Docket No. 109014.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

ITALO SANDERS, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 7, 2010.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, and

Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by

Justice Burke.

OPINION

In 1994, defendant, Italo Sanders, was convicted in the circuit

court of Cook County of first degree murder and sentenced to 40

years in prison. The appellate court affirmed his conviction. People v.

Sanders, No. 1–94–1710 (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). In November 2001, defendant filed a postconviction

petition, which the circuit court dismissed. After the appellate court

remanded for second-stage proceedings, the circuit court advanced

the petition to third-stage proceedings. Following oral argument, the

circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The appellate

court affirmed. 393 Ill. App. 3d 152.
-2-

BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with the murder of John Pinkerton, which

occurred on January 24, 1992. Pinkerton was shot in a stairwell of the

Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, where he was walking with

Alexander Robinson and seven-year-old Manuel Woods. Two months

later, Pinkerton died from complications of his injuries. Prior to trial,

defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from

introducing evidence related to street gangs. This evidence consisted

of the testimony of Michael Stewart, who was Pinkerton’s brother. At

the hearing on defendant’s motion, defense counsel told the court that

two days after the shooting, Stewart saw defendant at the Robert

Taylor Homes and asked defendant who had shot Pinkerton.

Defendant allegedly replied that he could not tell Stewart, but that it

was “BD business” and that Pinkerton had not been the intended

target. Defendant asked Stewart if Pinkerton was dead and Stewart

said no. Defendant smiled and walked away. The trial court denied

defendant’s motion, finding that the proposed evidence explained an

otherwise inexplicable murder and that the probative value of the

evidence outweighed any potential prejudice to defendant.

During jury selection, defense counsel submitted several questions

to the trial court concerning possible gang contact or bias. The court

refused to ask the questions, stating that an individual juror’s opinion

about gangs was not relevant and noting that the submitted questions

were highly subjective and might serve to inflame the members of the

venire. 

At defendant’s trial, then nine-year-old Manuel Woods testified

that on January 24, 1992, he lived at the Robert Taylor Homes. His

cousin, Michael Stewart, also lived there, on the same floor as

Manuel. Around dinnertime, Pinkerton and Robinson came over to

Manuel’s apartment. They stayed for a while and then left. Manuel

went with them. They were going to Stewart’s apartment to watch a

basketball game. They started walking down the hallway. Manuel was

holding Pinkerton’s hand. As they approached the elevator and

stairway, Manuel heard gunshots. Pinkerton was “jumping.” Manuel

saw defendant at the top of the staircase. He was approximately 12 to

15 feet from Manuel. Defendant was holding a gun and shooting at

Pinkerton, who pushed Manuel out of the way. Manuel ran to

Stewart’s apartment. Manuel stated that he went to the police station
-3-

with his mother and identified defendant in a lineup. He had previously

seen defendant more than once at the Robert Taylor Homes. 

On three occasions, the jury was shown a photograph of the

stairwell at Robert Taylor Homes where the shooting took place. The

photo showed gang graffiti on the walls of the stairwell which read,

“GDs Die, Bds live.” 

Michael Stewart testified that a few days after the shooting, he

saw defendant walking on the fifth floor of the Robert Taylor Homes.

Stewart had seen defendant in the building several times, but did not

know his name. Stewart told defendant that he had seen him in the

stairwell the night Pinkerton was shot and he asked defendant who

had shot Pinkerton. Defendant asked if Pinkerton was dead and, upon

being told Pinkerton was alive, defendant said “it was BD business”

and all he could tell Stewart was that Pinkerton was not the intended

target. Stewart testified that the term “BD” meant Black Disciples,

which was a street gang. 

Sometime later, the police recovered a gun from defendant. A

firearms expert testified that the bullets recovered from Pinkerton had

the same class characteristics as the gun and could have been fired

from the gun. However, the expert was unable to include or exclude

the gun as the murder weapon. 

Defendant called three witnesses to testify. His mother, sister, and

girlfriend all testified that the three of them and defendant were in

defendant’s mother’s apartment at the Robert Taylor Homes at the

time of the shooting. They heard the shots and ran out to see what

happened. Afterward, they went back into the mother’s apartment and

stayed there until defendant walked his girlfriend home about 10 p.m.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to defendant’s

alleged gang affiliation and the alleged gang motive for the shooting

by repeatedly referring to Stewart’s testimony that defendant told him

Pinkerton’s shooting was “BD business.” The jury convicted

defendant and the trial court sentenced him to 40 years in prison.

On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s

conviction and sentence. Before the appellate court, defendant argued,

inter alia, that the trial court had erred in refusing to ask potential

jurors questions during voir dire concerning potential bias against

gangs. The appellate court rejected this argument, concluding that the
-4-

trial court’s questions were reasonably calculated to expose latent bias

and prejudice. Sanders, No. 1–94–1710 (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23).

On November 16, 2001, defendant filed a petition for

postconviction relief, in which he alleged that the trial court erred in

failing to voir dire potential jurors on the subject of gang bias.

Defendant alleged that this failure, together with the State’s reliance

on gang-related evidence at trial, deprived him of his right to an

impartial jury. In support, he cited this court’s decision in People v.

Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467 (2000), in which the court held that, where

gang evidence is to be integral to the defendant’s trial, the trial court

must ask potential jurors during voir dire about any biases they may

have against gangs. The trial court dismissed the petition at the first

stage as untimely. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and

remanded the cause for second-stage proceedings. People v. Sanders,

No. 1–02–0880 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule

23). On remand, the trial court found the petition was not untimely or

barred by res judicata, based upon a 2002 appellate court decision,

People v. Gardner, 331 Ill. App. 3d 358 (2002), which found Strain

to be applicable on collateral review. Thus, the trial court denied the

State’s motion to dismiss on those grounds. The court advanced the

petition to third-stage proceedings to determine whether the gang

evidence at defendant’s trial was integral to the trial within the

meaning of Strain. The court reviewed transcripts from the trial and

heard oral argument. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss

on the basis that the gang evidence could not have been considered

integral to the trial. 

On appeal, the appellate court held that Strain announced a new

rule and thus could not be applied retroactively to defendant’s case.

The court rejected defendant’s reliance on Gardner, finding that,

although Strain was doctrinally consistent with prior law, it

represented a clear break in placing a “stringent limitation upon the

broad range of discretion traditionally afforded to the trial court.” 393

Ill. App. 3d at 166. The appellate court concluded that, becauseStrain

was not applicable to defendant’s case, his postconviction petition was

barred by res judicata. In addition, the appellate court noted that,

even if it agreed with the Gardner court’s analysis, it would find that

defendant’s petition was barred as untimely. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 167.
-5-

ANALYSIS

Defendant raises three arguments in this appeal: (1) this court’s

decision in Strain did not announce a new constitutional rule of

criminal procedure and therefore applies retroactively to defendant’s

case; (2) defendant’s postconviction petition is not barred by res

judicata and the late filing of his petition was not due to his culpable

negligence; and (3) under the holding of Strain, the gang evidence was

integral to defendant’s trial and the trial court’s failure to voir dire

potential jurors on the issue of gang bias thus deprived him of a fair

trial. 

Defendant argues that this court’s decision in Strain applies

retroactively to his case. 

A postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on a prior

conviction in which a defendant may challenge his conviction or

sentence on the basis that his substantial constitutional rights were

violated. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 71 (2008). Postconviction

claims are limited to those claims that were not and could not have

been previously adjudicated on direct appeal. People v. Johnson, 206

Ill. 2d 348, 356 (2002). Claims that were raised and decided on direct

appeal are barred by res judicata and those claims that could have

been raised, but were not, are considered waived. People v. Towns,

182 Ill. 2d 491, 502-03 (1998). Here, the trial court advanced

defendant’s petition to third-stage proceedings. However, the court

heard no new evidence; rather, the court reviewed the transcripts from

the trial and heard arguments of counsel. In addition, the judge who

presided over the postconviction hearing was not the same judge who

presided at defendant’s trial. Defendant argues, and the State does not

disagree, that the judge had no special expertise or familiarity with

defendant’s trial. In such circumstances, this court has applied a de

novo standard of review. See People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 88

(2002). In addition, this court applies a de novo standard of review as

to questions of law. In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 321 (2001). 

In Strain, the defendant was charged with murder. The State’s

theory was that the defendant, who was a member of the Black

Disciples street gang, shot the victim while attempting to take revenge

on a rival gang, the Gangster Disciples, for allegedly shooting the

defendant at an earlier time. During voir dire, the trial court asked

potential jurors if they, any member of their family, or close friend had
-6-

been involved in a gang. The court refused defense counsel’s request

to ask each prospective juror whether the juror would find the

defendant less believable if the juror learned that the defendant

belonged to a gang. During trial, gang members testified, a statement

made by defendant to the police concerning the gang-related motive

for the shooting was admitted into evidence, and defendant testified,

denying that he made the statement. The trial court allowed the State

to introduce evidence at trial of other gang-related crimes in an effort

to bolster the State’s theory regarding the motive for the murder. The

defendant was convicted. This court noted two matters of crucial

importance: (1) gang information permeated the testimony of almost

every witness at trial; and (2) the outcome of the trial turned upon the

credibility of the defendant, the testifying police officers, and members

of the Gangster Disciples. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 473.

This court noted that article I, section 13, of the Illinois

Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §13) guarantees a “right

of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed.” The court had previously

construed those words to mean the right to trial by jury as it existed

under the common law, which entails the right to have the facts

determined, under the supervision of a judge, by the unanimous

verdict of 12 impartial jurors who possess the qualifications and are

selected in the manner prescribed by law. The court observed that the

scope and extent of the voir dire examination is left to the discretion

of the trial court; however, that discretion must be exercised in a

manner consistent with the purpose of voir dire, which is to obtain

enough information about the beliefs and opinions of potential jurors

as would allow for the removal of those members of the venire whose

minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they cannot apply the

law as instructed by the trial court. A failure to permit pertinent

inquiries to reveal any such prejudices may constitute reversible error.

Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 476-77.

This court noted it had previously recognized that street gangs are

regarded with disfavor by other segments of society and that,

especially in metropolitan areas, there may be strong prejudice against

gangs. For this reason, this court has held that evidence of gang

membership or gang-related activity is admissible only where there is

sufficient proof that such membership or activity is related to the

crime charged. Strain stated that these same concerns dictated its
-7-

holding that “when testimony regarding gang membership and gangrelated activity is to be an integral part of the defendant’s trial, the

defendant must be afforded an opportunity to question the prospective

jurors, either directly or through questions submitted to the trial court,

concerning gang bias.” Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 477. 

The question before us is whether Strain announced a new

constitutional rule of criminal procedure. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), the United States

Supreme Court set forth standards for determining when a case

announces a new rule. The Court stated that a case announces a new

rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the

states or federal government. The result must not be “dictated by

precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became

final.” (Emphasis in original.) Teague, 489 U. S. at 301, 103 L. Ed. 2d

at 349, 109 S. Ct. at 1070. Generally, new rules are not to be applied

retroactively to cases on collateral review except in two instances: (1)

if the rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct

beyond the power of the criminal-law-making authority to proscribe;

or (2) if the rule requires the observance of those procedures that are

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The Court described rules

that come within the second exception as “watershed rules of criminal

procedure” and stated that they should be limited to those new

procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is

seriously diminished. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at

356, 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1076, 1077. 

The purpose of the Teague framework is to promote the

government’s interest in the finality of criminal convictions (Teague,

489 U.S. at 309, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 109 S. Ct. at 1074) and to

validate “reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents

made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to

later decisions” (Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 108 L. Ed.

2d 347, 356, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)). “ ‘Application of

constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became

final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to

the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the

criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.’ ” People v.

Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 239 (1990), quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at

309, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 109 S. Ct. at 1074. 
-8-

It is “often difficult” to determine whether a case announces a new

rule. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 349, 109 S. Ct. at

1070. This is particularly true where the new decision is reached by an

extension of the reasoning of prior cases. Butler, 494 U.S. at 412-13,

108 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 110 S. Ct. at 1216. “[T]he fact that a court says

that its decision is within the ‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision,

or indeed that it is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive

for purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’

under Teague.” Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 110 S.

Ct. at 1217. Rather, the task is to determine whether courts

considering the defendant’s claim at the time his or her conviction

became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent to

conclude that the rule *** was required by the Constitution.” Saffle

v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 424, 110 S. Ct. 1257,

1260 (1990); People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 360 (2010). This

court adopted the Teague retroactivity standards in Flowers, which

held that this court’s decision in People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184

(1988), constituted a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure

and was not applicable to postconviction proceedings. Flowers, 138

Ill. 2d at 240. 

Defendant argues that this court’s holding in Strain derives from

the constitutional principle that an accused has the right to an

impartial jury. He notes this court has previously stated in People v.

Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993), that the purpose of voir dire

is to ascertain sufficient information about the beliefs and attitudes of

prospective jurors to allow removal of those venire members whose

biases and prejudices would prevent them from applying the law as

instructed by the trial court. Defendant argues that Strain applied this

principle in light of the judicially recognized bias against gang

affiliation. Defendant also points to prior cases in which he says this

court and the appellate court recognized the potential for bias against

gangs among prospective jurors. Thus, defendant argues that Strain

was motivated by concerns regarding the prejudicial effect of gang

evidence and it relied on prior case law in reaching its holding. For

these reasons, Strain did not announce a new rule.

Defendant particularly emphasizes Strain’s statement, after citing

cases that had recognized the prejudice against gangs, that “[t]he same

concerns regarding the prejudicial effect of gang evidence dictate our
-9-

holding that, when testimony regarding gang membership and gangrelated activity is to be an integral part of the defendant’s trial,” the

trial court must question potential jurors about any bias against gangs.

(Emphasis added.) Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 477. 

Defendant notes that the appellate court in People v. Gardner,

331 Ill. App. 3d 358 (2002), held that Strain did not announce a new

rule. Gardner found that Strain had premised its holding on prior case

law concerning the purpose of voir dire, the procedures outlined in

Rule 431 (177 Ill. 2d R. 431), and constitutional safeguards. Gardner

also noted Strain’s citation of cases recognizing the possibility of

strong prejudice against gangs in large metropolitan areas. Gardner

found that Strain did not announce a new rule, given its reliance on

precedent and long-standing principles surrounding voir dire. Thus,

the Gardner court stated that the holding of Strain may be applied

retroactively to cases on collateral review. Gardner, 331 Ill. App. 3d

at 367.

The State argues that, although Strain may have been doctrinally

consistent with the rules regulating voir dire and with case law

regarding public disapproval of gang membership, Strain was the first

time this court had mandated gang-bias inquiry during voir dire based

upon, not just an abuse of discretion, but a denial of the constitutional

right to an impartial jury. The State argues this conclusion did not

necessarily follow from this court’s rules or existing case law. 

This court has long recognized that the scope and extent of voir

dire examination rests within the discretion of the trial court. People

v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 300 (1959); People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144,

176 (1999); People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1994). Although

Rule 431 requires the trial court to allow counsel to “supplement the

examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for a

reasonable period of time depending upon the length of the

examination by the court, the complexity of the case, and the nature

of the charges,” this court has held that the trial court retains

discretion to determine what direct questioning will be allowed, as

long as the court exercises its discretion in accordance with the

requirements of the rule. See People v. Garstecki, 234 Ill. 2d 430

(2009). Indeed, this court in Garstecki even noted that it was not

impossible to conceive of a case in which the trial court might

properly conclude, based upon the factors cited above, that no
-10-

attorney questioning should be permitted. Garstecki, 234 Ill. 2d at

444. 

Defendant cites several cases that he believes support his

contention that Strain did not announce a new rule. His reasoning is

that these cases recognized the disfavor in which street gangs are held

by the general public, directly leading, in his view, to this court’s

holding in Strain. 

In People v. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d 908 (1996), the defendant

was charged with murder. The shooting was gang-related and the

State focused on gang affiliation as the motive for the murder. The

defendant asked the trial court to question the individual members of

the venire on whether the fact that the defendant was a member of a

street gang would prevent them from giving him a fair trial. The trial

court refused the question. On appeal, the defendant argued that the

trial court committed reversible error by refusing to question the

venire on the subject of gang affiliation. The appellate court reversed

and remanded for a new trial. The court noted that the parties had

cited no case requiring the trial court to question prospective jurors

about biases against gang members. The court observed that in most

Illinois cases, the trial court had permitted such questions to be asked.

The court noted that gang membership is an area of potential bias due

to a widespread prejudice against street gangs. Because the trial court

failed to ask any questions concerning this bias, the defendant was

deprived of the opportunity to exercise his peremptory challenges in

an effective manner. Once the trial court decided to permit evidence

of the defendant’s gang affiliation, the trial court was under a “clear

duty” to insure that the jury selected was free from prejudice against

gangs. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 912. We note that Jimenez relied

on a California case for this holding, noting that the question was one

of first impression in Illinois. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 912. 

In People v. Pogue, 312 Ill. App. 3d 719 (1999), the defendant

was charged with shooting a member of a rival gang. The appellate

court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the trial

court had failed to question individual members of the venire

concerning the defendant’s right not to testify as required by People

v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984). Because the issue was likely to recur

on retrial, the appellate court also addressed the defendant’s

contention that the trial court erred by refusing to ask prospective
-11-

jurors whether the defendant’s gang affiliation would affect their

ability to be fair and impartial. Relying on Jimenez, the appellate court

held that the trial court should have questioned the venire concerning

gang bias. Specifically, the court noted that, while Jimenez does not

impose an affirmative duty on the trial court to make gang bias

inquiriessua sponte, “where an appropriate question is tendered prior

to voir dire, and the circumstances of the case are such that

fundamental fairness requires that the venire be probed on this issue,

the refusal to do so constitutes reversible error.” Pogue, 312 Ill. App.

3d at 727.

Defendant also cites People v. Cruz, 164 Ill. App. 3d 802 (1987).

There, the trial court allowed the State to show the jury a

documentary video concerning street gangs in an attempt to support

its effort to establish a gang-related motive for the shooting. The

victim claimed that he had been harassed by members of the

defendant’s gang to join the gang and that the shooting was part of an

attempt to recruit him. The appellate court found the admission of the

video to be highly inflammatory and prejudicial. The court noted that

in Chicago there was a “ ‘deep, bitter and widespread prejudice

against street gangs.’ ” Cruz, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 812, quoting People

v. Parrott, 40 Ill. App. 3d 328, 331 (1976). 

Defendant also cites People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990), a

capital case involving extensive evidence of gang-related activity. In

discussing this evidence and its relevance, this court noted that it has

been recognized that, particularly in metropolitan areas, there may be

strong prejudice against street gangs. 

We note that neither Cruz nor Smith involved any issue concerning

voir dire. Regarding Jimenez, the appellate court inPogue recognized

that Jimenez imposed no sua sponte duty on the trial court to question

the venire regarding gang bias. Rather, Pogue noted that the thrust of

Jimenez was that where gang-bias questions are submitted and

“fundamental fairness” so dictates, a trial court is required to question

potential jurors on gang bias. Pogue, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 727. This

amounts to no more than saying that a trial court abuses its discretion

in refusing to question the venire concerning gang bias in appropriate

cases. These cases cannot be said to lead inevitably to the holding of

Strain. 

This court has previously held that a new requirement mandating
-12-

certain questions during voir dire did not apply retroactively. In Zehr,

this court held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to ask

prospective jurors, upon the defendant’s request, whether they

understand and accept the following concepts: (1) the defendant is

presumed innocent until proven guilty; (2) the defendant is not

required to offer any evidence in his own behalf; (3) the defendant

must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the

defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be held against

him. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. In Zehr, the State argued that because

Supreme Court Rule 234 prohibited voir dire questions on matters of

law or instructions, the trial court properly refused to ask the

defendant’s questions. This court rejected that argument, noting that

the understanding of the four concepts was essential to the

qualification of jurors in a criminal case. If a juror has an objection to

any of these basic guarantees, the court opined, an instruction given

at the end of the trial will have little curative effect. The court

observed that each of the mandated inquiries goes to the heart of a

particular bias or prejudice that would deprive a defendant of the right

to a fair and impartial jury. The failure to ask such questions thus

results in prejudicial error. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477-78. 

Despite the importance of the questions mandated by Zehr, this

court held in People v. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d 314, 318-19 (1986), a preTeague case, that the holding of Zehr was to be given only

prospective effect because it represented a change in Illinois law. In

support of this holding, the court cited Rule 234’s prohibition of voir

dire questions that directly or indirectly concern matters of law or

instructions and noted that Zehr represented a departure from that

rule. Defendant here attempts to distinguish Britz by noting that while

Zehr was contrary to supreme court rules, Strain was in accord with

those rules. This claim is inaccurate. As previously noted, the conduct

of voir dire has historically been left to the trial court. Strain

represented a break from this precedent by removing the trial court’s

discretion where gang evidence will be integral to a defendant’s trial.

Rule 431 was adopted by this court to regulate voir dire examination

of prospective jurors. That rule gives the trial court the primary

discretion of conducting voir dire and for determining the extent and

scope thereof. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 475-76. The holding of Strain,

removing that discretion when gang evidence is to be integral to the
-13-

trial, was not consistent with that rule. 

In his argument that Strain did not announce a new rule, defendant

relies heavily on Strain’s recognition of the disfavor in which gangs

are held by the general public and its citation of prior cases that had

commented on this fact. However, it does not necessarily follow from

this that Strain was a mere extension of this prior precedent. And even

if Strain is viewed as an extension of prior precedent, this fact alone

would not be enough to find that Strain did not announce a new rule.

As we noted earlier, “the fact that a court says that its decision is

within the ‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is

‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of

deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”

Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.

Rather, the key to the determination of whether a new rule was

announced is whether courts considering the defendant’s claim at the

time his or her conviction became final “would have felt compelled by

existing precedent to conclude that the rule *** was required by the

Constitution.” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415,

424, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990); People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at

360. 

Defendant has cited no case predating Strain that came to the

conclusion that mandated questioning of the venire was required by

the Constitution. The case that comes closest to doing so, Jimenez,

relied on a California case for its holding. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d at

912-13. The fact is that, prior to Strain, as the State notes, there were

very few subjects concerning which trial courts were required to

question potential jurors. Some of those subjects included the Zehr

factors (Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472); views concerning the defense of

insanity (People v. Stack, 112 Ill. 2d 301 (1986)); racial bias in certain

cases (People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39 (1998)); abortion (People v.

Murawski, 2 Ill. 2d 143 (1954)); dram shop and temperance (Lavin v.

People, 69 Ill. 303 (1873); Schneider v. Kirk, 83 Ill. App. 2d 170

(1967)); and life-qualifying questions in capital cases (People v. Buss,

187 Ill. 2d 144 (1999)). Instead, as we have noted, the scope of voir

dire was committed in the vast majority of cases to the sound

discretion of the trial court. For these reasons, at the time defendant’s

conviction became final, no court would have felt compelled by

existing precedent to conclude that the rule announced in Strain was
-14-

required by the Constitution. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that

Strain announced a new rule. 

Defendant, however, analogizes Strain to this court’s decision in

People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421 (1997). There, the issue was whether

the decision in People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995), applied

retroactively to the defendant’s case. Kilpatrick held that section

5–8–1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) prohibits a trial

court from imposing a longer sentence on reconsideration, even if the

aggregate period of imprisonment remains the same. Kilpatrick, 167

Ill. 2d at 446-47. The defendant in Moore had been given consecutive

sentences. The appellate court vacated the sentences as improper and

remanded for resentencing. The trial court resentenced the defendant

to concurrent terms of imprisonment that equaled the combined length

of his prior consecutive sentences. The defendant filed a

postconviction petition challenging the sentences. This court held that

Kilpatrick did not announce a new rule and was therefore applicable

to cases on collateral review. In doing so, the court noted that a case

does not announce a new rule if “ ‘ “ ‘it has simply applied a wellestablished constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely

analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior

case law.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 431, quoting Penry

v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 274, 109 S. Ct.

2934, 2944 (1989). Moore concluded that a decision does not

announce a new rule if it merely applies existing precedent to an

analogous set of facts. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 431. The court noted that

Kilpatrick had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072

(1969), which stated that due process may prohibit a judge from

imposing a more severe sentence where a defendant has been

convicted after a retrial in the absence of objective evidence of

identifiable misconduct occurring after the time of the original

sentencing. Section 5–8–1 of the Code was consistent with Pearce.

Moore noted that this court followed Pearce in People v. Baze, 43 Ill.

2d 298 (1969). Moore noted further that the legislature had

incorporated the Pearce and Baze decisions into section 5–5–4 of the

Code (applicable in Moore), which prohibits a more severe sentence

from being imposed on resentencing unless it is based on a defendant’s

conduct occurring subsequent to the original sentencing. Thus, Moore
-15-

concluded that this had been the rule in Illinois for over 20 years.

Kilpatrick merely applied this precedent to the facts of that case. As

such, the rule enunciated in Kilpatrick was predicated on well-settled

principles of law. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 432-33. 

Moore is distinguishable from Strain. The holding of Kilpatrick

was a mere extension of existing law. It was already well settled in

Illinois that due process prohibited a judge from increasing a sentence

upon resentencing unless justified by a defendant’s conduct occurring

after the original sentencing. In addition, the Illinois legislature had

enacted section 5–5–4 of the Code, incorporating Pearce and Baze.

Kilpatrick merely applied the then-existing precedent and statutory

law to the set of facts in that case. Strain, on the other hand, was a

clear break from precedent. Nothing in the case law foretold the

holding in Strain. Comments made by the dissenting justices in Strain

confirm this fact. Justice Heiple noted in his dissent that this court had

consistently held that potential jurors may not be asked about

anticipated responses to specific items of evidence. Calling Strain’s

holding “revolutionary,” he worried that the court was setting a

troubling precedent which would result in future litigants requesting

voir dire on any potential bias merely by showing that the evidence on

a particular subject will play a major role in the trial and that segments

of our society view the subject with considerable disfavor. He

expressed concern that such mandated questioning of the venire

would be counterproductive and might corrupt a jury by prematurely

exposing potential jurors to evidence. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 483-84

(Heiple, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic, J.). 

Defendant, however, maintains that there is a difference between

a new rule and a “change” in the law and that Strain represents the

latter, thus allowing him to avoid the bar of res judicata. In making

this argument, defendant relies primarily on Moore and Kilpatrick.

Although he agrees that Kilpatrick applied existing precedent and

statutory law to the facts of that case, he argues that it nonetheless

changed the law, allowing for retroactive application. Defendant

points to the fact that the trial court and the appellate court in

Kilpatrick had rejected Kilpatrick’s claim. Defendant also notes that,

prior to this court’s Kilpatrick decision, the appellate court in People

v. Todd, 263 Ill. App. 3d 435 (1994), reached a contrary conclusion

to that reached by this court in Kilpatrick. Defendant further asserts
-16-

that because no lower court would reach this contrary conclusion

subsequent to this court’s Kilpatrick decision, Kilpatrick’s

“clarification of what the law required represented a change from the

previous state of affairs.” 

We disagree with defendant’s argument. This court in Moore

stated that the appellate court’s decision in Todd was not a reasonable

application of existing precedent and that it conflicted with Pearce and

with the plain language of sections 5–8–1 and 5–5–4 of the Code.

Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 435-36. Further, that post-Kilpatrick decisions

of the appellate court would not reach the contrary position of Todd

merely reflects the fact that Kilpatrick, as a decision of this court, is

binding on all lower courts. See People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 164

(2009). 

We therefore conclude that this court’s decision in Strain

announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure. Under

Teague, a new rule may not be applied retroactively except in two

limited circumstances: (1) if the new rule places certain kinds of

primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminallaw-making authority to proscribe; or (2) if the rule is a watershed rule

of criminal procedure, requiring the observance of those procedures

that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Teague, 489 U.S.

at 311, 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1076, 1077. The

first exception is obviously not applicable. As to the second exception,

we note the Supreme Court stated in Teague that it should be limited

to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate

conviction is seriously diminished. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 103 L.

Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077. At oral argument in this case,

counsel for defendant candidly acknowledged that neither exception

applies to Strain and we agree. Thus, the holding of Strain is not

retroactive and does not apply to cases on collateral review.

Because Strain announced a new rule and is not to be applied

retroactively to collateral proceedings, defendant’s postconviction

petition is barred by res judicata. A postconviction proceeding

permits review of constitutional issues that were not and could not

have been adjudicated on direct appeal. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205

Ill. 2d 444, 455-56 (2002). Thus, issues that were decided on direct

appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata.

People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). Here, absent the
-17-

applicability of Strain, the claim raised by defendant in his

postconviction petition is the same one raised and decided in his direct

appeal. Thus, res judicata bars defendant’s petition. Due to our

disposition of this case, we need not address the remainder of

defendant’s arguments. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we hold that this court’s decision in Strain

announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure and that

neither of the Teague exceptions to nonretroactivity apply. Therefore,

the holding of Strain does not apply retroactively to cases on

collateral review. Defendant’s postconviction petition is thus barred

byres judicata. In addition, we overrule the appellate court’s decision

in People v. Gardner, 331 Ill. App. 3d 358 (2002), to the extent that

case is inconsistent with our holding today. 

The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:

In its opinion, the majority concludes that our prior decision in

People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467 (2000), announced a new

constitutional rule of criminal procedure and, therefore, may not be

applied retroactively. Although I have no quarrel with the majority’s

holding on this issue, I believe my colleagues have erred by not first

addressing a threshold, procedural question: whether Sanders’

postconviction petition was timely filed. The appellate court, using an

incorrect standard, determined that Sanders’ petition was untimely.

Normally, such a holding ends the case, as the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2000)) forbids

any proceedings filed beyond the time periods it sets forth. However,

the appellate court nevertheless reached the merits of the substantive

issue. In their opinion, my colleagues do not address this threshold

procedural issue, analyzing only Sanders’ substantive claim. By doing

so, this court creates confusion for the bench and bar in several
-18-

respects: not only does the court call into question the proper

analytical sequence used to review such claims, the court also leaves

standing a published appellate court opinion that applies an incorrect

standard to assess the timeliness of Sanders’ petition. Because today’s

opinion leaves these matters unaddressed, I am compelled to write

separately.

Section 122–1(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1(c) (West 2000))

sets forth the specific time period within which a petitioner shall

initiate a postconviction proceeding. At the time defendant filed his

petition, the Act provided:

“No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced

more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to

appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or

more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in

the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court

(or more than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the

defendant’s brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is

filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is

sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the

delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 

Thus, the General Assembly has not only established a clear

framework within the Act for assessing the timeliness of a

postconviction petition, but also has specified the test to be used to

excuse a petitioner’s noncompliance with these requirements: a

petition filed outside the delineated time period is considered untimely

unless “the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due

to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122–1(c) (West 2000);

see also People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 420 (2003); People v.

Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002).

The appellate court, despite acknowledging that the clear language

of section 122–1(c) mandates the use of the culpable negligence

standard to assess the timeliness of Sanders’ initial postconviction

petition, instead applied the cause-and-prejudice standard set forth in

Pitsonbarger which is used to determine the timeliness of successive
 

1Section 122–1(f) was added to the Act in 2004, and codified the holding

of Pitsonbarger. By its plain language, section 122–1(f) applies only to

successive postconviction petitions, and provides that a successive petition

may be filed only upon leave of court where “a petitioner demonstrates cause

for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction

proceedings and prejudice results from that failure.” 725 ILCS 5/122–1(f)

(West 2004). 

-19-

postconvicition petitions.1 In applying this heightened standard, the

appellate panel reasoned that where a “defendant seeks in the first

instance to file an untimely postconviction petition because of a

change in the law that occurred after the filing deadline had passed,”

this is “analogous to the situation in which a defendant has already

filed an unsuccessful postconviction petition, but seeks to file a

successive postconviction petition because of a change in the law that

occurred after the rejection of his first petition.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at

171-72. This reasoning is without support and in error.

As this is the first postconviction petition filed by Sanders, both

the Act and our case law make it clear that challenges to timeliness

must be evaluated under the culpable negligence standard and not the

more stringent cause-and-prejudice test. The appellate court ignored

the distinction between initial and successive postconviction petitions,

which mandates that each type of petition be evaluated under different

analytical frameworks. In addition, the appellate panel’s holding runs

counter not only to our long-held view that the Act in general must be

“ ‘liberally construed to afford a convicted person an opportunity to

present questions of deprivation of constitutional rights’ ” (Rissley,

206 Ill. 2d at 421, quoting People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 546

(1985)), but also that the specific exception contained in section

122–1(c) allowing a petitioner to file an otherwise-untimely petition

operates as a “ ‘special “safety valve” ’ in the Act.” Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d

at 420, quoting People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (1988). 

In light of the above, I cannot understand why my colleagues do

not address this threshold issue and clarify that the appellate court

used the wrong standard. The majority’s silence on this issue is even

more disturbing in light of the concession made by the State in its brief

to this court that the appellate court’s holding with respect to

timeliness does “not find support in the Act,” and that the applicable
-20-

timeliness standard in this appeal is one of culpable negligence.

Further, during oral argument, several members of this court

repeatedly questioned the parties concerning the timeliness issue and

the manner in which it was handled by the appellate panel. Counsel for

both the State and petitioner agreed that the culpable negligence

standard applies in this case, and that the appellate court erred in

employing the cause-and-prejudice test.

It is my view that when the correct standard is applied to Sanders’

postconviction petition, the delay in filing was not due to his culpable

negligence. This court has defined culpable negligence as “ ‘something

greater than ordinary negligence’ ” and “ ‘akin to recklessness.’ ”

Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 420, quoting People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89,

108 (2002). Sanders had argued on direct appeal that the circuit

court’s voir dire was deficient and denied him his constitutional right

to a fair and impartial jury by failing to question the jury regarding

potential gang bias. See 393 Ill. App. 3d at 160. Because this

argument was rejected on direct appeal, Sanders was barred by res

judicata from re-raising it in a postconviction petition. People v.

Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). As my colleagues hold today,

this court’s decision in Strain announced a new constitutional rule of

criminal procedure which impacted defendant’s ability to once again

raise this issue in postconviction proceedings. Thus, it was only after

Strain was decided that Sanders was able to resurrect the issue of

inadequate voir dire without being barred by res judicata. 

Here, Sanders’ petition for leave to appeal to this court with

respect to his direct appeal was denied on April 2, 1997 (People v.

Sanders, 172 Ill. 2d 563 (1997)), and the six-month statutory

postconviction period following that date expired on October 2, 1997.

Since he was sentenced on May 4, 1994, the three-year period

following that date expired on May 4, 1997. Therefore, under the

applicable version of section 122–1(c), Sanders’ postconviction

petition was due on May 4, 1997, the earlier of the two dates. We

decided Strain on November 16, 2000, and Sanders filed the instant

postconviction petition exactly one year later, on November 16, 2001.

Under these facts, I conclude that Sanders’ delay in filing was not due

to his culpable negligence, as he reasonably pursued the voir dire issue

again after the new rule in Strain was announced. I note that the Act

does not specify an additional time period, after the expiration of the
-21-

normal filing period, during which a petitioner may be found culpably

negligent in filing a postconviction petition based upon a change in the

law. In addition, our case law has not squarely addressed this issue.

We have, however, traditionally relied upon federal case law in

interpreting and applying the Act. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 12

(2009). In Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357, 162 L. Ed. 2d

343, 349, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2481-82 (2005), the Supreme Court held

that 28 U.S.C. 2255, ¶6(3) establishes that a federal prisoner may file

a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence within one year

from the date on which the right he asserts was newly recognized by

the Court. Relying upon Dodd, there is no question that, at a

minimum, Sanders’ petition filed one year after Strain was decided

was not untimely. 

Accordingly, after having survived this threshold procedural

inquiry, it only then becomes appropriate to examine the substantive

issue of whether Strain applied retroactively to Sanders’ case. As

stated, I am in agreement with my colleagues’ holding that Strain

represents a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure that is not

to be retroactively applied.

JUSTICE BURKE joins in this special concurrence.