alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 2, 2016

s0418 

# Order

Clerk May 2, 2016

151476

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 151476

COA: 325431

Wayne CC: 97

- 500792

- FC

LONNELL VENTURA HAYWOOD,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 11, 2015 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of

granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the sentence of the Wayne Circuit Court on the

defendant’s first

- degree murder conviction, and we REMAND this case to the trial cou rt

for resentencing on that conviction pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. See

Montgomery v Louisiana , 577 US ___; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), and Miller

v Alabama , 567 US ___; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). In all other respects,

l eave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions

presented should be reviewed by this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.
#### Shannel Mackins, Appellant, v Mohammad Javed et al., Respondents.

[971 NYS2d 215]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated February 16, 2012, which granted the separate motions of the defendant Mohammed Javed and the defendant Wayne B. Williams for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, and the separate motions of the defendant Mohammed Javed and the defendant Wayne B. Williams for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiffs spine and to her left shoulder did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Staff v Yshua,*59 AD3d 614 [2009]) *880and that, in any event, any injuries to these areas were not caused by the subject accident *(see Frisch v Harris,*101 AD3d 941, 942 [2012]). However, in opposition, the plaintiff submitted evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether those alleged injuries constituted serious injuries under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and as to whether those injuries were caused by the subject accident *(see Perl v Meher,*18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]; *Broughal v Moss,*94 AD3d 798, 799 [2012]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Lott, JJ., concur.
#### George J. TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald HUTCHINSON; Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-6279.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 17, 2001.

Decided May 25, 2001.

George J. Taylor, pro se.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit judges.

PER CURIAM.

George J. Taylor appeals the district court’s order dismissing his motion, which the district court properly construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Taylor’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. *Taylor v. Hutchinson,*No. CA-01-24-AW (D. Md. filed Jan. 17, 2001; entered Jan. 18, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit
      10(g)











**AMENDMENT
      NO. 3**





**TO**





**PPL
      CORPORATION INCENTIVE**


**COMPENSATION
      PLAN FOR KEY EMPLOYEES**





WHEREAS,
      PPL Corporation, (“PPL”) has adopted the PPL Corporation Incentive Compensation
      Plan for Key Employees (“Plan”), effective January 1, 1997; and


WHEREAS,
      the Plan was amended and restated effective January 1, 2003, and subsequently
      amended by Amendment No. 1 and 2; and


WHEREAS,
      PPL desires to further amend the Plan;


NOW,
      THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:


I.  Effective
      January 1, 2007, Section 2(o) is amended to read:





**SECTION
      2. DEFINITIONS.**





(o) **"Fair
      Market Value"** means
      the closing sale price of the Common Stock as reflected in the New York Stock
      Exchange Composite Transactions on the date as of which Fair Market Value is
      being determined or, if no Common Stock is traded on the date as of which Fair
      Market Value is being determined, Fair Market Value shall be the closing price
      of the Common Stock as reflected in the New York Stock Exchange Composite
      Transactions on the next preceding day on which the Common Stock was
      traded.


II.  Except
      as
      provided for in this Amendment No. 3, all other provisions of the Plan shall
      remain in full force and effect.


IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment No. 3 is executed this  day of
      ____________________, 2007.








PPL
                SERVICES CORPORATION
            
            PPL
                CORPORATIONBy:
            __________________________________
              John
                R. Biggar
              Executive
                Vice President and
              Chief
                Financial Officer
            
            By:
            __________________________________
              John
                R. Biggar
              Executive
                Vice President and
              Chief
                Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1





Certification of CEO and CFO

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002







In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Angeles Partners X (the "Partnership"), for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Martha L. Long, as the equivalent of the chief executive officer of the Partnership, and Stephen B. Waters, as the equivalent of the chief financial officer of the Partnership, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.



| |                        
| | -----------------------
| | /s/Martha L. Long      
| | Name: Martha L. Long   
| | Date: November 7, 2007 
| |                        
| | /s/Stephen B. Waters   
| | Name: Stephen B. Waters
| | Date: November 7, 2007 



This certification is furnished with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Partnership for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Genesis Technology Group, Inc.
on Form 10-KSB for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Adam Wasserman, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


Date: January 19, 2005

 /S/ Adam Wasserman
 ------------------
     Adam Wasserman,
     Chief Financial Officer
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk November 30, 2012 

# Order

November 30, 2012

144327

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 144327

COA: 306106

Oakland CC: 2010

- 233501 FC

DONALD MICHAEL HARDY,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________

On order of Chief Justice, leave to appeal having been granted by the order of June

8, 2012 which also provide d for possible appointment of counsel pursuant to

Administrative Order 2003

- 03 and it appearing that defendant

- appellant has neither

requested counsel nor filed his brief and appendix, IT IS ORDERED that defendant

appellant show cause in writing within 14 days why his appeal should not be dismissed

for lack of progress.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to
the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements:



| | (1) | Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-138515) of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.;
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | Registration Statement (Form S-8 Nos. 333-89263, 333-90118, 333-138518 and 333-151068) pertaining to the compensation plans of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc.;
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

of our reports dated March 14, 2011, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule
of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2010.

New York, New York

March 14,
2011
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Timothy Murphy, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent

[974 NYS2d 670]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Ap*1047peal Board, filed May 31, 2012, which, among other things, ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because he was not totally unemployed.

Claimant was the president and founder of Select Staffing Inc. In 1997, his wife became president and sole owner of the corporation in an effort to market it as “a woman owned company.” However, plaintiffs wife began losing interest in the business and, due to declining business, claimant purportedly decided to discontinue corporate operations. In 2009, claimant applied for and began receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ultimately found that claimant was a de facto principal of the corporation and was ineligible to receive benefits because he was not totally unemployed. The Board further charged him with a recoverable overpayment of benefits and assessed a forfeiture penalty of benefit days upon the basis that he had made willful misrepresentations. Claimant now appeals.

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination and, accordingly, we affirm. “Even if it could be accepted that claimant’s participation in the corporate business was minimal, so long as he stood to gain financially from the continuing existence of the business, his affiliation could preclude the receipt of benefits on the ground that he was not totally unemployed” *(Matter of Armbruster [Commissioner of Labor],*36 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2007] [citations omitted]; *see Matter of Lawrence [Commissioner of Labor],*39 AD3d 980, 980-981 [2007]). Claimant continued to maintain the corporate office and work from it during the period he was purportedly unemployed, had access to the corporate checking account, and used revenues to pay corporate expenses such as rent, wages to other employees and his own health insurance. Inasmuch as claimant repeatedly certified that he had not worked any days despite performing the above tasks, substantial evidence also supports that part of the Board’s determination charging him with a recoverable overpayment and imposing a forfeiture penalty *(see Matter of Armbruster [Commissioner of Labor],*36 AD3d at 1038).

To the extent not specifically addressed herein, claimant’s remaining contentions have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.

Rose, J.E, Stein, McCarthy and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2100 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for District of Columbia, 

Federal Payment for Judicial Commissions, Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for District of Columbia, Federal Payment for Judicial Commissions, Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure 

for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2100 IH

1 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, FEDERAL PAYMENT 

3 FOR JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS, COMMISSION 

4 ON JUDICIAL DISABILITIES AND TENURE FOR 

5 FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail8 able for District of Columbia, Federal Payment for Judi9 cial Commissions, Commission on Judicial Disabilities and 

10 Tenure for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $295,000. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2132 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2132

 To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Independent 
 Agencies, National Credit Union Administration, Community Development 
               Revolving Loan Fund for fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Independent 
 Agencies, National Credit Union Administration, Community Development 
               Revolving Loan Fund for fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR INDEPENDENT 
              AGENCIES, NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, COMMUNITY 
              DEVELOPMENT REVOLVING LOAN FUND FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Independent Agencies, 
National Credit Union Administration, Community Development Revolving 
Loan Fund for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $1,545,000.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, )

SUCCESSOR TO RBC BANK (USA), )

SUCCESSOR TO RBC CENTURA BANK, )

SUCCESSOR TO REGIONS BANK, )

d/b/a AMSOUTH BANK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00154-KD-M

)

MWM, INC, d/b/a MATTRESS WORLD )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 

(Doc. 15). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the Plaintiff seeks an entry of judgment against the 

Defendant. Rule 12(c) states: “After the pleadings are closed . . . a party may move for judgment 

on the pleadings.” A Rule 12(c) motion is improper at this stage of the litigation as the Defendant 

has not filed an answer and the pleadings have not closed. Sampson v. Washington Mut. Bank, 

453 F. App'x 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2011)(“The district court erred by granting the motion under 

Rule 12(c) because a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings may be filed only ‘after 

the pleadings are closed,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and the defendants never filed an answer in this 

case.”).

1

The Court acknowledges that the Defendant has signed a “Confirmation of Service and 

Consent to Judgment” (Doc. 12) but has not found any cases in the Eleventh Circuit indicating 

that the filing of such is sufficient to close the pleadings. Further, even if the “Confirmation of 

Service and Consent to Judgment” were construed as an answer, this would be improper as the 

 1 The Court notes that this is an unpublished opinion and is considered persuasive rather than binding. 

Case 1:14-cv-00154-KD-M Document 16 Filed 01/22/15 Page 1 of 2
Defendant corporation is proceeding pro se, which is not permitted. Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp.,

764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985)(“The rule is well established that a corporation is an 

artificial entity that can act only through agents, cannot appear pro se, and must be represented 

by counsel...[t]he general rule applies even where the person seeking to represent the 

corporation is its president and major stockholder.”)2

Accordingly, at this time, a Rule 12(c) motion is not a method by which the Plaintiff may 

obtain relief and the Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2015. 

s / Kristi K DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 2 Ander Lee, Sr., who signed the “Confirmation of Service and Consent to Judgment” (Doc. 12) is President of 

MWM, Inc.

Case 1:14-cv-00154-KD-M Document 16 Filed 01/22/15 Page 2 of 2
AO 247 (02/08) Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

United States of America )

)

)

)

)

)

v.

Case No:

USM No:

Date of Previous Judgment:

(Use Date of Last Amended Judgment if Applicable) Defendant’s Attorney

Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

Upon motion of  the defendant  the Director of the Bureau of Prisons  the court under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) for a reduction in the term of imprisonment imposed based on a guideline sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered and made retroactive by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(u), and having considered such motion,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is:

 DENIED.  GRANTED and the defendant’s previously imposed sentence of imprisonment (as reflected in 

the last judgment issued) of months is reduced to .

I. COURT DETERMINATION OF GUIDELINE RANGE (Prior to Any Departures)

Previous Offense Level: Amended Offense Level:

Criminal History Category: Criminal History Category:

Previous Guideline Range: to months Amended Guideline Range: to months

II. SENTENCE RELATIVE TO AMENDED GUIDELINE RANGE

 The reduced sentence is within the amended guideline range.

 The previous term of imprisonment imposed was less than the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time 

of sentencing as a result of a departure or Rule 35 reduction, and the reduced sentence is comparably less than the

amended guideline range.

 Other (explain):

III. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Except as provided above, all provisions of the judgment dated shall remain in effect.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Order Date:

Judge’s signature

Effective Date:

(if different from order date) Printed name and title

 Southern District of Alabama

TERRANCE KEOKI CALLEN

01/20/2005

2:06-CR-00176-011

09535-003

Pro Se

✔

✔

The defendant's original total offense level was derived from the Career Offender provision of the Sentencing

Guidelines, which makes him ineligible for a reduction in sentence due to the amended Guidelines for crack

cocaine offenses.

10/23/2008 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade

Chief United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cr-00176-CG-N Document 657 Filed 10/23/08 Page 1 of 1
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2202 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for US Department 

of Agriculture, Forest and Rangeland Research for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, and in addition to the Committee 

on Natural Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 

Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within 

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for US 

Department of Agriculture, Forest and Rangeland Research for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST 

5 AND RANGELAND RESEARCH FOR FISCAL 

6 YEAR 2024. 

7 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

8 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise availVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:40 Apr 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2202.IH H2202

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2202 IH

1 able for US Department of Agriculture, Forest and 

2 Rangeland Research for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed 

3 $296,616,000. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB