alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
      32.2





CERTIFICATIONS
      PURSUANT TO SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934


RULE
      13a-14(b) or 15d-14b AND


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the annual report of Shiming U.S., Inc. (formerly Argenta
      Systems, Inc.) on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended December 31, 2005, as
      filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
      I, Ziyuan Lu, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that based on my knowledge:





|1. | the
              Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
              of
              the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and,
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




|2. | the
              information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
              respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
              Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------







Date: March 28, 2007
            
            /s/ Ziyuan Lu_______________________________Ziyuan
                Lu
              Chief
                Financial Officer
12003.

#### HILL *v.*THE STATE.

A conviction of larceny from the house was authorized by the evidence. •

Decided March 8, 1921.

Indictment for larceny from house; from Wilkes superior court — Judge Walker. November 27, 1920.

Application for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.

The prosecutor, Lizzie Luckey, testified: “Lamb Hill (the defendant) came to my house about 12 o’clock and went to the *423hydrant in front of the house to get a drink of water. He asked me to lend him a dipper. I was sitting on the porch, right at the door. I told him the dipper was in the house. I had to move a little to let him in the door. He went in the house, got the dipper, went out to the hydrant, got him a drink of water, and took the dipper back in the house. My money in my pocket-book, with my snuff-box, was on the bed in the house. Lamb came out of the house and went around to John Brown’s. When I missed my money I went up to Mr. Hill’s lot where Lamb was working, and told Lamb to give me my money. Lamb had some money in his shirt pocket that was folded up like my money was folded in the pocket-book. I had $36.20. I had seen my money not long before Lamb went in. From the time I saw it until I missed it nobody had been in the room but Lamb. -I was on the porch the entire time, and if anybody else had gone in the room I would have seen them. . . There was another door on the opposite side of the house, which was not locked, but was buttoned. My money was in my pocket-book on the bed, the bed was next to the window, the dipper was on a table on the other side of the window from the bed. . . I had three five-dollar bills, one ten-dollar bill, and the balance of my $36 was in one-dollar bills. I don’t know what sort of bills Lamb Hill had in his pocket when I went up to Mr. Hill’s lot; all I know to identify it by is that it was folded the same way my money was folded. ” Another witness testified that' when the defendant was arrested on the day on which Lizzie Luckey said that her money was stolen, he had $29 on him, consisting of two ten-dollar bills,’ one five-dollar bill, and four one-dollar bills; the witness was not positive as to this. It was testified in behalf of the defendant, and in his statement at the trial he said, that he had $29 on his person and showed it to others in the morning, before he went to Lizzie Luckey’s house, on the day on which she said her money was stolen. He denied that he took her money.

*W. A. Slaton,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. G. Norman, solicitor-general, Earle Norman,*contra.

Luke, J.

This case is. here for review upon the sple assignment of error that the verdict of guilty was not authorized by the evidence. The evidence was weak; yet the jury had a right to believe, and did believe, the evidence of the prosecutor, which *424evidence was sufficient to authorize the conviction of the defendant. The verdict, having the approval of the trial judge, and there being evidence to support it, cannot by this court be set aside. It was not error to overrule the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, G. J., and Bloodworlh, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         791,258
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,736,132
<ALLOWANCES>                                    53,559
<INVENTORY>                                    698,452
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,264,572
<PP&E>                                         673,764
<DEPRECIATION>                                 289,951
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,279,980
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,219,827
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       397,624
<OTHER-SE>                                     613,971
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,279,980
<SALES>                                      5,533,847
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,866,614
<CGS>                                        5,059,943
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,470,581
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,296,160
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                15,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              33,014
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 51,859
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             51,859
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    51,859
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 12.1**

 

**HCC INDUSTRIES INC.**

**COMPUTATION OF RATIOOF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES**

**(in thousands)**

**(unaudited)**

 

 
|                               |   | **For the  Three Months Ended** |   |
|------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|--------|
|                               |   | **June 29,**                    |   | **June 30,** |   |
|                               |   | **2002**                        |   | **2001** |   |
| Earnings:                          |   |                            |   |   |   |
|                               |   |                            |   |   |   |
| Earnings (loss) before taxes       |   | $                               | (1,869 | ) | $ | 1,900 |   |
|                               |   |                            |   |   |   |
| Add:   Fixed Charges*         |   | 2,429                           |   | 2,465 |   |
|                               |   |                            |   |   |   |
|                               |   | $                               | 560    |   | $ | 4,365 |   |
|                               |   |                            |   |   |   |
| * Fixed Charges:                   |   |                            |   |   |   |
|                               |   |                            |   |   |   |
| Interest expense                   |   | $                               | 2,429  |   | $ | 2,465 |   |
|                               |   | $                               | 2,429  |   | $ | 2,465 |   |
| Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges |   | 0.2                             |   | 1.7 |   |

----

*  The ratios of earnings to fixed charges werecomputed by dividing earnings by fixed charges.  For this purpose, “earnings” consist of earnings before taxes andextraordinary item plus fixed charges and “fixed charges” consist of interestexpense and amortization of debt issuance costs.

 

 

 

 

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6349

SCOTLAND E. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

FRANK SIZER, Commissioner; LEHRMAN DOTSON, Warden; KAREN

GIBSON, Mail Clerk,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:06-cv01759-AMD)

Submitted: July 22, 2008 Decided: July 25, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Scotland E. Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Phillip Michael Pickus,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Scotland E. Williams appeals the district court’s orders

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint and denying

reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by

the district court. Williams v. Sizer, No. 1:06-cv-01759-AMD (D.

Md. Aug. 10, 2007; Feb. 1, 2008). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN CHARLIE PEARSON,et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No.: 05-0056-BH-C

)

LINDEN LUMBER COMPANY, )

INC., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 61) to Dismiss and in conjunction

with the Court’s Adoption (Doc. 83) of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

regarding the issue of attorneys’ fees and expenses. On October 4, 2005, Plaintiffs motioned (Doc.

61) the Court for dismissal of their claims, to which Defendant consented so long as the Court

retained jurisdiction to rule on their request for attorneys’ fees and expenses related to this litigation.

The Court considered the parties’ pleadings regarding attorneys fees and expenses and adopted

(Doc. 83) the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that Defendant’s request be denied.

Pursuant to this ruling, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 61) to Dismiss their claims, with

prejudice, is due to be and hereby GRANTED and each party is to bear their own costs. 

So ORDERED, this 13th day of April, 2006.

CLERK IS ORDERED TO CLOSE THE CASE. 

s/ W. B. Hand

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00056-BH-C Document 85 Filed 04/13/06 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dale R. Rigby, Appellant.

[963 NYS2d 492]

Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Patricia D. Marks, J.), rendered April 6, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of reckless endangerment in the first degree (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a plea of guilty of two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25), defendant contends that the indictment must be dismissed because the prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury of defendant’s request to call a witness to the incident giving rise to the charges. We note at the outset that defendant’s contention concerns the integrity of the grand jury proceeding *{see generally People v Hill,*5 NY3d 772, 773 [2005]), and it therefore survives defendant’s guilty plea *(see People v Gilmore,*12 AD3d 1155, 1155-1156 [2004]). Nevertheless, we conclude that the prosecutor properly informed the *1384grand jury of defendant’s request to call a witness *(see*CPL 190.50 [6]; *cf. Hill,*5 NY3d at 773; *People v Calkins,*85 AD3d 1676, 1677 [2011])- The record establishes that defendant requested in writing that the grand jury cause a certain person to be called as a witness, and the prosecutor read defendant’s request verbatim to the grand jury and afforded the grand jury the opportunity to determine whether it wanted to hear testimony from that person. By pleading guilty, defendant forfeited his further contention that the indictment should be dismissed because the prosecutor failed to introduce exculpatory evidence before the grand jury *(see People v Crumpler,*70 AD3d 1396, 1397 [2010], *lv denied*14 NY3d 839 [2010]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Present—Smith, J.P, Fahey, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Octavio Hernandez SUAREZ, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 04-10425.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 12, 2006.*

Decided June 16, 2006.

USSAC-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff — Appellee.

*598Michael B. Bigelow, Esq., Sacramento, CA, for Defendant — Appellant.

Before: FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Octavio Hernandez Suarez appeals from the district court’s judgment and 240-month sentence imposed following his jury trial conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846(a)(1), 841(a)(1), and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Suarez contends that during his closing argument, the prosecutor committed misconduct by using Suarez’ prior drug conviction to argue that Suarez had the propensity to commit the instant offense. Because Suarez did not raise an objection below, we review for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); *United States v. Olano,*507 U.S. 725, 730, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The record reveals that the prosecutor expressly told the jury that he was offering the prior conviction for the limited purpose of showing Suarez’ intent to be at the location, he limited his remarks to that purpose, and the district court gave a limiting jury instruction to that effect. Accordingly, there is no error, let alone plain error. *See United States v. McChristian,*47 F.3d 1499, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).

Suarez also contends that his sentence should be remanded because the district court failed to comply with 21 U.S.C. § 851’s requirement that the district court ask the defendant to affirm his prior conviction. This contention is also reviewed for plain error because Suarez did not object in the district court. *See Olano,*507 U.S. at 730, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The record reveals that the district court satisfied Section 851’s requirement by asking both defense counsel and Suarez personally if they affirmed the prior conviction, which they both did. Accordingly, there is no error. *See United States v. Harris,*592 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1979).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LILLIE MIMS and BARBARA TURNER, )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 13-00643-KD-M

 ) 

MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, et al., )

Defendants. )

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Orders entered on this date regarding the Defendants’ motions for 

summary judgment (Docs. 58, 59), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that

JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Lillie Mims and Plaintiff 

Barbara Turner.

DONE and ORDERED this the 12th day of August 2015.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00643-KD-M Document 60 Filed 08/12/15 Page 1 of 1
EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of CreditRiskMonitor.com,
Inc.
(CRM) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Lawrence Fensterstock, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge: (1)
The Report
 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
The
 information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
 respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  By: /s/
Lawrence
 FensterstockLawrence
 FensterstockChief Financial
 Officer November 14, 2008 This certification is being
furnished to the SEC with this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such
Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to liability
of that section. 20
#### Anthony J. ANGELUCCI v. CONTINENTAL RADIANT GLASS HEATING CORPORATION and Basil Needham.

Civ. A. No. 69-1946.

United States District Court,. E. D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 8, 1971.

Herbert Monheit, Monheit & Rosenfield, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Spencer Ervin, Jr., and W. Bourne Ruthrauff, Tate & Ervin, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WOOD, District Judge.

Plaintiff has moved for a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff instituted suit in this Court in August, 1969. Defendant, Continental Radiant Glass Heating Corporation (Continental), filed its answer and compulsory counterclaims. However, service by plaintiff on Continental’s president, Basil Needham, was quashed for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff thereafter commenced an action in New York against the same parties. In that case, plaintiff was able to obtain jurisdiction over both Continental and Mr. Needham. Defendants have moved to dismiss the New York action, partly on the ground that the present action is still pending in this Court. Plaintiff, therefore, wants to dismiss his action in this Court so that he can pursue the New York action in which he can obtain jurisdiction over both defendants. He contends that defendant Continental can still pursue its counterclaim in this Court or in the New York action.

Defendant objects to plaintiff’s motion unless it is permitted to pursue its counterclaim in this Court and plaintiff pays the fees incurred by defendant in defending the suit to date and in transcribing plaintiff’s deposition.

Federal Rule 41(a) (2) provides that where “a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.” As defendant has asserted a compulsory counterclaim, this Court retains jurisdiction over that counterclaim notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of plaintiff’s action. See United States for Use and Benefit of Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Bero Construction Corporation, 148 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.1957). Consequently we shall grant plaintiff’s motion and allow defendant to pursue his counterclaim in this Court. The question of the costs for which plaintiff must reimburse defendant will be determined upon final disposition of the merits of defendant’s counterclaim.

ORDER

And now, this 8th day of January, 1971, it is ordered that plaintiff’s motion for a voluntary dismissal is granted.
EXHIBIT 32(b)

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Enzo Biochem, Inc., and
Subsidiaries ("the Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Barry Weiner, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

                  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and


                  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.



Date:  June 11, 2007                            By: /s/ Barry Weiner
                                                    ----------------
                                                Barry Weiner
                                                Chief Financial Officer




         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Act
Commission or its staff upon request.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Daniel W. Fairfax

Daniel W. FairfaxVice President, Finance and Administration &Chief Financial OfficerJune 14, 2007
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Pacer International, Inc. (the Company), on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), we, Donald C. Orris, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Lawrence C. Yarberry, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        
|------------------------
|/s/ Donald C. Orris     
|Donald C. Orris         
|Chief Executive Officer 
|March 8, 2005           
|                        
|/s/ Lawrence C. Yarberry
|Lawrence C. Yarberry    
|Chief Financial Officer 
|March 8, 2005           



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Pacer International, Inc. and will be retained by Pacer International, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.