United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 05-4140/06-1099

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Eric Clemmons, * 

* 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

William Armontrout, Warden; * 

George Brooks; Alonzo Gross; *

Arthur Dearixon; Thomas Steigerwald; *

Donald Cline; Larry Henson, Deputy * 

Warden; Bill Rutledge; Robert Acree; *

James Eberle; * 

* 

Cross-Appellees, * 

* 

Estate of George Brooks, * 

* 

Appellant/Cross-Appellee. *

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Submitted: November 17, 2006

Filed: February 12, 2007

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Before RILEY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Eric Clemmons, an inmate incarcerated at the Missouri State Penitentiary

("MSP"), sued MSP Investigator George Brooks, now deceased, Warden William
1

In 1983, Clemmons was convicted of capital murder and assault and sentenced

to life without the possibility of parole for 50 years. 

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Armontrout, and Corrections Supervisor Alonzo Gross (collectively referred to as

"appellants") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Clemmons alleged that appellants' intentional

or reckless failure to disclose or investigate exculpatory leads or exonerating

information deprived Clemmons of his liberty interest in a fair trial. Clemmons

contends that their acts caused him to be wrongfully convicted for murder and placed

on death row for 14 years. The district court granted summary judgment to Warden

Armontrout and Captain Gross, concluding that neither of them was personally

involved in the alleged deprivation of Clemmons's constitutional rights, but denied

Investigator Brooks qualified immunity. We reverse the district court's denial of

qualified immunity to Investigator Brooks and affirm the district court's grant of

summary judgment to Warden Armontrout and Captain Gross. 

I. Background

Clemmons is an inmate in the custody of the Missouri Department of

Corrections.1

 While Clemmons was incarcerated at the MSP, someone stabbed fellow

inmate Henry Johnson three times, leading to his death. When the assault occurred,

Corrections Officer Thomas Steigerwald called for assistance, and Captain Gross

responded to the call. Officer Steigerwald claimed to have witnessed the stabbing and

identified Clemmons as the perpetrator. Officer Steigerwald and Captain Gross took

Clemmons into custody. The officers noticed bloodstains on Clemmons's sweatshirt

and tennis shoes. 

After taking Clemmons into custody, Captain Gross returned to the scene of the

stabbing and ordered corrections officers to search for the assailant's weapon. No

weapon, however, was ever located. Thereafter, Captain Gross supervised a

preliminary investigation into Johnson's stabbing until the MSP investigator arrived

to conduct an investigation. In the meantime, inmate Dwight Clark approached
2

The "out-count" list sets forth the names of inmates who have permission to

be out of their cells. Douglas v. Clark, 993 F.2d 1549, 1993 WL 137718, at *3 (7th

Cir. Apr. 30, 1993) (unpublished). 

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Captain Gross and told him that he had witnessed two men assaulting Johnson. He

described both assailants as being black, stated his belief that one of the inmates was

Fred Bagby, and explained that he only knew the second inmate by sight. 

Captain Gross never interviewed Fred Bagby or searched his cell; however, he

did review the out-count list and concluded that because Bagby was not on the outcount list2

, Clark's statement was not credible. He admitted, however, that there would

have been more than one out-count list, meaning that Bagby could have been listed

on another out-count list that he did not check. Additionally, he conceded that an

inmate could be in the prison yard without being listed on the out-count list. 

After receiving and investigating Clark's statement, Captain Gross prepared an

Inter-Office Communication ("IOC") memorandum to Investigator Brooks—the MSP

investigator assigned to the murder investigation—which outlined Captain Gross's

investigation and his conversation with Clark. In the IOC, Captain Gross noted his

misgivings about Clark's statement, concluding that "[w]hen questioned in detail Clark

did not make sense and further investigation reflects that Clark's statement is untrue."

Warden Armontrout, Deputy Warden Donald Cline, Superintendent Robert Acree, and

Major James Eberle were forwarded a copy of the IOC. 

Investigator Brooks never interviewed Clark or Bagby as part of his

investigation. After he completed his investigation, he forwarded his investigation file

to Warden Armontrout, who then forwarded the file to the Cole County Prosecuting

Attorney's Office for review. The file forwarded to the prosecuting attorney did not

contain the IOC detailing Clark's statements. The prosecuting attorney charged

Clemmons with the murder of Johnson. Clemmons was subsequently convicted of the

murder in 1987 and sentenced to death. Clemmons exhausted his state appeals.
3

At trial, Clemmons presented the testimony of three fellow inmates who

identified Bagby as Johnson's killer; however, in each case, the witness had not come

forward until Bagby had died. The prosecution impeached the testimony of

Clemmons's witnesses by asserting that Bagby was conveniently dead at the time that

they came forward. Without knowledge of the IOC, Clemmons was unable to

rehabilitate his witnesses. At the time Clark accused Bagby of Johnson's murder,

Bagby was alive; therefore, Clark identifying Bagby as the killer an hour after the

murder would have supported the three inmates' testimony. In addition, Clemmons

could have called Clark as a witness. Clemmons, 124 F.3d at 950–51. 

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In 1997, Clemmons filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that exculpatory

evidence—the IOC—"was withheld from him prior to his trial in violation of Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)." Clemmons v.

Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1997). We granted Clemmons the writ, concluding

that "[w]hether framed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim or as a Brady

claim, Clemmons's claim undeniably states a constitutional violation." Id. at 949. "We

[could not] say with confidence that the jury would have reached the same verdict

when presented with an eyewitness [Clark] who accused a different inmate [Bagby]

of the crime within an hour of the murder, the very same inmate that three other

witnesses had also accused of the crime."3 Id. at 951.

The State of Missouri then retried Clemmons, and, on February 18, 2000, a jury

acquitted him of the murder of Johnson. Approximately three years later, Clemmons

filed the instant lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was deprived of his

liberty interest in a fair trial due to appellants' intentional or reckless failure to disclose

or investigate exculpatory leads or exonerating information. 

II. Discussion

The Estate of Investigator Brooks appeals, arguing that the district court erred

in denying Investigator Brooks qualified immunity because Clemmons failed to show

that Brooks intentionally or recklessly failed to investigate leads or produce

exculpatory information in violation of Clemmons's due process rights. Clemmons
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cross-appeals, asserting that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

Warden Armontrout and Captain Gross because a genuine issue of material fact

remains as to their "personal involvement" in the investigation of Johnson's murder.

A. Qualified Immunity

We review de novo the district court's denial of qualified immunity to

Investigator Brooks. McClendon v. Story County Sheriff's Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515

(8th Cir. 2005). 

To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we engage

in a two-part analysis. The "threshold question" is whether, taking the facts in the light

most favorable to the injured party, the alleged facts demonstrate that the official's

conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). "To

establish a substantive due process violation, plaintiffs must show that the behavior

of the [official] was so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the

contemporary conscience," Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quotations and citation omitted), and that the conduct "violated one or more

fundamental rights." Moore v. Briggs, 381 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2004). If we

conclude that the alleged facts do not establish the violation of a constitutional right,

then we need not address the second inquiry. Id. 

"On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the

parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. To determine whether a right is "clearly

established," we ask "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. 

As to the threshold inquiry, the Supreme Court has held that "suppression by

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
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good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)

(emphasis added). We recognized this constitutional violation in our previous decision

granting Clemmons habeas relief for the prosecution's failure to divulge the IOC. See

Clemmons, 124 F.3d at 949. 

We have, however, also recognized that while "[t]he Brady doctrine imposes

an absolute duty on the prosecutor to produce all materially favorable evidence in the

State's possession," the Court "has never imposed this absolute duty on law

enforcement officials other than the prosecutor." Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976,

979 (8th Cir. 2004). The "Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent

act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property."

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (emphasis added) (overruling Parratt

v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), "to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care

by a state official may 'deprive' an individual of life, liberty, or property under the

Fourteenth Amendment"). "[I]t would be impermissible to hold the police liable for

due process violations under § 1983 where they have acted in good faith." Jean v.

Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660 (4th Cir. 2000). "Indeed, negligent conduct cannot by

definition establish the 'affirmative abuse of power' necessary to constitute a due

process deprivation." Id. Therefore, where no evidence exists that the investigator

acted in bad faith or "engaged in a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence,"

the accused's due process rights have not been violated. Villasana, 368 F.3d at 980

(internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Likewise, "[n]egligent failure to investigate other leads or suspects does not

violate due process." Wilson v. Lawrence County, Mo., 260 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir.

2001) (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334). Even allegations of gross negligence fail to

establish a constitutional violation. Id. "[O]nly reckless or intentional failure to

investigate other leads offends a defendant's due process rights." Id. (emphasis added).
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We hold that, under the first prong of Saucier, Investigator Brooks did not

violate Clemmons's constitutional rights, as Clemmons adduced no evidence that

Brooks acted intentionally, recklessly, or in bad faith when he failed to disclose the

IOC to the prosecutor and failed to investigate Clark's statement that Bagby murdered

Johnson. While Clemmons argues that he demonstrated recklessness by providing

evidence that Investigator Brooks received the IOC, failed to interview Clark, failed

to interview other eyewitnesses, and failed to include the IOC to the prosecutor, he has

offered no explanation for why these actions constitute recklessness as opposed to

mere negligence. "[C]onclusory allegations will not suffice." Jean, 221 F.3d at 662.

As a matter of law, we conclude that the undisputed facts establish that

Investigator Brooks's actions were not intentional or reckless. Mere negligence on

Brooks's part by failing to disclose the IOC or investigating another lead is insufficient

to deny him qualified immunity. First, Captain Gross stated in the IOC that "Clark's

statement was not credible." Brooks may have erroneously relied on Gross's

credibility assessment or been less than thorough, but, without more, his actions

cannot be deemed "reckless." Investigator Brooks had the eyewitness statement of

Officer Steigerwald identifying Clemmons as the perpetrator. Second, as in Villasana,

Clemmons has produced no evidence that Brooks consciously sought to suppress

exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose the IOC to the prosecutor. Third,

Clemmons has not alleged that Investigator Brooks unlawfully coerced others to

suppress the exculpatory evidence or refrain from investigating other leads. See

Wilson, 260 F.3d at 955 (agreeing with the district court's conclusion that "[i]f [the

plaintiff's] allegations about unlawful coercion are proved true, a reasonable factfinder

could determine that Defendants recklessly or intentionally chose to force [the

plaintiff] to confess instead of attempting to solve the murder through reliable but time

consuming investigatory techniques designed to confirm their suspicions") (quotations

and citation omitted). 

Therefore, we hold that Investigator Brooks is entitled to qualified immunity.
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B. Personal Involvement

As to Clemmons's cross-appeal, we review de novo the district court's grant of

summary judgment to Warden Armontrout and Gross. Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass'n, 467

F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 2006). 

"Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility

for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory

defendants, [the plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or

direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights." Mayorga v.

Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). A plaintiff fails to meet this burden where no evidence is presented that the

officials caused the suppression of exculpatory evidence "or that [the officials]

participated in the investigation in anything other than a limited manner." Fleming v.

Greater St. Louis Area Major Case Squad, 48 F.3d 1223, 1995 WL 57457, at *2 (8th

Cir. Feb. 14, 1995) (unpublished). "[A] warden's general responsibility for supervising

the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement." Ouzts v.

Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987). 

Captain Gross's investigation of Johnson's murder was brief and limited, as he

only supervised a preliminary investigation into the stabbing incident until

Investigator Brooks arrived to take over the investigation. Once Investigator Brooks

took over the investigation, Captain Gross had nothing further to do with it. In

addition, the undisputed facts show that Captain Gross forwarded the information that

he received from Clark to Investigator Brooks via the IOC.

As to Warden Armontrout, his general supervisory duties are also insufficient

to establish his personal involvement in the investigation. Clemmons has produced no

evidence indicating that Warden Armontrout was ever directly involved in the

investigation of Johnson's murder. Furthermore, although Warden Armontrout did

receive a copy of the IOC, it was Investigator Brooks, not Warden Armontrout, who
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was responsible for putting the packet of investigatory materials together for the

prosecutor. 

Because the undisputed facts establish that Captain Gross and Warden

Armontrout had only minimal personal involvement in the investigation, we hold that

a reasonable jury could not return a verdict in Clemmons's favor. Therefore, the

district court properly granted summary judgment to Warden Armontrout and Captain

Gross. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity to

Investigator Brooks and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to

Warden Armontrout and Captain Gross. 

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