Affirmed and Opinion filed March 16, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00274-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 300th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 43370

OPINION

The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) appeals the denial of its plea to 

the jurisdiction. In two issues it contends that (1) sovereign immunity bars the trial 

court from imposing sanctions under its inherent authority; and (2) the trial court 

violates the separation of powers doctrine when it sanctions the OAG when the 

OAG is acting solely in its administrative authority. We affirm the order of the 

trial court denying the OAG’s plea to the jurisdiction. 
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BACKGROUND

In 2018, the trial court ordered Mother to pay $534.00 per month in child 

support. In February 2020, Mother filed a Petition to modify the parent child 

relationship. Father filed an answer, and the OAG filed a notice of nonappearance. Soon thereafter, the trial court entered temporary orders that 

terminated Mother’s child support obligation as of February 19, 2020. The 

temporary orders also established a child support obligation for Father. 

After the trial court terminated Mother’s child support obligation, Mother 

alleges that the OAG continued to submit writs of withholding to her employer. 

Mother alleges that the OAG “continued to withhold $5,597.74 from [Mother’s] 

paychecks and denied her child support from [Father].” Mother filed a “Motion to 

Compel Termination of Wage Withholding Order and Motion for Sanctions”

(Motion) asserting that the trial court should compel the OAG to withdraw the 

wage withholding order as to Mother and assess sanctions against the OAG for its 

failures to withdraw the wage withholding order in violation to the trial court’s

temporary orders. In response to Mother’s Motion, the OAG filed an answer. The 

OAG asserted a plea to the jurisdiction alleging that the trial court did not have 

jurisdiction to order or award sanctions against the OAG based on sovereign

immunity and the separation of powers doctrine.

1

After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the OAG’s plea to the 

jurisdiction but did not award sanctions. Instead, the trial court reserved the 

question of whether it would award sanctions for a later hearing. The OAG filed a 

notice of interlocutory appeal on the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. 

1 The OAG asserted other immunity defenses, but those are not raised on appeal. 
3

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

The OAG argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to impose any 

sanctions under its inherent authority because of the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity. The OAG next contends that if the trial court were to impose sanctions 

that such an order would violate the separation of powers doctrine. 

A. General Legal Principles

In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, a court does not weigh the merits of 

the claims but only considers the pleadings and evidence relevant to the 

jurisdictional inquiry. Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 

2002). We construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and look to the intent of 

the pleader. Id. If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, then the case 

should be dismissed. Id. 

Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state cannot be 

sued without its consent. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.

2011). Sovereign immunity refers to the state’s immunity from both suit and 

liability and protects the state and its divisions. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. 

Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). “An action to determine or protect a 

private party’s rights against a state official who has acted without legal or 

statutory authority is not a suit against the State that sovereign immunity bars.” 

Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997). “[W]e distinguish 

suits to determine a party’s rights against the State from suits seeking damages.” 

Id.; see also In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no 

pet.) (concluding trial court had jurisdiction over dispute regarding writ of 

withholding because “[Father] filed his motion for declaratory judgment within 

thirty days after meeting with the [OAG]. Accordingly, we hold the [father] 

substantially complied with section 158.506”). 
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B. Analysis

The substance of the Motion is a request that the trial court determine the 

rights and obligations of the parties—specifically, of Mother’s child support 

obligation and arrearages, an order from the trial court that Mother be reimbursed, 

an accounting of the child support paid to the OAG, and for the OAG to cease all 

wage withholding from Mother. This is akin to a suit against the government for a 

determination of rights and is not barred by sovereign immunity. See Fed. Sign, 

951 S.W.2d at 404; In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 574; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 

158.506(c).

Included in the Motion is a request for sanctions based on the OAG’s 

conduct pursuant to the trial court’s inherent power. Mother asserts that the OAG 

should be sanctioned for its alleged failure to comply with the trial court’s order 

terminating Mother’s child support obligation despite her multiple requests and the 

“improper garnishment of child support despite receipt of proper notice.” Mother 

alleges that the OAG “ignored” all requests and continued to unlawfully garnish 

Mother’s wages. Mother alleges this is an “abuse of process and demonstrates bad 

faith.” 

In its plea to the jurisdiction, the OAG argues that the trial court has inherent 

authority to sanction bad faith conduct resulting from the impeding of the judicial 

process itself. See Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718 

(Tex. 2020). The OAG argues that its actions in the administrative writ of 

withholding process are not part of the judicial process citing to In re B.N.A., 278 

S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). However, the In re B.N.A.

court concluded that an errant administrative writ of withholding was not asserting 

a cause of action or counterclaim under section 105.002 of the Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code. Id. “The only items complained of in Father’s motion (issuance 
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of the administrative writ and violation of the injunction) do not constitute the 

assertion of a cause of action by an agency.” Id. Therefore, the trial court 

concluded that an award under section 105.002 was improper because the OAG 

had not asserted a cause of action. Id. The opinion did not address sovereign

immunity or whether it would have been appropriate to otherwise sanction the 

conduct at issue. It is further clear that “an award of attorney’s fees under [section 

105.002] requires more than a finding that particular incidents of an agency’s 

conduct are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Black v. Dallas Cnty. 

Child Welfare Unit, 835 S.W.2d 626, 629–30 (Tex. 1992).

Here, appellee did not seek or request sanctions under section 105.002 and 

instead requested sanctions under the trial court’s inherent authority. “It is well 

established that when the State enters the courts as a litigant, it must observe and 

will be bound by the same evidentiary and procedural rules that apply to all 

litigants.” Att’y Gen. of Tex. ex rel. State v. Cartwright, 874 S.W.2d 210, 219 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); see also Lowe v. Tex. Tech 

Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tex. 1976) (“[T]he State is not exempt from these 

rules of procedure but is subject to them as any other litigant.”); In re A.C.B., 103 

S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (request for declaratory 

judgment against the OAG for alleged wrongful issuance of writ of withholding

and sanctions did not implicate sovereign immunity); Office of Att’y Gen. v.

Phillips, No. 14-03-01040-CV, 2004 WL 2559934, *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Nov. 12, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We are unpersuaded . . . and decline to 

hold in this case that sovereign immunity applies to deprive the trial court of 

jurisdiction to assess attorney’s fees against it.”). 

We are unpersuaded by the OAG’s general arguments that the trial court’s 

inherent authority is “limited” and therefore the trial court lacks jurisdiction. See 
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In re Tex. Dep’t. of Fam. & Protective Servs., 415 S.W.3d 522, 529–30 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (concluding inherent authority limited by 

plenary power doctrine but not discussing court’s inherent authority to sanction

under principles of sovereign immunity). The OAG does not dispute that it may be 

sanctioned under Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure but argues that an

“express rule of civil procedure” should be treated differently. However, the OAG 

has given no argument as to why such a distinction should be made between an 

“express rule” and the trial court’s inherent authority. Instead, the OAG asserts

that an award of attorney’s fees in this case could not be rendered under section 

105.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, nor under Rule 215.2 of the 

Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the OAG acknowledges the trial court’s 

authority and jurisdiction to render such an award in those cases. The OAG does 

not indicate why or how the trial court’s inherent authority should be afforded 

different treatment and we decline to apply such different treatment under the facts 

as presented herein. See Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 Cartwright, 874 S.W.2d at 219.

“Courts possess inherent powers that aid the exercise of their jurisdiction, 

facilitate the administration of justice, and preserve the independence and integrity 

of the judicial system.” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 

718 (Tex. 2020). Thus, we disagree with the OAG that the trial court lacks

jurisdiction to render sanctions under its inherent authority or that sovereign 

immunity is implicated herein. See Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301; In re A.C.B., 103 

S.W.3d at 574. We do not comment on whether such sanctions, would be 

appropriate in this case. The trial court has not rendered any opinion on whether it 

will or will not award sanctions and the record has not been developed with the 

presentation of evidence. We merely conclude that in this case, the trial court’s 

jurisdiction is not implicated by a request for sanctions under its inherent authority.
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We overrule the OAG’s first issue. 

SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

The OAG next contends that any award of sanctions in this case would 

necessarily conflict with the separation of powers doctrine because it “seeks to 

manage the solely administrative actions of the OAG, an executive branch 

agency.” See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, Inc., 947 S.W.2d

655, 659 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied). The OAG concludes that “the 

trial court violated the separate [sic] of powers doctrine when it held that it could 

sanction the OAG under these facts.”

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“In the context of judicial review of administrative decisions, the separationof-powers doctrine ensures that discretionary functions delegated to administrative 

agencies by the legislature are not usurped by the judicial branch.” Id. “Although

courts have the authority to hold that an agency erred and must correct its error, 

courts cannot dictate how to correct the error if, by doing so, the court effectively 

usurps the authority and discretion delegated to the agency by the legislature.” Id. 

However, “[i]t is well settled that trial courts may review an administrative action 

only if a statute provides a right to judicial review or the action adversely affects a 

vested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional right.” In re Office of 

Att’y Gen., 456 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. 2015); see also Tex. Fam. Code 

§158.506(c) (“[T]he obligor may file a motion with the court to withdraw the 

administrative writ of withholding and request a hearing . . . .”). 

The OAG argues that through sanctions the trial court “seeks to manage the 

solely administrative actions of the OAG.” However, the OAG admits that the trial 

2 The order denying the Plea to the Jurisdiction states that “the Court has jurisdiction to 

consider imposing sanctions against the OAG for alleged acts of bad faith in only its conduct of 

the litigation. Therefore, the plea to the jurisdiction is denied. . . . This finding is not a comment 

on the merits of the request for sanctions.”
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court has not yet ordered sanctions. The question presented by the OAG is, 

therefore, whether if the trial court rendered sanctions under those facts pleaded, it 

would violate the separation of powers doctrine. However, since no such sanctions 

have been awarded and the record has not been fully developed, the mere 

consideration of the evidence and facts does not implicate a separation of powers 

concern. Any award of sanctions is still contingent and uncertain. As a result, this 

question is not ripe for our review. See Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 

(Tex. 2001) (“Ripeness is one of several categories of justiciability. . . . ‘Ripeness 

doctrine is invoked to determine whether a dispute has yet matured to a point that 

warrants decision. The central concern is whether the case involves uncertain or

contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur 

at all.’” (quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3529, at 278–79 (2d ed. 1984))).

We overrule the OAG’s second issue. 

CONCLUSION

Concluding that a request for sanctions under the facts herein does not 

implicate sovereign immunity and the separation of powers issue is not ripe for our 

review because the trial court has not awarded any sanctions, we affirm the trial 

court’s order denying the OAG’s plea to the jurisdiction. 

/s/ Ken Wise 

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.