2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-14-2004 

# Hun g v . E va nk o P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-4475

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" Hun g v . E va nko " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 230. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/230NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF A PPE AL FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-4475 KAM WAN HUNG; HAU WAN NG v. PA UL J. EVA NK O, IN DIV IDU AL LY AN D IN HIS OFFICI AL CAPACITY; DERRICK WATFORD, INDI VIDUALLY AND IN H IS OFFI CIA L CAPAC IT Y; T YRONE BRAD FORD, INDIVI DUALLY AN D IN HIS OFFI CIAL CAPACITY

Kam W an Hung,

Appellant

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Civi l No. 01-cv- 03580) District Judge: H on. W illiam H. Y ohn, Jr.

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

October 8, 2004 BE FO RE : SL OV ITE R, V AN AN TW ER PE N a nd C OW EN , Circuit Judges (Fil ed: October

14, 2004)

OPI NION

CO W EN , Circuit

Judge
.2

Kam W an Hung (“Hung”) appeals f rom a jury

verdict in favor of St ate Poli ce Trooper Derri ck Watford (“Watfor d”), fi nding that Watford did not

use excess ive forc e during H ung’s arrest on Aug ust 2, 1999 . We find no error in the D istrict Court’s in stru ct io ns to the j ur y , a nd we wil l a ffi rm. As w e w rite only fo r the pa rties, we will brie fly expla in the re levan t facts und erlying this a ction. O n A ugu st 2, 19 99, H ung wa s invo lved in a min or traff ic accident . Watford was the firs t poli ce officer to arrive on thescene, and began inv estig ating wh at ha d ha ppe ned and colle cting info rma tion fro m th e dr iver s inv olv ed. During thi s ti me, Hung became upset and bel ligerent, disre garding s everal orders f rom W atfo rd. W hen Hu ng d id n ot ca lm d ow n, W atfo rd a rrest ed h er fo r diso rde rly con duc t. Hung contends that , al though the arrest was lawful, Watford used excess ive forc e when he arrested her. Specifi cally , she alleges t hat, alt hough she m ade no attempt to resist

arre st or f lee, W atfo rd g rab bed her by the nec k an d th rew her for cef ully to th e gr oun d. Wa tford, o n the o ther ha nd, co ntend s that H ung wa s out o f con trol, and that he mere ly used the moves he ha d learne d at the police academy to take Hung to the ground and place her in h andc uffs . The jury returne d a ve rdict in f avor of W atford , specif ically findin g that h e did n ot use exce ssive f orce d uring the arre st. Hung now argues that t he District Court

improperl y charged the j ury on excessi ve force . The Distric t Cou rt instruc ted the jury that:

You must determi ne the degr ee of force t hat a re asonable and prudent pol ice offi cer would have appl ied in e ffecti ng the arrest under the3

circumst ances shown by the evi dence recei ved in thecase. I n determi ning whether defendant

trooper used excess ive forc e, y ou may consi der the following f

actors : the e xtent of

the inj ury suffered, the need for the applic ation of

force, the rel ations hip between the need and the amount of force used, the threat re asonablypercei ved by t he responsible offi cial s, and any eff orts made to temper the severi ty of a forcefulresponse. Injuries wh ich res ult from , for ex amp le, an o ffice r’s use of fo rce to overcome resi stance to arres t do not i nvolve constitutionall y pr otect ed interests. An officer’s use of excess ive forc e does not gi ve consti tuti onal protect ion to t he plai ntiff

against injuries t

hat would have occur

red absent the exces sive for ce. (Ap pellee ’s Ap p. at 73 .) The Distric t Cou rt then e xplain ed the facto rs that the jury could consider in dete rmining whethe r the force was excessi ve, expl ained that the

reaso nable ness o f the f orce s hou ld be d eterm ined b ased on th e pers pectiv e of a reaso nable officer at the scene and not

through hi ndsight , and expl ained that the use of force must be obj ectiv ely rea son able . ( Id. at 74-75.) The Distric t Cou rt next g ave th e jury an a ddition al cha rge, ex plainin g: If, how ever, you find th at the d efen dant tro oper had a reaso nable belie f that

his actions di d not viol ate the consti tuti onal ri ghts of the plaintiff , then you cann ot find defe ndan t police offic er liable, e ven if plaint iff’s right s were, i n fact, violated as a res ult of t he defendant pol ice officer ’s obje ctive ly reasonabl e acti on. A mistake n but reas onable bel ief as to the us e of force j usti fied i n a parti cular s ituat ion as t he trooper

percei ved it do es n ot v iolat e the fou rth a me ndm ent. ( Id. at 75. ) Hung objects to thi s inst ructi on, argui ng that i t improperly made the

reas ona blen ess te st into a su bjec tive t est, ra ther than an o bjec tive t est. Becau se Hu ng argu es that the D istrict Court applied the w rong stand ard in its jury instr uctio ns, o ur re view is ple nar y. See Mosley v. Wilson , 102 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1996)4

(cit ations omitt ed). We must r everse “[i ]f, l ooking at t he charge as a whole, the inst ructi ons were capabl e of confusing and thereby misleadi ng the jur

y. ” Id. (internal quotations an d citations om itted). “The use of force i s contr ary to the Fourth Amendment if it is exces sive under objective st andards of r easonable ness. ” Sau cier v. K atz , 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). The reasonabl eness of the officer ’s bel ief as to the appropriate level of force i s to be j udged fro m th e pe rspe ctive of a reas ona ble o ffic er o n th e sc ene , not fro m h ind sigh t. Id. at 205; Graham v. Connor , 49 0 U .S . 38 6, 3 96 (1 98 9) . “I f a n o ff ice r re as on ab ly, b ut m ist ak en ly, belie ved that

a suspect

was likel y t o fight ba ck, for i nstance, the offi cer would be j usti fied in usi ng more force than in fact was needed.” Saucier , 533 U.S . at 20 5. Hung argues that

the deci sion i n Mosley v. Wilson req uire s rev ersa l in th is ca se. We disagree. The plaintiff i n Mosley brought two claims agai nst a pol ice offi cer aft er an

arre st: an exc essiv e fo rce c laim and a m alicio us p rose cutio n cla im. Id. at 88. The Distri ct Court told the jurythat, i n order for the police to viol ate a person’s constit utional ri ghts,

som ethin g m ore than neg ligen ce w as n eed ed. Id. The Distri ct Court t hen inst ructed t he jury tha t it ha d to find that t he o ffic er h ad a cted wit h de liber ate o r rec kles s ind iffe ren ce. Id. In other

words, the District Court inst ructed t he jurythat i t had to de terminethe officer’s sub jective intent in determin ing wh ether a violation of the plaintiff’s consti tuti onal ri ghts had occur red. I t was unclear from the i nstruc tions whether the Distri ct Court i ntended for that i nstruc tion to applyto both cl aims or onl y t o the mali cious1 Both officer s and the ot her dri ver invol ved in theaccident are African-American. 5 prosecution claim. As the test for whether a particul ar use of force is exc essiveis an objective one, we found that the juryinst ructi ons were capabl e of misle ading the juryand

rem and ed th e ca se f or a new trial. Id. at 95
. In thi s case, the Dist

rict Court’s i nstruc tion cor rectl y l aid out t

he standard for an excessi ve force cl aim. The l anguage about mis take di d not impermi ssibl y change the standard fro m an o bjective to a sub jective one. U nder the lang uage o f the charg e, the jury would find Watford l iable if he was mist aken as to t he appropri ate l evel of for ce requi red and that m istake was unreason able. The lan guage comp orts with the S uprem e Cou rt’s admonishment that the test of whether a particul ar use of force is appropriate must be judged from the perspect ive of a r easonable officer at thescene, not

with the “ 20/20 visi on of hindsi ght.” Saucier , 533 U.S. at 205 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 393). The instr uctio ns a s a w hol e w ere n ot co nfu sing or m islea din g, an d w e fin d no rev ersib le err or. Hung also argues that t

he District Court

erred i n inst

ructi ng the jur

y r egarding he r use of the word di scri minati on during her testimony. The Distri ct Court e xplaine d to the jurythat “ [t]here is no cl aim in this cas e of discrimination, s o you shoul d ignore t hat as well. ” (App. at 50. ) Hung argues that thi s inst ructi on denied her

equal protecti on and due pro cess, becau se the jury was no t instructed to disregard testim ony about H ung’s possible racialbiases. 1 Hun g did no t object to this instruction at trial, howev er, and there is no evid enc e tha t she req ues ted a sim ilar in struc tion reg ard ing her ow n ra cial b iase s.6

Sh e ha s the refo re w aive d th is issu e on app eal, a nd w e w ill rev iew onl y for p lain e rror. Alexander v. Riga , 208 F .3d 41 9, 426 -27 (3 d C ir. 2000 ). We find n o plain error e ither in the instruction regard ing discrimination or the lack of an instruction rega rding H ung’s biases. For the for egoing rea sons, t he judgment of t

he District Court

entere d on November 3, 2003, wil l be affi rmed.