IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 58296-1-II

Respondent,

v.

MATTHEW MICHAEL MERZ, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

VELJACIC, A.C.J. — Matthew M. Merz appeals his conviction for computer trespass in the 

first degree and electronic data theft. He argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions because the State did not prove these acts occurred in the State of Washington. Merz 

further argues that the mandatory victim penalty assessment (VPA), deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 

collection fee, and $250 jury demand fee must be stricken. In his statement of additional grounds 

for review (SAG), Merz raises multiple claims. Finding no error affecting Merz’s convictions, we 

affirm Merz’s convictions but remand with instructions to strike the VPA, DNA collection fee, 

and jury demand fee. 

FACTS

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Merz is a resident of Kalama, Washington. Merz took office as a Kalama City Council 

member for a four-year term in 2020. When Merz and his colleagues first took office, the city 

clerk/treasurer, Constance McMaster, issued them laptops and an assigned e-mail address and 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 8, 2024
58296-1-II

2

password that were unique to them. The format of that password was CC2020PX: CC for city 

council, 2020 for the year the council member took office, P for position, and X was each elected 

official’s position number.

On August 31, 2021, Christopher Jensen sent threatening Facebook messages to Merz, 

which suggested to him that Jensen had some mental health issues. Merz blocked Jensen when he 

began receiving text messages and e-mails threatening his life. Jensen called Merz at 2:00 AM one 

morning, which concerned Merz. Then, on December 26, Jensen showed up at Merz’s uncle’s 

house, which was next door to Merz’s own house. Merz became aware that Jensen had been in 

Kalama since December 15 and that law enforcement and the city administrator had been aware 

of his presence, yet they failed to warn him.

At trial, Merz testified that he needed to know what was going on with regard to Jensen’s 

presence in Kalama. To gain information, Merz deduced his fellow council member, Jonathan

Stanfill’s, e-mail password by reasoning that each council member’s account had similar log-in 

information.1 Merz logged into Stanfill’s e-mail account without Stanfill’s authorization. He 

chose Stanfill’s city e-mail account because Stanfill acted as the liaison between the city council 

and the police department. Merz was “looking for information on individuals targeting him.” Rep. 

of Proc. (RP) at 115. He found communication pertaining to Jensen, as well as a folder titled 

“Police Committee.” RP at 150. He admitted to downloading information from Stanfill’s account. 

Merz believed that Stanfill and the police department created a new committee and a new position 

in the city without the city council’s or the public’s knowledge. He believed he had discovered 

multiple crimes and reported his information to the Cowlitz County Sheriff’s Office.

 

1 There are conflicting reports as to whether Merz guessed or knew what he was doing. Deputy 

James Hanberry and Detective Troy Lee said in an interview with Merz that Merz guessed it, but 

Merz says that he knew what he was doing.
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On January 3, 2022, Merz spoke with Detective James Hanberry to discuss the e-mails he 

saw. Hanberry asked Merz to come to the sheriff’s office and provide a written statement, which 

he did. Hanberry wrote a report that included copies of the e-mails Merz saw and downloaded, 

and forwarded the report and its attachments to Cowlitz County detectives.

On January 4, 2022, Detective Troy Lee began investigating. Lee felt that the allegations 

of unlawfully accessing an e-mail account and extracting electronic data files warranted further 

investigation. On January 7, Lee contacted Stanfill and informed him of the information and emails in the report, and sought to obtain more information from Stanfill. Lee later met with Stanfill 

in person, where Stanfill provided him with an Internet Protocol (IP) address. Lee met with Merz 

and read him his Miranda2rights prior to discussing the matter. Merz signed a waiver that included 

the Miranda warnings about his constitutional rights. After speaking with Merz about what Merz 

uncovered in Stanfill’s e-mail, Lee advised Merz that he was under arrest. The State charged Merz 

with computer trespass in the first degree and electronic data theft.

II. TRIAL 

During the State’s direct examination of Stanfill, it established that each council member’s 

computer and account were given by the city of Kalama for the purpose of conducting city 

business. The computer and account were considered property of the city of Kalama. Stanfill 

noted his account was accessed by an unfamiliar IP address four times on January 1 and January 

2. During the State’s direct examination of McMaster it once again established that the accounts 

were city of Kalama’s accounts.

After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that 

there was no showing that the acts occurred in the State of Washington. Defense counsel noted 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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that there was no evidence admitted from any Internet provider establishing the location or the IP 

address. The State responded that the accounts were city of Kalama controlled accounts, implying 

that they are within the State of Washington. The trial court rejected defense counsel’s motion 

because the e-mail accounts that were accessed were city of Kalama accounts, therefore satisfying 

the jurisdictional requirement. Merz does not assign error to the trial court’s denial of his motion.

Merz testified. Defense counsel asked him where he lived. Merz replied, “Kalama, 

Washington” RP at 139. 

The State proposed a definition of “without authorization.” Defense counsel proposed a 

definition of “data.” The court accepted both definitions. The court asked both parties if there 

were any concerns about any of the other proposed instructions; neither party raised a concern.

Instruction 6, regarding computer trespass in the first degree reads as follows:

To convict the defendant of the crime of Computer Trespass in the First 

Degree, each of the following four elements of the crime must be proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt:

(1) On or about January 2, 2022, the defendant, intentionally gained access 

to a computer system or electronic database of another;

(2) That the defendant gained access without authorization;

(3) The access involves a computer or database maintained by a government 

agency; and

(4) That this act occurred in the State of Washington

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 26 (emphasis added). 

Instruction 10 regarding electronic data theft read as follows:

To convict the defendant of the crime of Electronic Data Theft, each of the 

following five elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) On January 2, 2022, the defendant, intentionally obtained electronic 

data;

(2) That the defendant obtained the data without authorization;

(3) That the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe that he had 

authorization to obtain the data;

(4) That the defendant acted with intent to wrongfully control, gain access 

to, or obtain electronic data; and

(5) That this act occurred in the State of Washington. 
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CP at 30 (emphasis added). 

During the State’s closing arguments, the State reiterated several pieces of evidence that 

were presented during the trial. The State argued that both acts occurred in the state of Washington 

because “Stanfill’s city email account is a city email account belonging to the city of Kalama, 

which is within the State of Washington.” RP at 180. 

The jury ultimately found Merz guilty of the crimes of computer trespass in the first degree 

and electronic data theft. The trial court found him indigent. Nevertheless, it imposed a $500 

VPA, a $100 DNA collection fee, and a $250 jury demand fee as legal financial obligations 

(LFOs).

Merz appeals his convictions. 

ANALYSIS

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Merz argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that his acts occurred in 

the State of Washington. We disagree. 

A. Standard of Review

Due process of law requires that the State prove every element of the charged crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 105, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). Challenges to 

sufficiency of the evidence are questions of constitutional law that we review de novo. State v. 

Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). 

When evaluating whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we must determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). The evidence must be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. Id. 
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Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 

618 P.2d 99 (1980). 

“A claim of insufficiency [of evidence] admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all 

inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. We do not review 

credibility determinations. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). 

B. Legal Principles

Computer trespass in the first degree occurs when a person intentionally gains access 

without authorization to a computer system or electronic database of another and the access is 

made with the intent to commit another crime or the violation involves a computer or database 

maintained by a government agency. RCW 9A.90.040(1). 

Electronic data theft occurs when a person intentionally and without authorization, and 

without reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has such authorization, “obtains any electronic 

data with the intent . . . to [d]evise or execute any scheme to defraud, deceive, extort, or commit 

any other crime in violation of a state law . . . or to [w]rongly control, gain access to, or obtain 

money, property, or electronic data.” RCW 9A.90.100(1). 

C. Sufficient Evidence Exists to Support Merz’s Convictions

The core of Merz’s argument is that the State failed to prove the acts occurred in the state 

of Washington. We disagree. 

Council member Stanfill, the user of the account that Merz accessed without authority, 

testified that each council member’s computer and account were given by the city of Kalama for 

the purpose of conducting city business and that the computer and account were considered 

property of the city of Kalama. McMaster also testified that the accounts were city of Kalama 

accounts. Indeed, Merz himself testified that Kalama is located within the state of Washington. 
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Additionally, the evidence showed that Merz logged into Stanfill’s e-mail account on January 2. 

Merz then met with Hanberry in person in Washington on January 3. A reasonable inference from 

the evidence is that Merz was in the state of Washington at the time he accessed Stanfill’s city email account without authorization or permission. 

Based on the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence, sufficient evidence

exists for the jury to find that Merz committed computer trespass in the first degree and electronic 

data theft within the state of Washington. The State met its burden of proof. 

II. LFOs

Merz next argues that we should remand to the trial court to strike the VPA, the DNA 

collection fee, and jury demand fee based on recent legislative changes and because he is indigent. 

The State concedes that we should remand for the trial court to strike the VPA, DNA collection 

fee, and jury demand fee.

Effective July 1, 2023, RCW 7.68.035(4) prohibits courts from imposing the crime victim 

penalty assessment on indigent defendants. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048, 

pet. for rev. filed, 102378-2 (2023). The legislature also amended RCW 43.43.7541 to require 

waiver of a DNA collection fee imposed before July 1, 2023 upon the defendant’s motion. LAWS 

of 2023, ch. 449, § 4. RCW 10.46.190 explains that “[t]he court shall not order a defendant to pay 

costs . . . if the court finds that the person at the time of sentencing is indigent.” LAWS OF 2022, 

ch. 260, § 20. Here, the court found Merz indigent.

We accept the State’s concession and remand for the trial court to strike the VPA, DNA 

collection fee, and jury demand fee.
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III. SAG ISSUES

In his SAG, Merz raises numerous arguments that can be combined into five issues: 

prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, duress, entrapment, and prosecutorial 

vindictiveness.3 We find no error. 

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Merz claims that the Cowlitz County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office engaged in 

prosecutorial misconduct in numerous ways. Specifically, Merz contends that the prosecuting 

attorney’s office withheld evidence to protect the purported wrongdoing of fellow council member 

Stanfill and the police chief who created a taskforce. He appears to argue that he provided public 

records of “deleterious activity” by council member Stanfill and police chief Herrera but the 

prosecuting attorney’s office did nothing about it. SAG 3. He also contends that he provided 

evidence that an individual within the city of Kalama deleted a death threat sent to his city e-mail. 

Merz further contends that the prosecuting attorney’s office and the Cowlitz County Sheriff’s 

Office withheld this evidence to conceal a criminal conspiracy by individuals within the city of 

Kalama. Merz also claims that the sheriff’s office, prosecuting attorney’s office, Public Defense 

Attorney Daniel Counsel, Cowlitz County Superior Court, and the jury ignored or were 

intentionally not made aware of Merz’s rights under the Public Records Act located at chapter 

42.56 RCW, the Intent of the Cybercrimes Act at RCW 9A.90.010, and other sections of law 

governing transparency, accountability, and oversight in government. Merz further claims that the 

 

3 Merz also appears to allege that Cowlitz County Jail Director, Marin Fox, maliciously and 

recklessly endangered his life within the Cowlitz County Jail to intimidate him. This argument is 

not based on our record and would be more properly brought in a personal restraint petition. See 

State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (“If a defendant wishes to raise 

issues on appeal that require evidence or facts not in the existing trial record, the appropriate means 

of doing so is through a personal restraint petition.”).
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prosecuting attorney’s office wrongfully created a right of privacy for Stanfill. Presumably, Merz 

intends that such allegations, if true, would provide a defense to his convictions. 

To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that the 

prosecutor’s conduct was improper and prejudicial. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756, 278 P.3d 

653 (2012). The defendant bears the burden of proving that there is a reasonable probability that 

a reasonable juror’s judgment would have been affected by the withheld evidence. State v. 

Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 442, 258 P.3d 43 (2011). However, if a defendant is raising 

prosecutorial misconduct for the first time on appeal, an error is waived unless the defendant 

establishes that the “misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not 

have cured the resulting prejudice.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760-61. While some of Merz’s 

arguments were raised below and some are raised for the first time on appeal, his arguments all 

fail because he cannot meet even the lowest standard of prejudice to warrant relief. Merz fails to 

demonstrate prejudice affecting the outcome of his case. There is nothing in the record to suggest 

that Merz’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct would have a reasonable probability of 

undermining confidence in the jury’s verdict. 

Next, Merz alleges that the prosecuting attorney’s office falsely claimed that record 

requests are required of elected officials and that their false claims were refuted by McMaster, the 

city clerk. However, McMaster actually testified that council members have access to information 

regarding activities that they are performing and that do not have to go through a formal public 

records request to gain that information. Nothing in the record suggests that Merz’s initial foray 

into Stanfill’s e-mail account was for actions related to his activities as a council member. Merz 

admits that he accessed Stanfill’s e-mail account without authorization because of the private 
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matter relating to his stalker being in the city of Kalama and his need to find out “what was going 

on.” RP at 149. We do not find that the prosecuting attorney’s office made an improper statement.

Merz also claims that state law supports that he cannot be prosecuted for failing to follow 

public record request procedures that did not exist, were not provided to him, and were not posted 

publicly by the city of Kalama. But the record shows that Merz was not prosecuted for failing to 

follow public record request procedures. Rather, Merz was prosecuted because, as he admits, he 

used Stanfill’s username and password to access Stanfill’s city e-mail account without any 

authority or permission. 

Merz’s prosecutorial misconduct arguments fail.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Merz next claims ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Merz alleges that defense 

counsel (1) refused to request withheld exculpatory evidence from the State; (2) failed to submit 

evidence Merz provided; (3) failed to cite relevant state laws Merz provided; (4) failed to place 

those same relevant laws into the jury instructions; (5) failed to address, at trial, claims in a 

witness’s report; (6) failed to address false statements made by the police chief; (7) confessed that 

Merz did not receive fair treatment; (8) failed to request a change of venue; and (9) failed to submit 

a motion to vacate.

We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Vazquez, 198 

Wn.2d 239, 249, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 

must show that their attorney’s performance was deficient and prejudicial. Id. at 247-48. An 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails if the defendant fails to establish either deficient 

performance or prejudice. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011); see also 

Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d at 247. 
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There is a strong presumption that counsel is effective. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d at 247. “The 

defendant has the burden to show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient based on the 

trial court record.” Id. at 248. “Specifically, ‘the defendant must show in the record the absence 

of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons supporting the challenged conduct by counsel.’” Id. at 

248 (quoting State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). “Defense counsel’s 

performance is not deficient if it is a ‘legitimate trial strategy or tactic.’” State v. Bertrand, 3

Wn.3d 116, 128, 546 P.3d 1020 (2024) (quoting State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 863, 215 P.3d 177

(2009)).

To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of 

the trial would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance. McFarland, 127 

Wn.2d at 337; see also Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d at 267.

With regard to claims 1 through 6, Merz relies on evidence beyond our record. We do not 

know what conversations he and defense counsel may have had. Arguments that rely on evidence 

outside our record are best raised in a personal restraint petition (PRP). McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 

at 335.

With regard to claim 7, defense counsel’s statement about his opinion on Merz’s fair 

treatment would not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Merz claims 

that counsel confessed that Merz would not receive a fair trial. According to the e-mail thread 

Merz shared in his SAG, Merz was upset that counsel did not file a motion to vacate within the 

accepted window. But also in the thread, counsel tells Merz that counsel researched the standard 

and decided that the claims Merz wanted to put forth would be more appropriate to raise on the 

appellate level. The thread continues with Merz informing counsel that he no longer needs 

counsel’s assistance. Counsel then retorts that an elected official (presumably the judge) would 
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not set aside a jury verdict, and would instead, “craft a carefully worded decision as to why the 

jury came to a reasonable decision.” SAG at 46. Additionally, counsel believes that a party distant 

from the local population, such as an appellate court outside of Cowlitz County, would be a better 

forum for Merz. In fact, counsel states that he is acting in what he believes is Merz’s best interests. 

Again, there is a strong presumption that counsel is effective. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d at 247. Merz 

fails to rebut that presumption. We do not find that counsel’s expression of his personal beliefs, 

or his explanation of his tactics amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

With regard to claims 8 and 9, again, we presume counsel is effective. Merz argues that a 

change of venue would have been justified because of the articles in the local newspaper that would 

have influenced the court and the jury.

Common criteria or factors generally utilized by courts in determining the propriety of an 

order granting or denying a motion for change of venue based on alleged prejudicial pretrial 

publicity are: 

(1) [T]he inflammatory or noninflammatory nature of the publicity; (2) the degree 

to which the publicity was circulated throughout the community; (3) the length of 

time elapsed from the dissemination of the publicity to the date of trial; (4) the care 

exercised and the difficulty encountered in the selection of the jury; (5) the 

familiarity of prospective or trial jurors with the publicity and the resultant effect 

upon them; (6) the challenges exercised by the defendant in selecting the jury, both 

peremptory and for cause; (7) the connection of government officials with the 

release of publicity; (8) the severity of the charge; and (9) the size of the area from 

which the venire is drawn. 

State v. Crudup, 11 Wn. App. 583, 587, 524 P.2d 479 (1974). 

As stated above, “[d]efense counsel’s performance is not deficient if it is a ‘legitimate trial 

strategy or tactic.’” Bertrand, 3 Wn.3d at 128 (quoting Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 863). Moreover, for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on an attorney’s failure to take a certain action, the
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defendant must show that the action likely would have been successful. See Emery, 174 Wn.2d at

755 (requiring showing that severance motion likely would have been granted).

Merz fails to show that a motion to change venue would have been successful. Defense

counsel’s decision to not file a motion to change venue is a tactical decision, and here, the decision

to not bring such a motion did not amount to deficient performance. 

Similarly, Merz’s contention that defense counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion

to vacate also fails because Merz does not show that such motion would have been successful. 

Based on the above, we hold that Merz’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 

C. Duress

Next, Merz accuses the prosecuting attorney’s office and McMaster of making false claims 

that he did not submit a record request for e-mails from the city e-mail account utilized by Stanfill. 

Merz also claims he was under duress when he committed computer trespass in the first degree 

because he had already reached out to local law enforcement who failed to ensure him protection 

or assistance.

To support his claim, Merz references evidence outside of the record. As discussed above, 

if a defendant wishes to raise issues that require evidence or facts not in the existing trial record, 

the appropriate means of doing so is through a PRP. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335.

D. Entrapment

Merz claims entrapment. He claims that the sheriff’s office and prosecuting attorney’s 

office engaged in entrapment together with malicious and selective prosecution thus violating 

equal protection of the laws.

Entrapment is a defense when (1) “[t]he criminal design originated in the mind of law 

enforcement officials, or any person acting under their direction,” and (2) “[t]he actor was lured 
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or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise intended to commit.” RCW 

9A.16.070(1). Entrapment is not established by a mere showing that law enforcement simply 

allowed an actor the opportunity to commit a crime. RCW 9A.16.070(2). We find nothing in the 

record to suggest that the sheriff’s office lured or entrapped Merz to commit computer trespass in 

the first degree and electronic data theft. 

Additionally, the prosecuting attorneys of the State of Washington have discretion as to 

whether to file criminal charges and what charges are available to file. The most important power 

of the prosecutor’s office is that it may consider individual facts and circumstances when deciding 

whether to enforce criminal laws and that it may seek individualized justice. State v. Rice, 174 

Wn.2d 884, 901-02, 279 P.3d 849 (2012). 

E. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness

Finally, Merz claims prosecutorial vindictiveness. Prosecutors have substantial discretion 

in determining how and when to file criminal charges. State v. Stearns, 2 Wn.3d 869, 877, 545 

P.3d 320 (2024). However, prosecutorial discretion is limited by constitutional due process 

principles, which prohibit prosecutorial vindictiveness. State v. Korum, 157 Wn.2d 614, 627, 141 

P.3d 13 (2006). There are two kinds of prosecutorial vindictiveness: actual vindictiveness and a 

presumption of vindictiveness. Id. Merz alleges a presumption of vindictiveness. 

“A presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant can prove that ‘all of the 

circumstances, when taken together, support a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.’” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). “The prosecution may then rebut 

the presumption by presenting ‘objective evidence justifying the prosecutorial action.’” Id. at 627-

28 (quoting Meyer, 810 F.2d at 1245). If we find there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find 

Merz guilty of computer trespass in the first degree and electronic data theft, then we may conclude 
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that the prosecution was able to present objective evidence that justified its prosecutorial action of 

Merz. 

Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we find there 

is nothing in the record to support Merz’s allegation of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm Merz’s convictions for computer trespass in the first degree and electronic data 

theft, but we remand to the trial court with instructions to strike the VPA, the DNA collection fee, 

and the jury demand fee. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Veljacic, A.C.J.

We concur:

Lee, J.

Che, J.