NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 06a0779n.06 Filed: Oc tober 19, 2006 No. 05-2588 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
RU TH F . V AN DE R MA AS,

Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. COMMI SSI ONER OF SOCI AL SECURI TY, Def endant- Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
OPI NI ON

Be for e : G UY , G ILM AN , a nd R OG ER S, C ir c uit Judg e s. RONALD LEE GILMAN, Cir cuit Judge
. Ruth Van der Maas appea ls the denial of he r application for disability insurance benef its (DI B) under the Social Security Act. Va n der Ma as, a former colleg e pro fe s sor, filed a n application for

DI B on Aug ust 19, 1996, alleg ing that she had become disabled as a result of fibromy alg ia, asthma, chronic fatig ue and immune dy sfunction, joint problems with her r ight kne e and le ft ankl e, hy pothy roidism, connective- tissue disorder, a nd
s o m atoform disorde r. Afte r an a dminist rative la w judg e (A L J ) denie d her a pplication and the Appea ls Council concurre d, Van de r Maa s appea led to the district court, whic h g rante d summary jud g me nt i n favo r of the Com mis sio ne r o f S oc ia l Se c ur ity (C omm iss ion e r) . F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th below, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 2 - I. BACKG ROUND A. Medical history Va n d e r M a a s’ s me dic a l his tor y c ov e rs ov e r 80 0 pa g e s of the Ad min istra tiv e Re c or d in

thi s
case . The following is a summary of the most rele vant points. Van de r Maa s alleg es that she be came disabled as of Marc h 1, 1995. Her

insured st atus expired on Dec ember 31, 1998. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.101(a ). The most cr itical evidenc e in the pre sent ca se re lates to the time period be tween those two dates. I n Fe bruar

y of 1994, Van der Maas underw ent surg ery to r epair a fra cture in he r left a nkle. Her surg e o n in s e rte d me ta l s c r e w s an d a p late a t th e s it e o f th e f r a c tu r e to a s s is t in the healing proce ss. Van der Maas experience d complications as a result of the ankle s u rge ry , requiring additional surg ery soon there afte r to r epair a broken fibula. By the fall of 1994, Van de r Maa s’s Xray s showed a full rec overy , and her orthopedist noted that Van de r Maa s suffer ed fr om “no pain” and wa s “doing well.” I n Aug ust of 1995, Van de r M aa s b ega n complaining of g ener al fatigue and we akness. A contempora

neous medica l exam prove d inconclusive. Van der Maas visited another phy sician one month later, complaining of a r ash, g eneral i z ed m u s cle pa in, and wea kness. That phy sician, Dr. Martin, surmised that Va

n der Ma as suffe red f

rom a fibr omy alg ia

- ty

p e il ln e s s , s o ma

ti c p r e o c c u

p a tion (m e anin g that he r ps y c ho log ic a l str e ss e vid e nc e d its e lf in ph y sic a l wa y s) , a pe rs ist e ntl y

pa inf ul l e ft

ank le fr a c tur e , a

nd a ri g ht r otator -c uff

te ar. A f e w d ay s late r, Va

n d e r M a a s c on ta c te d D r. Mart in to c omp la in o f blu

rr e d vis ion , fatigue , and wo rk dis a bil ity

. Dr
. Ma

rt in re fe rr e d he r t o a

ne ur olo g ist , who found no ne urolog ic impairment.No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 3 - I n November

of 1995, Va

n der Ma as complaine d to her orthope dist that her left ankle wa s sti ll c a us inghe r p a in. Des pi te the pa in, Va n d e r M a a s a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e e xer c ise d r e g ula rl y by swimming. Van de r Maa s visited a

nother phy sician, Dr. Walen, in May of 1996. B eca

use Va n der Ma as was convince d

th a t s h e h a d

c h r o n ic f a ti g u e s y n dr o me ( CF S) , s h e r e qu e s te d th a t D r . Wa le n r e ad

mate r ia ls a

b o u t th e s y

n dr o me an d c h an g e s o me o f h e r p r e s c r ip ti o n s . D r . Wa le n r e f e r r ed Va n der Maas to Dr . Gonzalez, a specia list i n allerg y and immunology . Van de r Maa s told Dr. Gonzalez that
s h e m i gh th av e C FS
. I nad d i t i o nt o ch ro n i c f at i gu e, Va nd er

M aa s co mp l ai n edo f d i ff

i cu l t y s l ee p i n g, diffi cu l t y co n centr ating , migr aine he adac hes, and a wide ra ng e of othe r ailments. Dr. G onzalez conclude d that Van der Maas did not have CFS—which require s that the fatigue be unre lated to any other a ilment or condition—beca use she ha d sever al other c onditions t hat were common cause s of fatig ue. Van de r Maas saw Dr . Huver , her ne w primary car e phy sician, in Octobe r of 1996. She complained of

chronic fatig ue, muscle pa in, difficulty sleeping and conc entrating, a nd short-term memory loss. Dr. Huver

deter mined that Van der Maas likely suffe red from fibromy alg ia. Van de r Maas a g ain visited Dr. Huve r in Dec ember of 1996 and in Mar ch of 1997, e ach time with a long lit any of sy mpt oms . D r. Huve r d e te rm ine d th a t V an d e r M a a s’ s c omp la ints did n ot n e c e ssa ri ly
corr elate w ith a diag nosis of CFS, and she re commended that Van d er Maas see k a psy cholog ical evaluation. During a psy cholog ical eva luation conducted by Dr. Jongsma, Va

n der Ma as pre sented a ty pewr itten document of seve ral pa g es outlining her sy mptoms. Van der Maas told Dr

. J ong sma thatNo. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 4 - she st ill h a d

ana c ti v e s o c ia l l if

e th a t i n c lu d e d

s in g in g in

a lo c a l c h o ir , v o lu

n te e r in g f

o r the sy mphony , g oing to churc h, counseling a church club, and attending a fibromy alg ia support g roup. I n addition to these social ac tivit i es , Va n d er Maas did housew ork, g arde ned, drove a ca r, and
s h o p p e d f o r g r o c e r ie s . A f

te r d e te r mi n in g th a t V an d e r M a a s w a s e xa g g e r a ti n g h e r p roblems, Dr. Jong sma dia g no se d h e r a s h avi ng a so ma tof or m di so rd e r. A s oma

tof or m di so rd e r i s g e ne ra lly d i a g n o s e d

w h e r e a p a t i e n th a s p e r s i s t e n tp h y s i c a l s y mp t o m s t h a tc an n o tb e f

u l l y e x p l a i n e d b y a dia g no se d me dic a l c on dit ion . A c c or din g to a psyc ho log ist wh o la te r e xami ne d V an d e r M a a s, the se sy mptoms are not intentionally produce d or fe igne d. Phy sicians for the state of Michig an per formed me dical examinations in May of 1997 and Marc h of 1998. They

deter mined that Van de r Maa s could lift a nd car ry up to 20 pounds, stand or
wa lk f or up to 6 ho ur s per wo rk da y , a nd sit up to 6 ho ur s p e r w or

k d ay . Ps y c ho log ist s f

or the state of Michig an beg an re viewing Van de r Maa s’s medica l rec ords in J une of 1997. F ollowing two examinations, one in J une of 1997 a nd the oth er i n M ar ch o f 1998, t hey deter mined that Van de r Maas wa s capa

ble of pe rfor

ming unskilled work. I n April of 1998, Va

n der Ma as ag ain complained of pain in her l ef

t ankle, which she attributed to the metal scr ews a nd plate that re mained following her sur g ery in 1994. Dr. Eastman, Van de r Maa s’s orthopedist, told her that she could underg o surg ery for the remova l of the scr ews and plate at her c onvenienc e. I n Dec ember

of 1998, Va

n der M aa s v i s i ted the Mayo Clini c. Dr . Ytterbe rg , a rheumatologist, deter

mined afte r an examination that there wa s no objective e vidence explaining Van de r Maa s’s fatig ue. She also reviewe d Van der Maas’s various test results and diag nosed herNo. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 5 - with fatig ue and somatiz ation, a ty pe of somatoform disorder. Apsy cholog ist, Dr. Maruta, a g ree d with the ear lier di agn o s i s o f som atoform disorde r and r ecommende d that Van de r Maa s seek psy cholog ical counse ling. After Van der Maas returne d from the May o Clini c, Dr. Eastman remove d her a nkle scre ws and plate on Dec ember 31, 1998. The stitches wer e remove d from her ankle in January

of 1999, and the doctor r ecommende d that Van der Maas eng ag e in exercises to reg ain motion and streng th in her ankle. Dr. He aley , an orthope dist, ex amined Va n der Ma as’s lef

t ankle in April of 1999 and found that it was hea ling well. I n May of 1999, Va

n der Ma as ag ain visited Dr. Ea stman, who found that Va n d e r Ma a s suf

fe re d fr om a “b it of sw e lli ng ” in the ank le . B a se d o n th e X- ra y s, the or tho pe dis t de te rm ine d th a t V an d e r M a a s h a d a c a lc if ie d loos e bo dy in he r le ft

ank le tha t c ou ld b e re pa ir e d w ith surg ery . Van de r Maa s continued to complain of left-ankle pain, and af ter Dr . Eastman discove red swelling , war

mth, and decr ease d motion, Va n der Maas schedule d another surg ery , which she later
canc elled due to illness. I n her last visit to Dr. Eastman in A pril of 2000, the orthopedist noted that Van de r Maa s walked w ith a “fa irly g ood g ait” despite swe lling and te nderne ss in her left a nkle. B. Adm inis trat ive and d istrictcourt proc eedings An AL J denied Van der Maas’ s initial application in May of 1999, finding that Van de r Maa s could re turn to her e arlier work a s a c o l l ege pr ofessor. T he Appe als Council denied re view and adopted the de cision of the AL J as t he C ommissi oner’ s final decision. Van der Maas then soug ht judicial revie w pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g ).No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 6 - Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re ma nd e d th e c a se , ord e ri ngfu rt he r r e vie w b e c a

us e the or ig ina l A L J did
no t qu e sti on

Va n d e r M a a s th or ou g hly

or g ive Va n d e r M a a s’ s atto rn e y

the op po rt

unity to e lic it testimony . On re mand, a diff ere nt AL J hear d Van de r Maa s’s ca se. The new AL J conclude d that Van de r Maa s had a somatof orm disorder a

nd mild arthritis of her rig ht kne e prior to the expiration of he r i ns ur e d s ta tus on

De c e mbe r 3 1, 19 98 . D e sp ite t he AL J ’s find ing s r e g ard ingthe se imp a ir me nts , th e AL J con c lud e d th a t V an d e r M a a s h a d th e re sid ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity (RF C) to perf orm a ra ng e of lig ht work with moderate limitations . A testify ing v o ca t i o n al expert (VE) conclude d that someone with Va n der Ma as’s RFC could perf orm approximately

15,000 jobs in the national ec onomy . The AL J there fore conclude d that althoug h Van de r Maa s could not perf orm her previous job, she wa s by n o m ea n s unable to wor k. After the Appea ls Council denied Van de r Ma a s’ s r e qu e st f

or re vie w, Va

n d e r M a a s f

ile d th e pr e se nt s uit

in f e de ra l c ourt
. Upon re viewing the re cord, the mag istrate judg e assig ned to the ca se issued a Repor t and Recommendation (R&R) re commending that Van der Maas’ s application for DI B be denied. Va

n der Ma as ra ised the following two objections to the R&R: (1) that the AL J improperly relied on the Commi ssioner’s c hara cter ization of the evidence , and (2) that the AL J failed to prope rly analy ze Van der Ma as’s a

pplication as being on the “borderline” for consideration as a person of “adva nced a g e.” A d d r e s s ing these two objec tions, the district court held that substantial evidenc e supported the AL J ’s finding s and that the AL J adequa tely considere d Van de r Maa s’s ag e in making his decision. The
c ourt the n a do pte d th e R& R.No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 7 - On a pp e a l, V and e r

M a a s c h a l l e n g e s t h e A L J’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o nt h a t

h e r C F S an d l e f t
- a nk le impairment wer e insuffic ient to establish DI B. She also argues that the AL J neg lected to c onsider Van de r Maa s’s “borde rline” a g e in eva luating he r RFC.

II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review We must uphol d t h e C ommissi oner’ s conclusions if they are supported by

substantial evidenc e. See 42 U. S.C. § 4 05 (g ); Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , 245 F.3d 528, 534 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Subs tantial evidenc e is define d as “suc h rele vant evidenc e as a rea sonable mind might a cce pt as adequate to support a conc lusion.” Heston , 2 4 5 F. 3 d a t 5 3 4 (q u o t i n g Richardson v. Pe rales , 402 U. S. 38 9, 40 1 (1 97 1) ). Whe n re vie wi ng the Com mis sio ne r’ s c on c lus ion s, we “ may no t tr y the c a se de novo , nor re solve conflicts in evide nce, nor decide questions of cre dibilit y .” Garner v. H eck ler , 74 5 F .2 d 3 83 , 3 87 (6 th C ir . 1 98 4) ; see also Foster v . Halter , 279 F.3d 348, 353 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the cour

t should defer

to the ag ency ’s dec ision if it is suppor ted by substantial evidence ,

“ e ve n if the re is s ub sta

nti a l e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d th a t w ou ld h a ve su pp orted an o pp os ite
co n cl u s i o n . . . . ” ( qu o t i n g Key v . Callahan , 109 F.3d 270, 273 ( 6th Cir. 1997))). B. The ALJ’s decision i s sup ported by sub stantial evidence I n the pre sent ca se, we are of t he opini on that the AL J applied the corr ect lega l standards a nd rende red a

decision that is supported by substantial evi d ence . The g overningframework f or
e va luatin g dis a

bil ity c la ims is the “ fi ve -s te p s e qu e nti a l pr oc e ss” se t f or th i n th e fe de ra l r e g ulatio ns .No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 8 - A b b o tt v . S u ll iv an , 9 0 5 F. 2 d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). This court ha s summarized the five-step pr oc e ss a s f

oll ow s: First, p la in ti f

f mu s t d e mo n s tr a te th a t s h e is n o t c u r r e n tl y e n g a g e d in “ s u b s ta ntial g ainful ac tivity ” at the time she seeks disability benef its. Second, plainti ff must show t h a ts h e s u f

f e r s f r o m a “ s e v e r e i mp a i r

m e n t ” i no r d e r

t o w ar r an ta f i n d i n g o f d i s a b i l i t y. A “se vere impairment” is one [that] “significa ntly l i m i t s . . . phy sical or menta l ability to do basic work activities.” Third, if pla intiff is not performingsubstantial g ainful ac tivity , has a se vere impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is presumed to be d i s ab l ed reg ardle ss of ag e, educ ation or work e x perie nce. F ourth, if the plaintiff's impairment does not pre vent her from doing her pa st releva nt work, plaintiff is not disabled. F or the fif

th and final step, eve n if the plaintiff’s impairme nt does preve nt he r f ro m do inghe r p a st r e le va nt w or k, if oth e r wo rk e xists in the natio na l e c on omy that plaintiff ca

n perf orm, plaintiff is not disabled. Heston , 245 F.3d at 534 (citations omitted). At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bea rs the burde n of proof, but the burden shifts to the Commissi oner at Step 5. W arner v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec

. , 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). Van der Maas challeng es t he AL J ’s re asoning and conc lusions as to S teps 2 and 5, cla iming that t h e s y m p tom of chronic f

atig ue wa s wrong ly

diag nosed at Step 2 of the sequential proc ess and , there fore , was wr ong ly excluded from conside ration of he r RFC at Step 5 of the proce ss. She also challeng es the AL J ’s decision to consider he r application accor ding to he r chronolog ical ag e instead of treating he r as a

person of advanc ed ag e. 1. Ev ide nc eof

V an d e r Ma as ’s impai

rment s I n o rd e r t o b e c la ssi fi e d a s a se ve re imp a ir

me nt f or the purp os e s of S tep 2, a me dic a lly deter minable impairment o r co m b ination of impairments must significa ntly limit an individual’s phy sical or me n t al ab i l i ty to do basic work a ctivities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a) . After
cons id e r in g th e me d ic a l e v id e n c e th a t V and e r M a a s s u f f e r e d f r o m C F S, th e A L J d e te r

mi n e d tha tNo. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 9 - “ any . . . c hr on ic fa

tigue sy nd rome . . . w hic h th e c la ima nt m ay e xpe ri e nc e [is] no t me dic a lly de te rm ina ble .” Th e AL J’s d isc us sio n o f V an d e r M a a s’ s a lle g e d CF S pr oc e e de d a s f oll ow s: The unde rsig ned has c ons i d ere d the claimant’ s alleg ation that she experienc es fibromy alg ia, chr onic fatigue sy ndrome, a

nd/or lupus. SS R 9 9 -2 p provides the g uidelines on how evaluation is to be made for case s involving chr o n i c fatigue sy nd ro me (C F S) . T hat r

uli ngstate s that CF S c on sti tut e s a me dic a lly

de te rm ina

ble imp a ir me nt w he n it is a c c omp anie d b y c e rt a in m e dic a l si g ns or

la bo ra tor y fi nd ing s. T h e M ay o Cl in ic r e p o rte d n o c le ar - c u t c a u s e f o r th e c la im an t’ s a ll e g e d fatig ue. Th e re we re no tr ig g e r p oin ts t o suggest fi br omya lg ia or sim ila r c a us e s. Ma g ne tic re so na nc e ima g ing(M RI ) a

nd e l e c t r o e n c e p h a l o gr a

m ( EE G) of the br a in w e re no rm a l. Other te s ti n g f

a il e d to me e t th e c r it e r ia s e t f o rth in SS R 9 9

- 2 p . . . . I t was no te d .

. . that the c la ima

nt’ s th ou g ht c on te nt w a s si g nif ic ant f or “ pr e oc c up a tio n w ith her somatic c omplaints. S he wa s try ing to convince me that she had psy cholog ical problems. This w as partially beca use of the fac t that she could no t get Social Security disability .” Van de r Maa s complains that the AL J mischara cter ized the evidence and failed to c onsider

a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e re le va nt t o w he the r C F S is a med ically de te rm ina

ble imp a ir

me nt. She fi rs t argues that the lac k of a “ clea r-c ut cause ” for

her f atig ue actua lly streng thens her claim that she has CFS. Van de r Maa s also contends that the A L J relied on the neg ative test results while ig noring the positive test results. Whe the r V an d e r M a a s a c tua lly su ffers fro m CF S is a sse sse d p ur su ant t o So c ia l Se c ur ity Ru li ng 99 -2p (S S R 9 9-2 p). Acco rdi ng to S S R 9 9-2 p, a ph y si cia n s ho ul d m ake a d iagno si s o f C FS only afte r alter

native medica l and psy chiatric cause s of chr onic fatigue have be en excluded. The AL J pro pe rl y

c on sid e re d SSR

99 -2p , cit ingthe ru le to n ote that “ CF S c on sti tut e s a me dic a lly deter minable impairment whe n it is accompanie d by cer tain medical signs of laboratory finding s.” After articulating this rule, the A L J went on to discuss various test re sults and rec ord evide nce establishing that “the cla imant has neve r bee n diag nosed with or tre ated f or [CFS] .”No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 10 - Even thoug h the AL J did not discuss (or may be eve n cons i d er ) ev ery

piece of medica l evidenc e re levant to CFS , t h e evidence that she did consider w as substantial. The AL J noted, for example, that of all the doctors that Van der Maas visited, not one of them had eve r diag nosed her with CFS. This fact is instructive, par ticularly consideringthat Van de r Maa s sugg ested to seve ral of the doc tors that CFS might be the cause of her fatig ue. None of them ag ree d with her sug g estion, andso me det erm in ed th at her fat igue w as ca us ed b y ot her c on di ti on s— a cl ear i nd ica ti on th at a CFS diag nosis was not appropr iate. The AL J ’s deter mination reg ardingCFS was ther efor e supported by substantial evidence , see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) , which mea ns that Van de r Maa s cannot pre vail even if the AL J mis se d co ntr ary e vid e nc e that ten ds to s up po rt a dia g no sis of

CF S. See F

oster , 279 F.3d at 353. Al tho ug h the AL J d id no t c on c lud e that V an d e r M a a s h a d CF S, the AL J did d e te rm ine in Step 2 that Van der

Maas’ s somatoform disorder and ar thr i t i s i n h er rig ht knee c onstitut ed seve re imp a ir me nts
. Th e AL J a lso fo un d in Ste p 2 th a t V an d e r M a a s’ s a nk le c on dit ion

wa s a me dic a lly de te rm ina ble imp a ir

me nt, bu t th a t V an d e r M aas “di d no t hav e an a nk le c on dit ion

. . . e ith e r s o restric tive or so painful as to be disabling.” Van der Maas argues on appea l that the AL J misapplied the standar d in Step 2 as it pertaine d to Van der Maas’ s ankle injury . Rather than “ disabling,” which is the standard that Van der Maas a lleg es the AL J applied in Step 2, the prope r standar d acc ording to Van der

Maas is whether the injury “sig nificantly

limit s basic wor

k activities.” Va

n der Ma as g oe s o n to argue tha

t becau se her ankle inj ur

y ke pt h e r f

ro m w a lki ngor

sta nd ing , th e AL J shou ld have f ound her disable d at Step 5 of the seque ntial proce ss.No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 11 - We conclude that the AL J corr ectly articulated t he st andar d in Step 2 when she noted that

a me dic a lly

de te rm ina

ble imp a ir

me nt o r c omb inatio n o f i mpa ir ment s is sev e re if

it s ig nif ic a ntl y limit s an individual’s phy sical or menta l ability to do basic wo rk ac t i v i ties. After articulating the sta nd ard , th e AL J we nt o n to c on c lud e that th e re wa s n o e viden ce t hat th e c la ima

nt’ s le ft a nk le impairment had a

ny eff ect on her abili ty to perf

orm work-r elated a ctivities. The AL J expli citly noted that V an d e r M a a s’ s c la ims of im pairme nt a nd its imp a c t on

he r a bil ity to w or k w e re no t e nti re ly
cre dible in light of he r own de scription of her activities and lifestyle, the deg ree of medica l treatment required, t h e cl aimant’s deme anor at the hear ing, the repor ts of the treating a

nd examining prac titioners, the medical history , and th e fi n d i n g s made on e x amination. Contrary to Van der Maas’ s assertion that the AL J either a pplied the wrongstandard in Step 2 or ig nored evidenc e of he r impairment, a re view of the AL J ’s finding s makes cle ar that the AL J proper ly considere d the r eleva

nt standard a nd evidenc e, but simply

deter mined that Van de r Maa s had ex ag g erated the leve l to which she wa s impaired. 2. The ALJ followed the proper standar d for ev aluati ng borderlin e age Van der Maas was 54 y ear s old w hen her insured status expired on Dec ember 31, 1998, but she was only 55 day s short of turning 55 at that time. She there fore argued bef o re t h e A L J t hat be c a us e he r a ilm e nts le ft he r wi th le ss mob ili ty and sta min a tha n a n ave ra g e 54 -y e ar- old , s he sh ou ld be considere d as someone of “adva nced ag e.” Wit h that deter mination, the AL J would have be en require d to find Va n d er M aas disabled. See 2 0 C
. F. R
. P t
. 4 0 4 , S u b p t
. P , Ap p . 2 (p ro v i d i n g a framework of

medical- vocational guidelines wher e, in certain ca ses, the par ticular c ombination of

a c l a i m an t ’ s a g e , e d

u c a t i o n , w o r

k e xp e r i e n c e , an d

R F C m an d a t e s a

f i n d i n g o f d i s a b i l i t y )

. T h e A L J,No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 12 - howeve r, dete rmi n ed t h at “it is not appropriate to consider the claimant to be a n individual of

a d v an c e d a g e o n h e r d a t e l a s t i n s u r e d f o r b e n e f i t s . ” O n a

p p e a l , V and e r

M a a s ar g u e s t h a tt h e A LJ failed to c onduct the prope r ana ly sis before arr iving at this conclusion. When deter

mining a claimant’s ag e under the medica l-vocational guide lines for purpose s of DIB e l i gibilit y , the claimant’ s ag e on the date last insured g ener ally g overns. Curtis v. Sec ’y of Health a n d Hu man Services , No. 88-1773, 1989 WL83869, at *3 (6th Cir. J uly 28, 1989) (unpublished). The ag e categ ories ar e not to be mecha nically applied, howe ver, w hen the c laimant is in a border line situation. See Crady v. Sec’ y of H ealth and Human Serv

s ., 83 5 F .2 d 6 17 , 6 22 (6 th Cir. 1987) (holding that the AL J could make his own de termination of Crady ’s age in a borde rline sit ua tio n a nd wa s n ot b ound

by a me dic a l r e po rt

statin gthat Cr a dy app eared olde r t ha n h is chronolog ical ag e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). A bor derline situation is prese nt where the claimant is within a few da

y s to a few m onths of rea ching an older ag e ca teg ory and whe re a

pplication of the old e r a g e c a te g or

y wo uld re su lt i n a

fi nd ingof

dis a bil ity . 2 0 C. F .R. § 4 04 .1 56 3( b) . I f b oth of the se fac tors ar e p r e s e n t, th e A L J is to u s e a “ s li d in g s c a le ” a p p r o a c h , ta

k in g into c o n s id e r a ti on the claimant’s pr offe r of “additional vocational adver sities” that might wa rra nt moving her

to an older ag e categ ory . A

p p l i ca t i o n o

f th e M ed i ca l -V o ca t i o n a l Gu i d el i n es i n B o rderline Age Situations , Soc ial Security Ad m i n . , Ofc . of He aring s and Appe als, Hearings, Appeals and Litigati on Law Manual ( H A L L E X ) II
- 5
- 3

- 2 ( 2 0 0 6 )

. “ T h e f a c t t h a t a g e c a t e g o r i e s ar e n o tt o b e a p p l i e d m e c h an i c a l l y, h o we v er , o b v i o u s l y

d o es n o tm ea nt h at a c l ai m an tm u s tb e m o v e d m ec h an i ca l l y t o t h e n ex tage catego ry wh en ev er [her] chronologic al ag e is close to that categ ory .” Crady , 835 F.2d at 622; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b).No. 05-2588

Van der Maas v . Commissioner

- 13 - Va nd er M aa s wa s wi t h i na c o u

p l e o f m o n t h s o f re ac h i n g an o l d er age ca t ego ry . Al t h o u gh the AL J ac kn ow le dg e d th a t f a c t, t he AL J did n ot mo ve he r t o th e hig he r c a te g or y , p re su ma

bly beca use the AL J did not find that Va n der Ma as had de monstrated the “ additional vocational adver sities” require d to do so. See H ALLEX II-5-3- 2 . The AL J ’s fa ilure to expli citly mention the
s l i d i n g s ca l e, es p ec i al l y

co n s i d er i n g t h at s h e a rt i cu l at edt h e t wo fa ct o rs re l ev an t t o t h e b o rd er l i n e a ge analy sis, does not undermine the AL J ’s deter mination to consider Van de r Maa s’s appli cation
acc ording to her c hronolog ical ag e. A re view of the AL J ’s dec ision makes clea r that the AL J was
u np e r s u a d e d

b y V and e r M a a s ’ s a l l e g a t i o n s r e g ar d i n g t h e e x t e n to f h e r i mp a i r

m e n t s an d t h a tt h e A LJ believed that many

of Va n der Ma as’s he alth problems ar ose af ter h er i n s u re d status had expired. Substantial evidence in the rec ord supports the AL J ’s conc lusion. See H eston , 245 F.3d at 534.

III . C ON CL USI ON For all the re asons stated a

bove, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.