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 2019 IL App (5th) 180137 NOTICE 

Decision filed 07/23/19. The 

text of this decision may be NO. 5-18-0137 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for IN THE Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same. 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

RACHEL LANDMANN, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) Bond County. 

) 

v. ) No. 17-OP-101 

) 

KATLIN LANDMANN, ) Honorable 

) Ronald R. Slemer, 

Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Overstreet and Justice Chapman concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The respondent, Katlin Landmann, appeals from the circuit court’s plenary order of 

protection entered on December 20, 2017, in which the court ordered the respondent to stay 500 

feet away from the petitioner, Rachel Landmann, and her four minor children for a period of one 

year. On appeal, the respondent argues that the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence 

certain hearsay statements, failing to apply the adverse inference rule against the petitioner, and 

finding that he abused the petitioner or other person. We reverse and vacate the circuit court’s 

judgment. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The petitioner and the respondent are ex-spouses and have three children together. On 

December 1, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition seeking an emergency ex parte order of 

protection against the respondent pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Act) 
 

 

 

 

 

 

(750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2016)). The petitioner sought protection for the parties’ three 

children as well as the petitioner’s one-year-old child by another man. At the time of the plenary 

hearing, O.L. was 10 years old, N.L. was 8 years old, and I.L. was 5 years old. The petition 

alleged that the respondent spanked O.L., causing injury, because O.L. “did not know the answer 

to a math problem.” The petitioner asserted she took O.L. to the emergency room for treatment, 

where the hospital staff and the police took photographs of O.L.’s injuries. Based on the 

allegations in the petition, the circuit court issued the ex parte order. 

¶ 4 On December 20, 2017, the circuit court conducted a plenary hearing on the petition. At 

the hearing, the petitioner testified that on November 30, 2017, the children returned home from 

visitation with the respondent. When they came home, O.L. was crying and “whining” that her 

“butt hurt[ ].” Over the respondent’s hearsay objection, the petitioner testified that O.L. told her 

that the respondent spanked her 27 times because she did not know the answer to a math 

problem. The petitioner testified she observed on O.L.’s bottom a large red mark with bruising, 

which worsened over time. The petitioner took O.L. to the hospital for treatment that evening. 

The petitioner testified the hospital took photographs of O.L.’s injuries and contacted the police. 

During cross-examination, the petitioner denied recently seeking additional monthly support or a 

vehicle from the respondent or offering to allow the respondent additional parenting time in 

exchange for a vehicle. 

¶ 5 The respondent also testified at the hearing. During direct examination, the respondent 

denied spanking O.L. 27 times. The respondent stated he spanked O.L. three times and sent her 

to the corner because “she was having problems with her math homework.” The respondent 

testified he spanked O.L. because she wanted him to give her the answer and she was not 

applying herself to her homework. The respondent emphasized that he has “rules in [his] house” 

and that O.L. “continued to ignore [him] and not try and not apply herself.” The respondent 

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testified the petitioner recently requested additional child support from him and attempted to 

bargain with him to obtain a car from him or his father. The respondent denied hurting O.L. but 

testified he was not aware whether the spanking left marks on O.L. 

¶ 6 At the conclusion of the evidence, the petitioner’s counsel requested the court enter a 

plenary order of protection, asserting that the respondent’s spanking of O.L. constituted abuse 

because it resulted in bruises lasting days. The respondent’s counsel requested the court dismiss 

the order of protection because the spanking constituted the “reasonable direction of a minor by a 

parent” and, therefore, fell within the statutory exclusion to abuse. The respondent also requested 

that the court apply the rule of adverse inference with regard to the alleged photographs of the 

bruising because the petitioner did not produce the photographs at the hearing and he believed 

that she had exclusive access to the photographs. 

¶ 7 The circuit court, stating it “heard the evidence [and] considered the credibility of the 

witnesses,” entered a plenary order of protection for one year. The court entered a written order 

utilizing a preprinted form. In the written order, the court found the respondent “abused 

Petitioner and/or the children,” that the actions of the respondent would likely cause irreparable 

harm or continued abuse unless they are stopped, and that it was necessary to grant the requested 

relief to protect the petitioner and other abused persons. The preprinted order defined “abuse” as 

“physical abuse *** but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent.” 

¶ 8 The respondent filed a motion for relief after judgment pursuant to section 2-1203 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2016)). The court denied the postjudgment 

motion, stating it had weighed the believability of the witnesses in entering the plenary order. 

This appeal follows. 

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¶ 9 ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 Mootness 

¶ 11 Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we must first address the issue of mootness. 

“An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues 

involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible 

for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 

338, 349-50 (2006). The issues raised by the respondent on appeal are moot because the plenary 

order of protection expired on December 20, 2018. See Hedrick-Koroll v. Bagley, 352 Ill. App. 

3d 590, 592 (2004). 

¶ 12 While reviewing courts generally do not decide moot questions, a reviewing court will 

review a moot question if the question falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the 

mootness doctrine. In re Christopher C., 2018 IL App (5th) 150301, ¶ 13. One of those 

exceptions is the public interest exception. In re Christopher C., 2018 IL App (5th) 150301, ¶ 13. 

Under the public interest exception, a court may review a moot issue on the merits if “(1) the 

moot question is public in nature, (2) it is desirable to provide an authoritative determination so 

as to offer guidance for public officers, and (3) it is likely that the question will reappear.” 

Whitten v. Whitten, 292 Ill. App. 3d 780, 784 (1997). The Act addresses issues of great public 

interest, and its purposes can only be accomplished if the courts properly apply the statutory 

requirements. Whitten, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 784. Furthermore, questions as to the Act’s 

requirements are likely to reappear, and we find it desirable to offer guidance as to those 

requirements. As such, we will address the merits of this case under the public interest exception 

to the mootness doctrine. 

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¶ 13 Sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Factual Findings 

¶ 14 In proceedings to obtain an order of protection, the central inquiry is whether the 

petitioner has been abused. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 348 (2006). Under section 214(a) of the 

Act, the trial court shall issue an order of protection if it finds that the petitioner has been abused. 

750 ILCS 60/214(a) (West 2016). Before issuing an order of protection, however, the trial court 

is required to make certain findings in “an official record or in writing.” 750 ILCS 60/214(c)(3) 

(West 2016). We will reverse the trial court’s entry of an order of protection if it fails to make 

the required findings. People ex rel. Minteer v. Kozin, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1043 (1998). 

¶ 15 Section 214(c)(3) provides: 

“(3) Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection, 

the court shall make its findings in an official record or in writing, and shall at a 

minimum set forth the following: 

(i) That the court has considered the applicable relevant factors 

described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. 

(ii) Whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, 

will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse. 

(iii) Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to 

protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons.” 750 ILCS 60/214(c)(3) 

(West 2016). 

¶ 16 Under the facts of this case, the circuit court needed to consider the “relevant factors” set 

forth in section 214(c)(1) in order to comply with the dictates of section 214(c)(3)(i). Section 

214(c)(1) states as follows: 

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“(1) In determining whether to grant a specific remedy, other than 

payment of support, the court shall consider relevant factors, including but not 

limited to the following: 

(i) the nature, frequency, severity, pattern and consequences of the 

respondent’s past abuse, neglect or exploitation of the petitioner *** and 

the likelihood of danger of future abuse, neglect, or exploitation to 

petitioner or any member of petitioner’s *** family or household; and 

(ii) the danger that any minor child will be abused or neglected or 

improperly relocated from the jurisdiction, improperly concealed within 

the State or improperly separated from the child’s primary caretaker.” 750 

ILCS 60/214(c)(1) (West 2016). 

¶ 17 Here, the circuit court’s written order consisted of a preprinted form on which the court 

checked off boxes and handwrote certain orders. The court boxes that were checked on the 

preprinted form indicated that, “[a]fter reviewing the Petition and hearing the evidence and 

testimony of Petitioner, the Court makes findings which: are stated on page 11 of this Order, or 

were made orally and videotaped or recorded by a court reporter and are incorporated into this 

Order.” The “Findings” section of the order, beginning on page 11, included the following 

optional findings: “[t]he actions of Respondent will likely cause irreparable harm or continued 

abuse unless they are prohibited” and “[i]t is necessary to grant the requested relief in this Order 

to protect Petitioner or other abused persons.” The trial court checked the boxes next to each of 

these findings, thus satisfying sections 214(c)(3)(ii) and (iii). See In re Marriage of McCoy, 253 

Ill. App. 3d 958, 964-65 (1993) (trial court order satisfied the minimum statutory requirements 

where it included a provision stating the court had considered the relevant statutory factors). The 

order does not, however, include any language satisfying section 214(c)(3)(i). 

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¶ 18 Section 214(c)(3)(i) requires, “at a minimum,” that the court make findings regarding its 

consideration of the relevant factors listed in section 214(c)(1) in “an official record or in 

writing.” 750 ILCS 60/214(c)(3)(i) (West 2016). These required findings do not explicitly appear 

anywhere in the record, including as part of the court’s oral pronouncements on the record or in 

the written order. Furthermore, neither the trial court’s oral pronouncement that it “heard the 

evidence [and] considered the credibility of the witnesses,” nor the court’s written order stating it 

had reviewed the petition and heard the evidence, satisfies the statute’s requirement that the court 

set forth, in granting a specific remedy, that the court had considered the nature, frequency, 

severity, pattern, and consequences of the respondent’s past abuse; the likelihood of danger of 

future abuse; and the danger that any minor child will be abused. See Kozin, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 

1043-44; In re Marriage of Henry, 297 Ill. App. 3d 139, 143-44 (1998); In re Marriage of Healy, 

263 Ill. App. 3d 596, 601-02 (1994); and Bagley, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 592-94. 

¶ 19 In this case, the circuit court made no findings, written or oral, regarding the relevant 

factors as required by section 214(c)(3)(i). We are somewhat concerned that the preprinted form 

relied upon by the court may have been inadequate to comply with the statutory mandates of 

section 214(c)(3)(i). We have little doubt that the trial court considered the evidence as it related 

to the findings required by section 214(c)(3)(i), but there is simply no record of this finding 

available for our review. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court judgment and vacate the order of 

protection based on the court’s failure to make the specific findings required by the Act. As our 

resolution on this issue controls our disposition on appeal, we need not address the respondent’s 

arguments on appeal.1 

1

The petitioner filed with this court a motion to correct statement at oral argument, indicating that 

petitioner’s counsel mistakenly represented to the court during oral argument that the form order used by 

the circuit court was a standardized form that had been adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court Access to 

Justice Commission. In her motion, counsel clarified that the form had not been adopted by the Access to 

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¶ 20 Reversed; order vacated. 

Justice Commission Forms Committee. The petitioner’s motion was originally taken with the case, and 

the respondent was granted 10 days to file a response. The respondent elected not to file a response. The 

petitioner’s motion is now granted. 

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2019 IL App (5th) 180137 

NO. 5-18-0137 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

RACHEL LANDMANN, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) Bond County. 

) 

v. ) No. 17-OP-101 

) 

KATLIN LANDMANN, ) Honorable 

) Ronald R. Slemer, 

Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

Opinion Filed: July 23, 2019 

Justices: Honorable Judy L. Cates, J. 

Honorable David K. Overstreet, P.J., and 

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J. 

Concur 

Attorney David M. Fahrenkamp, Law Office of David M. Fahrenkamp, 205 North 

for Second Street, P.O. Box 625, Edwardsville, IL 62025-0625 

Appellant 

Attorneys Andrea Neubauer Schrader, Susan M. Simone, Land of Lincoln Legal 

for Assistance Foundation, Inc., 310 Easton Street, Suite 330, Alton, IL 

Appellee 62002