NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.
LEANDRO GOMEZ III, AKA Leo,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 10113

D.C. No. 1:05

- cr

- 00300

- JMS

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 17, 2022 * * Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: HAWKINS, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

The district court denied the Motion for Compassionate Release brought by
Defendant Leandro Gomez, III . On appeal, Gomez argues that the district court erred
by: (1) failing to consider each argument he raised in support of relea se , either
separately or in combination; (2) requiring him to prove he suffered an “ enormous ”

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 23 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

sentencing disparity before considering such dispar ity as a basis for granting relief ; and (3) failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in d enying his

motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review each of the issues Gomez raised for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Keller , 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Aruda , 993 F.3d

797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). After an initial determination that a defendant
has exhausted his administrative remedies, district courts must make three findings
to grant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
First, th at “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Second, that “such a reduction in sentence is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). 1 And third, that the sentence reduction is warranted under
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

B ecause each of these requirements must be satisfied to grant a sentence reduction,
“a district court that properly den ies compassionate release need not evaluate each
step.” Keller , 2 F.4th at 1284.

1 “[T]he Sentencing Commission has not yet issued a policy statement ‘applicable’ to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant.” Aruda , 993 F.3d at 802. Therefore, in this context district courts are “‘empowered...to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.” Id . at 801 (quoting United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020)).3

1. Consideration of Gomez’s Arguments. The district court considered all the
reasons Gomez proffered , both separately and in combination , when it denied his

motion

. Indeed, the district court expressly concluded: [N] either [Gomez] ’s 10

- month sentencing disparity, nor his health conditions

— either separately or in

combination

— constitute ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons justifying
compassionate release.” T h us , we f ind no error on this point. Aruda , 993 F.3d at 80 1

.
2. Sentencing Disparity

. Contrary to Gomez’s assertion, t he district court did
not require him to demonstrate a gross or enormous disparity in his sentencing.
Instead, the district court merely concluded that Gomez’s 10

- month sentencing

differential was small and not “grossly disproportionate” to the offense, therefore

not ris ing to the level of an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. T he district

court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this c onclu sion

. Cf. United States v. Lii , 528 F.Supp.3d 1153 , 1164

– 65 (D. Haw. Mar. 23, 2021) (identifying a sentencing
disparity between ten years and life in prison as a “gross disparity” and granting
compassionate release).

3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors. As noted above, w e have previously held that

district courts that properly deny compassionate release based on one of the required

statutory elements need not consider the other elements. Keller , 2 F.4 th at 1284
(“although a district court must perform this sequential inquiry before it grants
compassionate release, a dis trict court that properly denies compassionate release4

need not evaluate each step.”)

. Here, t he district court properly concluded that there
were no extraordinary and compelling reasons that justified granting Gomez
compassionate release and , therefore , h ad no obligation to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors.

AFFIRMED.