1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 19-1249

________________ YVONNE RALEY, Appellant

v. FELICIAN COLLEGE

________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(D.N.J. No. 2:1 5-cv-06626) District Judge: Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo

________________ Submitted Under Third Ci rcuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 5, 2020 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge , HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 16, 2020)

________________ OPINION *

________________ KRAUSE, Circuit Judge

.

* This disposition is not an opini on of the full Court and pursu ant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute bindi ng precedent.2 Yvonne Raley appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judg ment in favor of her former employer, Felician College, on her Title VII gender discrimination claim. Raley argues the District Court erred in holding, first, that she had not established a prima facie case of discrimination, 1 and second, that she failed to demonstrate Felician’s reason f or her termination was pretextual. We resolve this case on the second ground: Raley’s failure to demonstrate that Felician’s reason for her termination was pret extual is fatal to her case. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I. Discussion 2 We review the grant of summary j udgment here de novo and will a ffirm if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and, viewing the fa cts in the light most favorable to Raley, Felician is nonetheless “entitled to judgment as a ma tter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Burton v. Teleflex Inc. , 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). Felician asserts that it had a le gitimate, nondiscriminatory re ason for terminating Raley’s employment: a drop in st udent enrollment precipitated aschoolwide reduction-inforce and Raley was selected for termination based on a holisti c assessment of criteria,

1 Specifically, Raley asserts that she established her prima fac ie case by identifying at least two similarly situated c omparators, Drs. Khawaja and A baunza, who had less seniority and were not terminated. Felician argues that the Di strict Court correctly concluded that neither comparato r was similarly situated becaus e, unlike Raley, they both had administrative duties in add ition to their classroom respon sibilities. In view of our disposition on alternative ground s, we need not resolve that di spute.

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 an d 1367(a), and we have jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3 including “academic prioritizati on; essentiality to the program ; teaching effectiveness; service to the university; credentials; scholarship, and senior ity.” Def.’s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 35–36, ECF No. 50-21. To defeat summary judg ment, Raley must show that Felician’s proffered reason was pretextual by “point[ing] to evidence that would allow a factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s reason[s].” 3 Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh , 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie , 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)). On appeal, Rale y advances two principal argum ents. Neither is persuasive. First, she argues that two Felic ian administrators disputed Fel ician’s claim that it was in dire economic straits. These administrators stated Feli cian’s enrollment projections were “trending upward” and that the financial strain Felician f aced at the time of Raley’s termination was not “materially d ifferent” from prior dips in e nrollment that the college weathered successfully. See Kubersky Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 56-3; Back Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 56-4. But those same administrat ors testified that they either were not privy to discussions about Felician’s financial condition or had not reviewed the co llege’s financial data. Without any substantial ground for challenging Felician’s descr iption of its financial state, these administrators’ comments do not suffice to demonstrate th at Felician’s proffered reason for Raley’s termination was pretextual.

3 Raley does not point to evidence that “an invidious discrimina tory reason was more likely than not a motivati ng or determinative cause” as an alternative way to show pretext. Willis , 808 F.3d at 645 (internal quot ation marks and citation omitte d).4 Second, Raley points out that prior to her termination, a Felic ian taskforce had ranked her department in the t op quintile of its departments, a nd she was teaching more students than any other faculty m ember in her department. This evidence does not discredit Felician’s economic motive for Raley’s termination. The questi on before us “is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” Willis , 808 F.3d at 647 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Considered alongside the other steps Felician took to cut its o perating budget—including firing at least fifteen other professors, half of whom were men , and decreasing administrative positions schoolwide—this evidence is insufficie nt to support an inference that Felician’s reason for termi nating Raley’s contract was pre textual.

II. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in Felician’s favor.