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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT THOMAS, JR.,

AIS #115280

Plaintiff,

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:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-248-WS-M

:

CORIZON, INC., et. al,

Defendant.

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:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This § 1983 action, filed by Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., an 

Alabama prison inmate, proceeding pro se, was referred to 

the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 

S.D. Ala. GenLR 72, and is now before the Court on 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Second 

Amended Complaint (Docs. 1, 5, 35-37), Defendants’ Answers

and Special Reports (Docs. 22, 23, 45, 46), which the Court 

has converted into a Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 

34, 47), and to which Plaintiff has responded. (Docs. 25, 

31, 35, 50). After consideration of the pleadings, 

Motions, and Responses, and for the reasons set out below, 

it is recommended that Defendants’ Motions for Summary 

Judgment be granted and that Plaintiff’s action be 

dismissed with prejudice.

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I. Facts and Proceedings

This action arises out of an incident on April 15, 2015, 

wherein Plaintiff was stabbed during a fight between two 

other inmates in the H-Dorm. (Doc. 1 at p. 4). According 

to Plaintiff, prior to him being injured, Officer Barron 

was made aware of the altercation but did not intervene. 

(Doc. 35). Plaintiff additionally claims he was injured

“because of the narrow spacing where I sleep.” (Id). 

Lastly, Plaintiff complains that following the incident he 

was taken to the infirmary where “no alcohol pads, gauzes, 

bandaids, or the primary supplies used for treatment was 

available.” (Id). Plaintiff contends that he bled for two 

and a half hours and his high blood pressure skyrocketed. 

(Id). The following morning, Plaintiff returned to the 

infirmary where he received stitches, but not pain 

medication. (Id). Plaintiff contends the incident was the 

result of a “lack of security/over-crowdness (sic)/and 

narrow bed spacing.” (Id).

According to Defendants, on April 15, 2015, at 12:55 

a.m., Officer Barron, while working as the night rover, 

discovered an altercation between two inmates (not 

Plaintiff) in H-Dorm. (Docs. 46-1, 46-2, 46-5). Officer 

Barron called for assistance, but prior to assistance 

arriving, other inmates within H-Dorm stopped the 

Case 1:15-cv-00248-WS-M Document 58 Filed 03/08/16 Page 2 of 20
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altercation. (Docs. 46-1, 46-2). Officers then detained 

the two inmates involved in the altercation and took them 

to the infirmary and then to segregation (Id). 

Immediately following the altercation, several weapons were 

found and confiscated from H-Dorm. (Id). At 2:30 a.m., 

approximately two hours after the altercation, Plaintiff 

arrived in the infirmary and stated to the nurse that “I 

hit my knee when I was tying to get out of the way of them 

fighting.” (Doc. 23-1 at p. 9). Medical records show that

Plaintiff was treated for a three to four inch1 laceration 

on his right knee wherein the wound was cleaned and 

covered. (Doc. 23-1 at pp. 5-9). Plaintiff then returned 

to the infirmary the following day where he was seen by Dr. 

Kouns. (Id). Plaintiff’s medical records from the day 

after his initial treatment indicate that Dr. Kouns 

examined and sutured Plaintiff’s wound. (Id). There is no 

indication that Plaintiff made any complaints relating to 

his blood pressure on April 15, or April 16, 2015, or 

thereafter. (Id). According to Officer Barron’s 

Affidavit, on the date of the incident, he did not know 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 There is a disparity in the medical records relating to the size of 

Plaintiff’s laceration. According to Defendant Strickland’s notes, the 

wound was between 3” and 31⁄2“ (using the inch symbol, but not the word), 

and according to Dr. Kouns’ notes the wound was approximately “4.0 cm”. 

(Doc. 23-1 at pp. 5-9).

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Plaintiff and was unaware of Plaintiff’s alleged 

involvement in the altercation in H-Dorm. (Doc. 46-1). 

Plaintiff has now brought this action against the Alabama 

Department of Corrections (ADOC), Lieutenant Davis, Officer 

Barron, Nurse Strickland, Ken Dover, and Corizon, Inc. 

(Corizon) asserting his Eighth Amendment rights were 

violated. For damages, Plaintiff request that Defendants 

“[r]eward me in money for my suffering and try and make 

things better for the treatment of the inmates as far as 

medical situations are concerned. (Doc. 1 at p. 7). 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court 

authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of 

law” to the party who moves for summary judgment. 

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact. . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The Court must view the evidence produced by “the 

nonmoving party, and all factual inferences arising from 

it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield 

v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, 

Rule 56(e) states that:

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If a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party’s assertion of 

fact as required by Rule 56(c), the 

court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly 

support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion; 

(3) grant summary judgment if the 

motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered 

undisputed—show that the movant is 

entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless 

there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the 

evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not significantly 

probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary judgment is 

mandated where a party fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway 

Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).

Also, it is well settled that a conclusion cannot be 

taken as true, and the Court will not accept conclusory 

allegations as facts in consideration of a motion for 

summary judgment. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 

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(2009); see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 

1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)(“[t]his court has consistently 

held that conclusory allegations without specific 

supporting facts have no probative value”); Fullman v. 

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984)(a 

plaintiff’s mere verification of conclusory allegations is 

not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment). 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that Defendants’ actions 

subjected him to a substantial risk of serious harm, i.e., 

inmate-on-inmate assault and inadequate medical care, to 

which they were indifferent. This Court will address these 

two claims separately. 

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, ... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United 

States ... to the deprivation of any 

rights ... secured by the Constitution 

and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Additionally, the Eighth 

Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 

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The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment prohibits prison officials from 

exhibiting deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of 

serious harm to an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 828 (1994).

The Supreme Court summarized a state’s constitutional 

responsibilities with regard to inmates as follows:

[W]hen the State takes a person into its 

custody and holds him there against his 

will, the Constitution imposes upon it a 

corresponding duty to assume some 

responsibility for his safety and 

general well-being . . . . The rationale 

for this principle is simple enough: 

when the State by the affirmative 

exercise of its power so restrains an 

individual’s liberty that it renders him 

unable to care for himself, and at the 

same time fails to provide for his basic 

human needs – e.g., food, clothing, 

shelter, medical care, and reasonable 

safety – it transgresses the substantive 

limits on state action set by the Eighth 

Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 

189 (1989)(citations omitted).

In order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claims, 

Plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) a condition of 

confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, 

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (citations 

omitted), (2) the defendant’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to 

that condition, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) 

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(citations omitted), and (3) causation, Williams v. 

Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations 

omitted.).” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th

Cir. 1993). 

In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 

1994), the court described the first two elements as 

follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to 

have two components, an objective 

component, which inquires whether the 

alleged wrongdoing was objectively 

harmful enough to establish a 

constitutional violation, and a 

subjective component, which inquires 

whether the officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind.

A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is 

to ensure “reasonable safety,” a “standard that 

incorporates due regard for prison officials’ ‘unenviable 

task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane 

conditions.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 (citations 

omitted). “Whether one puts it in terms of duty or 

deliberate indifference, prison officials who act

reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. 

DISCUSSION

A. Nurse Strickland, Ken Dover, and Corizon

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With regard to Defendants Strickland, Dover, and 

Corizon, Plaintiff has asserted an Eighth Amendment claim 

of failure to provide adequate medical care. To prevail on 

a claim for inadequate medical care, an inmate must show 

that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to 

his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 

(1976). 

In order for Plaintiff to meet his burden on the 

objective component of the Eighth Amendment claims,

Plaintiff must demonstrate that an “objectively serious 

medical need” exists. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 

(11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is “considered 

one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating 

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person 

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s 

attention.” Id. (citing Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. 

Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) overruled on 

other grounds in Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 

1014, 1031 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2001)(quotation marks omitted)). 

“In either of these situations, the medical need must be 

one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of 

serious harm.” Id. (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

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In order to meet the subjective requirement of an 

Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a serious 

medical need. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. “Deliberate 

indifference entails more than mere negligence. Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 106; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 

(1994). The Supreme Court held that a prison official 

cannot be found deliberately indifferent under the Eighth 

Amendment “unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S., 

825, 837-38 (emphasis added). However, “an official’s 

failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, 

cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of 

punishment.” Id. at 838. Therefore, “under Estelle and 

Farmer, deliberate indifference has three components: (1) 

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) 

disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than 

mere negligence.” Farrow, 320 F.3d 1235, 1246 (citing 

McElligot, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255)(stating that defendant must 

have subjective awareness of an “objectively serious need” 

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and that his response must constitute “an objectively 

insufficient response to that need”)). 

In the present action, it is undisputed that Plaintiff 

suffered a laceration to his right knee which was treated 

within approximately two hours of it occurring. (Docs. 23-

1 at pp. 5-9; 25 at p. 2; 46-2). Further, Plaintiff’s 

medical records detail Plaintiff’s treatment by Defendant 

Strickland for his laceration which included cleaning and 

dressing Plaintiff’s wound. (Doc. 23-1 at pp. 5-9). 

Plaintiff’s exam also indicated a temperature of 98.0, 

pulse of 78, respirations of 16, blood pressure of 223/109, 

and an oxygen saturation of 98%. (Id). While Plaintiff 

has asserted that his blood pressure was “grave-dead” (Doc. 

25 at p. 2) and could have resulted in a “stroke or massive 

heart attack” (Doc. 25, at p. 6), there is little medical 

evidence in his records, other than an elevated blood 

pressure reading when he was first seen by the nurse, to 

support such a claim. In fact, Plaintiff’s claim that he 

was “in a daze and fell (sic) very lightheaded” (Doc 25 at 

p. 2) does not even appear in his medical record and there 

is no indication that Plaintiff informed anyone of these

alleged symptoms or concerns.

Based on the medical records describing Plaintiff’s 

laceration, this Court does not find that Plaintiff’s 

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injury was an objectively serious medical need. 

Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s inadequate 

medical care claim relies on his blood pressure (and not on 

his laceration), there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s 

blood pressure amounted to a serious medical need as there 

is no objective medical evidence that it posed a 

substantial risk of serious harm.

Nevertheless, even if a serious medical need existed, 

Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Strickland was 

deliberately indifferent to it. To the contrary, it is 

undisputed that Plaintiff was seen within two hours of 

suffering a laceration and at that time, Plaintiff was 

examined, treated, and released. It is additionally 

undisputed that Plaintiff was seen again the day after his 

injury for follow up care by Dr. Kouns, who again examined 

Plaintiff’s wound and applied sutures to it. Further, with 

respect to Plaintiff’s blood pressure, the medical records 

are void of any facts which indicate that Plaintiff 

complained of his blood pressure to either Defendant 

Strickland or Dr. Kouns either at the time of his initial 

exam or on his follow up visit the next day. (Doc. 23-1 at 

pp. 5-9). While Plaintiff now asserts that he was dizzy 

and light-headed, there is no indication in the medical 

records of these complaints such that it could be inferred 

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that Defendant Strickland was aware of a medical need and 

indifferent to it. Lastly, to the extent that Defendant 

Strickland was aware of Plaintiff’s blood pressure based on 

her exam on April 15, 2015, there is still a lack of 

factual support that she was indifferent because, as the 

records indicate, she arranged for Plaintiff to see Dr. 

Kouns the following day. (Doc. 23-1 at p. 3). These 

facts, simply fail to support that Defendant Strickland was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs or 

that the complained of two hour delay in care resulted in a 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. 

The only complaints made against Defendants Dover and 

Corizon are based on Plaintiff’s delay in medical care and 

the actions of Defendant Strickland, as detailed above. 

Thus, this Court interprets Plaintiff’s claim against these 

Defendants as stemming from their supervisory position over 

Defendant Strickland and of the infirmary at the 

correctional facility. These claims are rooted in the 

theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. 

It is well established in this circuit that 

supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983

for the unconstitutional acts of their 

subordinates “on the basis of respondeat superior 

or vicarious liability.” Belcher v. City of 

Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir.1994)

(citation and quotation omitted). “Supervisory 

liability [under § 1983] occurs either when the 

supervisor personally participates in the alleged 

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constitutional violation or when there is a 

causal connection between actions of the 

supervising official and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. The causal connection 

can be established when a history of widespread 

abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice 

of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, 

and he fails to do so. The deprivations that 

constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify 

the supervising official must be obvious, 

flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, 

rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown v. 

Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.1990)

(citations omitted). In addition, the causal 

connection may be established and supervisory 

liability imposed where the supervisor's improper 

“custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights.” Rivas v. 

Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.1991)

(citing Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397 (11th 

Cir.1986)).

Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F. 3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 

First, considering Plaintiff’s claim with regard to 

Defendant Strickland’s treatment of Plaintiff, this Court 

finds that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant 

Strickland was liable. Second, there is no evidence that 

Defendant Dover was directly involved with Plaintiff’s 

treatment. (See Docs. 23-1 at pp. 5-9; 23-2 generally). 

Lastly, Plaintiff has failed to assert, much less, 

establish any causal connection between Defendant Dover or 

Corizon and his alleged constitutional deprivations, i.e. 

that they were the result of a policy or procedure such 

that a causal connection could ostensibly be made. 

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As a result, Defendants Strickland, Dover, and Corizon

are entitled to summary judgment.

B. Defendants Barron, Davis, and the ADOC

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Barron failed to 

secure H-Dorm, i.e., protect and/or intervene in the 

altercation that led to Plaintiff being injured. (Doc. 

35). Plaintiff also contends that his injuries were the 

result of overcrowding and lack of spacing between the beds 

in H-Dorm. (Doc. 1 at p. 4). Lastly, Plaintiff contends 

that Defendant Davis failed to properly investigate the 

cause of the altercation in H-Dorm, including watching the 

video surveillance of the altercation. (Doc. 35 at p. 2).

In order for Plaintiff to meet his burden on the 

objective element of his failure to protect claim, 

Plaintiff must establish that the conditions under which he 

was incarcerated presented “a substantial risk of serious 

harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[A]n excessive risk of 

inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail creates a substantial 

risk of serious harm . . . . And confinement in a prison 

where violence and terror reign is actionable.” Purcell ex 

rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 

1320 (11th Cir. 2005). However, “occasional, isolated 

attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment.” Id. Moreover, a “prison 

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custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.” 

Id. at 1321 (citations omitted). Thus, “not . . . every 

injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . 

. translates into constitutional liability for prison 

officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 834. 

In the present case, Plaintiff has not alleged that he 

was exposed to a constant threat of inmate-on-inmate 

violence, see Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320, or to any other 

condition that presented a substantial risk of serious 

harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Hale v. Tallapoosa 

Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995). Instead, 

Plaintiff has only asserted that he was injured as a result 

of an isolated altercation between two other inmates. 

Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that the altercation 

between the two inmates was warned of or anticipated in any 

manner. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to provide any 

factual support that his injuries could have or should have 

been anticipated by Defendant Barron as a result of an 

altercation that did not involve him. Lastly, Defendant 

Barron has indicated that he does not know Plaintiff and 

has no knowledge of his involvement in the altercation 

between the two other inmates. (Doc. 46-1). Based on 

these facts, no conclusion can be reached that the 

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conditions of Plaintiff’s incarceration amount to an 

objective finding of a substantial risk of serious harm.2

Plaintiff next asserts that Defendant Davis failed to 

adequately investigate3 the cause of the altercation which 

resulted in Plaintiff’s injury, most notably by failing to 

review video footage. (Doc. 35). Regardless of 

Plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, records show that 

Officer Davis did, in fact, investigate the subject 

altercation. Specifically, after being notified of the 

altercation, Lieutenant Davis notified the security 

supervisor of the event and created an incident report 

detailing the occurrence. (Doc. 46-5). Lieutenant Davis 

has additionally explained that he did not have access to 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 Because Plaintiff’s claim fails to satisfy the objective element, this 

Court need not address the subjective component of Plaintiff’s claim. 

Nevertheless, in reviewing the relevant pleadings, this Court notes 

that Plaintiff’s factual assertions fail to show that Defendant Barron 

was deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. 

Specifically, there are no facts to show that Defendant Barron was 

aware that an altercation may occur prior to it occurring or that 

Plaintiff would have been injured as a result of an incident between 

two other prisoners. Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown that 

Defendant Barron’s actions were unreasonable in waiting for assistance 

before entering a dorm to stop an altercation where weapons were being 

used. 

3 Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Davis (and ostensibly the ADOC) 

is liable for failure to protect/intervene because of their supervisory 

role over Defendant Barron. However, as discussed previously herein, 

there is no vicarious liability for § 1983 claims unless the supervisor 

was directly involved or a causal connection between the supervisor and 

the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F. 

3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). First, this Court has found that 

Defendant Barron’s actions do not warrant liability. Second, in the 

present case, there is no dispute that Defendant Davis was not involved 

in the altercation that led to Plaintiff’s injuries and, lastly, 

Plaintiff has wholly failed to establish that his alleged injuries were 

causally related to a policy, practice, etc., of Defendants Davis or 

the ADOC such that supervisory liability would be proper. 

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the video footage of the incident. (Doc. 46-2). Based on 

these facts, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant 

Davis violated a clearly established constitutional right.4 

Lastly, Plaintiff’s contention that the spacing of 

beds in H-Dorm led to his injuries also fails to show a 

prison condition that presents a substantial risk of 

serious harm. Plaintiff has not provided any facts 

relating to the spacing between the beds including, but not 

limited to, the size of H-Dorm, the number of beds, the 

size of the beds, the space between the beds, the amount of 

space that should have existed, etc., and Plaintiff’s 

explanation as to the cause of his injuries i.e., “I hit 

knee when I was trying to get out of the way of them 

fighting”5 offers no insight such that this Court could 

conclude that there were too many beds or a lack of spacing 

between the beds in H-Dorm. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff 

had established that the spacing of the beds was 

objectively dangerous, he still failed to show that 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent as there is no 

indication that any complaints were made to Defendants. 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4

 While an analysis is unnecessary, it should be noted that Plaintiff’s 

claims relating to the investigation conducted by Defendant Davis 

would, likewise, fail pursuant to the PLRA, based on the minimal nature 

of Plaintiff’s injury, i.e., a single laceration. See 42 U.S.C.A. 

1997e(e) . 5 This Court is aware of Plaintiff’s contention that he was stabbed 

during the altercation. However, regardless of whether Plaintiff 

struck his knee or was stabbed, the analysis hereinabove will not 

change.

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As a result, there is no question of material fact as 

to whether Defendants Barron, Davis, or the ADOC

objectively subjected Plaintiff to a substantial risk of 

serious harm, either by failing to intervene and/or 

protect, failing to investigate, or based on the placement 

of the beds in H-Dorm and the Court finds that Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.6

Conclusion

There is no question of material fact from which a 

jury could reasonably find that Plaintiff was subjected to 

a substantial risk of serious harm, of which Defendants 

were subjectively aware and deliberately indifferent, or 

that Defendants’ conduct caused the deprivation of 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As a result, it is 

recommended that Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment 

be granted and this action be dismissed with prejudice. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 Because this Court has determined that Plaintiff has failed to 

establish a violation of a constitutional right, it is unnecessary to 

address the merits of the defenses raised by Defendants, including 

whether they have qualified immunity. 

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Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c)(2). The parties should note 

that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with 

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the 

interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 8th day of March, 2016.

s/ BERT W. MILLING, JR 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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