J-S56022-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANDREW CLEVELAND

Appellant No. 46 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 19, 2012

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0002853-2011

 CP-35-CR-0002855-2011

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 04, 2015

Appellant Andrew Cleveland appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas following his 

guilty plea to two counts of robbery, threat of immediate serious bodily 

injury.1 We affirm.

In November of 2011, Appellant robbed two convenience stores by 

threatening the respective cashiers with a knife and demanding all of the 

money in the cash registers. On March 26, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to 

the previously mentioned crimes. In exchange for his guilty plea, the 

Commonwealth did not charge Appellant with additional convenience store 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701 (a)(1)(ii).
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robberies, it agreed to seek concurrent sentences for the two robbery 

convictions, and Appellant’s remaining eight charges against him relating to 

the two convenience store robberies were nolle prossed.

On June 19, 2012, the court sentenced Appellant to ninety (90) to one 

hundred eighty (180) months’ incarceration, followed by five (5) years’ 

special probation for his first robbery conviction and ten (10) years’ special 

probation for his second robbery conviction. The court imposed the 

sentences consecutively.

On December 3, 2012, Appellant filed a petition for relief pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).2 On June 17, 2014, the trial court 

granted Appellant’s petition and reinstated his post-sentence rights nunc pro 

tunc. On June 26, 2014, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, 

which the court denied by operation of law on December 8, 2014. On 

December 30, 2014, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On January 7, 

2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he timely complied on January 

15, 2015.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO AMEND THE 

SENTENCE OF [APPELLANT] TO A CONCURRENT TERM, 

RATHER THAN CONSECUTIVE, WHERE THE PLEA 

____________________________________________

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMONWEALTH CALLED FOR 

SUCH A SENTENCE?

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 

IMPROPERLY CONSIDERING FACTORS, SUCH AS 

[APPELLANT’S] PRIOR RECORD AND POSSESSION OF A 

KNIFE DURING THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, WHERE 

SUCH FACTORS WERE ALREADY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY 

THE GRADING OF THE OFFENSE ITSELF, THE SENTENCING 

CODE AND GUIDELINES AND ITS ENHANCEMENTS AND, 

AS A RESULT, IMPOSED A MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE 

SENTENCE?

3. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS 

DISCRETION IN FAILING TO PLACE SUFFICIENT REASONS 

UPON THE RECORD TO SUBSTANTIATE AND JUSTIFY A 

SENTENCE OF TOTAL CONFINEMENT AT THE HIGHEST 

END OF THE AGGRAVATED RANGE AND AN ADDITIONAL 

TERM OF 15 YEAR TERM OF SPECIAL PROBATION?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Generally, a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all defects and 

defenses excepting the voluntariness of the plea, the jurisdiction of the court 

and the legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 

589, 591 (Pa.Super.2005). This Court, however, “has also ruled that an 

appellant may challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence [after 

pleading guilty], so long as there is no plea agreement as to the terms of the 

sentence.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Dalberto, 648 A.2d 16, 21 

(Pa.Super.1994), appeal denied, 867 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa.2005)).
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In his first issue, Appellant purports to challenge the legality of his 

sentence.3 He argues that, because his plea agreement with the 

Commonwealth called for his sentences to run concurrently, the court 

violated the terms of his agreement by imposing his sentences 

consecutively, resulting in an illegal sentence. 

First, we must determine whether Appellant’s claim challenges the 

legality of his sentence.

[O]ur case law draws a careful distinction between truly 

“illegal” sentences, and sentences which may have been 

the product of some type of legal error...The term “illegal 

sentence” is a term of art that our Courts apply narrowly, 

to a relatively small class of cases.

Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 900 A.2d 368, 373 (Pa.Super.2006).

This class of cases includes: (1) claims that the sentence 

fell “outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the 

applicable statute”; (2) claims involving merger/double 

jeopardy; and (3) claims implicating the rule in Apprendi 

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 

L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). These claims implicate the 

fundamental legal authority of the court to impose the 

sentence that it did. 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa.Super.2007).

Following the acceptance of a negotiated plea, the trial 

court is not required to sentence a defendant in 

____________________________________________

3

“We do note that Commonwealth v. Anderson, 643 A.2d 109, 111-112 

([Pa.Super.]1994), and its progeny stand for the proposition that where the 

trial court fails to comply with the terms of a plea agreement, that sentence 

is illegal.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 483-84 

(Pa.Super.2005).
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accordance with the plea agreement. Such a sentence is 

legal, so long as it does not exceed the statutory 

maximum. However, a criminal defendant who is 

sentenced to more than was agreed upon in a negotiated 

plea may withdraw his guilty plea upon being deprived of 

the benefit of his bargain.

Commonwealth v. Tann, 79 A.3d 1130, 1133 (Pa.Super.2013), 

reargument denied (Dec. 19, 2013), appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1009 (Pa.2014).

In Commonwealth v. Berry,

4

this Court noted that 

“Commonwealth v. Anderson,[

5

] and its progeny stand for the proposition 

that where the trial court fails to comply with the terms of a plea agreement, 

that sentence is illegal.” The Berry Court then held that an appellant’s claim 

that the trial court violated his plea agreement by imposing consecutive 

sentences did not implicate the legality of his sentence because it was not 

based on a statute or claim of double jeopardy. Commonwealth v. 

Raphael, 879 A.2d 1264, 1265 (Pa.Super.2005). In Raphael, this Court 

noted the above principals and nonetheless proceeded to address the 

appellant’s sentencing claim on the merits.

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4 877 A.2d 479, 483-84 (Pa.Super.2005).

5 643 A.2d 109, 111-112 ([Pa.Super.]1994). Anderson was abrogated by

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 870 A.2d 838, 844 (Pa.2005) (“Anderson's

holding that “any sentence imposed after probation revocation must not 

exceed the maximum sentence originally imposed” is legally unsupportable 

and is inconsistent with both the clear and unambiguous language of the 

Sentencing Code and this Court’s precedent.”).
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Here, because Appellant’s sentencing claim is based on the court’s 

consecutive imposition of his sentences, and not based on a statute or claim 

of double jeopardy, he does not challenge the legality of his sentence. See 

Raphael, supra. Nonetheless, we will discuss Appellant’s claim on the 

merits. 

Our standard of review of questions involving the legality of a sentence 

is well settled:

“A challenge to the legality of a sentence ... may be 

entertained as long as the reviewing court has 

jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 

1242, 1254 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation omitted). It is also 

well-established that “[i]f no statutory authorization exists 

for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and 

subject to correction.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 95 

A.3d 913, 915 (Pa.Super.2014) (citation omitted). “An 

illegal sentence must be vacated.” Id. “Issues relating to 

the legality of a sentence are questions of law[.] ... Our 

standard of review over such questions is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 

A.3d 227, 238 (Pa.Super.2014) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801-02 (Pa.Super.2014) appeal 

granted, No. 63 MAL 2015, 2015 WL 4755651 (Pa. Aug. 12, 2015).

This Court has analyzed the terms of plea bargains as follows:

Where the plea bargain calls for a specific sentence that is 

beyond the prosecutor’s narrowly limited authority in 

sentencing matters, the plea bargain implicates the court’s 

substantive sentencing power, as well as its guardianship 

role, and must have court approval. Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 664 A.2d 622 ([Pa.Super.]1995), appeal denied,

679 A.2d 229 ([Pa.]1996). Thus, the trial court has broad 

discretion in approving or rejecting plea agreements. 

Commonwealth v. Chazin, 873 A.2d 732, 737 

(Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1239 
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([Pa.]2005). The court may reject the plea bargain if the 

court thinks it does not serve the interests of justice. Id. If 

the court is dissatisfied with any of the terms of the plea 

bargain, it should not accept the plea; instead, it should 

give the parties the option of proceeding to trial before a 

jury. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(A)(3) and Comment. Assuming 

the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, when the 

parties enter the plea agreement on the record, and the 

court accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and 

the court must abide by the terms of the agreement. See 

Commonwealth v. Kersteter, 877 A.2d 466, 470 

(Pa.Super.2005). See also Commonwealth v. 

Townsend, 693 A.2d 980 (Pa.Super.1997) (reiterating 

distinction between agreements in which parties have 

agreed upon specific sentence and agreements in which 

parties have left length of sentence to discretion of court); 

Commonwealth v. Coles, 530 A.2d 453 

([Pa.Super.]1987), appeal denied, 559 A.2d 34 

([Pa.]1989) (holding court cannot unilaterally countermand 

specific sentence in plea bargain and reduce sentence 

without Commonwealth’s consent).

Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1268 (Pa.Super.2009), 

appeal denied, 982 A.2d 1228 (Pa.2009).

Further,

there are various options, including an agreement to make 

no recommendation or...an agreement to make a favorable 

but non-binding recommendation. So long as the limits of 

the agreement are plainly set forth on the record, 

understood and agreed to by the parties, and approved by 

the trial court, we find no impediment...to the offer, 

acceptance, performance or enforcement of such plea 

agreements.

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 589 A.2d 706, 710 (Pa.Super.1991), 

appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1151 (Pa.1991).

Here, Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the 

Commonwealth. In exchange for his guilty plea, the remaining charges 
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against him were nolle prossed, the Commonwealth did not charge Appellant 

with additional robberies, and it agreed to seek concurrent sentences for the 

two robbery convictions. Appellant directs us to the following alleged 

exchange:

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, [Appellant’s] cases are 

docketed at 11-CR-2853 and 2855. It’s my understanding 

he’ll be pleading guilty to one count of robbery in each of 

those cases, graded as a felony of the first degree 

punishable by up to 20 years in prison and a $25,000.00 

fine.

The agreement also incorporates a deadly weapon 

enhancement to be applied. However, the agreement 

includes that these matters be run concurrent for the 

defendant.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, your Honor. Just in 

addition to that, there are two other docket numbers out 

there. They’re minor offenses. They’re going to be [nolle 

prossed] and the Commonwealth will not seek to invoke a 

mandatory as well as not have any other charges filed for 

any other robberies.

* * *

[THE COURT]: At this time I will accept the plea.

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (quoting “(NT, 6/26/12,[6] p. 2,3,5&6)”). The 

transcript from the guilty plea hearing is not included in the certified record, 

____________________________________________

6 This is the date listed in Appellant’s brief. It is more likely this hearing 

took place on March 26, 2012, the same day Appellant completed the 

written colloquy, and before the court sentenced Appellant.
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and so we cannot consider it in this appeal.7 Even if it was included in the 

record and the previous exchange transpired, Appellant’s issue merits no 

relief because he completed a written guilty plea colloquy that provides:

13. State specifically in detail any plea agreement with 

the District Attorney.

11 CR 2853 – Robbery (F1)

11 CR 2855 – Robbery (F1)

CW agrees to concurrent sentences

NP all remaining cases

∆ will not be charged w/ other robberies

No mand. min.

Guilty Plea Colloquy, dated March 26, 2012, at 2 (verbatim). This colloquy 

is signed by Appellant.

Later in the colloquy, Appellant indicated that he understood the court 

was not bound by the agreement:

14. Do you understand that the Court is not bound by the 

agreement you made with the District Attorney?

Yes

15. Do you understand that the maximum penalty to the 

charges you are pleading guilty to is:

F1 – 20 yr/$25000(XL) Yes

____________________________________________

7 See Commonwealth v. Martz, 926 A.2d 514, 524-25 (2007) (“It is black 

letter law in this jurisdiction that an appellate court cannot consider anything 

which is not part of the record in the case. It is also well-settled in this 

jurisdiction that it is Appellant’s responsibility to supply this Court with a 

complete record for purposes of review. A failure by Appellant to insure that 

the original record certified for appeal contains sufficient information to 

conduct a proper review constitutes waiver of the issue sought to be 

examined.”)
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15 (a) If you are pleading guilty to more than one charge, 

do you understand that the Judge may impose consecutive 

sentences?

Yes

If the answer to the preceding question is yes, state the 

total sentence that may be imposed on you. 

40 yrs/$50,000

Guilty Plea Colloquy at 3.

At sentencing, counsel for Appellant reminded the court of the plea 

agreement:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your honor, I would point out that 

the guilty plea colloquy does have an agreement with the 

Commonwealth that the Commonwealth would agree to 

concurrent sentences, and I believe we discussed that 

matter with the [c]ourt at the time of the guilty plea. So I 

would ask the [c]ourt when imposing sentence if it would 

stay at the bottom end of the standard range. It’s five and 

a half years. I think that’s more than enough time to 

punish, to rehabilitate, and to deter future criminal conduct 

in the state system; and I would ask the [c]ourt to run the 

two sentences concurrent as set forth in the plea 

agreement.

N.T., 6/19/12, at 3-4.

The Commonwealth did not object or ask the court to impose 

Appellant’s sentences consecutively. Further, Appellant was not charged 

with other robberies, and the eight other charges against him were nolle 

prossed. Thus, the Commonwealth abided by the terms of the plea 

agreement.
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Although the plea agreement required the Commonwealth to refrain 

from seeking consecutive sentences, the court was not bound by the 

Commonwealth’s recommendation and chose to impose consecutive 

sentences for Appellant’s two armed robbery convictions. The court imposed 

an aggregate sentence of seven and one half (71⁄2) to fifteen (15) years’ 

incarceration, followed by fifteen (15) years’ special probation. As Appellant 

indicated in his written guilty plea colloquy, the court could have sentenced 

him to forty (40) years’ incarceration. The sentence was legal and did not 

violate the terms of the plea agreement.8 Thus, Appellant’s first issue merits 

no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle a 

petitioner to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 

1064 (Pa.Super.2011). Before this Court can address such a discretionary 

challenge, an appellant must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying the 

following four-part test:

____________________________________________

8 Appellant does not argue that his plea agreement was unlawfully induced, 

but we note that his written colloquy indicates he entered the plea 

intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. See Commonwealth v. Moser, 

921 A.2d 526, 529 (Pa.Super.2007) (“where the record clearly demonstrates 

that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident 

that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the 

voluntariness of the plea is established.”). 
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(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id.

Presently, Appellant preserved his issues in a post-sentence motion 

and filed a timely notice of appeal. Further, Appellant’s brief includes a 

concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. We now must determine whether 

Appellant presents a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is 

not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 

526, 533 (Pa.Super.2011). Further:

A substantial question exists only when the appellant 

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant argues the court should not have considered his prior 

conviction for a bank robbery, the fact that the offenses involved knives and 

that the crimes involved confronting and scaring people with weapons as 
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aggravating factors because they were already included as factors within the 

grading of the offense of robbery, threat of immediate serious bodily injury. 

He further claims the previously mentioned aggravating factors were 

included within his offense gravity score and his prior record score and the 

court abused its discretion by erroneously applying the guidelines. 

“A claim that the sentencing court misapplied the Sentencing 

Guidelines presents a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 

A.2d 7, 11 (Pa.Super.2007). Thus, we grant Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal and address the merits of his claim.

We review Appellant’s sentencing claim under the following standard:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed 

on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this 

context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by 

reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored 

or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons 

of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a 

manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa.Super.2014) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa.2014).

Appellant was convicted under the following statute:

§ 3701. Robbery

(a) Offense defined.--

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 

committing a theft, he:

* * *
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(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him 

in fear of immediate serious bodily injury...

18 Pa.C.S. § 3701. 

This offense has an offense gravity score of ten (10). 204 Pa.Code § 

303.15. Appellant had a prior record score of four (4) for a bank robbery. 

When utilizing the Deadly Weapons Enhancement (“DWE”) Used Matrix, the 

standard range provided for a sentence of sixty-six (66) to seventy-eight 

(78) months’ incarceration with plus or minus twelve (12) months for 

calculation of the mitigated or aggravated range. Pa.Code § 303.17(b).

The court sentenced Appellant to ninety (90) to one hundred eighty 

(180) months’ incarceration, which was in the aggravated range of the 

sentence. Upon sentencing him, the court stated:

[Appellant], in the future you may be able to be 

productive, but the [c]ourt, in reviewing this through – I 

mean, when you have a form of bank robbery and both of 

these involve knives in regard to people that work as 

clerks at [Convenience] Stores who went to work to pay 

their bills and they face you coming in with a knife robbing 

them, and people shouldn’t have to be worried about that 

when they go to work... 

And the fact that you bring the knives in after you’ve 

already served a sentence for bank robbery, the [c]ourt 

can’t just look and say, [“]Well, that’s okay.[”] There is a 

protection of society that needs to be paid to the citizens. 

And in this matter the [c]ourt is going to sentence you in 

one count in the aggravated range based upon the facts 

and circumstances of your prior involvement with the 

robbery and sentence you to 90 to 180 months, plus five 

years of special probation. 
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And on the second count the [c]ourt is going to be giving 

you ten years[’] probation consecutive to the first 

sentence. Obviously, no drugs or alcohol, nor must you 

frequent any liquor-licensed premise. You must remain in 

treatment upon your release.

N.T., 6/19/12 at 5-6.

The court specifically stated that it chose to give Appellant an 

aggravated range sentence based on the fact that he used knives to rob 

convenience store employees while they were trying to make a living and 

that Appellant continued to commit armed robberies after he had served a 

prison sentence for robbing a bank. Although these actions supported 

Appellant’s convictions, offense gravity score, prior record score, and deadly 

weapon enhancement, the specific details, which are not in the statutes, 

offended the court. The court did not abuse its discretion in considering 

these factors and sentencing Appellant in the aggravated range.

In his final issue, Appellant argues the court erred by failing to place 

sufficient reasons on the record to justify sentencing him in the aggravated 

range with an additional term of fifteen (15) years of special probation. 

Again, we disagree.

The relevant sentencing statute provides, in pertinent part:

(b) General standards.--In selecting from the 

alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court shall 

follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

The court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing 
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and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission 

on Sentencing and taking effect under section 2155 

(relating to publication of guidelines for sentencing, 

resentencing and parole and recommitment ranges 

following revocation). In every case in which the court 

imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies 

a sentence, resentences an offender following revocation 

of probation, county intermediate punishment or State 

intermediate punishment or resentences following remand, 

the court shall make as a part of the record, and 

disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a 

statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence 

imposed. In every case where the court imposes a 

sentence or resentence outside the guidelines adopted by 

the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing under 

sections 2154 (relating to adoption of guidelines for 

sentencing), 2154.1 (relating to adoption of guidelines for 

county intermediate punishment), 2154.2 (relating to 

adoption of guidelines for State intermediate punishment), 

2154.3 (relating to adoption of guidelines for fines), 

2154.4 (relating to adoption of guidelines for resentencing) 

and 2154.5 (relating to adoption of guidelines for parole) 

and made effective under section 2155, the court shall 

provide a contemporaneous written statement of the 

reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines to 

the commission, as established under section 2153(a)(14) 

(relating to powers and duties). Failure to comply shall be 

grounds for vacating the sentence or resentence and 

resentencing the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721.

As previously stated, the court did state its reasons for sentencing 

Appellant in the aggravated range.9 The court was offended by Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

9 Additionally, the court reviewed Appellant’s pre-sentence report before 

sentencing, and we can presume it also considered these factors when 

sentencing Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18-19 

(Pa.1988) (“Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume 

that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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flagrant violation of the law after he had already served a prison sentence 

for robbing a bank. The court specifically expressed its desire to protect the 

public, especially hard-working convenience store clerks who were trying to 

pay their bills without being threatened with knives and robbed by Appellant. 

Further, the court demonstrated its consideration of Appellant’s rehabilitative 

needs in fashioning its sentence by imposing the special probation and 

treatment. The court stated its reasons for imposing Appellant’s sentence 

on the record and did not err.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/4/2015

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors. A pre-sentence report constitutes the record 

and speaks for itself...Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, 

the sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed.”).