alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Geoffrey E. Hollinden, Respondent, v City of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[970 NYS2d 598]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New York appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), entered November 25, 2011, which granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action insofar as asserted against the defendant City of New York is denied.

The plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that he had been assaulted by the defendant Jamel Dennis, alleged to be a police officer employed by the defendant City of New York. In the City’s answer, filed only on its own behalf, the City denied “knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief with respect to the truth of the allegations” set forth in the paragraphs of the complaint alleging that Dennis was a police officer and that Dennis was acting within the scope of his employment. As a tenth affirmative defense, the City asserted that “such acts as were committed by law enforcement in the employ of the City of New York in the scope of their employment were justified.”

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against the City on the first cause of action, submitting a certificate of disposition from the Supreme Court, Queens County, indicating that Dennis had been convicted of assault in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the second degree in connection with the assault at issue. The plaintiff contended that the tenth affirmative defense constituted an admission that Dennis had been acting within the scope of his employment. The Supreme Court granted the motion.

The Supreme Court erred in granting the motion. The City’s *585affirmative defense was that “such acts as were committed . . . in the scope of employment were justified.” In light of the conditional nature of this language, and the City’s denials that Dennis had in fact been acting within the scope of his employment, the City’s tenth affirmative defense did not constitute an admission. A plaintiff may not deem those allegations set forth in an answer that are favorable to him or her to be admissions, while refusing to be bound by those allegations that are unfavorable *(see Case Press v Kennai Drilling,*55 AD2d 590 [1976]; *Green v Messing,*236 App Div 107, 111 [1932]).

The parties’ remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered academic in light of our determination. Rivera, J.E, Hall, Cohen and Miller, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of NetNation Communications, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joseph
Kibur, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:

     (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



                                        /s/ Joseph Kibur
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Joseph Kibur
                                        Chief Executive Officer
                                        February 7, 2003


This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to (section) 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
(section) 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.


                                     F-22
<PAGE>
11375.

#### Askew *v.*Central Trust Company.

Stephens, J.

1. Value being a mere matter of opinion,’a false statement as to the value of stock in a corporation, ir.r le.by a seller to induce a sale of the stock, is not such a misrepresentation of an existing fact as will amount to a fraud and void the sale. . *Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*v. *Anderson,*13 *Ga. App.*772 (80 S. E. 32). In a suit on a promissory note given for the purchase-price of certain stock in a corporation, a defense by the maker that he was induced to execute the note by fraud is not sustained by evidence that at the time of the execution of the note the payee falsely represented to him the value of the stock.

2. A false statement made by the seller, as to what stock in the corporation has sold for, might, if innocently acted upon by the purchaser, to his damage, void the sale and afford a defense to the note. There is no evidence that such a false statement was made in this case. The evidence as to various sales of stock at values less than the price at which it is alleged the seller, in making the sale for which the note sued on was given, represented that stock of the same kind had been sold, does not show-that those transactions' occurred prior to the time the note sued on was executed.

3. .The defense to the note not being supported by the evidence, the issue' ■' as to whether or-not the plaintiff transferee-was a purchaser before .'' or -after maturity is immaterial. . .. - ' -

4'. The defendant having admitted the execution o'f the.note sued..upon, iand •'.’the evidence failing to sustain the. defense relied upon, a verdict for,'the , plaintiff was p'rojierly directed. . • •

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Hill] J.,' concur.*

*123Decided January 20, 1921.

Rehearing denied February 24, 1921.

Complaint; from Calhoun superior court- — Judge Harrell. December 2, 1919.

*Dowling & Aslcew,*for plaintiff in error.

*Pope £ Bennetj,*contra.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6212** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. VICTOR ALEXANDER HOLT , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. James C. Dever III , Chief District Judge. ( 5:11

- cr - 00002

- D

- 1; 5:12

- cv - 00075

- D )

Submitted : May 13 , 201 5 Decided: May 18, 2015

Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Victor Alexander Holt, Appellant Pro Se. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Jennifer P. May

- Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Victor Alexander Holt seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate o f appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U. S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional righ t. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85.
As t he lone issue presented in this appeal is squarely foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Foote , __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 1883538 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 2015) , w e conclude that Holt has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, w e deny a certificate of appealability , deny Holt’s motions for appointment of counsel, and dismiss the appeal. We also deny3 Holt’s motion for relief pursuant to the panel decision in Whiteside v. United S tates , 748 F.3d 541 (4th Cir. 2014), which has been superseded by the opinion of the en banc court , see Whiteside v. United States , 775 F. 3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Simmons , 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), because

a Simmons

- based challenge to a federal prisoner’s sentence is not cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. See Foote , 2015 WL 1883538, at *1, *12. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argu ment would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
**Exhibit 31.1****CERTIFICATION**I, Leslie Bernhard, certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of AdStar, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.Date: March 30, 2006              /s/ Leslie Bernhard   Leslie Bernhard   Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1
 XM SATELLITE RADIO HOLDINGS INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002
    By:
    
    /s/ MEL KARMAZIN

Mel KarmazinPresident(Principal Executive Officer)
 By:
    
    /s/ DAVID J. FREAR

David J. FrearTreasurer(Principal Financial Officer)
  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**KEITH T. DOUGHERTY AND LARRY**
**RUNK II,**

**Petitioners**

**v.**

**ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY,**

**Respondent :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 968 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 23rd day of March, 2016, the Petition for All owance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DERIC LaVELLE MAY, # 209534, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-30-KD-M

BENNIE ANDREWS, et al., :

Defendants. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this 

file deemed relevant to the issue raised, and there having been 

no objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED 

as the opinion of this Court. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DONE this 24th day of April 2015. 

s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:15-cv-00030-KD-M Document 5 Filed 04/24/15 Page 1 of 1
Order entered March 31, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01476-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.T.H. AND H.V.H., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 302nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-14-07021

ORDER

Appellants, grandparents of the children, appeal from an order from family 

court denying their motion to dismiss pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation 

Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003, 51.014(a)(12). Before the 

Court is appellee’s March 10, 2020 emergency motion to lift stay. Appellee asks 

this Court to lift the automatic stay invoked by appellants so that she can seek to 

modify possession and access to the children and enforce child support and 

medical support against the father of the children. See id. § 51.014(b). 

Section 51.014(b) provides that “[a]n interlocutory appeal under Subsection 

(a), other than an appeal under Subsection (a)(4) or in a suit brought under the 
Family Code, stays the commencement of a trial in the trial court pending

resolution of the appeal.” See id. (Emphasis added). Because the underlying 

lawsuit was brought under the Family Code, the automatic stay of section 

51.014(b) does not apply. Accordingly, we DENY the motion as moot.

We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to the 

Honorable Sandra Jackson, Presiding Judge of the 302nd Judicial District Court, 

and, all parties.

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL

JUSTICE
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1681 

To make certain improvements to child care services provided by the Secretary 

of Defense. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 21, 2023 

Mr. KIM of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To make certain improvements to child care services provided 

by the Secretary of Defense. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Military Child Care 

5 Transparency and Expansion Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. IMPROVEMENTS TO CHILD CARE SERVICES PRO7 VIDED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. 

8 (a) EXPANSION OF PILOT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE FI9 NANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED

10 FORCES FOR IN-HOME CHILD CARE.—Section 589(b) of 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1681 IH

1 the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Au2 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116– 

3 283; 10 U.S.C. 1791 note) is amended by striking ‘‘five 

4 locations’’ and inserting ‘‘six locations’’. 

5 (b) WAIT TIMES FOR CHILD CARE SERVICES AT

6 MILITARY CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTERS.— 

7 (1) PUBLICATION.—Not later than 90 days 

8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec9 retary of Defense shall publish and maintain on a 

10 website of the Department of Defense, accessible by 

11 members of the Armed Forces, waiting lists for child 

12 care services at military child development centers. 

13 (2) ESTIMATES.—On the website described in 

14 paragraph (1), the Secretary shall publish a tool 

15 that uses data collected by the Secretary to estimate 

16 how long a member assigned to serve at a military 

17 installation will likely wait before receiving child care 

18 services at the military child development center of 

19 such installation. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHARON WILLIAMSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0552-CG-C

)

BALL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, 

INC.,

)

)

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This cause is before the court on the Unopposed Motion for Leave to Amend 

Defendant’s Answer to the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 37). The court notes that the 

defendant acknowledges that the motion is being filed outside of the deadline as set 

forth in the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order (Doc. 17), construes such to be a request to 

file the motion to amend out of time, and hereby grants the request. 

Upon due consideration of the grounds cited, and because “The court should 

freely give leave when justice so requires." FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2), and as the 

defendant further represents that the plaintiff does not oppose the motion, the 

motion for leave to amend answer is GRANTED. The Defendant is directed to file 

its amended answer no later than September 2, 2015.

DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of August, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00552-CG-C Document 40 Filed 08/26/15 Page 1 of 1
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