F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

S A M A A B D I A Z I Z A B D I S A L A N , P etitioner
,

v

.

E R I C H. H O L D E R , J R ., Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 10-73215

Ag ency No. A095-406-303

S A M A A B D I A Z I Z A B D I S A L A N , P etitioner
,

v

.

E R I C H. H O L D E R , J R ., Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 11-71124

Ag ency No. A095-406-303

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued and Submitted En B anc J une 19, 2014—Seattle, W ashing ton

F iled December 15, 2014A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 2

B e fore: Sidney

R. Thomas, Chief J udg e, and Alex Koz inski, Kim McL ane W a r dlaw, Ronald M. Gould, Richard A. P aez , Marsha S. B erz on, Richard C. Tallman, Sandra S. I kuta, Mary

H. Murg uia, J a cqueline H. Ng uy en, and Andrew D. Hurwitz

, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e W ardlaw

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

Overruling Li v. H

older

, 656 F .3d 8 98 (9th Cir. 2011), a s well as A nnachamy v. Holder

, 733 F .3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013), to the ex tent it relied on Li
, the en banc court held that when the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals issues a decision t h at d e n i e s some claims, but remands any other claims for reli e f
to an I mmig ration J udg e for further proceeding s, the B oard decision is not a final order of removal with reg ard to any of the claims, and it d oes not trig g er the thirty

- d a y w i ndow in which to file a petition for review.

The court ex plained that its holding renders prema t ure any pending petitions for review that were filed in this court while backg round checks or other re m a n d ed proceeding s

were o n going

, but that it would be unfair to punish those petitioners who reasonably relied o n Li in filing th eir
pr e m a ture petitions. The court therefore held that any pending petitions rendered prematu r e by today ’ s decision

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 3

shall be treated as automatically ripening into timely p e titions
upon the c ompletion o f remanded proceeding s, reg a rdless o f whether those proceeding s have already conc l u d ed. The
court noted that its holding ex tends o nly to petitioners whose petitions f

or review were filed in this c ourt before the d ate o f this decision.

The court noted t h at, under the f acts of this case, it need
not revisit the r

ule in Pinto v. Holder

, 6 48 F .3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2 011), and Castrejon-Garcia v. I NS
, 60 F .3d 1359, 1 361- 62 (9th Cir

. 1 9 9 5 ), that the B oard’s decision is a f inal order of removal when it remands for c o n s i d eration of voluntary departure, but denies all other forms of relief.

I n lig ht o f its h olding reg arding finality

, t h e c ourt h eld that it had jurisdiction to c onsider petitioner’s challeng e to the B oard’s determination that her asy lum application was timebarred.

The court remanded, as it did in Singh v. Holder

, 649 F .3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), f or the B oard to address in the first instance whe t h er an asy lum applicant’s credible and uncontradicted te s t i m ony reg arding her date o f entry meets the statutory “clear and convin cing evidence” standard for timeliness.

COUNSEL

Vicky Dobrin and Hilary H an (arg ued), Dobrin & H a n , PC, Seattle, W ashing ton, for Petitioner.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 4

L inda Y. Cheng

, Patrick J

. Glen, and J e si J

. Carlson (arg ued), O f f ice of I mmig ration L itig ation, United States Departme n t of J ustice, W ashing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

Deborah S. Smith, U niversity of I d a h o C o lleg e of L aw, Moscow, I daho, for Amicus Curiae A merican I mmig r ation L awy e rs Association.

Charles Roth, Chicag o, I llinois, for Amicus Curiae National I mmig r a tion J ustice Center.

OP INION

W A RDL AW , Circuit J udg e:

W h en does an o rder of removal become “final” for t h e purpose of seeking judicial review? Panels of our court have reached vary

ing conclusions, creating u nnecessary confusion

as to the timeliness of petit i o n s f or review a

nd our jurisdiction to e ntertain them. We reheard this matter en banc
to clarify the issue of finality of the Bo a r d of I mmig r ation Appeals’ ( “B I A”) decisions. T oday

, we adopt a straig htforward rule: when the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals issues a decision that denies some claims but reman d s any other c laims for relief to an I mmig rati o n J udg e (“I J ” ) for furth er p roceeding s ( a “mix ed” decision), 1 the B I A decision

1 T h ere are sev eral w ay s th at an alien co u ld b e elig ib le f o r certain f

o rm s

o f relief b u t i n elig ib le f

o r o th ers. Fo r in stan ce, s h e co u ld m eet th e “ w ellf o u n d ed f ear” bar f o r asy lu m b u t f

ail t o m eet th e stricter “ m o re l i k ely th an

n o t” stan d ard f

o r w ith h o ld in g of rem o v al an d CA T

. S ee Ah med v. Keisler

, 5 0 4 F.3 d 1 1 8 3
, 1 1 9 9

– 1 2 0 0 ( 9 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ). A ltern ativ ely

, b ecau s e th e stan d ard f

or asy lu m in clu d es a o n e- y ear f i lin g lim itatio n , see 8 U.S.C.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 5

is not a final order o f r e m o v a l with r eg ard to any of the claims, and it does not trig g er the thirty -day w indow in which to file a petition for review.

As a result, we have jurisdiction to consider petitio ner’s
asy lum claim, but we r emand to the B I A in lig ht of Singh v

. Holder , 649 F

. 3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

I.

Sama A bdiaz iz Abdisal a n i s a 36-y ear-old native a nd citi z e n of Somalia. Abdisalan asserts that she entered the United States in F e bruary 2 0 02. On March 25, 2 0 0 2, Abdisalan filed an a

pplication fo r asy lum, withholding o f removal, a

nd protec tion under the Convention Ag ainst Torture (“CAT”). She claimed that in Somalia, she was f o r ced to underg o female g e nital mutilation and w a s kidnapped and raped by

members of a rival clan. Abdisalan appeared at a merits h e a

ring before an I J i n 2 0 07. T he I J found that Abdisalan was credible, but denied her asy lum claim as time-barred, c oncluding that s h e had not demonstrated by clear a

nd convincing evidence that she filed her asy lum a

pplication within one y ear of a r r i v i n g in the United States. The I J did, however, g rant Abdisalan withholding of removal as to Somalia. 2

§ 1 1 58 (a)(2 )(B ), w

h ereas w i th h o ld in g an d CA T d o n o t, an ap p lican t co u ld b e elig ib le f

o r w i t h h o l d i n g o r CA T relief bu t n o t asy lu m

. Here, f or

ex am p le, th e IJ f

ou n d th at A

b d isalan qu alif

ied f o r w ith h o ld i n g o f rem o v al, b u t also co n clu d e d t h a t sh e w as in elig ib le f o r asy lu m b ecau se sh e f

ailed
to f ile h er ap p licatio n

w ith in o n e y ear o f

en terin g th e Un ited States.

2 T h e IJ also d e n i e d A

bd isalan ’ s CA T claim o n th e m erits. A b d isalan d id n o t ap p eal th is claim

to th e B IA

.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 6

Abdisalan a

ppealed t h e I J’ s a s y l um determination, and the Government declined to challeng e t h e I J ’s g rant o f withholding

. I n Novem b e r 2008, the B I A affirmed the I J ’s denial of Abdisalan’s a sy lum cla im and r emanded for backg round c hecks related to h e r withholding c l aim. Abdisalan did not f

ile a petition f

or review o f the B I A’s 2008 decision.

I n J une 2009, the Government completed its backg r ound checks, and the I J issued a nother order g ranting Abdisalan withholding of r e m oval. Abdisalan ag ain appealed to the B I A, challeng ing the ag ency ’s p r e v i o us determination that her asy lum c l aim was time-barred. The B I A treated this

a p peal as an u ntimely motion to reconsider and dismissed i t in a September 2010 decision. The B I A ag ain remanded the

ma t t er to the I J for u

p dated backg round checks. F inally

, in March 2011, the I J issued an order confirming that Abdisalan had completed another r ound of backg r ound checks. This order also reaffirmed the g rant of withholding and reiterated that Abdisalan’s asy lum claim had been d en i ed. Abdisalan then filed in this court petitions for re v iew o f the 2 010 B I A decision and the 2011 I J order, challeng ing the finding that her asy lum claim is time-barred. The two petitions have been consolidated for our review.

A divided t h r e e -judg e panel of our court held that it lacked jurisdiction o ver Abdisa l a n ’s consolidated petition because she failed to file a petition for re v i e w w ithin thirty day s of the B I A ’s 2 008 decision affirming the I J ’s denial o f her asy lum c laim. Abdisalan v. Holder

, 728 F .3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). A majority of active, nonrecused judg e s voted to r ehear the p etiti o n for review en banc. 750 F .3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014).A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 7

II.

W e have jurisdict ion to d etermine our o w n jurisdiction. Y e v

. INS
, 214 F .3d 1 128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). I n t h i s instance, whether we have jurisdiction is a purely le ga l questio n , which we d etermine de novo. Annachamy v

. Holder , 733 F

. 3d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 2013).

III.

A.

A “petition for review must be filed n ot later than 30 day s after the date of the f

i n a l order o f r emoval.” 8 U .S.C. § 1252(b)(1). This time limit is “mandator y and jurisdictional.” Stone v

. INS
, 5 14 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the “ point at which a removal order becomes final i s critical for the
purposes of timely petitioning f or judicial rev iew.” OrtizAlfaro v. Holder , 694 F .3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2012).

I n the ordinary case, this point is e a s y t o determine: the thirty -day clock beg ins to run when the B I A issues a decision that a ffirms in full t h e I J ’ s o rder of removal. However, a s here, an alien often seeks more than one avenue of relief from deportation in a sing le a

pplication. Commonly the alien will seek asy lum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, or, in the altern at i ve, voluntary departure. The standards for obtaining such relief vary , 3 so that, for ex ample, an a lien may

3 A n ap p lican t f

or a s y l u m m

u st sh ow “ a w ell- f

o u n d ed f ear of
p e r secu t io n o n acco u n t o f ” o n e of f

i v e p ro tected g ro u n d s. 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 0 1 (a)(4 2 )(A ). A n a p p l i c a n t f or w ith h o ld in g o f rem o v al m u st sh o w th at h er “ lif

e o r f reed o m w o u ld b e t

h reaten ed ” o n acco u n t o f o n e o f th oseA B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 8

be able to obtain withholding but not asy lum. F inality is less obvious w hen the B I A a f

firms the denial of r elief on some o f

an alien’s claims for r el i e f b ut r emands to the I J for f urther proceeding s on others in a “mix e d” decision. D oes that B I A decision constitute a “final order of removal” with reg ard to t he claims denied? To date, we have offered conflicting answers to that question.

I n Go v. Holder

, 640 F .3d 1 047 (9th Cir. 2011), the I J denied the petitioner’s asy lum, withholding

, and CAT claims. The B I A affirmed a s to asy lum a nd withholding

, but remanded for further consideration of the peti t i o n er’s CAT claim. Id. at 1050. After a d ditio nal proceeding s before the I J
, the B I A a f

f i r m e d the denial of CAT relief. Id. at 1051. The petitioner never fi l ed a petition for review of the first B I A decision, but he timely filed a petition challeng ing the second B I A decision, seeking judicia l review of all three claims. Id. W e held that “ b ecause Go’s r e m o v a l order did
not become final until the B o ard r e jected each o f his c laims for relief,

. . . our jurisdiction e x tends to each of his claims.” Id. at 1052. W e acknowledg ed that t h e B I A’s first decision “may have been the final administrative decision with respect to Go’s elig ibility for asy lum a nd withholding r elief,” but

ex p lained that “that decision was not a final order of removal because it left open the possibility that Go mig ht obtain CAT relief” and therefore avoid removal. Id. at 1051.

sam e pro tected g ro u n d s

. 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 3 1 (b )(3 )(A ). T o q u alif y f o r relief

u n d er CA T
, an ap p lican t m u st estab lish th at “ it is m o re lik ely th an n o t th at h e o r sh e w o u ld b e to rtu red .” 8 C .F.R. § 2 08 .1 6 (c)(2 ). A ltern ativ ely

, th e A tto rn ey Gen eral m ay d en y relief b u t p erm it v olu n tary d ep artu r e i f th e ap p lican t is n o t rem o v ab le d u e to an ag g rav ated f elo n y o r terro rist activ i ty

. 8 U.S.C. § 1 22 9 c(a)(1 ).A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 9

W e reached a contrary conclusion in Li v. H older

, 656 F .3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011)

. I n Li
, the I J denied the petitioner’s a sy lum c laim but g ranted withh olding o f removal. Id. at 900. On a p p e al, the B I A affirmed the I J ’s d enial of asy lum, but as in A bdisalan’s case, remande d t h e matter to the I J “to complete backg round checks required before withholding o f r e m o v al can be g ranted.” Id. at 899. W e held that the BI A d ecision was a “final order” as to the petitioner’s a sy lum claim b ecause it “ wa s n o t the subject o f the remand, and the board considered and decided the merits of the [ asy lum] appeal before dismissing it.” Id. a t 904. W e therefore concluded that “where the B I A denies [ one form of]

r e l i e f a nd remands

. . . for backg round checks required for alternative r elief, we have jurisdiction to co n s i d e r an appeal of the final order deny

ing relief.” Id.

I n O rtiz-Alfaro

, we recog n iz ed that “ Go appears to be at odds with Li .” 6 94 F .3d at 959. W e att e m p t e d t o sidestep that tension by observing that in both Go and L i
, “ a ll administrative proceeding s had concluded at the t i me we decided that we had jurisdiction.” Id. W e h e l d t h a t we lacked jurisdiction over Ortiz -Alfaro’s petition because “administrative p roceeding s a r e ong oing in [ his] case.” Id. Despite our e fforts in Ortiz-Alfar o , the divided Abdisalan panel opinion correctly p erceived an intract a ble conflictA B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 10

between Go and Li

. 4 W e ag reed to rehear this case en banc to resolve that conflict.

Th e stakes for Abdisalan a re hig h: if the B I A’s 2008 d e c i s i on was a final o rder of removal with reg ard to h e r

a s y l u m claim, a s in Li
, then she lost her opportunity to challeng e the ag e ncy ’ s denial of that claim when she failed to file a petition for review of the 2 008 dec i s i o n

. B ut if the B I A’s 2008 de c ision was not a f inal o rder of r emoval, as in Go
, then we have jurisdiction to review Abdisala n ’s asy lum claim as part of her subsequent petitions for review. This di fference is not without sig nificance. 5 B oth Abdisalan a nd the Government urg e us to follow Go and overrule Li

. B ecause Go ’s approach be t ter alig n s with the tex t of the

4 Ou r sister circu its h av e also reach ed d iv erg en t h o ld in g s o n th is issu e. T h e Sev en th Circu it h as h eld th at a B IA d ecisio n d en y in g so m e claim s b u t

rem an d in g oth ers is f

in al w i th reg ard to th e claim s d en ied

. Vira ca ch a v. Mu ka sey , 5 1 8 F.3 d 5 1 1
, 5 1 3 (7 th Cir. 2 0 08 ) (h o ld in g th at B IA ’ s d ecisio n af f irm in g den ial o f

asy lu m b u t rem an d i n g f

o r co m p letio n o f b ack g ro u n d ch eck s related to w ith h o ld in g w as a rev iew ab le “ f in a l o rd er” as to asy lu m ). T h e T h ird an d Eig h th Circu its, h o w ev er, h av e h eld th at a m ix ed B IA d ecisio n is n o t f

in al. Va kker v. Att’y Gen

. o f th e U.S

. , 5 1 9 F.3 d 1 4 3
, 1 4 7

– 4 8 (3 d Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (h o ld in g th at BIA ’ s d ecisio n w as n o t a “ f in al o rd er

o f rem o v al” b ecau se it “ d id n o t f in ally ad j u d icate all i ssu es in th e p ro ceed in g in w

h i ch it w as en t ered ”); Go r o mo u v. Ho ld er , 7 21 F.3 d 5 6 9
, 5 7 6 n .6 (8 th C ir. 2 0 1 3) (h o ld in g th at BIA d ecisio n af f irm in g d e n i a l o f
asy lu m bu t rem an d in g f

o r co m p letio n o f b ack g ro u n d ch eck s “ is a n o n

f in al o rd er f

o r p u rp o ses o f

j u d icial rev iew ”).

5 T h e g ran t

o f asy lu m is a b ro ad er f

o rm o f relief th at sets on e o n a p ath
to citizen sh ip

. On e y ear af t er b ein g g ran ted asy l u m , an asy lee m ay ap p ly f o r ad j u s t m e n t o f statu s to law f u l p erm an en t resid en t. S ee 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 9 (b ). In co n trast, th e g ran t o f w i t h h o ld in g o f rem o v al m erely
p rev en ts o n e f

ro m b ein g rem ov ed to th e co u n try w h ere o n e’ s lif

e or f reed o m w o u ld be th reaten ed o n acco u n t o f a p ro tected g ro u n d

. See INS v. Ag u irre-Ag u irre , 5 26 U.S. 4 1 5 , 4 1 9 (1 9 9 9 ).A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 11

I mmig r a tion and Nationality Act (“I NA”) a n d t h e ag e ncy ’s implicit interpretations of the I NA, we agree.

B.

W e beg in w ith our own jurisdictional statute, 8 U .S.C. § 1252. W e h ave jurisdiction to r eview “a final o rder o f removal.” Id. § 1252(a)(1). Cong r ess h as defined an order o f removal 6 as “the order” of the I J “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(A). “The order” then becomes “final upon the earlier of”:

(i) a d e t e rmination b y the B oard o f I mmig r ation Appeals affirming such order; o r

( i i ) the ex piration o f the period in which t h e alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals.

Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B ).

A straig htforward r eading of this tex t indicates that an order of removal cannot become final for any purpose when it depends on the r esolutio n o f f urther issues by the I J on remand. The I

NA’s repeat e d r e ference to “the” order
sug g ests that Cong r ess contemplated that an alien’s removal proceeding s would ty

p ically culminate in o ne final o rder o f

re m o val. See In re HP Inkjet P rinter Litig.
, 716 F .3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting the statutory term “the” to

mean “sing ular”); In re Cardelucci

, 285 F .3d 1231, 1234 (9th

6 T h e INA ref

ers to an “ o rd er o f d ep o rtatio n ,” b u t its d ef in itio n also
ap p lies to t

h e p o st- REA L ID A ct term “o rd er o f rem o v al.” S in g h v. Go n za les , 4 9 9 F.3 d 9 6 9 , 9 7 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ).A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 12

Cir. 2002) (observing that th e “ d efinite article ‘the’ particulariz es the subject which it precedes and is [ a] w ord o f limitation as opposed to [ the] indefinite or g eneraliz ing force ‘a’ or ‘an’” (quoting B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 1477 ( 6 t h ed. 1990)); cf. Stone
, 5 14 U.S. at 3 93–95 (holding th at an amendment to the I

NA in 1990 abrog ated the default presumption that “ C o n g r e s s v i s u a liz e d a sing le administrative proceeding in which all questions relating to an alien’s de p ortation w ould b e raised and resolved,” but that it did so only in the specific conte x t o f m otions to reopen a nd reconsider (internal quotat i o n marks omitted)). I f there is only one final order of removal—as is true in the absence of

a motion to reope n o r reconsider—it is difficult to conceive how the order could become final at multiple points in time.

Cong r ess’s use of the word “final” streng thens this v iew. “F inal” commonly means “[ m] arking th e l a s t stag e of a process; leaving nothing to be looked fo r or e x pected;

u l t i m a t e

. ” F i n a l

, O X FORD E N G L I S H D I C TI O N A R Y , http://www.oed.com/view/Entry /70319 (last visited Aug

. 11, 2014). I n the leg al contex t, the term “final” r efers to an order “ending a court action or proceeding leaving nothing f

urther
to be determined by t h e c o urt or to be done ex cept the

a dministrative ex ecution of the court’s finding

. . . . ” W E B S T E R ’ S T H I R

D N E W I N T ’ L D I C T I O N

A R Y 851 (2002); see als o B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 7 47 (10th ed. 2 014) (defining “final” as “not requiring any further judicial action by the court th a t rendered judg ment to determine the matter litig ated; concluded”). Cong ress’s use o f th i s f a miliar term sug g ests that it did not int e n d for an order of r emoval to become final while remanded proceeding s are ong oing

. Althoug h the statutory tex t provides a strong indication o f how we should treat mix ed B I A decisions, it “does not speakA B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 13

u n a m b i guously to the issue h ere.” S cialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio
, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014). I n particular, the d ual

r e f e r e nce to “the order

. . . concluding that the alien i s deportable o r ordering deportation” could sug g est that t wo d i f f e rent kinds of orders are covered; an alien could b e deportable but not ord e re d deported (because he is possibly entitled to some form of relief from d e portation). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) (emphasis added). The lang uag e of the I NA thus does not completely foreclose the possibility that a mix e d B I A decision c ould constitute a final order o f removal with reg ard to the claims denied. F o r f urther
g uidance, we turn to the ag ency ’ s interpretations.

Neither the B I A nor the Ex ecutive Office for I mmig r ation Review ( “EOI R”) has ex press l y a ddressed the issue before

us. Nonetheless, the ag ency ’s reg ulations, and p articularly its interpr e t a t i o n s of those reg ulations, b olster the view that a mix ed B I A decision is not “final” with reg ard t o a n y of the

a l i e n ’ s c l a i m s

. T h e s e w e l l

- r e a s o n e d

, i f i n d i r e c t , interpretations further persuade us that i n the absence o f a motion to r e open or reconsider, there is o n l y one final order of removal p er alien, and that order d o e s not become final until backg r ound checks or other remanded p r oceeding s a re complete. Cf. Mejia-Hernandez v

. Holder

, 633 F .3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 2011) ( apply ing S kidmore deference t o t he B I A ’s interpretati o n “proportional to its thoroug hness, reasoning

, consistency , and ability

to persuade”). 7

7 A lth o u g h w e f

in d t h e ag en cy ’ s in terp retatio n s p ersu asiv e u n der S k i d m o r e , w e co n clu d e th at n eith er Ch evro n n o r Au er d ef eren ce i s ap p ro p riate

. T h e q u estio n p resen ted h ere i s w h eth er th e B IA ’ s 2 0 0 8 d ecisio n w as a “ f

in al o rd er o f rem o v a l” w ith in th e m ean in g of 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 5 2
, o u r j u risd ictio n al statu t e. J u st as w e ref u se to ap p ly C

h evro n d ef eren ce w h en an ag en cy p u rp orts to d irectly d ef in e o u r j u risd ictio n , see Da n d in o, In c. v. U.S

. Dep ’t o f Tra n sp

. , 7 2 9 F

. 3 d 9 1 7, 9 2 0 n .1 (9 th Cir.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 14

As a g eneral matter, EOI R r eg ulations provide that the B I A “may return a case to

. . . an immig r ation judg e f or such further a ction a s may be appropriate, without entering a final decision on the merits of the case.” 8 C.F .R. § 1003.1(d)(7) (emphasis added). A lso rel e v a n t to the particular circumstan ces before us is that a c omprehensive set o f
regu l a t ions and B I A decisions g overns backg round checks. B y reg u lation, the B I A may not g rant c ertain forms of relief, including w ithholding of removal, until backg round c hecks have been completed. 8 C. F. R

. § 1003.1(d)(6)(i). I f ba ck gr o u nd checks must be completed or updated, the B I A
may r em an d t o the I J with instructions to carry o ut the checks. Id. § 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)(A). When a case is remanded
to the I J for backg round checks, the I J is required to “consider the results of the identity

, law e n f o r cement, o r security investig ations or ex aminations,” and “[ i] f new information is presented, the immig ration judg e may hold a further hearing if necessary to consider any leg al or factual issues, including issues relating to cred ibility

, if relevant.” Id. § 1003.47(h). “The immig ration judg e shall then e nter an order g ranting o r deny ing the immig ration r elief soug h t.” Id. Similarly

, EOI R’s interim rule g overning backg round checks states that when required checks h ave n ot been completed, “the Bo ard will not be a b l e to issue a final decision g ranting any application for relief t h a t i s subject to the provisions o f § 1003.47, because the record is n ot y et complete.” B ackg round and Secur i ty I n vestig ations in Proceeding s

2 0 1 3 ) (“ It is w ell- estab lish e d th at th e A g en cy ’ s p o sitio n o n ou r j u risd ictio n i s n o t en titled t o d ef eren ce u n d er Ch evro n .” (alteratio n s an d in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s om itted )), an ag en cy ’ s im p licit in terp retatio n of

o u r j u risd ictio n al stat u t e i s n ot en titled t o co n tro llin g Ch evro n o r Au er d ef eren ce.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 15

B efore I mmig ration J udg e s and t h e B oard of I mmig r ation Appeals, 70 F e d. Reg . 4743, 4748 (J an. 31, 2005).

The B I A has interpreted these reg ulations in a pai r o f published, three-member decisions. F irst, in In re AlcantaraPerez
, 23 I

. & N. Dec. 882 (B I A 2006), the B oard considered how an I J should p roceed i f b a c k g round checks reveal that the alien may be inelig ible f o r a form of relief that has already been provisionally g ranted. The B I A concluded that because an order remanding the case for backg round c hecks is “not a final decision,” n ew information that comes to lig ht

on remand permits the I J to “ex amine the case in a different lig ht,” including by holding new hearing s. Id. at 884. The B I A also ex plained that where the backg round checks fail to turn u p new evidence, “the I mmig ration J udge w i l l enter an order g ranting relief,” a

nd “[ t] h at o rder then becomes the final administrative o rder in the case.” Id. at 885 (emphasis added).

I n In re M-D-
, 24 I

. & N. Dec. 138 (B I A 2007), the B I A
ag ain considered the scope of the I J ’s jurisdiction on remand. The B I A ex plained that “when a case is remanded to an I mmig r at i on J udg e for the appropriate backg round c hecks pursuant to 8 C.F .R. § 1 003.47(h), the I mmig ration J udg e reacquires jurisdiction over the proceeding s.” Id. at 141. On remand, the I J “may not reconsider the dec i s i o n o f the B oard,” but “if the backg round checks r eveal n e w e vidence potentiall y a f

fecting r elief, the I mmig ration J u dg e must consider such evidence before entering an order.” Id. Reiterating its position in Alcantara-Perez

, the B I A remarked that when it remands for backg round c hecks, “no final order

ex ists.” Id.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 16

These agency interpretations shed further lig ht on what the tex t of t h e statute a lready implies: in a case like A b d i s alan’s, there is o nly one final order of removal, a n d when the B I A remands to the I J
, that order is not “final” until administrative proceedin gs h ave concluded. I ndeed, under the B I A’s own precedenti a l d ecisions, the B I A lacked

a uthority to issue “the f inal administrative order i n [ Abdisalan’s] c ase” because it remanded the matter to the I J for backg round c hecks. In r e A l c a ntara-Perez
, 23 I

. & N

. Dec. at 885. I n such circumstances, the B I A has made clear that “no final o rder ex ists.” In re M-D-
, 24 I

. & N

. D e c. at 141.

I n a related contex t, th e S u p r eme Court has long interpreted the term “final a g ency a c t ion” in the Administrative Procedure Act t o r equire that an ag e ncy ’s

ac t i o n “mark the ‘consummation’ of the ag e ncy ’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. S p ear , 5 20 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chicago & S

. Air Lines, I

nc. v

. W aterman S.S. Corp.
, 333 U.S. 103, 113 ( 1 9 4 8 ) ). I n other

w o r ds, the a ction “must n ot b e of a merely tentative o r interlocutory nature.” Bennett
, 520 U

. S

. at 178; see also Sackett v. E

PA
, 132 S. Ct. 1 367, 1 372 (2012) (holding that an ag ency order was f

inal in part because its conclusions “were
not subject to further a ge n cy review”). I n the immig r ation
contex t, the ag ency ’s a djudication of an alien’s claims can hardly be considered fully c o nsummated while backg r ound checks or other remanded proceeding s which h ave the potential to affect the disposition are still in prog ress.

F inally

, we note that considerations of judicial efficiency also weig h in favor of r e v i e w i ng a sing le final order o f removal. See, e.g. , Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. Dir., Office o f W o r k ers’ Comp. Programs
, 626 F .2d 106, 107–08A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 17

(9th Cir. 1980) (hol d i n g that an ag ency order involving a remand is no t a r eviewable “ final order,” and reasoning that this rule “furthers the same policies as the finality ru l e

e m bodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291”); D ir., Office of W o r k er s ’ Comp. Programs v. Brodka

, 643 F .2d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 1 981) (noting that d eclining to ex e r cise jurisdiction o v er ag ency remand orders “furthers the interests o f administrative
economy a

nd judicial efficiency embodied in the p olicy
ag ainst piecemeal appeals”). Nor is this rule likely to have an unfair imp a ct o n petitioners. See INS v. Doherty

, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“[ A] s a g eneral matter, every delay works
to the advantag e of the deportable alien who w i s h e s merely to remain in the United States.”).

C.

W h en the B I A r emands to the I J for any reason, no final order of removal ex ists u ntil all administrative pro c e eding s have concluded. Thus, when the B I A i s s u e s a mix ed decision, no aspect of the B I A’s d ecision i s “ f i n a l” f or the
purpose of

judicial review. B y adopting this rule, we o verrule Li as well as Annachamy v. Holder

, 733 F

. 3 d 2 5 4 (9th Cir. 2013), to the ex tent that it relies on Li ’s finality holding

. 8

Today ’s holding renders premature any pending p e titions for review that were filed in this court whil e b a c k g r ound checks o r other remanded proceeding s were ong oing

. Here, for instance, Abdisalan’s petition f or review of the 2010 B I A

8 Un d er th e f

acts o f th is case, w e n eed n ot rev isit o u r ru le th at th e B IA ’ s d ecisio n i s a f

in al o rd er o f

rem o v al w

h en it rem an d s f

o r co n sid eratio n of

v o lu n t ary d ep artu re b u t d en ies all o th er f o rm s of relief

. See, e.g

. , Pin to v. Ho ld er , 6 4 8 F.3 d 9 7 6
, 9 8 0 (9 t h C i r

. 2 01 1 ); Ca strejo n -Ga rcia v. INS
, 6 0 F.3 d 1 3 5 9 , 1 36 1

– 6 2 (9 th Cir. 1 9 95 ).A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 18

decision was filed b efore the conclusion of her ag ency p r o c e e ding s in 2011, and w as thus premature at the time i t

was filed. Abdisalan also filed a timely petition for review o f the 2011 I J order, but there are sure l y other petitioners w ho

were n ot so prescient. I n particular, there may be petitioners who filed petitions for review that we now know to be premature, but w ho a ssumed—in reaso n able reliance on Li —that they did not need to file a second petition a fter their remanded proceeding s were completed. I t would be unjust to punish these petitioners for our own doctrinal inconsistency

.

T herefore, we hold that any pending petitions render e d premature b y today ’s d ecision shall be treated as automatic a lly ripening into timely p etitions u pon the completion o f remanded proceeding s , r e g ardless of whether those proceeding s have already c oncluded. Under th i s r ule, Abdisalan’s premature 2010 p etition ripen e d u pon the conclusion of her a dministrative proceeding s in 2011, which

means we have jurisdiction over both of her p etitions. W e take no position on the c u r rent c ircuit split re garding
treatment of premature petitions g en erally

. 9 Our holding

ex tends only to p etitioners whose p e t i t ions for review were filed in this court before today ’s date.

F inally

, we note that if the B I A wishes to avoid formally remanding cases to the I J
, it may avail itself of its reg ulatory

9 Co mp a re Kh a n v

. Att’y Gen

. o f th e U.S

. , 69 1 F.3 d 4 8 8, 4 9 3 (3 d Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) (h o ld in g th at a p rem atu re p etitio n f

o r r ev iew au to m atically rip en s

o n ce th e o rd er o f

rem o v al b eco m es f

in al so lo n g as th e Go v ern m en t w as

n o t p rej u d i c e d b y th e p rem atu re f i lin g ), a n d Herrera -Mo lin a v. H o ld er , 5 9 7 F.3 d 12 8
, 1 3 2 (2 d Cir. 2 0 1 0) (sam e), w ith Mo reira v. Mu ka sey , 5 0 9 F.3 d 7 0 9, 7 13 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (h o ld in g t h at a p rem atu

re p etitio n d oes

n o t rip en w

h en th e o rd er o f rem o v al b eco m es f in al), a n d Ja b e r v. Go n za les , 4 8 6 F.3 d 2 2 3 , 2 2 8

– 3 0 (6 t h Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (sam e).A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 19

authority to stay proceeding s a n d refrain f

rom issuing a decision unt il backg round c hecks have been completed o r updated. See 8 C.F .R. § 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)(B ); id. § 1003.1(d)(6)(iii). Adopting such a n a pproach mig ht prevent further confusion in the c o u rts of appeals that have y et to decide this issue.

IV.

W e therefore h ave jurisdiction over Abdisal a n ’s consolidated p etition for review, which chall eng e s the
ag ency ’s finding that her asy lum claim was time-barred.

The Gover n ment c oncedes that b ecause the I J g ranted Abdisalan withhold i n g of removal on the basis o f past persecution, Abdisalan has n e c e s sarily met the lesser standard for a g r ant of asy lum. Reg a rdless of the merits of h er asy lum claim, however, she mu st demonstrate “by c lear a nd convincing evidence that the a p plication has b een filed within 1 y ear after the date of [ h e r ] arrival in the U n i t e d S t ates.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)( 2 ) (B ). Althoug h we ty pically lack jurisdiction to review whether th e applicant’s evidence was “clear and c onvincing ,” we may review the ag enc y ’s interpretation of this leg al standard. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (stating that we retain jurisdiction over “constitutional c laims or questions of law”).

Abdisalan testified that she arrived in the United States in F ebruary 2002. She ex plained that after entering via Mex ico and stay ing i n S an D ieg o f or a few day s, she took a Grey hound bus to Seattle, w here she now lives. Abdisalan’s relative H alimo Mohamed N ur test i f i e d that she saw Abdisalan in the U n ited States for the first time in F ebruary 2002. Althoug h she could no t re c a ll the ex act date, sheA B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 20

testified that “ I believe it was [ F ebruary ] 20 something .” No
person or document placed her timely filing in dispute. Even if there w as some disc r e p a n cy in the record as to whether Abdisalan arrived in F ebruary or M a r ch of 2002, her application would have been timely either way

. Despite this testimony

, the I J found that Abdisalan failed
to dem o n s t r ate b y clear and convincing evidence that her application was timely

, reasoni n g t hat she h ad neither documentary e vidence nor convincing witness testimony to corrobo rate h e r claim that she arrived in the United States within one y ear of filing h er asy lum applicati o n

. T h e B I A affirmed for the same reasons.

I n Singh v. Holder

, 6 49 F .3d 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 20 1 1) (en banc), decided after Abdisalan filed her p e titions for review, we held that the REAL I D Act does not require an asy lum applicant to “corroborate c redible testimony that he

c o mplied w ith the one-y ear filing deadline,” id. at 11 6 5

. I n other words, the REAL I D Act did nothing to affect our long

standing rule that testimony reg arding timely filing need not be corroborated to be deemed “ clear a n d convinci n g. ” W e declined to consider, however, “whether Sing h simply failed
t o m e et the standard here,” g iven that “testimony may b e credible without rising to the level of clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 11 6 8

– 6 9

. W e further noted that “the B I A h a s provided neither definition n or structure to the c ontou rs of [ the “ clear a

nd convincing ”] standard with respect to the
one-y ear filing bar,” id. at 1168, and remanded to the B I A so that it could elaborate on that standard, see id. at 1169. The Government has informed us t h at no such elaboration occurred, as Sing

h’s case was administratively closed, so no precedential decision is forthcoming

.A B D I S A L A N V

. H O L D E R 21

Abdisalan’s petition once ag ain raises the q u e s tion remanded in Singh— the standards for determin ing w hether, in lig ht of o ur en banc opinion in Singh

, a pre–REAL I D A ct asy lum applicant’s c redible and uncontradicted tes timony

r e garding her date of e n try meets the statutory “clea r a n d convincing evidence” standard. W e therefore remand to the B I A so that it may address that q uestion in the first instance.

G RANTED AND REMANDED.