### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: JAMES E. DETIEGE and AMY A. DETIEGE , Debtors. BAP No. ID

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Bk. No. 4:19

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Adv. No. 4:19

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MEMORANDUM ∗ JAMES E. DETIEGE ; AMY A. DETIEGE , Appellant s , v. MARIA JOSEFA VILMA ROSAUER , Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho Joseph M. Meier , Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: GAN , BRAND , and SPRAKER , Bankruptcy Judges

. INTRODUCTION Chapter 7 1 debtors, James and Amy Detiege (“Debtors”) appeal the bankruptcy court’s judgment in favor of Mr. Detiege’s mother, appellee Maria Josefa Vilma Rosauer. The bankruptcy court determined that Mrs.

∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024

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1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and sec tion references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 1 1 U.S.C. §§ 101

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# FILED

MAR 22 2022
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT2 Rosauer contributed $92,000 for the purchase of a home (the “Property”) to
be co

- owned by the parties , and it imposed a constructive trust and lien on the Property in her favor.
Debtors argue that the court erred by imposing the constructive trust because Mrs. Rosauer signed a letter stat ing that no repayment was expected or implied (the “Gift Letter”)

. We agree with the bankruptcy
court that the Gift L etter was evidence of donative intent, but it was not dispositi ve of the issue. The court’s factual determination that the funds
were not intended as a gift is supported by the record and is not clearly

erroneous

. A c cordingly, we AFFIRM.
FACTS
A. Prepetition Events The relevant facts are largely undisputed

. Prior to 2016, Mrs. Rosauer
lived in Iowa with her husband

. After Mr. Rosauer’s health began deteriorating , Debtors visited the Rosauers and discussed the possibility that they sell their home in Iowa and mov e to Idaho to live with Debtors.
The Rosauers mo ved to Idaho i n September 2016, but Mr. Rosauer unfortunately died two months later

. Debtors continued discussions with Mrs. Rosauer about buying a home together and shared their plan with multiple family members. They were informed by their lender that Mr s. Rosauer could not qualify for a mortgage on her own, but Debtors could potentially qualify if their credit improved. Mrs. Rosauer then advanced $12,000 from the sale of her home3 in Iowa to improve Debtors creditworthiness by pay ing some of their existing debt. Debtors eventually qualified for a mortgage , and the parties
located a suitable home to purchase. Mrs. Rosauer contributed an additional $80,000 towards the purchase
of the Property a nd signed the Gift Letter which was required by the mortgage lender. Mrs. Rosauer expressed concern about signing the Gift Letter but was assured by her son that he would not “screw her over” and
she would have a home to live in for the rest of her life. M r. Detiege told Mrs. Rosauer that, although t itle to the P roperty was placed only in
Debtors’ names , she w ould be added to the title after two years. Soon after purchasing the Property , the relationship between the parties began to suffer. The parties disa gree about what caused the rift, but

u ltimately, Debtors prevented Mrs. Rosauer from entering the Property or accessing her personal belongings , which they ev entually sold

. Mrs.
Rosauer filed suit in state court, and Debtors filed a chapter 7 petition.
B. The Bankruptcy Case And Adversary Proceeding In May 2019, Mrs. Rosauer filed an adversary complaint . She alleged
that Debtors obtained the P roperty through actual fraud, misrepresentations, and concealments , and she alleged a nondischargeable
debt of $92,000 under § 523(a)(2)(A). She al ternatively sought a constructive trust and asserted that, despite the parties’ agreement to purchase the
P roperty as co

- owners, Debtors wrongfully took the funds and deprived
her o f any interest in the Property

.4 At trial, several family members testified that Debtors and Mrs. Rosauer had discussed their agreement to purchase the Property together
and for Mrs. Rosauer to live there

. Debtors each testified that Mrs. Rosauer provided the funds as a gift so they could purchase the Property and Mrs.
Rosauer w ould have a place to stay when she visited , but they did not agree she would be a co

- owner of the Property or that she could stay there indefinitely. Debtors testified that they asked Mrs. Rosauer to leave the
P roperty because of her behavior and waited two years for her to remove her personal property before selling i t

. After post

- trial briefing, t he bankruptcy court issu ed its
memorandum decision

. The court concluded that the evidence did not
establish a nondischargeabl e debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) , but it rejected Debtors’ contention that the Gift Letter conclusively determined the funds were a gift. The bankruptcy court determined that Mrs. Rosauer ’s testimony

— that the parties agreed to be equal co

- owners

— was corroborated by multiple independent witnesses. It found Debtors’ testimony to be less credible and belied by the fact that Mrs. Rosauer immediately moved into the Property with all her personal belongings and began purchasing items for the home and paying for utilities.
The court held that permitting Debtors to retain the benefit of Mrs. Rosauer’s payments would constitute unjust enrichment, and it imposed a5 constructive trust on the P roperty in the amount of $92,0 00

. The court entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Rosauer, and Debtors timely appealed. JURISDICTION The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)( O ). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUE Did the bankruptcy court e rr by imposing a constructive trust on the Property in favor of Mrs. Rosauer ?
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a bankruptcy court’s decision to impose a constructive
trust for abuse of discretion. Goldberg v. Bank of Alex Brown (In re Goldberg) , 168 B.R. 382, 384 (9th Cir. BAP 1994). A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard or its factual findings are illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver, Inc. , 653 F.3d 8 20, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION The imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy used to prevent injustice. In re Goldberg , 168 B.R. at 384; Custer v. Dobbs (In re Dobbs) , 115 B.R. 258, 269 (Bankr . Idaho 1990). The propriety of a
constructive trust must be established under state law and be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Torres v. Eastlick (In re N. Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd.) , 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Dobbs , 115 B.R. at 269.6 A constructive trust may be imposed under Idaho law where “one who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey the property to another in order to prevent unjust enrichment.” Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collecti ons, Inc. , 336 P.3d 802, 808 (Idaho 2014). Unjust enrichment consists of three elements: “(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circ umstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof.” Vanderford
Co. v. Knudson , 165 P.3d 361, 272 (Idaho 2007).
A. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err By Considering All Evidence Of Donative Intent.
Debtors ’ sole argument on appeal is that the bankruptcy court erred by imposing the constructive trust because , under Idaho law, the Gift Letter conclusively established Mrs. Rosauer’s intent to provide the funds

as a gift. They argue that consideration of other evidence of Mrs. Rosauer’s
intent was barred by the parol evidence rule , rely ing on an unpublished Idaho Court of Appeals case, Wilson v. Wilson , 2020 WL 1487684 (Idaho Ct. App., Mar. 23, 2020), for th is proposition

. Mrs. Rosauer contends that Debtors failed to object to the admission
of parol evidence and , thus , waived the argument on appeal. Debtors did not make evidentiary objections, but they preserved the issue by arguing in their post

- trial brief that Mrs. Rosauer should not be permitted to7 contradict the Gift Letter. M ore importantly, the court did not err by considering other evidence.
Under Idaho l aw, t he parol evidence rule is a rule of contract
construction which provides: [W]hen a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or unders tandings which relate to the same subject matter is not admissible to vary , contradict , or enlarge the terms of the written contract.
Simons v. Simons , 11 P.3d 20, 24 (Idaho 2000). The rule applies only when the “integrated character of the writing is established.” Valley Bank v.
Christensen , 808 P.2d 415, 417 (Idaho 1991)

. The mere existence of the document does not establish integration; it must be de termined from the surrounding circumstances. Nysingh v. Warren , 488 P.2d 355, 356 (Idaho 1971)

. The parol evidence rule is in applicable here because t he Gift Letter is

not a written contract between Debtors and Mrs. Rosauer , and there is no
evidence in the record that they intended the Gift Letter to integrate their previous discussions about purchasing a home together. The Gift Letter is a form document that contains no terms and, at best, evidences an agreement
between Deb tors and their lender, not one between Debtors and Mrs.
Rosauer.
Wilson v. Wilson is also inapposite. That case was an appeal from a divorce proceeding in which the parties disputed the characterization of a8 home purchased before the marriage as either se parate or community property . 2020 WL 1487684, at *1. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision not to impose an equitable lien because the appellant offered no authority for a premarital unjust enrichment claim in a divorce proceeding. Id. at *2. The court further noted that even if the trial court
could decide the issue, appellant would not be able to rely on parol evidence because he signed, not only a “gift letter,” but a quitclaim deed conveying any interest to his spouse as her sole an d separate property. Id.
at *1

- 3 ; see also Hall v. Hall , 777 P.2d 255, 256 (Idaho 1989) ( “ W here the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of the parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not
admissible to sh ow intent.” ).
H ere, there wa s no deed or integrated contract between Mrs. Rosauer
and Debtors and t he bankruptcy court was not precluded from considering other evidence about the nature of the funds provide d by Mrs. Rosauer

. B. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Clearly Err By Determining The Funds Were Not A Gift. Under Idaho law, a gift is “a voluntary transfer of property by one to another without consideration or compensation therefor.” Banner Life Ins. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irre vocable Tr. , 206 P.3d 481, 490 (Idaho 2009) (quoting Stanger v. Stanger , 571 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Idaho 1977)). To effectuate a gift, “a donor must deliver property to a9 done e

. . . with a manifested intent to make a gift of the property.” Id. (citations omitt ed). The bankruptcy court determined that the funds were not a gift for two reasons. First, whether Mrs. Rosauer provided the funds in exchange for an ownership stake, as she testified, or to have a place to stay when visiting the grandchildren, as Mr. Det iege testified, she did so for
consideration. See , e.g., Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass’n , 272 P.3d 491, 498 (Idaho 2012) (explaining what constitutes consideration under Idaho law) . Second, the court held that the evidence did not support a finding o f
donative intent.
Under Idaho law, the question of donative intent is one of fact. Wilson

v. Mocabee , 467 P.3d 423, 432 (Idaho 2020). Donative intent may be prove d “by direct evidence, including statements of donative intent, or inferences drawn from the surrounding circumstances

. . . ” Banner Life Ins. , 206 P.3d at 490; see also Mocabee , 467 P.3d at 432 (“[D]onative intent is ascertained from
inferences drawn when examining all surrounding circumstances. The
facts

. . . are not to be viewed in a vacuum; rather, all evidence of donative intent must be reviewed as contained in the entire record.”) (internal citation omitted).
T he bankruptcy court properly considered all evidence of donative
intent , including corroborating testimony from other witnesses, the surrounding circumstances , and witness credibility. It determined that Mrs. Rosauer provided the funds , not as a gift, but as part of an agreement10 to be co

- owner of the Property. The court’s factual findings are not illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)

. CONCLUSION
B ecause the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Mrs.
Rosauer’s transfers w ere not gift s , Debtors have not demonstrated an abuse
of discretion. W e AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s judgment

.