1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT WILLIAMS, JR., :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. :

 : CIVIL ACTION 14-0250-CG-M

MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT :

ATTORNEY, COUNTY OF MONROE, :

MONROE COUNTY COURTHOUSE, :

MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF’S :

DEPARTMENT, LISA LYNAM McDONALD,:

JAMES McKINLEY, and JIMMY :

McKINLEY, :

 :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Monroe County, 

Monroe County Courthouse, and Monroe County Sheriff’s Department 

(Docs. 19-20) and the Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Monroe 

County District Attorney (Doc. 29) have been referred for report 

and recommendation, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local 

Rule 72((a)(1) & (a)(2)(S)). Plaintiff invokes federal 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 (Doc. 10). After consideration, it is recommended that the 

Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Monroe County, Monroe 

County Courthouse, and Monroe County Sheriff’s Department (Docs. 

19-20) be granted, in part, and denied, in part, and that the 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 1 of 18
2

Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Monroe County District 

Attorney (Doc. 29) be granted.

The facts, briefly, are as follows. On June 7, 2012, 

Williams was at the Monroe County Courthouse to resolve a

dispute with Defendant Lisa McDonald over a Chrysler PT Cruiser 

(Doc. 10, ¶ 8).1 After the Judge ruled in Williams’s favor, he 

waited in the courtroom for a while, on his attorney’s advice, 

to avoid McDonald; when he left to exit the back stairwell, he 

encountered McDonald and Defendants Jimmy and James McKinley 

(id.). McDonald said “You lying Nigger” and Williams stepped 

toward her; Jimmy McKinley stepped between them and James 

McKinley pushed Williams in the face and slapped him (id.). 

James McKinley then stabbed Plaintiff with a knife; as Plaintiff 

assumed a self-defense posture, the District Attorney came out 

and broke up the fracas (id.). Williams was taken to the 

hospital to treat the wound and was later arrested by the Monroe 

County Sheriff’s Department as the District Attorney had filed 

third-degree assault charges against Plaintiff for attacking him 

(id.). Plaintiff was held for approximately twenty-four hours 

 

1

The Court notes these facts and claims come from Williams’s 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The Court further notes that, in his 

Responses to the two Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that he is 

amending his Complaint (see Doc. 31, pp. 13, 16, 21-22 and Doc. 36, 

pp. 14, 17, 23-24, 31-32). The Court STRIKES the language—and 

attempted amendments—in those Responses as Williams fails to meet the 

requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 2 of 18
3

before being released (id.).

On June 4, 2014, Plaintiff, acting pro se, brought this

action against the following Defendants: the County of Monroe, 

Monroe County Courthouse, Monroe County Sheriff’s Department, 

and the Monroe County District Attorney as well as individual 

Defendants Lisa McDonald, James McKinley, and Jimmy McKinley 

(Doc. 10, ¶ 4). Williams asserts the following claims: (1) 

Violation of the First Amendment in depriving him of speech, 

association, and assembly;2 (2) violation of the Fifth 

Amendment’s due process clause against the County, the Sheriff’s 

Department, and the District Attorney; (3) violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses

against the District Attorney and the Sheriff’s Department; (4) 

violation of Titles II, III, VI, IX, and X of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964 against the District Attorney; (5) violation of the 

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act and Federal Hate 

Crime Legislation against McDonald and Jimmy and James McKinley; 

 

2

The Court notes this claim is brought, apparently, only against 

the Monroe County Commission, an entity unnamed as a Party to this 

action (Doc. 10, ¶ 17). Williams also invokes the Commission’s 

liability in claims two, three, four, five, six, and eight (Doc. 10, 

¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24). As Plaintiff failed to name the Monroe 

County Commission as a Defendant as required in Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a), 

the Commission is STRUCK as a Defendant.

The Court notes that it lists the named Defendants for each claim 

for the convenience of the Reader, but cautions that the Complaint’s 

language is, often, imprecise and confusing.

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 3 of 18
4

(6) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 for deprivation of 

rights under color of law against McDonald, Jimmy and James 

McKinley, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff’s Department; 

(7) violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against 

McDonald, Jimmy and James McKinley, the District Attorney, and 

the Sheriff’s Department; (8) violation of Alabama Code § 11-93-

1 against the District Attorney, Sheriff’s Department, the 

County, and the Courthouse; (9) violation of Alabama Code § 13A5-13 against McDonald and James and Jimmy McKinley; (10) 

violation of his civil liberties against the Courthouse; (11) 

assault against McDonald and James and Jimmy McKinley; (12) 

battery against James and Jimmy McKinley; (13) false 

imprisonment against the Sheriff’s Department and the District 

Attorney; (14) intentional infliction of emotional distress

against McDonald, James and Jimmy McKinley, and the District 

Attorney; (15) failure to provide a general duty of care against 

all Defendants; (16) conspiracy against McDonald, James and 

Jimmy McKinley, the District Attorney, and the Sheriff’s 

Department; (17) defamation by slander and libel against the 

Sheriff’s Department; (18) malicious prosecution against the 

District Attorney; and (19) negligence against McDonald, James 

and Jimmy McKinley, the District Attorney, and the Courthouse. 

Williams seeks injunctive relief as well as damages.

On July 8, 2015, Defendants Monroe County, Monroe County 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 4 of 18
5

Courthouse, and Monroe County Sheriff’s Department filed a 

Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 120). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 

31) to which a Reply has been filed (Doc. 35). On July 17, 

Defendant Monroe County District Attorney filed a Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 29). Williams filed a Response (Doc. 36) to which 

a Reply was filed (Doc. 42).

The Court notes, initially, that “[w]hen considering a 

motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s 

complaint ‘are to be accepted as true and the court limits its 

consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.’” 

Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 

2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 

(11th Cir. 1993)). In order to state a claim for relief, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a pleading must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The 

U.S. Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the rule was to 

“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 

U.S. 41, 47 (1957).3 While factual allegations do not have to be 

 

3

Conley also stated that “a complaint should not be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. The U.S. 

(Continued)

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 5 of 18
6

detailed, they must contain more than “labels and conclusions;” 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause will not do.” 

Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). “Facts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ the plaintiff’s legal theory will not 

suffice when, ‘without some further factual enhancement [they] 

stop short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

“entitle[ment] to relief.”’” Weissman v. National Association 

of Securities Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Twombley, 550 U.S. 557) (quoting DM Research, Inc. v. 

College of American Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 

1999)). “Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for 

relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Twombley, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where 

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more 

than the mere possibility of conduct, the complaint has alleged—

but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to 

 

Supreme Court has done away with this standard in Bell Atlantic 

Corporation v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 557-563 (2007). The Court, 

nevertheless, finds Conley’s statement regarding the purpose of Rule 

8(a)(2) to be useful here in deciphering the analysis necessary for 

evaluating Plaintiff’s claims.

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 6 of 18
7

relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 

8(a)(2)). As noted by the Supreme Court, Plaintiffs must 

“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to 

plausible[; otherwise,] their complaint must be dismissed.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. It is noted, however, that a 

complaint may be dismissed, under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), “on the basis of a dispositive issue of 

law.” Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 

(11th Cir.) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991). 

In their brief supporting the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants 

Monroe County, Monroe County Courthouse, and Monroe County 

Sheriff’s Department argue that the Sheriff’s Department and the 

County Courthouse are not recognized legal entities subject to 

lawsuit (Doc. 20, pp. 5-6).4 

The Court first notes the following language regarding 

section 1983 actions:

“Section 1983 alone creates no substantive 

rights; rather it provides a remedy for 

deprivations of rights established elsewhere 

in the Constitution or federal laws.” 

 

4

The Court notes that although Plaintiff asserts nineteen 

different claims, variously, against the Defendants, this Motion to 

Dismiss only addresses the dismissal of claims brought under § 1983 

(see Docs. 19-20). Therefore, that is all the Court will consider. 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 7 of 18
8

Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, Ala.,

880 F.2d 348, 352 (11th Cir.1989). Section 

1983 “merely provides a mechanism for 

enforcing individual rights ‘secured’ 

elsewhere, i.e., rights independently 

‘secured by the Constitution and laws' of 

the United States. ‘[O]ne cannot go into 

court and claim a “violation of § 1983”—for 

§ 1983 by itself does not protect anyone 

against anything.’” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,

536 U.S. 273, 285, (2002) (quoting Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 

600, 617 (1979)). 

West v. Cochran, 2015 WL 1013108, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 

2015). 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 

“[u]nder Alabama law, a county sheriff’s department lacks the 

capacity to be sued” under section 1983. Dean v. Barber, 951

F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing White v. Birch, 582 

So.2d 1085, 1087 (Ala. 1991)). Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme 

Court has held that “[a]n action against a sheriff is 

‘essentially a suit against the State.’ Montiel v. Holcombe, 

240 Ala. 352, 354, 199 So. 245, 245 (1940). ‘[T]he State of 

Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or 

equity.’ Ala. Const. 1901, Art. 1, § 14.” King v. Colbert 

County, 620 So.2d 623, 626 (Ala. 1993). 

The Court finds that Williams has failed to state a claim 

against the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department upon which relief 

can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, it is 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 8 of 18
9

recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 19-20) be granted 

as to the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department, that all claims 

against it be dismissed, and that the Mobile County Sheriff’s 

Department be dismissed from this action.

Likewise, the Court notes that “a county courthouse is not 

a legal entity subject to suit or liability under section 1983.” 

Beamon v. Alabama, 2009 WL 588951, *2 (M.D. Ala. March 6, 2009) 

(citing Dean, 951 F.2d at 1215); see also Johnson v. Alabama, 

2009 WL 581492, *2 (M.D. Ala. March 6, 2009). As such, no 

claims brought in this action pursuant to § 1983 can withstand 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court further takes judicial 

notice that a courthouse is a building not subject to liability 

for anything; in any event, the undersigned surmises that the 

Courthouse is not the real party in interest under Fed.R.Civ.P. 

17. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 19-20) be granted as to Monroe County 

Courthouse, that all claims against it be dismissed, and that 

the Monroe County Courthouse be dismissed as a Defendant. 

Defendant County asserts that it cannot be held liable for 

the acts of Defendants McDonald and the McKinleys (Doc. 20, pp. 

6-8). Defendant argues that the individual Defendants were 

neither agents nor employees of the County, so they cannot be 

held responsible for their actions, even though the underlying 

event occurred on county property.

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 9 of 18
10

The Court notes that Williams makes no allegations that his 

three attackers had any relationship, by way of agency or 

employment, with the Defendant County other than their use of 

the Courthouse to resolve a legal dispute (see Doc. 10). As 

such, the Court finds that the Individual Defendants acted 

independently of the County; therefore, the Court finds that the 

acts of the Individual Defendants cannot be attributed to the 

County. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 

noted that “[w]hen establishing the parameters of local 

government liability for § 1983 violations, Congress declined to 

impose liability on municipalities for the actions of mobs which 

the municipalities had no duty under state law to control.”

Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th

Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998), citing 

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 

1292, 1298 (1986) (citing Monell v. New York City Department of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 665–83, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2022–32

(1978)). 

The Court further notes that the Parties do not agree 

whether Williams was an invitee or licensee at the Courthouse 

(see Doc. 31, pp. 5-11; cf. Doc. 35, pp. 3-6). The Alabama 

Supreme Court, has held as follows:

The three classifications of persons coming 

onto the land are trespasser, licensee, and 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 10 of 18
11

invitee. . . . In order to be considered an 

invitee, the plaintiff must have been on the 

premises for some purpose that materially or 

commercially benefited the owner or occupier 

of the premises. Autry v. Roebuck Park 

Baptist Church, 285 Ala. [76] at 81, 229 

So.2d [469 at 473] (1969), citing McNulty v. 

Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957). The duty 

owed to an invitee ‘is limited to hidden 

defects which are not known to the invitee 

and would not be discovered by him in the 

exercise of ordinary care.’ Harvell v. 

Johnson, 598 So.2d 881 (Ala. 1992).”

Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 699 So.2d 158, 

161 (Ala. 1997). 

“It is the general rule in Alabama that absent special 

relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty to protect 

another from criminal acts of a third person.” Moye v. A. G. 

Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So.2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1986) (citations 

omitted). The Moye Court went on to hold that “[a]bsent a duty 

to protect its invitee/employee from the criminal acts, a 

premises owner/employer cannot be held liable for injuries and 

damage resulting from those criminal acts;” the single exception 

to the rule “arises where the ‘particular criminal conduct was 

foreseeable.’” Moye, 499 So.2d at 1370-1371 (quoting Henley v. 

Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So.2d 272, 276 (Ala. 1984)). That 

foreseeability is an objective standard, requiring “actual or 

constructive knowledge that criminal activity which could 

endanger an invitee was a probability.” Moye, 499 So.2d at 1371 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 11 of 18
12

(quoting Ortell v. Spencer Companies, 477 So.2d 299, (Ala. 

1985)). 

In this action, the Court finds, under Mountain Top, that 

Plaintiff has not shown that the County had any higher duty than 

informing him of hidden defects that could not be discovered 

with ordinary care. The Court further finds that Williams has 

not asserted—much less demonstrated—actual or constructive 

knowledge that the County knew the Individual Defendants were 

hiding in a stairwell to do him harm; the Court finds that the 

objective standard of Moye and Ortell has not been realized in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends 

that the Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 19-20) be granted as to Monroe 

County for all claims brought against it pursuant to section 

1983.5 

In summary, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss 

(Docs. 19-20) be granted as to the Defendant Monroe County 

 

5

The Court notes Defendant County fails to distinguish among 

Plaintiff’s nineteen claims as to which can—and those which cannot—be 

brought pursuant to § 1983 (Doc. 20, pp. 6-8). As such, the 

undersigned recommends that only those claims brought pursuant to 

section 1983 be dismissed as Defendant has presented no arguments 

regarding any other claim.

The Court further notes, though, that Plaintiff appears to only 

bring three claims against the County: claim two for violations of 

the Fifth Amendment; claim eight for violating a state statute; and 

claim fifteen, alleging the failure of a general duty of care (see

Doc. 10). Since the Fifth Amendment claim would apparently be 

dismissed as being brought under § 1983, only state claims against the 

County would remain.

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 12 of 18
13

Sheriff’s Department, that all claims against it be dismissed, 

and that Defendant be dismissed from this action. It is further 

recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to 

Defendant Monroe County Courthouse, that all claims against it 

be dismissed, and that Monroe County Courthouse be dismissed as 

a Defendant. It is further recommended that the Motion to 

Dismiss be granted as to all claims brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Monroe County but denied as to 

all other claims.

Defendant District Attorney has also filed a Motion to 

Dismiss in this action, arguing that it is not an entity subject 

to suit or liability under section 1983 (Doc. 29). 

Before addressing this Motion, however, the Court notes 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) fails, in bringing this 

action, to name any individual in the District Attorney’s 

Office. In its Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant District 

Attorney states that Tommy Chapman was the District Attorney in 

June 2012, the time of the incident leading to this action, 

while Steve Wadlington took his place in October 2012 (Doc. 29, 

pp. 5-6). It was only after the District Attorney filed its 

Motion to Dismiss that Williams attempted to provide names for 

the person holding that position (see Doc. 31, p. 22; see also

Doc. 36, pp. 23-24). The Court previously struck Plaintiff’s 

attempt to amend his complaint (see note one); therefore, the 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 13 of 18
14

Court further finds that Wadlington and Chapman are not 

individually-named Defendants in this action. With this 

finding, the Court further determines that all claims brought 

against the District Attorney’s Office are brought against the 

District Attorney in an official—and not in a personal—capacity 

as Williams has not named the person against whom personal 

claims are to be brought.

In Harris v. Elmore County D.A. Office, 2013 WL 1084294, *1 

(M.D. Ala. January 30, 2013), a § 1983 action against the Elmore 

County District Attorney’s Office was dismissed as it was not an 

entity subject to liability. Id. (citing Dean, 951 F.2d at 

1214. Further support for this holding can be found in Hagood 

v. Morgan County, Alabama, 2014 WL 7337413 (N.D. Ala. December 

23, 2014) and Garrett v. Talladega County Drug and Violent Crime 

Task Force, 983 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1378 (N.D. Ala. 2013). As such, 

all claims brought pursuant to § 1983 cannot stand and should be 

dismissed.

The District Attorney further argues that it has absolute 

immunity in its official capacity (Doc. 29, pp. 6-7). The 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[p]rosecutors 

are absolutely immune from liability for damages for activities 

that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 

criminal process.” Bias v. Crosby, 346 Fed.Appx. 455, 457 (11th

Cir. 2009) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 14 of 18
15

(1976) (holding that a state prosecuting officer had absolute 

immunity under § 1983 when initiating a prosecution and when 

presenting a state’s case) and Rose v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 

279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that immunity 

extends to all actions the prosecutor takes while performing his 

function as an advocate for the government)). 

The Court finds that Williams has pointed to nothing 

indicating that the District Attorney’s Office was doing 

anything other than undertaking the responsibilities of the 

office. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has absolute 

immunity from the claims brought against it.

Finally, the District Attorney argues that any action for 

damages against the District Attorney is barred by Eleventh 

Amendment immunity (Doc. 29, pp. 7-8). The United States 

Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is clear, of course, that in 

the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its 

agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed 

by the Eleventh Amendment. This jurisdictional bar applies 

regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State 

School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) 

(citations omitted). The Court further notes that “[a]ll 

District Attorney’s offices are deemed to be agencies of the 

State of Alabama.” Garrett, 983 F.Supp.2d at 1376 (citing Hooks 

v. Hitt, 539 So.2d 157, 159 (Ala. 1988)). Therefore, Eleventh 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 15 of 18
16

Amendment immunity applies to the District Attorney’s Office, 

depriving this Court of jurisdiction of the federal and state 

claims against it. See Garrett, 983 F.Supp.2d at 1376 (citing 

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106). It appears that the Eleventh 

Amendment immunity also extends to actions brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1985. Fincher v. State of Florida Department of Labor 

and Employment Security Unemployment Appeals Commission, 798 

F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1072 (1987).

Therefore, the § 1985 claim should be dismissed as to the Monroe 

County District Attorney.6

Defendant Monroe County District Attorney has brought this 

Motion to Dismiss, showing that it should be dismissed as it was 

not an entity that could be sued under §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986

and that it enjoyed Eleventh Amendment and absolute immunity 

(Doc. 29). Therefore, it is recommended that Defendant Monroe 

County District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) be 

granted, that Defendant District Attorney be dismissed from this 

action, and that all claims brought against the District 

 

6

The Court notes that Plaintiff also brought a claim against the 

District Attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Doc. 10, ¶ 23). However, 

“no action under the provisions of [that] section shall be sustained 

which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has 

accrued.” Section 1986. As Williams’s complaint was filed nearly two 

years after the underlying event in this action took place, a claim 

under § 1986 comes too late.

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 16 of 18
17

Attorney be dismissed. 

In conclusion, the undersigned recommends the following: 

that the Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 19-20) be granted as to the 

Defendant Monroe County Sheriff’s Department, that all claims 

against it be dismissed, and that Mobile County Sheriff’s 

Department be dismissed from this action; that the Motion to 

Dismiss (Docs. 19-20) be granted as to Defendant Monroe County 

Courthouse, that all claims against it be dismissed, and that 

Monroe County Courthouse be dismissed as a Defendant; that the 

Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 19-20) be granted as to Defendant 

Monroe County for all claims brought against it pursuant to 

section 1983 and denied as to all other claims; and that 

Defendant Monroe County District Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 29) be granted, that Monroe County District Attorney be 

dismissed from this action, and that all claims brought against 

the District Attorney be dismissed. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties 

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 17 of 18
18

should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An 

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the 

briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 10th day of September, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00250-CG-M Document 43 Filed 09/10/15 Page 18 of 18