alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 60413 Summary Calendar

DONALD MORAN , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v. CENTURION; DOCTOR ROLANDO ABANGAN; OLLIE LITTLE, Health Services Administrator , Defendant s
- Appellee s

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:16

- CV

- 15

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Donald Moran, Mississippi prisoner # 171513, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants and the dismissal of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He argues that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indiffer ence to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, by failing to provide treatment from a podiatrist or to prescribe

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 30, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-60413 Document: 00514492348 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/30/2018No. 17

- 60413

2 pain medication for his healed ankle and foot injuries

. This court reviews a district court’s ruling on summary judg ment de novo, employing the same standard used by the district court. McFaul v. Venezuela , 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). As an inmate, Moran had a clearly established Eighth Amendment right not to be denied, by deliberate indifference, attention to h is serious medical needs. See Gobert v. Caldwell , 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2006). Prison officials violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when they demonstrate deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medica l needs, resulting in unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see Reeves v. Collins , 27 F.3d 174, 176

- 77 (5th Cir. 1994)

. The medical record s show that Moran requested and received treatment for his foot and ankle pain, including x

- rays, pain medicine, and orthopedic shoe s. While Moran argues that he continued to experience pain, the defendants’ unsuccessful treatment and Moran’s disagreement with the treatment are insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Gobert , 463 F.3d at 346. Further, the mere claim that he was not referred to a specialist does not itself state a claim of deliberate indifference. See Green v. McKaskle , 788 F.2d 1116, 1127 (5th Cir. 1986). Because Moran has not shown a “wanton disregard” for his “serious medical needs,” the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED

. See Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice , 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Case: 17-60413 Document: 00514492348 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/30/2018
**EXHIBIT 32.1***

 

SECTION 1350CERTIFICATIONS

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of California Coastal Communities, Inc. (the  “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Raymond J. Pacini, Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to Rule 13(a)-14(b) or Rule 15(d)-14(b) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on my knowledge:

 

1.               The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.               The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby 18 U.S.C. 1350 has been provided to California Coastal Communities, Inc. andwill be retained by California Coastal Communities, Inc. and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 
| Dated: November 4, 2004 | /s/ Raymond J. Pacini   |   |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
|                    | Raymond J. Pacini       |
|                    | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----

*In accordance withclause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), the above certification (A) shall not be deemed“filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section, and (B) shallnot be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under theSecurities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended, except to the extent that the Company explicitly incorporates it byreference in any such filing.

 

----
#### Lina Ambasa CASEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John D. ASHCROFT, Attorney General, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 01-15149.

D.C. No. CV-00-2581-FCD.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.1

Decided May 21, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

1

. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM2

This preliminary injunction appeal comes to use for review under Ninth Circuit Rule 3-3. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.

Our inquiry is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction or based its *519decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. *Does 1-5 v. Chandler,*83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1996).

The record before us shows that the district court did not rely upon an erroneous legal premise or abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant’s showing of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury was insufficient to warrant the preliminary injunctive relief. *Id.; see also Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press, Int’l, Inc.,*686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir.1982) (stating legal standards governing issuance of preliminary injunction). Moreover, the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous. *Chandler,*83 F.3d at 1152.

Accordingly, the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

2

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §1350




Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and in connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Cytomedix, Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010 (the “Report”), I, Martin P. Rosendale, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief:




1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for said period.




Date:  March 30, 2011





/s/ Martin P. RosendaleMartin P. RosendaleChief Executive Officer




A signed original of this written statement has been provided to Cytomedix, Inc. and will be retained by Cytomedix, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-04-00079-CR

Braxton Tyrone Henderson, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 55,347, HONORABLE MARTHA J. TRUDO, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant Braxton Tyrone Henderson guilty of assaulting a household

member, subsequent offense. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2004).

The court imposed a ten-year prison sentence.

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573

S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);

Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1969).
2

Appellant also filed a pro se brief responding to counsel’s brief. In this brief,

appellant asserts that he has learned since his trial that his earlier conviction was based on a false

arrest and that his attorney at trial should have used this fact to secure an acquittal in the instant

cause. These assertions are not supported by the record before us.

We have reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and the pro se brief. We find nothing

in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

__________________________________________

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Pemberton

Affirmed

Filed: September 10, 2004

Do Not Publish
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAKEISA GRIFFIN, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 15-0189-WS-C

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of all issues raised, and there 

having been no objections filed, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and dated March 7, 2016 is ADOPTED as the opinion of 

this Court.

DONE this 12th day of April, 2016.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:15-cv-00189-WS-C Document 23 Filed 04/12/16 Page 1 of 1
#### In the Matter of Bianca J., Respondent, v Dwayne A., Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 237]

Order, Family Court, New York County (Rhoda J. Cohen, J.), entered on or about March 9, 2012, which denied respondent’s objections to the Support Magistrate’s order denying his petition for a downward modification of the support order and granting the petition for an upward modification, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Respondent failed to submit credible evidence of his income, assets or means of support, and therefore did not meet his burden of showing an inability to pay his court-ordered child support so as to rebut petitioner’s prima facie evidence of a willful violation of the support order *(see Matter of Powers v Powers,*86 NY2d 63 [1995]).

Although respondent presented evidence that he was terminated from his job after taking an extended medical leave, he failed to establish that he thereafter “used his best efforts to obtain employment commensurate with his qualifications and experience” so as to show that his loss of employment constituted a change of circumstances warranting a downward modification *(see Matter of Heyward v Goldman,*23 AD3d 468, 469 [2d Dept 2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Eetitioner established a decrease in her salary, and, as set forth in her financial disclosure affidavit, increases in her rent, child care, and food expenses, thereby showing a substantial change in her circumstances sufficient to warrant an upward modification *(see Webb v Webb,*197 AD2d 847 [4th Dept 1993]; *575
      *Beck v Beck,*236 AD2d 703 [3d Dept 1997]). The Support Magistrate properly credited petitioner’s explanation that she was forced to accept a decrease in pay or risk termination of her employment *(see Matter of Heyward,*23 AD3d at 469).

Concur— Tom, J.E, Sweeny, Saxe, Román and Feinman, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1871 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1871

   To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for House of 
  Representatives, Office of the Minority Leader for fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
           referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for House of 
  Representatives, Office of the Minority Leader for fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR HOUSE OF 
              REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICE OF THE MINORITY LEADER FOR FISCAL 
              YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for House of Representatives, 
Office of the Minority Leader for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed 
$7,751,946.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTO****SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Inconnection with the Annual Report of Chemtura Corporation (the “Company”) onForm 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2006 (the “Report”), I, Robert L.Wood, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|        | /S/ ROBERT L. WOOD      |
|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Robert L. Wood          |
|   | Chairman, President and |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   | March 8, 2007           |

 

Thiswritten statement accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes ofSection 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
10955.

#### Loganville Banking Co. *v.*Forrester *et al.*

Decided March 2, 1921.

Motion to enter judgment; from Walton superior court — Judge W. L. Hodges presiding. August 19, 1919.

*J. H. Fellcer,*for plaintiff. *R. L. Oox, O. Roberts,*contra.

Luke, J.

This case is controlled by the decision this day rendered in *Loganville Banking Co.*v. *Brodnax,*ante, p. 352.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, G. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         522,673
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   37,457
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     42,093
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               612,261
<PP&E>                                       5,964,007
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,084,480
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,553,034    
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          283,691
<BONDS>                                      1,276,066
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,973,277
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,553,034
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,402,830
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  654,553
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               724,771
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              94,402
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                929,104
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            929,104
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   929,104
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   131.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   131.62
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Shirin S. Muldowney, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[967 NYS2d 522]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 6, 2012, which ruled, among other things, that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed.

Substantial evidence supports the determination that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed. The record establishes that, during the period in which claimant received unemployment insurance benefits, she worked in the evenings and on weekends as a licensed real estate agent. Specifically, claimant testified that, while receiving benefits, she attended meetings and training sessions in a real estate office, handed out business cards, used her cell phone to make and receive business calls, advertised properties, held open houses, showed property to clients, negotiated sales, contacted inspectors, prepared extensive paper work and closed two deals that earned her commissions. Such activities, which were in furtherance of a plan to produce income, constitute employment *(see Matter of Petrillo [Commissioner of Labor],*2 AD3d 948 [2003]; *Matter of Melnick [Commissioner of Labor],*268 AD2d 863, 864 [2000]; *Matter of Savage [Commissioner of Labor],*253 AD2d 924, 924 [1998]). We also reject claimant’s argument that her confusion regarding the reporting requirement rendered her conduct not willful. Claimant received and read a copy of the Department of Labor handbook that explained that such activities were to be reported, notwithstanding any lack of compensation. Nevertheless, claimant indicated on her certification for benefits that she was not involved in any business activity. Because it is the responsibility of a claimant to ensure accurate reporting regarding any business activity when certifying for unemployment insurance benefits, substantial evidence supports the Board’s *1283finding that claimant made false statements to obtain benefits, even if it was unintentional, which is insufficient *(see Matter of Bowlby [Commissioner of Labor],*31 AD3d 939, 940 [2006]; *Matter of Petrillo [Commissioner of Labor],*2 AD3d at 949).

Rose, J.P., Lahtinen, Spain and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000

       

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                  JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                        93,263
<SECURITIES>                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                 162,450
<ALLOWANCES>                  3,583
<INVENTORY>                   174,482
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              436,289
<PP&E>                        387,274
<DEPRECIATION>                238,520
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                681,118
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         121,843
<BONDS>                       41,276
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      1,027
<OTHER-SE>                    500,872
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  681,118
<SALES>                       632,228
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              632,228
<CGS>                         384,206
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 384,206
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              130,468
<LOSS-PROVISION>              1,242
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            4,868
<INCOME-PRETAX>               116,774
<INCOME-TAX>                  39,703
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           77,071
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  77,071
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 0.87
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0.87


        

</TABLE>
#### Isaira Fernandez, an Infant, by Her Mother, Olga Martinez et al., Respondents, v Lorna Bridges, Appellant.

[826 NYS2d 890]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Dianne T. Renwick, J.), entered February 8, 2006, which granted plaintiffs’ *241motion to restore the case to the calendar and denied defendant’s application to compel plaintiffs to provide proper authorizations and x-ray and MRI films, unanimously modified, on the facts, to the extent of requiring plaintiffs, within 30 days of service upon them of a copy of this order with notice of entry thereof, to provide defendant with proper authorizations and x-ray and MRI films, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs failed to provide defendant with court-ordered, post-note of issue discovery relevant to the inquest ordered following the striking of defendant’s answer. We therefore modify the order to require plaintiffs to comply with the court-ordered discovery obligations. We decline to disturb the court’s exercise of discretion in denying defendant’s request to transfer the case to Civil Court pursuant to CPLR 325 (d) *(see Matter of Hill v Smalls,*49 AD2d 724 [1975], *appeal dismissed*38 NY2d 893 [1976]). Defendant’s remaining claims are unavailing. Concur— Tom, J.P., Andrias, Marlow, Nardelli and McGuire, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2212 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2212

   To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Related 
    Agencies, National Institutes of Health: National Institute of 
           Environmental Health Studies for fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Related 
    Agencies, National Institutes of Health: National Institute of 
           Environmental Health Studies for fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR RELATED AGENCIES, 
              NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
              ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH STUDIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

     Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Related Agencies, 
National Institutes of Health: National Institute of Environmental 
Health Studies for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $79,000,000.
                                 <all>
```