UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LARRY DRAKE HANSEN, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee. No. 18-4104 (D.C. No. 2:15- CV-00722-JNP) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , MORITZ , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Larry Drake Hansen, proceeding pr o se, appeals the district cou rt’s judgment dismissing his civil rights act ion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)( 6) and its order denying his post-judgment motion under Fe d. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and (b). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously to honor the parties ’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir . R. 34.1(G). The case is ther efore submitted without oral argument. T his order and judgment is no t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, an d collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 4, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Background In 2012, Hansen was assaulted dur ing a late-night walk down Mai n Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. He suffered numerous injuries, including bruises, abrasions, a broken nose, and damage to his hamstring ligament. Although ot her people in the area witnessed the a ttack, Hansen did not see his assailant and was unable to identify him later in a police line-up . But he believes the police phot ographed the suspects, and a bystander told him the ass ailant was wearing a black jack et and a white t-shirt with red stains (possibly bloo d). No arrests were made, and no criminal charges were filed relating to the assault on Hansen. In 2015, Hansen filed a civil rights action against the Salt La ke City Police Department (“the Police Departme nt”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, th ough the Salt Lake City Corporation was later substi tuted as the proper defendant. The operative (second amended) complaint assert s state law claims for gross n egligence, due process claims under the Fifth an d Fourteenth Amendments to the federal and state constitutions, and a violation of Hansen’s constitutional right to access the courts. Relevant to this appeal, Hansen a lleges that the police failed to adequately, diligently, thoroughly, and timely investigate the assault, suc h that he was precluded from filing a civil action agains t his unidentified assailant. He seeks over $5.7 million in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damage s. The Police Department filed a mo tion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(6). The magistrate judge issued a Repor t and Recommendation, recommendi ng that the motion to dismiss be granted and that the entire action be dism issed with prejudice.3 Hansen conceded several claims w ithin his objections, leaving o nly his federal access-to-the-courts claim and hi s state constitutional claims. The district court limited its analysis accordingly . It adopted the Report and Re commendation in part, dismissing the federal claim wi th prejudice; however, it declin ed to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over th e state constitutional claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Hansen filed a Rule 60 motion for reconside ration, which was denied. Hansen timely appealed both the dismissal order and th e order denying his Rule 60 motion. Analysis
I. Motion to Dismiss “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffi cient factual matter, accepted as true, to st ate a claim to relief that is pl ausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (interna l quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must allege specific facts that would support the conclusion that he is entitled to relief. Khalik v. United Air Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere labels and conclusions . . . will not suffice.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) i s subject to de novo review. SEC v. Shields , 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014). Because Hansen is proceeding wit hout the assistance of counsel, “we construe his pleadings liberally.” Ledbetter v. City of Topeka , 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). We make some allowances f or deficiencies, such as unfam iliarity with pleading requirements, failure t o cite appropriate legal author ity, and confusion of4 legal theories. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But “the cour t cannot take on the responsibi lity of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id. Nor will we “supply additional factual al legations to round out a plaint iff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico , 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). We turn first to the access-to-t he-courts claim. Hansen assert s that he could not file a state-court civil acti on against his assailant befor e the statute of limitations expired because the Police Depart ment did not pro cess crime-sce ne evidence or identify his assailant. This t ype of claim is known as a “back ward-looking” access claim. See Christopher v. Harbury , 536 U.S. 403, 405, 412-15 (2002) (in which the plaintiff alleged government dec eption prevented her from bring ing a lawsuit that might have saved the life of her husband, who was a foreign dis sident). The district court traced the history o f such a claim back to Harbury . R. at 136. It then explained how the circuit courts recognizi ng such a claim have done so on ly where obstructive actions by state actors (such as destruction or concealment of evidence) prevented an individual from pursuing a civi l claim. R. at 137-38. It foun d Hansen’s claim to be “qualitatively different” in that he alleged “the city did not try hard enough to assist his civil litigation efforts agai nst an unknown third party.” R. at 138. Ultimately, the district court held that his clai m fails as a matter of law “[b ]ecause the Constitution does not impose a duty on governme nt entities to actively assis t the civil litigation efforts of crime v ictims.” R. at 139.5 We affirm the dismissal of the a ccess-to-the-courts claim for t he reasons set forth in the district court’s well-reasoned order. We agree Ha nsen’s theory has no basis in Supreme Court or Tenth C ircuit case law. Hansen’s cla im rests on a purportedly “reckless investigation,” see R. at 11, which is not the type of wrongful or intentional police behavior that a backward-looking access c laim seeks to redress. Moreover, in attacking the Polic e Department’s due diligence, H ansen effectively asks the judiciary to micromanage how the Police Department per forms investigations and allocates its resources. We decline to ente r such a morass, and indeed it would be inappr opriate for us to do so. See, e.g. , Muehler v. Mena , 544 U.S. 93, 110 (2005) (“[A] c ourt should not ordinarily quest ion the allocation of police officers or r esources[.]”). We also agree with, and therefor e affirm, the district court’s decision to dismiss the state constitutiona l claims without prejudice. It is well established that when all federal claims have been dismissed, as is the case her e, “the court may, and usually should, decline to exercis e [supplemental] jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch Cty. , 853 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n , 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998)).
II. Motion for Reconsideration Hansen moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order under Rule 60(a), (b)(1), and (b)(6), alleg ing mistake and clear error. H e reiterated his earlier arguments for his federal acce ss-to-the-courts c laim, albeit wi th a focus on the Police6 Department’s failure to process material evidence, and posited that the district court’s ruling will force assault victim s around the country to take ma tters into their own hands to “‘settle the score’ w ith their attacker(s)” and “to re ap ‘justice.’” R. at 146. He also asked the district court to examine his state constitut ional claims “following certification to, and determinat ion by, . . . the Utah Supreme Court.” R. at 148. The district court denied the m otion. It reasoned that relief was inappropriate under Rule 60(a) because Hansen d id not identify “a clerical mi stake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission,” as required, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), and because “Rule 60(a) may not be us ed to change something which h as been deliberately done,” R. at 153-54 (quoting Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century Cas. Co. , 621 F.2d 1062, 1065 ( 10th Cir. 1980)). It also found relief wa s unwarranted under Rule 60(b)(1) due to Hansen’s fa ilure to identify a mistake of law or fact by the district court or, alternativel y, to provide persuasive reasons why the court should adopt his position. Finally, it co ncluded Hansen was not entit led to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because his argument was impermissibly duplicative of his Rule 60(b)(1) argument. See State Bank of S. Utah v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill) , 76 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A court may not premise Rule 60(b)(6) relief . . . on one of the specific grounds enumerated in c lauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).”)

. We review the district court’s denial of Hansen’s Rule 60 motio n for an abuse of discretion. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Cade , 510 F.3d 1277, 1278 (10th Cir. 2007) ( Rule 60(a) motion); Jennings v. Rivers , 394 F.3d 850, 854 (10th Cir. 2005) (Rule 60(b) m otion). We will reverse the dist rict court’s7 determination “only if we find a complete absence of a reasonab le basis and are certain that the decision is wrong.” Yapp v. Excel Corp. , 186 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (ellipsis and in ternal quotation marks omitted ). Here, too, we agree with the district court’s s ound reasoning. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing this action under Rule 12(b)(6) and its order denying Ha nsen’s motion for reconsiderat ion under Rule 60(a) and (b).

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge