NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMY FIEDEROWICZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-35567

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-01036-MO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 12, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge; HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges. 

Amy Lorene Fiederowicz appeals the district court’s affirmance of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 13 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-16254 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, and the 

Commissioner's decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, 

and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Attmore v. Colvin, 

827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016). If the evidence is “susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation,” we are required to affirm. Id. (quoting Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by regulation on other grounds). 

We affirm. 

The ALJ erred in failing to discuss the April 2013 opinion of Fiederowicz’s

treating physician Dr. Jacqueline Lustig, which addressed Fiederowicz’s condition 

shortly after brain surgery during which she suffered a stroke. See Marsh v. 

Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2015). Dr. Lustig’s opinion was 

considered, however, in Fiederowicz’s prior unsuccessful claim for benefits, and 

her current claim alleged a failure to improve sufficiently in subsequent months. 

In the context of the current claim, the ALJ’s error is harmless because Dr. 

Lustig’s assessment of Fiederowicz’s post-operative condition is “inconsequential 

to the ultimate nondisability determination” and this court can confidently 

conclude that no reasonable ALJ could have reached a different disability 

determination based on the neglected opinion. Id. at 1173 (quoting Stout v. 
3 17-16254 

Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion of 

examining clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Julia Wong-Ngan. The ALJ was not 

required to include every facet of Dr. Wong-Ngan’s opinion in the residual 

functional capacity (RFC) because the ALJ is “responsible for translating and 

incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” See Rounds v. Comm'r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Stubbs–Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008)). Moreover, the ALJ discounted parts 

of Dr. Wong-Ngan’s opinion for valid reasons, and the RFC was properly based on 

Dr. Wong-Ngan’s clinical findings, as well as other opinions and evidence in the 

record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.