alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Runko, Appellant.

[962 NYS2d 911]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Spinner, J.), dated July 12, 2012, which, without a hearing, denied his motion pursuant to Correction Law § 168-o (2) for a downward modification of his risk level classification under Correction Law article 6-C.

*928Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing and, thereafter, a new determination of the defendant’s motion.

By notice of motion dated September 21, 2010, the defendant moved pursuant to Correction Law § 168-o (2) for a downward modification of his risk level classification under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C). The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion without holding a hearing. Because the requisite procedures set forth in Correction Law § 168-o were not followed, we reverse.

As the People correctly concede, the Supreme Court failed to conduct a hearing on the defendant’s motion, as it was required to do pursuant to Correction Law § 168-o (4) *(see People v Hazen,*103 AD3d 943 [2013]; *People v Lashway,*90 AD3d 1178, 1178 [2011]; *see also People v Damato,*58 AD3d 819, 821 [2009]). Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing and, thereafter, a new determination of the defendant’s motion.

Rivera, J.R, Dickerson, Leventhal and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
11911.

#### Brown *v.*The State.

Broyles, C. J.

1. There being in this State no practical distinction between principals in the first degree and principals in the second degree *(August*v. *State,*11 *Ga. App.*798, 76 S. E. 164; *Maughon*v. *State,*9 *Ga. App.*559, 71 S. E. 922), the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury upon the law in reference to the conviction of a principal in the second degree.

2. The alleged error in the charge of the court upon the law of murder is immaterial, since the defendant was convicted of the offense of voluntary manslaughter only. *McDonald*v. *State,*23 *Ga. App.*125 (97 S. E. 556).

*190Decided January 25, 1921.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Hall superior court — Judge J. B. Jones. September *24,*1920.

*C. N. Davie, B. D. Kenyon, W. J. Phillips, Luther Roberts,*for. plaintiff in error.

*J. G. Collins, solicitor-general, W. B. Sloan, Boyd Sloan,*contra.

3. In the absence of timely and appropriate written requests, the court did not err in failing to explain to the jury what constitutes a “ conspiracy,” and what constitutes “ aiding and abetting.”

4. The other excerpts from the charge of the court, excepted to, when considered in the light of the entire charge and the facts of the case, do not require a new trial.

5. The defendant and Otis Darnell were jointly indicted for murder, but were tried separately. Upon the defendant’s trial the evidence authorized a finding that Darnell killed the deceased under circumstances that made the homicide either, murder or voluntary manslaughter, and that the defendant was. present at the killing and aided and ’ abetted in the commission of the offense. The conviction of the defendant of voluntary manslaughter was therefore authorized (see in this connection *Maughon*v. *State,*supra), and, the finding of the jury having been approved by the judge, this court has no authority to reverse the judgment overruling the general ground of the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., eoneur.*
#### Hilda A. Gentry, Appellant, v William A. Finnigan et al., Respondents.

[973 NYS2d 560]

*569Order, Supreme Court, New York County (George J. Silver, J.), entered April 6, 2012, which granted defendants’ motion for a change of venue from New York County to Ulster County, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff properly commenced this action arising from a motor vehicle accident in New York County based on the corporate defendant’s place of business (CPLR 503 [a]). However, the court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to change venue for the convenience of material witnesses (CPLR 510 [3]). Defendants showed that the New York State trooper who responded to the scene of the accident in Ulster County was willing to testify, but would be extremely inconvenienced by having to travel to New York County *(see Henry v Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.,*57 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2008]). Moreover, most of the medical records and witnesses are located in Ulster County *(see Lopez v Chaliwit,*268 AD2d 377 [1st Dept 2000]; *Abulhasan v Uniroyal-Goodrich Tire Co.,*232 AD2d 219 [1st Dept 1996]). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, DeGrasse and Freedman, JJ.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 32

        Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18
                            of the United States Code

     I, Robert E. Busch, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
PSE&G Transition Funding LLC, to the best of my knowledge, certify that (i) the
Annual Report of PSE&G Transition Funding LLC on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2003 (the "Periodic Report") fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the
information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PSE&G Transition
Funding LLC.


                                        /s/ Robert E. Busch
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Robert E. Busch
                                        Chief Executive Officer and
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        March 22, 2004
Exhibit 21

SUBSIDIARIES OF PACER INTERNATIONAL, INC.



|                                                               |  |                              
|-------------------------------------------------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|                                                               |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation
|Intermodal Container Service, Inc. d/b/a Harbor Rail Transport |  | California                   
|Manufacturers Consolidation Service of Canada, Inc.            |  | Delaware                     
|Pacer Cartage, Inc.                                            |  | Delaware                     
|Pacer Transport, Inc.                                          |  | California                   
|Pacer Distribution Services, Inc.                              |  | Delaware                     
|PDS Trucking, Inc.                                             |  | Delaware                     
|RF International, Ltd.                                         |  | New York                     
|Ocean World Lines, Inc.                                        |  | Delaware                     
|OWL Air, Inc.                                                  |  | Delaware                     
|Pacer Transportation Solutions, Inc.                           |  | Ohio                         
|Stacktrain Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.                          |  | Mexico                       
|Pacer Stacktrain, Inc.                                         |  | Tennessee                    
|Pacer International (Hong Kong) Ltd.                           |  | Hong Kong                    
|S&H Transport, Inc.                                            |  | Delaware                     
|S&H Leasing, Inc.                                              |  | Delaware                     
|Pacer Container Line, Inc.                                     |  | Delaware                     
|CTP Leasing, Inc.                                              |  | Delaware                     
|Pacer Services, Inc.                                           |  | Delaware                     
|Rail to Rail Transport, Inc.                                   |  | Delaware
#### Youn Koo Lyu, Appellant, v Kaganov Aleksandr, Respondent.

[971 NYS2d 885]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated June 13, 2012, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345, 350 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant’s motion papers failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claims, clearly set forth in the bill of particulars, that the plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his knees under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Bove v Zanelli,*102 AD3d 644 [2013]), and that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Reynolds v Wai Sang Leung,*78 AD3d 919, 920 [2010]). Since the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see generally Stukas v Streiter,*83 AD3d 18, 24 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment *716dismissing the complaint. Angiolillo, J.P., Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### O. S. Williams *v.*G. W. Warner, et al.

Mortgage — Preference of Creditor.

A mortgage or sale of property not at the -time subject to the claims of creditors cannot be set aside at the instance of creditors.

APPEAL PROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT.

March 17, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

It is nof averred that the mortgage executed by George W. to John Warner,- was actually fraudulent.

The only claim, therefore, that appellant can assert to the proceeds of the corn, must arise out of the averment that it was executed in contemplation of insolvency, and to prefer John W. Warner and *636Robinson to the other creditors of the mortgagor. This averment is distinctly and unequivocally denied. The only proof conducing in any degree to sustain it is the agreed fact that the mortgagor had no property, or very little property subject to levy and sale under execution, at the date of the execution of the mortgage.

*Burdett & Plopper, for appellant.*

*John A. Anderson, for appellees.*

When it is considered in connection with this fact, that the property mortgaged was not, itself, subject to the payment of appellees’ debts, it is difficult to perceive how the preference given could bring' the case within the reason of the statute of 1856. This court has heretofore held, and still adheres to the doctrine, that a mortgage or sale of property not at the time subject to the claims of creditors, cannot be set aside under the provisions of the act in question. *Lishby, White & Cochran v. Perry & Clayton,*6 Bush 515.

It may be that a sale or mortgage of a growing crop, made with the intent to commit an actual fraud, can be disregarded when the crops mature; but that question does not arise in this case, as no actual fraud is charged. It does not matter that John W. Warner, was paid nothing as surety for George W. He has the right to have the proceeds of the mortgaged property applied to the payment of the debt for which he is bound as surety.

From all that appears in this record we may infer that George W. Warner purchased the land from Robinson before the debt to appellant was contracted. Such being the case, he has the right to pay for said land and hold his homestead as against such debt, and equity will not compel Robinson to refuse payment, and resort to his lien on the land. .

Judgment *affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Ralph Eisenschmid, President, Chief Executive and Financial
Officer, Secretary and Treasurer of InteliSys Aviation Systems of America
Inc(the "Company") certifies, under the standards set forth and solely for the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Annual Report on Form
10-KSB of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2005 fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and information contained in that Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:  April 20, 2006
                                     /s/ Ralph Eisenschmid
                                     -----------------------
                                         Ralph Eisenschmid
                                         President, Chief Executive and
                                         Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James E. Wolven, Appellant.

[961 NYS2d 794]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Forman, J), rendered December 6, 2011, convicting him of burglary in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that his plea of guilty was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Fernandez,*103 AD3d 813 [2013]; *People v Elufe,*102 AD3d 982 [2013]). In any event, the record demonstrates that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent *(see People v Elufe,*102 AD3d at 982; *see generally People v Fiumefreddo,*82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]; *People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]).

Skelos, J.E, Chambers, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT OMEGA TITLE NAPLES, LLC d/b/a ) Dunn Title and SCOTT DASCANI, ) ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D19-1151 ) ROGER BUTSCHKY and SHERYL ) LYNN BUTSCHKY, ) ) Respondents. ) ________________________________ )

Opinion filed November 20, 2019. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Collier County; Elizabeth V. Krier, Judge. Roy D. Wasson of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, and Leland W. Wilson of McCullough Legal Services, LLC, Fort Myers, for Petitioners. Kimberly L. Boldt and Ryan C. Tyler of Boldt Law Firm, Boca Raton, and Michael Petruccelli of Petruccelli Law, Fort Lauderdale, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Denied. NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
#### In the Matter of Angela M., an Infant. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Annmarie T., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Christopher M., an Infant. Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Annmarie T., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[975 NYS2d 683]

In two related child protective proceedings pursuant to Fam*941ily Court Act article 10, the mother appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Budd, J.), dated August 23, 2012, which, after a hearing, inter alia, found that she neglected the subject children.

Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

By submitting proof of the mother’s repeated use of cocaine, the petitioner established a prima facie case of neglect pursuant to the presumption contained in Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (iii) *(see Matter of Audrey K. [Erik K.],*108 AD3d 717 [2013]; *Matter of Alexandria S. [Alexander*S.], 105 AD3d 856, 857 [2013]; *Matter of Sadiq H. [Karl H.],*81 AD3d 647 [2011]; *Matter of Arthur S. [Rose S.],*68 AD3d 1123 [2009]; *Matter of Keira O.,*44 AD3d 668, 670 [2007]). In this regard, the presumption operates to eliminate a requirement of specific parental conduct vis-á-vis the child and neither actual impairment of the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition nor specific risk of impairment need be established *(see Matter of Sadiq H. [Karl H.],*81 AD3d at 647; *Matter of Paolo W.,*56 AD3d 966, 967 [2008]). The mother did not rebut this presumption, instead admitting to using cocaine on more than one occasion while she was the children’s custodial parent.

Accordingly, the Family Court properly found that the mother neglected the subject children. Rivera, J.E, Angiolillo, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Mighty, Appellant.

[971 NYS2d 54]

— Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.), rendered July 15, 2010, and (2) an amended judgment of the same court (Griffin, J.), rendered July 28, 2010, convicting him of attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree (two counts), assault in the third degree (two counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the appeal from the judgment rendered July 15, 2010, is dismissed, as that judgment was superseded by the amended judgment rendered July 28, 2010; and it is further,

Ordered that the amended judgment is modified, on the law, by reducing the defendant’s conviction of assault in the third degree under count eight of the indictment to attempted assault in the third degree, and vacating the sentence imposed thereon; as so modified, the amended judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of attempted assault in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt *(see People v Chiddick,*8 NY3d 445 [2007]; *People v Andrews,*78 AD3d 1229, 1230-1231 [2010]). Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to that count was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

However, we agree with the defendant that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish his guilt of assault in the third degree under count eight of the indictment *(see People v Cheeks,*161 AD2d 657 [1990]). Nevertheless, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of the lesser-included offense of attempted assault in the third degree *(see*CPL 470.15 [2] [a]; *People v Woodford,*259 AD2d 717 [1999]). Accordingly, the conviction of assault in the third degree under count eight of the indictment must be reduced to a conviction of attempted assault in the third degree, and the sentence imposed under count eight of the indictment vacated. Although the defendant has already served the maximum sentence that could be imposed for attempted assault in the third degree *(see*Penal Law § 70.15 [1]), we nevertheless remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the imposition of an authorized sentence for that offense *(see People v Sutherland,*102 AD3d 897 [2013]; *People v Rumley,*102 AD3d 894 [2013]).

The defendant’s contention that certain counts were multiplicitous is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, *842without merit *(see People v Smalls,*81 AD3d 860, 861 [2011]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Eng, RJ., Dillon, Dickerson and Chambers, JJ., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAKEISA GRIFFIN, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 15-0189-WS-C

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

:

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the order entered on this date, it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in the 

amount of $3,603.92 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

DONE this 12th day of April, 2016.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00189-WS-C Document 24 Filed 04/12/16 Page 1 of 1
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2101 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2101

 To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for District of 
Columbia, Federal Payment for Judicial Commissions, Judicial Nomination 
                    Commission for fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
       referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for District of 
Columbia, Federal Payment for Judicial Commissions, Judicial Nomination 
                    Commission for fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DISTRICT OF 
              COLUMBIA, FEDERAL PAYMENT FOR JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS, 
              JUDICIAL NOMINATION COMMISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for District of Columbia, 
Federal Payment for Judicial Commissions, Judicial Nomination 
Commission for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $270,000.
                                 <all>
```