### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 5, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RO LAN D R . S MITH

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2002-A- 600 Steve D ozier , Judge

No. M2004- 01457-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 29, 2005

The De fendant, Roland R. S mith, was convicted by a jury of nine c ounts of statutory rape and thre e counts of espe cially

ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor. The trial c o urt sentenc ed the Def endant to two y ear s on eac h o f t h e s t atutory rapeconvictions and e leven y ear s on eac h of the

se xua l e xploi ta tio n co nv ic tio ns

. Th e se nte nc e s w e reor de re d to be se rv e d insu c h f a sh ion a s to re su lt in an ef fec tive term of se ventee n y ears in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. I n this direct appe al, the De fe nd a nt raise s the fo llo wi ng iss ue s: 1) wh e the r the e vid e nc e is su ff ic ie nt to s up po rt

c e rt a in o f h is convictions of statutory

rape ; 2) whethe r ce rtain of the D efe ndant’s convic tions m u s t be re verse d

un de r the do c tr ine of

e le c tio n of of

fe ns e s; 3 ) w he the r c e rt a in o f the De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns vio la te principles of double jeopar dy ; 4) whethe r the trial c ourt err ed in r ef u s i n g t o sever

some of the offe nses; and 5) w hether

the Def endant’ s sentence is ex cessive. We reve rse and rema nd for r etrial th e D e f e n d a n t’ s c o n v ic ti o n s o f

s tatu to r y r ap e ar is in g o u t of Co u n ts F o u r , F iv e , E ig h t a n d N in e

. We

re v e r s e a n d d is mi s s th e D e f e n d a n t’ s c o n v ic ti o n o f s tatu to r y r ap e ar is in g o u t o f Count Six . The Def endant’ s eff

ective se ntence is there by modified to fiftee n y ear s. I n all other re spects, we aff irm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t; Re m anded

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Je f f r e y A

. D e V a s h e r ( o n ap p e a l) a n d J. M ic h a e l E n g le ( a t tria l)
, N a s h v il le
, T e n n e s s e e, for the appellant, Roland Richar d Smit h.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Richard H. Dunav an t, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. Johnson, Dis trict Attorney Gene ral; and Brian Holmg ren, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.It i s t he p o l i cy o f t his C o urt t o refer t o t he victi m s o f sex c rime s b y t he i r i nit i als. 1

T

. H

. i s al s o t he named vi ct i m i n t wo count s of s t at ut ory r ape al l ege d aga i ns t t he D ef endan t ; he nce , we r ef

er 2

t o he r b y her ini t i als.

-2- OP IN ION

F AC TS T.M., the victim of most of the instant crimes, testified that she wa s born on September 18, 1 1 9 8 5 . She met the Def

endant while shewas in the ninth g rade ; the Def endant wa s twenty -seve n y e ars olda t th e tim e

. T. M. ha d be e n li vin g wi th h e r f a the r b ut r a n a way

to l ive wi th the De fe nd a nt. Th e tw o h a d be e n livi ng tog e the r ap pr oximate ly tw o y e ars wh e n th e De fe nd a nt w a s a rr e ste d inAp ri l 2002. At that time, they

wer e living in a

house on Carria g e Hill in Davidson County , wher e they had been r esiding about a y ear

. T.M.’s mother a nd two y oung er sisters lived in the house with them for a couple of months around Christmas of 2001. T.M. and the Def endant mar

ried on F ebrua

ry 14, 2002, afte r the police beg an investig ating the Def endant’ s sexual relationship with her.

T. M. te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s f if te e n y e ars old th e fi rs t ti me sh e ha d s e x withthe De fe nd a nt. She could not rec all wher e this initial episode occur red. T.M. also stated that, over the course of the period during which she lived w ith the Defenda nt, they had sex hundreds of times. She could not

r e me mb e r

e a c h a n d e v e r y

ti me b u t s tate d th a t th e ir r e lati o n s in v o lv e d b o th in te r c o u r s e a n d o r a l s e x. The De fendant also penetrated T.M. on more tha n one occ asion with a “dildo.”

T.M. rec alled having intercourse with the Defenda nt at a Marriott hotel in front of a person named Josh Hildrit h “[ o ] n ce o r t wice.” Other w itnesses to sexual activitybetwee n T.M. and the Def endant include d her sister Na t as h a Meadow s, her c ousin L acrisha Tay lor, and T.M.’s f riends T.H. and Rande e Goodwin. T.M. e x plained that, on one occa sion, T.H. was visit ing the house on 2 Carria g e Drive wh e n the De fe nd a nt too k bo th of the m int o the be dr oo m. Th e re , he “ fo rc e d” T. M. and T.H. to ha ve “or al sex with each other .” The Def endant wat ched this ac tivityand also ha d intercour se with both g irls. T.M. testified t hat s he witnessed the Def endant having sex with T.H. and T.H. w itnessed the De fendant having sex wit h T.M. T.H. also witnessed T.M. perf orming oral sex on t he De fendant. T.M. stated that this gr oup scena rio repe ated itself two or

three times.

T.M. testified that Randee Goodwin saw he r g iving oral sex to the Defe ndant on one oc casion at Carriag e Drive. On anothe r occ asion, the Def endant forc ed T.M. to give him oral sex while her sis te r N a ta sh a wa s wa tc hin g

. Th e De fe nd a nt thr e a te ne d to sh oc k T .M . w ith a Ta se r g un if

sh e did

no t do a s h e re qu e ste d. Th is in cid e nt a lso oc c ur re d o n Ca

rria g e Drive . L a c ri sh a

Tay lor a lso witnessed on one oc casion T.M. g iving or al sex to t he De fendant on Carriag e Drive.

T.M. acknowl ed ged t h at , wh i l e s h e a n d t h e D ef en d an tl i v ed o n C arri age Dr i v e, t h e D ef en dant took photogr aphs of her while she wa s unclothed. One of these photog raphs wa s admitted at trial as Exhibi t 4. The De fendant also fi l m ed a v ideo of T.M. a nd T.H. while they wer e in the showe r tog e the r, bo th u nd re sse d. Th e De fe nd a nt a lso fi lme d a vid e o o f h ims e lf

ha vin g se x withT. M. T. M.-3-

testified t hat s he re cog nized both of these videotape s. Both we re a dmitted at trial and play ed for the jury

.
Duri n g c r o s s

- e xa mi n a ti o n , T

. M

. main tain e d th a t s h e a n d th e D e f e n d a n t h a d f

a ll e n in love wi th e a c h othe r andthat th e y sh are d a lov ing re la tio ns hip . T he ir we dd ing too k p la c e a t a

c ha pe l in Nashville and T.M.’ s mother and three sisters attended. T.M. wanted the wedding to ta ke plac e.

On re dir e c t, T .M . ac kn ow le dg e d tha t she be c a me pr e g na nt twi c e du ri ng he r r e la tio ns hip wi th the Def endant, misca

rrying both times.

T.H. testified that she w as born on Septembe r 28, 1984, and ha d known the Defendant eig ht months prior to her be ing interviewed by the police a

bout him in J anuary

2002. She lived with the De fe nd a nt andT. M. fo r t wo mon ths a t th e ir ho us e on Carria g e Drive

. She wa s se ve nte e n y e ars old

a t th a t ti me . T .H . s ta te d that, while sh e liv e d th e re , s he a ndthe De fe nd a nt h a d s e xua l in te rc ou rs e four times. She also witnessed the Def endant having intercour se with T.M. She ac knowledg ed that the De fe nd a nt f

ilm e d he r an d T .M . to g e the r i n th e sh ow e r w hil e the y we re bo th u nc lothe d. She a lso acknow ledg ed participating in se x ual ac tivitywi t h T

. M . but claimed that she and T.M. did so by mutual choice.

Randee Goodwin, eig hteen at the time of her te stimony , had bee n friends w ith T.M. and the Def endant f or seve ral y ear s. She spent two nights with them while t hey wer e li ving in an apa rtment in Be llevue. Ms. Goodwin st ated that, on one occasion, she was in the bedroom with the Def endant and T.M. watching a movie when she saw T.M. perf orming oral sex on the Def endant. L ater

on that same nig ht she saw the D efe ndant sexuallypenetr ating T.M. with a “dildo.” Ms. Goodwin wa s six teen at the time.

Natasha Meadow s, also eig hteen at the time of the trial, testified that she witnessed sexual activity betwee n T.M. and the Def endant on “may

be thre e” oc casions. The first time was whe n she saw T.M. g iving or al sex to the De fendant while they wer e re siding in He rmitag e. She witnessed this same activity

twice more at the Carriag e Drive re sidence

. Kelley Allen, one of

T.M.’s y oung er sisters, was thirteen at the time of the trial. She testified that, when she was e leven or twelve, she lived with her mother f or a “ few months” at the house that T.M. share d with the Def endant. He r sister Chris t i e al s o lived there with them. Whi le they wer e there , T.M. was pre g nant but never had the ba

by . They m o v ed o u t wh en the police be g an an investigation of the Def

endant.

Detec tive Stanley

L eo Mitchell testified that he operates the computer fore nsic lab for

the Metro Police De partm en t. He examined a c omputer re cover ed fr om the Def endant’ s residenc e. F ro m th is c omp ute r h e re c ov e re d th e ph oto g ra ph that w a s a dmi tte d a s E x hib it F ou r. Th is ph oto g ra ph
, whi c h is inc lud e d inthe re c or d b e fo re us , d e pic ts T .M . lying on he r b a c k w hil e undresse d with her leg s raised and apart, reve aling her g enital re g ion.T he victi m s’ na m es a re sp ell ed o ut i n the S t ate’s elec t i o n o f o f fen ses. 3

-4- Detec tive Ken Potter testified that he executed a sear ch wa rra nt at the Def

endant’ s residenc e at Carriag e Drive on J anuary 9, 2002. During that sear ch he seized a computer as well as a dig ital

came ra. He also seized a video c amer a and a number of e ight millimeter video c assettes. The police de pa rt me nt t rans fe rr e d th e ma te ri a l onthe se c a sse tte s onto VH S vid e ota pe s. Portio ns of tw o o f the se videotapes w ere play ed for the jury ; the tapes are also in the rec ord bef ore us. De t. Pott er ide ntified the two fe male participants in one of the tapes a s T.M. and T.H. De t. Pott er ide ntified the voice and the pe rs on in the oth e r v ide ota pe a s T .M

. Following Det. Potter’s testimony
, the State rested its c ase. The prose cutor then r ead to the jury the State ’s e le c tio n o f o ff e ns e s, a s f

oll ow s:

I n th e Cr imi na l Co urt f

or Da vid so n Co un ty , T e nn e sse e , D ivi sio n O ne , St a te of Te nn e sse e ve rs us Rol a nd Smith, c a se nu mbe r 2 00 2- A- 60 0, e le c tio n o f o ff e ns e s: Count One of the indictment alleg es an act of statutory rape involving T.M., 3 date of birth 9 -1 8- 85 , a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant used a dildo to penetrate the vag ina of T.M. at the r esidenc e
on Carria g e Drive . Rand e e Go od wi n w itn e sse d th is e ve nt. Count Two of the indictment a lleg es an act of statutory rape involving T.M., date of birth 9 -1 8- 85 , a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: T.M. perf

ormed a n act of

fellatio on t h e d ef

endant at the residenc e on Carria g e Drive . Rand e e Go od wi n w itn e sse d th is i nc ide nt. Count Three of the i ndictment alleg es an a ct of statutory rape involving T.M., date of birth 9 -1 8- 85 , a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: Th e de fe nd a n[t] h a d s e xua l in te rc ou rs e wi th T .M . in a n apartme nt i n Na sh vil le . T his inc ide nt w a s v ide o ta pe d b y the de fe nd a nt. Count Four of the indictment alleg es an a ct of statutory rape involving T.M., date of birth 9 -1 8- 85 , a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant eng ag ed in sexual intercourse with T.M. at the re sidence on Carria g e Drive . T .M . b e c a me pr e g na nt a s a re su lt o f this inc ide nt. Count F ive of the indictment alleg es an a ct of statutory rape involving T.M., date of birth 9 -1 8- 85 , a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: T.M. perf

ormed a n act of

fellatio on the de fendant at t h e re sidence on Carria g e Drive . N a ta sh a

Me a do ws wi tne sse d th is i nc ide nt. Count Six of t he indi ctment alleg es an a ct of statutory rape involving T.M., date of birth, 9- 18 -8 5, a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant and T.M. enga g ed in sexual intercourse at the re sidence on Carria g e Drive. T.H. wa s prese nt and witnessed the a ct of interc ourse. Cou nt Sev e n of the ind ic tme nt al le g e s a n a c t of statut ory ra pe inv olv ing T. M. , d a te of birth, 9- 18 -8 5, a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant and T.M. eng ag ed in sexual intercourse at the re sid ence on Carria g e Drive. T.H. wa s prese nt and witnessed the a ct of interc ourse.-5- Count Eight of the indictment a lleg es an a ct of statutory rape involving T.H., date of birth, 9- 28 -8 4, a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant and T. H. en g ag ed in sexual intercourse at the re sidence on Carria g e Drive. T.M. was pr esent a nd witnessed the a ct of interc ourse. Cou n t N in e o f

th e in d ic tm e n t a ll e g e s

. . . a n a c t o f s tatu to r y r ap e in v o lving T. H. , d a te of

birth, 9- 28 -8 4, a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant and T.H. e ng ag ed in sexual intercourse at the re s i d ence on Carria g e Drive. T.M. was pr esent a nd witnessed the a ct of interc ourse. Count Ten of the indictment a lleg es the a ct of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual

e xploi ta tio n o f a

min or a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant photogr aphed T .M. naked on a bed w ith her leg s sprea d at the Carria g e House residenc e. Count Eleven of the indictment alleg es an a ct of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual

e xploi ta tio n o f a

min or

. . . r e fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant video taped T.M. a nd T.H. i n a showe r at the Car riag e Drive residenc e. Count Twelve of the indictment alleg es an a ct of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual

e xploi ta tio n o f a

min or a ndre fe rs to the fo llo wi ng c on du c t: The de fendant video taped he and T.M

. en g ag ing in se x ual interc ourse a nd T. M. pe rf ormin g a n a c t of

fe llatio on the de fe nd a nt.

The De fendant rec alled T.M. to t h e st and and e stablished that she wa s not afraid of the Def endant with re spect to the sexual matters at issue.

After considering the above proof, the jury convicted the Def

endant a s char g ed.

AN AL YSI S I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence I n his first issue the Def

endant c ontends that the evidenc e is not sufficient to establish that the Def endant c ommitt ed the statutory rape s char g ed in Counts One, Two, F our, F ive, Six and Seven beca use the State failed to establish that he and T .M. were not married w hen those a cts took place

. Statutory rape is defined a s the “sexual penetr ation of a victim by the def endant or of the de fendant by the victim when the victim is at least thirtee n (13) but le ss tha n eig hteen (18) y ear s of ag e and the defe ndant is at le ast four (4) y ear s older than the victim.” Tenn. Code An n

. § 3 9 -13-506( a). Howeve r, conduc t which would otherw ise be statutory rape is not criminal “if the victim is t he leg al spouse of the pe rpetrator.” I d. § 39-13-507( a). T h e De fendant contends that the proof at trial established that the De fendant and T.M. were married to one another for approximately six wee ks during the time they

resided at Carriag e Drive, and that the State failed to prove that the a cts alleg ed in the re fe re nc e d c ou nts oc c ur re d pri or to that time

. Ac c or din g ly , the De fe nd a nt a rg ue s, the State failed to a dduce suf

ficient proof

of t he criminal nature of the sexual conduct f or which the Def

endant

was c harg ed with statutory rape

.-6-

Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whe ther by

the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by the trier of fac t of g uilt bey ond a rea sonable doubt.” A convicted criminal def endant who cha lleng es the suff

iciency of the e vidence on appea l bear s the burden of demonstrating why the evidenc e is insufficient to support the ve rdict, bec ause a verdic t o f g uilt destroy s the presumption of innoce nce and imposes a pre sumption of guilt. See S tate v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (T enn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . This Cour t m u s t reje ct a c onvicted criminal defendant’s challeng e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence if, afte r considering the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier of fac t could have f ound the essential e lements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app e a l, the State is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the evi den c e a nda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces which may be dra wn there from. See Ca rruther s, 35 S.W .3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uilty verdic t by the trier of fac t a ccr edits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s all c on fl ic ts in the e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . See State v. Bla nd, 9 5 8 S .W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Que stions about the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidence are r esolved by the trier of

fac t, and thi s Court will not re-w eig h or re -eva luate the e vidence . See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659. Nor w ill t h i s C o u rt substitut e its own infer ence s drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of

fac t. See Ev ans, 108 S .W.3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

As po int e d o ut b y

the Sta te in its bri ef, T. M. te sti fi e d a bo ut the e ve nts c ha

rg e d in Cou nts One, Tw o, Five, Six and Seven, and the prosecutor t hen asked her if she had g otten marrie d “af ter the police investig ation into all these thi ng s? ” T.M. responde d in the affirmative. Obviously , then, “these things” had all occ urre d prior to the mar riag e. Count Four alleg ed a statutory rape based on

an ac t of intercour se that re sulted in T.M. becoming preg nant by the Def endant. T.M. testified that she told the Def

endant upon her becoming preg nant bot h times. When the prosec utor asked if the Def endant sugg ested marriag e on either oc casion, T.M. testified “ he may have onc e.” H oweve r, she fu rthe r t e sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt n e ve r t oo k an y a c tio n to wa rdg e tti ng marrie d at th a t ti me . T his is s uf fi c ie nt p ro of

fr om w hic h th e jury ma y ha ve dr a wn the inf e re nc e that the De fe nd a nt andT. M.

wer e not married at the time of the conduct r efe rre d to in Count Four

.
Th e pr oo f wa s the re fo re su ff ic ie nt to sup po rt

the c ha lle ng e d c ou nts of

statut ory ra pe . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.T h e se c o u n ts a lleg e thr e e inc id e n ts o f statu to ry ra p e o c c u rr ing w h e n a ) the D e fen d a n t vid e o ta p e d him se lf 4
h a v ing se x w ith T .M ., an d b ) T .H . o b se rv e d the D e fen d a n t ha v ing se x w ith T .M . o n two o c c a sio n s.

-7- II. Election of

Of fenses The Def endant next cha lleng es the eff icac y of the State’s elec tion of offe nses with respe ct to all counts of statutory

rape except Counts Three, Six and Seven. The State re sponds both that 4 thi s is su e ha s b e e n w a ive d, a ndthat it is w ith ou t me ri t.

Th e do c tr ine of

e le c tio n of of

fe ns e s is imp lic a te d wh e n th e Sta te c ha rg e s a de fe nd a nt w ith

one or more sex ual offenses and then adduces at trial proof of more sex ual offe nses than have been

c ha rg e d. Un de r tho se c ir c ums ta nc e s our su pr e me c ou rt

ha s lo ng a ndc on sis te ntl y he ld that th e Sta te must se l ec t fr o m among the various offense s proved, those pa rticular a cts upon which it seeks convictions. See State v. J ohnson, 53 S.W .3d 628, 630 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Kendrick, 38 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Brow n, 992 S.W .2d 389, 39 1 (Tenn. 1999) ; State v. Walton, 958 S. W. 2 d 7 2 4
, 7 2 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 ) ; T id w e ll v

. St a te , 9 2 2 S. W. 2 d 4 9 7
, 5 0 0

- 0 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6); State v. Shelton, 851 S.W .2d 134, 136-37 (Te nn. 1993); Burlison v. S tate, 501 S.W

. 2 d 801, 804 (Tenn. 19 73 ). Th e B ur lis on de c isi onc ite s th re e re a so ns fo r t he e le c tio n r e qu ir e me nt:

F ir st, to e na

ble the de fe nd a nt t o prep are fo r andmake his de fe ns e to the sp e c if ic char g e; sec ond, to protect him from double j e o pardy by individualiz ation of the issue,

a nd thi rd
, so that the jury ’s ve rd ic t ma y no t bea ma tte r o f c ho ic e be tw e e n o ff e ns e s, some jurors convic ting on one offe nse and othe rs, another

.
501 S.W .2d at 803. I t is the third of these rea sons that a ddresse s the most serious c oncern : “the well-e stablished rig ht unde r our state constitution to a unanimous jury verdic t be fore a c riminal conviction is imposed.” Shelton, 851 S.W .2d at 137. This rig ht “re q uires the tria l court to take prec autions to ensure that the jury deliberates over the particula r cha rg ed off ense, instea d of cr eating a ‘patchwork ve rdict’ ba sed on diffe rent off enses in evide nce.” I d. (empha sis added).
Our supre me court has “stre ssed that the ele ction require ment is a responsibilityof the trial court a nd the prosec ution and, there fore , does not depe nd on a spec ific re quest by the def endant.” Kendrick, 38 S.W.3d at 569. More emphatica lly , our hig h court in B urlison held that

it [ is] the duty

of the trial judg e to re quire the State, at the close of its proof -in-chie f, to elect the pa

rticular of

fense of ca

rnal knowle dg e upon which it would rely for

c on vic tio n, a ndto p ro pe rl y ins truc t th e jury

so that the ve rd ic t of

e ve ry jur or wo uld be united on the one offe nse.

50 1 S. W.2 d at 80 4. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht t o a un a nim ou s ju ry

ve rd ic t on e a c h a nde ve ry c ou nt i s “fundamental, immediately touching the constitutional rights of an ac cused.” I d. As such, any err or committed by

the trial court in failing to re quire the State to elec t the offe nses on which it choose s to seek c onviction, or to proper ly in s truct the jury

there on, is rever sible unless determined to be harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt. See Shelton at 138.W e no t e t hat
, i n ad d res si ng t he el ect i o n i ss ues i n t hese cases
, t he co urt s d i d no t d eem i t necessar y t o unde rt ake 5

t he anal y s i s s et for t h i n St at e v

. Adk i s s on , 899 S. W

. 2d 626, 641- 42 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. 1994)
, i n or der t o de t erm i ne wh et h er t h e St at e’ s f ai l u r e t o pr oper l y e l ec t c on s t i t u t ed “ pl ai n e r r or

. ” W e fol l ow t h ei r l ea d.

-8- We will first address the State’ s claim of waiver

. The S tate is corr ect that the Defe ndant’s mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l do e s n ot r a ise a n is su e re g ard ing th e S tat e ’s e le c tio n o f o ff e ns e s at tria l. Howeve r, as set forth above and a cknowledg ed by the State in its brief, the doc trine of e lection of offe nses touches on a

criminal defe ndant’s fundame ntal constitutional rig hts and is the ref ore subjec t to p l ain error re view, whe ther or not r aised in a motion for ne w trial. See State v. K endric k, 38 S.W. 3d 56 6, 56 7 (T e nn . 200 1) (r e ve rs ing c on vic tio n und e r doc tr ineof e le c tio n o f o ff

e ns e s a s p la in

err or although not addre ssed i n the di rec t appea l); State v. Walton, 958 S .W.2d 724, 726-27 (Tenn. 1997) (r ever sing convictions as pl ain error for State’s fa ilure to elec t offense s, althoug h not raised by the parties); State v. Clabo, 905 S.W .2d 197, 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that the State’s failure to elect of

fense s “is pl ain er

ror” ). Acc ording ly , we will addr ess on the merits the 5 De fe nd a nt’ s is su e s r e g ard ing the State ’s e le c tio n o f o ff e ns e s.

Wit h respe ct t o Counts One and Two, t he Defendant contends that the State’s de scription of the e le c te d o ff

e ns e s “ didno t su ff

ic ie ntl y c orr e sp on d to [the ] pr oo f” a ndtho se c on vic tio ns mus t there fore be re verse d. As to these counts, the State e lected those offe nses to consist of the following

co n d u ct : “t h e de fe n d an t u s ed a d i l d o t o p en et ra t e t h e v agi n a o f T

. M

. at t h e r es i d en ce o n C arri age Drive [while] Randee Goodwin witnessed this event” a nd “T.M. performed an act of fellatio on the defe ndant at the r esidenc e on Carriag e Drive [while] Randee Goodwin witnessed this incide nt.” The Def endant c orre ctly

points out t hat, while Ms. Goodwin testified that she wit nessed the Defe ndant using a dildo on T.M. and also saw T.M. perf orming oral sex on the Def endant, she stated that she witnessed these events at an apartment in Be llevue. The State’s e lection spec ifies that these of fense s
occur red instea d at the house on Car riag e Drive. Henc e, the De fendant asserts, the State’ s elec tion of of fe ns e s as to Coun ts On e a nd Tw o doe s not su ff ic ie ntl y c or

re sp on d to th e pr oo f a dd uc e d at tria l,

re qu ir ing the re ve rs a l of

his c on vic tio ns on tho se tw o c ou nts

.
We acknowle dg e the discr epanc y pointed out by the Def

endant. We disa g ree , howeve r, that it is of such mag nitude as t o require reve rsal. Ms. Goodwin testified to witnessing two acts of se x ual

c on du c t be tw e e n T .M . a ndthe De fe nd a nt. B othoc c ur re d o n th e sa me e ve ning a ndin the sa me location: t h e Def

endant’ s bedroom. One of the a cts witnessed by Ms. Goodwin involved the Def endant pe n etrating T.M. with a dildo. The othe r ac t consisted of T.M. per forming fellatio on the De fe nd a nt. T. M. a lso te sti fied tha t sh e re c a lle d o nc e pe rf ormin g fe llatio on the De fe nd a nt i n fr o n to f M s

. Go o d wi n , al t h o u gh s h e s t at ed t h at t h i s i n ci d e n t o c c u rr ed att h e a d d re s s o n C arri age Drive. T.M. did not re call Ms. Goodwin’s pr esenc e while the D efe ndant pene trated he r with a dildo.

The De fendant relies on State v. Alfr ed L ee M i d d l eton, No. W 1996-00022-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1531759, at *8-9 (T enn. Crim. App., J ackson, D ec. 17, 1999) , for the pr oposition t hat anT he D ef endan t al s o re l i es upon St at e v

. B r own, 992 S. W

. 2d 389 ( T enn

. 199 9). T hat ca s e i s i napposi t e. T her e, 6

t h e def en dan t w as i n d i ct ed o n a s i n g l e cou n t of r ape of a c h i l d. T h e v i ct i m t es t i f i ed at t r i al a bou t f

i v e i n s t an ce s of pen et r at i on oc cu r r i n g on di f fer en t da y s

. T h e St at e “ el ec t ed” t h e of fen s e as oc cu r r i n g “ bet we en Eas t er , Apr i l 11, 1993, and Ju ne 30
, 199 3. ” I d. at 39 1. O ur s upr eme cour t he l d t hat “ [ t ] hi s t i me- f r ame l i mi t at i on was not an el ect i on an d f ai l ed
to e n su re th a t th e j u ry w o u ld fo c u s o n a s ing le o ff e n se .” Id . a t 3 9 2

. In th e in sta n t ca se , t h e S ta te e le c te d two sp e c ifi c ins ta n c e s o f co n d u c t, b o th o c c u rr ing o n a sing le nig h t.

-9- elec tion that does not c orre spond to the proof at trial y et re sults in a conviction, must be rever sed. 6 We find Middleton disting uishable from this c ase. I n Middleton, the jury was instructe d to consider an alleg ed ra

pe “w here in th e d ef

en d ant alleg edly

forc ed [the victim] to perform fellatio afte r
rec eiving a whipping .” I d. at *8. Howeve r, t he proof at t rial was that the victim performed an a ct of fe llatio in order to avoid a w hipping, a nd on another occa sion, refuse d to fellate the defe ndant

a ft e r h a vin g a lr e a dy

re c e ive d a

wh ipp ing

. Th e jury wa s su ff ic ie ntl y c on fu se d that it se nt a no te to the tr ia l cou rt

du ri ng de lib e ratio ns se e kin g c lari fi c a tio n o n th is v e ry po int . T he jury

wa s si mpl y

tol d to rere ad the jury

instructions, and eve ntually convicted on theelec ted cha rg e.

I n the pre sent ca se, there was proof of only two acts of se x ual conduc t betwee n the Def endant

a ndT. M. that we re wi tne sse d by Ms. Go od wi n. B oth T. M. a ndMs. Go od wi n te sti fi e d a bo ut the se
a c ts. Th e a dd re ss at

wh ic h th e se a c ts o c c ur re d w a s, in the c on te xt of thi s c a se , r e la tiv e ly unimportant. The differe n ces in the te stimonyabout the De fendant’s addre ss at the time did not

c re a te the da ng e r o f a

“ patc hw or

k v e rd ic t” in wh ic h so me of the jur or s w e re c on vic tin g on the ba sis of on e ins ta nc e of c on du c t, an d o the r j ur or s c on vic tin g on the ba sis of a dif fe re nt i ns ta nc e of

c on du c t. Ms. Go od wi n te sti fi e d th a t sh e watc he d w hil e the De fe nd a nt p e ne tr a te d T .M . o n o ne oc c a sio n w ith

a dil do . M s. Go od wi n a ndT. M. bo th t e sti fi e d th a t Ms . Goodw in w a tc he d o n o ne oc c a sio n w hil e T.M. perf ormed ora l sex on the Def endant. Both of these incidents occur red on the same night. The State elec ted one of

fense fo r ea ch of these instanc es. The jury convicted on e ach of

fense . Eac h

e le c te d o ff

e ns e wa s suf

fi c ie ntl y dis tin c t as to re nd e r uni mpo rt a nt the a dd re ss at w hic h th e se inc ide nts

occur red. U nlike the sce nario in Middleton, the jury here was not conf

ronted with an of

fense that appea red to c ombine elements of pr oof fr om two separ ate incidents and which cor responde d to no sin g le de sc ri be d in c ide nt. He re , th e jury ha d p ro of

that matc he d th e e le c te d o ff e ns e s in a ll r e sp e c ts but the addre ss, a detail which, unde r the c ircumstance s of this case, is trivial. Acc ording ly , we f ind

no me ri t to the De fe nd a nt’ s c la im that the Sta te ’s e le c tio n a s to the se of fe ns e s w a s so fl a we d a s to

re qu ir e re ve rs a l.

Th e De fe nd ant als o comp la ins abo ut the State ’s e le c tio n o n Co un t F ou r, wh ic h th e Sta te elec ted to consist of the De fendant’s sexual interc ourse with T.M. occ urring at the Carriag e Drive residenc e and r esulting in her preg nancy

. We ag ree with the Defenda nt that the State’s ele ction on this particular c ount is flawed. T.M. testified that she twice be came preg nant by the Def endant. She did not describe the circ umstances surr ounding e ither pre g nancy other than to explain that each ha d terminated in a

miscarriag e. The State g ave the jury no indication in its election as to which preg nancy

was the ba sis for the char g e. Obviously
, then, some of the jurors mig ht have c onvicted the Def endant f or the act of i nterc ourse that resulted in the first pre g nancy , while other juror s may ha ve c on vic te d the De fe nd a nt fo r the su bs e qu e nt a c t of int e rc ou rs e . Wh ilewe a g re e wi th the State that the Def

endant could have been prosecuted f or both ac ts, the State chose to prose cute only one.W e a lso no te tha t t h e a c ts o f i n te rc o u rs e e le c te d b y th e S ta te to s u p p o rt C o u n t S ix a n d /o r C o u n t S e v e n c o u ld 7
b e t he same ac t of i nt erco urs e t he Stat e el ect ed t o s up p o rt C o unt Fo ur.
-10- Unfortunately , the State di d not specify with sufficie nt detail which act it was prosecuting : and the jury ha d tw o f

ro m wh ic h to c ho os e

. Th is i s th e ve ry e vil a g a ins t w hic h a n e le c tio n o f o ff e ns e s is 7 desig ned to pr otect. See Shelton, 851 S.W .2d at 138 (“the purpose of elec tion is t o ensure that eac h juror is considering the same occurr ence ”). The protection failed in this instance. Accor dingly , we have no c hoice but to re verse the Def endant’ s conviction on Count Four and r emand that c ount for

a new trial. See W alton, 958 S.W .2d at 728 (def endant’ s convictions reve rsed and remanded for new trial wher e ther e exis ted in the rec ord “no means

. . . by which [to] be assur ed that ea ch juror r elied upon the same e vidence to convict the def endant” ).

The De fendant attacks his conviction of Count Five on simil ar gr ounds. I n that count, the State described the re levant conduc t as an a ct of fe llatio performed by T.M. on the Def

endant at the Carria g e Drive re sidence and witnessed by Natasha Meadow s. T.M. testified about a sing le incident of or a l sex ob se rv e d by Nata sh a , an d d e sc ri be d it a s b e ing pr e c ipi ta te d b y

the De fe nd a nt’ s th re a t to shock her with a Tase r g un if she did not coop er at e. T

. M. stated that this incident occur red on Carria g e Drive . N a ta sh a

te sti fi e d th a t sh e wi tne sse d T. M. g ivi ng the De fe nd a nt o ra l se x on at le a st two occa sions at the Carria g e Drive addre ss. Both occ asions involved the Tase r g un. Thus, the jury ag ain had two incide nts from which to choose in deciding whether to convict t he Defendant of Count Five. A s in Count Four, this scenari o p er m i t t ed a “patc hwork ve rdict” a s to this count, and the Def endant’ s conviction of C ount Five must there fore be reverse d and the char g e remanded for a ne w tr ia l.

Th e s a m e p r o b l e m ar i s e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o C o u n t s E i g h t a n d N i n e , e a c h o f w h i c h th e Sta te described as re fer

ring to an ac t of

sexual int erc ourse be tween the Def endant a nd T.H. and w itnessed by T. M. T. H. te sti fi e d th a t she ha d inte rc ou rs e wi th the De fe nd a nt on fo ur oc c a sio ns a ndthat T .M

. was pre sent. T.M. testified that she sa w the De fendant having intercour se with T.H. “[t]wo or three” times. Thus, the jury

had more than two episodes of intercour se betwe en the De fendant and T.H. from which to c hoose in dec iding whe ther to convic t the Def endant on Counts Eight and Nine . The Def endant’ s convictions on these c ounts must t here fore be re verse d and the cha rg es re manded f

or
a ne w t ri a l.

III . D oubl e Je opa r dy A. Counts Th reeand T welve The Defendant was convicted on Count Three of t he st atutory rape of T.M. as revea led by the vid e ota

pe he ma de of the e pis od e

. Th e De fe nd a nt wa s c on vic te d on Cou nt Tw e lve of e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor based on the fac t that he made the videotape relied upon by th e S t a t e i n C o u n tT h r e e

. T h e D e f e n d a n tn o w c o n t e n d s t h a th i s d u a l c o n v i c t i o n s f o r t he se offe nses violate his constitutional protections ag ainst double jeopar dy . See U. S. Const. Ame nd. V; Tenn. Const. Art. I , § 10. We disag ree

.B l o ckb urger v. U ni t ed Stat es, 28 4 U

. S. 29 9 (19 3 2 ). 8

D uchac v. Stat e, 50 5 S.W

. 2 d 23 7 (T enn. 19 7 3 ). 9

-11- As our supre me court has explained, thr e e fu nd a me nta l princ ipl e s u nd e rl ie do ub le je op ard y : (1) pr ote c tio n a g a ins t a second pr osecution af

ter a n ac q u i t t al; (2) pr otection ag ainst a sec ond prosec ution

a ft e r co n v i c t i o n ; a n d ( 3 ) p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s tm u l t i p l e p u n i s h m e n t s f o r t h e s a me offe nse.
State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996) (footnote omitted); se e also Whalen v. United State s, 44 5 U .S. 68 4, 68 8 ( 19 80 ). I t is the thi rdof the se pr ote c tio ns that th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s is being violated. I nitially
, we note that Tenne ssee’ s constitutional protection ag ainst double jeopar dy has bee n construed to be gre ater than t hat offere d by the fe dera l Consti tution. S ee D enton at 378-81; State v. Hay es, 7 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

“ Th e ke y iss ue in mult ipl e pu nis hme nt c a ses is leg isl a tiv e int e nt, ” a ndwe are to p re su me “that the leg islature does not ordina rily intend to punish the same offe nse under two differ ent statutes.” De nton, 938 S.W .2d at 379. Acc ording to the Denton dec ision,

resolution of a double jeopar dy punishment issue under the Te nnessee Constit ution require s the following : (1) a B lockburg er analy sis of the statutory offe nses; (2) a n 8 analy sis, guided by

the principles of

Du ch ac , of the e vidence used to prove the

9 of fe ns e s; ( 3) a

c on sid e ratio n o f w he the r t he re we re mul tip le vic tim s o r d isc re te a c ts; and (4) a compa

rison of the purpose s of t he respective statutes. None of the se steps is d e te rm inativ e ; rathe r the re su lts of e a c h mu st b e we ig he d a ndc on sid e re d in relation to each other

.
938 S.W .2d at 381 (footnotes a dded).

We turn now to the Blockburg er analy sis of t he two crimes in question. That analy sis looks to w he the r e a c h o ff

e ns e re qu ir e s p ro of

of a n a dd iti on a l f

a c t w hic h the oth e r doe s not. Se e 28 4 U .S. at 304. Diffe ring elements indicate th at the two offe nses ar e not the same for double je opardy purposes. Statutory

rape is defined a s the “sexual penetr ation of a vic tim bythe def endant . . . when the vic tim is at le a st thirte e n ( 13 ) but le ss tha n eig hte e n (18 ) y e ars of a g e a ndthe de fe nd a nt i s a t le a st fo ur (4 ) y e ars old e r tha n th e vic tim .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 39 -13 -50 6(a ). Th e c ri me of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d se xua l e xploi ta tio n of a min or pr ov ide s that “ [i]t is un la wf ul f or a pe rs on to kno wi ng ly promote, employ , use, assist, transport or permit a minor to participate in the per formanc e or in the production of mate rial which inc ludes the minor eng ag ing in: (1) Sex ual ac tivity ; or (2) Simulated sexual activitythat is patently offe nsive.” I d. § 39-17-1005( a). Statutory rape require s the eleme nt of se xua l pe ne tr a tio n, wh ic h the c ri me of se xua l e xploi ta tio n of a min or do e s n ot. Sta tut ory

ra pe a lso require s a minimum age differ ence betwee n the victim and the def endant, not re quired by

the

e xploi ta tio n o ff

e ns e . E sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d s e xua l e xploi ta tio n of a min or re qu ir e s th e of

fe nd e r t oM cK ni gh t s et s fort h t he propo s i t i on t hat wi l l i ng vi ct i ms of s t at ut ory r ape ar e c ons i dere d accomp l i ces

. See 10
900 S. W

. 2d a t 47- 48. T h ei r t es t i mon y abou t t h e f ac t s c on s t i t u t i n g t h e of fen s e mu s t t h er ef

or e be cor r obor at ed. Se e i d. In this c a se , T .M . t e stif ie d tha t she w a s a w ill ing p a rtic ip a n t i n a t le a st “ m o st” o f th e se x u a l co n d u c t she e n g a g e d in w ith the D e fen d a n t.

W e d o not i m p l y t hat T

. M

. was not al so a vi ct i m of t he D efend ant ’ s sexual exp l o i t at i o n of her. 11

-12- eng ag e a minor in the performanc e or production of material depicting sexual activityor simulated sexual activity ; statutory

rape does not. Thus, under the Bloc kburg er test, these two offe nses ar e not the “ sa me ” fo r d ou ble je op ard y pu rp os e s.
Turning to the second D enton criterion, we a cknowledg e that the e vidence used to prove the se of fe ns e s w a s, ind e e d, the sa me . T he Sta te re lie d o n T .M .’s tes ti mo nya ndthe vid e ota pe to prove both c rimes. Howeve r, the evidenc e wa s used for dif fer ent purposes. In proving the statutory

ra pe , th e Sta te wa s r e qu ir e d to off e r s ome c or

ro bo ratio n o f T .M .’ s te sti mon y be c a us e sh e is

c on sid ered an accomplic e to the c ri me . Se e Sta te v. Mc Kn ig ht, 90 0 S. W.2 d 3 6, 48 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1994). The videota pe of the sexual int erc ourse be tween the Def endant a nd T.M. was off

ere d 10 to corrobor ate he r testim o n y as to that ac t taking pla ce. With respec t to the sex ual exploit ation char g e, howe ver, the videotape w as off ere d to prove a n element of the crime itself : that the Def endant ha d produce d materia l depicting a minor eng ag ing in se x ual ac tivity

.
Du c ha c ins truc ts that “ ‘[o ]ne te st o f i de nti ty of of fe ns e s is wh e ther th e sa me e vid e nc e is

re qu ir e d to pr ov e the m. I f the sa me e vid e nc e is n ot r e qu ir e d, the n th e fa c t th a t bo th c ha rg e s r e la te to, and g row out of, one transac tion, does not make a sing le offe nse whe re two a re define d by the statutes.’” 505 S.W.2d at 239 (citation omitted) (emphasis adde d). I n this case, the same evidenc e was used, but the s ame evidence was not require d. Any form of c orrobor ative evide nce w ould have been suf ficient to support the State’s c harg e of statutory rape . On the other

hand, the videota

pe wa s
nece ssary to the State’s ca se of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor. The diff ering purposes for

which the e vidence was off ere d supports, under the principles of Duc hac, a finding that the tw o o ff

e ns e s a re no t th e sa me fo r d ou ble je op ard y pu rp os e s.

Th e thi rdfa c tor

ne c e ssa ry fo r us to co ns ide r is whe the r the tw o o ff e ns e s in vo lve d mu lti ple victims or discrete a cts. The nominal victim of both crimes i s T

. M

. Ho we v er, the offe nse of statutory rape is included in the cha pter of our

criminal code titled “ Offe nses Ag ainst Person.” The la ng ua g e de fi nin g the c ri me of statut ory ra pe re fe rs to “ the vic tim ,” c le arl y imp ly ing that th e re is o nly

on e v i c t i mo f

e a c h a c to f

s e xu a l p e n e tr a t i o n b y

t h e d e f e n d a n t

. I n c o n tr a s t , t h e c r i m e o f e s p e c i a l ly ag g ravated sex u al ex ploitation of a minor is included in the cha pter of our

criminal code titled “Of fense s Ag ainst Publi c Hea lth, Saf ety , Welfare .” That is, this is a crime ag ainst society at larg e. I nd ee d
, t h e lang uag e of the statute itself does not re fer to the minor participant a s “the victim.” Ra the r, thi s p art ic ula

r c ri me is i nc lud e d inPart 10 of the c ha pte r s e tt in g fo rt h the c ri me s a g a ins t pu bli c he a lth , s a fety and we lf are , w hic h p art

is aime d at pu nis hin g “ pe rs on s in vo lve d inc hil d p o r n o g r ap h y. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 7

- 1 0 0 1
, S e n t e n c i n g C o m m i s s i o n C o m m e n t s

. A c c o r d i n g l y,
we fi ndthat, u nd e r the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f this c a se , th e tw o c ri me s in vo lve d mu lti ple vic tim s. 11W hen t he es peci al l y ag gr ava t ed s exu al ex pl oi t at i on of a mi nor s t at ut e was ena ct ed i n 19 90
, t he r ef er enc ed 12

s t a t u t e pr os c r i bi n g a g g r a v a t e d r a pe c on t a i n e d a pr ov i s i on ma k i n g t h e r a pe of a v i c t i m u n de r t h e a g e of t hi r t een

“ agg r ava t ed. ” See T enn

. Co de Ann. § 39

- 13

- 50 2(a) ( 4) ( 19 91 )

. I n 1992
, t he r ape of a v i ct i m under t he age of t hi r t een b e c a m e a c rim e un d e r a s e p a ra te s ta tute , c o d ifi e d a t T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d s e c tio n 3 9 -1 3 -5 2 2

. T h e c u rr e n t statu te p ro scrib i ng ag gra va t ed rap e n o l o ng er c o ntains a p ro visi o n d ea l i ng wit h victi m s un d er t he ag e o f t hirt ee n. W e surm i se t hat t he l egi sl at ure si m p l y f ai l ed t o co rr ect t he espec i al l y aggravat ed s exual exp l o i t at i o n of a m i no r s t at ut e t o ref l ect t he

n ew s t at u t e con ce r n i n g r ape of a c h i l d.

-13- Th e tw o c ri me s a lso inv olv e d dis c re te a c ts. Th e a c t su pp ortin g the statut ory ra pe c ha rg e is the sexual intercourse that occur red be tween the Def

endant a nd T.M. The a ct supporting the exploi tation c harg e was the Def endant’ s videotaping of this a ct: and the taping of the a ct would have supported the c on v i ct i o n even if sexual penetration had be en mer ely simulated. Thus, this thi rd fa c tor a lso su pp orts a

fi nd ing that th e tw o of

fe ns e s are no t the sa me fo r do ub le je op ard y pu rp os e s.

A c omp ari so n of the pu rp os e s of the re sp e c tiv e statut e s a lso su pp orts a fi nd ing of

no do ub le je op ard y vio la tio n. As po int e d o ut a bo ve , th e pu rp os e of

the se xua l e xploi ta tio n s ta tut e is t o p un ish those involved in child pornog raphy . The purpose of t he crime of statutory rape is to punish persons olde no ug h to kn ow be tte r fr om t akin g se xua l a dv a nta g e of tho se de e me d to o y ou ng to e ff e c tiv e ly

c on se nt. Th e tw o c ri me s a re a ime d at di ff

e re nt e vil s a ndsu pp ort se pa rate pu nis hme nts

.
Th e De fe nd a nt p oin ts o ut that th e e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d s e xua l e xploi ta tio n o f a m i no r s ta tut e provides that “[n] othing in this section shall be construed as limit ing pr osecution under § 39-13-502, for aggra vated r ape or § 39-13- 504, for a g g ravated sexual battery .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 12 1005(c) . The De fendant arg ues t h at t his lang uag e “r efle cts a leg islative intent to preclude prosec ution for statutory rape ” bec ause “ had the leg islature intended that persons convic ted of espec ially ag g ravated s exual exploi tation of a minor fa ce a dditional prosecution for statutory rape based upon the same fac tual circ umstances, it would have expressly included the offe nse of statutory rape in [ this sentence].” The Def endant r elies upon the rule of statutory constru ct i o n t h at the mention of one subjec t in a provision implies the exclusion of those subjects that ar e not mentioned. See State v. Ha

rkins, 811 S.W .2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991)

.
Whil e we acknow ledg e this rule of statutory const ru ct i o n , we conclude that it avails the Def e n d a n t n o b e n e f

it inth is c a s e

. Wh il e th e le g is latu r e may h a v e e n v is io n e d s o me a s p e c t o f the espec ially aggravated se x ual exploit ation of a minor statute to ha ve thre atene d simult aneous p ro s ec u t i o n fo r t h e r ap e o r s ex u al b at t er y o f a ch i l d u n d er t h e a ge o f t h i rt ee n , s u ch t h at t h e l an gu age at issue was de emed ne cessa ry , we se e no similar conc ern w ith a s i m u l t an eo us prosec ution for

s tatu to r y r ap e

. T h a t is
, w e s e e n o th in g in s e c ti o n 3 9

- 1 7

- 1 0 0 5 th a t c a n b e c o n s tr u e d a s limi ting prosec ution for statutory

rape ; theref

ore, a ref ere nce to the statutory

rape statute in the final sentenc e of sec tion 39-17-1005 was unne cessa ry . I t s ex cl usion is, accor dingly , immaterial and doe s not evince a leg islative intent that the crimes of statutory rape and especially

ag g ravated sexual

e xploi ta tio n o f a

min or be c on sid e re d th e “ sa me ” fo r d ou ble je op ard y pu rp os e s.

Th e De fe nd a nt’ s c la im that hi s c on vic tio ns on Co unts T hr e e a ndTw e lve vio la te his pr ote c tio ns a g a ins t do ub le je op ard y is w ith ou t me ri t.T he Stat e event ual l y dis m i ss ed ori gi nal co unt s o ne t hrough si x. 13

-14- B. Coun ts Six and Seven Th e De fe nd a nt a lso c on te nd s th a t hi s c on vic tio ns on Cou nts Six a ndSe ve n v iol a te do ub le jeopar dy beca use t hey constitute multipl e punis hments for a single offe nse. The De fendant arg ues that th e State ’s pr oo f su pp orts on ly on e of the se c on vic tio ns a nd he a sk s that we re ve rs e a nddis mis s one of the m, or that we me rg e the two c onvictions into a si n gl e o n e. T h e S tate ar g ues that the Def endant ha s waived this issue by failing to include it in his m o t i o n for ne w trial. Given the fu nd a me nta l c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht at is su e , w e c ho os e to a dd re ss the Defen dant’ s c on te nti on on its merits. See Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(b).

Counts S ix and Seven eac h ref er to an incident of statutory rape occur

ring on Carria g e Drive and consisting of the De fendant h av i n g s ex u al intercour se with T.M. while T.H. wa s prese nt and watching . T.H. testified that she sa w the De fendant and T.M. eng ag ing in inter course . She did not testify about witnessing more than one instance of this activity . T.M. also testified that T.H. watched wh ile sh e a ndthe De fe nd a nt h a d in te rc ou rs e , b ut w a s n ot s pe c if ic abo ut h ow ma ny

tim e s th is

occur red.

The De fendant’s arg ument is essentially one of suf

ficienc y . We ag ree with the Def endant that the State adduc ed suff icient proof to sustain a single c onviction of statutory rape based upon an incident of sexual intercour se betwe en the De fendant and T.M. that was w i t n es s ed b y T

. H. The

e vid e nc e do e s n ot s up po rt tw o c on vic tio ns of

statut ory ra pe ba se d upo n tw o d ist inc t su c h in c ide nts

. Acc ording ly , we rev er s e an d dismiss the Def endant’ s conviction on Count Si x . We affirm the conviction on Count Seven.

IV. Sever ance The De fendant next contends that the trial court erre d in refusing to sever the statutory rape offe nses naming T.H. as the vic tim: C ounts Eight and N ine.

Th e De fe nd a nt wa s orig ina lly ind ic te d in a n e ig hte e n c ou nt Tr ue B ill

. Th e fi rs t si x co un ts alleg ed six individual inst ance s of ra pe of a chil d involving anothe r victim. The indictment was

su bs e qu e ntl y

a me nd e d s uc h th a t th e se ini tia l si x co un ts w e re re mov e d ; th e re ma ini ng tw e lve c ou nts 13

wer e re numbere d One throug h Twelve . The fir st seven of the se re mai n i n g t we l v e counts e ach alleg ed an instanc e of statutory rape inv o lving T.M. Renumbe red Counts Eig ht and Nine e ach alleg ed an instanc e of statutory rape involving T.H. Renumbere d Counts Ten, Eleven a nd Twelve

eac h alleg ed an instanc e of e specia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor.

Af te r the ind ic tme nt wa s ame nd e d, the De fe nd a nt f ile d a mot ionpu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Criminal Procedur e 14, see king a sever ance

o f th ee s p e c ia

ll y ag g ravated exploit ation char g es fr om the re maining one s; of the remaining charg es, t he De fendant reque sted to sever six of the statutory rape char g es involving T.M. f rom one of the statutory

rape char g es involving T.H . The De fenda nt did not move to sever the two rema ining statutory rape char g es (Count Seven involving T.M. and Count Nine involving T.H.) based upon the State’s re prese ntation that those counts involvedT he D e fe n da n t c on t e n ds on a pp e a l t h a t bo t h of t h e s t a t u t or y r a pe c ou n t s i n v ol v i n g T

. H

. s h ou l d h ave been 14
severed and t hat “def ense counsel ’ s p ret ri al rel i ance o n t he Stat e’ s [] represent at i o n co ncerni ng t he evi d ence i n co unt ni ne

s houl d not pre cl ude h i m f r om ar gu i ng on appeal t hat bo t h count s i nv ol vi ng T

. H

. as t he named vi ct i m sh oul d hav e been

s ev er ed. ” As e v en t u al l y e l ec t ed af t er t h e cl os e of

t h e St at e’ s pr oof

a t t r i al
, Coun t N i n e di d n ot i n cl u de an y a l l eg at i on

o f a “ t h r ee s ome. ” T h e St at e does n ot ar g u e wa i v er i n i t s br i ef

. Acc or di n g l y , we wi l l addr es s on t h e mer i t s t he D ef endan t ’ s conc er ns about bot h Count s E i gh t an d N i ne.
-15- simult aneous c ontact with both women (a “thre esome” ). The De fendant later a mended his motion at t he hearing such t hat he soug ht to sever only one of the statutory

rape counts involving T.H. A fter an evide ntiary

hearing, the trial court de nied the De fendant’s motion. 14

We review a trial c ourt’s dec ision on a motio n t o sever under an abuse of

discretion standard. See Spicer v. S t at e, 1 2 S.W .3d 438, 442 (Tenn. 2000) . That is, we will not reve rse the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on un le ss i t app lie d a n in c or re c t le g a l st a nd ard , o r r e a c he d a c on c lus ionwh ic h is ag ainst logic or re asoning and ca used an injustice to the c omplaining pa rty . I d. at 443.

Our Rules of Criminal Proce dure pr ovide that, wher e two or mor e o ff en s es have bee n permissively

joined, “the de fendant shall have a rig ht to a sever ance of th e off enses unless the offe nses ar e part of a c ommon scheme or pla n and the e vidence of one w ould be admissible upon the trial of the othe rs.” Te nn. R. Crim. P . 14(b)( 1). As explained by our supre me court,

a t i t s m o s t b a s i c l e v e l
, a q u e s t i o n o f s e v e r a n c e u n d e r R u l e 1 4 ( b ) ( 1 ) i s r e a l l y a question of evidentiary

rele vance . When the other off enses in a common scheme or plan ar e not relevant t o a material issue at t rial, t hen a severance should be g rante d in orde r to e n s u r e a f

a ir tria l b y in s u lati n g th e d e f e n d a n t f r o m e v id e n c e of other unrelated offe nses. Otherw ise, admission of the other of fense s invites the trier of f act to i mpr op e rl y

inf e r that th e de fe nd a nt h a s a pr op e ns ity

to c omm it c ri me s.
State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tenn. 1999) ( citation omitted).
Turning to the trial court’ s analy sis of t his case , we first note t hat offe nses may be part of a

co m m o n s ch em e o r p l an i n an y o f t h re e c i rc u m s t an ce s : (1 ) t h e o ff en s es re v ea l a d i s t i n ct i v e d es i gn
or ar e so similar as to constitute “sig nature ” crimes; (2) t he offenses a re pa rt of a la rg er, c ontinuing plan or c onspiracy ; or (3) the offe nses ar e all part of the same c riminal transac tion. See Moore, id. at 240; State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 248 (Tenn. 1999) . I n this case, the trial court c oncluded that al l o f t h e o ff

en s es we re p ar to f al ar ger , co n t i n u i n g p l an , s t at i n g:

As th e C o u rt understa nds the State’s expected pr oof in this case, the defe ndant alleg edly

has a long -standing habit of pre y ing upon y oung r u n a way s whom he believes to be vulnera

ble to his sex ual adva nces. Mor eover , due to their a g e and imm a turity

the vic tim s h e se le c ts a

re e a sil y pe rs ua de d a nd

/or intimi date d w he n it comes to considering a ctivities - such as “ three somes” and v i d eotaped shower

a c tiv iti e s in vo lvi ng tw o p e op le of the sa me se x - in wh ic h a n o lde r, le ss- vu lne ra ble woman would be less likely to pa rticipate. Given this theory as we ll as the fac t thatO ur s upr eme cour t i ns t r uct s us t hat
, whe r e t he St at e mo ves pre- t r i al t o c ons ol i dat e offens es , “ becau s e t he t r i al 15

c o u rt’s d e c isio n o f wh e the r to c o n so lid a te o ff e n se s is d e te rm ine d fro m the e v id e n c e p re se n te d a t t h e he a rin g , ap p e llate

c o u rts sh o u ld us u a lly o n ly l o o k to tha t ev id e n c e , alo n g w ith the trial c o u rt’s fi n d ing s o f fa c t an d c o n c lus io n s o f l a w , t o det er mi n e wh et h er t h e t r i al c ou r t abu s ed i t s di s cr et i on by i mpr oper l y joi n i n g t h e of fen s es

. ” Spi ce r , 12 S. W

. 3d a t 445. Logi c di ct at es t hat
, on mot i ons t o s eve r , we cons i der onl y t he evi dence pre s en t ed a t tha t he ar i ng , as wel l as t he t r i al

c o u rt’s fi n d ing s o f fa c t an d c o n c lus io n s o f l a w

. -16- the incidents involving the se two victims are so intertwined, the Court finds that the d e f e n d a n t ’ s a c t i o n s ar e p ar to f a l ar g e r , c o n t i n u i n g p l a n o r c o n s p i r a c y.

Th e De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot s up po rt thi s c on c lus ionby

the tr ia l c ou rt

.
At the evidentiary hearing c onducted on the D efe ndant’s motion to sever, De tective Potter testified t h at h e investigated the alleg ations ag ainst the Def endant. During the course of the investigation, he lea

rned that T.M. had be en re siding with the De fendant during periods of time whe n sh e wa s o n “ ru na way

status .” Whil e sh e re sid e d w ith the De fe nd a nt, sh e e ng a g e d inse x withhim

. Det. Potter also intervie wed T.H . and lea rned that she had lived with the Def endant a nd T.M. for a short period of time during w hi ch s h e wa s also on runaw ay status. She eng ag ed in sex with t he Def endant during this time.

Det. Potter also lea

rned that, in 1997, the Defe ndant was living with a “y oung g irl” name d Brittany Wil son who was on r

unaway status. Poli ce r ecove red f rom t h e De fendant’s residenc e a videotape of

Ms. Wi lson eng ag ing in se x ual re lations. Det. Potter interviewe d the Def endant a bout his relationship with Ms. W ilson and the Def endant a dmitted having se x with her.

Det. Potter also intervie wed the D efe ndant’s ex-wife, Christa N ichols. Det. Potter testified that Ms. Nichols told him “that she me t the defe ndant when s h e wa s t h i rt ee n and beg an a se x ual relationship wit h him at that point.” They marrie d when Ms. Nichols wa s fiftee n.

Ba sed upon De t. Pott er’ s testimony
, the State established at the hea ring on the Def

endant’ s motion to s ever that the Def endant ha d taken in and beg un a sexual relationship with four under- 15 ag e fe males betwe en 1997 and January 2002 (whe n the investig ation leading to the instant charg es
wa s c on du c te d) . We dis a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt , ho we ve r, that thi s pr oo f wa s su ff ic ie nt to e sta

bli sh that th e ins ta nt o ff

e ns e s w e re pa

rt of a “ larg e r, c on tin uin g plan or c on sp ir a c y ” a ndthe re fo re pa rt s of a c ommon scheme or pla n as conte mplated by Rule 14(b)(1)

. Our supre me court instructs us that “[a] larg er pla n or conspi r acy in this contex t contemplates crimes c ommitt ed in furtheranc e of a plan that has a

rea dily distinguishable g oal, not simplya string of simil ar offe nses.” State v. Denton, 149 S.W .3d 1, 15 (Tenn. 2004). Such a p l an re q u i res “evide nce th at t h e defenda nt had a wor king pla n operating towa rds the future such as to make probable the crime with which the def endant is cha

rg ed.” I d. I n this case, the e vidence indicates that th e D e f e n d a n t h a s a p r o c li v ity f

o r s e xu a l p r e d ati o n u p o n u n d e r a g e g irls
, b u t th e proof doe s not ind ic a te a ny

pa rt ic ula r o ve ra ll g oa l or

plan th a t th e De fe nd a nt s e e ks to r e a lize by his re pr e he ns ibl e conduct, or

that makes proba

ble his commission of a dditional suc h offe nses. The pursuit of se x ual-17-

g ratif ic a tio n a lon e is n ot s uf

fi c ie nt t o s a tis fy

the “ c omm on sc he me or plan” re qu ir e me nt o f R ule 14 (b) (1)

. S ee id.; M oo re , 6 S.W. 3da t 24 0; S ta te v. Ha llo c k, 87 5 S. W.2 d 2 85 , 2 90 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1993). Under the authority of these case s, then, we must c onclude that the trial court a bused its discretion in finding that the f irst require ment for de ny ing a sever ance was satisfied.

We review a trial c ourt’s er roneous f ailure to g rant a

sever ance under a

harmless e rror stand ard . Se e De nto n, 14 9 S.W. 3d a t 15 ; T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 5 2( a ); Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( b) . T hat is
,
“ the de fe nd a nt mus t sh ow that th e e rr or pr ob ably

a ff e c te d th e jud g me nt b e fo re re ve rs a l is

app ro pria te .” Mo or e , 6 S.W. 3da t 24 2. Th e lin e be tw een harm les s a ndpr e jud ic ia l e rr or

in this context is in direct proportion to the ex tent by which the proof at trial e x cee ds the standar d require d to c on vic t. S e e De nto n at 15 . “ ‘T he mor e the pr oo f ex ceeds th at whic h is ne c e ssa ry to s up po rt

a fi nd ing of g uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, the les s like ly it b e c ome s th at a n e rr or

a ff ir ma tiv e ly aff ecte d the outcome of

the trial on its merits.’” State v. Toliver, 117 S.W .3d 216, 231 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W .3d 266, 274 (Tenn. 2000) ).

I n this case, the State’ s proof a s to all of the offe nses cha rg ed and tri ed t o gether was undisputed. All of the victim testimony was corr oborate d. The jury obviouslyfound the witnesse s
c re dib le . V ide ota

pe s a ndph oto g ra

ph s c aptu re d o n f

ilm so me of the De fen da nt’ s il le g a l c on du c t. I n short, the State’s proof was sig nificantly

more than suf

ficient to establish the c h ar ges it levied ag ainst the Def

endant. More over, w e conc lude that, even had the offe nses ag ainst T.H. bee n sever ed from those a g ainst T.M., proof of the offe nses ag ainst T.H. would have been a dmissibl e in the trial of the statutory

rape char g es i n v o l v i n g T.M. As noted above , in proving a ca se of statutory rape wher e the victim conse nted to the s exual penetr ation, the S tate mus t offe r corroboration because the victim is considered a n acc omplice. See Mc Knig ht, 900 S.W .2d at 47-48. The State re lied on T.H.’s statement that she witnesse d the interc ourse be tween T .M. and t he De fendant to corrobor ate T.M.’ s testimonyabout the sex ual contac t. T.H. was a ble to corr oborate T.M.’s testimony beca use they

we re ha vin g se x withthe De fe nd a nt s imultane ou sly . T hat is , th e De fe nd a nt andthe tw o v ic tim s
we re ha vin g g ro up sex

. Th e ci rc ums ta nc e s o f T .H .’ s p re se nc e du ri ng the statut ory ra pe s o f T .M

. would have be en re levant to her cre dibi l i t y an d t here fore admissible at trial. Acc ording ly , we
c on c lud e that th e De fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to dem on str a te that the joi nd e r of his c ri me s a g a ins t T .H . w ith those he c ommitt ed ag ainst T.M. prob ab ly aff ecte d to his detriment the jury ’s ver dicts as to the char g es ag ainst him invol ving T .M. There fore , we f in d t h at t h e t rial court’s err or in denying the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to se ve r wa s harmle ss as to the statut ory ra pe c ou nts na min g T. M. a s th e vic tim

. We further

find the er

ror ha rmless as to the exploitation charg es.

Wit h respe ct to the jury ’s verd i ct o n t he statutory rape char g es involving T.H ., we
a c kn ow le dg e that mu c h o f the pr oo f a dd uc e d at the De fe nd a nt’ s tria l w ou ld n ot h a ve be e n a dmi ssi ble at a se parate trial on the two counts char g ing the statutory rape of T.H. Acc ording ly
, the potential fo r h arm fu l e rr or

re su lti ng fr om the de nia l of a se ve ranc e is g re a te r a s to those t wo ve rd ic ts. Ho we ve r, we ha ve pr e vio us ly de te rm ine d th at th e De fe nd a nt i s e nti tle d to a ne w t ri a l onthe se ch ar ges beca

use of a flaw in the State’ s elec tion of offe nses. We need not de termine, ther efor e, wh e the r the De fe nd a nt is als o en tit le d to a new tr ia l on thos e tw o co un ts on the ba sis that th e y sh ou ld have be en seve red. We simply caution the trial court that, unless it is g iven proof dif fer ent from that-18-

pr e vio us ly

pr e se nte d to it i n opp os iti on to the De fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st f or a se ve ranc e , th e tw o c ou nts alleg ing the statutory

rape of T.H. should not be tried tog ether with the rema ining c ounts that we ar e
rema nding f

or re trial.

V. SENTE NCING The De fendant was convic ted of nine c ounts of statutory rape , a C lass E felony

. See Te nn. Cod e An n. § 3 9- 13 -5 06 (c ). Th e De fe nd a nt w a s a ls o con vic te d o f thr e e c ou nts of e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, a C lass B felony

. See id. § 39-17-1005( c). The trial c ourt sentenc ed the De fendant as a Rang e I , standard of fende r. The Ra ng e I

sentenc e for

Class E felonies is one to two y ear s. See id. § 40-35-112( a)( 5). The Ra ng e I sentenc e for

Class B fe lonies is eig ht to twelve y ear s. See id. § 40-35-112( a)( 2).

After a hea ring , the trial court sentence d the Def endant to two y ear s on eac h of the statutory rape convictions, and to eleve n y ear s on eac h of t he ex ploitation convictions. The court order ed the two y ear sentenc es in Counts One, Seven, Eig ht and the ele ven-y ear sentenc e in Count Ten to run

consec utively

to eac h other, but conc urre ntly with the rema i ning c ounts, for an e ffe ctive term of sevente en y ear s, to be serve d in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. The De fendant now contends that the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d inapp ly ing c e rt ain e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s; e rr e d infaili ng to a pp ly c e rt a in

m i t i g a t i n g f

a c t o r s ; a n d e rr e d i n o r d e r i n g a n y o f h i s s e n t e n c e s t o b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y. In i t i a l l y,
we note that our dispositi on of the Def endant’ s convictions on Counts F our, Five, S i x , E i gh t and Nine re duces the Def

endant’ s eff

ective se ntence to a term of f ifteen y ear s.

A. Standard of

Review Be fore a trial c ourt imposes a sentenc e upon a convicted criminal defe ndant, it must consider (a) the evidence adduced at the trial and the se ntencing hearing; ( b) the pre sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by

the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sec tions 40-35- 1 1 3 an d 4 0 -3 5-114; and (f ) any statement the de fendant wishes to make in the def endant’ s own behalf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o f

a c ili ta te app e llate re vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to pla c e on the reco rd it s
rea sons for imposing the specific sentenc e, including the identifica t i o n of the mitigating a nd enhanc ement fa ctors found, the specific fa ct s s upporting eac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, and the

me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mitig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s h a vebeen eval uate d a ndba la nc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).
Upon a challeng e to the sente nce imposed, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sentenc e with a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court a re c orre ct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . Howeve r, this presumption “ is conditioned upon the aff irmative sh ow ing in the re c or d that the tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview ref lects that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the c ourt imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r having g iven due c onsideration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princi p l es set out underAt t h e s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g , t h e D ef en dan t a dmi t t ed t h at h e h ad pr ev i ou s l y v i ol at ed t h e t er ms of h i s pr obat i on 16
wh i l e s er v i n g a pr i or s en t en ce

. H en ce , t h e D ef en dan t does n ot ch al l en g e u n der B l ak el y t h e t r i al c ou r t ’ s a ppl i ca t i on of the e n h a n c e m e n t fa c to r re g a rd ing the D e fen d a n t’s fa ilure to c o m p ly w ith a se n te n c e inv o lvin g re le a se in the c o m m u n ity.

-19- the sentenc ing la w, and that the trial court’s findings of fac t are adequately supported bythe re cord, then the pre sumption i s applicable
, an d we m aynot modify the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pref err ed a differ ent result. See State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the trial court if (1) the sentenc e complies with the purposes and princ iples of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, and ( 2) the trial c ourt’s finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. See State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . The burde n of showing that a sentence is im proper

is upon the appea ling pa

rty . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401 Sentencing Commi ssion Com ments; Arnett, 49 S.W.3d at 257.

B. En hancem ent F actor s The trial court applied two enhanc ement fac tors to e ach of the Def endant’ s sentence s: the De fe nd a nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be ha vio r i n a dd iti on to tho se
nece ssary to establish the appropriate ran ge, and the De fendant has a pre vious historyof unwillingness to comply

with the conditions of a sentence involving rele ase in the c ommunity . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) , (9). W i t h respe ct to the Def endant’ s three c onvictions for espec ially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, the t rial court also imposed two additional enhanc ement fa ctors: the off enses involved a victim a nd wer e committed to g ratify the Def endant’ s desire f or plea sure or

excitement, and the Def

endant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a spe cial skill in a manner that significantly fac ilitated the commission or fulfillment of the offe nse. See id. § 40-35- 114(8), ( 16).

The De fendant does not challeng e the tria l court’s a p plication of enhanceme nt fac tors (2) a nd (9). He does challeng e the trial court’s application of factors (8) and (16). We will first address the Def endant’ s contentions reg arding the United States Supreme Court’s r ece nt decision in Blake ly v. Washington, 124 S.Ct

. 2531 (2004). The De fendant arg ues that, under Blakely , the trial court erre d in apply ing the latter two e nhance ment fac tors to his sentences on the exploi tation offense s.

Th e B lake ly de c isi on ho lds that the Sixth Ame nd me nt to the fe de ra l Co ns tituti on pe rm its a defe ndant’s sente nce to be incre ased only i f t h e enhancement f actor s relied upon by

the judg e ar e based on f

acts re flec ted in the jury verdic t or admitted by the defe ndant. See id., 124 S.Ct. at 2537. 16 The only basis upon which enhance ment is otherwise permitted is the defendant’s pr evious criminal history : where the def

endant ha s prior convic tions, the t ri al court may enhanc e the de fenda nt’s sentenc e without an admission or jury finding . S ee Ap p rendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); B lakely

at 2536.
Subsequent to the Def

endant’ s appea l of this case, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court considere d the impact of B la

k e ly o nT e n n e s s ee’ s sentencing scheme and conc luded that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, pursuant to which the Defe ndant was se ntence d, does not violate a de fendant’s-20-

Si xthA me n d me n t rig hts. See S tate v

. E d w inG o me z, N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 2 0 9

- SC

- R1 1

- CD
, 2 0 0 5 WL 85 68 48 , at *2 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . A c c or din g ly , th e De fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt o n th is b a sis ha s n o me ri t.

We turn n ow to the De fe nd a nt’ s c la im that the tw o ch a lle ng e d e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s sh ou ld not have be en applied in a ny event. With respe ct t o the t rial court’s determination that the Def endant committed the exploi tation offense s to gr atify his desire for

pleasure or excitement, the De fendant sta t es t h at “t h e State fa iled to meet its burden of e stablishing that the of fense s in this case we re sexuallymotivated.” We beg to differ . The Def endant admitted at the sentenc ing hearing to taking photogr aphs of at least three m i n o r fe m al es while they wer e eng ag ing in se x ual ac ts. One of the videotap es m ade by

the Def endant a nd admitted at trial depic ts T.M. and T.H. nake d in a shower toge ther; during this “perf ormanc e,” T .M. lifts her bre asts and shake s them at the camera . The other videotape a dmitted at t rial depicts the Def endant ha ving inter course with T.M. and T.M. per forming fellatio upon the Defendant. The Defendant kept these ta pes at his home in re usable c ondition. They contain explicit and gr aphic se x ual ac tivitywith T.M., with whom the Defe ndant had a n ong oing sexual relationship. I n describing how he supported himself, the D efe ndant did not mention that he sold or rente d these materials. The tria l court wa s entitled to infer that the D efe ndant made and kept these photog raphic materia ls for his ow n use and pleasure

. The trial c ourt did not err in de termining that this enhance ment fac tor applied.

The De fendant also complains that the trial court erre d in finding that he abuse d a position of trus t in c omm itt ing the e xploi ta tio n of fe ns e s. He state s in his brie f, “ the Sta te faile d to sh ow bo th that he occupie d a position of trust w ith r espec t to the alleg ed victims, a nd that he ab u s ed s u ch position bycommission of the offe nses in this case.” Ag ain, we disa g ree

. Our supre me court instructs us that application of this fac tor

re qu ir e s a fi nd ing , fir st, that [ the ] de fe nd a nt oc c up ie d a po sit ionof

trus t, e ith e r p ub lic

or private . T he po sit ionof

pa re nt, ste p- pa

re nt, bab y si tt e r, te a c he r, c oa c h a re bu t a few obvious examples. The determination of t he ex istence of a posi tion of trust does not depend on the le ng th or forma lity of the relationship, but upon the nature of the relationship. Thus, t he court should look t o see wh et h er the offe nder f ormally or i n f o r m a l l y s t o o d i n a

r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e v i c t i mt h a tp r o m o t e d c o n f i d e n c e , r e l i ab i l i t y, or fa ith. I f the e vidence supports that finding , then the court must determine whethe r the position occupied wa s abused by the commission of the offe nse.

State v. Kissinge r, 922 S.W .2d 482, 488 (Tenn. 1996). We have little difficulty concluding that the Def endant occupied a position of t rust with respe ct t o T.M., who was a named victim in eac h of the three exploi tation counts. The Defendant behave d as T.M.’s husband and eventua lly became such. He pr ovided her

with a home and the other ne cessities of life . She obviouslyt ru s t ed h i m . The De fe nd a nt a

bu se d h is p os iti on of

trus t w ith T. M. by

us ing he r t o c re a te se xua lly e xplic it photogr aphic mate rials, in violation of our statutes prohibiting child pornog raphy . The trial c ourt committed no error

in apply ing this enhanceme nt fac tor.-21-

C. Mitigating F actor s The trial c ourt applied a s a mitigating fac tor to a ll of the Def endant’ s sentenc es the fa ct that his criminal conduct ne ither caused nor thre atene d serious bodi ly injury

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(1) . The trial c ourt specif ically stated in its sentencing order that it “considere d the fa cts and

c ir c ums ta nc e s su rr ou nd ing thi s c a se in ap plying e a c h of the se mit ig a tin g fa c tor s andthe app ro pria te sentenc e in these c ases. All re maining mitig ating fac tors wer e conside red and found not to apply .” The De fendant now arg ues t hat the trial c ourt should have a pplied the following additional mitigating fac tors: that substantial gr ounds exi st tending to ex cuse or justify his conduct; that he wa s suffe ring from a me ntal condition that significantly reduc ed his culpability for the offe nse; and that he suff ere d an “unstable childhood,” including “being the victim of sexual abuse.” See id. § 40-35- 113(3), ( 8), (13)

.

I n s up po rt

of his arg ume nt that he ha s su bs ta nti a l g ro un ds te nd ing to e x cus e or justif y his conduct, the D efe ndant states in his brief that his relationship with T.M. “met with approva l from her f amily , provided he r with more e motional stabili ty than she ha d in her troubled pa st, and resulted in m arria g e .” We a

re no t pe rs ua de d. A pa

re nt’ s mis g uid e d app ro va l of the c omm iss ionof a c ri me ag ainst his or h er ch i l d d o es n o t excuse or justify the offe nse. The pr oof at the tria l and the sentenc ing he aring does not support the De fendant’s claim that he pr ovided T.M. wit h “emotional sta bil ity .” I nd e e d, the no tio n th a t on e c a n “ c ur e ” the harm c a us e d b y statut ory ra pe a nde sp e c ia lly ag g ravated sexual exploi tation by subsequently marrying the victim is offe nsive on its face . The trial court did not err

in refusing to apply

this factor in mitigation.

Th e De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t hi s me nta l he a lth pr ob le ms, inc lud ing dia g n o s e s o f p os t- tr a umatic str e ss d iso rd e r, a nxie ty

dis or de r andbip ola

r d iso rd e r, sig nif

ic a ntl y redu cedhis c ulp abil ity fo r h is of fe ns e s. Ho we ve r, the De fe nd a nt h a s f a ile d to a dd uc e su ff

ic ie nt pr oo f as to the lin k b e tw e e n th e se problems and his re duced c ulpability . Mental hea lth problems do n ot automatically reduc e one’ s ob lig a tio ns to c on fo rm

on e ’s c on du c t to the la w. Th e tr ia l cou rt didno t e rr

in r e fu sin g to a

pp ly thi s fac tor in miti g ation.

We a re likewise unimpressed with the Def endant’ s arg uments reg arding h i s ch i ldhood. On e ’s ow n a

bu se do e s n ot l e sse n o ne ’s du ty no t to abu se oth e rs . T he tr ia l c ou rt did no t er

r i n ref using to a pply this factor in mitigation.
D. Length of

Sentences Our sente ncing statutes provide that the pr esumptive sent en ce for B and E fe lonies is the minimum in the rang e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c). W h er e there ar e enhanceme nt and mitigating fac tors, “the c ourt must start at the minimum sentenc e in the rang e, enhanc e the sentenc e with in th e r a n g e a s ap p r o p r iate f o r th e e n h a n c e me n t f

a c to r s , th e n r e d u c e th e s e n te n c e w ith inthe rang e as a

p p ro p ri ate f

or the mitigating f

actor s.” I d. § 40-35-210( e). In this case, the trial court’s balanc ing of

one mitigating a nd two enhanc ement fa ct o rs with respec t to the statutory rape
c on vic tio ns re su lte d in the imp os iti on of the ma ximum

se nte nc e of tw o y ears fo r e a c h o f tho se of fe ns e s. We a

re no t pe rs ua de d to mod if y the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g on the se c ri me s. With re sp e c t to the exploit ation offe nses, the trial court a pplied four e nhance ment fac tors and a sing le mitigating-22-

fac tor, resulting in se ntence s of one y ear less than the maxi mum. We see no err or in this result and,

a c c or din g ly , w ill no t mo dif y it.

E. Consecutive Sentence s The trial c ourt order ed three of the s tatutory rape sentenc es t o run conse cutively to eac h other and to the exploitation s entenc es, for an ef fec tive term of seve nteen y ear s (now re duced to f ifteen y ear s as the re sult of our reve rsal of se vera l convictions). The D efe ndant contends that the trial court

e rr e d i n o r d e r i n g a n y o f

h i s s e n t e n c e s t o b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y.

The Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 permits a trial c ourt to order sentenc es to run

consec utively

if it finds by

a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e any

of the following seven c riteria:

(1) The defe ndant i s a professional criminal who has knowing ly devoted [his or her] life to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a
c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti g a tio n p ri or to sentenc ing that the defe ndant’s criminal conduct ha s been c hara cterized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous offe nder whose behavior indicates little or no re g ard fo r hum an life , a ndno he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk

to human life is hig h; (5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consideration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re lationship between the defe ndant and victim or victim s , t h e t i me span of defe ndant’s undete cted se x ual ac tivity , the nature and scope of t h e s ex u al acts and the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; or (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b) . The trial c ourt did not indicate upon which of these c riteria it wa s relyin g i n i m p o s i ng partially consec utive sentenc es. Howe ver, the proof a dduced at the trial and sentenc ing hearing lends support to both criteria numbers (2) and (5). Acc ording ly , we will re view the pr op ri e ty

of the De fe nd a nt’ s c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s u nd e r tho se pr ov isi on s.
The pre sentenc e re port admitted into evidence at the De fendant’s sent en cing hearing indicates that the D efe ndant has p ri o r convic tions for eig ht misdemeanors a nd one fe lony , which

rec ord the Def

endant does not dispute. Additionally
, the Def endant admitted to us i n g illega l substances. H e further admitted to nume rous instances of statutory rape involving his f irst wife. He committed many instances of statutory rape with T.M. for which he was not char g ed. W e have no difficulty concluding that the Def

endant’ s rec ord of c riminal activity is ex tensive.-23-

We also conclude that consec utive sentenc ing is a ppropriate under criterion number (5) . The ag g ravating c ircumstance s prese nt in this case include t h e Defendant’s use of a stun gun to for ce T. M. to p e rf

orm or a l se x on h im i n f

ro nt o f h e r s ist e r; his pred ati on up on T. M. ’s frie nd s; andhis

encour ag ing T .M. to participate in g roup and homosex ual s ex with another minor. The De fenda nt

car ried on his re lationship with T.M. for approxi mately two y ear s. Whil e the De fendant arg ues that the sexual activity was not “ undetec ted” beca use T.M.’s mother was a war e of it, the a ctivity went undetec ted by

authorities. T.M.’s mother’ s failure to safeg uard he r daug hter fr om t h e De fenda nt do e s n ot a c c ru e to the De fe nd a nt’ s b e ne fi t in thi s c on te xt. T he natur e a ndsc op e of the se xua l a c ts

wa s ex t en s i v e, i n cl u d i n g i n t er co u rs e, fe l l at i o , s ex t o y s , h o mosex ual and g ro u p s ex

. W e a ck n o wl ed ge that the S tate pu t onno sp e c if ic pr oo f a s to the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to T .M

. Ho we ve r, the re c or d d e mon str a te s th a t th is y ou ng wo ma n e xpe ri e nc e d tw o mi sc arria g e s w hil e sti ll very y oung as a dire ct re sult of the Def endant’ s conduct. Any

failure by

the State to adduce additional proof on the damag e done to T.M. by the Def endant does not ove rcome the streng th of the re maining pr oof nec essary for the a pplication of this criterion. The trial court committed no err or in finding that consec utive sentenc es ar e prope r.
Finally , we look to the overa ll leng th of the Def endant’ s eff

ective se ntence in relation to the seriousness of the offe nses committed. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102( 1) (the de fe ndant’s eff ective se ntence must be “justly deserved in re lation to the s eriousness of the offense[s] ”) a nd 40- 35-103(2) (the de fendant’s eff ective se ntence “should be no g reater than that deserve d for the offe nse[s] committed”). B ecau s e we have r ever sed seve ral of the Def endant’ s convictions, the Def endant’ s eff

ective se ntence has bee n reduc ed to fifteen y ear s. Given the De fendant’s long history of criminal conduct and the Defenda nt’s utter lac k of re morse for his behavior, whic h is indicative of a r educe d potential for reha bilitation, we are confide nt that the Def endant’ s eff

ective se ntence of fiftee n y ear s is appropriate and justified under all of t he circumstance s of t his case

. The De fendant i s n o ten t i t l ed t o re l i ef

o n t h e i s s u es h e r ai s es wi t h re gar d t o h i s s en t en ci n g.

CO NC LU SION We reve rse and rema nd for retrial the Defe ndant’s cha rg es of statutory

rape ag ainst T.M. set forth in Counts Four and Five. We reve rse a nd dismiss the conviction of statutory rape arising under Count S ix

. We r ever se and rema nd for retria l the Def endant’ s char g es of statutory rape ag ainst T.H. set forth in Counts Eight and N ine. The Defe ndant’s ef fec tive sentenc e is there by reduc ed to fiftee n y ear s. I n all other re spects, we aff irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE