## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

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. P D

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D A N A H A N N A

, A p p e l l a n t

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.

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E S E V E N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

L U B B O C K C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n w h i c h M E Y E R S

, P R IC E

,

J O H N S O N

, H E R V E Y a n d A L C A L A

, J J

. , j o i n e d

. K E L L E R

, P

. J

. , f i l e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n

i n w h i c h K E A S L E R

, J

. , j o i n e d

. W O M A C K

, J

. , c o n c u r r e d

.

O P I N I O N

A p p e l l a n t p l e d g u i l t y t o d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d

. T h e t r i a l j u d g e a c c e p t e d h i s p l e a

a n d o r d e r e d h i m t o p a y $ 7

, 7 6 7

. 8 8 i n r e s t i t u t i o n t o L u b b o c k P o w e r a n d L i g h t ( L P & L ) f o r

r e p a i r i n g a u t i l i t y p o l e t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s c a r h a d s t r u c k

. A p p e l l a n t a p p e a l e d

, a r g u i n g t h a tHanna Pag e 2

A r t i c l e 4 2

. 0 3 7 o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e d o e s n o t a u t h o r i z e r e s t i t u t i o n b e c a u s e 1

L P & L w a s n o t a “ v i c t i m ” o f t h e o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h h e w a s c o n v i c t e d

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

a g r e e d

, h o l d i n g t h a t t h e r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r w a s i m p r o p e r b e c a u s e ( 1 ) d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d

i s a v i c t i m l e s s c r i m e b e c a u s e i t “ d o e s n o t e n c o m p a s s p e r s e a p a r t i c u l a r c a t e g o r y o f

c o m p l a i n a n t

, ” a n d ( 2 ) t h e r e w a s n o v i c t i m a l l e g e d i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

. W e g r a n t e d 2

r e v i e w a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n ( 1 ) m a y b e o r d e r e d i n a D W I c a s e

, a n d ( 2 ) m a y b e

3

o r d e r e d f o r s o m e o n e w h o s e n a m e d i d n o t a p p e a r i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

. H o w e v e r

, t h e

S t a t e m u s t p r o v e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e o f f e n s e w a s t h e d i r e c t c a u s e o f t h e

h a r m

. B e c a u s e t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o p r o v e t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v i n g c a u s e d t h e

d a m a g e t o t h e u t i l i t y p o l e

, w e a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, w h i c h h a d d e l e t e d

t h e r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r

.

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art. 42.037. Article 42.037(a) states, “I n addition to any fi ne 1

authorized by law, the court that sentenc es a defe ndant convicted of an offe nse may order the

defe ndant to make restitution to any victim of the offe nse[.] ” Article 42.037(b)( 1) states, “I f the

offe nse results in damag e to or l oss or destruc tion of proper ty of a victim of t he offense, the court

may order the def endant” to pay

for the va lue of the pr operty

.

Hanna v. State , 406 S.W .3d 670, 673-74 (Te x . App.–Amar illo 2013). 2

The State’s sole que stion for revie w asks the f ollowing: 3

When rec ord evidenc e est ab l i shes a person’ s proper ty damag e or loss as a direc t

result of the defe ndant’s commission of the offe nse of con v i ct i on, does the plain

lang uag e of Article 4 2 .037, Code of C riminal Procedur e, authoriz ing restitution to

“any victim of the offe nse,” (1) limit elig ibilit y for restitution only to persons actua lly

named i n the char g ing instrument, even when the exis tence of a victim is not an

essential element of the offe nse of conviction, or otherwise require d by offe nsechar g ing law, or (2) exclude whole cate g o ri es of “victimless” offe nses from

consideration for restitution to persons damag ed as a direc t result of the criminal

conduct?Hanna Pag e 3

I

.

A p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e o f d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d

. B e f o r e a p p e l l a n t

e n t e r e d h i s g u i l t y p l e a

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e h e l d a r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g

, d u r i n g w h i c h t h e p r o s e c u t o r

i n t r o d u c e d a “ d a m a g e r e p a i r i n v o i c e ” t h a t g a v e t h e t o t a l c o s t o f r e p a i r i n g L P & L ’ s p o l e

. T h a t

w a s t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g t h i s h e a r i n g

, a n d a p p e l l a n t o b j e c t e d

– d u r i n g

t h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s

– t h a t t h e S t a t e h a d f a i l e d t o p r o v e c a u s a t i o n

.

T h e t r i a l j u d g e t h e n r e c e s s e d t h e h e a r i n g t o a l l o w t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o i n t r o d u c e

a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e

. T h e e v i d e n c e a t t h e s e c o n d h e a r i n g s h o w e d t h a t

, o n J a n u a r y 1 7

, 2 0 1 2

,

O f f i c e r J o s h u a F r a n c o w a s d i s p a t c h e d t o a c a r c r a s h

. O f f i c e r F r a n c o t e s t i f

i e d t h a t

, w h e n h e

a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e

, h e n o t i c e d “ p o w e r e l e c t r i c i t y l i n e s a l l o v e r t h e r o a d ” a n d “ a v e h i c l e t h a t

w a s c r a s h e d i n t o a b r o k e n t e l e p h o n e p o l e

. ” T h e o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r

– a p p e l l a n t

– t o l d

h i m t h a t h e h a d g o n e t o S o n i c t o g e t a h a m b u r g e r

, a n d

, w h i l e d r i v i n g h o m e

, “ h e m u s t h a v e

h i t a w a t e r p u d d l e w h i c h c a u s e d h i m t o l o s e c o n t r o l c r a s h i n g i n t o t h e p o l e

. ” W h e n a s k e d

w h e t h e r h e m a d e a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h a t c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t

, O f f i c e r F r a n c o r e s p o n d e d

,

“ [ A p p e l l a n t ] d r i v i n g t h a t v e h i c l e

. ”

D u r i n g h e r c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t

, t h e p r o s e c u t o r a r g u e d t h a t s h e “ p r o v e d t h e c a u s a t i o n t o

t h e d a m a g e o f t h e p o l e w i t h M r

. D a n a H a n n a h

. . . i n t h i s c a s e d r i v i n g h i s v e h i c l e

. ” 4

A p p e l l a n t s a i d t h a t A r t i c l e 4 2

. 0 3 7 o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e l i m i t s p a y m e n t s o f

The State continued, “He hit the pole causing damag e to that pole that the State proved on 4

Fr iday

. The amount of damag e to the pole was over $7,000 to the victim, the victim being L ubbock

Power a nd L ight.”Hanna Pag e 4

r e s t i t u t i o n t o v i c t i m s o f t h e o f f e n s e

, a n d

, b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s n o v i c t i m i n t h i s c a s e

, t h e t r i a l

j u d g e c o u l d n o t o r d e r r e s t i t u t i o n

. U n p e r s u a d e d

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e o r d e r e d a p p e l l a n t t o p a y f u l l

r e s t i t u t i o n f

o r t h e p o l e

.

O n a p p e a l

, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e d t h a t L P & L w a s n o t a v i c t i m o f t h e o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h h e

w a s c o n v i c t e d

. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a g r e e d f o r t w o i n t e r r e l a t e d r e a s o n s

. F i r s t

, t h e c o u r t

n o t e d t h a t t h e D W I s t a t u t e “ r e q u i r e d n e i t h e r i n j u r y t o a n y o n e n o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o r l o s s o f

a n y o n e ’ s p r o p e r t y

. ” T h e r e f o r e “ L P & L w a s n o t a v i c t i m ‘ o f t h e o f f e n s e [ D W I ] f

o r w h i c h 5

[ a p p e l l a n t ] w a s c o n v i c t e d

, ’ a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n h o l d i n g o t h e r w i s e

. ” S e c o n d

, a l t h o u g h 6

t h e c o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t o u r d e c i s i o n i n M a r t i n v

. S t a t e l e f

t o p e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 7

r e s t i t u t i o n t o v i c t i m s n o t n a m e d i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

, i t h e l d t h a t s u c h a p o s s i b i l i t y w a s

v e r y l i m i t e d a n d a l l o w e d o n l y i n r a r e s i t u a t i o n s

– s u c h a s w h e n a d e f e n d a n t s t e a l s p r o p e r t y

f r o m a h u s b a n d a n d w i f

e b u t t h e i n d i c t m e n t l i s t s o n l y o n e o f t h e m a s t h e c o m p l a i n a n t

. T h e 8

c o u r t c o n c l u d e d :

A g a i n

, t h e n a t u r e o f t h e o f f e n s e h e r e d o e s n o t e n c o m p a s s p e r s e a p a r t i c u l a r

c a t e g o r y o f c o m p l a i n a n t

. N o o n e n e e d b e i n j u r e d o r s u f

f e r l o s s f o r a D

. W

. I

. t o

o c c u r

. N o r w a s t h e i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e e l e c t r i c a l p o l e o r t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e p o l e ’ s

o w n e r m e n t i o n e d a n y w h e r e i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t o r s o m e h o w a l l e g e d t o

b e p a r t o f t h e o f

f e n s e c h a r g e d

. S o

, i t c a n n o t b e s a i d t h a t L P & L w a s s o m e h o w

Hanna , 406 S.W .3d at 672. 5

Id. 6

Martin v. State , 874 S.W .2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 7

Hanna, 406 S.W .3d at 672-73. 8Hanna Pag e 5

a v i c t i m o f t h e c r i m e f

o r w h i c h a p p e l l a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d

. 9

B e c a u s e m a n y D W I c a s e s i n v o l v e a c c i d e n t s w i t h p r o p e r t y d a m a g e a n d b e c a u s e t h e

c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a d o p t e d b r o a d a n d s e e m i n g l y p e r s e r u l e s

, w e g r a n t e d r e v i e w

.

I I

.

R e s t i t u t i o n i s n o t o n l y a f o r m o f p u n i s h m e n t

, i t i s a l s o a c r i m e v i c t i m ’ s s t a t u t o r y

r i g h t

. R e s t i t u t i o n s e r v e s m u l t i p l e p u r p o s e s

, i n c l u d i n g r e s t o r i n g t h e v i c t i m t o t h e s t a t u s q u o 1 0

a n d f o r c i n g a n o f

f e n d e r t o a d d r e s s a n d r e m e d y t h e s p e c i f i c h a r m t h a t h e h a s c a u s e d

. “ A 1 1

b r o a d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e r e s t i t u t i o n s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e s j u d g e s w i t h ‘ g r e a t e r d i s c r e t i o n i n

e f f e c t u a t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i n g c r i m i n a l s

, d e t e r r i n g f u t u r e h a r m s

, a n d e f

f i c i e n t l y

c o m p e n s a t i n g v i c t i m s

. ’ ” H o w e v e r

, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s a l s o r e c o g n i z e d l i m i t s o n t h e r i g h t 1 2

t o r e s t i t u t i o n : t h e a m o u n t o f r e s t i t u t i o n m u s t b e j u s t ; i t m u s t h a v e a f a c t u a l b a s i s i n t h e r e c o r d ;

a n d i t m a y b e o r d e r e d o n l y t o a v i c t i m o f a n o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d

. 1 3

Id. at 673-74. 9

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 42.037. 1 0

Don Roge rs

, Feature: The Crime Victim’s Constit utional Right t o R estitution in Texas 1 1

Criminal Procee dings

, 46 H O U S T O N L A W Y E R 18, J anuar y /Febr uary

, 20 0 9 (“r estitution not only

compensa tes the crime victim for actua l loss in applicable ca ses, but also further s the socially

desirable g oal of reha

bilitation ‘[b] eca

use it forc es the defe ndant to confr ont, in concr ete terms, the

harm his ac tions have ca

used.’” ) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986)).

Lemos v State

, 27 S.W .3d 42, 45 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, pet. ref ’d) (quoting Neil 1 2

D. Okazkai

, People v. Sexton: Insuring an Absurd Resul t Through Inflexible Interpretation—The

Court of Appeal Denies Criminal Restitution To a Vi ct i m’ s Insurance Company

, 31 L O Y

. L .A. L

. R E V . 297, 321 (1997))

.

Campbell v. State

, 5 S.W .3d 693, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (one “limit on the 1 3

authority of a trial court to or der restitution is that a trial c ourt may not order r estitution t o any butHanna Pag e 6

T h i s c a s e p o s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h o i s a “ v i c t i m ” f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e T e x a s r e s t i t u t i o n

s t a t u t e

. A s i n a l l c a s e s i n v o l v i n g s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

, w e l o o k f i r s t t o t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e

o f t h e s t a t u t e

. W e d o s o i n a n e f f o r t t o “ e f f e c t u a t e t h e ‘ c o l l e c t i v e ’ i n t e n t o r p u r p o s e o f t h e

l e g i s l a t o r s w h o e n a c t e d t h e l e g i s l a t i o n

. ” 1 4

T h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t i t s h o u l d b e “ l i b e r a l l y

c o n s t r u e d ” t o a c h i e v e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ’ s p u r p o s e

– “ [ t ] h e p r e v e n t i o n

, s u p p r e s s i o n a n d

p u n i s h m e n t o f c r i m e

. ” T h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d r e s t i t u t i o n t o “ ‘ a d e q u a t e l y c o m p e n s a t e t h e 1 5

v i c t i m o f t h e o f

f e n s e ’ i n t h e c o u r s e o f p u n i s h i n g t h e c r i m i n a l o f f e n d e r

. ” “ S o c i e t y i s

1 6

b e n e f i t t e d b y p u n i s h m e n t

, i n c l u d i n g r e s t i t u t i o n

, t h a t i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e o f f e n s e s f o r

w h i c h a d e f

e n d a n t h a s b e e n c h a r g e d a n d c o n v i c t e d

. ” W i t h t h e s e g o a l s i n m i n d

, w e t u r n t o 1 7

t h e r e s t i t u t i o n s t a t u t e

.

A r t i c l e 4 2

. 0 3 7 ( a ) s t a t e s t h a t a t r i a l j u d g e h a s d i s c r e t i o n t o o r d e r a d e f e n d a n t t o m a k e

r e s t i t u t i o n “ t o a n y v i c t i m o f t h e o f f e n s e [

. ] ” S e c t i o n ( b ) ( 1 ) c o v e r s “ d a m a g e t o o r l o s s o r

1 8

the v i cti m or victims of the offe nse with which the offe nder is char g ed. Nor may a trial court,

with o u t the ag ree ment of the defe ndant, order restitution to other victims unless their losses have

been a djudicated.” ) (c itations omi tted).

Boyk in v. State , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 1 4

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 1.26. 1 5

Cabla v. State

, 6 S.W .3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (q u oting T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. 1 6

P R O C . art. 42.12, § 9(a )).

Id. at 545-46. 1 7

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 42.037(a ). 1 8Hanna Pag e 7

d e s t r u c t i o n o f p r o p e r t y o f a v i c t i m o f t h e o f f e n s e [

. ] ” S e c t i o n ( b ) ( 2 ) a p p l i e s w h e n t h e

1 9

o f f e n s e “ r e s u l t s i n p e r s o n a l i n j u r y t o a v i c t i m [

. ] ” S e c t i o n ( k ) p r o v i d e s

, “ T h e c o u r t s h a l l 2 0

r e s o l v e a n y d i s p u t e r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o p e r a m o u n t o r t y p e o f r e s t i t u t i o n [

, ] ” a n d t h a t “ [ t ] h e

s t a n d a r d o f p r o o f i s a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e

. ” S e c t i o n ( k ) a l s o p u t s t h e b u r d e n t o 2 1

d e m o n s t r a t e “ t h e a m o u n t o f t h e l o s s s u s t a i n e d b y a v i c t i m a s a r e s u l t o f t h e o f f e n s e ” o n t h e

S t a t e

, w h i l e d e f

e n d a n t b e a r s t h e b u r d e n t o p r o v e h i s f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s a n d h i s n e e d s

, a s w e l l

a s t h e n e e d s o f a n y d e p e n d a n t s

. S e c t i o n ( m ) s t a t e s t h a t a r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r m a y b e e n f o r c e d 2 2

l i k e t h e j u d g m e n t i n a c i v i l a c t i o n

. 2 3

W h i l e A r t i c l e 4 2

. 0 3 7 s e t s o u t a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e s t i t u t i o n s c h e m e

, i t l e a v e s o n e

i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t v a g u e : t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t d e f i n e t h e t e r m “ v i c t i m

. ” W h e n i n t e r p r e t i n g 2 4

Id

., art. 42.037(b)( 1). This restitution section l i s ts sever al possible reme dies, including 1 9

returning the prope rty

or pay ing f or its value. Id.

Id.

, art. 42.037(b)( 2). The restitution reme dies for persona l injury include pay ment of “any 2 0

expenses incurre d by the victim as a result of the offe nse” or compensa tion to the victims of crime

fund. Id.

Id ., art. 42.037(k)

.

2 1

Id

. 2 2

Id. , art. 42.037(m)

. 2 3

I n Chapter 56, titled “Rig hts of Crime Victims,” the term “victim” is define d i n Ar t i cl e 2 4

56.01 and includes only victims of specifie d offe nses or other offe nses when the person “has suffe red

persona l injury or death as a result of the criminal conduct of another .” Id.

, art. 56. 01(2). That

definition, howeve r, is only for the purpose of Chapter 56. Id.

, art. 5 6

. 0 1

. Victims of theft or

burg lary , for ex ample, are not cover ed by the t erm “victim” in Chapter 56, but they are entitled to

restitution for their proper ty losses. See art. 42.037(b)( 1) (discussing restitution when “the offe nse

results in damag e to or loss or destruction of proper ty of a victim of the offe nse”) ; see e.g., Campbell

v. State

, 5 S.W .3d 693, 696-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (def endant convicted of theft could be

order ed to pay $100,000 restitution to various named victims); Long v. State

, 7 S.W .3d 316, 322-23Hanna Pag e 8

a s t a t u t e

, a n u n d e f

i n e d w o r d o r p h r a s e s h o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d a n d u n d e r s t o o d a c c o r d i n g t o i t s

c o m m o n

, e v e r y d a y u s a g e

. A c c o r d i n g t o B l a c k ’ s L a w D i c t i o n a r y

, a “ v i c t i m ” i s a “ p e r s o n 2 5

w h o i s t h e o b

j e c t o f a c r i m e

. . . . ” B u t c a n t h e r e b e a v i c t i m

, f o r p u r p o s e s o f r e s t i t u t i o n

, 2 6

w h e n t h e d e f

e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h a “ v i c t i m l e s s c r i m e ” ? A n d m u s t a v i c t i m b e n a m e d i n

t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t ? T e x a s l a w i s u n c l e a r o n b o t h p o i n t s

.

A

. “ V i c t i m l e s s c r i m e s ” a r e n o t v i c t i m l e s s i f t h e o f f e n s e c a u s e d s o m e o n e h a r m

.

W e h a v e n e v e r h e l d t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n i s a l l o w e d o n l y f o r p e n a l o f

f e n s e s w i t h s t a t u t o r i l y

r e c o g n i z e d v i c t i m s

. B u t t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e a c a u s a l

c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e a n d t h e r e c i p i e n t o f r e s t i t u t i o n

. F o r e x a m p l e

, i n

G o r d o n v

. S t a t e

, w e d e l e t e d a r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r f o r f u n e r a l e x p e n s e s b e c a u s e t h e j u r y 2 7

a c q u i t t e d t h e d e f

e n d a n t o f m u r d e r

, a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s n o t c r i m i n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e

f o r t h e v i c t i m ’ s d e a t h a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g f u n e r a l e x p e n s e s

. I n M a r t i n

, t h i s C o u r t a g a i n 2 8 2 9

(Tex. App.–B eaumont 1999, no pet.) (def endant convicted of theft of timber could be order ed to pay

restitution of $105,488, which included the curr ent marke t value and the costs of reg rowing timber).

T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 311.011 (statutorily undefine d words shall be “construe d acc ording 2 5

to the rules of g rammar and common usag e”) ; see Kirsch v. State

, 357 S.W .3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012).

B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 1 4 0 5 (5th ed. 1979); see also W E B S T E R ’ S N E W T W E N T I E T H 2 6

C E N T U R Y D I C T I O N A R Y U N A B R I D G E D 2036 (2d ed. 1983) (def ining “victim” as “someone or

something killed, destroy ed, injured, or otherwise harme d by

, or suffe ring from, some act, condition,

ag ency

, or circ umstance” ; defining “victimless crime” as “a statutory crime, such as prostitution or

g ambling, r eg arde d as having no clea rly identifiable victim.”).

707 S.W .2d 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 2 7

Id

. at 629 (def

endant police office r convicted of civil-rig hts violation; noting that the only 2 8

“fa ct” that the trial judge could have relied upon was that the defe ndant had pulled the arr estee ’s hair,Hanna Pag e 9

r e c o g n i z e d t h a t “ r e s t i t u t i o n m a y n o t b e o r d e r e d a s a c o n d i t i o n o f p r o b a t i o n f o r l o s s e s c a u s e d

b y a n o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t i s n o t c r i m i n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e

. ” A n d

, i n C a b l a v

. 3 0

S t a t e

, w e s t a t e d

, i n d i c t a

, t h a t “ t h e f o c u s o f r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r s [ i s ] l i m i t e d t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s 3 1

a l l e g e d a n d p r o v e n t o b e v i c t i m s o f t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e ” a n d t h a t “ t h e a m o u n t o f a

3 2

r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r i s l i m i t e d t o o n l y t h e l o s s e s o r e x p e n s e s t h a t t h e v i c t i m o r v i c t i m s s u f f e r e d

a s a r e s u l t o f t h e o f

f e n s e f o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d

. ” T h i s p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e 3 3

i n C a b l a c o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d a s m e a n i n g e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s “ a l l e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t ” o r

,

but that act was not the cause of the victim’s death, which was cause d by the blows he rec eived from

other office rs). See also Campbell v. State

, 5 S.W .3d 693, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“I n Gordon

, there was no fac tual basis in the rec ord for the trial co u rt ’s order of restitution for causing the

victim’s death. The trial court as a matter of law could not have imposed restitution based on conduct

that had no basis in the re cord.” ).

874 S.W .2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App 1994). 2 9

Id

. at 677. I n Martin

, the defe ndant was convicted of a defr auding a single victim. Id. at 3 0

675. This Court held that the defe ndant could not be order ed to pay restitution to other investors who

wer e defr auded in separ ate, unchar g ed incidents. Id. at 677. Restituti on was not proper beca use the

defe ndant was never found g uilty of the crime that alleg edly cause d the other investors’ losses. Id.

See also Ex parte Lewis

, 892 S.W .2d 4 (T ex

. C rim. App. 1994) (trial court err ed in g ranting

r e s ti tu ti on to victims of other, unchar g ed burg lary ). Appellant arg ues that Martin prohibits r e s ti tu ti o n

in this case beca

use “the trial court’s awa rd of restit ution to L P&L was outside the scope of the

offe nse” and “the crime for which Appellant was char g ed and conv i ct ed h as nothing to do with

ca u s i n g d am age to a phone pole.” Appellant’s Br ief at 11. But in the prese nt case

, appellant pl ed

g uilty to the DWI that the State ar g ued ca used the da mag e to the pole.

6 S.W .3d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 3 1

Id. at 546. 3 2

Id

. I n Cabla

, the issue was whether the defe ndant’s previous bankrup t cy p roceeding 3 3

discharg ed the trial court’s restitution order

. We upheld the restitution order “bec ause the evidenc e

at trial established [defendant] committed a crime ag ainst the alleg ed victims and that he was order ed

to pay restitution in the amount proven to have been unlawfully appropr iated from those victims.”

Id. at 550.Hanna Pag e 10

m o r e g e n e r a l l y

, i n d i v i d u a l s “ a l l e g e d a n d p r o v e n t o b e v i c t i m s o f t h e c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e ” a t t h e

r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g

. W e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h e c o r r e c t o n e b e c a u s e l a t e r

i n C a b l a w e s t a t e d t h a t “ i f a t r i a l c o u r t

. . . a w a r d s r e s t i t u t i o n t o a n i n d i v i d u a l e i t h e r n o t

n a m e d a s a v i c t i m i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t o r n o t s h o w n t o b e a v i c t i m a t t r i a l

, . . . [ t ] h e n t h e

r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r m a y b e a t t a c k e d o n t h o s e g r o u n d s

. ” 3 4

I n s u p p o r t o f i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n i s n o t p e r m i s s i b l e w h e n a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e

c o n t a i n s n o s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t o f a c o m p l a i n a n t ( i

. e

. , a v i c t i m )

, t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s r e l i e d

o n t w o l o w e r c o u r t o p i n i o n s : B r u n i v

. S t a t e a n d L e m o s v

. S t a t e

. I n B r u n i

, a d e f e n d a n t w a s 3 5 3 6

o r d e r e d t o p a y r e s t i t u t i o n t o a t h e f t v i c t i m ’ s w i f

e e v e n t h o u g h h e

, n o t h i s w i f e

, w a s t h e n a m e d

c o m p l a i n a n t

. T h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t

, a l t h o u g h t h e v i c t i m ’ s w i f e w a s n o t a n a m e d c o m p l a i n a n t

,

t h e r e c o r d s h o w e d t h a t t h e s t o l e n m o n e y w a s j o i n t l y o w n e d b y t h e v i c t i m a n d h i s w i f e a s

c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y

, s o t h e v i c t i m ’ s w i f e w a s h e r s e l f a v i c t i m

. 3 7

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i n t h i s c a s e r e a d B r u n i a s p e r m i t t i n g r e s t i t u t i o n b e c a u s e t h e w i f e

,

l i k e t h e v i c t i m

, “ f

e l l w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r i l y c o n t e m p l a t e d c a t e g o r y o f v i c t i m s o f t h e f t

. ” B u t 3 8

n o t h i n g i n B r u n i i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t s h o l d i n g h i n g e d o n “ s t a t u t o r i l y c o n t e m p l a t e d ” v i c t i m s

.

R a t h e r

, t h e B r u n i c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e v i c t i m ’ s w i f e w a s a l s o a v i c t i m b e c a u s e “ [ t ] h e r e c o r d

Id. at 549. 3 4

669 S.W .2d 829 (Tex. App.–Austin 1984, no pet.). 3 5

27 S.W .3d 42 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, pet. ref .). 3 6

Bruni , 699 S.W .2d at 836. 3 7

Hanna , 406 S.W .3d at 673. 3 8Hanna Pag e 11

s h o w [ e d ] t h a t t h e $ 4 0

, 0 0 0 a p p r o p r i a t e d b y B r u n i w a s j o i n t l y o w n e d b y J o h n a n d B e t t y R o s s

a s h u s b a n d a n d w i f

e

. . . . P e r f

o r c e

, b o t h w e r e v i c t i m s

. ” T h e r e s u l t d e p e n d e d e n t i r e l y o n t h e 3 9

e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e n a m e d v i c t i m ’ s w i f e w a s a l s o a v i c t i m a n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c r i m i n a l

c o n d u c t c a u s e d h e r l o s s

, n o t t h a t s h e w a s a “ s t a t u t o r i l y c o n t e m p l a t e d ” v i c t i m

.

I n L e m o s

, t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s a c q u i t t e d o f m u r d e r

, b u t c o n v i c t e d o f a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y

. O n a p p e a l

, h e c h a l l e n g e d a r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r t h a t r e q u i r e d h i m t o p a y f o r t h e r a p y f

o r

t h e m u r d e r v i c t i m ’ s f

a m i l y

. T h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e v i c t i m ’ s f a m i l y d i d n o t q u a l i f

y f o r 4 0

r e s t i t u t i o n b e c a u s e “ ‘ r e s t i t u t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e o f

f e n s e o r o f

f e n s e s c h a r g e d

,

a n d t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n m u s t b e m a d e o n l y t o t h e v i c t i m [

. ] ’ ” T h u s

, “ r e s t i t u t i o n e x i s t s o n l y f o r 4 1

t h o s e d i r e c t v i c t i m s o f t h e o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s c h a r g e d a n d c o n v i c t e d

. ” 4 2

H o w e v e r

, t h e L e m o s c o u r t e q u a t e d t h a t c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t w i t h a n i n c o r r e c t o n e : t h e v i c t i m ’ s

f a m i l y c o u l d n o t r e c o v e r b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e n o t “ s t a t u t o r i l y

- r e c o g n i z e d v i c t i m [ s ]

. ” 4 3

I t w a s t h i s l a n g u a g e o n w h i c h t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e r e l i e d

. 4 4

H o w e v e r

, a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y n o t e d

, t h e r e s t i t u t i o n s t a t u t e d o e s n o t d e f i n e “ v i c t i m ” n o r d o e s

Bruni , 669 S.W .2d at 836. 3 9

Lemos , 27 S.W .3d at 44-45. 4 0

Id

. at 48 (quoting Gonzalez v. State

, 954 S.W .2d 98, 106 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, 4 1

no pet.)).

Id . at 49.

4 2

Id

. 4 3

Hanna, 406 S.W .3d at 673. 4 4Hanna Pag e 12

i t r e q u i r e t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n m a y b e o r d e r e d o n l y f o r t h o s e c r i m i n a l o f

f e n s e s t h a t f

o r e s e e h a r m

t o a s p e c i f

i c v i c t i m o r c o m p l a i n a n t

. T h e r e f o r e

, w h i l e w e a g r e e t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o

v i c t i m s w h o h a v e s u f

f e r e d h a r m t o t h e i r p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y a s a r e s u l t o f t h e o f f e n s e

, t h i s

d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t s u c h r e s t i t u t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o a “ s t a t u t o r i l y

- r e c o g n i z e d ” v i c t i m

.

I n s t e a d

, w e h o l d t h a t

, f

o r p u r p o s e s o f

t h e r e s t i t u t i o n s t a t u t e

, a “ v i c t i m ” i s a n y p e r s o n

w h o s u f f e r e d l o s s a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e c r i m i n a l o f

f e n s e

. A s s t a t e d i n S e c t i o n 4 2

. 0 3 7 ( k )

,

“ [ t ] h e b u r d e n o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e a m o u n t o f t h e l o s s s u s t a i n e d b y a v i c t i m a s a r e s u l t o f t h e

o f f e n s e i s o n t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y

. ” T h e p h r a s e “ a s a r e s u l t o f t h e o f f e n s e ” i n c l u d e s t h e 4 5

n o t i o n o f b o t h a c t u a l a n d p r o x i m a t e c a u s a t i o n

. A s t h e S t a t e a c k n o w l e d g e s

, t h e d a m a g e 4 6

m u s t b e a “ d i r e c t ” r e s u l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c r i m i n a l o f

f e n s e

– t h a t i s

, t h e S t a t e m u s t p r o v e

, b y

a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f

t h e e v i d e n c e

, t h a t t h e l o s s w a s a “ b u t f o r ” r e s u l t o f

t h e c r i m i n a l o f

f e n s e

a n d r e s u l t e d “ p r o x i m a t e l y

, ” o r f o r e s e e a b l y

, f

r o m t h e c r i m i n a l o f

f e n s e

. 4 7

T E X

. C O D E

. C R I M

. P R O C . art. 42.037(k) (empha sis added). 4 5

The fede ral Mandatory Victims Restituti on Act define s a victim as “a person direc tly and 4 6

proxi mately

harme d as a r esult of the commission of an off ense[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2).

I n Hughey v. United States

, 495 U.S. 411 (1990), the Supreme Court rec og nized a simil ar 4 7

standard in its interpre tation of the fede ral Victim and Wit ness Protection Act (VWPA). Howeve r,

instead of holding that the harm must be cause d by “the offe nse,” the Supreme Court held that under

the VWPA restitution “is intended to compensa te victims only for losses cause d b y t h e conduct

underlying the offe nse of conviction.” Id. at 416. We use differ ent lang uag e to avoid what would be

an incorre ct interpre tation, that restitution is allowed for any harm cause d by the actu s r eus of an

offe nse. I n Hughey

, the Supreme Court held that a defe ndant could not be order ed to pay restitution

for the fra udulent use of multipl e cre dit c ards when he was convicted of the fra udulent use of only

a single victim’s cre dit car d. Id

. at 422. I n so holding, the Court rec og nized that the statute did not

“re flec t cong ressional intent to include in the restitution calc ulus losses bey ond those cause d by the

offe nse of c onviction.” Id . at 416.Hanna Pag e 13

T h i s s t a n d a r d i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t u s e d i n m a n y o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s

. I n a d d i t i o n

, p u b l i c 4 8

p o l i c y s u p p o r t s a l l o w i n g r e s t i t u t i o n t o v i c t i m s o f p u r p o r t e d l y “ v i c t i m l e s s ” c r i m e s

. A l l o w i n g

r e s t i t u t i o n i n s u c h c a s e s p r o v i d e s v i c t i m s w i t h a s i n g l e f o r u m i n w h i c h t h e y m a y r e c o v e r

a c t u a l d a m a g e s

, a l b e i t o n l y t h o s e c a u s e d a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e o f f e n s e

. P r o h i b i t i n g

r e s t i t u t i o n i n s u c h c a s e s w o u l d s e v e r e l y l i m i t a v i c t i m ’ s a b i l i t y t o b e m a d e w h o l e i f t h a t

p e r s o n d i d n o t h a v e t h e f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s t o h i r e a n a t t o r n e y a n d p u r s u e a c i v i l l a w s u i t

.

T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t a r e s t i t u t i o n p r o c e e d i n g c o u l d

, o r s h o u l d

, r e p l a c e c i v i l a c t i o n s

. B u t 4 9

See Pena v. State

, 664 P.2d 169, 178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1 9 8 3 ) (defendant convicted of 4 8

manslaug hter order ed to pay restitution to dece dent’s surviving passen ger b eca use “prope rty

damag es and injuries direc tly sustained by [t he passeng er] wer e unquestionably the conseque nce of

prec isely the same conduct and intent on [t he defe ndant’s] part” ); State v. Lewis

, 214 P.3d 409, 412-

13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“[E]ven a ‘victimless’ crime may support a restitution awa rd when the

criminal conduct direc tly cause d the economic damag e. Rather than the elements of the crime, ‘the

fac ts underly ing the conviction deter mine whether there are victims of a specific crime.’ ”) (citation

omitted); State v. W

ilkinson, 39 P.3d 1131, 1133 (A ri z

. 2002) (def endant who misrepre sented

himself as a licensed contra ctor must pay restitution for the salary he rec eived, beca use it was a direc t

result of misrepre senting self, but not for shoddy work, wh i ch wa s an indirect result); State v.

Guadagni

, 178 P.3d 473, 477-79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (def endant order ed to pay restitution to wives

who suffe red economic losses as a direc t result of biga my beca u s e, althoug h biga

my may

occa sionally be victimles s

, “t h e elements of a crime do not alone deter mine whether a particula r

person is entitled to restitution”); State v. Mai

, 572 N.W.2d 168, 171 (I owa Ct

. App. 1997) (State

must prove “by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e a causa l connec tion exis ts betwee n the criminal act

and the victim’s damag es”) ; State v. McBride

, 940 P.2d 539, 543-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (applying

“modified ‘but for’ test” in reje cting defe ndant’s arg ument that police neg li gen ce was not

superse ding cause of victim’s loss); United States v. Vaknin

, 112 F.3d 579, 589 (1st Cir. 1997)

(“Eve n if but for causa tion is acce p t ab l e in theory

, limit less but for causa tion is not. Restituti on

should not lie if the conduct underly ing the offe nse of conviction is too far remove d, either fac tually

or tempora lly , from the loss.”)

.

Restituti on “is not awa

rdable for pain and suffe ring or the inconvenienc e the offe nse may 4 9

have cause d the victim.” 43A G E O R G E E. D I X & J O H N M. S C H M O L E S K Y

, T E X A S P R A C T IC E : C R I M I N A L

P R A C T I C E A N D P R O C E D U R E § 46.136 (3d ed. 2011). See also T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C

. art

. 42.037(f) (2) (“A n y am o u n t rec overe d by a victim from a person order ed to pay restitution in a

fede ral or state civil proce eding is reduc ed by any amount previously paid to the victim by the person

under a n order of re stitut ion.”).Hanna Pag e 14

w h e n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e s a p r o c e d u r a l m e c h a n i s m f o r c o m p e n s a t i n g t h e

v i c t i m s o f c r i m e

, t h a t m e c h a n i s m s h o u l d n o t b e u n n e c e s s a r i l y o r a r t i f i c i a l l y l i m i t e d

.

F u r t h e r m o r e

, a l l o w i n g r e s t i t u t i o n i n D W I c a s e s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p u b l i c p o l i c y

c o n c e r n s s p e c i f

i c t o D W I l a w s

. A l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s c o r r e c t l y n o t e d t h a t t h e

o f f e n s e o f D W I d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a v i c t i m

, t h e w h o l e p u r p o s e o f c r i m i n a l i z i n g d r i v i n g w h i l e

i n t o x i c a t e d i s t o p r e v e n t “ [ t ] h e c a r n a g e c a u s e d b y d r u n k d r i v e r s ”

– f a t a l i t i e s

, s e r i o u s i n

j u r i e s 5 0

a n d p r o p e r t y d a m a g e

. F u r t h e r m o r e

, j u d i c i a l l y e n a c t i n g a f l a t p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t r e s t i t u t i o n 5 1

i n D W I c a s e s c o u l d h a v e d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s

, s u c h a s g i v i n g p r o s e c u t o r s a n i n c e n t i v e t o

c h a r g e D W I d e f

e n d a n t s w i t h a d d i t i o n a l c o u n t s o f i n t o x i c a t i o n a s s a u l t o r c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f

s o l e l y t o p r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t t o r e q u e s t r e s t i t u t i o n f o r a n a c c i d e n t v i c t i m

. T h e r e f o r e

, w e

c o n c l u d e t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n m a y b e o r d e r e d

, w h e n a p p r o p r i a t e

, i n D W I c a s e s

. 5 2

South Dakota v. Neville

, 459 U.S. 5 5 3

, 5 5 8 (1 983) (“The situation underly ing this 5 0

case —that of the drunk driver—oc curs with trag ic fre quency on our Nation’s highw ay s. The car nag e

cause d by drunk driver s is well documented a nd needs no de tailed re citation here .”).

See Blackburn v. State

, 204 S.W .2d 619, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947) (“The purpose of the 5 1

law is to protec t people ag ainst drunk drivers while using such public road, street or thoroug hfar e.”)

. Acc ording to the National Hig hway Traf fic Safe ty Administration,

Alcohol is a fac tor in 26% of the United States’ cra sh costs. Alcohol-re lated cra shes

in the United States cost the public an estimated $114.3 billion in 200 0

, i n cl u d i ng

$ 5 1 .1 billion in monetary costs and an estimated $63.2 billion in quality of life

losses.

. . . People o t h er t h an the drinking driver paid $71.6 billion of the

alcohol-r elated cra sh bill.

. . . Alcohol-re lated cra shes acc ounted for an estimated

18% of the $103 billion in U.S. auto insurance pay ments.

Dexter Tay lor, Ted Miller & Keny a Cox

, Impaired Drivi n g i n the United States Cost Fact Sheet

, N a t i o n a l H i g h w a y T r a f f i c S a f e t y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

, 2 0 0 2

, a v a i l a b l e a t

http:// www.nhtsa.g ov/people/injury /alcohol/impaired_driving _pg 2/US.htm.

Other Texas courts of appea ls have ordere d restit u t i on in DWI case s when appropriate

. 5 2

See, e.g., Ruiz v. State

, No. 14-04-01140- CR, 2006 WL 771381, *1-2 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t hHanna Pag e 15

B

. A v i c t i m n e e d n o t b e n a m e d i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

.

T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e r e q u i r i n g

, a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a

r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r

, t h a t a v i c t i m b e a l l e g e d i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

. I n d e e d

, t h e r e s t i t u t i o n

s t a t u t e e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t a d e f e n d a n t m a y b e o r d e r e d t o m a k e r e s t i t u t i o n t o “ a n y v i c t i m

o f t h e o f f e n s e

. ” I f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n c o u l d b e o r d e r e d o n l y f o r “ t h e 5 3

n a m e d v i c t i m o f t h e o f

f e n s e ” o r “ t h e c o m p l a i n a n t o f t h e o f f e n s e ” i t s u r e l y w o u l d h a v e s a i d

s o

. E v e n t h e p h r a s e s “ t h e v i c t i m ” o r “ a v i c t i m ” a r e m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e t h a n t h e e x p a n s i v e

p h r a s e “ a n y v i c t i m

. ” W h e n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e u s e s t h e w o r d “ a n y

, ” i t u s u a l l y m e a n s “ a n y a n d

a l l

. ” F u r t h e r m o r e

, w e h a v e n e v e r h e l d t h a t

, t o b e e n t i t l e d t o r e s t i t u t i o n

, a v i c t i m m u s t b e

n a m e d i n t h e c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

. I n f a c t

, w e i n d i c a t e d q u i t e t h e o p p o s i t e i n M a r t i n v

.

S t a t e

, w h e n w e n o t e d t h a t

5 4

[ n ] a m e d c o m p l a i n a n t s w i l l g e n e r a l l y b e t h e o n l y v i c t i m s o f t h e c r i m e

a d j u d i c a t e d b e c a u s e i n t h e m a j o r i t y o f c a s e s t h e o f

f e n s e i s a l l e g e d i n t e r m s o f

a n i d e n t i f

i e d v i c t i m o r c o m p l a i n a n t

. H o w e v e r

, w e m a k e t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n

Dist.] Marc h 28, 2006, no pet.) (not desig nated fo r publication) (upholding DWI defe ndant’s

restitution order to pay for “re place ment st ru cture ” for the house destroy ed by his intox icated

driving ); Banda v. State

, No. 13-97-400- CR, 1998 WL 34202281, *1-2 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi

J une 11, 1998, no pet.) (trial judge could rec ommend that parole board order DWI defe ndant to pay

restitution to accident victim for pr operty damag e ca

used by his driving while intoxicated).

Appellant raises a valid counter vailing public-policy conce rn that, if we allow restitut ion

for DWI damag es, we open the floodg ates for restitution in a wide swath of “victimless” offe nses–

perha ps even thousands of

dollars worth of restitution f or ac cidents ca

used by Class C jay

walking

offe nses. We leave those leg itimate conce rns to another day as DWI

, unlike many other “victimless”

offe nses

, cl ea rl y has the purpose of preve nting and deter ring death and damag es to persons and

proper ty by intox icated dr ivers on our hig hway s.

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 42.037(a ) (e mphasis added)

. 5 3

874 S.W .2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 5 4Hanna Pag e 16

b e c a u s e w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e n a m e d c o m p l a i n a n t m a y n o t a l w a y s b e t h e o n l y

v i c t i m o f t h e c r i m e a d

j u d i c a t e d

. 5 5

T h e r e i s n o r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a r e s t i t u t i o n v i c t i m b e a l l e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t

. H o l d i n g

o t h e r w i s e w o u l d a l l o w f o r b i z a r r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n t h e i n t e n t o f t h e

l e g i s l a t u r e

. I m a g i n e t h a t D a n g e r o u s D a n b r e a k s i n t o S u z i e Q ’ s h o u s e a n d s t e a l s S u z i e ’ s

c o m p u t e r a n d h e r h o u s e g u e s t ’ s R o l e x w a t c h

. I s t h e t r i a l j u d g e f o r b i d d e n f

r o m o r d e r i n g

r e s t i t u t i o n f

o r t h e h o u s e g u e s t s i m p l y b e c a u s e s h e i s n o t t h e c o m p l a i n a n t n a m e d i n t h e

b u r g l a r y i n d i c t m e n t ? T h i s c a n n o t b e t h e c a s e

. I t i s m o r e l o g i c a l a n d j u s t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e

h o u s e g u e s t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e s t i t u t i o n i f t h e S t a t e p r o v e s

, b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e

,

t h a t s h e i s a l s o a v i c t i m

– t h a t t h e b u r g l a r y w a s t h e “ b u t f o r ” a n d p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e l o s s

o f h e r R o l e x

.

I n s u m

, w e c o n c l u d e t h a t a p e r s o n w h o s u f f e r s p r o p e r t y d a m a g e o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s

a s t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t o f a d e f e n d a n t ’ s D W I c r i m e m a y b e e n t i t l e d t o r e s t i t u t i o n e v e n t h o u g h t h a t

v i c t i m i s n o t n a m e d i n t h e D W I c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t

.

I I I

.

A l t h o u g h w e r e

j e c t s o m e o f t h e r e a s o n i n g o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

, w e n o n e t h e l e s s

a f f i r m i t s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e $ 7

, 7 6 7

. 8 8 r e s t i t u t i o n o r d e r w a s i m p r o p e r

. T h e S t a t e o f f e r e d

e v i d e n c e t h a t a p p e l l a n t c a u s e d t h e d a m a g e t o t h e u t i l i t y p o l e

, b u t t h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e

– a n d

c e r t a i n l y n o t p r o o f t h a t s a t i s f i e s t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d

– t o s h o w t h a t t h e

Id . at 676 n. 4 (c itations omi tted). See also id. at 678 n. 9 (discussing Bruni v. State , 669 5 5

S.W .2d 829 (Tex. App.–Austin 1984, no pet.) an d noting that “eve n though Be tty Ross was not a

named c omplainant, she wa s clea rly a victim of the c rime adjudica ted.”)

.Hanna Pag e 17

o f f e n s e ( a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v i n g ) c a u s e d t h e d a m a g e t o t h e u t i l i t y p o l e

. T h e o n l y

e v i d e n c e a s t o w h a t c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t ( a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g d a m a g e ) w a s a p p e l l a n t ’ s s t a t e m e n t

t h a t “ h e m u s t h a v e h i t a w a t e r p u d d l e w h i c h c a u s e d h i m t o l o s e c o n t r o l c r a s h i n g i n t o t h e

p o l e

. ” T h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t h a v e t o b e l i e v e a p p e l l a n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a u s e o f

t h e a c c i d e n t

, b u t t h e r e i s n o o t h e r a f f i r m a t i v e e v i d e n c e t h a t w o u l d s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h a t

a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v i n g c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t

. 5 6

I n t h i s c a s e

, a p p e l l a n t p l e d g u i l t y

, s o t h e r e w a s n o t r i a l t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g h i s

d r i v i n g

, t h e a c c i d e n t

, o r h i s i n t o x i c a t i o n

. A t t h e e n d o f t h e f i r s t r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g i n w h i c h

t h e S t a t e p r o v e d o n l y t h e a m o u n t o f t h e d a m a g e t o t h e u t i l i t y p o l e

, a p p e l l a n t o b j e c t e d b e c a u s e

“ [ t ] h e r e ’ s b e e n n o e v i d e n c e o f c a u s a t i o n

. ” W h e n t h e t r i a l j u d g e a s k e d i f t h e S t a t e n e e d e d a

r e c e s s

, a p p e l l a n t a g a i n o b j e c t e d

, s a y i n g

, “ T h e S t a t e h a s h a d p l e n t y o f t i m e t o p r e p a r e t h i s

.

T h i s i s t h e t h i r d t i m e w e ’ v e b e e n h e r e

. T h e y d i d n ’ t p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e a s t o c a u s a t i o n

. ”

N o n e t h e l e s s

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e r e c e s s e d t h e r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g f o r s e v e r a l d a y s t o a l l o w t h e S t a t e

a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o v e c a u s a t i o n

.

A t t h a t s e c o n d h e a r i n g

, O f f i c e r F r a n c o t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e r e s p o n d e d t o a d i s p a t c h c a l l

f o r “ a c a r c r a s h w i t h i n

j u r i e s

. ” W h e n h e a r r i v e d

, h e s a w a c a r “ t h a t w a s c r a s h e d i n t o a

See, e.g., Cavazos v. State

, 382 S.W .3d 377, 385 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2012) (holding that 5 6

defe ndant is not entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offe nse based on mere specula tion;

“it require s aff

irmative evidence that both raises the les ser- included offense and rebuts or neg ates

an element of the g rea

ter offe nse.”) ; Hampton v. State

, 109 S.W .3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

(trial court err ed in submit ting instruction on lesser -included of fense of sexual a ssault be cause the

failure to find or re t ri ev e a knife matching the descr iption g iven by the complainant is not

“af firmative e vidence ” that no knife was used dur ing the assault).Hanna Pag e 18

b r o k e n t e l e p h o n e p o l e ” a n d “ p o w e r e l e c t r i c i t y l i n e s a l l o v e r t h e r o a d

. ” T h e p o l e w a s b r o k e n

i n h a l f

. A p p e l l a n t

, t h e d r i v e r o f t h a t c a r

, t o l d O f f i c e r F r a n c o t h a t h e h i t a w a t e r p u d d l e a n d

l o s t c o n t r o l o f h i s c a r

. O f f i c e r F r a n c o n e v e r m e n t i o n e d a n y t h i n g a b o u t a p p e l l a n t b e i n g

i n t o x i c a t e d

, s m e l l i n g o f a l c o h o l

, o r e x h i b i t i n g a n y o t h e r i n d i c i a o f d r u n k e n n e s s

. H e n e v e r

m e n t i o n e d t h e w o r d a l c o h o l o r d r i n k o r d r u n k

. H e d i d n o t d e s c r i b e a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o n d i t i o n o r

d e m e a n o r

. W h e n t h e p r o s e c u t o r a s k e d i f O f f i c e r F r a n c o h a d m a d e a d e t e r m i n a t i o n a s t o w h a t

c a u s e d t h a t a c c i d e n t

, O f f i c e r F r a n c o s a i d

, “ M r

. H a n n a [ ] d r i v i n g t h a t v e h i c l e

. ” P e r i o d

. W e

c a n n o t s i m p l y a s s u m e

, w i t h o u t a n y e v i d e n c e

, t h a t O f f i c e r F r a n c o t h o u g h t a p p e l l a n t w a s

i n t o x i c a t e d o r t h a t t h i s a s s u m e d i n t o x i c a t i o n c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t

.

P e o p l e f r e q u e n t l y h a v e c a r a c c i d e n t s r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r t h e y a r e i n t o x i c a t e d

. T o

o b t a i n r e s t i t u t i o n

, t h e S t a t e m u s t p r o v e t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v i n g w a s t h e “ b u t f o r ”

a n d p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e d a m a g e

. A l t h o u g h t h e S t a t e w a s g i v e n a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o f f e r

e v i d e n c e t h a t i t w a s a p p e l l a n t ’ s i n t o x i c a t e d d r i v i n g t h a t c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t

, t h e r e w a s n o

s u c h p r o o f i n t h i s c a s e

. 5 7

Althou gh ap p el l ant pled g uilty to being intox icated, he expli citly denied that his 5 7

intox ication was the cause of the acc ident. At any rate

, proof of the defe ndant’s intox ication is not

equiva l en t t o proof of causa tion. For example, other intox ication offe nses such as intox ication

assault and intoxi cation manslaug hter require proof t hat i t was the intox icated driving tha t cause d

the victim's injuries, not mere ly that the defe ndant was driving (while intox icated) and that a person

had been injured by the defe ndant' s driving

. See T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 49.07 (a person commits

intox ication assault “if

the per son, by

acc ident or mistake . .

. while opera ting a motor vehicle in a

public place while intox icated, by reason of that intoxication cause s serious bodily inju ry to

another .”) (empha sis added) ; T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 49.08 (a person is g uilty of intox icated manslaug hter

if he “oper ates a motor vehicle in a public place

. . . and is intox icated and by reason of that

intoxication cause s the death of another b y accident or mistake.”) (empha sis added)

. See also

Martinez v. State, 66 S.W .3d 467, 469 (Tex. A pp.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref ’d) (suffic ientHanna Pag e 19

T h e r e f o r e

, w e a f

f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s

.

D e l i v e r e d : A p r i l 9

, 2 0 1 4

P u b l i s h

evidenc e for jury to find “that appellant cause d the deaths of the four v i ct i m s by rea son of his

intox ication.”) ; Rodriguez v. State, 191 S.W .3d 428, 438 (Tex. App.–Corpus Chris ti 2 0 06, pet. ref ’d)

(“[J ]ury could rationally conclude that appellant was intox icated and t hat the ac cident wa s cause d

by that intox ication.”) ; W

ooten v. State

, 267 S.W .3d 289, 295 (Tex. Ap p .–Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008,

pet. ref ’d) (“[A] fac t-finder rea sonably could have found that “but for” appellant' s intox ication, the

complainants' deaths would not have occur red” ). Although in Kuciemba v. State, S.W .3d 460, 462

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) we stated that “[b] eing intox icated at the scene of a traff ic acc ident in which

th e ac t o r wa s a driver is some circ umstantial evidenc e that the actor ’s intox ication cause d the

acc ident .

. .,” Kuciemba had nothi ng to do with whether the evidenc e wa s sufficient to prove that

the defe ndant’s intox icated driving cause d the acc ident. I nstead, in Kuciemba we held that the fac t

that a defe ndant was intox icated at the scene of an acc ident, paire d with e vidence that the acc ident

had occur red rec ently

, was sufficie nt evidenc e that the defe ndant was intox icated at the ear lier time

when he was driving the vehicle

. Id . at 463.