J-S13012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFERY FLAMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2144 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003093-2010

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2023

Appellant Jeffery Flamer appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following the revocation of his probation and resentencing. Appellant 

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence and contends that the 

trial court failed to provide reasons for a sentence of total confinement and 

abused its discretion when it failed to consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. 

Following our review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows: 

On January 31, 2011, [Appellant] pled guilty to robbery, graded 

as a felony of the first degree, and one violation of the Uniform 

Firearms Act (VUFA): § 6105, carrying a firearm as a person not 

to own or possess firearms, graded as a felony of the second 

degree. Appellant was sentenced to his negotiated sentence of 

21⁄2 to 5 years [of] state incarceration plus 3 years [of] reporting

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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probation. This court ordered that [Appellant] receive job training 

and earn his GED while in custody. This court further ordered that 

upon release, [Appellant] was to seek and maintain employment 

and stay out of trouble with the law. 

On February 7, 2020, a mental health evaluation was performed, 

at which time [Appellant] was diagnosed with post-traumatic 

stress disorder and an unspecified personality disorder with

narcissistic and paranoid features. The report also indicated that 

[Appellant] had a history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 

and oppositional defiant disorder, and that the primary focus of 

long-term treatment should be for his personality defenses. The 

report further stated [that] much of [Appellant’s] provocative 

behaviors serve a defensive purpose as well, in that he requires 

an audience in order to act out his insecurities through his 

grandiose displays. The interviewer has learned anecdotally that 

[Appellant] often occupies the courtroom engaging in this type of 

behavior. [Appellant’s] problems are deeply ingrained in his 

personality. On February 25, 2020, [Appellant] appeared before 

this court for a status hearing regarding his probation. 

[Appellant’s] probation officer Christina Nestel stated that she did 

not believe [Appellant] was suited for community supervision at 

this point. The supervision summary dated February 19, 2020[,]

indicated that [Appellant] failed to provide GED verification, 

refused to make payments towards fines and costs, and continued 

to remain uncooperative. After reviewing [Appellant’s] mental 

health report and reading much of it into the record, this court 

stated [that] they are also recommending that [Appellant] be 

supervised by the mental health unit of the probation department 

so I’ll order [Appellant] to be supervised by the mental health

[unit] and we’ll give this a status date for his compliance with a 

referral for mental health therapy. This court further stated:

I’ll allow the probation to continue. [Appellant] is to be

supervised by the mental health unit of the probation

[department]. [Appellant] is to comply with all treatment 

recommendation and report to the mental health unit as 

required. He’s to undergo random urinalysis and seek and 

maintain employment. He is to pay $25 per month toward 

costs and fines, cost and supervision fees and the matter is 

continued for [a] status [hearing] on May 5th. Those 

conditions of the sentence that I just mentioned were the 

same conditions of sentence that I imposed when 

[Appellant] was sentenced back on January 31st. I also 

imposed a stay-away order in favor of the victim in this case.
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The following month, the courts were closed due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. The next status hearing was listed for August 4, 2020. 

At that time, this court ordered probation to continue but 

requested an updated summary from the probation department. 

A summary dated July 28, 2020[,] indicated that [Appellant] had 

not made contact with the mental health treatment facility in 

several weeks.

This matter was listed again on January 14, 2021, at which time 

this court allowed probation to continue even though [Appellant]

was still not receiving any mental health treatment. On February 

17, 2021, this court conducted another status hearing. The 

probation summary recommended that probation continue with a 

status hearing scheduled for 30 days to check on compliance, 

indicating that [Appellant] had been in contact with his probation 

officer in the mental health unit but still had failed to receive any 

mental health treatment. [Appellant’s] counsel William Reilly 

confirmed that [Appellant] had yet to receive any mental health 

treatment. This court issued a detainer and instructed 

[Appellant’s] counsel to tell [Appellant] that he’ll have to get his

mental health treatment perhaps in custody since he is refusing 

to do it from the street.

On September 15, 2021, [Appellant] appeared before this court 

for a violation hearing. First, this court reviewed the probation 

summary, which stated, during the course of [Appellant’s]

probation, he was to be supervised by the mental health unit of 

the probation department and was not in compliance because he 

was not in contact with his mental health facility. This report 

indicates that back in July of 2020, [Appellant] was directed to reengage with the mental health facility and refused to do so. The 

summary reported that [Appellant] had two outstanding warrants 

for a robbery and an incident involving terroristic threats. On April 

29, 2021, [Appellant] was shot in the calf, at which time he was 

taken into custody. Both of his open bills were dismissed on 

September 9, 2021[,] for lack of prosecution. [Appellant’s]

probation was scheduled for natural expiration on May 13, 2021; 

however, [Appellant] committed technical violations prior to its 

expiration. The probation department recommended that this 

court revoke [Appellant’s] probation, lift the detainer, and 

sentence him to time-served. 

[Appellant] stated that he did an in-take interview for mental 

health treatment but that “COVID happened” and he did not enroll 

in any mental health treatment thereafter. He stated that he 
J-S13012-23

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enrolled in cosmetology school and then suffered a gunshot wound 

to the leg. 

Anthony Gil, Esquire, on behalf of the Commonwealth, argued that 

[Appellant] had mental health issues that he failed to address and 

that he continued to rationalize his own failure to act. Mr. Gil 

further argued that [this court] should order that [Appellant]

engage in some type of mental health treatment, and in such a 

manner that will force him to do so, but left the sentence to this 

court’s discretion.

[Appellant’s] counsel Jena Simonds, Esquire of the Defenders 

Association of Philadelphia argued that this court needed to 

conduct a Grazier hearing because [Appellant] wanted to

represent himself and that he had represented himself before. 

[Appellant’s counsel] argued that she believed her office was 

backup for [Appellant] during the VOP hearing. The court clerk 

then reviewed [Appellant’s] docket, and identified which lawyer 

[had] represent[ed Appellant] on each date. The record showed 

that the Defender Association of Philadelphia had been 

representing [Appellant] at each listing while he was out on bail.

At [Appellant’s] counsel’s request, this court then conducted an 

on-the-record inquiry as to whether [Appellant] should be 

permitted to represent himself. At the conclusion of questioning,

this court denied [Appellant’s] request, finding that he did not 

understand what is necessary to represent yourself and follow the 

rules of the court. Throughout the hearing, [Appellant]

interrupted and spoke over others, and repeatedly claimed he did 

not understand and was unable to follow along. 

[Appellants’ counsel] argued that even though [Appellant] did not 

get mental health treatment, he did do the intake interview and 

he was trying to do what he was supposed to do by enrolling in

school. [Appellant’s counsel] recommended a sentence of timeserved and that this court lift any detainers. 

[Appellant] stated that he also wanted to receive time served. He 

stated that he wanted to go back to school and get his career off 

the ground. [Appellant] stated that he should be given credit for 

at least trying.

After hearing from all parties, this court found [Appellant] in 

technical violation of his probation for failure to comply with these 

specific instructions of the court to get mental health treatment. 

This court revoked [Appellant’s] probation and sentenced him to 
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6 to 12 months [of] county incarceration plus 3 years [of] 

reporting probation, with credit for time serve[d] since a detainer 

was lodged. This court ordered that [Appellant] be paroled 

directly to a mental health program, with [the] sheriff to transport, 

and thereafter receive supervision from the mental health unit of 

the probation department, seek and maintain employment, 

undergo random urinalysis, and strictly comply with all 

recommendations of the mental health treatment facility including 

medication.

After sentencing, [Appellant] continued to ask numerous 

questions about his sentence, claiming that he did not understand 

what was going on. Both [Appellant’s counsel] and this court 

attempted to explain his sentence to him several times; however, 

[Appellant] repeatedly stated that he did not understand. This 

court then had [Appellant] and his counsel go into a booth so that 

she could answer any further questions.

On September 27, 2021, [Appellant] filed a motion for 

reconsideration of sentence. On October 13, 2021, [Appellant]

filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. On October 14,

2021, [Appellant], through the Defenders Association, filed a 

motion for early parole, asking this court to vacate the condition 

that [Appellant] go to a mental health treatment facility with 

sheriff to transport and instead allow [Appellant] to live with his 

cousin and receive outpatient mental health treatment at Wedge 

Juniper.

On December 14, 2021, [Appellant] filed a motion for new 

counsel, stating that he had a conflict of interest with the 

Defenders Association. On January 4, 2022, the Defenders

Association filed a petition to remand the case to the trial court 

for a [Grazier] hearing on Appellant’s request to proceed pro se

on appeal.

On January 12, 2022, this court ordered that [Appellant] file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 13, 2022, this court denied 

[Appellant’s] motion for early parole, citing judicial discretion and 

[Appellant’s] need for mental health treatment. On January 25, 

2022, the Defender Association filed a 1925(b) statement.

On February 1, 2022, the Superior Court remanded the matter 

and ordered that this court conduct a Grazier hearing to 

determine whether [Appellant] could proceed pro se on appeal. 

This court listed the matter for a video hearing on March 21, 2022, 
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after which Court Administration rescheduled the matter for April 

4, 2022. On April 4, 2022, when this case was called, this court 

was informed that [Appellant] had been released from custody on 

February 15, 2022; therefore, the scheduled video Grazier

hearing could not take place. That same day, [Appellant]

appeared at the courthouse at 12:30 pm and was directed to 

report immediately to his probation officer directly from the 

courthouse. He failed to do so and warrant cards were issued. 

When he was released from custody on February 15, 2022, 

[Appellant] was transported to Wedge South for treatment; 

however, the mental health unit was unable to verify [Appellant’s]

progress or attendance since then because [Appellant] refused to 

sign an Authorization of Release Form. On April 25, 2022, 

[Appellant] was taken into custody as a result of the wanted cards 

issued April 5, 2022. According to the probation summary dated 

April 28, 2022, [Appellant] appeared unscheduled at the probation 

department on April 5, 2022, but left after twenty minutes,

claiming he had other things to do. On May 19, 2022, this court 

found [Appellant] in criminal contempt for failure to report to his 

probation officer from the courthouse on April 4, 2022, . . .

On June 1, 2022, [Appellant] filed another motion for new counsel, 

once again arguing that he had a conflict with the Defenders 

Association because they were bar-licensed attorneys. On June 

13, 2022, the Superior Court issued an order stating that due to 

[Appellant’s] flight, he had forfeited his right to proceed pro se

and would continue to be represented by the Defenders

Association.[1]

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1 This Court’s order stated in relevant part, as follows:

In light of the trial court’s April 13, 2022 order indicating that it 

was unable to conduct a waiver of counsel hearing pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) due to 

Appellant’s flight, Appellant has forfeited his right to proceed pro 

se and the Defender Association of Philadelphia shall continue to 

represent Appellant in this appeal. 

Order, 6/13/22. Appellant absconded in April of 2022, after the trial court 

revoked his probation and resentenced him, and after he filed his notice of 

appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s flight was not a factor in the revocation of 

probation or revocation sentence imposed on September 15, 2021. 
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Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 1-8 (formatting altered and footnote and some 

citations omitted). The record reflects that Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises the follows in issues:

1. A court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon 

revocation of probation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant 

has been convicted of a new crime; or (2) the conduct of the 

defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another 

crime if he is not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential 

to vindicate the authority of the court. Where none of these 

factors applied to Appellant, did not the lower court abuse its 

discretion when it sentenced him to incarceration?

2. A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it imposes a 

sentence in excess of what is necessary to address the gravity 

of the offense, the protection of the community and the 

defendant’s rehabilitative needs. Where Appellant was not a 

danger to the community and the court failed to consider 

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, did not the lower court impose 

a sentence violative of the Sentencing Code and the norms that 

underlie the sentencing process?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

2

Appellant’s issues implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence, 

and we note that “[t]he right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence is not absolute[.]” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant raised three additional issues in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement that the trial court addressed in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Rule 

1925(b) Statement, 1/25/22; Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 8-18. However, 

Appellant has not included those issues in his appellate brief and abandoned 

those issues on appeal. Accordingly, we deem those issues waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is 

abandoned and, therefore, waived.” (citation omitted)).
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132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Rather, where an appellant 

challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be 

considered a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 

Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2007).

As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 

(Pa. Super. 2010), an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see 

Pa.R.Crim.P. [708(E)]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (formatting altered and citation omitted).

In the instant case, following the revocation of his probation, Appellant 

filed a timely motion to reconsider and modify his sentence, a timely appeal, 

and has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. Accordingly, 

Appellant is in technical compliance with the requirements to challenge the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence, therefore, we will proceed to determine 

whether Appellant has raised a substantial question. See id.

The determination of whether there is a substantial question is made on 

a case-by-case basis, and this Court will grant the appeal only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; 
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or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process. Id.

In the instant case, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to 

consider relevant sentencing factors from 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) and abused 

its discretion by imposing a sentence of total confinement for technical

violations. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. We conclude that Appellant has raised 

a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 

242 A.3d 667, 680 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that a claim that the trial court 

failed to consider sentencing criteria required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), 

including the defendant’s rehabilitative needs, presents a substantial 

question), appeal denied, 253 A.3d 213 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v. 

Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that the imposition 

of a sentence of total confinement after the revocation of probation for a 

technical violation of probation raises a substantial question).

Our standard of review is as follows:

The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation 

is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which, 

absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. 

An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment – a 

sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record 

discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Starr, 234 A.3d 755, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted).

The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon 

revocation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant has been 
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convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant 

indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is 

not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate 

the authority of the court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) (formatting altered). Before the trial court may revoke 

probation, the court must find, “based on the preponderance of the evidence, 

that the probationer violated a specific condition of probation or committed a 

new crime[.]” Commonwealth v. Parson, 259 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 

2021) (citations omitted).3

In addition, in all cases where the court resentences an offender 

following revocation of probation[,] the court shall make as a part 

of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, 

a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed 

and failure to comply with these provisions shall be grounds for 

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3

In Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019), our Supreme 

Court examined the statutory framework governing probation revocations and 

concluded that “a court may find a defendant in violation of probation only if 

the defendant has violated one of the specific conditions of probation included 

in the probation order or has committed a new crime.” Id. at 1250; see also 

Commonwealth v. Koger, 15 WAP 2022, 2023 WL 4193028 (Pa. 2023); 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9754(b). “To insure that general condition is met, or to assist the 

defendant in meeting that general condition, the order must also include 

certain “specific conditions” of probation. Foster, at 1250; see also Koger, 

at 2023 WL 4193028 at *5; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763.

Only upon the violation of any of the specified conditions in the 

probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the 

defendant's probation. In other words, a court may find a 

defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has 

violated one of the specific conditions of probation included in the 

probation order or has committed a new crime. The plain 

language of the statute does not allow for any other result.

Foster, 214 A.3d at 1250 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the 

record reflects that the trial court ordered mental health treatment as a 

specific condition of Appellant’s probation. See N.T., 2/25/20, at 7.
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vacating the sentence or resentence and resentencing the 

defendant. 

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted and formatting altered); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

708[(D)(2)] (indicating at the time of sentence following the revocation of 

probation, “[t]he judge shall state on the record the reasons for the sentence 

imposed.”). However, “[the] trial court need not undertake a lengthy 

discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the 

statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing 

court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”

Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044 (citation omitted). Moreover, “our review is limited 

to determining the validity of the probation revocation proceedings and the 

authority of the sentencing court to consider the same sentencing alternatives 

that it had at the time of the initial sentencing.” Parson, 259 A.3d at 1019 

(citation omitted and formatting altered); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by making 

only a “blanket statement” that incarceration was needed to vindicate the 

authority of the court and that “Appellant did nothing to slight the court’s 

authority.” Appellants’ Brief at 17.

As noted, the trial court ordered mental health treatment as a condition 

of Appellant’s probation. Although Appellant failed to satisfy this condition, 

the trial court initially provided Appellant multiple opportunities to obtain such 

treatment while he remained on probation. However, Appellant failed to enroll 
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in and obtain mental health treatment, and Appellant’s failure to engage in 

mental health treatment constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of 

his probation. The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation, and as noted, 

resentenced Appellant to a term of six to twelve months of incarceration 

followed by three years of probation with immediate parole to a mental health 

facility. The trial court stated:

This record is absolutely clear that this sentence is absolutely 

necessary to vindicate the authority of the [c]ourt, as well as to 

protect society from [Appellant], given that he had a violent 

robbery. He was charged with two new cases he says against his

girlfriend, those were withdrawn.[4] But [Appellant] has serious 

mental health issues that have gone on for a long period of time 

that he has not addressed. And he needs to address his mental 

health issues.

N.T., 9/15/21, at 45. 

In its opinion, the trial court explained:

[Appellant] was given multiple opportunities to rectify this 

situation but chose to blatantly disregard this [c]ourt’s order. This 

[c]ourt conducted status hearings on August 4, 2020, January 14, 

2021, and February 17, 2021. Each time, this [c]ourt allowed 

[Appellant’s] probation to continue in order to give [Appellant] 

more time to comply, and each time [Appellant] failed to do so. 

At the violation hearing, [Appellant] admitted that he did not get 

any mental health treatment and knew that he was ordered to do 

so. Based upon [Appellant’s] conduct, this [c]ourt properly found 

[Appellant] in technical violation and sentenced him to 6 to 12 

____________________________________________

4 As the trial court pointed out, these charges were later withdrawn. However, 

we note that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s prior arrests which 

did not result in convictions, as long as the court recognizes that the defendant 

was not convicted. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 481 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. 

Super. 1984).
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months county incarceration plus 3 [years of] reporting probation 

in order to vindicate the authority of the court.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 18. 

On this record, the trial court concluded that Appellant had serious 

mental health issues that required treatment, made such treatment a specific 

condition of probation, addressed Appellant’s repeated failures to obtain

mental health treatment, and initially afforded Appellant more time to obtain 

mental health treatment while remaining on probation. N.T., 9/15/21, at 45. 

Further, the trial court explained that probation had failed as a mode of 

rehabilitation, Appellant demonstrated that he was unfit for supervision, and 

as such, found Appellant posed a threat to society. Id. 

On this record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument that the trial 

court made merely a blanket statement concerning vindication is meritless. 

The trial court explained that Appellant violated the specific conditions of his 

probation, provided its rationale for revoking Appellant’s probation and 

imposing a sentence of total confinement, and it set forth the reasons why 

Appellant’s sentence was necessary to vindicate the authority of the court. 

We conclude that Appellant is due no relief.5 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant also argues that the decision in Commonwealth v. Cottle, 426 

A.2d 598 (Pa. 1981), supports his claim that a sentence of incarceration was 

unwarranted. See Appellant’s Brief at 17. In Cottle, the appellant voluntarily 

appeared before the trial court during the trial of another defendant. Cottle, 

426 A.2d at 599. Although the appellant was admonished to remain silent by 

the trial court, he approached the bench and confessed to a robbery for which 

he had never been charged. Id. Because of his forthrightness and honesty, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing

to consider his rehabilitative needs. Appellant’s Brief at 20-22. 

As noted previously, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six to twelve

months of incarceration followed three years of reporting probation. See 

____________________________________________

the trial court imposed a sentence of six to twenty-three months of 

incarceration followed by five years of probation. Id. For three years, the 

appellant complied with the terms of his probation. However, at one point, 

the appellant missed scheduled meetings with his probation officer. Id. The 

trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and imposed the statutory 

maximum sentence of total confinement. Id. Although this Court affirmed, 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the statutory maximum sentence 

and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court explained:

It is our judgment that under these unique facts it cannot be said 

that the imposition of the maximum sentence was ‘essential’ to 

vindicate the court’s authority.

. . . To ignore Mr. Cottle’s efforts in his own behalf and act solely 

on the basis of his failure to comply with the court’s directive, 

would place form over substance. It would ignore the ultimate 

objective that has been achieved and the fact that, that 

accomplishment resulted from the efforts of the offender himself. 

We are here faced with a man who has demonstrated that he is 

now able to live successfully in the community. The imposition of 

the maximum sentence at this point in Mr. Cottle’s life would be 

more punitive than corrective in nature. Moreover, it may very 

well destroy that which has already been accomplished, i.e., his 

readjustment.

Id. at 602. Unlike the appellant in Cottle, Appellant never sought the courtordered mental health treatment while on probation. Rather, Appellant has 

continuously failed to obtain mental health treatment and demonstrated that 

he is unwilling or unable to meet the conditions of his probation. See Trial Ct. 

Op., 8/2/22, at 18. The trial court concluded that a sentence of total 

confinement was necessary to vindicate the authority of the court and provide 

for Appellant’s rehabilitative needs which included mental health care. See

N.T., 9/15/21, at 45. Clearly, the circumstances in Cottle are distinguishable

from the instant case, and cannot be applied to disturb the trial court’s 

revocation sentence. See Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c).
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Sentencing Order, 9/15/21, at 1-2. The trial court gave Appellant credit for 

time served with immediate parole to a mental health treatment facility. See 

id. Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court considered the factors set forth 

in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), including the protection of the public, the gravity of 

Appellant’s crimes in relation to the impact on the life of the victim and the 

community, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Indeed, the trial court 

repeatedly addressed the fact that Appellant’s mental health issues are 

paramount in his rehabilitation, and the trial court noted that consistent 

attempts to allow Appellant to obtain such treatment while on probation had 

failed. N.T., 9/15/21, at 7, 14, 26, 37.

The trial court explained:

This [c]ourt had given [Appellant] multiple opportunities to work 

on his issues while out on probation. Unfortunately, [Appellant]

chose not to do so and instead was arrested for a robbery and 

later arrested again for making terroristic threats on SEPTA, a 

Philadelphia public transportation authority. Revocation and a 

county sentence with immediate parole to a mental health 

treatment facility was an appropriate sentence under the 

circumstances since [Appellant] demonstrated that he was 

unwilling to do so on his own. As stated above, there is no 

requirement that [the trial court] impose the minimum possible

sentence. Rather, based upon [Appellant’s] ongoing failure to 

comply with the terms and conditions of probation as well as his 

serious mental health issues that had yet to be adequately

addressed, this [c]ourt found it appropriate to sentence 

[Appellant] to a term of 6 to 12 months county incarceration plus 

3 years reporting probation with parole to a mental health facility.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 21 (formatting altered). 

While acknowledging that the charges were withdrawn, the trial court 

noted that the Commonwealth charged Appellant with robbery and making 
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terroristic threats while he was on probation. Moreover, although the trial 

court provided multiple opportunities for Appellant to obtain mental health 

treatment while he remained on probation, Appellant refused to do so. See

Trial Ct. Op., 8/2/22, at 18; N.T., 9/15/21, at 6-17; 45. The trial court 

concluded that Appellant’s rehabilitative needs necessitated mental health 

treatment, and Appellant repeatedly demonstrated his refusal to satisfy this 

condition of his probation. See N.T., 9/15/21, at 6-17, 45. As such, the trial 

court concluded that the sentence of was necessary to achieve this goal. See

N.T., 9/15/21, at 45. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court amply considered 

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs including mental health treatment. See

Derrickson, 242 A.3d at 680; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Moreover, the record 

reflects that the trial court stated its reasons for the sentence imposed and its 

consideration of the facts of the case and Appellant’s character, and we discern 

no abuse of discretion. See Colon, 102 A.3d at 1044; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(D)(2). Accordingly, Appellant is due no relief, and we affirm 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
J-S13012-23

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/11/2023