IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS E. PEREZ, )

Secretary of the United States )

Department of Labor, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00426-N

)

GULF COAST MANAGEMENT )

COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a HAMPTON )

INN SARALAND, and )

ANAND PATEL, individually, )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This action is before the Court on the Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 14) 

filed by Plaintiff Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of the United States Department of 

Labor (hereinafter, “the Secretary”). Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated 

herein, the Court finds that the motion is due to be GRANTED, as set out.1

 1 This case has been randomly assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge 

for all purposes, including trial (see Doc. 4), in accordance with the Court’s Standing Order 

No. 24 (www.alsd.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/STDO24.pdf). Inasmuch as no party, to 

date, has returned to the Clerk of Court a Request for Reassignment to a United States 

District Judge (see Doc. 4 at 1 (“The parties have the right to have this action reassigned to 

a United States District Judge for trial and disposition. Any party may request 

reassignment by emailing the attached Request for Reassignment to a United States 

District Judge to sandra_rey@alsd.uscourts.gov. Do not electronically file the 

document.”)), there presently exists implicit consent to the undersigned conducting all 

proceedings in this case. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1703, 155 L. 

Ed. 2d 775 (2003) (“We think the better rule is to accept implied consent where, as here, the 

litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and 

still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge. Inferring consent in 

these circumstances thus checks the risk of gamesmanship by depriving parties of the 

luxury of waiting for the outcome before denying the magistrate judge’s authority. Judicial 

efficiency is served; the Article III right is substantially honored.”).

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I. Procedural History

The Secretary commenced this action on September 12, 2014, by filing a 

Complaint (Doc. 1) against the Defendants alleging violations of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“the FLSA”). On 

October 23, 2014, Defendant Anand Patel (“Patel”) executed a waiver of service in 

this District that was sent on September 24, 2014 (see Doc. 6; Doc. 8 at 2, ¶ 4); thus, 

his responsive pleading was due November 24, 2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3), 

12(a)(1)(A)(ii), & 6(a)(1)(C). A process server served Defendant Gulf Coast 

Management Company, LLC (“GCMC”), through its registered agent Ramon Patel,

on November 8, 2014 (see Doc. 7; Doc. 8 at 2, ¶ 5); thus, its responsive pleading was 

due December 1, 2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) & 6(a)(1)(C). To date, 

neither Defendant has appeared, filed a responsive pleading, or otherwise defended 

in this action.

On January 12, 2015, upon application by the Secretary (see Doc. 11), the 

Clerk of Court entered default against both Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 55(a). (See Doc. 12). On February 5, 2015, the Secretary filed the 

present Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 14) under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 55(b)(2) against both Defendants, requesting that the Court “enter 

judgment as prayed for in the Complaint.”2

 2 The Court questions whether the Defendants have been served with notice of the 

Entry of Default and (at least for GCMC) the Motion for Default Judgment. Neither was 

served on GCMC at the address of its registered agent. (Compare Docs. 13 and 14 at 3 

(indicating that the entry of default and motion were both served on GCMC at 1320 

Industrial Parkway, Saraland, Alabama) with Doc. 7 (indicating that process was served on 

GCMC’s registered agent at 6401 Canebrake Road, Mobile, Alabama)). The registered mail 

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II. Analysis

In this Circuit, “default judgments are disfavored. Courts prefer adjudication 

on the merits. Since this case involves a default judgment there must be strict 

compliance with the legal prerequisites establishing the court's power to render the 

judgment.” Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. & Canada, 674 

F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (internal citation omitted). See also In re 

Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is a strong 

 

receipts for the notices of Entry of Default mailed to the Defendants were both signed by 

“Sherri Jacobi,” who did not indicate that she was signing them as an agent of either 

Defendant. (See Doc. 13).

Nevertheless, Rule 55 does not specify that entry of default need be noticed on a 

party, and a “ ‘defendant who fails to answer within the time specified by the rules is in 

default even if that fact is not officially noted.’ ” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., -- F.3d --, No. 13-

13853, 2014 WL 7229271, at *6 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright 

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2692 at 85 (3d ed. 2004)). Moreover, 

under the current version of Rule 55(b)(2), a party against whom default judgment is 

sought is only required to be served with written notice of the application if that party “has 

appeared personally or by representative...” See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2) (“No service is 

required on a party who is in default for failing to appear...”). Neither Defendant has 

appeared in this action.

“The appearance required by [Rule 55(b)(2)] has been broadly defined, and not 

limited to a formal court appearance.” Charlton L. Davis & Co., P. C. v. Fedder Data Ctr., 

Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing cases indicating that a “letter,” “letters and 

phone calls,” and a “claim and cost bond” could constitute “appearance”) (“The plaintiff 

knew Financial had a clear purpose to defend the suit. The knowledge came from a phone 

call and a letter responsive to plaintiff's formal Court action.” (quotation omitted)). See also 

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent in this Circuit all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior 

to close of business on September 30, 1981); S.E.C. v. Getanswers, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 698, 700 

(S.D. Fla. 2004) (While Rule 55(b)(2)’s notice requirement “only applies when the defendant 

has ‘appeared,’ the defendant does not have to make a formal appearance to trigger the 

notice requirement. The defendant must simply manifest a clear intention to defend.”). The 

Secretary has represented that, after he mailed notice of this action and a request for 

waiver of service to both Defendants, on October 22, 2014, Patel “telephone [counsel for the 

Secretary] and advised that he would sign the []waivers and overnight them to the 

[Secretary].” (Doc. 8 at 2, ¶ 3). This lone phone call does not manifest a clear intent to 

defend by Patel, and nothing else in the record supports a determination that either 

Defendant has “appeared” in this action (e.g. filings, attempts to contact the Court).

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policy of determining cases on their merits and we therefore view defaults with 

disfavor.”).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“It is . . . axiomatic that the inferior federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction. They are ‘empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power 

of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,’ and which have 

been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress.” Univ. of 

S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. 

Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, “it is well settled that a 

federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte

whenever it may be lacking.” Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, 

the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or 

proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof 

expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.” “This suit was brought not by the 

United States but by the Secretary of Labor. Therefore, the issue is not whether the 

United States could initiate such a suit in the district court but whether the 

Secretary can...[F]or section 1345 jurisdiction to exist over this action, the Secretary 

must be expressly authorized to sue.” Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano, 

584 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir. 1978).3

 3 In Marshall, the Secretary of Labor had brought suit “to enjoin the defendant...to submit 

to inspection under section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 

29 U.S.C. s 657(a) (1976).” 584 F.2d at 670. “After submission of the case[ on appeal], the 

court directed both parties to file briefs stating the basis of federal court jurisdiction and 

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The Secretary has asserted claims that the Defendants have violated the 

minimum wage and overtime compensation requirements of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 

207, respectively, which also constitute violations of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2) (making it 

“unlawful for any person to violate any of the provisions of section 206 or section 

207 of this title...”). The Secretary has demanded damages under 29 U.S.C. § 

216(c), which expressly provides that the “Secretary is authorized to supervise the 

payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing 

to any employee or employees under section 206 or section 207 [and] may bring an 

action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid 

minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated 

damages.” See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 

1958) (“In the drafting of the 1949 [Fair Labor Standards Amendments] there was 

included as Section 16(c) the provision that, with the exceptions stated, the 

Administrator, now the Secretary, could sue with the consent of the employees for 

unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation. Thus was created a 

cause of action in the Secretary. Suits by him under the statute are, in effect, suits 

by the United States.”), rev'd on other grounds, Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 

Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).

 

discussing the right of the Secretary to commence the action. Both parties insisted that the

court had federal question jurisdiction and that the Secretary had ample authority under 

the Act to maintain the suit.” Id. at 678 n.1 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). Without addressing 

whether federal question jurisdiction applied, the panel majority found “that the district 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Secretary's suit...” Id. 

Considering the reasoning of the majority in Marshall, the Court is left in doubt as to 

whether subject matter jurisdiction over the Secretary’s present action, admittedly under a 

different statutory scheme, can be premised solely on federal question jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331.

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The Secretary has also requested injunctive relief under 29 U.S.C. § 217, 

which provides that the “district courts... shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, 

to restrain violations of section 215 of this title, including in the case of violations of 

section 215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding of payment of 

minimum wages or overtime compensation found by the court to be due to 

employees under this chapter...” The Eleventh Circuit has held that “the Secretary 

of Labor has the exclusive right to bring an action for injunctive relief” under the 

FLSA. Powell v. State of Fla., 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 

Thus, because the FLSA has expressly authorized the Secretary to sue for the relief 

requested, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 1345.

B. Personal Jurisdiction and Venue4

The Secretary’s Complaint alleges that both Defendants conduct business in 

Mobile County, Alabama, and that all relevant actions occurred in this district. 

These uncontested allegations indicate that the Court can properly exercise 

personal jurisdiction over both Defendants and that venue is proper in this District. 

C. Sufficiency of the Complaint

“An allegation – other than one relating to the amount of damages – is 

admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). “While ‘a default is not treated as an absolute confession by the 

 4 See Tyco Fire, 218 F. App'x at 864 (“A defaulted defendant...can defend by challenging the 

jurisdiction of the court to enter judgment against him. Thus, for example, a defendant in 

default still can...contest the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him.”); United 

States v. Hall, Civil Action No. 13-326-KD-N, 2013 WL 6844099, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 

2013) (sua sponte addressing whether venue and personal jurisdiction were sufficiently 

shown in granting uncontested motion for default judgment).

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defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover,’ a defaulted

defendant is deemed to ‘admit[ ] the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact.’ The

defendant, however, ‘is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit 

conclusions of law.’ Thus, before entering a default judgment for damages, the 

district court must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, which 

are taken as true due to the default, actually state a substantive cause of action and 

that there is a substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular relief 

sought.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank,

515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)) (footnote omitted). See also Chudasama v. 

Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1371 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] default 

judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” (citing 

Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206 (“See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l 

Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1975) (“A default judgment is unassailable on 

the merits but only so far as it is supported by well-pleaded allegations, assumed to 

be true.”)).

The FLSA currently provides that, subject to certain inapplicable exceptions, 

“[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is 

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in 

an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 

wages” in the amount of $7.25 an hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). The FLSA also 

provides that, subject to certain inapplicable exceptions, “no employer shall employ 

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any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than 

forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in 

excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 

regular rate at which he is employed. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). It is “unlawful for any 

person...to violate any of the provisions of section 206 or section 207...” 29 U.S.C. § 

215(a)(2).

By failing to answer the allegations in the Complaint, Patel has admitted 

that, at all relevant times, he “acted directly or indirectly in the interest of” GCMC 

“in relation to their employees,” as he “makes final decisions on the operation of the 

enterprise, is responsible for maintaining compliance with the Hilton franchise 

agreement, and the general manager answers directly to him.” (Id. at 2). Thus, 

Patel deemed an “employer” for purposes of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (“ 

‘Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 

employer in relation to an employee...”).

Moreover, by failing to answer the allegations in the Complaint, both 

Defendants have admitted that they “engaged in related activities performed either 

through unified operation or common control for a common business purposes” (Doc. 

1 at 2), which constitutes an “enterprise” under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1) 

(“ ‘Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either through unified 

operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business 

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purpose...”)). They have also admitted that this “enterprise” “employed employees 

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees 

handling, selling or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved 

in or produced for commerce; and...ha[s] an annual gross volume of sales made or 

business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level 

which are separately stated)” (Doc. 1 at 3), thus making it an “enterprise engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” for purposes of the FLSA. 

See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). As such, the Defendants have admitted that their 

employees were employed in an “enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce” and were thus subject to the minimum wage and 

overtime requirements of §§ 206 and 207, respectively. 

The Secretary’s Complaint alleges that, “since May 7, 2011,” the Defendants 

have “repeatedly and willfully” violated §§ 206, 207, and 215(a)(2) by failing to pay 

their employees the required minimum wage and overtime.5 “Specifically, the 

 5 “[T]he statute of limitations applicable to civil actions to enforce the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (FLSA)...provides that such actions must be commenced within two years 

‘except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within 

three years after the cause of action accrued.’ ” McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 

128, 129 (1988) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)). Moreover, § 217 bars injunctions restraining 

withholding of back wages for “sums which employees are barred from recovering, at the 

time of the commencement of the action to restrain the violations, by virtue of the 

provisions of section 255...” 

However, because the Defendants are in default, the Court need not determine 

whether any of the Secretary’s claims may have been filed beyond the statute of limitations, 

as this is a procedural defense that the Defendants must assert. See Tyco Fire, 218 F. 

App'x at 864 (“Other than the narrow exceptions [of contesting jurisdiction and the 

sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations to support the judgment sought], a 

defendant, once a default has been entered against him, is not entitled to raise any other 

defenses. Accordingly, procedural defenses, such as a motion to dismiss for forum non 

conveniens...are lost.”); Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 1972) 

(holding that 29 U.S.C. § 255 “ was intended as a limitation on the remedy available, not on 

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Defendants did not provide compensation for all hours worked and the 

compensation they did pay did not equal at least the minimum wages for all hours 

worked[,]” and “the Defendants did not provide employees overtime compensation 

unless they recorded more than 80 hours in payroll in a bi-weekly pay period and 

payroll records did not record all hours worked by employees.” (Doc. 1 at 3-4). By 

failing to contest these allegations, the Defendants have admitted to them, and the 

allegations sufficiently demonstrate that the Defendants are in violation of §§ 206, 

207, and 215(a)(2).

The FLSA further provides that “[e]very employer subject to any provision of 

this chapter or of any order issued under this chapter shall make, keep, and 

preserve such records of the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours, and 

other conditions and practices of employment maintained by him, and shall 

preserve such records for such periods of time...” 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). Additionally, 

under 29 U.S.C. § 211(d), the Department of Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and 

Hour Division6 “is authorized to make such regulations and orders regulating, 

restricting, or prohibiting industrial homework as are necessary or appropriate to 

prevent the circumvention or evasion of and to safeguard the minimum wage rate 

prescribed in this chapter...” It is “unlawful for any person...to violate any of the 

provisions of section 211(c)..., or any regulation or order made or continued in effect 

 

the right to bring the action, and must be pleaded as an affirmative defense”); Mumbower v. 

Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1187 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 

F.2d 1367, 1370 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[W]e hold that s 255 establishes only a procedural 

limitation period under the Act. It is not like a statute which imposes a liability and 

provides the remedy which must be exercised in strict conformity to the statute.”).

6 See 29 U.S.C. § 204(a).

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under the provisions of section 211(d)..., or to make any statement, report, or record 

filed or kept pursuant to the provisions of such section or of any regulation or order 

thereunder, knowing such statement, report, or record to be false in a material 

respect.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5).

The Secretary’s Complaint alleges that the Defendants violated §§ 211(c) and 

215(a)(5), as well as relevant regulations found at 29 C.F.R. § 516, “by failing to 

make, keep and preserve adequate and accurate records of the persons employed 

and of the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment 

maintained by them as prescribed in the aforesaid Regulations.” (Doc. 1 at 4). By 

failing to contest these allegations, the Defendants have admitted to them, and the 

allegations sufficiently demonstrate that the Defendants are in violation of §§ 211(c) 

and 215(a)(5).

D. Damages

“A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what 

is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). “A court has an obligation to 

assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters...” Anheuser 

Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003). The Secretary’ 

Complaint seeks a damages award of “back wages for a period of three (3) years 

prior to the commencement of this action and an additional equal amount as 

liquidated damages to [the Defendants’ ]employees” under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).7 (Doc. 

1 at 4-5).

 7 The Complaint claims that these “employees” are “named in Appendix ‘A’ attached hereto 

and made a part hereof...” (Doc. 1 at 5). No such appendix is attached to the Complaint 

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“The court may conduct hearings...when, to enter or effectuate [default 

]judgment, it needs to determine the amount of damages.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(b)(2)(B). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

An evidentiary hearing is not a per se requirement; indeed, Rule 

55(b)(2) speaks of evidentiary hearings in a permissive tone. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (“[T]he court may conduct such hearings ....” 

(emphasis added)). We have held that no such hearing is required 

where all essential evidence is already of record. See S.E.C. v. First 

Fin. Group of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 669 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 

55(b)(2) does not require the district court to hold either an evidentiary 

hearing or oral argument on a motion for a default judgment.”) (citing 

Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1976) 

(“Taxpayer's first contention that the district court should have held an 

evidentiary hearing and/or oral argument on the motion is without 

merit. All the essential facts were of record.”)). Other circuits agree. 

See, e.g., KPS & Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 21 (1st 

Cir. 2003). Other circuits also agree, however, that such hearings are 

required in all but “limited circumstances,” id., as when the district 

court already has a wealth of evidence from the party requesting the 

hearing, such that any additional evidence would be truly unnecessary 

to a fully informed determination of damages. Id. (collecting cases).

S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Complaint demands, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), to recover from the 

Defendants “minimum wage and overtime compensation, together with an equal 

amount as liquidated damages” (Doc. 1 at 1), but does not state a specific sum. 

However, in support of his motion for default judgment, the Secretary has 

submitted the affidavit of Monetta Roberts (“Roberts”), an investigator with the 

Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division who investigated the FLSA 

violations at issue in this action (Doc. 14-1). She avers that her “investigation 

covered the period from April 10, 2011 through April 7, 2013” and “included 

 

filed with the Court.

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examining time, payroll and other employment records[,]” as well as speaking with 

Patel and interviewing “several of Defendants’ employees...” (Id. at 1). Based in 

her investigation, she determined that the Defendants “owe nine employees 

$2,848.37 in back wages.” (Id. at 3). Attached to Roberts’s affidavit, which 

incorporates it by reference, is an appendix listing the names of the nine employees 

and the total back wages due to each of them. (Doc. 14-2).

Roberts, however, does not provide any specific details regarding the data or 

methodology used to determine these amounts, instead simply asserting in 

conclusory fashion that they are the back wages the Defendants owe. Generally, 

such conclusory assertions are insufficient in this District to support a claim for 

damages in a default judgment. In PNCEF, LLC v. Hendricks Building Supply 

LLC, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (S.D. Ala. 2010), Chief Judge Steele rejected similar 

conclusory asserts as insufficient to support an award of damages on default:

In support of its Motion for Default Judgment, plaintiff offers the 

Declaration of Tara Love, who is a “Lawsuit Coordinator” for PNCEF. 

Love explains the Stipulated Loss Value calculation as follows: 

“Pursuant to the express terms of the Lease, Defendants owe PNC 

$22,584.74 in delinquent payments, $2,634.66 in late fees, $56,456.85 

in future payments which are accelerated pursuant to the express 

terms of the Lease, and $45,000.00 as the future market value for the 

Equipment, for a total amount due and owing to PNC from Defendants 

under the Lease of $126,674.25.”

The problem is that the record is devoid of evidence of how any of these 

figures were calculated, but is instead confined to the conclusory Love 

Declaration listing those amounts in summary fashion. Presumably, it 

would be a simple matter for plaintiff to produce a ledger or other 

backup documentation showing the due dates and amounts of the 

delinquent payments, and to provide testimony in declaration form 

explaining how the late fees and future payment amounts were 

computed and demonstrating the factual and contractual basis for 

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each. But plaintiff has not done so, instead asking the Court to accept 

on faith that the bare, unadorned payment and late fee numbers 

presented in the Love Declaration are accurate. What's more, plaintiff 

submits a fair market value estimate of $45,000 for the equipment, 

without a trace of evidence of the factual underpinnings of this figure. 

Given the current state of the record, the Court has no idea where this 

$45,000 valuation originated and would be adopting it in a blind act of 

guesswork and speculation. This sort of judicial leap of faith in fixing 

the amount of a default judgment is fundamentally incompatible with 

the bright-line requirement that a plaintiff seeking a default judgment 

must prove its damages by record evidence. Rather than merely 

telling the Court in summary fashion what its damages are, a 

plaintiff seeking default judgment must show the Court what 

those damages are, how they are calculated, and where they 

come from, by reference to the lease agreement, appropriate back-up 

documentation, and witness testimony as appropriate. This was not 

done here.

Nor does the record, as presently formulated, provide a reasonable 

evidentiary basis for computing the attorney's fee component of any 

damages award. Again, the lease agreement obligated Hendricks 

Building “to pay all of Lessor's costs of enforcing Lessor's rights 

against Lessee ... including reasonable attorney's fees.” But the record 

is devoid of evidence of the reasonable attorney's fees that PNCEF has 

actually incurred in enforcing its rights in this action. Rather than 

presenting such evidence, plaintiff submits the declaration of its 

counsel of record, who avers, “I believe that a fee of 15% of the fund to 

be collected, or $19,001.14, is reasonable” in this case. But this 

evidence answers the wrong question. The Court's task is not to 

ascertain what a hypothetically reasonable attorney's fee might be and 

to award that amount to plaintiff, but is instead to determine PNCEF's 

actual attorney's fee incurred in enforcing its rights against Hendricks 

Building in this matter, and to ascertain whether that actual figure 

(not a hypothetical fee untethered to PNCEF's actual financial 

commitment) is a “reasonable attorney's fee” within the ambit of 

Paragraph 14 of the lease agreement. On this record, the Court cannot 

ascertain what PNCEF's actual legal costs have been, much less make 

any judgment as to their reasonableness.

PNCEF, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1293-94 (boldface emphasis added) (record citations 

omitted).8

 8 Chief Judge Steele expressly noted that he had “designated [PNCEF] for publication 

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However, Roberts has also averred that, “[o]n November 30, 2013, Anand 

Patel signed Wage and Hour Form WH-56 agreed to pay the [stated] back wages 

and an equal amount in liquidated damages; a total of $5,696.74” but “has not 

complied with this agreement.” (Doc. 14-1 at 3). Patel is also averred to be the 

“owner” of GCMC. (Id. at 2). Given that the Defendants have previously been made 

aware of the amount of damages sought by the Secretary and (at least initially) 

agreed to it, the Court will accept as competent and sufficient evidence the back 

wages assessment set forth in Roberts’s affidavit and accompanying appendix (Docs. 

14-1 & 14-2). The Court incorporates by reference the information contained in the 

appendix (Doc. 14-2), and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to attach a copy of the 

appendix (Doc. 14-2) to this Order upon docketing.

As such, pursuant to § 216(c), the Court will award the Secretary $2,848.37 

in “unpaid minimum wages” and “overtime compensation,” plus “an equal amount 

as liquidated damages[,]” for a total monetary damages award of $5,696.74.

E. Injunctive Relief

The Secretary’s Complaint also seeks injunctive relief under 29 U.S.C. § 217. 

“Section 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 217, authorizes the district courts to issue both 

prospective and restitutionary injunctions.” Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 

F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Donovan v. Brown Equipment and Service 

Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1982)), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

 

because it addresses recurring issues concerning a plaintiff's burden and the quantum of 

proof needed for a default judgment...By designating th[e] Order for publication, [Chief 

Judge Steele] hope[d] that it w[ould] be instructive to other litigants of the applicable 

standards and requirements with which a movant seeking default judgment must comply.” 

PNCEF, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 n.1.

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 15 of 25
16

in Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23 F.3d 110, 117 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994)). “Generally speaking, the 

propriety of a grant of injunctive relief in a § 217 action is an equitable matter, 

committed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the district court.” Id.

(citing Shultz v. Parke, 413 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1969)).

A restitutionary injunction under section 17 is intended to accomplish 

several purposes. First, and most obviously, it is intended to 

compensate the affected employees for the losses they sustained as a 

result of the wrongful withholding of their wages. Hodgson v. American 

Can Co., 440 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1971)...Moreover, the issuance of 

the injunction against withholding back pay is indispensable to its 

restitution in these cases, for once the Secretary has sought such an 

injunction, the employees' right to sue for wages due is terminated. 

Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. 216(b) (Supp. III 1979). Therefore, if the court 

refuses to order the payment of back wages in the Secretary's suit, the 

employees “will have a legal right to that money without any means to 

enforce it.” Wirtz v. Malthor, Inc., 391 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1968).

The second major purpose is “to correct a continuing offense against 

the public interest.” See, e.g., Marshall v. A&M Consolidated 

Independent School District, 605 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 

1979)...Therefore, a district court, in deciding whether to grant a 

restitutionary injunction, may not focus only on the interests of the 

parties to the suit before it. Requiring the payment of back wages is 

meant both to “increase the effectiveness of the enforcement of the Act 

by depriving a violator of any gains accruing to him through his 

violation,” Marshall v. A&M Consolidated Independent School District, 

supra, 605 F.2d at 189, quoting Wirtz v. Malthor, Inc., supra, 391 F.2d 

at 3, and to protect those employers who comply with the Act's wage 

requirements from having to compete unfavorably with those who fail 

to comply. Wirtz v. Jones,...340 F.2d [901,] 905[ (5th Cir. 1965).]

This is not to suggest that section 17 restitutionary injunctions should 

issue as a matter of course upon a finding of past wages due. Compare

Wirtz v. Malthor, Inc., supra, 391 F.2d at 3 (granting restitutionary 

injunction) with Brennan v. Saghatelian, 514 F.2d 619, 621-622 (9th 

Cir. 1975) (denying such an injunction). If, for example, the employer is 

bankrupt, an injunction would be vain and the employer should not be 

threatened with citation for contempt for not doing what he is unable 

to do.

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 16 of 25
17

On the other hand, the trial judge's discretion should be exercised with 

an eye to the purposes of the Act. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Ballenger Paving 

Co., 299 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922, 82 S.

Ct. 1565, 8 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1962).[] A section 17 injunction provides a 

remedy for violation of national labor policy in a single suit initiated by 

the Secretary on his own volition, thus avoiding potential multiplicity 

of employee actions on the one hand and, on the other, the complete 

abandonment of their just wages by employees apprehensive of 

employer retaliation. When an injunction is explicitly authorized by 

statute, proper discretion usually requires its issuance if the 

prerequisites for the remedy have been demonstrated and the 

injunction would fulfill the legislative purpose. See Shultz v. Parke, 

supra, 413 F.2d at 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. B. B. Saxon Co., 

365 F.2d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. United States v. Hayes 

International Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VII).

Brown Equip., 666 F.2d at 156-57. Accord Donovan v. Grantham, 690 F.2d 453, 

456-58 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Sabine Irrigation, 695 F.2d at 196-97.

The Secretary has not specifically requested a restitutionary injunction in his 

Complaint (see Doc. 1). However, the Secretary’s proposed default judgment order 

(Doc. 14-3), attached to the present motion, includes a provision that the 

Defendants be “restrained from withholding payment of back wages in the total 

amount of $2,848.37 and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages due 

employees...” (id. at 5). Considering the above reasoning in Brown Equipment, 

and given that the Defendants have already reneged once after agreeing to pay 

damages, see supra, the Court finds that a restitutionary injunction as to the back 

wage award of $2,848.37 is appropriate. However, the Secretary’s request that the 

liquidated damages also be included in the injunction is inappropriate, as “[c]ourts 

are still not...authorized to require payment of liquidated damages in section 17 

suits.” Brown Equip., 666 F.2d at 156. Accord Monahan v. Emerald Performance 

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 17 of 25
18

Materials, LLC, No. C08-1511 RBL, 2009 WL 1172703, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 

2009) (“Liquidated damages are unavailable as a remedy in a FLSA § 217 suit.” 

(citing Brown Equip., 666 F.2d at 156)). Accordingly, the Court will, by separate 

document, enter an injunction stating as follows: “The Defendants are restrained 

from withholding from the Plaintiff Secretary of Labor payment of back wages in 

the total amount of $2,848.37 due their employees, as awarded in this action.” (Cf.

Doc. 14-3 at 5).

As to prospective injunctive relief, the Secretary’s Complaint requests that 

the Court “permanently enjoin[] Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, 

employees and all persons in active concert or participation with them from 

violating” §§ 206, 207, 211(c), 215(a)(2), and 215(a)(5). (Doc. 1 at 4-5). The 

“injunctive relief” section of the Secretary’s proposed order attached to his motion 

for default judgment (Doc. 14-3 at 4-5) is equally general, requiring no more that 

the Defendants “shall not...fail to” obey §§ 206, 207, 211(c), 215(a)(2), and 215(a)(5).

“Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) requires that a[n]...injunction be ‘specific in its terms’[9]

and ‘describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought to be restrained.’ ” Fla. 

Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative 

Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000).

This Circuit has held repeatedly that “obey the law” injunctions are 

unenforceable. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 

1200 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that injunction which prohibited 

municipality from discriminating on the basis of race in its annexation 

decisions “would do no more than instruct the City to ‘obey the law,’ ” 

and therefore was invalid); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 

 9 The current version of Rule 65(d) requires that an injunction “state its terms specifically.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B).

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 18 of 25
19

899 (5th Cir. 1978) (invalidating injunction that prohibited defendant 

from violating Title VII in its employment decisions). The specificity 

requirement of Rule 65(d) is no mere technicality; “[the] command of 

specificity is a reflection of the seriousness of the consequences which 

may flow from a violation of an injunctive order.” Payne, 565 F.2d at 

897. An injunction must be framed so that those enjoined know exactly 

what conduct the court has prohibited and what steps they must take 

to conform their conduct to the law. See Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. 

Co., 661 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing International 

Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assoc., 389 U.S. 

64, 76, 88 S. Ct. 201, 208, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967)).

Id. at 1222-23. See also S.E.C. v. Sky Way Global, LLC, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (M.D. 

Fla. 2010) (thoroughly discussing why “obey the law” injunctions are).

However, the former Fifth Circuit, interpreting McComb v. Jacksonville 

Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949), took a more lenient view for FLSA injunctions, 

holding that such injunctions “may be sufficiently broad and general to enjoin any 

practices which would constitute violations of the Act's provisions dealing with 

minimum wages, overtime and the keeping of records. Decrees of such generality 

are often necessary to prevent further violations.” Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 

236, 240 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing McComb, 336 U.S. at 191 (internal citation and 

footnote omitted).10 In Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1969), 

the court upheld an FLSA injunction that closely tracked certain statutory 

language,11 finding that

 10 Ocala Gas held that prior precedent “stand[ing] for a more restricted view[ of injunctions] 

must, with respect to the use of injunctions in Fair Labor Standards Act cases, yield to 

McComb...” 336 F.2d at 243 n.6 (citing Nasif v. United States, 165 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1947)).

11

The injunction read[] as follows:

‘For reasons contained herein, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 19 of 25
20

the injunction conformed to the requirements of F. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 

Rule 65(d) requires that an injunction have specificity so that those 

constrained to follow it will not want for guidance. The injunction in 

question is not lacking in clarity. Its interdiction of oppressive child 

labor is not vague, and its command that Gulf King keep and preserve 

records is clearly understandable. If for some reason Gulf King had 

doubts about the meaning of any part of the injunction, it could have 

sought district court clarification. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 

1949 , 336 U.S. 187, 69 S. Ct. 497, 93 L. Ed. 599.

The fact that the decree includes specific references to sections of the 

Fair Labor Standards Act is not, as here used, inconsistent with the 

requirements of Rule 65(d). It is significant that the injunction does 

not engraft the statute in gross, Cf. Fleming v. Salem Box Co., D.C. Or. 

1940, 38 F. Supp. 997, or rely on the statute for clarification of what is 

otherwise unclear in the decree itself. It merely supplements specific 

instructions in the decree with the statutory authority from which the 

right to issue such instructions derives. The statutory material is thus 

given as a parenthetical reference, not as a substantive command.

407 F.2d at 517 (footnotes omitted). See also S.E.C. v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934, 952 n.11 

(11th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 517 (5th Cir.

1969), the former Fifth Circuit found that an injunction which required compliance 

 

that defendant, Gulf King Shrimp Company, its agents, servants, employees 

and all persons acting or claiming to act in its behalf and interest, be, and the 

same are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from violating the 

provisions of sections 15(a)(4) and 15(a)(5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 

1938, as amended, in any of the following manners:

I.

‘Defendant shall not fail to make, keep and preserve records of its employees 

and of the wages, hours or other conditions and practices of employment 

maintained by it, as prescribed by the Regulations of the Administrator 

issued, and from time to time amended, pursuant to Section 11(c) of the Act 

and found in Title 29, Chapter v. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 516;

II.

‘The defendant shall not, contrary to Sections 12 and 15(a)(4) of the Act, 

employ any oppressive child labor (as defined in Section 3(l) of the Act) in 

interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce.’

Gulf King Shrimp, 407 F.2d at 517 n.10.

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 20 of 25
21

with the records requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act satisfied Rule 

65(d).”).

Considering the lenience shown FLSA injunctions by Ocala Gas and Gulf 

King Shrimp, the Court finds that the Secretary’s requested prospective injunctive 

relief does not run afoul of Rule 65(d)’s specificity requirements.

Although the question of whether an injunction should issue to 

restrain an employer from future FLSA violations is initially addressed 

to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of that discretion is not 

unbridled. Wirtz v. Atlas Roofing Manufacturing Co., 5 Cir. 1967, 377 

F.2d 112; Goldberg v. Cockrell, 5 Cir. 1962, 303 F.2d 811. Since the 

FLSA itself provides for no administrative sanctions, the only remedy 

of the Secretary where an employer refuses voluntary compliance with 

the Act is resort to the judiciary for injunctive relief, and it is “no less 

important for the judiciary to use its injunctive power to effectuate the 

national policy expressed by Congress than for the executive branch to 

police the Act”. Wirtz v. Graham Transfer and Storage Co., 5 Cir. 1963, 

322 F.2d 650, 653.

The effect of permanently enjoining from future violations of FLSA an 

employer found to have violated that Act in the past is to shift the 

“responsibility for compliance onto the employer's shoulders” and to 

lessen the responsibility of the Wage and Hour Division of 

investigating past violators to ascertain if they are in compliance with 

the provisions of the Act. Goldberg v. Cockrell, 5 Cir. 1962, 303 F.2d 

811, 814. The issuance of a permanent injunction in FLSA cases does 

not subject an employer against whom its runs to a penalty or a 

hardship since it requires him to do “what the Act requires anyway to 

comply with the law.” Mitchell v. Pidcock, 5 Cir. 1962, 299 F.2d 281, 

287. Because an injunction has an administratively beneficial effect in 

enforcing the FLSA, this court has not hesitated to reverse district 

courts for refusing to enjoin future violations. See Shultz v. Salinas, 5 

Cir. 1969, 416 F.2d 412; Mitchell v. Pidcock, supra; Mitchell v. Jax Beer 

Distributors, 5 Cir. 1961, 290 F.2d 24; Mitchell v. Hausman, 5 Cir. 

1958, 261 F.2d 778. In other cases where the facts have warranted 

prospective injunctions we have granted such relief but limited its 

duration. See, e. g., Wirtz v. Atlas Roofing Manufacturing Co., supra.

[T]he two factors properly to be considered in determining whether a 

permanent injunction should be granted are the previous conduct of 

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 21 of 25
22

the employer and the dependability of his promises for future 

compliance. Shultz v. Salinas, supra; Wirtz v. Atlas Roofing 

Manufacturing Co., supra; Mitchell v. Hausman, supra...[C]urrent 

compliance with the requirements of FLSA is no bar to prospective 

injunctive relief, see Hodgson v. Ricky Fashions, Inc., 5 Cir. 1970, 434 

F.2d 1261, 1263; Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 5 Cir. 1969,407 F.2d 

508, especially where compliance is achieved only by the direct 

scrutiny of enforcement authorities. Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. 

v. Goldberg, 5 Cir. 1962, 299 F.2d 37, 44; Mitchell v. Hausman, supra

at 780; Mitchell v. Hodges, 5 Cir. 1956, 238 F.2d 380, 381.

Dunlop v. Davis, 524 F.2d 1278, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). Accord 

Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d at 197 (““In deciding whether to issue a prospective 

injunction[ under the FLSA], the district court must evaluate the previous conduct 

of the employer and the dependability of his promises for future compliance.”).

Considering these principals, the Dunlop court reversed the district court’s 

denial of permanent injunctive relief, find, inter alia, that, even “assuming that [the 

employer] had ceased violating the Act after the initial investigation by the 

compliance officer, his attempts thereafter to avoid the payment of admittedly due 

back wages, his falsification of the receipts for those wages, and his 

misrepresentations to the Department do not demonstrate likelihood of future 

voluntary compliance on his part.” Id. at 1281. The court “fail[ed] to find any 

indication in these circumstances, in light of [the employer’s] proven practices and 

attitude, that violations will not be resumed in the future.” Id.

As reported in the affidavit of investigator Roberts, see supra, the Defendants 

had previously signed a form indicating that they agreed pay the damages amount 

sought by the Secretary, but the Defendants have not kept this promise. This 

“previous conduct” weighs in favor of issuing a permanent injunction. Moreover, 

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 22 of 25
23

given that the Defendants have utterly failed to defend their conduct in this action, 

the Court is bereft of any “promises for future compliance” to consider. Thus, the 

Court finds it appropriate to grant the prospective injunctive relief the Secretary 

seeks and will issue, by separate document, an injunction stating as follows:

Defendants Gulf Coast Management Company, LLC d/b/a Hampton 

Inn Saraland and Anand Patel, their officers, agents, servants, and 

employees, and other persons who are in active concert or participation 

with any of the foregoing

• shall not, contrary to §§ 7 and 15(a)(2) of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C §§ 207 and 215(a)(2), employ 

any employee in commerce or in the production of goods for 

commerce, or in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the 

Act, for more than 40 hours in a workweek unless such employee 

is compensated for such hours in excess of 40 at an overtime rate 

of at least one and one-half times the regular rate at which such 

employee is employed;

• shall not, contrary to §§ 6 and 15(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 

206 and 215(a)(2), fail to pay employees employed in an 

enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 

commerce, the applicable minimum hourly rate; and

• shall not, contrary to §§ 11(c) and 15(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 211(c) and 215(a)(5), fail to make, keep and preserve 

adequate and accurate employment records as prescribed by 

Regulation found at 29 C.F.R. § 516.

(See Doc. 14-3 at 5).12 Upon consideration, the Court will set this prospective 

injunctive relief to expire after one year from the date of the injunction’s issuance. 

 12 The Court declines the Secretary’s invitation that he be enjoined to exercise his 

obligations under § 216(c) (“Any sums thus recovered by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of 

an employee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall 

be paid, on order of the Secretary of Labor, directly to the employee or employees affected. 

Any such sums not paid to an employee because of inability to do so within a period of three 

years shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.”). 

(See Doc. 14-3 at 5). The Court has no reason to believe that the Secretary will fail to do so 

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 23 of 25
24

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, and under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 55(b)(2), it is ORDERED that the Secretary’s Motion for Default 

Judgment (Doc. 14) is GRANTED as follows:

• Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), the Secretary is awarded and shall recover 

from the Defendants, jointly and severally, a total of $2,848.37, representing 

back wages owed to the employees listed in appendix attached hereto for the 

periods set forth therein, and an equal sum as liquidated damages, for a 

total monetary award of $5,696.74.

• Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 217, the Court, by separate document, shall issue an 

injunction against the Defendants in conformance with Section II.E. of this 

Order.13

Final judgment in accordance with this Order and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 58 shall issue separately.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to serve copies of this Order, the 

injunction, and the final judgment on the Defendants by certified mail at the 

following addresses:

 

voluntarily.

13 The Secretary has also requested that the Court include in this Order the provision that 

“court costs of this action hereby are taxed to Defendants for which execution may issue.” 

(Doc. 14-3 at 6). The Court declines to do so. The Secretary may apply for an award of 

costs in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), SD ALA LR 54.1 

(www.alsd.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/local-rules.pdf), and SD ALA Standing Order No. 

13 (www.alsd.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/STDO13.pdf).

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 24 of 25
25

Gulf Coast Management Company, LLC

d/b/a Hampton Inn Saraland

c/o Ramon Patel

6401 Canebrake Rd.

Mobile, AL 36695

Gulf Coast Management Company, LLC

d/b/a Hampton Inn Saraland

1320 Industrial Parkway

Saraland, AL 36571

Anand Patel

1320 Industrial Parkway

Saraland, AL 36571

DONE and ORDERED this the 3rd day of March 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00426-N Document 15 Filed 03/03/15 Page 25 of 25