## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Hastin gs Mutu al Insu rance Co. v. Ultim ate Backyard, LLC , 2012 IL App (1st) 101751

Appellate Court Caption HASTI NGS MUTUAL I

NSURAN CE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. UL TI M ATE BA CKYARD, L L C, NATI ONAL COUNCI L ON COMPENSATI ON I

NSURANCE, I

NC., and J AVI ER VASQUEZ
, Def endants-A

ppellees.

District & N o. First District, F ourth Division Docke t Nos. 1-10-1751, 1-10- 3001 cons.

Filed Fe bruar y 9, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) I n an action ari s i n g from a worke rs’ compensation claim wher e the worke rs’ compensation insurer filed a decla ratory judgme nt action seeking an order that it was not responsible for cov erag e beca use the poli cy h ad been canc elled, the trial court abused its discretion in dismiss in g t h e i nsurer ’s action and denying its motion to stay the worke rs’ compensa

tion proce eding s, since the interpre tat ion of section 4(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which dictates the proper proce dure for canc elling an insur an ce policy
, does not require the specia liz ed expertise of the I llinois Workers’ Compensation Co mm is s ion and it is a question of law be st answer ed by the trial cour

t.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 09-CH-07232; the Hon. Richard J. Billik, J r., Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded.Counsel on

Appea l Rusin Maciorow ski & Fr iedman, L td., of Chicag o (Gre g ory G. Vac ala, Theodore J

. Powers, and Yvonnw M. O’Connor, of counsel ), for appellant.

Dy kema Gossett PL L C (Ha

rry N. Arger, R o sa M. Tumialán, and Sarah A. Smit h, of counsel), and Br ian J

. McManus & Associates, L t d

. (Matthew J. Murphy , of counse l), both of Chicag o, for a ppellee.

Panel PRES I DI NG J USTI CE L AVI

N delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J us t i ce s Fitzge rald Smit h and Pucinski concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This appea l ste m s fr o m t h e denial of a motion to stay proce eding s and the g rantingof motions to d ismiss

. Hasting s Mutual Insuranc e Company (Ha stings Mutual) filed a complaint for decla

ratory judgme nt s ee k i n g an order that it was not responsible for an underlyin g workers’ compensation claim betwee n J avier Vasque z (Va squez) and his employ er, the Ul t i m ate Ba cky ard, L L C (Ultimate Backyard)

. The case ulti mately turns on t h e i s s u e of whether a notice of canc ellation that was sent from Hasting s Mutual t o t h e National Council on Compensation Insuranc e con fo rm ed with the statutory require ments. Hasting s Mutual appea ls t h e d en i al o f its motion to stay as well as the order g ranting appellee s Vasque z’s a

nd Ultimate Ba cky ard’ s motions t o dismiss . We reve rse a nd rema nd with direc tions for the lower court to stay the underly ing worke rs’ compensation claim until a dec ision is m ade by

the cour t reg ardingthe issue of insura nce c overa g e.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Appellee Vasque z sustained a knee injury during the course of h i s em p l o y m ent with Ultimate Ba cky ard. Soon afte r the incident, Vasque z filed a claim with the I llinois Workers’ Compensation Commi ssion (re fer red to here inafter as I WC C or Commi ss i o n ) n aming Ultimate Ba cky ard a

nd Hasting s Mutual, as i nsurer of Ult imate Backyard, as responde nts. Ultimate Ba cky ard tender ed its defe nse and indemnity to Hasting s Mutual based on an insurance policy which was eff ective from April 18, 2007, to April 18, 20 0 8

. Under a

rese rvation of rig hts, Hasting s Mutual beg an providing temporar y total disability (TDD) and medical benef

its to Vasque z. Five mo n t hs later, Hasting s Mutual informed Ultimate Ba cky ard that it was withdra wing its tentative acc eptanc e and would deny cover ag e of the Vasque z claim. Hasting s Mutual soug ht a decla ratory judgme nt that it had no duty to defe nd or i ndemnify and also filed a motion to stay the underly ing proce eding s befor e the I WC C.

-2-Appellee s Vasque z and Ultimate Ba cky ard eac h filed a motion to dismiss Hasting s Mutual’s

complaint alongwith a re sponse to the motion to st ay

. ¶ 4 Hasting s Mutual’s complaint asser ted that it did not owe cover ag e to Ultimate Ba cky ard, beca use the workers ’ co mpensation insurance policy had been canc elled and any duty to indemnify or defe nd was vitiated. Hasting s Mutual argues that it complied with section 4(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 I L CS 305/4(b ) (West 2010)), the statute which controls the canc ellation of wor kers’ compensation policies, when it sent a notice of

canc ellation J anuar

y 14, 2008, to Ultimate Ba cky ard and the National Council on Compensation I nsuranc e (NCCI ). The notice informed the parties that the worke rs’
compensation insura

nce policy would be canc elled eff ective 12:01 a .m. on April 18, 2008. Hasting s Mutual maintains that the sole question befor e the court invo l v es the statutory interpre tation of whethe r it complied with section 4(b) of the Workers’ Compensa

tion Ac t when it sent the notice of canc ellation to the NCCI

. The NCCI is an org anization which the I WC C contra cted with to deleg ate some of i ts duties, including rec eiving an d maintaining

cer tificates of insurance and notices of termination of insurance cover ag e under section 4 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Hasting s Mutual and the NCCI enter ed into an aff iliation
ag ree ment in which the NCCI ag ree d to service s that included transmitting Hasting s Mutual insurance policy

information to the I WC C. ¶ 5 The next month, Vasque z an d t h e Attorney Gene ral’s office
, on behalf of the Injured Workers’ Be nefit Fund, proce eded with the worke rs’ compensat i o n claim by initiating a hear ing befor e an I WC C arbitrator. Hasting s Mutual claims that despite the fac t that it never

rec eived proper notice or service and that neither it nor Ultimate Ba cky ard participated in the arbitration, the arbitrator still ruled ag ainst Hastings M u t u al o n the issue of insurance

cover ag e. ¶ 6 Shortly there afte r, the trial court ruled that Hasting s Mutual’s motion lacke d convincing authority to enjoin the proce eding s and t h at the motion to stay was moot in light of the deci s ion alre ady handed down by the I WC C arbitrator. In g ranting appellee s’ motions to dismiss without prejudice
, the court held that t h e I W C C had valid authority to decide the

cover ag e issue. Hasting s Mutual then filed its second amende d compl ai n t that named the NCCI as a defe ndant for the first time. All three appellee s, Vasque z, Ultimate Ba cky ard and the NCCI
, filed motions to dismiss

. Appellee s’ motions to dismiss argued that the issue befor e the c ourt involved fac tual deter minations and that the I WC C had both the authority and expertise to best handle such deter minations. Fur

thermore
, the appellee s maintained that the arbitrator’s decision alre ady adjudicate d the issue of insurance cover ag e. Soon there afte r, Hasting s Mutual filed a third amende d complaint in order to add fac ts specific to its claims
ag ainst the NCCI ; this complaint was ag ain followed by the NCCI filing a motion to dismiss

. ¶ 7 Be fore a ruling was made on Hasting s Mutual’s complaint and ap p el l ee s ’ m otions to dismiss
, the I WC C enter ed a decision vacating Vasque z’s previous ex p a r t e wo rk ers’
compensation arbitration awa rd. Following this dismiss al, Vasque z ag ain filed a claim with the I WC C, asking an arbitrator to adjudicate his worke rs’ compensa tion claim as well as the

cover ag e issue betwee n Hasting s Mutual and Ultimate Ba cky a r d

. H a s ti n g s M utu a l o n c e more filed a motion in the circuit court to stay or seve r the I WC C procee dings a s they related t o the insuranc e covera g e is sue. On June 30, 2010, the lower c ourt denied H asting s Mutual’s

-3-motion to s tay . Hasting s Mutual filed a timely interlocutory

appea l on this i ssue. ¶ 8 Undeterre d an d wi t h t h e reve rsal of the initial I WC C arbitrator’s decision in hand, Hasting s Mutual filed a motion in the circuit court to strike appellees’ moti ons to dismiss
, arguing that their motions wer e supported by the I WC C arbitrator’s decision. On August 18, 2008, the circ uit court conducte d a hearing on appellee s’ three motions to dismiss
, Hasting s Mutual’s complaint for decla ratory ac t i on and all of the replies. The court g rante d the

mo t i ons of appellee s Vasque z and Ultimate Ba cky ard based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, holding that there are sever al fac tual questions that neede d to be deter mined and that the matter was alre ady being proper ly resolved in another forum, the I WC C. Ultimately
, the court held that the issue as to whether Hasting s Mutual proper ly canc elled the worke rs’
compensation liabili ty policy , which could have an impac t on Vasquez’s ability to rec over if he pre vails on his w orker s’ compensation c laim, is a matter that is unique ly suited to the specia liz ed and/or techni ca l expertise of the I WC C. L ast, the court dismiss ed Hasting s Mutual’s claims aga inst the NC CI
, finding the claims to be pre mature. The court he ld that Hasting s Mutual may attempt to reple ad a leg ally sufficie nt claim that is ripe for adjudication
ag ainst the NCCI within 30 day s of an awa rd b y t h e arbitrator in the underly ing worke rs’
compensation a ction or the decision of the Commi ssion, if an appe al is taken by any party

. Hasting s Mutual filed a timely appea l of the order g rant i n g Ultimate Ba cky ard’ s and Vasque z’s moti ons to dismi ss. ¶ 9 Finally
, we note that appellee Ultimate Ba ckyard did not file an appea ranc e or a brief on any of the issues bef

ore this cour

t.

¶ 10 ANALYSI S ¶ 11 This is a consolidated appea l which consists of: (1) an appea l of the J une 23, 2010, denial of Hasting s Mutual’s motion to stay I WC C proce eding s (all three ap p ellees, Ultimate Ba cky ard, the NCCI and Vasque z, are a party to this motion); and (2) Hasting s Mutual’s
appea l of the Aug ust 18, 2010, order g ranting Ultimate Ba cky ard’ s and Vasque z’s motions
to dismiss with prejudice

. There was no final di smissal order enter ed on August 18, 2010, with reg ard to the NCCI ’s motion to dismiss

. I t is worth noting that the arguments and issues raised throug hout Hasting s Mutual’s complaint for decla ratory judgme nt and its subsequent

m o t ions to stay as well as appellee s’ motions to dismiss are essentially the same: is the question being asked in the l ower court one of fact or law? I t is undisput ed that the circuit
court and t h e I WC C have concur rent jurisdiction over worke rs’ compensation matters. Hasting s Mutual argues that there are only two way s in which the I WC C c an have primary jurisdiction over this matter. Either the leg islature must have divested the circ uit court of its jurisdiction or the I WC C must be able to provide a specia liz ed or technica l expert i s e t h at would help resolve the controve rsy

. Hasting s Mutual cites case l aw wh i ch s tates that the leg isl at u re d i d n ot divest the court of jurisdiction over the interpre tation of an insurance
contra ct n o r d oes such an interpre tation require the expertise of an administrative ag ency

. Appellee s maintain that the issue prese nted is fac tual and cite a line of authority that confe rs fac tual decisions to the Commi ssion. Thus, our revie w of the motion to stay and motions to dismiss will involve the same question: is the issue prese nted a question of fac t that should

-4-be dec ided by the Commiss ion or one of la w that should be dec ided by the trial cour

t?

¶ 12 Motions to Dis miss ¶ 13 As a primary matter, we note that neither Ultim a te B ackyard nor Vasque z specifie s which section of the I llinois Code of Civil Procedur e that their motions to dismiss wer e filed under. I t appea rs throug h a rea ding of the order that the lower court interpre ted appellee s’ motions
to dismiss as a combination of a section 2-615 (735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2010)) and section 2-619 (735 I L CS 5/2-619 (West 2010)). The lower court al s o n ever specific ally stated on which g rounds that it g rante d ap p el l ee s ’ motions. The I llinois Code of Civil Procedur e specific ally deals with this is s u e in section 2-619.1 (735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)), which
states that motions with respe ct to pleading s under section 2-615 and motions for involuntary dismiss al under section 2-619 may be filed toge ther as a single motion in any combination. 735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010). A combined motion, howeve r, shall be in parts. 735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)

. Eac h part shall be limit ed to a nd shall specify that it is made under section 2-615 or 2-619. 735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010). Eac h part shall also clea rly show the points or g rounds relied upon under the section on which it is based. 735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)

. To that extent, we also note that the supreme court has regularly admonished parties that fail to distinguish whether their motions to dismiss wer e made pursuant to section 2-615 or 2-619, “[m] eticulous prac tice dictates that a lawy er specific ally desig nate whether her motion to dismiss is pursuant to section 2-615 or section 2-619. [C itations.] The failure
to do so may not alway s be fata l, but reve rsal is require d if prejudic e re s u l t s to the nonmovant.” Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum
, 159 I ll. 2d 469, 484 (1994). We will reluc tantly revie w appellees’ m o t i o n s t o dismiss throug h the l ens used by the l ower court, which re cog nized and conducte d both a sec tion 2-615 and sec tion 2-619 analy sis. ¶ 14 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challeng es the leg al s u ff i ci en cy o f a complaint by alleg ing defe cts on the fac e of the complaint. Id

. at 493. A section 2-615 motion provides that

a pleading or portion there of may be stricken beca use it is substantially insufficient in la w. Kea t i n g v. 68th & Paxton, L.L.C

. , 401 I ll. App. 3d 456, 463 (2010). A court considering whether to g rant or deny a section 2-615 motion to dismiss must deter mine whether the alleg ations of the complaint and a ll reasona ble infer ence s theref

rom, when c onsidered in a light most favor able to the plaintiff, are sufficie nt to state a cause of action upon which relief

can be g rante d. Vitro v. Mihelcic
, 209 I ll. 2d 76, 81 (2004). The court must consider all fac ts that are appar ent on the fac e of the pleading s, which includes any exhibi ts attache d there to. Dloogatch v. Brincat
, 396 I ll. App. 3d 842, 846-47 (2009). The court does not consider nor does the motion raise any aff irmative fac tual defe nses. Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co.
, 402 I ll. App. 3d 704, 712 (2010). A cause of action will not be dismiss ed on the pleading s unless it clear ly appea rs that t he plainti ff cannot prove any set of facts that will entitle it to relief. Board of Directors of

Bloomfield Club Rec reation Ass’n v. Hoffman Group, Inc.
, 186 I ll. 2d 419, 424 (1999). ¶ 15 Hasting s Mutual fra mes its argument as asking the l o we r co u rt t o m ere ly interpre t a statute and ins uranc e contract. This is the t y pe of issue that the circ uit court is well versed in and not the ty

pe of question that re q u i res the expertise of the I WC C. Hasting s Mutual

-5-contends that this case should mere ly involve compar ing the canc ellation notice which was

sent to the NCCI with the statute which dictates the proper p ro ce d u re that an insurance
company takes wh en canc elling an insurance policy

. Section 4(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act states in per tinent part: “The insurance so cer

tified shall not be cance lled or i n the eve nt that such insuranc e is
not ren ew ed
, ex tended or otherwise continued, such insurance shall not be terminated until at least 10 day s afte r the rec eipt by the I llinois Workers’ Compensa tion Commi ssion of notice of canc ellation or t ermination of said insurance [.] ” 820 I L CS 305/ 4(b) ( West 2010). Hasting s Mutual argues that it complied perf ectly with the statute when it sent the notice of

canc ellation to the I WC C. I t further contends that there is no q u es tion of fac t reg arding recei p t o f t h e notice beca use the I WC C logg ed the notice in its sy stem and put its unique coding on the canc ellation form indicating the date the form was rec eived. Hasting s Mutual
argues that this case should mere ly involve having the lower court deter mine an issue of law

. I t asks for the lower court to make a deter mination, based on a rea ding of the rele vant statute, what constitutes rec eipt of notice. Hasting s Mutual argues for the l o wer court to make a deter mination if the NCCIis even a llowed to reje ct a notice of ca ncellation. ¶ 16 Hasting s Mutual further contends that this case is analog ous to Employe rs Mutual Cos.

v. Skilling
, 163 I ll. 2d 284 (1994), wher e the supreme court was asked to deter mine the scope of the I WC C’s and the circ uit court’ s j u ri s d iction over the interpre tation of a worke rs’
compensa t i o n policy

. Skilling involved an employ ee who filed worke rs’ compensation claims. The employ er’ s insurance company contende d that its policy only provided cover ag e for injuries occur

ring in Wis consin and beca use the employ ee’ s injuries occur red in I llinois
, it had no obligation to defe nd or indemnify

. Id

. at 285-86. The insurance company also filed

a suit for decla

ratory action in the circ uit c ourt seeking an order that it ha d no obligation to the employ ee or the employ er. Id. at 286. The supreme court held that the courts of I llinois have orig inal jurisdiction over al l j u s t i ci ab le matters. Id

. at 287. The court stated that the leg islature may vest exclusive orig inal jurisdiction to an administrative ag ency , but it must do so expli citly throug h a compre hensive statutory administrative scheme
, and that the Workers’ Compensation Act is insufficient to divest the circ uit courts of jurisdiction. Id

. The
court went on to hold that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, “a m at ter should be ref err ed to an administrative ag ency when it has a specia liz ed or technica l expertise that would help resolve the controve rsy , or when there is a need for uniform administrative standards.” Id

. at 288-89. The court hel d t h at t h e circ uit court should not have declined to resolve the insurance cover ag e dispute, ultimately finding that questions of law, such as the

one prese nted, are questions that the circ uit court was meant to handle. Id

. at 289. Hasting s M u t u al u rge s this court to adopt t he reasoning found i n Skilling and find that the questi o n befor e the lowe r cour

t is an issue of law that doe s not require the expertise of the IWC C. ¶ 17 Appellee Vasque z argues that the I WC C is expressly authorized t o re s o lve insuranc e

cover ag e questions. Vasque z conce des t hat t he circuit court shares concurre nt jur i s d i ct ion with the I WC C. While Vasque z also cites to Employe rs, he maintains that the circ uit c ourt only has para

mount jurisdiction if the complaint raises issues of law. Vasque z further argues that the exis tence of concur rent jurisdiction does not depr ive the cir cuit court of disc retion

-6-to deter mine that the fac tual issues are best left befor e the I WC C. Keating
, 401 I ll. App. 3d 456; Residential Carpentry, Inc. v. Kennedy
, 377 I ll. App. 3d 499, 502 (2007). Va s qu ez char acte rizes Hasting s Mutual’s argument as asking the circ uit court to decide a fact question in a worke rs’ compensation case reg arding the I llinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the I llinois I nsuranc e Code’s (215 I L CS 5/143.17 (West 2010)) notice require ment. Vasque z states that Hasting s Mutual is not proposing a question of law but is in fac t asking the court to make fac tual deter

minations reg arding what date Hasting s Mutual provided notice to NCCI of the canc ellation of the insurance policy

. He argues that notice of canc ellation of an insurance policy is fundame ntally a question of fac t. Vasque z also takes issue with Hasting s Mutual’s failure to state in its brief that the orig inal notice of canc ellation Hasting s Mutual submitt ed had been reje cted and returne d by the NCCI and was not resubmitted until seven months late r. He argues that these fac tual questions a re at the hear

t of the case and are best handled by the I WC C. Vasque z further contends that Ski l l i n g is distinguishable from the
prese nt case , beca

use Skilling only prese nted a question of law while here we are prese nted with questions of fac t. ¶ 18 Vasque z supports hi s position by arg uing that this jurisdictional issue has alre ady been decide d in Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kendall Enterprises, Inc.
, 295 I ll App. 3d 582 (1992). I n Kendall
, the insurance company filed a decla ratory judgme nt seeking an order that it was not obligated to defe nd employ er or pay benef its to em p l o y ee in a pending worke rs’
compensation dispute. Id

. at 583. K en d a l l hinge d on whether the insurance company had
proper ly canc elled the insurance policy

. At an I WC C hear ing, an employ ee of the insurance
company provided testimony that she did not see nor did she have persona l knowledg e that
t h e notice of canc ellation had been mailed to or rec eived by the NCCI

. Id

. at 5 8 3 -8 4

. An employ ee of the NC CI testified t hat after an exhausti ve sea rch of its entire database
, it did not f ind e ither an orig inal filing of the policy or a notice of any filing of canc ellation. Id

. at 584. The arbitrator found in favor of employ ee and employ er, concluding that the insurance
company could not “provide conclusive proof of rec eipt of a n o t i ce of canc ellation by the NCCI as require d by the statute.” Id

. Af t er t h e I WC C arbitrator rende red its decision, the insurance company filed a decla ratory judgme nt acti on in the circ uit court. Id

. at 585. Employ er and employ ee filed motions to dismiss
, which the lower court g rante d. Id

. at 585- 86. On appea l this court aff irmed the decision, holding that despite the insurance company ’s attempt to fra

me the issue as a question of law, the insurance company ’s decla ratory action

was mere ly contesting the administrative finding s of fac t by the I WC C. Id

. at 586. Kendall

we n t on to distinguish itself proce durally from Skilling in two way s. First, in Skil l i n g t h e I WC C had not made any fac tual finding s, and second, the insurance company in Skilling contested the authority

or jurisdiction of the I WC C to hear the c ase. Id . at 587. ¶ 19 This court is unpersua ded by Vasque z’s argument and finds that the prese nt case is easily distinguishable from the fac ts of Kendall

. First, Hasting s Mutual aff irmatively states on the

rec ord that it sent notice of canc ellation to the NCCI

. Fur thermore
, Hasting s Mutual asser ts, and appellee s do not rebut, that the notice of canc ellation was not only rec eived by the NCCI but w as also logg ed into its sy stem and stamped by the NCCI ’s unique date coding sy stem. Second, the rele vant fac ts in Kendall that distinguish its holding from Skilling are prese nt in the case sub judice
, namely
, Hasting s Mutual’s contesting the authority and/or the

-7-jurisdiction of the I WC C to hear the underly ing worke rs’ compensation claim as well as the I WC C not y et makingany fac tual finding s. ¶ 20 The lower court also conducte d a section 2-619 analy sis in its order g rantingVasque z’s and Ultimate Ba cky ard’ s motions to dismiss

. An appea l from a section 2-619 dismiss al is the

same in nature as one following a g rant of summary judgme nt. Carroll v. Paddock
, 199 I ll. 2d 16, 22 (2002). I n both instances, the revie wing court must asce rtain whether the exis tence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t should have prec luded the dismiss al, or ab s en t s u ch an issue of fac t, whether dismiss al is proper as a matter of law. Ultsch v. Illin o is Mu n i ci p a l Retireme nt F

u n d
, 226 I ll. 2d 169, 178 (2007). A section 2-619 motion admits the leg al sufficie ncy of the pleading s and raises defe cts, defe nses, or other aff irmative matters that act to defe at the claim. Keating
, 401 I ll. App. 3d at 463. In ruling on a section 2-619 motion, the lower court may take under consideration all pleading s, aff idavits and other proof prese nted b y t h e parties. People v. Philip Morris, Inc
., 198 I ll. 2d 87, 90 (2001). On appea l, a cour t

m u s t deter

mine whether there is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t, which should hav e prec luded the dismiss al or, abs ent such an issue of fac t, whether dismiss al is proper as a matter of la

w. Carroll , 199 I ll. 2d at 22. ¶ 21 A section 2-619(a )(3) motion specific ally applies in case s wher e there is another action
p en d i n g b et wee n the same parties for the same cause

. Under section 2-619(a )(3)
, it is th e movant’s burden to demonstrate by clea r and convincing evidenc e that t h e t wo actions involve the same cause and the same parties. Ha p a g -Lloyd (

America)

, Inc. v. Home InsuranceCo.
, 312 I ll. App. 3d 1087, 1091 (2000). Even in the case wher e the movant has established both the same ca u s e an d parties, the lower court reta ins discretion to g rant or deny the motion; sec tion 2-619(a) (3) r elief is not mandator y

. Id .; Kendall
, 295 I ll. App. 3d at 586. Finally
, the t rial court m u s t al so consider the potential prejudice to the nonm ovant if the motion is g rante d versus the policy of avoiding duplicative litigation. Kapoor v. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. , 298 I ll. App. 3d 780, 785-86 (1998). ¶ 22 Motions to dismiss are g ener ally revie wed de novo , due to the fac t that they ty pically do
not require the lower court to deter mine cre dibilit y or weig h the fa ct s p re s ent in the case

. Hapag-Lloyd (

America) , Inc ., 312 I ll. App. 3d at 1090. This is not the case with section 2- 619(a) (3), wher e the motion in fac t ur g es the trial court to w eigh sever al fac tors in order to make the deter

mination of whether it is appropr iate for an action to proce ed. Id

. Due to this weig hing of

evidenc e by

the lower court, motions to dism iss under sec tion 2-619(a) (3) a re revie wed unde r an a

buse of discr etion standard, the require d alternative. Id . at 1091. ¶ 23 Whil e a majority of the analy sis on this motion has been fleshed out above, we find that Kendall
, 295 I ll. App. 3d 582, is pa rticularly instructive on this issue. There this c ourt held that “[t] he circ uit court and the Commi ssion had concur rent jurisdiction over q u es tions arising under the Act.” Id

. at 586. The court went on to state that based on the doctrine of primary ju ri s d i ct i o n , a circuit court should ref er a matter to the appropriate administ rative
ag ency when that ag ency has a specia l e x pertise that would help resolve the controve rsy or wher e there is a need for a uniform standard. Id

. The court also stated, howeve r, t h at the circ uit court should rule on questions of law when it could “ ‘for eclose needle ss litigation.’ ” Id

.

-8-¶ 24 Motion to S tay

¶ 25 The last issue on appea l in this case is whether the lower court proper ly denied Hasting s Mutual’s motion to stay , which asked the lower court to halt proce eding s befor e the I WC C until the circ uit court made a decision reg arding insurance cover ag e. As a threshold matter, appellee s contend that this court does not have jurisdiction over Hastings Mutual’s appea l
reg arding the denial of its motion to stay

. Appellee s argue that the stay order does not qualify

as an injunc t i o n and does not qualify as an appea lable interlocutory order under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 307(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). Appellee s contend that there is no constitutional rig ht to appea l from interlocutory order s and, there fore
, this c ourt lacks appellate jurisdiction over the stay order

. They argue that a stay order does not qualify

as an injunction under Rule 307(a)
, mai n t ai n ing that the stay order mere ly related to the circ uit court’s inhere nt rig ht to control its own docket, which are the ty pes of order s that are not subject to interlocutory appea l. Fur thermore
, appellee s contend that nowher e in Hasting s Mutual’s complaint did it plead the elements nece ssary t o obtain an injunction such as hardship or irr epar able ha rm. ¶ 26 Appellee s rely on Short Brothe rs Construction, Inc. v. Korte & Luitj ohan Contractors
, Inc
., 356 I ll. App. 3d 958 (2005), which dealt wit h wh ether an order by the trial court ref err ing a case to mediation was subject to appea l unde r Rule 307(a)

. Short Brothe rs held that the substance of the mediation order was to streamline the judicial proc es s , wh i ch is clea rly related to the circ uit court’s authority to control its own dock et , an d t h u s, was not ap p ea l ab l e as an inj unction under Rule 307(a)

. Id. at 960. Short Brothers further held t h at whether an order constitutes an appea lable injunction is deter mined by the substance rathe r than the form of the order

. Id

. Appellee s contend th at t h is point further streng thens their contention that the stay order was administrative, not injunctive, reg ardle ss of how it was labeled. ¶ 27 Hasting s Mutual argues that th e d en i al o f t h e s t ay order was implicitl y a denial of injunctive relief

. Hasting s Mutual also relies on Short Brothers for the propositions that the
term “injunction” is to be construed broadly and actions of the circ uit court which have the eff ect and forc e of injunctions are appea lable, reg ardle ss of what the mot i o n or order is called. Id

. ¶ 28 Despite the numerous case s cited by Hasting s Mutual and ap p el l ee s , this court finds

numerous decisions that are dispositi v e o n t h e i s sue. “Courts have treated the denial of a motion to stay as a denial of a reque st for a preliminary injunction.” L u n d y v. Farmers Group, Inc
., 322 I ll. App. 3d 214, 216 (2001). “A stay is considere d injunctive in nature , and thus a n order g ranting or denying a stay fits squarely within Rul e 307(a ).” Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
, 385 I ll. App. 3d 287, 288 ( 2008). “The denial of a stay by a trial court is treated

as a denial of a reque st for a preliminary injunction, which is appea labl e u nder Rule 307(a) (1).” Beard v. Mount Carroll Mutual Fire Insur a n ce Co.
, 203 I ll. App. 3d 724, 727 (1990). Thus, this court has jurisdiction to hear the appea l of the lower court’s order denying the motion to st ay

. ¶ 29 The standard of revie w in an appea l of a m o t i o n t o s t ay is abuse of discretion. Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc
., 213 I ll. App. 3d 591, 594 (1991). “In deter mining

-9-whether the circ uit court abused its discretion, this court should not decide whether it ag ree s

with the circ uit court’s decision, but rathe r, should deter mine whether the circ uit court acte d arbitra rily without the employ

ment of conscie ntious judgme nt or *** exceede d the bounds of rea son and ignor ed rec og nized princi p l es of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Id . at 594-95. ¶ 30 We first note that while the order denying Hasting s Mutual’s motion to st ay appea rs in the rec ord, the motion itself is not included in the appellate rec ord and, there fore
, cannot be considered

. An y doubts that may arise from incompleteness of rec ord will be resolved
ag ainst appellant. Foutch v. O’Bry ant , 99 I ll. 2d 389, 392 (1984). Whil e the motion to stay is missing, the rec ord does include a transcr ipt of the in-depth hear ing on the issue which will be ample for conducting a conclusive analy sis. Hasting s Mutual argues that the lower court should stop proce eding s befor e the I WC C until t h e ci rc u it court deter mines the issue of insurance cover ag e, which it believes is a question of law, and t h e ci rc u it court, not the I WC C, is in the best position to addre ss the issue. The appellee s ag ain contend that Hasting s Mutual has pre sented a

question of fa ct, which must be a nswere d by

the I WC C. ¶ 31 I t is undisputed that the courts of I llino i s h av e o ri ginal jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters. I ll. Const. 1970, art. VI
, § 9. Whil e the leg islature g ener ally cannot deprive circ uit
courts of this jurisdiction, an exception arises in administrative actions. The leg islature may vest exclusive orig inal jurisdiction in an adminis trative ag ency only when it has ex pl i ci t ly

enac ted a compre hensive statutory administrative scheme

. People v. NL Industries
, 152 I ll. 2d 82, 96-97 (1992). This court in Skilling held that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s
pronounce ment that “[a]ll questions arising under this Act *** sha ll *** be deter mined by the Commi ssion” was insufficient to dive st the circ uit c ourts of jurisdiction a nd, there fore
, the cir cu i t court and the I WC C have concur rent jurisdiction.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Skilling
, 163 I ll. 2d at 287. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that even when the circ uit court has jurisdic t i o n o v er a m atter, it should, in some instances, stay the judicial p r o c e eding s pending ref err al of the controve rsy to an administrative ag ency

. Refer ral of th e m at t er is proper so long as the administrative ag ency has a specia liz ed or technica l expertise that would help resolve the controve rsy , or wher e there is a need fo r u n i fo rm administrative standards. Id

. at 288-89; Kellerman v. MCI Telecomm unications Corp.
, 112 I ll. 2d 428, 445 (1986); NL Industries
, 152 I ll. 2d at 95-96. We find that reso l v i n g t h e controve rsy

at issue does not re quire the spe cialized expertise of the I WC C. ¶ 32 This court finds the fac ts of Skilling t o b e m o s t an al o go u s t o t h e case at hand and, there fore
, finds its rea soning to be instructive. The question that is posed by Hasting s Mutual

as k s the lower court to interpre t section 4(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Ac t

. I nterpre tation of a statute is a question of law, which is best answe red by the circ uit court and

one that does not require the specia liz ed expertise of the I WC C. There fore
, the I WC C does
not have primary jurisdiction, and as stated in Kendall, when there is a ruling on a question of law that could fore close needle ss litigation, it i s b es t ad d ressed by the circ uit court. Kendall , 295 I ll App. 3d at 586. We find that this is the exact situation present be fore us. ¶ 33 For the above-menti o n ed re as ons, we find that the l ower court abused i ts discretion in
g ranting appellee s’ motions to dismiss and denying Hasting s Mutual’s motion to stay

. We, there fore
, reve rse and rema nd. We dir ect the lower court to stay the proce eding s befor e the

-10-I WC C on the underlying worke rs ’ co mpensation claim until it deter mines if the notice of

canc ellation that Hasting s Mutual submitt ed to the NCCI met the statutory require ments of section 4(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, rely ing on the undisputed fac t that the NCCI logg ed and date stamped the notice of ca ncellation prior to its reje ction.

¶ 34 Reverse d and re manded.

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