alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           9,030
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               109,030
<PP&E>                                         469,317
<DEPRECIATION>                                  63,797
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 586,102
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           93,281
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        40,140
<OTHER-SE>                                     268,667
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   586,100
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   61,446
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (61,446)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (59,800)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (59,800)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
---

EXHIBIT 21

# ACME Communications,
Inc. Listing of Subsidiaries

|Subsidiary                                  |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation
|------------------------------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|ACME Television Holdings, LLC               |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Intermediary Holdings, LLC             |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television, LLC                        |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of New Mexico, LLC          |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of New Mexico, LLC |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of Tennessee, LLC           |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of Tennessee, LLC  |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of Florida, LLC             |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of Florida, LLC    |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of Ohio, LLC                |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of Ohio, LLC       |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of Wisconsin, LLC           |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of Wisconsin, LLC  |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of Illinois, LLC            |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of Illinois, LLC   |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television of Madison, LLC             |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Licenses of Madison, LLC    |  | Delaware                     
|ACME Television Productions, LLC            |  | Delaware                     
|The Daily Buzz, LLC *                       |  | Delaware                     

---

| | * | (50% owned
as of December 31, 2006)
| | - | -----------------------------------
NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 12a0924n.06 No. 11-6537 UNI TED STATES COURT OF A PPEAL S FOR THE SI XTH CI RCUI T
RAMONA POWEL L , Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. CHEROKEE I

NSURANCE CO., Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COU RT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF KE NTUCKY

Before: BOGG S, GILMAN, and DONALD, Circ uit Jud ges . P er Curiam
. Plaintiff-Appellant Ramona Powell alleg es that Cherokee I nsuranc e Company (“Cher okee” ) violated Kentuck y ’s Un fair Claims Settlement Practice s Act (“U CSP A”) in its proce ssing of her third-par ty insurance claim. The district court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of Cherokee on the g round that Powell failed to prese nt evidenc e that Chero k ee h ad eng ag ed in outrag eous or e g reg ious behavior, notwithstanding the undisputed delay in resolving her c laim. After the district court rende red its decision and the parties had fully briefe d the issues in the instant appea l, we decide d Phelps v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company , 680 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2012), a case that considere d simil ar claims of an insurer’ s bad faith arising under the UCSP A. Be cause Phelps may be instructive in the resolution of the issues prese nted in the instant
case , we here by VACATE the judgme nt of the district court and REMAND for rec onsideration in light of our

analy sis in Phelps
.
Second Amendment to the Second Restatement






 Exhibit 4.10


SECOND AMENDMENT 
TO THE SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE 
MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. 401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN




This Second Amendment to the Second Restatement of the Medical Systems, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the "Plan") is adopted effective by Merit Medical Systems, Inc. (the "Employer") as principal sponsor of the Plan.


WHEREAS, the Employer maintains the Plan for the benefit of its employees and the employees of its participating subsidiaries; and


WHEREAS, it is necessary and desirable to amend the Plan to comply with certain requirements of the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Tax Relief Act of 2008 that became effective in 2010 and make certain other changes; and


WHEREAS, the Employer has reserved the right to amend the Plan.


NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows: 


1.    Article II F of the Plan document is amended to add the following sentences at the end thereof effective January 1, 2010:


“Without limiting the foregoing, to the extent required by Section 414(u)(12) of the Code, if the Employer makes a “differential wage payment” within the meaning of Code Section 414(u)(12)(D) to a Participant on qualifying military leave, the Participant will be considered actively employed by the Employer during the period for which such payments are made and the payments shall be considered compensation for all purposes of the Plan.  Additionally, in the case of a Participant who dies while performing “qualified military service” as defined in Section 414(u) of the Code, the Beneficiaries of the Participant shall be entitled to any additional vesting and other benefits the Participant would have received had the Participant resumed and then terminated employment on account of death.”


2.    Section (d) of Article IV E 2 and Section (f) of Article IV E 3 are hereby eliminated effective January 1, 2008.


3.    Except as provided above, the Plan is hereby ratified and confirmed in all respects.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Employer has caused this Second Amendment to the Second Restatement of the Plan to be executed this 29th day of November, 2010.


MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.




By: /s/ Rashelle Perry                 
Name: Rashelle Perry
Its: Chief Legal Officer
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e ,

v. JIANGUO HAN,

De fe nda n t-Appe l la

nt. No. 17-10475

D.C . No. 2:15-c r-00069-JC M -NJK-1

M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da Ja m e s C . M a ha

n, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Oc tobe r 17, 2018 * * Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia
B e fore : HAW KINS a n d HUR W ITZ, C irc uit Judge s , a

nd EATON, * ** Judge

. 

# FIL ED

OCT 22 2018
M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not ap p r op r i at e for public a tion a nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * T h e p an el u n an i m o u sl y co n cl u d es t h i s cas e i s s u i tab l e for de c isio n without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).

* * * Ri ch ar d K

. Eat o n , J u d g e o f t h e U n i t ed S t at es Co u r t of Inte rna tio n al Tra de , sitting by

de signa tion.Jia

nguo Ha n (“ Ha n” ) a

ppe a ls his c onvic tions f

o r conspira c y to m a nufa c ture ,
a nd m a nufa c ture of, m o re tha n 100 m a rijua na pla nts, c la im i ng insuffic ie n t e vide nc e . W e ha v e jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291 a nd a ffirm

. 1
Polic e s e iz e d 908 m a rijua na pla nts from i nside two re side ntia l prope rtie s, both

owne d by Ha n’ s wife

. Dra wing a ll re a s ona b le infe re n c e s in fa vor of the gove rnm e nt, Unite d State

s v
. Alv are

z -Val en z u ela , 231 F.3d 1 198, 1201-02 (9th C ir. 2 000), the

e vide nc e pre se nte d a t tria l showe d tha t Ha n, a long with a nothe r m a n, unloa de d “ grow lights” from a U -Ha

ul tr u ck at one of the prope rtie s. Additiona lly , Ha n wa s

a ppre h e n de d at t em

pting to fle e the ne ighborhood surrounding tha t prope rty while

sm e lling of c ultiva

te d m a rijua

na a nd driving a v a n t

ha t wa s c a rry ing s e ve ra l “ b undle s” of potting soil

. H an ha d pre viously be e n se e n pa rking the va

n a t the prope rty on a

re gular b as i s. Furthe r, H a n’ s son told polic e tha t he ha d h e lpe d h is fa the r c ultiva te

m a rijua na a t the se c o n d prope rty from whic h m a rijua na pla nts we re se i z e d. Give n t

his

e vide nc e , a “ ra t iona l trie r of fact co u ld ha ve found t he e sse ntia l e le m e nts of”

1 Ha n fa i le d to pre se rve h is suffic ie nc y of the e vide nc e c l a im

. Ac c ordingly , we re vie w for pla in er ror to de te rm ine whe the r “ ‘ any ra tiona l trie r of fa c t c ould ha ve found the e sse ntia l e le m e nts of the c rim e [s] be y o nd a r eas o n able doubt.’ ” Unite d State s v
. Phillips , 7 04 F.3d 754, 763 (9th C ir. 2 012) (quoting J ac k son v
. V irginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
2conspira c y to m a nufa c ture , a nd m a nufa c ture o f, m ore tha n 100 m a rijua

na p l an t s

“ be y o nd a re a s ona ble doubt.” Se e Phillips , 704 F.3d a t 763.
AFFIRM E D.

3
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. §1350




Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and in connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A,
Amendment No. 1 of Cytomedix, Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2009 (the “Report”), I, Martin P. Rosendale, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and
belief:




1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      for said period.


Date:  April
      9, 2010
                  
                  /s/ Martin P.
      RosendaleMartin
      P. RosendaleChief
      Executive Officer




A
signed original of this written statement has been provided to Cytomedix, Inc.
and will be retained by Cytomedix, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Louisville Soap Manufacturing Co. *v.*William A. Richardson.

Landlord and Tenant — Repairs.

The landlord cannot be required to make repairs unless he has expressly agreed to do so.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

March 14, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor;

Unless the landlord binds himself by an express agreement to that effect, the tenant, whether for life, for years, or at will, cannot compel him to repair. “The tenant takes the premises for better or for worse, and cannot involve the landlord in expense for repairs without his consent.” Taylor’s Landlord and Tenant 229.

“A lessor, as such, in the absence of some covenant or agreement to that effect, is not bound to make repairs on the premises, nor to compensate the lessee for repairs made by him.” 1 Waterman on Real Property 325.

A tenant is bound for stipulated rents, though the premises should be destroyed by inevitable casualty. *Ridding v. Hall, et al.,*1 Bibb 536-

The landlord is not bound to repair in any case except by force of an express agreement. 3 Duer. 464.

*438
      *Young & Boyle, for appellant.*

*A. Barnett, for appellee.*

There is no covenant in this case on the part of the appellee to repair.' The demurrer was properly sustained, as the answer presented no defense. Judgment *affirmed.*
Exhibit 32.3
 Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Maria R. SchekerName:
    
    Maria R. SchekerTitle:
    
    Chief Accounting OfficerDate:
    
    November 17, 2010
#### In the Matter of Julian Raul S. and Others, Children Alleged to be Permanently Neglected. Oscar S., Appellant; Catholic Guardian Society & Home Bureau, Respondent.

[974 NYS2d 425]

Orders of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Susan Knipps, J.), entered on or about December 20, 2012, which, following a fact-finding determination that appellant father had permanently neglected the subject children, terminated his parental rights and transferred custody and guardianship of two of the children to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services, for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from order, same court and *457Justice, entered on or about September 21, 2012, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeals from the December 20, 2012 orders.

The agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it exerted diligent efforts to reunite the family, through multiple referrals for services, including drug treatment, parenting skills, anger management and domestic violence programs, scheduling and supervising visitation and therapy, and by monitoring the children’s care during the multiple trial discharges *(see Matter of Sheila G.,*61 NY2d 368, 373 [1984]; *Matter of Jeremiah Emmanuel R. [Sylvia*C.], 101 AD3d 571, 572 [1st Dept 2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 863 [2013]). The court properly determined that the father had permanently neglected the children, despite completion of numerous programs and referrals, because he failed to demonstrate that he had overcome his problem with domestic violence, and he was unable to meet the children’s special needs *(see Matter of Dina Loraine P. [Ana C.],*107 AD3d 634 [1st Dept 2013]).

The alternative of a suspended judgment was properly rejected, given the long history of failed attempts to return the children to the parents *(see Matter of Jayden C. [Michelle R.],*82 AD3d 674, 675 [1st Dept 2011]). The therapist for two of the children noted that the foster parents were able to provide these children with stability and meet their special needs, which was paramount to the children’s growth and progress at this point in their lives. Concur — Andrias, J.E, Acosta, Saxe, Renwick and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
#### FORECLOSURE CONSULTANTS, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, v. ASL INVESTMENTS (MOULTON PARKWAY) INC., a California Corporation, Defendant, and Chevron, Defendant—Appellee, Theodor C. Albert, Chapter 7 Trustee on behalf of Sayareh Rastegar, an individual, Defendant-cross-claimant—Appellant.

No. 04-56567.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 5, 2006.*

Filed June 19, 2006.

Martin W. Phillips, Esq., Lane *&*Phillips, Anaheim, CA, for Plaintiff.

Herbert N. Niermann, Esq., Herbert N. Niermann Attorney at Law, Irvine, CA, for Defendant.

Michael L. Armstrong, Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Paula J. Bailey, Chevron Products Company, Brea, CA, Sima Fard, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Appellant.

Before: D.W. NELSON, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Theodor C. Albert1 appeals the district court’s award of the surplus funds from a foreclosure sale to Chevron Products Company. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Because the Internal Revenue Service was a party to the case, the interpleader action was properly removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1444. The district court did not abuse its discretion under § 1442(a)(1) and § 1444 in retaining jurisdiction after the IRS and Shockers, Inc. were dismissed from the case. *United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,*383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

The district court did not improperly deny Rastegar’s demand for a jury trial. *640Rastegar’s attorney expressly consented to the district court’s bifurcation of the trial into two phases, and Rastegar participated in the bench trial without objection. *See Thompson v. Mahre,*110 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir.1997); *White v. McGinnis,*903 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir.1990) (en banc) (“[Kjnowing participation in a bench trial without objection is sufficient to constitute a jury waiver.”)

The district court did not improperly deny Rastegar’s due process right to call Paula Bailey and Adrien Labi as witnesses. As an attorney employed by Chevron, Bailey’s legal impressions are protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and the district court properly disallowed such questioning. Rastegar and the court agreed Labi’s attendance at trial would only be an issue if the court did not award the entire amount of the surplus fund to Chevron.

The district court did not err in awarding Chevron all of the surplus funds because Chevron presented evidence to establish the amount of its claim. *Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp.,*783 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir.1986).

Nothing in the record indicates that the district court was biased against Rastegar or her counsel.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. Albert is the Chapter 7 Trustee for Sayareh Rastegar and brings this appeal on her behalf.
**EXHIBIT 10.15**

 

ANDREW CORPORATION

EXECUTIVE SEVERANCE BENEFIT PLAN AGREEMENT

 

THIS AGREEMENT, made this 5th day of July, 2004, by and between AndrewCorporation (the “Company”) and Jim LePorte (the “Executive”),

 

WITNESSETH:

 

WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Andrew Corporation ExecutiveSeverance Benefit Plan, as amended and restated effective May 14, 2004 (the“Plan”); and

 

WHEREAS, the Executive has been designated as an eligible participantin the Plan;

 

NOW, THEREFORE, the Executive and Company hereby agree as follows:

 

1.                                       PlanBenefits.  The Executive has beendesignated as a TIER II Participant in the Plan and shall be eligible solelyfor the benefits set forth therein applicable to TIER II Participants.  The receipt of such benefits shall besubject to all of the terms and conditions set forth in the Plan, including,but not limited to, terms related to the amount, time and form ofbenefits.  By execution of thisAgreement, the Executive agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Plan, asamended and restated effective May 14, 2004, and as may be subsequentlyamended.

 

2.                                       Arbitration.  The Executive acknowledges thatSection 7.2 of the Plan contains an arbitration provision, and byexecution of this Agreement agrees to be bound by the terms of such arbitrationprovision.

 

3.                                       PlanNot Contract of Employment.  ThePlan does not constitute a contract of employment and nothing in the Plan shallbe construed to give the Executive the right to be retained by the Company orto any benefits not specifically provided by the Plan.

 

4.                                       PlanSupercedes Prior Change in Control Severance Agreements.  The Executive acknowledges and agrees thatthe benefits and terms set forth in the May 14, 2004 restatement of the Plan,as applicable to the Participant based on the Tier designated in paragraph 1above, are a replacement for and in lieu of any benefits to which the Executivemay have been entitled under the Plan prior to its restatement or under anyother agreement with the Company relating to Change in Control severancebenefits.  The Executive furtheracknowledges such benefits and terms may be subsequently amended pursuant toSection 7.1 of the Plan.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to beexecuted as of the date first above written.

 
| EXECUTIVE                | ANDREW CORPORATION                           |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|                     |                                         |
|                     |                                         |
| /s/ James L. LePorte III |                                         | /s/ Ralph E. Faison |   |
| , individually           |                                         | By: Ralph E. Faison |
|                     | Its: President & Chief Executive Officer |
|                          |                                              |  |  |  |

 

----
<PAGE>
                                                               Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned,  Denis Gallant,  Chief Financial Officer of InteliSys  Aviation
Systems of America Inc (the "Company") certifies,  under the standards set forth
and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Annual Report
on Form  10-KSB of the  Company  for the year  ended  December  31,  2003  fully
complies  with the  requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities
Exchange  Act of 1934 and  information  contained  in that  Form  10-KSB  fairly
presents,  in all material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of
operations of the Company.

Dated:  April 14, 2004
                                                        /s/ Denis Gallant
                                                        ----------------------
                                                        Denis Gallant
                                                        Chief Financial Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.