IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BILLY SHIELDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 16-0263-WS-N

 )

GEORGIA-PACIFIC, LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 7). Defendant, 

Georgia-Pacific, LLC, filed a Response (doc. 9) on June 30, 2016, and the Motion is now ripe.

Plaintiff, Billy Shields, filed his Complaint against Georgia-Pacific, LLC, and certain 

fictitious defendants in the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, Alabama, on May 2, 2016. 

Shields’ Complaint asserted a claim against Georgia-Pacific and fictitious defendants for 

workers’ compensation benefits, based on allegations that he had been an employee of those 

entities when, while working within the line and scope of his employment, Shields “was caused 

to sustain cardiovascular injuries and other injuries and damages.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 5-6.) The 

Complaint also alleged a common-law claim for the Alabama tort of outrage, on the theory that 

defendants had “intentionally or recklessly caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and emotional 

distress by refusing to pay for and refusing to pay him temporary total disability benefits, and 

denying his claim for workers’ compensation benefits.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) According to the 

Complaint, defendants’ actions were intended “to either force him to settle his workers’ 

compensation claim for less than its value or to defraud him of his medical, vocational, and 

disability benefits outright.” (Id. at ¶ 16.)

Georgia-Pacific filed a Notice of Removal (doc. 1) on June 6, 2016, whereby it removed 

this entire lawsuit to federal court. In the Notice, Georgia-Pacific looked solely to Shields’ 

outrage cause of action, arguing that the outrage claim gave rise to removal jurisdiction on both 

diversity and federal question grounds. Specifically, Georgia-Pacific posited that the parties 

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were of diverse citizenship and that the amount in controversy for the outrage claim exceeded 

$75,000 because Shields appeared to be claiming that he was owed as much as $770,000 in 

workers’ compensation benefits, that Georgia-Pacific’s actions had caused him pain and 

suffering due to inability to obtain proper medical care, that Shields had suffered emotional 

distress due to medical bills he could not pay, and that he was seeking both compensatory and 

punitive damages. Moreover, Georgia-Pacific maintained that the outrage claim gave rise to 

federal question jurisdiction because Shields’ claim based on failure to pay disability benefits is 

subject to ERISA preemption. On its face, the Notice of Removal predicated removal 

jurisdiction solely on the outrage cause of action, without relying on or even addressing the 

jurisdictional implications of Shields’ claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

On June 20, 2016, two weeks after Georgia-Pacific filed its Notice of Removal, Shields 

filed a First Amended Complaint (doc. 6).1 As such, the First Amended Complaint is now 

Shields’ operative pleading. On its face, the First Amended Complaint is virtually identical to its 

predecessor, except that it deletes the outrage cause of action. In its present form, then, 

plaintiff’s pleading is confined to a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

The obvious jurisdictional problem engendered by this state of affairs is that, as a matter 

of law, Shields’ claim for workers’ compensation benefits was never properly removable in the 

first place. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (“A civil action in any State court arising under the 

workmen’s compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the 

United States.”).2 Typically, courts in this Circuit faced with the removal of both workers’ 

 1 The First Amended Complaint was timely submitted as a matter of right because 

Shields had not previously amended his pleading and the First Amended Complaint was filed 

within 21 days after service of defendant’s Answer (doc. 3), which had been submitted on June 

8, 2016. See Rule 15(a)(1)(B), Fed.R.Civ.P.

2 See also Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1057 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A federal 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), bars the removal to federal court of claims arising under state 

workers’ compensation laws.”); Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood Inc., 388 Fed.Appx. 902, 905 

(11th Cir. July 22, 2010) (“We have concluded that, under section 1445(c), a district court lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction to review a ... claim arising out of state workers’ compensation 

laws.”); Formosa v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 806 F. Supp.2d 1181, 1186 (N.D. Ala. 2011) 

(“improper removal of a claim that arises under the state’s worker’s compensation laws raises a 

subject matter jurisdiction issue,” such that “the worker’s compensation claim is due to be 

remanded”); Nolen v. Frit-Car, Inc., 2008 WL 819036, *2 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2008) (workers’ 

(Continued)

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compensation claims and other claims have severed and remanded the workers’ compensation 

cause of action under § 1445(c), while retaining the otherwise removable claims. See Lamar v. 

Home Depot, 907 F. Supp.2d 1311, 1314 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (“The inclusion of a non-removable 

worker’s compensation claim in the same lawsuit did not render removal of the action improper 

under ... Section 1445(c). Instead, the presence of the worker’s compensation claim triggered 

Section 1445(c) as to only that claim and required remand of only that claim.”).

3 With Shields’ 

intervening amendment to the Complaint, however, the only claim left in play is the nonremovable workers’ compensation cause of action. Section 1445(c), the foregoing case 

authorities, and the parties themselves4 all concur that the workers’ compensation claim must be 

remanded because it was not properly removable. There are no other claims that may be severed 

and retained; therefore, remand of the case in its entirety is appropriate at this time.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 7) is granted. This 

action is hereby remanded to the Circuit Court of Choctaw County, Alabama, for further 

proceedings.

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of July, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

compensation claims “are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Alabama state courts, are not 

removable, and this Court is not empowered to hear them in removal proceedings”).

3 See also Musgrove v. Kellogg Brown and Root, LLC, 2013 WL 1827583, *2 (S.D. 

Ala. Apr. 29, 2013) (“when removal is properly accomplished under Section 1441(a), the federal 

court is to remand the worker’s compensation claim and retain the properly removed claims”); 

Wilson v. Dominion Management, LLC, 2010 WL 1542501, *1 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2010) (“The 

appropriate remedy when a properly removed case includes a claim captured by Section 1445(c) 

is to remand the worker’s compensation claim to state court.”). 

4 In support of his Motion to Remand, Shields argues that his “workers’ 

compensation claim, which is the only claim asserted in the First Amended Complaint, must be 

remanded to state court.” (Doc. 7-1, at 7.) And in response to the Motion, Georgia-Pacific 

“acknowledges that the worker’s compensation claim is due to be remanded.” (Doc. 9, ¶ 13.)

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