The Honor able William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge f or the * Norther n District of California, sitting by desig nation. Talmon also alleg ed a br eac h of the c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment by a sec ond 1 defe ndant, International Brothe rhood of Te amsters Tr uck Dr ivers Union L ocal 407, but later vo luntari ly

dis mis se d th a t c la im. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0332n.06 Filed: May

11, 2007 No. 06-3253 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
KENN ETH T ALMON, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. CE NT RA L STA TES, SOU THEA ST & SOUTH WEST AREAS P ENSION FUN D, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

BEFORE: MARTIN and DAUG HTREY, Circuit Judges; SCHWARZER, Distr ict

Judge. * P ER CURIAM . Ke nn e th T a lmo n a pp e a ls the dis tr i c t

c o u r t ’s jud g me nt d ism iss inghis c la im ag ainst Central States Southeast and Southwest Are as Pension Funds (Ce ntral States) for a Partial Pension. Talmon’s complaint alleg ed brea ch of fiduciar y duty and denial of bene fits under sec tion 502 of the Employ ee Retirement I ncome Security Act (ERI SA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. He c ontended 1 that Central States had inc orre ctly calc ulated the number

of y ear s of qualify ing service to which he2

was e ntitled. Central States moved to dismis s the breach of fiduciar y duty claim and for judg ment on the administrative re cord on the bene fits claim. The district cour t, in a well-re asoned opinion, g rante d both motions, holding that (1) ERI SA bars fiduciary duty claims on behalf of a pa rticipant
su ing fo r i nd ivi du a l be ne fi ts, and (2 ) o n th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e re c or d, Ce ntr a l State s’ de nia l of be ne fi ts
wa s n ot a rb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s. We a do pt t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s op ini on and a ff ir m. In h is a pp e a l T a lmo n d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the dis mis sa l of his fi du c iary

bre a c h c la im. Hi s principal a

rgument in this court is th at t h e d i s t ri ct court used the wrongstandard in de ciding the motion for judgme nt on the admini strative record and s hould have r eviewe d the trustees’ decision to deny benef its de novo rather

than under

the “a rbitrar y and capr icious” standard. As the district
c ourt c or re c tly ob se rv e d, the a

pp ro pr iate sta

nd ard of re vie w i n E RI SA c a se s d e pe nd s o n th e te rm s of the plan in que stion. “[U] nless the benefit plan g ives the administrator or fiduciar y discretionar

y authority to det er mine elig ibilit y

for be nefits or to construe the terms of the plan,” the de cision of the administrator is reviewe d de novo. Firestone T ire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). “ I f the plan g ives such discre tionary authority , [t he cour

t] revie ws the administrator’ s decision to deny

benef its using the hig hly

defe rential a

rbitrar y and capr icious standard of revie w.” Darland v. Fortis Bene

fits Ins. Co. , 317 F.3d 516, 527 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation omit ted). Both pa rties ag ree that the district court may only consider the evidenc e t h at wa s b efor e the plan administrator at the time of the orig inal decision. See, e .g. , Perry v . Simplicity Eng. , 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The de novo standard of revie w, l ike t he .
. . arbitra ry and ca pricious standar d, does not mandate or per

mit the consideration of e vidence not presente d to the administrator.”)
. Talmon offe rs no leg al or fac tual support for his contention t hat t he dis trict court or this court should review the administrator’s de cision de no v o. His only argument as to whythat standard3

should be used is that applying the arb i t ra ry and ca pricious standar d “re sults in [ an] unjust and inequitable d ec i s i o n . ” Under the ter ms of Central States’ Tr

ust Ag ree ment, “[t] he Truste es ar e
v est ed with discre tionary and fina l authority

in making a ll such decisions, including Trustee decisions upon claims for

benef its by . . . claimants, and inc luding Tr ustee de cisions construing plan documents of the Pension Fund.” The district cour t theref ore c orre ctly

applied the a

rbitrar y and capr icious standard.

“ Un de r [the ] de fe re nti a l ‘ arb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s’ sta

nd ard , [th e c ourt ] wi ll uph old a be ne fi t deter mination if it i s rational in light of the plan’s pr ovisions.” Darland v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co. , 317 F.3d 516, 527 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (interna l quo t at i o n omitted). “[W ]hen it i s possible to offer a
rea soned explanation, based on the evidenc e, for a particula r outcome, that outcome is not arbitra ry
or ca pricious.” Id. (interna l quotation omit ted). In s up po rt

of his c la im f

or a Part ia l Pe ns ion , Ta lmo n c on te nd e d that L oc a l 29 3 in c or re c tly
rec orded his cr edit for 1967 to 1969 and char g ed him with a brea k in se rvice in 1968, and that he wa s entitled to work for I llinois California Ex press (I CX) (and there fore ear n cre dit) from 1980 to 1985. Ba sed on the undisputed fa ct that Talmon left cover ed service no later than 1985, the Central States Tr us te e s c on c lud e d th a t e ve n if he ha d e sta bli sh e d fu ll y e ars of c on tr ibutio ns fr om 19 80 thr ou g h July 1984 (whe n I CX went bankr upt) and full y ear s of cr edit under L ocal 293’s Pension Fund f rom 1967 to1969, he still would not have e stablished the thirty y ear s of Combined Credited Service (re quired when a participa nt leaves c overe d employ ment befor e ag e fifty

) to qualify

for a Partial Pension. The Tr ustees’ d e te r

mi n a tion that Ta lmon was inelig ible for a Partial Pension was rational and supported by

the evidenc e. Eve n i f T al m o n we re a war ded cr edit for a ll the y ear s in dispute, he would still fall fa

r short of the r equisite thirty y ear s of cr edited ser

vice f or a Par tial Pension.4

The district cour

t abl y summarized the rele vant evidenc e and c orre ctly identified the applicable law. Given that treatment of the plaintiff’s cla ims, the issuanc e of a f ull written opinion b y this court would be duplicative a nd serve no prec edential pur pose. We there fore AFF I RM the judgme nt of the district court on the r easoningset forth in th at co u rt ’s o pinion and order filed J anuar y 6, 2006.