UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4162

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CORTEZ MAURICE MALLORY,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District 

Judge. (8:11-cr-00171-DKC-3)

Submitted: September 27, 2012 Decided: October 1, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Mark J. Carroll, Potomac, Maryland, for Appellant. William 

Moomau, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Cortez Maurice Mallory appeals from his convictions 

for bank robbery and entering a bank with intent to commit 

larceny. The district court accepted the terms of the plea 

agreement entered pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) and 

sentenced Mallory to the agreed-upon 97 months in prison. On 

appeal, counsel has submitted a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious issues 

for appeal, but questioning whether Mallory’s guilty plea was 

valid under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and whether the district court 

erred in permitting a co-defendant to withdraw his motion to 

suppress. In response, the Government has filed a motion to 

dismiss in part, seeking to enforce the waiver provision in the 

plea agreement. Although informed of his right to do so, 

Mallory has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We grant the 

Government’s motion and dismiss the appeal in part. Finding 

Mallory’s plea was voluntary, we affirm his convictions. 

A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the 

right to appeal. United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th 

Cir. 1990). We review de novo whether a defendant has 

effectively waived his right to appeal. United States v. Marin, 

961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). To determine whether a 

waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine “the totality of 

the circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the 
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accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and 

familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” United 

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, if a court 

fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to 

appeal during the Rule 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid and 

enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th 

Cir. 2005). 

In accordance with the language of the plea agreement, 

we conclude that Mallory knowingly and intelligently waived the 

right to appeal his conviction and sentence, reserving only the 

right to appeal a sentence over 97 months. The language of the 

waiver provision is clear and unambiguous, and at the Rule 11 

hearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement, including the 

waiver. Mallory stated that he understood and accepted the plea 

agreement. Of significance, Mallory does not challenge either 

the validity of the waiver provision on appeal or the 

Government’s conclusion that his challenge to the motion to 

suppress falls within the scope of the waiver. Because Mallory 

was sentenced as contemplated by the plea agreement, we grant 

the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the 

appeal of Mallory’s sentence, as well as the appeal from the 

withdrawal of the motion to suppress.
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However, as the Government notes, a defendant cannot 

waive a colorable claim that his plea was not knowing or 

voluntary. Nonetheless, while we review this claim on the 

merits, our review of the plea transcript reveals that the 

district court substantially complied with Rule 11 and that 

Mallory’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. In addition, 

we have examined the record pursuant to Anders for any unwaived, 

meritorious claims for appeal, and we have found none. 

Accordingly, we affirm Mallory’s convictions. 

We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw at this time. 

This court requires that counsel inform Mallory in writing of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Mallory requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may motion this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Mallory. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; 

DISMISSED IN PART