J-A15038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

THE ESTATE OF JOHN ROBERT ROSE

APPEAL OF: ARDEN REILLY

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1164 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): NO-02-21-106

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: August 17, 2023

In this intestate succession case, Arden Reilly (Reilly) petitioned to be 

the son and intestate heir of John Robert Rose (Decedent). Decedent’s estate

filed preliminary objections asserting, among other things, that Decedent was

not Reilly’s father. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (orphans’

court) sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed his petition. After

Reilly filed this appeal, genetic testing confirmed that Decedent was not his

natural father. Undeterred, he argues that our intestate succession laws 

permit him to be Decedent’s heir because Decedent held him out as his son. 

After review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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I.

A.

Decedent was born in 1953 and had one sister, Judith A. Rose (Sister). 

He was married once from 1984 to 1986 to a woman named Monica Reilly. 

During their marriage, she gave birth to a son, Reilly, but the birth certificate 

did not list Decedent as the father.

On November 25, 2020, Decedent died intestate and unmarried in 

Pittsburgh. On January 7, 2021, Sister filed a petition for grant of letters of 

administration with the Register of Wills of Allegheny County. In her petition, 

Sister averred that she was Decedent’s sister and sole heir and that she was 

renouncing her right to administer her brother’s estate in favor of Attorney 

Thomas Dempsy, Jr. Accordingly, the register of wills granted letters of 

administration to Attorney Dempsey that same day.

At the time that the letters were issued, Decedent’s body was still being 

held at the Allegheny County Medical Examiner’s Office. As a result, on 

January 20, 2021, Attorney Dempsey petitioned for Decedent’s remains to be 

released to Sister because she and not Reilly was Decedent’s closest relative 

by blood. In support of this assertion, Attorney Dempsey pointed to two 

emails that Reilly sent to the medical examiner’s office in which he admitted 

that a man named Paul Stevens and not Decedent was his biological father. 

On January 29, 2021, the orphans’ court granted the petition and ordered that 
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the remains be released to Sister for funeral arrangements.1 On March 11, 

2021, Sister’s ex-husband, Thomas Marotta (Administrator), was substituted 

as the estate’s administrator.

On December 23, 2021, Reilly petitioned for a citation to show cause 

why he should not be Decedent’s interstate heir. In his petition, Reilly 

asserted that he was Decedent’s heir because Decedent was married to his 

mother when he was born and held him out as his son both during and after 

the marriage. For support, Reilly relied on Section 2107 of Pennsylvania’s 

Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code (PEF Code). Under that section, a 

child born out of wedlock can be considered the child of a father when there 

is clear and convincing evidence that during the child’s lifetime, “the father 

openly holds out the child to be his and receives the child into his home, or 

openly holds the child out to be his and provides support for the child.” 20 

Pa.C.S. § 2107(c)(2). Even though Section 2107 applied to children born out 

of wedlock, Reilly argued that the section “can only serve to create an even 

stronger presumption under which a child born of wedlock may inherit,” since 

“[s]urely the drafters of the PEF Code would not intend that a child born during 

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court’s order also directed that Reilly receive notice of any 

arranged funeral services.
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a marriage, of wedlock, have less right to inherit from their father than a child

born out of wedlock.”2

On February 9, 2022, Administrator filed preliminary objections raising 

three grounds for dismissal of Reilly’s petition: (1) that Reilly had failed to 

timely appeal within one year from the January 7, 2021 grant of letters of 

administration as required by Section 908 of the PEF Code;

3 (2) that Reilly’s 

petition named only Administrator as a respondent, thus failing to join Sister 

as an indispensable party; and (3) that Reilly admitted that Decedent was not 

his natural father.

Reilly responded on March 1, 2022. Addressing first whether he needed 

to appeal from the grant of letters of administration, Reilly argued that such 

an appeal was not necessary because he was contesting only Sister’s status 

as sole heir and not the grant of letters of administration; that his petition was 

filed less than one year after the original grant of letters of administration;

and that the register of wills had granted new letters of administration on 

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2 Petition for Citation, 12/23/21, ¶¶ 13-14.

3 Under Section 908(a), “[a]ny party in interest seeking to challenge the 

probate of a will or who is otherwise aggrieved by a decree of the register ... 

may appeal therefrom to the court within one year of the decree.” 20 Pa.C.S. 

§ 908(a). Administrator contended that Reilly’s petition was not an appeal 

from the original decree of the register of wills but instead a separate and 

declaratory judgment action to establish a filial relationship with Decedent. 

See Administrator’s Preliminary Objections, 2/9/22, ¶ 50.
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March 19, 2021, that could be appealed until March 19, 2022.4 As for the 

indispensable party issue, Reilly asserted that his petition sought relief from 

Administrator and not Sister, and that the attorney for Administrator who was 

served with the petition and citation had already appeared as Sister’s counsel. 

Last, Reilly asserted that it was not yet known whether he was Decedent’s 

natural son because genetic testing was not performed during Decedent’s 

lifetime, and that he should still be permitted to prove that he is Decedent’s 

heir under Section 2107 because he was born during Decedent’s marriage to 

his mother and Decedent held him out as his son.

On June 30, 2022, Reilly filed a supplemental response requesting 

discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether he is Decedent’s 

son. Administrator moved to strike Reilly’s supplemental response because 

he did not obtain Administrator’s approval. Reilly, in turn, responded by 

asserting, among other things, that he was, in fact, Decedent’s biological son. 

At argument on the preliminary objections, Reilly argued that until paternity 

testing was conducted, an evidentiary hearing was necessary. However, if 

paternity testing showed that he was not Decedent’s natural son, Reilly 

____________________________________________

4 While not conceding the merit of Administrator’s claims, on March 18, 2022, 

Reilly refiled his petition for citation to show cause why petitioner should not 

be an intestate heir as a petition for appeal of the register of wills’ March 19, 

2021 grant of letters of administration, which he served on both Administrator 

and Sister.
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conceded that would “end the case” and there would be no dispute about 

Reilly’s parentage.

On September 23, 2022, the orphans’ court sustained the preliminary 

objections and dismissed with prejudice Reilly’s petition. In its supporting 

opinion, the orphans’ court agreed with Administrator that Reilly had violated 

Section 908 of the PEF Code by failing to file a timely appeal within one year 

from the decree of the register of wills that Sister was Decedent’s sole heir. 

The orphans’ court also found that Reilly’s failure to name Sister as a 

respondent was fatal to his petition. As for whether Reilly was Decedent’s 

son, the orphans’ court credited Reilly’s prior admission and found that Reilly 

knew that Decedent was not his natural father, thus establishing that he could 

not be considered his “issue” under our intestate succession laws.

B.

Reilly timely appealed on October 7, 2022.5 After filing his appeal, Reilly 

moved for reconsideration because, among other reasons, the man alleged to 

be his natural father, Paul Stevens, was willing to subject himself to genetic 

testing. Before the results were obtained, however, the orphans’ court denied 

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5 The orphans’ court’s order was appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 

342(a)(5), which permits an appeal from an orphans’ court order “determining 

the status of fiduciaries, beneficiaries, or creditors in an estate, trust, or 

guardianship[.]”
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the motion. Not long after, Reilly obtained the results and learned that Paul 

Stevens was, in fact, his natural father.

Despite this new information and his prior position that genetic testing 

would end the case, Riley applied to this Court for a remand to allow discovery 

and an evidentiary hearing on whether he could be considered Decedent’s son 

under Section 2107. In his application, Reilly asserted (as he does on appeal)

that it does matter under that section whether a putative heir is a blood 

relative of the decedent—if he could prove that Decedent held him out as his

son, then he should be Decedent’s son and intestate heir regardless of him 

having a different natural father.

6

Administrator answered that the results of the genetic testing essentially 

ended the case because Section 2103 of the PEF Code provides that if a 

decedent dies without a surviving spouse, then the first class of persons to 

take the estate is the decedent’s “issue.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 2103(1). “Issue,” in 

turn, is defined in estate matters as “all lawful, lineal descendants of a 

common ancestor.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. Because “a stranger in blood is not a 

lineal descendant,” In re Struck’s Estate, 87 A.2d 485, 486 (Pa. 1952), 

Reilly could not be Decedent’s issue.

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6 Riley reasserted this argument in response to our January 20, 2023 order

directing him to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed or 

dismissed as moot because of the genetic testing. On February 24, 2023, we 

discharged the rule to show cause, subject to revisitation of the issue by the 

merits panel.
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After receiving Administrator’s answer, we denied the application to 

remand on March 3, 2023. Both Reilly and the orphans’ court have complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and this matter is now ready for review.7

II.

On appeal, Reilly challenges all three grounds on which the orphans’

court sustained the preliminary objections—that is, whether his petition should 

be dismissed because (1) he failed to timely appeal the grant of letters of 

administration, (2) he failed to join Sister as an indispensable party, and (3) 

he is not a natural son of Decedent. While it is not clear that Reilly needed to 

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7 Our standard of review of a orphans’ court order sustaining preliminary 

objections is well-established:

In determining whether the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt properly 

[sustained] ... preliminary objections ..., we review the ruling for 

an error of law or abuse of discretion. On an appeal from an order 

sustaining preliminary objections, we accept as true all wellpleaded material facts set forth in the appellant’s complaint and 

all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. 

Preliminary objections seeking the dismissal of a cause of action 

should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from 

doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally 

sufficient to establish the right to relief; if any doubt exists, it 

should be resolved in favor of overruling the objections.

Threshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 147 A.3d 897, 901 (Pa. Super. 2016) (cleaned up).
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style his petition as an appeal from the grant of letters of administration8 or

dismissal was warranted because he failed to join Sister as an indispensable 

party,9 we need not delve into those issues. Indeed, now that there is no 

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8

It is unclear whether the PEF Code requires a putative heir to formally appeal 

a decision of the register of wills to seek a determination that he is an heir of 

a decedent, as neither the orphans’ court nor the Administrator point us to

any case law for such a proposition. Reilly also did not seek to set aside the 

letters of administration; rather, he sought a determination of his status as 

an intestate heir. While the decree recited that the administrator was selected 

based on the “renunciation of Judith A. Rose, sole intestate heir” and 

“satisfactory proof having been presented,” it is unclear whether that operates 

as an adjudication of an estate’s heir that is final and unchallengeable unless 

the grant of the letters of administration is appealed. Indeed, the jurisdiction 

of the register of wills is “the probate of wills [and] the grant of letters to a 

personal representative,” not the determination of who is to receive 

distribution from an estate. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 901. Issues of “distribution of 

the real and personal property of decedents’ estates” are within the 

jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 711(1). Section 3521 of 

the PEF Code, meanwhile, permits review of a decree of distribution if it is 

filed within five years after the final confirmation of any account of a personal 

representative. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 3521. Thus, for these reasons, Reilley’s 

petition should not be dismissed for failure to formally appeal from the grant 

of the letter of administration or style his petition as such.

9 Generally, “an indispensable party is one whose rights are so connected with 

the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made without impairing its 

rights.” In re Navarra, 185 A.3d 342, 349 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). While Sister was an indispensable party, she had already appeared 

and sought relief twice from the orphans’ court before Reilly filed his petition. 

It appears that she may have already been a party and that nothing had to 

be done to obtain personal jurisdiction over her. Where the court already has 

personal jurisdiction over a person when a citation is issued, the person may 

be served with the citation by mail. See Pa.R.O.C.P. 3.5(a)(3). Although the 

citation was not issued to Sister, a citation is not required where personal 

jurisdiction has already been obtained and the party seeking relief may 

proceed by filing a petition with a notice to file a response. See Pa.R.O.C.P 

3.5(b)(1). While Reilly did not initially serve Sister or provide her any notice 

of his petition, he did mail the petition to her on March 1, 2022, which would 
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dispute that Decedent was not Reilly’s natural father, we limit our review to

the discrete question of whether Reilly can be Decedent’s “issue” for intestate 

succession purposes even though genetic testing has conclusively proven that 

he has no biological connection to Decedent.

The order of intestate succession to other than a surviving spouse is set 

forth under Section 2103 of the PEF Code.

The share of the estate, if any, to which the surviving spouse is 

not entitled, and the entire estate if there is no surviving spouse, 

shall pass in the following order:

(1) Issue.--To the issue of the decedent.

(2) Parents.--If no issue survives the decedent, then to the 

parents or parent of the decedent.

(3) Brothers, sisters, or their issue.--If no parent 

survives the decedent, then to the issue of each of the decedent’s 

parents.

20 Pa.C.S. § 2103.

“Issue” is defined under the Statutory Construction Act as follows: “As 

applied to the descent of estates, means all lawful, lineal descendants of a 

____________________________________________

have been over six months before the orphans’ court addressed the petition. 

Even though Reilly did not comply with Orphans’ Court notice requirements, 

the remedy for an interested party not receiving notice is for it to be sent to 

that party before the orphans’ court acts on the petition, not dismissal of the 

petition. See Pa.R.O.C.P 3.5(b)(3). Here, however, the orphans’ court gave 

no consideration to ordering Reilly to serve the petition on Sister with proper 

notice or allow him to correct the defect. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(b) (remedy 

for failure to join indispensable party is to order joinder of the indispensable 

party and dismiss the action only if indispensable party cannot be joined).
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common ancestor.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. When passing to the decedent’s issue, 

the estate “shall be divided into as many equal shares as there shall be 

persons in the nearest degree of consanguinity to the decedent living and 

taking shares therein and persons in that degree who have died before the 

decedent and have left issue to survive him who take shares therein.” 20 

Pa.C.S. § 2104(1) (emphasis added).

As discussed, Reilly argues that he can prove that he is Decedent’s son 

under Section 2107(c)(2) of the PEF Code. Section 2107, titled “Persons born 

out of wedlock,” provides in relevant part:

(c) Child of father.--For purposes of descent by, from and 

through a person born out of wedlock, he shall be considered the 

child of his father when the identity of the father has been 

determined in any one of the following ways:

(1) If the parents of a child born out of wedlock shall have 

married each other.

(2) If during the lifetime of the child, the father openly holds 

out the child to be his and receives the child into his home, or 

openly holds the child out to be his and provides support for the 

child which shall be determined by clear and convincing evidence.

(3) If there is clear and convincing evidence that the man 

was the father of the child, which may include a prior court 

determination of paternity.

20 Pa.C.S. § 2107(c).

As this Court has explained, “[w]ith the exception of surviving spouses 

and adopted children, only those heirs in some degree of consanguinity may 

inherit” under our intestate laws. See In re Estate of Simmons-Carton, 

644 A.2d 791, 797 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1994). That being the case, “[t]he clear 
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legislative purpose of § 2107(c) is to provide a means by which children born 

out of wedlock and those who seek to inherit from or through them can legally 

establish the requisite degree of consanguinity where paternity is a relevant 

fact.” Id.

In Bahl v. Lambert Farms, Inc., 819 A.2d 534 (Pa. 2003), our 

Supreme Court addressed a similar argument as that raised here. In Bahl,

William (William Sr.) and Rose Bahl (the Bahls) owned a family farm and had 

six natural children. In 1921, one of their daughters had a child out of

wedlock. To avoid the stigma that would attach to the child born out of 

wedlock, the Bahls raised the child as their own and called him William Bahl, 

Jr. (“Willaim Jr.”). Although the Bahls never adopted William Jr., the Bahls 

held him out as their own. When William Sr. passed away in 1945, title to the 

farm was passed to his wife Rose. Then, when she died in 1969, title passed 

to the Bahls’ surviving children and grandchildren by intestate succession.

In 1991, Lambert Farms purchased the farm from the surviving children,

but the deed did not list William Jr., who passed away in 1980, or any of his 

heirs as a grantor. In 1998, William Jr.’s heirs file an action to partition the 

farm, alleging that part of the farm was theirs because William Jr. should have

been considered the last-born son of the Bahls and inherited one-sixth of the 

farm by intestate succession. The trial court, however, held that William Jr. 

could not be the Bahls’ child for intestate succession purposes because it 

credited the testimony that he was not their natural child. On appeal, we 
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reversed, finding that even though the trial court’s factual determination was 

supported, Lambert Farms was equitably estopped from denying that the 

Bahls held out William Jr. as their son throughout their lives, citing in support 

several cases in which the doctrine of paternity by estoppel was used to 

prevent parents from denying the paternity of minor children.

On discretionary appeal, our Supreme Court reversed, holding that

William Jr.’s heirs did not inherit any part of the farm through intestate 

succession under an estoppel theory. In so doing, the Court laid out how 

Pennsylvania intestate laws both before and after the PEF Code provide that 

a decedent’s “issue” includes his or her natural children, that is, those related 

by blood.

Under the version of the Intestate Act of 1947 that was in effect 

at the time of Rose’s death in 1969, when a mother passed away, 

leaving no surviving spouse, her property passed to her “issue.” 

20 P.S. § 1.3 (1950); see also 20 Pa.C.S. 2103(1) (2002).

Although the statute did not specifically define “issue,” it made 

clear in setting forth the rules of succession that only those with 

some “degree of consanguinity” to the decedent ordinarily 

qualified as such. Specifically, the statute provided that in passing 

to a decedent’s issue, the estate “shall be divided into as many 

equal shares as there shall be persons in the nearest degree of

consanguinity to the decedent living and persons in that degree 

who have died before the decedent and have left issue to survive 

him who take shares therein.” 20 P.S. § 1.4(1) (1950) (emphasis 

added); see also 20 Pa.C.S. § 2104(1) (2002). It further 

emphasized that “[w]hen the persons entitled to take under this 

chapter other than as a surviving spouse are all in the same

degree of consanguinity to the decedent, they shall take in equal 

shares.” 20 P.S. § 1.4 (1.1) (1957) (emphasis added); 20 Pa.C.S.

§ 2104(2) (2002). Thus, when a decedent had living natural 

children and no surviving spouse, it was the natural children (who 

are, by definition, in the same degree of consanguinity to the 

decedent) who shared the estate equally, with the single caveat 
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that if any natural child predeceased the decedent, his share 

would be divided among his issue, i.e., the decedent's 

grandchildren.

Bahl, supra at 538 (footnotes omitted).

Based on this analysis, therefore, the Court observed that anyone who 

was neither the natural nor adopted child of the decedent could not be the 

decedent’s “issue.”

Under these provisions, it is apparent that the General Assembly 

intended, as a general rule, to limit “issue” to those in the 

decedent’s blood line and did not intend to include as first 

degree “issue” individuals without the requisite 

consanguinity who had merely been treated like, or held 

out as, the decedent’s children. (Emphasis added.)

Id. Accordingly, holding that the case was “controlled by the clear statutory 

limitations on inheritance by intestate succession” and finding the doctrine of 

paternity by estoppel inapplicable,10 the Court held that William Jr.’s heirs 

could did not inherit any part of the Bahl family farm even though the Bahls 

held him out as their son. Id. at 539-41.

Applying Bahl, we conclude that Reilly cannot be deemed Decedent’s 

“issue” under Section 2103 (c) (2) that he was held out as Decedent’s son, 

once, as here, it is conclusively established that Decedent was not his natural 

____________________________________________

10 The Bahl Court found the doctrine of paternity by estoppel inapplicable

because the doctrine was generally applied in cases involving support of minor 

children where the expectations of minor child are at stake and has never 

been extended to estop a third party like Lambert Farms from challenging 

paternity. See Bahl, 819 A.2d at 540.
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father, that is, there is no degree of consanguinity between the two. As 

discussed, a decedent’s “issue” is defined as the decedent’s “lineal 

descendants” which, according to the plain language of that term, means a 

decedent who proceeds in direct line by birth from the ancestor and does not 

include a “stranger in blood.” In re Strunk’s Estate, supra. As our Supreme 

Court explained in Bahl, a decedent’s “issue” is limited to descendants by 

blood and does not include persons like Reilly who were merely held out as or 

treated like a child of the decedent. See Bahl, supra at 538. Thus, even 

assuming Reilly presented clear and convincing evidence under Section 

2107(c)(2) that Decedent held him as out his son, he cannot be Decedent’s 

“issue” now that there is no factual dispute that Decedent was not his natural 

father and, consequently, not a blood relative.

Reilly nonetheless contends that his lack of consanguinity with Decedent 

should not hamper his ability to be Decedent’s son under Section 2107(c)(2)

since it does not matter under that section whether a father is biologically 

related to a child. For support of this proposition, Relly cites Estate of Ackley 

v. Ackley, 266 A.3d 604, 2021 WL 4520326 (Pa. Super. October 4, 2021) 

(unpublished memorandum).11 There, the decedent was married and had 

three children. At some point during his marriage, though, the decedent 

____________________________________________

11 Under amended Pa.R.A.P. 126, non-precedential decisions are not binding 

but may be cited as “persuasive” authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (stating 

that unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after 

May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
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began living with another woman. While the two were living together, the 

woman gave birth to two daughters, one of them named Brittany. The 

decedent was listed as Brittany’s father on her birth certificate and Brittany 

used the decedent’s surname. Brittany lived with the decedent until she was 

about nine years old. Several years later, when she moved out of her mother’s 

residence, Brittany lived with the decedent for about five years before moving 

in with her aunt to finish high school. After high school, Brittany lived another 

year with the decedent.

After the decedent died intestate, the estate’s administrator petitioned 

to be named administrator. Brittany, in turn, petitioned for production of 

formal accounting and proposed distribution. The administrator, meanwhile, 

responded that Brittany was not the decedent’s offspring and eventually 

petitioned for DNA testing of Brittany. The trial court denied testing and after 

holding an evidentiary hearing, concluded that Brittany presented clear and 

convincing evidence under Section 2107 proving that she was the decedent’s 

issue.

On appeal, the administrator argued that the trial court erred in denying 

his request for DNA testing to determine if Brittany was the decedent’s issue. 

Finding no support for the proposition that a trial court erred in denying such 

a request for genetic testing, we noted that there was nothing in our intestate 

succession laws for a request for testing. Estate of Ackley, supra at *2. 

While agreeing that the degree of consanguinity is the determining factor for 
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inheritance in an intestate estate distribution under 20 Pa.C.S. § 2104(1), we 

also observed that Section 2107 allows for proof in three separate ways for “a 

consanguinity determination that adjudicates whether an individual born out 

of wedlock is a descendant of a male.” Id.

We also faulted the administrator’s attempt to rely on In re Estate of

Greenwood, 587 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. 1991), and Wawrykow v. Simonich,

652 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 1994). In the former, the potential child of the 

decedent petitioned for an order requiring the genetic testing of the decedent, 

while the latter involved a putative heir attempting to establish paternity by 

exhuming the decedent. Finding both cases inapposite, we observed that it 

was the administrator and not Brittany that was seeking paternity testing to 

disestablish that she was not an heir, thus effectively preempting her from 

proving that she was the decedent’s heir. See Estate of Ackley, supra at 

*3.

As a result, we found “no basis, statutory or otherwise, to conclude that 

the Administrator has the inherent ability to seek a DNA test of an individual 

attempting to demonstrate paternity from a decedent.” Id. While adding that 

genetic testing “would be probative (if not effectively conclusive) as to 

whether Brittany is an heir to the Estate,” we nonetheless concluded that there 

was no authority for the administrator to “offensively seek a DNA sample from 

a paternity-based estate claimant.” Id.
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After review, we do not read Estate of Ackley as Reilly does as standing 

for the proposition that Section 2107(c) allows for a non-biological, nonadopted child to be an intestate heir. Instead, Section 2107(c)(2) provides a 

method of proving biological paternity without genetic testing. Thus, as long 

as a petitioner can present clear and convincing evidence that the decedent 

father held him as his son, then Section 2107 permits the putative heir born 

out of wedlock to establish consanguinity even if there has not been paternity 

testing. In such a situation, as we emphasized in Estate of Ackley, the party 

opposing the putative heir cannot compel the trial court to order genetic 

testing, as there is no basis in our statutes or case law for such testing to be 

ordered.

That situation changes, however, where the putative heir chooses to 

have genetic testing conducted to conclusively establish paternity. Reilly was 

under no obligation to have such testing performed but nonetheless chose to 

have it done. By so doing, Reilly has now conclusively proven that Decedent 

is not, in fact, his natural father. Even if Reilly could sustain his burden of 

proof under Section 2107(c)(2) and prove that Decedent held him out as his 

son, his decision to seek genetic testing that confirmed that Decedent was not 

his natural father has brought an effective end to the case. Accordingly, 

because he cannot be Decedent’s “issue” under Section 2703(1) and supplant 

Sister as Decedent’s intestate heir, we affirm the orphans’ court’s order 
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sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing with prejudice Reilly’s 

petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/17/2023