IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADAM BEECH, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 14-0241-WS-B

 )

FV WISHBONE, her tackle, furniture, )

apparel, equipment, and appurtenances, )

etc., in rem, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 

63). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition.1

I. Nature of the Case.

Plaintiffs, Adam Beech, Tenley Warhurst, and Kris Leith, commenced this in rem action 

on May 29, 2014, to enforce maritime liens against defendant, the fishing vessel F/V 

WISHBONE, her tackle, furniture, apparel, equipment and appurtenances, etc. (the “Vessel”). 

The well-pleaded allegations of the Verified Complaint (doc. 1) filed by Beech and Warhurst, as 

 1 The parties have made the task of summary judgment review more onerous than 

necessary by failing to comply with the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order’s requirement that “[i]f a 

party’s exhibits in support of or in opposition to a motion exceed fifty (50) pages in the 

aggregate, then that party must deliver a courtesy hard copy of those exhibits to the Judge’s 

chambers by mail or hand delivery.” (Doc. 35, ¶ 13(c).) Movant relies on more than 100 pages 

of exhibits and plaintiffs collectively submit more than 170 pages of exhibits; however, neither 

side has provided courtesy copies. Also, plaintiffs have cluttered the court file with three 

separate summary judgment responses (docs. 69-71), significant portions of which are identical, 

thereby forcing the Court and opposing counsel to sift through the same text three different 

times. The clutter extends to the exhibits. Each plaintiff has filed exhibits and deposition 

excerpts that not only duplicate each other’s, but also substantially overlap those filed by 

defendant. The net result is that there are as many as four copies of certain exhibits in the court 

file, complicating efforts to locate and review pertinent materials. In its discretion, the Court will 

consider the parties’ filings notwithstanding these defects.

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well as the Verified Complaint in Intervention (doc. 9) subsequently filed by Leith, reflect that 

plaintiff Beech seeks to recover $25,000 that he claims to be owed for services and supplies 

provided to the Vessel in May 2013; that plaintiff Warhurst seeks to recover $25,000 that she 

claims to be owed for services and supplies provided to the Vessel in May 2013; and that 

intervenor-plaintiff Leith seeks to recover $4,000 that he claims to be owed for services and 

supplies provided to the Vessel in May 2013. The present owner of the Vessel, non-party 

Skipper’s Landing, Inc., is appearing in this matter for the limited purpose of defending on the 

Vessel’s behalf. Skipper’s Landing denies that plaintiffs have valid, enforceable maritime liens 

for these services and supplies, and further interposes various affirmative defenses.

II. Relevant Background.2

A. Ownership History of the Vessel.

Prior to May 2013, the Vessel was owned by non-party B&D Maritime, Inc., which 

utilized it in connection with activities in the fishing and boat charter industries in Orange Beach, 

Alabama. (Doc. 63, Exh. 1.) On May 28, 2013, B&D Maritime entered into a 

“Lease/Agreement to Purchase” with an entity called Davy Jones Fishing Charters, LLC (“Davy 

Jones LLC”). (Id.)

3 By the terms of this Lease/Agreement to Purchase, Davy Jones LLC was to 

lease the Vessel from B&D Maritime through the closing date of September 19, 2013, at which 

time the purchase would be finalized and title would pass to Davy Jones LLC. The buyer

intended to use the Vessel to perform charter fishing operations. The parties to the Agreement 

acknowledged that, during the lease period, “work to vessel may be performed to ‘make ready’ 

 2 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record, 

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, plaintiffs’ evidence 

is taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in their favor. Also, federal courts cannot 

weigh credibility at the summary judgment stage. See Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 

F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Even if a district court believes that the evidence presented by 

one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of 

credibility choices.”). Therefore, the Court will “make no credibility determinations or choose 

between conflicting testimony, but instead accept[s] [plaintiffs’] version of the facts drawing all 

justifiable inferences in [their] favor.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008).

3 Davy Jones LLC was comprised of members Gene Warhurst and David Jones, 

who formed this entity for the purpose of acquiring and operating the Vessel. (Doc. 71, Exh. 1, ¶ 

IX; doc. 63, Exh. 4, ¶ 15.) 

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for upcoming fishing season.” (Doc. 63, Exh. 1.) This lawsuit, and the maritime liens asserted

by plaintiffs pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31342, arise from certain “make ready” work that plaintiffs 

allegedly performed for Davy Jones LLC during that lease period.

For reasons not germane to this lawsuit, the contemplated closing as between B&D 

Maritime and Davy Jones LLC never took place.

4

 Instead, B&D Maritime entered into a new 

Purchase Agreement with Skipper’s Landing on October 17, 2013, pursuant to which Skipper’s 

Landing agreed to close on the purchase of the Vessel within 30 days. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2.) 

Skipper’s Landing delivered a sizeable down payment on the date of that Purchase Agreement, 

and wired the balance of the purchase price two days later, on October 19, 2013. The Bill of 

Sale for that transaction is dated October 21, 2013. (Doc. 63, Exh. 4, ¶ 37.) From that time 

through the present, Skipper’s Landing has owned and operated the Vessel.

B. Services/Supplies Provided by Plaintiff Beech.

Plaintiff Adam Beech seeks to enforce a maritime lien against the Vessel for work that he 

characterizes as follows: “We went in and completely renovated the cabin on that boat.” (Beech

Dep., at 9.) According to Beech, these renovations included removal of seats, walls and ceilings; 

rebuilding of benches; installation of cabinets, plywood for ceilings, lights, and electrical wiring; 

and the like. (Id.) Beech was hired to perform this work by Gene Warhurst (“Mr. Warhurst”), a 

member of Davy Jones LLC. Beech’s understanding was that, in exchange for these services, he 

would not be paid directly, but instead “would have twenty-five thousand dollars interest in the 

boat,” meaning that he would be granted a share interest in the Vessel by virtue of his work and 

labor. (Id. at 10-11.) Beech elaborated that his efforts were “an investment in the boat, because 

it was an ongoing business starting up as a charter business, and I would have a stake of interest 

in that business.” (Id. at 11.) The parties did not reduce this agreement to writing because Beech 

 4 Efforts to affix blame and delineate financial accountability for the implosion of 

the B&D Maritime / Davy Jones LLC transaction are ongoing in state-court litigation captioned 

Davy Jones Fishing Charters, LLC; Ernest E. Warhurst, Jr., individually and as parent and next 

friend on behalf of Kathleen Warhurst, a minor; Lorrie Johnson, as parent and next friend on 

behalf of Matthew Johnson, a minor v. Randy Boggs, Susan Boggs, David Jones, B&D Maritime 

Inc., and Skippers Landing Inc., Case No. CV 2013-901412, pending in the Circuit Court of 

Baldwin County, Alabama. (See doc. 63, Exh. 4.) Adam Beech, Tenley Warhurst, and Kris 

Leith are not named parties in the state-court litigation, and apparently have no direct 

involvement in same.

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“was going through a divorce at the time” and “didn’t want to show me having any ownership in 

the boat or ownership in anything until I got my divorce settled, because it would just be 

something else I had to fight over.” (Id. at 12.) By the time Beech’s divorce proceeding had 

concluded, in his words, “the boat had vamoosed,” so Beech never documented this agreement 

with Mr. Warhurst. (Id. at 18.)

Beech’s expectation was that the services he provided to renovate the Vessel’s cabin 

were simply an “initial investment” in the fishing charter business and that he would “eventually, 

invest more in it, too. And if the boat continued to do good and make money, then I would begin 

to draw a percentage of profits out of it.” (Id. at 13.) Beech viewed the supplies and services he 

provided to the Vessel as “a long-term investment,” but also believed that if things went wrong, 

he could “get some money out of it one way or the other,” presumably referring to the maritime 

lien he now asserts against the Vessel. (Id. at 14.) Prior to filing suit in this case on May 29, 

2014, Beech never claimed or demanded payment from anybody for his work on the Vessel in 

May 2013, because he understood that “we may get the boat back” and resume the previously 

described long-term investment plan. (Id. at 14-15.) Moreover, given Beech’s stated “goal” of 

investing in the Vessel, he “really wasn’t worried about keeping up with time and materials” in 

the course of performing the cabin renovation services. (Id. at 15-16.) Beech has maintained

neither invoices nor other records showing the money and time he expended in performing that 

work. (Id. at 17.)

C. Services/Supplies Provided by Plaintiff Warhurst.

Plaintiff Tenley Warhurst (“Warhurst”) is the wife of Gene Warhurst, who is both a 

member of Davy Jones LLC and a practicing attorney. (Warhurst Dep., at 9.) On “numerous, 

numerous times,” Warhurst loaned her own money to Mr. Warhurst’s law practice (the “Law 

Practice”) to avoid the need for Mr. Warhurst’s firm to draw on a line of credit. (Id. at 20, 26-

27.)5 She made these loans to the Law Practice as “general loans,” without earmarking them for 

the Vessel or for any other specific purpose; however, in lieu of demanding reimbursement for 

certain of those loans, Warhurst authorized the Law Practice to “use that money to go to the boat 

to be able to buy these supplies to get it started.” (Id. at 26-27.) As Warhurst put it in her 

 5 Warhurst explained that she had her own “personal savings” funds that were 

separate and apart from marital or joint accounts maintained with Mr. Warhurst. (Id. at 25.)

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deposition, “instead of having to pay that money back to me, I was kind of vested in this boat 

venture after we got it going.” (Id. at 20.)6 She further explained as follows: “I agreed that we 

could take the money that [the Law Practice] owed to me to buy supplies for the [Vessel] in 

order to get that business up and going as fast as possible to be able to make some money at that 

business.” (Id. at 92.) Warhurst had recently left a job in the pharmaceutical industry, and 

wanted to “be able to participate more” in the contemplated charter fishing business of the 

Vessel, “just being able to run the business” when it became operational. (Id. at 97.)

Under this system, instead of repaying Warhurst for her loans to the Law Practice, the 

Law Practice would disburse those funds to Davy Jones LLC as a loan for the latter to use to 

purchase supplies for the Vessel. (Id. at 20-21, 25.) Because Warhurst personally “handle[s] the 

books” and is “in charge of the money” for the Law Practice, she pays herself back for her loans 

to the Law Practice as and when she deems appropriate. (Id. at 29.) Warhurst also testified that 

many items she provided to the Vessel “are directly from [her] personal accounts,” and that other 

supplies were funded via means such as (i) rental income checks that she and Mr. Warhurst 

ordinarily would have deposited in their joint personal accounts, (ii) joint credit card accounts 

held by Warhurst and Mr. Warhurst, or (iii) a business account for a “little business” owned by 

Warhurst that “never really did anything.” (Id. at 28, 37, 50, 54, 71-73.) On occasion, Warhurst

indicated, she would deposit checks directly into the Davy Jones LLC’s account. (Id. at 75.) 

However, she was never a member of that entity.

According to Warhurst, among the items she provided the Vessel were “a little robot 

vacuum that we had at home” that the Law Practice had purchased for $349 in December 2012 

(id. at 31-33), a fishing reel purchased from Academy Sports for $439.99 on May 21, 2013 (id. at 

38-39), a satellite television which was acquired by “an even trade” of Mr. Warhurst’s reef 

permit (id. at 44-45), an Apple TV device purchased for $100 that the Warhursts “just had ... 

around” to connect to the Vessel’s television to stream music and movies (id. at 63-64), a “big 

 6 In Warhurst’s words, she was not concerned about this arrangement because “I 

know if anything goes awry, that I always have the net to fall back on of having a lien against the 

boat to get these supplies.” (Warhurst Dep., at 20.) She reiterated this philosophy later in her 

deposition by explaining that “my hope was that the business would make money,” but if the 

Vessel did not become profitable, “I had a second safety net, now that I could claim a lien.” (Id.

at 92-93.)

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Yeti cooler” purchased for $1,018.45 (Id. at 61), another Yeti cooler purchased on June 1, 2013 

for $502.14 (id. at 68-69), a Green Egg grill purchased for $624.24 (id. at 81), and two Shimano 

fishing rods valued at $300 that the Warhursts had previously maintained at their residence (id. at 

86-87). Warhurst also identified numerous other line items as payments for Vessel-related 

supplies or repairs; however, she was unable to specify precisely how those funds were allocated. 

With respect to the Yeti coolers, the Green Egg grill, the Apple TV and so forth, Warhurst 

testified that she had “no idea” whether those items remained on the Vessel after Davy Jones 

LLC relinquished possession in September 2013. (Id. at 82.)

D. Services/Supplies Provided by Intervenor-Plaintiff Leith.

Plaintiff Kris Leith’s involvement in this matter dates back to a time when Mr. Warhurst 

served as his lawyer in a personal injury case. (Leith Dep. at 12.) Upon resolution of that 

personal injury matter, Leith testified, “I had some money.” (Id.) Mr. Warhurst then approached 

Leith because he “needed some stuff done” on the Vessel. (Id. at 13.) The idea, according to 

Leith, was that Leith would act as “kind of a silent partner with no money invested other than 

this.” (Id.) Mr. Warhurst convinced Leith to “tie up my money” in the Vessel by telling him that 

his “interest in it would be protected” because he could bring a maritime lien if anything went 

wrong, “so you ain’t got to worry about it.” (Id. at 13-14.) The pitch to Leith was that “[w]e’re 

going to make some money” and were “fixing to go make a million dollars” in this business 

venture in which Leith was participating. (Id. at 14.) As part and parcel of this arrangement, 

Leith attended business meetings with Davy Jones LLC members concerning the Vessel, at 

which time he provided input and suggestions on matters such as names, pictures, and 

advertising. (Id. at 13.) Leith “knew all of their business” and contrasted his situation with one 

in which a contractor “had no inside information.” (Id. at 23.)

Based on this understanding, Leith purchased and installed seven security cameras on the 

Vessel. (Id. at 17.) He testified that he has “no idea what date” this work was performed. (Id. at 

25.) Be that as it may, Leith testified, he provided these services as “kind of an investment” with 

the thought of “doubling your money” because he “had an extra two thousand” in cash because 

of the personal injury settlement. (Id. at 22.) Leith’s understanding was that he would recoup 

his investment “[w]hen the boat started making money.” (Id.) During his deposition, Leith 

repeatedly characterized his efforts for the Vessel as “an investment,” explaining, “somebody 

comes into money like that, and they think you can make an investment .... I mean, you want to 

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invest money, you know.” (Id. at 28.) According to Leith, “I thought I was rich and was going 

to make some money.” (Id.) Leith never asked or expected to be compensated directly for his 

work on the Vessel until, in his words, “everything went to crap.” (Id. at 23.) He never made 

demand upon Mr. Warhurst or Davy Jones LLC to pay him for the work he had done. (Id. at 25.)

E. Facts Pertaining to Plaintiffs’ Preservation/Enforcement of Liens.

On October 15, 2013, Davy Jones LLC – but not Beech, Warhurst or Leith – filed a 

lawsuit against B&D Maritime, Randy Boggs (an owner or officer of B&D Maritime) and David 

Jones (formerly a member of Davy Jones LLC) in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, 

Alabama. (Doc. 69, Exh. 1.) Skipper’s Landing was not originally named as a defendant in that 

case. As initially pleaded, the complaint filed in that action (the “Baldwin County Complaint”) 

alleged that B&D Maritime had breached the Lease/Agreement to Purchase, that Jones had 

breached his duty to Davy Jones LLC by becoming captain of the Vessel for B&D Maritime, that 

the defendants had wrongfully converted the Vessel and had been unjustly enriched thereby, and 

that Davy Jones LLC was entitled to an equitable lien on the Vessel for “amounts advanced and 

paid to [sic] by Plaintiff to Defendant for acquisition, charter and repairs to the vessel.” (Doc. 

69, Exh. 1, at ¶ XXVII.)

7

 The Baldwin County Complaint did not reference (much less 

enumerate) any services and supplies allegedly provided by Beech, Warhurst and Leith, nor did 

it identify them as putative lienholders with respect to the Vessel. A copy of the Baldwin County 

Complaint was served on Boggs on October 21, 2013. (Doc. 63, Exh. 3.)

Prior to closing on the Vessel in October 2013, Skipper’s Landing received no records, 

documents, correspondence or other communication reflecting that Beech, Warhurst and Leith 

had performed any work on, or provided any supplies or services for, the Vessel five months 

earlier, much less that they were claiming maritime liens for that work. (Britt Dep., at 59-61.) 

At some time, Skipper’s Landing did review an abstract of title, which would have revealed any 

 7 The acrimonious nature of the parting of ways between David Jones and Gene 

Warhurst as members of Davy Jones LLC, is further exemplified by Earnest E. Warhurst, Jr. v. 

One Twenty Foot Bertran, etc., in rem, and David L. Jones, in personam, Civil Action 14-0245-

N, a separate federal lawsuit between Mr. Warhurst and Jones filed in this District Court. As the 

Court understands it, that case arose from a disagreement as to possession of another vessel 

owned by Mr. Warhurst as to which Jones performed repairs for which he had never been paid. 

Following a non-jury trial, Magistrate Judge Nelson entered judgment in Jones’ favor in March 

2015.

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recorded liens on the Vessel; however, no such items appeared on the document. (Id. at 21; 

Boggs Dep., at 70.)8 Prior to closing, Skipper’s Landing did not undertake to determine whether 

there were any unrecorded liens or other claims against the Vessel. (Britt Dep., at 19, 21.) Nor 

did Skipper’s Landing endeavor to ascertain whether there were any pending lawsuits involving 

B&D Maritime at the time of that transaction. (Id. at 22.) Skipper’s Landing did not review any 

of the Vessel’s logs prior to closing on the sale, and its principal did not go onboard the boat 

until after it was purchased. (Id. at 32-33.) As Skipper’s Landing’s principal put it, “I didn’t get 

anything, didn’t ask for anything.” (Id. at 33.) Skipper’s Landing was not represented by 

counsel in this transaction. (Id. at 21.)

III. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 

56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the 

district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to 

show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 

'a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden 

of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party 

has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility 

determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBHSiegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual 

determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(citation omitted).

 8 This result comes as no surprise, given that Beech, Warhurst and Leith had not 

recorded or caused to be recorded any such liens against the Vessel.

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IV. Legal Analysis.

The Motion for Summary Judgment advances seven separate grounds on which Skipper’s 

Landing maintains that the Complaint should be dismissed. The Court finds it necessary to 

address only two of these issues, to-wit: (i) movant’s contention that plaintiffs are not strangers 

to the Vessel and therefore lack valid maritime liens; and (ii) movant’s argument that plaintiffs’

maritime liens (if any) were rendered unenforceable by operation of the equitable doctrine of 

laches. These two issues are, independently and collectively, dispositive of the pending Rule 56 

Motion in its entirety.

A. Plaintiffs Are Not Strangers to the Vessel.

1. Governing Legal Principles.

Central to plaintiffs’ in rem claim against the Vessel is their contention that each of them 

holds a valid maritime lien. The Maritime Commercial Instruments and Liens Vessel 

Identification Systems Act of 1988 specifies that “a person providing necessaries to a vessel on 

the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner ... has a maritime lien on the vessel.” 

46 U.S.C. § 31342. An important limitation to this general rule is that it applies only to strangers 

to the vessel. Indeed, the law is unequivocal that joint venturers are not entitled to, and cannot 

obtain, maritime liens. See, e.g., Rose v. M/V “GULF STREAM FALCON,” 186 F.3d 1345, 

1348 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is true that joint venturers generally are not entitled to a lien for 

‘necessaries’ provided because they occupy a position akin to an owner. ... Conversely, a 

‘stranger’ to the vessel is entitled to a maritime lien for ‘necessaries’ provided to a vessel 

because a ‘stranger’ relies on the credit of the vessel, and not on the credit of the co-venturer.”) 

(citations omitted); Fulcher’s Point Pride Seafood, Inc. v. M/V Theodora Maria, 935 F.2d 208, 

211 (11th Cir. 1991) (“While the presumption in favor of a maritime lien is strong, joint venturers 

cannot hold maritime liens because they are not strangers to the vessel.”) (citations and internal 

marks omitted).9

 9 See also Sasportes v. M/V Sol de Copacabana, 581 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 

1978) (“Joint venturers cannot hold maritime liens because they are not strangers to the vessel, 

... but rather occupy a position akin to that of the vessel’s owner.”) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); Mullane v. Chambers, 438 F.3d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 2006) (“maritime 

liens, created pursuant to the rule of advances or any other theory, are intended to safeguard the 

interests of ‘strangers to the vessel,’ not vessel owners or those who can control the vessel’s 

affairs”); In re SeaEscape Cruises Ltd., 191 B.R. 944, 947 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (“[S]hipowners, joint 

(Continued)

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From a policy standpoint, in the maritime lien system, “[t]he overarching goal is keeping 

the channels of maritime commerce open – by ensuring that people who service vessels have an 

efficient way of demanding reimbursement for their labor and are thus willing to perform the 

services necessary to keep vessels in operation.” Mullane v. Chambers, 438 F.3d 132, 138 (1st

Cir. 2006). That objective is simply not promoted by conferring maritime liens upon persons 

who own or otherwise have the ability to control or influence the affairs of a vessel.10 

Furthermore, the “strangers to the vessel” prerequisite for maritime liens “is justified because of 

the equities involved; that is, those who share the responsibility for incurring the debts of the 

vessel ought not be reimbursed out of that vessel’s proceeds to the detriment of other 

lienholders.” Hinson v. M/V CHIMERA, 661 F. Supp.2d 614, 619 (E.D. La. 2009) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ridinger v. 33’ Speedboat, Hull ID Number: 

EMO0331169A89, 2009 WL 2030237, *3 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009) (similar).

Skipper’s Landing’s Motion for Summary Judgment takes the position that Beech, 

Warhurst and Leith were all joint venturers with Davy Jones LLC, and that they therefore are not 

strangers to the Vessel and are ineligible to hold maritime liens against it. To determine whether 

a person furnishing necessaries to a vessel is a joint venturer (and, hence, not a stranger to the 

vessel), binding appellate precedents have examined the following considerations:

“The parties’ intentions are important. Joint ventures involve joint control or the 

joint right of control. Both venturers share in the profits, and both have a duty to 

share in the losses. But of course these elements cannot be applied mechanically. 

No one aspect of the relationship is decisive.”

 

venturers, investors or shareholders in a shipowning corporation cannot have a valid maritime 

lien on a vessel in which they own an interest.”); Fathom Expeditions, Inc. v. M/T Gavrion, 402 

F. Supp. 390, 397 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (“joint venturers are not entitled to a maritime lien for 

furnishing supplies, repairs or labor”). 

10 “The purpose of a maritime lien, therefore, is to encourage the provision of goods 

and services, especially in distant ports, by providing an in rem claim against the vessel itself 

should the party controlling the vessel’s affairs abscond. ... Since owners are the ones that 

control the vessel’s affairs, or have access to the entity that controls the vessel’s affairs, they do 

not require such a mechanism.” L & L Electronics, Inc. v. M/V OSPREY, 764 F. Supp.2d 270, 

273 (D. Mass. 2011) (citations omitted).

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Fulcher’s Point, 935 F.2d at 211 (citation omitted); see also Sasportes v. M/V Sol de 

Copacabana, 581 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1978) (elements for joint venture include the parties’ 

intentions, joint right of control, joint proprietary interests in subject matter of venture, and 

sharing of profits and losses). Significantly, factors such as joint control, joint proprietary 

interest, and sharing of profits/losses “are not a checklist. They are only signposts, likely indicia, 

but not prerequisites.” Fulcher’s Point, 935 F.2d at 211. Indeed, “the factors that indicate the 

existence of a joint venture do not have to be met point for point.” Id. The old Fifth Circuit 

provided helpful illumination on this concept by opining as follows:

“Perhaps the best example of a joint venturer would be a party whose prospective 

gains resemble the owner’s, who has the owner’s prerogatives, and who might 

otherwise appear to investigating creditors to be a part owner. Such a party may, 

of course, have an in personam contract claim against the true owner. But when 

the seas get rough one who looks, thinks, acts, and profits like an owner cannot 

retreat to the relatively safe harbor of a maritime lienor, who of course has a claim 

against the ship itself.”

Sasportes, 581 F.2d at 1208-09.

Application of these principles to uncontroverted facts regarding each plaintiff’s 

relationship to the Vessel lends considerable support to the notion that they are joint venturers 

whose interests were directly aligned with Davy Jones LLC. Plaintiffs are therefore ineligible to 

hold maritime liens against the Vessel.11

2. Plaintiff Beech Was Not a Stranger to the Vessel.

Beginning with plaintiff Adam Beech, the summary judgment record leaves no doubt that 

his arrangement with Mr. Warhurst / Davy Jones LLC was that Beech would perform cabin 

 11 This “stranger to the vessel” argument was the centerpiece of the Motion for 

Summary Judgment. It was the lead ground for relief presented in the Motion, for which briefing 

consumed roughly 7 pages of the 24-page filing. In their individual response briefs (docs. 69, 70 

& 71), however, plaintiffs do not address or rebut the “stranger to the vessel” issue in any 

meaningful way. They do not argue that they should not be legally classified as joint venturers. 

They do not present facts challenging or questioning defendant’s portrayal of them as insiders 

and de facto part owners of the Vessel during the interval in which Davy Jones LLC was an 

agreed buyer in possession of same. This omission is at plaintiffs’ peril. See, e.g., Fils v. City of 

Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (“district courts cannot concoct or resurrect 

arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties”); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 

(11th Cir. 2009) (noting that a litigant “cannot readily complain about the entry of a summary 

judgment order that did not consider an argument they chose not to develop for the district court 

at the time of the summary judgment motions”) (citation omitted).

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renovation services in exchange for a $25,000 interest in the Vessel and the expected charter 

fishing operation for which Davy Jones LLC would employ the Vessel. Beech never submitted 

invoices for reimbursement for his work on the Vessel because he understood and intended that 

he was performing said work in exchange for a share of the business. By Beech’s own 

admission, the work he did on the Vessel constituted an “initial investment” that gave him a 

“stake of interest in that business.” His understanding and arrangement was that if the charter 

fishing business prospered, then he “would begin to draw a percentage of profits out of it.” In 

the vernacular of Sasportes and Filcher’s Point, these facts establish that Beech’s position was 

akin to that of part-owner in the Vessel. He had a proprietary interest in the success of the 

charter fishing business for which that Vessel was to be used, and expected to receive a stream of 

profits from that business in exchange for his labor and supplies to the Vessel. At the very least, 

Beech looked, thought and expected to profit like an owner of the Vessel; therefore, the Court 

agrees with Skipper’s Landing that Beech had the legal status of a joint venturer who was not a 

stranger to the Vessel and therefore could not hold a maritime lien against it.

3. Plaintiff Warhurst Was Not a Stranger to the Vessel.

With respect to plaintiff Tenley Warhurst, a multitude of considerations favor treating her 

as a joint venturer, rather than a stranger to the vessel. First, she is married to Gene Warhurst, 

who was not only a member of Davy Jones LLC (the agreed buyer in possession of the Vessel), 

but also the individual making arrangements for labor, supplies and services to be done on the 

Vessel during the relevant time period.

12 Stated differently, Warhurst’s marital relationship to 

the person who was exercising control and dominion over the Vessel makes her in many ways 

the ultimate insider with respect to the Vessel. She had access to (and identity of personal, legal 

and financial interest with) the person who was acting to control the Vessel’s affairs during the 

interval in which she was furnishing necessaries to the Vessel. Under those circumstances, 

 12 Plaintiffs readily acknowledge that Mr. Warhurst “was, at all times material, a 

buyer in possession of the MV WISHBONE at the time the work was performed.” (Doc. 69, at 

3.) There are thus no material disputed facts as to Mr. Warhurst’s role vis-à-vis the Vessel 

during the time period in question.

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Warhurst cannot reasonably be viewed as a “stranger to the Vessel” who might be eligible to 

assert a maritime lien.13

Second, Warhurst’s deposition testimony reveals that the expenditures for which she 

seeks maritime lien status consist to a large degree of commingled (and often hopelessly

entangled) resources. Many of the services and supplies for which Warhurst claims a maritime 

lien were purchased using joint marital credit cards, funds or accounts belonging to both 

Warhurst and Mr. Warhurst (who, again, was one of two members of the LLC in possession of 

the Vessel and a person exercising control and dominion over all aspects of the Vessel’s 

restoration, repairs, outfitting and finances during the lease period). Certain of the supplies 

encompassed within Warhurst’s maritime lien claim were marital property maintained in the 

marital home and subsequently moved onboard the Vessel. The “loans” for which Warhurst 

seeks compensation in her maritime lien were made to Mr. Warhurst’s law practice and were not 

earmarked for any particular purpose. In lieu of repaying Warhurst directly for those loans, the 

Law Practice (by and through its bookkeeper, who was none other than Warhurst herself) 

invested those funds in services and supplies for the Vessel. The tangled, commingled finances 

of Warhurst’s contributions to the Vessel underscore her status as an insider to the Vessel, with 

direct access to (and influence over) the person and LLC that controlled the Vessel’s affairs, and 

her lack of any reasonable need for an in rem claim against the Vessel to protect her if the parties

controlling the Vessel’s affairs (i.e., her husband and her husband’s LLC) absconded.14

 13 Plaintiff Warhurst’s case appears to hinge on the premise that a spouse of the 

agent in possession and control of the Vessel can nonetheless constitute a stranger to the vessel 

for purposes of obtaining and enforcing maritime liens. However, plaintiffs have identified no 

legal authority that might support such a notion, which runs directly contrary to the principles 

enunciated in Sasportes, Fulcher’s Point, and the other cases identified supra. Indeed, even a 

common-sense assessment of the arrangement inexorably prompts the conclusion that Warhurst 

was anything but a stranger to the F/V WISHBONE.

14 To sharpen the point, it bears emphasis that Warhurst was the Law Practice’s 

bookkeeper. In this capacity, she had direct control over the means to reimburse herself for each 

loan she made to the Law Practice that was subsequently funneled to the Vessel for services and 

supplies. If Warhurst wanted to be repaid for such funds, she had only to write herself a check 

from the Law Practice. This arrangement demonstrates that Warhurst falls well outside the 

category of persons whom the maritime lien mechanism is designed to protect and encourage to 

make contributions to vessels.

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Third, Warhurst’s own characterization of her relationship with the contemplated charter 

business for the Vessel reinforces the conclusion that she is properly classified as a joint 

venturer, rather than a stranger to the vessel. She testified that her arrangement with Mr. 

Warhurst / the Law Practice / Davy Jones LLC meant that she “was kind of vested in this boat 

venture after we got it going.” Warhurst explained that her motivation in allowing her loans to 

the Loan Practice to be repaid via investment in the Vessel rather than disbursements to her was 

“to get that business up and going as fast as possible to be able to make some money at that 

business.” She also testified to her hope that she would “be able to participate more” and help 

“run the business” after it went into effect. These sentiments further cement the undersigned’s 

conclusion that, taking the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 

Tenley Warhurst was properly classified as a joint venturer, and not a stranger, with respect to 

the F/V WISHBONE and the contemplated charter fishing business that her husband and his 

business associates were undertaking to establish. That determination deprives Warhurst of the 

legal right to hold and enforce a maritime lien against the Vessel.

4. Plaintiff Leith Was Not a Stranger to the Vessel.

Intervenor-plaintiff Kris Leith is similarly situated to both Beech and Warhurst with 

respect to the “stranger to the vessel” issue. Leith’s deposition testimony reveals that he had 

come into some money as a result of a settlement in a personal injury case in which Mr. 

Warhurst represented him. Because of that windfall and his personal circumstances (an ongoing 

and apparently contentious divorce proceeding), Leith was looking to invest that money. Mr. 

Warhurst approached him with the idea of having Leith “tie up [his] money” in the Vessel, 

offering grand forecasts of how much money they were going to make in the charter fishing 

venture. Leith provided labor and supplies to the Vessel under these circumstances. His 

understanding and intention was that he worked on the Vessel as “kind of an investment,” and 

Leith testified to his expectation that he “was going to make some money” in this deal. Leith 

contemplated that he would recoup his investment “[w]hen the boat started making money.” 

What’s more, Leith attended and participated in business meetings concerning the Vessel, 

offering his own suggestions and input on matters such as advertising plans for the charter 

fishing business. By his own admission, Leith “knew all of their business,” in terms of Davy 

Jones LLC’s plans and activities concerning the Vessel. These circumstances, taken in the 

aggregate, cast Leith in the light of a joint venturer who possessed joint control (or at least input) 

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as to the Vessel, a joint proprietary interest in the Vessel, and an expectation of sharing in 

proceeds of the contemplated charter fishing business involving the Vessel. On this record, the 

Court finds no genuine issues of disputed fact, and concludes that plaintiff Leith is properly 

deemed a joint venturer, and not a stranger to the Vessel, and that he therefore cannot pursue 

maritime lien claims in this litigation.

5. Conclusion.

As shown by the foregoing discussion, none of the three plaintiffs in this case were 

positioned as arm’s-length vendors providing labor and supplies to the Vessel. To the contrary, 

all were insiders, making investments in the Vessel in the hope of reaping a profit once the 

charter fishing business got up and running. Far from billing Davy Jones LLC for their labor and 

supplies, plaintiffs never asked to be paid, and instead treated their work as an investment from 

which they expected to profit once the charter fishing business came to fruition. All of them 

occupied positions akin to (and fully aligned with) that of the Vessel’s agent in possession. 

Their prospective gains resembled those of Mr. Warhurst and Davy Jones LLC. Whether they 

considered themselves to be joint venturers or not, all of their actions and all of the details of 

their arrangements with Mr. Warhurst and Davy Jones LLC created the appearance that they 

were just that. At some point, those appearances must be accepted as reality. See Fulcher’s 

Point, 935 F.2d at 213 (“Though we do not suggest it as a legal principle, some merit lies with 

the old saw that what looks, walks and quacks like a duck is probably a duck.”).

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ prior arrangements with Mr. Warhurst / Davy Jones LLC and 

their calls for enforcement of maritime liens against said Vessel in this litigation demonstrate a 

have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too mindset. Each plaintiff contemplated that he or she was investing 

in a business enterprise. If that enterprise succeeded, then plaintiffs expected to make money. If 

it failed, however, plaintiffs’ testimony reveals that each of them expected to recoup his or her 

initial investment in the business from the Vessel itself. Stated differently, the three plaintiffs in 

this case invoke the doctrine of maritime liens not to provide essential protections to them for the 

goods and services they provided to the Vessel, but to hedge their “investment” in a business that 

never got off the ground. The doctrine of maritime liens was not created as a means of ensuring 

that investors in maritime-related activities could enjoy the upside without fear of any potential 

downside. Our system of maritime liens does not exist to give part owners a safety net or a 

guarantee of a risk-free investment if a vessel-related business enterprise stumbles out of the 

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gate, or fails altogether. See Sasportes, 581 F.2d at 1209 (“when the seas get rough one who 

looks, thinks, acts, and profits like an owner cannot retreat to the relatively safe harbor of a 

maritime lienor”). Yet each plaintiff testified with remarkable candor that this is precisely what 

he or she sought to achieve.

Maritime liens are not available to insiders, part-owners, and investors in vessels and 

vessel-related business enterprises. Rather, their function is to protect and incentivize third-party 

outsiders to supply necessaries to vessels, secure in the knowledge that they may obtain 

recompense for their labors even if the vessel owners leave them in the lurch. Uncontroverted 

record evidence establishes that plaintiffs, and each of them, fall squarely in the first category, 

not the second. Each plaintiff had direct access to, and special relationships with, the agent in 

control of the Vessel. Each plaintiff’s interests were aligned with, and identical to, those of 

Davy Jones LLC. And each asserted a maritime lien against the Vessel only after their business 

venture failed, without ever seeking to collect from Mr. Warhurst or Davy Jones LLC, the person 

/ entity that retained them to contribute to the Vessel in the first place. As such, the Court 

concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment is properly granted on the ground that 

plaintiffs do not qualify as strangers to the vessel, and therefore are not properly classified as 

maritime lienholders.

B. Laches.

As a separate, independent ground for the Motion for Summary Judgment, Skipper’s 

Landing maintains that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of laches.

“Laches is a defense sounding in equity that serves to bar suit by a plaintiff whose 

unexcused delay, if the suit were allowed, would be prejudicial to the defendant.” Black Warrior 

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 781 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is well settled that a claim asserting a 

maritime lien can be barred by laches.” John W. Stone Oil Distributor, Inc. v. M/V Miss Bern, 

663 F. Supp. 773, 778 (S.D. Ala. 1987).

15 At issue here are both the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ 

 15 See also Bermuda Express, N.V. v. M/V Litsa (Ex. Laurie U), 872 F.2d 554, 558 

(3rd Cir. 1989) (“Both at common law and under the statute, however, maritime liens may be lost 

by laches in their prosecution.”); Gammill v. Bradley T, 879 F. Supp. 737, 741 (W.D. Ky. 1995) 

(“Where a claim is brought in rem against a vessel owned by a bona fide purchaser for value 

without notice of the claim, the party bringing the claim must have exercised reasonable 

(Continued)

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delay in asserting their maritime liens against the Vessel and the prejudice (or lack thereof) to 

Skipper’s Landing occasioned by that delay.

In furtherance of the “unexcused delay” factor, Skipper’s Landing points to uncontested 

facts that plaintiffs provided services and supplies to the Vessel in May 2013, yet they never 

asserted maritime lien claims arising from those activities until filing their Complaint in this 

action on May 29, 2014, fully one year later. During the interim, of course, there was a change 

in ownership, as B&D Maritime sold the Vessel to Skipper’s Landing in October 2013. This fact 

is important to the laches analysis. After all, “[t]he claim will lapse in a much shorter time and 

the court will undertake a more rigid scrutiny of the circumstances of the delay in cases where 

the vessel is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser as opposed to cases where there has been no 

change in ownership.” John W. Stone, 663 F. Supp. at 778; see also A/S Dan-Bunkering Ltd. v. 

M/V Zamet, 945 F. Supp. 1576, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (“innocent owners in the position of a bona 

fide purchaser who had no notice of a lien incurred against the vessel prior to purchasing it can 

generally assert the laches defense”). It is undisputed that Skipper’s Landing was a bona fide 

purchaser of the Vessel.

What is challenged on summary judgment is whether Skipper’s Landing was on notice of 

the maritime lien claims of Beech, Warhurst and Leith at the time of the closing. The summary 

judgment record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs confirms that Beech, Warhurst and Leith 

never contacted or communicated to Skipper’s Landing to alert it to their purported maritime 

liens prior to the October 17, 2013 purchase agreement for the Vessel. The record likewise 

reflects that Skipper’s Landing was unaware that Beech, Warhurst and Leith had provided 

services and supplies to the Vessel five months earlier for which they had not received 

recompense. It is undisputed that, at some time, Skipper’s Landing reviewed an abstract of title, 

which would have revealed recorded liens on the Vessel (had there been any), but none 

appeared. All of these facts and circumstances point unambiguously to a lack of notice to 

Skipper’s Landing.

 

diligence in pursuing the claim. Laches can operate to bar such a claim where unreasonable 

delay in pursuing the claim results in prejudicial harm to the owner.”). 

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In response, plaintiffs insist that “Skipper’s Landing Inc. was, in fact, on notice of 

potential claims against the MV WISHBONE at the time of purchase.” (Doc. 69, at 8.) 

Plaintiffs reason that Skipper’s Landing entered into the purchase agreement to buy the Vessel 

on October 17, 2013, some two days after Davy Jones LLC filed the Baldwin County Complaint 

against B&D Maritime, its owner (Randy Boggs) and David Jones. This reasoning is 

unconvincing in multiple respects. First, plaintiffs do not identify any reasonably available 

mechanism through which Skipper’s Landing could or should have ascertained the existence of 

the Baldwin County Complaint prior to entering into the October 17, 2013 purchase agreement 

for the Vessel. After all, neither the Vessel nor Skipper’s Landing were named as parties in that 

pleading, and there is no allegation or evidence that Davy Jones LLC undertook to serve the 

Baldwin County Complaint on Skipper’s Landing at that time. Second, uncontroverted record 

evidence demonstrates that B&D Maritime and Boggs were not served with the Baldwin County 

Complaint until October 21, 2013, four days after execution of the Skipper’s Landing agreement; 

therefore, Skipper’s Landing could not have learned about the particulars of that action by 

inquiring of the seller, because the seller had not yet been served when Skipper’s Landing agreed 

to purchase the Vessel.

Third, even if Skipper’s Landing could have obtained and reviewed the Baldwin County 

Complaint prior to the October 17 purchase agreement, nothing in that document would have put 

Skipper’s Landing on notice that Beech, Warhurst and Leith were asserting maritime liens. The 

Baldwin County Complaint does not name those individuals, much less specify that any of them 

claimed to be owed money for necessaries provided to the Vessel five months earlier. In short, 

that document would not have afforded Skipper’s Landing the requisite notice, even if it had 

been reasonably possible for Skipper’s Landing to locate and review the Baldwin County 

Complaint during the 48-hour gap between its filing in state court and Skipper’s Landing’s 

execution of the purchase agreement. For these reasons, the Court rejects as factually and legally 

unsupported plaintiffs’ contention that Skipper’s Landing was on notice of their maritime lien 

claims when it agreed to purchase the Vessel from B&D Maritime.16

 16 Plaintiffs’ argument leans heavily on the following passage from the Baldwin 

County Complaint: “[T]he parties hereto as joint owners of the vessel as aforesaid are unable to 

agree on ... a plan for repayment of the amounts advanced and paid to [sic] by Plaintiff to 

Defendant for acquisition, charter and repairs to the vessel.” (Doc. 69, Exh. 1, at ¶ XXVII.) 

(Continued)

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Not only was Skipper’s Landing a bona fide purchaser of the Vessel without notice, but 

there is no dispute that the liens claimed by Beech, Warhurst and Leith are unrecorded.17 Under 

these circumstances, a maritime lienholder is required to demonstrate a “high degree of 

diligence” to preserve the lien against a laches defense.

18 In examining whether a lienor has 

 

Plaintiffs insist that this allegation is “broad enough” to place Skipper’s Landing on notice “of 

the factual basis of the maritime lien claims asserted herein for claims arising from charter and 

repairs to the vessel for the lien claimants Adam Beech, Tenley Warhurst and Kris Leith.” (Doc. 

69, at 9-10.) The Court disagrees. The quoted allegation in the Baldwin County Complaint 

states that Davy Jones LLC (the only named “Plaintiff” in that case, as originally filed) had an 

equitable lien for amounts that the LLC paid for acquisition, charter and repairs to the Vessel. 

Under no reasonable construction can that language be construed as alluding to claims for 

maritime liens asserted by Beech, Warhurst and Leith for services and supplies that they 

provided the Vessel. By conflating Davy Jones LLC with Beech/Warhurst/Leith for purposes of 

this argument, plaintiffs seem to be suggesting that they were all one and the same, which is of 

course why those three plaintiffs do not qualify as strangers to the Vessel and cannot hold 

maritime liens in the first place. As agent in control of the Vessel, Davy Jones LLC certainly 

could not (and did not) assert a maritime lien against it. The bottom line is that no reasonable 

purchaser in Skipper’s Landing’s position could have surmised from reading the referenced 

portion of the Baldwin County Complaint that there were any potential maritime lien claims on 

the Vessel, much less that Beech, Warhurst and Leith claimed $54,000 in maritime liens for 

necessaries provided during the period in which Davy Jones LLC had leased the Vessel. Thus, 

even if Skipper’s Landing reasonably could or should have been aware of the Baldwin County 

Complaint prior to purchasing the Vessel (which it was not), that document failed to place it on 

notice of maritime lien claims.

17 To be sure, plaintiffs are correct that “it is not a mandatory requirement that the 

lien be recorded.” (Doc. 69, at 7.) As Judge Daniel Holcombe Thomas explained more than a 

quarter century ago, “[t]he Federal Maritime Lien Act ... does not require the recording of 

liens.” John W. Stone, 663 F. Supp. at 778. But Skipper’s Landing never argued otherwise. 

Instead, Skipper’s Landing’s point (which is also legally accurate) is that the failure of a 

maritime lienor to record said lien is an appropriate factor in the laches analysis. See id. (opining 

that issue of whether maritime lien was recorded or not is “relevant to a determination of whether 

a lien is barred by laches”).

18 “The standard of diligence required by the holder of an unrecorded lien against a 

bona fide purchase of a vessel is a high degree of diligence.” Tagaropulos, S.A. v. S.S. Santa 

Paula SS Hans Isbrandtsen, 502 F.2d 1171, 1172 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Merchants & Marine 

Bank v. The T.E. Welles, 289 F.2d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1961)); see also Liverpool and London S.S. 

Protection & Indem. Ass’n Ltd. v. M/V ABRA, 295 F. Supp.2d 674, 691 (M.D. La. 2003) (“in 

cases where the vessel has been sold to a bona fide purchaser, the holder of the unrecorded lien 

must exert a ‘high degree of diligence’ to preserve the lien”).

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“exercised the high degree of diligence required” to enforce a maritime lien against a bona fide 

purchaser without notice, courts “consider the following factors: (1) did the lienholder file a 

notice of claim of lien in the vessel’s homeport ...; (2) did the lienholder fail to arrest the vessel 

when he had the opportunity to do so; and, (3) did the lienholder wait for a time longer than that 

permitted by analogous state statutes of limitation before filing his action to enforce his lien?” 

John W. Stone, 663 F. Supp. at 779; see also Gammill v. Bradley T, 879 F. Supp.2d 737, 741 

(W.D. Ky. 1995) (applying John W. Stone factors in assessing lienor’s diligence in bringing 

claim). None of those factors support a finding of diligence by Beech, Warhurst and Leith. The 

uncontroverted evidence shows that they failed to file a notice of claim of lien against the F/V 

WISHBONE in Orange Beach, Alabama; that they could have arrested the Vessel at any time 

prior to the October 17 date of the Skipper’s Landing purchase agreement, but did not; and that 

they waited well beyond the expiration of the analogous state statute of limitations before filing 

suit.19

On these facts, the Court readily concludes that Beech, Warhurst and Leith did not act 

with the requisite “high degree of diligence” to protect and enforce their maritime liens against a 

bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Simply put, plaintiffs engaged in inexcusable and 

unreasonable delay in asserting their maritime lien claims, a determination which favors the 

equitable defense of laches.20

 19 The relevant Alabama statute providing for a lien on watercraft “for work done, or 

material supplied by any person within this state” is found at Alabama Code § 35-11-60. An 

action to enforce a lien under § 35-11-60 “must be commenced within six months after the

demand becomes due; and unless commenced within that time, the lien is lost.” Ala. Code § 35-

11-6. This statutory scheme thus creates a six-month limitations period for enforcement of the 

analogous state-law lien on watercraft. Plaintiffs tarried (without explanation) until long after 

the sunset of that limitations period before filing suit against the Vessel; indeed, they did not 

commence litigation until a full year after the alleged maritime liens accrued. That fact is not 

dispositive of the laches analysis, but it certainly is relevant. See, e.g., John W. Stone, 663 F. 

Supp. at 779 (“Although this court is not bound by any state statute of limitations, the fact that a 

state statute bars the cause of action can be considered when the equitable defense of laches is 

asserted.”).

20 Plaintiffs are sharply critical of what they describe as Skipper’s Landing’s lack of 

diligence in investigating the presence or absence of maritime liens or claims on the Vessel prior 

to agreeing to purchase it. Courts have deemed that factor relevant to the overall equities of the 

laches inquiry. See, e.g., Bermuda Express, 872 F.2d at 560 (“A balancing of the equities 

requires consideration not only of the bona fides of the purchaser, i.e., its lack of actual 

(Continued)

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The remaining question for purposes of the laches analysis is whether Skipper’s Landing 

was prejudiced by plaintiffs’ inexcusable delay and lack of diligence in asserting maritime lien 

claims against the Vessel. See Garrett Const. Co. v. Knowles, 2006 WL 237070, *5 (S.D. Tex. 

Jan. 31, 2006) (“Laches requires a factual inquiry into the effect of defendants’ delay and the 

resulting prejudice to plaintiff.”). Prejudice may not reasonably be disputed in this case. After 

all, Skipper’s Landing agreed to buy the Vessel from B&D Maritime for $60,000, while being 

entirely unaware that Beech, Warhurst and Leith were claiming maritime liens against the Vessel 

in the total amount of an additional $54,000. Not only that, but Skipper’s Landing spent 

approximately $75,000 in parts, materials and labor to repair and refurbish the Vessel after 

purchasing it (Britt Dep., at 67), all without knowledge or notice that plaintiffs were biding their 

time to interpose sizeable maritime lien claims against that Vessel. The prejudice to Skipper’s 

Landing from the lack of notice of liens almost equaling the agreed purchase price when 

Skipper’s Landing bought and invested considerable additional funds in the Vessel is both 

obvious and self-evident, and has not been seriously challenged by plaintiffs.21 

 

knowledge of unpaid liens and its search of the ship’s registry, but also of its efforts to ascertain 

whether, in light of the absence of any legal requirement of filing liens, there are in fact liens 

outstanding.”). On that point, plaintiffs are quite right that Skipper’s Landing could have 

investigated further before entering into the agreement to purchase the Vessel from B&D 

Maritime. Where this argument breaks down, however, is that plaintiffs have not shown, and 

cannot show, that any such reasonable inquiry would have alerted Skipper’s Landing to the 

existence of the maritime lien claims of Beech, Warhurst and Leith (none of which were 

recorded or otherwise documented in a place where Skipper’s Landing could have accessed or 

become aware of them upon reasonable inquiry). Simply put, further inquiry would have 

accomplished nothing. Skipper’s Landing would have remained unaware of the pendency of 

plaintiffs’ lien claims against the Vessel at the time the purchase agreement was finalized; 

therefore, the Court will not penalize Skipper’s Landing in the balancing of equities for not 

engaging in what would have been a fruitless, futile endeavor to investigate the lien status of the 

Vessel prior to purchasing it. Similarly, the Court declines to speculate, as plaintiffs do, that 

“[s]ome notice of the unpaid work for repairs and improvements to the boat may be inferred” by 

Skipper’s Landing’s hiring of David Jones as captain after purchasing the F/V WISHBONE. 

(Doc. 69, at 10.) Plaintiffs point to no record evidence reasonably supporting any such 

inference, and courts do not indulge unvarnished conjecture by nonmovants on summary 

judgment.

21 There is a strand of authority providing that “[h]e who would invoke laches must 

show a delay which has subjected him to a disadvantage in asserting and establishing his claimed 

right or defense.” Esso Int’l, Inc. v. S.S. Captain John, 443 F.2d 1144, 1150 (5th Cir. 1971). 

(Continued)

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In short, the Court concludes that even if Beech, Warhurst and Leith possessed valid 

maritime lien claims against the F/V WISHBONE (which they do not, by operation of the 

stranger to the vessel doctrine), those claims would still be properly dismissed by straightforward 

application of the equitable doctrine of laches. This determination is informed by plaintiffs’ 

delay in asserting such claims, plaintiffs’ lack of diligence in pursuing and preserving same, and 

the resulting prejudice to Skipper’s Landing, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

V. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 63) is 

granted. Plaintiffs’ maritime lien claims are dismissed in their entirety for the separate, 

independent reasons that (i) plaintiffs were not strangers to the Vessel and therefore were not 

eligible to hold maritime lien claims against it, and (ii) even if plaintiffs were valid lienholders, 

their liens were barred by laches because plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in 

preserving those liens, to the detriment of a bona fide purchaser without notice.

There being no other claims presented, the Complaint of plaintiffs Adam Beech and 

Tenley Warhurst, and the Complaint in Intervention of plaintiff Kris Leith, are dismissed with 

prejudice. A separate judgment will enter.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Under this formulation of the standard, Skipper’s Landing has also been prejudiced. With the 

passage of time, plaintiffs’ memories about what exact work they did, how much it cost, which 

supplies were purchased and for how much, and even when the work was done have become 

spotty at best. Plaintiffs’ vagueness and lack of specific recollection as to these details places 

Skipper’s Landing at an acute disadvantage in defending against their maritime lien claims. Had 

plaintiffs timely and diligently pursued such claims, Skipper’s Landing could have obtained their 

deposition testimony before plaintiffs’ memories faded and before plaintiffs’ records, invoices 

and receipts were destroyed or lost. In short, Skipper’s Landing has adequately demonstrated 

that plaintiffs’ delay in interposing their claims against the Vessel has impaired Skipper’s 

Landing’s ability to marshal and scrutinize pertinent evidence bearing on those claims. That fact 

constitutes prejudice for purposes of the laches analysis.

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