SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3786- 22 K.R., 1 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. J.L.R., Defendant-Respondent.

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Submitted May 6, 2024

– Decided May 13, 202 4 Before Judges Sabatino and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FM

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. Wernik & Salvatore, attorneys for appellant (David Salvatore, of counsel and on the brief). Senoff & Enis, attorneys for respondent (Michael J. Gunteski, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

1 We use initials to protect the medical privacy an d welfare of the parties' minor son who is the subject of this appeal. R. 1:38-3(d ). NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 3786

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This is a child relocation and custody case in whic h we are guided by the "best interests of the child" test adopted by the S upreme Court in Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017). After a fact-finding hearing with several witnesses, the Family Part judge denied the mother' s opposed application to move the parties' eleven-year-old son with her from New Jersey to Florida. We affirm. The parties married in 2010, separated in 2014, and divorced in 2015. They have one child together, a son who was born in December 2012. Since the time of the separation, plaintiff K.R., the child's mother, has had primary residential custody of the son. However, the fathe r, defendant J. L. R. , 2 has regularly enjoyed parenting time with the son every other weekend and on vacations, pursuant to the parties' divorce agreeme nt. The son has lived in New Jersey his entire life. H e resides with his mother at her parents' home in New Egypt and attends schoo l there. The father lives in Neptune Township. He has been employed with the same firm as an environmental technician for about fourteen years.

2 All three of the child's initials are identical to th ose of the father. The child is referred to in the trial court's opinion as "J.R." To avoid confusion , we refer to the child as "the son," rather than by initials.3 A- 3786

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Both parties have remarried. The mother' s present husband, who she married in 2022, has two children from another rela tionship. They were ages twelve and six at the time of the trial court's decision. Those children live abroad, but the y vis it with the ir father about twice each year. The father has two children with his second wife, w ho he has known since 2016 . Those children, who were ages five and one-and-h alf at the time of the trial court's decision, live with the father and th e stepmother in Neptune Township. The ir home is large enough to accommodate the son and hi s two half- siblings. The mother sought to relocate with the son to Florida because her cur rent husband's long-time employer offered him a better p aying position in Florida in
2021 , with a chance to take over the reins of the compa ny in the future. He accepted the offer, and they bought a house togethe r in Florida. The mother's plan is to move to Florida and find a job herself. Her parents are also planning to move to Florida and be nearby. The parties agree the son would prefer to remain in New Jersey and live, for the first time, at his father's house. The mot her contends the son is becoming receptive to a possible move to Florida. If the so n remained in New Jersey and moved in with his father, his stepmother would take the lead in getting him ready4 A- 3786

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for school, meals, and so on at the father ’s house. The father is willing to assume primary residential custody if the mother moves to Florida. If he remained in New Jersey, the son would have to change school districts to Neptune. He has special needs (dyslex ia) and an IEP. The trial judge found it unclear if the Neptune school district wou ld be as effective as the son's present district in providing services. On the oth er hand, the judge also noted it is unclear if the Florida schools would provide the son with equally effective services, either. There are cousins in New Jersey on the father's sid e, with whom the son often spends time. The son has no cousins in Flori da. The stepfather' s children are there during the summer for a few weeks and on school breaks. The judge found that if the son moved to Florida, his time th ere would not overlap much with the stepfather's children, because the mother's revise d custody plan called for the son go to New Jersey during the summer and on school breaks. The judge declined in his discretion to interview t he son about his preferences. Neither parent wants the son caught i n the middle of a conflict. The parties fortunately have an amicable relationsh ip, and there has been no domestic violence between them. Until the present relocation matter, they have not been litigating disputes with one another in the Family Part.5 A- 3786

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After a plenary hearing at which each of the parent s testified, as well as the maternal grandmother and the mother's current h usband, the Family Part judge found it is the best interests of the son to not r elocate. The judge wrote a detailed opinion dated July 11, 2023, applying the Bisbing factors. He recognized that, no matter who prevailed in the cas e, the parents would be 1,200 miles apart. The opinion reasonably discusses the evidence in a fair manner. On appeal, the mother argues the judge misapplied t he factors

. She contends the judge placed too much weight on the so n's lifelong residence in New Jersey and his interactions with extended famil y in New Jersey. She also contends the judge did not give enough consideratio n to the fact that the father would depend greatly on his present wife to take ca re of the son's daily needs and the fact that the family unit the son has lived with up until now are all moving to Florida. N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 requires a parent seeking to relocat e a child from New Jersey without the consent of the other parent to demonstrate "cause" for the relocation. The intent of N.J.S.A. 9:2 -2 is "to preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and d evelop their familial relationship." Bisbing , 230 N.J. at 323 (quoting Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 350 (1988) ). The "Court has observed[] [that] a court making the sensit ive6 A- 3786

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determination of 'cause ' must weigh 'the custodial parent's interest in free dom of movement as qualified by his or her custodial oblig ation, the State's interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and the competing interests of the noncustodial parent.'" Ibid.
In its seminal opinion in Bisbing, the Court interpre ted "cause" under
N.J.S.A. 9:2 -2 as requiring the petitioning parent to satisfy t he "the best interests analysis . . . set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), supp lemented by other factors as appropriate." 230 N.J. at 338 (citing N.J.S.A. 9:2 -4(c)). In adopting the best interest standard, the Bisbing Court specifically o verruled the two-part removal
test Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001). 230 N.J. at 312-23. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) details the following statutory f actors for consideration by trial courts in making custody arrangements:

[T]he parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child; the par ents' willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationsh ip of the child with its parents and siblings; the histor y of domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent; the preference of the child when of suffici ent age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelli gent decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the home environment offered; the quality and continuit y of the child's education; the fitness of the parent s; the geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the7 A- 3786

- 22 extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation; the parents' employment responsibilities; and the age and number of the children. The Bisbing Court noted that "additional factors no t set forth in the statute may also be considered in a given case." 230 N.J. at 335 (citing N.J.S.A. 9:2-4). For example, "the parent of primary residence may have important insights about the arrangement that will most effectively serve th e child [and] [t]he parent of alternate residence may similarly offer significant information about the child." Ibid. Additionally, "[t]he views of other adults with close relationships with the child may also inform the court's decision." Ibid. (citing Emma v. Evans, 215 N.J. 197, 216-23 (2013)). Trial courts may also co nsider "documentary evidence, interviews with the children at the court 's discretion, and expert testimony." 230 N.J. at 335 (citations omitted).
In reviewing determinations on appeal, we afford considerable deference

to the discretion of

Family Part judges. The Family Part's findings are binding on appeal, "when supported by adequate, substantial , credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) ; see also O'Connor v. O'Connor, 349 N.J. Super. 381 (App. Div. 2012). Such deference is par ticularly appropriate in cases where, as here, the evidence is largely testimonial in nature and hinges upon a8 A- 3786

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court's ability to make assessments of credibility and veracity based on its observation of testifying witnesses. Id. at 412. The trial court's application of the pertinent relo cation and custody factors under Bisbing involved the exercise of discretion. "Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examin ed to discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547 (2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision "rested on an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate facto rs, failed to consider controlling legal principles[,] or made findings in consistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This court will not "disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" S.D. v. M .J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 42 9 (quoting Cesare , 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc., v . Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (alteration in original)) ). We review rulings on questions of law, however, de novo. Manalapan R ealty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.9 A- 3786

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of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Applying these review principles to the substance of this appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision substantially for the so und reasons expressed in Judge David M. Fritch's thoughtful written decision. We reject the criticisms levied by the mother as unpersuasive. The judge carefully considered the evidence and applied the correct post-Bisbing legal standards. Although reasonable minds might differ about the outcome of this difficult di spute, it is abundantly clear that the judge acted within the zone of his conside rable discretion. We discern no reason to set aside his ruling. Affirmed.