UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRENT D. JACOBSEN, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee. No. 13-9002 (Tax Ct. No. 22536-12) (United States Tax Court)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT •

Before KELLY , TYMKOVICH , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

Brent D. Jacobsen, proceeding pro se, appeals the United States Tax Court’s dismissal of his petition for failure to confor m to Tax Ct. R. 34(b), and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Exercising jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482, we affirm.

• After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 3, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. Background Jacobsen filed a tax return for the 2010 tax year reporting a zero tax liability. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service determined th at Jacobsen omitted $74,971 in wages from his employer, BD Infusion Therapy Systems, Inc. (BD), $3 in interest income, and wa s liable for $371 in tax for premature distributions from a retirement plan. The Commi ssioner issued Jacobsen a no tice of deficiency, stating that he had a tax deficiency of $14,196 and imposed an accuracy -related penalty of $2,691 for substantial underpayment of tax under 26 U. S.C. § 6662(d). Jacobsen then filed a petition in the Tax Court. He did not dispute the Commissioner’s deficiency tax determinat ion, tax liability, or penalty asserted against him. Instead, he alleged, among other things, that BD did not pay him “wages,” and that he did not work for an “American employer” in the “United States” because the term “United States,” as defi ned in 26 U.S.C. § 312 1(e)(2), includes only the named U.S. territories a nd possessions of the Commonw ealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Am erican Samoa. He subse quently filed an “Amended Petition” largely reiterating the allegations contained in the original petition. The Commissioner filed a motion to dismis s Jacobsen’s petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion asserted that Jacobsen’s petition and amended petition failed to comply with Tax Ct. R. 34(b), which requires clear and concise assignments of error in the determinati on of deficiency or liability, raised frivolous and groundle ss arguments, and failed to al lege any justiciable error- 3 - or facts in support of such errors. The Commissioner also notified Jacobsen that he would move for sanctions under 26 U.S.C. § 6673 if Jacobsen pu rsued his frivolous arguments. Considering the motion, the Tax Court ordered Jacobsen to file a proper amended petition to comply with Tax Ct. R. 34(b). Jacobsen filed a second amended petition in which he claimed to withdraw positions in the amended petition that “could be construed as a viola tion of [s]ection 6673.” R., Doc. 7, at 2. He also alleged that he was not involved in a ny revenue taxable activities, that the Commissioner erred in determin ing that he was subject to federal income tax, and that the federal income tax is an excise tax on privileged ac tivities. He also filed an objection to the Commissioner’s motion to di smiss. The Commiss ioner then moved for sanctions under § 6673(a). The Tax Court entered an order of di smissal and decision. It concluded Jacobsen’s petition failed to comply with Tax Ct. R. 34 because it neither assigned error nor alleged facts in support of any ju sticiable claim. It dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be grante d, and sanctioned Jacobsen in the amount of $1,000 for making frivolous arguments. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion “We review de novo the Tax Court’s dismi ssals for failure to state a claim and apply the same standard as would a di strict court in the first instance.” Fox v.
Comm’r , 969 F.2d 951, 952 (10th Cir. 1992). A ccordingly, we review factual issues under a clearly erroneous standard and legal questions de novo. Lewis v. Comm’r ,- 4 - 523 F.3d 1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008). We review Tax Co urt sanctions for abuse of discretion. Id

. Because Jacobsen proceeds pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka , 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). As we understand Jacobsen’s brief, he largely does not challenge the Tax Court’s finding of a deficiency but instead challenges the Ta x Court’s imposition of sanctions, claiming that there is insufficient evidence that his second am ended petition is frivolous or groundless. See Appellant’s Br. at 2

‒ 3. He does so by arguing that the Tax Court’s citation to case law in its order does not establish the frivolous ness of his amended petition. We reject J acobsen’s challenge. Under § 6673(a)(1), the Tax Court is authorized to impose sanctions up to $25,000 when a taxpayer’s suit is instituted primarily for delay or the taxpayer’s position is frivolous or groundless. The Tax Court considered Jacobsen’s second amended petition and concluded that it contained “nothi ng but frivolous and groundless arguments.” R., Doc. 13, at 2. And in imposing sa nctions, it determined that Jacobsen’s argument concerning the “a lleged nontaxable status of his wages is frivolous and groundless.” Id . at 3. The Tax Court did not expressly enumer ate and reject Jacobsen’s specific claims. See, e.g. , Crain v. Comm’r , 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding there is “no need to refute [similarly frivolous] arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these ar guments have some- 5 - colorable merit”). Bu t it is evident that Ja cobsen’s claims were properly dismissed. Jacobsen’s position in his second amended pe tition that federal income tax is an excise tax imposed only on privileged activities has been rejected. See Parker v.
Comm’r , 724 F.2d 469, 471

‒ 72 (5th Cir. 1984) (refuting allegation that the income tax is an excise tax applicable only ag ainst special privilege s and finding Congress empowered to levy income tax against any s ource of income). Li kewise, Jacobsen’s claim that he has not been involved in a ny revenue taxable activ ities fails. As the Tax Court found, Jacobsen did not deny receiving wa ges as determined by his employer, and is a taxpayer obligated to pay federal income tax on his wages. See R., Doc. 13, at 2. Wages are properly taxable income. See Charczuk v. Comm’r , 771 F.2d 471, 472

‒ 73 (10th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Sloan , 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991) (“All individuals . . . must pay federal income tax on their wages, regardless of whet her they requested, obtained or exercised any privilege from the federal government.” (int ernal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we agree with the Tax Court that Jacobs en’s petition is frivolous and groundless. Arguments simi lar to Jacobsen’s have prev iously been rejected. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the Tax Court’s imposition of sanctions. 1

1 We further note that Jacobsen’s claim in his original petiti on and first amended petition that the term “United States,” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(2), includes only Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam , and American Samoa, has also been refuted. See Wnuck v. Comm’r , 136 T.C. 498, 506

‒ 07 (2011).- 6 - Jacobsen also argues summarily that the Tax Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Anti-Injunction Act, see 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), beca use there is no claim or controversy within the Tax Court’ s jurisdiction to adjudicate. See Appellant’s Br.
at 5

‒ 6. Jacobsen’s claim is me ritless. Although federal cour ts lack jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act to issue declarat ory relief with respect to federal taxes, Jacobsen does not request such relief and, therefore, the Act does not apply. Similarly, the Anti-Injunction Act, whic h prohibits suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax, does not apply. To the extent Jacobsen otherwise chal lenges the dismissal of his petition, we have reviewed the petition and conclude, as did the Tax Court, that it contains no valid challenges to the noti ce of deficiency and fails to specifically identify any errors related to the determination of his income tax deficienci es or liabilities.
III. Conclusion The judgment of the United St ates Tax Court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge