IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SKINNNER PILE DRIVING, INC., )

Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00329-N

)

ATLANTIC SPECIALTY )

INSURANCE COMPANY, )

Defendant/Counter Claimant. )

ORDER

This action is before the Court on the Motion for Leave to Intervene (Doc. 20) 

filed by Natures Way Marine, LLC (“Natures Way”) pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 24. Though given the opportunity (see Doc. 21), no party has filed 

opposition to the motion. With the consent of the parties (Doc. 4), this action has 

been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in 

this action, including trial; to order entry of final judgment; and to conduct all postjudgment proceedings, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 73. (See Doc. 5).

I. Background

This action involves an insurance coverage dispute arising from an incident 

in which a Linkbelt Crane attached to a barge was damaged while the crane and 

barge were in the custody and control of Plaintiff Skinner Pile Driving, Inc. 

(“Skinner”). Skinner sought coverage for the damage to the crane under its policy of 

insurance with Defendant Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (“Atlantic”). After 

Atlantic denied the claim, Skinner filed the present action against Atlantic, alleging 

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breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, and bad faith. Atlantic filed a 

counterclaim for declaratory judgment as to the rights, remedies, obligations, and 

liabilities of Skinner and Atlantic under the subject insurance policy, claiming that 

it owes no coverage for damage to the crane due to certain exclusions in the 

insurance policy. (See Doc. 1-1; Doc. 2; Doc. 15 at 2-3).

In its motion to intervene (Doc. 20), Natures Way asserts that it is the owner 

of the damaged crane and barge, which it had chartered to Skinner for use in a 

project in Florida, during which the damage allegedly occurred. Natures Way has 

demanded that Skinner pay for the damages to the crane, but Skinner has refused, 

citing an inability to pay “and/or” its intention to seek coverage for the damage 

under its insurance policy with Atlantic. In its proposed Complaint in Intervention 

(Doc. 20-1), Natures Way asserts only a breach of contract claim against Skinner, 

alleging that “Skinner breached its duties under the Charter Agreement by (a) 

failing and refusing to pay monies due for the hire of the Barge and Crane, and b) 

failing and refusing to pay monies due for the damage to the Crane.” Natures Way 

demands $60,000 for “unpaid charter hire” and $30,715 for the cost of repairs to the 

crane. Natures Way asserts no claim against Atlantic. Natures Way argues that it 

is entitled to both intervention of right under Rule 24(a) and permissive 

intervention under Rule 24(b).

II. Intervention of Right under Rule 24(a)

Rule 24(a)(2) provides that, “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit 

anyone to intervene who[] claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 

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that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may 

as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, 

unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”1 “Rule 24(a)(2) requires 

a third party moving for intervention of right show:[] ‘(1) his application to 

intervene is timely; (2) he has an interest relating to the property or transaction 

which is the subject of the action; (3) he is so situated that disposition of the action, 

as a practical matter, may impede or impair his ability to protect that interest; and 

(4) his interest is represented inadequately by the existing parties to the suit.’ ” 

Huff v. Comm'r of IRS, 743 F.3d 790, 795-96 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fox v. Tyson 

Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chiles v. Thornburgh,

865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989))) (internal citation omitted). “Intervention of 

right is only available if the interest asserted is ‘direct, substantial, [and] legally 

protectable.’ In other words, ‘the intervenor must be at least a real party in interest 

in the transaction which is the subject of the proceeding.’ ” Id. at 796 (quoting 

Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir.

1982) (citations omitted)).2 “In deciding whether a party has a protectable 

 1 Natures Way does not argue that it has “an unconditional right to intervene by a federal 

statute[,]” nor is the undersigned aware of any such right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).

2 See also In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006):

[B]oth Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b) require the prospective intervenor to anchor its 

request in the dispute giving rise to the pending lawsuit. The prospective 

intervenor must demonstrate “an interest relating to the property or transaction 

which is the subject of the action” if relying on Rule 24(a), or it must show that its 

“claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common” 

if relying on Rule 24(b). In either case, the plain language of Rule 24 requires the 

intervenor's interest to be based on the action pending before the court. See Mt. 

Hawley Ins. Co. v. Sandy Lake Props., Inc., 425 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) 

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interest,...courts must be ‘flexible’ and must ‘focus[ ] on the particular facts and 

circumstances’ of the case.” Id. (quoting Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1214).

The Court finds that Natures Way has not shown entitlement to intervene of 

right because it has not demonstrated a direct, substantial, and legally protectable 

interest “in the transaction which is the subject of this action” – the insurance policy 

between Skinner and Atlantic. Natures Way, noting that “[t]he issue of how the 

damage occurred – which is a threshold question to whether or not insurance 

coverage exists – will be decided in this lawsuit[,]” argues that “[c]ertainly, the 

owner of property has a sufficiently protectable interest in participating in such 

determination.” (Doc. 20 at 4). In support of this proposition, Natures Way cites 

Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1970),3 in which the former 

Fifth Circuit held: “We do not believe...that the interest[ in the subject of the action]

has to be of a legal nature identical to that of the claims asserted in the main 

action...All that is required by the terms of [Rule 24(a)(2)] is an interest in the 

property or other rights that are at issue, provided the other elements of 

intervention are present.” 427 F.2d at 1124. 

 

(per curiam) (upholding district court's denial of a motion for permissive 

intervention because the purpose of intervention was unrelated to the issues 

presented by the underlying suit); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Rule 24(a) requires a relationship between the 

intervenor's legally protectable interest in the suit and the plaintiff's claims, and 

that such a relationship exists “if the resolution of the plaintiff's claims actually 

will affect the applicant”).

3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Circuit 

adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

close of business on September 30, 1981.

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Diaz, however, is distinguishable. In Diaz, the United States government

“intervened...because it wanted to assert a lien (unrelated to the underlying issues) 

on a fund before the court.” Id. In finding that the government properly intervened 

of right under Rule 24(a)(2), the court stated: “[T]he Government in this case is 

asserting a tax lien, clearly a legally cognizable interest in property, which it seeks 

to attach to a res that is before the court. Interests in property are the most 

elementary type of right that Rule 24(a) is designed to protect...We hold that the 

Government is asserting an interest in the property that is the subject of the suit 

within the meaning of Rule 24(a).” Id. 

Natures Way has asserted no “legally cognizable interest” similar to the 

government’s tax lien in Diaz (e.g., a judgment against Skinner for damages to the 

crane). Indeed, in upholding the government’s intervention in Diaz, the court 

rejected application of cases cited by the appellants because they were “cases in 

which intervention was denied because the interest was speculative or had no 

legally protectable nature.” Id. at 1124 & n.2. As to this line of reasoning, the 

Court finds Mt. Hawley Insurance Co. v. Sandy Lake Properties, Inc., 425 F.3d 1308, 

1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), to be on point. 

There, an insurer, Mt. Hawley, filed a declaratory judgment action against 

two insured property owners, claiming that it had no duty to defend or indemnify

the insureds under the subject policy for a drowning death occurring on the 

insureds’ property. See Mt. Hawley Ins., 425 F.3d at 1309-10. After the property 

owners failed to respond to the declaratory judgment action and the insurer had 

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moved for default judgment, Andre Rigaud, the personal representative for the 

decedent, who prior to the declaratory judgment action had filed a wrongful death 

action against the insureds, filed a motion to intervene in the declaratory judgment 

action under both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), attempting to argue that Mt. Hawley 

should not be able to deny coverage. See id. The Eleventh Circuit, affirming the 

district court’s denial of the motion to intervene of right, rejected the personal 

representative’s argument that he had “a direct, substantial, and legally protectable 

interest in the subject matter of the declaratory action because if Mt. Hawley owes 

neither a defense nor coverage to [the insureds], then Rigaud ‘will not have [a] pool 

or fund from which to recover his damages.’ ” Id. at 1311. In so doing, the Eleventh 

Circuit stated:

This Court has held that a legally protectable interest “is something more

than an economic interest.” United States v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,

922 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“What is required is that the interest be one which the substantive law 

recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant.” Id. (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Thus, a legally protectable interest is an 

interest that derives from a legal right.

In this case, Rigaud's interest in the subject matter of the declaratory 

action is purely economic. Rigaud is not a party to the Mt. Hawley 

insurance policy and has no legally protectable interest in that insurance 

policy. Rigaud fails to cite any legally protectable interest and states only 

that there will be less money available from which he can recover his 

wrongful death damages if Mt. Hawley is released from defending and 

providing coverage to Muria International and Sandy Lake Properties. 

Further, Rigaud's interest is purely speculative because it is contingent 

upon his prevailing against Muria International and Sandy Lake 

Properties in the wrongful death action.

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Id. (footnote omitted).4 Accord Canal Indem. Co. v. Dueitt, Civil Action No. 10-0526-

WS-B, 2011 WL 335166, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2011) (Steele, C.J.) (“An injured 

party has no legally protected interest in an insurance policy to which it is not a 

party; its economic interest in having proceeds from a tortfeasor's insurance policy 

available to satisfy any judgment does not satisfy this standard.” (citing Mt. Hawley 

Ins., 425 F.3d at 1311))

 4 In reaching this holding, the Mt. Hawley court noted:

Although there is no case directly on point from this Court, several district courts 

from our circuit have addressed whether an interest contingent upon the 

outcome of other pending litigation is a legally protectable interest, and relying 

on this Court's decision in South Florida Water Management, those district 

courts have decided the issue the same way we do today.

For example, in Ace American Insurance Co. v. Paradise Divers, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 

537, 538 (S.D. Fla. 2003), the dispute between the insurer and Paradise Divers 

was whether the insurance policy provided coverage to Paradise Divers for 

liability arising out of work-related injuries sustained by employee Kevin Upmal. 

The district court, relying on South Florida Water Management, determined that 

Upmal's interests were both speculative and purely economic. Specifically, the 

district court stated: “Here, Upmal's interests, while certainly not unimportant, 

are affected only speculatively, and at that only economically, by the present 

action. Upmal's possessing a stake in this action is contingent on first obtaining 

a judgment against Paradise Divers and not based on a legally protected 

ground.” Id. at 539; see also HealthSouth Corp. Ins. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 688, 692 

(N.D. Ala. 2004) (“Here, Movants' interest in securing a pool of insurance money 

to draw upon is not only purely economic, but also theoretical, considering no 

judgments have been obtained against the insureds.”); Midwest Employers Cas. 

Co. v. East Ala. Health Care, 170 F.R.D. 195, 198 (M.D. Ala.1996) (recognizing 

movant's interest in insurance proceeds and in the outcome of the declaratory 

action, but stating that the interest “does not rise to the level of a significant 

interest”). But see TIG Speciality Ins. Co. v. Financial Web.com, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 

336, 338 (M.D. Fla.2002) (“[I]f this Court declares that the insurance policy is 

void in the present suit, a significant source of recovery for the intervenors would 

become extinct; therefore, the Court finds that the intervenors have a direct, 

significant legal interest in the insurance policy.”).

425 F.3d at 1311 n.6.

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Here, it is the insured, Skinner, who initiated this action, claiming breach of 

an insurance contract and related torts against its insurer, Atlantic, who 

counterclaimed for declaratory judgment. Nevertheless, in essence this action, like

Mt. Hawley, “involve[s] an insurance coverage dispute.” Id. at 1310. Like the 

would-be intervenor in Mt. Hawley, Natures Way has not claimed it is a party to the 

Atlantic insurance policy and has not claimed a legally protectable interest in that 

policy (e.g., additional named insured; third-party beneficiary status). Rather, 

Natures Way’s interest in the subject matter of this action is “purely economic” –

that is, there may be “less money available from which [it] can recover” on its claims

against Skinner for breach of the charter agreement and the damage to the crane.5 

Moreover, Natures Way’s interest in the outcome of this action is “purely 

speculative,” as it is “contingent upon [its] prevailing against” Skinner on its own 

breach of contract and/or property damage claims. Indeed, Natures Way’s 

Complaint in Intervention appears to seek to use this action as a vehicle to litigate 

those very issues, which are based on a contract entirely separate from and 

independent of the insurance policy currently at issue.6

 5 Natures Way acknowledges as much, claiming it has shown “a ‘vital interest’ in the 

outcome of the instant matter[ because] Skinner has already indicated an inability to pay 

for damages to the crane absent insurance coverage.” (Doc. 20 at 5).

6 Natures Way has also cited Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Crider, 58 

F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Ill. 1973), in which the district court, relying generally on Diaz, inter alia, 

found that an intervenor had a “clearly apparent” interest in an action justifying 

intervention of right in an insurance declaratory judgment action because the action would 

“determine whether [the] insurance policy extends to cover [the intervenor]’s claim against 

[the insured].” Crider, however, is not controlling authority and appears inconsistent with 

the reasoning of Mt. Hawley, which is controlling authority.

In reaching its determination, Crider also cited, generally, to Martin v. Travelers 

Indemnity Co., 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971). In Martin, the former Fifth Circuit held that a 

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Because Natures Way has not demonstrated it has an interest relating to the 

property or transaction which is the subject of this action, Huff, 743 F.3d at 795, the 

Court need not decide whether the other factors for intervention of right are 

satisfied, and Natures Way’s motion to intervene (Doc. 20) is due to be DENIED as 

to its request for intervention of right under Rule 24(a).

III. Permissive Intervention under Rule 24(b)

Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 

intervene who[] has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common 

question of law or fact.”7 “In exercising this discretion, the court must consider 

whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the 

original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). See also Mt. Hawley Ins., 425 F.3d 

at 1312 (“ ‘Permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(b) is appropriate 

where a party's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact 

in common and the intervention will not unduly prejudice or delay the adjudication 

of the rights of the original parties.’ ” (quoting Georgia v. United States Army Corps 

of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2002))). “[W]hen the grounds for denying 

coverage are irrelevant to the issues in the underlying action, there is no common 

question of law or fact...” Reed v. Barnett, Civil Action No. 09-0200-WS-N, 2010 WL 

 

driver claiming insured status under a vehicle owner’s liability insurance policy was 

properly allowed to intervene in the injured parties’ suit against owner's insurer. Here, 

Natures Way’s Complaint in Intervention asserts no claim based on the subject insurance 

policy, instead attempting to enforce an entirely separate contract between it and Skinner.

7 Natures Way does not argue that it has “a conditional right to intervene by a federal 

statute[,]” nor is the Court aware of any such right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(A).

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5239249, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 15, 2010) (Steele, C.J.) (citing generally Mt. Hawley 

Ins.).

In Mt. Hawley, the insurer’s declaratory judgment action asserted that the 

insureds’ “refusal to notify Mt. Hawley of the wrongful death action and refusal to 

cooperate in their defense against the wrongful death action had so prejudiced Mt. 

Hawley that coverage under the Mt. Hawley policy had been waived.” 425 F.3d at 

1310. The would-be intervenor, the personal representative of the decedent, 

“argued that, contrary to Mt. Hawley's assertions, [the insureds] were cooperating 

in the defense of the wrongful death suit” and “that Rigaud's counsel had notified 

Mt. Hawley of the wrongful death suit, and thus, Mt. Hawley could not be 

prejudiced by lack of notice.” Id.

In affirming the district court’s denial of permissive intervention, the 

Eleventh Circuit stated:

The lack of cooperation that Mt. Hawley asserts in the declaratory 

judgment action is irrelevant to the issue of fault in the wrongful death 

action. Specifically, the primary issue in the declaratory judgment action 

is whether Mt. Hawley owes insurance coverage to Muria International 

and Sandy Lake Properties under the insurance agreement. The issue of 

insurance coverage is unrelated to the issue of fault in the wrongful death 

action. Further, we do not see how Rigaud's intervention will help resolve 

the issue of whether Muria International and Sandy Lake Properties are 

entitled to insurance coverage pursuant to a policy with Mt. Hawley. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rigaud's 

motion for permissive intervention.

Id. at 1312.

In its declaratory judgment counterclaim, Atlantic cites the following policy 

exclusions as grounds for denying coverage to Skinner:

III. Exclusions from Coverage

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This insurance does not apply to loss, damage, liability, or expense 

directly or indirectly caused by, or contributed to or resulting from:

A. Wear and tear, gradual deterioration, rust, corrosion, dampness 

of atmosphere, freezing or extremes of temperature;

B. An original defect in the property;

C. Mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure...

(Doc. 2 at 7-8). In a letter to Skinner denying coverage (which Skinner has attached 

to its Complaint), Atlantic, citing to this provision of the policy, stated: “This policy 

provides coverage for fortuitous or accidental damages to the leased crane but 

excludes damages resulting from mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure.” 

(Doc. 1-1 at 8). In the report of the parties’ planning meeting under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(f), Atlantic asserts that “[t]he crane was in poor repair prior to 

the loss resulting in the alleged damage.” (Doc. 15 at 3).

For its part, Skinner asserts that the crane was damaged when one of its 

employees “accidentally failed to secure the boom before exiting the crane,” 

resulting in “the boom collaps[ing] and sustaining damage.” (Doc. 1-1 at 3-4). “In 

other words,” according to Skinner, “the fall was not due to a mechanical error, but

by an event that would be covered under the policy in question.” (Doc. 15 at 2).

Natures Way’s charter agreement with Skinner provides: “Throughout the 

Charter Period, Charterer shall, at its sole cost and expense, maintain the Barges in 

accordance with good commercial marine maintenance practices and shall maintain 

and preserve the Barges, in as good condition, working order and repair as when 

first delivered to Charterer for service hereunder, ordinary wear and tear (as 

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defined in Section 14) only excepted.” (Doc. 20-1 at 15). Section 14 of the 

agreement defines “ordinary wear and tear” as “the wear and tear which would 

normally be expected to occur during the careful, proper and prudent use of the 

Barges over the period of time involved, assuming proper maintenance and 

compliance with the other terms of this Charter.” (Id. at 17). 

It appears, then, that the cause of the damage to the crane is a question of 

fact common to both whether Skinner must pay Natures Way for the damage under 

the charter agreement and whether Atlantic owes coverage for the damage under 

its policy with Skinner. Thus, Natures Way has sufficiently carried its burden 

under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) in showing that its claim in intervention against Skinner 

shares with a common question of fact with the main action. Compare Travelers 

Indem. Co. v. Bastianelli, 250 F.R.D. 82, 85-86 (D. Mass. 2008) (“Given the present 

posture of this litigation, the Intervenors have an interest in establishing under 

whose direction the truck was being driven at the time of the accident. This fact will 

affect liability in the state court action as well as the availability of insurance 

coverage... [T]his court finds that the Intervenors have satisfied the requirements of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) and have shown that their participation as defendants in this 

action will promote the full development of the underlying factual issues as well as 

the just and equitable adjudication of the pending coverage dispute.”) with Canal 

Indem., 2011 WL 335166, at *3 (“Whether the individual was Buena Vista's 

employee or an independent contractor certainly affects Buena Vista's liability to 

Roberta, but Livingston has not attempted to show that his status is a question 

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relevant to whether Livingston is liable to Roberta or to whether Buena Vista owes 

Livingston indemnity. On this record, the Court must conclude that the 

independent contractor issue is irrelevant to Livingston's claim or defense and thus 

inadequate as a matter of law to support permissive intervention.” (footnote 

omitted)).

A motion to intervene, whether under Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b), must be 

“timely.” As to this issue, the Eleventh Circuit has held:

In determining whether a motion to intervene was timely, we consider (1) 

the length of time during which the proposed intervenor knew or 

reasonably should have known of the interest in the case before moving to 

intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of 

the proposed intervenor's failure to move for intervention as soon as it 

knew or reasonably should have known of its interest; (3) the extent of 

prejudice to the proposed intervenor if the motion is denied; and (4) the 

existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a 

determination that their motion was timely. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. 

However, we must also keep in mind that “[t]imeliness is not a word of 

exactitude or of precisely measurable dimensions. The requirement of 

timeliness must have accommodating flexibility toward both the court and 

the litigants if it is to be successfully employed to regulate intervention in 

the interest of justice.” Id. (quoting McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 

1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)).

Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d at 1259. Rule 24(b) also requires 

that a court “consider whether [permissive] intervention will unduly delay or 

prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

Neither of the original parties have opposed Natures Way’s motion, and 

considering the record, the Court finds no reason to believe that permissive 

intervention will cause undue delay or prejudice to the original parties, or that the 

motion is untimely. Cf. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d at 1259-60 

Case 1:14-cv-00329-N Document 23 Filed 03/31/15 Page 13 of 15
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(“Georgia contends that SeFPC's motion is untimely because SeFPC knew of the 

litigation and had copies of the papers in the case since February 2001, and did not 

move to intervene until August 2001, after discovery was largely complete and the 

parties had agreed upon a schedule for the briefing of the case. We do not believe 

that a delay of six months in itself constitutes untimeliness. See [Chiles, 865 F.2d at 

1213] (finding motion timely when filed seven months after the case was filed). 

Although in Chiles we observed discovery had not yet begun, in this case SeFPC's 

intervention did not delay the proceedings and the court had yet to take significant 

action. Therefore, we do not believe that the existing parties will be prejudiced by 

SeFPC's intervention, and SeFPC would be prejudiced if its motion is denied. See id.

Accordingly, we find that its motion to intervene was timely.”).8

Accordingly, the Court finds that Natures Way’s motion to intervene (Doc. 20) 

is due to be GRANTED as to its request for permissive intervention under Rule 

24(b).

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that Natures 

Way’s Motion for Leave to Intervene (Doc. 20) is GRANTED as to its request for 

 8 Natures Way’s Complaint in Intervention also appears to allege an independent basis for 

subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, in that it asserts claims for breach of a maritime 

charter agreement. See Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd. v. Europa Cruises Corp., 188 F.3d 1317, 

1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Sea Lane's allegations of defendants' breaches of the charter 

agreement compose the gravamen of the complaint. The complaint therefore falls within 

the district court's admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 

735, 81 S. Ct. 886, 890, 6 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1961) (‘Without doubt a contract for hire either of a 

ship or of the sailors and officers to man her is within the admiralty jurisdiction.’); Jack 

Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1970) (‘[T]he charter provisions of the 

contract are maritime in nature ... and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district 

court.’).” (footnote omitted)).

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permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) and DENIED as to its request for 

intervention of right under Rule 24(a). Natures Way shall file and serve its 

Complaint in Intervention no later than Tuesday, April 7, 2015.

DONE and ORDERED this the 31st day of March 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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