alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1
 Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Alan B. LevanName:
    
    Alan B. LevanTitle:
    
    Chief Executive OfficerDate:
    
    May 16, 2011
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



William C. Owens as Chief Executive Officer and President of Owens Financial Group, Inc., the General Partner of Owens Mortgage Investment Fund, a California Limited Partnership (the Registrant), and Bryan H. Draper, as Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Owens Financial Group, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:

(1)     the Registrants Report on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report) fully complies with the applicable requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant at the dates and for the periods indicated.



/s/ William C. Owens

William C. Owens

Chief Executive Officer and President of Owens Financial Group, Inc., General Partner

August 16, 2006



/s/ Bryan H. Draper

Bryan H. Draper

Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Owens Financial Group, Inc., General Partner

August 16, 2006
#### Goldie Weiner, Appellant, *v.*St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

December 8, 1924.

Insurance — fire insurance — jewelry was placed in stove by wife of insured for safekeeping — wife inadvertently started fire in stove — insurer is not liable.

An insurance company is not liable for the loss of jewelry by fire where it appears that the wife of the insured placed the jewelry in question in a stove for safekeeping and thereafter inadvertently started a fire in the stove which destroyed the jewelry.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the City Court of the city of New York, dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and from a judgment entered thereon.

*154
      *Lesser & Lesser [Bruce Ellison*of counsel], for the appellant.

*Solomon J. Rosenblum [Meyer Strunsky*of counsel], for the respondent.

Per Curiam:

The complaint was held to be bad upon its face. The action is by assured against insurer, for recovery, under the policy, for the destruction by fire of plaintiff’s jewelry. The peculiar cause of the destruction raises the question of law involved. The plaintiff’s wife “ for the purpose of safe keeping and protecting * * * [the jewelry] from burglars during her absence from the home, placed the said jewelry [of plaintiff] into a velvet handbag and deposited same in the stove of the household * * * and while the said jewelry * * * was in the stove * * * the wife * * * through inadvertence caused a fire to be made in the said stove.” We are of the opinion that the decision below was correct. Of course, mere negligence would not bar recovery. Nor would willful incendiarism by some one other than the assured, and without'his consent. Upon principle and authority, recovery may be had for loss caused by the spread of fire, or the result of heat, from a stove or fireplace. We are not required to pass upon what may, possibly, be the difficult question whether recovery could be had for the loss of something that fell, or was blown, into a stove or fireplace. We are of the opinion, however, that, as matter of common sense and human experience, it must be held that unless a fire policy expressly includes such a clause, the parties to the policy cannot be said to have contemplated a loss by flame or heat wholly confined to a stove used by the assured as a stove, where, as here, the property destroyed was *placed*in the stove, regardless of how or why it was so placed.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs, with leave to appellant to appeal to the Appellate Division.

All concur; present, Guy, Bijur and Mullan, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2010 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2010

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of 
    Health and Human Services, The Administration for Children and 
 Families, Payments to States for the Child Care and Development Block 
                      Grant for fiscal year 2024.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 29, 2023

Mr. Biggs (for himself, Mr. Rosendale, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Good of Virginia, 
   Mr. Roy, and Mr. Crane) introduced the following bill; which was 
        referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of 
    Health and Human Services, The Administration for Children and 
 Families, Payments to States for the Child Care and Development Block 
                      Grant for fiscal year 2024.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
              AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND 
              FAMILIES, PAYMENTS TO STATES FOR THE CHILD CARE AND 
              DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, amounts authorized 
to be appropriated or otherwise available for Department of Health and 
Human Services, The Administration for Children and Families, Payments 
to States for the Child Care and Development Block Grant for fiscal 
year 2024 may not exceed $5,276,000,000.
                                 <all>
```
#### Rosa Coplon Jewish Home & Infirmary, Respondent, v Larry LaDuca, Also Known as Lawrence LaDuca Appellant.

[974 NYS2d 835]

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Timothy J. Walker, A.J.), entered March 1, 2012. The order and judgment granted the motion of plaintiff for summary judgment and awarded plaintiff money damages.

It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the motion is denied.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover the outstanding balance owed for nursing home care that it rendered to defendant’s mother, who is now deceased. The outstanding balance resulted from defendant’s alleged breach of the parties’ contract, in which defendant had agreed to be responsible for ensuring payment to plaintiff from his mother’s income, assets, and insurance policy, as well as from Medicare and Medicaid, to the extent that those resources were available. We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]) and indeed, plaintiffs own submissions in support of its motion raise triable issues of fact whether defendant owes plaintiff any money and, if so, in what amount *(see generally Andrews, Pusateri, Brandt, Shoemaker & Roberson, P.C. v County of Niagara,*91 AD3d 1287, 1287-1288 [2012]). Present — Scudder, EJ., Peradotto, Garni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

APRIL M. LUCAS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-0191-CB-M

 :

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of the issues raised, 

and there having been no objections filed, the Recommendation of 

the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is 

adopted as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that the Secretary’s decision be AFFIRMED and 

that this action be DISMISSED.

DONE this 2nd day of February, 2015.

s/Charles R. Butler, Jr.

CHARLES R. BUTLER, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

Case 1:14-cv-00191-CB-M Document 19 Filed 02/02/15 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
Provident Financial Group, Inc.'s 10-Q for June 30, 1998 and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         225,541
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                34,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                59,794
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                  1,520,276
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      5,588,006
<ALLOWANCE>                                     75,472
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,857,742
<DEPOSITS>                                   4,781,849
<SHORT-TERM>                                 1,435,657
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            269,712
<LONG-TERM>                                    668,101
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      7,000
<COMMON>                                        12,744
<OTHER-SE>                                     682,679
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               7,857,742
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                250,488
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               49,166
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 2,281
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               301,935
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             109,926
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             167,432
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          134,503
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   10,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               5,716
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                135,535
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 95,504
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      62,400
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    62,400
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.45
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.39
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.89
<LOANS-NON>                                     57,924
<LOANS-PAST>                                    10,058
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 9,196
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 17,185
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                71,980
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   12,859
<RECOVERIES>                                     6,351
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               75,472
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            75,472
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
11559.

#### LeBron *v.*Stewart.

Decided January 20, 1921.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court — Judge George L. Bell. April 2, 1920.

*Neufville & Neufville,*for plaintiff.

*Burress é*Dillard, for defendant.

Jenkins, P. J.

1. Where a plaintiff in certiorari paid the cost in the court below and made the affidavit provided for by the Civil Code (1910), § 5187, except that in the affidavit he did not say that he was unable to pay the cost, the law in these respects was complied with, and the court did not err in refusing to dismiss the certiorari because the affiant did not swear that he was unable to pay the cost. *Simpkins*v. *Johnson,*3 *Ga. App.*437, 440 (60 S. E. 202).

2. A note voluntarily given in liquidation of a disputed claim is not without consideration *(Stewart*v. *Hardin,*24 *Ga. App.*611(2), 101 S. E. 716) ; but if the plea shows that such was not the purpose and intent of the parties to the contract and that it was a mere nudum pactum, the defendant owing nothing to and receiving nothing from the plaintiff and the plaintiff parting with nothing, the contract would be void, because lacking in consideration; and the defendant would be entitled to set up and prove such a defense. Even were the contract founded upon a disputed claim or other valid consideration, the free assent of the parties being essential to a valid contract, it would not be enforceable if the maker was induced to sign the instrument under actual duress by means of which his free will was restrained and his consent thus obtained. In this case, it appearing by the plea that the maker of the note was induced to sign the instrument in order to suppress a prosecution for an actual and stated criminal offense, which the plaintiff represented he was then and there about to institute under the advice of the prosecuting attorney already obtained, it became a question for the jury whether under such circumstances the instrument was. freely and voluntarily signed, or whether it was obtained by means of duress. *Lucas*v. *Castelow,*8 *Ga. App.*812, 815 (70 S. E. 184) ; *Bond*v. *Kidd,*1 *Ga. App.*798 (57 S. E. 944) ; Civil Code (1910), § 4255. The judge of the superior court did not err in sustaining the certiorari and holding that the plea was not subject to general demurrer.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Stephens and Hill, JJ., concur.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PAMELA SPAIN, individually and 

on behalf of all similarly situated 

individuals,

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0326-CG-N

)

RJM ACQUISITIONS, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

The parties having filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal (Doc. 43) on 

September 30, 2015, it is ORDERED that this matter is hereby DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE as to the individual claims of Spain and without prejudice to 

the claims of unknown putative class members. Each party shall bear her or its

own costs.1

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of October, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 1 In light of the foregoing, the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings (Doc. 36) is deemed to be MOOT.

Case 1:14-cv-00326-CG-N Document 44 Filed 10/01/15 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 12(a)


                          DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION
               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                                 (IN THOUSANDS)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                      QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 
                                                                      -----------------------
                                                                              1999

<S>                                                                   <C>
INCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

EARNINGS:
   Pre-tax income from continuing operations                                $ 17,804
Plus
   Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)                             32,214

TOTAL EARNINGS                                                              $ 50,108
                                                                            ========
FIXED CHARGES:
   Interest expensed and capitalized                                        $ 31,764
   Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
      expenses related to indebtedness                                           148
   An estimate of the interest component within rental expense                   338

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES                                                         $ 32,250
                                                                            ========

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES (INCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS)             1.55

EXCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

EARNINGS:
   Pre-tax income from continuing operations                                $ 17,804
Plus:
   Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)                             25,562

TOTAL EARNINGS                                                              $ 43,366
                                                                            ========
FIXED CHARGES:
   Interest expensed and capitalized                                        $ 25,112
   Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
     expenses related to indebtedness                                            148
   An estimate of the interest component within rental expense                   338

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES                                                         $ 25,598
                                                                            ========

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES (EXCLUDING INTEREST ON DEPOSITS)             1.69
</TABLE>
1

Filed 4/19/23 P. v. Ayobi CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHAJIA AYOBI,

Defendant and Appellant.

C096935

(Super. Ct. No. 12F00488)

Defendant Shajia Ayobi appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Counsel filed a brief raising no arguable 

issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) and requesting we 

exercise our discretion to review the entire record for arguable issues on appeal.

On February 1, 2023, we notified defendant: 1) counsel had filed a brief 

indicating no arguable issues had been identified; 2) as a case arising from an order 

1 Defendant filed his petition under Penal Code former section 1170.95. Effective 

June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered Penal Code former section 1170.95 to 

section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2

denying postconviction relief, defendant was not entitled to counsel or to an independent 

review of the record; and 3) in accordance with the procedures set forth in Delgadillo, 

defendant had 30 days in which to file a supplemental brief or letter raising any argument 

he wanted this court to consider. In addition, we notified defendant if we did not receive 

a letter or brief within that 30-day period, the court may dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant.

We consider defendant’s appeal abandoned and order the appeal dismissed. 

(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

 /S/

MAURO, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 /S/

KRAUSE, J.

 /S/

MESIWALA, J.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7683

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ANTHONY JOHNSON, a/k/a AJ, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-95-249, CA-98-116-1) Submitted: January 21, 1999 Decided: February 9, 1999 Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Anthony Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. David Bernard Smith, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Anthony Johnson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate ofappealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Johnson , Nos. CR-95-249; CA-98- 116-1 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 27, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<PAGE>   1


                                                                EXHIBIT NO. 11.1



                        FIDUCIARY CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P.


                         STATEMENT OF COMPUTATION OF NET
                          INVESTMENT INCOME PER LIMITED
                                PARTNERSHIP UNIT
               FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND 1998

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                1999              1998
                                             -----------       -----------
<S>                                          <C>               <C>        
Net Investment (Loss) Income                 $   (38,184)      $    29,191

Percentage Allocable to Limited Partners              99%               99%
                                             -----------       -----------

Net Investment (Loss) Income Allocable
   to Limited Partners                       $   (37,802)      $    28,899
                                             ===========       ===========

Weighted Average Number of Limited
   Partnership Units Outstanding               1,109,694         1,201,564
                                             ===========       ===========

Net Investment (Loss) Income Per Limited
   Partnership Unit                          $      (.03)      $       .02
                                             ===========       ===========
</TABLE>
11937.

#### EVANS *v.*WILLIAMS.

Where an untraversed answer to a certiorari does not verify the allegations of fact upon which the petition for certiorari is based, and states that “ all the allegations [in the petition] are not true,” this court can not hold that the judge of the superior court erred in overruling the certiorari.

Decided March 8, 1921.

Certiorari; from Putnam superior court — Judge Park. October 26, 1920.

*B. C. Jenkins,*for plaintiff in error.

*Davidson, Callaway & DeJarnette,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

It is well settled that an untr aver sed answer of the magistrate to a petition for certiorari, and not the petition, is controlling upon the superior court and this court, and that points made in the petition for certiorari, but not verified by the answer of the magistrate, cannot be considered by either court. In the instant case the only point that the petition for certiorari raises which was insisted upon before this court is that the justice who tried the case was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, for the reason that the damage sued for was to growing crops that had never been severed from the realty; but the allegations as to these facts, and the evidence in support thereof, set out in the petition, were not verified by the answer of the magistrate. Moreover, it is stated by the magistrate, in his answer to the petition, “that all the allegations [in the petition for certiorari] are not true, ” and it is not directly or clearly specified in the answer what allegations in the petition are untrue and what are true, and the answer was neither trav*413ersed nor excepted to. Under such circumstances this court is unable to say that the judge of the superior court erred in overruling the certiorari.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Lulee and*Bloodworth, JJ., *concur.*