alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-1884
ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, Esq., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JACK HARBESTON; SEA SEARCH ARMADA; ARMADA COMPANY; IOTA PARTNERS; DANILO DEVIS PEREIRA, Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (CA-00-1523-A) Submitted: November 9, 2001 Decided: November 28, 2001 Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant Pro Se. R. Harrison Pledger, Jr., Bernard G. Feord, Jr., PLEDGER & FEORD, P.L.C., McLean, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Isidoro Rodriguez appeals the district court orders dismissing his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We review de novothe district court’s legal conclusions concerning personal jurisdiction. To the extent that the district court’s conclusions are based on findings of fact, however, such findings should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V. , 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). Rodriguez bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction existed. In re Celotex Corp. , 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s findings and legal conclusions and find no error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Rodriguez v. Harbeston , No. CA-00-1523-A (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2000 & June 5, 2001). We deny Rodriguez’s motion seeking certification of a question from the Supreme Court of Virginia. We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

I, Benton H Wilcoxon, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
Report of Composite Technology Corporation on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended
March 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form
10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of Composite Technology Corporation.


Date: August 8, 2005

By: /s/ Benton H Wilcoxon

Benton H Wilcoxon
Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer
J

- A12028

- 17

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEPHEN TERREL RUSSELL

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1688 WDA 2016 Appeal from the Order Entered October 6, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 25

- CR

- 0001497

- 2016 BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J. and, RANSOM, J. CONCURRING STATEMENT BY SOLANO, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2017
In Commonwealth v. Ricker , 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. 2015), pet. for allowance of appeal granted , 135 A.3d 175 (Pa. Apr. 18, 2016), and Commonwealth v. McClelland , ___ A.3d ___, 2017 WL 2312083 (Pa. Super. May 26, 2017), this Court resolved the substantive issues raised by Appellant under the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses. As a panel of this Court, we are bound by those decisions, and I therefore conclude that Appellant i s not entitled to relief on those substantive issues. I disagree, however, with the Majority’s conclusion that we lack jurisdiction to hear these appeals. In Ricker and McClelland , we held that we had jurisdiction to hear issues substantially identical to those raised by Appellant under the “exceptional circumstances” theory advanced in those decisions. In explaining why we had jurisdiction, we said, “Not only is Appellant’s claim capable of evading review, it presents an importantJ

- A12028

- 17

- 2

-

constitutional questio n regarding whether a powerful state governmental entity violates federal and state constitutional principles in allowing a defendant to be restrained of his liberty and bound over for trial based solely on hearsay evidence.” Ricker , 120 A.3d at 354 (addr essing Confrontation Clause challenge); see McClelland , 2017 WL 2312083, at *1 (“the same reasoning applies” to a Due Process challenge). The Majority holds, however, that although we had jurisdiction in Ricker and McClelland , we lack jurisdiction in the se cases because “extraordinary circumstances” no longer are present here. The Majority reasons that because Ricker and McClelland have now decided the “important constitutional questions” that gave rise to the extraordinary circumstances in those cases, anything we say about those issues here is redundant. Maj. Memo. at 7. But for this defendant faced with these same constitutional questions, the matters raised here are no less important and the circumstances are no less extraordinary. Nothing in Ricke r suggested that its jurisdictional holding applied to just that one case. Any such limitation would be both peculiar and suspect, since it would afford a special,

one - time

- only ticket to the courthouse door to only that litigant who was swiftest to prese nt the issue, and then bar all other comers. We do not create jurisdictional doctrine in that way. I therefore disagree with the decision to quash these appeals, although I agree that on the merits no relief is due.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the 

Southern District of Alabama

United States of America )

)

v. ) Case No. 06-00022-KD

)

KENDRICK MELTON )

Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

Upon motion of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a reduction in the term of

imprisonment imposed based on a guideline sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered and

made retroactive by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(u), and having

considered such motion, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is:

X DENIED. GRANTED and the defendant’s previously imposed sentence of imprisonment

(as reflected in the last judgment issued) of months is reduced to months.

I. COURT DETERMINATION OF GUIDELINE RANGE (Prior to Any Departures)

Previous Offense Level: 38 Amended Offense: 36 

Criminal History Category: 1V Criminal History: IV 

Previous Guideline Range: 235 to 293 months Amended Guideline Range: 188 to 235 months 

II. SENTENCE RELATIVE TO AMENDED GUIDELINE RANGE

 The reduced sentence is within the amended guideline range.

 The previous term of imprisonment imposed was less than the guideline range applicable to the

defendant at the time of sentencing as a result of a departure or Rule 35 reduction, and the reduced

sentence is comparably less than the amended guideline range.

 Other (explain): 

III. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS - Defendant was sentenced to the statutory mandatory

minimum of 120 months and is not eligible for consideration of a reduction because Amendment

706 does not apply when a defendant has been sentenced to a statutory mandatory minimum

penalty. Defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence of sixty months as to Count

Three to be served consecutive to his sentence as to Count One. 

 

Except as provided above, all provisions of the judgment shall remain in effect.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

Order Date: December 19, 2008 Judge’s signature

Effective date: United States District Judge

(if different from order) Printed name and title

Case 2:06-cr-00022-KD-B Document 39 Filed 12/19/08 Page 1 of 1
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for Southern New York, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRISHNA KUMAR GURUNG,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-70955

Agency No. A098-510-886

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 29, 2012** 

Seattle, Washington

Before: SCHROEDER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, Senior District

Judge.*** 

Krishna Kumar Gurung, a native and citizen of Nepal, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from the

FILED

SEP 04 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for

substantial evidence. Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011). We

deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The record does not compel reversal of the agency’s denial of Gurung’s

asylum claim because he did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear

of future persecution on account of his political beliefs; rather he was mistreated

because the Maoists believed he had money that could be extracted. See

Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (economic

motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion). Even if

he proved past persecution and was entitled to a presumption of well-founded fear,

there was substantial evidence to support the agency’s finding that the presumption

had been rebutted by proof of changed circumstances in Nepal. See

Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because Gurung did not establish his eligibility for asylum, he necessarily

fails to satisfy the higher standard for withholding of removal. See Farah v.

Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of

relief under the Convention Against Torture because Gurung did not show that it is
more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Nepal. See SantosLemus, 542 F.3d at 747–48.

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Gurung’s request for humanitarian

asylum because he did not raise this claim to the agency. See Tijani v. Holder, 628

F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).

DENIED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.
tse_EX_10-3


		
			Exhibit 10.3
		

		
			 
		

			
					
						

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						Trinseo LLC

				
	
					
						1000 Chesterbrook Blvd.

				
	
					
						Suite 300

				
	
					
						Berwyn, PA 19312

				



		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			May 11, 2015
		

		
			 
		

		
			Mr. Martin Pugh
		

		
			SWITZERLAND
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			Dear Mr. Pugh:
		

		
			 
		

		
			RE:  Definition of Retirement for Purposes of Equity Awards under 2014 Omnibus Incentive Plan
		

		
			 
		

		
			This letter confirms that the following definition of "Retirement" i s applicable to the Stock Options granted to you on February 27, 2015, in addition to the definition set forth in the Non-Statutory Stock Option Agreement:
		

		
			 
		

		
			"Retirement" also means a termination of Employment on or after March 1, 2017 if the Optionee's current employment agreement expires without renewal on March 1, 2017.
		

		
			 
		

		
			This letter confirms that the following definition of "Retirement" is applicable to the Restricted Stock Units granted to you on February 27, 2015, in addition to the definition set forth in the Restricted Stock Unit Agreement:
		

		
			 
		

		
			"Retirement" also means a termination of Employment on or after March  1, 2017 if the Grantee's current employment agreement expires without renewal on March 1, 2017.
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			* *
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

			
					
						 

					
					
						Trinseo S.A.

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						By:

					
					
						/s/ Christopher D. Pappas

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						Name: Christopher D. Pappas

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						Title: President and Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1





Certification Pursuant To


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As Adopted Pursuant To


Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002








In connection with the Yearly Report of China Yida Holding, Co. (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the year ending December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Chen Minhua, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the results of operations of the Company.








/s/  Chen Minhua


Chen Minhua


Chief Executive Officer





Dated: March 27, 2012
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2033 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2033

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of 
  Education, Departmental Management, Office of Inspector General for 
                           fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
        referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of 
  Education, Departmental Management, Office of Inspector General for 
                           fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DEPARTMENT OF 
              EDUCATION, DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
              GENERAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Department of Education, 
Departmental Management, Office of Inspector General for fiscal year 
2024 may not exceed $61,143,000.
                                 <all>
```
#### The State, ex rel. Irish, *v.*Klaas, Trustee.

APPEAL from the Lake Common Pleas.

*M. Wood*and *L. y. Wood,*for appellant.

*y, Barnard*and *M. C. Barnard,*for appellee.

Pettit, J.

On the transcript, the names of the parties are reversed. Klaas, trustee, should be placed as the appellant, and the State, *ex rel.*Irish, as the appellee. This awkwardness might not dispose of the case; but the transcript is neither paged nor numbered by lines, for which the submission should be set aside. Rule 19 of this Court, 32 Ind.

But the assignment of errors has no names to it, either appellants, or appellees, and for this last defect the appeal, under many decisions of this court, must be dismissed. Rule 1, of this Court, 32 Ind.

The appeal is dismissed, at the costs of the appellant.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2224 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Related Agencies, 

National Endowment for the Humanities for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Related Agencies, National Endowment for the Humanities 

for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 RELATED AGENCIES, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT 

5 FOR THE HUMANITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 

6 2024. 

7 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

8 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise availVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:48 Apr 19, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2224.IH H2224

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 2224 IH

1 able for Related Agencies, National Endowment for the 

2 Humanities for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $0. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1817 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1817

   To prohibit Federal agencies from requiring lenders to estimate a 
    borrower's race or ethnicity via visual observation or surname.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 27, 2023

  Mr. Williams of Texas (for himself, Mr. Luetkemeyer, and Mr. Hill) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit Federal agencies from requiring lenders to estimate a 
    borrower's race or ethnicity via visual observation or surname.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Preventing Racial Profiling in 
Lending Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON ESTIMATING RACE OR ETHNICITY.

    A Federal agency may not require any person or entity, when 
extending credit, to estimate a borrower's race or ethnicity via visual 
observation or surname.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1





Certification of CEO and CFO

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002







In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Angeles Partners X (the "Partnership"), for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Martha L. Long, as the equivalent of the chief executive officer of the Partnership, and Stephen B. Waters, as the equivalent of the chief financial officer of the Partnership, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.



| |                        
| | -----------------------
| | /s/Martha L. Long      
| | Name: Martha L. Long   
| | Date: August 13, 2008  
| |                        
| | /s/Stephen B. Waters   
| | Name: Stephen B. Waters
| | Date: August 13, 2008  



This certification is furnished with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Partnership for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### Elizabeth Costanzo, Respondent, v County of Chautauqua, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[972 NYS2d 791]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (James H. Dillon, J.), entered September 14, 2012 in a personal injury action. The order denied the cross motion of defendant County of Chautauqua for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustained when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle operated by Paul L. Rosage (decedent) at the intersection of Route 5, a state road, and Van Burén Road, a county road, in Chautauqua County. Decedent’s vehicle hit the driver’s side of plaintiffs vehicle when plaintiff, after stopping at a stop sign on Van Buren Road, drove the vehicle through the intersection and into the path of decedent’s vehicle, which was traveling eastbound on Route 5. It is undisputed that decedent was not subject to any traffic control devices at the intersection and thus had the right-of-way. According to plaintiff, defendant County of Chautauqua (County) was negligent in, inter alia, “causing and creating an unsafe intersection.” We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied the County’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it inasmuch as it failed to meet its initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). The County’s cross motion was based in part on the affidavit of a transportation engineer who offered his opinion as an accident reconstruction expert. We conclude that the affidavit was speculative and conclusory inasmuch as the expert failed to submit the data upon which he based his opinions, and thus the affidavit had no probative value *(see Lillie v Wilmorite, Inc.,*92 AD3d 1221, 1222 [2012]; *Schuster v Dukarm,*38 AD3d 1358, 1359 [2007]). We reject the County’s further contention that it *1474cannot be held liable as a matter of law for this accident because it does not control the intersection of a county road and a state road *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1621 [a]). Lastly, the County’s contention that it cannot be held liable because it did not have prior written notice of the allegedly defective intersection is without merit given that plaintiff alleges that the County created the allegedly unsafe condition *(see generally Amabile v City of Buffalo,*93 NY2d 471, 474 [1999]). Present — Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.