IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

HICA EDUCATION LOAN )

CORPORATION, )

Plaintiff, ) 

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-550-KD-M

 )

WALTER K. LITTLE a/k/a ) 

WALTER K. LITTLE, JR. )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. (Doc. 9). 

Upon consideration, the motion is GRANTED. 

I. Background

On November 26, 2014, Plaintiff HICA Education Loan Corporation filed a complaint 

(the “Complaint”) against Defendant Walter K. Little seeking enforcement of a federally 

guaranteed Health Education Assistance Loan that was signed by the Defendant pursuant to the 

provisions of the United States Health Education Assistance Loan Program, 42 U.S.C. § 292 et 

seq. and 42 C.F.R. Part 60. (Doc. 1). The Complaint contains the following relevant allegations. 

On December 30, 1994, the Defendant signed a promissory note (“the Note”) borrowing 

$81,557.75 from the Student Loan Marketing Association. (Doc. 1 at 2). The sum set forth in the 

Note was “loaned and advanced to the Defendant.” (Id.). On an unspecified date, the Note was 

“sold, transferred, and assigned to Plaintiff by the Student Loan Marketing Association (SLMA)” 

and “Plaintiff is the owner and/or holder of the Note.” (Id.). Defendant has since failed to make 

the required payments on the Note, and therefore is in default. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff is entitled to 

collect the unpaid amounts due and owing under the Note, including, but not limited to, the 

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unpaid principal, interest, and late charges. (Doc. 1-5, the Note). The Complaint “requests 

judgment and damages against Defendant for actual damages, including (1) unpaid principal, (2) 

accrued, unpaid, prejudgment interest calculated in accordance with the terms of the Note and (3) 

accrued, unpaid late charges, as applicable, with post-judgment interest on these amounts at the 

variable rate set forth in the Note.” (Doc. 1 at 4). Plaintiff also requests an award of attorney's 

fees and costs. Id.

On February 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a return of service, in which the process server 

averred that Defendant was personally served on January 16, 2015. (Doc. 6). On March 4, 2015, 

Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default, which was granted on March 6, 2015. (Docs. 7-

8). A copy of the default was mailed to the Defendant. (Doc. 8 docket entry).

On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. (Doc. 9). The 

declaration of Robin Zimmermann, an employee of Navient Solutions, Inc., the servicing agent 

for Plaintiff was included with the motion. (Doc. 9-2). Zimmermann declares that as of February 

12, 20151 – the date of her declaration – Defendant owed Plaintiff the following amounts under 

the Note: 1) $38,998.66 in unpaid principal; 2) $977.66 in unpaid interest; and 3) interest through 

the date of judgment at the rate of $3.33 per day. (Doc. 9-2 at 1). Plaintiff maintains that the 

allegations in the Complaint and the evidence presented in support of the motion demonstrate 

that it is entitled to default judgment against Defendant “in the amount of $39,976.32, plus 

additionally prejudgment interest from February [1]3, 2015 to the date of judgment at the rate of 

$3.33 per day”2 and post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in the Note or, in the alternative, 

the rate established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. (Doc. 9 at 2 at n.1). 

 1 The Zimmerman declaration was misdated as February 12, 2014. The correct date is February 12, 2015. (Doc. 11). 2 The Zimmerman declaration stated this date as February 3, 2015. However, Plaintiff clarified that prejudgment 

interest is to be calculated from February 13, 2015. (Doc. 11).

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II. Standard of Review

When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought fails to plead or 

otherwise defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that fact is made to 

appear by affidavit or otherwise, the Clerk enters default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). However, the mere 

entry of default by the Clerk does not in itself warrant the entry of default judgment by the Court. 

Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1975).

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Rather, the Court must find that there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment to be 

entered. Id.; see Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n. 41 (11th Cir.1997)

(“[A] default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”). A default 

judgment has the effect of establishing as fact the plaintiff's well-pled allegations of fact, and 

bars the defendant from contesting those facts on appeal. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 

361 (11th Cir.1987) (citing Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206). Although it must accept well-pled 

facts as true, the Court is not required to accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Notwithstanding the propriety of default judgment against a defendant, it remains 

incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the amount of damages to which he or she is entitled. “While 

well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, plaintiff's allegations relating to the 

amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the court must determine both 

the amount and character of damages.” Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F.Supp.2d 588, 

593 n. 5 (S.D.Ala.2007); Whole Space Indus., Ltd. v. Gulfcoast Int'l Prods., Inc., Case No. 2:09–

cv–217–UA–SPC, 2009 WL 2151309, at *3 (M.D.Fla. July 13, 2009) (same). Therefore, even in 

the default judgment context, “[a] court has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis 

for any damage award it enters[.]”Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th 

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Cir. 2003); see Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 

1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that damages may be awarded on default judgment only if the 

record adequately reflects a basis for an award of damages).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[f]ederal law similarly requires a judicial 

determination of damages absent a factual basis in the record,” even where the defendant is in 

default. Anheuser Busch, 317 F.3d at 1266. Ordinarily, unless a plaintiff's claim against a 

defaulting defendant is for a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation, the law 

requires the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to fix the amount of damages. See S.E. 

C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). However, no hearing is needed “when the 

district court already has a wealth of evidence from the party requesting the hearing, such that 

any additional evidence would be truly unnecessary to a fully informed determination of 

damages.” See Id. at 1232 n. 13; see also Wallace v. The Kiwi Grp., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 679, 681 

(M.D.Fla. 2008) (“a hearing is not necessary if sufficient evidence is submitted to support the 

request for damages”).

III. Analysis

To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must establish the following: 1) defendant 

signed the note; 2) plaintiff is the present owner of the note; and 3) the note is in default. HICA 

Educ. Loan Corp. v. Perez, 2012 WL 4336026, at *1 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 20, 2012) (citing FDIC v. 

Selaiden Builders, Inc., 973 F.2d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir.1992)). Here, the Complaint contains the 

following relevant allegations: 1) Defendant signed the Note on December 30, 1994. (Docs. 1 at 

2, 1-5); 2) Plaintiff is the present owner of the Note (Doc. 1 at 2); and 3) the Note is in default 

due to Plaintiff's failure to make the required payments thereon. (Doc. 1 at 2). Accordingly, the 

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED. 

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The amount Plaintiff seeks to recover under the Note is one capable of mathematical 

calculation, thus there is no need for a hearing on damages. Zimmermann declares that as of 

February 12, 2015 – the date of her declaration – Defendant owed Plaintiff the following 

amounts under the Note: 1) $38,998.66 in unpaid principal; 2) $977.66 in accrued, unpaid 

interest; and 3) interest through the date of judgment at the rate of $3.33 per day. (Doc. 9-2 at 1).

The declaration is uncontroverted. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the amounts 

set forth above, as well as post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1961.3

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. 

(Doc. 9) and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 

against Defendant Walter K. Little a/k/a Walter K. Little, Jr. Plaintiff is entitled to the following 

sums:

 3 Plaintiff requests that post-judgment interest accrue at the variable rate to which the parties contracted in the Note 

and only seeks post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 in the alternative. (Doc. 9 at 2, n.1). In support 

of the contractual rate, plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 292d(d), which provides that laws limiting interest rates on loans 

do not apply to HEAL loans. Plaintiff does not provide any authority for the proposition that this provision 

implicates 28 U.S.C. § 1961. “Post-judgment interest in a civil case is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) which 

provides that the rate of interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment [ ] at a rate equal to 

the weekly average 1—year constant maturity Treasury [bill] ... for the calendar week preceding the date of the 

judgment. ...Although the Eleventh Circuit has never addressed the issue, the consensus among courts that have is 

that parties may agree to a different post-judgment interest rate. However, federal law requires language expressing 

an intent that a particular interest rate apply to judgments or judgment debts' to be clear, unambiguous and 

unequivocal. This requirement arises from the principal that the debt is extinguished upon entry of judgment and a 

new debt, a judgment debt, is created. The parties must explicitly state that they are agreeing to a post-judgment 

interest rate. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Foley, 2012 WL 1382523, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2012)(internal 

quotations and citations omitted). The Note in this case does not contain the type of “clear, unambiguous and 

unequivocal language” necessary to circumvent the statutory interest rate. See HICA Educ. Loan Corp. v. Perkins, 

2012 WL 3079132, at *1 n.2 (D.Colo. July 25, 2012) (holding the same). Accordingly, post-judgment interest is to 

be calculated at the rate determined by 28 U.S.C. §1961. 

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Unpaid principal: $38,998.66

Unpaid interest: $977.66

Pre-judgment interest from February 13, 2015 to June 11, 2015 at $3.33 per day: $386.28

Total: $40,362.60

Plaintiff is also awarded post-judgment interest, which shall accrue beginning on the date 

of entry of this Order, bearing the rate specified under federal law, 28 U.S.C. §1961. Final 

default judgment shall be entered upon resolution of Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees and 

costs. 

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this order to the Defendant at his address of 

record. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 11th day of June 2015.

s / Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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