Filed 6/9/15 Unmodified opinion attached

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LENA LEE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. JOSEPH M. SILVEIRA et al., Defendants and Respondents. F067723 (Super. Ct. No. 652893)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION [No Change in Judgment]

It is hereby ordered that the published op inion filed on May 15, 2015, be modified
as follows:
1. On page 2, the third full paragraph, beginning “For purposes of” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place: For purposes of determining whethe r a defendant “fail[e]d to obtain a more favorable judgment” under sec tion 998, we conclude that any negotiated rate differential included in a jury’s verdict shou ld be subtracted from the award before the comparison is made to the offer to compromise “for the simple reason that the injure d plaintiff did not suffer any economic loss in that amount.” ( Howell v. Hamilton Meat s & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 548 ( Howell ).) In other words, the negotiated rate differential is not part of the judg ment “obtained” in the litigation.
2. On page 3, the second full paragra ph, beginning “Befor e this personal injury” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place: Before this personal injury lawsu it was filed, the California Supreme Court granted review of the decision in Howell v. Hamilton Meats &2. Provisions, Inc. on March 10, 2010, S179115, to address whether the “negotiated rate differential”—the diffe rence between the full billed rate for medical care and the actual amount paid as negotiated between a medical provider and an insurer—is a collatera l source benefit under the collateral source rule and thus recoverable by th e plaintiff as economic damages.
3. On page 3, footnote 2 is deleted in its entirety, which will require renumbering of all subsequent footnotes. There is no change in judgment.

_____________________ FRANSON, J. WE CONCUR:

_____________________ KANE, Acting P.J.

_____________________ POOCHIGIAN, J.Filed 5/15/15 Unmodified opinion

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LENA LEE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. JOSEPH M. SILVEIRA et al., Defendants and Respondents. F067723 (Super. Ct. No. 652893)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Roger M. Beauchesne, Judge. Alan Charles Dell’Ario ; The Brandi Law Firm and Daniel Dell’ Osso for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Morris Polich & Purdy, Richard H. Nakamu ra, Jr.; Law Office of Murray M. Aron and Murray M. Aron for Defe ndants and Respondents.
-ooOoo-2. In this appeal, a personal injury plainti ff contends the trial court erred in denying her request for expert witness fees and pr ejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3291. The plaintiff argues she was entitled to such fees and interest, which totaled over $350,000, because the defendants “fail[ed] to obtain a more favorable judgment” (Code Civ. Proc., § 998) 1 than the $1 million offer to compro mise she made under section 998. The plaintiff contends the proper comp arison is between her offer and an intermediate judgment based on a jury verdict that included an award for past medical expenses in the full amount bille d to her, rather than the smal ler amount actually paid by her insurer under the rates the insurer nego tiated with the medical providers. This negotiated rate differential (i.e., the di fference between the amounts billed and the amounts paid) totaled $165,262. When it was subtracted from the verdict, the plaintiff recovered less than $1 million in damages. For purposes of determining whether a defe ndant failed to obtain a more favorable judgment under section 998, we conclude that any negotiated rate differential included in a jury’s verdict should be subt racted from the judgment or aw ard before it is compared to the offer to compromise “for the simple reason that the inju red plaintiff did not suffer any economic loss in that amount.” ( Howell v. Hamilton Meat s & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 548 ( Howell ).) In other words, defendants di d not “obtain” a judgment that included the negotiated ra te differential. In this case, the trial court correctly reduc ed the jury verdict by the negotiated rate differential before making the section 99 8 comparison and concluding the judgment obtained by the defendants was more favorable than the offer to compromise for $1
million. We therefore affirm the judgment.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless noted otherwise.3. FACTS AND PR OCEEDINGS On April 29, 2008, plain tiff Lena Lee was injured wh en her GMC Yukon collided with a large manure spreader that defenda nt Joseph M. Silveira had pulled onto
Ellenwood Road in front of he r. Lee suffered fractures of he r hips, leg, elbow and wrist and damage to associated nerv es, ligaments and tendons. Attempts to settle Lee’s claim
before the lawsuit was filed were unsuccessful. Before this personal injury lawsuit wa s filed, the California Supreme Court granted review of the decision in Howell v. Hamilton Meat s & Provisions, Inc. on March 10, 2010, S179115. The Supreme Court stat ed it would consider the following issues: “(1) Is the ‘negotiated rate differen tial’[—]the difference between the full billed rate for medical care and the actual amount paid as negotiated between a medical provider and an insurer—a collateral source benefit under the collateral source rule, which allows plaintiff to collect that amount as economic damages, or is the plaintiff limited in economic damages to the amount the medical prov ider accepts as payment? (2) Did the trial court err in this case when it permitted plaintiff to present the full billed amount of medical charges to th e jury but then reduced the jury's award of damages by the nego tiated rate differential?” 2 (See <http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?di st=0&doc_id=1930127 &doc_no=S179115>.) In April 2010, Lee sued Joseph M. Silveira and Silveira Custom Farming (collectively, defendants).

2 The Supreme Court subsequently granted re view in other cases from the Courts of Appeal addressing whether write-offs obt ained by insurance companies through negotiations with medical providers were rec overable by the insured as collateral source benefits. ( Yanez v. SOMA Environmental Engineering , Inc., review granted Sept. 1, 2010, S184846; King v. Willmett , review granted Oct. 13, 2010, S186151; Felix v. Aronson (Mar. 2, 2011, B2181 60) [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 11, 2011, S191874; Cabrera v. E. Rojas Properties , Inc. , review granted June 8, 2011, S191826) Once th e California Supreme Court grante d review, these cases could no longer be relied upon as authority. (Cal. Ru les of Court, rules 8.1105(e)(1), 8.1115(a).)4. On August 12, 2010, Lee’s attorney served defendants with a section 998 offer to compromise in the amount of $1 million. 3 Defendants did not accept the offer which, by its terms, lapsed after 30 days. On August 18, 2011, the California Supreme Court filed its opinion in Howell , supra , 52 Cal.4th 541 and held that the negotiate d rate differential could not be recovered by a plaintiff as past medical e xpenses “for the simple reason that the injured plaintiff did not suffer any economic loss in that amount.” ( Id . at p. 548.) The court also stated the collateral source rule “does not expand th e scope of economic damages to include expenses the plaintiff never incurred.” ( Id . at p. 549.) About a year after the Howell decision, a jury trial began in this case. Defendants filed a motion in limine requesting the tria l court permit only th e introduction into
evidence of paid medical bills. The court denied the motion, concluding that the amount of billed medical expenses was relevant to the question of reasonable past medical expenses, future medical expe nses and pain and suffering. 4 The court indicated that the
verdict would be reduced to reflect the amount of paid medical expenses. Counsel then stipulated that the amount of billed medicals was $274,514.12 and the amount of paid medicals for Lee was $109,251.61. In September 2012, the jury complete d a special verdict form awarding Lee damages totaling $1,027,014. The jury exp licitly found the past economic loss for Lee’s medical expenses totaled $274,514. This wa s the amount the parties stipulated was billed
to her.

3 About 20 months later, shortly before th e original trial date, defendants made a section 998 offer to compromise in the amount of $400,001.
4 The court noted that the evidentiary issue concerning the relevancy of the billed amounts was not addressed in Howell . (See Greer v. Buzgheia (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154 [appellate court upheld trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion in limine to prevent the jury from receiving evidence of me dical bills that exce eded the amount paid to medical providers on plaintiff’s behalf].)5. On October 5, 2012, the trial court filed a document labeled “JUDGMENT ON
JURY VERDICT.” It stated that “Lee is entitled to judgme nt against Joseph M. Silveira in the amount of $1,027,014” a nd her daughter was entitled to $1 ,979. It also stated: “The judgment is subject to amendment foll owing post trial hear ing concerning: 1) Plaintiffs’ motion for pre-judgme nt interest and costs; and 2) the stipulated reduction for plaintiffs’ past medical expenses.” Defendants immediately filed a posttrial mo tion for reduction of jury verdict that requested the award for past medical expens es be reduced from the amount charged (i.e., $274,514.12) to the amount actually paid by Lee’s insurer (i.e., $109,251.61). Lee agreed the deduction for the ne gotiated rate differential of $1 65,262 eventually should be made, but opposed defendants’ motion on the ground her expert fees and prejudgment
interest under Civil Code sec tion 3291 should be determined before the negotiated rate
differential was deducted. The trial court agreed with Lee’s positio n. The court’s ruling from the bench was
confirmed in a December 2012 order stati ng defendants were en titled to a $165,262.51 reduction of the judgment, but the reduction would be made after determining Lee’s entitlement to prejudgment in terest and expert witness fees under section 998. Lee filed a memorandum of costs, which in cluded a request for expert witness fees totaling $100,300. Defendants filed a motion to strike and tax costs, which was heard by the trial court in January 2013. After the he aring, the court filed a written ruling denying
defendants’ motion to strike and tax costs. On February 21, 2013, the court filed a judgment that included Lee’s costs and expert witness fees and excluded the negotia ted rate differential. The amount of the judgment was “$987,398.26 plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $250,231.07.” In April 2013, defendants filed a motion to vacate and modify the judgment under section 663. The motion was brought on the gr ound of “[a]n incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or supported by the facts.” Defendants argued6. there should be no award of costs or prejud gment interest under section 998 because the negotiated rate differential shoul d have been deducted from th e jury’s verdict before the
court evaluated Lee’s courtroom success. Defendants argued the legally correct amount of the judgment was $887,098.26. In May 2013, the trial court filed a writte n ruling that granted defendants’ motion to vacate and modify the judgment. On Ma y 31, 2013, a third ju dgment was entered in the amount of $887,098.26. This amount excluded Lee’s expert witness fees and prejudgment interest under Ci vil Code section 3291. Lee appealed from this judgment and th e order granting defendants’ motion to vacate and modify the judgment. DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW The question presented in this appeal involves application of section 998, subdivision (d) and whether defendants failed “to obtain a more favorable judgment” than Lee’s offer to compro mise for $1 million. Issues of statutory construction as well as the application of that construction to an undisputed set of facts are que stions of law subject to inde pendent review on appeal. ( Scheenstra v. Califo rnia Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 391.) Therefore, we will conduct an indepe ndent review of th e issue presented.
II. JUDGMENTS AND COMPARISONS
A. Contentions of the Parties Lee contends that section 998 contemplat es “a comparison of the section 998 offer with the circumstances as they existed when [defendants] had the opportunity to accept the offer.” (Boldface omitted.) Lee also c ontends that, during the relevant time frame, case law held that a plaintiff’s damages incl uded the negotiated rate differential. Lee supports her position with the following quot e: “Considering the amount of the verdict7. reduced only by offset s to which it was subject at the time the section 998 offer was outstanding is consistent not only with the purpos e but is implicit in the language of section 998.” ( Guerrero v. Rodan Termite Control, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1441 ( Guerrero ).) Defendants raise the following argume nts. First, they contend that Guerrero is distinguishable from cases involving negotiate d rate differentials and therefore the
rationale used in Guerrero does not apply in this case. Second, they contend the test referring to the status of the litigation at the tim e of the offer is used to assess the validity or reasonableness of the offer, not to de termine whether the judgment was more favorable. Third, defendants disagree with L ee about the status of the law at the time of the offer. In their view, Howell was retroactive and thus should be regarded as the applicable law at the time the offer was made. (See Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1334-1335 [ Howell applied retroactively].) Lee’s reply brief asserts that the retroactivity of Howell is irrelevant to the analysis and the parties’ success and failure in this litig ation should be evaluated without regard to postoffer deductions from the judgment. B. Background: Section 998 and Guerrero Section 998 is a cost-shifting statute th at uses economic incentives to encourage pretrial settlements and av oid needless litigation. ( Barba v. Perez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 444, 451.) One economic incentiv e involves expert witness fees, which ordinarily are not recoverable costs. A part y who declines an offer to compromise under section 998 and fails to obtain a more favor able judgment may be compelled to pay the offeror’s expert witness fees incurred during trial. (§ 998, subds. (c) & (d).) Also, personal injury defendants who refuse to settl e before trial for le ss than the plaintiff recovers at trial must pay interest on the ju dgment at 10 percent annually from the date of8. the settlement offer. (Civ. Code, § 3291; see Cadlo v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1042.) A major dispute in this case concerns whether the principles used in Guerrero should be extended to reductions based on ne gotiated rate differentials.
In Guerrero , the plaintiff who purchased a hous e with dryrot sued the home’s seller, the real estate agent, and the home inspection firm. ( Guerrero , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Ten months after th e suit was filed, the inspection firm served the plaintiff with a section 998 o ffer to compromise for $5,000. ( Guerrero , supra , at p. 1438.) The plaintiff did not accept the offer. ( Ibid .) Over two years later, shortly before the start of trial, the plaintiff entered a j udicially approved good fa ith settlement with the real estate agent for $34,000. ( Id . at p. 1439.) The case went to trial against the inspection firm and the jury awar ded $15,600 to the plaintiff. ( Ibid .) The inspection firm
then filed a motion under section 877 to offset the settlement amount against the verdict. ( Guerrero , supra , at p. 1439.) The trial court granted the motion and reduced the judgment to zero. ( Ibid .) The inspection firm moved to tax the costs the plaintiff incurred after its $5,000 offer to compromise was served. ( Ibid .) The trial court denied the inspection firm’s motion to tax costs. ( Ibid .) The appellate court affirmed the denial. ( Id . at p. 1446.)
In Guerrero , the issue presented on appeal was “whether, for the purpose of allocating costs under section 998, a plaintiff whose judgm ent is reduced to zero by operation of section 877 can be deemed to have ‘obtain[ed] a more favorable judgment or award’ than a rejected section 998 offer to pay $5,000.” ( Guerrero , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440.) The appellate court determined the plainti ff had obtained a more favorable judgment, stating: “[I]n determining whether plaintiff obt ained a ‘more favorable judgment or award’ than a section 998 offer, the objective of encouraging settlement requires consideration of the status of the litigation when the section 998 offer was submitted. In the presen t case, when [the inspection firm]9. submitted its $5,000 offer early in th e litigation, plaintiff had recovered nothing by way of settlement or othe rwise and had a valid claim against [the inspection firm] that the jury later determined to be worth substantially more than the $5,000 than [the inspection firm] offered. Plaintiff thus did not reject an offer that the outcome of trial indicates should have been accepted. Even if [the inspection firm ’s] offer was not so low as to have been in bad faith, there is still no re ason why [the insp ection firm] should be rewarded for having submitted the offer, nor is there any reason to penalize plaintiff for having rejected it. The costs that plaintiff incurred subsequent to rejecting the $5,000 offer were incurred in pursuit of a claim with a value of at least $15,600. Regardless of the offset based on subsequent developments in the litigation, plaintiff wa s justified in rejecting the offer when he rejected it.
“The situation would ha ve been very different if [the inspection firm] had submitted a section 998 offe r for $5,000 after plaintiff had accepted $34,000 in settlement from Help –U–Sell. In that event, plaintiff would have been required to evaluate the likelihood of recovering at least $39,000 from [the inspection firm]. Had he rejected such an offer at that time, it would be entirely consistent w ith the objectives of section 998 to shift the burden of subsequently incu rred costs to him. However, because there had been no such settlement wh en [the inspection firm] made its offer, plaintiff had occasion to evalua te only the prospects of recovering more than $5,000. Since plaintiff did in fact recover more than that amount and obtained a verdict against [the in spection firm] for more than that amount, there is no reason to give [the inspection firm] a windfall benefit because other defendants later decided to settle for an amount that offset plaintiff’s verdict against it. “... Considering the amount of the ve rdict reduced only by offsets to which it was subject at the time the se ction 998 offer was outstanding is consistent not only with the purpose but is implicit in the language of section 998.” ( Guerrero , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441.) Based on this analysis, the appellate court concluded the trial court correctly determined the plaintiff had obtained a judgm ent or award more favorable than what he would have received, at the tim e the section 998 offer was in effect, if he had accepted the offer. ( Guerrero , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.) As a result, the court affirmed the decision that the inspection firm was not entitled to shift the cost burden to plaintiff pursuant to section 998. ( Guerrero , supra , at p. 1446.)10. C. Analysis 1. State of the Law First, we consider the disagreement betw een the parties regarding the state of the law regarding the recovery of negotiated rate differentials at the time Lee made her section 998 offer to compromise. Five months before Lee’s attorney served defendants with the offer to compromise, the Supreme Court had granted review in Howell . Therefore, the law regarding the recovery of negotiated rate di fferentials was unsettled at the time of the offer. As a result, this uncertainty regardin g recoverable damages was one of the factors an objectively reasonable attorney and client would have considered when evaluating the offer to compromise. In reaching this conclusion, we reject the more extreme positions urged by the parties regarding the status of the law in August 2010. At th at time, objectively reasonable persons coul d have made different predictio ns of how the Supreme Court would resolve the issue. Therefore, uncerta inty existed as to how the Supreme Court would rule and how that ruling might affect pending cases. Accordingly, Lee has not established one of the foundations for her position— namely, that at the time of her offer sh e was entitled to recover the negotiated rate
differential. 2. Amount of Judgment or Award
In Guerrero , the court addressed how to handle an offset to the damages awarded in the jury verdict based on a good faith settlement approved pursuant to section 877. That offset (1) was based on money actually received by the plaintiff from another defendant and (2) the money received relate d to damages that were compensable under applicable law. In contrast, Lee received no money from another defendant and had no money paid on her behalf. Moreover, Lee did not suffer an economic loss in the amount of the11. negotiated rate differential. As a result, defe ndants in this case are not seeking a windfall benefit from money paid by a third party. Instead, defendants ask that the judgment in
this case be evaluated based on what the law allowed Lee to recover. In defendants’ view, to hold otherwise would subject them to additional liability based on the legally erroneous amount awarded by the jury.
Based on the dissimilarities between this case and the offset made in Guerrero , we conclude that Guerrero ’s rule about evaluating whether a litigant obtained a “more favorable judgment” for purposes of secti on 998 before taking ce rtain offsets does not extend to reductions for negotiated rate differe ntials. Therefore, our conclusion is based on the following statutory interpretation: When a jury’s verdict awards damages for losses not suffered by the plaintiff or for damages not allowed by law, those damages must be excluded when determining whethe r the defendant failed “to obtain a more favorable judgment or award” for purpos es of section 998, subdivision (d). Our approach to Guerrero means that defendants in different lawsuits will be treated the same for purposes of section 998 regardless of (1) whether the trial court makes the reduction for the negotiated rate differential after the jury has rendered a verdict or (2) whether the jury is instructed that its awar d of reasonable past medical expenses shall not exceed th e amount actually paid. Thes e two categories of defendants would be similarly situated at the time of th e offer to compromise a nd, therefore, we can identify no reason for treating defendants in the first category less favorably than defendants in the second category. 3. Statutory Text Because the issue presented in this case is ultimately one of statutory interpretation, we will explai n our conclusion using the spec ific language appearing in section 998, subdivision (d).12. The relevant text provides that a plain tiff may recover postoffer costs if “the defendant fails to obtain a more favorable ju dgment or award ....” (§ 998, subd. (d).) Therefore, the issue can be phrased as wh at judgment or award did the defendant obtain

. The statute does not define the word “obtain” a nd, therefore, we infer that the Legislature intended it to be given its ordina ry meaning. The verb “obtain” means “to gain or attain possession or disposal of usu. by some planned action or me thod” and “to bring about or call into being : EFFECT.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1559, col. 2.) Therefore, the verb “obtain” suggests an active connection between the defendants’ conduct of the litigation and the judgment achieved. In this case, defendants’ decision to re ject the $1 million offer to compromise and go to trial brought about a judg ment requiring them to pay $887,098.26. They were not liable for (i.e., required to pay Lee) the $1,027,014 mentioned in the October 2012 judgment because that documen t expressly stated it was s ubject to amendment following the hearing concerning “the sti pulated reduction for plaintiffs’ past medical expenses.” Furthermore, this statement a bout a reduction reflected the tria l court’s earlier handling of the motion in limine, where th e court allowed evidence of the amount billed for medical expenses and stated it would implement Howell by reducing the award of past medical expenses to the amount paid. Thus, the $1,0 27,014 figure in the October 2012 judgment was never more than a transitional figur e and not the one u ltimately obtained by defendants. Instead, plaintiffs’ plan of action to go to trial resulte d in the judgment or award of $887,098.26 and this is the amount of the judgment they obtained for purposes of section 998. This interpretation and applica tion of the verb “obtain” is consistent with the result
in Guerrero . The plaintiff in Guerrero decided to go to trial against the inspection firm and obtained an award of $15, 600 as a result of his plan of action and effort. ( Guerrero , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) The judgment or award for zero dollars ultimately13. entered against the plaintiff in favor of the in spection firm was the result of (i.e., obtained by) the postoffer settlement paid by real estate agent, not the inspecti on firm’s efforts.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUE
A. Motions under Section 663 The grounds for a motion to vacate a judgm ent are set forth in section 663, which provides in part: “A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the followi ng causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitli ng the party to a different judgment: [¶] 1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basi s for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the f acts; and in such case wh en the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision sh all be amended and corrected.”
B. Contentions of the Parties Lee contends defendants pursued the wr ong remedy when they filed their motion to vacate and modify the Febr uary 2013 judgment under section 663. Lee argues that defendants’ “proper remedy was to bring a motion for a new trial directed to the judgment entered October 5, 2012. [Their ] non-statutory motion for a [negotiated rate differential] reduction effectiv ely functioned as a motion for new trial, particularly in light of Lee’s failure to object. [Citation.] When the trial court denied it, [defendants were] left with the choice of accepting the ru ling or appealing. Another round of posttrial motions was not an option.” In shor t, Lee contends “the court had no power to
entertain the motion.” In response, defendants contend that L ee did not raise this issue below and, therefore, it should be deemed waived. Defendant s also contend their motion for a reduction of jury verdict was not the equivale nt of a motion for new trial because, among other things, the parties’ stipulation rendered a new trial unnecessary. Defendants also contend the October 2012 judgment was tentative and left issues open and, therefore, the14. February 2013 judgment qualifies as a “judg ment” subject to a motion to vacate under
section 663. C. Analysis First, we agree with defendants that th e document filed on October 5, 2012, and
labeled “JUDGMENT ON JURY VERD ICT” was not a final, appealable judgment. Its own terms indicated it was an interim or tempor ary description of the results of the jury
trial and did not constitute a final resolution of the whole controve rsy. The document explicitly stated is was subject to amendmen t following a posttrial hearing concerning the stipulated reduction in Lee’s past medical expenses. Second, defendants’ motion, which was labeled “POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF JURY VERDICT,” was an appr opriate way to address the legal issue left open in the October 2012 “JU DGMENT ON JURY VERDICT.” (See Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758 [defendant in auto accident case filed a motion for adjustment or reduction of verdict amounts to reflect amount of pa st medical expenses actually paid to medical providers]; see Olsen v. Reid (2008) 164 Cal.Ap p.4th 200, 203, fn. 2 [what form a motion to reduce judgment should take is unclear and need not be
decided because evidence did not demonstr ate the amount plaintiff and her insurer actually paid; trial court erred in reducing the jury verdict].) Third, because the October 2012 docum ent was not a final judgment and the February 2013 document labeled “JUDGM ENT ON JURY VERDICT” was a final judgment—the first entered in this ca se—defendants could challenge the legal correctness of that document by filing a moti on to vacate a judgment under section 663 and the trial court had the power to hear and decide such a motion. Therefore, we reject Lee’s procedural argum ent that the trial court had no power to
consider defendants’ moti on to vacate the judgment.15. DISPOSITION The May 2013 judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

_____________________ FRANSON, J. WE CONCUR:

_____________________ KANE, Acting P.J.

_____________________ POOCHIGIAN, J.