IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EARL L. LOCKE, *

 *

 Plaintiff, * CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00012-B

 *

vs. *

 *

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, *

Commissioner of Social Security,*

* 

Defendant. *

ORDER

Plaintiff Earl L. Locke (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) brings 

this action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for a period 

of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental 

security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security 

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., and 1381, et seq. On December 

15, 2015, the parties waived oral argument and consented to have 

the undersigned conduct any and all proceedings in this case. 

(Docs. 18, 19). Thus, the action was referred to the 

undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of 

judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful consideration of the 

administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, it is 

hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be 

AFFIRMED.

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income

on November 4, 2011, alleging that he has been disabled since 

January 2, 2010, due to “deaf[ness] in left ear and severe 

arthritis.” (Tr. 107-121, 170). Plaintiff’s application was 

denied, and on March 21, 2013, Plaintiff was granted an 

administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge David R. 

Murchison. (Id. at 23). Plaintiff attended the hearing with 

his counsel and provided testimony related to his claims. (Id.

at 28). A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the hearing 

and provided testimony. (Id. at 38). On April 25, 2013, the 

ALJ issued an unfavorable opinion, finding that Plaintiff is not 

disabled. (Id. at 17). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review on November 18, 2014. (Id. at 1). Thus, the 

ALJ’s decision dated April 25, 2013, became the final decision 

of the Commissioner.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff 

timely filed the present civil action. (Doc. 1). The parties 

agree that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is 

properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3).

II. Issue on Appeal

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to find 

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that Plaintiff’s closed head injury and 

low back pain are severe impairments?

III. Factual Background 

Plaintiff was born on April 18, 1965, and was forty-seven

years of age at the time of his administrative hearing on March 

21, 2013. (Tr. 28, 107). He testified that he did not complete 

the tenth grade. (Id. at 28). 

Plaintiff testified that at some time in the past (he could 

not say when), he had a head injury and was in a coma and had to 

learn to walk again. (Id. at 30). Plaintiff’s medical records 

reflect that at age thirty-eight, Plaintiff jumped from a moving 

vehicle in May 1993, while high on cocaine. He suffered a 

subdural hematoma. (Id. at 196-97). Surgery was performed to 

remove fluid, and Plaintiff did well postoperatively and was 

discharged after one month in the hospital. (Id. at 197). His 

diagnosis was good upon discharge. (Id.). 

Plaintiff’s alleged onset date in this case is January 2, 

2010, approximately seventeen years after his accident. (Id. at 

165). Plaintiff testified that his past work includes working 

for Rooms to Go lifting furniture and that they fired him after 

he started having trouble with his foot. (Id. at 29-30). His 

work history report shows that he worked for Rooms to Go for 

approximately ten years, from 1999 to 2009. (Id. at 130). His 

Disability Report shows that he also worked for a carpet company 

Case 1:15-cv-00012-B Document 22 Filed 03/29/16 Page 3 of 19
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installing carpet from 1997 to 2000. (Id. at 171). 

Plaintiff testified that now he is in constant pain and can 

hardly walk. (Id. at 30, 32-33). He does not use a walker, 

although he testified that he needs a wheelchair. (Id. at 30-

31, 36). According to Plaintiff, he is also totally deaf in his 

left ear. (Id. at 37).

Plaintiff testified that he cannot remember if he has spent 

the night in a hospital in the last year. (Id. at 33). No 

doctor has told him what is causing his problems, nor has any

recommended surgery. (Id. at 33-34). His treating physician, 

Dr. Paul Smith, has given him pain medicine because of his foot 

pain. (Id. at 34). Plaintiff testified that his feet have been 

hurting for two or three years, and while his back also hurts

sometimes, his real problem is his feet. (Id. at 35). 

Plaintiff testified that he lived with his aunt, then his 

mother, and now his daughter. (Id. at 31-32). He does not drive 

any more. (Id. at 30). He had a driver’s license, but it was 

suspended after he got a DUI. (Id.). 

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s 

role is a limited one. The Court’s review is limited to 

determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is 

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct 

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legal standards were applied. 1 Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may not decide the facts 

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that 

of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th 

Cir. 1986). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be 

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. 

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.”). In determining whether substantial 

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking 

into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the 

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4 

(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999). 

B. Discussion 

An individual who applies for Social Security disability 

benefits must prove his or her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1512, 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

 1 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal 

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

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medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations 

provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for 

determining if a claimant has proven his disability.2 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

 2 The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the 

claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant 

proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets 

or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is 

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or 

work experience. If the claimant cannot prevail at the third 

step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the 

claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In 

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the 

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective 

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, 

education and work history. Id. Once a claimant meets this 

burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the 

fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy, given the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 

1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such 

jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability 

to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. 

Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

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has not worked since January 2, 2010, the onset date; he has the 

medically determinable impairments of hypertension and obesity; 

he does not meet a listing; and he does not have any impairment 

that significantly limits his ability to perform basic work 

related activities for twelve consecutive months. Therefore, he 

has no severe impairments. (Tr. 13.).

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff was not credible with 

regard to his claims of pain and that his medically determinable 

impairments could not reasonably be expected to produce his 

alleged symptoms. (Id. at 14-15). The ALJ concluded that there 

were “many, many inconsistencies in the record.” (Id. at 15). 

Having determined that none of Plaintiff’s impairments was 

severe, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id.

at 16). 

The Court now considers the foregoing in light of the 

record in this case and the issue on appeal.

1. Issue

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to 

find that Plaintiff’s closed head injury 

and low back pain are severe 

impairments?

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred 

in failing to find that his closed head injury and low back pain 

are severe. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that these 

impairments are more than slight abnormalities and that they 

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have more than a minimal effect on his ability to work. Thus, 

Plaintiff maintains, under the regulations they are “severe” 

impairments, and the ALJ erred in finding to the contrary. 

(Doc. 12 at 1). The Commissioner counters that the ALJ’s 

finding is supported by the substantial evidence in this case 

and, thus, must be affirmed. (Doc. 15 at 6-7). Having reviewed 

the record at length, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claim is 

without merit. 

In this case, the ALJ found at step two of the sequential 

evaluation process that Plaintiff has the medically determinable 

impairments of hypertension and obesity but that none of his

impairments, including his alleged closed head injury and low 

back pain, is “severe.” Thus, the ALJ ended the inquiry at step 

two. (Tr. 13). 

“Step two is a threshold inquiry,” and at this stage, “only 

claims based on the most trivial impairments” are rejected. 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F. 2d 1026, 1031 (llth Cir. 1986). At 

step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s 

impairments, alone or in combination, “significantly limit” the 

claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work skills.”

Wind v. Barnhart, 133 Fed. Appx. 684, 690 (llth Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 

2004)). In order for an impairment to be severe, it must be 

more than a slight abnormality or a combination of slight 

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abnormalities “that causes no more than minimal functional 

limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). Indeed, it must 

“significantly limit[]” an individual’s “ability to do basic 

work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). 

Stated differently, “[a]n impairment is not severe only if 

the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it 

would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual’s 

ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work 

experience.” McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1031. However, a diagnosis 

alone is insufficient; instead, the claimant has the burden of 

showing the effect of the impairment on his ability to work.

Wind, 133 Fed. Appx. at 690; see also Marra v. Colvin, 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 105669, *13-14, 2013 WL 3901655, *5 (M.D. Fla. 2013) 

(“It is [the] Plaintiff’s burden to prove the existence of a 

severe impairment, and [he or] she must do that by showing an 

impact on [his or] her ability to work.”).

In addition, as part of the disability determination 

process, the ALJ is tasked with weighing the opinions and 

findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians. 

In reaching a decision, the ALJ must specify the weight given to 

different medical opinions and the reasons for doing so. See

Winschel v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th 

Cir. 2011). The failure to do so is reversible error. See

Williams v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12010, *4, 2009 WL 

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413541, *1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 

When weighing the opinion of a treating physician, the 

ALJ must give the opinions “substantial weight,” unless good 

cause exists for not doing so. Costigan v. Commissioner, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 2827, *10, 2015 WL 795089, *4 

(11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Crawford v. Commissioner of 

Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) and Broughton v. 

Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, whether 

considering the opinions of treating, examining, or nonexamining physicians, good cause exists to discredit the 

testimony of any medical source when it is contrary to or 

unsupported by the evidence of record. Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004). “Good cause may also 

exist where a doctor’s opinions are merely conclusory, 

inconsistent with the doctor’s medical records, or unsupported 

by objective medical evidence.” Hogan v. Astrue, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 108512, *8, 2012 WL 3155570, *3 (M.D. Ala. 2012). 

The ALJ is “free to reject the opinion of any physician when the 

evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Sryock v. Heckler, 

764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citation 

omitted); Adamo v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 365 Fed. Appx. 

209, 212 (11th Cir. 2010) (The ALJ may reject any medical 

opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of proof 

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with respect to the alleged severity of his closed head injury 

and low back pain. Although Plaintiff has produced opinion 

evidence from his treating physician, Dr. Paul Smith, M.D., that 

Plaintiff cannot engage in any form of gainful employment

because of his closed head injury and low back pain, see

treatment questionnaire (id. at 243), Physical Capacities 

Evaluation (id. at 290), and Clinical Assessment of Pain form 

(id. at 292), these opinions are inconsistent with the 

substantial medical evidence in this case and, thus, were

properly given no weight by the ALJ. (Id. at 15). 

The record shows that on November 17, 2011, Dr. Smith

opined in a Treatment Questionnaire that Plaintiff’s closed head 

injury has a profound impact on his ability to work and that 

Plaintiff cannot engage in any form of gainful employment 

because of his closed head injury, which causes confusion. (Id.

at 243). In addition, on June 13, 2012, Dr. Smith opined in a 

Physical Capacities Evaluation form that Plaintiff cannot sit, 

stand, or walk for even one hour each day; he cannot lift/carry 

more than ten pounds for even one hour each day; he cannot push 

or pull with his arms or legs; he cannot bend, squat, climb, 

crawl, or reach; and he has total restriction of all hazardous 

activities. (Id. at 290). Also, Dr. Smith opined in a Clinical 

Assessment of Pain form that Plaintiff’s pain will distract him 

from adequately performing daily activities or work, that 

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physical activity will increase his pain greatly and cause 

distraction from task or total abandonment of task, and that his 

pain is expected to be severe and to limit his effectiveness. 

(Id. at 291-92).

As the ALJ found, Dr. Smith’s opinions, which essentially 

render Plaintiff an invalid who cannot sit, stand, or walk for 

even one hour a day, are inconsistent with his own treatment 

notes, which do not document this severe level of functional 

limitations. The record reflects no radiology or other tests to 

confirm the presence of any severe musculoskeletal impairments, 

and there are no recommendations from Dr. Smith or any physician 

that Plaintiff have surgery or be treated with anything other 

than medication. 3 In addition, Dr. Smith’s opinions are 

internally inconsistent. Dr. Smith opined in the Physical 

Capacities Evaluation that Plaintiff could carry ten pounds for 

one hour each day but that Plaintiff could not stand or walk for 

an hour. (Id. at 290). Dr. Smith also opined that Plaintiff 

could lift ten pounds for an hour each day but that he could not 

 3 The record shows that the ALJ attempted to obtain evidence 

related to Plaintiff’s physical condition by sending Plaintiff 

to a consultative orthopedist, Dr. William Crotwell, M.D., but 

Plaintiff failed to appear for the examination and did not 

respond to the Agency to discuss his reason for failing to 

appear. (Id. at 16, 299).

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reach at all. (Id.). As the ALJ found, this is “impossible.” 

(Id. at 16). Dr. Smith’s opinions are further contradicted by 

Plaintiff’s and his daughter’s report to consultative 

psychologist, Dr. Thomas Bennett, Ph.D., and to consultative 

physician Dr. Thomasina Anderson-Sharpe, M.D., that Plaintiff 

“takes care of his own activities of daily living.” (Id. at 

236, 250-51). Moreover, Dr. Smith’s opinions are inconsistent 

with Plaintiff’s testimony at his hearing that his back hurts 

“sometimes” but that his real problem is the pain in his feet. 

(Id. at 35). Plaintiff stated, “sometime my back go out and my 

back be hurting me sometime. . . it use to bother me bad all the 

time, but now the real[] problem I’m having now [is] in my feet. 

. . I had a problem with my back sometime, but not all the 

time.” (Id.).

Dr. Smith’s opinions are also inconsistent with the 

remaining medical evidence in this case, including the following

evidence specifically related to Plaintiff’s closed head 

injury/alleged mental impairment: (1) consultative Psychologist, 

Dr. Thomas Bennett, Ph.D., examined Plaintiff on May 25, 2011, 

and was unable to make a diagnosis because Plaintiff was 

virtually unresponsive to all of his questions and could give no 

information about his disability except that his left foot hurt

(id.); Plaintiff could not give Dr. Bennett any information 

about his previous accident or head injury, his personal or

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family history, or his work history (id.); Dr. Bennett observed 

that Plaintiff “often did not respond” and while “there were a 

few occasions when he acted as though he could understand what 

was being asked of him,” “the majority of the time he either 

gave a blank stare or replied, “hold on hold on” (id. at 235); 

Dr. Bennett noted that Plaintiff had an “awkward gait;” that his 

“posture was bent forward from the hips;” that “he held his head 

tilted;” and that he appeared to be confused (id. at 235-36); 

when Dr. Bennett asked Plaintiff to count from one to ten, 

Plaintiff “gave random numbers” (id. at 235); Plaintiff could 

not tell Dr. Bennett the month, date, or situation, and told him 

the year with great difficulty (id.); Plaintiff was able to

point to some objects in the room when they were named (id.); 

Dr. Bennett diagnosed “rule out cognitive disorder due to 

unknown trauma. Other diagnoses impossible to assess” (id. at 

236); (2) seven months later, on December 15, 2011, a second 

consultative psychologist, Dr. John Davis, Ph.D., examined 

Plaintiff and concluded that there were strong efforts of 

malingering found (id. at 245, 248); Dr. Davis noted that 

Plaintiff could not count to ten and or say his ABC’s, simple 

exercises that can be performed by even profoundly mentally 

retarded individuals (id. at 248); Dr. Davis noted that 

Plaintiff could not describe his activities of “today, 

yesterday, or the day before” or describe his trip to the office 

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that day (id. at 247); Plaintiff told Dr. Davis where he was 

born and his marital status and provided information about his 

children and siblings and his previous work history at Rooms to 

Go (all of which he ostensibly was unable to do during his 

consultation with Dr. Bennett) (id. at 246); Dr. Davis observed

that Plaintiff had “no unusual gait or posture abnormalities,” 

no unusual mannerisms, and his motor activity and attitude were 

“normal” (in stark contrast to Dr. Bennett’s observations that 

Plaintiff walked with an “awkward gait,” “was bent forward from 

the hips,” and “held his head tilted”) (id. at 235-36, 246); Dr. 

Davis ultimately diagnosed Plaintiff with “Malingering.” 

According to Dr. Davis, Plaintiff did not put forth his best 

effort, and the results of his examination were “an 

underestimation of the claimant’s ability for unknown reasons” 

(id. at 245, 248); and finally (3) the record is devoid of

evidence that Plaintiff ever required outpatient mental health 

treatment, hospitalizations, or emergency room visits for any

psychiatric condition. 

Dr. Smith’s opinions are also inconsistent with the 

remaining medical evidence in this case specifically related to 

Plaintiff’s low back pain, including the following: (1) 

consultative neurologist, Dr. Ilyas Shaikh, M.D., examined 

Plaintiff on July 15, 2011, at which time Plaintiff complained 

of left leg, back, and shoulder pain (id. at 239); Plaintiff

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reported to Dr. Shaikh that he completed the ninth grade in 

school and that his last job was lifting furniture, and he 

discussed his parents and siblings (which he was ostensibly 

unable to do during his consultation with Dr. Bennett two months 

earlier) (id. at 240); Dr. Shaikh noted that Plaintiff “has a 

limp” and “is using a walker . . . provided by his daughter” 

(id. at 239-40); upon examination, Dr. Shaikh noted that 

Plaintiff was in no acute distress, that his spine had no 

tenderness and “fairly normal range of motion,” that he could 

move all four extremities, and that there was no swelling in his 

extremities (id.); Plaintiff’s motor strength was normal (5/5); 

his fine motor skills were normal; he was able to tie his 

shoelaces, and his grip strength was 5/5 and bilaterally 

symmetrical (id. at 241); Plaintiff’s neurological examination 

revealed that he was alert, able to hear and understand normal

volume4 but that he “had variable responses,” acted confused, and 

insisted that his daughter answer all questions (id. at 240); 

Plaintiff’s sensory exam was “variable” as “he demonstrated poor 

sensation but [his] facial expression of the sensory stimuli was 

noticeable” (id.); Plaintiff had a negative Romberg test (no 

loss of balance) and refused to stand on his heels or toes or 

demonstrate a tandem gait (id.); Dr. Shaikh diagnosed history of 

 4 The Court notes that Plaintiff demonstrated no hearing 

difficulty at his administrative hearing. (Tr. 23)

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closed head injury, history of sub-dural hematoma evacuation, 

poor hearing and poor vision demonstration, and “exaggeration of 

post closed head injury complaints”5 (id.) (emphasis added); Dr. 

Shaikh noted “poor effort” during the examination (id. at 242); 

(2) consultative examiner, Dr. Thomasina Anderson-Sharpe, M.D., 

examined Plaintiff on December 17, 2011 (two days after 

Plaintiff was examined by consultative psychologist, Dr. Davis), 

and noted that Plaintiff was a poor historian and that whenever 

he got confused, he would say that he “likes Kool Aid or watches 

TV” (id. at 250); Plaintiff’s chief complaints on that date were 

back problems, arthritis, hearing problems, and pain every day, 

which Plaintiff related to his previous car accident (id.); 

Plaintiff reported that he “manages all [of his own] ADL’s” and 

that he has had no hospitalizations or emergency room visits in 

the last two years (id. at 250-51); upon examination, Dr. 

Anderson-Sharpe noted that Plaintiff was in no acute distress 

but that he got up and down off of the examining table with 

difficulty (id.); Dr. Anderson-Sharp documented that Plaintiff 

demonstrated a broad-based right limp with positive Romberg and 

 5Plaintiff points to Dr. Shaikh’s notation during his examination

that Plaintiff gave his wrong age and education which 

“demonstrates confusion . . . probably related to his closed 

head injury” to support his argument that his closed head injury 

is severe. (Tr. 242; Doc. 12 at 3). However, Dr. Shaikh’s 

subsequent diagnosis of “exaggeration of post closed head injury 

complaints” places this note in context and, when combined with 

this and other evidence of Plaintiff’s malingering, renders 

Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. 

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was unable to heel toe walk or tandem gait (id. at 252) (in 

contrast to Dr. Davis’ observation two days earlier that 

Plaintiff had “no unusual gait or posture abnormalities” (id. at 

246); Dr. Anderson-Sharpe noted that no assistive device was 

used or needed (contrasting Dr. Shaikh’s observation five months 

earlier that Plaintiff “has a limp” and “is using a walker” but 

consistent with Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that he does not 

use a walker) (id. at 31, 239-40, 252); that Plaintiff’s motor 

strength was normal (5/5), and that his sensory exam was normal 

in all extremities (id. at 252); and finally, (3) at his hearing 

on March 21, 2013, Plaintiff responded at length to the ALJ’s 

questions about his background, his school history, his past 

work history, his medical problems, his doctors, and his 

medications (despite appearing completely unable to speak or 

recall any of these events during his consultative evaluation

with Dr. Bennett on May 25, 2011 and with Dr. Anderson-Sharpe on 

December 17, 2011)6 (id. at 28-43, 250).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ had 

good cause to discredit Dr. Smith’s opinions and that the 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that 

Plaintiff’s closed head injury and low back pain are not severe 

 6 As discussed, when asked questions by Dr. Anderson-Sharpe, 

Plaintiff would appear confused and say random things like, “[I] 

like Kool Aid” or “[I] watch[] TV.” (Tr. 250).

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impairments. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is without merit.

V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful 

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the 

parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a 

period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income be AFFIRMED.

DONE this 29th day of March, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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