IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KATHERINE WHITE, etc., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-322-WS-N

 )

THE NIF CORPORATION, etc., )

 )

Defendant. )

 ORDER

The plaintiff has filed a motion for conditional certification and to facilitate 

notice. (Doc. 4). The defendant concedes it is “in a virtually indefensible position 

relative to the subject motion.” (Doc. 25). Rather than contest the merits of the 

plaintiff’s motion, the defendant has filed a “motion to toll the statute of 

limitations.” (Doc. 24). The defendant’s theory – unsupported by any legal 

analysis or citation to authority – is that tolling the limitations period as of the date 

the complaint was filed will protect potential class members while saving the 

defendant the “hardship” of “increased litigation costs and having to address 

Plaintiff’s allegations not only in this Court, but in the court of public opinion.” 

(Id. at 2). 

“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding 

sentences may be maintained against any employer ... in any Federal or State court 

of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of 

himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 

216(b) (emphasis added). The FLSA thus allows the maintenance of a collective 

action, and notice to potential class members, if the represented employees are 

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“similarly situated” to the named plaintiffs. Hipp v. Liberty National Life 

Insurance Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001).1

The Eleventh Circuit has recommended that trial courts consider 

certification under Section 216(b) in two stages. “The first determination is made 

at the so-called ‘notice stage.’ At the notice stage, the district court makes a 

decision — usually based only on the pleadings and any affidavits which have 

been submitted — whether notice of the action should be given to potential class 

members.” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218 (internal quotes omitted). “Because the court 

has minimal evidence, this determination is made using a fairly lenient standard, 

and typically results in ‘conditional certification’ of a representative class. If the 

court ‘conditionally certifies’ the class, putative class members are given notice 

and the opportunity to ‘opt-in.’” Id. (internal quotes omitted). At the second stage, 

in response to a motion to decertify made after discovery, the court makes a more 

informed factual determination on the similarly situated issue. Id. at 1218. 

At the initial stage, “[t]he plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating a 

reasonable basis for their claim of class-wide discrimination.” Grayson v. K Mart, 

79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotes omitted). “The plaintiffs may 

meet this burden, which is not heavy, by making substantial allegations of classwide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations supported by affidavits which 

successfully engage defendants’ affidavits to the contrary.” Id. (internal quotes 

omitted). “[T]he district court should satisfy itself that there are other employees 

... who desire to ‘opt-in’ and who are ‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job 

requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.” Morgan v. Family Dollar 

Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotes omitted).

 1 Section 216(b) applies to actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act (“ADEA”), and cases (such as Hipp) construing Section 216(b) in the ADEA context 

apply equally to cases brought under the FLSA. Albritton v. Cagle’s, Inc., 508 F.3d 

1012, 1014 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007). 

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The plaintiff’s presentation easily satisfies this relaxed standard. The 

defendant’s motion to toll the statute of limitations is not supported and is due to 

be denied on that basis. Even were it granted, it would not “moot” the plaintiff’s 

motion, (Doc. 25 at 2), since the defendant’s motion does not provide for notice to 

potential class members. 

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s motion for conditional 

certification is granted, with the class and sub-class defined as set forth in the 

motion. (Doc. 4 at 1-2). The defendant’s motion to toll the limitations period is 

denied. The parties are ordered to submit for judicial approval, on or before 

August 31, 2015, an agreed notice and consent to join. 

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of August, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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