FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT (BERMUDA)

LIMITED; ALIREZA ITTIHADIEH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

AERO LAW GROUP; JOHN SCHMIDT,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-17347

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-01236-

JCM-NJK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2018

San Francisco, California

Filed September 18, 2018

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, 

Circuit Judges, and Solomon Oliver, Jr., * District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Nguyen

 * The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge 

for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
2 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

SUMMARY**

Personal Jurisdiction

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack 

of personal jurisdiction of a complaint in which plaintiffs 

alleged that John Schmidt made defamatory statements 

about Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Limited at an aviation 

industry conference in Nevada.

Freestream is a Bermudan full-service aircraft company 

that was founded by Alireza Ittihadieh, a citizen of the 

United Kingdom who currently resides in Switzerland. John 

Schmidt, a Washington resident, is an attorney at Aero Law 

Group, a Washington professional corporation that provides 

transactional legal services to airlines and aircraft owners 

and operators worldwide, and regularly solicits business in 

Nevada, including participating in industry meetings and 

conventions in the state. Plaintiffs Freestream and Ittihadieh 

sued defendants Schmidt and Aero in the United States 

District Court for the District of Nevada.

The panel held that Nevada’s exercise of personal

jurisdiction over defendants comported with constitutional 

due process because all three prongs of the minimum 

contacts test for specific jurisdiction were satisfied.

The panel held that the district court erred in relying on 

the “effects test” of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), 

because the inquiry under that test focused on conduct that 

took place outside the forum state and that had effects inside 

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 3

the forum state. The panel further held that the rule in 

Paccar Int’l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 

757 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1984), not Calder, was the proper 

starting place where, as here, an intentional tort was 

committed within the forum state.

The panel held that because plaintiffs alleged that 

defendants committed the intentional tort of defamation 

while present in the forum state, the first two prongs of the 

minimum contacts were satisfied.

The third prong of the minimum contacts test for specific 

jurisdiction provides that the exercise of jurisdiction must 

comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be 

reasonable. Under Paccar, to evaluate reasonableness, the 

court uses a seven-factor balancing test. The panel held that 

the balancing test weighed in plaintiffs’ favor, or, at best was 

a wash. The panel concluded that defendants failed to make 

a compelling case that the district court’s exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over them would be unreasonable, 

particularly in light of Nevada’s strong interest in 

adjudicating matters involving intentional torts committed 

within the State.

COUNSEL

Marc Ayala (argued), Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Armonk, 

New York; Douglas A. Mitchell, Boies Schiller Flexner 

LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Angela T. Nakamura Ochoa (argued) and Joseph P. Garin,

Lipson Neilson Cole Seltzer & Garin P.C., Las Vegas, 

Nevada, for Defendants-Appellees.
4 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

A defendant who travels to Nevada and commits an 

intentional tort there can be sued in that state, absent 

circumstances that would make such a suit unreasonable. 

The outcome appears obvious, but we have admittedly 

created some confusion as to the proper analytical approach 

to specific jurisdiction in our circuit. Today we take the 

opportunity to clarify our case law.

Plaintiffs Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Limited 

(“Freestream”) and Alireza Ittihadieh sued Defendants John 

Schmidt and Aero Law Group (“Aero”) in the United States 

District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging that 

Schmidt made defamatory statements about Freestream at an 

aviation industry conference in Nevada. The district court 

granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

reverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Freestream is a Bermudan full-service aircraft company 

in the business jet market. It participates in all aspects of 

aircraft transactions: brokerage, acquisition, marketing, 

sales, custom design services, import/export, and 

maintenance review. Freestream was founded in 1992 by 

Plaintiff Alireza Ittihadieh, a citizen of the United Kingdom 

who currently resides in Switzerland.

John Schmidt, a Washington resident, is an attorney at 

Aero. Aero is a Washington professional corporation that 
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 5

provides transactional legal services to airlines and aircraft 

owners and operators worldwide. Aero allegedly regularly 

solicits business in Nevada, including by participating in 

industry meetings and conventions in the state.

Aero belongs to several trade groups, including the 

National Business Aviation Association (“NBAA”), and 

attends trade seminars and conferences around the world. 

The NBAA holds its annual conferences in various 

locations, and, in 2015, held a conference in Las Vegas, 

Nevada.

Freestream alleges that Schmidt has been attacking its 

reputation by falsely stating that a transaction structure used 

by Freestream—a “back-to-back” transaction1—is illegal 

and unethical and that Freestream only uses this type of 

transaction.

In 2014, Schmidt allegedly interfered with Freestream’s 

imminent sale of a Boeing Business Jet to a company named 

Blue City Holdings LLC by telling its representatives that 

Freestream was built entirely on illegal and unethical backto-back transactions and urging them to discontinue all 

business with Freestream and Ittihadieh. After the 

transaction fell through, Freestream’s counsel wrote to Aero 

demanding that Schmidt and his colleagues stop defaming 

Freestream. Aero’s founder responded that, to his 

 1 In a back-to-back transaction, the broker acts as both an interim 

buyer and interim seller of an aircraft. In other words, the broker, who 

is aware of a potential seller and buyer, buys the aircraft from the seller 

and then sells it to the buyer. The broker’s compensation is the 

difference between the purchase price from the original seller and the 

sale price to the end buyer. This is in contrast to a direct-sale transaction, 

in which a broker connects a buyer and seller and then takes a 

commission on the direct sale between the two.
6 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

knowledge, nobody at Aero had ever stated or implied that 

Freestream’s business was built entirely on back-to-back 

transactions.

On June 25, 2015, at an aviation conference on the Isle 

of Man, Schmidt met with Masha Shvetsova, whom Schmidt 

understood to be an agent for potential buyers of a Boeing 

Business Jet. When Shvetsova told Schmidt that she was 

leaning towards using Freestream as a broker, Schmidt told 

her that she was “going to be led” to a back-to-back 

transaction. Shvetsova asked about the legality of back-toback transactions. Schmidt responded, “It’s quite possibly 

illegal,” adding that back-to-back transactions were “ripe” 

for criminal prosecution, “but it has not happened yet.” 

When Shvetsova asked why brokers use the back-to-back 

transaction if it is illegal or arguably illegal, Schmidt said,

“[I]t’s extremely lucrative.”

Several months later, on November 18, 2015, Schmidt 

again met with Shvetsova at the NBAA Annual Meeting and 

Convention in Las Vegas, Nevada. This time, they were 

joined by Marwan Khalek, CEO of Gama Aviation, a global 

business aviation services company. During this 

conversation, Schmidt reiterated that back-to-back 

transactions are illegal under federal law and violate the 

ethical rules of the Washington State Bar. Schmidt said that 

Freestream would try to structure the sale to Shvetsova’s 

buyer as a back-to-back transaction, and the buyer would be 

“significantly disadvantaged by that.” When Shvetsova 

reminded Schmidt that he had previously called back-toback transactions “illegal, essentially,” Schmidt agreed. He 

said that a broker in these transactions is not “a real, bona 

fide seller” and called the transactions “completely 

unethical.”
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 7

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District 

Court for the District of Nevada, seeking compensation for 

defamation and injunctive relief against further defamatory 

statements. Plaintiffs allege that Schmidt’s statements at the 

NBAA meeting were false and defamatory because 

Freestream does not engage only in back-to-back 

transactions and those transactions are not illegal. Plaintiffs 

allege that the defamatory statements harmed their business 

because reputation is critically important in the private 

aviation industry, which enjoys a particularly tight-knit 

market.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to change venue to the 

Western District of Washington. The district court granted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction without addressing whether venue transfer 

would be appropriate. This appeal timely followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting 

Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 2012). The factual 

findings underlying the district court’s jurisdiction 

determination are reviewed for clear error. Panavision, Int’l, 

L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). To 

avoid dismissal, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

demonstrating that its allegations establish a prima facie 

showing of personal jurisdiction. Boschetto v. Hansing, 

539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Uncontroverted 

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and 

factual disputes are construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Rio 
8 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, 

the district court applies the law of the forum state. 

Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015. Nevada’s jurisdiction reaches 

the limits of due process set by the United States 

Constitution. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065. Constitutional due 

process requires that a defendant “have certain minimum 

contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of 

the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).

There are two categories of personal jurisdiction: 

(1) general jurisdiction and (2) specific jurisdiction. See 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 413–15 (1984). Plaintiffs concede that the allegations 

in the complaint do not support the exercise of general 

jurisdiction,2 and so we address only specific jurisdiction 

here.

As to specific jurisdiction, we generally conduct a threepart inquiry—commonly referred to as the minimum 

contacts test—to determine whether a defendant has 

sufficient contacts with the forum to warrant the court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction:

 2 General jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s contacts with the 

forum state are so “continuous and systematic” as to render the defendant 

essentially “at home” in that forum. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. 

Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 9

(1) The non-resident defendant must 

purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the 

forum or resident thereof; or perform 

some act by which he purposefully avails 

himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking 

the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of 

or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport 

with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., 

it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 

802 (9th Cir. 2004). The minimum contacts test “ensures 

that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as 

a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts[.]” 

Burger King Corp. v. Redzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the minimum contacts test and the applicable 

authority, we conclude that there was specific jurisdiction in 

Nevada in this case.

I.

A.

Generally, “[t]he commission of an intentional tort in a 

state is a purposeful act that will satisfy the first two 

requirements [of the minimum contacts test].” Paccar Int’l, 

Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d 1058, 
10 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

1064 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 

1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he ‘purposeful availment’ 

requirement is satisfied if the defendant has taken deliberate 

action within the forum state . . . .”). We applied that rule in 

Paccar and held that a non-Californian defendant could be 

sued in California for an allegedly fraudulent demand for 

payment made to a California entity. 757 F.2d at 1064. We 

found that “[t]he inducement of reliance in California [was] 

a sufficient act within California to satisfy the requirement 

of minimum contacts where the cause of action [arose] out 

of that inducement.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 

Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 

1288 (9th Cir. 1977)).

The same is true here: Schmidt’s allegedly defamatory 

statement was made in Nevada, and the cause of action arises 

from that statement. Because Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendants committed the intentional tort of defamation 

while present in the forum state, the first two prongs of the 

minimum contacts test are satisfied here. See Paccar, 

757 F.2d at 1064.

B.

Rather than look to the location of allegedly intentional 

tortious conduct, the district court’s minimum contacts 

analysis centered on what has become known as the “effects 

doctrine” or “effects test” of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 

(1984).3 The district court’s reliance on the Calder effects 

 3 Under the Calder effects test, purposeful direction exists when a 

defendant allegedly: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly 

aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is 

likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin 

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Dole Food Co. v. 

Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)).
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 11

test was misplaced, however, because the inquiry under that 

test focuses on conduct that takes place outside the forum 

state and that has effects inside the forum state. Because 

some of our past opinions have suggested that Calder is also 

the starting place for conduct that takes place inside the 

forum state, we take this opportunity to clarify our case law.

A review of the development of our jurisprudence in this 

area is helpful. In Data Disc, Inc., we reaffirmed the 

minimum contacts test for evaluating the “nature and quality 

of the defendant’s contacts in relation to the cause of action,” 

and held that “[t]he inducement of reliance [within the forum 

state] is a sufficient act . . . to satisfy the requirement of 

minimum contacts where the cause of action arises out of 

that inducement.” 557 F.2d at 1287–88. At that time, the 

first prong of our minimum contacts test referred only to 

purposeful availment and made no mention of purposeful 

direction. See id. at 1287.

Then, in Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court established 

the effects test, whereby a defendant can be subject to 

personal jurisdiction based on “intentional conduct [outside 

the forum] calculated to cause injury to [a plaintiff] in [the 

forum].” 465 U.S. at 791. We first cited Calder for that 

proposition in Gilbert v. DaGrossa, in which the plaintiff 

filed suit in Washington, but alleged that the defendants 

worked in New York and New Jersey and that the allegedly 

tortious acts occurred in those two states. 756 F.2d 1455, 

1459 (9th Cir. 1985). After noting that there was “neither an 

allegation nor evidence that the [defendants] ever transacted 

any business, or committed any tortious act or acts, within 

the state of Washington,” we “recognize[d] that the ‘effects’ 

doctrine may also serve as a basis for a finding of in 

personam jurisdiction.” Id. at 1459 & n.4. Ultimately, 

because there was no evidence that the alleged activities had 
12 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

an effect in Washington, we held that the effects test was not 

satisfied. Id. at 1459 n.4.

What was implicit in Gilbert—that an allegation of 

tortious activity within the forum state would likely have 

supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction—was 

decided in Paccar. Paccar, 757 F.2d at 1064 (“The 

commission of an intentional tort in a state is a purposeful 

act that will satisfy the first two requirements [of the 

minimum contacts test].”).4

Over the next few years, we reaffirmed (1) “that the 

‘purposeful availment’ requirement is satisfied if the 

defendant has taken deliberate action within the forum 

state,” Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498, and (2) that Calder extended 

the reach of personal jurisdiction to a defendant who never 

physically entered the forum state. See Haisten v. Grass 

Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 

1397 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[W]ithin the rubric of ‘purposeful 

availment’ the [Supreme] Court has allowed the exercise of 

jurisdiction over a defendant whose only ‘contact’ with the 

forum state is the ‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act 

having effect in the forum state.”).

In Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., we again 

described the purposeful direction test as applying to out-offorum conduct. 374 F.3d at 802. We explained that “[a] 

showing that a defendant purposefully availed himself of the 

privilege of doing business in a forum state typically consists 

of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as 

 4 Paccar also suggested that “[a] tortious act, standing alone, can 

satisfy all three requirements [of the minimum contacts test] if the act is 

aimed at a resident of the state or has effects in the state.” 757 F.2d at 

1064 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89).
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 13

executing or performing a contract there.” Id. (emphasis 

added). By contrast, “[a] showing that a defendant 

purposefully directed his conduct toward a forum state . . .

usually consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions

outside the forum state that are directed at the forum, such as 

the distribution in the forum state of goods originating 

elsewhere.” Id. at 803 (emphasis added). We also noted that 

a purposeful availment analysis is “most often used in suits 

sounding in contract,” whereas a purposeful direction 

analysis is “most often used in suits sounding in tort.” Id. at 

802.

Read together, those statements comparing withinforum-state versus out-of-forum-state conduct, and contract 

versus tort actions, suggest that a purposeful direction 

analysis naturally applies in suits sounding in tort where the 

tort was committed outside the forum state. See C. Douglas 

Floyd and Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test 

of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused 

Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 Ind. L.J. 

601, 624 (2006) (“In Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 

Co., the Ninth Circuit distinguished between ‘purposeful 

availment,’ applicable in contract and other cases involving 

the conduct of business within a state, and ‘purposeful 

direction,’ applicable in tort cases involving extraterritorial

conduct, equating the purposeful direction (but not the 

purposeful availment) standard with the Calder effects test.” 

(emphasis added)). Nonetheless, the district court here 

relied on our observation that a purposeful direction analysis 

is “most often used in suits sounding in tort,” 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802, and applied the Calder

effects test on that basis.

Although rigidly applying the Calder effects test without 

taking into account where the allegedly tortious conduct 
14 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

occurred conflicts with our approach in Paccar, we may 

have unwittingly contributed to the district court’s error by 

suggesting otherwise in a couple of our subsequent opinions. 

In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 

L’Antisemitisme, we stated, “In tort cases, we typically 

inquire whether a defendant ‘purposefully direct[s] his 

activities’ at the forum state, applying an ‘effects’ test that 

focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s actions were 

felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within 

the forum.” 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 

(citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803). We then 

analyzed, under the effects test, the defendants’ act of 

intentionally filing suit in France, which resulted in a French 

court’s orders directing the plaintiff to take actions in the 

forum state. Id. at 1209. Notably, we did not apply the 

effects test to the defendants’ contacts that occurred within

the forum—the sending of a cease and desist letter to, and 

service of process on, Yahoo!. Id. at 1206, 1209. Similarly, 

in Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Technologies, Inc., we 

suggested that an effects test would apply “whether or not 

the actions themselves occurred within the forum,” but, 

again, we did so in the context of assessing out-of-forumstate conduct. 647 F.3d 1218, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(applying effects test to company’s out-of-forum posting of 

allegedly infringing photos on website aimed at forum state). 

Importantly, unlike the case at hand, neither Yahoo! nor 

Mavrix involved an alleged tort committed while the 

defendant was physically present in the forum state.

This review of the history of the effects doctrine and its 

place in our jurisprudence makes clear that Paccar, not 

Calder, is the proper starting place where an intentional tort 

is committed within the forum state. Paccar was rooted in 

the well-settled understanding that the commission of a tort 

within the forum state usually supports the exercise of 
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 15

personal jurisdiction. See Judge Beverly Reid O’Connell 

and Judge Karen L. Stevenson, Federal Civil Procedure 

Before Trial ¶ 3:161–162 (Rutter Group Nat. Ed. 2017) (“If 

the nonresident committed the liability-producing acts while 

physically present in the forum state, this is almost always 

held a sufficient ‘contact’ to support personal jurisdiction in 

lawsuits arising from those acts. . . . This principle is most 

frequently encountered in cases involving torts committed 

by nonresidents while temporarily in the state.”); see also

Elkhart Eng’g Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861, 868 

(5th Cir. 1965) (“When a non-resident has voluntarily 

entered a state and invoked the protections of [its] laws, it 

does not in our view offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice’ to require the non-resident to answer 

in the courts of that state for any tortious acts committed 

while there.”); Kilpatrick v. Texas & P.R. Co., 166 F.2d 788, 

791 (2d Cir. 1948) (“It is settled that, given the proper 

procedural support for doing so, a state may give judgment 

in personam against a non-resident, who has only passed 

through its territory, if the judgment be upon a liability 

incurred while he was within its borders.”).

The effects doctrine, on the other hand, makes more 

sense when dealing with out-of-forum tortfeasors. See

Martensen v. Koch, 942 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994 (N.D. Cal. 

2013) (“[T]he ‘effects’ test appears unnecessary where, as 

here, part of the alleged tort occurred in [the forum].”); see

also Nelson v. Millennium Labs., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01301-

SLG, 2012 WL 12826476, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2012) 

(relying on Paccar to find the first prong of the minimum 

contacts test satisfied where the defendant committed an 

intentional tort within the forum state).
16 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

C.

Defendants urge us to follow our recent opinion in 

Morrill v. Scott Financial Corp., 873 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 

2017), instead of Paccar. In Morrill, the plaintiffs, residents 

of Arizona, filed suit in Arizona and alleged that the 

defendants engaged in conduct aimed at the forum state 

because the defendants filed suit against the plaintiffs for 

defamation in Nevada and then served process, sought 

subpoenas, and engaged in other allegedly abusive litigationrelated tactics in Arizona. Id. at 1142–43. We found that 

because the defendants had not expressly aimed their 

conduct at Arizona, personal jurisdiction was lacking. Id. at 

1142–49.

At first blush Morrill appears to conflict with Paccar, 

since some of the conduct did occur in Arizona. But the 

allegedly tortious conduct in Morrill was materially different 

from that in Paccar and here. Namely, it was the litigation—

and only the litigation—that brought the Morrill defendants 

to Arizona. We explained:

Defendants’ conduct in Arizona occurred as 

part of the required process for pursuing 

discovery and serving Plaintiffs in 

connection with the litigation in Nevada. The 

outcome would be different if, as suggested 

by the hypothetical presented by the dissent, 

an attorney had traveled to Arizona, not to 

appear at a hearing on a motion to quash a 

subpoena, but to throw a rock through the 

window of the Arizona residence of opposing 

counsel in litigation that was pending in 

Nevada. The reason for such inappropriate 

conduct could have been the animosity 

between counsel that resulted from their 
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 17

interaction during the litigation in Nevada. 

However, the throwing of the rock would not 

have been required, or in any manner 

justified, by the litigation process there.

Id. at 1148. Because the Nevada litigation required the 

defendants to conduct activity in Arizona (where the 

plaintiffs happened to reside), and the defendants thus were 

not in the forum state of their own volition, they had not 

availed themselves of the forum under the minimum contacts 

test. See id. at 1146–47 (“[P]hysical entry that is merely 

incidental to an out-of-state transaction does not satisfy the 

constitutional minimum contacts requirement.”). By 

contrast, in the instant case, Schmidt voluntarily traveled to 

Nevada to attend the aviation industry conference, and 

voluntarily agreed to speak with Shvetsova and Khalek 

there. In other words, Schmidt threw Morill’s hypothetical 

rock.

We therefore reject Defendants’ invitation to find that 

Morill, rather than Paccar, applies to the circumstances 

here.

II.

Having found that Plaintiffs satisfied the first two prongs 

of the minimum contacts test under Paccar, we now turn to 

the third prong. Defendants have the burden of presenting a 

“compelling case that the presence of some other 

considerations would render jurisdiction [in Nevada] 

unreasonable.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell 

& Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477); see also

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. To evaluate 

reasonableness, we use a seven-factor balancing test that 

weighs: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful 
18 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on 

the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of 

conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the 

forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the 

most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the 

importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in 

convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an 

alternative forum. Paccar, 757 F.2d at 1064–65.

(1) Extent of the purposeful interjection into the forum 

state

Defendants assert that they are residents of Washington 

who did not interject themselves into any of Nevada’s 

affairs. They contend that there are no allegations in the 

complaint to support an inference that Schmidt went to 

Nevada specifically to commit intentional torts against 

Plaintiffs or to solicit clients. Defendants sum up their 

argument as such: “Attending a conference, and republishing 

an allegedly defamatory statement first published in another 

state, should not be a basis for personal jurisdiction.”

But Defendants’ contacts with Nevada are not so 

attenuated. Plaintiffs allege that Schmidt intentionally 

traveled to Nevada to participate in the 2015 convention on 

behalf of Aero. Aero also regularly solicits business in 

Nevada for its law practice, including through participation 

in industry meetings and conventions there. Accordingly, 

this factor weighs in favor of the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants in Nevada.

(2) Burden on defendant of defending in the forum

Defendants contend that they would suffer a financial 

hardship and be unduly burdened by having to travel to 

Nevada to attend depositions and court appearances. 
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 19

Relatedly, they argue that, as attorneys, they would want to 

be “heavily involved in the defense of their case,” and this 

would require them to become acquainted with Nevada law 

and procedures.

This factor cuts in favor of Defendants, but barely. True, 

Defendants would be burdened by having to travel to 

Nevada. But Defendants have not presented evidence that 

the “inconvenience is so great as to constitute a deprivation 

of due process.” Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323 (quoting 

Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128–29 

(9th Cir. 1995)). As Plaintiffs point out, Defendants 

regularly do business around the country, including in 

Nevada, and we have previously noted that “modern 

advances in communications and transportation have 

significantly reduced the burden of litigating in another 

[forum].” See Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 

1199 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, it is not at all clear that 

learning the law and procedure of another state would 

unduly burden Defendants, who operate a global law 

practice and provide services to clients “worldwide.”

(3) Extent of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant’s 

state

Defendants assert that Schmidt qualified his statements 

to Shvetsova and Khalek as being based on Washington law, 

and “[a]s the case revolves around communications made to 

clients and potential clients, the law on disclosure of 

attorney-client privileged documents in Washington may 

differ from the state law established in Nevada.” Plaintiffs 

respond that there should be no concern about a potential 

conflict of laws regarding attorney-client privilege because 

there was no legal representation involved. Indeed, 

Defendants seemed to take this very position in their 

answering brief where they stated, “Plaintiffs do not contend 
20 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

that legal representation was solidified” between Aero and 

Shvetsova and Khalek. This factor weighs in favor of 

Plaintiffs.

(4) Forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute

Defendants argue that Nevada has no interest in 

disciplining Washington attorneys for their alleged 

misconduct involving foreign citizens. Defendants also 

contend that the aviation industry has ties to Washington, so 

Washington has a greater interest in the underlying subject 

matter of the case.

Plaintiffs argue that this is not a legal malpractice claim, 

but a tort case, so the Washington State Bar’s interest in 

disciplining its attorneys is irrelevant. Plaintiffs also 

contend that Nevada has a strong interest in adjudicating 

cases involving intentional torts committed within the state.

Defendants may be right that Nevada generally does not 

have a significant interest in “policing utterances and 

comments made by travelers in the state.” But although 

Nevada’s interest in this case may have been stronger if 

Plaintiffs were Nevada residents, Nevada does have an 

interest in torts allegedly committed within its borders 

(namely, preventing them). See Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1288 

(“A state has a special interest in exercising jurisdiction over 

those who have committed tortious acts within the state.”). 

Washington’s interest in the matter, as home to Defendants 

and a Boeing distribution center,5 is outweighed by 

 5 The parties dispute whether Boeing Business Jet’s headquarters is 

in Washington.
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 21

Nevada’s interest. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of 

finding personal jurisdiction over Defendants in Nevada.

(5) Most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy

Defendants contend that Schmidt made his statements 

about the legality of back-to-back transactions based on his 

understanding of Washington law, so it would be more 

efficient for matters concerning Washington law to be 

resolved in Washington. Defendants’ argument misses the 

mark. This factor depends “primarily [on] where the 

witnesses and the evidence are likely to be located.” Menken 

v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the 

witnesses reside in several different fora (including foreign 

nations). And this factor is “no longer weighed heavily 

given the modern advances in communication and 

transportation.” Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1133 (quoting 

Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323).

This factor may weigh slightly in favor of Defendants, 

given that the burden for the foreign plaintiffs and witnesses 

to travel to Washington (as opposed to Nevada) is minimal, 

but it is more likely neutral since it is also reasonably 

efficient to convene at the place of the wrongful conduct—

Nevada.

(6) Importance of the forum to plaintiff’s interest in 

convenient and effective relief

Defendants argue that Nevada is not a convenient 

location for any of the parties, and they stress that Plaintiffs 

have demonstrated no personal connection to Nevada. In 

response, Plaintiffs note the significant time and resources 

invested in the litigation in Nevada thus far and the great 

inconvenience should they have to refile elsewhere. 

Plaintiffs also point out that their counsel is located in 
22 FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP

Nevada. This factor weighs slightly in favor of Plaintiffs, 

but we generally do not give it much weight. See Dole Food 

Co., 303 F.3d at 1116.

(7) Existence of an alternative forum

Defendants contend that there are alternative fora 

because, “[a]ccording to the complaint, Aero allegedly made 

defamatory statements or interrupted Plaintiffs’ business in 

two other instances in different locations.” This argument 

directly undermines Defendants’ main argument that 

allegedly making defamatory statements in a particular 

forum is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction in that forum.

Defendants also renew their argument that Washington 

is the better forum. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the 

unavailability of an alternative forum, see Core-Vent Corp. 

v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993), but 

Plaintiffs agree that Washington would have personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants because Aero and Schmidt are 

domiciled there. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of 

Defendants. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1134.

* * *

The seven-factor balancing test weighs in Plaintiffs’ 

favor, or, at best, is “a wash.” Id. Therefore, Defendants 

have failed to make a compelling case that the district court’s 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over them would be 

unreasonable, particularly in light of Nevada’s strong 

interest in adjudicating matters involving intentional torts 

committed within the State.
FREESTREAM AIRCRAFT V. AERO LAW GROUP 23

CONCLUSION

Because all three prongs of the minimum contacts test 

for specific jurisdiction are satisfied, we hold that Nevada’s 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports 

with constitutional due process.6 Accordingly, we reverse 

the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

 6 Having determined that there is personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants in Nevada, we need not reach the question of whether the 

district court erred in refusing to transfer the case to a different venue in 

lieu of dismissal.