In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-24-00028-CR 

No. 07-24-00029-CR

 

BRANDEN ANTONYO CONWAY, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 297th District Court 

Tarrant County, Texas1 

Trial Court Nos. 1720776 & 1732727, Honorable David Hagerman, Presiding 

August 7, 2024 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Pursuant to pleas of guilty, Appellant, Branden Antonyo Conway, was granted 

deferred adjudication community supervision for four years for the offenses of assault 

family violence and aggravated assault with an affirmative finding on use of a deadly 

1 The Texas Supreme Court transferred these appeals from the Second Court of Appeals. Thus, 

we are bound by the latter’s precedent should it conflict with ours. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2

weapon.

2

 The State filed its fifth amended petition to proceed to adjudication alleging the 

following violations in both cases:

1. Possession of a controlled substance;

2. Failure to identify as a fugitive during a traffic stop;

3. Possession of a firearm on (a) October 5 and (b) October 10;

4. Testing positive for marihuana use on (a) November 8, 2023, (b) March 

24, 2023, and (c) August 21, 2023;

5. Admitting to marihuana use on (a) October 31, 2022 and (b) March 8, 

2023; and

6. Failing to report for the months of April, May, June, and July 2023.

Appellant entered pleas of not true to paragraphs 2, 3(b), 4, 5, and 6 and the State waived 

paragraphs 1 and 3(a).

The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress the traffic stop and 

the State’s motion to adjudicate. After presentation of the evidence, the trial court denied 

the motion to suppress and found allegations 2, 4(a), 4(c), 5(a), 5(b), and 6 to be true, 

adjudicated Appellant guilty of the original offenses, and assessed sentences of eight 

years for assault family violence and twelve years for aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. 

Appellant challenges his adjudications of guilt and sentences by two issues: (1)

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the traffic stop which resulted in the 

allegation that he failed to identify himself as a fugitive and (2) the sentences imposed 

2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(b)(2)(B), 22.02(a)(2).
3

constitute cruel and unusual punishment and are grossly disproportionate to the violations 

found by the trial court. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with assault family violence for impeding the normal 

breathing or circulation of the blood of the victim with whom he was in a dating relationship 

and for threatening imminent bodily injury against the victim with a firearm. He was 

granted deferred adjudication community supervision in July 2022. Less than a year and 

a half later, the State moved to adjudicate guilt in both cases.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appeal from a court’s order adjudicating guilt is reviewed in the same manner 

as a revocation hearing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.108(b). When 

reviewing an order revoking community supervision imposed under an order of deferred 

adjudication, the sole question before this Court is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In a revocation 

proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb 

v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In a revocation context, “a 

preponderance of the evidence” means “that greater weight of the credible evidence 

which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of [his

community supervision].” Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 

759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). The trial court abuses its discretion in revoking 

community supervision if, as to every ground alleged, the State fails to meet its burden of 
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proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In determining 

the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1979). The finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to 

support revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

ISSUE ONE—DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

During the hearing on the State’s adjudication motion, Appellant moved to 

suppress the traffic stop which resulted in the allegation that he failed to identify as a 

fugitive. The trial court denied the motion which Appellant maintains was erroneous. He 

contends that but for the traffic stop, he would not have been accused of failing to identify 

as a fugitive. Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s ruling on the motion to 

suppress was erroneous, the trial court had other allegations to rely on to support 

revocation. 

The State presented evidence from two community supervision officers who 

testified Appellant admitted to marihuana use three to four times one day and 

acknowledged doing so in a signed admission form which was admitted into evidence. A 

urinalysis confirmed Appellant tested positive for marihuana. One of the officers testified 

Appellant failed to report as required from April through July 2023.3 Because evidence 

of one violation is sufficient, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court adjudicating 

Appellant guilty of the original offenses. Issue one is overruled.

3 Appellant’s grandmother disputed that Appellant failed to report because she testified that she 

drove him to his meetings and waited outside for him.
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ISSUE TWO—CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Appellant alleges his sentences of eight and twelve years are grossly 

disproportionate to the technical violations of the terms of his community supervision and 

therefore constitute cruel and unusual punishment.4 We disagree.

Appellant did not preserve his complaint for appellate review. To avoid procedural 

default on a punishment issue, a defendant must complain of the sentence by objection 

during trial, or if there is no opportunity to object, then in a motion for new trial. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a); Landers v. State, 402 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing 

Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Preservation 

requirements also apply to an allegation of cruel and unusual punishment. Curry v. State, 

910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

In the underlying case, after the trial court pronounced sentences of eight and 

twelve years, it asked, “[i]s there any reason why the sentence should not be imposed at 

this time?” Defense counsel answered, “[n]o, your Honor.” Appellant had the opportunity 

to complain about his sentences and did not object nor did he file a motion for new trial 

alleging cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, his punishment issue is waived. Issue two 

is overruled.

4 Appellant asserts the sentences for technical violations of community supervision are three times

more than what he could have received. As the State notes, his argument is misplaced. The sentences 

imposed were for the gravity of the original offenses—choking the victim and pointing a firearm at her—and 

not for the violations of the terms of community supervision. See Ceniceros v. State, No. 07-21-00126-CR, 

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1124, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 16, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). See also Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

1998, no pet.).
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CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

Alex Yarbrough

 Justice

Do not publish.