Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 76903 

Background 

The final regulations that are the 

subject of this correction relates to 

‘‘Unlicensed National Information 

Infrastructure (U–NII) Devices in the 5 

GHz Band’’ under § 15.407(a)(1). 

Need for Correction 

As published, the revised text in the 

final regulations contains errors that are 

misleading and need immediate 

correction. 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 15 

Communications equipment, Radio. 

Accordingly, 47 CFR part 15 is 

corrected by making the following 

correcting amendment: 

PART 15—RADIO FREQUENCY 

DEVICES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 15 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 302a, 303, 304, 

307, 336, 544a, and 549. 

■ 2. Section 15.407 is amended by 

revising paragraph (a)(1)(iii) to read as 

follows: 

§ 15.407 General technical requirements. 

(a) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(iii) For fixed point-to-point access 

points operating in the band 5.15–5.25 

GHz, the maximum conducted output 

power over the frequency band of 

operation shall not exceed 1 W. In 

addition, the maximum power spectral 

density shall not exceed 17 dBm in any 

1 megahertz band. Fixed point-to-point 

U–NII devices may employ antennas 

with directional gain up to 23 dBi 

without any corresponding reduction in 

the maximum conducted output power 

or maximum power spectral density. 

For fixed point-to-point transmitters 

that employ a directional antenna gain 

greater than 23 dBi, a 1 dB reduction in 

maximum conducted output power and 

maximum power spectral density is 

required for each 1 dB of antenna gain 

in excess of 23 dBi. Fixed, point-topoint operations exclude the use of 

point-to-multipoint systems, 

omnidirectional applications, and 

multiple collocated transmitters 

transmitting the same information. The 

operator of the U–NII device, or if the 

equipment is professionally installed, 

the installer, is responsible for ensuring 

that systems employing high gain 

directional antennas are used 

exclusively for fixed, point-to-point 

operations. 

* * * * * 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene H. Dortch, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2014–29858 Filed 12–22–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 73 

[GN Docket No. 12–268; ET Docket Nos. 

13–26 and 14–14; FCC 14–157] 

Expanding the Economic and 

Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum 

Through Incentive Auctions 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This document addresses 

several outstanding issues related to the 

Incentive Auction. The Commission 

addresses and rejects proposals for 

additional limits on any new 

interference between television stations 

as a result of the repacking process. The 

Commission establishes a methodology 

and the associated input values to 

predict inter-service interference 

between television and wireless services 

in certain areas for use during the 

incentive auction (ISIX Methodology). 

DATES: Effective January 22, 2015, 

except for §§ 73.3700(b)(1)(iv)(B), 

73.3700(b)(2)(i) introductory text, and 

73.3700(b)(2)(ii) of the rules which 

contain new or modified information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

Public Law 104–13, that are not 

effective until approved by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). The 

Federal Communications Commission 

will publish a document in the Federal 

Register announcing OMB approval and 

the effective date of this rule. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Aspasia Paroutsas, (202) 418–7285, 

Aspasia.Paroutsas@fcc.gov, Office of 

Engineering and Technology. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Second 

Report and Order and Further Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 

12–268; ET Docket Nos. 13–26 and 14– 

14, FCC 14–157, adopted October 16, 

2014 and released October 17, 2014. The 

full text of this document is available for 

inspection and copying during normal 

business hours in the FCC Reference 

Center (Room CY–A257), 445 12th 

Street SW., Washington, DC 20554. The 

complete text of this document also may 

be purchased from the Commission’s 

copy contractor, Best Copy and Printing, 

Inc., 445 12th Street SW., Room, CY– 

B402, Washington, DC 20554. The full 

text may also be downloaded at: 

www.fcc.gov. People with Disabilities: 

To request materials in accessible 

formats for people with disabilities 

(braille, large print, electronic files, 

audio format), send an email to fcc504@

fcc.gov or call the Consumer & 

Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202– 

418–0530 (voice), 202–418–0432 (tty). 

Summary of Second Report and Order 

Requested Additional Limits on New 

Interference in the Repacking Process 

1. The Commission declined to 

establish a one-percent cap on the 

amount of total or aggregate new 

interference that a broadcast station will 

be allowed to receive from other 

stations, as requested by the National 

Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and 

others. In the Incentive Auction R&O, 79 

FR 48442, August 15, 2014, the 

Commission adopted a 0.5 percent limit 

on new interference that will be applied 

on a pairwise or station-to-station basis. 

The Commission concludes that 

broadcasters’ concerns regarding the 

potential for new interference in the 

absence of a separate one-percent cap on 

aggregate interference are exaggerated: 

the vast majority of stations are unlikely 

to experience aggregate new interference 

of more than one percent. The 

Commission also adopted measures that 

will effectively address broadcasters’ 

concerns about such interference in 

exceptional cases where there may be 

aggregate new interference of more than 

one percent. In addition to being 

unnecessary, the proposed cap is not 

practical or realistic, because even if the 

broadcasters had identified a means of 

implementing it (they have not), an 

aggregate interference cap would 

deprive the reverse auction bidding 

process of its speed and, therefore, 

compromise the success of the incentive 

auction. The Commission concludes 

that it can fulfill Congress’s mandate to 

make ‘‘all reasonable efforts’’ to preserve 

the population served of stations that 

will remain on the air after the incentive 

auction without imposing an aggregate 

interference cap. Crucially, the 

Commission can do so in a manner that 

ensures an efficient channel assignment 

scheme, minimizes repacking costs and 

disruption to broadcasters and viewers, 

and furthers the goal of a successful 

auction. The Commission also declined 

to adopt an additional limit on new 

interference to stations that are 

currently experiencing ten percent or 

more interference within their service 

areas. 


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76904 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

Background 

2. Section 6403(b)(2) of the Spectrum 

Act requires the Commission, in 

reorganizing or ‘‘repacking’’ the 

broadcast television bands, to ‘‘make all 

reasonable efforts to preserve, as of 

[February 22, 2012], the coverage area 

and population served’’ of eligible 

television stations. In the Incentive 

Auction R&O, the Commission 

interpreted this mandate to require ‘‘that 

we use all reasonable efforts to preserve 

each station’s coverage area and 

population served without sacrificing 

the goal of using market forces to 

repurpose spectrum for new, flexible 

uses.’’ Consistent with that 

interpretation, the Commission adopted 

an approach to preserving population 

served under which no channel 

assignment, ‘‘considered alone, may 

reduce another station’s specific 

population served by more than 0.5 

percent.’’ The Commission’s rules treat 

0.5 percent interference or less as de 

minimis or no new interference, as this 

amount rounds to zero at integer 

precision. Under this approach, the 

Commission will only consider stationto-station (or ‘‘pairwise’’) interference 

when determining whether a particular 

channel assignment is permissible. 

3. While most commenters, including 

the broadcast industry, supported the 

Commission’s approach to pairwise 

interference, NAB, supported by other 

broadcasters, urged the Commission to 

adopt two additional measures. First, 

NAB asked that the Commission cap the 

amount of total new interference that a 

station may receive at one percent. 

According to NAB, ‘‘while an individual 

station can only cause a maximum 

addition of 0.5 percent interference 

. . . , ‘stations repacked during the 

incentive auction process . . . , would 

likely receive interference from multiple 

stations’ which, in the aggregate, could 

‘lead to significant viewer losses.’ ’’ 

Second, noting that some stations 

currently receive up to ten percent 

interference, NAB requested that the 

Commission prevent any new 

interference to these stations. The 

Commission deferred a decision on 

these proposals, explaining that FCC 

staff would be ‘‘releasing a Public 

Notice inviting comment on a staff 

analysis of the potential impact of 

aggregate interference on television 

stations as a result of the repacking 

process,’’ and that the Commission 

would resolve the issue in a subsequent 

order. 

4. The staff released its analysis on 

June 2, 2014. The Aggregate Interference 

PN explained that the staff analysis was 

based on updated ‘‘constraint files’’ for 

each station developed using the 

repacking approach adopted in the 

Incentive Auction R&O, including the 

pairwise approach to preserving 

population served. Using these 

constraint files, the staff conducted 100 

simulations of the repacking process, 

based on two different spectrum 

recovery scenarios (84 MHz and 120 

MHz) and applying several different 

approaches to select which stations 

went off the air as a result of the reverse 

auction, producing a channel 

assignment plan for each simulation. 

The staff then calculated the aggregate 

or total predicted new interference from 

all stations to each station’s population 

served for every channel plan. Across 

all of the simulations, no station was 

predicted to receive aggregate new 

interference of two percent or more. One 

percent of stations were predicted to 

receive aggregate new interference 

between one and two percent, while the 

vast majority of stations (approximately 

88 percent) were predicted to receive 

aggregate new interference of well under 

the 0.5 percent de minimis threshold. 

Stations Are Highly Unlikely To 

Experience Aggregate Interference of 

More Than One Percent 

5. Broadcasters’ concerns regarding 

the potential for aggregate new 

interference to more than one percent of 

their viewers in the absence of a cap are 

overstated: The vast majority of stations 

are unlikely to experience significant 

new interference as a result of the 

repacking process. NAB points to a 

sample New York station which has 

seven stations causing some unique, 

non-overlapping interference, arguing 

that without a cap this station could 

receive new aggregate interference of 

two to three percent as a result of the 

repacking process. However, NAB’s 

analysis includes existing patterns of 

interference—that is, areas in which 

viewers do not currently receive service 

from a station due to interference from 

other stations—which the repacking 

approach does not consider in seeking 

to preserve population served. Staff 

analysis applying the repacking 

approach adopted in the Incentive 

Auction R&O predicts that the 

overwhelming majority of stations 

(approximately 99 percent) will not 

experience new interference above the 

proposed cap. Only one percent of all 

stations were predicted to receive 

aggregate new interference between one 

and two percent, with no station 

predicted to receive two percent or 

greater. In addition, the vast majority of 

stations (approximately 88 percent) 

across all 100 simulations conducted by 

the staff were predicted to receive new 

interference from all stations of well 

under the 0.5 percent de minimis 

threshold. These results indicate that 

the station-to-station or pairwise 

approach to preserving population 

served that the Commission adopted in 

the Incentive Auction R&O is 

sufficiently conservative to prevent the 

crowded market scenario that concerns 

NAB. 

6. Accuracy of the Underlying Data. 

NAB questions the accuracy of the staff 

analysis based on purported anomalies 

in the underlying data. The updated 

constraint files underlying the staff 

analysis consist of two files for each 

television station: A ‘‘domain’’ file that 

lists all of the channels to which the 

station could be assigned considering 

fixed constraints, and an ‘‘interferencepaired’’ file that lists all of the other 

stations that could not be assigned to 

operate on the same or on an adjacent 

channel with that station (because the 

stations’ interference relationship would 

violate the 0.5 percent new pairwise 

interference threshold). NAB points to 

two examples in which the files reflect 

that two or more stations cannot be 

assigned to the same channel on certain 

frequencies, but may be assigned to the 

same channel on nearby frequencies. 

According to NAB, these ‘‘results appear 

highly unlikely given that . . . the 

change in the amount of interference 

caused between assigning closely 

spaced channels . . . is not significant.’’ 

The examples NAB identifies represent 

neither an error nor an inconsistency in 

the underlying data. These results 

simply demonstrate that predicted 

interference will change slightly as 

stations move from one channel to 

another because radio waves propagate 

differently on different frequencies. The 

slight variations may result in situations 

where stations cannot operate on one 

channel under the applicable 

constraints, but may operate on a nearby 

channel, because such variations cause 

the interference relationship between 

two stations to go above or below the 0.5 

percent interference threshold. Thus, 

NAB’s examples do not reflect 

inconsistencies or errors in the updated 

constraint files underlying the staff 

analysis. 

7. Robustness of the Studies. The 

Commission also rejected NAB’s claims 

that the staff analysis is skewed by the 

spectrum recovery scenarios studied 

and understates the potential for new 

aggregate interference. Arguments that 

lower levels of broadcaster participation 

in the reverse auction (resulting in less 

spectrum recovered) increase the 

potential for new aggregate interference 

in crowded markets are based on a 

misunderstanding of the repacking 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 76905 

process. In the 84 and 120 MHz 

scenarios studied by the staff, higher 

levels of participation are required 

because more stations would have to 

voluntarily relinquish their spectrum 

usage rights in order for the Commission 

to be able to repack the remaining 

stations consistent with the constraints 

adopted in the Incentive Auction R&O. 

In other words, more stations would 

have to go off the air because fewer 

channels would be available in the TV 

spectrum to repack broadcasters. If, on 

the other hand, fewer broadcasters 

choose to participate, as NAB contends 

is likely, the pairwise constraints would 

prevent the auction from repurposing as 

much spectrum, leaving more television 

channels available to assign to stations. 

Regardless of how much spectrum is 

recovered, the constraints remain static 

throughout the auction, and provide 

limits to whether and how stations may 

be repacked. 

8. The results of the staff’s analysis 

were consistent across broadcaster 

participation rates, which ranged from 

80 to 100 percent, and across a large (36 

MHz) difference in the two spectrum 

recovery scenarios studied. This 

consistency confirms that lower levels 

of broadcaster participation—and 

scenarios in which less spectrum is 

recovered—will not have a significant 

impact on new aggregate interference. 

The staff’s approach to selecting the 

stations to voluntarily go off the air in 

the simulations also ensured that 

virtually every station was part of at 

least one simulation in which that 

station remained on the air. 

Accordingly, we reject NAB’s 

contention that the results of the staff 

analysis are unreliable. 

9. Release of Simulation Software. 

The Commission rejects contentions 

that the Aggregate Interference PN 

comment period was too short and that 

meaningful comment on the staff 

analysis was impossible without access 

to the simulation software that the staff 

used to generate constraint files and 

perform feasibility checks. The 

Aggregate Interference PN provided 30 

days for comments and an additional 20 

days for reply comments, and parties 

have had additional time to analyze the 

study (and to submit ex parte filings) 

since the comment period closed. 

Ample information has been made 

publicly available to allow for 

meaningful input on the staff analysis 

and its results, including the 

methodology, data, and assumptions 

underlying the analysis. Moreover, in 

the interest of transparency and 

encouraging meaningful input, the 

Commission and its staff have made 

extensive information about the 

repacking process publicly available 

over the course of this proceeding. The 

data and methodology required to 

simulate repacking scenarios were first 

detailed more than a year ago in the 

Repacking Data PN. The staff provided 

technical detail about how software 

could be used to perform ‘‘feasibility 

checks’’ (that is, to determine whether 

channels can be assigned to all of the 

stations eligible for protection in the 

repacking process consistent with the 

constraints imposed by the Spectrum 

Act) in January 2014, and further 

detailed the staff’s repacking simulation 

software in a subsequent workshop. 

Thus, interested parties have had 

sufficient time and information to 

comment meaningfully on the staff 

analysis. 

Measures To Address Aggregate 

Interference of More Than One Percent 

in Exceptional Cases 

10. The Commission adopted two 

measures to address exceptional cases 

where a station is predicted to receive 

aggregate new interference in excess of 

one percent. First, it will use 

optimization techniques that seek to 

avoid final channel assignments that 

would result in aggregate new 

interference of more than one percent. 

After the incentive auction bidding 

closes and the set of stations that will 

remain on the air in each band is 

established, the Commission plans to 

employ optimization techniques to 

determine a final channel assignment 

scheme from the provisional channel 

assignments identified during the 

reverse auction bidding process. During 

this final channel assignment process, 

the Commission can take time to 

account for factors in addition to 

feasibility, such as aggregate new 

interference, without compromising the 

speed of the reverse auction bidding 

process. Among other objectives, it 

intends to seek a final channel 

assignment that minimizes new 

aggregate interference above one 

percent. Although the current rules do 

not provide broadcasters with complete 

protection from aggregate interference 

caused by other broadcast stations, the 

Commission chose a one percent 

threshold in light of broadcasters’ stated 

concerns about aggregate interference 

exceeding this amount. 

11. Although the Commission 

anticipates that this final channel 

assignment optimization procedure will 

further reduce the already-small number 

of stations that are predicted to receive 

new interference greater than one 

percent, it cannot guarantee this result 

in every case. The optimization 

procedure can identify the best final 

channel assignment scheme given the 

station-to-band assignments produced 

by the reverse auction. However, the 

Commission cannot change these 

assignments after the bidding stops and 

the final stage rule is met without 

undoing the entire auction. 

Accordingly, as an additional safeguard, 

if a station is predicted to receive new 

interference above one percent on the 

final channel assigned to it following 

the repacking process, the Commission 

will provide it with the opportunity to 

file an application proposing an 

alternate channel or expanded facilities 

in a priority filing window, along with 

a limited number of other stations that 

have been assigned the same priority. 

This opportunity will be available to 

any station entitled to protection in the 

repacking process that is predicted to 

experience aggregate new interference 

in excess of one percent, regardless of 

whether that station was reassigned to a 

new channel in the repacking process. 

Taken together, the final channel 

assignment optimization procedure and 

post-assignment facilities modification 

processes will provide a ‘‘safety valve’’ 

in the exceptional cases where new 

aggregate interference above one percent 

has occurred or is likely to occur. 

An Aggregate Cap Would Deprive the 

Reverse Auction Bidding Process of Its 

Speed and Threaten the Success of the 

Auction 

12. In addition to being unnecessary 

for the reasons described above, 

imposition of an aggregate interference 

cap would compromise the central 

objective of a successful auction that 

allows market forces to determine the 

highest and best use for spectrum. 

Speed is critical to the successful 

implementation of the incentive 

auction: The repacking methodology 

must be capable of analyzing complex 

technical issues fast enough to not 

unduly slow down the bidding process. 

Under the repacking approach adopted 

in the Incentive Auction R&O, only one 

provisional channel assignment scheme 

that meets all of the constraints need be 

identified for the reverse auction 

bidding to proceed. Tens of thousands 

of individual ‘‘feasibility checks’’ may 

need to be run in each bidding round, 

and examining interference 

relationships only on a ‘‘pairwise’’ or 

station-to-station basis is the only way 

to identify a ‘‘feasible’’ repack analysis 

quickly enough to meet the 

Commission’s objectives for the reverse 

auction. As discussed, the Commission 

intends to account for factors beyond 

mere feasibility without compromising 

the bidding process by seeking to 

optimize provisional channel 


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76906 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

assignments after the bidding stops: 

Once the set of stations that will remain 

on the air in each band after the auction 

is complete has been established, the 

Commission intends to use optimization 

techniques to determine a channel 

assignment that limits the amount of 

aggregate new interference for any 

station. 

13. It would be significantly more 

complicated and, as a result, timeconsuming to consider the amount of 

aggregate interference from all sources 

that a station may receive on its 

provisional channel during the bidding 

process, as would be necessary to 

implement a cap on aggregate 

interference. Specifically, after the 

repacking process identifies a 

provisional channel assignment for a 

station that is feasible—based on the 

pairwise constraints—the aggregate 

interference of the provisional 

assignments for all of the other stations 

that may need to be assigned a channel 

(non-participating stations and stations 

that continue to participate in the 

bidding) would have to be determined 

in a separate step. If the cap were 

exceeded, then the assignment would 

have to be disallowed and a new 

assignment identified. This iterative 

process would have to be repeated until 

either a provisional channel assignment 

were found that satisfies the cap or all 

possible assignments were eliminated. 

The same analysis would need to be 

performed repeatedly for each station 

that continues to participate in the 

bidding process, leading to possibly an 

exponential number of feasibility checks 

for each round of the auction. Such an 

approach would deprive the repacking 

feasibility checker of its speed and 

threaten the success of the incentive 

auction. 

14. Despite the results of the staff 

analysis discussed, broadcasters argue 

that the Commission must adopt the 

proposed cap under the ‘‘all reasonable 

efforts’’ mandate because doing so 

would not significantly increase 

repacking constraints. The Commission 

disagrees. As explained in the Incentive 

Auction R&O, the Commission 

interprets the statutory mandate in light 

of the other objectives of the Spectrum 

Act, including the goal of repurposing 

spectrum for new, flexible uses. 

Requiring steps that would impede the 

Commission’s ability to conduct a 

successful auction would sacrifice this 

goal and therefore is not ‘‘reasonable’’ 

within the meaning of the statute given 

the results of the staff analysis. The 

Commission adopted measures that will 

effectively address broadcasters’ 

concerns regarding aggregate new 

interference. The Commission has not 

identified, and no commenter has 

suggested, a means of implementing the 

proposed cap without compromising the 

speed of the bidding process, which is 

critical to conducting a successful 

auction. Under the circumstances, the 

Commission concludes that the statute 

does not require adoption of the 

proposed cap. 

15. The Commission also rejects 

NAB’s assertion that failure to adopt the 

proposed cap would undermine the 

voluntariness of the reverse auction. 

The Commission does not believe—and 

NAB has not demonstrated through 

record evidence—that the possibility of 

an increase in aggregate new 

interference, such as the remote 

possibility predicted in the staff study, 

would so devalue a broadcaster’s license 

(or increase its costs) that it would 

coerce a broadcaster to participate in the 

auction. 

Proposed Cap on Any New Interference 

to Certain Stations 

16. The Commission also declined 

NAB’s suggestion to adopt a cap on any 

new interference to stations that are 

currently experiencing ten percent or 

more interference within their service 

areas. As explained in the Incentive 

Auction R&O, the Commission 

interprets section 6403(b)(2) of the 

Spectrum Act ‘‘to require efforts to 

preserve service to those viewers who 

had access to a station’s signal within its 

protected coverage area as of’’ the 

statutory date. Accordingly, it base 

comparative evaluations of interference 

on the population that a station was 

predicted to serve as of the statutory 

date. Thus, the interference level that 

the stations in question were 

experiencing as of the statutory date is 

their baseline for repacking purposes. 

Adopting NAB’s suggestion would 

increase the constraints on the 

repacking process, hindering the 

Commission’s ability to repack TV 

spectrum. In addition, the Commission 

does not believe the statutory ‘‘all 

reasonable efforts’’ mandate warrants 

granting these stations greater 

interference protection than the current 

rules. The Commission therefore 

declines to treat these stations 

differently from other stations in the 

repacking process. 

Requested Cap on Viewer Losses Due to 

Channel Reassignments 

17. In a recent ex parte filing, NAB 

criticizes the staff’s analysis for ignoring 

potential terrain losses due to channel 

reassignments that could cause some 

stations to lose viewers, and argues for 

the first time that the Commission must 

adopt ‘‘an aggregate cap on . . . the 

percentage decrease in population 

served as a result of repacking during 

the incentive auction process.’’ The 

Commission declines to address NAB’s 

new requested cap here. Prior to NAB’s 

recent filing, no commenter proposed 

such a cap. Rather, NAB and others 

advocated a cap on aggregate 

interference between stations, and the 

purpose of the staff’s analysis was to 

study the potential for such 

interference. The interference cap that 

NAB previously advocated would have 

no effect whatsoever on terrain losses, 

because such losses are not caused by 

interference between stations. Thus, 

NAB’s request for an aggregate cap on 

population loss is outside the scope of 

this item. 

18. Although the Commission 

declines to address NAB’s requested 

new cap here, consistent with the 

Commission’s decision above to use 

optimization techniques to seek to avoid 

final channel assignments that would 

result in aggregate new interference of 

more than one percent, the Commission 

concludes that it should use 

optimization techniques to seek to avoid 

final channel assignments that would 

result in significant viewer losses due to 

terrain losses. The Commission did not 

decide now on an optimization 

technique to carry out this objective, 

because unlike interference between 

stations, terrain losses can be avoided 

by optimizing for various factors. For 

example, minimizing channel moves 

will avoid terrain losses while also 

reducing broadcaster relocation costs, 

because a station that stays on the same 

channel will not experience terrain 

losses. Similarly, preferring moves to 

channels lower in the UHF band will 

avoid terrain losses while also serving 

the Commission’s goal of repurposing 

UHF spectrum contiguously from 

channel 51 down. The Commission will 

seek comment on optimization factors 

for the final channel assignment 

scheme, including factors that would 

help both directly and indirectly to 

avoid final channel assignments that 

would result in significant viewer losses 

due to terrain losses, in the forthcoming 

Incentive Auction Comment PN. 

Although different measures may be 

necessary to protect viewers from loss of 

service due to terrain losses and 

interference, consistent with the 

statutory mandate we will make all 

reasonable efforts to preserve television 

service to all existing viewers. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 76907 

ISIX Methodology and Input Values To 

Determine 600 MHz Band Wireless 

License Area Impairments During the 

Incentive Auction 

19. The Commission adopts here the 

ISIX Methodology and input values 

proposed in the ISIX PN, see Office of 

Engineering and Technology Seeks to 

Supplement the Incentive Auction 

Proceeding Record Regarding Potential 

Interference Between Broadcast 

Television and Wireless Services, Public 

Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 712 (2014) with 

certain modifications, for use during the 

incentive auction. The ISIX 

Methodology is set forth in detail in 

Appendix A (Technical Appendix) of 

the Second R&O. The ISIX Methodology 

and input values will be used during the 

auction to estimate the extent to which 

600 MHz Band wireless license areas 

may be ‘‘impaired’’ due to predicted 

interference to, or from, broadcast 

television stations assigned to the 600 

MHz Band as a result of market 

variation. ‘‘Impaired’’ license areas may 

include ‘‘infringed’’ and/or ‘‘restricted’’ 

areas. An ‘‘infringed’’ area is one where 

wireless operation is predicted to 

receive harmful interference from a 

television station that is placed in the 

600 MHz Band. Wireless licensees will 

be free to operate in infringed areas but 

will assume the risk of receiving 

interference from a television station. A 

‘‘restricted’’ area is one where wireless 

operations would be predicted to cause 

harmful interference to a television 

station that is placed in the 600 MHz 

Band, depending on how the wireless 

operations are deployed. 

20. Because new 600 MHz Band 

wireless operations will not be deployed 

until after the incentive auction, the 

ISIX Methodology and input values the 

Commission adopted in this Order 

necessarily rely on a number of 

assumptions, all of which are described 

in the ISIX PN and the Technical 

Appendix. To the extent that the 

Commission changed any of the 

assumptions proposed in the ISIX PN, 

the basis for such changes is explained 

below. The Commission also addressed 

commenters’ objections to certain 

aspects of the ISIX Methodology and 

input values. The results of the ISIX 

Methodology and input values adopted 

in the Second Report and Order may be 

used for several purposes during the 

incentive auction. The Commission will 

address these uses in the forthcoming 

Comment PN on auction procedures. 

Importantly, the Commission does not 

determine in this Order how the ISIX 

Methodology and input values will be 

applied following the incentive auction. 

21. Although the ISIX Methodology 

may be characterized as more complex 

than the distance-based approach 

advocated by some commenters, the 

Commission concludes that the ISIX 

Methodology’s ability to account for 

different inter-service interference 

scenarios, local terrain obstacles and 

other factors make it significantly more 

spectrally efficient than a distancebased approach, and these benefits 

outweigh the costs of greater 

complexity. Also, its granularity is 

better suited to the requirements of 

conducting the incentive auction than a 

distance-based approach. Accordingly, 

the Commission adopts the ISIX 

Methodology. 

Background 

22. In the Incentive Auction R&O, the 

Commission adopted a flexible band 

plan framework that accommodates 

market variation. Market variation 

occurs where broadcast stations remain 

on spectrum that is repurposed for 

wireless broadband under the 600 MHz 

Band Plan. The Commission explained 

that accommodating market variation is 

necessary because the amount of 

spectrum recovered along the Canadian 

and Mexican borders and in some 

markets may vary from that recovered in 

most markets nationwide. 

Accommodating market variation will 

allow for avoiding limits to the amount 

of spectrum repurposed across the 

nation to what is available in the most 

constrained market. 

23. Broadcasters and several other 

industry participants raised concerns 

over the potential for inter-service 

interference created by market variation. 

This potential interference results 

because, in constrained markets where 

broadcast television stations are 

assigned to channels within the 600 

MHz Band, television services and 

wireless services will be operating in 

close geographic proximity on either the 

same or adjacent frequencies. Some 

commenters proposed fixed geographic 

separation distances to mitigate such 

potential interference. 

24. On January 29, 2014, the 

Commission’s Office of Engineering and 

Technology (OET) released a Public 

Notice seeking comment on an 

alternative to the fixed separation 

distance methodology to address interservice interference. The ISIX 

Methodology is intended to 

accommodate market variation in a 

more spectrally efficient manner than 

fixed separation distances. The rationale 

underlying the proposed ISIX 

Methodology was that a fixed 

geographic separation distance 

approach would be spectrally inefficient 

because it would group together 

different inter-service interference 

scenarios (e.g., wireless base station to 

television receiver, television 

transmitter to wireless user equipment, 

etc.) and apply separation distances 

based on the worst case scenario, 

without considering factors such as 

technical characteristics (i.e. antenna 

height, power), terrain variability, and 

density of population. 

25. The ISIX PN discussed the varying 

degrees of spectral overlap between 

broadcast television and wireless 

services will impact to different degrees 

the potential for harmful interference 

between the two services. Under the 600 

MHz Band Plan adopted in the Incentive 

Auction R&O, six megahertz broadcast 

television channels will be repurposed 

as five megahertz wireless blocks. The 

difference in channel bandwidth (six vs. 

five megahertz) means that the wireless 

spectrum blocks will not perfectly align 

with the existing television channels 

and, where market variation exists, 

there will be varying degrees of spectral 

overlap between the channels. As the 

wireless spectrum block moves from 

complete overlap in frequency with a 

television channel to an edge-to-edge 

separation of five megahertz, the level of 

undesired signal that the victim receiver 

can tolerate without experiencing 

interference increases. The ISIX PN 

proposed to define ‘‘co-channel 

operations’’ as any spectral overlap 

between a wireless spectrum block and 

a television channel in one megahertz 

increments ranging from +5 (complete 

overlap) to +1 megahertz, and ‘‘adjacent 

channel operations’’ as a wireless 

spectrum block and television channel 

that do not overlap but are separated by 

less than five megahertz (edge to edge 

separation of five megahertz or less). 

26. The ISIX PN outlined four 

scenarios of potential interference when 

broadcast television and wireless 

operations are co-channel or adjacent 

channel in nearby markets: (1) Digital 

television (DTV) transmitter to wireless 

base station (Case 1); (2) DTV 

transmitter to wireless user equipment 

(Case 2); (3) wireless base station to DTV 

receiver (Case 3); and (4) wireless user 

equipment to DTV receiver (Case 4). 

Digital Television to Wireless 

Interference (Cases 1 and 2) 

27. The Commission adopted the ISIX 

Methodology and input values as 

proposed in the ISIX PN for use during 

the incentive auction to predict 

interference from DTV transmitters to 

wireless base stations (Case 1) and 

wireless user equipment (Case 2), except 

that it will not consider clutter loss for 

Case 2. While wireless commenters 


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support the proposed consideration of 

clutter loss for Case 2, the Commission 

determined that considering clutter loss 

would not improve the accuracy of the 

ISIX Methodology. The resolution of the 

clutter database is 30 meters and, 

therefore, every grid cell would have 

more than 4,000 associated clutter 

values. The one clutter value selected in 

each cell would not be representative of 

the entire cell and thus would fail to 

provide for an accurate assessment of 

the interference environment. 

28. The Commission will use the 

proposed F(50,50) statistical measure to 

predict the strength of an interfering 

television signal within the wireless 

license area for Cases 1 and 2 rather 

than the F(50,10) measure advocated by 

broadcasters. The F(50,50) measure 

assumes that the DTV signal will be 

strong enough to interfere with the 

wireless base station or wireless user 

equipment in 50 percent of the locations 

within the wireless license area 50 

percent of the time; the F(50,10) 

measure would assume that the 

interfering signal will be strong enough 

to interfere in 50 percent of the 

locations 10 percent of the time. The 

Joint Broadcasters support use of the 

F(50,10) measure as more conservative 

and more consistent with Commission 

practice. The Commission concludes 

that the F(50,50) measure is more 

appropriate for use in predicting 

interference from DTV signals to 

wireless operations during the auction. 

First, the F(50,50) measure will not risk 

harming broadcasters because it will be 

applied only during the incentive 

auction and only to predict interference 

to wireless operations from television 

stations for auction-related purposes, 

not to protect television signals. Second, 

the majority of wireless providers, who 

have the greatest stake in the accuracy 

of predicted inter-service interference to 

wireless operations, support use of the 

F(50,50) measure, supporting the 

conclusion that it will provide a 

reasonably accurate assessment of such 

interference. Third, use of the F(50,50) 

measure is appropriate in this context 

because various techniques are available 

to wireless operators to avoid harmful 

interference to wireless base stations 

that are not available to television 

stations or viewers. Accordingly, the 

Commission disagrees with the Joint 

Broadcasters that use of the F(50,50) 

measure is inconsistent with 

Commission practice in predicting 

interference between DTV stations. 

Under the circumstances, the 

Commission concludes that use of the 

more conservative F(50,10) measure is 

neither necessary nor consistent with 

the Commission’s goals for the incentive 

auction. 

29. The Commission declines to adopt 

Qualcomm’s suggested parameters for 

wireless user equipment in lieu of the 

parameters proposed in the ISIX PN. 

While the antenna gain value suggested 

by Qualcomm may reflect today’s 

smartphones, the Commission expects 

other wireless devices to be used in the 

600 MHz Band, like tablets or personal 

Wi-Fi hotspots, that could have either a 

higher antenna gain or a better antenna 

efficiency and thus be more susceptible 

to harmful interference. The 

Commission finds it appropriate to 

account for the types of devices that will 

most likely be used in the 600 MHz 

Band. Qualcomm also claims that the 

proposed parameter value for noise 

figure should be increased from 7.5 dB 

to 9 dB. However, the proposed value 

accounts for factors in addition to 

receiver noise that should be considered 

when calculating an effective noise 

figure. Therefore, the Commission 

declines to adopt Qualcomm’s suggested 

values for wireless user equipment. 

30. The Commission declines to adopt 

the Joint Broadcasters’ suggested fixed 

distance-based approach for Cases 1 and 

2. The Joint Broadcasters’ approach for 

Case 1 (television transmitter to wireless 

base station) would create unreasonably 

large zones where wireless operations 

would be deemed ‘‘impaired’’ by 

interference because their approach 

does not account for specific terrain 

obstacles that mitigate the potential for 

interference from television stations to 

wireless operations. As a result, it 

would significantly increase the 

predicted impairments to wireless 

license areas and exclude from the 

forward auction spectrum that could 

otherwise be offered for wireless 

services if impairments were assessed 

more accurately. For example, under the 

Joint Broadcasters’ proposal, a television 

station in Los Angeles could be 

predicted to interfere with wireless 

operations in Las Vegas. In contrast, the 

ISIX Methodology would evaluate the 

effect of terrain on the propagation of 

the interfering television signal. As a 

result, areas shielded by terrain, such as 

mountains, would not be identified as 

impaired by potential interference that 

is not likely to occur in those locations. 

Applying the ISIX Methodology in the 

example above, wireless operations in 

Las Vegas would not be considered 

impaired because of the shielding 

provided by the San Gabriel and San 

Bernardino mountain ranges. As a 

result, a wireless license in Las Vegas 

would be deemed unimpaired because 

of this terrain shielding and can 

therefore be auctioned even when there 

is a television station co-channel or 

adjacent channel in Los Angeles. The 

approach the Commission adopted will 

assess the interference environment and 

wireless license area impairments 

significantly more accurately in Case 1 

than the Joint Broadcasters’ suggested 

approach of a generic separation 

distance. 

31. For Case 2 (television transmitter 

to wireless user equipment), the Joint 

Broadcasters’ proposed five-kilometer 

separation distance would not 

adequately reflect the potential 

impairment to a wireless license area. 

The Joint Broadcasters conflate their 

proposed separation distances for Case 

1 with those for Case 2 and assume that 

the Case 1 distances will preclude 

wireless user equipment from operating 

near a television station. As stated, 

however, the Case 1 interference 

scenario will only occur if a television 

station is placed in the 600 MHz uplink 

spectrum, while Case 2 will only occur 

if a television station is placed in the 

600 MHz downlink spectrum. In 

addition, wireless user equipment is 

more sensitive than television receivers, 

and the high power and height of 

typical DTV transmitters require 

separation distances that can be much 

greater than five kilometers. However, 

adopting a generic distance-based 

separation to provide additional 

protection for wireless user equipment 

would raise the same concerns 

discussed with regard to Case 1. 

Therefore, the approach of predicting 

the specific locations (on a twokilometer grid) where the interfering 

DTV field strength exceeds the 

thresholds will provide wireless 

providers with more accurate 

information as to wireless license area 

impairments. 

32. Although the Commission 

recognizes that the ISIX Methodology it 

adopts may be more complex than a 

fixed distance-based approach, the 

Commission concludes that the added 

complexity of this approach is justified 

by its benefits. The ISIX Methodology’s 

granularity, tailored approach to 

different interference scenarios, and 

ability to account for factors that will 

mitigate interference in individual cases 

will generally lead to more accurate 

interference predictions. This is critical 

to meeting the Commission’s goals for 

the incentive auction because 

overestimating the extent of wireless 

license area impairments may limit the 

ability to repurpose spectrum for new 

uses through the auction. Moreover, 

more accurate predictions and more 

granular data will allow for more 

informed decisions, both for the 

Commission in determining whether to 


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auction certain licenses and for auction 

participants in making bidding 

decisions. The Commission also notes 

that, contrary to the Joint Broadcasters, 

most commenters support the ISIX 

Methodology. For Cases 1 and 2, the 

Commission therefore concludes that 

the benefits of the ISIX Methodology’s 

increased accuracy over an 

oversimplified fixed distance-based 

approach outweigh its costs in terms of 

additional complexity. 

Wireless Base Station to Digital 

Television Receiver (Case 3) 

33. The Commission adopted the ISIX 

Methodology and input values as 

proposed in the ISIX PN for use during 

the incentive auction to predict 

interference from wireless base stations 

to DTV receivers (Case 3), except that (1) 

the Commission adopted slightly higher 

D/U ratios (by 1 dB) for co-channel 

operations based on the measurements 

conducted by the staff and CEA, and (2) 

the Commission will not consider 

clutter loss. 

34. D/U ratios. The ISIX PN was 

premised on the assumption that ATSC 

DTV and LTE signals are sufficiently 

similar that the D/U ratios in the rules 

for television-to-television interference 

can be used in predicting interference 

from wireless base stations to television 

receivers. In response to concerns raised 

by some commenters, OET measured 

the susceptibility of a number of DTV 

receivers to interference from LTE 

signals, and CEA conducted additional 

measurements with six different DTV 

receivers. The Commission concluded 

that the record supports the D/U ratios 

proposed in the ISIX PN for adjacent 

channel interference based on the 

measurements conducted by staff and 

CEA. However, based on the 

measurement data, LTE signals create 

slightly more co-channel interference to 

DTV reception than other DTV signals. 

The Commission concludes that the D/ 

U ratios proposed in the ISIX PN for cochannel interference should be 

increased by 1dB from 15 dB to 16 dB 

in light of this data. Therefore, the 

Commission adopted the following D/U 

ratios for different degrees of spectral 

overlap in Case 3. This adjustment will 

result in a more accurate determination 

of impairments to co-channel wireless 

operations to any broadcast television 

stations that are assigned to the 

downlink 600 MHz Band spectrum as a 

result of market variation. The D/U 

ratios are accordingly adjusted as shown 

in Table 1, paragraph 43 of the Second 

Report and Order. 

35. While one receiver OET measured 

was predicted to receive interference at 

the D/U ratios the Commission adopted 

in this Order, it concludes that this 

result does not undermine the 

Commission’s decision. This receiver is 

a digital-to-analog converter box. While 

the Commission recognizes that such 

converter boxes remain in use and are 

still commercially available, the analogonly television receivers they are used 

with are reaching the end of their life 

cycles. Television receivers with digital 

tuners have no need of such converter 

boxes, and new television receivers 

have been required to include digital 

tuners since July 2004. Thus, most 

television receivers purchased since 

then have no need for a converter box. 

The Commission declines to adjust the 

D/U ratios it adopted based on the 

susceptibility to LTE signal interference 

of obsolete analog-to-digital converter 

boxes, the vast majority of which will 

no longer be in service during and after 

the 39-month Post Auction Transition 

Period. 

36. Although broadcasters argue for 

more measurements, no commenter 

disagrees that DTV and LTE signals 

behave similarly because both have 

noise-like emission characteristics. The 

measurement data from OET and CEA 

encompasses most new models of DTV 

receivers, as well as a representative 

sample of older models. With the 

exception of the one digital-to-analog 

converter box that is no longer likely to 

be in use within a few years, none of the 

DTV receivers OET tested was 

susceptible to LTE signal interference at 

the D/U ratios adopted in this Order. 

Testing additional receivers under 

different conditions, as broadcasters 

advocate, would delay this proceeding, 

and therefore the auction, without 

contributing meaningfully to the data in 

the record. Accordingly, the 

Commission concludes that the D/U 

ratios it adopted are sufficient to protect 

DTV receivers from LTE signal 

interference. 

37. The Commission rejects claims 

that the measurement data in the record 

is not reliable because it does not 

consider factors such as multiple LTE 

interferers, third-order intermodulation 

(IM3) or taboo interference, and splatter. 

The Commission’s rules governing DTVto-DTV interference do not address 

these factors, yet there is no evidence 

that the rules fail to adequately protect 

DTV signals as a result. Likewise, OET– 

69 does not consider taboo interference 

in its calculations but only considers the 

interference protections provided in the 

rules. Equipment manufacturers are 

aware of these factors and are expected 

to consider them when designing their 

receiver products. Because the 

Commission’s existing rules do not 

include provisions to protect DTV 

signals from the effects of multiple DTV 

interferers, IM3 or splatter, the 

Commission declines to account for 

such factors in the D/U ratios adopted 

for Case 3, and concludes that the 

measurement data in the record is 

reliable despite the lack of information 

regarding these factors. 

38. While the Commission recognizes 

the asymmetry in the performance of 

DTV receivers, the D/U values adopted 

in the ISIX Methodology are sufficiently 

conservative to protect against 

interference from wireless signals on cochannel and adjacent-channel 

frequencies above or below a received 

television channel. In addition, the 

adopted values will protect adjacentchannel operations, by several dB or 

more. Accordingly, the Commission 

adopts the values for OFR set forth in 

Table 9 of the ISIX PN. 

39. Clutter Loss. The Commission 

declined to adopt the proposed use of 

clutter loss for Case 3 for reasons similar 

to those set forth above with regard to 

Case 2. Clutter loss has not been used 

in the context of interference between 

television stations, and the Commission 

concluded that application of a single 

clutter value in a four-square kilometer 

area would not improve the accuracy of 

the ISIX Methodology. 

40. Propagation Model. The 

Commission rejects suggestions that the 

ISIX Methodology use the Hata or the 

free space propagation model for Case 3 

instead of the Longley-Rice model. The 

Commission has relied on the LongleyRice model to predict television 

coverage and interference for more than 

fifteen years, and that model is widely 

accepted for use at the frequencies in 

the 600 MHz Band. 

41. Fixed Distance-Based Approach. 

The Commission also rejects Joint 

Broadcasters’ fixed distance-based 

approach for Case 3. Their approach 

predicts wireless license area 

impairments greater than those 

predicted by the ISIX Methodology in 

some cases, whereas in others it would 

produce similar results or result in 

smaller impairments. The critical 

difference between the two approaches 

for Case 3, however, is the granularity 

of the data. The fixed geographic 

distances under the Joint Broadcasters’ 

approach are not easily converted to the 

‘‘grid-by-grid’’ data needed to evaluate 

potential harmful interference to 

television stations in the initial 

optimization process during the auction. 

The ISIX Methodology provides for a 

cell-by-cell determination of license 

impairments which will allow the 

Commission to make more informed 

decisions about the appropriate clearing 

targets for the reverse auction and 


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76910 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

which wireless spectrum blocks to 

auction in the forward auction, and also 

provide additional certainty to bidders 

in the forward auction. Therefore, the 

Commission concludes that the ISIX 

Methodology is better suited to the 

requirements of conducting the 

incentive auction than a distance-based 

approach for Case 3. 

42. Technical Parameters. The 

Commission rejected broadcasters’ 

claims that the parameter values for 

wireless base station power and height 

proposed for Case 3 in the ISIX PN are 

inconsistent with real-world wireless 

facilities. These typical values were 

obtained from advisory committees and 

industry submissions in the record. The 

Commission has previously considered 

typical operating parameters in 

predicting interference, rather than 

assuming the maximum permissible 

levels authorized under the 

Commission’s rules. As Sprint notes, the 

typical parameters may not precisely 

reflect the parameters that a wireless 

provider would use in actual 

deployment, but they are reasonable for 

purposes of modeling. The Commission 

emphasizes that the use of typical 

values for Case 3 will be restricted to the 

incentive auction, when actual values 

will not be available because 600 MHz 

Band services will not be deployed yet. 

43. For purposes of the auction, the 

ISIX Methodology assumes an Effective 

Radiated Power (ERP) level of 120 W/ 

MHz for a wireless base station. This 

power level, which is supported by data 

in the record, is based on a wireless base 

station operating with two LTE 

transmitters, rated at 40 watts (W) each 

and transmitting at their maximum 

capable output power (ignoring network 

effects such as power control) and an 

antenna gain of 15 dBi. The 15 dBi 

value is based on manufacturer data on 

panel antennas designed for operation 

in frequency bands above and below the 

600 MHz Band. An antenna with 15 dBi 

gain used with two 40 W transmitters 

and a line loss of 1 dB produces an ERP 

of 1200 W in a 10 MHz LTE channel, or 

120 W/MHz ERP. To simulate the effect 

on one 6 MHz television channel of 

wireless operations transmitting across 

contiguous adjacent 5 MHz wireless 

blocks, OET multiplied the ERP/MHz by 

6, so that the ERP in a 6 MHz channel 

would be 720 watts. 

44. The antenna Height Above 

Average Terrain (HAAT) value of 30 

meters adopted for use in the ISIX 

Methodology is consistent with realworld network information incorporated 

in the Commerce Spectrum 

Management Advisory Committee 

(CSMAC) Final Report. This report 

specifies 30 meters as the typical HAAT 

for base stations in urban/suburban 

areas where inter-service interference 

would most likely occur. The wireless 

industry also supports this assumption. 

The Joint Broadcasters’ analysis 

overestimates the typical wireless base 

station antenna height because it is 

based on the overall height above 

ground level for the towers hosting a 

wireless antenna, rather than the height 

at which the wireless antennas are 

actually mounted on each tower. 

Wireless antennas are typically sidemounted on platforms or other 

supporting structures, resulting in a 

much lower antenna height than the 

overall tower height. Moreover, while 

the Joint Broadcasters’ analysis relies on 

data from American Tower, one of the 

largest tower management entities in the 

United States, it excludes rooftop, onbuilding, and broadcast tower mounted 

sites. The Commission believes that the 

typical values adopted are appropriate 

for modeling a 600 MHz Band wireless 

network. 

45. ‘‘Error Code 3’’ Messages. The 

Commission disagrees with the Joint 

Broadcasters that it should assume 

service in cells where an ‘‘error code 3’’ 

message appears, rather than using the 

predicted field strength at such 

locations. The Joint Broadcasters’ claim 

that the proposed approach departs 

from the Commission’s treatment of 

error warnings ignores the fact that the 

Commission has treated error warnings 

differently depending on context. In the 

Incentive Auction R&O, the Commission 

decided to assume service in cells 

where an ‘‘error code 3’’ message 

appears, because doing so is consistent 

with the traditional assumption for 

purposes of applying the OET–69 

methodology that service is available 

throughout a station’s coverage area and 

that broadcasters locate and configure 

their transmitters to maximize coverage. 

In predicting Case 3 interference, 

however, the Commission found that 

different treatment of ‘‘error code 3’’ 

messages is appropriate. If service were 

to be assumed in the presence of an 

error warning, the cell in question 

would be treated as having interferencefree service, meaning that potential 

inter-service interference would be 

ignored. The result would be a failure to 

check for inter-service interference at 

locations where the DTV signal could be 

subject to interference. Instead by using 

the predicted field strength at such 

locations, the Commission ensures that 

the ISIX Methodology evaluates service 

and potential interference in the flagged 

cells just as it would in non-flagged 

cells. The Commission’s approach does 

not alter or otherwise affect the 

treatment of error warnings in applying 

the OET–69 methodology as set forth in 

the Incentive Auction R&O. 

46. Aggregate Wireless Interference to 

DTV. The Commission declines to 

consider the potential impact of 

interference from multiple wireless base 

stations on DTV reception when 

applying the ISIX Methodology for Case 

3 during the incentive auction. 

Broadcasters express concern that LTE 

signals could combine at the point of 

DTV signal reception, increasing the 

potential for interference. They urge the 

Commission to use either a simple 

direct summation of signals or the Root 

Square Sum (RSS) method for 

calculating interference from multiple 

DTS transmitters under the current 

rules. The Commission concludes that 

neither of these approaches is 

appropriate here because the ISIX 

Methodology necessarily relies on 

hypothetical placement of wireless base 

stations every ten kilometers with no 

regard to whether actual operation on 

those locations is desirable or possible. 

First, the hypothetical wireless base 

stations are placed even within the 

contours of television stations—a 

situation that will not occur in reality. 

Therefore, aggregating the interference 

from those hypothetical base stations 

would not provide any meaningful 

information and would not improve the 

accuracy of the ISIX Methodology. The 

Commission also observes that in order 

to manage interference within their 

systems, wireless providers may not 

operate on a given frequency block 

simultaneously at all of their cell sites. 

Thus, aggregating signals from all of the 

hypothetical base stations would not 

improve the estimates of impairments, 

would tend to produce a ‘‘worst case’’ 

scenario, and overestimate potential 

interference. Moreover, the patterns of 

frequency use that would be optimal for 

wireless providers are not clear because 

they would vary with terrain and other 

considerations. As a result, it would not 

improve the accuracy of the impairment 

estimates to assume a standard 

frequency re-use pattern for the ISIX 

methodology. The Commission also 

notes that aggregating the signal 

strengths from each hypothetical 

wireless base station within the 500 

kilometer culling distances of a cochannel or adjacent channel television 

station could result in impairing all, or 

nearly all, of the locations considered. 

That is because locations whose own 

contributions to interference would be 

below the D/U threshold could be 

considered sources of interference when 

interference is aggregated with other 

hypothetical base stations. Also it might 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 76911 

be more useful for wireless providers to 

have impairment information based on 

the individual wireless base station. 

Finally, the plan to consider a whole 

county impaired if even one of the 

hypothetical ten-by-ten kilometer cells 

located in that county is predicted to 

cause interference will provide a 

conservative approach in establishing 

impairments that should address Joint 

Broadcasters’ concerns. Therefore, 

because the RSS method would not 

improve the accuracy of the estimates of 

interference potential during the 

auction, it will not be used when 

determining impairments to the wireless 

licenses during the auction. 

Wireless User Equipment to Digital 

Television Receiver (Case 4) 

47. The Commission adopted fixed 

geographic separation distances for Case 

4. Specifically, wireless user equipment 

(i.e. mobile and portable devices) will 

be prohibited from co-channel or 

adjacent-channel operations within a 

television station’s contour and within a 

set distance from the station’s contour. 

The Commission determined that the 

appropriate distance is five kilometers 

for co-channel operations, and one-half 

kilometer for adjacent-channel 

operations. 

48. The Commission finds that a 

simple, fixed-distance approach is 

warranted for Case 4 because it involves 

short distances only. Wireless user 

equipment transmits at relatively low 

power and its location is usually closely 

bound to the vicinity of its associated 

base station. In addition, outdoor 

operation of wireless user equipment 

usually involves heights above ground 

on the order of 1.5 meters, resulting in 

significant attenuation of signals by 

ground clutter. Wireless user equipment 

operating in buildings may be 

significantly higher than 1.5 meters, but 

signals are significantly attenuated by 

walls indoors. As a result of these 

factors, the potential for wireless user 

equipment to cause harmful interference 

to television service operating cochannel or adjacent channel occurs only 

at short distances of a few kilometers. At 

these distances, the number of grid cells 

in a television station’s coverage area 

that could be affected by wireless user 

equipment is limited to a few cells in 

the interference range of the devices 

rather than all of the cells in the 

station’s coverage area. In addition, the 

Longley-Rice Model is not designed for 

distances less than a kilometer and 

relies on either free-space or line-ofsight predictions for such distances. The 

Commission also observed that use of 

site-by-site Longley-Rice evaluations for 

Case 4 would necessitate the 

development of complex and detailed 

maps of locations where user equipment 

can operate. 

49. In view of these considerations, 

the Commission finds that a separation 

distance approach can adequately 

protect that station’s service. Such an 

approach is also more administratively 

efficient for wireless service licensees 

because it will avoid the need for 

computerized evaluations required by 

the Longley-Rice model and maps of 

locations where wireless user 

equipment may operate. Instead, 

wireless providers will be able to design 

their networks to avoid operation of 

wireless end user equipment within the 

contour of television station and within 

the specified separation distances. For 

these reasons, the Commission 

concludes that applying the LongleyRice propagation model is not 

warranted for Case 4, because it would 

increase the ISIX Methodology’s 

complexity without resulting in more 

accurate interference predictions. The 

Commission therefore will use a 

straightforward distance separation 

approach for Case 4. As described in the 

Technical Appendix of the Second 

Report and Order, the Commission finds 

that the appropriate model for the short 

distances associated with Case 4 is the 

OET TM91–1 propagation model. Using 

this model the Commission calculated 

that broadcast television service will be 

protected from interference from 

wireless user equipment if such devices 

are not permitted to operate within the 

contours of the television station and 

within five kilometers if co-channel or 

a half kilometer if operating on the 

adjacent channel. 

The Spectrum Act Does Not Preclude 

Use of the ISIX Methodology and Input 

Values To Predict or Prevent InterService Interference 

50. The Commission rejects the Joint 

Broadcasters’ claim that section 

6403(b)(2) of the Spectrum Act limits its 

authority to adopt the ISIX Methodology 

and input values to address inter-service 

interference. Section 6403(b)(2) requires 

the Commission, in ‘‘making any 

reassignments or reallocations,’’ to 

‘‘make all reasonable efforts to preserve, 

as of [February 22, 2012], the coverage 

area and population served of each 

broadcast television licensee, as 

determined using the methodology 

described in OET Bulletin 69. . . .’’ The 

Joint Broadcasters argue that the 

Commission’s efforts ‘‘to preserve’’ 

broadcasters’ coverage area and 

population served from inter-service 

interference will violate section 

6403(b)(2) unless it used ‘‘the 

methodology described in OET Bulletin 

69. . . .’’ 

51. The Commission disagrees. As 

explained in the Incentive Auction R&O, 

the coverage area and population served 

of broadcasters, including any assigned 

to spectrum in the 600 MHz Band, must 

be ‘‘determined’’ using ‘‘the 

methodology described in OET Bulletin 

69,’’ as required by section 6403(b)(2). 

The ISIX Methodology and input values 

the Commission adopted in this Order 

(for use during the auction) will not be 

used to ‘‘determine[]’’ coverage area and 

population served. Rather, they will be 

used ‘‘to preserve’’ the coverage area 

and population served that has already 

been ‘‘determined’’ through the 

methodology set forth in the Incentive 

Auction R&O. These efforts are not 

restricted by the statute’s reference to 

‘‘the methodology described in OET 

Bulletin 69. 

Procedural Matters 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

52. As required by § 603 of the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA), 5 U.S.C. 603, the Commission 

has prepared a Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis of the possible 

economic impact on small entities of the 

policies and rules adopted in the 

Second Report and Order. This Final 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is set 

forth in Appendix F of the Second 

Report and Order. 

53. The Second Report and Order 

contains modified information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(PRA), Public Law 104–13. It will be 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) for review under 

section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the 

general public, and other federal 

agencies are invited to comment on the 

modified information collection 

requirements contained in this 

proceeding. In addition, pursuant to the 

Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 

2002, Public Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 

3506(c)(4), we previously sought 

specific comment on how the 

Commission might further reduce the 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees. 

54. The Commission has assessed the 

effects of the policies adopted in the 

Second Report and Order with regard to 

information collection burdens on small 

business concerns, and find that these 

policies will benefit companies with 

fewer than 25 employees by providing 

them with a safeguard in the unlikely 

event of aggregate new interference in 

excess of one percent. In addition, we 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
76912 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

1See 5 U.S.C. 603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C. 601– 

612, has been amended by the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 

(SBREFA), Public Law 104–121, Title II, 110 Stat. 

857 (1996), and the Small Business Jobs Act of 

2010, Public Law 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010). 2See Expanding the Economic and Innovation 

Opportunities of Spectrum through Incentive 

Auctions, GN Docket No. 12–268, Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, 27 FCC Rcd 12357 (2012). 3Additional comment on the specific proposals 

addressed in the Second Report & Order was sought 

with the issuance of three separate Public Notices. 

See Incentive Auction Task Forces Releases 

Updated Constraint File Data Using Actual 

Channels and Staff Analysis Regarding Pairwise 

Approach to Preserving Population Served, GN 

Docket No. 12–268, ET Docket No. 13–26, Public 

Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 5687 (2014). See also Office of 

Engineering and Technology Seeks to Supplement 

the Incentive Auction Proceeding record Regarding 

Potential Interference Between Broadcast Television 

and Wireless Services, GN Docket No. 12–268, ET 

Docket No. 14–14, Public Notice, 29 FCC Rcd 712 

(2014); Office of Engineering and Technology Seeks 

Comment on Measurements of LTE into DTV 

Interference, Public Notice, GN Docket No. 12–268, 

ET Docket No. 14–14, DA 14–852 (2014). 

4See 5 U.S.C. 604. 5See Expanding the Economic and Innovation 

Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive 

Auctions, GN Docket No. 12–268, Report and Order, 

29 FCC Rcd 6567 (2014) (Incentive Auction R&O). 6See id. at 6651, para. 182. The Commission 

adopted a 0.5 percent ‘‘pairwise’’ or station-tostation limit on any new interference as a result of 

the repacking process in the Incentive Auction 

R&O. See id. at 6649–51, paras. 179–81. 7See id. at 6605–6, paras. 82–84. The 

Commission will address the specific uses to be 

made of the interference predictions in the 

forthcoming Comment PN on final auction 

procedures. See note 79, para. 23 of the Second 

Report and Order. 

8 Id. at 603(b)(3). 

9 5 U.S.C. 601(3) (incorporating by reference the 

definition of ‘‘small business concern’’ in 15 U.S.C. 

632). Pursuant to the RFA, the statutory definition 

of a small business applies ‘‘unless an agency, after 

consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the 

Small Business Administration and after 

opportunity for public comment, establishes one or 

more definitions of such term which are 

appropriate to the activities of the agency and 

publishes such definition(s) in the Federal 

Register.’’ 5 U.S.C. 601(3). 

10Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632 (1996). 

11U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions: 

515120 Television Broadcasting, http:// 

www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/ 

naicsrch?code=515120&search=2012 (last visited 

Mar. 6, 2014). 12 13 CFR 121.201 (NAICS code 515120) (updated 

for inflation in 2010). 13See FCC News Release, Broadcast Station 

Totals as of December 31, 2013 (rel. Jan. 8, 2014), 

http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/ 

Daily_Business/2014/db0108/DOC-325039A1.pdf. 14We recognize that BIA’s estimate differs 

slightly from the FCC total given the information 

provided above. 15 ‘‘[Business concerns] are affiliates of each other 

when one concern controls or has the power to 

control the other, or a third party or parties controls 

or has the power to control both.’’ 13 CFR 

121.103(a)(1). 

16See FCC News Release, Broadcast Station 

Totals as of December 31, 2013 (rel. Jan. 8, 2014), 

http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/ 

Daily_Business/2014/db0108/DOC-325039A1.pdf. 

17See generally 5 U.S.C. 601(4), (6). 

18See FCC News Release, Broadcast Station 

Totals as of December 31, 2013 (rel. January 8, 

have described impacts that might affect 

small businesses, which includes most 

businesses with fewer than 25 

employees, in the FRFA attached to the 

Second Report and Order as Appendix 

F. 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

55. As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA),1 an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 

in ET Docket No. 12–268.2 The 

Commission sought written public 

comment on the proposals in the NPRM, 

including comment on the IRFA.3 This 

present Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.4

Need for, and Objective of, the Second 

Report and Order 

56. In the Second Report and Order, 

the Commission addresses several 

outstanding issues related to the 

Incentive Auction R&O.5 First, we 

address and reject proposals for 

additional limits on any new 

interference between television stations 

as result of the repacking process.6

Second, we establish a methodology and 

the associated input values to predict 

inter-service interference between 

television and wireless services in 

certain areas for use during the 

incentive auction (ISIX Methodology).7

Summary of Significant Issues Raised by 

Public Comments in Response to the 

IRFA 

57. No comments were filed in direct 

response to the IRFA. 

Response to Comments by the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration 

58. Pursuant to the Small Business 

Jobs Act of 2010, the Commission is 

required to respond to any comments 

filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy 

of the Small Business Administration 

(SBA), and to provide a detailed 

statement of any change made to the 

proposed rules as a result of those 

comments. The Chief Counsel did not 

file any comments in response to the 

proposed rules in this proceeding. 

Description and Estimate of the Number 

of Small Entities to Which the Rules 

Will Apply 

59. The RFA directs agencies to 

provide a description of and, where 

feasible, an estimate of the number of 

small entities that may be affected by 

the proposed rules, if adopted.8 The 

RFA generally defines the term ‘‘small 

entity’’ as having the same meaning as 

the terms ‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small 

organization,’’ and ‘‘small governmental 

jurisdiction.’’ In addition, the term 

‘‘small business’’ has the same meaning 

as the term ‘‘small business concern’’ 

under the Small Business Act.9 A small 

business concern is one which: (1) Is 

independently owned and operated; (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation; 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA.10

60. Television Broadcasting. This 

economic census category ‘‘comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

broadcasting images together with 

sound. These establishments operate 

television broadcasting studios and 

facilities for the programming and 

transmission of programs to the 

public.’’11 The SBA has created the 

following small business size standard 

for Television Broadcasting firms: Those 

having $38.5 million or less in annual 

receipts.12 The Commission has 

estimated the number of licensed 

commercial television stations to be 

1,388.13 In addition, according to 

Commission staff review of the BIA 

Advisory Services, LLC’s Media Access 

Pro Television Database on March 28, 

2012, about 950 of an estimated 1,300 

commercial television stations (or 

approximately 73 percent) had revenues 

of $38.5 million or less.14 We therefore 

estimate that the majority of commercial 

television broadcasters are small 

entities. 

61. We note, however, that in 

assessing whether a business concern 

qualifies as small under the above 

definition, business (control) affiliations 

must be included.15 Our estimate, 

therefore, likely overstates the number 

of small entities that might be affected 

by our action because the revenue figure 

on which it is based does not include or 

aggregate revenues from affiliated 

companies. In addition, an element of 

the definition of ‘‘small business’’ is that 

the entity not be dominant in its field 

of operation. We are unable at this time 

to define or quantify the criteria that 

would establish whether a specific 

television station is dominant in its field 

of operation. Accordingly, the estimate 

of small businesses to which rules may 

apply does not exclude any television 

station from the definition of a small 

business on this basis and is therefore 

possibly over-inclusive to that extent. 

62. In addition, the Commission has 

estimated the number of licensed 

noncommercial educational (‘‘NCE’’) 

television stations to be 396.16 These 

stations are non-profit, and therefore 

considered to be small entities.17

63. There are also 2,414 LPTV 

stations, including Class A stations, and 

4,046 TV translator stations.18 Given the 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 76913 

2014), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/ 

Daily_Business/2014/db0108/DOC-325039A1.pdf. 

19U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 NAICS Definitions: 

517210 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers 

(except Satellite), http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ 

sssd/naics/naicsrch?code=517210&search=2012 

(last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 

20 13 CFR 121.201 (NAICS code 517210). 

21U.S. Census Bureau, Table No. EC0751SSSZ5, 

Information: Subject Series—Establishment and 

Firm Size: Employment Size of Firms for the United 

States: 2007 (NAICS code 517210), http:// 

factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/ 

pages/ 

productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2007_US_51SSSZ5. 

22 Id. Available census data do not provide a more 

precise estimate of the number of firms that have 

employment of 1,500 or fewer employees; the 

largest category provided is for firms with 1000 

employees or more. 

23See Trends in Telephone Service at Table 5.3. 

24See id. 

25 5 U.S.C. 603(c). 

26See 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). 

nature of these services, we will 

presume that all of these entities qualify 

as small entities under the above SBA 

small business size standard. 

64. Radio and Television 

Broadcasting and Wireless 

Communications Equipment 

Manufacturing. The Census Bureau 

defines this category as follows: ‘‘This 

industry comprises establishments 

primarily engaged in manufacturing 

radio and television broadcast and 

wireless communications equipment. 

Examples of products made by these 

establishments are: transmitting and 

receiving antennas, cable television 

equipment, GPS equipment, pagers, 

cellular phones, mobile 

communications equipment, and radio 

and television studio and broadcasting 

equipment.’’ The SBA has developed a 

small business size standard for Radio 

and Television Broadcasting and 

Wireless Communications Equipment 

Manufacturing, which is: all such firms 

having 750 or fewer employees. 

According to Census Bureau data for 

2007, there were a total of 939 

establishments in this category that 

operated for part or all of the entire year. 

Of this total, 912 had less than 500 

employees and 17 had more than 1000 

employees. Thus, under that size 

standard, the majority of firms can be 

considered small. 

65. Audio and Video Equipment 

Manufacturing. The SBA has classified 

the manufacturing of audio and video 

equipment under in NAICS Codes 

classification scheme as an industry in 

which a manufacturer is small if it has 

less than 750 employees. Data contained 

in the 2007 U.S. Census indicate that 

492 establishments operated in that 

industry for all or part of that year. In 

that year, 488 establishments had fewer 

than 500 employees; and only 1 had 

more than 1000 employees. Thus, under 

the applicable size standard, a majority 

of manufacturers of audio and video 

equipment may be considered small. 

66. Wireless Telecommunications 

Carriers (except satellite). The Census 

Bureau defines this category as follows: 

‘‘This industry comprises 

establishments engaged in operating and 

maintaining switching and transmission 

facilities to provide communications via 

the airwaves. Establishments in this 

industry have spectrum licenses and 

provide services using that spectrum, 

such as cellular phone services, paging 

services, wireless Internet access, and 

wireless video services.’’ 19 The 

appropriate size standard under SBA 

rules is for the category Wireless 

Telecommunications Carriers (except 

Satellite). The size standard for that 

category is that a business is small if it 

has 1,500 or fewer employees.20 For this 

category, census data for 2007 show that 

there were 1,383 firms that operated for 

the entire year.21 Of this total, 1,368 

firms had employment of 999 or fewer 

employees and 15 had employment of 

1000 employees or more.22 Similarly, 

according to Commission data, 413 

carriers reported that they were engaged 

in the provision of wireless telephony, 

including cellular service, PCS, and 

Specialized Mobile Radio (‘‘SMR’’) 

Telephony services.23 Of these, an 

estimated 261 have 1,500 or fewer 

employees and 152 have more than 

1,500 employees.24 Consequently, the 

Commission estimates that 

approximately half or more of these 

firms can be considered small. Thus, 

using available data, we estimate that 

the majority of wireless firms can be 

considered small. 

Description of Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 

Requirements for Small Entities 

67. The Second Report and Order 

provides that, if a full power or Class A 

station is predicted to receive aggregate 

new interference above one percent on 

the final channel assigned to it 

following the repacking process, it may 

file an application proposing an 

alternate channel or expanded facilities 

in a priority filing window, along with 

a limited number of other stations that 

have been assigned the same priority. 

This opportunity will be available to 

any station entitled to protection in the 

repacking process that is predicted to 

experience aggregate new interference 

in excess of one percent, regardless of 

whether that station was reassigned to a 

new channel in the repacking process. 

Steps Taken To Minimize Significant 

Economic Impact on Small Entities, and 

Significant Alternatives Considered 

68. The RFA requires an agency to 

describe any significant alternatives that 

it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance or reporting requirements 

under the rule for small entities; (3) the 

use of performance, rather than design, 

standards; and 4) an exemption from 

coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, 

for small entities.25

69. The Commission believes that 

applying the same rules equally to all 

entities in this context promotes 

fairness. The Commission does not 

believe that the costs and/or 

administrative burdens associated with 

the rules will unduly burden small 

entities. Moreover, the revisions the 

Commission adopts should benefit 

small entities by providing them with a 

safeguard in the event of aggregate new 

interference above one percent. 

Report to Congress 

70. The Commission will send a copy 

of the Second Report and Order, 

including this FRFA, in a report to 

Congress and the Government 

Accountability Office pursuant to the 

Congressional Review Act.26 In 

addition, the Commission will send a 

copy of the Second Report and Order, 

including this FRFA, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA. 

71. The Commission will send a copy 

of the Second Report and Order to 

Congress and the Government 

Accountability Office pursuant to the 

Congressional Review Act. 

72. Pursuant to the authority found in 

sections 1, 4, 301, 303, 307, 308, 309, 

310, 316, 319, 332, and 403 of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, and sections 6004, 6402, 

6403, 6404, and 6407 of Middle Class 

Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 

Public Law 112–96, 126 Stat. 156, 47 

U.S.C. 151, 154, 301, 303, 307, 308, 309, 

310, 316, 319, 332, 403, 1404, 1452, and 

1454, and § 1.2 of the Commission’s 

rules, 47 CFR 1.2, the Second Report 

and Order, is adopted. It is further 

ordered that the Commission’s rules are 

hereby amended as set forth in 

Appendix B of the Second Report and 

Order. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
76914 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 246 / Tuesday, December 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

73. The rules adopted herein will 

become effective January 22, 2015, 

except for §§ 73.3700(b)(1)(iv)(B), 

73.3700(b)(2)(i) introductory text, and 

73.3700(b)(2)(ii) of the rules which 

contain new or modified information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

Public Law 104–13, that are not 

effective until approved by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). The 

Federal Communications Commission 

will publish a document in the Federal 

Register announcing OMB approval and 

the effective date of this rule. 

74. The Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 

Information Center, shall send a copy of 

this Second Report and Order in GN 

Docket No. 12–268, including the Final 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the 

Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration. 

75. The Commission shall send a copy 

of this Second Report and Order in GN 

Docket No. 12–268 in a report to be sent 

to Congress and the Government 

Accountability Office pursuant to the 

Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 

801(a)(1)(A). 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73 

Communications equipment, 

Education, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene H. Dortch, 

Secretary. 

Final Rules 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Communications 

Commission amends 47 CFR part 73 as 

follows: 

PART 73—RADIO BROADCAST 

SERVICES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 73 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 334, 336, 

and 339. 

■ 2. Section 73.3700 is amended by 

revising paragraphs (b)(1)(iv), (b)(2)(i) 

introductory text, and (b)(2)(ii) to read 

as follows: 

§ 73.3700 Post-incentive auction licensing 

and operation. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(iv) Priority filing window. (A) The 

licensee of a reassigned station, a UHFto-VHF station, or a High-VHF-to-LowVHF station that, for reasons beyond its 

control, is unable to construct facilities 

that meet the technical parameters 

specified in the Channel Reassignment 

Public Notice, or the permissible 

contour coverage variance from those 

technical parameters specified in 

paragraph (b)(1)(ii) or (iii) of this 

section, may request a waiver of the 

construction permit application 

deadline specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) 

no later than 30 days prior to the 

deadline. If its waiver request is granted, 

the licensee will be afforded an 

opportunity to submit an application for 

a construction permit pursuant to 

paragraph (b)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section 

in a priority filing window to be 

announced by the Media Bureau by 

public notice. 

(B) The licensee of any broadcast 

television station that the Commission 

makes all reasonable efforts to preserve 

pursuant to section 6403(b)(2) of the 

Spectrum Act that is predicted to 

experience aggregate new interference to 

population served in excess of one 

percent as a result of the repacking 

process will be afforded an opportunity 

to submit an application for a 

construction permit pursuant to 

paragraph (b)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section 

in the priority filing window required 

by paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(A). 

* * * * * 

(2) * * * 

(i) Alternate channels. The licensee of 

a reassigned station, a UHF-to-VHF 

station, a High-VHF-to-Low-VHF 

station, or a broadcast television station 

described in paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(B) of 

this section will be permitted to file a 

major change application for a 

construction permit for an alternate 

channel on FCC Form 301, 301–CA, or 

340 during a filing window to be 

announced by the Media Bureau by 

public notice, provided that: 

* * * * * 

(ii) Expanded facilities. The licensee 

of a reassigned station, a UHF-to-VHF 

station, a High-VHF-to-Low-VHF 

station, or a broadcast television station 

described in paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(B) of 

this section will be permitted to file a 

minor change application for a 

construction permit on FCC Form 301, 

301–CA, or 340 during a filing window 

to be announced by the Media Bureau 

by public notice, in order to request a 

change in the technical parameters 

specified in the Channel Reassignment 

Public Notice (or, in the case of a 

broadcast television station described in 

paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(B) that is not 

reassigned to a new channel, a change 

in its authorized technical parameters) 

with respect to height above average 

terrain (HAAT), effective radiated power 

(ERP), or transmitter location that would 

be considered a minor change under 

§§ 73.3572(a)(1),(2) or 74.787(b) of this 

chapter. 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. 2014–29687 Filed 12–22–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 600 

[Docket No. 130904784–4999–02] 

RIN 0648–BD67 

Fisheries Off West Coast States; List 

of Authorized Fisheries and Gear 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This action updates the 

Federal list of authorized fisheries and 

gear issued under section 305(a) of the 

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 

Conservation and Management Act 

(‘‘List of Fisheries’’). The List of 

Fisheries includes a description of 

fisheries that operate in the U.S. West 

Coast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 

the Pacific Fishery Management 

Council’s (Council’s) geographic area of 

authority. This action is necessary 

because the current list is outdated and 

either includes several fisheries that no 

longer occur, or does not include 

fisheries that do occur, within the U.S. 

West Coast EEZ. This rule would bring 

the list up to date with current West 

Coast fisheries and fishery management 

plans (FMPs). 

DATES: Effective January 22, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Additional requests for 

information regarding this action may 

be obtained by contacting the 

Sustainable Fisheries Division, NMFS 

West Coast Region, 7600 Sand Point 

Way NE., Seattle, WA 98115. This final 

rule also is accessible via the Internet at 

the Federal eRulemaking portal at 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Yvonne deReynier, 206–526–6129, (fax) 

206–526–6736, 

Yvonne.deReynier@noaa.gov; Joshua 

Lindsay, 562–980–4034, 562–980–4047, 

Joshua.Lindsay@noaa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 

305(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 

Conservation and Management Act 

(MSA) requires that the Secretary of 

Commerce maintain a list of all fisheries 

operating in the U.S. EEZ and all fishing 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES