alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Derrick Solomon PRUITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janice BROWN, Washington County, MS Fourth Judicial District Circuit Court Clerk, in her individual and official capacities; Ashley Hines, Circuit Court Judge, Fourth Judicial District, Washington County, MS; Leola Jordan, Former Washington County Circuit Court Clerk, Defendants-Ap-pellees.

No. 05-60952

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 25, 2006.

Derrick Pruitt, Leakesville, MS, pro se.

Edwin W. Tindall, Lake Tindall, Green-ville, MS, John Lewis Clay, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Defendants-Appel-lees.

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Derrick Solomon Pruitt, Jr., Mississippi prisoner #46846, has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The district court denied Pruitt’s IFP motion and certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving for IFP, Pruitt is challenging the district court’s certification. *Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir.1997).

Pruitt alleged that Janice C. Brown, the Circuit Court Clerk for Washington County, Mississippi, denied his request for documents related to his criminal conviction. Pruitt alleged that Brown did not deliver the documents based on instructions from Circuit Judge Ashley Hines. “Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity *637from claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.” *Boyd v. Biggers,*31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir.1994). This immunity can be overcome only by demonstrating that the conduct complained of was non-judicial or by showing that the conduct was “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” *Id.*Judicial acts are those that are “ ‘normally performed by a judge’ ” and that affect parties who “ ‘dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’ ” *Id.*at 285. Court clerks “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.” *Clay v. Allen,*242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir.2001).

On appeal, Pruitt’s arguments are based solely on the irrelevant issue of qualified immunity for Brown. Pruitt makes the conclusional assertion that Brown’s refusal was a ministerial act not covered by qualified immunity. Pruitt does not refute his allegation that Brown was acting on the instructions of Judge Hines. Pruitt has not presented a nonfrivolous issue on appeal.

Pruitt has not shown that the district court’s determination that his appeal would be frivolous was incorrect. The instant appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. Accordingly, Pruitt’s request for IFP status is denied, and his appeal is dismissed. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-220 (5th Cir.1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0484

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ANDREW JOHN SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including August 23, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 17 2023

07/17/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0484
**EXHIBIT 10.14**

 

ANDREW CORPORATION

EXECUTIVE SEVERANCE BENEFIT PLAN AGREEMENT

 

THIS AGREEMENT, made this 5th day of July, 2004, by and between AndrewCorporation (the “Company”) and Robert Hudzik (the “Executive”),

 

WITNESSETH:

 

WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Andrew Corporation ExecutiveSeverance Benefit Plan, as amended and restated effective May 14, 2004 (the“Plan”); and

 

WHEREAS, the Executive has been designated as an eligible participantin the Plan;

 

NOW, THEREFORE, the Executive and Company hereby agree as follows:

 

1.                                       PlanBenefits.  The Executive has beendesignated as a TIER II Participant in the Plan and shall be eligible solelyfor the benefits set forth therein applicable to TIER II Participants.  The receipt of such benefits shall be subjectto all of the terms and conditions set forth in the Plan, including, but notlimited to, terms related to the amount, time and form of benefits.  By execution of this Agreement, theExecutive agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Plan, as amended andrestated effective May 14, 2004, and as may be subsequently amended.

 

2.                                       Arbitration.  The Executive acknowledges thatSection 7.2 of the Plan contains an arbitration provision, and byexecution of this Agreement agrees to be bound by the terms of such arbitrationprovision.

 

3.                                       PlanNot Contract of Employment.  ThePlan does not constitute a contract of employment and nothing in the Plan shallbe construed to give the Executive the right to be retained by the Company orto any benefits not specifically provided by the Plan.

 

4.                                       PlanSupercedes Prior Change in Control Severance Agreements.  The Executive acknowledges and agrees thatthe benefits and terms set forth in the May 14, 2004 restatement of the Plan,as applicable to the Participant based on the Tier designated in paragraph 1above, are a replacement for and in lieu of any benefits to which the Executivemay have been entitled under the Plan prior to its restatement or under anyother agreement with the Company relating to Change in Control severancebenefits.  The Executive furtheracknowledges such benefits and terms may be subsequently amended pursuant toSection 7.1 of the Plan.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to beexecuted as of the date first above written.

 
| EXECUTIVE            | ANDREW CORPORATION                           |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|                 |                                         |
|                 |                                         |
| /s/ Robert J. Hudzik |                                         | /s/ Ralph E. Faison |   |
| , individually       |                                         | By: Ralph E. Faison |
|                 | Its: President & Chief Executive Officer |
|                      |                                              |  |  |  |

 

----
EX-10.6



 Exhibit 10.6 

Power of Attorney 
 The company, Beijing
Century High-Tech Investment Co., Ltd, registered in the People’s Republic of China (“China”), with enterprise registration number 110000003484202, is the shareholder of Beijing Gamease Age Digital Technology Co., Ltd.
(“Gamease”), holding 100% equity interests of Gamease. The company hereby agrees and irrevocably grants the person (“fiduciary”) who is appointed by the board of Beijing AmazGame Age Internet Technology Co., Ltd.
(“AmazGame”) upon written resolutions from time to time with the following rights during the term of this Power of Attorney: 
 Authorize the
fiduciary as the unique and exclusive attorney of the company and solely represent the company to exercise the shareholder’s all the due rights according to the Chinese laws and Gamease’s Articles of Association (including current and
future amendments from time to time), including but not limited to the right to call the shareholder’s meeting (if applicable), accept the notice regarding the shareholder’s meeting (if applicable) and discussion procedure, participate in
the shareholder’s meeting and exercise the voting right (if applicable , including but not limited to nominate, elect or appoint the director, general manager, financial controller or other senior management personnel, and the matters of
dividend distribution etc.), make any shareholder decision, sell or transfer any or all of the equity interests of Gamease owned by himself/herself. 
 Such
authorization and appointment are based upon the precondition that the fiduciary is acting as an employee of AmazGame or its affiliates. Once the fiduciary loses his/her title or position in AmazGame or its affiliates, or the board of AmazGame
terminates such authorization and appointment in written notice, the authorization and appointment that granted by the company shall be immediately void. The company will designate/authorize the other individual nominated by the board of AmazGame in
written resolutions to exercise all the above shareholder’s due rights. 
 The term of this Power of Attorney has the same term as the Business
Operation Agreement that entered by Gamease, AmazGame and other party in April 15, 2015. If the foregoing Business Operation Agreement is terminated early or extended in accordance with the terms of this agreement, this Power of Attorney shall
terminate at the same time as the Business Operation Agreement, or extend at the same time with the same extension of maturity as the Business Operation Agreement. Within the term of this Power of Attorney, this Power of Attorney shall not be
revised or terminated without the written consent of AmazGame. 
 Beijing Century High-Tech Investment Co., Ltd (Signature/Seal) 

April 15, 2015
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. §1350




Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and in connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A,
Amendment No. 2 of Cytomedix, Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2009 (the “Report”), I, Andrew S. Maslan, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and
belief:




1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      for said period.


Date:  January
      7, 2011
                    
                    /s/ Andrew S.
      MaslanAndrew
      S. MaslanChief
      Financial Officer




A
signed original of this written statement has been provided to Cytomedix, Inc.
and will be retained by Cytomedix, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Anthony A. Barone, certify that:
1.   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of J.L. French AutomotiveCastings, Inc and Subsidiaries;
2.   Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the year covered by this annualreport;
3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other informationincluded in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant asof, and for, the years presented in this annual report;
4.   The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
     a)   Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the year in which this annual report is being prepared;
     b)   Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on suchevaluation; and
     c)   Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and
     5.   The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
     a)   All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and
     b)   Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
March 17, 2004    /s/ ANTHONY A. BARONE Anthony A. Barone Chief Financial Officer
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ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

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IT IS SO ORDERED



1

Judge’s signature

-


1

(if different from order date) Printed name and title

 Southern District of Alabama

NOLAN KENDRICK BOYINGTON 11-00270-005

12316-003

June 21, 2012

Pro Se

✔

✔

121 97 months

June 21, 2012

March 11, 2015

November 1, 2015 United States District Judge

Callie V.S. Granade 

U.S. District Judge

Digitally signed by Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge 

DN: cn=Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge, o=U.S. 

Government, ou=Federal Judiciary, 

email=efile_granade@alsd.uscourts.gov, c=US 

Date: 2015.03.11 08:24:08 -06'00'

Case 1:11-cr-00270-CG-N Document 195 Filed 03/11/15 Page 1 of 1
#### Ronald Paul ADAMS, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee, v. Nathan MATHIS et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Roy L. THORNELL, State Fire Marshal, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-2035.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 17, 1980.

*43Robert S. Lamar, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., W. Scears Barnes, Jr., Alexander City, Ala., for defendants-appellants.

Joel M. Nomberg, Daleville, Ala., for Ronald Paul Adams.

Drew S. Days, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civ. Rights Div., John B. Oakley, Barry E. Teague, U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., Kenneth E. Vines, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dept. of Justice, Walter W. Barnett, Joan F. Hartman, Attys., Appellate Section, Civ. Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for the U. S.

Charles H. Barnes, State Dept. of Ins., David E. Allred, Montgomery, Ala., for Roy L. Thornell, State Fire Marshal.

Before AINSWORTH and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER,* District Judge.

*

 District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

This class litigation was instituted by the filing of a pro se complaint alleging serious constitutional violations in the operation of the Houston County Jail in Dothan, Alabama. In March 1975 the Court granted the motion of the United States to intervene and subsequently certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of all inmates of the jail at any time since the suit was filed, as well as all future inmates to be confined in that facility.

The District Court found that the jail was seriously overcrowded, posed a health hazard, was psychologically debilitating to inmates, did not adequately protect inmates from harm, had no classification system, and did not adequately separate male and female inmates. The District Judge’s order of extensive relief was commensurate in scope with that of the infirmities discerned.1*Williams v. Edwards,*547 F. 2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); *Newman v. Alabama,*503 F.2d at 1320 (5th Cir. 1974). We affirm on the basis of the District Court’s opinion at 458 F.Supp. 302.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Pursuant to court order, defendants have filed reports which reflect clear compliance with the specifics. The Fire Marshal argues that he has complied as precisely as possible, but seeks relief from the language which prohibits him, generally, from “depriving any member of the class of his or her constitutional rights.” He argues persuasively that this language does not apprise him of the acts he is restrained from doing. Defendants may and should seek clarification from the district court.
----

**EXHIBIT        32.2**

**CERTIFICATION        OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**Pursuant        to**

**18        U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**As        Adopted pursuant to**

**Section        906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

| Date:                  February 8, 2007 | By:    | /s/                  Greg A. LeClaire                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                    |   | Greg                  A. LeClaire                                                                     |
|                                    |   | Chief                  Financial Officer(Principal                  Financial and Accounting Officer) |

**A        signed original of the written statement above required by Section 906 of        the        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to ClearOne Communications,        Inc.        and will be retained by ClearOne Communications, Inc. and furnished to the        Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon        request.**
11701.

#### Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co. *v.*Rawls.

Bloodworth, J.

1. In the motion for a new trial certain evidence is objected to as “ entirely immaterial.” In *Thompson*v. *Thompson,*77 *Ga.*692(7) (3 S. E. 161), it is held: “Neither the rejection nor admission of immaterial evidence is cause for a new trial.” If the court erred in the admission of the evidence complained of, it was not of such materiality as to require the grant of a new trial. See *Arnold*v. *Stevens,*139 *Ga.*495 (77 S. E. 579); *Brown*v. *State,*119 *Ga.*572(2) (46 S. E. 833); *Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co.*v. *Parsons,*12 *Ga. App.*180(6) (76 S. E. 1063).

2. When considered in connection with all the facts of the case and in the light of the entire charge of the court, no error that would require the grant of a new trial appears in any of the excerpts from the charge of which complaint is made. In his charge the judge covered all the material issues in the case, submitted them fairly, and did not “express or intimate his opinion as to what had or had not been proved.” *585If more specific instructions were desired, on any particular contention of the defendant, they should have been embodied in a proper and legal request submitted to the judge before the jury retired to consider of their verdict.

Decided April 13, 1921.

Action on insurance policy; from Mitchell superior court — Judge Harrell. April 19, 1920.

The insurance company contended that the fire-insurance policy sued upon had been surrendered and canceled before the fire. The plaintiff contended that he delivered the policy to the company’s agent for the purpose of enabling the agent to make an indorsement on it, but not for surrender and cancellation.' The evidence referred to in paragraph 1 of the decision was to the effect that the plaintiff made efforts to see the agent and get the policy on the next day after the night of the fire, and that he then learned for the first time that the insurance company claimed that his policy had been canceled; that thq agent then said that he had canceled it and had sent it to the company, but did not say why it had been canceled. This testimony was admitted over the objection that it was “ entirely immaterial. ”

*Smith, Ham’mond & Smith, Ernest M. Davis,*for plaintiff in error. *H. H. Merry, E. E. Oox,*contra.

3. On conflicting evidence the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the verdict has the approval of the presiding judge and must be

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles', G. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
Exhibit 12

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated

Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

(In Thousands, Except Ratios)



|                                                   |  |               |        |      |   |       
|-------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------- | ------ | ---- | - | ------
|                                                   |  | First Quarter
|                                                   |  | 2007          |        | 2006
|Computation of Earnings                            |  |               |        |      |   |       
|Income before income taxes                         |  | $             | 7,650  |      | $ | 1,374 
|Add:                                               |  |               |        |      |   |       
|Minority interest                                  |  |               | 681    |      |   | 556   
|Interest expense                                   |  |               | 11,450 |      |   | 11,555
|Amortization of debt premium/discount and expenses |  |               | 768    |      |   | 665   
|Interest portion of rent expense                   |  |               | 305    |      |   | 292   
|                                                   |  |               |        |      |   |       
|Earnings as adjusted                               |  | $             | 20,854 |      | $ | 14,442
|                                                   |  |               |        |      |   |       
|                                                   |  |              
|Computation of Fixed Charges:                      |  |               |        |      |   |       
|Interest expense                                   |  | $             | 11,450 |      | $ | 11,555
|Capitalized interest                               |  |               | 273    |      |   | 63    
|Amortization of debt premium/discount and expenses |  |               | 768    |      |   | 665   
|Interest portion of rent expense                   |  |               | 305    |      |   | 292   
|                                                   |  |               |        |      |   |       
|Fixed charges                                      |  | $             | 12,796 |      | $ | 12,575
|                                                   |  |               |        |      |   |       
|Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges                 |  |               | 1.63   |      |   | 1.15  
|                                                   |  |               |        |      |   |