Federal Building and Fire Safety Inves

of the World Trade Center Disast

Project #8,

The Emergency Response Op

September 13, 2005

J. R. Lawson, Project Leader

Building and Fire Research Labo

National Institute of Standards and Tec

U.S. Department of Commerce

james.lawson@nist.gov
Contributing Personnel Contributing Personnel

NIST Personnel:•

J. Randall Lawson

•

Stephen A

•

Robert L. Vettori • Ronald Me

•

Schuyler Ruitberg • Michael R. 

•

Lisa Petersen • Melissa J. 

NIST Experts:•

Vincent Dunn, FDNY (retired) 

•

John J. Hodgens, FDNY (retired)

•

Kevin S. Malley, FDNY (retired)

Contractor:•

Nustats, Inc.
Interactions With Other WTC P

Interactions With Other WTC P

Emergenc

y

Services 

Resp

o

nse

Stru

Co

(W

Codes and 

Standards

Active Fire 

Protection

Evacuati

o

n
Purpose of Project #8 Purpose of Project #8 

1. Fully documenting what happened during 

the fire services to the attacks on the Woup to the time of collapse of WTC 7; 

2. Identify issues that need to be addressed 

practices, standards and codes;

3. Identify alternative practices and/or techn

address these issues; and

4. Identify R&D needs that advance the safe

service in responding to massive fires in t
Investigative Approach Investigative Approach

Collect, Review, and Analyze Existing Data:

y Documentary data: written reports and documentsy Photographic data: photographs and videoy Electronic data: radio and telephone communications y First-person inter

view data: FDNY, NYPD, PANYNJ, 

Develop:

y Detailed timeline of eventsy Visual representation of disaster sitey Assessment of emergency response factors

Derive:

y Finding

s

y Conclusionsy Recommendations

Data analysis protocols:

• Fire Fighter Line-of-Duty Death & Injur

y Investigation

• NFPA 921, G

uide for Fire and Explosion Investigatio

• Atlas.ti qualitative data management and analysis so
NIST Conducted Interviews: NIST Conducted Interviews:

Investigative lead Investigative lead

-following protocol following protocol 

y Targeted interviews of people with knowle

following categories:

1. Operational policies and procedures2. Dispatch, deployment3. Communications4. Incident command, control, command posts, fire fig

safety

5. Emergency response equipment and technology6. Elevator operations in high-rise buildings7. High-rise building operations and procedures, fire f

rescue before the towers fell, evacuation, roof oper

units
First Person Interviews Conducted First Person Interviews Conducted

• New York City

FDNY Interviews -

6

8

Command Officers, Company Officers, FirefighSquads, EMS, Communications, Fire MarshalsNYPD Interviews -

2

5

Command Officers, Special Operations Divisio

Communications Personnel, and Aviation Unit 

• Port Autho

rity of New York and New Jersey

PANYNJ Interview

s -

1

5

PAPD Command Officers, Police Officers, BuilStaff, Communications & Vertical Transportatio

• Other

Communications, Building Engineers, Fire and Security Personnel -

8

Total Number of Interviews 

- 116
February 26, 1993 Truck Bo

February 26, 1993 Truck Bo

of the

World Trade Center World Trade Center
Changes Resulting from the 199

Changes Resulting from the 199

•

Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was es

with inter-agency operations

•

FDNY Incident Command System was upgraded:

•

Addressed the delegation of functions;

Command, Planning, Operations, Logistic

•

Added Command Staff: Safety, Informatio

• Interagency representation at command p•

Established a Communications Coordinat

•

Expanded Field Communications Unit op

•

Added an officer to Field Comm operation

• 800 MHz radios were purchased for FDNY manag
Policy Changes Resulting from the 199

Policy Changes Resulting from the 19

•

PANYNJ adopted a policy for implementation of fi

recommendations made by local government fire after a fire safety inspection of PANYNJ facilities

•

PANYNJ adopted a policy for prior review by loca

agencies of fire safety systems to be introduced facility.

•

PANYNJ entered into an agreement with FDNY w

the above policies and recognized the right of FDfire safety inspections of PANYNJ properties in Nguidelines for FDNY to communicate needed cothe PANYNJ, assured that new or modified fire swere in compliance with loc

al codes and regulati

third-party review of such systems by a NY State architect or engineer.
Physical Changes Resulting from the 1

Physical Changes Resulting from the 1

FDNY worked with the PA to upgrade WTC 

•

FDNY high-rise radio repeater was 

•

Fire Command Desks installed in 

•

Elevator intercom system was upg

•

New Operations Control Center w

the complex on the B1 level of WT

•

Multiple power sources installed fo

lighting

•

New decentralized fire alarm syste

installed at the WTC

•

Various fire drills were conducted 

and some included FDNY particip
September 11, 2001 Aircraf

September 11, 2001 Aircraf

on the

World Trade Cente

World Trade Cente
Role of Each Responding Depa

Role of Each Responding Depa

September 11, 2001 September 11, 2001

FDNY - Established operational control and the Inc

Post for the WTC operations, conducted evacuatoperations, and fought fires at the disaster.

PAPD 

- Established security at the WTC and cond

and rescue operations.

NYPD 

- Established traffic control, perimeter secur

security for command posts, and conducted evacrescue operations inside the WTC. The aviation observation capabilities and assessed the potentrescue.

OEM - Functioned as a multi-agency command res

provided support for all agencies and departmendis

aster.
Emergency Responder Oper

Emergency Responder Oper

FDNY’s Initial Size-up of WTC Conditions•

A large aircraft had hit the WTC 1 building. 

• Large fires were burning on multiple floors at and ab

impact zone.

•

The elevators were not working and people were trap

many of the elevators.

•

The sprinkler system and standpipe systems were lik

compromised. 

• It was likely that no water supply was available to fig

at and above the impact zone.

• It was likely that many of the occupants trapped at an

the impact zone were already dead or would die befocould get to them.
FDNY Units Dispatch to the 

FDNY Units Dispatch to the 

3

26 35

66

121

0 0

6

23 30

0

50

100150200250

8:46 8:48 8:50 9:00 9:15 

time (h:m)

Number of Units 

Dispatched Signal Arri

v

a

Dispatch and Arriv

al of FDNY Units 
FDNY Operations at the W

FDNY Operations at the W

No one interviewed by NIST thought th

WTC towers would totally collapse

Three operational strategies:Outside Command Posts & Inside Command Comthe Outside Command Post - Fires in the buildings were located too high in the buildings to accomplish fthat could save the lives of occupants above the firesto evacuate and rescue all below the fires.Command Officers for Inside Operations - The firextinguish. The objective was to get enough personnupstairs to cut a path through the fire to rescue occupand also evacuate and rescue all below the fires.Company Level Command - Saw this as a convenrise fire. The objective was to get up to the fire floors fires. In some cases firefighters were persuaded by 

officers to switch from the idea of fire fighting to evacoperations. 
Locations of FDNY and NYPD Com

Locations of FDNY and NYPD Com
Staging, Assignments, & Per

Staging, Assignments, & Per

Accountability Accountability

•

Emergency responders generally followed their de

protocol related to staging, assignment, and acco

•

Some freelancing (not officially assigned or direct

experienced during the emergency response at t

•

An Operations Post and staging area was ordered 

inside of WTC 1. It was to be established by the F

D

N

Y units on the 70th floor of the building.

•

FDNY established off site staging areas at differe

city for assembling personnel and equipment and units and assignments at the WTC site.

•

Many FDN

Y units assigned to the WTC site did n

building was WTC 1 and which was WTC 2. The not well marked.

•

FDNY personnel had great difficulty trying to safe

WTC towers as a result of falling debris and hum
Staging, Assignments, & Per

Staging, Assignments, & Per

Accountability Accountability

•

FDNY maintained personnel accountability on Comman

the lobbies of WTC 1 and 2 and at the Incident CommVesey Streets in front of WFC 2.

•

EMS maintained personnel accountability and patient tr

on paper tablets.

•

NYPD maintained a personnel accountability list at eac

This list was typically kept on a clipboard.

• PAPD maintained personnel accountability from the PA

located inside of WTC 5.

•

With the collapse of WTC 2, all accountability lists for e

were lost, and no records were maintained beyond the 

•

FDNY fire apparatus and vehicles parked at the WTC c

destroyed when the WTC towers collapsed. Unit assilists) for many of these units were lost.
FDNY Command Board FDNY Command Board

Located in the Lobby of W

Located in the Lobby of W
FDNY Operations at the W

FDNY Operations at the W

Access to the buildings:1. After aircraft impact only two elevators out of 1operating inside the two WTC towers. WTC 1, frthe 16th floor. WTC 2, from the lobby to the 40th 

2. The stairways were filled with occupants evacbuildings. FDNY personnel and other emergencreported difficulty attempting to climb the stairs in environment. Also made it difficult to carry equipstairways3. Counter flow in the staircases caused teams responders to become separated, causing delayteam operations. 
FDNY Operations at the W

FDNY Operations at the W

Human Physiological Challenge:1. Firefighters’ personal protective equipment weighs 

23 Kg (50 lbs).

2. Firefighters carry an additional 23 Kg (50 lbs) of gehigh-rise fire fighting, i.e., hose packs, tools, and extra 3. Many of the firefighters were only able climb the firon the stairways before they had to rest. Subsequent often require additional rest periods and hydration afteadditional 3 to 5 floors. Some firefighters and other emresponders with light loads were able to climb a seconbefore resting.4. Climbing many floors of stairs and carrying heavy lseriously degrades the physical capabilities of firefightrescue and fire fighting operations. 
Video Image of Firefighte

Video Image of Firefighte

Inside the WTC 1 Lobb

Inside the WTC 1 Lobb
Emergency Responders & High Emergency Responders & High

-Ris

Ris

•

First responding FDNY units took from 4 to 1

to the WTC complex. They then got their eqreceived assignments, another 3 to 5 minuteoperations 7 to 15 minutes.

•

Of the 27 emergency responders interviewed 

WTC 1, maximum floor height achieved befocollapsed, a time period of 1 hour 13 minute

1 –

A police officer carrying no extra equipment 

uniform climbed to the 44th floor.

8 –

Emergency responders (FDNY, PAPD, NYP

30’s. Two FDNY took an elevator to the 16th 

16 –

Emergency responders (mostly FDNY) climb

2 –

Emergency responders (NYPD) climbed to t

•

Estimated climbing rate based on a 60 mi

period to their maximum height: 1.4 to 2 
High-Rise Buildings & Emergency 

Rise Buildings & Emergency 

Example: Fire department response to a 60 story high-ris

trapped above fires on the 58th floor and no opera

L

F

Firefighters carrying equipment and wearing PPE ~ 125 minutes

Firefighters carrying no equipment and not

wearing PPE ~ 90 minutes

Firefighters carrying equipment and

wearing PPE ~ 70 minutes

Firefighters carrying no equipment and not

wearing PPE ~ 50 minutes

Firefighters begin to climb 10 minutes

Fire department arrival 4 minutes 
Mobility Impaired Occupa

Mobility Impaired Occupa

•

As the emergency responders started evacuating 

collapse of WTC 2, they found mobility impaired the staircases going down.

•

Several ambulatory mobility impaired occupants w

be walking down the stairs with one hand on eacthey took one step at a time going down. In addoften accompanied by one person, another occuemergency responder. This blocked others behimoving more rapidly down the stairs.

•

FDNY and PAPD personnel found 40 to 60 m

obil

occupants on the 12th floor of WTC 1 as they we

attempted to clear each floor on their way out. Tindividuals had been placed on this floor in an atstairways.

•

Emergency responders were assisting approxima

mobility impaired people down the staircase just collapse of WTC 1. It is unknown how many fatawith this group. 
Issues

Emergency Response - Access and Fir• Physiological impact on firefighters with e

climbing more than 10 to 12 floors during emergency.

• Adequacy of capacity for egress and firef

during full evacuation of fully occupied ta

• Access to high-rise buildings by first resp

hindered by counter flow, egress capacitavailable safe elevators.
Emergency Responder Oper

Emergency Responder Oper

Situational Awareness:Definition: The degree of accuracy by which operception of the current environment mirrors Perception vs. Reality

•

View of the situation

• Incoming information•

Expectations & biases

• Incoming information vs. expectations

Factors that Reduce Situational Awareness

• Insufficient communications•

Fatigue / stress

•

Task overload & Task underload

•

Group mindset

•

“Press on regardless” philosophy

•

Degraded operating conditions
Emergency Responder Oper

Emergency Responder Oper

Situational Awareness:•

Emergency responders working outside of the WTC 

view building conditions and communicate over radios situational awareness.

•

Situational awareness for personnel that observed th

and fires from outside the buildings before entering exp

maintaining their awareness after entering the building•

Emergency responders working inside of the WTC b

not see what was happening outside and had poor radhad poor situational awareness. 

•

Emergency responders working inside of the WTC b

see what was happening outside and had good radio cbetter situational awareness over those with poor radio 
Fire Fighting Operations at th

Fire Fighting Operations at th

Three cases were identified where fire fighting WTC 2 collapsed.1. Fireball victims were extinguished with the use extinguishers at the lobby of WTC 1 upon FDNY a2. A Port Authority employee was reported as usinextinguis

h flames entering a staircase in one of th

occupants to evacuate down the staircase.3. At 9:55 a.m. firefighters on the 78th floor inside W

that they were going to extinguish two fires in the they could get to the A staircase. 
Roof Evacuation Roof Evacuation 

• Standard evacuation protocol for the WTC to

recommended by The Port Authority of NY & building occupants only evacuated down the 

• The Port Authority had no procedures for roo• NYPD had a roof rescue protocol that had be

with the cooperation of FDNY. NYPD helicoa number of people from the WTC roof durinbombing.

• FDNY had the same basic roof rescue protoc

only planned to use it as a last resort to save building occupants that may have gotten on 
NYPD Aviation Units Roof Op

NYPD Aviation Units Roof Op

•

NYPD aviation units arrived at the WTC by 8:52 a.m

see if roof rescue was possible and reported back th

to land as a result of heavy smoke conditions.

First person interviews with aviation unit pers

that heat from the building’s fires was causing 

engine temperature to increase. 

An aviation unit called again at 9:38 a.m. for p

the roof of WTC 1. First person interviews ind

aviation units were desperate to assist the pejumping from the upper floors. There was no landing conditions had improved.

Five minutes after the request to land, a senio

ordered that no one was to rappel onto the bu

Definition: rappel – to descend by means of a rop
Video Image of WTC Video Image of WTC

Showing Aviation Unit Near 

Showing Aviation Unit Near 
Photograph Taken by NYPD Avi

Photograph Taken by NYPD Av

Showing Top of WTC 1 Showing Top of WTC 1 
First Person Accounts of Tele

First Person Accounts of Tele

Communications Communications 

• Before the attack at the World Trade Center both 

cellular telephone systems were working.

•

Moments after the first aircraft impacted WTC 1 th

systems were stressed by increased caller volume

•

Although there was impact damage and fires were 

World Trade Center towers, some landline telepho

the buildings.

•

After the collapse of WTC 2, a number of cellular p

were not functioning in lower Manhattan.

•

After the collapse of WTC 2, there were still some 

telephones working within the city block areas adja

World Trade Center.
Emergency Responder Radio 

Emergency Responder Radio 

Simplex Communications

-

direct point-to-point, 

HT-to-Base Station 

Duplex Communications - tra

nsmissions are cha

through a radio rep

PAPD Operations -

Duplex through their dedicated 

police department repeater

FDNY Operations -

Simplex for command channel 

tactical operations

-

Duplex through their dedic

ate

FDNY high-rise repeater.

-

Cross-band through the Batta

repeater.

NYPD Operations -

Simplex between ESU teams 

ESU Mobilization Point.

-

Duplex through the NYPD SO

repeaters.
Example: Radio Repeater S

Example: Radio Repeater S

RX 154 MHz 

Building

Radio

Repeater

HT

TX 153 MHz

TX 

Duplex

Operation

RX 154 MHz

TX 153 MHz

HT

RX 153 MHz TX 154 M

Only one radio transmission at a t
Graphic Showing the FDNY High Graphic Showing the FDNY High

-R

R

Antenna Location Relative to the W

Antenna Location Relative to the W
Video Image of FDNY Video Image of FDNY

WTC 1 Lobby Command Po

WTC 1 Lobby Command Po

Showing a Repeater Phone Showing a Repeater Phon
Example: Battalion Car Cross Example: Battalion Car Cross

-ba

ba

Signal attenuation,

multiple floors of

steel and concrete

Rx

Tx

460 MHz, UHF 

460 MHz HT

154 MHz HT’s

L-CP

Clear line-of-sigh

Only one transmis

154 MHz HT’sDrawing by NIST base on document by Battalion 

C

hief Orio J. Pal

mer and or

FF Bill Kristoff, FDNY, WNYF, Repeater Systems, 3rd 1998
Radio Communications Radio Communication

•

All three of the responding departments, 

PAPD experienced difficulties with radio co•

Each of the departments was aware of th

associated with their radio communications related to operations in high-rise buildings.•

Two basic issues with radio communicatio

1. Normal function of the radio equipment in environments. (Radio signal attenuation in 

concrete buildings)2. The volume of radio traffic.
Video image of EMS responder at

Video image of EMS responder at

improve communications from insi

improve communications from ins

of WTC 1 by lifting his radio above 

of WTC 1 by lifting his radio above 
Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con

1. After the first aircraft struck WTC 1, there was an 

of 5 peak increase in traffic level over the normaresponder radio communications, followed by an of 3 steady increase in level of subsequent traffic

2. A surge in communications traffic volume made 

handle the flow of communic

ations and delivery 

3. Analysis of radio communications records indic

a

to 1/2 of the radio messages during surge conditcomplete nor understandable.
Radio Traffic Volume – T% = 100(Transmissio

PAPD C

h

a

n

n

el 2

6/W

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 20 30 40

Time (

Minutes)

Percent Transmission (%)

First Aircraft Impact

Second Aircraft Im

pact

F

D

N

Y C

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 

Percent Transmission (%)

First Aircraft I

m

p

N

Y

P

D S

OD Chan

n

el

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 20 30 40

Time (

Minutes)

Percent Transmission (%)

First Aircraft Im

pact

Second AircraftIm

pact

NYP

0

102030405060708090

100

0 10 

Percent Transmission (%)
Readability of Radio Communi

Readability of Radio Communi

Factors affecting communications:• background noise either at the transmiss

receiving point or both;

•

operating health of transmitting and recei

and antenna systems;

•

doubling or crossing of radio signals caus

multiple transmissions at the same time oradio frequency; and

•

radio transmissions may be affected by a

materials or electromagnetic interference signals.
Radio Communications, cont

Radio Communications, con

•

Both PAPD and NYPD had handie-talkies 

stuck microphones that produced radio intaddition, reports came in from the field indradios were not working well.

•

There were many cases where FDNY, PA

personnel made radio calls, and they nevanswer. This may be attributed to the failsystem or the inability of the person called 

There were cases where the person calle

and would not be heard by the party that ocall.
Between when the first aircraft hit and approximatel

emergency responder communications included the of messages:

•

asking officers to stay off the air

•

comments that messages were being cut-off, t

crossing or doubling, and messages were unre

•

comments that multiple units were talking at th

time and requests that units talk one-by-one

Radio Communications, cont

Radio Communications, con
Radio Communications Readabilit

Radio Communications Readabilit

Readability, is a communications term u

the ability of a person to hear and undertransmission.Readability Scale:1 –

Unreadable

2 –

Barely readable, occasional words d

3 –

Readable with considerable difficulty

4 –

Readable with practically no difficult

5 –

Perfectly readable

Note: This is a subjective scale related to a trainability to hear and understand communications Ref: The ARRL Handbook for Radio Communica
Readability Summary Befor

Readability Summary Befo

Readability 

D

e

p

t. 123

PAPD Ch 26/WPolice Desk 8% 17%

19% 

FDNY H-R Ch 7(PAPD Ch 30)

n/a

-

-

RepeaterNYPD Div. 1

2

%

9

%

8

%

NYPD SOD

0

%

0

%

14
Readability Summary During O

Readability Summary During O

Readability 

D

e

p

a

r

t

m

e

n

t 123

PAPD Ch 26/WPolice Desk 9% 24%

43% 

FDNY H-R Ch 7(PAPD Ch 30)

10% 26%

42% 

RepeaterNYPD Div. 1

11% 26%

32% 

NYPD SOD

10% 35%

32% 
Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con

•

NYPD had relativ

ely good radio communicatio

to-point communications in the WTC towers becaonly six ESU teams working on the frequency, an

•

NYPD’s mobilization point that was communica

personnel inside the towers was set up more thaaway from the towers allowing for more direct or 

communications with the towers. 

•

FDNY was attempting to operate communicati

inside the WTC towers where building componen

radio communic

ations signals. 
Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con

•

Even though the Battalion Car Cross-band Repeate

approximately 9:07 a.m. and was to be delivered tcommand post, there is no record that FDNY used repeater at the WTC site. All known personnel thathe repeater died with the collapse of WTC 2.

•

There is no evidence that the WTC 1 lobby Comma

the FDNY/ WTC high-rise channel 7 repeater or threpeater to communic

ate with other personnel up 
Radio Communications, con

Radio Communications, con

•

Analysis of the FDNY City-wide, high-rise, channel 7 

30) repeater recording indicates that the World Trade repeater was operating.•

At approximately 9:05 a.m. the repeater’s recording 

the WTC 1 Lobby Command Post attempts to check rHandset and handie-talkie radio communications were • It is possible that one or both of the following conditiradio check that took place at the WTC 1 Lobby Comm

1. The radio repeater handset earpiece was bro2. The radio repeater handset volume was not t

• It is unlikely that the repeater’s antenna was broken debris since radio signals were received during the radinside WTC 1 and the communications that followed fr•

The repeater system recorded radio communication

between several different firefighters and several diffeas they worked inside of WTC 2. 
Emergency Response Equipment 

Emergency Response Equipment 

Emergency Response Apparatus on We

Emergency Response Apparatus on We
List of FDNY Apparatus Lost at 

List of FDNY Apparatus Lost at 

AmbulancesLadder or Trucks Engines o

f Pumpers

Satellite PumperRescue VehiclesSquad VehicleHigh-Rise VehicleEmergency Crew VehicleField Comm VehicleMask Service UnitTac (Tactical Equipment Unit)Sedans Staff utility Vehicles Total Units Destroyed
Example of Damaged FDNY Ap

Example of Damaged FDNY Ap
Equipment Contributing to Op

Equipment Contributing to Op

Equipment that influenced eme

rgency respo

•

Handie-talkie radios, for transmitting and 

evacuation and rescue information (for sresponders). Approximately 1⁄2

of the fire

police officers interviewed working inside HT radios received orders to evacuate ththeir radios.

•

Flashlights, for providing needed light wh

from the WTC complex after WTC buildin

•

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SC

providing safe air to breathe after WTC 2 collapsed.
Inter-Agency Cooperatio

Agency Cooperatio

• A significant amount of evidence (first person interviphotographic data) shows that the different agencies wtogether during the WTC disaster.• Data also indicates that inter-agency operations werloss of the OEM command center that was located ins

• OEM functions became dispersed• The OEM communications center was lost• The computer systems and other equipment u

support for emergency response operations w

• Unified operations structure for the emergency 

diminished

• First person interview data and photographic data spersonnel working with different emergency respondelocated at the various department command posts.• First responder interviews suggest that inter-departmhad minimal affect on operations at the WTC complex September 11th. First person interview data also sugg

the problems experienced were due to personnel not operating practices of the other agencies. 
Command and Contro

Command and Contro

• Difficulties with command and control bega

dispatch of large numbers of fire fighters to tadequate command posts and staff could be manage them.•

Self-dispatch further complicated comman

the incident.•

FDNY EMS command and control was aff

private and volunteer ambulance units self-d
Command and Control, cont

Command and Control, con

•

Command and control was seriously a

lack of good communications.•

FDNY’s system for maintaining record

assignments at each command post was of managing the numbers of units and peassigned to the incident. •

FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD: there was n

back-up the unit assignment records gencommand posts.
Issues

Emergency Response - Command and Control• Availability of detailed procedures and methods for gath

and delivering situational information to all first responoperators, wardens, incident commanders, etc.; this cand data integration.

• Availability of effective codes and protocols for establish

uninterrupted operation of the incident command and for preservation and dissemination of information manposts.

• Command posts establishment within the collapse z

buildings that received serious impact damage and clarge multi-floor fires.

• Establishing the command post prior to dispatch of n• Impact of self-dispatch and free-lancing on comman

responders and ambulances

• Assignment and tracking (accountability) system for 

emergencies

• Secure location of state and local emergency operation
Issues

Emergency Response - Comm• Lack of rigorous pre-emergency inspectio

radio communications systems within highidentify performance gaps. 

• Missed opportunities to better communica

among the occupants, 911 operator dispadepartment dispatch, police department demergency management service dispatchsecurity. (Inadequate situational awarene

• Performance requirements for emergency 

systems in buildings.

• Design, testing, certification standa• Maintenance and inspection require
Issues

Emergency Response - Communicatio• Lack of communications network architecture 

and operational protocols for intra- and inter-acommunication at all levels of organizational includes:

• Overall network architecture that covers local ne

incident sites, and dispatching. 

• Scalability in terms of the number of first respon

system and in providing radio coverage in large challenging radio frequency propagation enviro

• Interoperability with existing emergency commu• Techniques to identify first responders within ind

environments
Questions? Questions?