J-A01030-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TERRANCE M. BRENNAN AND GLADYS A. 

BRENNAN,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellees

v.

NVR, INC., T/A NV HOMES,

Appellant No. 2256 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Civil Division at No.: 2016-10546-TT

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2018

Appellant, NVR, Inc., t/a NV Homes, appeals from the trial court’s June 

20, 2017 order denying its preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to 

compel arbitration. We affirm.

We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from 

the trial court’s September 1, 2017 opinion and our independent review of the 

certified record.

[Appellees’] Complaint avers the following. On November 

17, 2014[,] the parties executed a Pennsylvania Purchase 

Agreement (Purchase Agreement) related to the construction of 

[Appellees’] home. The Purchase Agreement did not contain an 

arbitration provision. Section 6 of the Purchase Agreement states 

in relevant part: “You have received a copy of Seller’s limited 

warranty (the “Limited Warranty”) prior to execution of this 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Agreement and You agree to accept this warranty as the sole 

warranty being given to Purchaser. THE LIMITED WARRANTY OF

THIS AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY WARRANTY BY SELLER 

APPLICABLE TO THE PROPERTY. . . .” (emphasis in original). 

[Appellees] assert that they were not provided with this Limited 

Warranty prior to executing the Purchase Agreement or at 

settlement. At some point after settlement, [Appellees] were 

provided with a Limited Warranty that related to the construction 

of condominiums. According to [Appellees], nine months after 

settlement, [Appellant] provided them with the “correct” Limited 

Warranty. The Limited Warranty contained the following 

provision: “THE LIMITED WARRANTY PROVIDED FOR IN THIS 

BOOKLET INCLUDES BINDING ARBITRATION IN THE EVENT OF A 

DISPUTE WHICH IS NOT SETTLED BETWEEN YOU AND THE 

BUILDER. . . .” (emphasis in original). . . . 

* * *

. . .[Appellees] assert the following with regard to the construction 

of the house. Prior to settlement and before the installation of the 

exterior siding, stone veneer and drywall, [Appellees] retained 

Peach Inspections to conduct an inspection. Peach Inspections 

identified and photographed “significant defects and sloppy 

installation in the house-wrap, flashing and window installations 

that would allow water intrusion and included this information in 

an inspection report.” [Appellees] provided this report to 

[Appellant’s] Project Manager Kevin Hawley. Mr. Hawley 

promised to correct the identified issues before settlement. 

[Appellees] also requested that Mr. Hawley photograph the 

completed corrections. Subsequently, Mr. Hawley represented to 

[Appellees] that the problems identified by Peach Inspections had 

been corrected; however, he had not had time to photograph 

those corrections. [Appellees] were concerned about completing 

settlement; however, Mr. Hawley again reassured them that the 

issues had been resolved. By this time, it was impossible for

[Appellees] to independently verify that the issues had been 

corrected since the exterior siding, stone veneer and drywall had 

been installed. Based on Mr. Hawley’s representations, 

[Appellees] completed settlement. However, after settlement, 

[Appellees] discovered significant defects such as water leaks 

around the windows and doors as well as the ceiling, basement 

and garage. Four months after settlement, [Appellees] retained 

Peach Inspections to return to the property. Peach Inspection

removed the siding and found the defects originally identified to 
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be in the same condition they were in at the time of the original 

inspection. 

(Trial Court Opinion, 9/01/17, at 2-4).

Appellees filed the instant complaint on November 9, 2016, alleging 

counts for fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of Pennsylvania’s unfair 

trade practices and consumer protection law. See 73 P.S. §§ 201-1, et seq. 

Appellant filed preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to compel 

arbitration on February 7, 2017. On June 20, 2017, the trial court overruled 

the preliminary objections and directed Appellant to file an answer. The 

instant, timely appeal followed. On July 14, 2017, the trial court ordered 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed its Rule 1925(b) statement on August 1, 

2017. See id. On September 1, 2017, the trial court issued an opinion. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:

I. Is this appeal proper, where it is taken from an 

order overruling preliminary objections seeking to enforce 

the arbitration clause contained in the parties’ contract?

II. Did the trial court exceed its discretion in 

declining to enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement, 

where that agreement was valid, enforceable and this 

dispute is within the scope of that provision?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 2).

In its first issue, Appellant argues that this Court has jurisdiction over 

the appeal. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 2, 11). Appellees do not challenge this 
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Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal. (See Appellees’ Brief, at 7-18). It is long 

settled that an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is immediately 

appealable; therefore, we need not further address this issue. See 42 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 7320(a)(1); Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).

In its second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

declining to enforce the arbitration agreement. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-

22). We disagree.

Our scope and standard of review are settled.

We begin by noting that our review of a claim that the trial 

court improperly denied preliminary objections in the nature of a 

petition to compel arbitration is limited to determining whether 

the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

petition. As contract interpretation is a question of law, our review 

of the trial court’s decision is de novo and our scope is plenary. 

Petersen v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 641, 644 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (citations omitted).

Pennsylvania law favors settlement of disputes by arbitration. See 

Provenzano v. Ohio Valley General Hosp., 121 A.3d 1085, 1096 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). When deciding whether a trial court should have compelled 

arbitration, we employ a two-part test: (1) does a valid agreement to arbitrate 

exist, and (2) is the dispute within the scope of the agreement. See Smay 

v. E.R. Stuebner, Inc., 864 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2004). “[I]f a valid 

arbitration agreement exists between the parties and [the plaintiff’s] claim is 

within the scope of the agreement, the controversy must be submitted to 
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arbitration.” Highmark Inc. v. Hospital Service Ass'n. of Northeastern 

Pennsylvania, 785 A.2d 93, 98 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 797 A.2d 

914 (Pa. 2002). “[T]he scope of arbitration is determined by the intention of 

the parties as ascertained in accordance with the rules governing contracts 

generally.” Henning v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 795 A.2d 994, 996 

(Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 808 A.2d 572 (Pa. 2002) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the trial court found both that there was no valid agreement to 

arbitrate and that, even if there was, the instant matter was not within the 

scope of the arbitration agreement. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 3-4). After a 

thorough review of the certified record, we agree.

As the trial court correctly discussed, (see id. at 2-3), the relevant 

contract between the parties is the Purchase Agreement. The Purchase 

Agreement does not contain an arbitration clause. (See Purchase Agreement, 

11/17/14, at 1-11). The section of the Purchase Agreement entitled “Claims 

and Disputes” does not mention arbitration. (See id. at 4 ¶ 13). Again, the 

trial court rightly found that the only mention of arbitration occurs within the 

Limited Warranty, contained within the Homeowner’s Manual. (See Trial Ct. 

Op., at 3-4; Defendant’s Preliminary Objections, 2/07/17, Exhibit 1 at 61-62 

¶ 12). The Limited Warranty, which was unsigned, is not incorporated into 

the Purchase Agreement. (See Purchase Agreement, at 6 ¶¶ 27-28). While 

it is mentioned in the Purchase Agreement, (see id. at 2 ¶ 6), the Purchase 
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Agreement specifically mandated that Appellant provide a copy of the Limited 

Warranty to Appellees prior to the execution of the Purchase Agreement. (See 

id.). Appellant does not dispute that it failed to do so and that, when it did 

supply a copy of the Limited Warranty to Appellees, it provided the wrong one, 

only providing the correct Limited Warranty many months after the signing of 

the Purchase Agreement. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 5; Defendant’s 

Preliminary Objections, at 2-3). Under these circumstances, we cannot say 

that “both parties have manifested an intent to be bound by the terms of the 

[Limited Warranty.]” Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. Tedco Constr. Corp., 

657 A.2d 511, 516 (Pa. Super. 1995). Thus, we find that the trial court neither 

abused its discretion nor committed an error of law in finding that there was 

no valid agreement to arbitrate. See Quiles v. Financial Exchange Co., 

879 A.2d 281, 286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005) (affirming trial court decision that 

there was no valid agreement to arbitrate where, although arbitration 

agreement was contained within employee handbook, record demonstrated 

that it was not provided to employee at time of hiring despite employee’s 

signature on document saying she had read and received handbook). 

Moreover, even if there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, we agree 

with the trial court that the instant matter is not within the scope of the 

arbitration provision. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 3-4). As the trial court stated:

The booklet containing the Limited Warranty as well as the 

Limited Warranty itself describes the various systems in the house 

([e.g.] HVAC, structural components etc.), maintenance 

requirements as well as [Appellant’s] liability for repairing damage 
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to same. However, as detailed above, the instant action is not 

based on the improper construction of the home, but rather 

[Appellant’s] representative’s fraudulent misrepresentations. 

Therefore, we found that [Appellees’] causes of action did not fall 

within the arbitration provision. . . . 

(Id. at 4). We have thoroughly reviewed the record. Appellees’ complaint 

specifically alleges that Appellant’s employee fraudulently misrepresented that 

he had undertaken the repairs requested by Appellees but had not actually 

done so and other violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and 

Consumer Protection Laws. (See Complaint, 11/09/16, at 6-8). We see 

nothing in the Limited Warranty or the arbitration clause that covers these 

types of claims. (See Limited Warranty, at 61-62 ¶ 12; see also id. at 59-

63). Thus, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor committed an error 

of law in finding that the instant matter was not within the scope of the 

arbitration agreement. See Henning, supra at 996-97 (holding that limited 

arbitration clause only covers those disputes within its terms). 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the order of the 

trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/18