IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

A.D.H., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 315 M.D. 2022

: Submitted: October 10, 2023

Pennsylvania State Police, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: June 3, 2024

Presently before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, is an application 

for summary relief in which A.D.H. (Petitioner), a convicted sexual offender, seeks 

removal from the sexual offender registry website (Registry) and a declaration that 

Subchapter I of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act1(SORNA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, is unconstitutional. Upon review, we deny Petitioner 

summary relief. 

I. BACKGROUND2

In 2010, Petitioner was found guilty of Rape of a Child, Indecent 

Assault, and Corruption of Minors.3 He is incarcerated, serving a 13- to 30-year

sentence. The Sexual Offender Assessment Board did not find Petitioner to be a 

1 Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27 No. 10 (Act 10), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, as 

amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140 No. 29 (Act 29).

2 We discern the following facts from Petitioner’s petition. See Pet. for Rev., 6/6/22.

3

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3126(a)(7), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively. 
2

sexually violent predator (SVP), but Petitioner is subject to registration under 

Subchapter I of SORNA. 

In June 2022, Petitioner pro se commenced this litigation, asserting that

the General Assembly has utilized an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that 

sexual offenders have a reduced expectation of privacy to justify the registration and 

reporting requirements set forth in Subchapter I of SORNA.4 See generally Pet. for 

Rev.5 Petitioner seeks an order directing the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to 

remove Petitioner’s name from the Registry. See id. Further, Petitioner seeks a 

declaration that the Registry provisions in SORNA violate principles of due process, 

that those provisions are not severable, and that the entirety of Subchapter I is 

facially unconstitutional. See id.

The parties filed responsive pleadings. Thereafter, in August 2022, 

Petitioner sought summary relief.6 

4

In its legislative findings and declaration of policy, the General Assembly declared that 

“[p]ersons found to have committed a sexual offense have a reduced expectation of privacy 

because of the public’s interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(a)(5).

5 Although styled as a petition seeking mandamus relief, Petitioner also seeks a declaration 

that SORNA is facially unconstitutional. See Pet. for Rev., Wherefore clause; see also Taylor v. 

Pa. State Police, 132 A.3d 590, 598-600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (instructing that reviewing courts 

should not elevate form over substance). 

6 Although PSP has filed a respondent’s brief in this matter, PSP did not file a response to 

Petitioner’s application. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3; Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) (noting the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Civil Procedure regarding summary relief). 

In his application for summary relief, Petitioner expands his prayer for relief, additionally 

seeking a declaration from this Court that Subchapter H of SORNA is unconstitutional. See Appl. 

for Summ. Relief, 8/19/22, Wherefore clause. Such relief is beyond the scope of Petitioner’s 

petition. See Pet. for Rev. Further, Petitioner is not subject to the registration and reporting 

requirements set forth in Subchapter H. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.53. Thus, 

as noted by PSP, Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Subchapter H. See

Resp’t’s Br. at 8-9. To establish standing, an aggrieved party must establish a substantial, direct, 

and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation. See Fumo v. City of Phila., 972 A.2d 487, 
3

II. ISSUES

Petitioner contends that the General Assembly’s legislative finding that 

sexual offenders have a reduced expectation of privacy constitutes an 

unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption. See Pet’r’s Br. at 3. Proceeding from 

this premise, Petitioner asserts a violation of his rights to due process and freedom 

from unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. Further, according to Petitioner, 

this presumption is so pervasive throughout the registration and reporting regime 

that it is not severable, and the entirety of SORNA must be declared unconstitutional. 

See id.

III. DISCUSSION

This Court may grant an application for summary relief if the party’s 

right to judgment is clear as a matter of law and no material issues of fact are in 

dispute. Gregory v. Pa. State Police, 185 A.3d 1202, 1205 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); 

Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Further, “the moving party has the burden of proving that its 

right to relief is so clear as a matter of law that summary relief is warranted.” Naylor 

v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 54 A.3d 429, 431 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), aff’d, 76 A.3d 

536 (Pa. 2013). 

In considering an application for summary relief, the record includes 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and reports 

signed by expert witnesses. Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192, 195-

96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). We view the record “in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of disputed material facts 

against the moving party.” Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 216 A.3d 

448, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (en banc). 

496 (Pa. 2009). Because Subchapter H does not apply to Petitioner, he does not have such an 

interest.
4

Petitioner asserts that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(a)(5) creates an irrebuttable 

presumption that sexual offenders have a reduced expectation of privacy. Pet’r’s Br. 

at 6. According to Petitioner, an individual’s privacy interests, enshrined within 

article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution, are entitled to the protections of due process. See 

generally id. at 6-15. However, according to Petitioner, “there exists no mechanism 

for an individual to challenge [this] irrebuttable presumption . . . through a hearing, 

grievance process, appellate process or other avenue . . . .” Id. at 8. Therefore, 

Petitioner concludes, Section 9799.51(a)(5) is unconstitutional.7 See id. at 15.

The General Assembly may enact laws that limit constitutional rights 

to protect the health, safety, and welfare of society. In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 

2014). However, “any restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the 

constitutional rights of all citizens.” Id. A party challenging a statute must 

demonstrate that “the statute clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” 

Id.; Nixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 286 (Pa. 2003).

Essentially, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine safeguards protected 

interests limited by a statute that presumes that “the existence of one fact [is]

statutorily conclusive of the truth of another fact.” In re J.B., 107 A.3d at 14. 

“[I]rrebuttable presumptions are violative of due process where the presumption is 

deemed not universally true and a reasonable alternative means of ascertaining that 

presumed fact [is] available.” Id. at 14-15 (quoting Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 684 A.2d 1060, 1063 (Pa. 1996)). Thus, the test for an 

unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption considers whether the presumption (1) 

7 PSP rejects Petitioner’s argument, reasoning that Section 9799.51(a)(5) constitutes a 

declaration of policy not subject to statistical or scientific data and, therefore, does not implicate 

due process. See Resp’t’s Br. at 9-11. 
5

impacts a protected interest but (2) is not universally true, and (3) there are

reasonable alternatives to ascertain the presumed fact. Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 

232 A.3d 567, 586 (Pa. 2020).

For example, in In re J.B., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected an 

irrebuttable presumption that juvenile sexual offenders pose a high risk of recidivism

and thus held that juvenile offenders’ lifetime registration requirements were 

unconstitutional. 107 A.3d at 20. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized 

(1) offenders have a fundamental right to reputation under the Pennsylvania 

Constitution,

8

id. at 16; (2) scientific evidence suggests that juvenile offenders 

exhibit low levels of recidivism, id. at 17-18; and (3) individualized risk assessment 

is a reasonable alternative means of ascertaining the risk of juvenile recidivism. Id.

at 19. 

Critically, a challenger must submit evidence to establish that a 

presumption is not universally true. See, e.g., id. at 17-19 (construing scientific and 

societal evidence suggesting acts of delinquency are a product of impulsivity and 

sexual curiosity rather than irretrievable depravity); Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 594-96 

(remanding for the parties to supplement the record, thus enabling the trial court to 

evaluate “a consensus of scientific evidence”). This is a factual inquiry that 

necessarily precludes relief as a matter of law. See Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 596

(observing that the challenger’s unrebutted evidence was adequate support for a 

“colorable argument” but, absent “the benefit of opposing science,” insufficient to 

overturn a legislative determination); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d 805, 813 

8

See Pa. Const. art. I, § 1; see also, e.g., R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 149 

(Pa. 1994). 
6

(Pa. Super. 2022) (with no evidence of record sufficient to demonstrate a scientific 

consensus, rejecting an offender’s request for relief as a matter of law).9

Initially, we agree with PSP that the premise of Petitioner’s claim is 

flawed. See Resp’t’s Br. at 9-11. In contrast to sexual offenders’ recidivism rates, 

we find it unlikely that there is scientific consensus proving or disproving whether 

sexual offenders have a reduced expectation of privacy. Rather, it is a statement of 

policy in furtherance of the Commonwealth’s interest in public safety and effective 

operation of government. See In re J.B., 107 A.3d at 14; Nixon, 839 A.2d at 286; 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(a)(5). 

Further, Petitioner has presented no scientific evidence in support of his 

assertions. See Wolf, 276 A.3d at 813; cf. In re J.B., 107 A.3d at 17-19 (finding in 

the juveniles’ favor because they presented evidence that the scientific consensus 

supported their position). Certainly, absent such evidence, Petitioner cannot 

establish a clear right to relief as a matter of law. See Naylor, 54 A.3d at 431 n.4.

Finally, even if Petitioner could marshal evidence supporting his claim, 

such evidence would create a material issue of fact, and we would be constrained to 

view that evidence in the light most favorable to PSP. See Marcellus Shale Coal., 

216 A.3d at 458; Gregory, 185 A.3d at 1205 n.5; Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Thus, under 

these circumstances, summary relief would be inappropriate. 

9

“Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer persuasive 

precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 

A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation omitted). 
7

For these reasons, Petitioner’s application for summary relief is 

denied.10, 11

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

10 Having rejected the premise of Petitioner’s request for summary relief, we need not 

address Petitioner’s further arguments challenging Subchapter I of SORNA. See Pet’r’s Br. at 16-

22. We note, however, that Subchapter I does not require the disclosure of offenders’ medical 

information, see generally 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56, and it is far from clear as a matter of law whether

there exists a recognized privacy right in a person’s home, work, or school address that would 

protect this information from disclosure absent a warrant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duncan, 

817 A.2d 455, 469 (Pa. 2003) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the name and 

address associated with a bank atm card). 

11 PSP has not filed a cross-application for summary relief. Thus, we lack a procedural 

vehicle through which to dismiss this action. See C.M. v. Pa. State Police, 269 A.3d 1280, 1282 

n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (en banc).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

A.D.H., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 315 M.D. 2022

:

Pennsylvania State Police, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of June, 2024, the application for summary relief 

filed by A.D.H. is DENIED. 

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge