NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDAL JEROME DALAVAI, Successor 

in Interest to 'Decedent' Geetha Dalavai and 

Son of Geetha Dalavai, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

THE REGENTS; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-55412 

D.C. No. 

3:22-cv-01992-CAB-WVG 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 14, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BADE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Randal Jerome Dalavai appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his pro 

se suit, as successor in interest to his deceased mother, alleging violations of the 

Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 16 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

and California law against the Regents of the University of California (“the 

Regents”) and the Elizabeth Hospice (“the Hospice”). We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount 

them here. We affirm.

We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jajati 

v. U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, 102 F.4th 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2024). Further, 

we review de novo both the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, 

Fort v. Washington, 41 F.4th 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2022), and for expiration of the 

statutory limitations period, Gregg v. Hawaii, 870 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2017). 

“In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must take all factual 

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party.” Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023). We construe 

pro se complaints liberally. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th 

Cir. 2017). 

1. The district court properly dismissed Dalavai’s claims against the 

Regents for failure to state a claim. Our precedent is clear that EMTALA liability 

“normally ends when [an emergency room patient] is admitted for inpatient care.”

Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir 2002); see also 

42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(1)(ii) ( “[I]f the hospital admits the individual as an inpatient 

for further treatment, the hospital’s obligation . . . ends.”). Because Dalavai’s 
3 

mother was brought to the University of California San Diego (“UCSD”) hospital 

as an inpatient, not an emergency room patient, EMTALA liability does not apply 

to the Regents. The district court thus properly held that Dalavai did not “allege 

facts sufficient to establish [that] UCSD . . . violated the EMTALA.” Because we 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dalavai’s claims against the Regents for 

failure to state a claim, we need not assess his other argument that the district court 

improperly dismissed his EMTALA claim based on expiration of the statutory 

limitations period.

2. Because Dalavai did not contest the district court’s dismissal of his claim 

against the Hospice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in his counseled opening 

brief, he has forfeited any challenge to that decision. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 

94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is well established in this circuit that [t]he 

general rule is that appellants cannot raise a new issue for the first time in their 

reply briefs.” (quoting Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 

1990))). But, even assuming Dalavai had not forfeited such a challenge, the 

district court properly dismissed that claim because Dalavai, a California resident, 

alleged only state law violations against the Hospice, also a California resident. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

3. Dalavai’s counseled opening brief also failed to contest the district 

court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 
4 

Dalavai therefore forfeited review of that decision. See Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d 

at 1259. But, even if he had raised it, the district court was within its discretion to 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after it had 

dismissed all federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

AFFIRMED.