1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

POARCH BAND OF CREEK 

INDIANS,

)

)

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-0277-CG-C

)

JAMES H. HILDRETH, JR., in his 

official capacity as Tax Assessor of 

Escambia County, Alabama 

)

)

)

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This case arises from a complaint filed by the Poarch Band of Creek 

Indians (“the Tribe”) against in James H. Hildreth, Jr. (“Hildreth”), in his 

official capacity as the Tax Assessor of Escambia County. In the complaint, 

the Tribe sought relief to prevent Hildreth from levying property taxes 

against United States trust property held for the benefit of the Poarch Band 

of Creek Indians. Before the Court is the Tribe’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction (Doc. 12) against James Hildreth, the Tax Assessor of Escambia 

Co., Alabama; Hildreth’s corrected response in opposition (Doc. 16); the 

Tribe’s reply (Doc. 25); and Hildreth’s sur-reply (Doc 29). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court finds the Tribe is entitled to preliminary injunctive 

relief. 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 1 of 18
2

BACKGROUND

In 1984, the Secretary of the Interior formally recognized the Poarch 

Band of Creek Indians as an Indian tribe. (Doc. 16, Exh. A). Soon after 

federal recognition, the United States took roughly 229.5 acres of land (“Trust 

land”) in Escambia County into trust for the exclusive use and benefit of the 

Tribe. (Trust Deeds, Doc. 13, Exhs. A – J). The United States took the land 

into trust for the benefit of the Tribe pursuant to the Indian Reorganization 

Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C.A. § 465. Today, the Tribe occupies the Trust lands, has 

its own system of government and exercises jurisdiction. (Doc. 1, p.3, ¶ 9). 

The Trust land includes permanent improvements (collectively, “Trust 

Property”), most notably the structures that house the Tribe’s gaming 

enterprise. (Doc. 1, p.3, ¶¶ 10 - 11). 

In 1986, the Tax Assessor of Escambia County, James Hildreth, wrote 

the Alabama Attorney General and requested an opinion whether the Tribe’s 

Trust property was subject to state and local taxes. (Doc. 1, Exh. B). In a 

letter dated August 18, 1986 to Hildreth, the Attorney General’s office stated 

that the Tribe’s Trust Lands “will be exempt from taxation in the future” and 

that “there is no authority for state taxation.” (Ala. Atty. Gen. Op. 86-00327 

(August 18, 1986); Doc. 1, Exh. B.) Hildreth then refrained from assessing 

taxes on the Trust land for over twenty-five years. 

On April 17, 2012, the Escambia County Commission sent an inquiry 

to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior requesting information on 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 2 of 18
3

the status of the Trust lands in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). (Doc. 16-3). On June 4, 2012, the 

Office of the Secretary of the Interior responded, stating that the Tribe’s land 

is held in trust by the United States government and as such, the Tribe 

“enjoys all rights and privileges associated with having its Reservation held 

in trust by the United States under Federal Law.” (Doc. 1, Exh. C). 

On January 7, 2014, Hildreth informed the Tribe that “certain real and 

personal property of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians has escaped taxation.” 

(Doc. 1, Exh. D). Hildreth stated that his office was initiating an audit “for 

the purpose of valuing and assessing for taxation all property of the Poarch 

Band, both real and personal, which is situated in Escambia County.” (Doc. 1, 

Exh. D). The letter also stated that “any property which is claimed to be 

exempt from taxation must also be listed, and the burden is on the taxpayer 

to clearly establish its right to an exemption.” (Id.). 

In a letter dated February 28, 2014, the Tribe responded to Hildreth’s 

request and provided a list of property, exclusive of the Trust property. 

Hildreth answered and stated that the Tribe’s property listing was 

“incomplete and non-responsive.” Hildreth informed the Tribe of his intention 

to proceed with an audit of “all property of which the Poarch Band is the 

owner or holder within Escambia County, regardless of whether the Poarch 

Band considers to be “Trust Property.” ” (Doc. 1, Exh. F) (emphasis in the 

original). 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 3 of 18
4

On April 10, 2014, in a lawsuit brought by the State of Alabama 

against the commercial entity through which the Tribe conducts its gaming 

activities, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama 

issued an opinion affirming that the Tribe’s Trust lands in Escambia County 

are held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe. (Doc. 1, p. 

6; See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F.Supp.3d 1161, 1182 and 1184 

(M.D. Ala. 2014)(Watkins, C.J.)(appeal pending, 11th Cir. Case No. 14-

12004). The Tribe informed Hildreth of this decision in a letter dated April 

22, 2014. (Doc. 1, Exh. H). 

After the Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth. decision, the Tribe did not 

hear back from Hildreth for several months. Then, in a letter dated February 

26, 2015, Hildreth informed the Tribe that his office completed its appraisal 

of all of the Tribe’s property, including land held in trust, and he requested a 

meeting. (Doc. 1, Exh. I). In April, the Tribe met with Hildreth and his legal 

counsel to discuss the assessment. (Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶26; Doc. 24 p. 6, ¶26). 

On May 22, 2015, counsel for Hildreth sent an e-mail to Lori Stinson, 

the Attorney General for the Tribe, stating that Hildreth was available for a 

meeting on May 26, 2015 to discuss the tax matter. (Doc. 25, Exh. A). 

Hildreth’s counsel also advised that “[w]e are hopeful that the parties can 

reach an amicable agreement very soon, but please know that Mr. Hildreth 

otherwise intends to formalize a tax assessment (including escaped taxes) by 

mid-June.” (Doc. 25, Exh. A). 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 4 of 18
5

On May 26, 2015, the Tribe filed suit against Hildreth. (Doc. 1). In the 

complaint, the Tribe alleged that Hildreth intends to violate federal law by 

levying taxes on lands held in trust by the United States government for the 

benefit of the Tribe. Hildreth denies these allegations and states that under 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Tribe is not an 

Indian Tribe at all and that the Secretary of the Interior wrongful took the 

Trust lands into trust under 25 U.S.C.A. §465. (Doc. 24). On June 4, 2015, the 

Tribe filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop Hildreth from 

assessing the taxes on the Trust land. The Court now considers that motion. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction 

A threshold issue is whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear this 

case. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that 

power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by 

judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994) (internal citations 

omitted). 

In this case, Hildreth claims the Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 

the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), which states “[t]he district courts shall not 

enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under 

State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 5 of 18
6

courts of such state.”1 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Courts construe the TIA as a 

“jurisdictional rule and a broad jurisdictional barrier.” Arkansas v. Farm 

Credit Servs. of Central Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 825, 117 S.Ct. 1776, 138 L.Ed 34 

(1997). Though the TIA is a “broad jurisdictional barrier,” it has exceptions,

particularly in the context of federal law concerning Indian tribes. 

In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 

Reservation, et. al., 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), the 

Supreme Court found that a federally recognized Indian tribe suing under its 

rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1362, were “to be accorded treatment similar to that 

of the United States had it sued on their behalf.” Id. at 474. Therefore, since 

the Tax Injunction Act did not bar the United States from seeking to enjoin 

the enforcement of state tax law, the Court held that “the Tribe is not barred 

from doing so here.” Id. 

Here, the Tribe argues that its ability to enjoin the county tax collector 

from collecting taxes on trust lands falls squarely within the precedent of 

Moe and the Court agrees. Therefore, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1362. 

B. Preliminary Injunction Standard of Review 

“The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 

 1 Hildreth argues that the Tribe is not an Indian Tribe under his 

interpretation of Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). At this stage, the 

Court rejects this argument in section C, 1 below.

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 6 of 18
7

discretion.” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). In order 

to succeed on his motion for the entry of a preliminary injunction, the Tribe

must establish four prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on 

the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction were 

not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the 

harm an injunction may cause the defendant, and (4) that granting the 

injunction would not disserve the public interest. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 

Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

Courts do not hand out preliminary injunctions liberally. “A 

preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. 

In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must 

consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the 

requested relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 

7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). Therefore, motions for preliminary injunctions should not 

“be granted until the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to 

the four prerequisites. The burden of persuasion in all of the four 

requirements is at all times upon the plaintiff.” Northeast Fl. Chapter of the 

Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 

1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 7 of 18
8

C. Preliminary Injunction 

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

The first factor when determining whether to issue a preliminary 

injunction is whether the movant has a substantial likelihood on success on 

the merits. In this case, the Tribe has a substantial likelihood of succeeding 

on the merits of its claim that Hildreth will violate the Indian Reorganization 

Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 465, by assessing taxes on land held in trust by the United 

States government for the benefit of a federally recognized tribe. 

The IRA explicitly states that “[t]itle to any lands or rights acquired 

pursuant to this Act or the Act of July 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 392), as amended 

(25 U.S.C. 608 et seq.) shall be taken in the name of the United States in 

trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, 

and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” 25 

U.S.C.A. § 465. 

Established by the 1984, 1992, and 1995 deeds filed on record, the 

United States holds title to the lands in question in trust for the benefit of the 

Tribe. (Doc. 13, Exhs. A – J). Hildreth challenges the Secretary of the 

Interior’s taking of these lands into trust based on Hildreth’s understanding 

of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379.

In Carcieri, a case brought under the Administrative Procedure Act 

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06, the Supreme Court construed the definition of 

“Indian” in the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”). Enacted in 1934, the IRA 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 8 of 18
9

authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to acquire land and hold it in trust 

‘for the purpose of providing land for Indians.’ ” 555 U.S. at 381, 129 S.Ct. 

1058 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465). The IRA defines “[t]he term ‘Indian’ as used 

in this Act [to] include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any 

recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction....” 25 U.S.C. § 479. 

Applying the plain and unambiguous language of § 479, the Supreme Court 

held that “the phrase ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ refers to a tribe that 

was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the [IRA's] enactment,” 555 U.S. 

at 382, 129 S.Ct. 1058, rather than at the time the Secretary took the lands 

into trust. “As a result, § 479 limits the Secretary's authority to taking land 

into trust for the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was 

under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.” Id.

Curiously, the Supreme Court provided no guidance on what constituted 

“under federal jurisdiction” as of 1934. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer 

noted that “[t]he statute after all, imposes no time limit upon recognition.” 

Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398, 129 S.Ct. 1058 (Breyer, J., concurring). 

Hildreth claims that under Carcieri, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians 

is not an Indian tribe at all. However, a critical difference between the 

Carcieri case and the present, is in Carcieri, the state of Rhode Island 

brought a timely challenge under the APA of the Secretary of Interior’s 

decision to take land into trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe. Since 

Carcieri, in cases analogous to this one, courts have found that challenges to 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 9 of 18
10

the Trust land acquisitions are subject to APA procedures, including the sixyear statute of limitations for challenging agency decisions.2 Three years 

after Carcieri, the Supreme Court confirmed that a challenge to the 

Secretary’s decision to take land into trust is a “garden-variety APA claim.”

See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, −

U.S. − , 132 S.Ct. 2199, 2208, 183 L.Ed.21 211 (2012)).

Just last year, our sister court, the Middle District of Alabama, heard 

the same Carcieri argument from the state of Alabama concerning the same

trust lands as the present case. The State argued that the Secretary of the 

Interior impermissibly took lands into trust on behalf of the Poarch Creeks 

because they were not a federally recognized tribe when Congress passed the 

IRA in 1934. In his decision, Judge Watkins stated, “[t]he APA indisputably 

provides a proper framework for challenging the Secretary's land-into-trust 

decisions.” Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1181 (M.D. 

Ala. 2014); see also Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385, 129 S.Ct. 1058; Match–E–Be–

 2 See e.g., Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, No. 10-17803, 2015 WL 

3499884, at *5 (9th Cir. June 4, 2015), as amended on denial of reh'g (July 8, 

2015) (stating, “Allowing California to attack collaterally the BIA's APA 

would constitute just the sort of end-run that we have previously refused to 

allow, and would cast a cloud of doubt over countless acres of land that have 

been taken into trust for tribes recognized by the federal government.”); 

Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F.Supp. 3d 1161, 1182 and 1184 (M.D. Ala. 

2014)(Watkins, C.J.)(appeal pending, 11th Cir. Case No. 14-12004); City of 

Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147, 1153 

(8th Cir.2013) (refusing to rule on the validity of the NIGC's decision because 

“such challenges are properly made under the [APA],” and “[t]he NIGC [was] 

not a party ..., and the City ha[d] not made a showing that the review process 

established by Congress in the APA might be circumvented here”). 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 10 of 18
11

Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 

S.Ct. 2199, 2208, 183 L.Ed.2d 211 (2012) (observing that a challenge to the 

Secretary's decision to take land into trust is a garden-variety APA claim); 

Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2001) (analyzing 

under the APA, a challenge to the NIGC's decision to issue a tribe a permit 

for class II gaming on “Indian lands,” and, in particular, to the NIGC's 

Indian-lands determination). In rejecting the State of Alabama’s 

interpretation, Judge Watkins noted that Carcieri involved a timely APA 

challenge to the Secretary’s decision, which was not the case in PCI Gaming

Auth. Judge Watkins wrote, “[t]he State cannot avoid the APA’s procedures 

for reviewing the Secretary’s decisions by simply reformulating its 

argument.” PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F.Supp.3d. at 1181.

Hildreth’s defense also relies heavily on United States v. State Tax 

Comm’n of the State of Mississippi, wherein the Fifth Circuit found that the 

Mississippi Band of Choctaw was not an Indian tribe under the IRA in 1934 

because they had assimilated and gave up their land in various treaties in 

the 19th Century. 505 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1974). As a result, the Fifth Circuit

held that federal government, through the district courts, had no jurisdiction 

to deal with the Choctaw. Three years later, based on its findings in United 

States v. State Tax Comm’n, the Fifth Circuit found that while “the citizens 

of the State of Mississippi of Choctaw Indian blood are, anthropologically, 

Indians they are nevertheless subject to the inherent police powers of the 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 11 of 18
12

State anywhere within its exterior boundaries.” United States v. John, 560 

F.2d 1202, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) rev'd, 437 U.S. 634, 98 S. Ct. 2541, 57 L. Ed. 

2d 489 (1978). On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, 

holding that “[n]either the fact that the Choctaws in Mississippi are merely a 

remnant of a larger group of Indians, long ago removed from Mississippi, nor 

the fact that federal supervision over them has not been continuous, destroys 

the federal power to deal with them.” 437 U.S. 634, 653 (1978).

Here, this Court is not persuaded by Hildreth’s defense that the Fifth 

Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. State Tax Comm’n, allows Hildreth to subvert 

APA procedure requirements and cause the Tribe to lose its land with the 

stroke of a pen. At this stage Hildreth has presented no compelling evidence 

to contradict a finding that challenges to the Secretary of Interior’s decision 

to take the Tribe’s land into trust is anything more than a “garden variety 

APA claim.” See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians, 

132 S.Ct. at 2208. 

Thus, the Court finds that the Tribe fulfilled its requirement of 

demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. The Tribe is a federally 

recognized Indian tribe and the United States holds land for its benefit. (Doc. 

16, Exh. A). The Tribe filed the deeds on the record, which reflect that the 

land is held in trust for the benefit of the Tribe by the United States 

government. (Doc. 13, Exhs. A – J). Further, Congress explicitly provided in 

25 U.S.C.A. § 465, that trust land is exempt from state and local taxes, such 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 12 of 18
13

as the one Hildreth attempts to levy here. 

2. Substantial Threat Irreparable Injury

To succeed under the second factor, the Tribe must show a “substantial 

likelihood of irreparable injury” in the absence of a preliminary injunction. 

The Tribe asserts that Hildreth would injure the Tribe by impinging on the 

Tribe’s sovereign immunity by assessing property taxes on the trust land. 

Thus, the Court is presented with two questions: (1) is Hildreth’s assessment 

of property taxes imminent, and (2) would violation of 25 U.S.C. § 465 

constitute irreparable harm? 

First, to show a substantial likelihood, the asserted irreparable injury 

‘must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.’ ” Siegel v. 

LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of 

Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 

1285 (11th Cir.1990)). Here, Hildreth’s counsel emailed the Tribe stating that 

“[w]e are hopeful that the parties can reach an amicable agreement very 

soon, but please know that Mr. Hildreth otherwise intends to formalize a tax 

assessment (including escaped taxes) by mid-June.” (Doc. 25, Exh. A). 

Hildreth’s counsel also informed the Tribe that after a meeting scheduled for 

May 26th, 2015, Hildreth did “not intend to participate personally in any 

other meetings regarding the Tax assessment.” (Doc. 25, Exh. A). Hildreth 

claims that this email merely demonstrates an “open dialogue.” (Doc. 16, p. 

16). The Court disagrees. From the ongoing correspondence provided in the 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 13 of 18
14

record, it is apparent that Hildreth fully intended to assess taxes on the 

Tribe’s Trust Property if the parties failed to come to an agreement at the 

meeting. 

The second issue is whether irreparable harm occurs when a county

official threatens to violate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity by assessing 

property taxes on trust land, an action Congress explicitly bars under the 

Indian Reorganization Act § 465. This Court finds that it does. 3 As a 

federally recognized tribe, the Poarch Creeks are a “domestic dependent 

nation,” that exercises “inherent sovereign authority.” See Michigan v. Bay 

Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030-31, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1071 (2014) 

(citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.,

498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) (quoting Cherokee 

Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831)). As dependents, the tribes 

are subject to plenary control by Congress. Bay Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2030; see 

also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 

420 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress” powers “we have 

consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive’ ” to “legislate in respect to 

 3 The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly found that “an invasion of tribal 

sovereignty can constitute irreparable injury.” Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 

443 F.3d 1247, 1255 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 

and Ouray Reservation v. Utah, – F. 3d – , 2015 WL 3705904, *3 (10th Cir. 

2015); Kiowa Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1171- 72 

(10th Cir. 1998); Seneca–Cayuga v. Oklahoma, 874 F.2d 709, 716 (10th Cir.

1989). 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 14 of 18
15

Indian tribes”). The Constitution explicitly grants Congress exclusive power 

to legislate in respect to the Indian tribes. Sovereign authority is a default 

amongst federally recognized tribes and the Supreme Court confirms that “ 

‘until Congress acts, the tribes retain’ their historic sovereign authority.” Bay 

Mills, 134 S.Ct. at 2027 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 

98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978)).

Sovereign immunity is a cornerstone of the preserving of selfgovernance and the Tribe’s existence as dependent sovereigns. Allowing 

Hildreth to assess taxes on Trust land would be tantamount to exercising 

sovereignty over the Tribe, and would also violate federal law under IRA. 

Hildreth also claims that the assessment would not impair the Tribe’s 

ability to continue to provide law enforcement activities, fire protection and 

the provision of family services. (Doc. 16, p. 18). To support this contention, 

Hildreth cites a news article discussing the Tribe’s revenue from its lucrative 

gaming operation. (Id.) However, a Tribe’s purported financial ability to pay a 

state or local tax is not a reason to violate the Constitution’s provision that 

Congress has exclusive right to legislate concerning Indian tribes. 

Therefore, the Court finds that the Tribe demonstrated a “substantial 

likelihood of irreparable injury.”

3. Balance of Harms 

The third factor is whether the threatened injury to the movant 

outweighs the hardship that would be experienced by the opposing party if 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 15 of 18
16

the preliminary injunction were issued. Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons and 

Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001). In making this assessment, the 

Court must “consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding 

of the requested relief.” Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 

7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (citations omitted). Here, the 

Tribe requests the Court enjoin Hildreth from levying property taxes on 

Trust property. 

Hildreth argues that a preliminary injunction could result “in the 

permanent loss of significant tax revenues to which Escambia County is 

entitled for the provision of essential government services.” (Doc. 16, p. 19). 

The Tribe claims that if Court does not grant the preliminary 

injunction, Hildreth’s levying of property taxes on trust land would be 

tantamount to him exercising jurisdiction over the Tribe. The Tribe points 

out that Hildreth refrained from collecting taxes on the trust land for thirty 

years, the last six of which are post-Carcieri. Additionally, the Tribe contends 

if Hildreth were to recover, he would merely assess charges and penalties 

provided for the late payment of taxes under Alabama state law, making his 

delay argument entirely unconvincing. (Doc. 12, p. 12).

Balancing the arguments of both sides, the Court finds that Hildreth’s 

potential harm is not outweighed by the potential injury he will inflict if a 

preliminary injunction is not issued. By imposing taxes on the Tribal Trust 

Property, Hildreth would be exercising jurisdiction over the Tribe and 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 16 of 18
17

directly assaulting its sovereign immunity. See Wyandotte Nation v. 

Sebelius, 443 F.3d at 1255. The harm that may arise from delaying the 

assessment of property taxes is minimal at best, whereas the harm to the 

Tribe’s sovereignty and well-being caused by permitting the county tax 

assessor to exercise jurisdiction over a tribe’s trust property is substantial. 

Finally, what the Tribe requests is maintenance of the status quo, which is 

the purpose of a preliminary injunction. See Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 

U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) (stating “[t]he purpose of 

a preliminary injunction is to preserve the relative positions of the parties 

until a trial on the merits can be held.”). Therefore, the Court finds that 

Hildreth’s potential harm does not outweigh that of the Tribe if he is allowed 

to proceed. 

4. Public Interest

Finally, the requested preliminary injunction would not be adverse to 

the public interest. The Tribe requests application of federal law. Congress 

explicitly stated in 25 U.S.C.A. § 465 that trust land held for the benefit of 

Indian tribes is to be exempt from state and location taxation. It is in public’s 

interest that the State and its officials comply with federal law. Indeed, 

“frustration of federal statutes and prerogatives are not in the public 

interest.” United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Therefore, the Court finds that granting the Tribe’s motion for preliminary 

injunction does not violate public interest.

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 17 of 18
18

CONCLUSION 

 The Court finds that the Tribe fulfilled its burden of proof required for 

a preliminary injunction. Granting this preliminary injunction will enjoin 

Hildreth from assessing property taxes on the land held in trust by the 

United States government for the benefit of the Tribe. 

 Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the Tribe’s motion for 

preliminary injunction and ORDERS that James Hildreth, the Tax Assessor 

of Escambia County, is prohibited from proceeding with or issuing any 

assessment of the Tribe’s Trust Property. This injunction binds Hildreth

and all his officers, agents, servants, employees, and others in active 

concert or participation with any of them, who would seek to levy tax on 

these trust lands. 

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 2015. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

Case 1:15-cv-00277-CG-C Document 36 Filed 07/22/15 Page 18 of 18