This opinion is subject to revision before final p ublication in the Pacific Reporter
201 9 UT 53

IN THE 

## S UPREME 

## C OURT OF THE 

## S TATE OF 

## U TAH

S TEVEN D OWNS , Petitioner
,

v.
B RYAN T HOMPSON , B OARD OF C OUNTY C OMMISSIONERS OF U TAH C OUNTY , and U TAH C OUNTY , Respondents

.

No. 201806 96 Filed August 27 , 2019

On Certification from the United States District Court for the District of Utah The Honorable Dale A. Kimball Case No. 2:17

- cv

- 00330

Attorneys: J. Brady Brammer , Pleasant Grove, Steven C. Earl, Orem, for petitioner
Benson L. Hathaway , Jr. , Jackie Bosshardt, Ryan R. Beckstrom, Salt Lake City, for respondents

J USTICE H IMONAS au thored the opinion of the Court in which C HIEF J USTICE D URRANT , A SSOCIATE C HIEF J USTICE L EE , J USTICE P EARCE , and J USTICE P ETERSEN joined.

J USTICE H IMONAS , opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION ¶1 The United States District Court for the District of Utah certifie d three questions to be answered by this court: (1) “ Does a Utah [ state ] district court have jurisdiction to review the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ decision upholding a fine levied pursuant to Utah Code S ection 20A

- 11

- 1205 ? ” ; (2) “ Does the term

‘ ballot proposition ’ as used in Utah Code S ection 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) include a referendum during the period of time before its sponsors have obtained the requisite number of signatures on the referendumD OWNS v. T HOMPSON Opinion of the Court

2 petition ? ” ; and (3) “ Does the term ‘ ballot proposition ’ as used in Utah Code S ection 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) include a referendum during the signature gathering phase if the challenged local government action is later found to be administrative in nature and therefore not subject to a referendum? ” ¶2 W ith respect to question one , w e answer that a Utah state distric t court does not have appellate jurisdiction to review the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ decision upholding a fine levied under Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205. In doing so , we are obligated to clarify the difference between a district court’s original jurisdiction and its appellate juris diction

— specifically the source and authorization of these powers. And we are also obligated to note that
t he certified question does not implicate
, and therefore we do not opine on , whether the Utah County Board of Com missioners’ review process is constitutional, a query about which we harbor some serious reservations. ¶3 We answer the second question by defining a “ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) (b) to encompass the entirety of the referendum process
, including the period of time before sponsors have obtained the requisite number of signatures on the referendum petition. ¶4 Lastly, in response to the third question, we answer that a “ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) (b) encompasses the entirety of the referendum process

— including the signature gathering phase

— even if the challenged local government action is later found to be administrative in nature and therefore ultimately not subject to a referendum.

BA CKGROUND ¶5 In April 2016, Orem City passed Resolution No. R

- 2016

- 0012 , which authorized the mayor of Orem to sign a lease agreement and an interlocal cooperation agreement in connection with the implementation of the Utah Transit Authority’s Bus Rapid Transi t (BRT) program. 1 In response , several citizens filed a petit ion for referendum against the r esolution. The citizens circulated referendum packets and collect ed the necessary signatures for a referendum before submitting their petition to the City Recorder

. The City Recorder rejected the referendum petition because the City Recorder believed Resolution No. R

- 2016

- 0012 concerned an

_____________________________________________________________ 1 Orem had already approved the BRT program through resolu ti ons passed in 2008 and 2015.Cite as: 2019 UT 53 Opinion of the Court

3 administrative action and was therefore not subject to a referendum. The City Recorder’s decision was upheld by the Fourth Distr ict Court. As a result, the referendum vote sought through the petition

was never put on the ballot. ¶6 Steven Downs, in his role as the Public Information Office r for Orem, circulated an email

— using his work email account

— announcing a public meeting to discu ss the BRT program with the entities ch arged with its implementation. This email was sent after the petition had been submitted but before all necessary signatures had been gathered. T he email contained only information from opponents of the BRT referendum , invited recipients to attend a meeting held by opponents of the referendum , distributed a link to an anti

- petition website, and did not contain any information summarizing argument s in favor of the BRT project

. In response , Bryan Thompson, the Utah Count y Clerk, fined Downs $250 for violating the Political Activities of Public Entities Act

— specifically, Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1)(b)
, which stated that “a person may not send an email using the email of a public entity .

. . to advocate for or against a ballot proposition.” 2 ¶7 Downs demanded a review of the fin e before an impartial tribunal. In response , Utah County passed c hapter 31 of the Utah County Code
, which delegates the review of any civil fine issued under the Political Activities of Public Entities Act to the County Commission, and purports to make any decision by the Board of Commissioners appealable to the F ourth District Court in Utah County. After the Board of Commissioners voted to uphold the fine, Downs filed a petition in th e Fourth District C ourt challenging the ruling on several grounds

. Respondents removed the case to federal
court. The federal court found that Downs had standing to bring his claim in federal court but reserved ruling on a number of motions until receiving guidance on the three questions certified to this court

. ¶8 We have original jurisdiction to answer these questions of state law under Utah Code section 78A

- 3

- 102(1).

_____________________________________________________________ 2 While this case has been pending, Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1)(b) has been amended to state that “a person may not send an email using the email of a public entity .

. . to advocate for or against a proposed initiative, initiative, proposed referendum, or referendum.” Throughout this opinion we refer to section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1)(b) and any other sections of the Utah Code as they existed at the time Downs was fined.D OWNS v. T HOMPSON Opinion of the Court

4 STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9 “ A certified question from the federal district court does not present us with a decision to affirm or reverse a lower court’s decision; as such, traditional standards of review do not apply.” U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co. v. U.S. Sports Specialty Ass’n , 2012 U T 3, ¶ 9, 270 P.3d 464 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)

.
“ Accordingly, we merely answer the question presented, leaving resolution of the parties ’ com peting claims and arguments

. . . up to the federal courts, which of course retain ju risdiction to decide [ the ] case.” Garfield Cty. v. United States , 2017 UT 41, ¶ 6, 424 P.3d 46 ( alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. ANALYSIS
I. UTAH CODE S ECTION 20A

- 11

- 1205 DOES NOT CONVEY APPELLATE JURISDICTI O N ON STATE DISTRICT CO URTS ¶10 The first question certified to this court is narrow in scope :

“ Does a Utah [state] district court have jurisdiction to review the Utah County Board of Commissioners ’ decision upholding a fine levied pursuant to Utah Code Section 20A

- 11

- 1205 ? ” Or in other words, does a state district court have jurisdiction to conduct an appellate review of the Utah County Board of Commissioners ’ decision to uphold a fine levied by a county clerk ? I t do es not. But we make clear that this s tatement of law does not implicate or abridge the wide scope and authorization the district court s maintain under their grant of original jurisdiction. ¶11 We have stated that “[i]t is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction [] that it revises and cor rects the proceedings in a cause already instituted [] and does not create that cause .” State v. Johnson
, 114 P.2d 1034 , 1037 (Utah 1941) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
, overruled in part on other grounds by Boyer v. Larson , 433 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1967)

. In this case, the “proceeding [] in a cause already instituted” is the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ decision to uphold Downs’s fine. Id. ¶12 In Utah, jurisdiction to decide a case “derives from the Utah Constitution, state statute, or a combination of the two.” Carter v. State , 2015 UT 38, ¶ 19, 345 P.3d 737. And t he Utah Constitution makes clear that “[t]he district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute .” U TAH C ONST

. art. VIII , § 5 (emphasis added)

. ¶13 Chapter 31 of the Utah Co unty Code provides that an appeal of the Utah County Board of Commissioners’ decision can be taken in a state district court. U TAH C OUNTY C ODE § 31

- 1

- 5. ButCite as: 2019 UT 53 Opinion of the Court

5 section 31

- 1

- 5 is a county ordinance; a county ordinance is not a state statute. Therefore, the Utah County Code cannot convey appellate jurisdiction to the district court or regulate procedures for an appeal. Section 31

- 1

- 5 pretends to powers th e county does not have

. Put succinctly
, c ounties do not have the authority to grant appellate jurisdiction to state district courts

. 3 ¶14 T his statement of law is necessarily narrow and pertains only to grants of appellate jurisdiction by statute. The district court retains original jurisdiction “in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law

. ” U TAH C ODE § 78A

- 5

- 102 (1)

. Additionally, Utah Code section 78B

- 6

- 401 (1) affirmatively provides that “[e]ach di strict court has the power to issue declaratory judgments determining rights, status, and other legal relations within its respective jurisdiction.” We acknowledge that these broad jurisdictional grants beg an answer to the question as to whether the count y ordinance is constitutional. Because we are not asked to resolve this question
, we decline to comment on the
matter

. We are simply asked whether state district courts have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah County Board of Commissioners. It is sufficient to say that a county lacks the ability to

_____________________________________________________________ 3 There is also no statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction located in the Utah Code that would vest district courts with appellate jurisdiction over fines imposed under this county ordinance. Utah Code section 78A

- 5

- 102 articulates multiple grants of appellate jurisdict ion to the district court. The only potentially relevant section, section 7 , states that the “ district court has jurisdiction to review .

. . municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10

- 3

- 703.7.” U TAH C ODE § 78A

- 5

- 102(7)(b). Utah Cod e section 10

- 3

- 703.7 , in turn , cabins this review by referring exclusively to proceedings established by a “ municipality.” Id

. § 10

- 3

- 703.7 (1) . For the purposes of this section , a municipality is defined as “(a) a city of the first class, city of the secon d class, city of the third class, city of the fourth class, city of the fifth class; (b) a town .

. . ; or (c) a metro township.

. . .” Id

. § 10

- 1

- 104(5)(a )

– ( c). Notably, there is no mention of a county. Additionally, a rticle XI section 1 of the Utah Consti tution recognizes counties of the State of Utah “as legal subdivisions of this State.” This makes clear that the term “ county ” is a legally distinct term whose meaning is not to be merged with that of cities or townships. There is therefore no grant of app ellate jurisdiction under Utah Code s ection 78A

- 5

- 102 that would permit a district court to conduct an appellate review of a county commission ’s decision.D OWNS v. T HOMPSON Opinion of the Court

6 create appellate jurisdiction via a county ordinance. We say nothing as relates to the district court ’ s original jurisdiction.

II

. T HE TERM “BALLOT PROP OSITION” AS USED IN UTAH CODE SECTION 20A

- 11

- 12 05(1) INCLUDE S THE ENTIRE REFERENDUM PROCESS ¶15 The next question certified to us by the federal district court involves reading several statutory provisions in conjunction with each other : “ Does the term ‘ ballot proposition ’ as used in Utah Code S ection 20A

- 11

- 1205 (1) include a referendum during the period of time before its sponsors have obtained the requisite number of signatures on the referendum petition? ” We answer that it does. ¶16 Downs was fined for violating Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1)(b)
, whic h prohibits a person from sending “an email using the email of a public entity

. . . to advocate for or against a ballot proposition.” Although section 1205 does not define “ballot proposition,” the term is defined in both Utah Code section 20A

- 1

- 102(5) o f the Election Code and Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) of the Political Activit ies of Public Entities Act

— the

a ct Downs is alleged to have violated. ¶17 Our primary task w hen interpreting these provisions is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. H arold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder Cty.
, 2011 UT 18, ¶ 18, 251 P.3d 804. We “presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Boyle v. Christensen
, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810 (citati on omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “ [w] herever possible, we give effect to eve ry word of a statute, avoiding [a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statu te inoperative or superfluous.” Turner v. Staker & Parson Co s. , 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. Arave , 2011 UT 84, ¶ 28, 268 P.3d 163 )

. ¶18 It is admittedly difficult to in terpret the language in section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2). Specifically, when section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) defines “ballot proposition” as “ constitutional amendments, initiatives, referenda, judicial retention questions, opinion questions, bond approvals, or other questions submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection ,” do es the phrase “submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection ” apply only to “other questions” or to

e very term in the preceding list? This is a familiar problem. The two most relevant canons of statutory interpretation, the last

- antecedent

canon and the series

- qualifier canon, often compete with each other

. B ut context guides which canon s we apply.Cite as: 2019 UT 53 Opinion of the Court

7 ¶19 The rule of the last antecedent is a canon of statutory interpretation stating that “a limiting clause or phrase .

. . should ordinarily be read as mo difying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Lockhart v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 958, 96 2 (2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Lockhart , the United States Supreme Court analyzed 18 U.S .C. § 2252(b)(2), which prescribes a mandatory sentencing range for persons with a prior conviction “ relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward .” Relying on the last

- antecedent canon, the Court held that “‘ involving a minor or ward ’ modifies only

‘ abusive sexual conduct, ’ the antecedent immediately preceding it. ” Id

. at 962. In this case, an application of the last

- antecedent canon to section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) would mean that “submitted to the voter s” would apply only to “other questions.” ¶20 The series

- qualifier canon, on the other hand, provides that, “[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” A NTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN A. G ARNER , Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 (2012)

. The classic example involves the text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The relevant text reads “[t]he righ t of the people to be secure .

. . against unreasonable searches and seizures , shall not be violated .” U.S. C ONST . amend. IV. Applying the series

- qualifier canon, we and others read this text as barring both unreasonable searches and unreasonable seizures. In other words, both nouns in the series are qualified by the preceding adjective “unreasonable.” This canon can also be applied when, as with Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) , the modifier is positioned after what it modifies. To apply this canon to sect ion 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) would mean that “submitted to the voters” modifies the entire list of preceding terms , not just “other questions

. ” ¶21 We have applied this canon before and said that “[q]ualifying words and phrases are generally regarded as applying to the immediately preceding words, rather than to more remote ones.” LPI Serv s

. v. McGee , 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d 135 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. This is of course not an iron

- clad rule as we have also said “ the rule of the last antecedent does not mandate that qualifying rules and phrases only apply to the immediately preceding words; rather [,] when given a choice between the immediately preceding words and more remote words, we prefer the words closer in proximity .” Id

. Such a choice is given us here and context makes clear thatD OWNS v. T HOMPSON Opinion of the Court

8 application of the las t

- antecedent canon yields the better reading of the statute. ¶22 Reading section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) in con text necessitates that we apply the last

- antecedent canon. W e read the phrase “or other questions submitted to the voters for their approval or rejection” in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1202(2) as a catchall addition to the statute’s text, meant by the legisl ature to include any other type of question , not necessarily included by name in the preceding list, submitted to voters. “[O]ther questions submitted to the voters” merely reflects the legislature’s desire to include any categories of questions submitted to the voters that were not explicitly included in the list in section 1202(2). This reading

— an application of the last

- antecedent canon

— g ives me aning to the entire text
, as every term in the preceding list

— constitutional amendments, initiatives, referenda , judicial retention questions, opini on questions, bond approvals

— is already something that end s up submitted to the
voters. In other words, “submitted to the voters” would be entirely superfluous as applied to all the preceding terms in the list because

a ll of those things are already submitted to the voters. Therefore, in context, the better reading of the statute is reached through the use of the last

- antecedent canon. ¶23 Having determined that the term we must interpret is “referenda”

— as opposed to “referenda submitted to the voters”

— it

seems obvious to us that a referendum encompasses the totality of the referendum process. The Election Code defines a referendum as

“ a pro cess by which a law passed by the Legislature or by a local legislative body is submitted or referred to the voters for their approval or rejection .” U TAH C ODE § 20A

- 7

- 101(18) (emphasis added) 4 ; see also Referendum
, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019 ) ( “The process of referring a state legislative act, a state constitutional amendment, or an important public issue to the people for final approval by popular vote.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, to speak of a referendum is to speak of the entire ordered pr ocess by which citizens submit questions to voters

— a process initiated by the filing of an application with the local clerk. See Tobias v. S. Jordan City Recorder , 972 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1998) (“Sponsors who wish to circulate a referenda petition start th e process by filing an application with the ‘local clerk’ .

. . .”). Indeed, a close reading of Utah Code section 20A

- 7

- 609(2)(a) confirms that the legislature has

_____________________________________________________________ 4 Utah Code section 20A

- 7

- 101(18) has since been renumbered as section 20A

- 7

- 101(20). The text of the two provisions is identical.Cite as: 2019 UT 53 Opinion of the Court

9 also understood referenda to be a process: “[T]he county clerk shall ensure that county refe renda that have qualified for the ballot appear on the next regular general election ballot.” U TAH C ODE § 20A

- 7

- 609(2)(a). This statutory language marks a clear delineation between referenda that have qualified for a ballot and referenda that have not

— but both are still referenda

. 5 A referendum is the total process, not just the question that is ultimately submitted to a democratic vote. Therefore, the term “ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205 (1) includes all phases of the referendu m process, including the signature gathering phase.
III. A “BALLOT PROPO SITION” AS USED IN U TAH CODE SECTION 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) INCLUDES THE ENTIRETY OF THE REFERENDUM PROCESS E VEN IF THE CHALLENGE D LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION IS LATER FOUND TO BE ADMINISTRATIVE I N NATURE AND THEREFO RE NOT SUBJ ECT TO A REFERENDUM ¶24 The last question certified by the federal district court asks us whether “ the term ‘ ballot proposition ’ as used in Utah Code S ection 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) includes a referendum during the signature gathering phase if the challenged local government action is later found to be administrative in nature and theref ore not subject to a referendum. ” Because we define a referendum as the entire referendum process , it logically follows that an attempted referendum pro cess that is later found to pert ain to an administrative action

— and is theref ore not properly subject to a referendum

— is still a referendum and therefore a “ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1).

_____________________________________________________________ 5 Although we have never explicitly said this with regard to referend a , we have articulated this total process based definitio n in regards to initiative processes: The voters’ right to initiative does not commence at the ballot box: The voter s’ right to legislate via initiative includes signing a petition to get the proposed initiative on the ballot. Signing a petition is inextr icably connected to the voters’ right to vote on an initiative because it serves a gatekeeping function to the right to vote. Accordingly, [ t ] he use of

. . . pe t itions

. . . to obtain a place on the [ state’s ] ballot is an integral part of [ its ] elective sy stem. Gallivan v. Walker , 2002 UT 89, ¶ 26, 54 P.3d 1069 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).D OWNS v. T HOMPSON Opinion of the Court

10 ¶25 “ Article VI, section 1 of the Uta h Constitution vests

‘ Legislative power ’ in ‘ the people of the State of Utah ’ and provides for its exercise through ballot initiatives and referenda. ” Carter v. Lehi City , 2012 UT 2, ¶ 17 , 269 P.3d 141 ( quoting U TAH C ONST

. art VI, § 1 ). However, the legisl ative power may not trammel the executive power and there are limits to the people’s power of initiative and referenda. Id . An initiative or referendum is only permissible if it is legislative in nature and is conversely forbidden if it is administrative. See , e.g. , Baker v. Carlson , 2018 UT 59, 437 P.3d 333.

“ This legislative/administrative distinction is a reflection of our constitutio n’s explicit and strict separation of powers, which is set forth in article V. ” Carter , 2012 UT 2, ¶ 17. ¶26 Under Utah Code s ection 20A

- 7

- 602 (1)
, “[p]ersons wishing to circulate a referendum petition shall file an application with the local clerk.” 6 The petition shall include “at least five sponsors” and explain what law or la ws are challenged by the referen dum petition. Id

. Uta h Code section 20A

- 7

- 604 (2) mandates the duties of the local clerk: “ W ithin five days after the day on which a local clerk receives an application that com plies with the requirements of S ection 20A

- 7

- 602, the local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors (a) f ive copies of the referendum petition; and (b) five signature sheets. ” 7 At this stage in the referendum process, the local clerk has no discretion to refuse to supply citizens with the packets for a referendum petition or to make an aut horitative determina tion as to whether the petition may ultimately reach the ballot

. 8

_____________________________________________________________ 6 Utah Code section 20A

- 7

- 602 (1) has since been amended to state: “An eligible voter wishing to circulate a referendu m petition shall file an application with the local clerk. ”

7 Utah Code section 20A

- 7

- 604 (2) has since been amended to read: “ Within five days after the day on which a county, city, town, metro township, or court determines, in accordance with Section 20A

- 7

- 602.7 , that a proposed referendum is legally referable to voters, the local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors a copy of the referendum petition and a signature sheet. ”

8 Upon receipt of the citizens’ application in this case, the Orem City Attorney advised them that the 2016 Resolution was an administrative act and would therefore not be referable. But, as required by law, the local clerk furnished the citizens with referendum packets and t he process continued

.Cite as: 2019 UT 53 Opinion of the Court

11 ¶27 The local clerk’s discretion to reject a referendum petition does not vest until the requisite number of signatures has been gathered and the completed application is submitted for approval

. As we said in Taylor v. S outh

. Jordan City Recorder , “A ny determination [by the local clerk] of whether the subject matter is appropriate for the initiative process is proper only after the petition has been issued, completed, and returned. ” 972 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1998). In this case, Orem rejected the citizens’ completed petition because, in its estimation , the 2016 Resolution concerned an administrative action and was therefore not referable. But any decision made by the local clerk on the administrative/legislative nature of the subject of a referendum is subject to review by the
courts. See , e.g. , Baker , 2018 UT 59, ¶ 7 (citizens seeking judicial review of local clerk’s determination that city’s action was administrative in nature and the refore not referable). 9 ¶28 We take the time to recount all the steps in the referendum process because it is important to our answer to the certified question. As we have just detailed, the entire referendum process is part and parcel to the definition of “re ferendum

. ” Indeed, a referendum cannot exist in the absence of the many necessary steps taken along the way. The fact that a referendum ultimately turns out to be a doomed referendum does not alter its fundamental character throughout the process . We see n o prudence in creating a twilight zone in which an action taken by citizens
, in full compliance with the
statutor y guidelines for referenda
, is not considered a referendum until later definitively proven to be legislative in nature. The opposite is the case. A referendum may be destined to ultimately fail because it pertains to an administrative action, but it nonetheless remains a referendum at every stage along the way and
, therefore
, a referendum in the signature gathering phase is a “ ballot propositi on ” under Utah Code section 20A

- 2

- 1205 (1)

. CONCLUSION ¶29 We state as matters of law in answer to the federal district
court ’ s certified questions that: (1) without saying anything about Utah state district courts’ original jurisdiction, Utah state district

co urt s do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah County Board of Commissioners upholding a fine levied under

_____________________________________________________________ 9 In this case, no judicial determination has been made as to whether Resolution 2016

- 0012 is administrative or legislative in
nature.D OWNS v. T HOMPSON Opinion of the Court

12 Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205 ; (2) the term “ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 1205(1) include s the entire referendum process and therefore encompasses the period of time before a referendum’s sponsors have obtained the requisite number of signat ures on the referendum petition; and (3) the term “ballot proposition” as used in Utah Code section 20A

- 11

- 12 05(1) include s the signature gathering phase of the referendum process , regardless of whether the challenged local government action is later found to be administrative in nature and therefore not subject to a referendum.