IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL NO. 15-00134-CG

RAYFIELD SNOWDEN

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Rayfield Snowden’s (hereinafter, 

Defendant) motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his 

vehicle (Doc. 14) and the United States’ response (Doc. 17). For the reasons stated

herein, Defendant’s motion to suppress is due to be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts were established at the suppression hearing in this 

matter:

On April 13, 2015, Defendant was traveling along U.S. Highway 98 in Mobile 

County, Alabama. Alabama State Trooper George Roe conducted a traffic stop due 

to Defendant traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. Upon approaching the 

vehicle, Trooper Roe observed normal items within the car, such as a suit hanging 

from the rear window, an overnight bag in the back seat, and cell phone in the 

middle console. Trooper Roe asked Defendant for his insurance and registration. 

When Defendant opened his glove box, Trooper Roe observed a prescription pill 

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bottle. Trooper Roe asked Defendant to leave his vehicle and join him in the 

cruiser. After Defendant got out of his vehicle, Trooper Roe performed a brief pat 

down of Defendant for officer safety. Trooper Roe felt what appeared to be a roll of 

money in Defendant’s pocket. When asked the amount, Defendant stated that he 

had $600 – $700 dollars.

While in Trooper Roe’s cruiser, Defendant exhibited nervous behavior. 

Trooper Roe described defendant’s behavior as frigid and uncomfortable in the seat. 

Defendant informed Trooper Roe that he was returning home from visiting a sick 

friend in Houston, Texas and lady friend in Mesquite, Texas. Trooper Roe ran

Defendant’s information, vehicle information, and insurance information through 

law enforcement databases and found no reason to further detain Defendant. 

Trooper Roe then issued Defendant a written warning for speeding and returned all 

of Defendant’s information to him. As Defendant reached over to shake Trooper 

Roe’s hand, end the encounter, and exit the cruiser, Trooper Roe began further 

questioning Defendant. Trooper Roe asked to count the money Defendant had in 

his pocket. Trooper Roe discovered that Defendant had approximately $1,200 

instead of the amount initially represented. Based on this discrepancy, Trooper Roe 

asked Defendant whether he had any additional money or drugs in his vehicle. 

Defendant stated that he did not and volunteered verbal consent to search the 

vehicle. 

Trooper Roe requested additional officer support to assist with the search. 

Upon searching the vehicle, troopers found two packages of cocaine, in the center, 

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headliner console. Further search of the vehicle revealed a kilo of cocaine inside a 

hidden compartment access door. Trooper Roe arrested Defendant. Defendant was 

subsequently indicted with two counts of violating Title 21, United States Code, 

Section 841(a)(1). 

II. ANALYSIS

The issue is whether Trooper Roe’s prolonged detention of Defendant and 

investigation into matters unrelated to the initial traffic stop are supported by 

reasonable suspicion.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence derived 

from a search that violates the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal 

trial against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. United States v. Perkins,

348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003).

In a recent opinion, the United States Supreme Court re-stated the relevant 

law and expanded on the matter at issue:

A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that 

violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter”, a routine traffic stop is 

“more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than a formal arrest.” 

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1 (1968)). See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). 

Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the 

traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”––to 

address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 

U.S., at 407, and attend to related safety concerns, infra, at 6–7. See 

also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985); Florida v. 

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the 

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detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”). 

Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may 

“last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Ibid. 

See also Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407. Authority for the seizure thus 

ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are–or reasonably should 

have been–completed. See Sharpe, 470 U.S., at 686 (in determining 

the reasonable duration of a stop, “it [is] appropriate to examine 

whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation”).

. . . 

The seizure remains lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquires do not 

measurably extend the duration of the stop.” 555 U.S., at 333. . . . An 

officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an 

otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . [an officer] may not do so in a 

way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily 

demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–615 (2015). Thus, 

absent articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, detention beyond what 

is necessary to complete the traffic stop is unconstitutional. Id. at 1616. 

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exits, the court “must look at 

the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer 

has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 271 (2002) (internal citation omitted); United States 

v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). “It is clear that an inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity is not enough to satisfy the 

minimum level of objectivity.” United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 970 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Like the determination of 

probable cause discussed in Illinois v. Gates, the relevant inquiry in evaluating the 

presence of reasonable suspicion is “‘not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or 

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“guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal 

acts.’” United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370–371 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal 

activity is justified under circumstances such as no proof of ownership of the 

vehicle, no proof of authority to operate the vehicle, and inconsistent statements 

about the destination. United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 

1999). Furthermore, nervous behavior, coupled with additional factors, can form 

the basis of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See, e.g., United 

States v. Sims, 385 F.3d 1347, 1354–355 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable 

suspicion based on nervous conduct, a prior history of drugs, and a questionable 

story about the defendant’s travel plans); United States v. Payne, 2008 WL 

4671778, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 21, 2008) (finding reasonable suspicion where the 

defendant exhibited a nervous demeanor, the officer smelled marijuana emanating 

from the vehicle, and observed “blunt powder” in the car). 

Trooper Roe lawfully conducted a routine stop of Defendant’s vehicle for 

speeding. Defendant complied with the stop, provided all requested information, 

and joined Trooper Roe in his cruiser. Upon running Defendant’s information, 

Trooper Roe found that Defendant had no outstanding warrants or criminal history

and that the car was registered to Defendant. Trooper Roe then issued Defendant a 

written warning for speeding and returned all documentation to Defendant. At this 

point the seizure’s mission was accomplished and further investigation should have 

ceased. Defendant attempted to terminate the encounter and exit the cruiser. 

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Trooper Roe, however, began questioning Defendant as to the amount of money he 

possessed, which prolonged his detention. The court finds that Trooper Roe’s 

additional questions measurably extended the tolerable duration of the stop in such 

a way that violates the Fourth Amendment. 

The government argues that Defendant’s prolonged detention is justified by 

the reasonable suspicion Trooper Roe formed before returning Defendant’s 

documentation. More specifically, the government contends that Defendant’s 

nervousness, the prescription pill bottle in Defendant’s glove box, the reasonably 

large sum of cash Defendant had on his person, and the discrepancy about the 

amount of money Defendant possessed provides a basis for reasonable suspicion. 

The Court disagrees. 

Trooper Roe testified that he observed normal travel items in Defendant’s 

car. Further, upon questioning, Defendant provided a plausible itinerary of his 

travel. Although Trooper Roe indicated that Defendant exhibited nervous behavior, 

Trooper Roe testified that he uncovered no evidence whatsoever of any crime before 

giving Defendant’s documentation back to him and completing the traffic stop. This 

is not a case where Defendant was driving a rented vehicle, had a criminal history 

for trafficking drugs, or was traveling along a well-known drug corridor. It is 

reasonable to think that an individual would be nervous due to a police encounter. 

And it is reasonable to think that an individual’s nervousness would be heightened 

when he is asked to join an officer in his cruiser. Moreover, Trooper Roe did not 

discover the discrepancy in the amount of money Defendant possessed until after 

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the initial stop was completed. Therefore, it is not a factor to consider in deciding 

whether the prolonged stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. Nor did the 

trooper explain why possession of a prescription pill bottle in the name of the driver 

would arouse suspicion of illegal activity.

In conclusion, the prolonged detention of Defendant failed to comport with 

the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because Trooper Roe failed to 

articulate a particularized suspicion that criminal activity was afoot before the 

initial traffic stop with Defendant was completed. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to suppress (Doc. 14) is 

GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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