alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Washington Realty Owners, LLC, Appellant, v 260 Washington Street, LLC, Respondent.

[964 NYS2d 137]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saliann Scarpulla, J.), entered February 10, 2012, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and motion denied.

The motion court erred when it determined that defendant met its prima facie burden since defendant failed to include all of the pleadings. Although CPLR 3212 (b) requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported by copies of the pleadings, the court has discretion to overlook the procedural defect of missing pleadings when the record is “sufficiently complete” *(Welch v Hauck,*18 AD3d 1096, 1098 [3d Dept 2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 708 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Ayer v Sky*Club, 70 AD2d 863, 864 [1st Dept 1979] [the parties were permitted to supplement the record by submitting a copy of the pleadings], *appeal dismissed*48 NY2d 705 [1979]). The record is sufficiently complete when, although the movant has not attached all of the pleadings to the motion, a complete set of the papers is available from the materials submitted *(see e.g. Studio A Showroom, LLC v Yoon,*99 AD3d 632 [1st Dept 2012] [the pleadings were filed electronically and were available for the court’s consideration]; *Pandian v New York Health & Hosps. Corp.,*54 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2008] [the pleadings were attached to the reply papers]; *Welch,*18 AD3d at 1098 [summary judgment properly granted to plaintiff on cross motion where pleadings were attached to defendant’s motion for summary judgment]).

Here, respondent’s answer was not included as part of the record. Thus, the motion court did not have a complete set of pleadings available for its consideration. Accordingly, the omission of the pleadings renders the motion procedurally defective *(see*CPLR 3212 [b]; *Matsyuk v Konkalipos,*35 AD3d 675 [2d Dept 2006]; *Wider v Heller,*24 AD3d 433 [2d Dept 2005]); *Greene v Wood,*6 AD3d 976 [3d Dept 2004]; *Welton v Drobnicki,*298 AD2d 757 [3d Dept 2002]; *Krasner v Transcontinental Equities,*64 AD2d 551 [1st Dept 1978]).

In light of the foregoing, we do not consider the remaining *676contentions with regard to the merits of the motion.

Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P, DeGrasse, Abdus-Salaam, Manzanet-Daniels and Clark, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                    1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    APR-04-1998
<CASH>                          8151    
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   5250
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     5883
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                20850
<PP&E>                          19804
<DEPRECIATION>                  15156
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  25498
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           2710
<BONDS>                         0
<COMMON>                        14217
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<OTHER-SE>                      8546
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    25498
<SALES>                         9385
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                9385
<CGS>                           5826
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   8215
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              2
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 1168
<INCOME-TAX>                    468
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             700
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    700
<EPS-PRIMARY>                   .19
<EPS-DILUTED>                   .18
        

</TABLE>
Commercial Mortgage Acceptance Corp., Commercial Mortgage
                           Pass-Through Certificates,
                                 Series 1999-C1

                         Pooling and Servicing Agreement

                              OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE
                         Annual Statement of Compliance


Pursuant to the  requirements  of that certain  Pooling and Servicing  Agreement
governing the referenced Trust (the "PSA"),  it is hereby certified that (i) the
undersigned  has  completed  a  review  of  the  servicer's  performance  of its
obligations  under the PSA for the preceding  calendar year; (ii) to the best of
the  undersigned's  knowledge  on the  basis of that  review  the  servicer  has
fulfilled all of its  obligations  under the PSA  throughout  such period in all
material  respects;  (iii)  to the  best  of the  undersigned's  knowledge,  the
subservicer,  of  the  servicer  under  the  PSA,  if  any,  has  fulfilled  its
obligations under its  sub-servicing  agreement in all material  respects;  and,
(iv) no notice  has been  received  from any  governmental  agency or body which
would  indicate  a  challenge  or  question  as to the  status  of  the  Trust's
qualification as a REMIC under the U.S. Code.



                                                /s/ Charles J. Sipple   3/16/00
                                                -------------------------------
                                                Charles J. Sipple        Date
                                                Executive Vice President
#### Ilona Orsos, Appellant, v Hudson Transit Corp. et al., Respondents.

[975 NYS2d 655]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lizbeth Gonzalez, J.), entered September 25, 2012, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating the applicability of the emergency doctrine in this action where plaintiff was injured when the bus in which she was a passenger stopped suddenly, hurling her forward into the windshield. Defendants submitted evidence showing that, shortly after the bus had started to move after being stopped at a traffic light, a car drove around the bus erratically and at a high rate of speed, cutting the bus off so closely that the car’s rear bumper came within an inch of striking the bus’ front bumper. Defendant bus driver was forced to stop suddenly in order to avoid colliding with the car *(see Brooks v New York City Tr. Auth.,*19 AD3d 162 [1st Dept 2005]; *Gonzalez v City of New York,*295 AD2d 122 [1st Dept 2002]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to defendants’ negligence. Plaintiff may not rely on statements she entered in the errata sheet to her deposition transcript, as these corrections were untimely *(see*CPLR 3116 [a]).

Plaintiffs assertion in her opposition affidavit, that “[n]o car ever cut the bus off at any time prior to [her] accident,” is also *562unavailing, since it contradicts her deposition testimony. Moreover, even the corrected version of plaintiff’s deposition testimony fails to raise a triable issue of fact. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Acosta, Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.
11957.

#### VAN HARLENGEN *v.*BEARSE.

1. That the suit was for the tort of a partnership did not appear from the plaintiff’s petition; and, in order for the defendant to set up that it was based upon a partnership liability and that his copartner was a necessary party, he should have raised the point by a plea in abatement at the first term of the court. Without such a plea a verdict could not legally be directed in his favor on this ground.

2. The alleged injury to the plaintiff by the defendant’s bull was proved without contradiction; and the questions as to the viciousness of the bull, the negligence of the defendant, and the negligence of the plaintiff should have been submitted to the jury for determination. The court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant.

Decided March 9, 1921.

Action for damages; from city court of Atlanta — Judge Beid. September 30, 1920.

*Robert C. & Philip H. Alston,*for plaintiff.

*William F. Buchanan,*for defendant.

*474Luke, J.

By statute it is provided that where a person “ owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind, and by the careless management of the same, or by allowing the same to go at liberty, another without fault on his part is injured thereby, such owner or keeper shall be liable in damages for such injury.” Civil Code (1910), § 4417. This suit was brought under the foregoing section, for personal injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by a bull alleged to be the property of defendant. Upon the trial the defendant contended that there could be no legal recovery, inasmuch as the suit was brought against him as an individual, and the proof developed that the animal was the property of a partnership composed of the defendant and his son. He contended also that the evidence adduced was insufficient to authorize a recovery in any event. At the conclusion of the evidence the court, upon motion of the defendant’s counsel, directed a verdict in favor of the defendant.

1. It does not appear on the face of the petition that the suit was brought against an individual for the tort of a partnership, and, in order for the defendant to claim that the suit against him as an individual is based upon a partnership liability1", and that the other partner is a necessary party thereto, he should have raised the point by a plea in abatement properly sworn to and filed at the first term of the court. Civil Code (1910), § 5058; *Merritt*v. Bagwell, 70 *Ga.*578, 585; *Hirsch*v. Oliver, 91 *Ga.*554 (4) (18 S. E. 354); *Bray*v. Peace, 131 *Ga.*638 (2-5) (62 S. E. 1025). No such plea was filed in the instant ease, and consequently the defendant could not raise the point at the trial term, and a verdict in his favor could not legally be directed on this question. See also 20 E. C. L. § 126.

2. The injury alleged was proved beyond contradiction, but the other questions of fact involved, as to the viciousness of the bull, the negligence of the defendant, and the negligence of the plaintiff, should have been submitted to a jury for determination. It follows that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant.

*Judgment reversed.*

Broyles, *O. J., and Bloodworth,*J., *concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from audited
consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended 12/31/99 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                      57,222,154
<SECURITIES>                                 8,852,937
<RECEIVABLES>                               17,963,114
<ALLOWANCES>                                   113,392
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            87,081,664
<PP&E>                                       6,328,800
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,197,705
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              97,179,574
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       32,052,330
<BONDS>                                      3,500,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        14,500
<OTHER-SE>                                  61,483,028
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                97,179,574
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            38,084,285
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               16,897,660
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            22,762,181
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (832,072)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (202,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (630,072)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (630,072)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.05)


</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 12(A)


                           DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION
                COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                      SIX-MONTH
                                                                     PERIOD ENDED
                                                                    JUNE 30, 2000
                                                                   ----------------
<S>                                                                <C>
INCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

EARNINGS:
     Pre-tax income from continuing operations                          $ 46,272
  Plus:
     Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)                      131,150
                                                                        --------

TOTAL EARNINGS                                                          $177,422
                                                                        ========

FIXED CHARGES:
     Interest expensed and capitalized                                  $131,838
     Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
        expenses related to indebtedness                                     991
     An estimate of the interest component within rental expense           1,047
                                                                        --------

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES                                                     $133,876
                                                                        ========

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES                                          1.33
                                                                        ========




EXCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

EARNINGS:
     Pre-tax income from continuing operations                          $ 46,272
  Plus:
     Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)                      102,912
                                                                        --------

TOTAL EARNINGS                                                          $149,184
                                                                        ========

FIXED CHARGES:
     Interest expensed and capitalized                                  $103,600
     Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
        expenses related to indebtedness                                     991
     An estimate of the interest component within rental expense           1,047
                                                                        --------

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES                                                     $105,638
                                                                        ========

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES                                          1.41
                                                                        ========
</TABLE>
#### Ben K. Sleet, et al., *v.*Louisville, Cincinnati & Lexington R. Co.

Judicial Sales of Personalty — Execution on Railroad Company.

The sheriff cannot levy upon and sell timbers delivered to a railroad company and placed upon its line where the timber was about to be and some of it was being used in repairing a bridge constituting a part of its track.

Property of Railroad Company.

The property of a railroad company not constituting an integral part of its track or rolling stock is subject to execution, but where it is a part of the track or rolling stock the creditor must resort to a court of equity for relief.

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT.

March 19, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The petition shows that the timbers levied on and sold by the sheriff had been delivered or placed immediately upon the line of the railroad, and that they were about tO' be, and that some of them were, in fact, being used in repairing a bridge, constituting part of the track of the road. Under such circumstances, these timbers will be regarded as part of the railroad track. They were not, therefore, subject to seizure and sale under execution.

A chancellor cannot sell a public .improvement of the character of a turnpike or railroad until he has ascertained that the indebtedness of the corporation owing it is so great that' it cannot be- discharged in a reasonable time, by the application tO' that purpose of its tolls or profits. *Winchester & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Vimont,*5 B. Mon. i. The law treats a railroad as an entirety. Public policy protects the entire road from seizure and sale by a sheriff. Plaving no power to sell the entire road, of course he cannot seize and sell a fragment of it.

The property of a railroad corporation, not constituting an inte*448gral part of its track or of its rolling stock is subject to execution; but when that character of property is exhausted, the creditors must resort to a court of equity for relief.

*Gleen & Carlisle, for appellants.*

The demurrer to appellee’s petition was properly overruled, and the injunction properly perpetuated.

Judgment *affirmed.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY WAYNE WILLIAMS, :

 :

Petitioner. :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-0126-WS-M

 :

CYNTHIA STEWART, :

 :

Respondent. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of the issues raised, 

and a de novo determination of those portions of the 

Recommendation to which objection is made, the Recommendation of 

the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is 

adopted as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that this habeas petition be DENIED and that 

this action be DISMISSED. It is further ORDERED that any 

certificate of appealability filed by Petitioner be DENIED as he 

is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

DONE this 1st day of August, 2016.

 

 s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00126-WS-M Document 30 Filed 08/01/16 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                             5


<S>                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                         3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                     JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                45,236
<SECURITIES>                          1,102,000
<RECEIVABLES>                         1,200,214
<ALLOWANCES>                          0
<INVENTORY>                           174,323
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                      2,759,544
<PP&E>                                477,236
<DEPRECIATION>                        0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                        9,653,686
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 9,475,942
<BONDS>                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                              15,953
<OTHER-SE>                            (3,265,209)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>          9,651,686
<SALES>                               2,008,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      2,008,000
<CGS>                                 1,728,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         325,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       (45,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   (45,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                          (45,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                           (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                         (.00)



</TABLE>
<PAGE> 15
                                                             EXHIBIT 11
                                                            (Unaudited)


                                C.M. CORP.

     LOSS PER COMMON SHARE FOR THE CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS

               (Dollars in Thousands, Except Per Share Data)



                                Three Months Ended         Nine Months Ended
                                   September 30,             September 30,
                             -----------------------      --------------------
                                  1995         1994        1995         1994
                                 ------      -------      -------     -------

Net loss ...................     $   (59)    $   (75)     $  (253)    $  (234)
                                 =======     =======      =======     =======

Total common shares ........       1,000       1,000        1,000       1,000
                                 =======     =======      =======     =======

Loss per common share ......     $   (59)    $   (75)     $  (253)    $  (234)
                                 =======     =======      =======     =======
#### Paul L. PAYTON, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, NOTTOWAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-7305.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 20, 2007.

Decided: Dec. 28, 2007.

Paul L. Payton, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Josephine Frances Whalen, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Paul L. Payton, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition as untimely. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. *543§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Payton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*