IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WELLS FARGO BANK, etc., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 14-372-WS-C

 )

RAYMOND & ASSOCIATES, LLC, )

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

 ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s motion under Rule 66 for 

appointment of a receiver or, in the alternative, for a pre-judgment writ of seizure. 

(Doc. 45). Interested parties and non-parties have filed briefs and evidentiary 

materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 45, 51-54, 56, 61, 67-70, 

72, 75), and the motion is ripe for resolution.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff made two sizable loans to defendant Raymond & Associates, 

LLC (“R&A”), both guaranteed by defendants R&A Marine, LLC (“Marine”) and 

Raymond LaForce. When the defendants defaulted, the plaintiff brought this 

action against them. Counts One and Two assert breach of contract against R&A, 

Count Three asserts breach of guaranty against the other two defendants, and 

Count Four asserts statutory and common-law detinue against all three. (Doc. 7). 

LaForce filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiff dismissed without prejudice 

all claims against him. (Docs. 28, 34). The plaintiff moved for summary 

judgment, to which the entity defendants declined to respond. The Court granted 

summary judgment as to Counts One, Two and Three but, for want of adequate 

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discussion and support by the plaintiff, denied summary judgment as to Count 

Four. (Doc. 35). Judgment was recently entered in the amount of $1,398,965.74. 

(Doc. 64). 

R&A operates a shipyard. The loan documents at issue provide the 

plaintiff a broad security interest in R&A’s tangible and intangible personal 

property. The plaintiff says it has recently developed information indicating that 

the value of its collateral is declining, that equipment and funds subject to its 

security interest are missing, and that R&A has no work lined up after it completes 

the five vessels now in the yard. 

The plaintiff’s motion identifies seventeen additional creditors of R&A. 

(Doc. 45 at 6-7). The plaintiff gave notice of its motion to each of them, and the 

Court afforded them, as well as the defendants, an opportunity to be heard. One 

group of three creditors (collectively, “PNC”), another group of two creditors 

(collectively, “SCF”), and two individual creditors filed responses to the motion, 

as did R&A. Only R&A and SCF oppose appointment of a receiver. 

DISCUSSION

“[F]ederal law governs the appointment of a receiver by a federal court 

exercising diversity jurisdiction.” National Partnership Investment Corp. v. 

National Housing Development Corp., 153 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). “A 

district court’s appointment of a receiver ... is an extraordinary equitable remedy.” 

United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotes 

omitted).

“[T]here is no precise formula for determining when a receiver may be 

considered.” Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 

2009). The plaintiff asks the Court to consider the following factors identified in 

Canada Life, viz.:

(1) whether the party seeking the appointment has a valid claim; 

(2) whether there is fraudulent conduct or the probability of 

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fraudulent conduct, by the defendant; (3) whether the property is 

in imminent danger of being lost, concealed, injured, diminished in 

value, or squandered; (4) whether legal remedies are inadequate; 

(5) whether the harm to plaintiff by denial of the appointment would 

outweigh injury to the party opposing appointment; [and] (6) the 

plaintiff’s probable success in the action and the possibility of 

irreparable injury to plaintiff’s interest in the property .... 

Id. (internal quotes omitted). (Doc. 45 at 13-14). R&A proposes that “the 

availability of [a] less severe equitable remedy” also be considered, (Doc. 52 at 3 

(internal quotes omitted)), and SNF asks the Court to consider as well “whether 

the plaintiff’s interests sought to be protected will in fact be well-served by 

receivership.” (Doc. 54 at 6 (internal quotes omitted)). As all these factors find 

support in the case law, and as the Court has previously identified each of them as 

proper,

1 it accepts them as appropriate factors. 

Some factors, however, are more central than others. In particular, “equity 

intervenes only when there is no remedy at law or the remedy is inadequate.” 

Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1310.2 In Bradley, a criminal case, the trial court appointed a 

receiver to marshal the defendants’ assets and make them available to pay to the 

government the money judgments (representing restitution) and fines imposed 

against the defendants. Id. at 1307-09. The Eleventh Circuit held this was an 

abuse of discretion, since the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act “provided the 

Government with all the tools necessary to obtain payment of the fines and money 

judgments.” Id. at 1310. In particular, the government could “seize the property 

via writs of attachment (for tangible property) and garnishment (for intangible 

property, like a bank account).” Id. “Because federal and state law provide the 

United States with ample means of obtaining satisfaction of the judgments at hand 

 1 PNC Bank, N.A. v. Presbyterian Retirement Corporation, 2014 WL 6065778 at 

*5 & n.11 (S.D. Ala. 2014).

2 Accord Mitsubishi International Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 

1507, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994) (“It is axiomatic that equitable relief is only available where 

there is no adequate remedy at law ....”).

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– all of them far more efficient than the means the court fashioned – the court 

abused its discretion in appointing a receiver to perform the Government’s work.” 

Id. at 1311.

Since ordinary post-judgment collection procedures constitute an adequate 

legal remedy for the government, it is difficult to see why they are not an adequate 

legal remedy for the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s response is the technical one that, 

“as of today [April 17], [it] does not have a final judgment it can enforce.” (Doc. 

68 at 5). But the only reason the plaintiff had no judgment before April 15 is that 

it presented an incomplete motion for summary judgment, one that did not prove 

up its demand for interest and attorney’s fees, which deficiency necessitated the 

filing of a supplemental motion for summary judgment; otherwise, the plaintiff 

would have had a judgment in February. (Doc. 35 at 5-6). And the only reason 

the April 15 judgment is not a final judgment is that the plaintiff did not ask that it 

be made final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The plaintiff cannot obtain a receiver by the 

simple expedient of electing not to utilize the ordinary collection tools available to 

it. 

The plaintiff says that, even if it had a final judgment, R&A has not turned 

over its collateral voluntarily, so that the plaintiff “would still have to resort to 

judicial remedies to seize its collateral.” (Doc. 68 at 5-6). But it is precisely the 

availability of those remedies, not shown to be inadequate, that precludes

appointment of a receiver.

Finally, the plaintiff notes that other creditors have claims to its collateral –

in some cases, superior claims – and concludes that a receiver could “review and 

safeguard the legitimate claims of other creditors ... without a chaotic race to the 

courthouse that would result if [the plaintiff] were to attempt to seize and liquidate 

the [collateral] itself or through the execution process.” (Doc. 45 at 16). As SCF 

notes, legal remedies “must be inadequate, not merely inconvenient,” for 

appointment of a receiver to be warranted. (Doc. 54 at 7). The plaintiff has made 

no showing – indeed, has attempted none – that the commonplace situation of 

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competing claims to a judgment debtor’s property renders the law’s ordinary 

collection tools so inadequate as to support the “drastic” step of appointing a 

receiver. Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir. 2012). 

CONCLUSION

The lack of an adequate remedy at law is the sine qua non of equitable 

relief, including the appointment of a receiver. The plaintiff’s failure on this point 

is dispositive, and the motion for appointment of receiver is denied. However, the 

Court will, by separate order and pursuant to Rule 54(b), designate the April 15 

judgment as a final judgment, triggering the plaintiff’s access to the full panoply 

of post-judgment enforcement procedures.3 Because the Court has entered 

judgment and is by separate order rendering that judgment final, the plaintiff’s 

alternative motion for issuance of a “pre-judgment writ of seizure,” (Doc. 45 at 1, 

20), is denied as moot.

4

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of April, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 3 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 253 F.3d 695, 699 (11th Cir. 2001) (a trial 

court has “authority sua sponte to enter judgment under Rule 54(b)”).

4 The government’s motion for an extension of time to file its “final response” to 

the plaintiff’s motion, (Doc. 56), is denied as moot.

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