DLD-132 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2892

___________

JEFFREY GIBSON,

Appellant

v.

J.P. HARRIS ASSOCIATES; 

SUSQUEHANNA TWP. TAXING OFFICE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02901)

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 4, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 23, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Jeffrey Gibson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying 

his motion to reopen his District Court proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we 

will summarily affirm.

In 2013, Gibson filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a proposed 

complaint, naming as defendants J.P. Harris Associates and Susquehanna Township 

Taxing Office. A Magistrate Judge recommended granting Gibson’s application to 

proceed in forma pauperis and screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). Although the Magistrate Judge found the allegations unclear, she discerned 

that Gibson sought an order from the District Court directing Susquehanna Township, 

Pennsylvania, to turn over information on school property taxes from 2011 and 2012. 

Gibson also complained that the state had no right to levy a school tax and requested an 

order ending school taxes in Pennsylvania and replacing them with a federal tax on oil 

and gas companies. In an order entered on September 9, 2014, the District Court adopted 

the Magistrate Judge’s report, granted Gibson leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and 

dismissed his complaint with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Gibson did not appeal this dismissal. 

Instead, on July 23, 2015, Gibson filed a “motion to reopen” and a second motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis. In his motion to reopen, Gibson alleged that a June 2014 

report from the Pennsylvania “State Auditor General Office” purportedly found that 

Susquehanna Township “wasted 7.2 million dollars of people tax money.” Based on this 

report, Gibson requested that Susquehanna Township repay taxpayers $7.2 million and 
3

that a tax be levied on gas and oil companies to replace the school tax in Pennsylvania. 

In an order entered on July 27, 2015, the District Court summarily denied his motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis and his motion to reopen, noting that, as it had concluded 

when dismissing the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), Gibson’s claims had no basis in 

fact or law and were entirely frivolous. Gibson filed a timely notice of appeal. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

1

and we may summarily affirm 

the District Court’s order if the appeal does not raise a substantial question. 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. 

See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988). 

We construe Gibson’s motion to reopen as seeking relief pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), which allows a litigant to obtain relief from a final judgment 

based on “newly discovered evidence.”

2

 Generally, we review orders denying Rule 60(b) 

motions for abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 

 

1 To the extent that Gibson seeks to challenge the District Court’s September 9, 2014 

order dismissing his complaint as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), we lack 

jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely with regard to that order. 

Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal 

in a civil case in which the United States is not a party must be filed within 30 days of the 

date of entry of the judgment or order appealed. Gibson’s notice of appeal was filed after 

the District Court entered its order dismissing the complaint. Although the time to appeal 

may be tolled if, within 28 days of entry of judgment, a party files a motion pursuant to 

Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), 

Gibson’s motion to reopen was filed well beyond that time frame.

2 Although Gibson did not cite Rule 60(b)(2) in his motion to reopen, he expressly moved 

to reopen his case “on the legal gro[unds] that a case m[a]y be reopened should new 

information to the case [be] f[ou]nd.” 
4

2011). An appeal from the denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying 

judgment for review. See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). 

Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), a district court has discretion to reopen a judgment only if the 

newly discovered evidence is material and “would probably have changed the outcome” 

of the proceedings. See Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). 

The District Court initially dismissed Gibson’s complaint pursuant to 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because his request to stop Pennsylvania school taxes lacked any basis 

in fact or law. Gibson’s claim in his motion to reopen that a June 2014 report allegedly 

found that Susquehanna Township somehow misused $7.2 million of taxpayer money

does not change the District Court’s analysis that Gibson’s claims were factually and 

legally frivolous. Indeed, Gibson made similar claims in his objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s report and recommendation, which the District Court determined were without 

merit. In addition, Gibson’s motion to reopen reasserts his requests to end school taxes 

and levy taxes against oil and gas companies. These allegations are insufficient to 

warrant the “extraordinary relief” afforded by Rule 60(b).3 See Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930

(“We view Rule 60(b) motions as ‘extraordinary relief which should be granted only 

 

 

3 To the extent Gibson’s motion to reopen could be construed as seeking relief pursuant 

to Rule 60(b)(6), it similarly fails. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a litigant to move for relief 

from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” A litigant moving under Rule 

60(b)(6) must show “extraordinary circumstances” to justify reopening of a final 

judgment. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Gibson has not presented any 

extraordinary reasons why his District Court proceeding should be reopened. 
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where extraordinary justifying circumstances are present.’”) (citation omitted). 

Therefore, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in denying 

Gibson’s motion to reopen.4 

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 

 

4 To the extent Gibson also appeals the denial of his July 23, 2015 motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis, we note that the District Court had already granted Gibson 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis in its order entered on September 9, 2014. 

Accordingly, Gibson’s second motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was 

unnecessary.