IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EVANS DEWAYNE SCRUGGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-339-CG-B

)

BERG SPIRAL PIPE CORP., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Evans Dewayne Scruggs (“Plaintiff”), an African American who worked 

as a Support Operator and Grinder for Berg Spiral Pipe Corp. (“Defendant”), 

alleges Defendant unlawfully terminated his employment because of a

perceived disability and his race. (Doc. 1, pp. 3 – 7). Consequently, Plaintiff 

filed this lawsuit asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

of 1990, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e – 2000e17 (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981 (“Section 1981”). (Doc. 1, pp. 5 – 8). This matter is now before the 

Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26) together with 

supporting materials (Docs. 27, 28), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Docs. 

30, 31), and Defendant’s Reply. (Doc. 32). After careful consideration and for 

the reasons set forth herein, the motion is due to be GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(c) governs 

procedures and provides that a party seeking summary judgment bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion. This 

includes “identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The mere 

existence of a factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial; 

rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary 

judgment. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 

809 (11th Cir. 2004). 

 The substantive law of the plaintiff’s cause of action determines 

which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If a non-moving party fails to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of its case on which it has the 

burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 323. In reviewing whether a non-moving party has met its 

burden, the Court must stop short of weighing the evidence and determining 

credibility. Instead, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of 

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the non-moving party. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 –

99 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus the 

inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail 

as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

FACTS1

Plaintiff started working for Defendant on March 28, 2012 as a 

temporary employee. (Doc. 27, p. 4). Elwood Staffing, a skilled trades staffing 

company, helped place Plaintiff at Defendant’s facility. (Doc. 27, p. 2). 

Defendant considers temporary employees for permanent openings when 

positions become available, if the temporary employee passes the Test for 

Adult Basic Education, and completes a criminal background investigation, 

drug screen, and medical examination. (Doc. 27, pp. 3 – 5).

In January 2013, a permanent opening for a grinder position became 

available. (Doc. 27, p. 4). Defendant considered Plaintiff for the opening. 

Grinders must operate a handheld grinder and other equipment listed in the 

job description. (Doc. 27, p. 4; Doc. 27-1, pp. 21-22). Grinders generally tack 

welding tabs on to pipes, or cut them off, depending on the assignment. (Doc. 

27, p. 4). Grinders also roll pipe down the production line, which can require 

exerting 40 pounds of torque. (Doc. 27, p. 4). 

 1 At the summary judgment stage, the facts are taken in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant. Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998–99. The “facts, as 

accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the 

actual facts of the case.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 

n. 3 (11th Cir. 2000).

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As required for the permanent position, Plaintiff passed the Test for 

Adult Basic Education on January 17, 2013. (Doc. 27, p. 4). On January 28, 

2013, Defendant sent Plaintiff an offer letter for the permanent grinder 

position. (Doc. 27-1, pp. 18 – 19). The offer letter described the position, pay, 

and benefits associated with the job. (Doc. 27-1, p. 18). The letter also stated: 

If you are agreeable to our offer you must pass, at 

Berg’s expense, a pre-employment physical examination and 

drug test prior to starting work. The drug screen must be 

conducted within 48 hours of receipt of this letter. This 

employment offer will be withdrawn if the drug screen is not 

conducted within that 48 hour time period. 

(Doc. 27-1, p. 18). The letter continued:

Your employment is contingent on education 

verification (high school graduation or GED is required), our 

receipt of a favorable background investigation and preemployment physical exam, results of a negative drug test, 

and I-9 verification of authorization to work in the U.S. 

(Doc. 27-1, p. 18). The letter concluded by saying, “Your start date is 

scheduled for as soon as administratively possible.” (Doc. 27-1, p. 19). 

Plaintiff completed the drug screen and physical examination on 

January 29, 2013, one day after receiving the letter. (Doc. 27, p. 5). The drug 

screen results returned negative, meaning Plaintiff did not test positive for 

any of the drugs screened in the test. (Doc. 30, p. 5). Dr. Terry W. Taylor 

conducted Plaintiff’s physical examination. (Doc. 27, p. 5; Doc. 31-5, p. 2).

During the physical examination, Dr. Taylor learned that Plaintiff previously 

had back surgery. (Doc. 30, p. 7). Plaintiff told Dr. Taylor he did not have any 

medical restrictions as a result of his back surgery, but he informed Dr. 

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Taylor that he had prescriptions for Lortab and Skelaxin.2 (Doc. 30, p. 8; Doc. 

31-4, p. 3). Plaintiff’s pre-placement medical report stated he “is not currently 

taking Lortab or Skelaxin.” (Doc. 31-4, p. 3). At the end of the exam, Dr. 

Taylor prepared a report for Defendant, which under “accommodation 

required” stated “[n]o safety sensitive work,” and “[n]o lifting over 40 lbs.”

(Doc. 27-1, p. 24).

Defendant received the report from Dr. Taylor on February 13, 2013. 

(Doc. 27, p. 5). Upon receiving the physical examination report, Jim Key, 

Human Resources Manager for Defendant, e-mailed Dr. Taylor to ask him to 

elaborate on the note in the report regarding “no safety sensitive work.” (Doc. 

27-1, p. 5; Doc. 31-6; Doc. 31-7, pp. 2 – 3). Dr. Taylor replied and stated 

Plaintiff had received prescriptions for narcotic pain medication and muscle 

relaxers, and such medications “cause a safety concern.” (Doc. 31-7, p. 2). Dr. 

Taylor explained safety sensitive work includes 

climbing to unprotected heights, operating dangerous 

equipment or machinery, working where one could fall into 

water and drown. It would also include responsibility of 

operation of monitors where attention to detail could put 

others in danger such as a control room operator that 

monitors chemical operations. DOT and Coast Guard 

consider these medications disqualifying for individuals that 

need a license such as truck drivers, boat captains or 

engineers.

(Doc. 31-7, p. 2). Mr. Key then asked via e-mail whether Dr. Taylor could 

confirm if Plaintiff currently used the prescription drugs. (Doc. 31-7, p. 2). Dr. 

 2 Lortab is a narcotic pain reliever used to treat moderately severe pain. 

Skelaxin is a muscle relaxant used to relax muscles and relieve 

musculoskeletal pain. (Doc. 27-3). 

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Taylor stated an orthopedist had prescribed them to Plaintiff in the recent 

past, Plaintiff tested negative on the drug screen, and the drug screen did not 

test for muscle relaxers. (Doc. 31-7, p. 2). Dr. Taylor offered to change his 

recommendation to “no safety sensitive work while taking narcotics and 

muscle relaxers.” (Doc. 31-7, p. 2). 

After receiving this information from Dr. Taylor, Mr. Key and Scott 

Schuler met with Plaintiff on February 15, 2013. (Doc. 27-1, p. 6). Mr. Key 

told Plaintiff he was withdrawing the offer of employment because pushing 

pipe may be a problem for Plaintiff and he posed a high risk to the company. 

(Doc. 30, p. 8). Mr. Key did not ask Plaintiff about his current prescription 

drug use, nor did Mr. Key discuss with Plaintiff whether he would refrain 

from using substances that would impair his ability to work safely. (Doc. 30, 

p. 8). Mr. Key then contacted Elwood Staffing through e-mail, and stated 

Defendant could not offer Plaintiff employment because “he has back 

limitations, we cannot risk him harming his health in his current assignment 

and therefore his assignment at Berg must be ended.” (Doc. 31-8, p. 2).

Plaintiff timely submitted a charge with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on March 4, 2013, alleging discrimination 

based on race and disability. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 2 – 3). On March 29, 2013, 

Defendant sent Plaintiff a second offer of employment for the same position 

and pay. (Doc. 31-10). On August 2, 2013, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s 

EEOC charge. (Doc 30, p. 10). In its response, Defendant stated it “made an 

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unconditional offer of reinstatement on March 29, 2013, which [Plaintiff] 

declined.” (Doc. 31-2, p. 2). Defendant also stated in its response that it

decided to bring Plaintiff back to work if he would agree to adhere to the 

drug-free workplace policy and not use substances that may impair his ability 

to work safely. (Doc. 31-2, p. 5).3 Defendant asserted it terminated Plaintiff 

because of its concern over “whether [Plaintiff] could perform either job if he’s 

taking muscle relaxers because of the potential for temporary mental 

impairment as a side effect to the drug. It is potentially unsafe.” (Doc. 31-2, p. 

4). Defendant further stated it decided to make Plaintiff a second permanent 

job offer after receiving the additional background information about Plaintiff 

in the EEOC charge. (Doc. 31-2, p. 4).4

Plaintiff also alleged racial discrimination in his EEOC charge. (Doc. 

31-1, p. 3). Plaintiff observed Defendant hire a white employee, Phillip Wells, 

 3 The policy is not mentioned in Defendant’s second offer letter (Doc. 31-10), 

but it is attached as an exhibit to Defendant’s motion. (Doc. 27-1, pp. 26 – 29). 

The Drug-Free Workplace Compliance policy states in relevant part:

Although we do not prohibit proper use of prescription 

medication, we do prohibit the abuse of such substances. 

Employees must consult with their doctors about the effect of 

prescribed medications on their ability to work in a safe 

manner, and promptly disclose any restrictions to the Safety 

Supervisor. If the Company has reason to believe that the 

medication is affecting job performance, it may temporarily 

reassign the employee or take other appropriate action. 

(Doc. 27-1, p. 26). No one alleges Plaintiff abused his prescription drugs.

4 In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states this is 

disingenuous, because there is no reference to medication or new information 

in his EEOC charge. (Doc. 30, p. 15, n. 2).

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to work as a grinder after Defendant withdrew its job offer to Plaintiff. (Doc. 

30, p. 9). Plaintiff also stated in his EEOC charge that Defendant “failed to 

make other African American employees permanent employees because of 

their race.” (Doc. 31-1, p. 3). In response, Defendant notes that since 2009, it 

“has hired 33 African Americans who were working as temporary contract 

employees into permanent positions.” (Doc. 31-2, pp. 5 – 6). Defendant 

further notes nine other employees who reported taking prescription 

medication were not terminated, including one African American. (Doc. 32, p. 

3). The EEOC issued its dismissal and notice of rights letter to Plaintiff on 

May 1, 2014, and Plaintiff timely filed this lawsuit. (Doc. 1-2, p. 1).

Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff 

cannot establish a prima facie discrimination case or rebut Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. (Doc. 27, p. 1). Defendant argues it 

“terminated Plaintiff’s temporary assignment and withdrew its conditional 

offer of employment because it was concerned that his previous use of 

prescription muscle relaxers, which do not show up on a drug screen, could 

pose a potential danger to himself and to others in the workplace.” (Doc. 27, 

pp. 1 – 2). 

In response, Plaintiff asserts Defendant perceived him as disabled, and 

unlawfully terminated his employment. (Doc. 30, p. 4). Plaintiff also 

maintains Defendant discriminated against him because of his race. (Doc. 30, 

p. 21). Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim and racial discrimination 

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claim are analyzed separately below. 

ANALYSIS

1. ADA Discrimination Claim

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified individual on 

the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 

advancement, or discharge of employees ... and other terms, conditions, and 

privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines a 

“disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 

one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(1). Accordingly, a “qualified individual with a disability” means a 

person who is actually disabled, recorded as disabled, or “regarded as” 

disabled. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999) 

superseded by statute, U.S. Pub. L. 110-325 (January 1, 2009). 

Plaintiff contends Defendant regarded him as disabled, and unlawfully 

terminated him because of his perceived disability. Owusu-Ansah v. CocaCola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 655 

(2013) (concluding 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) protects employees who are not 

disabled); Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(holding a plaintiff may maintain a claim under the ADA of being perceived 

as disabled without proof of actually being disabled). As the Eleventh Circuit 

has elaborated, “[u]nder the ‘regarded as’ prong, a person is ‘disabled’ if her 

employer perceives her as having an ADA-qualifying disability, even if there 

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is no factual basis for that perception.” Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 

357 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). This type of “regarded 

as” claim is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas5 burden-shifting 

framework. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 

2005); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3). 

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework requires Plaintiff 

to first establish a prima facie discrimination case. Thus Plaintiff must show 

(1) a disability (whether real or perceived), (2) that he was otherwise 

qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, and (3) he was 

discriminated against based upon the (real or perceived) disability. Gordon v. 

E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996); accord

D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1226 (citations omitted).6 After a plaintiff establishes a 

prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. 

As Defendant notes, an employer may inquire into whether an employee 

suffers from a disability so long as such examination is limited to “job-related 

 5 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

6 In its reply, Defendant contends “Plaintiff has presented no evidence that 

he was replaced by a person who was not disabled or identified any employee 

or any comparator evidence showing that he was treated less favorably than 

similarly situated persons outside his protected classification.” (Doc. 32, pp. 

5-6). Defendant is confusing the elements of a prima facie racial 

discrimination claim with the elements of a prima facie “regarded as” 

disabled discrimination claim. See Snider v. U.S. Steel-Fairfield Works Med. 

Dep’t, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1361, 1366 (N.D. Ala. 2014) aff’d, 591 F. App’x 908 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (discussing how ADA claims use the same burden shifting analysis 

as Title VII claims, but listing different prima facie elements for ADA claim).

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functions” and “consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12112(d)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c); see also Owusu-Ansah, 715 F.3d at 

1311 – 12 (analyzing the ADA phrase “job-related and consistent with 

business necessity”). Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 

produce sufficient evidence to allow a fact-finder to conclude that the 

employer’s reasons were not the real reasons for the adverse employment 

action. Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff argues Defendant fired him because of a perceived 

disability: his previous back surgery and alleged back limitations. (Doc. 30, p. 

4). Plaintiff showed he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential 

functions of the job, and he had been working for Defendant for several 

months before being offered a permanent position. Defendant did not retract 

its offer of employment until it learned about Plaintiff’s previous back 

surgery. Based on the record, Defendant may have regarded Plaintiff as 

disabled, and unlawfully discriminated against him because of that perceived 

disability. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

The burden shifts to Defendant to show a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s position with the 

company. Defendant argues its decision “not to hire Plaintiff as a permanent 

employee and to terminate his temporary placement with the Company was 

based upon Plaintiff’s recent history of use of prescription muscle relaxers, ... 

[which] could impair his ability to work in a safety sensitive environment.” 

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(Doc. 32, p. 2). Defendant therefore argues it had a reasonable objective 

concern that Plaintiff presented a safety risk. (Doc. 27, p. 14). This legitimate 

explanation is enough to shift the burden back to Plaintiff to show that this 

reasoning is a pretext.7

To rebut Defendant’s proferred reason as a pretext, Plaintiff observes 

that when Mr. Key terminated his employment, he made statements only 

about Plaintiff’s back, and not his prescription drug use. (Doc. 30, p. 15). 

Plaintiff further argues that the March 2013 job offer creates the inference 

that Defendant’s decision to terminate him was not motivated by any safety 

concern because he had the same history of prescription medication then, and 

Defendant had not communicated with Plaintiff about that medication. (Doc. 

30, p. 15). Plaintiff also argues that Defendant made no effort to ask him 

whether he was currently taking muscle relaxers, or whether he would be 

willing to stop taking his medication while working for Defendant. (Doc. 30, 

p. 16). Indeed, Defendant states that while Mr. Key did not “expressly 

 7 As legal prescription drug use increases, employers are faced with new 

challenges concerning workplace safety, employee health, and potential 

discrimination. In turn, more prescription drug-related cases are being 

litigated in court. See, e.g., Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 566, 580 

(6th Cir. 2014) (court finding drug-testing protocol pushes the boundaries of 

the EEOC’s medical-examination and disability-inquiry definitions; 

remanding case to district court for jury trial); Connolly v. First Pers. Bank, 

623 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss after 

employer fired employee for legal prescription drug use); see also Elisa Y. 

Lee, An American Way of Life: Prescription Drug Use in the Modern ADA 

Workplace, 45 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 303, 318 (2011) (noting the number 

of employees testing positive for prescription painkillers increased by more 

than 40% from 2005 to 2009).

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reference Plaintiff’s recent history of use of undetectable prescription drugs 

which could impact his safety, Mr. Key’s statements express concerns about 

Plaintiff’s back condition....” (Doc. 32, pp. 4 – 5). The Court finds Plaintiff 

successfully challenges Defendant’s reason for terminating him as a pretext.

Additionally, it is not clear when Defendant developed its “reasonable 

objective concern” that Plaintiff presented a risk to himself and others in the 

workplace, nor is it obvious that Plaintiff could not safely perform the job 

functions described. (Doc. 27, p. 14). EEOC guidance explains that an 

employer generally may not “ask all employees what prescription medications 

they are taking” because such an inquiry is not job-related and consistent 

with business necessity, but notes that the questioning may be necessary for 

“employees in positions affecting public safety.” EEOC, Enforcement 

Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of 

Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Part B.2 (July 

27, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidanceinquiries.html. “Under these limited circumstances, an employer must be 

able to demonstrate that an employee’s inability or impaired ability to 

perform essential functions will result in a direct threat.” Id.

The record before the Court does not resolve many factual issues that

remain, including what job functions Plaintiff could allegedly not perform, 

when and how Defendant developed its “reasonable objective concern” that 

Plaintiff presented a safety risk, and whether Defendant unlawfully 

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terminated Plaintiff because of his prior back surgery. After careful 

consideration, the Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated there are genuine 

disputes of material facts concerning his ADA discrimination claim. As a 

result, there are allegations in this case that a fact-finder must decide, and 

Plaintiff’s claim cannot be decided as a matter of law. Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim is therefore 

DENIED. 

2. Racial Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff claims Defendant unlawfully terminated his employment 

because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against 

a person based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Likewise, Section 1981 

prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcement of 

public and private contracts, including employment contracts. See, e.g., 

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (holding Section

1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment). 

The test for discrimination in suits under Section 1981 is the same as 

that used in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases. See Ferrill v. The 

Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must 

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This prima facie case can 

be established in any one of three ways: (1) by presenting direct evidence of 

discriminatory intent; (2) by presenting circumstantial evidence of 

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discriminatory intent through the McDonnell Douglas test; or (3) by 

demonstrating through statistics a pattern of discrimination. Earley v. 

Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990).

In this case, there is no direct evidence of racial discrimination. Nor 

does Plaintiff introduce statistics to show a pattern of discrimination. The 

Court must therefore analyze Plaintiff’s claim based on circumstantial 

evidence pursuant to the burden-shifting rubric articulated in McDonnell 

Douglas.

To present a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must 

show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the 

position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) his

employer treated him less favorably than similarly situated individuals 

outside of his protected class. Smith v. Lockheed–Martin Corporation, 644 

F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2011). With respect to the last element, “the 

individuals must be similarly situated in all relevant respects besides race, 

since different treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate 

civil rights laws.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 

1273–74 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotation omitted). See also

Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The 

comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from 

second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer.”).

If the plaintiff is successful in proving a prima facie case, then a 

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presumption of discrimination is raised and the burden shifts to the 

defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 

employment action. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1324–25. If the defendant meets this 

burden, then the inquiry shifts back to the plaintiff, and he must prove by a 

preponderance of evidence that the defendant’s reason is a mere pretext for 

unlawful discrimination. Id. at 1326–27 (citations omitted). “Thus, if a jury 

reasonably could infer from the evidence presented that the employer’s 

legitimate justification is pretextual, the question becomes whether the 

evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, yields the 

reasonable inference that the employer engaged in the alleged 

discrimination.” Id. at 1326–27 (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff readily satisfies three of the four elements required for 

a prima facie case. First, Plaintiff is in a protected class due to his race, 

African American. Second, the parties do not dispute that he was otherwise 

qualified for the job. (Doc. 30, p. 20). Third, Plaintiff suffered an adverse 

action when Defendant rescinded its offer of employment.

The fourth element, however, is not satisfied, because Plaintiff fails to 

show how Defendant treated him less favorably than similarly situated 

individuals outside of his protected class. Plaintiff points only to the fact that 

nine other employees who reported taking prescription medication were not 

terminated, and just one of those nine was African American. (Doc. 30, p. 21; 

Doc. 32, p. 3). Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant replaced him with a white 

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employee. (Doc. 30, p. 21). This is the extent of Plaintiff’s argument for his 

racial discrimination claim. Plaintiff does not, for example, explain what 

positions those nine other employees held, whether Defendant also regarded 

them as disabled, or whether they were prescribed the same or similar 

medications as him. Furthermore, no one claims that the white employee who 

replaced Plaintiff also had a perceived disability or used prescription 

medication. The Court therefore finds Plaintiff does not point to adequate 

comparators, which is needed to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie

racial discrimination claim. In the absence of evidence to reflect that 

Defendant treated similarly situated employees who are not members of 

Plaintiff’s class more favorably, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie

case. 

Even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the Court finds 

that Defendant would still be entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 

defendant, who must “proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 

adverse employment action. The employer’s burden is exceedingly light.” 

Hamilton v. Montgomery Cnty Bd. of Educ., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 

(M.D. Ala. 2000) (quoting Meeks v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 

(11th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted). Defendant’s argument and 

evidence shows that it decided to terminate Plaintiff because of his back 

surgery or prescription drug use. While Defendant’s decision to terminate 

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Plaintiff for this reason may result in a claim under the ADA, it does not 

equate to racial discrimination under Title VII or Section 1981. This is a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate Plaintiff’s employment 

that is not driven by racial animus. Nor does Plaintiff successfully rebut 

Defendant’s proffered reason as pretext. Plaintiff merely reiterates that nine 

other employees, eight of whom were white, were allowed to continue 

working for the company after disclosing their prescription drug use. (Doc. 

30, p. 21). This is not enough to establish a claim of racial discrimination 

pursuant to McDonnell Douglas. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion or 

summary judgment on this claim is due to be GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, the Court finds Plaintiff has 

demonstrated there are genuine disputes of material facts for his ADA claim. 

As a result, Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim cannot be decided as a 

matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 

26) is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s ADA claim (Count I). The Court further 

concludes there is no genuine issue as to any material fact for Plaintiff’s race 

discrimination claim, and it can be determined as a matter of law. 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26) is therefore 

GRANTED as to that claim (Count II). 

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 2015. 

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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