IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-11203

Summary Calendar

JEROMY D BRAY

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

NFN YOUNG, Warden; SARGEANT NFN MOORE, Major; 

VARIOUS MEMBERS OF CLASSIFICATION, Staff and Ranking Officers; 

NFN WHEELER, Warden; NFN OWENS; NFN EDWARDS; NFN HUBBARD;

FNU ESPINOZA, Classification Chief; TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION 

Defendants-Appellees 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

consolidated w/

No. 06-10935

Summary Calendar

JEROMY D BRAY

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

NFN HUBBARD; FNU ESPINOZA, Classification Chief

Defendants-Appellees

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 14, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 05-11203

c/w No. 06-10935

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CV-39

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jeromy D. Bray, Texas prisoner # 919964 filed a complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Young, Warden Wheeler, Major Moore, Captain

Owens, Captain Edwards, Captain Hubbard, and Classification Chief Espinoza.

Bray’s complaint centered on the allegation that he was being forced to work at

a prison job that violated his medical restrictions. When Bray refused to work,

he received disciplinary convictions and was sanctioned with commissary

restrictions, property restrictions, cell restrictions, contact visitation restrictions,

and a change in his security classification. 

The magistrate judge dismissed Bray’s claims against Warden Young,

Warden Wheeler, Major Moore, Captain Owens, and Captain Edwards for

failure to state a claim and entered a final judgment. The magistrate judge

subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Captain Hubbard and

Classification Chief Espinoza. We have consolidated Bray’s appeals in these

matters. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(b)(2). 

Bray argues that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing his claims

against the defendants in their official capacities. He contends that he should

be allowed to maintain suit to force the defendants to comply with federal law

in the future. He also argues that the district court erred in denying his request
No. 05-11203

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3

for a temporary restraining order. Because Bray has been transferred to

another correctional institution, his claims for injunctive relief are moot. See

Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock

County, 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991).

Bray argues that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing his claims

against Warden Young, Major Moore, and Captain Edwards for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. He contends that these defendants

were personally involved in making decisions regarding his job assignments.

A dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim

is reviewed under the same de novo standard as a dismissal under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir.

1998). To state a claim, a plaintiff is required to make sufficient factual

allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful

in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations

omitted). 

Bray attempts to show error in the magistrate judge’s dismissal of his

claims against Warden Young, Major Moore, and Captain Edwards by pointing

to summary judgment evidence concerning Captain Hubbard and Classification

Chief Espinoza. Bray’s reliance on the summary judgment record is misplaced.

“While it is . . . appropriate to look beyond the pleadings to decide whether

summary judgment should be granted, the converse is true when the question

is whether the pleadings state a claim.” Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police

Dept., 958 F.2d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1992). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “is

to be evaluated only on the pleadings.” Id. (quotation marks and citation

omitted). As to this issue, Bray’s brief contains only unsupported, conclusional

assertions, which are insufficientto establish the denial of a constitutional right.

See Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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Bray contends that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing his claim

against Warden Wheeler. He argues that Warden Wheeler assigned him to the

community work squad, where he was forced to perform labor that violated his

medical restrictions. Bray also contends that Warden Wheeler was aware of the

difficulties he was having with his work assignments because Bray filed a

grievance about the matter. Because Bray’s allegations, which are accepted as

true, fail to show that Warden Wheeler was personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violation, we conclude that the magistrate judge did not err in

dismissing Bray’s claim. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; Thompson v. Steele,

709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Bray also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim against

Captain Owens, which are related to Captain Owen’s role as the adjudicator at

Bray’s disciplinary hearings. Bray argues that his due process rights were

violated when Captain Owens refused to allow him to call a witness and when

Captain Owens punished him by reducing his security classification and his

time-earning classification. Because the punishments received by Bray do not

implicate a constitutionally protected interest, the magistrate judge did not err

in dismissing Bray’s claim against Captain Owens. See Whitley v. Hunt,

158 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated in part on other grounds, Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995).

Finally, Bray challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of Captain Hubbard and Classification Chief Espinoza. Bray’s opening

brief in the appeal of that judgment, however, is devoid of citations to the record

or to supporting authority and is entirely conclusory. Bray instead attempts to

incorporate by reference a document he filed in the district court.

Although this court applies less stringent standards to parties proceeding

pro se than to counsel-represented parties and liberally construes briefs of pro se

litigants, pro se parties must still brief the issues. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d
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523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). The appellant’s brief must contain an argument, which

in turn must contain his “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations

to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” FED. R.

APP. P. 28(a)(9); see Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). The

appellant must raise his arguments in the body of his brief and may not

incorporate by reference his prior pleadings. See Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441,

443 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996).

Because Bray has not briefed the summary judgment dismissal of his

claims against Hubbard and Espinoza, he is deemed to have abandoned the

issue. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005). To the extent

that Bray has argued the issue of the grant of summary judgment in his reply

brief this effort is unavailing. “An appellant abandons all issues not raised and

argued in its initial brief on appeal.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th

Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). 

The judgment of the district court is, in all respects, AFFIRMED.