IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT THOMAS, JR.,

AIS #115280

Plaintiff,

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:

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vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-68-WS-M

:

CORIZON, INC.,

Defendant.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This § 1983 action, filed by Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., an 

Alabama prison inmate, proceeding pro se, was referred to 

the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 

Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the Court on 

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1), Defendant Corizon, Inc.’s 

Answer and Special Report (Docs. 14, 15), which the Court 

has converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17), 

and to which Plaintiff has responded. (Doc. 24). After 

consideration of the pleadings, Motion, and Response, and 

for the reasons set out below, it is recommended that 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that 

Plaintiff’s action be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Facts and Proceedings

Plaintiff is an Alabama prison inmate serving a 25-

year sentence at J.O Davis/Fountain Correctional Facility 

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for robbery and theft of property. (Doc. 1 at 6). Though 

Plaintiff only officially names Corizon, Inc., as a 

defendant, his Response “blames” Nurse Craft and “Kenneth 

Dovey, Vice President of Operating, Corizon Health Inc.,”1

for his alleged constitutionally violative medical care. 

(Doc. 24). Corizon, Inc., is the entity that provides 

medical care to inmates on behalf of the Alabama Department 

of Corrections (“ADOC”); Nurse Craft treated Plaintiff for 

his alleged injury. Despite not being officially named 

defendants, the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s 

Complaint and Response as though Nurse Craft and Vice 

President Dovey are officially named defendants. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is written in a day-by-day, play-byplay format, which the Court summarizes as follows.

On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff was working in the 

kitchen when he slipped and fell twisting his ankle causing 

swelling and a fracture. Plaintiff’s broad-brush complaint 

is that he was delayed adequate medical care after 

fracturing his ankle; however, he does state that he was 

treated in the Infirmary, where he received ibuprofen and 

an analgesic balm for his ankle, but he does not specify on 

																																																							 1 A cursory review of Corizon’s website does not 

indicate that there is a Kenneth Dovey acting as vice 

president of operations; regardless, the Court will treat 

Plaintiff’s Complaint as having named the proper vice 

president of Corizon.

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what date this treatment was given. (Doc. 1 at 8). On 

December 24, 2014, Plaintiff visited the health care unit 

where he was seen by Nurse Craft. (Doc. 15-1 at 3). Nurse 

Craft evaluated Plaintiff; his vitals were normal except 

for slightly elevated blood pressure. Nurse Craft provided 

Plaintiff with temporary work restrictions2 until he could 

be seen by the nurse practitioner on December 29, 2014. 

(Id.). When Plaintiff asked for a wheelchair, crutches, or 

a cane, he alleges he was told there were none available 

and he would have to find them himself if he wanted to use 

them. (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff states that all he could 

do was “suffer and mourn until Monday,” and his suffering 

was such that his “chest and head feels funny . . . I hope 

I don’t die. I need to be rushed to a hospital this very 

moment.” (Id.). 

On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by nurse 

practitioner Shawn Geohagan, who ordered an x-ray of his 

ankle. (Doc. 15-1 at 4). Geohagan also prescribed 

Naproxen for thirty days, and crutches for fourteen days. 

(Doc. 15-1 at 5). 

																																																							 2 Plaintiff’s work restrictions included no standing 

for more than five minutes, no team sports, no running, no 

jumping or jogging and no weight lifting. Plaintiff was 

also given a bottom bunk profile.

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The x-ray was taken, and the radiology report 

reflected a “fracture of the lateral malleolus. There is 

mild displacement of the distal fragment. There is no 

apparent callus formation. There are no gross lytic or 

blastic lesion in the bones. There is no dislocation. . . 

. [and] no radiographic evidence of acute disease in the 

left foot.” (Doc. 15-1 at 4). Dr. Timothy Iliff, who is a 

licensed doctor of medicine, viewed Plaintiff’s radiology 

report and placed a fiberglass cast on his left ankle, 

which remained in place for 7 weeks until February 17, 

2015, when it was removed by Dr. Iliff. (Id. at 5). A 

follow-up x-ray was then ordered and taken on February 19, 

2015. It indicated “a healing fracture involving the 

lateral malleolus with no displacement. The joint 

alignment is maintained. There is associated soft tissue 

swelling. . . . Improved from December 29, 2014.” (Id.). 

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff complained again to Nurse 

Practitioner Shawn Geohagan that he was experiencing 

swelling and discomfort in his left ankle. (Id.). Another 

x-ray was ordered and Plaintiff was prescribed antiinflammatory medications and a renewed crutches profile. 

(Id. at 6). This third x-ray reflected that “ossification 

is normal for the left foot, including the tarsal bones

seen. There is no fracture, dislocation or soft tissue 

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swelling. . . . Ankle swelling but no acute fracture.” 

(Id.). On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff had a follow-up visit 

with the nurse practitioner who told him that only slight 

swelling was present, and that he no longer needed to use 

the crutches. (Id.). This was the last time Plaintiff 

sought medical care for his left ankle. 

Plaintiff contends that the five days between his 

initial visit with the nurse on December 24, 2015, and his 

visit with the nurse practitioner and doctor on December 

29, 2015, constitute a constitutionally unacceptable delay 

in medical care. (Doc. 1 at 10). He states that the 

“staff here in the infirmary don’t [sic] seem to care or 

just can’t do anything until I see the person as for as 

[sic] being x-rayed. . . I guess my pain don’t [sic] 

deserve any type of urgency to be taken care of. It don’t 

[sic] seem to be an urgent matter. The state should have 

people on-call to handle these type [sic] of situations 

because an injury like this could worsen and cost [sic] me 

to lose my leg.” (Id. at 9-10). 

Plaintiff also alleges “the administration here at 

J.O. Davis . . . might retaliate against me due to my 

complaints.” (Id. at 12). Plaintiff presents no facts or 

circumstances in which he has already been retaliated 

against by any staff member at J.O. Davis; therefore, these 

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allegations are purely speculative and do not warrant any 

analysis by the Court.

For relief, Plaintiff requests to be “reward[ed] n 

money for my suffering and to try and make things better 

for the treatment of inmates as for as [sic] medical 

situations are concerned . . . . Alabama denies claims that 

it fails to give prisoners adequate medical care.” (Doc. 1 

at 7). 

Defendants answer Plaintiff’s Complaint by raising the 

defenses of, including, but not limited to, waiver, 

immunity, and failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. (Doc. 14). Defendant further responds to 

Plaintiff’s allegations by providing a sworn affidavit from 

the treating physician, Dr. Timothy Iliff, and medical 

records evidencing the extent and frequency of care that 

Plaintiff received. (Doc. 15-1). 

Dr. Iliff, via sworn affidavit, and based on the 

December 29, 2014, x-ray taken, asserts his medical opinion

that the mild fracture in Plaintiff’s left ankle was not 

worsened or accentuated by the five-day delay that 

Plaintiff contends is unconstitutional. (Doc. 15-1 at 4-

5). Dr. Iliff also states that Plaintiff’s fracture would 

have healed uneventfully, which it did, after he wore the 

provided fiberglass cast for three months. (Id. at 7). 

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In conclusion, Dr. Iliff attests that in his professional 

opinion, based on his review of the medical records and 

personal knowledge of Plaintiff, and through his education, 

training and experience, that Plaintiff’s care and 

treatment by him, as well as by the medical staff at J.O. 

Davis Correctional Facility, was always within the standard 

of care prescribed by physicians practicing medicine in the 

state of Alabama. (Id.). 

Plaintiff replied to Defendant’s Motion by “blaming” 

Nurse Craft and the Vice President of Corizon, Kenneth 

Dovey. Against Nurse Craft, Plaintiff claims she failed to 

do a body chart on his injured leg, made him find his own 

crutches, caused him to suffer great pain because of the 

delay, and treated with him deliberate indifference because 

she knew about his serious medical need and failed to 

respond reasonably to it. (Doc. 24).

Against Corizon Vice President Kenneth Dovey, 

Plaintiff states that he “failed to operate [Corizon] with 

proper health care, (Id. at 4), and that Dovey’s 

supervision essentially allowed Plaintiff to be “delayed 

medical care that could have eased a lot of the pain if 

there had of [sic] been a physician on duty during the 

Christmas holidays I suffered. Everything else as for as 

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[sic] being treated was after the delay, pain, emotional 

and mental pain and tears I cried out for help.” 

II. Discussion

a. Summary Judgment Standard

In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court begins with the following basic 

principles. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant 

this Court authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a 

matter of law” to the party who moves for summary judgment. 

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact. . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The Court must view the evidence produced by “the 

nonmoving party, and all factual inferences arising from 

it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield 

v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, 

Rule 56(e) states that:

If a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party’s assertion of 

fact as required by Rule 56(c), the 

court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly 

support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion; 

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(3) grant summary judgment if the 

motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered 

undisputed—show that the movant is 

entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless 

there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the 

evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not significantly 

probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary judgment is 

mandated where a party fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway 

Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007). “A mere 

‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's 

position will not suffice; there must be enough of a 

showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for 

that party.” Id. 

 Additionally, it is well settled that a conclusion 

cannot be taken as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678-79 (2009). Conclusory allegations based on subjective 

beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine 

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dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to 

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno,

115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n. 6 (11th Cir.1997); see also Leigh v. 

Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 

2000)(“[t]his court has consistently held that conclusory 

allegations without specific supporting facts have no 

probative value”); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-

57 (11th Cir. 1984)(a plaintiff’s mere verification of 

conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose a motion 

for summary judgment). Therefore, “[s]ummary judgment is 

mandated where a party fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway 

Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints 

are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro 

se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by 

sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. 

Brown v. Quality Corr. Healthcare, Inc. 2014 WL 2916747, 

at *2-*3 (M.D.Ala. June 26, 2014)(citing Beard v. Banks,

548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006)(citation omitted). Thus, the 

plaintiff's pro se status alone does not mandate this 

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court's disregard of elementary principles of production 

and proof in a civil case. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

b. 42 U.S.C § 1983

As stated above, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged delay in medical care 

regarding his fractured left ankle. (Doc. 1). Section 1983 

provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or 

the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of 

the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable 

to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

c. Delayed, Denied or Inadequate Medical Care

Treating Nurse Craft as though officially named in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, and construing the Complaint in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Nurse Craft for 

delayed, denied or inadequate medical care under the Eighth 

Amendment.

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To prevail on a claim for inadequate medical care, an 

inmate must show that the defendant acted with deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, the Supreme Court 

held that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to 

the serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the 

Eighth Amendment. Estelle at 104; see also Campbell v. 

Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999)(stating “[t]he 

Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting

deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical 

needs”). “However, not every claim by a prisoner that he 

has not received adequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” McElligot v. Foley, 

182 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted). 

The inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate 

medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain. . . . Medical malpractice 

does not become a constitutional violation merely because 

the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06.

Thus, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions 

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs. Id. at 106. The provided care must 

be “so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to 

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shock the conscience of be intolerable to fundamental 

fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th 

Cir. 1991). In fact, “once an inmate has received medical 

care, courts are hesitant to find that a constitutional 

violation has occurred.” Bell v. Bhadja, 2009 WL 464083 

(S.D.Fla. Feb. 24, 2009)(citing Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 

F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986).

The Eleventh Circuit delineated the objective and 

subjective portions of an Eighth Amendment claim, which 

must be met in order to prove an Eighth Amendment 

violation: 

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to 

have two components, an objective 

component, which inquires whether the 

alleged wrongdoing was objectively 

harmful enough to establish a 

constitutional violation, and a

subjective component, which inquires 

whether the officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind.

Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994)(citing 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). The objective 

component of the Eighth Amendment requires a plaintiff to 

demonstrate that an “objectively serious medical need” 

exists. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 

2003). A serious medical need is “considered one that has 

been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one 

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that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. 

(citing Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 

1187 (11th Cir. 1994) overruled on other grounds in Marsh 

v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 n. 8 (11th Cir. 

2001)(quotation marks omitted)). “In either of these 

situations, the medical need must be one that, if left 

unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.” 

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In order to meet the subjective requirement of an 

Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a serious 

medical need. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. “Deliberate 

indifference entails more than mere negligence. Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 106; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 

(1994). 

The Supreme Court held that a prison official cannot 

be found deliberately indifferent under the Eighth 

Amendment “unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S., 

825, 837-38 (emphasis added). However, “an official’s 

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failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, 

cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of 

punishment.” Id. at 838. Therefore, “under Estelle and 

Farmer, deliberate indifference has three components: (1) 

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) 

disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than 

mere negligence.” Farrow, 320 F.3d 1235, 1246 (citing 

McElligot, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255)(stating that defendant must 

have subjective awareness of an “objectively serious need” 

and that his response must constitute “an objectively 

insufficient response to that need”)). 

Assuming without concluding that Plaintiff’s fractured 

ankle was a serious medical need, the Court turns to the 

second, subjective element of deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any named defendant 

actually perceived a substantial risk of serious harm and 

disregarded that risk to the point that it worsened 

Plaintiff’s fracture. In fact, the record demonstrates 

just the opposite. Plaintiff’s injury occurred on December 

22, 2014. On December 24, 2014, within 2 days of his 

injury (and notably, on Christmas Eve), Plaintiff was 

treated by Nurse Craft in the health care unit. Nurse 

Craft thoroughly evaluated Plaintiff taking his vital 

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signs, all of which were normal, and provided him with 

temporary work restrictions until he could be seen by the 

nurse practitioner on December 29, 2014.

Plaintiff was then treated by the nurse practitioner 

on December 29, 2014. An x-ray of the left ankle was 

taken, a cast was placed on Plaintiff’s ankle and he was 

given crutches. Plaintiff wore the cast and used the 

crutches until Dr. Iliff removed the cast on February 17, 

2015. Dr. Iliff asserts his professional and medical 

opinion that Plaintiff’s ankle would have healed 

uneventfully regardless of the fact that Plaintiff had to 

wait one week to see the nurse practitioner. Dr. Iliff 

also states, based on his medical judgment, that the time 

Plaintiff had to wait to receive an x-ray and cast “did not 

accentuate his ankle problem of case any long-term pain or 

problem for him.” (Doc. 15-1 at 4-5). Based on this 

evidence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s injury was 

not disregarded under any circumstances, and the care he 

received was not so egregious that it shocks the conscience 

of the Court. The Court further concludes that Plaintiff 

carries this burden of proof at trial, and he fails to 

allege with significantly probative evidence that the care 

provided was unconstitutional. 

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Furthermore, though Plaintiff disagrees with the 

timeliness and quality of care he received, it is well 

established that a difference in opinion, or a disagreement 

between an inmate and prison officials as to what medical 

care is appropriate for his particular condition does not 

state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. 

See Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); 

accord Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 

1977)(disavowing any attempts to second-guess the propriety 

or adequacy of a particular course of treatment, as this, 

along with all other aspects of health care, remains a 

question of sound professional judgment). 

Likewise, the medical malpractice or negligence by a 

physician allegation is insufficient to form the basis of a 

claim for deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 105-07; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 

1995). Instead, something more must be shown. Evidence 

must support a conclusion that a prison physician’s harmful 

acts were intentional or reckless. See Farmer, 511 U.S. 

825, 833-38; Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th 

Cir. 1996)(stating that deliberate indifference is 

equivalent of recklessly disregarding substantial risk of 

serious harm to inmate)(Adams at 1543)(stating that 

plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to assert an 

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Eighth Amendment violation); Hill, 40 F.3d 1176, 1191 n. 28 

(11th Cir. 1994)(recognizing that Supreme Court has defined 

“deliberate indifference” as requiring more than mere 

negligence).

The fact that Plaintiff had to wait a few days to be 

seen by the nurse practitioner does not satisfy his burden 

of demonstrating conduct worthy of shocking the conscience. 

The five or so days that Plaintiff waited to be seen by the 

nurse practitioner is not an unreasonable or unheard of 

amount of time. Even in the free world where a person is 

able to choose when they want to receive treatment, many 

opt to wait that amount of time or more before choosing to 

go to the doctor on a holiday. Furthermore, many freeworld private doctors do not work at all during the 

Christmas holidays forcing even unincarcerated persons to 

wait that amount of time or longer before they can see 

their doctor. 

Based on the forgoing, the Court concludes that at no 

point during the week that Plaintiff waited for care was he 

treated with complete disregard to the point that it 

worsened his fractured ankle. Therefore, Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted, and any 

claim for deliberate difference regarding Plaintiff’s 

medical care against any defendant is ripe for dismissal. 

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III. Supervisory Liability as to Vice President Dovey

It is well established in this Circuit that 

supervisory officials are not liable [] for the 

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of 

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Gonzalez v. 

Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)(citations 

omitted). “The standard by which a supervisor is held 

liable in [his or] her individual capacity for the actions 

of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Id. To establish 

supervisory liability in this Circuit, a plaintiff must 

show that either the supervisor personally participated in 

the alleged unconstitutional conduct or that there is a 

“causal connection between the actions of a supervising 

official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” 

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). To 

establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must plead facts 

that plausibly show a causal relationship in one of three 

ways: (1) the supervisor had notice of a widespread history 

of abuse which he neglected to correct, (2) the supervisor 

implemented a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights, or (3) the facts 

support the inference that the supervisor directed 

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the 

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them 

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from doing so. Gonzalez 325 F.3d at 1234-35 (citations 

omitted). 

“While we do not require technical niceties in 

pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some 

minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant 

caused a legal wrong.” Harris, 2014 WL 4215576, at *4 

(citing Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 

2008)(citation omitted)(emphasis added). Because Plaintiff 

offers no proof causally connecting Dovey to the alleged 

deliberate indifference, and because Plaintiff fails to 

show how Dovey directed Corizon or Nurse Craft to act 

unlawfully, or knew that she would, any claim for 

supervisory liability is due to be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

IV. Liability pertaining to Corizon, Inc.

Even if Plaintiff’s Complaint had stated a valid 

Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care against 

individual defendants, he cannot maintain an action against 

Corizon as the corporate medical provider on any basis of 

alleged wrongdoing. “For § 1983 liability to attach to a 

private corporation providing prison medical care to 

prisoners, it must be shown that a prisoner’s 

constitutional rights were violated as a result of an 

established policy or custom of that corporation.” Green 

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v. Preemptive Forensic Health Solutions, 2015 WL 1826191, 

at *3 (N.D. Ala. April 21, 2015 (citing Buckner v. Toro, 

116 F.3d 450 (11th Cir. 1997). In this instance, Plaintiff 

names Corizon as a defendant, but makes no allegations 

specific enough to satisfy the requirement that he 

demonstrate a corporate policy or custom as the cause of a 

constitutional violation. 

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the Court 

concludes that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

should be granted, and Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed 

with prejudice on all claims alleged therein, against all 

Defendants.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that 

under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with 

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the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the 

interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 8th day of September, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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