In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-16-00224-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.A., A CHILD 

 

On Appeal from the 84th District Court 

Ochiltree County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 13,560, Honorable William D. Smith, Presiding 

 

September 27, 2016 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

G.A., the father of A.M.A., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating 

his parental rights to A.M.A. A.M.A.’s mother, T.A., signed an affidavit of relinquishment 

of her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. We will affirm the judgment 

entered by the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) first became 

involved with A.M.A. in December of 2012. As a result of this initial involvement with 

A.M.A., the Department instituted a Family Service Plan with G.A. on December 8. The 
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Department filed its petition for protection of a child, for conservatorship, and for 

termination on December 12. After a full adversary hearing on December 12, the trial 

court entered temporary orders naming the Department as temporary managing 

conservator of A.M.A. 

Subsequently, on May 8, 2014, the trial court entered a final order in suit 

affecting the parent-child relationship. Pursuant to that order, the Department was 

named A.M.A.’s permanent managing conservator. At the time of the final order 

appointing the Department permanent managing conservator, G.A. was appointed 

possessory conservator with certain restrictions on his visitation with A.M.A. 

On April 9, 2015, the Department filed a petition to modify prior orders and for 

termination in the suit affecting the parent-child relationship. A bench trial was held on 

the Department’s petition on March 21, 2016. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the 

trial court entered an order terminating G.A.’s parental rights pursuant to Texas Family 

Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O), and finding that termination was in the 

child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) 

(West Supp. 2016).1

At the trial, the Department’s caseworker, Jarrett Stone, testified to the facts 

leading to the decision to seek termination of G.A.’s parental rights. Stone testified that, 

at the original final hearing on May 8, 2014, the trial court ordered G.A. to complete 

specific services. These services were incorporated into a Family Plan of Service that 

was provided to G.A. and signed by him. 

 

1

Further reference to the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section ____” or “§ ____.”
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As pertinent to this discussion, G.A. was ordered to:

(1) return to Texas within sixty days of the final hearing and begin 

individual counseling sessions with a counselor agreed to by both 

parties;

(2) demonstrate and show evidence of employment and housing;

(3) submit to random drug testing;

(4) participate in NA/AA meetings on a regular basis, and provide 

verification of attendance;

(5) maintain contact with the Department.

In addition to those listed services, G.A. was also required to attend parenting classes 

and undergo OSAR2assessment to address substance abuse issues.

Stone testified that he had reviewed the requirements with G.A. However, G.A. 

had not begun, much less completed, any of the services required. Stone further 

testified that he had attempted to contact G.A. regarding the services through the mail 

at the address G.A. had previously provided. In addition, Stone testified that he 

attempted to contact G.A. through G.A.’s father in Montana and by trying to phone G.A. 

at the various phone numbers he had for G.A. in his file. Throughout the entire 

proceeding, Stone was only able to contact G.A. twice and, on both occasions, the 

contact was at a local jail where G.A. was incarcerated. 

In connection with the incarceration of G.A., Stone testified that, from the May 

2014 hearing date to late December 2015, G.A. had been incarcerated a substantial 

period of the time. When cross-examined about G.A.’s incarceration and whether such 

incarceration would prevent G.A. from completing the services, Stone’s testimony was 

that this was G.A.’s decision because he committed the crimes that led to his 

incarceration.

 

2 Outreach, Screening, Assessment and Referral Center.
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The record further reflects that, since the May 2014 hearing, G.A. has had no 

contact with A.M.A. When testifying about G.A.’s lack of contact with A.M.A., Stone 

stated that A.M.A.’s therapist recommended no contact between G.A. and A.M.A. 

However, the Department did agree that G.A. could have some contact under very

controlled situations. After receiving this information, G.A. never contacted the 

Department to initiate any visitation. 

Testifying further about his contact with G.A., Stone stated that he had received 

one letter from G.A. and “maybe” phone calls on two separate occasions. In neither 

phone conversation did G.A. ever ask about A.M.A. 

As stated above, Stone testified that G.A. had been incarcerated much of the 

time during the pendency of the case. The Department offered a number of judgments 

reflecting G.A.’s various criminal convictions. Of importance to our decisions are those 

convictions occurring since the permanent conservatorship was awarded to the 

Department in May of 2014. G.A. pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession of a 

controlled substance on May 14, 2015. He was sentenced to a term of one year 

deferred adjudication. That matter had a pending application to adjudicate at the time of 

the final hearing. Additionally, G.A. had numerous charges pending at the time of the 

final hearing. These included possession of methamphetamine, burglary of a vehicle, 

and possession of a dangerous drug. G.A. pleaded guilty to the possession of 

methamphetamine on December 2, 2015, and received a six year sentence but was 

placed on community supervision for five years. Stone opined that G.A.’s continued 

involvement with controlled substances was endangering conduct that would affect his 

parental rights with A.M.A. 
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A.M.A.’s foster mother also testified at the termination hearing. A.M.A. had been 

living with the foster family for almost three years on the date of the final hearing. The 

foster family includes A.M.A. in all of the family activities and plan to adopt A.M.A. In 

addition to A.M.A., the foster parents have two biological children, an adopted child who 

is three years old, and a foster daughter who is seventeen years old. 

The foster mother testified that A.M.A. is bonded to the family and refers to the 

husband and wife as “dad” and “mom.” A.M.A. is in the first grade and appears to be 

doing well in school. 

Regarding G.A., the foster mother testified that A.M.A. never refers to him and is 

very direct in asking that G.A.’s name not be mentioned in the family. A.M.A. has 

verbalized a desire to be adopted by the foster parents. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court terminated G.A.’s parental rights 

and found that termination was in the best interest of the child. G.A. now appeals 

presenting four issues that contend that the evidence was factually and legally 

insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. G.A. does not contest the trial court’s 

finding that the best interest of the child is served by termination of his parental rights. 

We will affirm.

Standard of Review

The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional 

dimensions. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see Santosky v. Kramer, 

455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). A decree terminating 

this natural right is complete, final, irrevocable, and divests for all time that natural right 
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as well as all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers between the parent and child 

except for the child's right to inherit. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. That being so, we are 

required to strictly scrutinize termination proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 

(Tex. 1980). However, parental rights are not absolute, and the emotional and physical 

interests of a child must not be sacrificed merely to preserve those rights. In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).

The Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the parent-child relationship 

if the petitioner establishes both (1) one or more acts or omissions enumerated under 

section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 

best interest of the child. § 161.001(b). Though evidence may be relevant to both 

elements, each element must be proved, and proof of one does not relieve the burden 

of proving the other. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. While both a statutory ground 

and best interest of the child must be proved, only one statutory ground is required to 

terminate parental rights under section 161.001(b). See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 

362 (Tex. 2003). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court's judgment of termination if 

legally and factually sufficient evidence supports any one of the grounds found in the 

judgment, provided the record shows that it was also in the best interest of the child for 

the parent's rights to be terminated. See id.

Due process requires the application of the clear and convincing standard of 

proof in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 

S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see § 161.206(a) (West 2014). "'Clear and convincing 

evidence' means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier 

of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 
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established." § 101.007 (West 2014). This standard, which focuses on whether a 

reasonable jury could form a firm belief or conviction, retains the deference a reviewing 

court must have for the factfinder's role. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order 

terminating parental rights, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or 

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. See In re J.F.C., 

96 S.W.3d at 265-66. "To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions 

and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that 

the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder 

could do so." Id. at 266. In other words, we will disregard all evidence that a 

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id.

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a judgment of 

termination, we determine "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the [Department]'s 

allegations. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. In conducting this review, we consider 

whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have 

resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. 

"If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could 

not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not 

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient." Id.
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Analysis

We begin our analysis by noting that the proof of one predicate act by clear and 

convincing evidence is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to terminate the 

parental rights of a parent. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. The trial court found by 

clear and convincing evidence that G.A. had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed 

the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or 

emotional well-being of the child. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). For purpose of a subsection (E) 

analysis, endanger means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize. In re M.C., 917 

S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). Further, such conduct does not necessarily 

have to be directed at the child nor does the child have to suffer actual injury. See In re 

M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). Conduct 

that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and 

emotional well-being of that child. See In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). When viewing the endangering conduct 

allegation, a reviewing court may consider the parent’s failure to complete the service 

plan. See In re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). 

The record before the Court demonstrates a continued pattern of drug abuse by 

G.A. The pattern of drug abuse demonstrated by G.A. pre-dates the original final 

hearing where the Department was appointed permanent managing conservator. 

Further, since the petition to modify and terminate was filed, G.A. has continued to use 

and abuse controlled substances. Since the beginning of the termination proceeding, 

G.A. has pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance on two separate 

occasions. G.A. has spent a majority of his time since the filing of the modification and 
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termination proceeding in jail or in another state. We have previously held that 

intentional criminal activity which exposed the parent to incarceration is relevant 

evidence tending to establish a course of conduct endangering the emotional and 

physical well-being of the child. In re K.V., No. 07-15-00424-CV, 2016 Tex.App. LEXIS 

3985, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re A.W.T., 

61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (per curiam)). In addition to his 

continued use of controlled substances, G.A. has availed himself of none of the services 

offered by the Department which might have helped him overcome his substance abuse 

issues.

Additionally, the record reflects that, since the petition to modify and terminate 

was filed, G.A. has had virtually no contact with A.M.A. Not only has G.A. had no 

contact with the child, when Stone visited with G.A. in person, G.A. did not inquire about 

the child. Such infrequent visitation, in this case virtually no visitation, can also serve to 

endanger a child’s well-being. See In re R.M., No. 07-12-00412-CV, 2012 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 10239, at *13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

When viewed in a neutral light and taking into consideration conflicting evidence, 

the record supports the proposition that the trial court could have reasonably formed a 

conviction or belief about the truth of the Department’s allegations regarding G.A.’s

endangerment of A.M.A. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. Accordingly, the evidence is 

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.

We therefore overrule appellant’s first issue that the evidence was not factually 

sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment that G.A. had engaged in endangering 
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conduct under section 161.001(b)(1)(E). We note, again, that G.A. has not contested 

the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the child.

Conclusion

Having overruled G.A.’s first issue, we affirm the judgment of termination.

Mackey K. Hancock

 Justice