J-S75023-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STARKSY IVEY

Appellant No. 715 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1204871-1998

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2014

Appellant, Starksy Ivey, appeals pro se from the January 17, 2014 

order dismissing as untimely his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful 

review, we affirm.

On February 22, 2000, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of 

murder and possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC).1 After a degreeof-guilt hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder2

and PIC. On April 28, 2000, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 907, respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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of life imprisonment. On February 15, 2002, this Court affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Ivey, 797 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition 

for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. As a result, his judgment 

of sentence became final on March 18, 2002, when the filing period for such 

a petition expired.3 See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 

1113(a). Thereafter, Appellant filed unsuccessful PCRA petitions in 2003 

and 2009. Appellant filed the instant petition on April 4, 2012. On January 

17, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. On February 

6, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

As noted above, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on April 4, 

2012. Therefore, it was patently untimely because it was not filed within 

one year of Appellant’s judgment of sentence becoming final. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). However, Appellant argues that the United States 

Supreme Court’s decisions in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), and 

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), satisfy the new constitutional 

right exception to the PCRA time-bar. Appellant’s Brief at 11; see also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). This Court has recently concluded that Frye and 

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3 We observe that the 30th day fell on Sunday, March 17, 2002. When 

computing the 30-day filing period “[if] the last day of any such period shall 

fall on Saturday or Sunday ... such day shall be omitted from the 

computation.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, the 30th day for Appellant to 

file a timely allocatur petition was Monday, March 18, 2002.
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Lafler do not satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Commonwealth v. 

Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA court’s 

January 17, 2014 order is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Judge Lazarus did not participate in the consideration or decision of 

this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2014