IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TONY R. DALTON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-587-WS-C

ROBERT EARL HERRIN, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a self-styled complaint and a motion to 

proceed without prepayment of fees. (Docs. 1, 2). Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without 

prepayment of fees has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(1). Local Rule 72.2(c)(1) 

provides for the automatic referral of a non-dispositive pretrial matter, such as 

plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees, to a Magistrate Judge. The 

consideration of this motion requires the Magistrate Judge to screen plaintiff’s action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 

2002) (applying § 1915(e) to non-prisoner actions).2 After screening the present action, it 

is recommended that this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

 1

 While the complaint was being screened, the Court received the $400 filing fee from 

plaintiff on March 2, 2015.

2

 Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, 

that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at 

any time if the court determines that --

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I. Nature of Proceedings.

Plaintiff named four defendants in his brief complaint: Mr. Robert Earl Herrin, 

Exalted Ruler of Elks Lodge #2782, Foley, Alabama (“lodge”); Mr. Frank Rohe, 

President of the Alabama Elks Association; Mr. Robert Eddings, member of the lodge’s 

Board of Directors; and Ms. Debbie Osborne, Mr. Herrin’s lady friend. (Doc. 1 at 1). It 

is alleged that defendant Herrin appointed plaintiff and Mr. Henry P. Glass to the house 

committee, which oversees the lodge’s operations. (Id.). At that time, defendant Herrin 

told them “that members of lodge # 2782, preferred not to have people of color 

nominated for membership at [that location], meaning [A]frican [A]mericans, Mexicans, 

etc.” (Id.). In June and July, 2013, plaintiff and his wife began inviting their daughter 

Amber and her husband, an African-American, to visit them at the lodge. (Id.).

After a couple of visits, defendant Osborne started “criticism.” (Id.). The 

“criticism” continued unchecked by defendants Herrin and Rohe. (Id.). Then, 

defendant Eddings “join[ed] in with his version of criticism (foul language).” (Id.).

Eventually, plaintiff and his wife were told not to bring their daughter and her husband 

to the lodge. (Id.). 

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he abuse and discrimination continues up to this very 

day against people of color and members who do not fit this lodge’s version of what an 

 

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal -

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.

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elk should be or look like.” (Id.). The lodge’s officers are charged with violating lodge 

by-laws and house rules. (Id.).

Plaintiff contends that there has been civil rights violations and racial and 

member discrimination. (Id. at 1-2). There has been discrimination against his daughter 

and her husband, and against him, using violations of house rules and by-laws. (Id.). 

There has been “false witness against [him]” and “verb[a]l[] abuse against [his] 

character, such as (poor white trash, son of a bitch, Etc.) in the presen[ce] of other lodge 

members[,]” and defendant Osborne “call[ed] [his] Daughter (a ‘N’ word loving bitch) 

with witnesses standing by.” (Id.). For relief, plaintiff states that he “leave[s] the relief 

factor to the discretion of the court.” (Id.).

II. Analysis.

A. Authority to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. 

In addressing any action on its docket, the Court’s first consideration is to inquire 

into its jurisdiction, United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 909, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 2219, 173 

L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009), as the Constitution and Congress limits its jurisdiction only to hear 

certain actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 

128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). “Because a federal court is powerless to act beyond its . . . grant 

of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over 

a case, and should itself raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction at any point in 

the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 

1299 (11th Cir. 2001). This inquiry should be done at the earliest stage in the 

proceedings and sua sponte whenever subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. 

University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).

“ [O]nce a court determines that there has been no [jurisdictional] grant that covers a 

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particular case, the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the case for lack of 

jurisdiction.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000). 

B. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction.

It is incumbent on a plaintiff in a federal action to set forth in his complaint the 

basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 

(11th Cir.1994) (a pleader in federal court must affirmatively allege facts demonstrating 

the existence of jurisdiction). In that regard, Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure requires a plaintiff to include in his complaint “a short and plain statement of 

the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends.” Id. This statement must 

reflect that the court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship or 

federal question. Id. (“Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction over diversity 

actions and cases raising a federal question.”).

Because plaintiff did not identify any statute under which he is proceeding, the 

Court will examine the two sources on which its jurisdiction is based. Looking first at 

diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the complaint must reflect that “the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is 

between -- citizens of different States. . . . “ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “Federal diversity 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires ‘complete diversity’ - the citizenship of 

every plaintiff must be diverse from the citizenship of every defendant.” Legg v. Wyeth,

428 F.3d 1317, 1321 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). That is, diversity jurisdiction exists only when 

“there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.” Wisconsin 

Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 2052, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 

(1998) (diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is destroyed by the mere presence of one 

non-diverse defendant).

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In the present action, it appears that plaintiff is a resident of Alabama as well as 

defendants. (Id. at 2). Thus, defendants and plaintiff are not diverse, and the Court 

lacks diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over this action. Furthermore, the complaint 

does not reflect that the controversy satisfied the jurisdictional amount in that an 

amount for damages was not specified. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,

__U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 547, 553,___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2014) (“When a plaintiff invokes federalcourt jurisdiction, the plaintiff's amount-in-controversy allegation is accepted if made in 

good faith.”).

C. Federal-Question Jurisdiction.

“Absent diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must present a ‘substantial’ federal 

question in order to invoke the district court's jurisdiction.” Wyke v. Polk County School 

Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 566 (11th Cir.1997). Under federal-question jurisdiction, district courts 

are given “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[A] case arises under federal law 

when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.” Gunn v. Minton, ___U.S. ___, 133 

S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). “Under the longstanding well-pleaded 

complaint rule, . . . , a suit arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's statement 

of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law].” Vaden v. Discover 

Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) (quotation marks 

omitted and brackets in original).

However, a court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not extend to a cause of 

action that is not valid, as compared to one that is arguable. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998 ).

“[W]hen the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decision of [the 

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Supreme Court], or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal 

controversy,” dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is appropriate. Id.

(quotation marks omitted). “A federal claim will be deemed without any legal merit if 

the claim has no plausible foundation, or [if] the court concludes that a prior Supreme 

Court decision clearly forecloses the claim.” Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted and brackets in original); Southpark Square Lmtd. v. 

City of Jackson, Miss., 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.) (same),3 cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). 

A claim “must be more than frivolous to support federal question jurisdiction” and can 

satisfy this threshold only if “there is any foundation of plausibility to the claim.” Id. at

341.

Because plaintiff does not refer to a specific constitutional provision or a federal 

statute, the Court is examining the allegations that tend to support federal question 

jurisdiction.4 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 

(1972) (ruling that a pro se litigant’s allegations are to be liberally construed); cf. GJR 

Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a 

court does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se

litigant] in order to sustain an action”), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009). Considering plaintiff‘s assertions of civil rights violations and racial 

 3

 The Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981), adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

4

 Plaintiff’s allegations of member discrimination and discrimination based on 

violation of house rules and by-laws are not violations of federal or constitutional law, 

and therefore will not be addressed in this Report and Recommendation.

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discrimination with respect to the lodge, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a appears to be the statute 

closest to his allegations and theory for a violation of a federal right. The Court 

interprets plaintiff’s allegations of civil rights violations and racial discrimination as a 

claim for discrimination as no other information is provided to support civil rights 

violations beyond his claim for racial discrimination. 

1. Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodations. 

Discrimination in places of public accommodation is addressed by 42 U.S.C. § 

2000a,

5 which provides:

a) Equal access

All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 

advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 

accommodation, as defined in this section, without 

discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, 

religion, or national origin.

(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or 

supported in their activities by State action as places of 

public accommodation; lodgings; facilities principally 

engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; 

gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other 

covered establishments

Each of the following establishments which serves the 

public is a place of public accommodation within the 

meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce, 

 5 This statute is found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was 

enacted “to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies 

denial[] of equal access to public establishments.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 

States, 379 U.S. 241, 250, 85 S.Ct. 348, 354, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1984). By passing this Act, 

Congress sought to address “burdens that discrimination by race or color place[] upon 

interstate commerce.” Id. at 253, 85 S.Ct. at 355. Congress received evidence in its 

hearings on the inability of African-Americans to secure accommodations while 

traveling, which served as a basis for this Act. Id.

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or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State 

action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which 

provides lodging to transient guests, other than an 

establishment located within a building which contains not 

more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually 

occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his 

residence;

(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch 

counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged 

in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, 

but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises 

of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, 

sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or 

entertainment; and

(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically 

located within the premises of any establishment otherwise 

covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of 

which is physically located any such covered establishment, 

and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such 

covered establishment.

(e) Private establishments

The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a 

private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, 

except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are 

made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment 

within the scope of subsection (b) of this section. (Emphases 

added.)

42 U.S.C. § 2000a. The chief purpose of this title is “to [re]move the daily affront and 

humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to 

the general public.” Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 23 L.Ed.2d 

318 (1969) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 18) (quotation marks 

omitted). To further this goal, only injunctive relief is available to “[a] plaintiff seeking 

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to enforce the substantive provisions of § 2000a[.]” Lizardo v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 97-cv1234 FJS GKD, 2000 WL 976808, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a3(a); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 

1263 (1968)), aff’d, 270 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2001). 

 In pleading a claim for violation of this statute, or for any federal civil action, Rule 

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). 

This statement must contain factual content that allows the Court to reasonably 

conclude that the plaintiff’s claim is facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations must be sufficient 

“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 

S.Ct. at 1965. Even though detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8 

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 127 S.Ct. at 1949. Moreover, it will not suffice to plead merely 

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.“ 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.

 To state a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, it is required that the 

allegations show the establishment in question is a public accommodation with its 

operations affecting commerce. United States v. Landsdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d 83, 86 

(3d Cir. 1990) (“[A] place of public accommodation has two elements: first, it must be 

one of the statutorily enumerated categories of establishments that serve the public, . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b); second, its operations must affect commerce, id.“). The statute 

“sets forth a comprehensive list of establishments that qualify as a ‘place of public 

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accommodation,’ id. § 2000a(b), and in so doing excludes from its coverage those 

categories of establishments not listed.” Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 

427, 431 (4th Cir. 2006). 

The present allegations do not convey that the local Elks Lodge #2782 is a place 

of public accommodation. The complaint’s single use of the conclusory term 

“entertainment“ with no accompanying descriptive terms does not satisfy the 

plausibility pleading standard and does not permit the Court to conclude the lodge falls 

into one of the categories enumerated in the statute. A “’place of entertainment’ 

includes a public establishment where entertainment takes the form of direct 

participation in some sport or activity as well as to an establishment where patrons are 

entertained as spectators or listeners.” Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of 

Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 648 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Daniel, 385 U.S. at 306). 

“Whether an entity qualifies as a place of public accommodation can be a fact-intensive 

inquiry, because establishments differ markedly in their operations.” Denny, 456 F.3d at 

431 (finding that a beauty salon is not a place of entertainment as contemplated by Title 

II’s definitions in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3)).

The only other allegation that is connected to the determination of whether the 

lodge is a place of public accommodation is the reference to “membership. “ See Doc. 1 

at 1. However, the reference to “membership” undercuts a finding that the lodge is a 

public accommodation. Due to the failure to allege a plausible claim that the lodge is a 

place of public accommodation, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. See Williams v. Le Crewe de Spaniards, CA No. 08-0506-WS-C, 2009 WL 

197303, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff, an African-American,

could not maintain a cause of action against defendant Mardi Gras organization 

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because she did not allege defendant was a place of accommodation and defendant, a 

private association, is not covered by Title II), adopted, 2009 WL 187254 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 

2009) (unpublished). This failure to state a claim is a ground for the complaint’s 

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff had met his pleading burden of showing that 

the lodge was a place of public accommodation, and defendants were served with 

process, the burden of proof would shift, Anderson v. Pass Christian Isles Golf Club, Inc.,

488 F.2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1974), and defendants would have the opportunity to assert 

that the lodge is a private establishment not subject to the anti-discriminatory 

provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a applied to public accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 

2000a(e) (“The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other 

establishment not in fact open to the public[.]”). 

In the seminal case of Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 

1182, 1203-04 (D. Conn. 1974), the court held that defendant Groton Elks was a private 

club entitled to the private club exception when it ruled for the Groton Elks on the claim 

that it did not consider plaintiff’s membership application because he was an AfricanAmerican. Id. at 1204. The court observed that in the Congressional Record “the Elks 

were specifically mentioned as an example of an exempted organization.” Id. (citing 

1100 Cong. Rec. 2292, 2294, 6008, 7407). The court also found instructive the decision in 

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1970, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972), 

in which the Supreme Court found that the Moose Lodge is a private club with 

discriminatory membership practices that the plaintiff, an African-American, had no 

standing to challenge. Id. Similarly, in Solomon v. Miami Woman’s Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 

44-45 (D.C. Fla. 1973), the court dismissed claims of African-Americans who had been 

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denied membership in defendant Miami Woman’s Club due to their race because 

defendant was a private club exempt from the civil rights requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 

2000a. Id. Furthermore, in Williams, CA No. 08-0506-WS-C, 2009 WL 197303, at *6 

(unpublished), supra, an African-American’s complaint against a private Mardi Gras 

association was dismissed because the organization was not a place of public 

accommodation covered by Title II. Id.

In addition, the complaint is lacking in direct allegations establishing that the 

lodge’s operations affect commerce. Inferences can be made, but Rule 8(a) requires the 

pleading of this element with allegations indicating that it is plausible that the lodge 

operations affect commerce. The Court finds that the lone phrase “buying products to 

re[sell]” is inadequate to show that the lodge’s operations plausibly affect commerce. 

See Doc. 1 at 1.

Furthermore, the Court finds an absence of allegations that identify plaintiff’s 

race. Inasmuch as he relates that he was told that “people of color [were] not to be 

nominated for membership at [that] location, meaning [A]frican-[A]mericans, 

[M]exicans, etc.[,]” and was subjected to “verb[a]l[] abuse against [his] character, such 

as (poor white trash, son of a bitch, Etc.) in the presen[ce] of other lodge members[,]” 

the Court deduces that plaintiff is of another race, presumably Caucasian, and it also 

presumes that defendants are Caucasian. Thus, plaintiff’s claim is that the Caucasian 

defendants discriminated him, a Caucasian. The reason for defendants’ unfavorable 

treatment of him is not his “race, color, religion, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 

2000a(a), but is with whom plaintiff is inviting to the lodge. However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a 

protects against discrimination that occurs only on account of “race, color, religion, or 

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Accordingly, the treatment that plaintiff is 

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experiencing from defendants is not the type of discrimination prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 

2000a(a). See Efstathiou v. Romeo Carryouts & Liquors, Inc., No. 96 C 8553, 1997 WL 

603896, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (unpublished)(finding that rights of association are not 

protected under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.)

Considering that other courts have found Elks Lodges and other fraternal 

organizations’ lodges are private organizations exempted from 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and 

that plaintiff is a Caucasian who has not been discriminated against for one of the 

protected reasons, i.e., “race, color, religion, or national origin,” the Court finds that 

plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a is without an arguable basis 

in the law. 

2. Defamation Claim.

As previously stated, the complaint contains allegations of ‘’false witness against 

me,” “verb[a]l[] abuse against my character, such as (poor white trash, Son of a bitch, 

Etc.) in the presen[ce] of other lodge members,” and “criticism.” (Doc. 1 at 1-2). This is 

the extent of the verbal statements that plaintiff claims were directed to him. Although 

not labeled by plaintiff as such, the Court is treating these allegations as a claim for 

defamation. Warren v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 739 So.2d 1125, 1132 (Ala. Civ. App. 

1999) (“The law of libel and slander is discussed generally under the tort of 

defamation[.]” ).

“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most States, but [it 

is] not a constitutional deprivation.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 

1794, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). There is “no constitutional doctrine converting every 

defamation . . . into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702, 96 S.Ct. 

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1155, 1161, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). A person’s interest in his reputation is not a liberty or 

property interest recognized under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 701-02, 96 S.Ct. at 

1161. To hold otherwise would turn the Due Process Clause into a font of tort law 

superimposed on state legal systems. Id. at 701, 96 S.Ct. at 1160. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that plaintiff’s allegations of him being defamed are without legal merit.

3. Lack of Standing.

Interspersed through plaintiff’s complaint are allegations that do not pertain to 

him, such as his daughter being called a derogatory phrase, “criticism” that is not 

directed to anyone, “discrimination . . . against people of color and members who do 

not fit this lodge’s version of what an elk should be or look like,” and “discrimination 

against [his] daughter and her [h]usband.” (Doc. 1 at 1-2). Plaintiff can only pursue 

violations of his federal rights, and not violations of another’s federal rights. Superior 

MRI Services, Inc. v. Alliance Healthcare, Services, Inc., 2015 WL 687711, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 

18, 2015) (“a party must assert its own rights”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 

S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces several judicially 

self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general 

prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights . . . .”), overruled on other 

grounds by Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 

S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 

45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (“the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and 

interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third 

parties”). Therefore, plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the actions and statements 

directed to others. These allegations in this action are without merit.

III. Conclusion.

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“[O]nce a court determines that there has been no [jurisdictional] grant that 

covers a particular case, the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the case for lack of 

jurisdiction.” Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1261. Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasons

on which the Court found that plaintiff’s claims are without arguable legal merit, it is 

recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding 

that the district court’s dismissal should have been without prejudice “[s]ince the court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action”). 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything 

in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P.

72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit 

precedent, “the failure to object limits the scope of [] appellate review to plain error 

review of the magistrate judge’s factual findings.” Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 

(11th Cir. 2013). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2015. 

s/ WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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