J-S27001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN ANDREW MORRIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 76 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0002793-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 3, 2023

Appellant, John Andrew Morris, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of 110 days’ to 23 months’ incarceration, imposed after he pled nolo 

contendere to one count of aggravated cruelty to animals, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5534(a)(2), based on his neglect of a horse, which ultimately died. On appeal, 

Appellant seeks to argue that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily entered, and that the court should not have required him to sign 

over his ownership of a horse to the Animal Rescue League as part of the plea. 

Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, Sean M. Fitzgerald, Esq., seeks to withdraw 

his representation of Appellant pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). 

After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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Briefly, Appellant was charged with three counts of aggravated cruelty 

to animals, as well as ten counts of neglect of an animal, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a), 

based on his neglect and/or abuse of horses that he owned. Ultimately, 

Appellant pled nolo contendere to one count of aggravated cruelty to animals 

based on the fact that he “intentionally or knowingly neglected a horse, Pretty 

Boy, resulting in serious bodily injury to and the death of that animal.” Trial 

Court Opinion (TCO), 3/22/23, at 2 (citing N.T. Plea/Sentencing, 12/16/22, at 

26-27). The other charges pending against Appellant were dismissed as part 

of the plea agreement. Additionally, as part of Appellant’s plea agreement, 

Appellant signed over ownership of a horse named Socks to the Animal Rescue 

League. 

On December 16, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to the term set 

forth supra. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. Instead, he filed 

a timely notice of appeal on December 29, 2022. He also timely complied 

with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, setting forth the following two issues therein:

1. Whether [Appellant] entered a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea of nolo contendere to one count of aggravated 

cruelty to animal[s] pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5534(a)(2) when 

[Appellant] was not responsible for the care of the horse named 

Pretty Boy and did not intentionally or knowingly cause serious 

bodily injury or death to the animal?

2. Whether [Appellant] should have been allowed to retain 

ownership of his horse named Socks after having signed 

ownership of the horse over to the Animal Rescue League[?]
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Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/13/23, at 1 (single page). The court 

filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing these two issues on March 22, 2023. 

On May 10, 2023, Attorney Fitzgerald filed with this Court a petition to 

withdraw from representing Appellant. That same day, counsel also filed an 

Anders brief, discussing the two issues set forth in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

statement, and concluding that they are frivolous. Attorney Fitzgerald also 

concludes that Appellant has no other, non-frivolous claims he could pursue 

herein. Accordingly, 

this Court must first pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw 

before reviewing the merits of the underlying issues presented by 

[the appellant]. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 

290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc).

Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,

counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established 

by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of 

the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a letter 

that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to 

pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any 

points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[‘]s attention 

in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” 
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Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 

2007)....

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879-80 (Pa. Super. 2014). After 

determining that counsel has satisfied these technical requirements of Anders 

and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of the record to 

ascertain if there appear[s] on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that 

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. 

Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

In this case, Attorney Fitzgerald’s Anders brief complies with the abovestated requirements. Namely, he includes a summary of the relevant factual 

and procedural history, he refers to portions of the record that could arguably 

support Appellant’s claims, and he sets forth his conclusion that Appellant’s 

appeal is frivolous. He also explains his reasons for reaching that 

determination, and he supports his rationale with citations to the record and 

pertinent legal authority. Attorney Fitzgerald also states in his petition to 

withdraw that he has supplied Appellant with a copy of his Anders brief. 

Additionally, he attached a letter directed to Appellant to his petition to 

withdraw, in which he informed Appellant of the rights enumerated in 

Nischan.

1 Accordingly, counsel has complied with the technical requirements 

for withdrawal. We will now independently review the record to determine if 

____________________________________________

1 We note that the petition to withdraw and Anders brief do not contain proof 

of service on Appellant, but counsel’s letter to Appellant mentions that those 

documents were enclosed with it. 
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Appellant’s issues are frivolous, and to ascertain if there are any other, nonfrivolous issues he could pursue on appeal. 

Initially, the Commonwealth avers, and we agree, that Appellant has 

waived his two issues by failing to raise them before the trial court either orally 

at the plea/sentencing proceeding, or in a post-sentence motion to withdraw 

his plea. It is well-settled that “a defendant wishing to challenge the 

voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the 

plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of 

sentencing. Failure to do either results in waiver.” Commonwealth v.

Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609–10 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted), appeal

denied, 87 A.3d 319 (2014) (holding that a defendant failed to preserve a 

challenge to validity of guilty plea where he did not object during the plea 

colloquy or file a post-sentence motion to withdraw plea). See also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i) (stating a post-sentence motion

challenging validity of a guilty plea shall be filed no later than 10 days after 

the imposition of sentence). “It is for the court which accepted the plea to 

consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which may have been 

committed.” Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 469 (Pa. 

Super. 2017).

Here, both Appellant’s issues challenge the validity of his plea, or 

aspects of his plea agreement that he now claims are unfair. While the record 

confirms that Appellant was notified of his post-sentence motion rights, he

failed to file any motion raising these claims before the trial court. We also 
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do not see where in the record he orally raised these claims at the 

plea/sentencing hearing. Consequently, they are waived. See id.; see also 

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

In any event, even if not waived, we would agree with Attorney 

Fitzgerald that it would be frivolous for Appellant to raise either of his two 

issues on appeal. In regard to Appellant’s first issue, he “argues that his [nolo 

contendere] plea was not knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily entered 

into because he was not responsible for the care of the horse named Pretty 

Boy and did not intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to the 

animal.” Anders Brief at 16. Appellant also claims that he “did not fully 

understand the nature of the plea process, nor did he understand the 

sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 15. He maintains that this “lack of 

understanding” constitutes a manifest injustice that warrants the withdrawal 

of his plea. Id.

In concluding this issue is frivolous, Attorney Fitzgerald explains:

[T]he record shows that Appellant’s nolo contendere plea was 

entered in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. [“I]n 

terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of nolo contendere is treated 

the same as a guilty plea.[” Commonwealth v.] Prieto, [206 

A.3d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted)]. [“]A valid 

plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the 

charges, 2) the factual basis for the plea, 3) the right to a jury 

trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, 

6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any recommended. 

sentence.[” Commonwealth v.] Ried, [117 A.3d 777, 782 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citations omitted)]. 
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During the plea colloquy, the Commonwealth’s attorney informed 

Appellant that he was pleading to one count of aggravated cruelty 

to animals and [Appellant] indicated that he understood this. N.T. 

[Plea & Sentencing Hearing at] 22. He was also informed of the 

factual basis for the plea and agreed that the Commonwealth 

could prove the offense to a standard of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt if the facts were presented to a jury. [Id. at] 25-27. 

Appellant acknowledged that he understood that he was 

presumed innocent of the offense and had an absolute right to a 

jury trial. [Id. at] 22-23. He also understood the maximum 

permissible sentence on the charge. [Id. at] 25. Prior to entry 

of the plea, the [trial] court and the Commonwealth’s attorney

explained the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines to Appellant 

and where he fell on those guidelines. [Id. at] 19-21. Appellant 

entered an open plea in this case and there was no agreement as 

to what the sentence would be. However, Appellant said he 

understood that the sentencing court could impose a sentence up 

to the maximum permissible sentence. [Id. at] 24-25. The 

sentencing court conducted a plea colloquy that addressed the six 

areas required to establish a valid plea and was satisfied that 

Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. [Id. at] 

28. For these reasons, appellate counsel submits that Appellant’s 

first argument is wholly frivolous. 

Id. at 20-21. 

After reviewing the record of Appellant’s nolo contendere plea, we agree 

with Attorney Fitzgerald. Appellant was thoroughly colloquied on the six areas 

required to be covered in a valid plea. Appellant indicated that he understood

all the information presented in the colloquy, and that he was voluntarily and 

knowingly choosing to enter the nolo contendere plea. Notably, he 

acknowledged that, although he was not admitting guilt, he was aware that 

the Commonwealth had sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt of aggravated cruelty to animals. Thus, even if Appellant 

had preserved his challenge to the validity of his guilty plea for our review, we 

would agree with Attorney Fitzgerald that his claim is frivolous.
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Likewise, we would also conclude that Appellant’s second issue is 

frivolous, had that claim been preserved on appeal. Essentially, “Appellant 

seeks the return of a horse he gave to the Animal Rescue League as part of 

the plea agreement.” Anders Brief at 15. Appellant points out that he only 

pled guilty to a crime involving the horse named Pretty Boy, and “[t]he count 

of aggravated cruelty of [an] animal that pertained to Socks was dismissed as 

part of the plea agreement.” Id. Thus, Appellant argues that he “did not 

receive the benefit of his plea agreement because he had to give up a horse 

that he never admitted to harming[, n]or did he ever admit that the 

Commonwealth could present evidence to prove that he harmed Socks.” Id. 

Consequently, Appellant asks this Court to “enter an order whereby Socks is 

returned to Appellant.” Id. at 19.

Even if Appellant’s claim were preserved, we would conclude that no 

relief is due. As the trial court explains in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

[Appellant] claims that he should have been permitted to retain 

ownership of his horse, Socks, instead of signing over the horse 

to the Animal Rescue League.

With respect to plea bargains, the reality of the criminal 

justice system is that nearly all criminal cases are disposed 

of by plea bargains: ninety-seven percent of federal

convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 

the result of guilty pleas. Plea bargaining is not some 

adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal 

justice system. Accordingly, it is critical that plea 

agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible perversion 

of the plea bargaining system. The disposition of criminal 

charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the 

accused, ... is an essential component of the administration 

of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. In

this Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is 
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generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and 

governed by court rule.... A “mutuality of advantage” to 

defendants and prosecutors flows from the ratification of the 

bargain.

Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, 

when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court 

accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the 

court must abide by the terms of the agreement. Specific 

enforcement of valid plea bargains is a matter of 

fundamental fairness. The terms of plea agreements are 

not limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the length of a 

sentence. Parties may agree to—and seek enforcement of—

terms that fall outside these areas.

Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it 

remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under 

contract-law standards. Furthermore, disputes over any

particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by 

objective standards. A determination of exactly what 

promises constitute the plea bargain must be based upon

the totality of the surrounding circumstances and involves a 

case-by-case adjudication. Any ambiguities in the terms of 

the plea agreement will be construed against the

Government. Nevertheless, the agreement itself controls 

where its language sets out the terms of the bargain with 

specificity.

Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607, 612 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citation and alterations omitted).

In this case, [Appellant] entered a nolo contendere plea to one 

count of aggravated cruelty to animal, 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5534(a)(2). 

During the plea colloquy, the following exchange took place

regarding the transfer of Socks to the Animal Rescue League:

THE COURT: I am ordering that the horse by the name of 

Socks, the ownership is hereby transferred to the Animal 

Rescue League. I don’t really actually know if I have 

authority to do that now that I’m sitting here thinking about 

it. Are you willing to give up -- whose horse is it?

[ATTORNEY] FITZGERALD: Socks is [Appellant’s] horse.
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[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Maybe the Commonwealth would 

ask that he -- part of the plea is that he agree to sign over 

ownership to the Animal Rescue League.

THE COURT: Would you agree to do that, sir?

[APPELLANT]: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Yes?

[APPELLANT]: Yes, as long as he got a good home.

THE COURT: I think that the Animal Rescue -- I think she’s 

here. Okay. So you’ll agree to do that?

[APPELLANT]: Yes. I will sign it over to her.

THE COURT: You’ll sign it over to her?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So she has the form. All right. So let’s 

go back and then I’m going to just read it again because I 

added stuff that I don’t – that we’re not going to do. Okay.

N.T. [Plea & Sentencing] at 32-33.

In this case, [Appellant] agreed to transfer the ownership of Socks 

to the Animal Rescue League as part of his nolo contendere plea 

agreement. As set forth above, “when the parties enter the plea 

agreement and the court accepts and approves the plea, then the 

parties and the court must abide by the terms of the agreement.”

Kerns, supra at 612 (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[t]he 

terms of plea agreements are not limited to the withdrawal of 

charges, or the length of a sentence. Parties may agree to—and 

seek enforcement of—terms that fall outside these areas.” Id.

Therefore, [Appellant’s] agreement to transfer the ownership of 

Socks to the Animal Rescue League is binding upon him as this 

was an agreed upon term of the nolo contendere plea agreement. 

This [c]ourt even took the horse’s transfer into consideration when 

imposing [Appellant’s] sentence. See N.T. [Plea & Sentencing] at 

33 (“I have taken into consideration your signing over your rights

to the last horse that is with the Animal Rescue League.”). 

Therefore, regardless of whether [Appellant] believes he should 

have been permitted to keep Socks, he agreed to the horse’s 

transfer as part of the plea agreement and relinquished his right 

to be the owner of Socks. [Appellant] is not entitled to relief.
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TCO at 4-7.

The record supports the trial court’s decision that Appellant knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to relinquish his ownership of Socks to the 

Animal Rescue League as part of his plea agreement. Therefore, we would 

conclude that he is bound by that agreement, had he preserved this claim for 

our review. 

In sum, we agree with Attorney Fitzgerald that Appellant’s issues are 

frivolous, given that he failed to preserve them for our review by filing a postsentence motion. Alternatively, even had Appellant preserved his claims, we 

would conclude that he is not entitled to relief. Additionally, our review of the 

record reveals no other, non-frivolous claims that Appellant could assert 

herein. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Date: 10/3/2023