IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JUDY N. BROCK, et al., etc., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 14-0324-WS-M

 )

RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, ) 

LP, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

 ORDER

The plaintiffs have filed a motion to stay discovery and all other 

proceedings in this action pending the Eleventh Circuit’s resolution of an appeal of 

this Court’s decision in Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462 (S.D. 

Ala. 2015). (Doc. 44). The defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. 47).

The amended complaint alleges that the defendants violated the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“the Act”) by filing proofs of claim in their Chapter 13 

bankruptcy proceedings on a debt barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 1 at 

2-4). The Court in Johnson held that, while the Act “provides that it is unlawful 

for a debt collector to file a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 proceeding knowing the 

claim to be time-barred,” the Bankruptcy Code generally “permits creditors to file 

proofs of claim in Chapter 13 proceedings on debts known to be time-barred.” 

528 B.R. at 465, 470. The two provisions are “in irreconcilable conflict,” with the 

result that “the Act must give way to the Code,” id. at 473, precluding the 

plaintiff’s cause of action. The Johnson plaintiff appealed that ruling in March 

2015.

The instant motion was triggered by two dispositive motions filed by the 

defendants. The motion to dismiss argues that the claim of plaintiff Brock is 

barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 37). The motion for judgment 

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on the pleadings argues that the claims of both plaintiffs are due to be dismissed 

for several reasons: (1) filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt cannot 

violate the Act; (2) even if such conduct does violate the Act, the Act is in 

irreconcilable conflict with the Code and cannot be enforced; (3) filing a proof of 

claim on a time-barred debt is not false, deceptive or otherwise violative of the 

Act; and (4) the proofs of claim will not support liability under the competentlawyer standard. (Doc. 41 at 3-4). The plaintiffs assert that the issues presented in 

Johnson “are substantially the same as in this case,” such that “the most efficient 

use of this Court’s and the parties’ resources and time” is to stay this action 

“pending a final decision by the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson.” (Doc. 44 at 2).

“[A] district court [has] discretion to stay a case pending the resolution of 

related proceedings in another forum.” Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. 

Communications, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000). However, a stay that 

is “immoderate” abuses that discretion. Id. “In considering whether a stay is 

‘immoderate,’ we examine both the scope of the stay (including its potential 

duration) and the reasons cited by the district court for the stay.” Id.

As noted, the plaintiffs seek a stay until the Eleventh Circuit proceedings 

are concluded, without offering a specific end date. Such proceedings may of 

course extend past briefing, oral argument and written decision to rehearing by the 

panel and/or en banc. An “indefinite” stay, such as one (as requested here) to 

continue until the related litigation is fully exhausted, may be deemed immoderate. 

Ortega Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1264-65. 

The plaintiffs’ only reason for seeking a stay is “efficien[cy].” But, “in a 

case like this one, the interests of judicial economy alone are insufficient to justify 

such an indefinite stay.” Ortega Trujillo, 221 F.3d at 1265. 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court exercises its discretion against the 

imposition of a stay. The plaintiffs’ motion to stay is denied.

The Court previously entered a briefing schedule on the defendants’ motion 

to dismiss but not on their motion for judgment on the pleadings. It now appears, 

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however, that consideration of the latter motion first would be most efficient. The 

defendants therein argue, (Doc. 41 at 31-43), that any cause of action under the 

Act is precluded by the Code – the very argument accepted by the Court in 

Johnson. Accordingly, the briefing schedule on the motion to dismiss, (Docs. 43, 

46), is suspended. The plaintiffs are ordered to file and serve, on or before July 

31, 2015, their response to that portion of the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings that presents a Johnson argument. The defendants are ordered to file 

and serve any reply on or before August 7, 2015. The Court will take that portion 

of the motion for judgment on the pleadings under submission on August 7, 2015.1

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of July, 2015. 

 

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 1 The defendants indicate they are amenable to a stay of discovery pending 

resolution of their threshold motions. They, or the parties jointly, are free to file, for 

consideration by the Magistrate Judge, a motion seeking such relief.

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