Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Memorandum Opinions filed March 

19, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-11-00938-CV

ADRIENNE GALLIEN, Appellant

V.

GOOSE CREEK CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Appellee

On Appeal from the 215th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2009-10149

M A J O R I T Y M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Adrienne Gallien, appeals a summary judgment in favor of 

appellee, Goose Creek Consolidated Independent School District (―Goose Creek‖),
2

in Gallien’s suit based on nonrenewal of her one-year term employment contract. 

We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Gallien filed suit asserting various claims against Goose Creek based on 

two general factual allegations: (1) Goose Creek discharged Gallien for reporting 

to multiple governmental agencies that she was instructed by superiors to alter 

records to falsely reflect students had completed certain courses and met 

graduation requirements; and (2) Goose Creek failed to provide the required notice 

of the proceedings relative to non-renewal of her contract and failed to conduct 

open meetings.

Goose Creek filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court signed 

an order granting the motion and dismissing all of Gallien’s claims with prejudice.

II. ANALYSIS

In five issues, Gallien contends the trial court erred by granting summary 

judgment on the following claims: (1) violations of the Texas Commission on 

Human Rights Act, (2) violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act, (3) violations 

of the Texas Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, (4) violations of the Texas 

Whistleblower Act, and (5) breach of contract based on wrongful termination.

1

 

Goose Creek filed one pleading, asserting both traditional and no-evidence 

motions for summary judgment on all these claims, except the claim of harassment 

or racial discrimination, on which Goose Creek presented only no-evidence 

grounds, to the extent a claim was pleaded. Exhibits comprising more than 440 

 

1 The above-listed claims are the only ones on which Gallien challenges the summary 

judgment on appeal. Therefore, Gallien has waived a challenge to summary judgment on any

other claims. See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 2001).
3

pages were attached to Goose Creek’s combined motions for summary judgment. 

The trial court granted summary judgment for Goose Creek without specifying the 

grounds relied on.

A. No-Evidence Summary Judgment Grounds

After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment 

on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a 

claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005); 

Pico v. Capriccio Italian Restaurant, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The movant must state the elements as to 

which there is no evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Goose Creek stated the 

following grounds in support of its no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

Texas Open Meetings Act

Goose Creek asserted Gallien has no evidence that Goose Creek was 

required to conduct public meetings on proceedings pertaining to non-renewal of 

her contract, that she requested public meetings, or that Goose Creek failed to 

provide the required notice. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.074(a)(1), (b) (West 

2012) (providing that a meeting ―to deliberate the appointment, employment, 

evaluation, reassignment, duties, discipline, or dismissal of a public officer or 

employee . . . . ‖ is exception to requirement that meetings of governmental body 

shall be open to public, but exception does not apply if employee requests public 

hearing); id. § 551.041 (West 2012) (requiring governmental body to give certain

written notice of meetings).
4

Texas Term Contract Nonrenewal Act

Goose Creek asserted Gallien has no evidence that Goose Creek failed to 

allow her the opportunity for a hearing as provided by the Texas Term Contract 

Nonrenewal Act. See generally Tex. Educ. Code §§ 21.206–.209 (West 2012) 

(prescribing procedures for nonrenewal of certain employees’ term contracts, 

including provisions regarding notice to employee and hearing on proposed 

nonrenewal).

 Texas Whistleblower Act

Goose Creek asserted Gallien has no evidence that her report to various 

agencies regarding Goose Creek’s alleged violations of law ―was the but-for cause 

of [Goose Creek’s] suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against 

[Gallien] at the time [Goose Creek] took that action.‖ See Guillaume v. City of 

Greenville, 247 S.W.3d 457, 463–64 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (reciting 

elements of claim under Texas Whistleblower Act); see generally Tex. Gov’t Code 

Ann. §§ 554.001–.010 (West 2004).

Breach of Contract / Wrongful Termination

Goose Creek asserted that Gallien has no evidence she performed, tendered 

performance of, or was excused from performing her contractual obligations, or 

that Goose Creek breached the contract by wrongfully discharging Gallien. See

West v. Triple B Servs., LLP, 264 S.W.3d 440, 446 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (reciting elements of breach-of-contract claim).

The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”)

Gallien contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on her 

claim for violations of the TCHRA because Goose Creek did not expressly move 
5

for summary judgment on that claim. On appeal, Gallien suggests that Goose 

Creek violated the TCHRA via ―retaliation, demotion and discriminatory 

employment practices to effect a constructive or de facto discharge.‖ See generally

Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051, 21.055 (West 2006) (rendering unlawful certain 

types of discriminatory employment practices, including practices based on

employee’s race, as well as retaliation by an employer for employee’s opposition 

to, or complaints about, such practices). However, Gallien did not plead a claim 

under the TCHRA in the trial court. At the outset of her original petition Gallien 

did generally assert, as a factual allegation, that she was harassed because of her 

African-American race and an ―undertone‖ of racial intolerance was always 

apparent. In the ―Conclusion‖ or ―Prayer‖ sections of her petitions, Gallien made 

isolated, general allusions to ―prejudice,‖ ―racial discrimination‖ and 

―discriminatory termination.‖ However, the focus of Gallien’s claims of retaliation 

and discriminatory employment practices were her allegations under the 

Whistleblower Act and Goose Creek’s alleged failure to comply with procedural 

requirements relative to nonrenewal of Gallien’s contract. Gallien did not plead 

any claims based on alleged harassment or discrimination or retaliation because of 

race, much less mention the TCHRA, by name or statutory citation. 

To the extent Gallien’s allusions may be construed as pleading a general 

claim for harassment or discrimination based on race, or even a claim under the 

TCHRA, Goose Creek asserted in the no-evidence motion that Gallien has no 

evidence she was subjected to harassment or discrimination based on race.
6

B. Summary-Judgment Response

When a movant files a proper no-evidence motion for summary judgment, 

the burden shifts to the respondent; unless the respondent produces summaryjudgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must 

grant the motion for summary judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Urena, 162 

S.W.3d at 550; Pico, 209 S.W.3d at 905. To defeat a no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment, the non-movant need not marshal her evidence but must point 

out in her response evidence raising a genuine issue of fact as to the challenged 

elements. See comment to Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Johnson v. Brewer & 

Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002); Pico, 209 S.W.3d at 912; see 

also Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Briggs Equip. Trust, 321 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (holding non-movant’s failure to respond to noevidence motion was ―fatal‖ to ability to successfully attack summary judgment on 

appeal); Dyer v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., No. 02-11-00046-CV, 2012 WL 

335858, at *2–5. (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Feb. 2, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 

(holding that trial court is not required to review evidence presented by movant to 

support traditional portion of a combined motion for summary judgment to 

determine whether that evidence raises a fact issue on the no-evidence ground, 

absent a timely response by non-movant); Modelist v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 

Co., No. 14-10-00249-CV), 2011 WL 3717010, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (summarily affirming summary 

judgment on no-evidence grounds when movant filed combined motion but nonmovant failed to respond); Burns v. Canales, No. 14-04-00786-CV, 2006 WL 

461518, at *3–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2006, pet. denied) 

(mem. op.) (affirming no-evidence summary judgment when non-movant filed 

one-half-inch-thick stack of evidence but page-and-a-half response which 
7

generally stated the attached evidence raised a fact issue but failed to cite argument 

or specific evidence supporting challenged causes of action; ―trial court is not 

required, sua sponte, to assume the role of [non-movant’s] advocate and supply his 

arguments for him‖); Judge David Hittner and Lynne Liberato, Summary 

Judgments In Texas, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 488 (2006) (―Responding to a noevidence summary judgment motion is virtually mandatory.‖).

It is undisputed Gallien filed her response late, and without leave of court. 

See Tex. R. Civ. P. Rule 166a(c) (providing that, except on leave of court, a 

summary-judgment response must be filed no later than seven days before hearing 

date). On appeal, Gallien acknowledges her summary-judgment response was 

untimely filed and ―not properly before the trial court.‖ Because the trial court 

did not grant leave for late filing of the summary-judgment response, we presume 

the trial court did not consider the response. See Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 

S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996); Brown v. Shores, 77 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

Gallien asserts that, although she ―would have preferred to present evidence 

in response to‖ the motion, she may still contend on appeal that the grounds 

expressly presented in the motion for summary judgment are insufficient as a 

matter of law to support summary judgment. However, Gallien then advances 

cases and argument applicable to traditional summary-judgment grounds, see, e.g.,

M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 

2000), without regard to the fact that Goose Creek also asserted no-evidence 

grounds. When, as in this case, the trial court does not specify in the order the 

grounds relied upon in granting summary judgment, we must affirm the summary 
8

judgment if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. See Urena, 162 S.W.3d 

at 550; Pico, 209 S.W.3d at 905.

Despite acknowledging she did not timely file a response to the motion for 

summary judgment, Gallien cites evidence attached to other filings, such as her 

petition, the record of the hearing on her request for a temporary injunction, Goose 

Creek’s response to Gallien’s request for mandamus, and a motion to exclude 

certain evidence. However, absent a timely summary-judgment response 

identifying evidence purportedly defeating the no-evidence grounds, the trial court 

was not required to search the record to find any such evidence. See Lee v. 

Palacios, No. 14–06–00428–CV, 2007 WL 2990277, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Oct. 11, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Burns, 2006 WL 

461518, at *3–6.

Finally, Gallien also cites evidence attached to her motion for new trial. 

Assuming, without deciding, that Gallien timely filed a motion for new trial, there 

is no indication the trial court considered any such evidence; there was no signed 

order on the motion for new trial, and it was denied by operation of law. See Lee, 

2007 WL 2990277, at *2 (refusing to consider evidence attached to non-movant’s 

motion for new trial after grant of summary judgment without indication trial court 

considered this late-filed evidence); cf. Auten v. DJ Clark, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 695, 

702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (considering evidence 

presented to support motion for new trial when reviewing summary judgment 

because trial court affirmatively indicated in written order that it considered the 

evidence yet confirmed summary-judgment ruling by denying new trial).

In summary, because Gallien failed to timely respond to the properly filed 

no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the trial court did not err by granting 
9

no-evidence summary judgment on her claims. Accordingly, we overrule all of 

Gallien’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Margaret Garner Mirabal

 Senior Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, McCally, and Mirabal (McCally, J., concurring).

2

 

2

Senior Justice Margaret Garner Mirabal sitting by assignment.