d at 336. One such justification for extending a traffic 

stop is to investigate a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity, known as a Terry stop. Id.; see also United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“[T]he police can stop and 

briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the 

officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable 

facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer 

lacks probable cause.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30)). In 

assessing the validity of a Terry stop, “we consider the 

totality of the circumstances . . . giv[ing] due weight to 

common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their 

experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 

317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). 

 Upon initiating the traffic stop, officer Koenigsberg 

observed that Washington had bloodshot, watery eyes and was 

shaking. The officer stated that, in his experience, this was 

an indication of intoxication. Moreover, the officer was 

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alerted to a partially consumed bottle of alcohol located on the 

rear passenger side floorboard. Based on these facts, the 

officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 

violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-323.1 (2004) (prescribing 

rebuttable presumption that driver is drinking while operating a 

motor vehicle when partially consumed container of alcohol is 

located within passenger area and the behavior or the physical 

characteristics of the driver is consistent with the consumption 

of alcohol), that permitted the extension of the traffic stop. 

 However, counsel asserts that Washington did not smell 

of alcohol, was not slurring his speech, and was able to keep 

his balance. Counsel also notes that, when questioned, 

Washington denied that he was intoxicated and denied ownership 

of the bottle. Koenigsberg likewise did not administer a field 

sobriety test. While Koenigsberg testified on cross-examination 

that he did not believe Washington was drunk, he nevertheless 

indicated that, in his experience, Washington’s physical 

appearance was consistent with some manner of intoxication. 

Thus, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government, as we must, we conclude that Koenigsberg was not 

unreasonable in his suspicion that Washington was intoxicated. 

 Additionally, the officer was within the scope of the 

automobile exception when he initiated the warrantless entry 

into Washington’s vehicle to retrieve the bottle. See

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Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (“If there is 

probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of 

criminal activity, . . . a [warrantless] search of any area of 

the vehicle in which the evidence might be found[] [is 

authorized].”); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) 

(stating automobile exception permits search that “is no broader 

and no narrower” than that which could be authorized pursuant to 

a warrant). Therefore, the district court properly denied the 

motion to suppress. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We deny Washington’s motion to place the appeal in 

abeyance and deny his motion for leave to file a pro se reply 

brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED