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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEHEN L. BOLAR, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. :

 : CIVIL ACTION 15-0010-M

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Social Security Commissioner, :

 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks 

judicial review of an adverse social security ruling denying a 

claim for disability insurance benefits (Docs. 1, 13). The 

parties filed written consent and this action has been referred 

to the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings 

and order judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 (see Doc. 19). Oral argument was heard on 

August 24, 2015. After considering the administrative record, 

the memoranda of the parties, and oral argument, it is ORDERED

that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED and that this 

action be DISMISSED.

This Court is not free to reweigh the evidence or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th

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Cir. 1983), which must be supported by substantial evidence. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial 

evidence requires “that the decision under review be supported 

by evidence sufficient to justify a reasoning mind in accepting 

it; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 

Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 918 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting 

Jones v. Schweiker, 551 F.Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1982).

At the time of the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was

forty-three years old, had completed a high school education 

(Tr. 57), and had previous work experience as a chipper/grinder, 

tank tester, sandblaster, and shipfitter (Tr. 70). Plaintiff 

alleges disability due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 

degenerative joint disease in the hip and ankle, poly-substance 

abuse, and sleep apnea (Doc. 13 Fact Sheet).

The Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on December 

27, 2011, alleging his disability began on October 18, 2008 (Tr. 

20, 147-50). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, 

determining that Bolar was capable of performing specific light 

work jobs (Tr. 20-29). Plaintiff requested review of the 

hearing decision (Tr. 15-16), but the Appeals Council denied it 

(Tr. 1-7).

Plaintiff claims that the opinion of the ALJ is not 

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Bolar alleges 

that the ALJ failed to properly consider (1) the opinions and 

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conclusions of his treating physician and (2) the Veteran 

Administration’s finding that he was disabled (Doc. 13). 

Defendant has responded to—and denies—these claims (Doc. 16). 

The relevant evidence of record follows.1

In discussing Bolar’s severe impairments, the ALJ found as 

follows:

In 2009 and 2010, the claimant was treated 

at USA Department of Orthopaedics for 

chronic foot pain, and talus spurring with 

arthritic changes/exostosis evidenced by 

computed tomography scans/x-rays. In March 

of 2010, the claimant underwent right foot 

partial excisions with calcaneus tarsal 

tunnel release. Medications were prescribed 

for the claimant (Exhibit 1F). From 2008 to 

2012, the claimant received treatment from 

Veterans Administration Gulf Coast Health 

Care System/Mobile Veterans Administration 

for ankle/foot/pelvic arthritis with joint 

pain, cocaine abuse in remission, episodic 

alcohol abuse, pelvic region discomfort, a 

depressive disorder, a post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD), sleep disturbance, and an

explosive personality disorder (Exhibits 2F, 

6F, 8F and 10F). 

(Tr. 22). 

On December 16, 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(hereinafter DVA) determined that Plaintiff’s disability,

because of PTSD, would be increased to seventy percent—up from 

																																																							 1The Court notes that the transcript in this action numbers 960 

pages (see Doc. 12). As such, the Court will focus on the evidence to 

which the Parties point and will not summarize the balance of it. 

However, the Court will record the ALJ’s medical evidence summary 

regarding Bolar’s severe impairments, albeit brief.

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fifty percent—effective September 2, 2010 (Tr. 226; see 

generally Tr. 226-38).

On April 4, 2011, Julie D. Teater, Doctor of Psychology

with the Biloxi VA Medical Center, completed a disability 

questionnaire indicating that Bolar had PTSD and also had 

suffered from cannabis, cocaine, and alcohol abuse, all in 

remission (Tr. 339-42). Plaintiff had experienced a traumatic 

event in that he “witnessed or was confronted with an event that 

involved actual or threatened death or serious injury” involving

intense fear, helplessness, or horror (Tr. 342); the traumatic 

event, however, was not persistently re-experienced (Tr. 343). 

Teater indicated that Bolar persistently avoided thoughts, 

feelings or conversations associated with the trauma, avoided 

activities, places or people that aroused recollections of it, 

and experienced markedly diminished interest or participation in 

significant activities. The Doctor went on to find that, since 

the trauma, Plaintiff had experienced difficulty falling or 

staying asleep, irritability or outbursts of anger, difficulty 

concentrating, and exaggerated startle response. These problems 

had lasted for more than one month but did not cause clinically 

significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or 

other important areas of functioning (Tr. 343-44). Teater 

indicated that Bolar suffered from depressed mood, anxiety, and 

mood and motivation disturbances. The Doctor indicated that 

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Plaintiff experienced occupational and social impairment due to 

mild or transient symptoms that decreased work efficiency and 

his ability to perform occupational tasks, but only during 

periods of significant stress (Tr. 346). Though Dr. Teater 

thought Bolar was capable of handling his own financial affairs, 

Plaintiff insisted that he could not. It was Dr. Teater’s 

opinion that his PTSD and other disorders would not impact his 

ability to work (Tr. 347). 

On July 18, 2011, a letter from the DVA found that although 

Bolar had “occupational and social impairment due to mild or 

transient symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability to 

perform occupational tasks only during periods of significant 

stress,” his PTSD did not impact his ability to perform light or 

sedentary work (Tr. 222; see generally Tr. 221-23). It was 

determined however, that he was not competent to manage his 

financial affairs (id.). Plaintiff’s GAF was rated at 61.2

On November 2, 2011, Dr. Rickey L. Jones, M.Ed. and 

Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor with the DVA, wrote the 

following letter regarding Bolar:

The veteran was determined to be 

infeasible for training leading to gainful 

																																																							 2A GAF score between 61 and 70 indicates “[s]ome symptoms OR 

some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning, 

but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful 

interpersonal relationships.” See https://depts.washington.edu/

washinst/Resources/CGAS/GAF%20Index.htm

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employment under the Vocational 

Rehabilitation and Employment Program, 

Chapter 31. The severity of the veteran’s 

service connected disabilities significantly 

impairs his ability to function in a 

training or occupational setting. He has a 

combined disability rating of 70% for the 

following SC conditions: Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder 70% and Tinnitus 10%. None 

Service Connected Disabilities include: 

Limitation of Extension, knee, Hypertensive 

Vascular Disease, Hearing loss, and 

Limitation of Motion, Ankle.

No Independent Living Needs were 

identified.

(Tr. 458). On that same date, Jones penned a letter indicating 

that Bolar was not able to receive vocational rehabilitation and 

employment services because it was “not reasonable to expect 

[him] to be able to train for or get a suitable job at [that]

time” (Tr. 216). More specifically, the letter indicated the 

VA’s belief that Plaintiff could not “[s]ucceed in a program of 

training or education and [g]et a job in an occupation that 

matches [his] skills, talents, and interests” (Tr. 216). 

On February 16, 2012, Dr. Henrietta T. Kovacs, General 

Practitioner and Internist, examined Plaintiff at the request of 

the Social Security Administration; by way of history, she

reported that he “was serving in 1991 at the Desert Storm/Desert 

Shield in artillery. He stayed in the Army for one year and 

nine months between 1990 and 1991. He developed post traumatic 

stress disorder after returning from Oklahoma” (Tr. 461; see 

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generally Tr. 461-67, 684-87). Kovacs’s physical exam revealed 

mild range of motion (hereinafter ROM) limitations in the 

cervical spine, right hip, and right ankle; Plaintiff had no ROM 

limitations in his dorsolumbar spine, shoulders, elbows, 

forearms, wrists, hands, or fingers. He could heel and toe walk 

with normal gait. Bolar could not do a full squat because of 

his ankle; straight leg-raising was negative at eighty degrees 

bilaterally. Her impression follows: (1) Post traumatic stress 

disorder per attached medical records; (2) chronic right hip 

pain with mild ROM limitation; (3) chronic right ankle pain with 

ROM limitation; (4) chronic intermittent right sided low back 

pain; (5) history of dyspnea on exertion; (6) history of 

hypercholesterolemia; (7) tobacco abuse; and (8) recovering 

alcoholic and drug addict. 

On November 26, 2012, Dr. D.M.G. Ewing took forty-five 

minutes to examine Bolar, a psychiatric outpatient taking

Amitriptyline (an antidepressant) and Seroquel (Tr. 691-95). 

His past medical history included the following: low back pain; 

ankle/foot pain; cocaine abuse, cannabis dependence, and alcohol 

dependence, all in remission; hip and ankle arthralgia; 

traumatic arthropathy; aggression, and PTSD. Bolar’s serviceconnected disability was seventy percent due to PTSD and 

Tinnitus. Plaintiff and his wife appeared without an 

appointment, saying that he had disability forms he needed 

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completed. Bolar reported that he had been taking his 

medications and they kept him calmer and helped him sleep tento-twelve hours most nights; he denied sedation, hangover, or 

other side effects from the drugs. Plaintiff’s wife confirmed 

his “mostly pleasant state of mind,” with no significant 

irritability, melancholy, and anxiety (Tr. 692). He denied 

hopelessness, persistent morbid thoughts, and alcohol or illicit 

drug use; he reported his mood as “Good...Great...” (Tr. 693). 

An alcohol-screening test was negative (Tr. 695). Ewing noted 

that he was oriented in four spheres, seemed to be of average 

intelligence, and had logical thoughts with no evidence of 

thought disorder or delusion; he was goal-directed, centered on 

the disability form. Ewing’s impression was that Bolar “[did] 

not appear to be disabled from work based on history and mental 

status exam—Vet reports robust SX reduction on current regimen” 

(Tr. 693). The Doctor estimated his GAF to be 50-55.3 Plaintiff 

was to see Ewing again in six months. That same date, Dr. Ewing 

completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity (hereinafter 

RFC) Questionnaire indicating that Bolar had moderate 

restrictions of activities of daily living and marked difficulty 

																																																							 3Error!	Main	Document	Only.“A GAF score between 51-60 indicates 

“moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, 

occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with 

peers or co-workers).” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic 

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed. 1994). 

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in maintaining social functioning; no assessment was made as to 

Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence or pace (Tr. 699-700). 

Bolar was expected to have three episodes of decompensation in 

work or work-like settings that would cause him to withdraw from 

the situation or experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms 

for a period of at least two weeks. Ewing went on to say that 

Plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to do the 

following: understand, carry out, and remember instructions; 

respond appropriately to supervision and co-workers; and perform 

simple, repetitive tasks. Bolar was markedly limited in 

responding appropriately to customary work pressure. The Doctor 

stated that Plaintiff had had these limitations for at least one 

year and that he frequently attended therapy; Plaintiff’s 

medications caused drowsiness, light-headedness, and blurred 

vision. The form urged the reviewer to do the following: “For 

any ratings of moderate or greater, please explain basis of 

limitation in sub-part 17 (COMMENTS);” Ewing did not avail 

himself of this opportunity (Tr. 699). 

On November 27, 2012, VA records show that Bolar attended a 

therapy session with a Social Worker4 for PTSD and aggression; he 

was oriented in four spheres, his thought processes were logical 

and goal-directed, and his mood was pleasant and animated (Tr. 

																																																							 4This Social Worker also signed off on Dr. Ewing’s Mental RFC 

Questionnaire just discussed (see Tr. 68; cf. Tr. 700).

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688-90). Insight and judgment were good; he was able to make 

healthcare and financial decisions independently. Strengths 

were listed: “Individual strengths, place to live, Educated, 

Family/Peer Support, Good judgment coping skills, psychosocial 

support, positive coping skills, future oriented, problem 

solving ability, motivated/seeking help, positive social 

support” (Tr. 689). Weaknesses were listed: “Psychosocial 

stressors, income not adequate, medical problems, chronic 

substance abuse, recent loss, anger/depression, risky behavior, 

lack social support, expressed hopelessness, recent history of 

divorce, recent drug/alcohol binge, unemployment, estranged from 

family” (Tr. 689). The Social Worker indicated Plaintiff had 

low risk for suicide or homicide; he had continuing same family 

issues but was “sporadic, at best, with obtaining treatment” 

(Tr. 690). This concludes all of the relevant medical evidence.5

Plaintiff's first claim is that the ALJ did not accord 

proper legal weight to the opinions, diagnoses and medical 

evidence of his physician, Dr. Ewing (Doc. 13, pp. 2-5). It 

should be noted that "although the opinion of an examining 

physician is generally entitled to more weight than the opinion 

of a non-examining physician, the ALJ is free to reject the 

																																																							 5The Court notes that the records submitted to the Appeals 

Council following the entry of the ALJ’s decision will not be 

discussed herein as no claim has been made regarding that evidence 

(see Tr. 701-956; cf. Doc. 13).

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opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary 

conclusion." Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 

1981);6 see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (2014).

The ALJ reported Dr. Ewing’s November 2012 findings as well 

as his conclusions in the mental RFC questionnaire he completed 

but found them internally inconsistent (Tr. 27). The evidence 

shows that the Doctor’s examination notes stated Plaintiff 

characterized himself as doing “Good . . . Great” (Tr. 693); his 

wife even confirmed his “mostly pleasant state of mind,” with no 

significant irritability, melancholy, and anxiety (Tr. 692). 

After a forty-five minute examination, Ewing found that Bolar 

“[did] not appear to be disabled from work based on history and 

mental status exam—Vet reports robust SX reduction on current 

regimen” (Tr. 693). Ewing indicated he did not need to see 

Plaintiff again for six months. Yet, that same date, the Doctor 

completed a Mental RFC Questionnaire indicating that Bolar had 

moderate restrictions of activities of daily living and marked 

difficulty in maintaining social functioning; in addition, 

Plaintiff was markedly limited in responding appropriately to 

customary work pressure (Tr. 699-700). Though encouraged to 

explain these limitations, Ewing did not do so (Tr. 699). 

The Court finds that Ewing’s notes are plainly inconsistent 

																																																							

					 6The Eleventh Circuit, in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 

1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopted as precedent decisions 

of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.

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with the conclusions listed in the RFC form. The conclusions 

are also inconsistent with Ewing’s report of Bolar’s description 

of how he was doing,7 the report of Dr. Kovacs (Tr. 461-67), the 

report of Psychologist Teater (Tr. 339-47), and other medical 

evidence cited by the ALJ but not restated here (Tr. 26). The 

Court specifically notes that the ROM chart completed by Kovacs 

does not demonstrate an inability to work (Tr. 466-47) while

Teater specifically found that Plaintiff’s impairments would not 

prevent him from working (Tr. 347).8

As further support for Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. 

Ewing’s conclusions were improperly dismissed, Bolar points out

that the Doctor repeatedly assigned GAF scores of 50 (Doc. 13, 

p. 4) (citing Tr. 610, 620, 693).9 Plaintiff further questions 

the ALJ’s characterization of his alcohol dependence, asserting 

her speculation as to the extent of the effects (Doc. 13, p. 4).

The ALJ’s findings were as follows:

Moreover, medical records indicated the 

claimant was abusing alcohol episodically 

(e.g., see page 62 of Exhibit 2F and pages 

17-18 of Exhibit 6F), which likely 

exacerbated the claimant’s mental issues for 

																																																							 7The Court notes Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s finding 

that his own testimony was not credible (see Tr. 25).		 8The Court notes that although Plaintiff points out Teater’s 

finding that Bolar could not handle his own financial affairs (Doc. 

13, p. 3), a more careful reading of the report shows that she thought 

he was capable of handling his finances, but deferred to his 

insistence that he could not (Tr. 346).

9The Court is aware of an earlier cite by Bolar showing eleven 

more GAF scores ranging from thirty-five to fifty (Doc. 13, p. 3).

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a portion of the time he was receiving 

treatment. Of note, medical records 

reflected the claimant had global assessment 

functioning (GAF) scores of 35-50, 

indicating major to serious impairments. 

However, the undersigned gives little weight 

to these GAF scores, since they could have 

been affected by the claimant’s alcohol 

abuse. Notably, in August of 2012, it was 

noted the claimant was stable on his medical 

regimen (see page 21 of Exhibit 8F), which 

established that the claimant’s mental 

condition improved with treatment (Exhibits 

2F, 6F, 8F and 10F).

(Tr. 26). The Court notes VA records show, as alluded to by the 

ALJ, that, on October 31, 2008, Plaintiff was positive for 

ethanol, cocaine, and cannabinoids and the attending physician 

stated that “Pt has a clear substance abuse problem. There may 

also be an underlying PTSD problem. However, one would only be 

able to make that Dx after some time of abstinence” (Tr. 484). 

In her evaluation of April 4, 2011, Teater noted that Bolar “has 

long history of substance abuse, unclear if it related to his 

current symptoms” (Tr. 345). These records provide support for 

the ALJ’s findings notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertions 

otherwise. Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ did not properly 

consider the conclusions of his treating physician are without 

merit.

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to properly 

consider the VA’s finding that he was disabled (Doc. 13, pp. 5-

7). While acknowledging that the ALJ was not bound by the VA’s 

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findings, Bolar asserts that the ALJ “failed to consider the VA 

rating decision altogether” (Doc. 13, p. 6). Plaintiff’s 

argument focuses on the VA report as well as the conclusions of 

Rehabilitation Counselor Jones.

Social Security regulations state as follows:

A decision by any nongovernmental 

agency or any other governmental agency 

about whether you are disabled or blind is 

based on its rules and is not our decision 

about whether you are disabled or blind. We 

must make a disability or blindness 

determination based on social security law. 

Therefore, a determination made by another 

agency that you are disabled or blind is not 

binding on us.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (2014). The Eleventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals has acknowledged this principle, though finding that 

another’s agency’s findings of disability are entitled to great 

weight. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1241 (1983).

The ALJ, in her determination, summarized the disability 

finding made known by Jones and found the following:

However, Dr. Jones did not determine the 

claimant was totally unable to work any type 

of job. In addition, Dr. Jones noted the 

claimant had no independent living needs, 

which indicated the claimant was able to 

function on some level. Hence, the 

undersigned assigns little weight to Dr. 

Jones’ opinions, since they seemed 

inconsistent with medical records from the 

Veterans Administration, which evidenced the 

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claimant was able to mentally and physically 

function at a high level.

(Doc. 27). 

The record shows that the VA, on December 16, 2010, issued 

a decision that Plaintiff was seventy percent disabled (Tr. 226-

38). That report had no author, but referenced Counselor Jones 

as the contact person for any questions regarding it (Tr. 229). 

The record further shows that, in a letter dated November 2, 

2011, Jones indicated that Bolar did not qualify for vocational 

rehabilitation and employment services because he would not 

successfully complete the education or get a job matching his 

skills (Tr. 216). 

The ALJ’s determination clearly discounts the conclusions 

in Jones’s letter. The Court further finds that the ALJ’s 

conclusion applies equally to the VA’s finding of seventy 

percent disability as she specifically references that finding 

in her discussion.10 The ALJ rejected those conclusions as 

“inconsistent with medical records from the [VA]” (Tr. 27). The 

Court finds substantial support for the ALJ’s conclusion. 

Plaintiff has raised two different claims in bringing this 

action. Both are without merit. Upon consideration of the 

entire record, the Court finds "such relevant evidence as a 

																																																							 10The Court further notes that the ALJ rejected Jones’s opinions—

not opinion—lending more credence to this finding.

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. Therefore, it is 

ORDERED that the Secretary's decision be AFFIRMED, see 

Fortenberry v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1980), and 

that this action be DISMISSED. Judgment will be entered by 

separate Order. 

DONE this 27th day of August, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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