### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT A ugu st 5, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 02- 1650 9

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 001-0006 7 CV- T- N BRA ND I H ARE WAL KE R, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION , De fendant-Appellee, G W EN D O L YN D IX O N , in he r ind ivi dua l a n do f f i c i a l c ap a c i t y, ROB ER T P . MU RCH ISO N, in his in divid ual a n do f f i c i a l c ap a c i t y, D ef en dants .

____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e M i d d l e D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 5, 200 4) Be fo re T JO FL A T , BA RKE T T and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.The a ct def ines “e mploy er” as “a

ny person e ng ag ed in commer ce or in any industry or 1 activity aff ectingcommerc e who e mploy s 50 or more e mploy ees f or ea ch wor

king da y during e a c h o f 2 0 o r m or e c a le nd ar w or kw e e ks in t

he c ur re nt o r p re c e din gc a le nd ar ye ar. ” 29 U. S.C. § 2611(4)( A)(i) . Section 2615(a) makes it “unlaw ful for a ny employ er to interf

ere with, restra in, or deny 2 the exercise of

or the attempt to ex erc ise, any rig ht provided under

[t he F MLA].” 2 TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: T he F am ily

and M ed ic al L eave A ct

of 199 3, P ub. L . N o. 103 -3 , 107 S ta t. 6, co dif ie d a t 29 U . S. C. §§ 2 601- 54 ( the “ FM L A ” or “ A ct ”) , r equir es “ em

plo y er s” 1 to provid e “ eligible” em

ploy ees w ith up to twelve w eeks of unpaid leave to care fo r a ne wbor

n c hil d. 29 U . S. C. § 26 12. A n e lig ibl e em plo y ee is ane m

plo y ee w ho ha s w orke d f

or the e m plo y er f or tw el ve m onths and f

or a t l ea st 1 , 250 hour s inthe pr ec ed ing y ear. 29 U . S. C. § 26 11. T he A ct pr ohi bit s an e m

plo y er f ro m r et al ia tin g against an em

ploy ee who attem

pts to exercise any

FML A- created right. 29 U. S. C. § 261 5(a). 2 T he que sti on this appe al pr es en ts i s w he the r a re que st f or m at er nity le av e m ade by an em ploy ee who is in eligible at the tim e of her request constitu tes an atte m pt t o e xe rc ise aF ML Ar igh t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt answ er ed thi s qu es tio n inthe affir m ative, but denied the em ploy ee’ s claim

that her em

ploy er had re taliated ag ai n s th erfo r r eq u es t i n g th e mat ern i t y l ea v e. We af fi rm th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s“A c orre ct judg ment may be af firmed on a

ny g round re g ardle ss of the g rounds 3 addre ssed, adopted or

reje cted by

the district court.” Sosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortg ag e Corp., 348 F.3d 979, 983 ( 11th Cir. 2003). In deter mining whe ther the district c ourt err ed in g rantingthe summary judgme nt, we 4 take the e vidence in the light most favor able to the nonmovant. F ocus on the F amily v. Pinellas Suncoast Tra

nsit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003). The fa cts rec ited in part I ref lect the evidenc e viewe d in such light. Under Alabama law, tea cher s are deeme d to have be en off ere d ree mploy

ment for the 5 su c c e e din gsc ho ol ye ar u

nle ss t he e mpl oyingbo ard

of e du c atio n n oti fi e s th e m to the c ontr ary in writingby

J une 15. Ala. Code § 16-24-12. 3 decision on the groundthat the Act does not protect the attem pt m ade in this case. 3

I. InAugus t 19 99, the Bo ar d of E duc at ionf

or E lm or e Co unty , A la

ba m a (the

“ Sc hool Bo ar d” or

“ Bo ar d” ), hir ed

Br an di H ar e W al ke r to t ea chthi rd gr ad e at the Ro bin son Sp ri ngs Sc hool f or one y ear. W al ke r re porte d f or w ork onAugus t 9, 4 1999 . T he c ontra ct , w hic h r equir ed W al ke r to t ea chunt il the sc hool y ear en de d on May 19, 2000, would be autom atically renew ed unless th e Sc hool Board elec ted not to re ne wit , and p ro vid ed that W al ke r w oul d be pa id $ 28, 394 in tw el ve 5
m on th ly ins ta ll m en ts be gi nn in g S ep te m be r 30 , 19 99 , anden di ng Aug us t 3 0, 2 00 0. InD ec em be r, W al ke r inf

orm ed the pr inc ipa l of

the Ro bin son Sp ri ngs School that she was pregnant. The f ollowing April, W alker told the principal that she w as due on Augus t 2 an d in qui re d a s to w ha t sh e shou ld d o to obt ai n m at er nityWalker sued the supe rintendent a nd principal in both their off icial and individual 6 capa cities. 4 le av e fo llo w ing the c hil d’ s arr iva l. T he pr inc ipa l t old W al ke r that sh e shou ld
m ake her r equest for leave in a le tter to the School Board. She re com m ended that W al ke r w ai t un til the Bo ar d de ci de d w he the r he r co ntr ac t w oul d be r en ew ed f or th e n ex t s ch oo l year. T he S ch ool Bo ar d m ad e its de ci sio n onMay 15. I t m et

that day to re ce ive the sup er int en de nt o f sc hool ’ s r ec om m en da tio ns o n pe rs onne l a ct ion s, inc lud ing the renew al of the one-y ear teacher contracts. W alker’ s principal had tol d W alker on May 12 that the School Board would no t be renew ing her contract, and on May 16 , th e su pe rin te nd en t o f sc ho ol s i nf orm edhe r by let te r th atsu ch was t he cas e. W al ke r ga ve bir

th t o adaught er

on July 27, 200 0. O n Augus t 3, the te ac he rs in the E lm or e Co unty sc hool sy ste m

r ep orte d f

or w ork f or the 200 0- 2001 sc ho ol ter m . II. On January

17, 2001, W alker brought thi s lawsuit against the Elm ore Co unty Bo ar d of E duc at ion , the sup er int en de nt o f sc hool s and the pr inc ipa l of Robins on Springs School. From the allegations of her com plaint, the district 6 court concluded th at W alker w as bringing two cla im s. T he first, which the courtTh e c ourt ’s ru lin gon the “ pr e sc ri pti ve ” c la im i s n ot c ha lle ng e d in thi s a pp e a l. 7 5 la be le d a“pr es cr ipt ive ” cl ai m , a ssum ed that W al ke r w as an e lig ibl e em plo y ee and as se rt ed that the S ch ool Bo ar d de nie d he r ri ght to m at er nity le av e. T he se co nd, which the court labeled a “proscriptive” claim , a sserted that the School Board de ci de d no t t o r en ewW al ke r’ s te ac hin g c ontra ct in re ta liatio n f

or he r re que st f

or FM L Ale av e. T he sup er int en de nt and the pr inc ipa l m ove d th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o dism iss them

from the case on the ground th at they we re not em

ploy ers as def

ined by the A ct . T he c ourt a gr ee d and g rante d th ei r m oti on. T he S ch ool Bo ar d a lso
m ove d f or dis m iss al and a lte rn at ive ly f or sum m ar y j udgm en t. T he c ourt w ith he ld ruling on the alternative m otion s pendin g the close of discovery . Af ter discovery wa s com pleted, the court granted the Boar d summ ary j udgm ent. W alker v. Elm ore CountyBd. of

Educ. , 223 F. Supp. 2d 1255 , 1256 (M. D. Ala . 2002). Turning to W alker’ s “ prescriptive” claim , the district court held that W alker wa s not an eligib le em

ploy ee—beca

use she had not worked f or the School Board fo r at le as t tw el ve m onths and f or a t l ea st 1 , 250 hour s of

se rv ic e dur ing the pr ev iou s tw el ve -m onth pe ri od— an d ha d no r igh t t o th e le av e she r eque ste d. T he co urt the re fo re de nie d r el ie f on tha t c la im . I d. a t 12 58. 7 Addressing W alker’ s “ proscriptive” claim , the district court fir st consid ered the thr es hol d is sue of

w he the r the F ML Apr ote ct s ar eque st f or m at er nity le av e by6

an ineligib le em

ploy ee. N oting that other district courts had adop ted the view that

“ an y a ct iontake n by

an e m plo y ee be fo re be co m ing an e lig ibl e em plo y ee c an not

be protected activity

under the FML A, ” the district court nevertheless found that

“ som e actions” taken by

an em ploy ee bef

ore eligibility“ m ay

be” protected. Id. at 1259 . S pe ci fi ca lly , the c ourt st at ed , w he re the e m

plo y ee , be fo re she be co m es e lig ibl e fo r FM L A , is puttin g th e em ploy er on notice of her intent to take FML A le ave af ter she becom es el igi ble f or F ML Ac ove ra ge , log ic r equir es that the F ML Abe r ea d to re qui re that the e m

plo y ee be pe rm itt ed

to m ak e a re ta liatio n c harg e ag ai nst the e m plo y er f or an a dve rs e- em

plo ym en t a ct ion . Id . a t 12 60. T he c ourt the n he ld tha t “ al tho ugh W al ke r w as not an e lig ibl e em plo y ee w he n sh e de liv er ed he r ch ild , and w oul d no t have be enan e lig ibl e em plo y ee e ve n if

she ha d de liv er ed

on h er anti ci pa te d de liv er

y da te , ” he r re que st wa s protected by

the Ac t because “ alm ost all of her leave w ouldhave taken place du rin g h er FM LA-eli gi bi li ty peri od .” Id . at 1 26 1. Having decided that the FML A protec ted W alker fr om retaliation for her
m at ern it y lea ve req ue st , th e d is tri ctco ur t t he n a dd res se d t he m eri ts of h er cl ai m . Beca use W alker’ s claim

—that the School Board decided not to renewher contrac t because she applied for m aternity leave—w as based on circum stantial evidence, the c ourt a

ppl ie d th e bur de n sh if

tin g f ram ew ork of

Mc D onne ll D ougl as Co rp . v. Gr een, 411 U.S . 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 , 36 L . E d. 2d 668 (197 3). Under that test, asThe re asons wer e: 8 (1) she did not maintain a proper relationship wit h pare nts; (2) she did not establish and maintain a prope r re lationship with children in her c lass, espec ially when disciplining the m; ( 3) sh e did

no t ma int a in h e r b ull e tin bo ard pr op e rl y ; ( 4) sh e did

no t ti me ly

su bmi t data r equeste d by

her pr incipal; (5) she did not maintain proper c lassroom control; (6) she re fe rr e d s tud e nts to t

he of fi c e a bo ut m atte rs that sh e c ou ld a nd sh ou ld h ave re so lve d in her c lassroom; and (7) her pr incipal did not believe she would be a satisfactory teac her. Walker, 223 F . Supp. 2d at 1262. 7 ap pli ed in the F ML Ac ont ex t at hand, if W al ke r es ta

bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se of re ta liatio n, the bur de n of

goi ng f or w ar d w iththe e vid en ce shi ft s to the Bo ar d. I f it proffer ed a nonretaliatory rea son for its adverse em ploym ent decision, W alker
w oul d have to showthat the r ea son w as apr et ex t f or r et al ia tio n. I n th is c as e, the Sc h o o l Bo ar dp ro ff

er eds ev en n o n re t al i at o ry re as o n s fo r n o tre n ew i n g Wal k er ’s co ntr ac t. T he c ourt the n lo oke d f or e vid en ce that the r ea sons w er e a pr et ex t f or 8
re ta liatio n and f

ound non e. B ec au se , in the c ourt’ s e y es , W al ke r ha d f ai le d th e McD onnell Dougl as test, it granted the School Board’ s m otion for sum m ary j udgm en t. W al ke r, 223 F . S upp. 2d at 12 62- 63. W alker now a

ppeals the dist rict court’ s disp ositio n of her “proscriptive” cl ai m . S he c ont en ds f

ir st tha t the e vid en ce of

the S ch ool Bo ar d’ s r ea sons f or not re ne w ing he r co ntr ac t w as not e vid en ce a t a ll; r athe r, it c onsi ste d of unauth en tic at ed

e xhi bit s a tta ch ed

to a m em or an dum

the Bo ar d’ s c ouns el f

ile d in supp ort of the Board’ s m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent. S econd, assum ing th at tho se e xhi bit s w er e pr ope rl y be fo re the c ourt, W al ke r say s th at m at er ia l i ssu es of8

fa ct r em ai n a s to w he the r the S ch ool Bo ar d’ s r ea sons w er e pr et ex tua l. W e ne ed not de ci de w he the r W al ke r fa ile d th e Mc D onne ll D ougl as te st because w e conclude that W alker’ s request for m aternity leave did not cons titute a pr ot ect edatt em

pt to ob ta in an FMLA b en efi t.

III . T o st at e a cl ai m

of r et al ia tio n un de r the F ML A , “ ane m plo y ee m ust a lle ge that ( 1) he e nga ge d inastatut or ily pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty ; ( 2) he suf

fe re d an a dve rs e em ploym ent decision; and(3) the decision wa s causally relate d to the protected ac tiv ity . ” S tr ic kland v . W at er W orks & S ew er

Bd . , 239 F . 3d 1 199, 120 7 ( 11th Ci r. 200 1) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ) (a ppl y ing the Mc D onne ll D ougl as ana ly sis in a FML A c ase). Contrary

to the district court, w e hold that W alker’ s claim fails at the f ir st s te p inthi s ana ly sis be ca use he r re que st f

or le av e w as not

pr ote ct ed

by the FMLA. A. W e fi rs t no te that W al ke r’ s c as e dif fe rs f ro m the usu al r et al ia tio n c as e be ca use W al ke r w as not

an e lig ibl e em

plo y ee und er

the F ML Aa t the ti m e she re que ste d m at er

nity le av e. A cc or din g to W al ke r, how ev er , r eque sti ng l eave f or w hic h on e w ill be e lig ibl e be fo re one is ac tua lly e lig ibl e is an “ atte m

pt t o ex er ci se ” a ri ght

pr ovi de d by

F ML A , and e m

plo y er s are pr ohi bit ed

f ro mWalker’s mate rnity leave would have c ommenced on A ugust 3, 2000, the first day upon 9 which she w ould have be en re quired to re port for w ork followingboth her due date ( August 2) an d h e r a c tu a l d e l i v e r

y d at e ( J u l y

2 7 ) . T h e d ay

W a l k e r w o u l d h av e b e c o m e e l i g i b l e f

o r F M LA leave , howeve r, wa s her twe lve-month anniver sary at the school, August 9, 2000. Walker ar gues that she c ould have use d sick leave to fill the tim e betwe en the date she 10 was re quired to re port for w ork and the date upon whic h she would have become elig ible for FMLA leave . This argument misses the point, however, be cause the deter mination of whether

an employ ee ha s been e mploy ed for at least twe lve months for F MLA elig ibilit y “must be made as of the date leave commence s.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) . For the same r eason, the district court’s ho ldi ngthat “ a lmo st a ll o f [Wa lke r’ s] le ave wo uld have take n p la c e duri nghe r F MLA- e lig ibi lity period” is inapposite. 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1261. 9 ret al ia ti ng ag ai ns t an em

pl oyee fo r m ak in g s uc h areq ue st . 29 U.S.C. § 2 61 5. Unless w e agre e that the FML A protec ts a request for le ave that is to begin after th e em pl oyee ach ie ve s el ig ib il it y , W al ke r’s cas e fai ls . Ex amin i n g th e f

ac t s o f t h i s ca s e c l o s el y, ho we v er , r ev ea l s th at Wal k er ’s ca se is not

one “ w he re the e m

plo y ee , be fo re she be co m es e lig ibl e fo r FM L A , is putti ng the em

ploy er on notice of her intent to take FML A le ave af ter she becom es eligible for FML A c overage. ” W alker, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. H ere, W alker
w oul d no t have be en

e lig ibl e fo r le av e ev ena t the ti m e he r le av e w as to be gin . 9 In ste ad , W al ke r’ s r eque st w as f or le av e that w oul d be ginse ve ra l day s be fo re she
w oul d have be co m e el igi ble ha d he r co ntr ac t be enr en ew ed . T he re c anbe no 10 doub t tha t the r eque st—

m ad e by an in el igi ble e m

plo y ee f or le av e that w oul d be gin wh en s h e w o u l ds t i l l h av e b ee n i n el i g i b l e— i s n o tp ro t ec t edb y t h e F M LA. We le av e fo r an oth er

day the que sti on o f w he the r the F ML Apr ote ct s apr e- el igi bil ity10

req ue stforpo st -el ig ib il it y m at ern it y

lea ve . B. A s af al lba ck pos iti on, W al ke r as se rt s th at the F ML Apr ote ct s ar eque st f or FMLA l eav e reg ard le ss of wh et he r th e em pl oyee wou ldbe eli gi bl e fo r th e le av e. This argum ent is based on th e district court’ s hold ing th at the FML A “ can protect som eo ne w ho m ist ak en ly a sks f or F ML Ale av e al tho ugh the y are ine lig ibl e. ” 223 F. Supp . 2dat 1 25 9. We di sa gr ee wi th th e d is tri ctco ur t’s h ol di ng . The FM LA
m ak es it unl aw fu l f

or an e m plo y er to int er fe re w iththe a tte m pt “ to e xe rc ise [] any right provi ded und er this subchapter,” 29 U. S. C. § 261 5(a)( 1) (em phasis add ed), an d t he rig ht to lea ve is pro vi de d o nl y to eli gi bl e em

pl oyees. 2 9 U.S.C. § 26 12 . Whil e w e do n ot r ea chthe que sti on o f w he the r one c ana tte m pt t o e xe rc ise ar igh t unde r the F ML Athat on e w ill have in the f uture , w e hol d th at

the statut e doe s no t pr ote ct an a tte m pt t o e xe rc ise ar igh t tha t i s no t pr ovi de d by F ML A , i. e. , the r igh t to leave before one becom es eligible therefor. IV. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s AFFIR MED.