2003 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-13-2003

Greer v. Smith

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket 01-2943

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Recommended Citation

"Greer v. Smith" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 747.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/747
*The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior District Judge for the Northern

District of California, sitting by designation.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 01-2943

LARRY L. GREER

Appellant

v.

BRUCE SMITH, Deputy Super.; LINDA J. NAVROTH; KEN KERESTES; O’CONNOR, Dr.;

STALLINGS, Dr.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(Dist. Court No. 01-CV-00078)

District Court Judge: Muir, Malcolm

Argued on February 10, 2003

Before: ALITO and McKEE, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge*

(Opinion Filed: March 10, 2003)

Mark H. Lynch

Robert J. Lundman (argued)

Covington & Burling
-2-

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-2401

Counsel for Appellant

James M. Sheehan

General Counsel

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Michael A. Farnan

Chief Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections

Raymond W. Dorian (argued)

Assistant Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections

55 Utley Drive

Camp Hill, PA 17011

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Larry L. Greer appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his action brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, in which he alleged a violation of his constitutional rights. The

District Court did not address the merits of the claim but rather dismissed the suit for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a).
1Exceptions to the general rule of conversion have been made where the materials

considered at the dismissal stage are either public records deemed to be undisputably

authentic or materials directly relied upon in the plaintiff’s complaint. See eg Southern

Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27

(3d Cir. 1999); City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir.

1998); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d

Cir. 1993).

-3-

The relevant provision of the PLRA states that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States

(42 U.S.C. §1983) or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. §1997(e)(a). While the District Court concluded correctly that the PLRA

exhaustion provision applies to the plaintiff, the Court erred by granting the defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust solely on the basis of representations made in an

affidavit submitted by the defendants. Subject to a few narrow exceptions not applicable in

this case,1 Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a District Court to

convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment if the Court considers

materials outside the plaintiff’s pleading, such as the affidavit relied upon in this case. Camp

v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). 

The Rule directs that

[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of

the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside

the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall

be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule

56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material

made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
-4-

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); See also, e.g., Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972). In the

present case, the District Court considered material outside of the pleadings and, therefore,

should have converted the motion for dismissal to a summary judgment motion, allowing the

plaintiff an opportunity for appropriate discovery and “a reasonable opportunity to present

all material made pertinent” to the motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).

Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint without

prejudice and remand for further proceedings to determine whether the defendants sustained

their burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative

remedies in accordance with the PLRA exhaustion requirement. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d

287 (3d Cir. 2002).