NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-4559

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PAULETTE BILLIE; RONALD BILLIE,

Appellants

v.

AUTISM SPEAKS, INC.

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On Appeal from the United States District Judge 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(Civ. No. 5-12-cv-02261)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Bayslon

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 13, 2013

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: December 16, 2013)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Appellants Paulette and Ronald Billie appeal from the District Court’s judgment in 

favor of Autism Speaks, Inc. (“Autism Speaks”). The Billies sought to recover from 

Autism Speaks for an injury Paulette sustained at a fundraiser in a park near Allentown, 
2

Pennsylvania. The District Court granted Autism Speaks’s motion for summary 

judgment, on the grounds that “a reasonable fact-finder could not infer, based on the 

evidence in the record, that [Autism Speaks] had possession of the park.” Billie v. Autism 

Speaks, No. 12 Civ. 2261, 2012 WL 6526869, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2012). We now 

affirm.1 

I.

Autism Speaks is a non-profit organization that raises funds for autism and 

research, in part by holding “Walk for Autism Speaks” fundraising events around the 

country. Walkers are encouraged to raise money before taking part in these walks. 

Autism Speaks held one such event at Lehigh Parkway, which is owned, maintained, and 

regulated by the City of Allentown. The City granted Autism Speaks a permit to use

Lehigh Parkway for the walk. Under that permit, Autism Speaks was required to follow 

the rules and regulations of the Parkway. During the walk, Autism Speaks lacked the 

ability to exclude the general public from walking, running, fishing, bicycling, or 

otherwise enjoying the Parkway. Thus, Autism Speaks could not exclude persons from 

the Walk for Autism Speaks who had not taken part in the fundraising efforts. Nor was 

Autism Speaks permitted to close the Parkway’s streets to public traffic. 

 

1

The District Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We 

have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary 

review of a district court’s decision to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law. ZF 

Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012). 
3

On the day of the event, Autism Speaks—with the City’s permission—set up 

portable toilets, tents, and a band trailer in the Parkway. These items were removed from 

the Parkway after the walk’s completion.

Paulette Billie attended the walk, along with 8,000 to 10,000 other persons. After 

parking her car in a field that Autism Speaks used as a makeshift parking lot, Paulette got 

out of her car and stepped into a large hole. As a result of the misstep, Paulette fractured 

her ankle.

The Billies brought a negligence action against Autism Speaks in the United States 

District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, based upon a theory of premises liability. 

After discovery, Autism Speaks moved for summary judgment. Concluding that no 

reasonable juror could find Autism Speaks to be the “possessor” of Lehigh Parkway, the 

District Court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The Billies appealed.

II.

Under Pennsylvania law, a party may be held liable for an injuries that occur on a 

premises only if that party possesses the premises in question.2 Blackman v. Federal 

Realty Inv. Trust, 664 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. 1995); see also Estate of Zimmerman v. Se. Pa. 

Trans. Auth., 168 F.3d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[t]he duty to protect 

against known dangerous conditions falls upon the possessor of the land”). A 

“possessor of land” is one who “occupies the land with the intent to control it.” Id. A 

party is “considered . . . in control of [a] premises” if it “has authority to manage the land 

and regulate its use.” Stanton v. Lackawanna Energy Ltd., 886 A.2d 667, 676 (Pa. 2005). 

 

2

The parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies in this case.
4

While a party may possess land without owning it, Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 987 

A.2d 1274, 1279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), “use of [land] does not [necessarily] equate with 

possession,” Estate of Zimmerman, 168 F.3d at 685.

The District Court granted Autism Speaks’ motion for summary judgment after 

concluding that the Billies had failed, as a matter of law, to prove that Autism Speaks was 

the possessor of Lehigh Parkway. The District Court explained:

The undisputed facts show that: (1) the City of Allentown owns and 

maintains the park; (2) Defendant obtained a permit to use the park which 

required adherence to the City’s rules and regulations; (3) Defendant did 

not modify the park other than by bringing in port-a-johns, tents, and a 

band trailer; and (4) Defendants have no authority to exclude the public 

from the park. 

Billie, 2012 WL 6526869, at *4. For substantially the same reasons outlined by the 

District Court, we agree that, based on the undisputed evidence in the record, no 

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Autism Speaks was a possessor of Lehigh 

Parkway. This conclusion is particularly compelled by the fact that Autism Speaks 

lacked the ability to exclude patrons unassociated with its event from the Parkway. As 

noted in Hill v. Superior Property Management Services, Inc., because “[a] person who 

has the control of a landowner in actual occupation of property has both the rights and the 

corresponding abilities to deal with the property as he sees fit . . . [, t]he right of exclusion 

is significant . . . .” --- P.3d ---, 2013 WL 5587843, at *4-5 (Utah, Oct. 11, 2013); see 

also O’Connell v. Turner Constr. Co., 949 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
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(holding that a defendant did not possess a property, and thus could not be liable for 

injury that occurred there, because he could not “exclude anyone from the premises”).3

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court is affirmed. 

 

3

Even assuming arguendo that a question of fact existed as to whether Autism Speaks 

possessed Lehigh Parkway at the time in question, the Billies’ suit would likely be 

precluded by Pennsylvania’s Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (“RULWA”), 

which provides landowners and land possessors with immunity from negligence liability 

in instances where the land is provided to the public for recreational purposes. 68 P.S. § 

477–3.