[Cite as Bryan v. Johnston, 2012-Ohio-2703.]

STATE OF OHIO, CARROLL COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

EARL BRYAN, ET AL., 

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, 

V. 

EUGENE JOHNSTON, ET AL., 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

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 CASE NO. 11 CA 871 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Municipal Court of 

Carroll County, Ohio 

Case No. CVG1100098 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiffs-Appellees Attorney Kelley Bryan 

Childers and Smith 

70 Public Square 

P.O. Box 252 

Carrollton, Ohio 44615 

For Defendants-Appellants Eugene Johnston, Pro-se 

Angela Arkenburgh, Pro-se 

369 South Lisbon Street 

Carrollton, Ohio 44615 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: June 12, 2012 
[Cite as Bryan v. Johnston, 2012-Ohio-2703.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Defendants-appellants, Eugene Johnston and Angela Arkenbaugh, 

appeal from a Carroll County Municipal Court judgment evicting them from the duplex 

they had been renting from plaintiffs-appellees, Earl and Tonya Bryan. 

{¶2} On March 14, 2011, appellees filed a forcible entry and detainer action 

against appellants. Appellees alleged that appellants failed to pay the monthly rent 

owed to appellees in the amount of $550 and sought to evict appellants. 

{¶3} The parties entered into a settlement agreement on March 30, 2011, 

whereby appellants agreed to be evicted on April 13, 2011 at 11:30 a.m. The court 

continued the case until April 20 to determine damages. 

{¶4} Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on April 4, 2011. 

{¶5} Initially, we should note that “the first cause of a forcible entry and 

detainer action is a final appealable order and the damages portion of the case need 

not be decided before the appeal of the eviction.” Nofzinger v. Blood, 6th Dist. No. H03-021, 2004-Ohio-2461, ¶11, citing Skillman et al., v. Browne et al., 68 Ohio App.3d 

615, 589 N.E.2d 407 (6th Dist. 1990); Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer Dist. v. Foster 

& Kleiser, Div. of Metromedia, 8th Dist. No.52717, 1987 WL 17623 *1 (Sept. 24, 

1987). Thus, the fact that the trial court did not yet rule on the damages cause of 

action in this case does not render the eviction judgment a non-final order. 

{¶6} Appellants are proceeding with this appeal pro se. Their assignment of 

error is not actually an assignment of error, but is more a statement of what they 

allege occurred: 

 We appeared in Carroll County Municipal Court on March 

30, 2011 for a hearing on case no. CVG1100098. Earl Bryan et 

al. and Eugene Johnston et al. were led to a room with Mike 

Durkin, Mediator for Judge Willen, to discuss the case. Eugene 

Johnston et al. showed a copy of the cashed rent check for the 

dates of Feb. 1 to March 1 to Mike Durkin. Mike Durkin advised 

us to hold onto our documents and evidence until the next 

hearing, which was scheduled April 13, 2011. 
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{¶7} Appellants’ brief fails to include an argument with citations to case law, 

statutes, or other authority to support their position in violation of App.R. 16(A)(2)(7). 

The brief also has numerous attachments that do not appear anywhere in the record. 

In a July 13, 2011 judgment entry, we informed appellants that these attachments are 

not evidence and we would only consider evidence that was presented in the trial 

court. Additionally, in their statement of facts, appellants set forth numerous facts 

that find no support in the record concerning a bad furnace, mold, and sewage. 

{¶8} A pro se appellant is held to the same obligations and standards set 

forth in the appellate rules that apply to all litigants. Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 

Ohio App.3d 357, 363, 676 N.E.2d 171 (8th Dist. 1996). Despite appellants’ lack of 

compliance with the Appellate Rules, in the interest of justice, we will consider their 

argument. 

{¶9} Appellants’ argument is that their rent was paid current. They state that 

they paid the February 1 to March 1, 2011 rent and appellees cashed the check. 

This was the rent that the complaint alleged appellants did not pay. Appellants 

request that we reverse the trial court’s judgment so that the eviction is not in their 

names. 

{¶10} Because the judgment entry was entered after mediation and there was 

no trial, there is very little factual information before us. All that can be gleaned from 

the record is that appellees filed a complaint alleging appellants failed to pay rent on 

the duplex unit they were renting from appellees. There are also copies of two 

checks made out from “Eugene Johnston” to “Earl Bryan” in the amount of $450 each 

and dated January 31 and February 28, 2011. There is no record of any testimony 

by any of the parties and there are no factual findings by the trial court. 

{¶11} The agreed judgment entry simply states that eviction is to take place 

on Wednesday April 13, 2011, at 11:30 a.m. and that the second cause of action 

(damages) is continued until Wednesday April 20, 2011. All parties and the court 

signed the agreed judgment entry. 

{¶12} Settlement agreements are highly favored as a means of resolving 
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disputes. State ex rel. Wright v. Weyandt, 50 Ohio St.2d 194, 197, 363 N.E.2d 1387 

(1977). When parties have agreed to settlement terms, the trial court may sign a 

journal entry reflecting the terms and may enforce the agreement. Hughes v. 

Yanikov, 8th Dist. No. 07CA009235, 2008-Ohio-2904, ¶9, citing Brilla v. Mulhearn, 

168 Ohio App.3d 223, 859 N.E.2d 578, 2006-Ohio-3816, ¶20 (9th Dist.). In an 

agreed judgment, 

litigants voluntarily terminate a lawsuit by assenting to specified 

terms, which the court agrees to enforce as its judgment by 

signing and journalizing an entry reflecting the terms of the 

settlement agreement. Grace v. Howell, 2d Dist. No. 20283, 

2004-Ohio-4120, ¶9. 

{¶13} A court is not bound to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to signing a 

settlement agreement. Mack v. Polson Rubber Co., 14 Ohio St.3d 34, 470 N.E.2d 

902 (1984), at the syllabus. The court may set aside a settlement agreement only on 

the basis of fraud, duress, undue influence, or a factual dispute concerning the 

existence of the terms of the agreement. Id. 

{¶14} Appellants have not asserted any of these reasons for setting aside the 

settlement agreement. Nor did they file a motion to set aside the settlement 

agreement in the trial court. 

{¶15} The parties entered into an agreed judgment entry after engaging in 

mediation. None of the reasons for setting aside a settlement agreement are 

present. There are very limited facts of record for us to consider. And appellants 

have not advanced any real argument for setting aside the agreement that they 

presumably negotiated for in mediation. On our limited record, appellants’ 

assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶16} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 
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Vukovich, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.