IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDDIE L. STOKES,1 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00559-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Eddie L. Stokes has brought this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his application for 

disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 401, et seq. By the consent of the parties (see Doc. 19), the Court has designated the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of 

judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Doc. 22).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 12, 15) and the administrative 

record (Doc. 11) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of 

transcript])”), and with the benefit of oral argument held October 27, 2015, the Court 

finds that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. Background

On August 3, 2011, Stokes filed an application for DIB with the Social Security 

 1 Though the Plaintiff’s name was docketed as “Eddie L. Strokes,” the record indicates that 

his last name lacks an “r” and is in fact “Stokes.” The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to 

correct the Plaintiff’s name on the docket accordingly.

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Administration (“SSA”),2 alleging disability beginning June 30, 2005.3 (R. 100). After 

his application was initially denied, Stokes requested a hearing, which was held before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the SSA on August 2, 2013. (R. 100). On 

August 30, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Stokes’s applications, 

finding him “not disabled” under the Social Security Act. (See R. 97 – 108).

Stokes requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council for the 

SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, submitting additional evidence for 

the Appeals Council’s consideration. The Commissioner’s decision on Stokes’s 

application became final when the Appeals Council denied Stokes’s request for review 

on October 31, 2014. (R. 1 – 5). On December 2, 2014, Stokes filed this action under § 

405(g) for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1). See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in 

controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within 

sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time 

as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a 

court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the 

Appeals Council.”).

 2 “The Social Security Act's general disability insurance benefits program (‘DIB’) provides 

income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they 

are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence. See 42 U.S.C. 423(a).” Sanders v. 

Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-0491-N, 2012 WL 4497733, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012).

3 “For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or 

before the last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) (2005).” Moore v. 

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

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II. Standard of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper 

legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” ’ ” 

Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 

(internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 

1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or 

substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 

(quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ 

‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, we 

must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 

F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

 “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as 

automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” Bloodsworth, 

703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). “In determining whether 

substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as 

well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 

131 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, “[t]here is no presumption...that the Commissioner 

followed the appropriate legal standards in deciding a claim for benefits or that the 

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legal conclusions reached were valid. Instead, [the court] conduct[s] ‘an exacting 

examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per 

curiam) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (internal 

citation omitted). In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with 

deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. 

Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 

1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the 

legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 

F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to 

determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). “ ‘The [Commissioner]'s failure to 

apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for 

determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’ ” 

Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th 

Cir. 1991)).

Eligibility for DIB ... requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 

423(a)(1)(E) ... A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

423(d)(1)(A) ...

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2015) 

(per curiam) (unpublished).4

 4 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (effective Dec. 1, 2014). See also

Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases 

printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”).

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The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation 

process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether 

the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) 

whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified 

impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can 

perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and 

(5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy 

that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, 

and work experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate 

both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 

F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In 

determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must 

consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of 

examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and 

work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) 

(citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These 

factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a 

single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations 

omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that 

he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then 

becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is 

 5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual 

steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

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capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. 

Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th 

Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although the “claimant bears the burden of 

demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the 

Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” 

Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). “This is an onerous task, as the 

ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all 

relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider 

the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 

2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

“When no new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council and it denies review, 

then the administrative law judge's decision is necessarily reviewed as the final 

decision of the Commissioner, but when a claimant properly presents new evidence to 

the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence 

renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262.

III. Claims on Judicial Review

1. The ALJ reversibly erred “in acting as both judge and physician by arbitrarily 

substituting his own medical opinion, without any supporting medical opinions 

or substantial evidence, for the opinion of a medical professional...”

2. The ALJ “reversibly erred in violation of Social Security Ruling 96-8p in finding 

that [Stokes] would have the residual functional capacity to perform medium 

work except with occasional postural and manipulative limitations and must 

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also avoid dangerous hazards, machinery, and heights ... Under Social Security 

Ruling 86-8p, the Administrative Law Judge, in delineating a Plaintiff’s residual 

functional capacity, is required to state a function-by-function assessment of the 

Plaintiff’s ability to do postural and manipulative activities.” 

(Doc. 12 at 1 – 2).

IV. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Stokes “did not engage in substantial 

gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of June 30, 2005 through 

his date last insured of December 31, 2006...” (R. 102). At Step Two, the ALJ 

determined that Stokes had the following severe impairments through his date last 

insured: cervical disc disease status post fusion surgery at C5-7, and lumbar 

degenerative disc disease. (R. 102). At Step Three, the ALJ found that Stokes did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of 

one of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments. (R. 37 – 38). 

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the regulations 

define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the 

limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). 

Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant's] 

residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other 

evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Furthermore, the RFC 

determination is used both to determine whether the claimant: (1) can 

return to her past relevant work under the fourth step; and (2) can adjust 

to other work under the fifth step...20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)

& (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past relevant work, the ALJ 

moves on to step five.

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In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant work, 

the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant medical 

and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That is, the ALJ 

must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular work level. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and 

determines that the claimant cannot return to her prior relevant work, 

the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Stokes had the RFC “to perform medium work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c)[ 6 ] except that [he] has occasional postural and 

manipulative limitations [and] also must avoid dangerous hazards, machinery, and 

heights.” (R. 103). Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined that Stokes “was capable of 

performing past relevant work as a welder/fitter...” (R. 105). Alternatively, the ALJ, 

proceeded to Step Five, determined that there existed significant numbers of jobs in the 

national economy that Stokes could perform (R. 106 – 107). Thus, the ALJ found that 

Stokes was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 107).

 6 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the 

national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 

very heavy. These terms are all defined in the regulations ... Each classification ...has its 

own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4. “Medium work involves lifting no more 

than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 

pounds. If someone can do medium work, ... he or she can also do sedentary and light 

work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). “A full range of medium work requires standing or 

walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday in order to 

meet the requirements of frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 25 pounds. As 

in light work, sitting may occur intermittently during the remaining time. Use of the arms 

and hands is necessary to grasp, hold, and turn objects, as opposed to the finer activities in 

much sedentary work, which require precision use of the fingers as well as use of the hands 

and arms. []The considerable lifting required for the full range of medium work usually 

requires frequent bending-stooping (Stooping is a type of bending in which a person bends 

his or her body downward and forward by bending the spine at the waist.) Flexibility of the 

knees as well as the torso is important for this activity. (Crouching is bending both the legs 

and spine in order to bend the body downward and forward.)” Social Security Ruling 83-10 

(Jan. 1, 1983).

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A. Claim 1

Stokes claims that the ALJ “was without substantial evidence to support the ... 

RFC ... and substituted his own medical opinion for the opinion of a medical 

professional[,]” as “[o]ther than the opinion of [non-examining state agency physician] 

Dr. Hayne and [workmen’s compensation physician] Dr. Schnitzer, the [ALJ] cited no 

further medical evidence to support his finding.” (Doc. 12 at 3 – 5). The assertion that 

the ALJ “cited no further medical evidence” other than the opinions of Dr. Hayne and 

Dr. Schnitzer is demonstrably incorrect. In addition to those opinions, the ALJ’s 

decision at Step Four summarized the objective record medical evidence and Stokes’s 

subjective allegations and testimony. (See R. 104 – 105). The assertion that the ALJ 

“substituted his own medical opinion for the opinion of a medical professional” is also 

demonstrably incorrect, as the ALJ assigned significant weight to the opinion of 

treating source Dr. Schnitzer, as well as “some limited weight” to Dr. Hayne’s opinion.

“ ‘Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other 

acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the 

claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and 

prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] 

physical or mental restrictions.’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). “There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) 

treating physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, 

nonexamining physicians.” Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 (11th 

Cir. Sept. 26, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 

416.927(c)(1)-(2)). “In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must consider a number of 

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factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion, including (1) 

whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of 

a treating physician's relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and 

explanation supporting the physician’s opinion; (4) how consistent the physician’s 

opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the physician’s specialization. These 

factors apply to both examining and non-examining physicians.” Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 

416.927(c) & (e)).

 “A ‘treating source’ (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's ‘own physician, 

psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[], or has provided[],[ the 

claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing 

treatment relationship with [the claimant].’ ” Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 179 F. 

App'x 589, 591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1502). “Absent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating 

physicians ‘substantial or considerable weight.’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 

Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). While noting that Dr. Schnitzer’s opinion “was offered prior 

to the claimant’s date last insured and even alleged onset date[,]” the ALJ nevertheless 

found that the opinion was “largely consistent with the medical evidence” (but 

“extensively inconsistent with the allegations of the claimant”), noting that “there is no 

treatment from [the time of Dr. Schnitzer’s opinion] through the date last insured that 

contradicts the[] limitations” in the opinion (R. 105). See Jarrett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

422 F. App'x 869, 873 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Generally, 

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the more consistent a physician’s opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight 

an ALJ should place on that opinion.” (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4), now at § 

404.1527(c)(4) (effective Aug. 24, 2012)). But see Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (good cause 

exists to disregard a treating physician’s opinion when it is not bolstered by the 

evidence, or when evidence supports a contrary finding). Thus, the ALJ did not err in 

assigning significant weight to Dr. Schnitzer’s opinion.

The ALJ also did not err in accepting Dr. Schnitzer’s opinion over that of nonexaminer Dr. Hayne, as “the report of a non-examining doctor is accorded little weight 

if it contradicts an examining doctor’s report; such a report, standing alone, cannot 

constitute substantial evidence.” Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 

1991) (citing Spencer on behalf of Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (11th Cir. 

1985) (per curiam)).7 Stokes argues that Dr. Schnitzer’s opinion “only encompassed 

[Stokes]’s workmen’s compensation impairment of cervical discectomy” (Doc. 12 at 4) 

and did not account for his complaints of back pain, which Dr. Hayne did discuss. 

However, in formulating his proposed RFC, Dr. Hayne considered only Stokes’s “Two 

Level Cervical Fusion with neck pain” and did not factor any limitations from back pain 

into the opinion. (R. 636). Indeed, Dr. Hayne noted that there was no medical evidence 

of record “present in the file to allow establishing an MDI for low back pain in 2000 or 

before the expired” date last insured. (R. 637. See also R. 636 (“We have no MER of 

detail to address his back pain and any L/S MDI from this time period based on the 

evidence we do have in file.”).

At oral argument, counsel for Stokes further suggested that Dr. Schnitzer’s 

 7 Stokes does not dispute the ALJ’s assignment of “treating source” status to Dr. Schnitzer’s 

opinions, and they are indisputably examining source opinions.

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opinion was unreliable because the record evidence indicates Stokes continued to 

receive treatment from Coastal Neurological Institute, first from Dr. Schnitzer and 

then from Drs. Troy Middleton and Patricia Boltz, for over a year after Dr. Schnitzer 

issued his opinion on April 12, 2000 (R. 631). Without citing to any specific examples in 

the record in support, counsel suggested that the Court infer from this that Stokes’s 

impairments worsened after Dr. Schnitzer issued his opinion. However, the ALJ noted 

that he had considered, inter alia, all record medical evidence from CNI (see R. 104 

(citing SSA Exs. 7F, 8F, and 9F [R. 605 – 632])), as well as Dr. Hayne’s summary of 

that evidence (see R.104 (citing SSA Ex. 11F [R. 635 – 637])) before finding Dr. 

Schnitzer’s opinions “largely consistent with the medical evidence” (R. 105), suggesting 

that, in the ALJ’s judgment, the additional treatment notes did not show a worsening of 

Stokes’s limitations. Stokes has cited nothing in the record that contradicts that 

judgment, and substantial evidence supports that determination, given that Stokes was 

discharged from treatment at CNI for failing to adhere to the prescribed treatment 

regiment, including “not following the pain contract, missing appointments,” and 

“taking narcotics as he pleaded...” (R. 104 (quotation marks omitted)). See Crawford, 

363 F.3d at 1159 (“the fact that Crawford repeatedly had declined medication that Dr. 

Ruiz had prescribed him” was relevant factor in the ALJs decision to discount treating 

physician’s opinion (citing Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1988) 

(failure to follow prescribed medical treatment will preclude a finding of disability))).

The complicating factor in this case, as the ALJ noted, is that there is simply no 

medical evidence from between June 30, 2005, Stokes’s alleged disability onset date, 

and December 31, 2006, his date last insured. While “the ALJ has a basic duty to 

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develop a full and fair record[,]” a “claimant bears the burden of proving that he is 

disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his 

claim.” E.g., Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). Stokes does not 

assert that there is any additional evidence that the ALJ should have made efforts to 

obtain but did not, and substantial evidence, particularly the opinions of a treating 

physician accorded significant weight, supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Stokes’s assertions of error in Claim 1.

B. Claim 2

In his second claim of error, Stokes asserts that the ALJ “reversibly erred in 

violation of Social Security Ruling 96-8p in failing to separately assess each exertional 

function when delineating the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.”8 (Doc. 12 at 6). 

SSR 96-8p provides, in relevant part: “The RFC assessment must first identify the 

individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related 

abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), 

and (d) of 20 CFR 404.1545 and 416.945. Only after that may RFC be expressed in 

terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very 

heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). In turn, 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(b) provides: “When we assess your physical abilities, we first assess 

the nature and extent of your physical limitations and then determine your residual 

functional capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis. A limited ability 

 8 “ ‘Social Security Rulings are agency rulings published under the authority of the 

Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the Administration.’ 

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n.9, 110 S. Ct. 885, 891 n.9, 107 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1990) 

(internal quotations omitted). Although SSA rulings are not binding on this Court, we 

accord the rulings deference. See Fair v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1466, 1468–69 (11th Cir. 1994).” 

De Olazabal v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 579 F. App'x 827, 832 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (per 

curiam) (unpublished).

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to perform certain physical demands of work activity, such as sitting, standing, 

walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions (including 

manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping or crouching), 

may reduce your ability to do past work and other work.”9 

Stokes contends the ALJ’s statement in the RFC that Stokes would have 

“occasional postural and manipulative limitations” (R. 103) is insufficient. “By 

grouping together any postural and manipulative limitations,” he argues, the ALJ did 

not follow SSR 96-8p’s requirement “to state a function-by-function assessment of the 

Plaintiff’s ability to do postural and manipulative activities[,]” resulting in an “overly 

broad” RFC that “does not adequately depict Plaintiff’s postural or manipulative 

limitations.” (Doc. 12 at 5 – 6). In sum, Stokes contends that the ALJ did not 

sufficiently “show his work” under SSR 96-8p and that this amounts to an error of law 

mandating reversal.

“The ALJ has a duty to make clear the weight accorded to each item of evidence 

and the reasons for the decision so that a reviewing court will be able to determine 

whether the ultimate decision is based on substantial evidence.” Freeman v. Barnhart, 

220 F. App'x 957, 959-60 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing

Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). Nevertheless, the Eleventh 

Circuit has repeatedly rejected similar claims that an ALJ’s failure to perform an 

explicit function-by-function assessment under SSR 96-8p is an error of law mandating 

reversal, so long as the ALJ’s decision sufficiently indicates that he or she considered 

 9 Stokes does not argue any error as to functions covered by § 404.1545(c) (mental activities) 

or (d) (“other work-related abilities” affected by certain medically determinable 

impairments).

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all relevant evidence in arriving at an RFC determination. See id. (“Freeman contends 

that the ALJ failed to identify her functional limitations and work-related abilities on a 

function-by-function basis ... While the ALJ could have been more specific and explicit 

in his findings, he did consider all of the evidence and found that it did not support the 

level of disability Freeman claimed. Only after he determined that she failed to carry 

her burden of showing that she had become disabled from performing any of her workrelated activities did he state that she could perform light exertional activity. 

Therefore, the ALJ complied with SSR 96–8p by considering Freeman's functional 

limitations and restrictions and, only after he found none, proceeding to express her 

residual functional limitations in terms of exertional levels. Furthermore, the ALJ’s 

analysis of the evidence and statement that Freeman could perform light work 

indicated how much work-related activity she could perform because ‘light work 

requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8–

hour workday.’ SSR 83–10.”); Castel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 355 F. App'x 260, 263 (11th 

Cir. Nov. 30, 2009) (“Castel argues that the ALJ reached an RFC determination 

without going through a function-by-function analysis. Specifically, Castel claims that 

the ALJ did not perform the function-by-function analysis to determine Castel's ability 

to handle strength demands. This argument is unfounded. []The ALJ made a 

determination of Castel's RFC at step four of the function-by-function analysis. The 

ALJ considered two disability examiners' reports, Castel's testimony, and two Disability 

Determination Services’ (‘DDS’) reports in arriving at Castel's RFC. See SSR 96–8p ... 

(advising that the RFC assessment must consider all relevant evidence, including 

medical history, medical evaluations, daily activities, and lay evidence). The ALJ 

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ultimately decided that Castel was capable of medium exertion level work and thus was 

capable of performing past relevant work ... We do not require the ALJ to ‘specifically 

refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,’ so long as the decision is sufficient to 

allow us to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant's medical condition as a 

whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The ALJ 

found that the medium level work determination was consistent with the medical 

evidence and found Castel’s RFC to be at a medium level of work. The ALJ performed a 

proper RFC function analysis, based on substantial evidence, and we shall defer to his 

conclusions.”); Carson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App'x 863, 864 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 

2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Following [SSR 96-8p’s ‘function-by-function’] rubric, 

the ALJ fully discussed and evaluated the medical evidence, Mr. Carson’s testimony, 

and the effect each impairment has on his daily activities. []While, the ALJ did not 

specifically refer to Mr. Carson’s ability to walk or stand, the ALJ did limit Mr. 

Carson’s exertional level of work to ‘light work.’ ‘Light work’ by definition limits the 

amount an individual can walk or stand for approximately six hours in an eight-hour 

work day. See SSR 83–10, 1983 WL 31251 (S.S.A.). Furthermore, the ALJ’s thorough 

evaluation of Mr. Carson’s case led the ALJ to adopt additional limitations to Mr. 

Carson's ability to perform light work. Simply because the ALJ chose not to adopt 

further limitations on Mr. Carson's ability to walk or stand, does not mean the ALJ did 

not properly consider the alleged limitations.”). 

Other circuits have also rejected the contention that an ALJ’s failure to perform 

an explicit function-by-function assessment under SSR 96-8p is reversible error in 

itself. See Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Where an ALJ’s 

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analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions 

affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal 

standards, and is supported by substantial evidence such that additional analysis 

would be unnecessary or superfluous, we agree with our sister Circuits that remand is 

not necessary merely because an explicit function-by-function analysis was not 

performed.” (citing Zatz v. Astrue, 346 F. App’x 107, 111 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009) (per 

curiam) (unpublished); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); 

Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567–68 (8th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 30 F. App’x 542, 547 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished)); Chavez v. 

Astrue, 276 F. App'x 627, 627-28 (9th Cir. May 1, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(“Chavez claims that the ALJ committed legal error by determining his mental residual 

functional capacity without performing a function-by-function assessment as required 

by Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3 (July 2, 1996). This claim fails 

because the ALJ considered and noted ‘all of the relevant evidence’ bearing on Chavez's 

‘ability to do work-related activities,’ as required by the function-by-function analysis. 

See Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3.”); Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 

956-57 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting claimant’s contention that the ALJ’s “RFC is not in 

the proper form” because the ALJ did not “separately discuss and make findings 

regarding her abilities to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, push, or pull” (citing Keyes–

Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Where, as here, we can follow 

the adjudicator’s reasoning in conducting our review, and can determine that correct 

legal standards have been applied, merely technical omissions in the ALJ's reasoning 

do not dictate reversal. In conducting our review, we should, indeed must, exercise 

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common sense.... [W]e cannot insist on technical perfection.”))). But see Cichocki, 729 

F.3d at 177-78 (“Remand may be appropriate, however, where an ALJ fails to assess a 

claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the 

record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review. 

See Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 2001) (remanding where ‘the ALJ failed 

to resolve the inconsistencies in the evidence’ regarding claimant's residual functional 

capacity).”). The Court in particular agrees with the Second Circuit’s rationale in 

rejecting such a contention:

We have said more generally (and now repeat) that where we are “unable 

to fathom the ALJ’s rationale in relation to evidence in the record, 

especially where credibility determinations and inference drawing is 

required of the ALJ,” we will not “hesitate to remand for further findings 

or a clearer explanation for the decision.” Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 

464, 469 (2d Cir. 1982). The automatic remand rule urged by [the 

claimant], however, goes far beyond this sensible practice. ... [T]he 

functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 CFR §§ 404.1545 and 

416.945 are only illustrative of the functions potentially relevant to an 

RFC assessment. Adopting a per se rule that these functions must be 

explicitly addressed on pain of remand (no matter how irrelevant or 

uncontested in the circumstances of a particular case) would thus not 

necessarily ensure that all relevant functions are considered ... We 

decline to adopt a per se rule. The relevant inquiry is whether the ALJ 

applied the correct legal standards and whether the ALJ’s determination 

is supported by substantial evidence.

Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177.

As the Court has already found in overruling Claim 1, the ALJ adequately 

considered the record evidence in formulating Stokes’s RFC at Step Four, and Stokes 

has made no effort in Claim 2 to identify contradictory record evidence or otherwise 

show that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, to the extent the 

ALJ could have set forth a more detailed “function-by-function analysis,” the ALJ 

committed no reversible error in failing to do so. Stokes also asserts the ALJ’s RFC “is 

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overly broad and does not adequately depict [his] postural or manipulative limitations.” 

Assuming without deciding that the ALJ’s opinion initial statement assigning 

“occasional postural and manipulative limitations” (R. 103) was improper lumping of 

those limitations, the opinion later clarifies that Stokes “would have an occasional 

limitation in each of the postural and manipulative limitations” (R. 105 (emphasis 

added)), which adequately conveys the ALJ’s determination that he assigned occasional 

limitation to each separate manipulative and postural function.10 Cf. Shanks v. Colvin, 

No. 2:13-CV-1770-SLB, 2014 WL 6608153, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2014) (Blackburn, 

J.) (“[S]everal courts have recognized an ALJ’s use of the term ‘postural activities’ to 

generally mean bending, climbing, kneeling, stooping, crouching, balancing, and 

crawling ... The court finds no error in the ALJ's use of the term ‘postural activities.’ 

Additionally, the ALJ's assessment that plaintiff should avoid ‘exposure to hazards’ was 

sufficiently specific to indicate plaintiff’s limitations.” (citing cases)).

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Stokes’s assertions of error in Claim 2 and 

finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

 10 After formulating Stokes’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Stokes was capable of 

performing past relevant work as a welder/fitter (R. 105), which would normally mean that 

an ALJ need not proceed to Step Five before making a determination of “not disabled.” 

Only as an alternative did the ALJ proceed to Step Five and determined, after consulting a 

vocational expert, that there existed significant numbers of jobs in the national economy 

that Stokes could perform (R. 106 – 107). Even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ’s 

hypothetical to the vocation expert describing Stokes’s RFC as containing “occasional 

postural limitations, occasional manipulative limitations” (R. 134) was impermissibly 

broad, see Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180 (“In order for a vocational expert's testimony to 

constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which 

comprises all of the claimant's impairments.” (quotation omitted)), Stokes challenges 

neither of these determinations on judicial review, and at the very least the Court finds no 

reason to question sua sponte the ALJ’s determination that Stokes was capable of 

performing past relevant work.

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V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the 

Commissioner’s final decision issued October 31, 2014, denying Stokes’s application for 

DIB benefits is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of January 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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