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No. CR-15-635 

JACKIE L. WILLIAMS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered January 21, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO: 60CR-95-2566]

HONORABLE HERBERT T. 

WRIGHT, JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

PER CURIAM 

In 1995, appellant Jackie L. Williams was charged with three counts of rape in case 

no. 60CR-95-2566 in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The counts were severed for 

trial. Williams was found guilty by a jury in count three and sentenced as a habitual offender 

to life imprisonment. We affirmed. Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998). 

Williams was found guilty by a jury in count two and sentenced as a habitual offender to 

twenty-five years’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Williams v. 

State, CR-96-725 (Ark. App. Apr. 2, 1997) (unpublished) (original docket no. CACR 96-

725). On count one, Williams was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life 

imprisonment as a habitual offender. We affirmed. Williams v. State, CR-98-1027 (Ark. 

Jan. 20, 2000) (unpublished per curiam). The sentences for the three offenses were ordered 

to be served consecutively. 

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
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On April 6, 2015, Williams filed in the trial court a pro se petition to correct an 

illegal sentence pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2006). The 

petition was denied, and Williams brings this appeal. 

 There is a provision in section 16-90-111 that allows the trial court to correct an 

illegal sentence at any time because a claim that a sentence is illegal presents an issue of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Walden v. State, 2014 Ark. 193, 433 S.W.3d 864. While 

the time limitations on filing a petition under section 16-90-111(a)(b)(1) on the grounds 

that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner were superseded by Arkansas Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 37.2(c) (2015), the portion of section 16-90-111 that provides a means 

to challenge a sentence at any time on the ground that the sentence is illegal on its face 

remains in effect. Halfacre v. State, 2015 Ark. 105, 460 S.W.3d 282 (per curiam). For that 

reason, the trial court had authority to grant relief under the statute if the sentences imposed 

on Williams were indeed illegal. Id.; see also Hill v. State, 2013 Ark. 291 (per curiam). 

 As grounds for his contention that the sentences imposed on him were illegal, 

Williams argued that the amended felony information in his case was unconstitutional. He 

contended that (1) the information was irregular and that it violated the constitutional 

provisions against double jeopardy because the information encompassed three separate 

offenses, and he was tried three times for the same offenses; (2) the State violated Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by not disclosing all exculpatory evidence to the defense; (3) 

he was entitled to indictment by grand jury under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure and Arkansas and federal law. Williams did not allege that the sentences imposed 

were outside the statutory range for the offenses as set by statute. 
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A sentence is illegal on its face when it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense 

for which the defendant was convicted. Bell v. State, 2015 Ark. 370, at 3 (per curiam); see 

also Halfacre, 2015 Ark. 105, 460 S.W.3d 282. Here, Williams did not contend that the 

sentences imposed on him exceeded the statutory maximum. Williams was convicted of 

three Class Y felonies. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(b) (Supp. 1993). Under the provisions 

of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-401(a)(1) (1987), in effect when Williams was 

convicted, a term of ten to forty years or life could be imposed for a Class Y felony. 

Accordingly, the life sentences and the twenty-five-year sentence imposed on Williams 

were within the range allowed by statute and were not facially illegal. Ehler v. State, 2015 

Ark. 107, at 2 (per curiam) (When the sentences imposed on the petitioner were within the 

statutory range for the offense, the sentence was legal on its face and not subject to challenge 

under section 16-90-111.).

 Constitutional violations such as those raised by Williams challenging the judgments 

on grounds of double jeopardy and a Brady violation, which did not implicate the facial 

validity of the judgment, did not render the sentences imposed illegal.1

 See Redus v. State, 

2013 Ark. 9 (per curiam). The claims advanced by Williams in his petition did not allege 

 

1 Williams’s claim of a defective charging instrument has been specifically rejected 

by this court. Section 1 of amendment 21 to the Arkansas Constitution provides that “all 

offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted either by 

indictment by a grand jury or information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney.” Smith v. 

State, 2012 Ark. 311, at 2 (per curiam). States are not required to charge by indictment 

but may charge by information. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). This court has 

addressed this issue on a number of occasions and has refused to extend the right to grand 

jury indictment to proceedings in this state. Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 593, 799 S.W.2d 

519, 523 (1990); Hamm v. State, 296 Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988). 
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an illegal sentence of the type that is jurisdictional in nature; rather, the grounds for relief 

were of the type that should have been raised at trial, on appeal, or, to the extent that the 

claims were intended as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, in a timely-filed 

petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 

(2015). Stanley v. State, 2013 Ark. 483 (per curiam). Assertions of constitutional error are 

not cognizable under section 16-90-111. Id. 

A trial court’s decision to deny relief under section 16-90-111 will not be overturned 

unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Gilliland v. State, 2014 Ark. 149. The trial court’s 

decision in this case was not clearly erroneous inasmuch as Williams did not meet his burden 

of demonstrating in his petition that the sentence was illegal. 

Affirmed. 

Jackie L. Williams, pro se appellant. 

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jake H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.