Opinion filed April 29, 2010



## In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 11

- 09

- 00020

- CR

__________ EVERT CLYDE BAKER JR. , Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 396 th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1047321D

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
The trial court convicted Evert Clyde Baker Jr. of felony driving while intoxicated and
assessed his punishment at ten years confinement, probated for three years, and a $1,000 fine

. We affirm.
I. Background Facts
Euless Police Officer Thomas White Tice was stopped at a red light

. A motorcyclist pulled alon gside and motioned for him to roll down his window. Officer Tice did so
, and the motorcyclist said that he had just witnessed a black
, Ford Ranger pickup “ weaving all over the2

road ” and that he believed the driver was intoxicated. Officer Tice found the pickup, followed it, and observed it weaving within its lane. Officer Tice initiated a traffic stop and identified Baker
as the driver. After conducting field sobriety tests , Officer Tice arrested Baker for driving while
intoxicated.
Baker was indicted for felony driving while intoxicated. Baker waived a jury. At the close of the State’s case, Baker’s counsel challenged the legality of the stop by moving for an
instructed verdict. Th e trial court denied the motion and ultimately found Baker guilty.
II

. Ineffective Assistance Baker’s sole complaint on appeal is that he received ineffectiv e assistance from trial
counsel. Baker argues that his detention by Officer Tice was illegal and that his trial counsel was
ineffective for not raising this by fil ing a motion to suppress or by object ing to the State’s
evidence

. Baker contends that
, had trial counsel done so, he would have been acquitted.
T o determine whether Baker’ s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial, we
must first determine wheth er Baker has shown that counsel ’ s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, if so, then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel ’ s errors. Strickland v.
Wash ington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When counsel has not had an opportunity to explain his actions, we must presume that the challenged action might be part of an overall strategic plan. Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 812

- 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Normally, t he record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to overcome this presumption; however, Baker may overcome this presumption if the record reflects that counsel’s omission would have been unacceptable regardless of any trial strategy. Id

. at 81 4

. Baker acknowledges that trial counsel raised the legality of Officer Tice’s stop during the
motion for instructed verdict but contends this was an unreasonable strategy because that motion challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence rather than its legality and because c ounsel failed to object to the State’s exhibits. The State responds that trial counsel’s decision to raise the legality of the stop by motion for directed verdict rather than motion to suppress was a reasonable trial strategy becaus e jeopardy had then attached. Because Baker has failed to satisfy
Strickland ’s second prong
, we need not determine whether counsel pursued a reasonable strategy. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a traffic stop is a seizure and must be reasonable.3

Davis v. State , 947 S.W.2d 240, 243, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Police officers may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if they have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. Unite d State s v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably concl ude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492

- 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Baker contends that Officer Tice lacked the authority to detain him because his testimony
d id not establ ish any predicate criminal activity. Baker notes that Officer Tice merely observed him weaving within his own lane

. Baker relies upon State v. Tarvin , 972 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.

— Waco 1998, pet. ref’d)
, for the proposition that weaving within a single lane of traffic alone is insufficient to justify a temporary detention. Baker’s argument, however, fails to consider the information Officer Tice received from the motorcyclist. Officer Tice testified that the motorcycle rider told him “that a black Ranger p ickup that had just turned southbound on Main Street was weaving all over the road and he believed the driver to be intoxicated.” The rider pointed
, and Officer Tice saw a Ranger pickup traveling southbound on Main

. Baker contends that the motorcyclist’s statement d id not justify his detention because it
was not corroborated. See Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (uncorroborated tip by unnamed informant of undisclosed reliability standing alone rarely will establish the requisite level of suspicio n necessary to justify an investigative detention). Corroboration of a citizen’s statement does not require independently acquired reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior.
Brother v. State , 166 S. W .3d 255, 25 8

- 5 9 & n.5 (Tex. Crim. Ap p . 2005) (officer need not personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity before relying upon a citizen’s report)

. Rather, corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms sufficient facts to reasonably conclu de that the citizen’s information is reliable. Alabama v.
White , 496 U.S. 325, 330

- 31 (1990). Texas courts have held that statements such as that given by the motorcyclist were properly corroborated when the officer observed the driver weaving
within a s ingle lane of traffic. See State v. Nelson , 228 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2007, no pet.) ; Mitchell v. State , 187 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2006, pet. ref’d). Texas courts have also recognized that citizen tips are entitled to great weight i f the informant puts himself in a position to be easily identified and held accountable for his intervention.4

Mitchell , 187 S.W.3d a t 117. Officer Tice did not get the motorcyclist’s name
, but the rider put himself in a position to be easily identified a nd held accountable for his interv ention by reporting in person. Baker has failed to establish a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress or an objection to the State’s evidence would have been successful. The information Officer Tice
received fro m the motorcyclist, coupled with his own personal observations, justified a temporary detention. Baker’s issue is overruled.
III. Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

RICK STRANGE

JUSTICE

April 29, 2010 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., McCall, J., and Strange, J.