alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
32.1




Certification
of Principal Executive Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002




Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned
officer of Mandalay Media, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does
hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 of the
Company (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information
contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: November
16, 2009




/s/ Ray SchaafRay
      SchaafPresident(Principal
      Executive Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
   THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEC FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
                  
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   OCT-31-1998
<CASH>                                               5,684
<SECURITIES>                                           999
<RECEIVABLES>                                        7,763
<ALLOWANCES>                                           628
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    16,429
<PP&E>                                               8,826
<DEPRECIATION>                                       6,634
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      19,538
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                7,025
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                            324
<COMMON>                                               137
<OTHER-SE>                                          12,052
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        19,538
<SALES>                                             14,563
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    18,473
<CGS>                                                2,712
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       13,715
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     9,061
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         1
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (4,408)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (4,408)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (4,408)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.33)
        


</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Terrell Z., Jr., an Infant. Erie County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Mamie W.-K., Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[825 NYS2d 388]

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Kevin M. Carter, J.), entered May 24, 2005 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order adjudged that Terrell Z., Jr. is a child whose parent is presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness, to provide proper and adequate care for her child, transferred the guardianship and custody rights of respondent to petitioner and authorized petitioner to consent to the adoption of the child.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is modified on the law by remitting the matter to Family Court, Erie County, for a hearing in accordance with the memorandum and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Same memorandum as in *Matter of Kahlil S.*(35 AD3d 1164 [2006]).

All concur, Kehoe, J., not participating. Present—Scudder, J.P, Kehoe, Gorski, Smith and Pine, JJ.
#### Max Filiberto et al., Respondents, v City of New Rochelle, Defendant, and New Rochelle Board of Education, Appellant.

[826 NYS2d 711]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant New Rochelle Board of Education appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (LaCava, J.), entered December 13, 2005, as denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant New Rochelle Board of Education is granted.

The plaintiff Max Filiberto (hereinafter the plaintiff), a student at New Rochelle High School, allegedly sustained injuries when he was assaulted by a fellow student while eating lunch in the school cafeteria. The plaintiff and his mother commenced this action to recover damages against the City of New Rochelle and the New Rochelle Board of Education (hereinafter the Board), alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion with respect to the City, but denied that branch of the motion pertaining to the Board. The Board appeals. We reverse.

The Board made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that it did not have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury, such that the acts of the fellow student reasonably could have been anticipated *(see Mirand v City of New York,*84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]; *Busby v Ticonderoga Cent. School Dist.,*258 AD2d 762, 764 [1999]). The Board demonstrated that the plaintiffs alleged injuries were the result of a sudden, unforeseeable, and spontaneous attack that could not have been prevented by more intense supervision *(see Nossoughi*
      *655
      *v Ramapo Cent. School Dist.,*287 AD2d 444, 445 [2001]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Nossoughi v Ramapo Cent. School Dist., supra).*Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the Board. Prudenti, PJ., Krausman, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
----

Exhibit 32.2 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In condition with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Polydex Pharmaceuticals Limited (the “Company”) for the fiscal quarter ended October 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John A. Luce, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  

the Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

(2)  

the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result ofoperations of the Company.

 

By /s/  John A. Luce                John A. Luce,Chief Financial OfficerDecember 14, 2007

A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
Exhibit 32.2





Certification of Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of NeuMedia, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2010 of the Company (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: February 22, 2011





/s/ Russell BurkeRussell BurkeChief Financial Officer and Secretary(Principal Financial Officer)
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    I, Donna L. Dubinsky, certify that the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended June 28, 2003 fully complies with the requirements in Sections
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information
contained in such Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Handspring, Inc. for the
periods being presented.

                                                /s/   Donna L. Dubinsky
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                                   Donna L. Dubinsky
                                                Chief Executive Officer

Date: August 26, 2003
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 12, 2003 Session

JOHN S. DOE v. RANDALL E. PEDIGO, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 2-380-95

FILED JUNE 30, 2003

No. E2002-01311-COA-R3-CV 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

While I agree with the bulk of the majority opinion, I write separately to express my

disagreement with the majority’s judgment that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Dr. Pedigo, “at the time of [the] occurrence [at his condominium]” was “acting by virtue of or under

color of the office [of deputy sheriff].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 (2002).

The only material fact in dispute pertaining to the Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 analysis is

whether Dr. Pedigo was a deputy sheriff at the time of the occurrence at his condominium. For the

purpose of the following discussion, I will assume that he was. Obviously, this assumption is

beneficial to the plaintiff’s theory of the case. However, even assuming the best possible scenario

for the plaintiff on this issue, I conclude that the undisputed facts and this assumption can lead to

only one reasonable conclusion, i.e., what happened at Dr. Pedigo’s condominium was purely

personal in nature and totally unrelated to his official duties.

When Dr. Pedigo and the plaintiff went to the doctor’s condominium, they were not going

there on any official business related to Dr. Pedigo’s assumed status as a deputy sheriff. They were

going there to “pass the time” as they awaited a possible call to respond to a crime scene. While they

were there, Dr. Pedigo suggested that he inject the plaintiff with a Hepatitis B vaccine and the

plaintiff agreed. It is obvious beyond any doubt that the plaintiff agreed to the injection not because

Dr. Pedigo was a deputy sheriff but rather because he was a medical doctor. Again, I find no nexus

between what happened at the condominium and Dr. Pedigo’s assumed position as a deputy sheriff.

In my judgment, the opinion of this Court in the case of J.W. ex rel. Watts v. Maury County,

No. M2001-02768-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 1018138 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed March 11, 2003),

perm. app. filed May 12, 2003, and the instant case can be distinguished on the facts of the two

cases. In J.W., it is arguable that the child went to the defendant’s home so the defendant could
-2-

counsel a troubled youth at that house as a part of the defendant’s duties as a school resource officer.

In the instant case, the plaintiff went to Dr. Pedigo’s condominium to relax while the two of them

awaited a possible call to duty for Dr. Pedigo. The former situation involved the defendant’s official

duties; the latter does not.

With respect to the language in the opinion in J.W. – “or takes advantage of such actual or

purported capacity” – upon which the majority relies, this language must be read in the context of

the facts of that case. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eddings, 188 Tenn. 512, 523, 221 S.W.2d

695, 699 (1949).

I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.

_______________________________ 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 250 (Wednesday, December 31, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 78882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30535]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Notice of 
Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases Special Emphasis Panel, NIAID Investigator Initiated 
Program Project Applications (P01).
    Date: January 8, 2015.
    Time: 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, 5601 Fisher Lane, 
Rockville, MD 20892, (Telephone Conference Call).
    Contact Person: Jane K. Battles, PhD., Scientific Review 
Officer, Scientific Review Program, DEA/NIAID/NIH/DHHS, 5601 Fishers 
Lane, Room F30B, Rockville, MD 20852, 240-669-5029.

    This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the 
meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and 
funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.855, 
Allergy, Immunology, and Transplantation Research; 93.856, 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Research, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)


    Dated: December 23, 2014.
David Clary,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2014-30535 Filed 12-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
11921.

#### *McCray v.*Bledsoe & Holmes.

Bloodworth, J.

Where personal property is delivered to the buyer under a contract of conditional sale which is in writing and duly attested and recorded as required by law (Civil Code of 1910, §§ 3318, 3319), the legal title will not vest in the purchaser until the purchase-price has been paid *(Atkinson*v. *Brunswick-Balke Collender Co.,*144 *Ga.*694, 87 S. E. 891) ; and where such a purchaser sold the property and absconded without paying any portion of the purchase-price, and an attachment for the purchase-money was issued and levied, and a claim was filed by one to whom the first purchaser had sold the property, and on the trial of the claim case these facts appeared without contradiction, the court did not err either in overruling the motion “ to direct a verdict in favor of the claimant and dismiss the levy of the attachment,” or in directing the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding the property subject. The plaintiff in error relies on *588tlie decision in the case of *McNabb*v. *Brice,*120 *Ga.*747 (48 S. E. 199). In that case, as shown by the record in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, the note given for the purchase-money of the property and in which it was sought to retain the title thereto was never recorded.

Decided April 13, 1921.

Attachment and claim; from city court of Carrollton — Judge Beall. September 15, 1920.

*Taylor Smith, Boykin & Boykin,*for plaintiff in error.

*Smith & Smith,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, O. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STATE OIL AND GAS BOARD OF :

ALABAMA,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v. CA 15-00183-C

:

DELPHI OIL, INC.,

:

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the order entered on this date, it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the motion to remand (doc. 8) is GRANTED, and, as 

such, this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Alabama, from 

whence it came.

DONE this the 8th day of May 2015.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00183-C Document 13 Filed 05/08/15 Page 1 of 1
**Exhibit32  18 U.S.C. Section 1350Certifications of Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officers**

 

 

*The following statement is being furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission solely for purposes of Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), which carries with it certaincriminal penalties in the event of a knowing or willful misrepresentation.*

 

Securities and ExchangeCommission

450 Fifth Street, NW

Washington, DC  20549

 

Re:  AndrewCorporation

 

Ladies and Gentlemen:

 

In accordance with therequirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 USC 1350),each of the undersigned hereby certifies that:

 

(i)                                     thisCurrent Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or78o(d)); and

 

(ii)                                  theinformation contained in this report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of Andrew Corporation.

 

Dated as of this 12th day ofMay 2004.

 

 
| /s/ Ralph E.  Faison                   |                     | /s/ Marty R.  Kittrell |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------|
| Ralph E.  Faison                       | Marty R.  Kittrell       |
| President  and Chief Executive Officer | Chief  Financial Officer |

 

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by section 906 has been provided to AndrewCorporation and will be retained by Andrew Corporation and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
NUMBER 13-18-00073-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

JOHN BERNARD FEIT, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 92nd District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion Per Curium

Appellant John Bernard Feit perfected his appeal from his conviction for firstdegree murder in cause number CR-0464-16-A in the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo 

County, Texas. During the pendency of this appeal, Feit’s counsel notified the Court that 

Feit died on February 12, 2020. “If the appellant in a criminal case dies after an appeal is 
2

perfected but before the appellate court issues the mandate, the appeal will be 

permanently abated.” TEX. R. APP. P. 7.1(a)(2); see also Barrera v. State, No. 13-03-

00707-CR, 2010 WL 880626, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 11, 2010, 

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we hereby order this 

appeal permanently ABATED.

PER CURIAM 

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

20th day of February, 2020.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1942 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Labor, 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 

5 SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION FOR 

6 FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

7 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

8 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail9 able for Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 1942 IH

1 Health Administration for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed 

2 $0. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB