****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL. v

.

DANNEL P. MALLOY ET AL.

(SC 19376)
Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued October 14, 2015—officially released February 23, 2016 Linda L. Morkan, with whom were Benjamin C. Jensen and, on the brief, James A. Wade and Norman H. Roos, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Matthew J. Budzik, assistant attorney general, with whom were Heather J. Wilson, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, GeorgeJepsen, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants). RyanP. BarryandMichaelJ. Dyerfiledabriefforthe Connecticut Bankers Association et al. as amici curiae.
J. L. Pottenger, Jr., Jeffrey Gentes, and Aurelia Chaudhury, Nicholas Gerschman and Marian Messing, law student interns, filed a brieffor the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center as amici curiae.Opinion PALMER, J. In 2013, the legislature amendedthe statutes governing Connecticut’s public land records system to create a two tiered system in which a mortgage nominee operating a national electronic database to track residential mortgage loans must pay recording fees approximately three times higher than do other mortgagees. The plaintiffs, MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., who are currently the only entities required to pay the increased recording fees, commenced the present action against the defendants, Governor Dannel P. Malloy, Attorney General George Jepsen, Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, Kendall F. Wiggin, the state librarian, and LeAnne R. Power, the state public records administrator,1 seeking, inter alia, injunctive reliefand ajudgment declaringthatthis two tieredfee structureviolatesvarious provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that General Statutes §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h), as amended, violate the equalprotection, dueprocess, andtakingsprovisions of the federal and state constitutions, the federal dormant
commerce clause, and the federal prohibition against bills of attainder. The plaintiffs further alleged that enforcement of the statutes violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment on all counts andrenderedjudgmentthereon. This appeal followed.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I
This case concerns the filing fees thatthe parties to a residential mortgage loan must pay to record mortgage documents in the public land records in Connecticut. Because the plaintiffs raise both federal and state constitutional issues of first impression, it will be helpful before considering the plaintiffs’ claims to briefly review the traditional procedure for recording residential mortgage documents, certain relatively recent changes to that system, and the novel response of the Connecticut legislature to those changes.
Under the traditional residential mortgage model, a person seeking to finance the purchase ofa residential property obtains a loan from a lender, typically a bank, in exchange for a promissory note committing the borrower to repay the loan. To secure the loan, the borrower provides the lender a mortgage on the property. Although, in Connecticut, there is no legal requirement that the lender record the mortgage in the public land records, mortgages typically are recorded—via the clerk of the town in which the property is situated— in order (1) to perfect the lender’s security interest by giving public notice thereof, and (2) to maintain a complete public chain of title.Underthe traditional model, the bank or otherlender maintainstheloanonitsbooksandcontinuesto service the loan until it is repaid. At that point, the parties typically record a release of the mortgage in the land records. At a minimum, then, the life of a residential mortgage loan may involve onlytwo recordable events, although other events—for example, a transfer of the mortgage loan to another lender, or the creation or subordination of a home equity credit line—also may arise under the traditional model.
The most significant factorinthe decline ofthe traditionalresidentialmortgagemodelhasbeenthe development and evolution ofthe secondary mortgage market. A secondary market is created when the initial lender sells the mortgage loan to outside investors. Doing so provideslocallenderswithgreaterliquidity,whichfacilitates additional home buying, and also allows large outside investors to pool—and thus to minimize—the risk that any particular loan will go into default. Although the modern secondary mortgage market had its genesis in the creation of the Federal Housing Authorityandassociatedgovernmentsponsoredfinancing corporations such as Fannie Mae in the 1930s, it expanded dramatically in the 1980s with the advent of
new types ofmortgage backed securities for sale in the private equity markets.
For mortgage loans sold in the secondary market, the investor typically engages a third party to perform servicing functions such as payment collection and file maintenance. Both the loan itself and the servicing rightsmaybesoldortransferredmultipletimesoverthe life ofaloan. Underthe common-lawrule, as codifiedin many states, the mortgage follows the note, so that an investor who acquires a residential note automatically obtains the attached security interest as well. Although the development of a robust and sophisticated secondary market has had a dramatic impact on the liquidity and, with some notable exceptions, the stability ofthe residential mortgage loan market, it also has created challenges for the public land record system. Because the ownership and servicing rights to a loan may be transferred multiple times over the life of
aloan, themortgagee ofrecord, whichmaybe eitherthe note holder or the servicer as nominee, will frequently change. This means that each subsequent holder must choose either (1) to undertake the costly and timeconsuming process ofrecording each ofthe numerous mortgagesthatitmaybrieflyhold, subjecttothevarying costs and requirements of each state’s county or, as in Connecticut, eachtownclerk, or(2)to declinetorecord its interest, which may result inpotential problems and costs resulting from an incomplete public chain oftitle.
To address these problems, in the 1990s, the major public financial service corporations, in collaborationwith various private interests, developed the national Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) system. There are two primary components to the MERS model.3 First, MERS operates a national electronic registration system that tracks any changes in the ownership and servicing rights of MERS-registered loans between MERS members, who include in-state and outof-state mortgage lenders, servicers and subservicers, and public finance institutions. In this sense, MERS operates as a centralized, virtual alternative to the hundreds oftraditional county or town land recording systems throughout the country. Second, because MERS members cannot completely eschewthe use ofthe public landrecords, MERS becomes the mortgage nominee
on any loans held by MERS members, and is identified
as such when the mortgage is initially recorded in the land records. Recording a mortgage with MERS as a mortgage nominee essentially creates aplaceholderfor the electronic MERS system in the public records, allowing the two systems to interoperate. That is to say, ifaparty searching the chain oftitle on aproperty
comes upon a recorded mortgage to MERS, the party is thereby notified that the MERS database may be consulted to determine the present beneficial owner of the mortgage and loan, as well as any related servicing rights or subordinate security interests. MERS remains the mortgagee ofrecord in the public records until the mortgage eitherisreleased orassignedto anonmember of MERS.
One potential advantage of the MERS system is that it eliminates the costs, inbothtime andfees, associated with recording each subsequent mortgage assignment in the public land records. Although the plaintiffs in the present case do not concede that any such savings have been realized in Connecticut, the parties do agree that, as of 2013, approximately 65 percent ofmortgage loans nationally and in Connecticut originated with MERS acting as the mortgagee. The plaintiffs’ principal place of business is in Virginia. Turning our attention to the legislation that led to the present action, we note that, prior to July 15, 2013, § 7-34a required that all filers pay the town clerk $10 for the first page of each document filed in the land records, plus $5foreachsubsequentpage. General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 7-34a (a). Section 7-34a imposed additionalfees of$3 and $40perfiling; General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 7-34a (d) and (e); and an additional fee of $2 per assignment after the first two assignments. General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 7-34a (a).
In 2013, General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 7-34a was amended by Public Acts, No. 13-184, § 98 (P.A. 13-184), and Public Acts, No. 13-247, § 82 (P.A. 13-247). As amended, § 7-34a defines a ‘‘nominee of a mortgagee’’

as ‘‘any person who (i) serves as mortgagee in the land records for a mortgage loan registered on a nationalelectronic database that tracks changes in mortgage servicing and beneficial ownership interests in residential mortgage loans on behalf of its members, and (ii) is a nominee or agent for the owner of the promissory note or the subsequent buyer, transferee or beneficial
owner of such note.’’ General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (2) (C). The parties agree that MERS is presently the only entity that qualifies as a nominee ofa mortgagee, as so defined, and that the legislature crafted the statutory language with MERS specifically in mind.
Section 7-34a, asamended, furtherprovidesthat, with two exceptions, when a nominee of a mortgagee files
a document in the land records, the town clerk shall collect a fee of $116 for the first page filed and $5 for each additional page. General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (2) (A). In addition, the clerk continues to collect $3 for each documentpursuantto § 7-34a (d) and $40 for each document pursuant to § 7-34a (e). The two exceptions
are that, when a nominee of a mortgagee files ‘‘(i) an assignment ofmortgage in which a nominee of a mortgagee appears as assignor, or (ii) a release ofmortgage bythe nominee ofamortgagee,’’ thetown clerk collects
afee of$159, plus $10 forthe first page and $5 for each additional page.4 See General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (1) and (2) (B). Therecordingfeesforallotherfilersremain unchanged under the amended statute.
The net effect ofthe amendments to § 7-34a (a) is to collect from a nominee ofa mortgagee, namely, MERS, substantially more for the filing of deeds, assignments, and other documents in the land records than from any other filer. When filing a mortgage deed, for example, ifMERS is a party to the transaction, the recording fee will be $159 ($116 plus $3 plus $40) for the first page and $5 for each additional page. See General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (2) (A), (d) and (e). If MERS is not a party to the transaction, the recording fee will be $53 ($10 plus $3 plus $40) for the first page and $5 for each additionalpage. See General Statutes § 7-34a(a) (1), (d) and (e). Whenfilingamortgageassignmentorrelease, if MERS is a party to the transaction, the recording fee will be $159, plus $10 for the first page and $5 for each additional page.5 See General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (1) and (2) (B). If MERS is not a party to the transaction, the recording fee will be $53 ($10 plus $3 plus $40) for the first page and $5 for each additional page. See General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (1), (d) and (e).
The 2013 amendments also shiftedhowthe recording fees on MERS-related transactions are allocated. See generally P.A. 13-184, § 97, and P.A. 13-247, § 81, codified at General Statutes § 49-10 (h). The $159 assessed for the filing of mortgage deeds in connection with MERS transactions is allocated as follows: $10, plus any fees for additional pages, to the town clerk; $39 to the municipality’s general revenue accounts; and $110 to the state, of which $36 is paid into the communityinvestment account and $74 into the state’s general fund. General Statutes § 49-10 (h). The $159 fee assessedin connectionwithMERS-related assignments and releases is allocated slightly differently: $32 to municipal general revenue accounts; $36 to the state’s community investment account; and $91 to the state’s general fund. General Statutes § 49-10 (h). By contrast, the $53 paidby othermortgagees forall recordedtransactions continues to be allocated as follows: $12 for the first page ($10 plus $1 ofthe $3 fee pursuant to § 7- 34a [d], plus $1 of the $40 fee pursuant to § 7-34a [e]), and $5 per additional page to the town clerk; $3 to the municipalityforlocal capitalimprovementprojects; and $38to the state, ofwhich $2 is dedicatedto historic document preservation and $36 for community investment. See General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (1), (d) and (e).
The parties agree that the legislature adopted the amendments to § 7-34a (a) at least in part as a revenue enhancing measure to help balance the state budget. Theyalso agree thatthere is no evidence that anymember of MERS has discontinued its membership in the MERSsystemorhaltedorreduceditsuse ofthatsystem
as a result ofthe 2013 amendments. Finally, the parties agree that, in most cases, the recording fees at issue will be collected from the borrowers at closing and not paid by MERS itself.
II
As an initial matter, we must address the dispute between the parties about whether the fees imposed by § 7-34a are more properly characterized as user fees
ortaxes. The state contendsthatthepaymentsaremore akin to taxes than user fees because the statute was enacted primarily to raise revenues for the state and its municipalities and because the lion’s share of the fees incurredin connectionwithMERS-relatedtransactions is allocated to the state’s general fund, the state’s community investment account, and municipal general
revenue accounts, whereas only a small fraction ofthe fees is retained by the town clerks as compensation for the recording service. The plaintiffs, by contrast, contendthatthe fees, whichare identifiedinthe statute
as recording ‘‘fees’’; General Statutes § 7-34a; and are paid in exchange for a discrete service ofbenefit to the filer, are properly considered user fees. Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered the question in other contexts—e.g., for purposes of the federal tax injunction law, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)—have reached different conclusions as to whether a purported ‘‘fee’’ that generates more revenue than is needed to fund the service for which the fee is charged, with the surplus allocated to the government’s general fund, constitutes
a tax or a fee. Compare, e.g., Empress Casino Joliet Corp

. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 651 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2011) (tax), with, e.g., SanJuan Cellular Telephone Co

. v. Public Service Commission, 967 F.2d 683,686 (1st Cir. 1992) (fee). But see S. Wolfe, ‘‘Municipal Finance and the Commerce Clause: Are User Fees the Next Target of the ‘Silver Bullet’?,’’ 26 Stetson L. Rev. 727, 729 (1997) (‘‘[r]ecent rulings by the [United States Supreme] Court suggest that the difference between
user fees and taxes may be a distinction without a difference’’). Because the payments atissue inthis case
are hybrids, bearing some indicia of both taxes and
userfees, andbecause the parties have notfullybriefed the issue, we will assume, solely for purposes of the present appeal, that we must apply the constitutional standards governing both taxes and fees.
III
We now address the merits of the plaintiffs’ various constitutional challenges,6beginningwiththe plaintiffs’ claim that §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h), by charging nominees such as MERS higher recording fees than other mortgagees, violate the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.7 We reject this claim. ‘‘To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff first must establish that the state is affording different treatment to similarly situated groups of individuals.

. . . [I]t is only after this threshold requirement is met thatthe courtwill considerwhetherthe statute survives scrutiny under the equal protection clause.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 403, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011). For purposes ofthis case, we will assume without deciding that the similarly situated requirement is satisfied and proceed to consider whether the legislature was warranted in singling out the plaintiffs for disparate treatment. Cf. City Recycling, Inc

. v. State, 257 Conn. 429, 449, 778 A.2d 77 (2001). ‘‘When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, whether under the United States constitution
or the Connecticut constitution, the reviewing court must first determine the standard by which the challenged statute’s constitutional validity will be determined.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D.A. Pincus & Co

. v. Meehan, 235 Conn. 865, 875, 670 A.2d 1278 (1996). In the present case, to prevail on their equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must overcome a highly deferential standard of review. ‘‘If the statute does not [affect] eitherafundamental right orasuspect class, its classificationneed onlybe rationallyrelatedto
some legitimate government purpose

. . . .’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Id. This rationalbasis review test ‘‘is satisfied [as] long as there is a plausible policy
reason for the classification

. . . the legislative facts
on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the government decisionmaker

. . . and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational

. . . .’’(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 876. ‘‘Itisundisputedthatthe constitutionalityofthetaxation scheme at issue

. . . must be analyzed under rational basis review because it neither implicates a fundamental right, nor affects a suspect class. Indeed, claims that taxation schemes violate the equal protectionrights ofthose more heavilytaxed are subjectto an especially deferential rational basis review. The United States Supreme Court has explained that in taxation,
even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members ofalegislature necessarily enjoyafamiliaritywith local conditions [that a reviewing] [c]ourt cannot have, the presumption ofconstitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification isahostileandoppressivediscriminationagainstparticular persons and classes.

. . . Accordingly, that court has repeatedly held that inequalities [that] result from
a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dept. ofPublic Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 70, 23A.3d 668 (2011); see, e.g.,AlabamaDept. ofRevenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc., U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1136, 1142–43, 191 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2015). ‘‘Similarly, this court consistently has held that the state does not violate the equal protection clause by singling out a particular class for taxation or exemption.’’ Markley v. Dept. ofPublic Utility Control, supra, 71. Rather, ‘‘[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis [that] might support it.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) D.A. Pincus & Co

. v. Meehan, supra, 235 Conn. 876–77. The same deferential standards govern equal protection challenges to user fees. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 65, 110 S. Ct. 387, 107 L. Ed. 2d290 (1989); Kadrmasv. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 462–63, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 101 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1988). Turning to the case before us, we first consider whether the challenged statutes seek to accomplish a legitimate public purpose. The parties agree that one primary purpose of the legislature in imposing higher recording fees on mortgage nominees such as MERS
was simply to raise additional revenues, either to compensate for fees allegedly lost as a result of the MERS business model or, more generally, to help balance the state’s budget. It is well established that raising revenues is a legitimate purpose—often the primary purpose—ofa tax or a fee. See HarborIns. Co

. v. Groppo, 208 Conn. 505, 511, 544 A.2d 1221 (1988) (tax); Eagle RockSanitation, Inc

.v.JeffersonCounty, UnitedStates District Court, Docket No. 4:12-CV-00100-EJL-CWD (D. Idaho November 22, 2013) (fee). Accordingly, the first prong of the test is satisfied.8The dispute between the parties thus centers around the question ofwhether it is permissible forthe legislature to impose a higher share of the state’s revenue burdenonnomineessuchasMERSthanitdoesonother recording parties. That is to say, we must determine whether the disparate treatment imposed by §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h) is rationally related to the goal of raising revenues and recouping lost fees.
Before considering whether the legislature had a rational basis for imposing higher recording fees on nominees such as MERS than on other mortgagees, we first address the plaintiffs’ contention that we must restrict our analysis inthis regardto those theories that the state raised before the trial court and that find evidentiary support in the record. The plaintiffs misstate the law. As the trial court properly recognized, the state ‘‘has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. [A] legislative choice is not subjectto courtroom [fact-finding] and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.

. . . A statute is presumed constitutional

. . . and [t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it

. . . whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Hellerv. Doe exrel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993). Indeed, it is well establishedthatareviewing courtneednotrestrict its analysis even to those rationales proffered by the partiesbutmayitselfhypothesizeplausiblereasonswhy
a legislative body might have drawn the challenged statutory distinctions. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commissionv.BeachCommunications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 318, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, supra, 487 U.S. 462–63; AmericanExpress TravelRelatedServices Co

. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2011). In the present case, in light ofthe highly deferential standard of review that applies to tax and user fee legislation and otherforms ofpurely economic regulation, we perceive at leasttwo conceivable bases on whichthe legislature might reasonablyhave imposed higherrecording fees on nominees such as MERS than on other mortgagees. First, the legislature might simply have concluded that a large corporation such as MERS, which is involved in nearly two thirds ofthe nation’s residential mortgage transactions, is better able to shoulder high recording fees than are smaller mortgagees. Although it is true that large banks, loan servicing companies, and other well-heeled mortgagees may be no less able to afford such fees, a statute subject to rational basis review can be under inclusive without running afoul of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Nordlinger v.Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992) (‘‘[i]n structuring internal taxation schemes the [s]tates have large leewayin making classifications and drawing lines [that] in theirjudgment produce reasonable systems of taxation’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Markley v. Dept. ofPublic Utility Control, supra, 301 Conn. 70 (‘‘[A] legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions ofdegree having arational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts [that] would support it.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); HarborIns. Co

. v. Groppo, supra, 208 Conn. 511 (‘‘[R]ecognizing that any plan of taxation necessarily has some discriminatory impact

. . . we have previouslystatedthe operativetestforthevalidity of a tax statute to be the following: As long as some conceivable rational basis for the difference exists, a classification is not offensive merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety.’’ [Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Indeed, our sister state courts have upheld taxation schemes that impose a heightened burden on individual corporate taxpayers when there is a principled basis for doing so. See, e.g., North Pole Corp

. v. East Dundee, 263 Ill. App. 3d 327, 336–37, 635 N.E.2d 1060 (1994); Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 21–23, 39 A.3d 228 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 211 N.J. 608, 50A.3d41 (2012); see also Verizon New England, Inc

. v. Rochester, 156 N.H. 624, 631, 940 A.2d 237 (2007) (city could tax one public utility more heavilythan others ifselective taxation was reasonably related to legitimate public interest).9 Second, as the trial court recognized, the legislature reasonably may have determined that mortgage assignments that typically would be recorded in the public land records are not recorded for loans registered with the MERS system because MERS remains the mortgagee ofrecord forits members. Accordingly, the legislature could have raised the initial recording fee that MERS pays, as well as the final fee that is paid when the mortgage isreleased ortransferred outofthe MERS system, to compensate for the fees ‘‘lost’’ over the
course of the life of the loan.
The plaintiffs offer four arguments in response: (1) there is no evidence in the record to support the contention that assignments are recorded less frequently for MERS loans than for other mortgagees’ loans; (2) there is no legal requirement that assignments be recorded in the public land records; (3) even if town clerks do perform fewer recording duties with respect to MERSloansthannon-MERSloans, there isno reason to compensate town clerks for lost recording revenues because theyalreadysave the costs associatedwithnot having to record assignments of MERS loans, or, put differently, clerks are not entitled to payment for ser-vices that they do not perform; and (4) even if town clerks have lostrecordingfees underthe MERS system, there is no rational relationship between those losses and the fees imposed under §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h) because those fees are primarily allocated to the state’s general fund and to municipal accounts, rather than to the clerks themselves. We consider each argument in turn.
With respect to the plaintiffs’ argument that there is
no evidence in the record that mortgage assignments
are recorded less frequentlyforMERS-listed loans than for non-MERS loans, we already explained that, under the rational basis test, ourreview is not limited to theories that the state has documented at trial or that have been subjecttojudicial fact-finding. Rather, courts may consider—and it is the plaintiffs who must debunk— any rationale that might plausibly have motivated the legislature. In the present case, it cannot be seriously suggested that the MERS model might not result in fewer recordings in the public land records, with concomitant cost savings to MERS and its users. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ argument is undercut repeatedly by the amicisupportingtheirownposition. Theamicicomprisingtwobankersassociationsandalandtitleassociation represent, for example, that (1) prior to the advent of MERS, recording expenses added at least $30 to the cost of each loan, and sometimes substantially more, (2) MERS was devised ‘‘with an eye toward eliminating many of the unnecessary costs

. . . associated with land title and recording issues,’’ (3) assignments that typicallywerefiledonthelandrecordsbeforethe establishment of MERS are no longer required, (4) this reduced need for assignments results in lower title insurance and closing costs for both buyers and sellers usingthe MERS system, and (5) MERS ‘‘madethe transfer of loans in the secondary market both cheaper and simpler.’’
The amici also direct ourattentionto scholarlyliterature concluding that MERS ‘‘reduces the need to pay additional recording fees associated with subsequent transfers ofmortgage loans or mortgage loan servicing rights’’ and to an article published by a former senior executive officer of MERS predicting that, because MERS ‘‘eliminates the need to record later assignments in the public land records

. . . MERS will save the mortgage industry $200 million a year by eliminating the need for many assignments. Because MERS should decrease the cost of servicing transfers, mortgage loan portfolios may begin to reflect a price difference if the loans are MERS registered.’’ Moreover, ‘‘[w]hether [town recorders’] assignment revenues will drop [as a result] remains an open question.’’ In light of these publiclyavailable statements, wehaveno difficultyconcludingthatthelegislaturemightreasonablyhavedetermined that parties to MERS-listed loans can obtain significant cost savings in recording fees over the life ofa loan and that, as a result, it is not unfair to ask them to pay higher recording fees at the outset and again whenthe mortgage ultimatelyis released ortransferred out of the MERS system.
The plaintiffs’ second argument, namely, thatthere is
no legal requirement that assignments ofloan servicing rights be recorded in Connecticut, is a red herring. It is clear from the above quoted statements that, when the plaintiffs represent that the MERS system ‘‘eliminates the needto record later assignments in the public land records’’; (emphasis added); they refer not to any legal recording requirement but, rather, to the factthat, from a practical standpoint, loan assignments must be recorded ifthe holder is to perfect its security interest and to avoidpotentially costly gaps in the chain oftitle.
Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiffs’ third argument, namely, that the legislature had no legitimate
reason to compensate town clerks for lost recording
revenues because, if a document is not recorded, the town clerk has performed no service for which he or she deserves to be compensated. There are three flaws with this argument. First, the argument accounts for only the marginal costs associated with recording a document. The costs of running a town clerk’s office, including the clerk’s salary and benefits, building and utilities, informationtechnology infrastructure, and the like, are largely fixed. By contrast, the marginal costs associated with recording any particular document—a bit ofpaper and ink, orthe digital equivalents thereof—
are quite limited. Thus, if increased use of the MERS system means that a clerk’s workload drops by 10 percent, it is unlikely that the clerk’s office will recognize
a corresponding 10 percent cost savings. It therefore
was reasonable for the legislature to impose higher upfront and back-end fees on MERS transactions to help the town clerks maintain budget stability. Second, the plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that the service provided by a clerk’s office only begins with the recording ofa document. The principal service provided, and the principal value to the recording party, is that a record of the transaction is perpetually maintained and made available to the public for search by any interested party. This is the primary reason parties opt to record assignments and other loan documents. One value ofthe MERS system to subsequent transferees, then, is that it allows them essentially to free ride
on the public recording system. They reap the benefit ofMERS’ initialrecordingasmortgagee, withouthaving to pay—at least without having to pay the clerk—for the ongoingbenefit ofthe public notice. Itis reasonable to assume that the legislature imposed higher up-front recording fees on MERS loans as a way to remedy this free rider problem. Third, the plaintiffs go astrayin consideringthe issue solelyfromthe standpointofthetownclerk. Regardlessof whether the clerks have lost money as a result of a lower recording rate for assignments of MERS loans, it seems clear that MERS, its members, and the buyers and sellers involved in MERS-listed transactions do achieve some savings in recording costs. If the legislature concluded that this system of loan processing results in significant cost savings for MERS members andits users, the legislaturewas freeto impose ahigher tax or fee on those transactions in order to recapture
a portion of those savings. See Rosemont v. Priceline.com, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 09 C 4438 (N.D. Ill. October 14, 2011) (equal protection clause was not offended when town imposed hotel tax
on only those travel companies using distinct business modelthatotherwisewouldhaveresultedintaxsavings for those companies); Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield

v. State, supra, 425 N.J. Super. 22–23 (equal protection clause was not offended when state imposed tax solely
onhealthservice companies, ofwhichplaintiffwas sole exemplar, which previously had advantage of certain tax loopholes). Finally, the plaintiffs’ fourth argument is that, even iftown clerks have lost recording fees as aresult ofthe MERS system, there is no rational relationship between those losses and the heightened fees imposed under §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h), which primarily are allocated to the state’s general fund and municipal accounts. This argument fails because, among other things, it assumes a system ofmunicipal financing that is largely obsolete. Pursuant to General Statutes § 7- 34b (b), ‘‘[a]ny town may, by ordinance, provide that the town clerk shall receive a salary in lieu of all fees and other compensation provided for in the general statutes

. . . . Upon the adoption of such ordinance the fees or compensation provided by the general statutes to be paid to the town clerk shall be collected by such town clerk and he shall deposit all such money collected by him in accordance with such provisions of law as govern the deposit of moneys belonging to such town.’’ On the basis of publicly available documents, the legislature reasonablycouldhave concluded thatonlyahandfulofConnecticuttownsstillhewtothe traditional model under which financially independent clerks’ offices retain the recording fees they collect, and that, in most cases, such fees are now paid into
a town’s general revenues. See Office of Legislative Research, Connecticut General Assembly, Report No. 2006-R-0297, Town Clerks: Duties, Responsibilities, and Fee Collection (April 26, 2006). Accordingly, afalloffin recording fees will adversely impact municipal budgets and potentially result in a heightened need for local community support by the state. For these reasons, we conclude that the distinctions established by §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h) are rationally related to legitimate public interests and, therefore, do not offend the equal protection provisions of the state or federal consti-tution.
IV
We next consider the plaintiffs’ claim that §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h) violate the dormant commerce clause ofthefederalconstitution. The commerce clause provides that Congress shall have the power ‘‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States, and with the Indian Tribes

. . . .’’ U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ‘‘Although the [c]lause is framed
as a positive grant of power to Congress, [the United States Supreme Court has] consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command, known
asthe dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause, prohibitingcertain state [regulation] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794, 191 L. Ed. 2d 813 (2015). ‘‘[T]he dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause precludes [s]tates fromdiscriminat[ing] betweentransactionsonthebasis of some interstate element.

. . . This means, among other things, that a [s]tate may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the [s]tate.

. . . Nor may
a [s]tate impose atax [that] discriminates against interstate commerce eitherbyprovidingadirectcommercial advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate
commerce to the burden of multiple taxation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Although the recording transactions at issue in this
case maythemselvesbepurelylocalinnature, thepresence of MERS as a participant indicates that many of the mortgage loans involved ultimately will be transferred on the national secondary loan market. For this reason, and in light ofthe unique role that MERS plays in the national secondary market, we will assume that interstate commerce is implicated. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc

. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 573, 117S. Ct. 1590, 137L. Ed. 2d852 (1997) (‘‘ifitisinterstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation [that] applies the squeeze’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
We first consider what legal standard governs challenges to taxes and user fees under the dormant commerce clause. The plaintiffs, at varying times, suggest that the fees at issue in this case should be assessed according to the tests and legal analysis that the United States Supreme Court has applied to dormant commerce clause challenges against (1) general regulatory measures, (2) tax schemes, and (3) userfees. The plaintiffs may be forgiven for any confusion in this regard, however, astheUnitedStates Supreme Court’sdormant
commerce clausejurisprudence is less than a model of clarity, particularly in the area ofuser fees and general and special revenue taxes.10 That court itself has acknowledged ‘‘the uneven course of [its] decisions inthis field’’;American TruckingAssns., Inc

. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 269, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987); and has indicated that its inability to settle on
a guiding legal framework has created ‘‘a quagmire of judicial responses

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 280; see also S. Wolfe, supra, 26 Stetson L. Rev. 778–81 (discussing ambiguous state of law). Moreover, the high court’s recent dormant commerce clause decisions have been decided by the narrowest of margins, with substantial disagreement among the members of that court as to the proper test or tests to be applied. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, supra, 135 S. Ct. 1791. As a result, several distinct but partially overlapping tests may be thought to govern the present case. See, e.g., id., 1802 (applying internal consistency test to income tax scheme); Dept. ofRevenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338–40, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 170 L. Ed. 2d 685 (2008) (general two part test governs all state regulations, includingtaxes, but different rules may govern taxes and fees imposed by state initsdualcapacityasmarketparticipantandregulator); Complete Auto Transit, Inc

. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S. Ct. 1076, 51 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1977) (establishing four part test governing state taxes that impact interstate commerce); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport AuthorityDistrict v. DeltaAirlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716–17, 92 S. Ct. 1349, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1972) (establishing three part test governing userfees and special revenue taxes); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970) (establishing balancing test governing any facially neutral state regulation).AsUnitedStatesSupreme CourtJusticeAntonin Scalia recently lamented: ‘‘One glaring defect of the negative [c]ommerce [c]lause is its lack of governing principle. Neither the [c]onstitution nor our legal traditions offer guidance about how to separate improper state interference with commerce from permissible state taxation or regulation of commerce. So we must make the rules up as we go along. That is how we ended up with the bestiary of ad hoc tests and ad hoc exceptions that we apply nowadays

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Comptrollerofthe Treasuryv. Wynne, supra, 1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Fortunately, we need not wade into this quagmire or attempt to divine the precise standards by which the UnitedStates Supreme Courtmightjudgethestatutesat issue inthis case. This is because the parties apparently agree that their dispute boils down to the question of whether two central criteria—criteria that reappear throughout the United States Supreme Court’s various dormant commerce clause tests and frameworks—are satisfied. First, a state user fee or tax is presumed to violate the dormant commerce clause if it facially discriminates against interstate commerce. See, e.g., United Haulers Assn., Inc

. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 338, 127S. Ct. 1786, 167 L. Ed. 2d 655 (2007). ‘‘In this context, discrimination simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.

. . . Discriminatory laws motivated by simple economic protectionism
are subject to a virtually per se rule of invalidity

. . . [that] can

. . . be overcome [only] by a showing that the [s]tate has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 338–39. Second, a fee or tax that is facially neutral nevertheless may offend the dormant commerce clause if it has the practical effect of imposing a burden on interstate commerce that is disproportionate to the legitimate benefits. See, e.g., Dept. of Revenuev.Davis, supra, 553U.S. 365 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). We consider each criterion.
A
Facial Discrimination
The plaintiffs first contend that the challenged statutes discriminate on their face against interstate commerce because they impose higher recording fees only
on those transactions involving a mortgage nominee, such as MERS, that operates in conjunction with a national electronic database. The plaintiffs argue that there is no apparentjustification forpenalizing companies that operate national databases, as opposed to a hypothetical nominee operating a database that tracks only mortgage loans transferred between Connecticutbased entities or securing Connecticut-based properties. For this reason, they contend, §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h) presumptivelyviolate the dormant commerce clause. There are at least four problems with this argument. First, although the plaintiffs correctly note that a statute can facially discriminate against interstate commerce even if it does not expressly favor in-state over out-of-state businesses; seeHealyv. BeerInstitute, 491 U.S. 324, 340–41, 109 S. Ct. 2491, 105 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1989); the United States Supreme Court nevertheless has emphasizedthat ‘‘[t]he central rationale forthe rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite thosejealousies and retaliatory
measures the [c]onstitution was designed to prevent.’’ C & A Carbone, Inc

. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 128 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1994); see also Dept. ofRevenuev. Davis, supra, 553 U.S. 337–38 (‘‘economic protectionism

. . . designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors’’ is paradigmatic form of discrimination [internal quotation marks omitted]); Healy v. Beer Institute, supra, 326 (challenged statute ensured favorable pricing for residents of Connecticut and maintained competitiveness of Connecticut-based retailers); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed.2d 475 (1978) (‘‘[t]he crucial inquiry

. . . must be directed to determining whether [the challenged statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it
canfairlybeviewedas alaw directedto legitimate local concerns, with effects [on] interstate commerce that
are only incidental’’). In the present case, there is no indication that the legislative choice to impose higher fees on nominees—whether in state or out of state— who operate national mortgage databases reflected an invidious discrimination against out-of-state interests,
oranefforttofavorConnecticut-basedfinancialcompanies. Ifanything, the opposite is true, as the likelyresult will be that Connecticut homeowners, who, the parties agree, typically absorb the higher upfront fees for MERS-listedloans, willsubsidize out-of-statebanksand government sponsored financing corporations or their agents, who, upon acquiring the loans in the secondary market, will receive the benefits of recordings in the publiclandrecordswithouthavingtopaytheassociated costs. See UnitedHaulersAssn., Inc

. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, supra, 550 U.S. 345.
Nordowebelievethatthehypotheticalfavoredmortgage nominee the plaintiffs conjure up—one that operates a Connecticut only electronic database—is anything otherthan achimera. Becausethe secondaryresidential mortgage market is national in scope and is dominated by federal agencies that are located outside of this state, there would be no reason for a company to investin an electronic registration systemthattracks only loan transfers between Connecticut investors, or onlyloansissuedinconnectionwith Connecticut-based properties.11 Theplaintiffs do not contendthat anysuch competitor currently exists or is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. As the Supreme Court explained in Associated Industries v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 114 S. Ct. 1815, 128L. Ed. 2d639 (1994), ‘‘[ithas] neverdeemed
a hypothetical possibility of favoritism to constitute discrimination that transgresses constitutional commands.’’ Id., 654; see alsoExxon Corp

. v. Governor, 437 U.S. 117, 125, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 57 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1978) (disparate treatment claim was meritless when state’s entire gasoline supply flowed in interstate commerce). Second, notwithstanding the statutory reference to national electronic databases; General Statutes § 7-34a (a) (2) (C); we do not interpret the challenged statute to be a facial attack on interstate commerce. Rather, therecordsuggests—andtheplaintiffs concededatoral argument—thatthe language inquestion appears in § 7- 34a only because the legislature cut and pasted it from MERS’ own corporate documents describing the company’s business model. In otherwords, the legislature’s apparentintentwasnottoimposehigherrecordingfees
on residential mortgage transactions with a national characterbut, rather, merely to indicate that the higher fees are directedatMERS andanyothermortgage nom-inees that may develop virtual recording systems to facilitate transactions in the secondary mortgage market. It is only because that market, like many modern financial markets, happens to be national in scope that the ‘‘national electronic database’’ language found its wayinto § 7-34a.12 Boththis court andthe United States Supreme Court have emphasized in this regard ‘‘the importance of looking past the formal language of [a] tax statute [to] its practical effect

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 249 Conn. 172, 210, 733 A.2d 782, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965, 120 S. Ct. 401, 145 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1999); accord Quill Corp

. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504U.S. 298, 310, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 119L. Ed. 2d91 (1992). As we discuss hereinafter, we perceive no deleterious effect ofthe challenged legislation on the national secondary mortgage market. Third, theUnitedStatesSupreme Courthasexplained that ‘‘a fundamental element of dormant [c]ommerce [c]lausejurisprudence [is] the principle that any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. ofRevenue v. Davis, supra, 553 U.S. 342. As
we explained in part III of this opinion, MERS is not substantially similar to other mortgagees—even other mortgagenominees—withrespecttotherolestheyplay inConnecticut’sresidentialmortgagerecordingmarket. Whereas traditional mortgagees are primarily lenders
or loan servicing companies, MERS is identified as a mortgagee in the public land records as a sort ofplaceholder, indicating to interested parties that the recent chain of title to a MERS-listed property may be traced byconsultingtheMERS database. Accordingly, the statutes do notfacially discriminate against interstate commerce. Rather, theysimplyrecognize thatMERS, which
uses the public land records as a means of enhancing the value that its member companies obtain from its electronic registration services, may realize a distinct and greater benefit from recording its interests than do other mortgagees. Fourth, and relatedly, even if we believed that the statutes in question discriminated against interstate commerce, we would conclude, for reasons discussed inpart III ofthis opinion, that there is no constitutional violationbecause such discrimination advances alegitimate local purpose. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc

. v. Harrison, supra, 520 U.S. 581. It is well established that interstate commerce can be made to ‘‘pay its way’’ under a state regulatory scheme without running afoul ofthe dormant commerce clause. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commonwealth Edison Co

. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 69 L. Ed. 2d 884 (1981). In the present case, to the extent that the purpose of the challenged legislation was merely to recoup from MERS the recording fees that its members otherwise wouldhave paiduponthe trans-fer ofa mortgage in the secondary market, §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49-10 (h) represent a legitimate attempt to level theplayingfieldbetweenMERSmembersandnonmembers and to ensure that recording revenues are not lost
as a result of MERS’ novel business model. For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the state that the statutes do not discriminate impermissibly against interstate commerce. B

Undue Burden
We next consider the plaintiffs’ claim that the challenged statutes place an undue burden on the national secondary mortgage market. Their argument appears to be that, despite the dearth of any evidence that the increasedfeeshaveadverselyimpactedMERS’business
orthesecondarymortgagemarketingeneral,thesimple fact that the state receives more than $5 million per year in increased fees on MERS-related transactions is, ipso facto, proof that interstate commerce has been burdened. The plaintiffs further contend that, because both the costs to the state and the benefits to the filers
are the same forthe recording ofMERS and non-MERS transactions, but MERS is forced to pay fees that are approximately three times higher than other mortgagees, the costs imposed are necessarily disproportionate to the benefits. We are not persuaded.
The amount of a tax or user fee is presumed to be appropriate; S. Wolfe, supra, 26 Stetson L. Rev. 739; and the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the burdens imposed on interstate commerce clearly outweigh the benefits. See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue v. Davis, supra, 553 U.S. 353. As we explained inpart III ofthis opinion,
we are not convinced that either the costs or the benefits of recording a MERS-listed mortgage are the same
as for any other mortgagee. Let us assume that a hypothetical non-MERS thirty year mortgage loan is transferred to a different lender every ten years during the life ofthe loan andthat each subsequentholderrecords its interest in the public land records. Under that scenario, the original lender’s recording fees would afford it the benefit often years ofpublic notice ofits interest in the property, and the clerk’s office would receive three recording fees—the initial one and the fees for two assignments—to subsidize its costs of operation
overthetermoftheloan, notincludingthereleasewhen the loan is fully repaid. Under the same circumstances, however, MERS and its members would continue to receive the benefit ofthe initial filing fee for the entire thirty year term of the loan, regardless of the number ofinterveningassignmentsamongMERSmembers, and the clerk’s office will be correspondingly poorer. See S. Wolfe, supra, 742 (noting that length ofuse ofpublic service ‘‘strongly affects cost’’); id., 744 (noting importance of intangibles in calculating value of public service and that continued consumer use suggests thatfees are not disproportionate to value provided). Accordingly, we cannot say that imposing higher frontend and back-end fees on MERS transactions in order to compensate for the reduced number of recorded mortgage assignments imposes an undue burden on MERS or, by extension, interstate commerce. SeeAssociatedIndustriesv. Lohman, supra, 511 U.S. 647 (interstate and intrastate transactions may be taxed differently, as long as ultimate burdens are comparable).
The United States Supreme Court also has suggested that, ingaugingthe burdens imposed oninterstate commerce, a reviewing court should consider whether, if every state were to adopt the challenged policy, the result would be to ‘‘place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comptroller ofthe Treasuryv. Wynne, supra, 135 S. Ct. 1802. Inthepresent case, even if every state were to charge $106 extra to recordMERS-listedmortgagesinitscorrespondingland records, there is nothing in the record to suggest that those higherfees, taken together, would undulyburden interstate commerce. There is no indication that higher recording fees would so overshadow the benefits of participationinanationalelectronicregistrationsystem thatborrowers andlenderswould optnottoparticipate in MERS or that the vitality ofthe secondary mortgage marketwouldbecompromised. Thepartieshaveagreed that higher fees have not resulted in a loss of MERS business within this state, and there is no reason to believe the outcome would differ elsewhere, or nationally. Nor is there any evidence of (1) what share of the estimated $5.4 million that the state will receive in additional annualrecordingfeeswillbe bornebyMERS and its members, and how that amount compares to the annual profits on theirresidential mortgage lending businessinConnecticut, (2) whatshare oftheincreased fees willbe borne byborrowers, andwhatimpactthose fees will have on their total closing costs, or (3) what cost savings MERS, its members, and borrowers in MERS-related transactions have achieved as a result of the MERS system. We are mindful in this regard ofthe United States Supreme Court’s recentguidancethatthe judiciary is particularly ill-suited to making the sorts of complex predictions and subtle cost-benefit calculations necessary to assess whether a particular tax scheme is unduly burdensome. See Dept. ofRevenue

v. Davis, supra, 553 U.S. 355.
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court also cautioned that a court ‘‘should be particularly hesitant to interfere

. . . under the guise of the [c]ommerce [c]lause [when] a [state or] local government engages in a traditional government function,’’ of which the maintenance ofpublic land records is clearly an example. (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Id., 341, quoting United Haulers Assn., Inc

. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, supra, 550 U.S. 344. Inlight ofthis guidance, and given the parties’ stipulation that the legislation at issue has not redounded to the tangible detriment ofthe MERS business model, we are compelled to defer to the legislature’s judgment that the fees at issue represent a reasonable approximation of the savings in recording costs generated by use of the MERS system. Accordingly, §§ 7-34a (a) (2) and 49- 10 (h) do not offend the dormant commerce clause,13 and we reject the plaintiffs’ claim to the contrary.14
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We hereinafter refer to the defendants collectively as the state.
2 The plaintiffs appealed from thejudgment ofthe trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. The plaintiffs have not appealed from the trial court’s ruling that the challenged statutes do not offend the takings provisions of the federal and state constitutions, and, accordingly, those claims are not before us. We granted permission for two groups to file amicus curiae briefs: the Connecticut Bankers Association, Connecticut Mortgage Bankers Association, and American Land Title Association; and the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center.

3 For the sake of brevity, in this opinion, we use the term MERS to refer to (1) the electronic recording system, (2) the entities that are the plaintiffs in this case, in their capacity as operators ofthe MERS system, and (3) the general model according to which changing legal interests in residential mortgages and mortgage loans are recorded in the MERS system.
4 The state interprets § 7-34a (a) (2) (B) to mean that, in addition to the $159 recordingfee, anominee ofamortgagee filing an assignment orrelease under that subparagraph must pay $10 for the first recorded page and $5 for each additional page pursuant to § 7-34a (a) (1). The plaintiffs contend that it is unclear whether town clerks are permitted to charge these additional fees, in light of the statement in § 7-34a (a) (2) (B) that ‘‘[n]o other fees shall be collected from the nominee for such recording.’’ For purposes ofthis appeal, because we glean from the state’s briefthat these additional fees are in fact being imposed on the plaintiffs, and that they are therefore

a subject of the plaintiffs’ complaint, we assume without deciding that the statute authorizes such additional fees.

5 See footnote 4 of this opinion.

6 Because a challenge to the constitutionality ofa statute presents a question of law, our review is plenary. E.g., Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 402, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011). We recognize, however, that legislation that structures and accommodates the burdens and benefits of economic life carries

a strong presumption of constitutionality. See, e.g., Schieffelin & Co

. v. Dept. ofLiquor Control, 194 Conn. 165, 186, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984).

7 The equal protection clause ofthe fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that no state shall ‘‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’’ U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Article first, § 20, ofthe constitution ofConnecticutprovides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law

. . . .’’ Neither party contends that the state and federal constitutional analyses diverge with respect to equal protection challenges to tax and fee statutes. Accordingly, forpurposes ofthis case, we treatthe relevantstate andfederal protections as coextensive. See, e.g., Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 403, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011).

8 The plaintiffs also contend that the amendments to §§ 7-34a and 49-10

were motivated by an impermissible desire to punish MERS for its business model. The trial court rejected this allegation, and we find no support for it in the legislative history. Even if it were true, however, the outcome of

our analysis would be no different. As long as the challenged distinction is rationally related to some legitimate public purpose that conceivably may have motivated the legislature, it is irrelevant whether certain legislators also may have been motivated by animus toward the plaintiffs. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968); see also WisconsinEducationAssn. Councilv. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 653 (7th Cir. 2013).

9 The equal protection cases on which the plaintiffs rely are readily distin-guishable, astheyprimarilyaddresslegislative distinctionsthat (1) implicate federalism or other constitutional interests, (2) are transparently arbitrary and without rational basis, or (3) impose criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) (in rare case in which United States Supreme Court held that challenged social legislation failed to withstand rational basis review, court concluded that irrational fear of mentally disabled individuals did not justify discriminatory zoning ordinance); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 86 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1985) (state impermissibly discriminated against nonresidents); Zobel

v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64, 65, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 72 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1982) (apportioning state benefits on basis of duration of residency would impermissibly divide citizens into castes and unduly infringe interstate travel rights); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 138–39, 92 S. Ct. 2027, 32 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1972) (statute imposed ‘‘unduly harsh or discriminatory terms’’ on indigentcriminal defendants andpotentiallyinfringedrightto counsel); City Recycling, Inc

. v. State, supra, 257 Conn. 453 (trial court’s specific factual findings ‘‘directly negate[d] every conceivable rational basis for the legislation’’); Statev. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 531–32, 473 A.2d 775 (1984) (quasi-penal statute imposing liability for hospital care expenses on certain confined individuals but not others was deemed to be ‘‘entirely arbitrary’’); Caldor’s, Inc

. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 316–18, 417 A.2d 343 (1979) (applying stricter standard in case of penal statute); see also Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co

. v. County Commission, 488 U.S. 336, 345, 109 S. Ct. 633, 102 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1989) (county assessorfailedto complywith uniform state tax policy).

10 Because the statutory scheme at issue in this case allocates a portion ofthe nominee filingfeesto the state’s generalfund andmunicipal accounts, and a portion to the town clerks and the state’s community investment account, the fees have characteristics of both general and special revenue taxes.
11 To the extent that they suggest otherwise, the plaintiffs place the cart before the horse. The amici consisting of the bankers associations and the land title association, who support the plaintiffs’ position in this case, have presented scholarship indicating that it was the national mortgage lending industry and government sponsored financing corporations such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that partnered to create MERS to fill the need for a centralregistryforthe nationalresidentialmortgage industry. See R. Arnold, ‘‘Yes, There Is Life on MERS,’’ 11 Prob. & Prop. 33, 33 (1997); see also P. Sargent &M. Harris, ‘‘The Myths and Merits ofMERS’’ (September25, 2012). From its very inception, then, the MERS business was necessarily national in scope.
12 Although the plaintiffs suggest in their reply brief that the statutes bespeak alegislative intenttopunish MERS fortransactingbusiness outside of Connecticut, there is no evidence in either the record ofthis case or the legislative history to support such a suggestion.

13 It might also be argued that, insofar as the state’s purpose in imposing higher recording fees on MERS-listed mortgages is to prevent a competitor in the mortgage recording business from free riding on its public recording system, the state acts as a market participant—as well as a regulator— with respect to MERS and, therefore, is immune from challenge under the dormant commerce clause. See, e.g., Dept. ofRevenue v. Davis, supra, 553 U.S. 339; SSC Corp

. v. Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 510–12 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112, 116 S. Ct. 911, 133 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1996); see also McBurney v. Young, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720, 185 L. Ed. 2d 758 (2015) (state, having created market by offering program, does not offend dormant commerce clause byrestricting access to thatmarket so as to favor localinterests). Becauseneitherpartyhasraisedthisargument, however, we need not consider it.

14 Onappeal, theplaintiffsalso contendthatenforcementofthe challenged statutes violates their substantive due process rights under the federal and state constitutions, the federal constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have reviewed these claims and, for essentially the same reasons that we rejected the equal protection and

commerce clause claims, we find them to be without merit.