IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

 )

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 

 ) 15-193-KD

MAURICE ODELL BROWN )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after

Jury Guilty Verdict filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) (Doc. 116) and 

Motion for a New Trial filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2) (Doc. 

117). Upon consideration and for the reasons discussed herein, the motions are DENIED.

I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (Doc. 116)

Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that, “[a]fter the government 

closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must 

enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 

conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The Rule also provides that “[a] defendant may move for a 

judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the 

court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). 

Defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal “on the basis of insufficient evidence that 

Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.” (Doc. 116 at 1). “A motion for judgment of acquittal 

is a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented against the defendant.” United 

States v. Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 98 (11th Cir. 1994). In deciding such a motion, “district courts 

should apply the same standard as that used for reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the 

evidence. The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and

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determine whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Sellers, 871 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal citations 

omitted); see also United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In reviewing 

a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the Government’s 

favor.”). 

To sustain a conviction, the evidence need not “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v. 

Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The 

jury is free to choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the 

evidence presented at trial, and the court must accept all reasonable inferences and credibility 

determinations made by the jury.” Sellers, 871 F.2d at 1021 (internal citations omitted). 

Therefore, a “conviction must be upheld unless the jury could not have found the defendant 

guilty under any reasonable construction of the evidence.” United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 

944 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999)). 

“[T]he relevant question is whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979) (emphasis in original). 

Upon consideration, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence 

adduced at trial supports a rational determination that Defendant is guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), as charged in Count One of the Indictment. Thus, the motion is DENIED. 

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II. Motion for New Trial (Doc. 117)

Defendant also moves for a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

33(b)(2) on the following grounds: 

Defendant moves for a new trial on the basis that ATF Agent Peterson was never 

identified as an expert witness by the government before trial but testified as an 

expert witness and gave expert opinion testimony at trial which was prejudicial to 

Defendant’s case; 

During closing argument, the AUSA commented that Defendant had a “history of 

of lawlessness”. Defendant’s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, which 

was denied. Said comment was prejudicial to Defendant’s case; 

The government admitted a “Bill of Sale” into evidence which was not prepared 

by Defendant and was admitted on the basis of perjured and hearsay testimony. 

Said evidence was prejudicial to Defendant’s case. 

(Doc. 117 at 1).

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[u]pon the defendant’s 

motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so 

requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “Thus, there are two grounds upon which a court may grant a 

motion for new trial: one based on newly discovered evidence . . . ; and the other based on any 

other reason, typically the interest of justice . . . .” United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1151 

(11th Cir. 2006). The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial rests in the sound 

discretion of the trial court. United States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1170 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Defendant points to the Assistant United States Attorney’s description of the Defendant’s 

“history of lawlessness,” as grounds for a new trial. “Even if a prosecutor’s comments are 

inappropriate, reversal is only warranted if the entire trial is so replete with errors that the 

defendant was denied a fair trial.” United States v. Adams, 280 F. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir. 

2008) citing United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). Further, “[a] 

prosecutor’s remarks mandate a new trial only if they are improper and prejudicially affect the 

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defendant’s substantial rights. A defendant's substantial rights are prejudiced if there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for the remarks, the outcome would be different.” United States 

v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996)(internal citations omitted). Upon consideration, 

the Court finds that if there were any error based on this remark, it was harmless. Eckhardt at 947 

(“When the record contains sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error is harmless.”)

The Court finds that the Defendant’s remaining arguments in support of a new trial 

provide no meritorious bases for the Court to grant a new trial. Accordingly, the motion for new 

trial (Doc. 117) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of March 2016.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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