alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Tatyana Oxman, Appellant, v Mountain Lake Camp Resort Inc. et al., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Ulster Heights Lake, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

[963 NYS2d 262]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Martin Shulman, J.), entered May 6, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from, upon renewal, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied plaintiffs motion for recusal, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In support of their motion for renewal, defendants submitted third-party defendant Ulster Heights Lake, Inc.’s answer to the *654third-party complaint, in which the lakefront homeowner’s association admitted that it owned the beach property where plaintiff fell and was injured. This new fact was not offered on the prior motion because Ulster Heights did not serve its answer until after the court’s prior determination was issued *(see*CPLR 2221 [e]).

The fact that Ulster Heights, and not defendants, owned the beach, coupled with the testimony of defendant Parzoch, the owner of defendant Mountain Lake Camp Resort Inc., that Ulster Heights managed the lake and controlled access to it, that he did not maintain, manage or inspect the beach, that he had no obligation to do so, and that Mountain Lake never told its guests that it maintained the beach, establishes prima facie that defendants had no duty to plaintiff to maintain the beach *(see Lopez v Allied Amusement Shows, Inc.,*83 AD3d *519*[1st Dept 2011]). In any event, there is no evidence that defendants created the condition complained of or had notice of it, and no evidence, contrary to plaintiffs contention, that the condition resulted from any negligence on their part in maintaining the beach gratuitously *(see Darby v Compagnie Natl. Air France,*96 NY2d 343 [2001]; *Garner v City of New York,*6 AD3d 387 [2d Dept 2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 609 [2004]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue whether defendants either owned or had a possessory interest in the beach, or had assumed a formal obligation to maintain it, or made special use of it *(see Poirier v City of Schenectady,*85 NY2d 310, 314-315 [1995]).

Nothing in the record suggests that the motion court’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” *(see*22 NYCRR 100.3 [E] [1]). Plaintiff did not move for recusal until after the court had ruled against her *(see Glatzer v Bear, Steams & Co., Inc.,*95 AD3d 707 [1st Dept 2012]), and the ruling reflects no bias against her *(see Matter of Anderson v Harris,*73 AD3d 456, 458 [1st Dept 2010]). We reject plaintiffs complaints about the courts actions.

Concur—Andrias, J.R, Saxe, DeGrasse, Richter and Gische, JJ.
#### Ples BELL, et al, Plaintiffs Ples Bell; Woodrow Wiley, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. TENSAS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD; et al, Defendants Tensas Parish School Board, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05-30428.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 13, 2006.

Louis Granderson Scott, Monroe, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Hammonds & Sills, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendantr-Appellee.

Before REAVLEY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Pies Bell and Woodrow Wiley filed this school racial discrimination lawsuit in 1975. In March 2005, a related case originally filed in 1969, *United States v. Tensas Parish,*was dismissed with prejudice upon a finding that the school district had reached unitary status. After this dismissal, Bell and Wiley filed a motion for enforcement of judgment, injunctive relief, and contempt of court-all of which looked to the jurisdiction and oversight of the federal court in the 1969 suit. Their motion was denied as moot in light of the earlier order of dismissal in *United States v. Tensas Parish.*For the following reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot and without jurisdiction.

1. A case may become moot if 1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and 2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects the alleged violation. *County of Los Angeles v. Davis,*440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). The district court’s finding of unitary status in *United States v. Tensas Parish*also impinges on the facts at issue in *Bell, at al v. Tensas Parish.*

*2. Davis’*first element is satisfied because the population of Tensas Parish, as well as the organization of the school district serving it and the conduct of the school board, are far different from that which existed in the 1970’s. For this reason, there is no reasonable expectation that segregation will be reimposed. *Davis’*second element is satisfied because, under the finding and judgment of the court, the 36-year duration of *327the integration order has spanned several generations of school children in the parish, eradicating the effects of past segregation to the extent practicable.

3. Insofar as the appeal seeks by filing this brief to contest or appeal the order of March 2005, it comes too late to confer jurisdiction on this court.

DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.6

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


In connection with the Quarterly Report of 3Si Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Dated: November 14, 2002               By: /s/ Jerome K. Thorson
                                          -------------------------------------
                                          Jerome K. Thorson, President, Chief
                                          Executive Officer and Director
OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMPWAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

STATE OF TEXAS jjL* ,. |§g§i|$^ 0.

PENALTY FOR ^ ^; g ' ~ PRIVATE USE #i >

'^-•W^,.^

ZIP 78701

02 W

0001401623 JUN 17. 2015

I "

$ 000.275

6/10/2015

PROPER, JOEY SHANE WR-35,475-18

On this day, the original applicatioh'«fqrwrit.of rpandamus has been received and

presented to the Court.

ME6H3B 75202

*s*a&&'

JOEY SHANE PROPER

ATO

NOT IN DALLAS COUNTY JAI

Abel Acosta, Clerk

UT.F
10774.

#### McFarland *v.*McFarland.

Decided February 15, 1921.

Complaint; from Brooks superior court — Judge Thomas. June 7, 1919.

*W. M. Henry, John E. Morris Jr.,-*for plaintiff in error.

*B. M. W. Glenn, Branch & Snow,*contra.

Per Curiam.

This court having affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this case (24 *Ga. App.*621, 102 S. E. 37), and the Supreme Court, on certiorari,'having reversed the judgment of this court (151 *Ga.*9, 105 S. E. 596), the judgment of affirmance originally rendered by this court must be vacated and the judgment of the trial court reversed.

*Judgment reversed.*

*JenMns, P. J., Stephens and Hill, JJ., concur.*
exhibitc2summaryseveranc







Per the terms of the Company’s plans and award agreements, the following payments will be made to Mr.   Humenik subject to the Plan terms:1   Summary – Severance Payments: Del Humenik   Severance Element Brief Description    Value   ($000)   Timing   Cash Severance   1.5 X Base Salary   and 1.5X Bonus   $1,665   Payable at separation pending the Company’s   receipt of the Release Agreement (Cash   Severance payable 60 days following   separation), and    at the same time as all other participants with   regards to the pro rata STI payment.   2015 Pro Rata Bonus (STI)   Pro Rata STI    (est @ 75% payout & term date 5/5/15)   $134   Benefit Continuation (Health) /   COBRA Supplement 2,4   18 months $23    Life Insurance3 18 months $2   Outplacement Services3 1 year $7   Stock Options5   101,586 total options; 36,800 vested   & exercisable; 64,786 potential   cancel   Expire/cancel unvested and   unexercisable options under NQSO   Agreement    --   Upon Term Effective date      options already vested on effective date of term   will be exercisable for 90 days   2013 & 2014 Restricted Stock   Awards (34,400 RSAs)   Forfeit under provisions of RSA   Agreement Section 3(a) & 3(d)   $0 Upon Term effective date   2014 Cash LTIP Award   Forfeiture of  2014 Performance Award   under the Cash LTI Plan Section 4.5   $0 Upon Term effective date   2014 VCP Award (20,000 units) 6   VCP Units Vest and are Payable Based   on VCP value as of May 5th   $0   If a positive value, payable at separation pending   the Company’s receipt of the Release Agreement   (if any payable due, then  six (6) months following   separation)   Total: $1,831   1     





 







Footnotes:   Summary – Severance Payments: Del Humenik   1. Any unpaid items due to Mr. Humenik at the time of his separation will be paid at the time of separation. These items include i)   unreimbursed business expenses, ii) unpaid base salary or perquisites, and iii) payment for unused vacation at the time of separation       (est $23,520.75 as of 05-5-2015).    2. Mr. Humenik will receive benefits under Company-sponsored pension plans (will provide to the Board separately / does not require Board   consideration or approval). These items will be paid out under, and in accordance with the terms of, their respective plans and award   agreements, as appropriate.   3. The values of certain benefits are estimated for CBC review; the actual costs and payments will be determined in accordance with the   Company’s benefits plans at the time they are actually paid.   4. No change to policy – updated estimate only.   5. Option Details:                     6. VCP value as of March 31, 2015      Grant Date   Exercise / Strike   Price   Options BS   FMV   Options Total   5/5/2015   Options Vested &   Exercisable   Options   Unexercisable   9/5/2013  $         10.25   $     5.57               61,100           30,550                 30,550    5/28/2014  $           9.99   $     5.52               25,000              6,250                 18,750    12/15/2014  $           9.18   $     5.03               15,486                     -                   15,486    2
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

      ( print page 77016)    
Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         Center for Inherited Disease Research Access Committee.                    

*Date:*                         January 16, 2015.                    

*Time:*                         11:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                     

*Place:*                         National Institutes of Health, 5635 Fishers Lane, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Telephone Conference Call).                     

*Contact Person:*                         Camilla E. Day, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer CIDR, National Human Genome Research Institute National Institutes of Health, 5635 Fishers Lane, Suite 4075, Bethesda, MD 20892, 31-402-8837,                         *camilla.day@nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.172, Human Genome Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: December 17, 2014.

David Clary, 

Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2014-30008 Filed 12-22-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
#### Siraj SHEIKH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James A. GEISLER, Defendant-Appellant, and James F. O’Connor; Invest in America, L.P.; Interbank Corporate Services, Incorporated; Dominion Industries, L.L.C.; Market Makers, L.L.C.; Ilene Marie Harrison; John L. Criner, II; Steven R. Maimon; Interbank Immigration Services, Incorporated; Atlantic Forex, Limited; Intellinet Corporate Services, Incorporated, Defendants.

No. 00-2498.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 24, 2001.

Decided June 1, 2001.

James A. Geisler, pro se. David Alan Hirsch, Van Gils & Hirsch, P.C., Fairfax, VA, for appellee.

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

James A. Geisler appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 and entering judgment for the Plaintiff following a jury trial in this civil action. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Geisler’s motion for a new trial. *Chesapeake Paper Products Co. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.,*51 F.3d 1229, 1237. We decline to review Geisler’s claims challenging the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss. *Id.*at 1234-37. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1996 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Health 

and Human Services, National Institutes of Health John E. Fogarty 

International Center for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health John E. Fogarty International Center 

for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1996 IH

1 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

2 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV3 ICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 

4 JOHN E. FOGARTY INTERNATIONAL CENTER 

5 FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail8 able for Department of Health and Human Services, Na9 tional Institutes of Health John E. Fogarty International 

10 Center for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $78,109,000. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Kevin P. Gallagher, Respondent, v City of New York et al., Appellants.

[826 NYS2d 725]

In a proceeding pursuant to CELR article 78 to review a determination of the Commissioner of the Fire Department of the City of New York which terminated the petitioner’s employment as a New York City Firefighter, the appeal is from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schneier, J.), dated August 2, 2005, as, upon reargument, granted that branch of the petition which was for a name-clearing hearing, which had previously been denied in an order of the same court dated December 2, 2004.

*859Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and upon reargument, the determination in the order dated December 2, 2004 denying that branch of the petition is adhered to.

The parties’ stipulation of settlement with respect to previous disciplinary charges provided that the petitioner, in exchange for having the charges against him dropped, would be subject to random testing for controlled substances and that a finding of a controlled substance in his blood or urine would result in termination “without a hearing of any kind.” Accordingly, the petitioner knowingly waived his right to a name-clearing hearing to challenge the results of the random drug test *(see e.g. Matter of Brothers v Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr. of N.Y. State Off. of Mental Health,*131 AD2d 756 [1987]; *Matter of Nedd v Koehler,*159 AD2d 344 [1990]; *Montiel v Kiley,*147 AD2d 402 [1989]). Schmidt, J.P., Santueci, Krausman and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### Kent-Costikyan Trading Company, Inc., Respondent, *v.*American Railway Express Company, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

February 27, 1925.

Carriers — action for breakage of goods in transit — vendor may sue carrier where contract of sale is not complete under Statute of Frauds.

A vendor may sue a carrier for damages caused by the breakage of goods in transit where there was no memorandum executed to comply with the Statute of Frauds and to complete the contract of sale between the vendor and its vendee, since, under such circumstances, title to the goods does not pass to the vendee but, as a matter of course, remains in the vendor.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York, Borough of Manhattan, First District, in favor of plaintiff, after trial by the court without a jury.

*Charles C. Evans [Emmet L. Holbrook*of counsel], for the appellant.

*Levy & Becker [Joseph Levy*of counsel], for the respondent.

Per Curiam:

Plaintiff sues for damages caused by the breakage of a lamp in transit. The lamp was ordered by three ladies to be delivered by express to a fourth as a gift. The defense is that the title passed from the plaintiff either to the purchasers or to the donee and *511that, therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover. Several questions are raised, but need not be determined because one issue must dispose of this appeal There was no memorandum executed to comply with the Statute of Frauds. Under these circumstances the title does not pass to the vendee and the carrier may assert this defense against the vendee. *(Fein*v. *Weir,*129 App. Div. 299, 300; *Krulder*v. *Ellison,*47 N. Y. 36; *O’ Neill*v. *New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co.,*60 id. 138.) It follows as a matter of course that the title must remain in the vendor. While it is true that these cases were decided under the old form of statute making the contract void, the old statute was uniformly construed as the equivalent of the new statute to the effect that the contract “ shall not be enforceable by action.” (40 McKinney’s Consol. Laws, p. 123, and cases there cited.)

The judgment is, therefore, affirmed, with twenty-five" dollars costs.

All concur; present, Guy, McCook and Proskauer, JJ.
Exhibit 32(f)
 CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 FOR PPL ELECTRIC UTILITIES CORPORATION'S 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2010
 
 In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Covered Report"), I, the principal financial officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certify that:
 
 ·
The Covered Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and·
The information contained in the Covered Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 Date:  August 5, 2010
/s/  Vincent SorgiVincent Sorgi

Vice President and Controller

PPL Electric Utilities Corporation
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
11681.

#### Whitten, *alias*Crosby, *v.*Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah.

Luke, J.

1. Where it is recited in a bill of exceptions in a criminal case that it is tendered “ within the time allowed by law,” and there is nothing in the bill of exceptions or the entries thereon, or in the record, tending to show that perhaps, as a matter of fact, the bill of exceptions was not so tendered, except that it was signed by the judge more than 20 days after the date of the judgment excepted to, the writ of error will not be dismissed on the ground that the bill of exceptions was not tendered and signed -within 20 days from the date of the judgment excepted to. Under such circumstances it will be presumed that the - bill of exceptions was tendered within 20 days from the date *378of the judgment and that the judge held the papers, through no fault of the plaintiff in error or his counsel, until the date of the certificate. See in this connection, *Pennington*v. *Sparta,*15 *Ga. App.*287 (82 S. E. 826) ; *Strickland*v. *Brannen,*18 *Ga. App.*325 (89 S. E. 377) ; *Cole*v. *Western Union Telegraph Co.,*23 *Ga. App.*479 (98 S. E. 407) ; *Hammond*v. *Hammond,*135 *Ga.*768(3) (70 S. E. 588); *Jones*v. State, 146 *Ga.*8 (90 S. E. 280).

Decided March 8, 1921.

Certiorari; from Chatham superior court — Judge Meldrim. May 18, 1920.

*Robert L. Golding,*for plaintiff in error.

*Shelby Myricle, Edwin A. Cohen,*contra.

2. Disorderly conduct, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Savannah, was the charge against the defendant. The evidence authorized the recorder, who tried her, to find that at night, at her home, she cursed police officers who had called her to her door to make inquiry of her about matters in their line of duty. She not only cursed them, but slammed the door of her house and ordered them away. It was not error for the judge of the superior court to overrule the certiorari.

*Judgment affU-med.*

*Broyles, O. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*