United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-40073

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Adam P. Runsdorf, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:21-CR-112-10

Before Davis, Jones, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A magistrate judge in the Southern District of Florida issued an order 

releasing Appellant Adam P. Runsdorf before his impending trial on a 

number of charges in the Eastern District of Texas. The district court in the 

Eastern District of Texas then vacated the release order and ordered 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 22, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Runsdorf detained. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the

detention order.

I. BACKGROUND

Runsdorf is the owner and president of Woodfield Pharmaceutical 

LLC (“Woodfield”), which “holds itself out as a contract manufacturing 

organization specializing in liquid solutions and offering pharmaceutical 

outsourcing services including research and development, commercial 

manufacturing, regulatory support, packaging, and labeling.”1

 The 

government alleges that, from approximately 2014 to August 2021, a drug 

trafficking organization “partnered with Woodfield, including Runsdorf and 

his employees and facilities, for assistance with the development, production, 

and delivery of misbranded and counterfeit promethazine-codeine cough 

syrup.”2

Runsdorf allegedly:

o “met with members of the [drug trafficking organization] 

multiple times at the Woodfield facilities in Houston, Texas 

to discuss improvements to the promethazine syrup 

product[;]”

o “instructed Woodfield employees to comply with the [drug 

trafficking organization’s] request to make the product 

1 The company is based in Boca Raton, Florida and operates a manufacturing 

facility in Houston, Texas.

2 “Promethazine and promethazine-codeine cough syrup are prescription drugs 

approved by the FDA for distribution within the United States.” But they “can have 

tranquilizing and euphoric effects when consumed at higher-than-recommended doses, 

especially when mixed with alcohol or drugs such as marihuana.” As a result, “[s]ome 

popular music has glamorized drinking promethazine-codeine cough syrup for its mindaltering effects, and promethazine-codeine has become increasingly popular among 

recreational drug users in Southeast Texas and elsewhere. Promethazine-codeine cough 

syrup mixed with a soft drink is sometimes referred to as ‘syrup,’ ‘drank,’ or ‘lean.’”

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indistinguishable from other legitimate promethazine syrup 

products[;]”

o “allowed the [drug trafficking organization] access to 

Woodfield facilities, ensuring a more efficient large-scale 

production process of the promethazine syrup product[;]”

and 

o “requested that the [drug trafficking organization] increase 

its business with Woodfield by ordering more ‘batches’ of 

the promethazine syrup product on a more frequent basis.”

The government believes that Runsdorf received between $3,000,000 and 

$5,000,000 by participating in the alleged counterfeiting scheme. The entire 

conspiracy allegedly made $52,000,000.

A magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Texas issued a criminal 

complaint in January 2022 referencing several felonies. Runsdorf was 

arrested in Boca Raton, Florida four days later.

A magistrate judge in the Southern District of Florida held a detention 

hearing one week after Runsdorf’s arrest. The government argued for 

Runsdorf’s pre-trial detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) because his 

wealth and history of travel, the seriousness of the charges, and the potential 

sentence made him a flight risk. It also urged the court to consider “the 

nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that 

would be posed by [Runsdorf’s] release.” A supervisor from the Drug 

Enforcement Administration’s Houston field office testified at length 

regarding the criminal complaint’s allegations. He also testified that a 

confidential source told another DEA agent that Runsdorf attempted to flee 

the country by boat.3

3 Runsdorf supposedly told the source that he “was about to travel from Boca 

Raton to the island of St. Marteen in the Caribbean Sea[,]” and “[t]he source knew that 

[Runsdorf] owns and operates (with the assistance of a hired captain and crew) a 110-foot 

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The magistrate judge ordered Runsdorf’s release pending trial. He 

reasoned that Runsdorf was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the 

community. The magistrate judge did, however, separately find that “the 

weight of the evidence is very strong and . . . the circumstances of the offense 

are a serious crime, all of which create[d] an inference that [Runsdorf] would 

have a motive not to appear.” The magistrate judge also clarified that:

Once [Runsdorf] has his first appearance in Texas, the judge in 

Texas is going to set their own bond. They may adopt my bond, 

they may adopt their own bond, or they may detain him. All 

these finites will be taken up with the judge in Texas.

. . . .

I’m just setting a bond to hold us over for a couple of weeks 

until he can get to Texas.

He then explained that “[u]ntil [a judge in the Eastern District of Texas] 

release[d] [Runsdorf], [his] order [was] held in abeyance.”

The government appealed and moved to stay the magistrate judge’s 

order several days later. The district court in the Eastern District of Texas 

then held two separate hearings over a period of four days. These hearings 

included testimony from a DEA agent who testified that that a confidential 

source told him “that Mr. Runsdorf had been in his words spooked and was 

fleeing the country for a number of factors.”4 The investigator then 

superyacht named the ‘Marigot’ that [he] keeps . . . in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.” 

Runsdorf also “owns a 30-foot Sea Ray boat[.]” The government later clarified that the 

source had interpreted comments by Runsdorf, not that Runsdorf had stated that he would 

flee.

4 This is the same confidential source referenced by the other DEA agent during 

the first hearing. The district court, however, stated “that the person who testified [at the 

first hearing] didn’t—he wasn’t a person who had spoken with the source like this witness 

has.” And the district court therefore did “not put[] much weight on anything that was 

said[]” during the first hearing.

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personally met with the source after their initial conversation and testified 

that the source’s information remained consistent.5

 The source confirmed 

for a third time on the phone that he “still believed that . . . Runsdorf was 

preparing to flee[.]”6

 The court next heard testimony from a supervisory 

deputy United States Marshal,

7 a special agent with the Internal Revenue 

Service’s Criminal Investigations Division,8 and a DEA task force officer who

initially submitted an affidavit to support the criminal complaint.9 A grand 

jury indicted Runsdorf on all three charged counts several days after the 

second hearing. The district court then vacated the magistrate judge’s order

and entered a pre-trial detention order because Runsdorf posed a risk of flight 

and a danger to the community. Runsdorf timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews pretrial detention orders under “a deferential 

standard of review that we equate to the abuse-of-discretion standard.” 

United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 

In doing so, the court reviews questions of law de novo and factual findings for 

5 This meeting occurred several days before Runsdorf’s arrest.

6 This last telephone call occurred nearly a week after Runsdorf’s arrest and the 

day before the initial hearing.

7 The Marshal’s testimony largely concerned his monitoring of Runsdorf’s yacht 

and how difficult it had been to track.

8 The IRS agent’s testimony largely concerned Runsdorf’s assets and financial 

reporting.

9 The DEA task force officer testified about a conference call one week before 

Runsdorf’s arrest during which nearly a dozen law enforcement officers discussed 

“possible flight risk information.” The general understanding was that Runsdorf would 

attempt to flee on January 14th, so the task force officer asked local law enforcement to “to

conduct spot checks surveillance . . . .” and travelled to Florida. No one was able to find 

Runsdorf between January 10th and the afternoon of January 13th. Officers then obtained 

a warrant to begin tracking Runsdorf’s phone, which led to his arrest.

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clear error. United States v. Olis, 450 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted); United States v. Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Runsdorf raises four arguments in favor of reversing the district 

court’s detention order and reinstating the magistrate judge’s release order.

First, Runsdorf argues that the district court erred in holding a second

full detention hearing and allowing additional testimony and evidence 

without a showing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 that the information was unknown 

at the time of the first hearing. Section 3142(f)(2)(B) provides that a 

detention hearing “may be reopened . . . at any time before trial if the judicial 

officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the 

time of the hearing . . . .” But the government did not move to reopen the 

initial detention hearing; it appealed the magistrate judge’s release order 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1). That provision has no new evidence 

requirement. Indeed, no textual link exists between §§ 3142 and 3145. This 

first argument therefore fails.

Second, Runsdorf contends that that the district court improperly 

denied his motion for disclosure of the statements of testifying witnesses 

under 18 U.S.C § 3500 and Fed. Rules of Crim. Pro. 26.2 and 46. “The 

district court’s administration of discovery rules will not be reversed unless 

the appellant shows an abuse of discretion that prejudiced his substantial 

rights.” United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 694 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 

United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 2005)). Runsdorf has not 

articulated how the extensive materials that he sought from the government 

would have contradicted the testimony relevant to the pre-trial detention 

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determination, and he therefore fails to show an effect on his substantial 

rights. See id. The second argument is unavailing.

Third, Runsdorf maintains that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to identify the confidential source who told the DEA about his alleged 

plans to flee. This court “review[s] alleged violations of the Confrontation 

Clause of the Sixth Amendment de novo, applying a harmless error analysis.” 

United States v. Diaz, 637 F.3d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

“Where there is no constitutional violation, we will not find an abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion absent ‘a showing that the limitations were clearly 

prejudicial.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438 (5th 

Cir. 2008)). Here, the confidential source’s information was only one among 

a number of factors that the district court considered in issuing its detention 

order. A great deal of other evidence adduced at the hearings demonstrates 

that the district court acted within its discretion, and that any error 

attributable to not disclosing the confidential source’s identity was ultimately 

harmless. See Diaz, 637 F.3d at 597 (citations omitted). The third argument 

fails.

Finally, Runsdorf insists that the district court erred by concluding 

that he posed a flight risk, and that no combination of conditions could 

reasonably assure his appearance and protect the community. If convicted, 

Runsdorf faces prison terms of up to 20 years for each charge of trafficking in 

drugs with a counterfeit mark and conspiring to commit money laundering. 

He also faces over $5,000,000 in fines if convicted on all counts. The district 

court emphasized these facts in addition to Runsdorf’s substantial assets, 

access to a yacht, history of international travel, and various other factors. 

These “[f]actual findings are ‘clearly erroneous only if, based on the entire 

evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.’” United States v. Barry, 978 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 609 (5th Cir. 2014)). Runsdorf

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has not met that burden. Based on those factual findings, the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Runsdorf posed a flight risk 

due to his assets, personal history, and characteristics. See Rueben, 974 F.2d 

580, 586 (citations omitted). Because Runsdorf poses a flight risk, the court 

need not address the district court’s dangerousness finding.

AFFIRMED.

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