NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2940-15T3

CYNTHIA M. BLAKE,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

and LAUREL HEALTHCARE,

LLC,

Respondents.

_______________________________________________

Submitted June 6, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Messano, Suter and Grall.

On appeal from the Board of Review, 

Department of Labor, Docket No. 068,871.

South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys 

for appellant (Alan W. Lesso, on the 

briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent Board of Review, 

Department of Labor (Melissa Dutton 

Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Lauren J. Zarrillo, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

Respondent Laurel Healthcare, LLC has not 

filed a brief.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MESSANO, P.J.A.D.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

September 28, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION

September 28, 2017
2 A-2940-15T3

Nearly six decades ago, the Legislature amended New 

Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law (the UCL), N.J.S.A.

43:21-1 to -56, disqualifying applicants from receiving 

unemployment benefits if they "left work voluntarily without 

good cause attributable to such work." Yardville Supply Co. v. 

Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 374 (1989) (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:21-

5(a)). "Accordingly, benefits are available to a worker who 

voluntarily leaves his job only if it [was] for 'good cause 

attributable to [the] work.'" Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J.

534, 544 (2008) (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)). A worker who 

leaves "for personal reasons, however compelling, . . . is 

disqualified under the statute." Ibid.; see also Ardan v. Bd. 

of Review, 444 N.J. Super. 576, 585 (App. Div. 2016) ("An 

employee who leaves work for good, but personal, reasons is not 

deemed to have left work voluntarily with good cause."), certif. 

granted, 229 N.J. 135 (2017).

The disqualification extends from the week the employee 

leaves work, "and for each week thereafter until [she] becomes 

reemployed . . . works eight weeks . . . and has earned . . . at 

least ten times [her] weekly benefit rate." N.J.S.A. 43:21-

5(a). The current disqualification period represents an 

extension, from four to eight weeks and from six to ten times 

the benefit rate, which enactment coincided with changes to 
3 A-2940-15T3

other provisions of the UCL intended to "reduce[] unemployment 

insurance (UI) tax rates" imposed on employers. L. 2010, c. 37, 

§ 2; Senate Labor Comm., Statement to S. 1813 (May 10, 2010).

This appeal requires us to construe the following language 

added to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) in 2015, which provides the 

disqualification 

shall not apply to an individual who 

voluntarily leaves work with one employer to 

accept from another employer employment 

which commences not more than seven days 

after the individual leaves employment with 

the first employer, if the employment with 

the second employer has weekly hours or pay 

not less than the hours or pay of the 

employment of the first employer, except 

that if the individual gives notice to the 

first employer that the individual will 

leave employment on a specified date and the 

first employer terminates the individual 

before that date, the seven-day period will 

commence from the specified date.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), as amended by L. 2015, 

c. 41 § 1 (emphasis added).]

In this case, Cynthia M. Blake provided her employer, 

Laurel Healthcare LLC (Laurel), with two weeks' notice that she 

was leaving her position to begin working for Alaris Healthcare 

(Alaris) at an increased hourly wage. Two days before she was 

to start, Alaris told Blake the position was no longer 

available. When Blake tried to rescind her resignation, Laurel 

informed her it no longer required her in a full-time capacity. 

The Deputy denied Blake's application for unemployment benefits 
4 A-2940-15T3

because she left work voluntarily without good cause 

attributable to the work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).1

The Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's decision, reasoning the 

Amendment's exception applied only if Blake actually commenced 

her employment with Alaris. In its final decision, the Board of 

Review (the Board) agreed with the Tribunal's reasoning and 

affirmed Blake's disqualification. This appeal followed.

Blake argues the plain language of the Amendment does not 

impose "a commencement requirement."2 She contends the 

Legislature intended "to protect a worker against a situation 

where . . . she leaves one job for a better job which 

subsequently falls through." The Board counters that the 

Amendment's plain language required Blake to commence work with 

Alaris in order for the exception to apply. It further contends 

 

1 At the time of the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal (the 

Tribunal), Blake continued to work for Laurel in a part-time 

capacity, had not found full-time employment and had not yet 

worked eight weeks earning the minimum of ten times her weekly 

benefit rate of $325 which would otherwise requalify her for 

unemployment benefits. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).

2 The Tribunal cited N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(9) as supporting its 

conclusion. That regulation provides: "An individual's 

separation from employment shall be reviewed as a voluntarily 

leaving work issue where the separation was for the following 

reasons including . . . [t]o accept other work." We agree with 

Blake that the Tribunal inexplicably engrafted language on the 

regulation that does not exist. The Board concedes this point.
5 A-2940-15T3

the legislative history of the Amendment supports that 

interpretation.

In a recent opinion, a panel of our colleagues essentially 

accepted Blake's interpretation of the Amendment and rejected 

the Board's. See McClain v. Bd. of Review, ___ N.J. Super. ___, 

___ (App. Div. 2017) (slip op. at 2) ("We reject the Board's 

interpretation and reverse, finding a claimant need not actually 

start the new employment to be exempt from disqualification 

under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)."). We respectfully disagree with our 

colleagues and conclude the Amendment's exception does not apply 

unless the employee accepts employment with another employer 

"which commences not more than seven days after the individual 

leaves employment with the first employer." N.J.S.A. 43:21-

5(a). We therefore affirm the Board's decision.

We need not reiterate the applicable standards that guide 

our review, which the panel capably explained in McClain. 

McClain, supra, slip op. at 5-6. Our colleagues determined 

"nothing in the plain language of the [A]mendment support[ed] 

the imposition of . . . a condition" that "[the] claimant 

actually commence the new employment within the seven-day 

period." Id. at 10. We disagree. In our view, the plain 

language of the Amendment fully supports the Board's position.
6 A-2940-15T3

The acceptance of a commensurate position with another 

employer does not trigger the Amendment's exception to 

disqualification. Rather, it is only the employee's acceptance 

of "employment which commences not more than seven days after 

the individual leaves employment with the first employer," 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)(emphasis added), that transforms otherwise 

disqualifying conduct — tendering a voluntary resignation — into 

an insignificant event for purposes of eligibility. 

Interpreting the language of the Amendment by giving the words 

their "generally accepted meaning, according to the approved 

usage," N.J.S.A. 1:1-1, "which" refers to something previously 

mentioned — employment accepted from another employer — and 

provides further information about that employment — it 

commences within seven days. Oxford English Dictionary, 

www.oed.com/view/entry/228284 (last visited Sept. 18, 2017) 

(defining "which" as, "[i]ntroducing a clause defining or 

restricting the antecedent thus completing the sense.").

Blake would have us read the Amendment to apply whenever an 

employee resigns to accept employment "which was intended to 

commence" within seven days of the effective resignation date, 

but never did. Simply put, we will not "insert language that 

the Legislature could have included in [the Amendment] -- but 
7 A-2940-15T3

did not." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 

212 N.J. 576, 596 (2013).

Moreover, our construction gives relevancy to the second 

portion of the Amendment, which provides "if the individual 

gives notice to the first employer that [she] will leave 

employment on a specified date and the first employer terminates 

[her] before that date, the seven-day period [in which the job 

commences] will commence from the specified date[,]" not the 

date of termination. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Obviously, the 

Legislature did not want the first employer's sudden and 

unilateral decision to terminate the employee who had given 

notice to adversely affect her continued eligibility for 

benefits simply because the second job commenced more than seven 

days later. 

Blake's interpretation of the Amendment, adopted by the 

panel in McClain, renders unnecessary this second part of the 

Amendment. If an employee resigned, yet remained eligible for 

benefits by accepting a position that was intended to commence 

within seven days of her resignation date, but never did, she 

would become eligible for benefits upon the date of her actual 

termination. Any difference between the anticipated resignation 

date and the actual termination date would be irrelevant. Basic 

principles of statutory interpretation require us to "presume 
8 A-2940-15T3

that every word in a statute has meaning and is not mere 

surplusage." Jersey Cent. Power & Light, supra, 212 N.J. at 587

(quoting Cast Art Indus., LLC v. KPMG LLP, 209 N.J. 208, 222 

(2012)). Blake's interpretation of the Amendment renders the 

second portion nugatory. 

Blake argues in her reply brief, "Logically, the failure of 

the second job to commence leaves the worker in the same 

position as that which occurs when the worker is laid off 

shortly after the second job does commence." That may be so, 

but the statement ignores the potential consequences to the two 

employers and is inconsistent with the Legislature's purpose in 

enacting the Amendment, as the legislative history amply 

demonstrates. 

The Senate Labor Committee's favorable report on S. 2802, 

which became the Amendment, made clear that the bill was 

intended to "make an exception" from the usual disqualification 

under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), "for a worker who leaves one job to 

accept a subsequent job at least equal in hours or pay, but is 

laid off from the subsequent job." Senate Labor Comm., 

Statement to S. 2082 (June 5, 2014) (emphasis added); see also

Assembly Labor Comm., Statement to S. 2082 (September 11, 2014) 
9 A-2940-15T3

and Assembly Appropriations Comm., Statement to S. 2082

(February 5, 2015) (same).3

In all instances, the Committees noted that the bill would 

not fiscally affect the first employer's contributions to the 

unemployment compensation fund, in particular, future rates of 

contribution based upon benefit experience. N.J.S.A. 43:21-

7(c)(1). 

Another portion of the current law, 

[N.J.S.A.] 43:21-7(c)(1), provides that an 

employer's UI account is not charged for UI 

benefits paid to a claimant if the

employee's employment . . . ended in any way 

 

3 Without specificity, the Committee statements referenced 

similar laws enacted by twenty-six states, and regulations 

enacted in five others, that had the same purpose. Senate Labor 

Comm., Statement to S. 2082 (June 5, 2014). In this appeal, 

neither Blake nor the Board have cited to the laws of our sister 

states, but the panel in McClain specifically considered two of 

them and found the language of those statutes explicitly 

provided that the employee actually commence work with the

second employer. McClain, supra, slip op. at 13 n. 3. We 

cannot quarrel with our colleagues' analysis in this regard.

However, contrary to the course taken by our Legislature, a 

number of other states have included explicit language that 

adopts Blake's position, i.e., that commencement of employment 

with the second employer was not necessary for the exemption 

from disqualification to apply. See, e.g., Alaska Admin. Code

8, § 85.095 (2017) (providing that "leaving work to accept a 

bona fide offer" is considered when determining "the existence 

of good cause . . . for voluntarily leaving work."); Ariz. 

Admin. Code § R6-3-50365 (2017) ("A worker who . . . quits 

because he has prospects of other work, but no definite offer, 

leaves voluntarily without good cause in connection with his 

work."); Cal. Code Regs. 22 § 1256-19(c) (2017) ("An individual 

who leaves work to accept other work has good cause for leaving 

the work if there was a definite assurance of employment in 

another substantially better job.").
10 A-2940-15T3

which would have disqualified the claimant 

from UI benefits if the employee had applied 

for benefits at the time when the employment 

ended, including if the employee voluntarily 

left work with that employer without good 

cause attributable to that work. Therefore, 

under those provisions of the current law, 

that employer's account would not be charged 

when the claimant leaves work with that 

employer to accept employment from another 

employer, and the claimant is, pursuant to 

the provisions of this bill, paid UI 

benefits after being laid off by the 

subsequent employer, even if the first 

employer paid wages to the claimant during 

the claimant's base year.

[Senate Labor Comm., Statement to S. 2082

(June 5, 2014); Assembly Labor Comm., 

Statement to S. 2082 (September 11, 2014); 

Assembly Appropriations Comm., Statement to 

S. 2082 (February 5, 2015) (emphasis 

added).]4

 

4 N.J.S.A. 43:21-7(c)(1) provides:

[A]n employer's account shall not be charged 

for benefits paid to a claimant if the 

claimant's employment by that employer was 

ended in any way which, pursuant to 

subsection (a), (b), (c), (f), (g) or (h) of 

[N.J.S.A.] 43:21-5, would have disqualified 

the claimant for benefits if the claimant 

had applied for benefits at the time when 

that employment ended. Benefits paid under 

a given benefit determination shall be 

charged against the account of the employer 

to whom such determination relates. When 

each benefit payment is made, notification 

shall be promptly provided to each employer 

included in the unemployment insurance 

monetary calculation of benefits. Such 

notification shall identify the employer 

against whose account the amount of such 

payment is being charged, shall show at 

(continued)
11 A-2940-15T3

The sponsor of S. 2802, Senator Fred H. Madden, was more 

explicit:

The bill also provides that an employer's 

account will not be charged for UI benefits 

paid to a claimant even if: the employer 

paid wages to the claimant during the 

claimant's base year; the claimant leaves 

work with that employer to accept employment 

from another employer; and the claimant is 

paid UI benefits after being laid off by the 

subsequent employer.

[Sponsor's Statement to S. 2802 (May 19, 

2014) (emphasis added).]

The Office of Legislative Services (OLS) was asked to 

consider the fiscal impact of S. 2802 upon the unemployment 

insurance trust fund. In recognizing the difficulty of the 

task, OLS noted "there is no data available . . . to quantify 

the number of these claimants who had secured future employment 

and then were subsequently laid off from the new employment." 

Office of Legis. Servs., Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S. 2802

(June 19, 2014) (emphasis added). 

The Senate Labor Committee's June 5, 2014 hearing makes 

clear that committee members intended to protect an employee who 

actually "assume[s] . . . new employment within seven days."

 

(continued)

least the name and social security account 

number of the claimant and shall specify the 

period of unemployment to which said benefit 

payment applies.
12 A-2940-15T3

Senate Labor Comm. Hearing on S. 2082, (June 5, 2014) (statement 

by Senator Madden), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/media/archive_a

udio2.asp?KEY=SLA&SESSION=2014. The legislators wanted that 

employee's eligibility for benefits to carry forward, rather 

than cause the eligibility "clock" to "reset to zero" once the 

employee started work with the second employer. Ibid.

Finally, as a practical matter, the first employer, in this 

case, Laurel, who did nothing to cause Blake to quit, is illequipped to rebut any claim for benefits. We logically assume 

that most offers of other employment are not reduced to writing. 

Therefore, an employer who participates in a hearing before the 

Appeal Tribunal can only testify to what is undisputed, i.e., 

that the employee quit her position. It is unlikely that the 

employer could call the second employer, who is not a respondent 

to the employee's appeal and may be unknown, as a witness to 

challenge whether the claimant actually had received an offer of 

employment and what were its terms. Despite this disadvantage, 

the first employer would bear the financial consequences of any 

benefits awarded. N.J.S.A. 43:21-7(c)(1).

In short, we conclude the plain language of the Amendment, 

as well as its legislative history, support the conclusion that 

it applies only if the employee voluntarily leaves employment 

and actually "commences" employment with a second employer.
13 A-2940-15T3

Affirmed.