alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Paul J. van der Wansem, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of BTU International, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and
other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not
material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: May 10, 2007



/s/ Paul J. van der WansemPaul J. van der WansemPresident, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors (principal executive officer)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

*Notice is hereby given*                     that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) as Receiver for Unity National Bank, Cartersville, Georgia (“the Receiver”) intends to terminate its receivership for said institution. The FDIC was appointed receiver of Unity National Bank on March 26, 2010. The liquidation of the receivership assets has been completed. To the extent permitted by available funds and in accordance with law, the Receiver will be making a final dividend payment to proven creditors.                

Based upon the foregoing, the Receiver has determined that the continued existence of the receivership will serve no useful purpose. Consequently, notice is given that the receivership shall be terminated, to be effective no sooner than thirty days after the date of this Notice. If any person wishes to comment concerning the termination of the receivership, such comment must be made in writing and sent within thirty days of the date of this Notice to: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, Attention: Receivership Oversight Department 34, 1601 Bryan Street, Dallas, TX 75201.

No comments concerning the termination of this receivership will be considered which are not sent within this time frame.

Dated: December 17, 2014.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Robert E. Feldman,

Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2014-29829 Filed 12-19-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
11794.

#### Morgan *v.*Rodgers.

Stephens, J.

In a suit in trover to recover an automobile and certain parts which the plaintiff had delivered to the defendant for the purpose of being sold for the plaintiff by the defendant, where the evidence authorized the inference that a sale of the automobile, which the defendant had made under such authority, had been rescinded by the defendant and the purchaser, with the consent of the plaintiff, and that *695the automobile had been returned by the purchaser and placed in the defendant’s possession, a verdict finding title in the plaintiff was authorized.

Decided April 14, 1921.

Trover; from Muscogee superior court — Judge Howard. July 10, 1920.

*T. T. Miller,*for plaintiff in error.

*McGutchen & Bowden,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Sill, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND
IS QUALIFIED BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998
<CASH>                                       3,607,221
<SECURITIES>                                   499,073
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,820
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,286,755
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,286,755
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,566,956
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,286,758
<SALES>                                      6,491,575
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,860,369
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  362,373
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,497,996
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          6,497,996
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 6,497,996
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .50
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .50
        

</TABLE>
# \tlJ ------------------------------------------------------------------------

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHRISTOPHER WORTHY, Petitioner, 

# FILED FEB 26 2010 Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts

v. Civil Action No. 

# 10 0315 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court onpetitioner's application to proceed informa pauperis andpro sepetition for a writ ofhabeas corpus. Petitioner, who currently is detained at the Peumansend Creek Regional Jail in Bowling Green, Virginia, appears to challenge his conviction in the Superior Court ofthe District of Columbia. See Compl. at 2. Petitionerhas submitted his petition using a preprinted form, and in the section devoted to the grounds on which he claims that he is being held unlawfully, he states the following:

Id. at 5. Section to the Constitution, Article 1, Bill ofRights, Section 106, Right for SpeedyTrial, witnesses, etc."

A challenge to the Superior Court conviction must be brought bymotion in that court under D.C. Code § 23-110. In relevant part D.C. Code § 23-110 provides: [An] application for a writ ofhabeas corpus in behalfofa prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by
... any Federal.
.. court ifit appears ... that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appearsthattheremedybymotionis inadequate orineffectiveto 1test the legality ofhis detention. D.C. Code § 23-11O(g). "Section 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effectivebecause it is coextensive with habeas corpus." 

### Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992). Itis settled that "aDistrict ofColumbiaprisonerhas no recourse to a federaljudicial forum unless the local remedy is 'inadequate or ineffective to test the legality ofhis detention.'" 

### Byrdv. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34,36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted); 

### Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), 

### cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986). Furthermore, habeas actions are subject tojurisdictional and statutory limitations. 

### See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court o/Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). The properrespondent in a habeas corpus action is the petitioner's warden. 

### Rums/eldv. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,434-35 

### (2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing 

### Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804,810 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Thus, "adistrict court maynot entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custodyunless the respondent custodian is within its territorialjurisdiction." 

### Stokes v. United States Parole Comm 'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Insofar as petitioner is challenging his current custody on an alternative basis, the petition shouldbe filed in the district where he is detained. The Court will dismiss the petition without prejUdice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this date.

DATE:

# ;;'/'!l.oi6

2
12217.

#### Ammons *v.*The State.

Broyles, C. J.

1. There being some evidence that ■would have authorized the jury to find that a conspiracy existed between the defendant and his half-brother to take the life of the deceased, and that both of them shot *653at the deceased about the same time, and that one of them killed him, it was not error for the court to refuse to charge: “ In order to convict the defendant of the offense of murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is necessary that you believe beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant now on trial fired the shot that took away the life of the deceased; and unless the evidence so convinces you, you would not be authorized to convict the defendant either of murder or voluntary manslaughter. In other words, unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the bullet from the defendant’s pistol that killed the deceased, you ■would not be authorized to find the defendant guilty of either murder or manslaughter, and in this view you would not be required to grade this homicide.”

Decided April 13, 1921.

Indictment for murder — conviction of manslaughter; from Rockdale superior court — Judge Hutcheson. January 24,1921.

*J. H.*McCalla, *C. B.*Vaughan, *King &*Johnson, for plaintiff in error. *A. M.*Brand, solicitor-general, contra.

2. Under repeated rulings of the Supreme Court and of this court, an erroneous charge upon the subject of murder does not require a new trial in a case where the verdict was for manslaughter. Under this ruling, ground 5 of the motion for a new trial is without merit.

3. Under the evidence it was not error for the court to submit to the jury the question whether or not a conspiracy had been shown and to accompany the submission of this question with appropriate instructions thereon.

4. The verdict was amply authorized by the evidence, and it was not error to overrule the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luhe and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*
Exhibit 31.1
**302 CERTIFICATION**
I, Herman M. Frietsch, certify that:
(1)  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of TeraForce Technology Corporation; (2)  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; (3)  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; (4)  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;  (b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and
(5)  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: May 16, 2005          /s/ HERMAN M. FRIETSCH      Herman M. Frietsch      Chief Executive Officer
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The undersigned,Michael P. McGee, the Chief Financial Officer of International RectifierCorporation (the “Company”), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, hereby certifiesthat, to his knowledge:

(i)                                     the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of theCompany for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2006 (the “Report) fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii)                                  the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company as of, and for the periods presented in theReport.

 
| Dated: February 9, 2007 |
|-------------------------|
|                    |
|                    |
|                    | /s/ Michael P. McGee |
|                    | Michael P. McGee |
|                    | Executive Vice President and |
|                    | Chief Financial Officer |
|                    | (Principal Financial and Accounting |
|                    | Officer) |

 

 

A signed original of the written statement required bySection 906 has been provided to International Rectifier Corporation and willbe furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.

1

----
#### Cassius M. Hazen v. Heinrich Lerche.

*Appointment of school teacher.*

.A school teacher cannot he lawfully employed by two members of the district board without the concurrence of the third, and without convening any meeting of the board.

Mandamus.

Submitted Jan. 24.

Denied Jan. 25.

*JBlaoh <& Owen*for tbe writ.

*Edson & West*against.

Per Curiam.

The relator claims to be a school teacher regularly employed in a school district in one of the townships of Tuscola county. The defendant is assessor of the district. The relator holds an order for one month’s salary, which the respondent refuses to pay, and a writ is asked to compel payment. Por cause against the writ the fact is shown that the relator was hired by two members of the school board, without calling any meeting of the board, and without consultation with the respondent or his knowledge.

*Held,*that the cause shown was conclusive; the statute expressly requiring the convening of, the board for the transaction of their official business. Laws 1881, p. 171, § 6; p. 173, § 13.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT THOMAS, JR.,

AIS #115280

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 15-68-WS-M

:

CORIZON, INC.,

Defendant.

:

:

:

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that JUDGMENT on all claims 

be entered in favor of Defendant Corizon, Inc., and against 

Plaintiff Roosevelt Thomas, Jr. 

DONE this 21st day of September, 2015.

 s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00068-WS-M Document 28 Filed 09/21/15 Page 1 of 1
EX-4.1



 Exhibit 4.1 

STATE OF DELAWARE 
  

	 CERTIFICATE NO.          
	 NUMBER OF SHARES                 



 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 

INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Authorized                  Shares of 

6.10% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series AA, Par Value $1.00 Per Share 

This certifies that Computershare Inc, as Depositary, is the owner of
                 shares of 6.10% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series AA, par value $1.00 per share, of JPMorgan Chase & Co., a Delaware corporation (the
“Corporation”), fully paid and non-assessable, transferable only upon the books of the Corporation, in person or by attorney, upon surrender of this Certificate properly endorsed. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Certificate to be signed by its duly authorized officers this
         day of                     ,         . 

 

					
	   
				   


 The Corporation will furnish, without charge to each stockholder who so requests, the powers, designations, preferences and
relative, participating, optional or other special rights of each class of stock or series thereof and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions of such preferences and/or rights. 







 FOR VALUE RECEIVED,
                                 does hereby sell, assign and transfer unto
                                
(                ) Shares represented by within Certificate, and does hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint
                                 as its attorney to transfer such Shares on the
books and records of the Corporation with full power of substitution in the premises. 
 Dated:
                    , 20    . 
  

					
	In presence of:				Stockholder:
			
	   
				   

	Name:				Name:
#### Frank Taylor *v.*Commonwealth.

Criminal Law — Sufficiency of Indictment — Confessions.

In charging assault and battery with intent to kill, an indictment is not defective for failing to state that the person assaulted did not die.

Confessions.

Voluntary confessions should be allowed to go to the jury; to exclude confessions from being admitted as evidence it should be made to appear to the court that the motive of hope or fear must have been directly applied by a third person to induce them, and must have been sufficient in the judgment of the court to overcome the mind of the prisoner, to render the confession unworthy of credit.

*402APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT.

March 25, 1875.

*Major & Jett, for appellant.*

*John W. Rodman, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

The first reason urged by the learned attorneys for the appellant for a reversal of the judgment, is for art alleged insufficiency of the indictment in omitting to state therein that Cook, the person wounded, did not die from the wounds then and there inflicted.

The same question was before this court in *Burns v. Commonwealth,*3 Met. 13;. and after stating the general requisites of an indictment as prescribed by the Criminal Code, the court decided that an indictment for wilfully and maliciously shooting and wounding another with an intention to kill, the words “so that he did not die thereby” being omitted, was sufficient either upon a demurrer, or on a motion in arrest of judgment.

It is next urged that the court erred in admitting evidence of the confessions of appellant to go to the jury. The doctrine on that subject seems to he that in order to exclude confessions, the motive of hope or fear must be directly applied by a third person to induce them, and must be, in the judgment of the court, sufficient, so far as to overcome the mind of the prisoner, to render the confession unworthy of credit. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence 220.

In this case the confessions made by appellant to the two witnesses introduced to prove them, were made voluntarily; they w;ere not asked for by Francis, the police officer; and to Dr. Hall he made them without any threats, persuasions or promises on his part. The doctor proves that he asked appellant if he did the cutting, and he replied he did it to keep from being shot, or after he had been shot at. The witness could not state which form of expression he used. Under the rule the evidence was admissible.

If there was any error in the instructions given to the jury, it is not assigned as a ground for a new trial, and it is, therefore, excluded from the consideration of this court, as was held in *Hopkins v. Commonwealth,*3 Bush 480, and other cases.

Wherefore the judgment must be *affirmed.*