UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TINA M. COUPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 98-2489

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(CA-98-83-A)

Submitted: April 13, 1999

Decided: July 20, 1999

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges,

and HALL,* Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

John Hardin Young, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Neal

David Mollen, PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER,

Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

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*Senior Judge Hall participated in the consideration of this case but

died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a

quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Tina M. Coupe appeals from the district court's order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant Mobil Oil Corporation in

Coupe's employment discrimination action filed under the Americans

with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 - 12117 (1994).

Finding no error, we affirm.

Coupe was hired as an administrative assistant for Mobil in 1989.

During her tenure with Mobil, Coupe was habitually tardy or absent

from work. As a result, she was placed on probation for absenteeism

in October 1992. Similar problems began recurring in 1994 and early

1995. When confronted by her superiors, Coupe claimed her absenteeism was the result of manic depression. In response to this claim,

Mobil arranged for Coupe to see a corporate physician, and upon his

recommendation, Mobil and Coupe arranged a new work schedule

that accommodated her illness. Following this accommodation,

Coupe experienced no further problems in meeting the expectations

of her employer; however, in September 1995 Coupe filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC") alleging, presumably, discrimination on the basis of a protected disability.1

In 1994 Coupe began working for Harvey Smith, then a Vice President for Mobil in its Exploration and Producing Division. In the late

Summer of 1996 Smith accepted a position as the Chief Executive

Officer of Hibernia Development Corporation in Canada. Mobil

decided it would not replace Smith and eliminated his position altogether. In September 1996 Smith informed Coupe that, because of the

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1 Because neither party has provided the court with documentation

regarding this complaint, we are unable to ascertain the specifics with

any degree of certainty. Nevertheless, this issue is not dispositive.

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elimination of his position, Coupe's position was also being eliminated and that she would have to find other employment, either within

Mobil or elsewhere. Coupe was told she could remain in her current

position through the end of the year and was advised to apply for

positions through Mobil's job posting system. Coupe did not apply

for another position with Mobil. Although Coupe was scheduled for

termination on December 31, 1996, the company extended her

employment until January 31, 1997, because of an error in the processing of her separation. On January 31st, having not applied for

another position with Mobil, Coupe's employment with Mobil was

terminated.

Following the issuance of a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC,

Coupe filed an action in the district court alleging: (1) unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADA; (2) retaliatory discharge; and (3)

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Discovery was completed

and Mobil moved for summary judgment on all counts. After briefing,

the district court conducted a hearing, received arguments from both

parties, and ruled from the bench, granting Mobil's motion as to all

counts. Coupe then filed a timely notice of appeal. 2

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and affirm only

if the record reveals no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Turning then to Coupe's claim under the ADA, this court must apply the

burden shifting proof scheme announced by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Ennis

v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th

Cir. 1995) (extending McDonnell Douglas to ADA claims). Under the

McDonnell Douglas framework the employee has the initial burden

of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance

of the evidence. See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 58. Should the plaintiff succeed

in proving her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation which could

support a finding that the employment action was not based on unlawful discrimination. If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption established by the employee is nullified, and the employee bears

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2 Coupe abandons on appeal her state law claim of intentional infliction

of emotional distress. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b).

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the ultimate burden of proving that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. See id.

To make out a prima facie case, Coupe was required to show that:

(1) she was in a protected class; (2) she was discharged; (3) at the

time of the discharge, she was performing at a level that met her superior's expectations; and (4) her discharge occurred under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of unlawful

discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Even if Coupe could establish a prima facie case, our review of the

record and informal briefs indicates that Coupe's discharge was not

a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The elimination of Coupe's

administrative assistant position was in direct response to the departure of her supervisor, Harvey Smith and Mobil's subsequent decision

to eliminate his position and its support staff altogether. Given the

larger reorganization and reduction in forces that were ongoing at

Mobil during 1996, the elimination of these positions raises no suspicion of improper motive. Moreover, Coupe was encouraged on

numerous occasions to apply for other positions within Mobil's corporate structure, and she admittedly chose not to. Given these facts,

no reasonable trier of fact could have determined that Coupe's discharge was a pretext for discrimination. As such, the district court did

not err in awarding summary judgment for Mobil on Coupe's ADA

claim.

Coupe's retaliatory discharge claim likewise fails. To establish a

prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must prove that

she engaged in protected activity, that the employer took adverse

employment action against her, and that "`a causal connection existed

between the protected activity and the adverse action.'" Williams v.

Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Ross

v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.

1985)). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the adverse action. Id. After the employer has done so, the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. Id.

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Even assuming that Coupe established a prima facie case of retaliation, she failed to prove that Mobil's legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its action was pretextual. Coupe's evidence of retaliation

essentially consists of the fact that she filed a complaint with the

EEOC and that Mobil thereafter eliminated both her position and that

of her supervisor. Coupe's assertion that these actions were taken as

a retaliatory measure simply stretches the bounds of credulity.

Coupe's retaliatory discharge claims are further undercut by Mobil's

numerous reminders to Coupe to apply for alternative employment

within the corporation, and Mobil's action extending her employment

termination date giving her further opportunity to secure employment

within the firm. These are not the actions of an organization engaged

in retaliation. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Coupe's retaliatory discharge.

We affirm the decision of the district court. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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