Filed 6/26/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CITY OF PASADENA

,
Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

SANDRA REYES JAUREGUI et al.,

Real Part ies in Interest. B 2 80805

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC596857; JCCP No. 4674)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Steven J.
Kleifield , Judg e. Petition granted. Foley & Mansfeld, Keith M. Ameele, Joseph V. Macha,
M. Amadea Gro seclose, Margaret I. Johnson ; Office of the2

Pasadena City Attorney , Michele Beal Bagneris, City Attorney, and John Nam, Deputy City Attorney, for
Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Kazan, McClain, Satterley & Greenwood, Joseph Satterley, Denyse F. Clancy, and Ian A. Rivamonte, for Real
P arties in Interest.

___________________________________________

INTRODUCTION
Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), before commencing an act ion against a public entity, a plaintiff must pr esent the claim to the entity within six
months of “ the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto

. ” (Gov. Code

, § 901. ) In the underlying action, real parties in interest
Sandra Reyes Jauregui and Mario Reyes Jauregui (the Jaureguis) filed a f

irs t a mended c omplaint (FAC) , alleging a cause of action against petitioner City of Pasadena (the City) arising from Sandra Jauregui ’s mesothelioma

. The City
demurred to the Jaureguis’ complaint

, arguing that the y had failed to comply with the claim presentation req uirement of
the Government Claims Act by not presenting their claim to the City within six months of the date of Sandra’s
mesothelioma diagnosis. The Jaureguis opposed the demurrer, arguing that their claim presentation was timely
because under the applicable statute of limitations

-- Code of3

Civil Procedure section 340.2

-- the ir cause of action never
accrued

. 1 Thus, they asserted, the six

- month c laim presentation period never began to run

. The trial court
overruled the demurrer

, and t he City now seeks a writ directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer

. For the reasons set forth below, w e conclude that “the date upon which the cause of ac tion woul d be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the [applicable] statute
of limitations” is the date on which a plaintiff discover s or should reasonably have discovered that she had suffered a compensable injury

. In this case, that date was no later
than the date Sandra was diagnosed with mesothelioma

. Because the Jaureguis presented their claim to the City
more than 10 months after that date, they failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandate.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL

HISTORY On October 5, 2015, the Jaureguis filed a complaint for personal injuries and loss of consortium against numerous
defendants , but not the City . The complaint alleged that
Sandra was diagnosed w ith mesothelioma on or about September 25, 2015. She allegedly develo p e d the disease as a result of exposure to airborne asbestos that her father “was

1 All further statu tory citations are to the Code o f Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.4

exposed to and thereafter tracked into the family’s home and
vehicles on his clothing, shoes, person, an d personal effects .” The complaint also alle g e d that Sandra’ s fat h e r was a mechanic wh o worked with asbestos

- containing products at various sites, including at “The City of Pasadena from about
1980 to 1987.” A year later, o n Oc t o ber 14, 2016, the Jaur eg uis filed
their FAC , adding the City as a defen dant. The FAC alleged a single cause of action against the City for dangerous conditions of public property. According to the FAC,
Sandra’s father worked for the City as a vehicle mechanic and was exposed to asbe stos at various vehicle repair
fa cilities owned, co n t rolled or managed by the City

. The
FAC further alleged that on August 22, 2016, the Jaureguis presented their claim to the City in compli a nce with the
Government Claims Act

. 2 On November 17, 201 6, the City demurred to the FAC. It argued that the Jaureguis had failed to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compl i a nce with the claim presentation requirement set forth in Government Code section 911.2, which re q uires that a claim be presented
with in six mon t h s of the accrual of the cause of action. The City asserted that the Jaureguis ’ causes of action accrued on

2 Although the FAC initially asserted Mario’s loss

- of

consortium claim against the City , the Jaureguis agreed to dismiss th at claim. Thus, the only claim against the City at issue is the cause of action based on allegedly dangerous conditions

.5

S eptember 25, 2015, the date when Sandra was diagnosed with mesothelioma. However, the Jaureguis did n ot present a claim to the City un til August 22, 2016, nearly 11 months later. Nor did they file a late

- claim application

. Accordingly, the City asserted, the Jaureguis failed to comply with the claim pre sentation requirement and thus,
the demurrer should have been sustained without leav e to amend

. The City fu r ther argued that section 340.2 , the applicable statute of limitations for the Jaureguis ’ cause of
action

, did not render their claim presentation timely

. A lthough the limitations period did not run because Sandra
was never disab led with in the meaning of section 340.2, that section “ says nothing about the acc r u al of the cause of
action.” Accordingly, the City asserted, section 340.2 did not provide an accrual date other than the date of di agnosis. The Jaureguis opposed the Cit y ’s demurrer , contending
there was no time limit on their claim presentation . They argued: “Sandra’s government claim had to be filed within six months of the ‘accrual’ of her underlying tort causes of
action

- - a date statutorily defined for this purpos e as the trigger date for the u nderlying lim i t ations period. ” Because that date was never triggered, “ Sandra’s claims never ‘accrued’ for purpo ses of f iling a government claim

. ” They further argued that “accrual” has two different meaning s

-- (1) “ ‘ ripen ess ’ ” and (2) “ ‘ beginning of the limitations period ’”

-

- and “accrual” as used in Government Code section 901
meant the latter

.6 In reply, the City argued that section 340.2 did not equate “accrual” with the commencement of the limitations period. Altho ugh section 340.2 altered the limitations period

-- the time duri n g which a plaintiff may file a complaint

-- it
had no impact on when a cause of action accrued

. The City also argued that nothing in section 34 0 .2 reflects an intent on the part of the Legi slature to modify the claim presentation d eadline in the Government Claims Act

. On December 15, 2016, the trial court overruled the demurrer without explanation. However, at the hearing on the demurrer, the court stated its belief that the term “accrua l” as used in Government Code section 901 is “not used in the sense of a case being ripe so that somebody can sue.” Rather, it is used to mean “when a person must sue or lose their right,” i.e., when the limitations period

commences. The City filed its petition on February 21, 2017, seeking an immediate stay of all proceedings and a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to set
aside and va ca te its order overruling the demurrer and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer. 3 In respons e to

3 Writ review is p roper because a “ significant legal issue is presented, and the benefits of the claims act defense would b e effectively lost if defendant[] [was] forced to go to trial. ” ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 730, 747, fn. 4; see also State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal. 4t h 1234, 1245 [“ failure to allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance with the claim7

the petition, o n March 16, 2017, w e issued an order to show

cause why the demurrer should not be sustained and an order for a temp o r ary stay entered

. The Juareguis filed their return to the petition on April 14, 2017 , and the City filed its reply May 5, 2017

.

DISCUSSION

“ Government Code section 905 requires that ‘ all claims for money or damage s against local public entities’ be presented to the responsible public entity befor e a lawsuit is filed.” ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court

, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 734 .) “ Claims for personal injury and property damage must be presented within six months after accrual; all other claims must be presented within a year. ( [Gov. Code,] § 911.2.) ‘ [N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a pub lic entity on a cause of action for which a clai m is required to be presented

. . . until a written claim therefor

presentation requirement subjects a complaint to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to con stitute a cause of action”]. ) We apply the same standard of demurrer review, that is, we review demurrer rulings de novo. ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court , at p. 747; accord, K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist . (2009) 172 Cal.App. 4th 1229, 1237 [“Our review is de novo.”].) The City also sought a stay of the trial, which had been scheduled for June 12, 2017. Subsequently, the City filed a letter brief informing this court that the trial court had granted i ts ex parte appl i ca t i on to continue the tri al to October 30, 2017.8

has been presented to the public entity and has been acted

upon

. . . or has been deemed to have been rejected

. . . . ’ ( [Gov. Code,] § 945. 4. ) ‘ Thus, under these statutes, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Id

. at p. 738 .)

“ The purpose of the claims statutes i s not to prevent surprise, but ‘ to provide the public entity sufficient
information to enable it to ad equately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] It is well

- settled that claims statutes
must be satisfied ev en in face of the public entity’ s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim. ’ [Citation.] The claims statutes also ‘ enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to
avoid sim ilar liabilities in t he future.’ [Citations.]” ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court

, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 738

. ) Here, the Jaureguis were obligated to present their claims ag a inst petitioner “ not later than six months after the
accrual of the cause of acti on.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) 4 “ For the purpose of computing the time limi ts prescribed by [ Government Code section ] 911.2

. . . , the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon
which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrue d

4 For purp o s es o f the Government Claims Act , six month s means “six calendar months or 182 days, whichever is longer.” ( Gonzales v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 601, 604

. )9

within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity
before an action could be commenced thereon

. . . . ” (Gov. Code, § 901.) Thus, to calculate the claim presentation deadline, we must determine the date the cause of action

accrue d under the app licable statute of limitations. ( Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App. 4th 42, 63 [“ The date of accrual for purposes of th e claim presentation requirement is the same date on which the cause of action would accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations in an action against a private party. ”].) Here, the statute of limitations applicable to the Juareguis’ claim is found i n section 340.2. That section provide s in relevant part:

“ (a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to asbestos, the time for the commencement of the action shall be the later of the following:

“ (1) Within one year after the date the plaintiff first suffered disability.

“ (2) Within one year after the date the plaintiff either knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was caused or

c ontributed to by such exposure. “(b) ‘Disability ’ as used in subdivision (a) means the loss of time from work as a result of such exposure which precludes the performance of the employee’s regular occupation.” (§ 340.2, subd. (a).)10 Under section 340.2, “ the limitations period does not begin until the asbestos

- related injuries cause a permane nt termination of the plaintiff’ s ability to perform his or her job, which actually forces the plaintiff off the job. ” ( Duty v. Abex Corp . (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 742, 750. ) For retirees and the unemployed, the limi tations period never commences. ( Ibid .) In the instant matter, the parties agree that Sandra was never disabled within the meaning of section 340.2 and thus, the limitations period on the Juareguis’ claim has never begu n to run. S ection 340.2 does not use the term “accru ed

. ” That
term is used in s ection 312 , which is found in the same title
of the Code of Civil Procedure as section 340.2 . Section 312 provides: “ Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after
the cause of action shall have accrued

. . . . ” Thus, accrual is a prerequisite to the running of the limitation period. ( Barr v. Acands, Inc

. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1049, overruled in part on other ground s by Hamilton v. Asbest os Co r p

. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127 , 1147 ( Hamilton ) .) Under section 312, a cause of action accrues when “ the party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute an action
thereon. ” ( United States Liab

. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger

- Hayes,
Inc . (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 586, 596 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App. 2d 45 1, 454 ( Collins ) [“ A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon. ”] .)

“ Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises11

immediately upon the commission of the wrong
claimed

. . . . ” ( Ibid

. ) Stated differently, a “cause of action
accrues ‘ when [it] is complete with all of its elements’

— those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation. ” ( Pooshs v. Ph ilip Morris USA, Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 797 ( Pooshs ) .) An exception to the general rule regarding the initial
accrual of a claim is the discover y rule. ( Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc . (2013) 55 Cal. 4t h 1185, 1192 ( Aryeh ).) Under the disco very rule, the accrual of a cause of action is delayed until “ the plaintiff ‘ discovers, or has reason

to discover, the cause of action.’ [Citation.] ” ( Pooshs

, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 79 7 ; see also Seelenfreund v. Terminix of
Northern Cal. , Inc. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 133, 136 [ “ In some situations,

. . . a cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers, or should discover, the existence
of the cause of action. ” ]

. ) 5 Courts have applied a similar analysis when addressing statutes of limit ations applicable to latent
diseases such as mesothelioma. In Buttram v. Owens

-

5 Other doctrines that alter the general acc rual rule include: (1) the continuo u s violation doctrine which treats a

ser ies of wrongs or injuries as a single cause of action t hat

ac c rues upon commission or sufferance of the last of them; and (2) the theory of continuous accrual, which segregates a

s eries of wrongs or injuries into separate causes of action, each accruing on a separat e date. ( Aryeh

, supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.)12

Corning Fiberglas Corp . (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520 ( Buttram )

, our Supreme Court noted that “ as a general proposition it is settled that a plaintiff’ s cause of action accrues for pur poses of the statute of limitations upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action; that is when the plaintiff is first entitled to sue. ” ( Id . at p. 531
, fn. 4, citing § 312.) However, the discovery rule applie s to delay the

acc rual of a cause of action for an asbes tos

- related disease.
Th us, the c ourt observed

, “ f or st atute of limitations purposes, it is well settled that a cause of action for a latent injury does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should hav e discovered that he has suffered a compensable injury. ” ( Id

. at p. 53 0 , citing Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp . (19 79) 97 Cal.App.3d 881

, 887

- 888 .) In Hamilton

, the c ourt reaffirmed Buttram

, stating: “[A] cause of action for a latent injury or disease generally accrues, in the sense that it is ripe for suit, when the plaintiff discovers or should reasonably have discovered he has suffered a compe nsable injury. ” ( Hamilton

, supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) As the foregoing demonstrates, in t he context of statutes of limitations, “ accrual ” of an action is used in the
sense of ripeness. This is also the ordinary and common understanding of the term “accrue.” In Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1969) page 6, the first definition
of “ accrue” is “to come into existence as a legally enforceable13

claim.” 6 Li k ewi se, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “accrue” as

“ To come into existence as an enforceable claim or right; to arise <the plaintiff's cause of action for silicosis did not

accrue un til the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the
disease > .” (Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014).) 7 In sum, we conclude that as used in Government Code section 901, “ the date upon which the cause of action would
be deemed to have accrued within the me aning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable ” is the date on which the cause of action bec ame actionable . In the instant matter, the Jaureguis’ cause of action against the City
accrued when Sandra discovered or reasonably should have
disc overed that she had suffered a compensable injury . That
date was no later than the date she was diagnosed with mesothelioma, September 25, 2015. However, the Jaureguis did not present their claim to the City until August 22, 2016,
more than 10 months aft er Sandra was diagnosed. Thus, they failed to comply with the six

- month claim presentation
deadline set forth in Government Code section 911.2.

6 The other definitions are: “to come by way of increase or addition” and “to be p eriodically accumulated whet h er a s an i n c rease or a decreas e.” (Webster’s 7th New Col l e giate Dict

., supra , at p. 6.)

7 Black’s Law Dic tionary has only one other defi nit i on of “accrue”: “To accumulate periodically; to increase over a period of time <the savings

- account interest accrues monthly>.”14

Accordingly, their action against the City is barred, and the City’s demurrer should have been sustained.
T he Juareguis argue that under Government Code section 901, “accrue” does not mean ripeness. Rather, they contend, it means “ commenc ement of the limitations period

. ” They note that in Nelson v. Flintkote Co . (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 727, the appellate court ch aracterized section 340.2 as a “ delayed accrual rule .” ( Nelson v. Flintkote Co

., at p. 735.) We acknowled ge that many courts have used

“ accrue” or “accrual” when referring to the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations. A likely reason for the conflation of the two concepts is that in the vast majority of cases, the date an action accrues is also the date the

statu te of limitations begins to run

. Our Supreme Court has recognized, h owever, that “ the accrual of a cause of action” is
dist inct from “ the beginnin g of the limitations period

. ” ( Hamilton

, supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144 .) Thus, i n Hamilton

, the c ourt observed that it would be a “mistake[]” to “equate[]
the accrual of a cause of action for asbestos

- related injury with the beginni ng of the limitations period prescribed by
section 340.2. ” ( I

bi d .) The c ourt explained: “ Before the enactment of section 340.2, [the] accrual date was also the date of the beginning of the limitations period in cases in which the latent injury or diseas e arose from exposure to
asbestos. [Citation.] But section 340.2 changed that rule, declaring a separate and distinct date f or the beginning of
the limitations period in asbestos cases, i.e., the date of disability as specially defined in the statute. ” ( Id . at pp.15

1144

- 1145 , italics omitted .) Notably, the Hamilton c ourt

never us ed the term “accrual” when referring to the beginning of the limitations period. In short , “[a] lthough commentators have referred to [section 340.2] as providing for a ‘ postpone d acc rual’ date [citation] , it is more accurately described as a statute of repose

-- a time in the future after which a claimant may not file suit because the claim
becomes stale. ” ( Barr v. Acands, Inc.

, supra , 57 Ca l.App.4th at p. 1049. )
T he Jaureguis’ argu m e nt that “accrue” means only

“ commencement of the limitations period” would lead to the anomalous result that they could not bring the instant
action. As noted, under section 340.2, the limitations period begins to run on the date of “disability.” Because Sandra never suffered a “disability,” the limitations period has never begu n to run
, and unde r the Jaureguis’ interpretation their
cause of action has not

-- and never will

-- accrue . However

, under section 312, “without exception,” an action may not be
filed un til the underlying claim “shall have accrued

. ” Thus, the Jaureguis could never bring a suit for an asbestos

related injury or illness. Like other courts, w e reject such an interpretation. (See Barr v. Acands, Inc.

, supra , 57 Ca l.App.4th a t p. 1049 [“ If a claim for personal injuries allegedly resulting from asbestos exposure could not accrue until disability occurred, it would lead to the anomalous16

result that plaintiffs who did not suffer disability as defined by the statute would be forev er barred from filing suit. ”].) 8 The Jaureguis further argue that interpreting “accru ed ” to mean when a cause of a ction is ripe would rewrite Government Code section 901 to excise any reference
to statutes of limitations. We disagree

. In the context of statutes of limitations, accrual refers to the settled common
la w accrual rules , incl u ding the discovery rule de l aying
accrual of a c a u se of action . (See Aryeh

, supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 1193 [where statute of limitations uses term “accrued” but provides no definition, we may assume “ the Legislature
intended the well

- settled body of law that has built up around accrual, including the traditional last element rule and its equitable exceptions, to apply fully here ”].) In
Buttram , the c ourt noted that it was “ well settled ” that “for statute of limitations purposes,” a cause of action for a latent injury , such as asbestos

- related mesothelioma, does not

accrue “ until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered that [s he ] has suffered a compensabl e injury. ” ( Buttram

, supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 530; accord,
Hamilton

, supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144 .) Thus, construing “accrual” in Government Code section 901 as our Supreme

8 We note that the Legislature has not acted on Justice Brown’s suggestion to revisit and revise the “cumbersome and confusing” language of section 340.2 , which has created several “anomalous,” “bizarre” and likely unintended results

. (See Hamilton

, supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1152 (conc. op n . of Brown, J. ) .)17

Court has done “for statute of limi t ations purposes” is
consistent with the sta t ut ory language. Finally, the Jaureguis contend that the intent and

purpos e of section 340.2

-- “to provide a unique and forgiving
lim i ta t ions p eriod to those sufferi n g from an a sbestos

- related
illness”

-- warrants interpreting Government Code section
90 1 to permit them to present an asbestos

- related claim against the City at any time prior to filing their action against the City. However, the intent and purpos e animating section 340.2 must be balanced against the intent
and purposes animating the Govern ment Claims Act . As
noted , the purpose s of the Government Claims Act are (1) to provide the public entity with sufficient information to
enable it to ad equately investigate and settle claims

, and (2)
to enable the entity to account for potential liabiliti es and to
avoid sim ilar liabilities in the future. ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court

, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 738.) “Moreover, the
intent o f the Government Claims Act is ‘ not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against government entities. Rather, the intent of the act is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances. ’ [Citation.] ” ( DiCampli

Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 991. ) An unlimited claim presentation period expanding the rights of plai ntiffs against government entities would frustrate th e intent and purposes of the Government Claims Act

. It could hamper a public entity from taking immediate remedial
action

-- such as using asbestos

- free products

-- and impede
its fi scal planning. (See Johnson v. San Diego Unified18

Sch ool Dist

. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 696

- 697 [“ ‘ claims statute provides an opportunity to the public entity to quic kly rectify a dangerous condition and

. . . to take the potential claim into account in its fiscal planning ’ ”].) Moreover, the Juareguis have pointed to nothing in the language or legislative history of section 340.2 to suggest that the Legislature intended, sub silencio, to amend the six

month claim presentation deadline in the Government
Claims Act

. On this point, we find the 2002 amendment to section 340.1 instructive. In 2002, the Legisl a ture amended
section 340.1 by adding, inter alia, subdivision (c) which provides that any claims for damages arising from childhood
sex abuse that would otherwise be barre d solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired “is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be

c omme n c ed within one year of Jan u a ry 1, 2003.” (§ 340.1, subd. (c).) Subsequently, our Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether a plaintiff who failed to present a timely claim to a publi c entity could thereafter bring a claim for childhood sex abuse against the entity under the amended
section 340

. 1. The c ourt con cluded t he answer was “ n o.” ( Shirk v. Vista Unified Schoo l Dist . (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 201,

2 05 ( Shirk ), superseded by statute as stated in A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist

. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252.)
The c ourt observed that section 340.1, subdivision (c) revived only claims ba rred solely because of the appl i ca b l e statute of limitations. However, “ the government claim presentation
deadline is not a statute of limitations .” Thus, section 340.119

did not revive those claims barred by failure to comply with
the claim presentation requirement . ( Shirk

, supra , at p. 213.) Moreover, as the appellate court in S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 ( S.M .) observed, although section 340.1 extended “ the time during which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue,

. . . it [did]
not alter th e cause of action’ s accrual date, which is when
the molestatio n occurred subject to any applicable delayed discovery. [Citation.] It is the date of accrual that triggers the government tort claim filing requirement, a predicate not addressed by section 3 40.1. ” ( Id . at p. 721.) Following Shirk , the Legislature enacted Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), adding childhood sex
abuse claims “arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009” to those claims exempted from the government c laim presentation requirement. ( See Gov. Code, § 905 [listing exempted claims] .) Notably, the Legislature did not overrule Shirk ’s holding for childhood abuse claims arising from conduct occurring prior to 2009. (See S.M

., supra , 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 7 21, fn. 6.) Nor did the Legislature address the date of accrual for such claims. Here, in enacting section 340.2, the Legislature
extended the limitations period for asbestos

- related actions

. It neither exempted those causes of action from the claim

p resentation requirement nor alter ed when such actions
accrued . (See Nelson v. Flintkote Co

., supra , 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 730 [ noting that prior to enactment of section 340.2,20

asbestos

- related causes of action were “ governed by the general one

- year tort st atute of limitations set forth in section 340, subdivision (3)

. . . ”].) Thus , while section 340.2 modified the limitations period for commencing asbestos

related causes of action against both public and nonpublic entities, it did not modify the claim pre sentation deadline
because it did not address the date of accrual for those
actions

. That date remains, as set forth in Supreme Court precedent, the date the Jaureguis “discover[ed] or should reasonably have discovered” that Sandra w as suffering from

meso thelioma. ( Hamilton

, supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) Lastly, we note our interpretation of Government Code
section 901 does not bar a n action by a plaintiff who

, years aft er exposure to asbestos, discovers s he has suffered a compensable injury

. It req uire s only that a fter making such a discovery, s he promptly present a claim to the governmental entity s he seeks to hold responsible

. 9

9 We note that pending before the Supreme Court is Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1037 [2016 Cal.App. LEXIS 211], review granted June 15, 2016, S234269. During oral argume nts before the court, the parties disputed whether the discovery rule would delay the date of accrual of Rubenstein’s childhood sex abuse claim and thus render her claim timely under the Government Claims Act. No such issue is presented here, as the City concedes the Jaureguis are entitled to the benefits of the discovery rule. More important, our holding incorporates the discovery rule. Under our holding, the six

- month claim presentation deadline for asbestos

- related disease is21 DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory wri t of mandate issue directing that respondent superior court vacate its order overruling

p etitioner’s demurrer , and enter a new order sustaining

p etitioner’s demurrer in its entirety. The order to show cause, having served its purpose

, is discharged, and the temporary stay is vacated effective upon the issuance of the
remittur. Petitioner i s entitled to i t s costs in this writ proceeding.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

calculated from the date of discovery, which in the instant case is no later than the date of diagnosis.