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SJC-13572

PAUL D. CRANEY & others1 vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.2

Suffolk. May 6, 2024. - June 27, 2024.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, 

& Wolohojian, JJ.

Initiative. Constitutional Law, Initiative petition. Attorney 

General. Network Companies. Labor, Collective bargaining.

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 

the county of Suffolk on February 14, 2024.

The case was reported by Georges, J.

Kevin M. McGinty (Daniel J. Goodrich also present) for the 

plaintiffs.

M. Patrick Moore, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the 

Attorney General & another.

Thomas O. Bean, for the interveners, was present but did 

not argue.

Stacey M. Leyton, of California, & Nicole M. Rothgeb, for 

Kate Andrias & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

1 Kristen Arute and Michael Hruby.

2 Secretary of the Commonwealth; Marcelo Cordoba, Juan

Garcia, Martin Pitney, and Roxana Lorena Rivera, interveners. 
2

WOLOHOJIAN, J. At issue is whether the Attorney General 

properly certified Initiative Petition 23-35, "An Act Giving

Transportation Network Drivers the Option to Form a Union and 

Bargain Collectively" (petition), as satisfying the requirements

of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. 

The plaintiffs argue that the petition should not have been so 

certified because it does not meet art. 48's requirement that it 

contain only related subjects. More specifically, they contend 

that the petition's provisions allowing transportation network 

drivers (drivers) to organize and collectively bargain with 

transportation network companies (companies) are unrelated to 

its provisions subjecting the results of any collective 

bargaining to supervision, review, and approval by the 

Commonwealth's Secretary of Labor. We conclude that the 

petition seeks to establish a multistep collective bargaining 

scheme in which the Secretary of Labor's role is an integrated 

component and, therefore, that the subjects of the petition are 

related for purposes of art. 48. We accordingly affirm the 

Attorney General's certification of the petition.3

3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by twenty-two 

law professors, the Center for American Progress, and the 

Chinese Progressive Association. 
3

Background.4 The petition proposes to add a new chapter to 

the General Laws, c. 150F, which would "create[] the opportunity 

for workers in the digital transportation industry to form 

[driver] organizations and to negotiate on an industry-wide 

basis with companies in this industry on recommendations to the 

commonwealth that raise standards for the terms and conditions 

of work in this industry."5 The proposed law would expressly

provide drivers the right 

"of self-organization, to form, join, or assist [driver]

organizations, to bargain collectively through 

representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 

concerted activities, for the purpose of collective 

bargaining or other mutual aid or protection free from 

interference, restraint, or coercion by [the companies], 

and . . . to refrain from any of these activities."

4 This matter is before us on the single justice's 

reservation and report of the plaintiffs' amended complaint, 

which was filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 

and sought a declaration that the petition does not satisfy the 

related subjects requirement of art. 48, and an order enjoining 

the Secretary of the Commonwealth from placing the petition on 

the Statewide election ballot.

5 Although workers defined as "employees" under the National 

Labor Relations Act (NLRA) already have the right to bargain 

collectively with their employers, it has not been resolved 

whether drivers are employees under the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 157; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Am. v. 

Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 795 (9th Cir. 2018) (Seattle). The 

proposed law would define drivers as exclusive of individuals 

"who, with respect to the provision of services through a 

[company's] online enabled-application or platform, [are 

employees] within the meaning of [the NLRA]." Thus, if the 

proposed law is enacted, it would create a scheme whereby 

drivers could collectively bargain under the NLRA if they are 

deemed employees for purposes of that statute or, if they are 

not so deemed, could collectively bargain under the proposed 

law. 
4

The proposed law would protect these rights by preventing the 

companies from engaging in conduct that would interfere with 

drivers' unionization and collective bargaining efforts. 

The proposed law contains detailed procedures to be 

utilized by drivers wishing to organize and to bargain 

collectively. For example, it contains procedures by which to

designate a bargaining representative. It also includes

procedures for conducting negotiations, and those to be followed 

should negotiations reach an impasse. If such an impasse 

occurs, the proposed law details a resolution process consisting 

of mediation followed by arbitration. It also identifies 

specific factors the arbitrator must consider in reaching a 

decision. Finally, of particular significance for purposes of 

this case, the proposed law provides that -- whether reached by 

agreement or by an arbitrator -- the outcome of the collective 

bargaining process must be reviewed and approved by the 

Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor is required to take 

into consideration the same factors as the arbitrator in 

reaching a decision.

Discussion. As we have already noted, the Attorney General 

certified that the petition was in proper form for submission to 

Massachusetts voters, and, among other things, "that it contains 

only subjects that are related or are mutually dependent." Art. 
5

48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74. The 

plaintiffs challenge the certification on the ground that the 

petition's provisions pertaining to the Secretary of Labor's 

supervisory role are not related to the remainder of the 

petition. We review the Attorney General's certification de 

novo. Anderson v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 780, 785 (2018). In 

conducting this review, we are guided by the "firmly established 

principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support the 

people's prerogative to initiate and adopt laws" (citation 

omitted), Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014), 

while keeping in mind that we are "obligated to safeguard the 

integrity of the initiative petition process by requiring that 

those seeking to change the law strictly comply with art. 48," 

Anderson, 479 Mass. at 785-786. 

To determine whether an initiative petition contains only 

related subjects, we ask whether "one can identify a common 

purpose to which each subject of an initiative petition can 

reasonably be said to be germane." Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n

v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 219-220 (1981). 

"At some high level of abstraction, any two laws may be said to 

share a 'common purpose,'" Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 

218, 226 (2006), S.C., 451 Mass. 803 (2008), but "the related 

subjects requirement is not satisfied by a conceptual or 

abstract bond," Gray v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 638, 648 
6

(2016). "There is no bright-line rule to follow in making such 

a determination. Rather, the question is a matter of degree." 

Colpack v. Attorney Gen., 489 Mass. 810, 814 (2022).

"[I]n addition to considering whether the subjects of an 

initiative petition share a common purpose, we have examined two 

more specific questions." Colpack, 489 Mass. at 815. First, we 

consider whether 

"'the similarities of an initiative's provisions dominate 

what each segment provides separately so that the petition 

is sufficiently coherent to be voted on "yes" or "no" by 

the voters,' [and s]econd, we consider whether the proposed 

initiative 'express[es] an operational relatedness among 

its substantive parts that would permit a reasonable voter 

to affirm or reject the entire petition as a unified 

statement of public policy'" (citation omitted).

Id., quoting Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 658

(2016). "[I]nitiative petitions containing multiple provisions 

involving a variety of different regulatory issues . . . may 

meet the related subjects requirement of art. 48, so long as the 

provisions are part of an 'integrated scheme' of regulation." 

Colpack, 489 Mass. at 816. 

The petition at issue here would establish an integrated 

scheme by which drivers may organize and collectively bargain 

with companies. The scheme extends from selection of an 

exclusive bargaining representative for the drivers, through the 

timeline and process of negotiations with the companies, to 

approval by the Secretary of Labor of either a negotiated 
7

agreement (if one is reached) or (in the case of an impasse) an 

arbitrator's determination.

We are unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that the 

Secretary of Labor's role in the collective bargaining process 

is not part of this integrated scheme. The last step in the 

collective bargaining process (approval by the Secretary of 

Labor) is no less connected to the scheme than any preceding 

step. Indeed, there is an explicit relationship between the 

Secretary of Labor's approval and the arbitrator's determination

because the Secretary of Labor must review the arbitrator's 

determination using the same factors employed by the arbitrator. 

In the circumstances, approval by the Secretary of Labor is 

merely one requirement of many that "determine[s] how 

[collective bargaining] will be implemented." See Oberlies v. 

Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 823, 832 (2018). 

Our conclusion that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory 

role is part of the petition's integrated scheme is buttressed 

by the fact that it is designed to "anticipate[] and address[] a 

potential consequence" of the collective bargaining process the 

petition seeks to create. Oberlies, 479 Mass. at 832

(operational relatedness where workforce reduction provision

addressed potential response by hospitals to nurse-patient ratio 

requirement). Specifically, the proponents of the petition 

foresee a legal challenge that the collective bargaining process 
8

would be preempted by Federal antitrust law.6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1. 

By giving the Secretary of Labor a supervisory role over that 

process, the proponents of the petition hope to place it outside 

the reach of Federal antitrust regulation. States are permitted 

to displace competition due to "the sovereign capacity of the 

States to regulate their economies." Federal Trade Comm'n v. 

Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 (2013), 

citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350, 352 (1943). NonState actors engaging in anticompetitive conduct may also obtain

State action immunity where "the challenged restraint [is] one 

clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as [S]tate 

policy" and "the policy [is] actively supervised by the State." 

Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. at 224-225, quoting 

California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 

445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The petition seeks to meet these two 

requirements by clearly articulating and affirmatively

expressing that the Commonwealth's policy is to allow drivers to 

organize and collectively bargain, and by providing active 

supervision of those activities by the Secretary of Labor.7

6 An antitrust challenge has been brought against a similar 

law and has survived a motion to dismiss. See Seattle, 890 F.3d 

at 775-776.

7 We need not -- and do not -- decide whether the proposed 

law would, in fact, satisfy the requirements for State action 

immunity. See Oberlies, 479 Mass. at 835, quoting Abdow, 468 

Mass. at 508 ("In circumstances like these, the proper time for 
9

Three further arguments bear brief mention. First, the 

plaintiffs argue that the petition allows the Secretary of Labor 

to "dictate" the terms and conditions of the drivers' 

relationship with the companies and that this role is not 

related to the petition's stated purpose of empowering drivers 

to bargain for themselves the terms and conditions of their 

work. But the Secretary of Labor's role is not so expansive;

instead, it is largely confined to reviewing and approving or 

disapproving -- while employing defined considerations -- the 

agreement reached by the drivers and the companies after 

negotiation or, in the event of an impasse, the arbitrator's 

determination. Although the Secretary of Labor would be 

permitted to set some terms and conditions in limited 

circumstances (which we set out in the margin),8 the petition 

deciding definitively whether the measure has the desired legal 

effect will come if and when the measure is passed"). We only 

decide that the provision giving the Secretary of Labor a 

supervisory role over the collective bargaining process "seeks 

to address" a potential challenge to that scheme. See Oberlies,

479 Mass. at 833.

8 For example, the Secretary of Labor may recommend 

modifications to the terms and conditions if she disapproves of 

the submitted version, but those modifications must be approved 

by the drivers and the companies. Additionally, if the

Secretary of Labor approves terms and conditions that 

incorporate her own modifications or terms and conditions 

determined by an arbitrator, she may "modify" such terms and 

conditions when "market conditions have changed." This is an 

exception to the rule, however, and does not "obliterate" the 
10

does not empower the Secretary of Labor to impose terms and 

conditions without restraint. And, absent State oversight, the 

entire scheme for collective bargaining might face an antitrust 

challenge, thwarting the petition's purpose.

Second, although it is true, as the plaintiffs point out, 

that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory role would mean that 

the drivers' right to bargain collectively would be constrained 

by State oversight, this does not in and of itself cause the 

petition to fail the related subjects requirement. An 

initiative petition may simultaneously broaden and restrict an 

entitlement (in this case, the right to organize and 

collectively bargain). See Colpack, 489 Mass. at 819 ("an 

initiative petition need not focus solely on loosening [or 

tightening] restrictions in order to meet the related subjects 

requirement of art. 48"); Weiner v. Attorney Gen., 484 Mass. 

687, 694 (2020), quoting Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 

515, 528-529 (2000) ("The provisions of an initiative petition 

need not be 'drafted with strict internal consistency'"). The 

question is not whether the subjects are congruous but whether 

they are related.

drivers' ability to collectively bargain as the plaintiffs

contend.
11

Third, the plaintiffs argue that the complexity of the 

petition's scheme, combined with the fact that the Secretary of 

Labor's role in it is "buried" on the twenty-ninth page of the 

thirty-two page petition, will lead to voter confusion. The 

entire petition is roughly organized in chronological sequence

of the labor and bargaining activities it seeks to establish and 

regulate. Given that the Secretary of Labor's role comes at the 

end of that process, it is hardly surprising that it is 

described towards the end of the petition, just as it is equally 

unsurprising that the arbitrator's role is described immediately 

before that. No confusion can arise from placing the provision 

in proper sequence with all the other steps of the collective 

bargaining process. Moreover, the Secretary of Labor's role is 

described with sufficiently clear and straightforward language9

that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention otherwise, the 

petition here does not present the concerns raised by the 

petition at issue in El Koussa v. Attorney Gen., 489 Mass. 823, 

838-839 (2022) (voter confusion was concern where unrelated 

subject was buried at end of proposed law in "murky language" 

9 The provision states: "Any recommendations agreed upon 

between [the companies] and a [driver] organization acting as 

exclusive bargaining representative of [the drivers] in the 

bargaining unit and/or any determination reached by an 

arbitrator under this chapter shall be subject to review and 

approval by the Secretary of Labor."
12

such that voters "may not even be aware they are making [a] 

second, unrelated policy decision").

Conclusion. The matter is remanded to the county court for 

entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General's 

certification of Initiative Petition 23-35 complies with the 

requirements of art. 48.

So ordered.