IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SUELLEN SHAW, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00111-CG-B

 * 

MOBILE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL *

SYSTEM, et al., *

 *

Defendants. *

Report and Recommendation

This action is before the Court on Defendant Martha L. 

Peek’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and Defendants Board of School 

Commissioners L. Douglas Harwell, Jr., Reginald A. Crenshaw, 

William Foster, Don Stringfellow, and Tracey Roberson’s Motion 

to Dismiss (Doc. 8). The motions have been referred to the 

undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c). Upon 

consideration of all matters presented, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS, for the reasons stated herein, that the motions be 

GRANTED. 

I. Background

In her complaint, Plaintiff Suellen Shaw alleges that she 

was employed as a teacher with the Mobile County School System, 

and that she has been denied vacant Driver’s Education teacher 

positions on account of her gender. (Doc. 1). In the style of 

her complaint, Plaintiff lists as Defendants, the Mobile County 

School System, Martha L. Peek, in her official capacity as the 

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Superintendent of the Mobile County School System, and School 

Board Commissioners L. Douglas Harwell, Jr., Reginald A. 

Crenshaw, William Foster, Don Stringfellow, and Tracey Roberson, 

in their individual and official capacities. In the body of her 

complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the individual Defendants are 

being sued in their official capacity only. (Doc. 1 at 2-3).

As noted supra, Superintendent Peek, and the School Board 

Commissioners have filed motions seeking the dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s claims against them. (Doc. 7). In her motion, 

Defendant Peek argues that because the Mobile County School 

System is Plaintiff’s employer, and has been named as a 

defendant in this action, Plaintiff’s “official capacity” claim

against her should be dismissed as redundant. Defendant Peek 

further argues that she is not an employer for purposes of Title 

VII liability. (Doc. 13 at 2).

The School Board Commissioners seek the dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s claims against them on the ground that relief under 

Title VII is only available against the employer and not the 

individual employees. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed a response 

opposing the dismissal of Peek in her official capacity. (Doc. 

11). Plaintiff contends that because Peek implements procedures 

adopted by the board and supervises school programs and

personnel, it is necessary to ensure that the Court has 

jurisdiction over her in order to enforce any judgments. Also, 

Plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal (Doc. 12), wherein 

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she asserts that “It is the intent of this stipulation to 

dismiss the named parties only in their individual capacities.”

(Doc. 12). 

II. Analysis

In Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (llth Cir. 1991),

the Eleventh Circuit addressed official capacity claims in suits 

where a municipal entity has also been named. In Busby, the 

plaintiff sued the city of Orlando, and several officers for 

race discrimination and violations of her constitutional rights 

in connection with her termination from her airport safety 

officer position. Id. After the trial court granted a directed 

verdict in favor of the individual defendant officers one of the 

issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding 

that because the plaintiff’s official capacity claims against 

the defendant officers were identical to her claims against the 

city of Orlando, her official capacity claims were due to be 

dismissed as redundant. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held 

that “[b]ecause suits against a municipal officer sued in his 

official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are 

functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring 

official-capacity actions against local government officials, 

because local government units can be sued directly... To keep 

both the City and the officers sued in their official capacity 

as defendants in this case would have been redundant and 

possibly confusing to the jury.” Id., 931 F.2d at 776. 

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According to the Court, in such a situation, “the proper method 

for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the 

employer, either by naming the supervisory employees as agents 

of the employer or by naming the employer directly.” Id., 931 

F.2d at 772; see also M.R. v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile 

County, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99535, 2012 WL 2931263 (S.D. Ala. 

July 18, 2012) (explaining that courts in this Circuit routinely 

and overwhelmingly deem suits against both a local government 

official in his official capacity and the entity of which the 

officer is an agent to be redundant, and thus they dismiss the 

official-capacity claims against the individual defendant on 

that basis); Lewis v. Eufula City Board of Education, 922 F. 

Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (because the plaintiff named the 

school board as a defendant on her Title VII retaliation claim, 

naming the school superintendent and school board members as 

defendants in their “official capacities” was redundant; thus, 

those claims were dismissed).

In the case at hand, Plaintiff, through her stipulation of 

dismissal (Doc. 12), has made clear that she is seeking to sue 

the individual Board members and Superintendent Peek in their 

“official capacities” only. Because Plaintiff has also named 

the Mobile County School System as a defendant in this action, 

her “official capacity” claims against these individuals are due 

to be dismissed as redundant. While Plaintiff asserts that 

Superintendent Peek is a necessary party, she has not cited any 

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case authority that would prevent the Court from enforcing a 

judgment or entering injunctive relief against the Mobile County 

School System if Superintendent Peek were not a party to this 

action. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that 

Defendants’ motions be granted, and that Plaintiff’s claims 

against Superintendent Peek and School Board Commissioners 

Harwell, Crenshaw, Foster, Stringfellow, and Roberson be 

dismissed.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that 

Defendants’ motions (Docs. 7, 8) be GRANTED, and that 

Plaintiff’s claims against Superintendent Peek and School Board 

Commissioners Harwell, Crenshaw, Foster, Stringfellow, and 

Roberson be DISMISSED.

Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who 

objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. 

The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit precedent, 

“the failure to object limits the scope of [] appellate review 

to plain error review of the magistrate judge’s factual 

findings.” Dupree v. Warden, Attorney General, State of Alabama,

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715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011). In order to be specific, 

an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s 

report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this 14th day of May, 2014.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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