Filed 11/27/23 Woods v. Law Offices of Shahrokh Mokhtarzadeh CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ALFREDO WOODS, 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LAW OFFICES OF SHAHROKH 

MOKHTARZADEH, PLC et al., 

Defendants and Respondents.

 B318790

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC707662

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed.

Alfredo Woods, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michelman & Robinson and Steven S. Davis for Defendants 

and Respondents. 

_____________________________
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SUMMARY

Plaintiff Alfredo Woods tells us in the introduction to his 

opening brief that he brought a claim for legal malpractice, and 

his appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of defendants’ 

motion for nonsuit and the court’s subsequent denial of his 

motion for a new trial. That is the last we hear about the motion 

for nonsuit or the rulings until page 23, where plaintiff describes 

defendants’ contentions, and on page 24, where plaintiff contends 

the grant of nonsuit was “a grave error that overlooked the 

overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrating intentional 

disloyalty, negligence, and deficient legal advice by [defendants].” 

Plaintiff does not engage with the legal principle 

underlying the court’s nonsuit ruling. Plaintiff was required to 

establish more than defendants’ malpractice. The issue in the 

case was not whether defendants were negligent; that element of 

plaintiff’s case was presumed in the motion for nonsuit. The 

issue was whether plaintiff proffered any evidence that in the 

absence of the alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have achieved 

a better result. The court concluded that, drawing all inferences 

in favor of plaintiff, “there’s simply no evidence . . . that has been 

offered that would prove [the] causation and damages 

element . . . .” 

We see no error in that conclusion. Moreover, while 

defendants have not raised the point, our review of plaintiff’s 

opening brief and appendix reveals that plaintiff has failed to 

comply with multiple rules of appellate procedure, a failure that 

justifies a finding he has forfeited any argument that the motion 

for nonsuit was erroneously granted. His statement of facts goes 

on for 20 pages, often with no citations to the record, and the 

citations that are included are to a string of exhibits, declarations 

and other documents, without telling us where in his 3,267-page 
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appendix any of the documents may be found. Plaintiff’s legal 

argument contains no citations to the record at all. We have no 

obligation to ferret out the facts on our own, and when we 

nonetheless do so, we find evidence related to defendants’ alleged 

malpractice, not to whether that malpractice caused the damages 

plaintiff claims. 

We affirm the order granting defendants’ motion for 

nonsuit and the ensuing judgment.

FACTS

Plaintiff’s malpractice claim arose from an eminent domain 

case in which the defendants – Law Offices of Shahrokh 

Mokhtarzadeh, PLC and Shahrokh Mokhtarzadeh – represented 

plaintiff. Plaintiff owned property he intended to use for solar 

generation, its highest and best use. His malpractice lawsuit 

alleged defendants failed to retain necessary qualified property 

valuation experts before trial. The court issued an order

precluding plaintiff from reopening expert witness discovery so 

that he could hire a new expert witness (who would supplement 

the flawed opinion of the unqualified appraiser who had valued 

the property at $75,000 (the Blaesi appraisal)). “[A]t that point” 

plaintiff was forced to settle or go to trial with a flawed appraisal. 

Plaintiff filed his malpractice lawsuit on May 29, 2018, and 

the operative second amended complaint on April 9, 2019. He 

alleged causes of action for professional negligence, breach of 

fiduciary duty and breach of contract, among others. (Defendants 

filed a cross-complaint to which plaintiff did not respond, and 

defendants requested a default judgment on the cross-complaint.)

Plaintiff contended he was forced to settle out of court “with 

a very bad and failed appraisal report,” and the City (Los Angeles 

Department of Water and Power, LADWP) would have paid more 

for his property than the settlement amount ($70,000), but for 

defendants’ handling of the case. Plaintiff cited an appraisal 
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report he obtained (the Connolly appraisal), dated February 6, 

2018, valuing the property at $218,800 as of May 3, 2016. 

Plaintiff made his opening statement to the above effect on 

December 8, 2021. Virtually all of his opening statement 

concerned the evidence of defendants’ negligence.

On December 9, 2021, defendants made an oral motion for 

nonsuit, pointing out plaintiff offered no evidence the City would 

have settled for more and no expert testimony that plaintiff 

would have achieved a better result at trial. Counsel also pointed 

out, among other things, that plaintiff’s legal malpractice expert 

specifically stated he had no opinions on causation or damages.

The trial court told plaintiff that defense counsel had raised 

“very compelling and valid points about what the evidence is,” 

and advised plaintiff to discuss in his response any additional 

evidence not previously discussed. Plaintiff then argued about 

the Connolly appraisal report, defendants’ negligence that forced 

him to settle, the flawed Blaesi appraisal he had to use, and 

another property owner in the same eminent domain proceeding 

who received a settlement of over $180,000 for a smaller 

property. 

The trial court concluded there was no evidence offered to 

show the City would have agreed to pay more than $70,000, and 

no expert testimony that would support causation and damages if 

plaintiff had gone to trial instead of settling: “[A]ssuming all 

other facts alleged are true and drawing all inferences in favor of 

[p]laintiff], as I must, there’s simply no evidence . . . that has 

been offered that would prove the causation and damages 

element . . . for the reasons [defense counsel] stated.” (Among 

other things, defense counsel again pointed out that while the 

joint witness list states that plaintiff’s expert witness on legal 

malpractice would testify to subjects including causation and 
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damages, at his deposition the expert explicitly disclaimed 

offering any opinions on causation or damages.)

On February 9, 2022, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from 

the court’s December 9, 2021 ruling on the nonsuit motion. At 

the time of the December 9, 2021 hearing, there had been no 

hearing on the default judgment on defendants’ cross-complaint, 

and the court scheduled that hearing for January 27, 2022. The 

court indicated it would enter “one single judgment” on the 

complaint and the cross-complaint. That judgment was entered 

on May 12, 2022. 

Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial based on error of law, 

which the trial court denied in an eight-page ruling on

October 21, 2022. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s opening brief disregards many principles 

governing appellate review. While plaintiff is representing 

himself, that does not excuse his failure to follow basic rules and 

principles. (See, e.g., Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 

570, 574 [“Although [the appellant] is representing himself in 

propria persona, he is not exempt from the rules governing 

appeals. A self-represented party is to be treated like any other 

party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration 

than other litigants having attorneys.”].)

“It is axiomatic that an appellant must support all 

statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the record 

[citation] and must confine his statement ‘to matters in the 

record on appeal.’ ” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 

29.) We have already observed that plaintiff has violated this 

principle throughout his brief, and that where there are record 

citations, most of them are to exhibits with no indication where 

the exhibit may be found. (The index to plaintiff’s appendix has 
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an entry entitled “Plaintiff’s Exhibit List” which, as it turns out, 

includes almost 3,000 pages.) This violates court rules requiring 

the appendix to contain, at the beginning, indexes “listing each 

document and the volume, where applicable, and page where it 

first appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.144(b)(5)(A) & 

8.124(d)(1).) It also violates the rule that a brief must support 

any reference to a matter in the record “by a citation to the 

volume and page number of the record where the matter 

appears.” (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)

“ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to 

undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of 

correctness.’ [Citation.] Nor are we ‘required to search the 

record on [our] own seeking error.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 

Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (L.O.).) “ ‘ “[I]f a party fails to support an 

argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the 

argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see 

ibid. [“[The appellant’s] briefs do not properly cite the record and 

are replete with unsupported legal and factual assertions. 

Because [the appellant] failed to appropriately cite the record, he 

forfeited any argument that the challenged orders were 

erroneously issued.”].)

The failure to cite the record is not the only deficiency in 

plaintiff’s briefing. As we also observed at the outset, plaintiff’s 

discursive arguments fail to address the pertinent legal point: 

whether the facts plaintiff alleged demonstrate that, but for 

defendants’ malpractice, plaintiff’s eminent domain case “would 

have settled for more or gone to trial and resulted in a larger 

recovery.” (Barnard v. Langer (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1462 

(Barnard).) Without evidence that the LADWP “would have 

settled for more or that a trier of fact would have awarded more” 
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(ibid.) than the $70,000 settlement, plaintiff’s arguments about 

defendants’ professional negligence take us nowhere.

Plaintiff’s failure to offer reasoned argument on the 

pertinent legal point, like his failure to cite support in the record, 

waives the argument. (L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620

[“ ‘[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails 

to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, 

we treat the point as waived’ ”].)

But even if we ignore all the deficiencies in plaintiff’s 

briefing and his presentation of the record, his appeal would 

nonetheless fail on the merits because the trial court correctly 

found that plaintiff proffered no evidence sufficient to allow a fact 

finder to conclude that, but for defendants’ negligence, he would 

have recovered more in settlement or at trial.

We state first the standard of review, which plaintiff also 

fails to describe in his briefing. The standard of review for a 

nonsuit after the plaintiff’s opening statement is de novo: “ ‘ “It 

can only be upheld on appeal if, after accepting all the asserted 

facts as true and indulging every legitimate inference in favor of 

plaintiff, it can be said those facts and inferences lead inexorably 

to the conclusion plaintiff cannot establish an essential element 

of [his] cause of action . . . .” ’ ” (Carachure v. Scott (2021)

70 Cal.App.5th 16, 25.) 

In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that but for the attorney’s 

negligent acts or omissions, he would have obtained a more 

favorable judgment or settlement in the action in which the 

malpractice allegedly occurred. (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1582 (Namikas).)
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As already described, most of the evidence plaintiff offered 

concerned defendants’ negligence that forced him to settle. Other 

than that, there was the Connolly appraisal report valuing the 

property at $218,800; the flaws in the Blaesi appraisal report 

plaintiff had to use; and the settlement of another property owner 

in the same eminent domain proceeding who received over 

$180,000 for a smaller property. What is absent is the same 

thing that was absent in Barnard: any evidence that LADWP 

would have settled for more, or expert evidence that a trier of fact 

would have awarded more. As the trial court put it, plaintiff 

“makes no claim that [Mr. Connolly] would have been able to 

proffer an expert opinion that either (1) the City would have paid 

more to settle or that (2) Plaintiff would have done better at trial 

if Plaintiff had submitted an . . . appraisal other than Mr. Blaesi’s 

appraisal in the underlying case.” As the Barnard court 

observed, “None of [the plaintiff’s] evidence does more than 

suggest speculative harm . . . .” (Barnard, supra, 

109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462; ibid. [“[The plaintiff] offered no 

evidence that the City would have settled for more or that a trier 

of fact would have awarded more . . . , leaving the harm caused 

by the [defendant’s] negligence as ‘only a subject of surmise, 

given the myriad of variables that affect [trials] of [inverse 

condemnation] actions. “[T]he mere probability that a certain 

event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is 

predicated, will not support the claim or furnish the foundation of 

an action for such damages. . . .” ’ ”].)

We have one further observation on this subject. 

Defendants repeatedly emphasize language from Namikas and 

other cases to the effect that, in a legal malpractice case, 

“ ‘ “Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as 
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follows the fact complained of as a legal certainty.” [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.] In other words, the plaintiff must show that ‘[he] 

would certainly have received more money [or had to pay less] in 

settlement or at trial.’ ” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1582.) Plaintiff responds that this is “an attempt to confuse 

and sway the Court to the position that there is a higher burden 

of proof, i.e. ‘legal certainty.’ ” (Capitalization omitted.) Plaintiff 

cites Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020) 

50 Cal.App.5th 1077 (Masellis).

We are not confused. Indeed, Namikas expressly states

that the plaintiff must prove, “by a preponderance of the 

evidence,” that he or she would have obtained a more favorable 

judgment or settlement but for the defendant’s negligence. 

(Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1582.) Masellis rejected a 

claim that the legal certainty standard imposes a higher 

standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence by 

“interpreting the statement that a plaintiff must present 

‘evidence showing to a legal certainty that’ the alleged breach of 

duty caused an injury [citation] as simply referring to the degree 

of certainty inherent in the applicable burden of proof. For ‘settle 

and sue’ legal malpractice actions, we conclude the applicable 

burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.” (Masellis, 

supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083.)

The trial court considered and addressed the Masellis case 

in denying plaintiff a new trial: “Masellis simply uses different 

language to describe the same analysis: a trial court must weed 

out speculative claims by looking to whether the evidence 

supports a finding that in the absence of the alleged malpractice, 

a plaintiff would have achieved a better result. [Citation.] In the 

instant case, Plaintiff did not make an offer of proof that 
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admissible, nonspeculative evidence would support a finding that 

the use of another expert would have resulted in a higher 

settlement.” We agree.

To the extent plaintiff argues his claims for breach of 

contract and breach of fiduciary duty are distinct from his 

professional negligence claim, the distinction fails. As the trial 

court observed, all causes of action “are directed at exactly the 

same conduct,” and “[t]he speculative nature of Plaintiff’s 

purported evidence of causation is a common defect that crosses 

all of Plaintiff’s claims.” 

Finally, on pages 47 and 48 of his opening brief, plaintiff 

“requests the dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim and the 

unfair default judgment, as he was denied an opportunity to 

respond.” That is all plaintiff says on the subject, and the 

assertion provides no basis for reversal of the default judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on 

appeal.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR: 

STRATTON, P. J. 

VIRAMONTES, J.