IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RAYMOND HARRISON, :

(AIS # 186090)

:

Plaintiff, 

: CIVIL ACTION 14-00085-KD-C

vs.

:

NOAH PRICE OLIVER, et al.,

:

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed 

a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the 

Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docs. 13, 18). For the reasons 

stated below, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of 

Defendants Mobile County Metro Jail Warden Noah Price Oliver, Mobile County 

Sheriff Sam Cochran, the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department, Mobile County Metro 

Jail Personnel, and two Transportation Officers, and the claims presented by Plaintiff 

Raymond Harrison be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Summary of Alleged Facts1

 1 The “facts, as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be 

the actual facts of the case. Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 

2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 n.1 

(11th Cir. 2003) (“Because we must accept the allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint as 

true, what we set out in this opinion as ‘the facts’ for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may not be actual 

facts.”). Nevertheless, for summary judgment purposes, the Court’s analysis begins with a 

description of the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and disregards legal conclusions 

and recitations of the basic elements of a cause of action. See Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 1 of 27
2

This action arises from the over-detention of Plaintiff Harrison. Harrison was 

imprisoned at Limestone Correctional Facility (“Limestone”) with an estimated release 

date of October 30, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 3). While housed at Limestone, Harrison 

participated in and completed courses at Calhoun Community Junior College and 

secured employment for himself with Dunn Construction Company in Birmingham, 

Alabama. (Id.). Upon his release from prison, Harrison was expected to attend 

orientation with Dunn Construction Company on October 31, 2013, and then begin 

employment on November 1, 2013. (Id.; Doc. 29 at 1). However, Harrison’s plans were 

fortuitously altered on October 30, 2013, when he was not released from Limestone as a 

free man; rather, he was detained and transferred to Mobile County Metro Jail (“Mobile 

Metro”) for an alleged pending charge against him. (Doc. 1 at 7).

Transportation officers arrived at approximately 11:10 a.m. on October 31, 2013, 

to transport Harrison to Mobile Metro. (Doc. 13-1 at 24). Harrison attempted to explain 

that the alleged outstanding charge was in fact a mistake, as he had paid a bond on the 

charge two years earlier. (Doc. 1 at 7). Despite his verbal attempts to persuade the 

officials and his presentation of legal documents evidencing the executed bond from 

August 2011, he was restrained in hand and leg cuffs and transported from Limestone 

to Mobile Metro, without being secured in a seat-belt and without being provided any 

food or water for the duration of the transport, notwithstanding notifying the 

transportation officers that he suffered from Type II diabetes. (Id. at 7-8). Upon arrival 

at Mobile Metro, after approximately 10 hours of traveling, Harrison was booked into 

the jail, received a medical screening, and was provided food. (Doc. 17 at 2). He spent 

less than eight hours in a cell before being released from Mobile Metro on November 1, 

 1153 (11th Cir. 2011); McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009).

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 2 of 27
3

2013. (Id.).

Respondents do not contest Harrison’s version of events; however, their 

submitted special report clarifies and explains the inadvertent over-detention of 

Harrison. (Doc. 13). The Alabama Department of Corrections notified Mobile Metro in 

early October 2013 that Harrison was due to be released from Limestone at the end of 

October but that outstanding charges remained for him in Mobile County. (Doc. 13 at 

1). Mobile Metro staff consulted two different electronic filing systems to review the 

status of charges pending against Harrison. AlaCourt, the state electronic filing system, 

as well as JMS, the Mobile Metro Jail’s internal filing system, both revealed that 

Harrison had an outstanding charge from 2011 of receipt of stolen property in the 

second degree, for which he had not made bond. (Doc. 13-1 at 8). Based on the 

database information, transportation officers were sent to retrieve Harrison from 

Limestone and bring him to Mobile Metro. (Doc. 13 at 1; Doc. 13-1 at 5).

Upon Harrison’s return to Mobile Metro, it was determined that he signed bond 

for the charge on August 4, 2011, however the bond release information was never 

entered into the AlaCourt system. (Doc. 13 at 1; Doc. 13-1 at 8-9). The investigation into 

Harrison’s 2011 bond did not expose why the AlaCourt database was not updated with 

the bond information nor whose responsibility it had been to input the bond 

information. (Doc. 13 at 1-2). Consequent to uncovering that Harrison had in fact made 

bond on his 2011 charge, he was immediately released from Mobile Metro, and the 

AlaCourt database was updated with the correct information. (Doc. 13 at 2; Doc. 13-1 at 

2, 8). 

Harrison brought suit against Mobile County Metro Jail Warden Noah Price 

Oliver, Mobile County Sheriff Sam Cochran, the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department, 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 3 of 27
4

Mobile County Metro Jail Personnel, and the Transportation Officers who transported 

him from Limestone to Mobile Metro on October 31, 2013, for wrongful detention for 

over-detaining him, neglectful supervision that resulted in over-detention, and reckless 

endangerment during his transportation from Limestone to Mobile Metro.2 (Doc. 1). 

He seeks monetary relief in the amount of $250,000.00 for damages suffered. 

Defendants, Mobile County Sheriff Sam Cochran and Noah Price Oliver, III, 

Warden of Mobile County Metro Jail, answered the suit (docs. 13, 18),

3 and the Court 

converted Defendants’ answer and special report to a motion for summary judgment. 

(Doc. 14). Plaintiff Harrison filed numerous responses to the motion for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30). After a thorough review of the record, 

the motion for summary judgment is now ripe for consideration. 

II. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 

106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("The mere existence of some alleged factual 

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 

summary judgment."); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) 

("[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if 'some alleged factual dispute' between the 

 2 On December 6, 2013, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Harrison for his failure to 

report to his probation officer after his release from prison on November 1, 2013. (Doc. 13-1 at 

11). At the time Harrison filed this action, he was and currently is imprisoned for probation 

revocation on the charge of theft of property in the second degree. (Id.). Harrison claims “had 

this unjust[ice] never happened I would not be facing this charge of receiving stolen property I . 

. . because I would have been on the Keystone Pipeline in Spoken [sic], Washington. Not in 

Brewton, AL & Hired a ride in a already stolen vehicle!” (Doc. 1 at 6).

3 Corporal Auston Durgin, the male Mobile County Sheriff’s Office Transportation Officer who 

transported Plaintiff Harrison from Limestone to Mobile Metro on October 31, 2013, submitted 

an affidavit as part of Defendants’ special report. (See Doc. 13-2). 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 4 of 27
5

parties remains, so long as there is 'no genuine issue of material fact.'").

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing 

the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based upon the discovery 

instruments outlined in Rule 56(c), that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Allen v. 

Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The moving party 

bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there 

are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial."). Once this initial 

demonstration is made, the "responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show 

the existence of a genuine issue . . . [of] material fact." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 

F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Allen, supra, at 1314 ("'When a moving party 

has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," 

and show by its own affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file," designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.'") internal citations omitted); see Comer v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 265 F.3d 1186, 

1192 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Once the moving party discharges its initial burden of showing 

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the nonmoving party must specify facts proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

for trial confirmed by affidavits, ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file.’”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Forbidding reliance upon pleadings precludes a party from "choos[ing] to 

wait until trial to develop claims or defenses relevant to the summary 

judgment motion." . . . This effectuates the purpose of summary judgment

which "'is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" . . . Thus, "mere general 

allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts" will not prevent 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 5 of 27
6

the award of summary judgment upon a court's determination that no 

genuine issue for trial exists.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub 

nom. Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp., 516 U.S. 817, 116 S. Ct. 74, 133 L.Ed.2d 33 (1995); 

see also LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[The 

nonmoving party] must raise 'significant probative evidence' that would be sufficient 

for a jury to find for that party."). In other words, there is no genuine issue for trial 

"[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party[.]" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Comer, supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 

("Summary judgment is required where the non-moving party's response to a motion is 

merely 'a repetition of his conclusional allegations' and is unsupported by evidence 

showing an issue for trial.").

In considering whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in this 

action, the Court has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Comer, 

supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("We view the evidence and all factual inferences raised by it in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts 

about the facts in favor of the non-moving party.").

The requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party's favor extends 

only to "genuine" disputes over material facts. A genuine dispute requires 

more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." A "mere 

scintilla" of evidence is insufficient; the non-moving party must produce 

substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Garczynski, supra, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations omitted). In addition, "[t]here is 

no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made 

based upon the materials before it on summary judgment." Resolution Trust Corp., 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 6 of 27
7

supra, 43 F.3d at 599.

III. Analysis.

A. Fictitious Parties and Defendants Immune from Suit. 

1. Fictitious Party Pleading.

In authoring his suit, Harrison named two “Transportation Officers assigned to 

pick me up from Limestone Co. Jail on 10-31-013 [sic]” as defendants in this action. 

(Doc. 1 at 2). “As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal 

court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010); see also CSX Transp., 

Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 236 F. App'x 562, 563 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) ("the Federal 

Rules do not authorize suit against fictitious parties"), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. 

Ct. 1475, 170 L. Ed. 2d 297 (2008); Featherstone v. Home Oil Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

139102, 2011 WL 5978774, at *1 n.4 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 2011) (subject to a limited 

exception, "fictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court"). The limited 

exception to this rule is when the plaintiff's description of the defendant is so specific as 

to be "at the very worst, surplusage." Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 

1992).

Generally, Harrison’s attempt to file suit against “two Transportation Officers” 

would be an inadequate identification of persons necessary to file a § 1983 action 

against them. However, the Court finds Harrison sufficiently described the unnamed 

defendants to overcome the bar to pleading a fictitious party. Harrison specified the 

date, times, geographic location of his transport, as well as the race and sex of the 

officers. (Id. at 4). Therefore, the Court contends that necessary facts were provided to 

identify the unnamed officers. As such, the unnamed parties are considered defendants

to this action. 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 7 of 27
8

2. Sovereign Immunity.

Plaintiff Harrison alleges violations of both the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution against Mobile County Sheriff’s 

Department and Mobile County Metro Jail4 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “neglectful 

supervision” that caused his over-detention and reckless endangerment. (Doc. 1 at 4). 

The Mobile County Sheriff’s Office and the Mobile County Metro Jail are entities that 

are not capable of being sued in Harrison’s action. 

In order "[t]o sustain a cause of action based on section 1983, [a plaintiff] must 

establish two elements: (1) that [he] suffered a deprivation of rights, privileges or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 

act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color 

of law." Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Under § 1983 liability can only be imposed 

against an entity that is capable of being sued, Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th 

Cir. 1992), that is a “person acting under color of law.” See Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1032. 

The capacity of a party to be sued is "determined by the law of the state in which 

the district court is held[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b); see Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214 (The 

capacity of a sheriff's department to be sued "is determined . . . by the law of the state 

 4 The complaint filed by Harrison specifically names “Mobile County Metro Jail personell 

[sic]” as a defendant in this lawsuit. (Doc. 1 at 4). Given that Harrison failed to identify any 

officer or staff member by name, job description, or action performed, the Court assumes 

Harrison intended to sue the Mobile County Metro Jail in its entirety for the alleged 

wrongdoing that occurred on October 30, 2013 through November 1, 2013. 

If the Court’s assumption is incorrect, Harrison’s suit against the Mobile County Metro 

Jail Personnel still fails, as discussed above, because “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted 

in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, it is 

immaterial as to whether or not Harrison sufficiently identified staff members of the Mobile 

County Metro Jail as defendants in this action, as the Court has determined, infra, that no party 

is liable in this action as Harrison has failed to prove a constitutional violation. 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 8 of 27
9

where the court is located."). 

Under Alabama law, the sheriff "has the legal custody and charge of the jail in his 

county and all prisoners committed thereto. . . ." Ala. Code § 14-6-1. Generally, a 

sheriff's department operates a county jail. However, an Alabama sheriff's department 

lacks the capacity to be sued. Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214; King v. Colbert County, 620 So.2d 

623, 626 (Ala. 1993); White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085, 1087 (Ala. 1991). Then, it 

follows that an Alabama county jail likewise lacks the capacity to be sued. Russell v. 

Mobile County Sheriff, No. Civ. A. 00-0410-CB-C, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18045, 2000 WL 

1848470, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2000) (unpublished) (finding that the Mobile County 

Jail is not a suable entity); Marsden v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 

(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the jail is not an entity amenable to suit); House v. Cook 

Cnty. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 98 C 788, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2262, 1998 WL 89095, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 1998) (unpublished) (same); May v. N. Cnty. Det. Facility, No. C 93-

1180 BAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10500, 1993 WL 300290, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 1993) 

(unpublished) (same); see also Castillo v. Cook Cnty. Mail Room Dep't, 990 F.2d 304, 

307 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that because the jail is not a suable entity, then it follows that 

the subdivision, the mail room, is not a suable entity). Therefore, the Court finds that 

Mobile County Sheriff’s Department is not a suable entity or a person for § 1983 

purposes, and Mobile County Metro Jail is not a suable entity or person for § 1983 

purposes. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are frivolous as a 

matter of law and should be dismissed.

With respect to the remaining Defendants in this action, it is unclear to the Court 

whether or not Harrison has sued them in their official or individual capacities. If 

Harrison has intended to sue Defendants in their official capacities, the individual 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 9 of 27
10

defendants claim they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as state officials. 

(Doc. 18 at 1). It is well-established that "suits against an official in his or her official 

capacity are suits against the entity the individual represents." Parker v. Williams, 862 

F.2d 1471, 1476 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y.,

436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978) (indicating that "officialcapacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an 

entity of which an officer is an agent"); Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir. 

1995); Farred v. Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11th Cir. 1990). The determination of the 

entity which the officials represent is determined by reference to state law. See Welch, 

57 F.3d at 1008. As a matter of Alabama law, Sheriff Cochran is a state officer within the 

executive department of state government. See Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 443 

(Ala. 1987). Likewise, a warden of county jail, such as Warden Oliver, and sheriff’s 

deputies and officers, such as the transportation officers, are legally an extension of the 

sheriff, and their acts are considered those of the sheriff. See Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 

Ala. 448, 17 So. 2d 536, 537 (1944). Accordingly, all defendants in this action are state 

officials for the purposes of immunity from suit. See Welch, 57 F.3d at 1008; Carr v. City 

of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990).

As such, Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants in their official 

capacities are effectively claims against the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court has 

held that states and state officials are not "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Moreover, pursuant to 

the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a state may not be sued by its own 

citizens unless the state consents to suit or Congress acts to abrogate immunity. See

Carr, 916 F.2d at 1524-25. Neither has happened in this case. Therefore, the individual 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 10 of 27
11

defendants enjoy absolute immunity from the damages claims raised against them by 

Harrison in their official capacities.

3. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants have further invoked the defense of qualified immunity for the 

claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. (Doc. 18 at 1). "Qualified 

immunity insulates government actors, in their individual capacities, from civil lawsuits 

as long as the challenged discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established 

federal statutory or constitutional rights." Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 

1995); see also Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1994). There 

can be no dispute that all parties were acting within their discretionary authority at all 

times when the acts in question occurred. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity unless Harrison can show that their conduct violated a clearly 

established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have 

known. See Belcher, 30 F.3d at 1395; Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir.

1997). “General propositions and abstractions do not qualify for bright line, clearly 

established law. For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must 

dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the 

conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is 

doing violates federal law in the circumstances.” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 

1288 (11th Cir. Ala. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the Court will now

address whether or not this action asserts any claim of a constitutional violation. 

B. No Fourteenth Amendment Violation in Over-Detention.

Although Harrison describes his claim against Defendants as wrongful 

detention, the allegation is better termed over-detention. Harrison, however, fails to 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 11 of 27
12

establish a plausible constitutional violation claim against Defendants, as the record 

does not support the allegations that Harrison’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due 

process was violated by being detained for one day after his prison sentence expired. 

With respect to a false imprisonment claim based on over-detention “the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to individuals the right to be 

free from excessive continued detention after a jail or prison ceases to have a legal right 

to detain the individual." Powell v. Sheriff, Fulton Cnty., Ga., 511 Fed. App’x 957, 960 

(11th Cir. Mar. 7, 2013) (unpublished). To state an over-detention claim under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, the elements of false imprisonment under common law must 

be met in addition to establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due 

process rights. See Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1993).

The elements of common law false imprisonment require: "(1) intent to confine, 

(2) acts resulting in confinement, and (3) consciousness of the victim of confinement or 

resulting harm." Id. at 1563 n.3 (citation and quotation marks omitted). And, a due 

process violation requires a showing that the defendant acted with deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff's due process rights. West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 

(11th Cir. 2007). To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must establish that a 

defendant had "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; [and] (2) 

disregard[ed] . . . that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence." Id. 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). "Th[is] deliberate indifference standard is a 

difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet," because human error does not equate to 

deliberate indifference. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 12 of 27
13

Turning to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants, the Court finds that they do 

not contain information indicating that any defendant had knowledge of Harrison’s 

signed bond or dismissal order and then disregarded the same in a manner that is 

greater than negligence.5 To state a claim of false imprisonment against defendants, 

Plaintiff Harrison must provide specific information that "allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. The information must be more than conclusions so as to raise the claim 

from the speculative to the plausible and thereby show that Harrison is entitled to 

relief.6 Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Harrison fails to make a direct allegation 

against Defendants Oliver, Cochran, or either transportation officer that he or she knew 

that the charge against him was inactive or that he made bond on the charge in question 

two years prior. Furthermore, the record before the Court, including affidavits of staff 

 5 Although the Court does not rely on Plaintiff’s characterization and word choice to 

satisfy essential elements of a claim or to denote legal relevance, it is interesting to note that 

Plaintiff uses the word negligence several times in his pleadings as the cause for his overdetention. Harrison states that the Defendants are liable “from the Negligence of unlawful 

imprisonment on 10-30-13” (doc. 17-2 at 4) (emphasis omitted) and this “Negligence has literally 

changed the course of [his] life” (emphasis omitted) (doc. 1 at 9); “[t]herefore [he is] seeking 

compensation for these negligence and lost [sic].” (Doc. 1 at 10). 

6 In response to Defendants’ special report, Plaintiff Harrison correctly identifies that 

Mobile Metro was alerted to the mistaken charge 28 days prior to his estimated release date. 

(Doc. 22-1 at 1-2). He suggests that the parties therefore had substantial notice and time to 

investigate the alleged charge against him and should have discovered the inaccuracy of the 

AlaCourt records prior to his being transported to Mobile Metro and being over-detained. 

However, Plaintiff fails to recognize that before he personally notified officials that the state 

records were incorrect, the officials had no reason to suspect the computer databases were 

inaccurate. The evidence submitted by Defendants details the communications that occurred 

between the Alabama Department of Corrections, the Mobile County District Court, Mobile 

County Sheriff’s Office, and the Mobile County Jail Records Specialist in early October 2013 and 

then late October 2013. (Doc. 13-1 at 12-15). The emails, despite Plaintiff’s contention, in fact 

show that Defendants reasonably relied on the computer system and did attempt to investigate 

and verify the alleged charge pending against Harrison. Again, the records show it was mere 

negligence, at worst, that caused the mistaken over-detention of Plaintiff. Once Plaintiff 

advised Mobile Metro officials that he had previously signed a bond on the charge for which he 

was being held, the situation was investigated beyond the computer databases and quickly 

rectified, Plaintiff was immediately released, and the state computer systems were updated. 

(Doc. 31 at 3-4).

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 13 of 27
14

who investigated the October 31, 2013 transfer of Harrison, email correspondence, and 

computer print outs all reflect that it was an inadvertent computer error that caused 

Harrison’s over-detention, and that error was rectified as quickly as possible. Thus, in 

absence of specific information indicating deliberate indifference on the part of any 

defendant, the Court concludes that Harrison has failed to state a plausible claim for 

false imprisonment against Defendants Oliver, Cochran, and the two transportation 

officers. See also, West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (No constitutional 

violation for over-detention of plaintiff where no deliberate indifference was evidenced. 

“[T]he evidence shows – at most – that Defendants . . . were negligent in failing to carry 

out their responsibilities.”); Powell v. Sheriff, 511 Fed. App’x 957 (11th Cir. 2013) (No 

constitutional violation for a jail’s known over-detention problem where there was no 

evidence of a custom or policy adopted by sheriff that created the over-detention 

problem, and the sheriff took actions to correct the problem. And no evidence 

supported finding nonsupervisory defendants were deliberately indifferent.); Pritchett 

v. Bates, 2:12-00084-CG-B, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102443 (S.D. Ala. June 24, 2013) (no 

constitutional violation for over-detention where plaintiff failed to prove defendant 

“had knowledge of the dismissal order and then disregarded the order in a manner that

is greater than negligence.”). At worst, Harrison’s over-detention was caused by the 

negligence of non-supervisory officials, which is not sufficient to support a § 1983 claim. 

See West, 496 F.3d at 1327-29.

C. No Eighth Amendment Violation During Transport. 

Plaintiff Harrison alleges Defendants are further liable for endangering his 

safety and treating him cruelly during his transport from Limestone to Mobile Metro on 

October 31, 2013. He contends he was: (1) denied food for the duration of his ten and 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 14 of 27
15

half hour bus ride, despite notifying the transportation officers that he suffered from 

diabetes (doc. 1 at 7-8), (2) denied his request for a seat belt (doc. 17-2 at 4), (3) was 

placed in full restraints for the duration of the transport (doc. 1 at 7), and (4) placed in a 

two-man cell with three other inmates for eight hours while housed at Mobile Metro

(id. at 8). 

The Eighth Amendment7 provides that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, 

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. 

amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual 

punishment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting deliberate indifference to a 

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 

S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994).

In DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 

103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989), the Supreme Court summarized a state's constitutional 

responsibilities with regard to inmates:

[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there 

against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to 

assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. . . . The 

rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the 

affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it 

renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to 

provide for his basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical 

 7 Harrison’s claims relate to his treatment and conditions of confinement during his 

transport to Mobile Metro Jail. However, because Harrison’s claims arise from his mistaken 

over-detention, it is likely that Harrison should be characterized as a pretrial detainee and his 

allegations sound properly in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 

1257 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000); Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); 

Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 

F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, condition of confinement claims are analyzed the 

same regardless of whether such arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment or under the Eighth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, the Court can rely upon both 

Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment cases in ruling upon Defendants' Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Id. 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 15 of 27
16

care, and reasonable safety -- it transgresses the substantive limits on state 

action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citations omitted).

In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must make both 

an objective and a subjective showing. In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1994), 

the court delineated the objective and subjective portions of an Eighth Amendment

claim as follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two components, an objective 

component, which inquires whether the alleged wrongdoing was 

objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation, and a 

subjective component, which inquires whether the officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind.

25 F.3d at 983. To prevail on constitutional claims like the ones asserted by Plaintiff, he 

must prove that there was "a substantial risk of serious harm," that the defendants were 

subjectively deliberately indifferent to that risk, and causation. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582; 

see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-34.

The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim inquires whether the 

alleged wrongdoing amounted to the infliction of "unnecessary pain or suffering upon 

the prisoner." LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993). This standard 

requires that the alleged deprivation be "objectively, 'sufficiently serious.'" Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 

(1991)). The objective standard "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 

civilized standards, humanity, and decency ..., but must be balanced against competing 

penological goals." LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim generally "inquires 

whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Sims, 25 F.3d at 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 16 of 27
17

983-84 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 

(1992)). This component "follows from the principle that 'only the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 

(quotation and citation omitted). In prison conditions cases, the required state of mind 

for a defendant is "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's health or safety. Id. (citations 

omitted). In defining "deliberate indifference," the Supreme Court in Farmer stated:

We hold ... that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth 

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement 

unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court concluded that the "subjective recklessness" standard 

of criminal law is the test for "deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 

at 839-40.

There is no liability for "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he 

should have perceived but did not . . . ." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. It is not enough that 

an inmate proves that the defendant should have known of the risk, but did not, as 

actual knowledge is the key. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 

1996). A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure "reasonable 

safety," "a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials' 'unenviable task of 

keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

844-45 (citations omitted). 

Having set forth the general legal principles relevant to Harrison's claims, the 

Court now turns to the application of those legal principles to the facts before the Court.

1. No food provided during transport. 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 17 of 27
18

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of meals and snacks while 

he was transported from Limestone to Mobile Metro. Harrison asserts the following 

exchange occurred at the time he boarded the bus to Mobile Metro:

[He] advised the Transportation Officers (both) male and female officers 

“I am a Type II Diabetic. Would you please at least get a few snacks to 

help regulated my ‘blood suga level.’” His reply, “It’s 11:00 am y’all just 

had lunch. Man get in the van.” 

(Doc. 1 at 7-8) (capitalization edited). Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Transportation 

Officer Durgin affirms that he was never privy to knowledge that Harrison suffered 

from diabetes. (Doc. 13-2 at 2). However, at the summary judgment stage, the Court is 

bound to review the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Comer v. City of 

Palm Bay, Fla., 265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) ("We view the evidence and all 

factual inferences raised by it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and 

resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-moving party.").

The record reflects Mobile County’s policy, due to security concerns, is to not 

provide food to inmates during prison transports. (Doc. 13 at 2). The standard protocol 

is that inmates eat before they are bused and again once they are safely secured at 

Mobile Metro. (Id.). This customary practice was followed on October 31, 2013, as 

Defendants contend, and Harrison does not deny, that Harrison was fed breakfast and 

lunch prior to being bused to Mobile, Alabama, and Harrison was again provided food 

once he arrived at Mobile Metro. (Doc. 13 at 2; Doc. 17 at 2). Additionally, Harrison has 

complained of no injury as a result of the deprivation or delay in receiving food. (Doc. 

13-2 at 2). Additionally, Harrison has not alleged that he ever notified either 

transportation officer during the transport or at any of the stops along the way that he 

was having diabetic symptoms or suffering from blood sugar issues. There is no 

indication in the record that Defendants had any subjective intent to deprive Harrison 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 18 of 27
19

of food in an attempt to punish or cause him harm. See Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 

1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (Essential to establishing an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff 

must first show that the defendants’ conduct was “sufficiently serious to constitute a 

cruel or unusual deprivation - - one denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities. Second, there must be a subjective intent by the public officials involved to 

used the sufficiently serious deprivation in order to punish.”) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted). Simply stated, Plaintiff's allegations related to his treatment 

during his transport to Mobile Metro do not amount to the denial of a basic human 

need, nor do they evidence a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm 

to plaintiff's health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38; see also Comer, 265 F.3d at 

1192 ("Summary judgment is required where the non-moving party's response to a 

motion is merely 'a repetition of his conclusional allegations' and is unsupported by 

evidence showing an issue for trial."). Thus, Plaintiff Harrison has failed to establish a 

genuine issue for trial and this claim should be dismissed. 

2. No seatbelt during transport. 

Also at issue in this action is Harrison’s claim that due to “the Risky & High 

Percentage Probability of being in - or – causing a[n] Auto Accident” (doc. 1 at 9), 

Defendants are liable for recklessly endangering his life by transporting him in a 

“divided van (dog cage style) 2 feet wide by 7 feet in length” without the protection of a 

seat belt. (Doc. 1 at 7) (capitalization omitted). Harrison fails to mention any injury that 

occurred to him as a result of being transported in the van to Mobile Metro. More 

importantly, there is no indication in the record or allegation made by Plaintiff that he 

was denied a seat belt or forced to ride in the van as punishment. Instead, Plaintiff 

Harrison rests on his sole allegation that his transport without a safety restraint was a 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 19 of 27
20

deprivation of his constitutional rights. 

This Circuit has determined that transportation of inmates without seat belts, 

alone, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. In Smith v. Sec'y, Dept. of 

Corr., 252 Fed. App’x 301, 304 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit examined whether 

or not transporting inmates in converted utility vans that were not equipped with 

manufacturers’ seat belts satisfied the objective component of the deliberate indifference 

standard and was thereby an Eighth Amendment violation. The Court relied on an 

Eighth Circuit case, Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 904-06 (8th 

Cir. 1999) (Plaintiff in the case was forced to ride on a steel bench in the back of a van 

without any safety restraints. The plaintiff was thrown from the seat during transport 

and paralyzed due to the fall. The Eighth Circuit, however, found that this practice did 

not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.), as persuasive authority and 

determined that riding in a van without seats, seat belts or windows was not a 

deprivation of the minimal measure of life’s necessities or was it something that 

modern society would find intolerable. Smith, supra, at 303-04; see also, Quinlan v. 

Pers. Transp. Servs. Co., LLC, 329 F. App’x 246 (11th Cir. 2009) (No constitutional 

violation when inmate was shackled and transported without a seatbelt from Illinois 

county jail to Florida prison.); Poulin v. Jeter, 6:08-cv-299-Orl-31KRS, 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 96483, 35-36, 2010 WL 3701384 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2010) (Transporting prisoners 

in vans without seatbelts does not amount to a constitutional violation.); Bryant v. 

Downs, 6:09-cv-1670-Orl-28KRS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63919, 15-16, 2010 WL 2593564 

(M.D. Fla. June 29, 2010) (“Plaintiff has failed to state a colorable claim for relief” 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 20 of 27
21

because “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has determined that transporting prisoners in vans 

without seatbelts does not amount to a constitutional violation.”). 

Thus, given the precedent of the Eleventh Circuit and the lack of further 

allegations, the Court determines there is no factual issue for trial and this claim should 

be dismissed.8 

3. Use of restraints during transport. 

In so much as Harrison challenges that the use of full body restraints while being 

transported was excessive force or cruelty in violation of his constitutional rights, he has 

failed to show that this use of force "shocks the conscience." Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 

F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A jailor's use of force . . . is excessive . . . if it shocks the 

conscience," however, "[t]he use of force does not shock the conscience if it is applied in 

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline") (internal quotations omitted). The 

"core judicial inquiry" in an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force is "whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 

and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 6, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1991) (citations omitted). In Hudson, the Supreme 

Court held that the extent of a plaintiff's injuries is one factor in determining whether 

the force was applied maliciously and sadistically, but it is not determinative. Id. at 7. 

Other factors relevant to this inquiry include lithe need for application of force, the 

relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat 'reasonably 

 8 In the alternative to dismissal for finding no constitutional violation, Defendants would 

be entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity had the Court determined there to be a 

violation. With no clearly established law on this issue, Defendants would be immune from 

suit. See Adams v. Proag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 1995).

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 21 of 27
22

perceived by the responsible officials,' and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a 

forceful response.'" Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 

L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)). In so holding, the Court in Hudson rejected any requirement that 

a plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim establish that the force caused significant 

injuries. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff has not established that the Transportation Officers used unnecessary or 

excessive force against him. "A jailor's use of force . . . is excessive . . . if it 'shocks the 

conscience.'" Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Danley v. 

Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008)). "The use of force does not 'shock the 

conscience' if it is applied 'in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.'" Id. 

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7)). The use of handcuffs and leg cuffs in the instant 

situation does not "shock the conscience." Transportation Officers were transporting 

prisoners across the state. It is reasonable that the drivers would restrain the prisoners

for the safety of guards and inmates. The amount of force in this case was not excessive

as Plaintiff has not established that the use of the handcuffs was done maliciously or

that there was not a need for him to be handcuffed. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable claim for use of excessive force, and summary judgment should be granted 

in favor of Defendants with respect to this claim and the instant claim is dismissed.

4. Overcrowded Cell.

In this action, Harrison asserts he was subjected to “cruelty . . when after being 

booked in to Mob[ile] Co. Metro Jail, Plaintiff was housed in the 2-man cell, already 

occupied by 3 men . . . for 8 hours.” (Doc. 17-2 at 4). To state a valid claim, Plaintiff 

"must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 22 of 27
23

harm." Farmer, supra, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. 

Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991) ("The Constitution . . . does not mandate comfortable 

prisons, and only those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's 

necessities', are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation" 

and required the inmate to show deliberate indifference on part of prison officials.). 

Plaintiff, however, has failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations in this action "to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff 

was held in a crowded cell for a mere eight hours. He does not complain of unsanitary 

conditions or violence due to the overcrowding. On the contrary, Plaintiff makes one 

conclusory argument that being housed with three other men in a “two-man” cell was 

cruel. (Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 17 at 2).

The law is clear, crowding of a prison does not, standing alone, create a 

constitutional violation. See e.g. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1959, 179 L. Ed. 2d 969, 

2011 WL 193607, * 41 (2011) (Alito, dissenting) ("The Eighth Amendment imposes an 

important — but limited—restraint on state authority in this field [and] the current 

population level [in a prison] is not itself unconstitutional."), citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981) (The Eighth Amendment 

prohibits prison officials from depriving inmates of 'the minimal civilized measure of 

life's necessities" and no such deprivation based on "double-celling" the inmates was 

established.). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim of overcrowding at 

Mobile Metro. Therefore, the undersigned finds Plaintiff Harrison’s allegations are not 

sufficient to allow the Court to draw the conclusion that the alleged overcrowding "is so 

extreme that it poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's health or 

safety." Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). Harrison has, 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 23 of 27
24

therefore, failed to carry his burden of establishing the needed elements to state a viable 

constitutional claim; thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be 

granted on this claim and this claim should be dismissed. 

C. No violation for failure to train or supervise. 

Plaintiff claims Defendants Oliver and Cochran are responsible as supervisors 

for unconstitutional acts that occurred by and during his over-detention. (Doc. 1 at 4). 

To state a successful claim, Plaintiff must establish a causal connection between each 

defendant’s actions, orders, customs, policies, or breaches of statutory duty and the 

alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Frankum v. Chapman, 2009 WL 

1118875, *3 (S.D. Ala. 2009); Trotter v. Corr. Medical Servs, Inc., 2008 WL 2225696, *9 

(S.D. Ala. 2008). Liability for an alleged constitutional violation cannot be established 

on the basis of a theory of respondeat superior. See Edwards v. Alabama Dep’t of Corrs., 

81 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“A theory of respondeat superior is not 

sufficient to support their § 1983 claim. . . .”). “[S]upervisory liability under § 1983 

occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged 

unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a 

supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 

F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). 

“The necessary causal connection can be established ‘when a history of 

widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the 

alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.’” Id. (citations omitted). “Alternatively, the 

causal connection may be established when a supervisor’s ‘custom or policy . . . result[s] 

in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights’ or when facts support ‘an inference 

that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 24 of 27
25

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.’” Id. 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In such instances, Plaintiff must show 

that the policy or custom was “the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’” 

Pinkney v. Davis, 952 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (citations omitted). “[I]t is 

clear that not only must there be some degree of ‘fault’ on the part of [defendant] in 

establishing the policy or tolerating the custom, but there must be a causal link between 

the custom or policy and the constitutional deprivation.” Id. (citations omitted).

Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendants Oliver and Cochran were personally 

involved in his over-detention. Furthermore, the Court has determined no 

constitutional violation occurred due to Plaintiff’s over-detention and treatment during 

his transport to Mobile Metro. Therefore, Defendants Oliver and Cochran cannot be 

liable for unconstitutional acts as supervisors where no constitutional violation has 

occurred. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that a 

supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he personally participates in unconstitutional 

conduct or if his actions can be connected causally to a constitutional deprivation.); 

Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (providing 

that a municipality’s § 1983 liability is premised upon an underlying constitutional 

violation.). Therefore, all claims against Defendants Oliver and Cochran should be 

dismissed. 

IV. Conclusion.

That Plaintiff was not released from prison on October 30, 2013 is unfortunate. 

Mistakes were made, particularly by uninvolved parties, and Harrison missed an 

employment opportunity by less than 16 hours. But, no one is entitled to an error-free 

bureaucracy; and the federal constitutional standard of deliberate indifference is a high 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 25 of 27
26

standard to meet. As a matter of law, the record does not show that Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s right to be released on October 30, 2013; instead, 

the evidence indicates that Harrison was over-detained for approximately a day and a 

half, and the errors that led to the over-detention were caused by - at worst –

nonsupervisory staffers. In fact, the record reveals that the matter was promptly 

investigated and Plaintiff Harrison was released expeditiously once the inadvertent 

computer error or data entry error was recognized. 

Based upon the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that summary 

judgment be granted in favor of Defendants Mobile County Metro Jail Warden Noah 

Price Oliver, Mobile County Sheriff Sam Cochran, the Mobile County Sheriff’s 

Department, Mobile County Metro Jail Personnel, and two Transportation Officers, and 

this action be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a valid § 1983 claim. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything 

in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(B); S.D. ALA. L.R.72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit 

precedent, “the failure to object limits the scope of [] appellate review to plain error 

review of the magistrate judge’s factual findings.” Dupree v. Warden, Attorney Gen., 

State of Ala., 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011). In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 26 of 27
27

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this 10th day of February 2015. 

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00085-KD-C Document 35 Filed 02/10/15 Page 27 of 27