IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

VONEKA Q. NETTLES, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 13-0605-WS-C

 )

DAPHNE UTILITIES, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Sever or Separate for Trial 

(doc. 12), with accompanying memorandum of law. Plaintiffs have filed a short Response (doc. 

16) confirming that they do not oppose defendant’s request to sever their claims for trial.

Plaintiffs, Voneka Q. Nettles, Carlos Butler, and Cedric Goodloe, brought this action 

against defendant, Daphne Utilities, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race and 

retaliation, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. According to the Amended 

Complaint, plaintiff Nettles, who has worked for Daphne Utilities as an Accounting Technician 

since 2009, was denied a wage increase while white employees performing similar duties were 

paid more, and was denied consideration for a vacant position. (Doc. 6, ¶¶ 6-13.) Plaintiff 

Butler is alleged to have worked for Daphne Utilities for more than seven years as a Wastewater 

Field Services worker. (Id., ¶ 14.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the Wastewater Field 

Services unit was divided into racially segregated departments, and that Butler received a 

negative performance evaluation and was denied a salary increase because of his race. (Id., ¶¶ 

14-29.) As for plaintiff Goodloe, he was employed by Daphne Utilities as a Payroll/Benefits 

Coordinator/Trainer until his discharge in March 2013. (Id., ¶ 30.) Well-pleaded facts in the 

Amended Complaint reflect that Goodloe was paid less than similarly situated white employees 

and was fired for complaining of racially discriminatory practices at the company. (Id., ¶¶ 30-

48.) The Amended Complaint asserts Title VII and § 1981 claims for Nettles predicated on 

discriminatory pay and failure to transfer/promote (Counts I – IV), a § 1981 claim for Butler 

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based on his negative evaluation and denial of a raise (Count V), and § 1981 claims for Goodloe 

alleging denial of fair salary and retaliatory discharge (Counts VI – VII).

The claims of all three plaintiffs were presented jointly in a single Amended Complaint 

against Daphne Utilities. In its Motion to Sever or Separate for Trial, defendant requests that (i) 

the three plaintiffs’ claims “be severed into three separate lawsuits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

Rules 20 and 21,” or (ii) alternatively, the three plaintiffs’ claims “be severed for trial under 

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 42(b).” (Doc. 12, ¶¶ 2-3.) The distinction between these alternative pathways

is not merely academic. After all, “[s]everance pursuant to Rule 21 essentially creates a separate 

case, the disposition of which is final and appealable. ... Rule 42(b) does not create a new case, 

but bifurcates issues or claims within a single case for separate trials.” Graudins v. Retro 

Fitness, LLC, 921 F. Supp.2d 456, 468 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

“The determination of whether to grant a motion to sever is left to the discretion of the 

trial court.” Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp., 245 F.R.D. 539, 541 (S.D. Ala. 2007); 

see also Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1324, n.16 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The trial 

court likewise has discretion under Rule 20(b) to order separate trials to prevent delay or 

prejudice.”); Oram v. SoulCycle LLC, --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2013 WL 5797346, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 

28, 2013) (“The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to sever claims under 

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 21.”). “[T]he factors considered in exercising that discretion include whether 

the claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, whether they present some common 

question of law or fact, whether severance would facilitate settlement or judicial economy, and 

the relative prejudice to each side if the motion is granted or denied.” Fisher, 245 F.R.D. at 541 

(citations omitted); see also Graudins, 921 F. Supp.2d at 468 (in evaluating motion to sever, 

courts weigh “convenience of the parties, avoiding prejudice, and promoting expedition and 

economy”) (citation omitted). “In considering whether to order separate trials of any claims or 

issues, the paramount consideration must remain a fair and impartial trial to all litigants through 

a balance of benefits and prejudice.” Fisher, 245 F.R.D. at 541-42 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-14, 287 F.R.D. 513, 522 

(N.D. Ind. 2012) (in evaluating motion to sever, “a court should consider the convenience and 

fairness to parties,” and its decision “should serve the ends of justice and facilitate the prompt 

and efficient disposition of the litigation”) (citation omitted).

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In seeking to sever each plaintiff’s claims into a separate lawsuit, Daphne Utilities argues

that the three plaintiffs have been misjoined under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To be 

sure, the rules provide that “[p]ersons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any 

right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or 

fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Rule 20(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. But both 

subsections appear to be satisfied here. Plaintiffs all work or worked for the same employer, 

Daphne Utilities. They claim to have been subjected to racially discriminatory treatment with 

regard to compensation during the same period of time. The same management figures at 

Daphne Utilities were allegedly involved in the subject personnel decisions (doc. 16, at 1), and 

plaintiff Goodloe’s complaints about the mistreatment of plaintiff Butler form part of the basis of 

his retaliation claim. (Doc. 6, ¶¶ 42-43.) Plaintiffs bring the same or very similar claims largely

under the same statute arising from the same or similar conduct by the same corporate defendant 

at the same time. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs were not misjoined under Rule 

20(a).

1

 Defendant’s Motion to Sever pursuant to Rule 21 is therefore denied.

More generally, fracturing this case into three separate lawsuits would be inefficient, and 

would not advance the objectives of convenience, judicial economy, expediting resolution of 

disputes and eliminating unnecessary litigation. See, e.g., Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp.2d 1344, 

1351 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“Joinder rules ... are construed generously towards entertaining the 

broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness of the parties.”) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); Blount v. U.S. Security Associates, 930 F. Supp.2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 

 1 See, e.g., Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1323 (for purposes of Rule 20(a), 

“‘[t]ransaction’ is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, 

depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical 

relationship.”) (citation omitted); Spaeth v. Michigan State University College of Law, 845 F. 

Supp.2d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2012) (“when determining whether employment discrimination claims 

raise common questions of law or fact for purposes of permissive joinder, courts often consider 

the circumstances surrounding the [] claims, including the people involved, the location, the time 

frame, and the defendant’s pattern of behavior”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 

Disparte v. Corporate Executive Bd., 223 F.R.D. 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2004) (“where multiple plaintiffs 

bring suit for employment discrimination alleging a pattern of discriminatory behavior a broad 

variation of circumstances relating to the merits of individual performance of each of the 

plaintiffs will not nullify a common question of fact”) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

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2013) (“the requirements for permissive joinder are to be liberally construed in the interest of 

convenience and judicial economy”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); First Time 

Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 252 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (observing that Rule 20(a) test 

is “flexible” and that “courts are encouraged to seek the broadest possible scope of action 

consistent with fairness to the parties”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Multiplying this singular lawsuit into three would not serve any constructive purpose and would 

not protect Daphne Utilities from prejudice to any greater extent than the more moderate option 

of bifurcation under Rule 42(b), as discussed infra. By contrast, it would likely require

overlapping discovery in triplicate and similar motion practice to be conducted by the same 

lawyers thrice. The Court exercises its discretion not to sever this action pursuant to Rule 21, 

Fed.R.Civ.P.2 Rather, all three plaintiffs’ claims will remain joined in this action.

In the alternative, Daphne Utilities requests separate trials for each plaintiff pursuant to 

Rule 42(b). That rule provides that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and 

economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues [or] claims.” Rule 

42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. “Among the pertinent considerations are the degree of difference between 

the issues to be tried separately, the overlap or lack thereof in the proof, and any prejudice to 

either side.” Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, 800 F. Supp.2d 484, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also 

Sterling Const. Management, LLC v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 280 F.R.D. 576 (D. Colo. 2011) (in Rule 

42(b) context, “[a] paramount consideration at all times in the administration of justice is a fair 

and impartial trial to all litigants”) (citation omitted). As noted, plaintiffs do not object to the 

birfurcation of their claims for trial. Additionally, Daphne Utilities has made a persuasive 

 2 Splintering this case into three at this juncture would be inefficient and 

inadvisable for another reason, as well. This action is already four and a half months old. 

Responsive pleadings have been filed, the parties have conducted their Rule 26(f) planning 

meeting and submitted the accompanying report, and Magistrate Judge Cassady has entered a 

Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 15) that provides for unified discovery proceedings based on 

the parties’ agreed discovery plan. In other words, this case is already well on its way in its 

present configuration. The parties agreed on – and Judge Cassady implemented – a discovery 

plan that would allow discovery relating to all three plaintiffs’ claims contemporaneously in the 

same litigation. To unravel that work now and create three separate lawsuits with three separate 

Scheduling Orders and discovery plans would be enormously inefficient, and would multiply and 

delay these proceedings unnecessarily, all at a substantial burden to litigant and judicial 

resources alike.

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showing of prejudice “if evidence of other instances of alleged discrimination are presented to 

the jury on each Plaintiffs’ [sic] claim.” (Doc. 13, at 8.) There is, of course, a risk “that one or 

two plaintiff’s [sic] unique circumstances could bias the jury against defendant generally, thus 

prejudicing defendant with respect to the other plaintiffs’ claims.” Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 

849 F. Supp. 785, 790 (N.D. Ga. 1994). And because each plaintiff’s claims involve a distinct

set of facts and witnesses (tailored to that plaintiff’s specific circumstances), the Court expects 

that there would be little redundancy in evidentiary presentation from one plaintiff’s trial to the 

next. Further, bifurcating each plaintiff’s claims for trial would mitigate the risk of jury 

confusion that may arise from presentation of disparate facts concerning the distinct claims of 

each of three different plaintiffs, all lumped together in the same trial. Accordingly, in the 

interests of efficiency and the fair administration of justice, defendant’s Motion to Separate for 

Trial is granted.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Sever or Separate for Trial (doc. 

12) is granted in part, and denied in part. The Motion is denied insofar as defendant requests 

severance pursuant to Rule 21, Fed.R.Civ.P. The Motion is granted insofar as defendant 

requests bifurcation pursuant to Rule 42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. It is ordered that each plaintiff’s 

claims will be tried separately during the May 2015 civil term. All discovery and other pretrial

deadlines in this matter will remain governed by the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (doc. 15) 

entered on April 4, 2014, except insofar as they may be modified by the undersigned or by 

Magistrate Judge Cassady. Other than bifurcation of trial of each plaintiff’s claims, this Order 

does not alter or adjust any provisions of that Scheduling Order.

DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 2014.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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