NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2019 IL App (3d) 190206-U

Order filed September 8, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

In re MARRIAGE OF )

 ) 

DEBORAH S. LANGEBERG, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

and ) 

 ) 

LEE LANGEBERG, ) 

 ) 

Respondent-Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Tazewell County, Illinois

Appeal No. 3-19-0206 

Circuit No. 17-D-123 

Honorable 

Timothy J. Cusack 

Judge, Presiding

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. 

Justice Holdridge concurred in part and dissented in part. 

____________________________________________________________________________

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial court erred in finding husband stipulated that the marital residence was 

nonmarital property but did not err in awarding maintenance to wife and ordering 

husband to reimburse wife for nonmarital funds she spent on marital expenses. 

¶ 2 Respondent Lee Langeberg appealed from a judgment of dissolution of his marriage to 

petitioner Deborah Langeberg, arguing that the trial court erred in distributing the parties’ assets 

and in awarding Deborah maintenance. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand. 
2 

¶ 3 FACTS

¶ 4 Petitioner Deborah Langeberg and respondent Lee Langeberg were married on June 28, 

2002. The parties acquired the following property during the marriage: the marital residence 

located on Kingsbury Road in Washington, the prior marital residence on South Cummings Lane, 

also in Washington, and rental properties in East Peoria, Washington and Tremont. Throughout 

the marriage, Lee worked at Caterpillar Tractor Company (CAT), where he started in 1974 and 

remained employed at the time of the dissolution trial. Deborah had also been employed at CAT, 

beginning with part-time hours in 2002 and a becoming a full-time employee in 2003. In June 

2016, Deborah was injured on the job and was thereafter terminated for unrelated misconduct. The 

parties separated the same month. Deborah remained at the marital residence on Kingsbury and 

Lee moved to the rental house on Cummings. 

¶ 5 Deborah filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in March 2017. Prior to trial on the 

petition, the court ordered the sale of three of the rental properties, the properties were sold, and 

the sale proceeds held in trust to be divided equally between the parties. The rental properties 

remaining at the time of trial, included houses on Kenwood Street, valued at $55,000; Main Street, 

valued at $102,000; and Kem Street, valued at $97,000, all in East Peoria. 

¶ 6 A trial took place. Deborah testified that she lost her health insurance when she was 

terminated from CAT and had to purchase it on her own. She had had a couple of jobs since leaving 

CAT. She was terminated from one position and the other position was temporary. She was 

currently unemployed. In 2013 and 2014, Deborah received three inheritances totaling 

approximately $1 million. A portion of those funds was used to purchase the Kingsbury residence

for $207,000. Title to house was held in both names. After Lee left the marital home in June 2016, 

Deborah was solely responsible for its costs and upkeep. Deborah listed its value on her financial 
3 

affidavit as $235,000, with a debt of $92,882. After the parties separated, Deborah used $110,000 

of her inheritance for repairs on the rental properties. She also paid $9000 on Lee’s credit card 

which they used for repairs and improvements on the rentals. She invested in the rental properties 

in anticipation of reimbursement when the properties were sold. Deborah provided two 

accountings of the checks she wrote using her inheritance to pay marital expenses. The remaining 

inheritance funds included $360,000 in an individual retirement account (IRA) and $20,000 in 

another account. Deborah suffered a head injury on the job in June 2016, resulting in ongoing 

physical difficulties, including severe migraines, difficulty walking and balancing, and depression. 

According to Deborah, the doctors were unable to make a diagnosis, as a result of her brain injury 

and she was undergoing tests. 

¶ 7 Lee testified that his financial affidavit indicated that his gross monthly income was $5240, 

that he had less overtime in 2018, and that he would probably not work at all in 2019. He earned 

between $60,000 and $80,000 per year in the several years prior to trial. The Cummings house 

was purchased before the marriage and was titled in both Deborah’s and Lee’s names. It was 

appraised at $155,000 and had a fair market value of $161,790. The mortgage was $100,676. He 

was not interested in the marital house but wanted to be awarded the Cummings house, which he 

agreed was marital property. Lee did not want to sell the Cummings property. At the time of trial, 

Lee was living at his girlfriend’s house the majority of the time and allowing a friend to stay rent

free at the Cummings house. Lee acknowledged the marital house was bought with funds from 

Deborah’s inheritance. Lee had a credit card he and Deborah used throughout the marriage for 

their rental properties. The current balance was $11,000 and he had not made a payment in two 

years. His financial affidavit, however, indicated he paid $200 per month on the credit card. Lee 
4 

admitted he had not contributed any support to Deborah after their separation. His main expense 

was gasoline to travel to work and his girlfriend’s house. 

¶ 8 Deborah’s supervisor, Don Pyatt Jr., testified. Deborah healed from her workplace injury 

and was back at work full time after it occurred. She was terminated for cause for making a 

threatening statement to another employee. 

¶ 9 The trial court entered an order of dissolution dividing the parties’ assets on December 4, 

2018. It awarded Deborah the Kingsbury house as “nonmarital property by stipulation.” The court 

awarded Lee a $4000 reimbursement for repairs he made to the house. The order stated the 

stipulated value of the Cummings house was $200,000 and awarded it to Lee. The court ordered 

the sale of the remaining rental properties. It also ordered that Deborah be reimbursed in the 

amount of $90,000, to be paid from the sale of the rental properties, finding Deborah presented 

clear evidence that $112,721.96 she used for repairs came from her nonmarital inheritance. The 

trial court further found that Deborah had no income and that maintenance was appropriate, 

ordering Lee to pay monthly maintenance in the amount of $1896.58 for 8 years and 10 months, 

subject to Deborah’s reasonable efforts to find employment. Lee filed a motion to reconsider, 

which the court denied in part and granted in part, reducing the value of the Cummings property 

to its appraised value of $155,000. Lee appealed. 

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 There are three issues on appeal: whether the trial court erred in awarding Deborah (1) the 

marital residence, (2) maintenance, and (3) a reimbursement for nonmarital funds contributed to 

the marital estate.

¶ 12 We first consider whether the trial court erred when it awarded Deborah the marital 

residence. Lee argues that the court erred when it found the Kingsbury house to be nonmarital 
5 

property by stipulation and awarded it to Deborah. According to Lee, he never stipulated the house 

was nonmarital and there is no evidence to support a stipulation. 

¶ 13 A trial court is required to classify property as marital or nonmarital in order to distribute 

it in a dissolution action. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). Marital property includes all property 

acquired by either spouse during the marriage. 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). Nonmarital 

property may include property acquired through inheritance. 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(1) (West 2018). 

A rebuttable presumption exists that property acquired after the marriage and prior to its 

dissolution is marital property. In re Marriage of Olson, 96 Ill. 2d 432, 438 (1983). The 

presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the property falls under one 

of the statutory exceptions. In re Marriage of Dhillon, 2014 IL App (3d) 130653, ¶ 24. The burden 

is on the spouse claiming the property is nonmarital. Id. This court will not reverse a trial court’s 

determination on the classification of property unless it was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. In re Marriage of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 44. 

¶ 14 Parties to a dissolution action may enter into an agreement regarding, inter alia, the 

disposition of property. 750 ILCS 5/502(a) (West 2018). A stipulation is an agreement of the 

parties regarding issues before the court. In re Marriage of Galen, 157 Ill. App. 3d 341, 344 (1987). 

When the parties to a dissolution proceeding stipulate to the value and division of the marital estate, 

that agreement is binding upon the court. In re Marriage of Dunlap, 294 Ill. App. 3d 768, 776-77 

(1998). A party that stipulates to a matter cannot dispute it on appeal. In re Marriage of Vondra, 

2016 IL App (1st) 150793, ¶ 21 (citing Charter Bank & Trust of Illinois v. Edward Hines Lumber 

Co., 233 Ill. App. 3d 574, 580 (1992)). 

¶ 15 The trial court found the parties stipulated that the Kingsbury house was nonmarital. 

However, there is no evidence in the record of an oral or written stipulation between the parties 
6 

regarding the Kingsbury house. Rather, the evidence established the following. Lee admitted the 

house was bought with Deborah’s inheritance funds but asserted it was listed in both their names. 

He also stated that he contributed up to $6000 toward improvements on the property. He wanted 

the house on Cummings and did not want the Kingsbury house. Deborah testified that she bought 

the Kingsbury house for $207,000 with funds she inherited, and that she did not recall that Lee 

contributed any funds or made any repairs on the property. In closing arguments, Deborah’s 

attorney stated that Lee considered Kingsbury nonmarital property and that Lee wanted the 

Cummings property instead. Lee’s attorney argued in closing that Deborah “admittedly” bought 

Kingsbury with her inherited funds, that Lee was not making a claim on it, and that Deborah could 

have “her property” although it was listed in both their names. 

¶ 16 We will not construe Lee’s testimony and the comments by the attorneys as evidence Lee 

was conceding that Laura was solely entitled to the Kingsbury house as a nonmarital asset. We do 

not consider any of these statements to constitute a stipulation. None of the evidence demonstrates 

an agreement between the parties that the Kingsbury house was nonmarital. In fact, the evidence 

shows the parties disagreed regarding the distribution of the Kingsbury house. At the start of the 

dissolution trial, the parties presented to the court the issues on which they agreed and those which 

were in contention, such as Laura’s inheritance and division of the rental properties, including the 

house on Cummings. The Cummings house was bought before the parties were married and was 

valued at $155,000. Both Lee and Laura were listed on the deed. Neither party asserted the 

Cummings house was nonmarital property and Lee expressly conceded it was not nonmarital 

property. The Kingsbury house was purchased with funds Laura inherited in 2013. Lee testified 

that he and Deborah agreed she would keep the Kingsbury house and he would keep the Cummings 

property. It appears that each party opted to retain the home in which they resided after the 
7 

marriage broke down and they separated. This agreement does not translate to a stipulation the 

Kingsbury house was nonmarital property. Lee did not testify that he believed Kingsbury was 

nonmarital but stated only that he did not want anything to do with the Kingsbury house. This 

statement does not suggest that he agreed the Kingsbury house was nonmarital or that he waived 

any claim to it as a marital asset. We find that Lee’s testimony regarding the Kingsbury house did 

not indicate he understood that he was stipulating that the property was nonmarital. 

¶ 17 Although the Kingsbury house was bought during the marriage and the couple used it as 

their marital residence until Lee moved out, the court classified the Kingsbury house as nonmarital.

A marital residence which both spouses owned is presumed to be marital property, even where 

one spouse paid for it out of nonmarital funds, absent clear and convincing evidence that rebuts 

the presumption. In re Marriage of Samardzija, 365 Ill. App. 3d 702, 706 (2006) (citing In re 

Marriage of Johns, 311 Ill. App. 3d 699, 703 (2000). Factors used to determine whether a party 

has overcome the presumption of a gift to the marital estate include making improvements, paying 

taxes and mortgages, occupying the premises, and the extent of control and management of the 

property. Marriage of Johns, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 703. Here, the record offers scant evidence 

regarding the Kingsbury house. The facts presented establish only that Deborah purchased the 

home with funds from her inheritance, Lee contributed some money to its maintenance, and the 

parties used the house as their marital residence until Lee moved out when they separated in June 

2016. Although Deborah testified that she bought the house with nonmarital funds, there was no 

documentary support for that testimony or to establish how Deborah and Lee paid the taxes and 

the upkeep, other than Lee’s testimony that he contributed approximately $6000. Because there 

was little evidence presented to overcome the presumption that the Kingsbury house was gifted to 

the marital estate, we reverse the trial court’s classification of the Kingsbury house as nonmarital 
8 

property and remand for the trial court to determine whether Deborah can overcome the 

presumption that the Kingsbury property was a gift to the marital estate. 

¶ 18 We next address the trial court’s award of maintenance to Deborah. Lee argues that the

maintenance award to Deborah was in error. He asserts that because Deborah was terminated from 

CAT due to misconduct, her unemployment is voluntary and her CAT income should be imputed 

to her, which would negate the need for maintenance. 

¶ 19 To decide whether to award maintenance, the court considers the following factors, in 

relevant part: each parties’ income and property, including the marital property apportioned and 

the nonmarital property of the spouse seeking maintenance, and each parties’ financial obligations 

as a result of the dissolution; reasonable needs; realistic present and future earning capacity; any 

realistic present or future impairment of the earning capacity of the party against whom 

maintenance is sought; any time needed for the spouse seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate 

education, training and employment and whether the spouse may support herself with appropriate 

employment; and the marriage’s standard of living and duration; each party’s age, health, station, 

occupation, income amount and sources, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and 

needs; sources of public and private income; and any other factor the court expressly finds to be 

just and equitable. 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2018). 

¶ 20 In determining maintenance, the benchmark is the reasonable needs of the spouse who is 

seeking maintenance compared to the marriage’s standard of living and duration, the spouse’s 

ability to become self-sufficient and the value of any nonmarital property. In re Marriage of 

Selinger, 351 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615 (2004) (citing In re Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 

972 (1992)). It is not required for a party to be reduced to poverty or impair his or her assets in 

order to qualify for maintenance to live according to the standard established during the marriage. 
9 

In re Marriage of Harlow, 251 Ill. App. 3d 152, 157-58 (1993). This court will not disturb a trial 

court’s maintenance award unless it was an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. 

App. 3d 640, 650 (2008). 

¶ 21 To impute income, the court must find that the party is (1) voluntarily unemployed; 

(2) trying to evade his support obligation; or (3) has unreasonably failed to take advantage of an 

employment opportunity. In re Marriage of Blume, 2016 IL App (3d) 140276, ¶ 30. Any income 

imputed must align with the party’s skills and experience. In re Marriage of Van Hoveln, 2018 IL 

App (4th) 180112, ¶ 40 (citing In re Marriage of Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, ¶ 46). A party’s 

previous employment may be considered when imputing income, but the court should not rely on 

outdated information that is no longer reflective of prospective income. Id. (citing Marriage of 

Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238, ¶ 47). 

¶ 22 Lee relies on In re Marriage of Ruvola, 2017 IL App (2d) 160737, for support that the court 

should have imputed Deborah’s CAT income to her. In Ruvola, the husband was trained as a 

chemist, quit his job as an executive in an occupation using his education, had long periods of 

unemployment, did not seek any employment commensurate with his experience but rather worked 

in the sports recreation and food industries, often for minimum wages. Id. ¶ 38. Ruvola is 

distinguished. Lee did not present any evidence that Deborah was attempting to avoid her selfsupport obligation or failed to take advantage of other employment. In fact, she was temporarily 

employed at two jobs after her termination from CAT. Although Lee characterizes Deborah’s 

unemployed status as voluntary, pointing to her termination for misconduct from CAT, Deborah 

was involuntarily terminated. Termination does not equate to voluntary unemployment, even when 

terminated for misconduct. See Marriage of Van Hoveln, 2018 IL App (4th) 180112, ¶ 41 

(considering husband’s termination for misconduct to be involuntary). We find there is no 
10 

evidence Deborah was purposefully unemployed. The trial court did not err in refusing to impute 

income to Deborah. 

¶ 23 In addition, a review of the statutory factors establishes the award of maintenance was 

proper. The parties’ financial affidavits established that Deborah’s monthly expenses outpaced her 

monthly income by $3564.87, while Lee had a monthly surplus of $725.24. While Deborah had 

substantial nonmarital assets, the bulk of the funds were invested, and she should not be required 

to deplete her investments in order to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 

The needs of both parties were reasonable. Lee had no impairment to his present or future earning 

potential, although he was expecting to retire in the near future. Even in retirement, Lee would 

enjoy income as a result of his CAT pension, which amount he failed to include on his affidavit. 

Deborah, on the other hand, had lost her last three jobs and was arguably suffering from medical 

issues that limited her employment options. Moreover, it would be unlikely she would ever earn 

the type of wages she did at CAT. Deborah’s job opportunities were bleak, while Lee was likely 

to retire after a long career at CAT with sufficient pension income. Importantly, the court premised 

the maintenance award on Deborah seeking employment. However, given Deborah’s employment 

prospects, it is unlikely she could obtain employment necessary to support herself in the standard 

of living established during the marriage. The parties had substantial assets, including multiple 

properties and vehicles. They did not appear to otherwise live extravagantly but they enjoyed 

ample resources. We find the maintenance award was not in error.

¶ 24 The partial dissent argues the maintenance order is improper because it fails to set forth 

explicit findings regarding the statutory factors, and contends this failure constitutes reversible 

error. See 750 ILCS 5/504(b-2) (West 2018). We respectfully disagree. “[I]t is not mandatory that 

the trial court make explicit findings for each of the statutory factors.” Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 
11 

21, 38 (2009). The lack of explicit findings does not require reversal where the record adequately 

provides a basis for review of the maintenance determination and the record supports the trial 

court’s determination, as it does here. In re Marriage of Connors, 303 Ill. App. 3d 219, 230 (1999). 

The trial court heard evidence at the dissolution trial as summarized in relevant part above. 

Contrary to the opinion of the partial dissent, the evidence presented was sufficient to satisfy the 

applicable factors.

¶ 25 The partial dissent also challenges the trial court’s calculation of the maintenance amount, 

finding its calculations varied slightly from the court’s figures. The partial dissent is correct. The 

guidelines in place when the judgment for dissolution was entered instructed that for couples with 

annual incomes under $500,000, the maintenance amount was 30% of the payor’s income, minus 

20% of the payee’s income. See 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West 2018). The trial court 

determined Lee’s annual income to be $75,864 based on Lee’s financial affidavit. However, 

according to his second amended financial affidavit dated April 2018, Lee’s monthly gross income 

was $6321.76, which actually calculates to an annual gross income of $75,861, a difference of $3

from the amount the court determined. Deborah lacked any income so the maintenance amount 

was based solely on Lee’s income. Determining 30% of Lee’s income calculates to be $1896.53 

per month. The court calculated the monthly obligation to be $1896.58. We consider this 

discrepancy as well as the $3 difference in Lee’s annual income to be de minimis. We will not 

require Deborah to reimburse Lee for the additional five cents he paid each month. Nevertheless, 

the court on remand may enter an order setting future payments at $1896.53. 

¶ 26 We also reject the partial dissent’s challenge to the duration of the maintenance award. The 

parties married in June 2002 and Deborah filed for dissolution in March 2017. The duration of the 

marriage was 14 years and 9 months. Per the guideline formula, the marriage’s duration should be 
12 

multiplied by .60, which results in a maintenance term of 8 years and 10 months. The trial court 

awarded Deborah maintenance in accord with the statute. Contrary to the assertions of the partial 

dissent, the court’s duration calculation was correct. 

¶ 27 The last issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in awarding Deborah a 

reimbursement for nonmarital funds she contributed to the marital estate. Lee argues that the court 

improperly reimbursed Deborah for contributions she made from her nonmarital property to 

maintain and repair the rental properties. According to Lee, Deborah gifted those funds to the 

marital estate and failed to provide evidence that they were not a gift. Lee also argues that Deborah 

failed to submit a proper claim for reimbursement.

¶ 28 A party is entitled to reimbursement when it makes a contribution to the marital estate, 

notwithstanding transmutation, but clear and convincing evidence tracing the contribution to 

nonmarital property or rebutting the presumption of a gift must be presented. 750 ILCS 

5/503(c)(2)(A) (West 2018). Where one estate contributes to another estate that was not a gift, the 

contributing estate is entitled to reimbursement from the estate that received the contribution. In 

re Marriage of McBride, 2013 IL App (1st) 112255, ¶ 27. The party seeking reimbursement bears 

the burden to establish it is appropriate. In re Marriage of Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 61. 

A party’s testimony may be sufficient to trace the contributions. In re Marriage of Henke, 313 Ill. 

App. 3d 159, 174 (2000). A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s decision to reimburse 

for contributions to the marital estate unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

In re Marriage of Dhillon, 2014 IL App (3d) 130653, ¶ 29. 

¶ 29 Deborah testified and Lee agreed that he did not participate in the rental property upkeep 

or financing after the parties separated, albeit for some work he did in preparation for the sale of 

one of the rental properties. It was by necessity that Deborah contributed her nonmarital funds to 
13 

the marital estate as the rental income did not cover the rental expenses. She did not seek 

reimbursement for any rental expenses prior to 2016 and presumably the expenses were paid out 

of the marital estate. Prior to the breakdown of the marriage, Deborah and Lee operated the rental 

business together, with Lee contributing his carpentry and maintenance skills and Deborah 

contributing her business and decorating abilities. After June 2016, Deborah was left to fend for 

herself regarding the rental properties, including carpentry, maintenance, decorating, as well as 

any other issues regarding the properties. Lee did not contribute either time or money. 

Nevertheless, because the court ordered Deborah be reimbursed off the top from the sale of the 

rental properties and the remaining funds divided equally, Lee’s payment was made from marital 

funds and not from his share of the marital distribution. Deborah expected that she would be 

reimbursed for her contribution once the rental properties were sold. She presented evidence 

tracing her contribution, including a summary of expenses incurred, a description of the expense, 

and identifying the corresponding rental property that benefited from the expenditure. Contrary to 

the partial dissent’s characterization, this evidence is clear and convincing that Deborah 

contributed nonmarital funds to the marital estate and was entitled to reimbursement for them.

¶ 30 Deborah’s documentation summarized the expenses incurred in 2016, 2017 and 2018. 

Deborah’s exhibit No. 3 showed expenditures in 2016 of $109,802.38. She listed the amount of 

the expense, for what it was used and on which rental property. The expenses included the costs 

of kitchen and bathroom remodels; window treatments and staging; payments on the line of credit 

loan, mortgages, taxes and property insurance; repairs, including driveway, roof and electrical; 

utilities; and labor. Deborah’s exhibit No. 4 listed the expenses she paid in 2017 out of her 

inheritance funds. These expenditures included utility bills; renovations, such as new flooring; 

repairs and installations; and expenses to ready the properties for sale. The total 2017 expenditures 
14 

for which Deborah sought reimbursement totaled $7921.01. She testified that she spent $4000 on 

a bathroom remodel in 2018. Deborah offered into evidence bank statements indicating transfers 

of funds from her personal account to pay the rental expenses. Her bank statements also established

that she paid more than $9000 on the business credit card from her inheritance in June 2016 just 

after the parties had separated, which presumably paid the balance in full. 

¶ 31 Lee refused to make any payments on the business credit card which had a balance in 

excess of $11,000 at the time of trial. He believed Deborah should have contributed to the payment. 

He acknowledged he did not perform any maintenance on the rental properties during the pendency 

of the proceedings or contribute any money or labor except to fix a sewer backup in one of the 

rental homes. Deborah said she paid the rental expenses out of the rent she collected but it was not 

adequate to cover the expenses so she also used funds from her inheritance with the expectation of 

reimbursement. The court reviewed Deborah’s exhibits and determined that she contributed 

$112,721.96 in nonmarital funds and awarded her $90,177.57 in reimbursement, amounting to 

80% of Deborah’s contributions. The trial court did not explain its calculation. We do not know 

the trial court’s reasoning for its calculation but find there was no error in requiring reimbursement 

to Deborah. The expenses were documented, the funds spent on marital property, and traced to 

Deborah’s personal account. Although Deborah presented evidence tracing her nonmarital 

property to $112,721.96 of expenditures for the rental properties and is entitled to full 

reimbursement, she did not appeal the reduced reimbursement amount. We find the trial court did 

not err in ordering reimbursement.

¶ 32 CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed

in part, reversed in part and remanded. 
15 

¶ 34 Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 35 Cause remanded.

¶ 36 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

¶ 37 I agree that the trial court erred in finding that Lee stipulated that the Kingsbury residence 

was marital property. I therefore join the majority’s judgment as to that issue. I write separately 

because, in my view, the trial court erred by ordering the reimbursement of certain expenses to 

Deborah’s nonmartial estate. In addition, the trial court further erred by: (1) failing to make 

explicit findings establishing Deborah’s entitlement to maintenance, as required by section 504(b2) of the IMDMA (750 ILCS 5/504(b-2) (West 2018)); and (2) failing to show that it correctly 

calculated the amount and duration of maintenance according to the formula prescribed by section 

503(b-1) of the IMDMA (750 ILCS 5/504(b-2) (West 2018)). 

¶ 38 I will begin by addressing the trial court’s reimbursement order. When property from one 

estate (marital or non-marital) is contributed to property from another estate, the contributed 

property is transmuted into the character of the recipient estate, but with a right to reimbursement 

in the contributing estate. In re Marriage of Mayzner, 144 Ill. App. 3d 645, 649 (1986). However, 

no reimbursement is permitted when the contribution is a gift. Id. There is a rebuttable 

presumption that a contribution of non-marital funds to a marital home held in joint tenancy 

constitutes a nonreimbursable gift. Id.; In re Marriage of Rogers, 85 Ill. 2d 217, 223 (1981) (ruling 

that a transfer from the nonmarital estate to the marital estate is presumed to be a gift to the marital 

estate). This presumption may be rebutted only by “clear and convincing evidence that no gift was 

intended.” Marriage of Rogers, 85 Ill. 2d at 223. 

¶ 39 Here, Deborah sought reimbursement for amounts she spent on maintenance and 

improvement of marital rental properties from her nonmarital inheritance. The rental properties 
16 

were held in joint tenancy by Lee and Deborah. All of the reimbursements that Deborah sought 

were for expenditures she made before the judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered in 

December of 2018, and some were for expenditures made before the parties had separated in June 

of 2016. The trial court awarded Deborah $90,177.57, which the court found constituted “80 

percent of the total contributions” that Deborah had made to the rental properties. The court did 

not explain how it arrived at that figure. Nor did it indicate whether any portion of the 

reimbursement it ordered covered expenditures that Deborah had made prior to the parties’ 

separation.

¶ 40 In my view, Deborah failed to rebut the presumption that the contributions she made to the 

rental properties before the parties separated and before the divorce action was filed were gifts to 

the marital estate. Although Deborah testified that she expected to get back what she invested in 

the properties, it is not clear whether she expected Lee to reimburse her for such investments or 

whether she merely expected that the properties would appreciate in value over time sufficiently 

to cover her expenses. As noted above, contributions to the marital estate are presumed to be gifts 

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. It is unreasonable to presume that 

improvements made to martial property by one spouse after the date of divorce were a gift. 

Capogreco v. Capogreco, 61 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515-16 (1978). Arguably, the same might be said 

of contributions made after the parties’ marriage has broken down irretrievably, such as where a 

petition for dissolution of marriage has been filed or where the parties have separated. Here, 

however, most of the expenditures sought by Deborah were made before she filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage in March 27, 2017, and some of them were made before the parties 

separated in June 2016. Deborah failed to rebut the presumption that these contributions were 
17 

gifts to the martial estate. Thus, to the extent that the trial court awarded reimbursement for any 

such expenses,1 the award was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 41 The trial court’s maintenance order was also improper because it failed to fulfill the 

requirements of the IMDMA. Section 504(a) of the IMDMA lists 14 factors that a trial court must 

consider (along with any other relevant factors) in determining whether a party is entitled to 

maintenance. Section 504(b-2) provides that: “[i]n each case involving the issue of maintenance, 

the court shall make specific findings of fact, as follows: (1) the court shall state its reasoning for 

awarding or not awarding maintenance and shall include references to each relevant factor set 

forth in subsection (a) of this Section. ***” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/504(b-2) (West 2018).

¶ 42 In this case, the trial court made no specific factual findings supporting its conclusion that 

Deborah was entitled to maintenance and made no reference to the factors set forth in section 

504(a). This violation of the IMDMA’s mandatory requirements constitutes reversible error. 

¶ 43 Moreover, the trial court’s order does not demonstrate that the court properly applied the 

formula prescribed by section 504(b-1) (750 ILCS 5/504(b-1) (West 2018)) in calculating the 

amount and duration of Lee’s maintenance payments to Deborah. When I calculated the amount 

and duration of maintenance by applying the statutory formula to the relevant facts in this case, I 

arrived at values that were slightly different from those ordered by that the trial court. Because 

the trial court did not articulate how it applied the statutory formula to calculate the amount and 

duration of maintenance, we have no way of knowing whether the trial court’s findings on those 

matters are accurate.

1 Because the majority of expenses sought by Deborah were made prior to the filing of the dissolution 

action, the large amount of the trial court’s reimbursement award suggests that it awarded reimbursement 

for at least some of these expenditures. 
18 

¶ 44 Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s award of reimbursement and remand for a 

redetermination of reimbursement limited to contributions that Deborah’s estate made to the rental 

properties after the parties separated in June 2016 or after the petition for dissolution was filed on 

March 27, 2017. I would also reverse the trial court’s award of maintenance and remand the matter 

to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to: (1) make the specific factual findings 

required by section 504(b-2) of the IMDMA; and (2) show how the court applied the formula 

prescribed by section 504(b-1) of the IMDMA in reaching its conclusions as to the amount and 

duration of maintenance.