In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-2961

AUDREY GOODWIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF ILLINOIS; and RANDY KORNEGAY and

KIP MECUM, in their individual capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 04 C 2026—Michael P. McCuskey, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2006—DECIDED MARCH 31, 2006

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and SYKES,

Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge. Audrey Goodwin, a building service worker foreman for the University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign, claims that she was demoted as a

result of unlawful race- and sex-based discrimination. She

has sued the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois under Title VII and the supervisors who she claims

demoted her under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court

granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts.

Goodwin now appeals. Because we conclude that Goodwin
2 No. 05-2961

has successfully established a prima facie case under

McDonnell Douglas indirect method of proof and

has created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the

University’s proffered reasons for her demotion were

pretextual, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

I. Background

Audrey Goodwin is a black female. She has worked for the

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign since 1978,

first as a building service worker (“BSW”) and then as a

BSW foreman. During the time period relevant to

this lawsuit, Goodwin’s supervisors included Randy

Kornegay, the superintendent of building services, and

Kip Mecum, the director of operations and transportation

services. Kornegay is a black male, and Mecum is a

white male. Goodwin’s immediate supervisor was Charles

Hassell, the assistant superintendent of the day shift.

From the time she was hired until 1998, Goodwin worked

“deep nights,” first as a BSW and then as a BSW foreman.

Her supervisors, including Kornegay and Mecum, eventually promoted her to the day shift as foreman of the moving

crew. Goodwin claims that throughout her tenure at the

University, her work record was well-regarded before

January 2002—a claim that the defendants do not dispute

on appeal.

The events leading to this lawsuit began on January 17,

2002, in Goodwin’s office. Goodwin’s office was located

in the corner of a large space dedicated to the moving crew.

It contained the time clock for the BSWs, and, every day at

the beginning and end of each shift, the BSWs and the

truck drivers who reported to Goodwin would clock in and

out there. Near the end of her shift, Goodwin was checking

her e-mail while employees were waiting to clock out. The
No. 05-2961 3

employees in the vicinity of Goodwin’s desk were James

Gillin, Elijah Green, Jack Hall, Jim McConkey, Donna

Rokos, and Donald Wisehart. Goodwin opened an e-mail

that had been sent to her university e-mail account. The email contained an image of at least three scantily-clad

women, each weighing over 1,000 pounds, eating. Their

naked breasts were resting on a table.

Goodwin claims that when she saw this e-mail, she made

an involuntary exclamation in the nature of “That’s so

terrible!” She claims that she was then distracted by a

work-related phone call and left the image on the

screen as she spoke on the telephone. As she was attending

to business, she claims that the employees around her

office, whose curiosity had been aroused by her exclamation, walked around her desk and looked at the image on

her computer screen.

The defendants claim that Goodwin’s “involuntary exclamation” was actually a comment intended to draw

the employees’ attention to the image, and that she

turned the computer screen around so that the employees

could better view the picture. The defendants also claim

that three of the employees, Hall, Rokos, and Wisehart,

heard Goodwin comment that if her breasts were that big,

she would cut them off. Only one employee, Rokos, claims

to have been offended by the picture.

Rokos reported the incident to Ron Burwell, a transportation foreman. Both Burwell and Rokos had previously

complained about Goodwin in her capacity as a manager.

Burwell advised Rokos to file a complaint against Goodwin.

The next day, Rokos contacted Goodwin’s immediate

supervisor, Charles Hassell, and set up a meeting for the

next day.

Goodwin claims that Hassell called her the day after the

incident, January 18, and asked if she knew why Rokos
4 No. 05-2961

wanted to see him. Goodwin claims that after thinking

about what might have prompted Rokos’s request, she

told Hassell about the e-mail incident. According to Goodwin, she was honest about the contents of the e-mail, and

after she finished telling Hassell about the incident, he

replied, “That’s not so bad.” Hassell has testified that he

does not recall this conversation.

Hassell and Rokos met as planned on January 18, and

after the meeting, Hassell discussed the incident with his

supervisor, Kornegay. Kornegay and Hassell decided that

it would be necessary to conduct an investigation.

On January 24, Goodwin met with Hassell and Tracy

Osby, the department’s public functions supervisor. During

this meeting, Goodwin admitted that she had received the

vulgar e-mail, denied that she had invited others to look

at it, and was given a paper with the heading “E-Mail

Etiquette.” Goodwin testified that Hassell told her that

he believed that she likely drew attention to the e-mail

through an involuntary exclamation or gesture, and asked

her to try to control her emotions better. Goodwin also

testified that at the end of that meeting, she asked, “Is that

it?” and Hassell replied, “Yes.” Goodwin claims that at the

close of the meeting, she was under the impression that the

matter had been resolved.

The defendants claim that on January 25, Goodwin

approached James Gillin, one of the employees under her

supervision who was present during the e-mail incident.

They allege that Goodwin asked Gillin if he had seen the email picture. When he responded that he had, Goodwin

allegedly told him that if he told supervisors that he

had seen it, “it would hurt [him] in the long run in trying to

become a supervisor or foreman or anything.” According to

the defendants, Gillin told Rokos and another BSW, Donald

Wisehart, about Goodwin’s comment on the same day.
No. 05-2961 5

As part of their investigation into the incident, Hassell,

Kornegay, and Osby interviewed Rokos, Hall, Gillin, Green,

and McConkey regarding the incident on January 17.

During her interview, Rokos informed Kornegay that she

believed that Goodwin had threatened Gillin. Kornegay

asked Gillin about these alleged threats during his interview. Gillin agreed that Goodwin had told him to deny that

the e-mail incident occurred if he was interested in advancing within the department.

Throughout the proceedings in this case, Goodwin has

denied mentioning the e-mail incident to Gillin or threatening him in any way. She claims that Gillin did not discuss

any desire to be promoted with her until after January 25,

and that even if he had, she would not have been in a

position to make recommendations or decisions about

promotions. She points out that by the time the alleged

intimidation occurred, she had already voluntarily discussed what happened on January 17 during the meeting

on January 24 with Hassell and Osby and, she claims, when

Hassell called her to discuss the reason that Rokos had

requested a meeting. In addition, she has testified that by

the date that Gillin alleges that she intimidated him, she

believed that the entire matter had been resolved. She

notes that Gillin had already been disciplined for lying to

supervisors at the time he made these accusations, and that

Gillin could not name the date of the alleged intimidation

until he consulted with Rokos and another personnel

service employee.

Goodwin claims that as part of Hassell and Kornegay’s

investigation, Hassell came to her office in early February to see if he could locate the vulgar e-mail in her

computer’s deleted e-mail folder. Goodwin alleges that

Hassell told her that it was rumored that she was “trying to

be more than what [she was.]” She testified that she then

asked Hassell what she was doing wrong. She claims that

Hassell replied, “People don’t like you because, historically,
6 No. 05-2961

this is a white male position. You are a strong black female,

and people don’t like that. You dress profession[ally], you

are strict and you enforce the rules, and people don’t like

that.” Hassell testified that he does not remember making

that statement and, in response to a leading question,

testified that he “would not make that kind of statement.”

Kornegay testified that he believed Gillin’s intimidation accusation was credible. He initiated a pre-disciplinary

meeting with Goodwin. Two pre-disciplinary meetings were

held during the month of February. On March 8, 2002,

Kornegay signed and delivered to Goodwin an intent to file

notice of demotion. The same day, he placed Goodwin on

administrative leave with pay. On March 13, a civil service

reconciliation meeting was held, but nevertheless, Goodwin

was demoted effective March 15, 2002. The reasons given

for the demotion were abuse of authority, intimidation of an

employee to withhold or misrepresent information, which

creates a hostile work environment, and poor

judgment/conduct unbecoming a supervisor.

The parties dispute who was responsible for the decision to demote Goodwin. All parties agree that Kornegay

was involved, but Goodwin claims that Kip Mecum could

have overridden Kornegay’s decision. The defendants

claim that Kornegay was solely responsible for the demotion

and that, although Kornegay did consult Mecum when

deciding whether to demote Goodwin, Kornegay had the

final authority in the matter. Although neither party claims

that Hassell had the authority to demote Goodwin, Goodwin

claims that Hassell was integral to Kornegay’s investigation

and that he recommended that Kornegay demote Goodwin.

Goodwin filed a grievance with the State University

Civil Service System. A hearing officer conducted an

administrative hearing on April 24, 2002. On May 31, 2002,

the hearing officer issued his findings of fact. The hearing

officer found that Gillin’s intimidation claim was not
No. 05-2961 7

credible, that Goodwin had made an involuntary exclamation when she viewed the e-mail, and that the employees

needed to walk around Goodwin’s desk to view the image;

the hearing officer further stated that the incident had been

“blown totally out of proportion.” On September 18, 2002,

the University Civil Service Merit Board (“the Merit

Board”) issued a final decision and order. The Merit Board

determined that the University had failed to establish just

cause for Goodwin’s demotion and ordered that she be

immediately reassigned to perform the duties of her former

classification without loss of compensation.

Goodwin was reinstated to BSW Foreman by the end

of September, and received the difference in pay between a

BSW and a BSW Foreman for the period of her demotion.

Although Goodwin received her former title of BSW Foreman, her position changed from foreman of the moving crew

to foreman of the cleaning crew. Her job was later reclassified as an office job, and she no longer directly supervises

BSWs. The defendants claim that the latter job switch was

because the University was concerned that the union was

targeting Goodwin, and so she was moved for her own wellbeing. Goodwin complains that neither of the new job

assignments provides the same opportunities for overtime

pay as her old job; she argues that she loses $10,000 to

$15,000 per year in overtime pay. She also claims that the

cleaning crew position was not as prestigious as the moving

crew position.

The defendants have produced no evidence that any other

employee has ever been disciplined for receiving personal email or vulgar e-mail. Goodwin has identified three employees whom she considers to be similarly situated to herself,

and who had not received as severe a punishment for what

she believes to be similar offenses. Those employees, their

offenses, and their punishments will be discussed below

with more specificity.
8 No. 05-2961

In February 2004, Goodwin filed suit against the Board of

Trustees of the University of Illinois (“the University”),

Kornegay, and Mecum, alleging that the University had

discriminated against her on the basis of her race and sex

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (“Title VII”), and her age, in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and that Mecum and Kornegay had

denied her right to equal protection of the law in violation of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1865, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (“§ 1983”). The district court dismissed the age

discrimination claim, finding it barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, in August 2004. That decision is not appealed.

At issue in this case is the district court’s July 2005 grant

of summary judgment to the defendants on the Title VII

and § 1983 claims. The district court reasoned that because

Goodwin had not alleged direct or circumstantial evidence

of discrimination, and had failed to indirectly prove discrimination using the burden-shifting method outlined in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the

defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Goodwin now appeals that decision, claiming that she has

proven discrimination through direct or circumstantial

evidence, and that she has also indirectly proven discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas indirect burdenshifting method.

II. Discussion

A. McDonnell Douglas analysis

In order to indirectly establish proof of discrimination in

her Title VII claim, Goodwin must first establish the prima

facie elements set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Those elements are: (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job

satisfactorily; (3) she suffered an adverse employment
No. 05-2961 9

action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her

protected class were treated more favorably. Traylor v.

Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002).

If Goodwin successfully establishes each element of the

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the University to

assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

challenged action. Simmons v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d

488, 492 (7th Cir. 2002). If it does so, the burden then shifts

back to Goodwin to present evidence that would allow the

trier of fact to conclude that the University’s proffered

reason is pretextual. Id. This method can also be used to

establish discrimination for the § 1983 action against

Kornegay and Mecum. Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d

965, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Am. Nurses Assoc. v.

State of Ill., 783 F.2d 716, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1986); Yarbrough

v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1986);

Ramsey v. Am. Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1307 (7th Cir.

1985)).

The district court ruled that Goodwin did not meet the

fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test because she did

not show a similarly situated individual outside of

her protected class who was not disciplined as severely.

Although Goodwin suggested three individuals that

she believed satisfied this prong of the test, the district

court found that each was distinguishable.

First, Goodwin offered defendant Mecum himself as

a similarly situated employee. Mecum admitted that he had

received vulgar jokes on his university e-mail account.

Goodwin notes that he has never been demoted. We agree

with the district court that Mecum is not similarly situated

to Goodwin. Mecum was in a more senior position, and thus

did not “deal with the same supervisor” as Goodwin. Peele

v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 330 (7th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617-

18 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

324 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2003). Assuming at this point
10 No. 05-2961

that Mecum was involved in the decision to demote

Goodwin, which we must since that is what Goodwin herself

alleges in her § 1983 claim against him, Goodwin can argue

at best that Mecum was hypocritical in not disciplining

himself for similar conduct.

Goodwin next suggests that Charles Elder, a white male

BSW, is a similarly situated individual who was treated

more favorably. Elder was caught using university computers to access pornography on the internet. He received

only a letter of warning for his conduct. The district

court ruled that Elder was not similarly situated because he

was not a supervisor and had not been accused of showing

the pornography to other co-workers.

Goodwin cites this court’s opinion in Ezell v. Potter, 400

F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2005), to support her position that Elder

is similarly situated. In that case, a postal worker who lost

certified mail was deemed similarly situated to the plaintiff,

who was accused of taking a long lunch hour. The panel

dismissed the postal service’s claim that the plaintiff had

not produced evidence to show that misplacing mail was a

“serious matter.” The court reasoned, “This is a curious

claim from an entity whose primary business is delivering

mail. Misplacing certified mail, that is, mail that has been

designated as especially important by its sender, would

seem to be a serious matter. . . . [W]e may infer [from the

termination of another employee for merely delaying mail]

that losing mail would . . . be a serious offense, at least as

serious as taking a long lunch.” Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1050.

Here, however, it is not so obvious that accessing pornography affected Elder’s job performance that we may “infer

that [it] would . . . be a serious offense.” We believe that this

case is distinguishable from Ezell, as accessing pornography

has nothing to do with the University’s “primary business.”

The University could quite legitimately believe that allowing subordinate employees to see a vulgar image negatively
No. 05-2961 11

affects job performance much more than accessing such an

image in private. Moreover, unlike Ezell, the record does

not reflect that another employee was terminated for a

similar offense. Like the district court, we also do not

believe that Elder and Goodwin are similarly situated.

We are, however, persuaded that Ray Northway, the final

employee that Goodwin has proffered, is similarly situated

to Goodwin within the meaning of the McDonnell Douglas

test. Northway, a white, male BSW foreman, threw a bottle

cap at a female BSW foreman and told her to “shove it up

[her] ass.” He received a written letter of warning, but was

not demoted. The district court found that Northway was

not similarly situated to Goodwin because the incident had

occurred during a heated argument and did not involve an

adverse interaction with one of the employees that

Northway supervised.

With respect to this individual, we respectfully disagree

with the district court’s analysis. While it is true that

Northway’s conduct involved insulting a co-worker who was

not under his supervision, we believe that requiring

Goodwin to show a supervisor/supervisee interaction in

order to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test would be

applying the indirect method of proof too narrowly. As we

stated in Ezell, “the other employees must have engaged

in similar—not identical—conduct to qualify as similarly

situated.” Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1050. We believe that

Northway’s comment was both vulgar and potentially

threatening, which is the essence of the charges against

Goodwin. Although the two situations are not identical,

they are sufficiently similar, which is all that McDonnell

Douglas requires.

Because the district court did not address the other

prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test, we will briefly do

so here. It is undisputed that Goodwin meets the first

prong, as she is a black female. And although the Univer-
12 No. 05-2961

sity makes a brief argument that Goodwin did not suffer an

adverse employment action, a demotion, even if it is later

rescinded, clearly meets the third prong of the test. See

Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1049; Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 600-

01 (7th Cir. 2000).

Defendants also briefly argue that Goodwin was not

meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations because

of her actions on January 17, 2002, and that she therefore fails the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas

test. This argument assumes its conclusion. The entire

purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test is to determine

whether the action in question was a legitimate reason

for demotion. Goodwin had a satisfactory work record before

January 17, 2002, which is the relevant time frame here.

She has met all prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test and

has successfully shifted the burden of showing legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for her demotion onto the

University.

Naturally, the University has argued that Goodwin’s

conduct in January 2002, i.e., showing University employees a vulgar e-mail and threatening an employee under

her direct supervision, was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to demote her. The burden is then shifted

back to Goodwin to show that this reason is merely a

pretext, and that her demotion was actually prompted by

discriminatory motives.

We conclude that Goodwin has created a material issue of

fact as to whether the e-mail incident and Gillin’s allegation

that Goodwin threatened him were pretextual reasons for

her demotion. The strongest evidence of pretext is Hassell’s

alleged statement that she was “trying to be more than

what [she is]” and that “people” didn’t like her because she

was a strong black female. Although Hassell was not the

final decisionmaker in her demotion, he was involved with

Kornegay’s investigation into the e-mail incident, and

Kornegay has admitted consulting with Hassell before
No. 05-2961 13

1 We are viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Goodwin when making this assessment, as we must at the

summary judgment stage of the proceedings.

making his decision to demote. A race-based comment by a

person close to the decisionmaking process can be thought

suspect, though it is not dispositive.

Adding to Goodwin’s pretext argument are the circumstances surrounding Gillin’s accusation. Gillin had already

been disciplined for lying to supervisors, and the substance

of his allegation is questionable. Arguably, Goodwin, who

had already admitted that the incident occurred and

believed that her “punishment” was a light talking-to and

a handout called “E-mail Etiquette,” would not risk her job

to keep Gillin from discussing the incident.1

 Further, if

Kornegay actually believed Gillin, the question arises why

he did not ask other employees if they had been similarly

threatened. Questions such as these apparently led the

Merit Board hearing officer, viewing the evidence as a

whole, to specifically find that Gillin’s allegations were not

credible. It is reasonable to assume that a jury might

conclude that Kornegay similarly doubted Gillin’s veracity.

This goes to the heart of Goodwin’s pretext argument. It is

our judgment that Goodwin has raised a material issue of

fact regarding Kornegay’s subjective belief in Gillin’s

allegations.

B. Collateral estoppel

Having decided that Goodwin’s claims can be tried under

the McDonnell Douglas standard, the question remains

whether the defendants have been collaterally estopped

from arguing during trial facts that are inconsistent

with the Merit Board hearing officer’s findings of fact.

Goodwin argues that the defendants should not be allowed
14 No. 05-2961

to re-litigate the hearing officer’s findings of fact, including

that the allegations against Goodwin were incredible.

Because we believe that this issue could affect the way the

pretext dispute plays out at trial, we will address it.

In University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797-99

(1986), the Supreme Court held that in § 1983 claims, state

administrative factfinding should be given preclusive effect

on subsequent federal proceedings. The Court held that

“when a state agency acting in a judicial capacity resolves

disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties

have had adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts

must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive

effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.”

Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

We believe that the Merit Board was acting in a judicial

capacity. The Merit Board was created by Illinois law, 110

ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/36o, and is subject to the Illinois

Administrative Review Law, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-101-

5/3-113. A hearing officer presided over an administrative hearing, during which counsel questioned and crossexamined witnesses who were under oath. At the conclusion

of the hearing, the hearing officer issued findings of fact.

The Merit Board issued a final decision and order thereafter. Therefore, our inquiry must focus on whether Illinois

courts would deem the Merit Board hearing officer’s

factfinding or the Merit Board’s final order to be issuepreclusive in the current cause of action.

Under Illinois law, “fact issues finally decided in an

administrative proceeding that is judicial in nature precludes litigation of those same fact issues in a subsequent

proceeding.” Vill. of Oak Park v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment

Sec., 772 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ill. App. 2002) (citing Osborne v.

Kelly, 565 N.E.2d 1340 (Ill. App. 1991)). Collateral estoppel,

also known as issue preclusion, applies when: (1) a material
No. 05-2961 15

fact issue decided in the earlier adjudication is identical to

the one in the current proceeding; (2) there was a final

judgment on the merits in the earlier adjudication; and (3)

the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or

was in privity with a party in the earlier adjudication. Id.

at 953 (citing Midland Hotel Corp. v. Dir. of Employment

Sec., 668 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. 1996)); Gumma v. White, 833

N.E.2d 834, 843 (Ill. 2005); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 451 (Ill. 2000).

Even if these threshold requirements are met, the

doctrine should not be applied unless it is clear that no

unfairness will result to the party that would be estopped

from re-litigating the issue. Savickas, 739 N.E.2d at 451. In

determining whether unfairness results, courts should look

to the party’s incentive to litigate the issue in the prior

action. Id.; see also Talarico v. Dunlap, 685 N.E.2d 325 (Ill.

1997) (holding that criminal guilty plea did not collaterally

estop civil claim issue that medication caused criminal

defendant to commit the crime, because defendant did not

have motivation to argue that issue during the criminal

proceedings).

In this case, the hearing officer decided material issues of

fact. Namely, the hearing officer found that Gillin’s accusations were not credible and that Goodwin had not, as

defendants claim, intentionally shown the vulgar e-mail to

the employees near her office. These facts are relevant to

the pretext inquiry under McDonnell Douglas.

However, we conclude that the hearing officer’s findings of fact cannot constitute a final decision by the

Merit Board. The hearing officer’s findings of fact were

entered on May 31, 2002. Goodwin has not argued, nor have

we found, any statutory authority that binds the Merit

Board to the hearing officer’s findings of fact.

In contrast, the “Decision and Order” of the Merit

Board, dated September 18, 2002, is a final order, yet it did
16 No. 05-2961

not incorporate the hearing officer’s findings of fact. It

merely held that the proceeding had been conducted in

compliance with Illinois law, that the Merit Board had

jurisdiction over the matter, that the “transcript of evidence

and Hearing Record” did not “support and sustain charges

of the Employer,” and that “said Employer has failed to

establish just cause for demotion.” Although the issue of

whether the evidence “supported and sustained the charges

of the Employer” is similar to the issues addressed in the

McDonnell Douglas pretext argument and the hearing

officer’s findings of fact, they are not identical, as required

for collateral estoppel to apply. Therefore, collateral

estoppel stemming from either stage of the Merit Board

proceedings is inappropriate, and Goodwin’s argument fails.

Goodwin has also sued under Title VII, but, as we stated

in Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892

(7th Cir. 1987),

[G]eneral rules of preclusion bar relitigation of administrative fact finding unless there is Congressional intent

to the contrary. The court in Elliott analyzed Title VII

and the history of the 1972 amendments and found that

Congress intended that employees have the right to

trial de novo following administrative proceedings when

contesting a discharge under Title VII[.]

Buckhalter, 820 F.2d at 894; see also Richmond v. St.

Joseph Care Center West, 190 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1999). With

Goodwin unable to prevail on her collateral estoppel

argument regarding her § 1983 claim, so too she cannot

succeed in the same regard with her Title VII claim.

Thus, the proceedings before the Merit Board have not

collaterally estopped defendants from arguing any issue

at trial.
No. 05-2961 17

III. Conclusion

We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-31-06