COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JOAN C. RAYMOND 

v. Record No. 2422-93-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 30, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Gerald Bruce Lee, Judge 

 Sammy S. Knight (Knight & Associates, on brief), 

 for appellant. 

 Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, 

 on brief), for appellee. 

 Joan C. Raymond (appellant) appeals her conviction for 

driving under the influence of alcohol (3rd offense within five 

years). She contends that the certificates of blood alcohol 

analysis (certificate[s]) admitted into evidence were not 

properly attested as required by statute and were, thus, 

erroneously admitted. We disagree. 

 The certificates are divided by a line running the width of 

the page. The upper portion of the certificate sent to the 

Division of Forensic Science indicates, inter alia, that the vial 

of blood was received by R. D. Cook on January 7, 1993, and 

examined by the same person on January 21, 1993. The bottom part 

of the certificate reports the analysis results and beside the 

____________________ 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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word "TESTE" is the signature of Paul F. Ferrara, Division 

Director, someone other than R. D. Cook. 

 The upper portion of the certificate sent to an independent 

laboratory indicates that the vial of blood was received by 

Hyun C. Thomason on January 11, 1993, and examined by Ruth Zapka 

on January 18, 1993. The bottom part of the certificate reports 

the analysis results and beside the word "TESTE" is the signature 

of Zenaida B. Barredo, Laboratory Supervisor, someone other than 

Ruth Zapka. 

 At trial, appellant objected to the admission of the 

certificates on the ground that the attestation requirements of 

Code § 19.2-187 (for admission of "material" generally) were not 

met because the person who performed the analysis did not provide 

an attestation. Appellant appears to have abandoned this 

argument on appeal. Assuming she has not, we hold that Code 

§ 19.2-187 has no relevance here as Code § 18.2-268.7 controls 

the admission of blood alcohol tests specifically. See Thurston 

v. City of Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 475, 478-79, 424 S.E.2d 701, 

703 (1992). Appellant now asserts that the attestation 

requirements of Code § 18.2-268.7 were not fulfilled. In 

pertinent part, it requires that: 

[T]he [Division of Forensic Science] Director 

shall execute a certificate indicating the 

name of the accused; the date, time and by 

whom the blood sample was received and 

examined; a statement that the seal on the 

vial had not been broken or otherwise 

tampered with; a statement that the container 
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and vial were provided by the Division and 

that the vial was one to which the completed 

withdrawal certificate was attached; and a 

statement of the sample's alcohol . . . 

content. . . . 

 . . . [T]he certificate of analysis, 

with the withdrawal certificate attached, 

shall, when attested by the Director, be 

admissible in any court . . . . 

(Emphasis added). Appellant's sole argument rests upon her 

conclusion that the dividing line running the width of the 

certificates renders each certificate two separate documents. 

Under such a rendering, the director would have attested to only 

some of the requirements under Code § 18.2-268.7. This issue was 

advanced for the first time in appellant's brief and is barred 

from our review. Rule 5A:18. Otherwise, appellant finds no 

fault with the admitted certificates. Nor do we. The 

Commonwealth has met the attestation requirements of Code 

§ 18.2-268.7. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 Affirmed.