in deliberations, see State v. Berry, 684 So. 2d 439, 448 (La Ct. App. 2015) 

(concluding that defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial court's 

denial of a challenge for cause against an alternate juror who did not 

participate as "an active member of the panel"); State v. White, 706 S.W.2d 

280, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that any error in denying 

defendant's challenge for cause against an alternate juror was harmless 

where the juror did not participate in deliberations). Accordingly, we 

conclude that no relief is warranted. 

Appellant next contends that the district court erred by not 

allowing him to impeach the victim with extrinsic evidence. On crossexamination, the victim denied that she had been "trespassed" from a 

particular casino because she had stolen money from a casino guest. 

Appellant unsuccessfully sought to introduce an affidavit concerning the 

incident. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, 

see Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1008, 103 P.3d 25, 29 (2004) ("It is 

within the district court's sound discretion to admit or exclude evidence"), 

as the admission of the affidavit was not permitted under NRS 50.085(3) 

(providing that Isbecific instances of the conduct of a witness, . . . other 

than a conviction of crime, may not he proved by extrinsic evidence"). 

Appellant further argues that the district court erroneously 

admitted evidence of prior bad acts. In this, he challenges four comments 

the victim made during her testimony. First, appellant contends that the 

victim's testimony that she went to "Safe Nest" after ending her 

relationship with appellant suggested that she had to flee from him for her 

safety. We conclude that he has not shown reversible error where the 

reference was brief and the victim did not overtly express concern for her 

safety. Second, appellant argues that the victim's testimony that she 

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"may have a restraining order" implied that he had history of violence. 

The victim was wrong about having a restraining order, and the district 

court offered to remedy the mistake but appellant declined. Under the 

circumstances, we conclude that he has not shown reversible error. Third, 

appellant argues that the victim's testimony that appellant taught her to 

keep her money in her bra suggested that he was her pimp. Because this 

testimony was relevant to the robbery charge to show that appellant knew 

where the victim kept her money, the district court did not err by 

overruling the objection to it. Fourth, appellant contends that the victim's 

testimony that he had been "trespassed" from a particular casino implied 

that he had committed a serious crime. We conclude that he has not 

demonstrated reversible error where the victim corrected her testimony 

and told the jury that she was not allowed in the casino. 

Appellant next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion concerning several jury instruction matters. "The district court 

has broad discretion to settle jury instructions, and this court reviews the 

district court's decision for an abuse of that discretion or judicial error." 

Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). 

First, appellant challenges an instruction defining use of a 

deadly weapon. The instruction advised the jury that to 'use' a deadly 

weapon, there need not be conduct which actually produces harm but only 

conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by means or display of the 

deadly weapon in aiding the commission of the crime." Appellant contends 

that the instruction was improper because a car—the deadly weapon 

alleged in this instance—does not lend itself to "display" as would a gun or 

other weapon; therefore, the suggestion that the "mere 'display' of a car 

could produce 'fear of harm' indicated "an additional basis of liability with 

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no relevance to the facts of the case" and minimized the State's burden of 

proof. We disagree. The instruction is a correct statement of law, see 

Allen v. State, 96 Nev. 334, 336, 609 P.2d 321, 322 (1980), and where the 

evidence shows that appellant struck the victim with his car, it is unlikely 

that the jury found that he used a deadly weapon in battering the victim 

by merely displaying his car. Additionally, the jury was instructed that 

the State bore the burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Second, relying on Phillips v. State, 99 Nev. 693, 669 P.2d 706 

(1983), appellant contends the district court should have given his 

proffered robbery instruction because it was more accurate than the 

instruction given, as his instruction advised the jury that the State must 

show that the victim had a possessory interest in the property taken. 

Phillips concerned whether a customer who was present during the 

robbery of a jewelry store could be the victim of robbery. Id. at 695, 669 

P.2d at 707. This court concluded that because the customer had no 

possessory interest in the property stolen, no robbery of the customer 

occurred. Id.; see also Klein v. State, 105 Nev. 880, 885, 784 P.2d 970, 973 

(1989). Appellant argues that he was entitled to his instruction because 

his defense was that the money the victim had on her person belonged to 

him and therefore no robbery occurred. Appellant confuses the possessory 

interest contemplated by Phillips and ownership, which is not an element 

of robbery. See NRS 200.380(1). Therefore, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in this regard. 

Third, appellant contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his proffered instruction that reflected his defense 

theory that he merely attempted to recover his money from the victim, see 

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NRS 193.240, and that the State bore the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he did not act in defense of his property. Appellant 

proffered his instruction based on testimony that he had accused the 

victim of taking his money shortly before the altercation with her. Even 

assuming that the instruction should have been given, see Rosas v. State, 

122 Nev. 1258, 1269, 147 P.3d 1101, 1109 (2006) ("[A] defendant is 

entitled to a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case as long as 

there is some evidence to support it."); Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 531, 

665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983), we conclude that no prejudice resulted where the 

evidence shows that appellant approached the victim as she exited a 

taxicab, knocked her to the ground, and punched her once or twice in the 

head, see Alexander v. Corn., 508 S.E.2d 912, 914 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) 

(concluding that reasonable force may be used in defense of property), 

rev'd on other grounds, 531 S.E.2d 567 (Va. 2000). 

Fourth, appellant contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by rejecting his proffered accident instruction because no other 

instructions defined the meaning of "accident" in as much detail and 

without his instruction, the jurors were unable to evaluate his accident 

defense. We conclude that the meaning of "accident" is understood by 

persons of ordinary intelligence and needed no further explanation. 

Moreover, the jury was adequately instructed that he could not be held 

criminally liable if his conduct constituted an accident and appellant has 

not demonstrated prejudice resulting from the omission of the proffered 

instruction. Therefore, no relief is warranted. 

Fifth, appellant argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his proffered instruction regarding "evidence 

susceptible to two interpretations." We have considered similar 

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instructions and concluded that it is not error to reject such an instruction 

where the jury is properly instructed on reasonable doubt. Hooper v. 

State, 95 Nev. 924, 927, 604 P.2d 115, 117 (1979); Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 

95, 97, 545 P.2d 1155, 1156 (1976). Because the jury was properly 

instructed on reasonable doubt, and appellant has not identified any 

prejudice resulting from the omission of his proposed instruction, no relief 

is warranted. 

Sixth, appellant contends that the district court erred by 

rejecting his instruction concerning non-expert witnesses consistent with 

NRS 50.265. While we are not convinced that he has demonstrated that 

the instruction was necessary, we conclude that no relief is warranted as 

he has not identified any prejudice resulting from its omission. 

Having considered appellant's arguments and concluded that 

no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. James M. Bixler, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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