Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 245 / Monday, December 22, 2014 / Notices 76417 

11 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3 In Amendment No. 1, OCC amended the filing 

to include the Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure and the Financial Resource Monitoring 

and Call Procedure as exhibits to the filing, both 

defined hereinafter, as Exhibits 5A and 5B, 

respectively. 

4 ‘‘Financial Resources’’ means, with respect to a 

projected loss attributable to a particular Clearing 

Member, the sum of the margin deposits and 

deposits in lieu of margin in respect of such 

Clearing Member’ accounts, and the value of OCC’s 

Clearing Fund, including both the Base Amount, as 

defined below, and the prudential margin of safety, 

as discussed below. 

5 ‘‘Clearing Member Group’’ means a Clearing 

Member and any affiliated entities that control, are 

controlled by or are under common control with 

such Clearing Member. See OCC By-Laws, Article 

I, Sections 1.C.(15) and 1.M(11). 

6This proposed rule filing has also been filed as 

an advance notice filing (SR–OCC–2014–811). 

7The procedures described herein would be in 

effect until the development of a new standard 

Clearing Fund sizing methodology. Following such 

development, which will include a quantitative 

approach to calculating the ‘‘prudential margin of 

safety,’’ as discussed below, OCC will file a separate 

rule change and advance notice with the 

Commission that will include a description of the 

new methodology as well as a revised Monthly 

Clearing Fund Sizing Procedure. 

8On October 15, 2014, OCC filed an emergency 

notice with the Commission to suspend the 

effectiveness of the second sentence of Rule 

1001(a). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 

73579 (November 12, 2014), 79 FR 68747 

(November 18, 2014) (SR–OCC–2014–807). On 

November 13, 2014, OCC filed SR–OCC–2014–21 

with the Commission to delete the second sentence 

of Rule 1001(a), preserving the suspended 

effectiveness of that sentence until such time as the 

Commission approves or disapproves SR–OCC– 

2014–21. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 

73685 (November 25, 2014) (SR–OCC–2014–21). At 

the time of this filing, the referenced Securities 

Exchange Act Release had not yet been published 

in the Federal Register. 

9See OCC Rule 1001(a). 

10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such 

filing also will be available for 

inspection and copying at the principal 

office of the Exchange. All comments 

received will be posted without change; 

the Commission does not edit personal 

identifying information from 

submissions. You should submit only 

information that you wish to make 

available publicly. All submissions 

should refer to File Number SR–MIAX– 

2014–64, and should be submitted on or 

before January 12, 2015. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.11

Kevin M. O’Neill, 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2014–29815 Filed 12–19–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–73853; File No. SR–OCC– 

2014–22] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The 

Options Clearing Corporation; Notice 

of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change, 

and Amendment No. 1 Thereto, To 

Establish Procedures Regarding the 

Monthly Resizing of its Clearing Fund 

and the Addition of Financial 

Resources 

December 16, 2014. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’)1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2

notice is hereby given that on December 

1, 2014, The Options Clearing 

Corporation (‘‘OCC’’) filed with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule 

change as described in Items I, II and III 

below, which Items have been prepared 

by OCC. On December 16, 2014, OCC 

filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed 

rule change.3 This Amendment No. 1 

amends and replaces in its entirety the 

proposed rule change as originally filed 

on December 1, 2014. The Commission 

is publishing this notice to solicit 

comments on the proposed rule change, 

as amended, from interested persons. 

I. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the 

Terms of Substance of the Proposed 

Rule Change 

OCC proposes to establish procedures 

regarding the monthly resizing of its 

Clearing Fund and the addition of 

financial resources through intra-day 

margin calls and/or an intra-month 

increase of the Clearing Fund to ensure 

that it maintains adequate financial 

resources in the event of a default of a 

Clearing Member or group of affiliated 

Clearing Members presenting the largest 

exposure to OCC. 

II. Clearing Agency’s Statement of the 

Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the 

Proposed Rule Change 

In its filing with the Commission, 

OCC included statements concerning 

the purpose of and basis for the 

proposed rule change and discussed any 

comments it received on the proposed 

rule change. The text of these statements 

may be examined at the places specified 

in Item IV below. OCC has prepared 

summaries, set forth in sections (A), (B), 

and (C) below, of the most significant 

aspects of these statements. 

(A) Clearing Agency’s Statement of the 

Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the 

Proposed Rule Change 

1. Purpose 

This Amendment No. 1 to SR–OCC– 

2014–22 (‘‘Filing’’) amends and replaces 

in its entirety the Filing as originally 

submitted on December 1, 2014. The 

purpose of this Amendment No. 1 to the 

Filing is to include the procedures that 

support the processes described in Item 

3 of the Filing as Exhibit 5A, Monthly 

Clearing Fund Sizing Procedure, and 

Exhibit 5B, Financial Resources 

Monitoring and Call Procedure. 

The proposed rule change is intended 

to describe the situations in which OCC 

would exercise authority under its Rules 

to ensure that it maintains adequate 

Financial Resources 4 in the event that 

stress tests reveal a default of the 

Clearing Member or Clearing Member 

Group 5 presenting the largest exposure 

would threaten the then-current 

Financial Resources. This proposed rule 

change would establish procedures 

governing: (i) OCC’s resizing of the 

Clearing Fund on a monthly basis 

pursuant to Rule 1001(a) (the ‘‘Monthly 

Clearing Fund Sizing Procedure’’); and 

(ii) the addition of Financial Resources 

through an intra-day margin call on one 

or more Clearing Members under Rule 

609 and, if necessary, an intra-month 

increase of the Clearing Fund pursuant 

to Rule 1001(a) (the ‘‘Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure’’).6 The 

Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure would permit OCC to 

determine the size of the Clearing Fund 

by relying on a broader range of sound 

risk management practices than those 

historically used under Rule 1001(a).7

The Financial Resource Monitoring and 

Call Procedure would require OCC to 

collect additional Financial Resources 

in certain circumstances, establish how 

OCC calculates and collects such 

resources and provide the timing by 

which such resources would be required 

to be deposited by Clearing Members. 

Background 

OCC monitors the sufficiency of the 

Clearing Fund on a daily basis but, prior 

to emergency action taken on October 

15, 2014,8 OCC had no express authority 

to increase the size of the Clearing Fund 

on an intra-month basis.9 During 

ordinary course daily monitoring on 

October 15, 2014, and as a result of 

increased volatility in the financial 

markets in October 2014, OCC 

determined that the Financial Resources 

needed to cover the potential loss 

associated with a default of the Clearing 

Member or Clearing Member Group 

presenting the largest exposure could 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
76418 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 245 / Monday, December 22, 2014 / Notices 

10OCC also has submitted an advance notice that 

would provide greater detail concerning conditions 

under which OCC would increase the size of the 

Clearing Fund intra-month. The change would 

permit an intra-month increase in the event that the 

five-day rolling average of projected draws are 

150% or more of the Clearing Fund’s then current 

size. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 72804 

(August 11, 2014), 79 FR 48276 (August 15, 2014) 

(SR–OCC–2014–804). 

11 12 U.S.C. 5465(e)(2). 

12See supra, note 6. 

13See Information Memorandum #35397, dated 

October 16, 2014, available on OCC’s Web site, 

http://www.theocc.com/clearing/clearinginfomemos/infomemos1.jsp. Clearing members also 

were informed that a prudential margin of safety of 

$1.8 billion would be retained until a new Clearing 

Fund sizing formula has been approved and 

implemented. 

14See Information Memorandum #35507, dated 

October 31, 2014, available on OCC’s Web site, 

http://www.theocc.com/clearing/clearinginfomemos/infomemos1.jsp. 

15See OCC By-Laws, Article IX, Section 14(c). 

16See supra, note 6. OCC also submitted this 

proposed rule change to the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission. 

17As noted in SR–OCC–2014–21, OCC would use 

its intra-month resizing authority only to increase 

the size of the Clearing Fund where appropriate, not 

to decrease the size of the Clearing Fund. 

18On a daily basis, OCC computes its exposure 

under the idiosyncratic and minor systemic events. 

The greater of these two exposures is that day’s 

‘‘peak exposure.’’ To calculate the ‘‘rolling five day 

average’’ OCC computes the average of the peak 

exposure for each consecutive five-day period 

observed over the prior three-month period. To 

determine the Base Amount, OCC would use the 

largest five-day rolling average observed over the 

past three-months. This methodology was used to 

determine the Base Amount of the Clearing Fund 

for November 2014 and December 2014. 

19Considering only the peak exposures is a more 

conservative methodology that gives greater 

weighting to sudden increases in exposure 

experienced by Clearing Members, thus enhancing 

the responsiveness of the procedure to such sudden 

increases. By using a longer look-back period, the 

methodology would respond more slowly to 

recently observed decreases in peak exposures. 

have exceeded the Financial Resources 

then available to apply to such a default. 

To permit OCC to increase the size of 

its Clearing Fund prior to the next 

monthly resizing that was scheduled to 

take place on the first business day of 

November 2014, OCC’s Executive 

Chairman, on October 15, 2014, 

exercised certain emergency powers as 

set forth in Article IX, Section 14 of 

OCC’s By-Laws10 to waive the 

effectiveness of the second sentence of 

Rule 1001(a), which states that OCC will 

adjust the size of the Clearing Fund 

monthly and that any resizing will be 

based on data from the preceding 

month. OCC then filed an emergency 

notice with the Commission pursuant to 

Section 806(e)(2) of the Payment, 

Clearing and Settlement Supervision 

Act of 201011 and increased the Clearing 

Fund size for the remainder of October 

2014 as otherwise provided for in the 

first sentence of Rule 1001(a).12

Clearing Members were informed of 

the action taken by the Executive 

Chairman13 and the amount of their 

additional Clearing Fund requirements, 

which were met without incident. As a 

result of these actions, OCC’s Clearing 

Fund for October 2014 was increased by 

$1.8 billion. In continued reliance on 

the emergency rule waiver and in 

accordance with the first sentence of 

Rule 1001(a), OCC set the November 

2014 Clearing Fund size at $7.8 billion, 

which included an amount determined 

by OCC to be sufficient to protect OCC 

against loss under simulated default 

scenarios (i.e., $6 billion), plus a 

prudential margin of safety (the 

additional $1.8 billion collected in 

October).14 All required contributions to 

the November 2014 Clearing Fund were 

met by affected Clearing Members. 

Under Article IX, Section 14(c), 

absent the submission of a proposed 

rule change to the Commission seeking 

approval of OCC’s waiver of the 

provisions of the second sentence of 

Rule 1001(a), such waiver would not be 

permitted to continue for more than 

thirty calendar days from the date 

thereof.15 Accordingly, on November 

13, 2014, OCC submitted SR–OCC– 

2014–21 to delete the second sentence 

of Rule 1001(a) and, by the terms of 

Article IX, Section 14(c), preserve the 

suspended effectiveness of the second 

sentence of Rule 1001(a) beyond thirty 

calendar days.16

SR–OCC–2014–21 was submitted in 

part to permit OCC to determine the size 

of its Clearing Fund by relying on a 

broader range of sound risk management 

practices than considered in basing such 

size on the average daily calculations 

under Rule 1001(a) that are performed 

during the preceding calendar month. 

The Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure, as described below, is based 

on such broader risk management 

practices and establishes the procedures 

OCC would use to determine the size of 

the Clearing Fund on a monthly basis. 

Similarly, SR–OCC–2014–21 was 

submitted in part to permit OCC to 

resize the Clearing Fund more 

frequently than monthly when the 

circumstances warrant an increase of 

the Clearing Fund. The Financial 

Resource Monitoring and Call 

Procedure, as described below, 

establishes the procedures that OCC 

would use to add Financial Resources 

through an intra-day margin call on one 

or more Clearing Members under Rule 

609 and, if necessary, an intra-month 

increase of the Clearing Fund pursuant 

to Rule 1001(a).17

Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure 

Under the Monthly Clearing Fund 

Sizing Procedure, OCC would continue 

to calculate the size of the Clearing 

Fund based on its daily stress test 

exposures under simulated default 

scenarios as described in the first 

sentence of Rule 1001(a) and resize the 

Clearing Fund on the first business day 

of each month. However, instead of 

resizing the Clearing Fund based on the 

average of the daily calculations during 

the preceding calendar month, as stated 

in the suspended second sentence of 

Rule 1001, OCC would resize the 

Clearing Fund so that it is the sum of: 

(i) An amount equal to the peak five-day 

rolling average of Clearing Fund draws 

observed over the preceding three 

calendar months of daily idiosyncratic 

default and minor systemic default 

scenario calculations based on OCC’s 

daily Monte Carlo simulations (‘‘Base 

Amount’’) and (ii) a prudential margin 

of safety determined by OCC and 

currently set at $1.8 billion.18

OCC believes that the proposed 

Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure provides a sound and 

prudent approach to ensure that the 

Financial Resources are adequate to 

protect against the largest risk of loss 

presented by the default of a Clearing 

Member or Clearing Member Group. By 

virtue of using only the peak five-day 

rolling average and by extending the 

look-back period, the proposed Monthly 

Clearing Fund Sizing Procedure is both 

more responsive to sudden increases in 

exposure and less susceptible to 

recently observed decreases in exposure 

that would reduce the overall sizing of 

the Clearing Fund, thus mitigating 

procyclicality.19 Furthermore, the 

prudential margin of safety provides an 

additional buffer to absorb potential 

future exposures not previously 

observed during the look-back period. 

The proposed Monthly Clearing Fund 

Sizing Procedure would be 

supplemented by the Financial 

Resource Monitoring and Call 

Procedure, described below, to provide 

further assurance that the Financial 

Resources are adequate to protect 

against such risk of loss. 

Financial Resource Monitoring and Call 

Procedure 

Under the Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure, OCC 

would use the same daily idiosyncratic 

default calculation as under the 

Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure to monitor daily the 

adequacy of the Financial Resources to 

withstand a default by the Clearing 

Member or Clearing Member Group 

presenting the largest exposure under 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 245 / Monday, December 22, 2014 / Notices 76419 

20Since the minor systemic default scenario 

contemplates two Clearing Members’ 

simultaneously defaulting and OCC maintains 

Financial Resources sufficient to cover a default by 

a Clearing Member or Clearing Member Group 

representing the greatest exposure to OCC, OCC 

does not use the minor systemic default scenario to 

determine the adequacy of the Financial Resources 

under the Financial Resource Monitoring and Call 

Procedure. 

21Rule 609 authorizes OCC to require the deposit 

of additional margin in any account at any time 

during any business day by any Clearing Member 

for, inter alia, the protection of OCC, other Clearing 

Members or the general public. Clearing Members 

must meet a required deposit of intra-day margin 

in immediately available funds at a time prescribed 

by OCC or within one hour of OCC’s issuance of 

debit settlement instructions against the bank 

account(s) of the applicable Clearing Member(s), 

thereby ensuring the prompt deposit of additional 

Financial Resources. 

22 ‘‘Capping’’ the intra-day margin call avoids 

placing a ‘‘liquidity squeeze’’ on the subject 

Clearing Member(s) based on exposures presented 

by a hypothetical stress test, which would have the 

potential for causing a default on the intra-day 

margin call. Back testing results determined that 

such calls would have been made against Clearing 

Members that are large, well-capitalized firms, with 

more than sufficient resources to satisfy the call for 

additional margin with the proposed limitations. 

23The Risk Committee would be notified, and 

could take action to address potential Financial 

Resource deficiencies, in the event that a Projected 

Draw resulted in a Margin Call Event and as a result 

of the 500/100 Limitation the margin call was less 

than the Exceedance Above Base Amount, but the 

Projected Draw was not so large as to result in an 

increase in the Clearing Fund as discussed below. 

24The back testing analysis performed assumed a 

single Clearing Member caused the exceedance. 

extreme but plausible market 

conditions.20 If such a daily 

idiosyncratic default calculation 

projected a draw on the Clearing Fund 

(a ‘‘Projected Draw’’) that is at least 75% 

of the Clearing Fund maintained by 

OCC, OCC would be required to issue an 

intra-day margin call pursuant to Rule 

609 against the Clearing Member or 

Clearing Member Group that caused 

such a draw (‘‘Margin Call Event’’).21

Subject to a limitation described below, 

the amount of the margin call would be 

the difference between the Projected 

Draw and the Base Clearing Fund 

(‘‘Exceedance Above Base Amount’’). In 

the case of a Clearing Member Group 

that causes the Exceedance Above Base 

Amount, the Exceedance Above Base 

Amount would be pro-rated among the 

individual Clearing Members that 

compose the Clearing Member Group 

based on each individual Clearing 

Member’s proportionate share of the 

‘‘total risk’’ for such Clearing Member 

Group as defined in Rule 1001(b), i.e., 

the margin requirement with respect to 

all accounts of the Clearing Member 

Group exclusive of the net asset value 

of the positions in such accounts 

aggregated across all such accounts. 

However, in the case of an individual 

Clearing Member or a Clearing Member 

Group, the margin call would be subject 

to a limitation under which it could not 

exceed the lower 22 of: (a) $500 million, 

or (b) 100% of a Clearing Member’s net 

capital, measured cumulatively with 

any other funds deposited with OCC by 

the same Clearing Member pursuant to 

a Margin Call Event within the same 

month (the ‘‘500/100 Limitation’’).23

Upon satisfaction of the margin call, 

OCC would use its authority under Rule 

608 to preclude the withdrawal of such 

additional margin amount until the next 

monthly resizing of the Clearing Fund. 

Based on three years of back testing 

data, OCC determined that it would 

have had Margin Call Events in 10 of the 

months during this time period. For 

each of these months, the maximum call 

amount would have been equal to $500 

million, with one exception in which 

the maximum call amount for the month 

was $7.7 million.24 After giving effect to 

the intra-day margin calls, i.e., by 

increasing the Financial Resources by 

$500 million, there was only one Margin 

Call Event where there was an observed 

stress test exceedance of the Financial 

Resources. 

To address this one observed 

instance, the Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure also 

would require OCC to increase the size 

of the Clearing Fund (‘‘Clearing Fund 

Intra-month Increase Event’’) if a 

Projected Draw exceeds 90% of the 

Clearing Fund, after applying any funds 

then on deposit with OCC from the 

applicable Clearing Member or Clearing 

Member Group pursuant to a Margin 

Call Event. The amount of such increase 

(‘‘Clearing Fund Increase’’) would be the 

greater of: (a) $1 billion; or (b) 125% of 

the difference between (i) the Projected 

Draw, as reduced by the deposits 

resulting from the Margin Call Event 

and (ii) the Clearing Fund. Each 

Clearing Member’s proportionate share 

of the Clearing Fund Increase would 

equal its proportionate share of the 

variable portion of the Clearing Fund for 

the month in question as calculated 

pursuant to Rule 1001(b). OCC would 

notify the Risk Committee of the Board 

of Directors (the ‘‘Risk Committee’’), 

Clearing Members and appropriate 

regulatory authorities of the Clearing 

Fund Increase on the business day on 

which the Clearing Fund Intra-month 

Increase Event occurred. This ensures 

that OCC management maintains 

authority to address any potential 

Financial Resource deficiencies when 

compared to its Projected Draw 

estimates. The Risk Committee would 

then determine whether the Clearing 

Fund Increase was sufficient, and would 

retain authority to increase the Clearing 

Fund Increase or the margin call made 

pursuant to a Margin Call Event in its 

discretion. Clearing Members would be 

required to meet the call for additional 

Clearing Fund assets by 9:00 a.m. CT on 

the second business day following the 

Clearing Fund Intra-Month Increase 

Event. OCC believes that this collection 

process ensures additional Clearing 

Fund assets are promptly deposited by 

Clearing Members following notice of a 

Clearing Fund Increase, while also 

providing Clearing Members with a 

reasonable period of time to source such 

assets. Based on OCC’s back testing 

results, after giving effect to the intraday margin call in response to a Margin 

Call Event plus the prudential margin of 

safety, the Financial Resources would 

have been sufficient upon implementing 

the one instance of a Clearing Fund 

Intra-month Increase Event. 

OCC believes the Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure strikes a 

prudent balance between mutualizing 

the burden of requiring additional 

Financial Resources and requiring the 

Clearing Member or Clearing Member 

Group causing the increased exposure to 

bear such burden. As noted above, in 

the event of a Margin Call Event, OCC 

limits the margin call to a monthly 

aggregate of $500 million, or 100% of a 

Clearing Member’s net capital in order 

to avoid putting an undue liquidity 

strain on any one Clearing Member. 

However, where a Projected Draw 

exceeds 90% of OCC’s Clearing Fund, 

OCC must act to ensure that it has 

sufficient Financial Resources, and 

determined that it should mutualize the 

burden of the additional Financial 

Resources at this threshold through a 

Clearing Fund Increase. OCC believes 

that this balance would provide OCC 

with sufficient Financial Resources 

without increasing the likelihood that 

its procedures would, based solely on 

stress testing results, cause a liquidity 

strain on any on Clearing Member that 

could result in such member’s default. 

The following examples illustrate the 

manner in which the Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure would 

be applied. All assume that the Clearing 

Fund size is $7.8 billion, $6 billion of 

which is the Base Amount and $1.8 

billion of which is the prudential 

margin of safety. The 75% threshold in 

these examples is $5.85 billion. 

Example 1: Single CM Under OCC’s 

stress testing the Projected Draw attributable 

to Clearing Member ABC, a Clearing Member 

with no affiliated Clearing Members and net 

capital of $500 million, is $6.4 billion, or 

82% of the Clearing Fund. OCC would make 

a margin call for $400 million, which 


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76420 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 245 / Monday, December 22, 2014 / Notices 

25 15 U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F). 

26 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(b)(3). 27 15 U.S.C. 78–q1(b)(3)(I). 

represents the Exceedance Above Base 

Amount. In this case the 500/100 Limitation 

would not be applicable because the 

Exceedance Above Base Amount is less than 

$500 million and 100% of the Clearing 

Member’s net capital. The Clearing Member 

would be required to meet the $400 million 

call within one hour unless OCC prescribed 

a different time, and OCC would retain the 

$400 million until the next monthly Clearing 

Fund sizing calculation. 

If, on a different day within the same 

month, CM ABC’s Projected Draw minus the 

$400 million already deposited with OCC 

results in an Exceedance above Base Amount, 

another Margin Call Event would be 

triggered, with the amount currently 

deposited with OCC applying toward the 

500/100 Limitation. 

Example 2: Clearing Member Group 

Under OCC’s stress testing the Projected 

Draw attributable to Clearing Member Group 

DEF, comprised of two Clearing Members 

each with net capital of $800 million, is $6.2 

billion, or 79% of OCC’s Clearing Fund. OCC 

would initiate a margin call on Clearing 

Member Group DEF for $200 million. The 

call would be allocated to the two Clearing 

Members that compose the Clearing Member 

Group based on each Clearing Member’s risk 

margin allocation. In this case the 500/100 

Limitation would not be applicable because 

the Exceedance Above Base Amount is less 

than $500 million and 100% of net capital. 

The margin call would be required to be met 

within one hour of the call unless OCC 

prescribed a different time. For example, in 

the case where one Clearing Member 

accounts for 75% of the risk margin for the 

Clearing Member Group, that Clearing 

Member would be allocated $150 million of 

the call and the other Clearing Member, 

accounting for 25% of the risk margin for the 

Clearing Member Group, would be allocated 

$50 million of the call. The funds would 

remain deposited with OCC until the next 

monthly Clearing Fund sizing calculation. 

Example 3: Clearing Member Group with 

$500 Million Cap Under OCC’s stress 

testing the Projected Draw attributable to 

Clearing Member Group GHI, comprised of 

two Clearing Members each with net capital 

of $800 million, is $6.8 billion, or 87% of the 

Clearing Fund. The Exceedance Above Base 

Amount would be $800 million, allocated to 

the two Clearing Members that compose the 

Clearing Member Group based on each 

Clearing Member’s risk margin allocation. 

Using the 75/25 risk margin allocation from 

Example 2, one Clearing Member would be 

allocated $600 million and the other Clearing 

Member would be allocated $200 million. 

The first Clearing Member would be required 

to deposit $500 million with OCC, which is 

the lowest of $500 million, that member’s net 

capital, or that member’s share of the 

Exceedance Above Base Amount, and the 

other Clearing Member would be required to 

deposit $200 million with OCC. After 

collecting the additional margin, OCC would 

determine whether the Projected Draw would 

exceed 90% of the Clearing Fund after 

reducing the Projected Draw by the 

additional margin. This calculation would 

divide a Projected Draw of $6.1 billion, 

which is the original Projected Draw of $6.8 

billion reduced by the additional margin, by 

the Clearing Fund of $7.8 billion. The 

resulting percentage of 78% would be below 

the 90% threshold, and accordingly there 

would not be a Clearing Fund Intra-month 

Increase Event. 

Example 4: Margin Call and Increase in 

Size of Clearing Fund Under OCC’s stress 

testing the Projected Draw attributable to 

Clearing Member JKL, a Clearing Member 

with no affiliated Clearing Members and net 

capital of $600 million, is $10.0 billion, or 

128% of the Clearing Fund. OCC would make 

a margin call for $500 million, which 

represents the lowest of the Exceedance 

Above Base Amount, $500 million and 100% 

of net capital. The Clearing Member would 

be required to meet the $500 million call 

within one hour unless OCC prescribed a 

different time, and OCC would retain the 

$500 million until the next monthly Clearing 

Fund sizing calculation. 

After collecting the additional margin, OCC 

would determine whether the Projected Draw 

would exceed 90% of the Clearing Fund after 

reducing the Projected Draw by the 

additional margin. This calculation would 

divide a Projected Draw of $9.5 billion, 

which is the original Projected Draw of $10 

billion reduced by the additional margin, by 

the Clearing Fund of $7.8 billion. The 

resulting percentage of 122%, while lower, 

would still exceed the 90% threshold, and 

accordingly OCC would declare a Clearing 

Fund Intra-month Increase Event. To 

calculate the Clearing Fund Increase, OCC 

would first determine the difference between 

the modified Projected Draw ($9.5 billion) 

and the Clearing Fund ($7.8 billion), which 

in this case would be $1.7 billion, OCC 

would then multiply this by 1.25, resulting 

in $2.125 billion. Because this amount is 

greater than $1 billion, the Clearing Fund 

Increase would be $2.125 billion and a 

modified Clearing Fund of OCC totaling 

$9.925 billion ($425 million in excess of the 

modified Projected Draw of $9.5 billion). 

2. Statutory Basis 

OCC believes the proposed rule 

change is consistent with Section 

17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act,25 and the rules 

and regulations thereunder. By 

establishing sound procedures 

governing the monthly resizing of the 

Clearing Fund and how OCC would add 

Financial Resources in response to a 

Margin Call Event and a Clearing Fund 

Intra-month Increase Event, the 

proposed modifications would further 

ensure that OCC is capable of 

safeguarding securities and funds which 

are in the custody or control of OCC or 

for which it is responsible and 

protecting investors and the public 

interest. The development of the 

Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure and the Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure also 

ensures that OCC has procedures 

designed to maintain sufficient financial 

resources to withstand, at a minimum, 

a default by the participant family to 

which it has the largest exposure in 

extreme but plausible market 

conditions, in compliance with Rule 

17Ad–22(b)(3).26

(B) Clearing Agency’s Statement on 

Burden on Competition 

OCC does not believe that the 

proposed rule change would impose any 

burden on competition.27 OCC believes 

the proposed rule change would not 

unfairly inhibit access to OCC’s services 

or disadvantage or favor any particular 

user in relationship to another user 

because OCC would establish the size of 

the Clearing Fund in accordance with 

the Monthly Clearing Fund Sizing 

Procedure and without regard to any 

particular user or Clearing Member that 

makes Clearing Fund contributions. 

Furthermore, OCC would respond to a 

Margin Call Event and Clearing Fund 

Intra-month Increase Event in 

accordance with the Financial Resource 

Monitoring and Call Procedure without 

regard to any particular user or Clearing 

Member. 

For the foregoing reasons, OCC 

believes that the proposed rule change 

is in the public interest, would be 

consistent with the requirements of the 

Act applicable to clearing agencies, and 

would not impose a burden on 

competition. 

(C) Clearing Agency’s Statement on 

Comments on the Proposed Rule 

Change Received From Members, 

Participants, or Others 

Written comments on the proposed 

rule change were not and are not 

intended to be solicited with respect to 

the proposed rule change and none have 

been received. 

III. Date of Effectiveness of the 

Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 

Commission Action 

Within 45 days of the date of 

publication of this notice in the Federal 

Register or within such longer period 

up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may 

designate if it finds such longer period 

to be appropriate and publishes its 

reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which 

the self-regulatory organization 

consents, the Commission will: 

(A) By order approve or disapprove 

the proposed rule change, or 

(B) institute proceedings to determine 

whether the proposed rule change 

should be disapproved. 

IV. Solicitation of Comments 

Interested persons are invited to 

submit written data, views and 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 245 / Monday, December 22, 2014 / Notices 76421 

28 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3MIAX initially filed a similar proposal for only 

SPY options on November 25, 2014, and indicated 

in its filing that it would implement the new fee 

on December 1, 2014. See File No. SR–MIAX–2014– 

59. On December 10, 2014, MIAX withdrew that 

filing and submitted this filing. 

4See MIAX Options Fee Schedule, Section (1)(b), 

entitled Marketing Fee for more detail regarding the 

marketing fee. 

arguments concerning the foregoing, 

including whether the proposed rule 

change is consistent with the Act. 

Comments may be submitted by any of 

the following methods: 

Electronic Comments 

• Use the Commission’s Internet 

comment form (http://www.sec.gov/

rules/sro.shtml); or 

• Send an email to rule-comments@

sec.gov. Please include File Number SR– 

OCC–2014–22 on the subject line. 

Paper Comments 

• Send paper comments in triplicate 

to Secretary, Securities and Exchange 

Commission, 100 F Street NE., 

Washington, DC 20549–1090. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–OCC–2014–22. This file 

number should be included on the 

subject line if email is used. To help the 

Commission process and review your 

comments more efficiently, please use 

only one method. The Commission will 

post all comments on the Commission’s 

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/

rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the 

submission, all subsequent 

amendments, all written statements 

with respect to the proposed rule 

change that are filed with the 

Commission, and all written 

communications relating to the 

proposed rule change between the 

Commission and any person, other than 

those that may be withheld from the 

public in accordance with the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be 

available for Web site viewing and 

printing in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 

Washington, DC 20549 on official 

business days between the hours of 

10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the 

filing also will be available for 

inspection and copying at the principal 

office of OCC and on OCC’s Web site at 

http://www.theocc.com/about/

publications/bylaws.jsp. All comments 

received will be posted without change; 

the Commission does not edit personal 

identifying information from 

submissions. You should submit only 

information that you wish to make 

available publicly. 

All submissions should refer to File 

Number SR–OCC–2014–22 and should 

be submitted on or before January 12, 

2015. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.28

Kevin M. O’Neill, 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2014–29820 Filed 12–19–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–73848; File No. SR–MIAX– 

2014–62] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice 

of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness 

of a Proposed Rule Change by Miami 

International Securities Exchange, LLC 

To Amend the MIAX Options Fee 

Schedule 

December 16, 2014. 

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 

19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act 

of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 

thereunder,2 notice is hereby given that 

on December 10, 2014, Miami 

International Securities Exchange LLC 

(‘‘MIAX’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) a proposed rule change 

as described in Items I, II, and III below, 

which Items have been prepared by the 

Exchange.3 The Commission is 

publishing this notice to solicit 

comments on the proposed rule change 

from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The Exchange is filing a proposal to 

amend the MIAX Options Fee Schedule 

(the ‘‘Fee Schedule’’). 

The text of the proposed rule change 

is available on the Exchange’s Web site 

at http://www.miaxoptions.com/filter/

wotitle/rule_filing, at MIAX’s principal 

office, and at the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, the 

Exchange included statements 

concerning the purpose of and basis for 

the proposed rule change and discussed 

any comments it received on the 

proposed rule change. The text of these 

statements may be examined at the 

places specified in Item IV below. The 

Exchange has prepared summaries, set 

forth in sections A, B, and C below, of 

the most significant aspects of such 

statements. 

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

1. Purpose 

The Exchange proposes to amend its 

marketing fee. The marketing fee is 

assessed on certain transactions of all 

Market Makers.4 The funds collected via 

this marketing fee are then put into 

pools controlled by Primary Lead 

Market Makers (‘‘PLMMs’’) and LMMs. 

The PLMM or LMM controlling a 

certain pool of funds can then 

determine the Electronic Exchange 

Member(s) (‘‘EEM’’) to which the funds 

should be directed in order to encourage 

such EEM(s) to send orders to the 

Exchange. In accordance with Exchange 

Rule 514, an EEM can designate an 

order (‘‘Directed Order’’) to a specific 

LMM. 

Currently, Section 1(b) of the Fee 

Schedule, provides that the Exchange 

will assess a Marketing Fee to all Market 

Makers for contracts, including mini 

options, they execute in their assigned 

classes when the contra-party to the 

execution is a Priority Customer. MIAX 

will not assess a Marketing Fee to 

Market Makers for contracts executed as 

a PRIME Agency Order, Contra-side 

Order, or a PRIME AOC Response in the 

PRIME Auction; unless, it executes 

against an unrelated order. 

The Exchange proposes to amend the 

Marketing Fee in order to add an 

additional incentive for order flow 

providers to post additional Priority 

Customer orders on the Exchange’s 

Book. Specifically, the Exchange 

proposes to assess an additional $0.12 

per contract Posted Liquidity Marketing 

Fee to all Market Makers for any 

standard options overlying EEM, GLD, 

IWM, QQQ, and SPY that Market 

Makers execute in their assigned class 

(e.g., SPY) when the contra-party to the 

execution is a Priority Customer and the 

Priority Customer order was posted on 

the Book at the time of the execution. 

MIAX will not assess the additional 

Posted Liquidity Marketing Fee to 

Market Makers for contracts executed as 

a PRIME Agency Order, Contra-side 

Order, or a PRIME AOC Response in the 

PRIME Auction. MIAX will also not 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES