PerUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BOLANLE ODEYALE, a/k/a Bella, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-4042

(D.C. No. 2:24-CR-00042-HCN-CMR-1)

(D. Utah)

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MORITZ, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Bolanle Odeyale was indicted on five criminal counts for her alleged role in a 

fraud and money laundering scheme that purportedly funneled millions of dollars of 

proceeds from victims in the United States to criminal associates in Nigeria. She 

appeals from the district court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s pretrial 

detention order. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

May 29, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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I

Odeyale is a citizen of Nigeria. In March 2016, she came to the United States 

on a B2 visa. Less than a month later, she married a United States citizen.1

 She 

thereafter applied for permanent resident status based on this marriage and claimed 

she had divorced her Nigerian husband in December 2015. In June 2017, Odeyale 

was granted conditional permanent resident status.

In May 2019, Odeyale filed a petition to remove the conditions on her status. 

That petition was denied on the grounds that the divorce papers she provided in 

support of her petition were not genuine and that her sworn representations about her 

divorce were fraudulent. Odeyale unsuccessfully appealed the denial of her petition.

Odeyale’s U.S. husband died in December 2020. Following his death, 

Odeyale filed a new form I-485 and an application for permanent residence based 

upon a deceased spouse’s citizenship. In June 2022, she received notice that her 

application would be denied on the grounds that the Nigerian divorce decree she 

submitted was fraudulent and that she had married her U.S. husband in order to 

circumvent United States immigration laws. No final decision, however, has been 

issued.

1 According to the government, in July 2018, Odeyale engaged in electronic 

communications evidencing her apparent involvement in marriage and visa fraud. 

Those messages, the government asserts, suggest that Odeyale’s marriage to the U.S. 

citizen was arranged for a fee and was fraudulent.

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Odeyale currently owns a house with a mortgage in Dallas, Texas, and, prior to 

these criminal proceedings, lived there with her two minor children.2

 Odeyale also 

has a serious boyfriend who lives in the Dallas area.

II

In early 2024, a federal grand jury in the District of Utah returned a seventeen 

count indictment against Odeyale and six codefendants. The indictment alleged that 

Odeyale and her codefendants “participated in a conspiracy to facilitate so-called 

romance scams and other advance fee frauds operated online, involving 

approximately $8 million of losses to victims around the United States and 

the world.” Aplt. App. vol. I at 39. According to the indictment, a group of 

individuals known as “Yahoo boys,” most or all of whom were located in Nigeria, 

operated so-called romance scams and preyed upon victims, mostly elderly women, 

in the United States. Id. at 40. A separate group of individuals known as the “Utah 

Money Transmitters,” all of whom were located in the District of Utah, agreed to 

help the Yahoo boys launder the proceeds of their romance scams. Id. at 39. 

Odeyale allegedly assisted the Utah Money Transmitters in laundering the proceeds. 

Odeyale worked at Ping Express, an unlicensed money transmission business located 

in Texas and formed by her brother. The ultimate goal of “the money laundering 

activities,” according to the indictment, “[wa]s to transmit the criminal proceeds to 

2 Odeyale and her U.S. husband had no children. Odeyale’s oldest child was 

born in Nigeria prior to Odeyale’s arrival in the United States. The record is unclear 

as to where Odeyale’s youngest child was born.

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the Yahoo boys overseas, while paying a share of the ill-gotten gains to those who 

help[ed] move the funds along the way,” including Odeyale. Id. at 41. 

The indictment charged Odeyale with one count of wire fraud, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1343, one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1349, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), two counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1957, and one count of aiding and abetting an unlicensed money transmitting 

business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960.

After Odeyale was charged in this case, the Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security issued an 

immigration detainer for Odeyale and a warrant for her arrest. The detainer alleged 

that probable cause existed that Odeyale was a removable alien. 

Following Odeyale’s arrest, the government filed a motion for pretrial 

detention. Odeyale appeared with counsel before a magistrate judge in the Northern 

District of Texas for a detention hearing. The government presented testimony from 

a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who testified, based on 

his conversations with an ICE agent and ICE attorney, about Odeyale’s immigration 

status. At the conclusion of the agent’s testimony, the magistrate judge stated on the 

record that she was “very, very concerned that . . . Odeyale represented to Pretrial 

Services and to [defense counsel] that she had legal status to be” in the United States, 

when in fact “she ha[d] been turned down for that legal status.” Aplt. App. vol. I 

at 92. 

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After considering the evidence, the magistrate judge found that Odeyale 

presented a serious risk of flight and that, consequently, the case was “eligible for 

consideration of detention based on” that risk. Id. at 98. The magistrate judge 

emphasized that her finding included consideration of “the nature of the indicted 

charges, the allegations of . . . Odeyale’s significant role in the offense, the 

substantial weight of the evidence” against Odeyale, “the lack of [her] ties to the 

prosecuting district, and [the fact] that . . . Odeyale face[d] a significant term of 

imprisonment if . . . convicted in this case as well as deportation.” Id. at 99. The 

magistrate judge in turn found, for essentially the same reasons, that there was no 

condition or combination of conditions that would assure Odeyale’s appearance in 

court.

Odeyale was moved to the District of Utah. There, she appealed and moved to 

revoke the detention order issued by the magistrate judge in the Northern District of 

Texas. Odeyale alleged in support that “on or around August 7, 2023,” she “received 

a I-551 Temporary Evidence Stamp on her passport” that “provides ‘Upon 

endorsement, serves as a temporary I-551 evidencing permanent residency for one 

year.’” Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Odeyale argued that “it 

appear[ed] that [she] currently ha[d] permission to be in the United States through the 

filing of her I-751 petition and the receipt of the I-551 stamp.” Id. at 71. She also 

argued that the magistrate judge erred in failing to give adequate weight to evidence 

of her “non-risk of flight,” which, she asserted, included the fact that her “two 

children . . . reside[d] in the United States,” the fact that she owned a home with a 

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mortgage in the Dallas area, and the fact she had a boyfriend who also resided in the 

Dallas area. Id. at 70. 

On April 5, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Odeyale’s appeal 

and motion to revoke the detention order. The district court found at the outset that 

the I-551 stamp in Odeyale’s passport “reflect[ed] the fact that her application for 

adjustment [of] status technically remain[ed] pending, but” did “not confer status and 

on its face expire[d] on August 6, 2024.” Id. vol. II at 292. Focusing on the legal 

requirements for detention, the district court questioned government counsel about 

whether the potential flight risk could be managed by, for example, the use of an 

ankle monitor and having Odeyale surrender her passport. Government counsel 

responded that the evidence in the case indicated that Odeyale’s coconspirators “had 

access to unused fake passports” and “[s]o if she wanted to leave the country, she has 

known associates who could procure a fake passport for her.” Id. at 306. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that both steps of the 

detention inquiry were satisfied. With respect to the first step, the district court 

found there was a serious risk that Odeyale would flee. The district court cited a 

number of factors in support of this finding: (a) that Odeyale faced substantial 

penalties if convicted in the case; (b) the evidence against her appeared to be strong; 

(c) she had significant ties to Nigeria; (d) she controlled bank accounts and had 

significant financial resources; (d) she had a significant network of contacts and 

associates in Nigeria; (e) she had no lawful ties to the District of Utah; (f) it was 

“extremely unlikely that she ha[d] any meaningful longterm prospects” in the United 

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States and she “accordingly ha[d] little incentive to remain in the United States to 

face a potentially significant prison term only to be deported afterwards”; and 

(g) there was no evident reason why she would not be able to take her children with 

her to Nigeria. Id. at 317–18. As for the second step of the detention inquiry, the 

district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no condition or 

combination of conditions that would reasonably assure Odeyale’s appearance in 

court. The district court also cited a number of factors in support of this finding: 

(a) that Odeyale posed a serious flight risk; (b) her immigration history and alleged 

criminal activity “evince[d] a willingness to flout legal rules and authority for 

personal gain”; (c) the evidence demonstrated “Odeyale’s ability to evade detection 

of her unlawful activities through sophisticated means”; (d) she had “a track record 

of procuring and submitting fraudulent official documents to the government and the 

government represent[ed] that her associates ha[d] proved able to obtain and willing 

to use false passports”; and (e) she had “demonstrated her ability to surreptitiously 

transfer large quantities of money from the United States to Nigeria.” Id. at 319. In 

light of all these factors, the district court found “little reason to believe that . . . 

Odeyale w[ould] comply with any conditions” imposed on her “and every reason to 

believe that” she would attempt to evade those conditions and would do so “through 

deceitful and sophisticated means that” had “a high likelihood of succeeding.” Id. at 

319–20. Based on its findings, the district court denied Odeyale’s appeal and motion 

for revocation of the magistrate judge’s order of detention pending trial.

Odeyale now appeals the district court’s decision.

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III

A

“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial 

is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 

(1987). Consistent with this principle, the Bail Reform Act (the Act), permits pretrial 

detention of arrestees but provides that individuals charged with a crime are generally 

“released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance 

bond,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(1), or they may be “released on a condition or 

combination of conditions” that will reasonably ensure their appearance in court and 

the safety of the community. Id. § 3142(a)(2), (c)(1).

“The Act establishes a two-step process for detaining an individual before 

trial.” United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334, 1336 (10th Cir. 2017). First, the 

government may move for pre-trial detention of the defendant if the case involves 

“certain enumerated offenses” or if the case “‘involves . . . a serious risk that such 

person will flee; or . . . a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to 

obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or 

intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.’” Id. (quoting § 3142(f)). Second, if the 

district court determines that the case involves one of the serious risks outlined in 

§ 3142(f), the government must prove “that there ‘is no condition or combination of 

conditions’ that ‘will reasonably assure the [defendant’s] appearance . . . as required 

[as well as] the safety of any other person and the community.’” Id. (quoting 

§ 3142(f)). In deciding whether the government has met its burden of proof, the 

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district court is required to consider several factors, including “‘the nature and 

circumstances of the offense charged,’ ‘the weight of the evidence against the 

person,’ ‘the history and characteristics of the person,’ and ‘the nature and 

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the 

person’s release.’” Id. at 1336–37 (quoting § 3142(g)).

“We apply de novo review to mixed questions of law and fact concerning the 

detention or release decision, but we accept the district court’s findings of historical 

fact which support that decision unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1337

(internal quotation marks omitted).

B

Odeyale makes two arguments on appeal. First, she argues that the district 

court erred in finding that she presented a serious risk of flight. Second, she argues 

that the district court erred by finding that no conditions existed that could 

reasonably assure her appearance in court. For the reasons that follow, we reject both 

of these arguments and affirm the district court’s decision.

In challenging the district court’s finding that she presented a serious risk of 

flight, Odeyale begins by arguing that the “district court’s focus on” her 

“immigration status, as it pertained to flight risk, was misplaced.” Aplt. Br. at 12. 

Although Odeyale acknowledges there is an ICE detainer in place, she argues “it is 

well established in this Circuit that a risk of involuntary removal does not establish a 

serious risk that” the defendant “will flee.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

She argues that the district court essentially ignored this authority and found that her 

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“risk of involuntary removal was a significant factor for pretrial detention.” Id. at 13. 

In particular, she asserts that the district court found that her “lack of ‘future 

prospects’ in light of her likely involuntary removal cut against any possible ties to 

the United States.” Id. (quoting Aplt. App. vol. II at 317). She argues, however, that 

the “denial of lawful immigration status and resulting removal are not foregone 

conclusions” in her case because she has “an I-551 stamp in [her] passport.” 

Id. at 14.

We reject these arguments. The district court expressly acknowledged that 

Tenth Circuit authority prohibited it from finding “someone is a flight risk just based 

on the fact that if they’re released, they’ll be deported.” Aplt. App. vol. II at 311. 

Thus, the district court did not ignore binding Tenth Circuit authority in making its 

finding that Odeyale posed a serious risk of flight. See Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d at 1337

(holding that a risk of involuntary removal does not, standing alone, establish a 

serious risk that the defendant will flee). To be sure, the district court did take into 

account the likelihood of Odeyale being deported in assessing her ties to the United 

States. But there is no prohibition on that. Indeed, § 3142(g)(3)(A) requires a 

district court to consider “the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . 

the person’s . . . community ties.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A). Lastly, the district 

court found, and Odeyale does not seriously dispute, that the I-551 stamp in her 

passport merely “reflects the fact that her application for adjustment [of] status 

technically remains pending, but it does not confer status and on its face expires on 

August 6, 2024.” Aplt. App. vol. II at 292. 

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Odeyale also argues, regarding the district court’s finding that she presented a 

serious risk of flight, that the “district court too easily disregarded” her “proffered 

ties to the U.S.” Aplt. Br. at 16. She notes that she represented at the hearing that 

her youngest child was a United States citizen and the government failed to refute her 

representation. She also asserts there “was an insufficient basis in the record to find 

that” her “youngest child’s father was a Nigerian citizen.” Id. at 17. Odeyale also 

asserts that she has lived in Texas since early 2016, her two minor children live 

with her, she speaks English fluently, and has not been to Nigeria “in some time.” 

Id. at 19. 

We again reject Odeyale’s arguments. In analyzing the § 3142(g) factors, the 

district court expressly considered Odeyale’s family and community ties, but did not 

find them sufficient to outweigh the other statutory factors, including, for example, 

the nature of the pending criminal charges and the weight of the evidence against her. 

We conclude the district court did not commit clear error in this regard.

That leaves Odeyale’s challenge to the district court’s finding that no 

condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure her appearance in 

court. She argues that she “has no criminal history nor a proven history of violating 

judicial orders.” Aplt. Br. at 20. Odeyale does not dispute that her prior petitions to 

adjust her immigration status contained misstatements, but she asserts that such 

evidence “does not prove, by itself, that [she] would willfully disregard conditions of 

release.” Id. at 21. She also argues that her alleged involvement in the underlying 

criminal activity should not have been considered because “[v]iolating legal rules is 

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inherent in every criminal prosecution and she is presumed innocent until convicted.” 

Id. Lastly, she argues that the district court erred in disregarding the viability of 

ankle monitors and surrendering her passport, and effectively required her to prove 

that those measures, or other measures, would guarantee her compliance.

We find no merit to these arguments. A defendant’s criminal history is but 

one of the statutory factors that a district court must consider in determining whether 

there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance. 

Although Odeyale’s apparent lack of criminal history weighs in her favor, it was not 

sufficient to override the weight of the other statutory factors that the district court 

considered. As for Odeyale’s prior misstatements in her immigration petitions, that 

was without question a proper factor for the district court to consider, particularly 

because it was relevant to her “character” and “past conduct.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(g)(3)(A). Odeyale’s assertion that the district court should not have 

considered her alleged involvement in the underlying criminal activity is simply 

wrong; § 3142(g)(1) required the district court to consider it. Finally, the district 

court did not disregard the possibility of using ankle monitors or having Odeyale 

surrender her passport, but rather found that those measures were insufficient. In 

particular, the district court noted that ankle monitors are “not foolproof” and that it 

had “see[n] a lot of cases where they’re removed” by defendants. Aplt. App. vol. II 

at 306, 320. The district court also found there was a likelihood that Odeyale could 

procure a fake passport, either on her own or with help from her criminal associates. 

In sum, we conclude the district court did not err in determining there was no 

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condition or combination of conditions of release that would reasonably assure 

Odeyale’s appearance in court.

IV

We affirm the district court’s detention order.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam

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24-4042, United States v. Odeyale

Judge Federico concurring 

Although I join the majority’s per curiam order to affirm the district 

court’s detention order, I write separately concerning two points. First, this 

order should not be read to dilute or unnecessarily confuse our precedent 

holding that the risk of involuntary immigration removal has no bearing on a 

district court’s consideration of whether there is a “serious risk that [the 

defendant] will flee” under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A). Second, the district court

noted the defendant “had no lawful ties to the District of Utah.” Aplt. App’x I

at 317-18. However, in my view this was an erroneous interpretation of the 

word “community” in the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et. seq., because it 

too narrowly construes the definition of “community” to solely encompass the 

charging district.

In United States v. Ailon-Ailon, we said, “a risk of involuntary removal 

does not establish a ‘serious risk that [the defendant] will flee’ upon which pretrial detention may be based.” 875 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting § 

3142(f)(2)(A)). The defendant correctly argues this precedent makes it “well 

established in this Circuit that a risk of involuntary removal does not establish 

a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee.” Aplt. Br. at 12. 

The district court cited Ailon-Ailon and deftly sought to navigate its 

holding. However, in our affirmance, our order says there is no prohibition 

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against a district court considering the likelihood of deportation because the 

statute requires consideration of a defendant’s community ties. But as we 

established in Ailon-Ailon, “the plain meaning of ‘flee’ refers to a volitional act 

rather than involuntary removal.” 875 F.3d at 1335. The likelihood that a 

person may be involuntarily removed from the country has nothing to do with 

her community ties. Whereas a comprehensive assessment of each individual’s 

circumstances is required to decide whether to detain or release a defendant, 

which may generally include a person’s immigration status (and, here, the 

evidence the defendant has on several occasions presented fraudulent 

documents as part of her immigration proceedings), we should be cautious to 

hold the line as we did in Ailon-Ailon that a risk of involuntary removal does 

not, in itself, create a serious risk that a defendant will flee to avoid 

prosecution. 

This point is further evident because a district court considers 

“community ties” only if it reaches the second step of the “two-step process,” or

“whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 

appearance of the person as required.” Id. at 1336-37 (quoting § 3142(f)). It is 

at step one, however, that a district court determines whether the government 

can establish a “serious risk that [the defendant] will flee.” Id at 1336. Thus, 

today’s opinion should not be read to conflate steps one and two of the “twostep process for detaining an individual before trial.” Id.

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Second, and speaking of community ties, the defendant was arrested in 

the Northern District of Texas, where she resides with her two minor children, 

is self-employed, owns a home with a mortgage, and has a serious boyfriend. 

Aplt. App’x I at 70. It is certainly common enough that a defendant is indicted 

in one federal district but arrested and/or resides in another district. See Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 5(c)(3) (explaining procedure for initial appearance when a 

defendant is arrested in a district other than where the offense was allegedly 

committed). And when that happens, the defendant often seeks release to 

where they live, not where they are charged and must appear in court. 

From the record, the district court considered the defendant’s community 

ties to the District of Utah – the venue for the criminal proceeding initiated 

against her by the filing of the indictment. That consideration and finding were

an overly narrow interpretation of the statute. The term “community” is not 

defined in the statute, but it is certainly broader than the district of the 

charges. 

The record indicates the defendant sought release to Texas, not Utah, so 

that is the “community” the district court should have evaluated the strength 

of her ties (which were many). See United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 

1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) (“‘[C]ommunity ties’ under the Bail Reform Act 

‘embrace[ ] both the community in which the charges are brought and also a 

community in the United States to which the defendant has ties.’” (citations 

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omitted)). So, while I agree with and affirm the district court’s detention order, 

I set aside the district court’s finding that the defendant’s lack of community 

ties to Utah was a significant factor to merit detention. 

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