IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0072-CG-C

)

280 Cody Road South, Mobile, AL, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Order of 

Forfeiture (Doc. 23). For cause shown, the Motion is GRANTED.

The defendant real property is 280 Cody Road South, in Mobile County, 

Alabama, with a legal description of: 

LOT 38 IN BLOCK 6, HIGHLAND PARK SUBDIVISION, 

ACCORDING TO PLAT THEROF RECORDED IN MAP BOOK 4, 

PAGE 380 OF THE RECORDS IN THE OFFICE OF THE JUDGE 

OF PROBATE, MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA.

The most recent deed places title to the defendant property in the name of 

Michael Wilson. 

18 U.S.C. § 985 governs civil forfeiture actions filed against real property. It 

provides: 

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“The Government shall initiate a civil forfeiture action against real property 

by -

(A) filing a complaint for forfeiture; 

(B) posting a notice of the complaint on the property; and 

(C) serving notice on the property owner, along with a copy of the complaint.”

On March 10, 2014, the Court authorized the plaintiff to file a Complaint for 

Forfeiture in Rem against the defendant real property under seal, and to delay for 

120 days serving notice to potential claimants, publishing notice, and posting the 

property. The Court later extended the seal and delay, but ordered that the case 

would be unsealed on September 9, 2014, unless ordered extended by the Court for 

good cause shown in a motion by the plaintiff. No such motion was filed, and the case 

proceeded. 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1)(B), in September 30, 2014, the U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS) posted a copy of the complaint and notice on the residence 

located on the property. Once done, no further action was necessary for the Court 

to have in rem jurisdiction over it. § 985(c)(3).

The U.S. Marshal’s Service served Wilbert Richards and Michael Wilson, with 

a copy of the complaint and notice, on October 14 and November 4, 2014, 

respectively. 

Under Rules G(4)(b)(ii)(B) and G(5), Wilbert Richards had 35 days after 

service to file a claim and 21 days after that to file a motion or answer. Therefore, 

Richards had until November 18, 2014, to file a claim, and until December 9, 2014, 

to file a motion or answer. He has filed none of the required responsive pleadings to 

oppose forfeiture of the defendant property, and his time to do so has expired.

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Michael Wilson, through an attorney, filed but then moved to withdraw a 

purported claim, which the Court granted.1

18 U.S.C. § 985 does not mention publication of notice. However, Rule 

G(4)(a)(i), requires publication of notice. “A judgment of forfeiture may be entered 

only if the government has published notice of the action within a reasonable time 

after filing the complaint or at a time the court orders[,]” except in circumstances not 

applicable here. As a result, beginning on October 17, 2014, plaintiff published 

notice on an official government internet forfeiture website at www.forfeiture.gov

for 30 consecutive days. Any putative claimants who received notice by internet 

publication had to file a claim no later than 60 days after the first date of publication 

on the official government forfeiture website (by December 16, 2014). See Rule 

G(5)(ii)(B). No putative claimant who received notice by internet publication filed a 

timely claim, motion or answer and the deadline to do so has expired. 

Supplemental Rule G(5)(b). Therefore, there are no claims in opposition to 

 1

As the plaintiff points out, Wilson’s claim did not meet the requirements of Rule G(5), which required that 

he personally sign the claim under penalty of perjury. Absent such a claim, and having filed no answer, Wilson 

lacked standing due to these pleadings defects. United States v. $125,934.62, 370 F. 3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004)( 

a verified claim is essential to conferring statutory standing and is necessary to deter the filing of false claims; claim 

must be verified by the claimant, not by counsel.); United States v. 40 acres, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1275 (S.D. Ala. 

2009)(pleading requirements in Rule G(5) must be strictly enforced; claimant who filed claim but no answer lacked 

statutory standing) (collecting cases). Nevertheless, had Wilson established standing, he would have had difficulty

proving that he was an innocent owner of the property under § 983(d)(6), as the Court concludes that it is likely 

Wilson was a nominee buyer for Richards. Among the facts supporting this conclusion are: Richards’s payment of 

nearly $180,000 in cash for renovations and improvements to the defendant property along with his occupation of it 

once completed, and Wilson’s lack of any involvement in the renovation process or shouldering any of the costs. See 

e.g., United States v. 2930 Greenleaf St., 920 F. Supp. 639, 646 ( E.D. Pa. 1996)(claimant who held deed to real 

property, but did not have possession of the property or exercise dominion or control over it at any time, lacked 

standing); United States v. 10.027 Acres, 2013 WL 2155994, *3 n.5 (M.D.N.C. May 17, 2013)(claimant could not 

be an innocent owner under § 983(d)(6) because although her name was on the deed, she exercised no dominion or 

control over the property). Therefore, had Wilson not been permitted to withdraw his purported claim, or had he 

filed a proper one, it is likely that he would have been unable to show that he was an innocent owner.

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forfeiture of the defendant property, and there are existing claims in the complaint 

pursuant to which it may be ordered forfeited to the plaintiff. 

This forfeiture proceeding was initiated after the April 2000 effective date of 

the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA); therefore, the procedures set forth in 

18 U.S.C. § 983 apply. 

Under CAFRA, the burden of proof is on the United States to establish that 

the property is subject to forfeiture, by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 

983(c)(1); United States v. $181,087.14 in U.S. Currency, 2002 WL 31951270, *2-*3 

(S.D. Ohio 2002). “The burden of showing something by a ‘preponderance of the 

evidence,’ the most common standard in the civil law, ‘simply requires the trier of 

fact “to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence 

before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] 

of the fact’s existence.”” United States v. Real Property in Section 9, 308 F. Supp.2d 

791, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. 

Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 

S. Ct. 2264, 124 L. Ed.2d 539 (1993)(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72, 90 

S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed.2d 368 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring)). The burden then shifts 

to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of admissible evidence a defense to the 

forfeiture or to prove that the property is not otherwise subject to forfeiture. 18 

U.S.C. § 983(d)(1); see, $181,087.14, supra. 

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) is one of the forfeiture statutes upon which plaintiff 

relies in its assertion that the defendant property should be forfeited. It subjects to 

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civil forfeiture all money or other things of value furnished or intended to be 

furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the 

Controlled Substances Act, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all 

money used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the Controlled 

Substances Act. 

When forfeiture is alleged based on 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), then the United 

States must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the money is traceable to 

drug trafficking generally, but not to a specific transaction. United States v. 

$21,000.00 in U.S. Postal Money Orders, 298 F. Supp. 2d 597 (E.D. Mich. 2003); 

United States v. $110,873.00 in U.S. Currency, 2004 WL 2359726 (N.D. Ohio 

2004)(property may be forfeited without linking it to a particular drug sale.) 

In carrying its burden in a 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) civil forfeiture, the United 

States is not required to offer direct evidence of a connection between the defendant 

currency and a specific drug transaction. See, e.g., United States v. $4,255,000.00, 

762 F.2d 95, 904 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S. Ct. 795, 88 L. 

Ed.2d 772 (1986). Rather, circumstantial evidence is a permissible form of proof in 

a civil forfeiture action. United States v. $22,991.00, 227 F. Supp.2d 1220, 1231 

(S.D. Ala. 2002). 

Finally, “[i]n evaluating the evidence of proceeds traceable to drug 

transactions we [the Eleventh Circuit] have eschewed clinical detachment and 

endorsed a common sense view to the realities of everyday life applied to the totality 

of the circumstances.” United States v. $242,484.00, 2004 WL 2434933, *9 (11th 

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Cir. 2004).

Among other factors, based on Richards’s criminal history of involvement in 

cocaine distribution, his continued involvement in cocaine distribution as described 

by Southall, who himself was caught with a significant quantity of cocaine; 

Richards’s possession of $4,000 cash when arrested; the search of the defendant 

property which revealed tools of the drug distribution trade, including a money 

counter with traces of cocaine; the discovery of a car on the property with $10,000 

cash secreted inside its rear quarter panel; the large amount of cash he paid 

contractors to renovate and expand the property, and the suspicious circumstances 

surrounding the deposit of $81,000 cash in Wilson’s bank account, the Court agrees 

that the United States has carried its burden to prove by a preponderance that the 

defendant property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), as it 

was likely purchased and renovated with money furnished or intended to be 

furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the 

Controlled Substances Act, proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all money 

used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the Controlled Substances 

Act. See United States v. Carrell, 252 F. 3d 1193,1201-02 (11th Cir. 2001) (evidence 

that a claimant in a civil forfeiture has been engaged in a drug business over time 

and has a history of drug violations are probative factors in a 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) 

civil forfeiture); United States v. $121,100 in U.S. Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1506-07 

(11th Cir. 1993)( claimant’s narcotics-related criminal history is a factor the Eleventh 

Circuit, as well as other circuits, consider); United States v. $4,424.00, 1994 WL 

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568594, *4; United States v. $121,100.00, supra at 1507 (11th Cir. 1993)(although 

insufficient by itself to demonstrate a connection to illegal drugs, the quantity of 

cash seized [may be] highly probative of a connection to some illegal activity.) United 

States v. $2,361.00 U.S. Currency, More or Less, 1989 WL 135257, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 

1989)(a substantial amount of cash present is probative of illegal drug activity, 

because it is well-known that drug-traffickers usually deal in cash.). Based on the 

foregoing facts and authorities, the United States submits that the defendant 

property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 881(a)(6).

In Count Two, it is alleged that the defendant property is subject to forfeiture 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). Under § 881(a)(7), real property is subject to 

forfeiture if it is used, or intended to be used, an any manner or part, to commit or 

facilitate the commission of a Controlled Substance offense, which is punishable by 

more than one year’s imprisonment. When forfeiture based on § 881(a)(7) is 

alleged, the United States must establish “that there was a substantial connection 

between the property and the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3); see also United States 

v. $22,991.00 in U.S. Currency, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1231 (S.D. Ala. 2002).

As relied upon by the plaintiff, the evidence supporting that the defendant 

property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 881(a)(7), includes: 1) evidence of 

Richards’s criminal history of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and 

Southall’s cooperative information that Richards continued to be actively involved 

in kilogram quantity cocaine distribution up to his arrest; 2) tools of the drug 

distribution trade discovered during the search of the defendant property, including 

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money counters; one with cocaine residue; vacuum seal bags; plastic wrap; and, a 

box in which a digital scale had been; 3) approximately $24,000 in cash bundled 

together in the kitchen pantry; 4) $10,000 in cash hidden inside the rear quarter 

panel of a Honda Accord parked outside the house; 5) contractor Sylvester Johnson’s 

description of the tough, shady looking characters delivering cars to Richards from 

California during the weeks he worked on the house; and, 6) Southall’s description of 

Richards’s California Gage Auto cocaine connection before Richards’s arrest coupled 

with the discovery of a business card for Gage Auto in Richards’s possession when he 

was arrested. See United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352, 364-65 (4th Cir. 2010) (the 

substantial connection is satisfied by showing that the property made the offense 

less difficult to commit, or more or less free from obstruction or hindrance); United 

States v. 2001 Lexus LS430, 799 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602-08 (E.D. Va. 2010) ( the illegal 

act does not have to be the property’s primary purpose; there is a substantial 

connection if the property made the crime less difficult and more or less free from 

obstruction or hindrance); United States v. One Parcel...2526 Faxon Ave., 145 F. 

Supp. 2d 942, 946 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (residence used as stash house for drug money 

is substantially connected to the drug offense even under CAFRA’s higher standard 

of proof; connection need not be integral, essential, or indispensable, but must have 

been more than incidental or fortuitous); United States v. One Parcel...7715 Betsy 

Bruce Lane, 906 F. 2d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 1990)(house used to store, prepare, package, 

and consume cocaine forfeitable under § 881(a)(7)). Based on the foregoing facts and 

authorities, there is a substantial connection between the defendant property, as it

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made it less difficult to store, prepare, and package cocaine, and as a location to 

stash drug money, which support to a preponderance of the evidence the defendant 

property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 881(a)(7). 

NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having considered the matter and having 

been fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED as follows:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the complaint 

states a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2. In accordance with the Verified Complaint, the defendant 280 Cody 

Road South, Mobile, Alabama, together with its appurtenances and improvements in 

Mobile County, Alabama, as more fully described above is ORDERED to be forfeited 

to the plaintiff, the United States of America, for disposition according to law 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§881(a)(6) and (a)(7), and 18 U.S.C. § 985.

3. This Order resolving all matters and issues joined in this action, the 

Clerk of Court is directed to close this file for administrative and statistical 

purposes.

DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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