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-- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T- P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0245n.06 F iled: April 3, 2007 No. 05-1948 No. 05-2642 No. 06-1122 No. 06-1652 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

MARY SCOTT, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,

v. METROPO L I TAN HEA L TH CORPORATI ON, d/b/a METROPOL I TAN HO SPI TAL , a Michig an c or po ratio n, and MI CH AE L F AA S, a n in div idu a l, j o i n t l y an d

s e v e r a l l y, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP EAL F RO M T HE

UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B EF OR E: GU Y, SUH RH EI NR I CH , a

nd GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiff M ar

y Sc o tt ti me ly a p p e a ls f iv e o r d e r s o f

th e d is tr ic t c o u rt: th e g r an t o f s u mma ry judgme nt; the imposi tion of sanctions; the calc ulation of the amount of sanc tions; t he district judg e’s ref usal to rec use himself; and the r efusa l to reconsider the recusal ruling. For the re asons that follow,

we a ff ir m th e or de rs of

the dis tr ic t c ourt

. I.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- The district cour

t ha d jur isdiction over Scott’s discharg e cla im pursuant to the g ener al fe dera l question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue was proper in the Western District of Michig an under the FCA, 31 U .S.C. § 3732(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. We reviewthe entry

of summary

judgme nt de novo. Brain ar d v. A m. Sk

an dia LifeAs su r. Corp. , 432 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 2005)

. Summary judgme nt is proper whe re no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts and the m o ving pa rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Moross Ltd. P’ship v. Flec kenste in Capit al, Inc. , 4 6 6 F. 3 d 5 0 8 , 5 1 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c) ). We c on str

ue the e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he no n- mo van t and

dr aw a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces i n h er fa v o r. Id. The c entra l issue is whether the e vidence prese nts sufficient dis a g re e me nt t o r e qu ir e su bmi ssi on to a jur y or wh e the r i t is so on e -s ide d th a t on e pa rt y mus t pr e va il

as a matter of law

. Id. “The mere exis tence of a scintill a of e vidence in support of [non-movant] ’s position wil l be insufficie nt; there must be evidenc e on which the jury could re asonably find for the plaintiff.” Id

. I n imposing sanc tions ag ainst Scott, the district court invoked Rules 26(g ) and 56(g ) and the court’s inhe rent a

uthority

. We revie w bot h a decision to im pose sanc tions and the deter mination of the amount of sanctions for abuse of discretion. Jordan v. City of Cleve land , 464 F .3 d 584 , 6 00 (6 th Cir. 2006); First Bank of M arietta v

. Hartford Unde rwrit ers Ins. Co. , 307 F.3d 501 ( 6th Cir. 2002). We will find a

n abuse of discretion only if the district c ourt “base d its rulingon an er roneous view of t he law or on a clear ly

err oneous asse ssment of the evide nce.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); Salkil v. Mt. Sterling Tw p. Police De

p’t , 458 F.3d 520, 527- 28 (6th Cir.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- 2006). We will find an abuse of discre tion only when we are left with “the d ef i n i t e an d firm conviction that the court below committed a clea r err or of judg ment . . . .” Sako v. G onzales , 434 F.3d 857, 863 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Finally , we r eview the judge ’s refusal t o rec use hi mself for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jam ieson , 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. de nied , – U

. S. – , 1 2 6 S. Ct

. 2 9 0 9 ( 2 0 0 6 )

. We lik e wi se a

pp ly a bu se -o f- dis c re tio n r e vie w t o the di st ric t c ourt ’s de nia l of Sc ott ’s mot ion

to

rec onsider the r ecusa l decision. Un ite d S tat es v . B ro wn , 449 F.3d 741, 750 ( 6th Cir. 2006). III

. Sc ott a sse rt s a c la im und e r 3 1 U .S. C. § 37 30 (h ), wh ic h p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , Any e mpl oy e e wh o is dis c ha

rg e d .

. . or

in a ny oth e r m ann e r d isc rimi nated a g a ins t in the t erms and conditions of employ ment by his or her e mploy er be cause of lawf ul acts done by the employ ee on behalf of t he employ ee or others in further ance of an action under

this section, i ncluding investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or a ssi sta nc e in a n act io n fil e d o r t o b e fi le d und e r t his se c tio n, sh a ll b e e nti tle d to a ll relief nece ssary

to make the e mploy ee w hole. The fa miliar McD onnell-Douglas burd e n- sh if tin g fr a me wo rk a

pp lie s to r e ta liatio n c la ims

. To establish a prima fac ie case of reta liation, Scott had to show that (1) she eng aged i n p rot ecte d

ac t i v i t y , (2) defenda

nt Metropolitan Hea lth Corporation (“Me tro”) kne w of this exercise of her protec ted rig hts, (3) Metro took an em p l o y m en t action adve rse to her , and (4) there was a causa l

connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity and the a dverse action. Balmer v. HCA, Inc. , 423 F.3d 606, 613-14 (6th Cir. 2005). I f Scott establishes a pr ima fac ie ca se of r etaliation, a presumption of re taliation arises; Metro

may re bu t th a t pr e su mpt ion

by a sse rt inga le g iti ma te , no n- re ta liator y re a so n f or the a dv e rs e a c tio ns .Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- Balmer , 423 F.3d at 614. The burden t hen shi fts back to Scott to show by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that Metro’ s stated lawf ul rea son was a pr etext for reta liation. Id. Scott must then produc e sufficie nt evi dence from which a jury could re asonably

reje ct Metro’ s expl anation and inf er that Metro intentionally

discriminated ag ainst her be cause of protec ted ac tivity

. Id. To sh o w p re t ex t, Scott “must subm it evidence demonstrating that the employ er did not ‘honestly believe’ i n t h e prof

fer ed non-discr iminatory

rea son for its adver se employ ment action.” Id. To inquire into the def end an t ’s honest belief

, the cour t looks to whether the e mploy er c an establish “re asonable relianc e” on the particula rized fac ts that were befor e the e mploy er w hen the decision wa s made. Id . The ke y inquiry is whether the employ er made a rea sonably informed a

nd considere d decision bef

ore taking a dverse action. Id. As this court rec ently

stated: I f there is no rea sonable dispute that the employ er made a “re asonably

informed a

nd considere d decision” that demonstrates a n “honest be lief” in the pr offe red r eason f or the a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n, the c a se sh ou ld be dis mis se d sinc e no rea so na ble jur or c ou ld f ind that th e e mpl oy e r’ s a dv e rs e e mpl oy me nt a c tio n w a s p re te xtua l. Id. L i k e w i s e , t h e S u

p r e m e C o u rt h a s h e l d t h a t t h e r e ar e c a s e s w h e r e a d e f e n d an t i s e n t i t le d to summary judgme nt, despite the plaintiff’s suc cess in makingout a prima fa cie c ase: [A] plaintiff’s prima f

acie case , co mbined with sufficient e vidence to find that the employ er’ s asser

ted justification is false, may permit the trier of fac t to conclude that the employ er unla

wfully discriminated. T h i s i s n o tt o s ay

t h a ts u c h a

s h o w i n g b y

t h e p l a i n t i f

f wi ll a l ways be a de qu a te to sustain a jury ’s findi ng of liability

. Certainly there will be instances where, although thepla int iff

ha s e sta bli sh e d a pr im a facie cas e and s e t fo rth su ffi c ie nt e v ide nc e to rejec t the defendant’s e

xplanation, no rational

factfin der could conclude that the action was discriminator

y. For instance, an employe r would be entitled to judgment as a ma tte r of law if the re c or d c on c lus iv e ly re v e ale d so me oth e r, no nd isc rim ina tor

yCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- reason for the employ er’s de cision , or if the plaintiff cre ated only a we ak issue of f act as to whethe r the e mploy er’ s rea son was untrue and t h er e was a bundant and uncontrove rted indepe ndent evidenc e that no discrimination had oc curr ed. Ree ves v . Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (e mphasis added)

. I n deter mining whe ther S co t t made out a pr ima fac ie ca se, the district cour t considere d wh e the r M e tr o’ s B oa

rd ha d s uf fi c ie nt n oti c e of

Sc ott ’s pr ote c te d a c tiv ity wh e n it te rm inate d h e r i n J anuar y 2003. First, the district cour t had to decide what is requir ed, as a matter of la

w, to place an

e mpl oy e r o n s uf

fi c ie nt no tic e of F CA pr ote c te d a c tiv ity in su c h a sit uatio n. Th e c ourt

he ld t hat Sc ott had to g ive heig htened notice to Metro bec ause he r re sponsibili ties included leg al compliance

. The court then c onsidered eac h instance of alleg ed protected activity proff ere d by Scott and found that

no ne wa s su ff

ic ie nt to g ive Me tr o the re qu isi te no tic e . T he c ourt re fu se d to c on sid e r S c ott ’s c la im that she met with Fa as in secr et to express conce rns about p o s s i b l y illega l vascular -study compensation, be cause that claim contra dicted her deposition te stimony

. The c ourt deter mined that Scott did not give ade quate notice of her possible intent to br ing an F CA qui tam a c tio n unti l Apr il 20 02 , w he n Sc ott re a c te d to no tic e of he r re a ssi g nme nt by g oin g to the Exe c uti ve Com mit te e wi th

c omp lia nc e iss ue s. Th e c ourt

re a so ne d, “ on

Sc ott ’s ow n th e or

y , F a a s h ad a lr e a dy

de te rm ine d to terminate her befor e April 2002,” so Fa as’s initial dec ision to terminate could n o t h av e b een motivated by

a desire to retaliate for F CA protecte d activity

. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . M

e tro . H e alt h Corp. , 375 F. Supp. 2d 626, 646 (W.D. Mich. 2005). The district cour

t concluded its analy sis of Scott’s prima fac ie ca se by noting the implications of the undisputed fa ct that Fa as was repla ced as her superior and de cisionmaker a s soon as she ra ised compliance issues on April 17, 2002. The district cour t rea soned:Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld no t have sa id t hat Sc ott “ e sse nti a lly” g ot n e w s up e rv iso rs in A pr il 1 2002; she lit e ra lly

and e nti re ly

g ot n e w s up e rv iso rs . Sc ott ha s n ot d isp ute d th a t f

ro m mi d- Ap ri l onwar d, she re ported not to Fa as but only to the Boa

rd and F rase r. The district co u rt al so stated that Scott “withheld from the c orporation tapes evidenc ing 2 corpor ate minutes.” United St ates v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 375 F. Supp. 2d 626, 646 (W.D. Mich. 2005). Howe ver, unlike the alteration of the minutes, Scott di d not expressly admit withholding the ta pe s.

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-- Fur thermore , there is an eve n more ba sic ca usal problem fo r Scott’s theory of liability . The c ausal c hain betwe en the “ protec ted ac tivity ” and disc harg e wa s broken asunder when she broug ht her prote cted a ctivity to the attention of [Metro’s outside empl o y m ent-lawcounsel Jeff] Fra ser in Apr il 2002. This act saved he r fr om termination by

Fa as [becau s e i t caused the B oard to re scind her just-a nnounced rea ssignment to the de ad-e nd, temporar y Bor g ess projec t] and esse ntially g ave he r [1] new supe rvisors – the B oard a nd Fr aser . United States v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 375 F. Supp. 2d 626, 646 (W.D. Mich. 2005). The c ourt conc luded by

stating that, eve n i f Scott could make out a prima fa cie c ase, defe ndants are entitled to summar y judgme nt. Even putting a side all other c omplaints about Scott’s conduct, Me tro indisputably knew, be fore it terminated her , that she surreptitiousl y altere d board minutes and prese nted them as the true minutes. The court also deter mined that Scott had not shown

a g e nu ine iss ue a s to wh e the r the bo ard te rm inate d he r be c a us e it h on e stl y

be lie ve d th e c omp la int s: Plaintiff has admitted fac ts which establish beyond any g enuine issue of

materia l fac t that she wrong ly

altere d corpor ate r ecor ds . . . . [2]

* * * Finally . . . Plaintiff also fails to make a showing to establish that the [st ated] rea sons for ter mination were prete x tual. I n this case, the de cision makers w ere the B oard a nd Fr aser, i n d ep endent of

Fa as. There is no evide nce raising a serious doubt that the Board [had] a “reasonable belief” a s t o t he manifold reasons for discharging Plain tif f – i .e ., . . . in su bo rd

ina tio n a s to Fras e r, re

fus al to o be

ytheprot ocol, inappropriate conduct as to manageme nt assessment [the OCI e valuations] , verbal abuse of coll ea gues, efforts to manipulate manageme nt assessments, disparagingCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- fe llo w of fic e rs [ in f ro nt o f he r s ub or

din ate s] , a nd thr e ate nin g to re tal iat e ag ain st sta ff t o n am e a fe w re as on s. Th is i s a mou nta in n ot a

mol e hil l. United States v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 3 75 F . Su pp . 2 d 6 26 , 64 6, 64 7 ( W.D . M ic h. 20 05 ) ( e mph a sis added)

. Me tr o p oin ts o ut t hat a s so on

a s Sc ott ma de he r co mpl ianc e and e mpl oy me nt c omp la int s to the Executive Commit tee ( in meeting s on April 19, 20, and 22, 2002), it re scinded Scott’s planne d

rea ssignme n t and hired law firms to investig ate he r alleg ations. Both firms re ported to the B oard that Scott had interfe red w ith their investigatio n s b y creating and submitting fa lse evidenc e (the doctore d minutes), hiding e vidence (the tape s), and attempting to influence or intimidate her staf f

awa y fr om h on e stl y

c oo pe ratin g wi th t

he inv e sti g a tio n. I n a dd iti on , th e B oa rd ha d nume ro us re po rt s of Scott’s bizarre, disruptive, distra cting , rude, thre atening , and unpr o fe s s ional conduct towa rds superiors, f

ellow manag ers, and staff. Thus, Metro contends that there is no ge nuine issue that the Boa rd honestly

believed that these re ports wer e true and that they war rante d Scott’s termination. On April 17, CPO Sefton told S cott that Metro wa s g oing t o ch an g e her role so that she would have no dir ect r eports and w ould manag e only the B org ess re lationship

. Ho we v er , the

rea ssignment ne ver took plac e. Scott immediately contac ted her

lawy er and F rase r, who sche duled meeting s for the 19th, 20th, and 22nd befor e the Ex ecutive Commi ttee. That same da y , as soon as Fr aser told Faa s about Scott’s p rese ntation of compliance and employ ment law conc erns to the Exe c uti ve Com mit te e , F a a s r e sc ind e d th e pla nn e d r e a ssi g nme nt. I t is undisput ed that Metro ne ver implement e d th e r eassig nment. Acc ording ly , Scott suffere d

no tang ibl e ha

rm a s a re su lt of the imm e diate ly -r e sc ind e d r e a ssi g nme nt a nn ounc e me nt. Th e law i nCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- our circuit is that actions that ar e not implemented ar e not adve rse e mploy ment actions. Se e Mi tc he ll v. Vande rbilt Univ. , 389 F.3d 177, 182 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (“Gr aham’ s proposals to reduc e Mitchell’s pay , alter his employ

ment status, and re assig n him . . . were never implemented and ther ef

o re not adver se employ

ment actions.”)

. About two months a fter the aborte d rea ssignment, Metro place d Scott on pa id leave pe nding investigation. I n our circ uit, “‘a suspe nsion with pay and full bene fits pending a timely investigation into suspec ted wrong doing is not an adver se employ ment action.’” Peltier v. United States , 388 F.3d 9 8 4 , 9 8 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g W hite v. Burlington No. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 364 F.3d 789, 803 (6th Cir. 2004) (e n banc) , aff’d o.g. , – U.S. –, 126 S. C t. 2405 (2006)). Be cause the unimplemented Apr il 2002 reassig nment and the June 2002 paid leave wer e not materia lly adver se actions, they cannot serve as the basis for an FCA retaliation claim. That lea ves only one mater ially

adver se ac tion: S cott’s termination in J anuar y 2003. E v en as s u m i n g arguendo t h at S co t t could make out a prima fa cie c ase of

FCA re taliation wi th re g ard to he r Janu ary 20 03 te rm inatio n, Me tr o wa s sti ll e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e Metro’s state d rea sons for the ter mination were not pretexts for FCA reta liation. Scott fails to show

a re asonable dispute as to whether Metro made a “rea sonably informed a nd considere d decision” that de mon str a te s an “ ho ne st b e lie f” in t he pr of fe re d r e a so ns . On summary judgme nt, the question is not whether the complaints about Scott were “true ” or made in good f

aith. L ikewise, the que stion is not whether Scott’s asserte d rea sons for alter ing the minutes are sinc ere , cre dible, or leg itimate. The question is w hether Scott ha s established a g enuine issue as t o wh ether

Metro honestly believ ed that the complaints wer e true and wa rra nted herCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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-- termination. Scott has not done so. Cf. Balmer , 423 F.3d at 615 (af firming summary

judgme nt for

e mpl oy e r o n r e ta liatio n clai m and stat ing , “ Ev e n if a g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t r e ma ins a s to whether Plaintiff improperly

used HCI ’s funds to pay

for personal lega l resea

rch, Plaintiff ha s put forth no evide nce sug g esting that [t he person ] who ul timately made the decision to end Plaintiff’s employ ment, did not ‘honestly

believe’ that Plaintiff had misused HCI ’s funds.”)

. I t cannot be sa id that Metro’s dec ision to t erminate Scott was not “re asonably informed a

nd considere d.” F irst, Metro did not rea ch that dec ision early on in Scott’s employ

ment, without giving her a n opportunity

to acc limate to the org anization and develop a rec ord and r eputation. For instance, if Scott had sta

rted w o rk i n g fo r Metro in 2000 or 2001 and started r aising compliance

co n ce rn s i m m ed i at el y o r s h o rt l y t h er ea ft er , a r ea s o n ab l e j u ry m i gh ts u s p ec tt h at M et ro t o o k u mb ra ge at her FCA prote cted a ctivity

and thus dec ided not to g ive her a cha nce. Scott beg an wor

king f or Me tr o a ro un d Jan ua ry 1, 19 98 , and

e ve n h e r v e rs ion

of e ve nts a lle g e s th a t F a a s d id n ot d e c ide to terminate he r unt il over four y ear s later, shortly befor e the aborted Apr il 2002 reassig nment. After the Executive Commit tee a nd Fr as er repla ced F aas a s Scott’s direct super ior in April 2002, the committee did not decide to ter minate Scott until s ometime late in 2002. Second, Metro’s decision to terminate Scott wa s supported by widespre ad complaints about Scott’s conduct. I f Metro ha d terminated Scott af ter rec eiving only one or two complaints, one mig ht argue that the c omplaints stemmed merely from the kind of routine personality clashe s and eve ry day disag ree ments that can de velop in the workpla ce, ev en when the pa rticipants ar e not unstable, uncooper ative, or be lliger ent – j ust a person or t wo whom Scott “rubbe d the wrongway” and vic e

ve rs a . In th a t si tuatio n, a re a so na ble ju ry mi gh t be lie ve tha t Me tr o w a s se izin g up on the fi rs tCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - complaints to come alongas conve nient prete x ts to ge t rid of her and stop her c ompliance complaints. But here , it is undisputed that Metro re ceive d complaints from a la rg e and dive rse g roup

o f pe o p l e o v er

a p er i o d o f y ea rs . T h er e i s n o b as i s fo r S co t t ’s as s er t i o nt h at M et ro h adt o d i g t h ro u gh

“ fi ve y e ars of

pe rf or manc e , th ou sand s o f e- ma ils , r e po rt s, int e ra c tio ns , e tc . in or de r t o e xtra c t on ly a handful of ‘ne g ative’ inter actions . . . .” Th ir d, Me tr o d oe s no t jus tif y its de c isi on to te rm inate Sc ott on ly by re fe re nc e to c omp la int s that came from other senior mana g ers. I f Metro ha d done so, a r easona ble jury might conc lude that the complaints wer e mer ely the re sult of the “turf w ars” that can oc cur betwee n office rs who have substantial authority

within a co rporation and compete w ith each othe r for influence and a w ide po rt fol io of jo b du ti es. Ex amp les mi ght b e th e al legat io ns th at S cot t at tem pt ed t o u nd erm in e C FO Sme de s and

pr e ve nt h im f

ro m a ssumin g po we rs that sh e be lie ve d s ho uld be he r o wn ; or

that Sc ott infring ed on the r ole of Christine L awr ence with respec t to the sex ual har assment matter at one of Metro’s of

f-c ampus clinics. But, it is undisputed that Metro rec eived c omplaints from people who

we re no t f

e llo w m ana g e rs and

the re fo re Sc ott ’s dir e c t po te nti a l r iva ls. Four th, Metro does not justify its decision to terminate Scott based only on complaints from her subor dinates, par

ticularly s u bordinates who Scott could show ha d poor work r ecor ds or wer e eventually

fired or encour ag ed to leave Metro. I f those we re the only complaints Metro re ceive d,

a re asonable jury

might conc lude that Metro did not honestly believe the problem wa s Scott rather than the underpe rfor

ming employ ees. I n other words, a jury might conclude that Met ro k n ew t he complainer s simply

rese nted Scott for re quiring them to work hard , gi v i n g them neg ativeCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - evaluations, or rec ommending a ction ag ainst them based on the ir perf ormanc e or attitude. Rather, it i s und isp ute d th a t Me tr o r e c e ive d c omp la int s fr om pe op le wh o w e re ne ve r S c ott ’s su bo rd inate s. Fifth, Metro had no rea son to be lieve that any of the g rounds for termi n at i n g h er we re improving. As to Sc ott ’s a lle g e d c on fl ic ts w ithc ow or ke rs and mis tr e a tme nt o f s ub or din a te s, Sc ott prese nts no evidence that the complaints taper ed off in number or sever ity

. Nor doe s she alleg e that

s h e t ri edt o ad dre s s t h e gr av am en o f t h e c o mp l ai n t s an d ch an ge h o w s h e c am e a cr o s s t o a w i d e r an ge of c oll e a g ue s and

su bo rd inate s –

rathe r t ha n me re ly a tta c kin g the c omp la ina

nts

. Wit h reg ard to S cott’s admit ted alteration of t he mi nutes, there is no evidenc e that she eve r

a po log ize d a

nd be g an to be have e thi c a lly

and c oo pe ra te wi th h e r s up e ri or s and

wi th M e tr o’ s c ouns e l. I nstead, Metr o had re ason to believe that Scott continued to eng ag e in unethica l a nd untrustworthy conduct: in J une and J uly 2002, she first claimed not to have any tapes of the Boa

rd mee ting, then “found” one tape, then produce d that tape with a portion appar ently era sed (the v er y p o rt i o n t hat would have matched the or igina l minutes and contradic ted her alterations). Me tr o a lso ha d r e a so n to be lie ve that Scott con tin ue d to be unc oo pe ra

tiv e and dis ob e die nt:

a ft e r s ig nin g the Ap ri l 29 , 2 00 2, a g re e me nt p ro mis ingto k eep th e sit uatio n c on fi de nti a l, s he tol d

su bo rd inate s tha t she wa s no long e r re po rt ing to F a a s. Af te r attor ne y s Fr a se r a

nd Va lia nt r e pe a te dly instructed Scott not to g ather documents t hat were not in her possession (and not to have her staf f d o s o ) , S c o t t ’ s s u

b o r d i n a t e s r e p o rt e d

t h a ts h e c o n t i n u e d

t o d o s o an yw ay. I n summary , Metro had g ood rea son to believe that Scott showed no si gns of ce asing her objectionable be havior.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 2

- - Sixth, and sig nif ic ant f or a re ta liatio n c a se , Met

ro did no t cla im to hav e re c e ive d c omp la int s

a b o u t S c o t to n l y after sh e we nt t o th e Exe c uti ve Com mit te e wi th h e r c omp lia nc e c omp la int s in

Ap ri l 2002. I f M e tr o h a d d on e so , a re a so na ble jur y mig ht sus pe c t tha t th e c omp la int s w e re no t le g iti ma te in the sense of being independe ntly made by the complaining parties. I n other wor ds, a jury might

c on c lud e fr om t

he tim ingof

the c omp la int s tha t Metro ha d en c oura g e d suc h c omp la int s in or de r t o bu ild a case for fi ri ngSc ott , w he n it s r e a l mo tiv e wa s to re ta liate fo r h e r F CA a c tiv ity . B ut i t is

un dis pu te d th a t Me tr o r e c e ive d c omp la int s a bo ut S c ott

lon g be fo re sh e wen t to the c omm itt e e in April 2002. Se ve nth , a

nd pe rh a ps mos t si g nif

ic ant, Me tr o d id n ot m e re ly a c c e pt c omp la int s a

bo ut S c ott at face value wit hout taking the t ime to let events unfold and g ive Scott a fa ir cha nce. B y waiting as long as it did to terminate Scott, M etro took t he time to see whether the complaints evince d a pattern of behavior by Scott that it could not tolerate

. On t his extreme and voluminous rec ord, Metro can hone stly

say that it a ct ed o n l y af

t er pr essed to do so by

the shee r number of

complaints, the leng th of time and differe nt contexts cover ed by the complaints, and the dive rsity of sourc es for

the

c omp l a i n t s . M o r e o v e r , F r a s e r i n t e r v i e w e d S c o t t ’ s s u

b o r d i n a t e s i nA p r i l

- M ay

2 0 0 2 – an d S c ott

c ann ot d e ny

that F ra se r d id s o, no r c omp la in t hat Me tr o d e lib e ra

te ly cho se inte rv ie we e s w ho m it knew disliked Scott, beca use Sc ott he rse lf urg ed F rase r to meet with her subo rd i n at es an d even i d en t i fi edt h e p eo p l e w i t h wh o m s h e wa n t edh i m t o s p ea k

. T h u s , i ti s u n t en ab l e f o r S co t tt o ch ar ge that Metro “mer ely rubber -stamped” the complaints with “no indepe ndent investig ation” of its own. So far we have f

ocused o n t h e co m plaints ag ainst Scott and her r elationship with her superiors, pe ers, a

nd subordinates. This is appropr iate, bec ause suc h evidenc e constitutes so muchCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 3

- - of the e normous rec ord in this case and Scott cannot convince a rea sonable jury that Metro did not be lie ve that th e c omp la int s were tr ue a nd se ri ou s e no ug h to wa

rr ant h e r t e rm inatio n. B ut t he re is another , independe nt rea son to aff irm summary judgme nt. Scott cannot convince a rea sonable jury that Metro did not believe that she secretly altere d the minutes of a B oard me eting , withheld tapes of that mee ting, a

nd disobey ed re peate d instruction to stop gathe ring documents not in her po sse ssi on

– a nd that su c h c on du c t w arr ante d te rm inatio n a s w e ll. Finally , in an attempt to show that her te rmination was not a “ rea son ab l y i n fo rmed a nd considere d” dec ision (which Metro needs for i ts “honest be lief” de fense ), Scott complains that the Boa rd shoul d h av e i nvestig ated he r alter ation of the minutes. This contention is untenable to the point of absurdity . Under the unusual circ umstances of this case, f urther “ investigation” into Scott’s

a lte ratio n o f t

he min ute s w a s unn e c e ssa

ry and po int le ss. Scott ex pressly

admitted that she sec retly altere d the cor

porate minutes. T h at al o ne wa s

su ff ic ie nt t o w arr ant S c ott ’s dis c ha rg e . Sco tt did no t con ta c t her su pe ri or s or o the r p art ic ipa

nts in the meetingto express her view that Wiest’s minutes neede d to be cor rec ted. I f she ha d done so and t h e B o ar d ci t edh er p ro p o s al t o re v i s e t h e m i n u t es as a r ea s o n fo r t er m i n at i o nwi t h o u ti n v es t i gat i n g, Me tr o mi g ht n ot h a ve an “ ho ne st b e lie f” de fe ns e to p re te xt. But Scott did not procee d in a n honest, ethica l fashion with reg ard to the minutes. Rather , she unilaterally and by stealth altere d the minutes and g ot caug ht tr y ing to pa ss of

f her version as the orig inal by

“re turning ” the altered version to her secre tary , Wiest, and by prese nting the a ltered version to Metro’ s outside counsel without acknow ledg ing the unauthori z ed alt erations. EvenCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 4

- - assuming a

rg uendo that Scott’s alter ations acc urate ly ref lected w hat happened at the me eting , that would not chang e the unde rhande d nature of what she did. Scott’s attempts to just ify her se cre t a lteration of the minutes is irreleva nt beca use they do not neg ate the f

act that Me tro leg itimately perc eived he r to be un t ru s t worthy beca use of the alteration. I n short, Metro for

med an h o n est belief in the c omplaints ag ainst Scott, which were sufficie ntly

corr oborate d and investig ated, a nd it did not need to inve s t i gat e her a dmitted unauthorized alteration of the minutes. See Sm ith v. Chrysler , 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998). Th e re fo re , t h e r e i s n o g e n u i n e i s s u e t h a t t h e c o m m i t t e e ’ s d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e S c o t t w a s a

rea sonably

informed a

nd considere d one, and Scott cannot prove pretext to a re asonable fac tfinder. Th is e nti tle s Me tr o a

nd F a a s to su

mma ry jud g me nt. I n v ie w o f o ur

dis po sit ion , w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss wh e the r S c ott

ma de ou t a

pr ima fa c ie c a se of re taliation. I V. We turn now t o Scott’s rec usal motion, which the district court denie d in United States v. Metro. He alth Corp. , No. 1:02-CV-485, 2006 WL763180 (W.D. Mich. Fe b. 23, 2006). Preliminarily , we note that a judg e is presume d to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification “be ars the substantial burden of proving otherwise.” United States v. De nton , 434 F .3 d 1 10 4, 11 11 (8 th C ir . 2 00 6) . T he burd e n is no t on the jud g e to p ro ve that he is i mpa rt ia l. In re McCarthey , 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 ( 10th Cir. 1004). Ti tle 28 U. S.C. § 1 44 , e nti tle d B ia s o r p re jud ic e of jud g e , p ro vid e s a s f

oll ow s:Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - Whenever

a par ty to any proce eding in a dis trict court make s and files a timely and sufficie nt affidavit that the judge befor e whom the matter is pe nding has a per sonal bia s o r p re

jud ic e e ith e r ag a ins t hi m or in f a vo r o f a ny a dv e rs e pa

rt y , s uc h ju dg e sh a ll proce ed no fur

ther ther ein . . . . The a ffidavit shall state the f acts a nd the re asons for the belief that bias or pre judice exis ts, and shall be filed not less th an ten da y s befor e the be g inning of the term at wh ic h th e pr oc e e din g is t o b e he ard , or g oo d ca us e sh a ll b e sh ow n f

or fa ilure to f

ile it within s uch time. A par ty may file only one such aff

idavit in any case . I t shall be acc ompanied by

a ce rtificate of counse l of rec ord stating that it is m ade in g ood faith. Recusal is mandatory

under § 144 once a

party submits a tim ely , sufficie nt affidavit and her c ounsel

cer tifies that the aff

idavit is made in g ood faith. United States v. Sy kes , 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 ( 7th Cir. 1993). A § 144 affidavit is timely if it is submitt ed “at the earliest moment afte r the movant a cquire s knowledg e of the fac ts de monstrating the basis for suc h disqualification.” Id. For purposes of § 144, a district cour

t is required to a cce pt as true the f actua l a lleg ations of the movant’s a ffidavit, but the

c ourt “ may on ly cre dit

fa c ts that are su ff

ic ie ntl y de fi nit e and

pa rt ic ula r t o c on vin c e a

re a so na ble person that bias e x ists; s imple conclusions, o p i n i o ns, or rumors a re insuff icient.” Hoffman v. Caterp i l l a r

, Inc. , 368 F.3d 709, 718 ( 7th Cir. 2004). The § 144 af fidavit must state fac tual

aver ments with particularity

as to time, person, plac e, and c ircumstance s. Tezak v. U nited States , 2 5 6 F

. 3 d 7 0 2 , 7 1 7 ( 7 t h C i r . 2 0 0 1 )

. F o r p u r p o s e s o f § 1 4 4 , a d i s t r i c t c o u rt m u s t t r e a tpr op e rl y prese nted fa ctual alleg ations as true, e ven if it knows or be lieves them to be fa lse, but it is not bound to acc ept the conc lusions that the movant would draw fr om those fac ts. Id. Her e, w e n e e d n o t c o n s id e r w h e th e r Sc o tt ’ s r e c u s a l a f f id a v it w a s ti me ly an d s u f f ic ie nt for purposes of § 144 be cause Scott does not contest Metro ’s s t at em en t that she failed to f ile theCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 6

- - cert i fi ca t e o f counsel required by that section. Ac cording ly , Scott never pla ced a § 144 rec usal motion prope rly befor e the district c ourt. The require ments of § 144 are strictly construed to pr event abuse beca

use the statute is he avily weig hted in favor of re cusal. Hoffman , 368 F.3d at 718. See,

e .g ., Un ite d S

tat es v . O c c hip int i , 851 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. N.Y. 1993), which re asoned c orre ctly that

a ca ref ul rea ding of

§ 144 clea

rly shows that a motion for re cusal should be a c c omp anie d b y

bo th a fa c tua l a ff

ida vit and a se pa rate c e rt if ic a te that th e a ff

ida vit wa s ma d e i ng o o d

f a i th

. T o t a l l y

d i s r e g ar d i n g t h e s t a tu t e , p e t i t i o n e r o f f e r s a s i n g le

“ Ce rt if ic a tio n” wh ic h p ur

po rt s to satis fy

the re qu ir e me nts of

§ 1 44

. Mo re ov e r, wh ile petitioner’s c ounsel states that the a lleg ations which he ha s ra i s ed are true and a c kn ow le dg e s th a t if

the y are “ wi llf

ull y fa lse , [he ] is su bjec t to punis hme nt, ” thi s blanket stateme nt does not satisfy the statutory require ment that counsel c ertify that the motion is m ade in g ood faith. Id. at 527 (re cord c itation omit ted). Be cause Scott did not properly raise the § 144 rec usal issue below, we decline to c onsider whether rec usal might have bee n require d o n a proper motion under that section. See P erez v . Oakland Cty. , 466 F.3d 416, 430 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We do not consider an ar g ument raised f

or the first time on appea l unless the party shows th at re fusal to consider the ar g ument would result in a miscarr iag e of justice.” ). Scott’s rec usal motion also invoked ano t h er statutory provision, however , which did not require her to fil e a c ertifica tion of counsel. This latter pr ovision addresses the perc eption of imp art ia lity

g e ne ra lly , a

nd fi na nc ia l c on fl ic t of

int e re st i n p art ic ula

r, and pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: (a) Anyjustice, judge , o r m agi s t r a t e j u d ge of t he Un ite d S

tat es sh all

dis qu ali fy himself in any procee ding in whi ch his impartialit y might reasonably bequestioned. (b) Hesh all

als o d isq ua lif yhim se lf i n th e fol low ing c irc um sta nc es: ( 1) W here hehas a personal bias or prejudice conc erning a party . . . ;Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 7

- - * * * ( 4) Hek

no ws t ha t he, individually

or as a fiduciar y , or his spouse

. . . ha s a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the procee ding, or a n y o t h er interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the procee ding; (5) He or

his spouse, or a pe rson within the third deg ree of re lationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: ( i ) Is a

p art y t o t h e p r o c e e d i n g , o r ano f f i c e r , d i r e c t o r , o r

t r u s t e e o f a p art y; (i i ) I s ac t i n g as a l aw y er i nt h e p ro ce ed i n g; (iii) I s known by

the judg e to have a

n interest that could be substantially aff ecte d b y t h e o u t co m e o f t h e p ro ce ed i n g; (i v ) I s t o t h e j u d ge’ s kn o wl ed ge l i k el y t o b e a m at er i al wi t n es s i nt h e p ro ce ed i n g. 28 U. S.C. §§ 45 5( a ) & (b ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he statut e de fi ne s “ fi na nc ia l in te re st” a s “ ow ne rs hip of a le g al or e quitable intere st, however small, or a rela

tionship as a dire ctor, a dviser, or othe r ac tive participa nt in the affa irs of a pa

rty ,” with exceptions not releva nt here . 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4). Be cause those safe g uards ( § 144’s af fidavit and c ertification-of-c ounsel requir ements) are lacking , § 455 does not requir e the judg e to “a cce pt as true the alleg ations made by the par ty seeking

rec usal.” In re Ma rti ne

z- Cat ala , 129 F.3d 213, 220 ( 1st Cir. 1997). Rather, the district cour t may make the nece ssary fac tual finding s and decide whether the facts wa rra nt disqualification. Id . When

c on sid e ri nga

§ 4 55 re c us a l re qu e st, “ the jud g e is fr e e to m a ke c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns , a ssi g n to the evidenc e what he believe s to be its proper we ight, a nd to contradic t the evidence with fa cts draw n from his persona l knowledg e.” Un ite d S tat es v . B ali

str ie ri , 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 ( 7th Cir. 1985). Section 455 is designe d “‘to promote conf idence in the judiciary

by avoiding even the appea ranc e of impropr iety

whene ver possible.’” Union Planters Bank v. L& J Dev. Co., Inc. , 115Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 8

- - F. 3 d 3 7 8 , 3 8 3 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Lilj eberg v. Health Serv s. Acquisition Cor

p. , 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)) . Under

§ 455, the ultimate que stion is whether “a rea sonable, objective person, knowing all of the c ircumstance s, would have que stioned the judge ’s impartiality .” United States v. Hartsel , 19 9 F .3 d 8 12 , 8 20 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) . B e c a us e the sta

nd ard is o bje c tiv e , th e jud g e ne e d n ot r e c us e himself based on the subjective viewof a pa rty

. United States v. Sammons , 9 18 F .2 d 5 92 , 5 99 (6 th Cir. 1990). W h en t h e o b

j ec t i v e ap p ea ra n ce -o f- p ar t i al i t y s t an d ar d p re s en t s a c l o s e q u es t i o n , “‘ t h e j u d ge must recuse himself.’” Union Planters Bank , 1 1 5 F. 3 d at 3 8 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. Dandy , 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 ( 6th Cir. 1993) ). Nonethele ss, a s the late Chief Justi ce Re hnquist noted, “a fe dera l judge has a duty

to sit where not disqualified whic h is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified.” Laird v. Tat um , 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (e mphasis omitt ed). Scott’s first g round for

rec usal is that the “Judge ha d, throug h his wife, an ong oing f inancial int e re st, wi thi n th e mea ni ng of 28 U. S.C. §§ 14 4, 45 5 a nd the c a se law t

he re un de r, in t

his c a se resolving favor ably

to d ef en d an t . . . .” We consider Scott’s f irst gr ound as a c laim under § 45 5( b) (4 ), wh ic h r e qu ir e s a jud g e to r e c us e him se lf

wh e n “ his sp ou se . . . ha s a fi na nc ia l int e re st i n the subject matter

in controver sy

or in a pa rty to the proce eding , or any other interest that could be substantially

aff ecte d by the outcome of

the proc eeding .” The judge ’s wife is e mploy ed by the law firm Miller Canfield. Whil e the judg e’s wif e wa s an attorne y

at Mi l l er C an field’s Ka lamazoo office , attorney s in that firm’s Ann Arbor office repr esente d UB S Financia l Services, Inc. (“U BS”) in c onnection with U BS’s underw riting of $165 mi ll io nin b o n d s is s u e d

b y M e tr o to f

in an c e c o n s tr

u c ti o no f a n e w h o s p it a l c o mp le x.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 1 9

- - Scott alleg ed that her qui tam a c tio n, and the g ov e rnme nt’ s N ov e mbe r 2 00 3 in te rv e nti on in a portion of the action, g ener ated adverse publicity that delay ed Metro’s bond sale seve ral months pa st i ts s c he du le d d a te in D e c e mbe r 2 00 3. Whil e Me tr o d e nie s th a t Sc ott ’s qui tam ac t i on was

re sp on sib le fo r t

he de lay , w e a ssume argue nd o th a t it wa s. Scott emphasizes that Metro settl ed the qui tam claims in Dec ember 2003, just day s befor e the bonds wer e to be sol d. Metro settl ed the fra ud claims by

ag ree ing to pa

y the g overnme nt about $6 .2 5 mi lli on

in FCA damag e s. Sc ott qu ote s a Me tr o s po ke sma

n’ s c on te mpo ra

ne ou s st a te me nt, “The bond marke tplace likes c erta inty . I f we had dec ided to litigate [the qui tam c la ims ], w e wo uld have ha d a proble m selling the bonds.” Sc ott c ha rg e d that the jud g e ’s wi fe , and the re fo re the jud g e , s too d to g a in i f S c ott ’s qui tam action we re r esolved in favor of Me tro: W hen the bond sa le was ha lted in Dece mber 2003, the bond unde rwriter , UB S . . . h adal r e a d y i n v es t eds i gn i fi ca n tre s o u rc es i n t o t h i s p l an . T h u s , t h er e w as a h u ge financ ial incentive, not only for [ Metro], but also for UB S, to make the bond sale a re a lity . . . . I mpo rt antl y , Pame la En sle n ha d just re c e ntl y re joi ne d M ill e r C anf

ie ld a s Se nio r C ouns e l . . . ( UB S’ s le g a l c ouns e l on the bond sa le ) at th a t ti me . I t is re a so na ble to c on c lud e that fa ilure of the bo nd sa le wo uld have c on sti tut e d a b ig los s to UBS and Miller Canf

ield and that these entities clea rly benef itted from making the Mary Sc ott [ qui tam ] case g o awa

y so as to g et the bond sale back on tr ack. But S cott fails t o tie the j udg e’s alleg ed financial st ake (throug h his wife’ s firm’s st ake in the

su c c e ss o f i ts c lie nt U B S, w hic h und e rw ro te Me tr o’ s b on d is su e ) w iththe judge’s ru lin g s in thi s action. As the di strict court observed, Metro’s summary judgme nt motion could not aff ect Me tro’s bo nd sa le on e wa

y or the oth e r: the bo nd s we re su c c e ssf ull y iss ue d a

nd so ld w e ll be

for e the district court rule d on the re taliatory -dischar g e cla im. Whatever be nefit Miller Canfie ld derived f rom theCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 0

- - succe ss of the bond sale on w hich it advised UB S, it had alrea dy derive d befor e the d i s t ri ct court ruled. Thus, whatever

benef it the judge ’s wife alleg edly derive d indirectly from the succe ss of the bond sale on whic h her e mploy er a dvised UB S, she derived it bef ore the court rule d. Scott tries to ge t around thi s inconvenient fact by imply ing that the judge made up his mind, be fo re the Me tr o b on d s a le , a bo ut h owhe wo uld ru le on su mma ry jud g me nt, and “ te le g ra ph e d” his pr e jud ic e to t

he un de rw ri te r ( UB S) and oth e r p art ie s in te re ste d in the bo nd sa le . Sc ott

wr ite s: Ap pe lle e s atte mpt

to m a ke muc h o f t

he fa c t th a t th e bo nd

sa le wa s u lti ma te ly c omp le te d b e fo re [t he ju dge] ac tua lly e nte re d h is o rd e r d ism iss ingthe Mary Sc ott litigation. So what? The fac t that the sale went throug h sever al months before the d ec i s i o nac tu al l y

wa s i s s u edi s n o ti nan d

o f i t s el f d i s p o s i t i v e o f a n y t h i n g. * * * [T] he fa ct that the bond sale was c omplet ed i n the Spring of 2005 and the final de c isi on of [the jud g e ] in this c a se wa s n ot iss ue d unti l Su mme r o f 2 00 5 d oe s n ot i n and of itself me an that there was no connec tion betwee n the t wo events. I f the fina l decision of [the judg e] was in f act made to be nefit clients of his wife’ s law firm, then cer tainly it is not inconce ivable that his wife (a nd thus her law f

irm’s clients) mig ht have know n of the impending decision bef ore it wa s issued. Scott a dmits, as she must, that thi s serious cha rg e is nothing more than spec ulation: “Ag ain, Mary Scott doe s n o t m ak e such a statement in order

to say that is in fact what happene d. * * * [S ]he

s i mp l y d o es n o tkn o w, an d h as n o wa y o f k n o wi n g, i f t h at i s wh at h ap p en ed

. ” B u ti ti s n o ten o u gh fo r Sco tt to thr ow ou t cha rg e s and the n mai nta in that the y c a st a pa ll ove r the pr oc e e din g s b e c a us e they are “not inconce ivable.” T he judg e is presume d to be impartial, and Scott “be ars the substantial burden of proving otherwise.” Denton , 434 F.3d at 1111. I t is not t he burden of the judg e, or the preva iling par

ty , to dis prove or

rule out any

“conc eivable” chain of

events the mova

nt can dr eam up.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 1

- - Sc ott of fe rs no thi ng that wou ld le a d a re a so na ble , obje c tiv e ob se rv e r t o s us pe c t th a t th e jud g e tol d

any on e in a dv anc e ho w the c a se wo uld tur n o ut. I n addition, Scott does not alleg e that the judg e’s wif e wa s involved in Mill er Canf ield’s repr esentation of UBS on the Me tro bond sale. I ndeed, Scott doe s not alleg e that the judg e’s wif e

even repr esente d Metro or UB S on matters other than the bond sale. Contrast In re Ae tna Cas. & Surety Co. , 919 F.2d 1136 ( 6th Cir. 1990) (re cusal wa s re quired be cause , int e r a lia , the judg e’s daug hter ha d been e mploy ed by a firm that r epre sented a party in that v er y

case and she ha d participated in depositions therein, eve n though she had since resig ned fr om the firm and he r nowformer firm was not involved in all the c onsolidated ca ses). Going a step further back in the “ chain,” Scott failed to prese nt any evidenc e that the f

ailure or fur ther de lay of the bond sale would have a ffe cted Miller Canfield substantially in the first place

. For example, Scott did not prese nt e vidence that Miller Canfield’s fee s from UB S were conting ent upon the succ ess of the bond sa le. Nor did Scott prese nt evidence that t h e d am age to Miller Canfield’s r evenue s from the fa ilure of the bond sa le would have repr esente d a substantial portion of its re ve nu e s. M o r e o v e r , g i v e nt h a tt h e j u d g e ’ s w i f e i s n o ta p art n e r

a tM i l l e r C an f i e l d an d h a s n o e qu i t y,

owner ship, o r p r o f

it

- s h ar in g in te r e s t in th e f ir m, Sc o tt f

a il e d to e xp la in h o w s h e w o u ld r e a p any discernible f

inancial be nefit fr om the later g rant of summar y judgme nt to Metro. Scott presents no evidenc e that the judge ’s wife’s compensation was formally or i nformally tied to the succe ss of the firm’s re prese ntation of UBS, the s ucce ss of t he UB S underwritten bond sa le, or the f irm’s reve nues or prof its ge nera lly

. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . M c Do na ld , Nos. 97-5187, 97-5196, 97- 5338, 97-5339, &Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 2

- - 97 -5556, 17 3 F .3 d 4 30 , 1 99 9 WL 14 96 58 , at *1 3 ( 6th

Cir . M ar. 1, 19 99 ) (

jud g e no t r e qu ir e d to

re c us e he rs e lf

du e to h us ba nd ’s e mpl oy

me nt w ithlaw f

ir m th a t ha d r e pr e se nte d o ne of the de fe nd a nts in an unre lated civil matter; “ [t ]he law firm was not involved in the pre sent ac tion, and there was no

w ay th a t th e ju d g e c o u ld h a v e f in an c ia ll y b e n e f

itte d f r o m th e la

w f ir m’ s r e p r e s e n tation of [the defe ndant], due to the law firm’s f ee struc turing arr an g ement.”)

. Acc ord In re Kansas Pub. Em plo y e es R e t. S

y s. , 8 5 F .3 d 13 53 , 13 64 (8 th Cir

. 19 96 ) (j ud g e ’s da ug hte r’ s a c c e pta

nc e of job wi th defe nse counse l did not require re cu s al; among other thing s, the daug hter “ was to be a salarie d

em p l o y ee . . . , not a partne r whose inc ome is directly related to the profit mar g in of the firm a nd could be substantially

aff ecte d by the outcome of

this case” ). One mig ht assume that an attorney is better off

if his firm’s cl i en t s p ro sper, in the g ener al

sens e th a t t

h e f ir m n e e d s c li e n ts in

o r d e r to e ar ne n o u g h r e v e n u e to c o v e r it s e xp e n s e s ( inc luding

s al ar i es an d b en ef

i t s ) an d av o i d ev en tu al p ay cu t s , l ay o ff s , o r d i s s o l u t i o n . Bu tan y

p o s tu l at edl o n gterm g ener al financ ial “bene fit” to the judg e’s wif e fr om her e mploy er ’s cl i en t’s succe ss is not verifia ble, let alone qua

ntifiable, so Mrs. Enslen’s suppose d st ak e i n t he succ ess of UB S’s Metro bond sale is fa

r too attenuated and spe culative a s a mat t er of law. Se e IQ

Pr od s. Co. v . P e nn zo il Prods. Co. , 305 F.3d at 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A n associate ’s continued e mplo y m ent or the amount o f h is bonus may depend on the financ ial succe ss of the firm. How ever , this is an ins uf fi c ie nt int e re st to re qu ir e dis qu a lif ic a tio n . . . .” ). Simi larl y , in Sensley v. Albritton , 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004), the F ifth Circuit held that rec usal wa s not require d due to the judg e’s wif e’s employ ment with the same D.A .’s offic e that re prese nted def endant in the case sub judice . T he F if th Circuit expl ained that the pa rties see king r ecusa lCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 3

- - are only able to make this argument by lay eringsever al spec ulative pre mises on top of on e ano the r t o r e a c h a

sp e c ulativ e c on c lus ion : if Di str ic t A tto rn e y L e vy los e s th is c a se , it might

a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c t hi s p oli tic a l po pu lari ty ; and if it a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c ts h is political popularity , he might lose his next elec tion; and if he loses his next election, [th e ju d g e ’ s w if

e ] might los e he r job if the ne w dis tr ic t a tto rn e y c ho se no t to re ta in her. This e difice of

conjec ture will not support an objec tive conc lusion that [ the district judge ] has a financ ial interest in the outcome of this case. Id. at 600. Ne xt, Sc ott

su g g e sts that e ve n if

Mil le r C anf

ie ld w ou ld h a ve su ff

e re d n o s ub sta

nti a l financial ha rm fr om the fa ilure of the Me tr o b on d s a le , it wo uld have su ff e re d s ub sta

nti a l non-financial

ha rm s. Sc ott re a so ns , [T] he fina ncial position and outlook of the clients of the Miller Can fi el d l aw firm improved dramatically

upon the dismissal of Mary Scott’s c laims . . . . [ I t] would not be ill og ic a l fo r a re a so na

ble pe rs on to c on c lud e that Mi lle r C anf ie ld w ou ld –

and did – benef it from its c lients’ g ood fortune, if not in a pecunia

ry fashion, then at the very le a st i n te rm s o f t

he re pu ta tio n a

nd g oo dw ill a sso c ia te d w iththe fi rm . But e ven if we acc ept t his argument, it is aga in impossi ble to do more than spe culate that the judge ’s wife mig ht someday

rea p a bene fit as an indire ct re sult of the succe ss of o n e o r m o re of her employ er’ s clients on a par ticular tra nsaction. Th e Ei g hth Cir c uit re

je c te d an a

rgume nt s imi lar t o Sc ott ’s in United St ates v. Tierney , 947 F.2d 85 4 ( 8 th Ci r . 1 9 9 1 ) , a p r o s e c u ti o n f o r tax o f f e n s e s an d f

r a u d a g a in s t th e U n it e d St a te s . The defe n d an t moved to rec use the prose cutor unde r 18 U.S.C. § 208(a), w hich prohibits a fe dera l employ ee f

rom participating in a matte r i n which his spouse has a financ ial interest, and unde r a

re g ulatio n th a t pr oh ibi te d a De pa rtme nt of Justi c e e mpl oy e e fr om part ic ipatin g in a pr os e c uti on

if he ha s a pe rs on a l r e latio ns hip wi th any on e wh o h a s a “ sp e c if ic and su bs tanti a l in te re st t

hat w ou ld be directly aff

ecte d by the outcome of

the investig ation or prose cution.” Tierney , 947 F.2d at 864.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 4

- - The prose cutor’s husba

nd was a partne r in a fir

m that repr es en t ed an ins urer that had sued f

or decla ratory judgme nt rescindingthe def endant’ s insurance policy

. Id. a t 86 4- 65

. Th e Ei g hth Cir c uit he ld t hat th e pr os e c uto r a

nd he r h us ba nd did no t ha ve an in te re st s uf

fi c ie nt t o r e qu ir e re c us a l: Although the prosec utor’s h u s b an d did not participate in the c ase, de fenda nt never theless re asons that bec ause defe ndant’s alleg ed dishonesty might bar rec overy un de r t he ins ur anc e po lic y , th e ins ur e r a nd its law f ir m w ou ld be ne fi t fr om a

g uil ty verdic t. The district c ourt ag ree d that the insurer would benef it, but found t hat be c a us e the hu sb and ’s law f

irm was pa id o n a

n h ourl y ba sis , it wo uld no t be ne fi t from a guilty

verdic t, and the husband’ s interest as a partne r in the firm wa s theref ore t o o “re mote and spec ulative” to implicate e ither [18 U.S.C .] § 208 or J ustice Depa rtment regulations. * * * [D] efe ndant ar g ues that eve n partne rs in a firm whic h bills clients by the hour have an intere st in winning a suit, bec ause the firm’s re putation (and thus eac h partne r’s inc ome ) be n e f

i t s f r o m v i c t o r

y . A l t h o u g h s u c h p art n e r s m ay h a v e ani n t e r e s tin preva iling, we b el i eve that this i ntere st is si mply too insubstantial to require disqualification of a

partne r’s spouse [even] in relate d litigation. Id. at 865. L ike the Eig hth Circuit in Tierney , we hold that “disqua lification is not r equire d on the basis of [such] remote, conting ent, indirec t or speculative interests.” Un ite d S tat es v . B ay le

ss , 201 F.3d 116, 127 ( 2d Cir. 2000). F ina lly , Sc ott ’s re a so nin g te nd s to supp or t the no tio n tha t the jud g e ’s wi fe ha d an int e re st i n the qui tam claims being resolved in f avor of Metro so that the Metro bond sale could g o forwa rd. Sc ott ’s argume nt d oe s not sh owtha t th e jud g e ’s wi fe ha d a

n in te re st i n Sc ott ’s dis c ha rg e c lai m being resolved in Me tro’s favor. As mentioned above, the bond sale took place afte r Metro settled the qui tam c la ims (M arc h 2 00 5 com par e d to De c e mbe r 2 00 3) , b ut be for e the district court rule d on the dis c ha rg e c la im ( su mme r 2 00 5) . T hu s, any a dv e rs e pu

bli c ity or pe rc e ive d f

ina nc ia l un c e rt a int

y attributable to the pe ndency of the discha

rg e cla im did not, i n fac t, thwart the bond sale

.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 5

- - Con ve rs e ly , on ce t

he Me tr o b on ds iss ue d, un de rw ri te r U B S c ou ld n ot h a ve any int e re st i n the discharge cl ai m being remove d as an obstac le to the sale. The ref ore U BS’s c ounsel (Miller Canfield) a

nd its counsel’s employ ees ( the judg e’s wif e) c ould not have any

derivative or “dow n-theline” intere st in removing the discharg e cla im as a possible obstacle to the sa le. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a re asonable , objective person knowing all the circumstances would not question the judg e’s impar tiality based on his wife’s e mploy

ment with Mill er Canf

ield. Cf. In re Drex el Burnham L ambert, Inc

. , 869 F.2d 11 6, 11 8 ( 2d

Cir . 1 98 9) (M ine r, J., c on c ur ri ngin d e ni al of reh’ g e n b anc , jo ine d b y Me sk ill , Card a mon e , a

nd Pie rc e , JJ.) ( re c us a l no t wa rr ante d by jud g e ’s wi fe ’s sa le of sto c k to a buy e r w ho se purcha se wa s finance d by Dre x el B urnham, whic h was a party to the action). Scott’s second g round for rec usal is that t h e j u d g e’s wif e ser ves on a Michig an B ar

c omm itt e e wi th the n- Di str ic t Judg e Mc Ke a g ue , w ho ha d a law c le rk wh os e un c le , B ru c e Ne c ke rs , is l e a d c ouns e l f

or Me tro in th is ma tte r. Th is a rgume nt i s d if

fi c ult to c omp re he nd . D e fe ns e counsel’s ne phew c lerke d for Judge McKeague , not the district judge presiding over the instant case, so the nephe w could not work on the instant case. Pe rh a ps Sc ott is the or izin g tha

t th e jud g e ha d a

n in c e nti ve to r e so lve her dis c ha rg e c la im favor ab ly to N e c k e r s ’ c li e n t, in

o r d e r to b e n e f it N e c k e r s , in

o r d e r to b e n e f it ( in anu n s p e c ified

mann e r) Ne c ke rs ’ n e ph e w, in o rd e r t o p le a se the ne ph e w’ s f or me r e mpl oy e r Jud g e Mc Ke a g ue , in order to ensure ple asant intera ction betwee n J udg e McK eague and the judge ’s wife on the state ba r committee. As a matter of law, such a connection i s too attenuated to lea d a re asonable , objective

o b s e r v e r t o qu e s t i o nt h e j u d g e ’ s i mp art i a l i t y.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 6

- - I n a ny e ve nt, Sc ott he rs e lf “ re a dil y c on c e de s that thi s ty pe [of ] re la tio ns hip in a

nd of its e lf would not be s ufficie nt to warr ant re cusal of a fede ral judg e” a

nd that “if this wer e the only conflict . . . that she had discove red r elative to th e t ri al judg e and this litigation, she would never have reque sted that the trial judg e re cuse himself . . . .” See ge nerally Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. , 418 F .3 d 1 , 2 6 ( 1s t Cir .) (“ Ev e ry jud g e c ome s to the be nc h w itha lif e tim e of ba c kg ro un d e xpe ri e nc e s, a roster of associations, and a my

riad of views. This pa st history , in a nd of itself, is seldom sufficient to require rec usal.”), cert. de nied , – U. S. – , 1 26 S. Ct

. 798 (2005). Scott contends, howeve r, that “w hen viewe d in light of a ll of the other items . . . the relationship between attorney Br uce Nec k er s and the tria l court does nothing to reducethe appearanceof par

tiality .” As discussed above, the “other item” – the judg e’s wif

e’s e mploy

ment with Mill er Canf

i el d – would not lead a r easona ble objective obse rver

to question the judge ’s partiality . Thus, there is nothing to view the McKe ag ue cler k connec tion “ in lig ht of

.” I t must st and

on its ow n me ri ts –

and it d oe s n ot. Scott’s third gr ound for r ecusa l is that the judg e’s ruling s g ranting summary judgme nt and imp os in g sanc tio ns , a

nd his op ini on s e xpla ini ngthe ru lin g s, de mon str a te pa lpa ble bia s a g a ins t Sc ott

. To preva il on a recusal moti on on this basis, S cott had to show either extrajudicial bias or a de epseate d unequivoca l a

ntag onism towa

rd the pe titioner. Liteky v. U nited States , 510 U.S. 540, 554-55 (1994) ( Scalia, J.). The Supreme Court ca utions that

re mark s duri ng the c ours e of a tr ia l th a t are c ri tic a l or

dis a pp ro vin g of

, o r e ve n h os til e to, c o u n s e l , t h e p art i e s , o r t h e i r c a s e s , o r d i n ar i l y

d o n o ts u p p o r ta b i a s o r p art ia lit y challeng e . . . . Not

establishing bia s or partiality

. . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoy ance , and ev en ang er that are within the bounds of whatCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 7

- - im p e r f e c tm e na n d

w o m e n , e v e na f

t e r h a v i n g b e e nc o n f

i r m e d a s f e d e r a l j u d g e s, s o m e t i m e s d i s p l ay. Id. at 555-56. Wit h reg ard to the judg e’s r ulings a g ainst Scott, “ [ b]i as ca nnot be infer

red f rom a mer e patte rn of ru lin g s by a jud ic ia l of fi c e r, bu t r e qu ir e s e vid e nc e that th e of fi c e r h a d it

‘i n’ fo r t he pa rt y for r easons unr elated to the of fice r’s view of the law , err oneous as that view might be.” Mc

Lau gh lin

v . Uni on Oi l Co. o

f Ca lif

. , 869 F.2d 1039, 1047 ( 7th Cir. 1989). This principle is well-esta blished in our circ uit. Se e W

oo dr uff v . To ml in , 593 F.2d 33, 44 ( 6th Cir. 1979) (“Such r ec u s al [ u nder 28 U. S

. C

. § 4 5 5 (a )] ca n n o t b e b as edo nd ec i s i o n s o r r u l i n gs o f a j u d ge. ”) (c i t i n g Ol iv e r v. Mi c h. Sta te Bd. of Educ. , 508 F.2d 178 ( 6th Cir. 1974)), on reh’g o.g. , 616 F.2d 924 ( 6th Cir. 1980). As evidenc e of the judg e’s bias, Scott complains that the judg e rule d on signific ant motions wi t h o u th ea ri n g o ra l ar gu m en t , i n cl u d i n g M et ro ’s m o t i o n fo r su m m ary j u d gm en to nh er d i s ch ar ge claim. Scott fails to acknowle dg e, howe ver, that disposit ive motions are routinely decide d on paper s fi le d b y the pa rt ie s, wi tho ut o ra l argume nts , j us t as th is co ur t of te n h e ars and

de te rm ine s a

pp e a ls without oral argument. Commodities E xport Co. v

. United States Customs Serv. , 888 F.2d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 1989) (Ne lson, J ., concur ring in part & dissenting in par t o.g.) . I ndeed, the district’s local rules provide , “In its discretion, the Court may schedule oral arg ument or m ay dispose of the motion without a rg ument at the end of the briefing schedule .” W.D. M I CH . L .C IV .R. 7. 2( d)

. Sc ott fa ils to mention that Metro also re quested ora l argument on its summ ary judgme nt motion, and the district court de nied that re quest, too.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 8

- - Scott’s rec usal moti o n al so asserte d that the district judge su a s po nteraised a

nd resolved unbriefe d issues ag ainst her. Howeve r, Scott’s r ecusa l motion fa i l ed t o give anyexample of an

un br ie fe d is su e ra ise d o n th e jud g e ’s ow n in iti a tiv e . H e r a pp e llate re c us a l br ie f l ike wi se fa ils to specify the unbrief

ed issues alleg edly

raised su a s

po nteby the judg e. As furthe r evide nce of

the judg e’s a lleg ed bias a g ainst her, Scott points to “the g ranting of the extraordinar ily

high a nd unjustified sa

nctions ag ainst her

. . . which, when e x amined throug h the le n s o f th e u n d is c lo s e d

r e lati o n s h ip s r e c e n tl y

d is c o v e r e d , c le ar ly

g iv e th e a

p p e ar an c e th a t suc h relationships i mproperly aff ecte d the out come of this case .” As discussed a bove, howe ver, ne ither the jud g e ’s wi fe ’s e mpl oy me nt n or de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s nep hew ’s fo rm e r c le rk sh ip c ome s c los e to constituting persuasive evidence of bias, conflict of interest, or even a rea listi c appearance of bias

o r c o n fl i ct o f i n t er es t

. T h u s , t h e s an ct i o n s aw ar d ed aga i n s t S co t t ar e n o t p ro p er l y v i ew ed“t h ro u gh the lens” of those relationships, but on their own merits. As discussed below, neither the impositi on of sanc tions, nor the deter

mination of the amount of the sanctions, constituted an a buse of discr etion. Th e re fo re , th e sanc tio ns or de rs c ann ot s up po rt Sc ott ’s a lle g a tio ns of

jud ic ia l bi a s. S co t tn ex tco n t en d s t h at a r ea s o n ab l e p er s o nco u l d i n fe r b i as fr o m t h e f

ac tt h at t h e j u d ge issued opinions that “were harshly and critically written so as to vi lify and ca stigate Mary

Scott on a per sonal level.” Scott points to t hree instances whe re the judge alleg edly “interje ct[ed] hi s own persona l predilec tions about her . . . .” First, in the opi nion g ranting summary judgme nt to Metro, the jud g e ’s di scu ss ion

of Sc ott ’s a lle g e d p ro te c te d a c tiv iti e s b e g an a s f oll ow s: “ Ag a ins t th is backg round, there is the portrait that Scott has painted of h er s el f as the c orporate/FCA aveng er.” Second, the ne x t sentence of the opinion rea d, “To he r cr edit, her personnel file per se was ke ptCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 2 9

- - squeaky clea n and fr ee f

rom repr imands, discipline and th e l i ke.” T hird, the summary judgme nt op ini on ’s B a c kg ro un d s e c tio n s ta te s, I n any event, the re co rd i s m urky as to whethe r, whe n Scott was assig ned the additional responsibi lity

of mana g ing Me tropolitan’s Whit e and White [medical supply ] subs idiary

in J anuary

2000, this was beca

use of tec hnical excellenc e (Plaintiff’s view) , beca

use she was “kicke d upstairs” to avoid a n are a of inc omp e te nc e – i.e ., int e rp e rs on a l r e la tio ns (D e fe nd ants ’ v ie w) , o r f or bo th r e a so ns . United States v. Me t r o . Health Corp. , 3 75 F . Su pp . 2 d 6 26 , 6 30 (W. D. Mic h. 20 05 ) ( fo otn ote omitted). As a result of the judge ’s char acte rizations of Scott, she c laims the press beg an to portra y “the onc e laude d wh i stleblower . . . a s a cr iminal and immoral wrong doer, w hile Metropolitan’s imag e wa s sanitiz ed.” As to the judg e’s tone and hi s comments about Scott’s conduct a nd char acte r, Scott contends that the jud g e “ e ng a g e d in e xce ssi ve ly ho sti le and un jus tif ie d pe rs on a l a tta c ks a g a ins t Ma ry S c ott (which ha ve bee n ampl y ev i d ence d by , among other thing s, the trial judg e’s e x cessive c hoice of lang uag e, including mocking her as the ‘F CA aveng er’ ”). Scott’s a ppellate briefs, howeve r, do not

c ite to t he re c or d f

or pr oo f t hat th e jud g e ma de thi s com me nt. I f the jud g e ma de the c omm e nt at a hear i n g, Scott could present e ither a tra nscript or re cordingof the he aring , or a state ment that the hear ing w as not transc ribed or r ecor ded; she ha s done neither , so we c annot simpl y ac ce p t her

a sse rt ion that th e jud g e ma de the “ a ve ng e r” c omm e nt. Firs t, th e re is n o r e a so n to be lie ve that th e jud g e ’s a pp are ntl y ne g a tiv e op ini on

of Sc ott ste mme d f

ro m e xtra jud ic ia l e xpe ri e nc e s o r s ourc e s. A re a so na ble ob se rv e r w ou ld c on c lud e me re ly that the judg e for

med a ne g ative opinion of Scott from the v o l u m i n o u s evidenc e in the ca se, and fr om t he pa rt ie s’ c on du c t in the lit ig a tio n. Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d tha t Scott wa s te rm inate d d ue toCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 0

- - mis c on du c t (w arr anti ng su mma ry jud g me nt on he r dis c ha rg e c la im) and a lte re d and wi thh e ld evidenc e (w arr anting sanctions). Our de cisions former ly

held that “[t] he judg e’s i m p re s s ions o[ r] perce ptions based upon information g ained dur ing the tri al ca nnot be the basis of a

n alleg ation of bias.” Lib e ris v . Craig , No. 87-5321, 845 F .2d 326, 1988 WL 37450, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 1988) ( citations omitt ed). The

ru le no w, ho we ve r, is that “ [o]pi nio ns fo rm e d by the jud g e on

the ba sis of

fa c ts i ntr od

uc e d o r e ve nts

oc c ur ri ngin t he c ours e of

the c ur re nt p ro c e e din g s, or

of pr ior pr oc e e din g s, do no t c on sti tut e a ba sis for a bias or par

tiality motion un le

ss the y dis pla y a de e p- se ate d fa v or iti

sm or an tag on ism tha t wo uld make fair judgme nt impossible. ” Al le yv . B e ll , 307 F.3d 380, 388 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis adde d) (q u o t i n g Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555). I t is imm a te ri a l w he the r t he jud g e ’s c omm e nts , s uc h a s th e c om me nt a bo ut t he po te nti a lly

c ri min a l natur e of

Sc ott ’s sp oli a tio n, we re le g a lly “ c or re c t.” What matte rs is th a t th e c omm e nts stemmed from the judg e’s ex perie nce with the parties’ c onduct and his re view of the ir evidenc e and arguments. Ag ain, as the Supre me Court has explained, The judg e who pr esides at a tria l may , upon completion of the e vidence , be e xce e din g ly

ill dis po se d to wa

rd s [a pa rt y ], w ho ha s b e e n s ho wn

to be a tho ro ug hly repr ehensible pe rson. B ut the judge is not t h er eb y re cusable for bias or prejudice , sin c e his kn ow le dg e a nd the op ini on

it p ro du c e d w e re pr op e rl y and ne c e ssa ri ly acquir ed in the cour se of the pr ocee dings . . . . Liteky , 510 U.S. at 550-51. Viewingthe comments in this context , they do not betray

a “de ep-se ated favor itism or anta g onism that would make fair judgme nt impossi ble,” Alley , 307 F.3d at 388. Sc ott fu rt he r c ha rg e s:Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 1

- - The trial judg e consistently turned a blind ey e t o t h e fraudulent and unde rhande d actions of Ap p el l ee s in all are as, fr om securingthe ce rtificate of nee d [for a new ho sp ita l] by

“ ri g g ingthe numbe rs ,” to s a bo ta g ingMary

Sc ott in h e r r e la tio ns hip wi th he r p e e rs and

su bo rd inate s. This arg ument misses the mark as w ell. First, whe ther Metro s u b m i t ted fa lse information to the S t at e t o s ec u re t h e c er t i fi ca t e r eq u i re d fo r i t s n ew fa ci l i t y h as n o b ea ri n g o n wh et h er S co t t ’s d i s ch ar ge claim should survive summary judgme nt, or on whethe r Scott should pay sanctions for he r mis c on du c t. T he re fo re , it wo uld have be e n unn e c e ssa ry and ina pp ro pr ia te fo r t

he dis tr ic t ju dg e to addre ss the cer

tificate- of-ne ed alleg ation. Second, S cott fails to explain how Metro sabotag ed her relationship wit h peer s and subordinate s, and she doe s not e x plain why the district judge should have considere d that alleg ed sabota g e. Scott further c harg es, “The trial judg e unjustifiably castig ated Ma

ry Scott for l eg ally

taping

conver sations to which she wa s a par ty . . . .” (Empha sis omit ted.) Spec ifically , the cour t wrote, Plaintiff . . . dispute[ s] Faas’ r ationale f or withholding the bonus [i n 2001] – arg uing that it was explained to her in a mee ting with F aas that the “in fig hting” issue was not confined to her and [Metro’s Chief Oper ations Offic er Tim] Crowley , but was an issue for all Boa

rd members. Plaintiff also made a sec ret re cordingof portions of her meeting with Faa s, . . . po rtions [ of which] purport to support the above claim. At t h at t i m e, an d

b ef o re h an d , P l ai n t i ff

wa s i nt h e h ab i to f m ak i n g s ec re tt ap e r ec o rd i n gs of conve rsations she h ad with manag ement and Me tropolitan’s leg al counse l, J eff Fr aser , acc ording to her for mer assistant

. . . . The c ircumstance s of the re cordingof the se ta pe s b y Pla int if f – inc lud ingthat th e re c or din g s are select ive and po ssi bly inc o mp le te , an d th a t p o rti o n s o f th e ta p e s ar e in a

u d ib le

– w h e n c o mb in e d with the fu rt ive and su sp ici ou s natur e of

the ta pin g , a nd the “ a c c ide nta l” los s o f s ome documented ta

pe re cording s, makes those re cording s suspect evide nce inde ed. Neve rtheless, the Court wi l l consider suc h evidenc e in the conte x t of the pre sent summary judgme nt motion. What is c le ar f

ro m Pla int if

f’ s a dmi ssi on s[,] th ou g h, a s w e ll a s th e fa c t th a t sh e fe lt a nee d to make sec ret a

nd selec tive tape rec ording s of others, is that she wa s unhappy with her e mploy

ment situation with Metropolit an in the fa ll of 2001.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 2

- - United States v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 375 F. Supp. 2d 626, 630-31 (W.D. Mich. 2005). We find nothing sug g estive of pe rsonal b i as i n t he judg e’s c omments about Scott’s tapes. The char acte rization of Scott’s r ecor dings as “sec ret” and “fur tive” are indisputably

acc urate ; Scott does not claim she made the re cording s with the knowledg e of those rec orded. L ikewise, Scott does not deny th a t p o rti o n s o f th e ta p e s ar e in a

u d ib le , th a t s o me o f h e r ta p e s o mi t p o rti o n s of the

conver sations in question, and that she fa iled to produce some tapes that she cl aimed she ma de. Thus, there is nothing inac curate, let alone bia sed, about the judg e ca lling the tape s “selec tive” and “possibly incomplete” a

nd concludin g t h at t hese c oncer ns undermined the tr

ustworthiness and probative va lue of the e x cer pts Scott chose to introduce. Scott a lso se es bias in the judge ’s statement that it would have bee n inclined to g rant Metr o’s motion to ex clude the ta

pes at trial. Spec ifically , the district court stated, Thoug h the Court has ele cted to re view such e vidence , the par ties should be advised that t h e C ourt is of the view that Defe ndants’ Motion in Limine Reg ardingTape Recording s and Tra

nscripts is well rec eived a nd would justify the pre clusion of the tapes a nd transcr ipts were this matter tr ied[,] g iven the provisions of Fe dera l Rules of Evidenc e 403, 1002, 1003, and 1004 and case law per taining to the c ommon law doctrine of

spoliation . . . . United St ates v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 37 5 F

. Sup p. 2d 62 6, 63 1 n .5 (W. D. Mic h. 20 05 ). Whil e it

was unne cessa

ry for the c ourt to teleg raph howit would have rule d on the motion in limine , there was nothing sug g estive of pe rson al b i as ab o ut doing so. More over, be cause the cour t gr anted summary judgme nt to Metro, Metro’s motion in limine be c a me moo t. Scott complains that the judge “labe led [he r] a crimi nal for making c orre ctions to draft minutes without t akingany evidenc e on the substantive accura cy of the c orre ctions of AppelleeCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 3

- - Fa as’s stateme nts on the phy sician compensation model (which, de spite what wa s alleg edly said at the meeting , wer e not historically acc urate ).” ( Emphasis omitt ed.) Spec ifically , the judg e wr ote, I n this case, Pl aintiff has admitted fac ts which establish bey ond any g enuine issue of materia l fac t that she wrong ly altere d corpor ate r ecor ds and that she withheld from the corpor ation tapes e videncingcorpor ate minutes. The w ithholding of the ta pes was not “pr otected c onduct” as argued by her c ounsel since she and her counsel we re fre e to make a

rra ng ements wit h i n d ep endent counsel for the safe g uardingand/or copying of

the tapes so a s to p ro t ec t her le g itimate interests in the evidenc e. Moreove r, the a lteration of the corpora te m inutes was not only bad conduc t, it was a cr ime under Michig an and c ommon law. Mic hig an la

w p ro vid e s: An offic er or

ag ent of a

corpor ation who knowing ly fals i fies or wr on g fu lly a lte rs the bo ok s, re c or ds , or a c c ounts of a c or po ratio n is g uilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of [si c] not to ex cee d $1,000.00 for e ach suc h offe nse. M I CH . C OMP . L A WS § 450.1932(2). * * * Pla int if f’ s o wn a dmi ssi on s – that sh e a lte re d the min ute s to ma

ke the m tr ue in s ome sense to a pr ior meeting – does not esta b l i s h ev en a leg al def ense to a criminal c ha rg e . U nd e r M ic hig an la

w, pr oo f t

hat a c ri min a l de fe nd ant act e d k no wi ng ly is sufficie nt evidence to convi ct o f a cr iminal offense requiringa scienter element of “knowing ” conduc t; the fac t t h at a def endant may

have be en motivated by an altruistic or pure motive is irreleva nt. See People v . Medly n , 544 N.W.2d 759, 761 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. 19 96 ); Pe op le v . H arre ll , 221 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974). U n it e d S ta te s v . M e tr o . H e a lt h Corp. , 375 F . Su

pp . 2 d 6 26 , 6 46 -4 7 ( W.D . M ic h. 20 05 ). Sc ott imp lie s mi sle a din g ly

tha t th e dis tr ic t ju dge mer e ly tos se d th e e pit

he t “ c ri min a l” a t he r d

ue to h is persona l animosity

ag ainst her. Rather, as the quoted portion of the opinion shows, the judge quoted

a Mic hig an c ri min a l st a tut e that c ov e rs c on du c t su c h a s th a t admitted by Scott, and explained whyCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 4

- - her a sserted g ood motive in secre tly alteringcorpor ate minut es would not be a defe nse, on the authority of published dec isions of t he Mi chig an appellate courts. Scott continues to maintain that the or ig ina l dr a ft

min ute s “ we re no t histo ri c a lly a c c ur a te ,” bu t she do e s not de ny that sh e (1 ) f

ur tiv e ly tried to l ocate the minutes from her assistant’s desk, (2) altere d the minutes, (3) fa iled to tell her employ er that she altere d the minutes, and (4) introduced the altere d minutes without providing the

or ig ina l ve rs ion

or ho ne stl y no tif y ingany on e that sh e ha d a lte re d th e min ute s. I t is a lso no te wo rt

hy that Scott doe s not try to ide nti fy any sh or tc omi ngin t

he jud g e ’s ana ly sis of Michig an law. The evidenc e that was available to the judge tends to suppor t the conclusion that Sc ott c ou ld be he ld cr imi na lly lia ble in Mic hig an for he r ad mit te d a lte ra

tio n o f c or

po ra te min ute s, and she of

fer s nothing to undermine that conclusion. There is no rea son to believe that the judg e’s dis c us sio n o f M ic hig an c ri min a l la w a s a pp lie d to Scott wa s ina c c ur a te , let a lon e mot ivate d b y bia s. Scott sees bias in the ju d ge’ s “[ m ] ak ing f indings of f

act ba sed on his total acc eptanc e of aff idavits from Appellee s and re jection of a ffidavits of Mary Scott as not credible.” I n a var iety of contexts, asses s m en t s of cr edibility (or de terminations that rest in par t on such assessments) a

re

c omm itt e d to the so un d d isc re tio n o f t he low e r t ri buna l; w e do no t distu

rb tho se a sse ssm e nts un le ss the ag g rieve d party

demonstrates a

n abuse of

discretion. See U

nited States v. Crumb , 187 F. App’ x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2006) (whe n a def endant make s a F ED . R. C R IM . P. 33 motion to s et aside a verdic t

a s a g a ins t the manif

e st we ig ht of the e vid e nc e and se t a ne w tr ia l, “ the dis tr ict cou rt may a sse ss wi tne ss c re dib ili ty

and we re vie w f

or a bu se of dis c re tio n . . . .” ); Huff v. Me tr o . L i fe Ins. Co. , 675 F.2d 119, 123 (6th Cir. 1982) (a ffirming denial of motion for r econside ration of summary judgme nt be c a us e “ we fi nd

no a bu se of dis c re tio n in the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n that the e vid e nc e wo uldCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 5

- - no t be c on sid e re d b e caus e it w a s n ot n e wl y dis c ov e re d a

nd its c re dib ili ty

wa s d ou btf ul” ). Sc ott

make s n o atte mpt

to s ho w that the dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

fi nd ingMe tr o’ s a ff

ida vit s to b e mor e c re dib le tha

n h e rs . The judg e’s c redibility

assessment is most sim ply and l o gically

explained by

the evidenc e in th e re co rd , n o t by

speculation about otherwise unpr oven bias. Most signif icant, Scott proved herse lf to be un trustworthy and untruthful whe n she (1) surre ptitious ly altere d minutes of the Fe bruar y 7, 2002, board me eting ; (2) took tapes of that meeting from her

assistant in April 2002 and ref used re quests to return them, r emoving t h e m o s t direct, objec tive means of ve rifying w hat was said at the mee ting; (3) said she intended to revie w t he tapes to make sure her unauthorized alteration (“ c or re c tio n” ) o f t

he dr a ft min ute s w a s a c c ur a te , b ut s ome ho w n e ve r f ound th e tap es in or de r t o pe rf or m th a t c he c k; ( 4) a dmi tte dly fo un d o ne of

the ta pe s, wh ic h c on ta ine d p art of the me e tin g , in J une 2002, but with h eld i t; and (5) late r in this lit iga tion, by “shee r luck,” found all three tapes of the me e tin g . O n th is r e c or d, the jud g e did no t ne e d p e rs on a l bi a s to c onclu de th at S cott wa s le ss

cre dible than Metro a s to her conduc t and the ca use of he r dischar g e. Scott complains that the di strict court accuse d her of “ac tively [seeking] leg al counse l to find

a wa y to sue” Metr o. Howeve r, i n the passage of t he sum mary judgme nt opinion cited by Scott, the district court a cc u ra t ely

rec ounts communication betwee n Scott and her attorney showing that by Fe bruar y 25, 2002– near ly two months be fore Scott’s A pril 17, 2002, rea ssignment – Scott and her attorney had discussed possibly

filing a claim fo r sex di scrimination, appar ently befor e eve n dis c us sin g a

wh ist le blo we r re ta liatio n cla im. I n ad dit ion , Sco tt’ s o wn wr iti ng s sh owthat sh e fi rs t contac ted the same attorney in May 1999, near ly

three y ear s befor e her

rea ssignment, r eg ardingherCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 6

- - perc eption that Metro wa s discriminating ag ainst her, a ppare ntly on the basis of sex and ag e. The

rec ord supports a c hara cter ization of Scott as looking “ea rly and often” (our wor ds, not the district j u d g e ’ s ) f o r g r o u n d s o nw h i c h t o s u e M e t r o , e v e nb e f o r e h e r r e a s s i g n m e n t

. T h e j u d g e d i d n o ti mp l y, let alone state , that there was a ny thing illeg al or une th i ca l about S cott contac ting a n attorney repe atedly

over the course of the y ear s and harbor ing many g rieva nces a g ainst Metro. A re asonable , ob je c tiv e ob se rv e r w ou ld n ot q ue sti on the jud g e ’s imp art ia lity

ba se d o n th e se li mited , a c c ur a te

c omm e nts

. Scott also charg es that the district cour t display ed bias by [m]ak inga

my ri a d o f f a c tua l f ind ing s th a t to ta lly la c k obje c tiv ity and ig no re wh a t is in the rec ord as f

act, i.e. [si c, she mea

ns e.g .], finding that re ports to Appellee F aas la c ke d s pe c if

ic ity and did no t r ise to [the le ve l of ] al legation s o f f

ra ud or fa ult , ignor ing that the United S t at es g overnme nt ultim ately pursued sa id fraud in the amount of $40,000,000. (R e c or d c itatio ns omi tte d. ) S c ott do e s n ot i de nti fy

any oth e r of the se “ my

ri a d” of fa c tua l f ind ing s. Most of the portion of t h e sum mary judgme nt opinion cited by Scott has nothing to do with the sp e c if ic ity of re po rt s to de fe nd ant F a a s. As to t he po rt ion

of th e op ini on

that ma y be re le va nt t o Scott’s char g e, she fails to explain which of the statements display a bias a nd how, so she has

a ba nd on e d th e argume nt. Sc ott ’s pe nu lti ma te c omp la int a bo ut pe rs on a l bia s c on c e rn s the jud g e ’s re mark that be c a us e S co t t ’s af fi davit made a

n alleg ation that she had ne ver ma de bef ore, “ caution must be had.” The portion of the opinion cited by Scott does not contain the “ca ution must be had” la

ng uag e, but she is presumably

ref err ing to this statement ea rlier in the opinion:Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

As the district co u rt n o t ed, a party cannot c reate a g enuine issue of materia l fac t by 3 submitt ing a

n aff idavit that contra dicts her earlier deposition testimony . I n addition to the decisions cited by the district court, see Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co. , 458 F.3d 416, 433 ( 6th Cir. 2006); Lanier v. Bryant , 332 F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 2003). Scott’s aff idavit did not mere ly

“cla rify ” and

“ e la bo rate on ” he r d e po sit ion te sti mony , a s sh e a sse rt s.

- - 3 7

- - Plaintiff’s testimony

about her top secre t, undocumented meetings with Faa s relating to he r un fi nis he d me mos is int e re sti ng fo r re a so ns oth e r tha n its sh eer u nl ike lin e ss . . . . Be cause the testimony prese nts for the fir st tim e specific testimony about prior meeting s in a ca se in which neither discovery , deposition testimony [n] or extensive prior court fi l ings ha

ve pre viously

disclosed these matters, ca ution must be had. Pla int if f s ta te d in a do c ume nt fi le d on May 13 , 200 5 tha t Plai nti ff ’s pr ote c te d a c tiv ity c on sis te d o f m e mor and

ums to F a a s re la tin g to R e ve nu e Cy c le . Ind e e d, De fe nd ants too k Pl a int if

f’ s dep os iti on and

sp e c if ic a lly a sk e d w he the r s he ha d a

ny me e tin g s w ith F a a s a bo ut v a sc ular s tu di es. S he sa id “ sh e did no t . . .” (S c ott

De p. a t 52 3, Re ply Mem., Ex. B) * * * United States v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 3 75 F

. S up p. 2d 62 6, 64 1- 42 (W. D. Mic h. 20 05 ). Sc ott convenie n tly

omits t he discussion prec eding and following the judg e’s “ caution must be had” statement. I t was eminently rea sonable for the j udg e to look skeptically at S cott’s claim that she met with Faa s about vascula

r study pay

ments and lack of written order s, g iven that the cla im contradicte d he r d e po sit ion

te sti mony . T he “ c a

uti on mus t be ha d” c omm e nt d oe s n ot e vin c e pe rs on a l bi a s. Finally , Sc o tt

a ll e g e s b ia s in

th e ju d g e ’ s s tate me n t t

h a t s h e h a d

“ a h is to r y o f li ti g a tion shenanig ans, including repe atedly hiding discove rable ev i d en ce. A s such, the new ly -minted

e vid e nc e [Sco tt’ s a ff

ida vit c la imi ng , c on tr ary to her deposi tio n, that sh e ha d s e c re t me e tin g s w ith Fa as about va scular study overc ompensation and lac k of writt en o rd er s ] will be excluded from consideration.” United States v. Me tro. Health Corp. , 375 F. Supp. 2d 626, 643 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (f oo tno te s o mit te d)

. As dis c us se d a bo ve , Sc ott ’s a ff

ida vit c la im a bo ut s e c re t me e tin g s w ithF a a s did contra dict her de position t estimony

. More o v e r , s h e did hide discover able infor

mation; she admitted 3Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 8

- - that sh e fo un d o ne of

the ta pe s o f the me e tin g wh os e min ute s sh e a lte re d and

that sh e no ne the le ss d i d n o ttu rn t h at t ap e ov er t o M et ro . T h e j u d ge’ s ch o i ce o f t h e w o rd“s h en an i gan s ” w as , i f a n y t h i n g,

c ha ri ta ble , a nd no re a so na

ble , o bje c tiv e ob se rv e r w ou ld s us pe c t th a t it ste mme d f ro m pe rs on a l bi a s. We c on c lud e that “ a

re a so na ble , o bje c tiv e pe rs on , k

no wi ng a ll o f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s, ” wo uld not have que stioned the judg e’s impar tiality bas ed o n t he substance or tone of his opinions or incourt stateme nts. See H

artsel , 1 99 F .3 d at 82 0; cf. Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp. , 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995) (“ Alth o u gh it is t rue that at times the judge criticized plaintiffs for

a tte mpt ingto m isl e a d th e jur y and be c a me sh or

t- te mpe re d wi th pla int if

fs ’ c ouns e l, t

he se c omm e nts appea r to arise from the judge’ s impatience a nd frustration with the manner in which pla intiffs were trying the ir ca se, rather than a ny partiality for de fenda

nts.”). I n short, none of Scott’s g rounds for rec usal prese nt a close question. Requiring this dist rict judge to rec use himself would encour ag e litiga nts to present “spe culative a nd ether eal a

rg uments for

rec usal and thus ar

rog at[e] t o themselves a veto power over the assig nment of judg es.” Draper v. Rey nolds , 3 69 F .3 d 1 27 0, 12 80 (1 1th Cir

. 20 04 ). Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e did no t a bu se his dis c re tio n in denying the rec usal motion, so we aff irm the Fe bruar

y 23, 2006, order

appea led in No. 06-1562. Be cause it was not an abuse of di scre tion to rejec t Scott’s recusa l motion on t he mer its, we

c ana s s u m e ar g u e n d o t h a tS c o t t ’ s r e c u s a l m o t i o nw a s t i m e l y. V. Scott filed a motion to re consider the order denying r ecusa l, which the district cour t denied in United States v. Me tro. Health Corp. , No. 1:02-CV-485, 2006 WL763181 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2006).Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

- - 3 9

- - A district court may

g rant a motion for rec onsideration – a motion to alter or amend judg ment under F ED . R. C IV . P. 59( e) – only if the movant shows (1) a cle ar e rror of law, ( 2) new ly

discovere d evidenc e, (3) an interve ning c hang e in controlling law, or ( 4) a ne ed to pre vent manife st injust ice. He nd e rso n v . W

all e d La k e Con so l. S

c hs

. , 4 69 F .3 d 479 , 4 96 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) . Sc ott do e s n ot c la im the re wa s a c ha

ng e in the c on tr oll ing law a ft e r sh e fi le d he r re c us a l mot io n, bu t s he es se nti a lly invoked t he other three g rounds for rec onsideration: clea r error of law, new evidenc e, and a need to preve nt manifest injustice. As to n e wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e , Sc ott argue d a s f

oll ow s: [N] ew evidenc e has come to lig ht w hich the Court should consider in r e-e valuating its de c isi on re g ard ing an a pp e ara nc e of imp ro pr ie ty in thi s ma tte r. Mil le r C anf ie ld (whe re [the judg e’s wif

e] is employ ed) w as counsel for not just one, but two, and possibl y ev en t h ree entities that have a direc t financia l interest in the outcome of Plaintiff’s case . Specifica lly , in addition to Mi ller Canfie ld repre senti n g UB S , the underw riter f

or Metropolitan’s bond issue, Miller Canfield also repr esents Standar d Fe dera l B an k

. . . a s th e is s u e r o f a d ir e c t p ay ir r e v o c a b le li n e o f c r e d it f

o r the $30,000,000 Series B portion of Metropolitan’s bond issue. Additionally , Standard Fe dera l Corporate a

nd I nstitut ional Trust . . . serve s as the B ond Trustee for the e ntire $165,000,000 Metropolitan bond issue. * * * I t is objectively rea sonable to inf er that, in the discharg e of its duties as counsel for both [UBS and Standar d Fe dera l] , Miller Canfield . . . not only assessed the validity , risk and potential outcome of the Mary Scott retaliation ca se . . . , but had an intere st in the outcome of said c ase g iven its fiduciary role with UB S and Standard F e de ra l. For two rea sons, this arg ument is of no avail to Scott. First, Scott does not explain why she did not learn of Miller Canfield’s repr esentation of these other entities, whether

throug h discovery or otherw ise, b ef

o re filing her

rec usal motion, and included it in that moti on. As with other rule s of civil and c riminal proce dure, Rule 59( e)’ s new- evidenc e prong require d Scott to show that dueCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - dil ig e nc e wo uld

no t ha ve un c ov e re d th is e vid e nc e be fo re the c ourt ru le d o n h e r r e c us a l mo tio n; S c ott

m ak es n o at t em p tat s u ch a s h o wi n g. Even if we treated M iller Canfield’s repre sentation of bond issuer S tandar d Fe dera l and bond trustee Standar d Fe dera l Corporate and I nstitut ional Trust as newly discovere d evidenc e, it does not

su pp or t Sc ott ’s re c us a l argume nt. Whate ve r sta ke Mil le r Canf

ie ld ha d in the su c c e ss o f t

he bo nd sa le was vindicated when the bonds were sold – which took place befor e the c ourt ru l ed o n summary jud g me nt. Scott’s rec onsideration motion seemed to fur ther theor ize that if her di s ch ar g e cla im were

re so lve d a g a ins t Metro , the fo llo wi ng se qu e nc e of e ve nts c ou ld oc c ur : (1) the bo nd ho lde rs wo uld demand pa

y ment on the bonds, (2) Standa rd F eder al (whic h was re prese nted by the judg e’s wif

e’s employ er) would have to pa y the bondholders, ( 3) Standard F eder al would see k reimburse ment from Metro, and (4) Metro’ s pay ment of dama g es on Scott’s reta liatory -dischar g e cla im would not leave

su ff ic ie nt r e so ur c e s to re imb ur se Stand ard F e de ra l. Even pa rsing this convoluted an d implausible scenar io from Scott’s confusing

rec onsideration motion, it is still not clear how t hat s equenc e of events is s upposed to tang ibly harm Miller Canfield, let alone the judg e’s wif e (w ho, ag ain, did not own an intere st in the law firm) and th us th e ju dge. S cot t al lu des , wi th ou t ex pl anat io n, to Mi ll er C anfi eld ’s “ fi du cia ry rol e” wi th UBS

and Sta nd ard , but doe s n ot e la

bo rate . F ina lly , Sc ott

sp e c ulate s th a t th is s e qu e nc e of e ve nts wo uld seriously impact th es e three clients of Miller Canfie ld, but she does not say what sig nificanc e we should attach to that possibi l i t y . Apparently Scott is i mply ing that Metro, UB S, and Standard Fe dera l would suffer

such losses as to be una ble to pay

Miller Canfield as muc h for f utureCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - repr esentation. Even then, the connec tion to the judge ’s wife is at best extremely attenuate d, as she does not have an ownership interest in Miller Canfield. I n summary , such fa r-r eac hing spe culation about unpredic table events aff ecting parties sever al times r emoved from the judge ’s wife’ s employ er could not lead a

rea sonable pe rson to perc eive a ny impropriety

on the par

t of the judg e. Ha vin g c o n c l u d e d

t h a tS c o t tw a s n o te n t i t l e d t o r e c o n s i d e r a t i o no f

r e c u s a l d u e t o ne wl y discovere d evidenc e, we consider w hether the orde r deny

ing r ecusa l contained a

clea r er ror of law

or wo rk e d a manif

e st inju sti c e . We co nc lud e that Scott wa s not en tit le d to re c on sid e ratio n o n th e se gr o u n d s e it h e r . O th er tha

n the re consideration arg uments addre ssed above , Scott complains only that the judg e’s or ders a

nd opinions “have be en peppe red w ith unnecessa ry p ersona l statements about the pla int if

f a nd [the ] c a se (s uc h as, “ May Go d for g ive us a ll that we have sp e nt v a lua ble mom e nts of our lives with such piddling disag ree ments” or “ This is the fagend of a long a nd bitter suit. W hat is left is to exact a measure of justice acc ording to what has come bef ore” ). This argument does not merit rec onsideration, either

. F ir st, Sc ott c ou ld and sh ou ld h a ve c ite d th e se tw o c omm e nts in h e r r e c us a l mo tio n. A R ule 59(e) motion is not the proper vehicle to r aise a rgu m en t s t hat should have be en made befor e judgme nt. Ge nCo rp , I

nc . v . A m. In t’ l U

nd e rwr ite rs , 178 F.3d 804, 834 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Se c on d, Sc ott

c on ve nie ntl y

omi ts t he langua g e th at acco mpa nie d th e “ Go d f

or g ive us ”

s t at em ent. The district c ourt was not ca lling the r etaliatory discharg e cla im a “piddling disag ree ment.” He re is the e ntirety of the footnote in whic h that statement appe are d: Plaintiff has disag ree d with [ Metro counse l] Fr aser ’s cha rac terization t hat the Monday me e ti ng was the “ first” mee ting be tween Plaintiff, Va rnum attorney s and the Exe c uti ve Com mit te e . T his dis a g re e me nt, lik e muc h of thi s r e c or d, is i ns ig nif ic ant.Case Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - What Ma ry Sc ott is r e fe rr ing to i s th a t on e Va rn um atto rn e y , Jac kie Sc ott , w a s w ith Fr aser at the Apr il 19-20, 2002 me et i n gs and identified he rself the n as a B oard Member ( which she w as); the parties do not disag ree appar ently that other membe rs of the Executive Commi ttee beside s J ackie Scott attended the f irst such meeting on April 22, 2002. May God forgive us all that we have spent va luable moments of our liv e s w ithsu c h p idd lin g dis a g re e me nts

. US ex rel. S co t t v. Metro. He alth Corp. , 3 75 F . Su pp . 2 d 6 26 , 6 35 n. 12 (W. D. Mic h. 20 05 ). Th is

com me n t w o u ld n o t c a

u s e a r e a s o n a

b le , o b je c ti v e o b s e r

v e r to s u s p e c t th a t th e ju d g e har bored pe rs on a l bi a s a g a ins t Sc ott that pr e ve nte d f

a ir jud g me nt. The Mar ch 24, 2006, orde r appe aled in No. 06- 1562 is also affir med. V I. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e xplanatio n o f i ts s anc tio ns de c isi on a de qu a te ly

jus tif ie s it s d e c isi on

to find Scott liable for sanc tions. The sanction amounts re quested by defe ndants and a

war ded by

the district court we re w ell documented a nd close to the sum plaintiff admits incurr ing in this litigation. I n th is r e g ard , w e fi nd

no a bu se of dis c re tio n an d af

fi rm fo r the re a so ns state d by the dis tr ic t c ourt

. Ba sed on Scott’s con d uct as de scribed he rein, a nd by the opinion below, the district cour t pr op e rl y inv ok e d F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 26 a s a

uth or ity fo r i mpo sin g sanc tio ns on Sc ott

. I n additi o n , Scott’s conduct as de scribed he rein, a nd by the opinion below, justified the district court’s de cision to invoke Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 56(g ) as a uthority for imposing

sanc tio ns on

Sc ott

. The district cour

t d id not clear ly

err in finding that Scott subm itted discovery filings that falsely cer tified that they

wer e believe d to be complete a nd acc urate , in violation of Rule 26(g )(1) and (2) . Nobody

could know better than Scott whe ther she had all thre e tape s of the mee ting. ThatCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - was flatly within her knowledg e, and it wa s not clear err or to find that Scott knew she w as lying wh e n h e r i nit ia l di sc los ur e s and la te r r e sp on se s c e rt if

ie d th a t sh e ha d n ot “ fo un d” a ll o f t he m. On c e the c ourt

fo un d th a t Sc ott

vio la te d Ru le 26 , it

wa s obligated

to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g )(3)

. Malautea v. Suzuk i Motor Co. , 987 F.2d 1536, 1545 ( 11th Cir. 1993). Nor did the district cour

t clear ly err in f inding that Scott submitted aff idavits that she knew

wer e not t ruthful, and that there fore she pre sented the a ffidavits in bad fa ith, in viol ation of Rule 56. Scott obviousl y

knew whe ther, a s alleg ed in her aff idavit, she deve loped her

version of the minutes based on her honest rec ollection of what happene d, rathe r t han fabricating a version of e vents that she knewnever

occur red or inserting materia l to reflec t what alleg edly was said at a prior

m ee t i n g. On c e the c ourt fo un d that Sc ott su bmi tte d an a ff

ida vit in ba d fa ith , it

wa s obligated

to i mpo se sanctions under

Rule 56(g ). Finally , we hold that t h e d i s t rict cour t did not abuse its discretion by invoking its inhere nt authority as an a ddit i o n al s o u rc e of authority for the sa

nctions ag ainst Scott. I n its opini on d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a m o u n to f

s an c t i o n s , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtw r o t e p e r s u a s i v e l y, As noted in t h e C o urt’s Opinion and Or der of September 29, 2005, the re a re thre e bases for assessing li ability ag ainst Plainti ff Ma

ry Scott: inherent authority , Fe dera l Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 26 (g ) a nd Rul e 56 (g ). Of

th e se , inhe re nt a

uth or ity is obviously the most important because it touches all of Plaintiff’s bad f aith conduct duri n g the litigation. A limited awa rd under Rules 26 and 56 would not do justice to the mag nitude of the off ense. * * * As ind ic a te d a

bo ve , th is C ourt ha s pre vio us ly fo un d Plai nti ff ’s lit ig a tio n c on du c t in thi s su it t o h a ve be e n in “ ba d f a ith ” du e to h e r p ur su it of the fa c tua lly

ba se le ss reta liation claim as part of a multi-mill ion dollar lawsuit, the intentional conce alment of multiple tape re cording s, including the cruc i al minutes tapes, and the f iling ofCase Nos. 05-1948, 05- 2642, 06-1122, and 06- 1652

Scott v. Me tro. Health Corp. & Michae l Faas

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- - intentionally

false a ffidavits on the minutes issue. The f iling and lit i gat i o n of the re ta liatio n c la im w a s, in l ig ht o f t his re c or d, mot ivate d b y

an “ imp ro pe r p ur

po se ” to hara ss and extort P laintiff’s for mer e mploy er. Se e Fi rst Ba nk of M ar ie tta , 307 F.3d at 5 2 4 (c i t i n g Big Y

ank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 1 25 F .3 d 3 08 , 3 14 (6 th Cir. 1997)). I n short, this was a case , like Cha mb e rs and Fi rst Ba nk of M ar ie tta , that was long brew ed and f

erme nted in the liquor of “ba d faith.” Scott v. Metro. Health Co rp. , No. 1:02-CV-485, 2005 WL3434830, at *3 and *6 ( W.D. Mich. De c. 1 3 , 2 0 0 5 ). W e a gre e w i t h t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s re as o n i n g. V II. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e or de rs of

the dis tr ic t c ourt

.