IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RAINEE SIMPSON, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00288-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Social Security Claimant/Plaintiff Rainee Simpson (“Simpson”) has brought 

this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of 

the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her

protective application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of 

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. By the consent of the parties (see

Doc. 25), the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all 

proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (See Doc. 26).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 16, 19), the administrative 

record (Doc. 13) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s)])”), and the arguments of 

counsel made at the hearing held March 6, 2015, the Court finds that the 

Commissioner’s decision is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural Background

On April 29, 2011, Simpson protectively filed an application for SSI with the 

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Social Security Administration (“SSA”), 1 alleging disability beginning May 15, 

2006. 2 After her application was initially denied on July 27, 2011, Simpson

requested a hearing on her application, which was held in Mobile, Alabama, before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September 17, 2012. (R. 27).

On November 29, 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Simpson’s 

application, finding her “not disabled” under the Social Security Act. (See R. 24-44). 

Simpson requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council for the 

SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (R. 21-22) and submitted 

additional evidence for the Appeals Council’s consideration (R. 15-19). On May 15, 

2014, the Appeals Council issued its decision denying Simpson’s request for review. 

(R. 1-6). 

On June 23, 2014, Simpson filed this action under § 1383(c)(3) for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1). See Ingram v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this 

Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of 

review by the Appeals Council.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final determination of 

the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be 

 1 “SSI is a general public assistance measure providing an additional resource to the aged, 

blind, and disabled to assure that their income does not fall below the poverty line. 

Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. 1382(a), 

1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C).” Sanders v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11-0491-N, 2012 WL 4497733, at 

*3 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012).

2 “For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled 

and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202–03 (2005).” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 

F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

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subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same 

extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title.”); 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the 

amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action 

commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or 

within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”).3

II. Standard of Review

“In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is ‘ “supported by substantial evidence and based on 

proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” ’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 

2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d

1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, 

reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8

(11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 

1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the 

 3 The record reflects that Simpson resides in this judicial district. Thus, venue is proper in 

this Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Such action shall be brought in the district court of the 

United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal 

place of business...”).

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[Commissioner]'s factual findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. 

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

 “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as 

automatons. [The court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the 

decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). “In determining 

whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence 

favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. 

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, “[t]here is no 

presumption...that the Commissioner followed the appropriate legal standards in 

deciding a claim for benefits or that the legal conclusions reached were valid. 

Instead, [the court] conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. 

Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (internal citation omitted). In sum, courts 

“review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s 

legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon 

which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine 

whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

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363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). “ ‘The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply 

the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for 

determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’ ” 

Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46

(11th Cir. 1991)).

Eligibility for...SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. 

§...1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§...1382c(a)(3)(A).

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 

2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).4

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of 

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 

relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are 

significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work 

experience.

 4 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (effective Dec. 1, 2014). See also

Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as 

their legal analysis warrants.”).

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Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-

(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).5

“These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate 

both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 

405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

“In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the 

examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; 

(2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the 

claimant's age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in 

combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” 

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).

If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a plaintiff proves 

that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant 

work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the 

plaintiff is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging 

in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 

economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 

764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although “the 

[plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her 

 5 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual 

steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

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past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to 

develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) 

(citations omitted).

“When no new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council and it denies 

review, then the administrative law judge's decision is necessarily reviewed as the 

final decision of the Commissioner, but when a claimant properly presents new 

evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new 

evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262.

III. Claims on Judicial Review

Claim 1 – The ALJ “erred in assigning no weight to the medical 

opinion provided by the Plaintiff’s long-standing 

psychiatrist, Dr. George Davis, while according significant 

weight to the opinions provided by the one examining 

physician and two non-examining physicians.”

Claim 2 - The ALJ “erred in finding that the Plaintiff’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 

of her symptoms not credible.”

(Doc. 16 at 2).

IV. Analysis

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Simpson had “not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since April 29, 2011, the application date.” (R. 29). At 

Step Two, the ALJ determined that Simpson had the following severe impairments: 

hypertension; sleep apnea; obesity; diabetes mellitus; bipolar disorder; depression; 

anxiety; attention deficit disorder; and panic disorder. (R. 29). At Step Three, the 

ALJ found that Simpson did not have an impairment or combination of 

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impairments that meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the 

Listing of Impairments. (R. 29-31). Simpson does not challenge any of the ALJ’s 

determinations at Steps One through Three. Her claims of error concern the ALJ’s 

analysis in Step Four.6

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the 

regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do 

despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant 

medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine 

whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under 

the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth 

step...20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past 

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant 

work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant 

medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That 

is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular 

work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the 

claimant's RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her 

prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

The ALJ determined that Simpson had the RFC to perform “a reduced range 

 6 Moreover, though Simpson claimed at the administrative level “that she is disabled by her 

combination of physical and mental impairment,” (R. 32), she has raised no claim of error 

with this Court concerning the Commissioner’s decision as to her physical impairments.

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of ‘light work’ as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).”7 More specifically, the ALJ 

found that Simpson could lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently; that in an 8-hour workday she could sit, stand, and walk up to 6 hours; 

that she could frequently use her upper and lower extremities to push and pull; that 

he should frequently bend, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps 

and stairs; that she is precluded from climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; that 

she could frequently reach overhead; that she can continuously handle, finger, and 

feel; that she is precluded from exposure to extreme heat and cold and from work 

around unprotected heights or dangerous machinery; that she is able to perform 

simple routine tasks involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple 

work-related decisions with few work place changes; that she could occasionally 

interact with the general public; and that she could sustain concentration and 

attention for 2-hour periods. (R. 31-32).

A. Claim 2 (Credibility Determinations)

When a claimant attempts to establish disability through his own 

testimony concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, [courts] apply 

a three-part test, which requires “(1) evidence of an underlying medical 

condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the 

severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined 

medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the 

 7 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the 

national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 

very heavy. These terms are all defined in the regulations...Each classification...has its 

own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4. “Light work is defined as work that 

‘involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of 

objects weighing up to 10 pounds.’...The regulations further state that ‘[e]ven though the 

weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of 

walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and 

pulling of arm or leg controls.’ ” Id. n.5 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), which is identical 

to § 416.967(b)).

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claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir.

2002) (per curiam).

If the record shows that the claimant has a medically determinable 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce his 

symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the 

symptoms in determining how they limit the claimant's capacity for 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In doing so, the ALJ considers all of 

the record, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant's 

history, and statements of the claimant and his doctors. Id. § 

404.1529(c)(1)—(2). The ALJ may consider other factors, such as: (1) 

the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, 

and intensity of the claimant's pain or other symptoms; (3) any 

precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, 

effectiveness, and side effects of the claimant's medication; (5) any 

treatment other than medication; (6) any measures the claimant used 

to relieve pain or symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning the 

claimant's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or 

symptoms. Id. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ then will examine the 

claimant's statements regarding his symptoms in relation to all other 

evidence, and consider whether there are any inconsistencies or 

conflicts between those statements and the record. Id. § 404.1529(c)(4).

“After considering a claimant's complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject 

them as not creditable, and that determination will be reviewed for 

substantial evidence.” Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The ALJ must explicitly and adequately 

articulate his reasons if he discredits subjective testimony. Id.

Caces v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 560 F. App'x 936, 939-40 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 

2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).

“Although this circuit does not require an explicit finding as to credibility, the 

implication must be obvious to the reviewing court. The credibility determination 

does not need to cite particular phrases or formulations[,]” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 

(citation and quotations omitted), and “ ‘there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ 

specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's 

decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] 

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to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.’ ” 

Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (quotation and brackets omitted)). “[C]redibility 

determinations are the province of the ALJ, Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 

(11th Cir. 2005), and [a court] will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility 

finding supported by substantial evidence, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th 

Cir. 1995).” Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 

2014). 

Here, the ALJ expressly considered Simpson’s “subjective complaints of 

anxiety, panic attacks, depression, inability to concentrate and other mental health 

symptoms” but found them “not fully credible,” explaining:

The record reflects that prescribed medications have been relatively 

effective in controlling the claimant’s symptoms with occasional 

episodes of exacerbation due to the claimant’s failure to take her 

medication as prescribed. (Exhibits 6F, 15F, 20F, 22F, 24F). [Treating 

psychiatrist ]Dr. Davis generally recommended follow up treatment 

approximately every two months, which suggests that the claimant’s 

symptoms are adequately controlled and not so severe as to warrant 

additional treatment. (Exhibits 6F, 15F, 20F, 24F). The claimant has 

not required inpatient psychiatric treatment since the application date. 

The claimant’s activities of daily living are also inconsistent with her 

complaints of disability. The claimant lives alone, is able to perform 

her household chores and cooking, cares for her pet dog, and attends 

church on a regular basis. (hearing testimony and Exhibit 5E). 

During her consultative evaluation with Dr. Wyatt, he found the 

claimant to be “very pleasant and informative” and to have speech that 

is audible, understandable and sustainable. (Exhibit 10F). 

Specifically regarding attention deficit disorder, the undersigned notes 

that the claimant did not, in her disability report, claim that attention 

deficit disorder was causing her to be disabled. (Exhibit 2E).

(R. 35).

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Initially, the ALJ appears to have considered Simpson’s noncompliance with 

her prescribed medications in assessing her credibility as to the severity of her 

mental impairments. The Commissioner may deny benefits “when a claimant, 

without good reason, fails to follow a prescribed course of treatment that could 

restore her ability to work.” McCall v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 1988)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.930). Accord, e.g., Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211, 1213 

(11th Cir. 1988) (“The regulations provide that refusal to follow prescribed medical 

treatment without a good reason will preclude a finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.930(b).”). However, Simpson argues, both in her brief and at oral argument,

that the ALJ failed to consider that sometimes her inability to obtain transportation 

or her “lack of resources has...prevented her from obtaining her medications” (Doc. 

16 at 20); indeed, Simpson testified that her failure to obtain her medications was 

sometimes due to her lack of money to purchase them or because she could not get 

a ride to pick them up. (R. 32, 53-54).8 

An “ALJ may not draw an adverse inference from a claimant's lack of medical 

treatment without first considering the claimant's explanation for his failure to seek 

treatment.” Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App'x 813, 817 (11th Cir. Apr. 27, 

2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Social Security Regulation (S.S.R.) 96–7p 

at 7 9 )). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has “held that...‘poverty excuses 

 8 Simpson claims she is unable to drive herself due to panic attacks, rather than lack of an 

automobile or other financial reasons. (R. 32, 53-54).

9 Simpson raised SSR 96-7p at oral argument. “ ‘Social Security Rulings are agency rulings 

published under the authority of the Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all 

components of the Administration.’ Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n.9, 110 S. Ct. 

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noncompliance.’ ” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam) (quoting Dawkins, 848 F.2d at 1213). “[W]hen an ALJ relies on 

noncompliance as the sole ground for the denial of disability benefits, and the record 

contains evidence showing that the claimant is financially unable to comply with 

prescribed treatment, the ALJ is required to determine whether the claimant was 

able to afford the prescribed treatment.” Id. (citing Dawkins, 848 F.2d at 1214). As 

occurred here, “[t]he claimant in Dawkins testified at the administrative hearing 

that she was unable to take her prescribed medication because she could not always 

afford to refill her prescription.” Id. However, the ALJ made no determination as 

to Simpson’s ability to afford her medications, nor does her opinion account for 

Simpson’s claimed inability to obtain transportation to fill her prescriptions.

Nevertheless, the ALJ’s credibility determination may still be affirmed if 

other valid reasons, supported by substantial evidence, are present. See id. (“In 

denying benefits, the ALJ[ in Dawkins] relied ‘primarily if not exclusively’ on 

evidence pertaining to the claimant's noncompliance with prescribed medical 

treatment. [848 F.2d] at 1212. On appeal, we reversed and remanded the case, 

concluding that, because the ALJ's finding that claimant was not disabled was 

‘inextricably tied to the finding of noncompliance,’ the ALJ had erred by failing to 

consider the claimant's ability to afford the prescribed medical treatment. Id. at 

1214. []This case is distinguishable from Dawkins because, unlike in Dawkins, the 

 

885, 891 n.9, 107 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). Although SSA rulings 

are not binding on this Court, we accord the rulings deference. See Fair v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 

1466, 1468–69 (11th Cir. 1994).” De Olazabal v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 579 F. App’x 827, 

832 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).

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ALJ's determination that Ellison was not disabled was not significantly based on a 

finding of noncompliance.”); Brown, 425 F. App'x at 817 (“[I]f the claimant's failure 

to follow medical treatment is not one of the principal factors in the ALJ's decision, 

then the ALJ's failure to consider the claimant's ability to pay will not constitute 

reversible error. See [Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275] (holding that ALJ's failure to 

consider claimant's ability to pay was not reversible error because the ALJ's 

decision primarily was based on factors other than the claimant's failure to obtain 

medical treatment).”). The Court finds this to be the case here.

As occurred here, “[t]he ALJ may consider the claimant's daily activities 

when evaluating his subjective symptoms,” though “a claimant's admission that he 

participates in daily activities for short durations does not necessarily disqualify 

him from a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); see Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1441 (11th 

Cir. 1997) (noting that the claimant's successful completion of a six-minute 

treadmill exercise was not necessarily indicative of his ability to work, and that the 

fact that he did housework and went fishing was not inconsistent with the 

limitations recommended by his treating physicians).” Crow v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 571 F. App'x 802, 807 (11th Cir. July 7, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished). 

See also Majkut v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App'x 660, 663 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 

2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Although a claimant's admission that she 

participates in daily activities for short durations does not necessarily disqualify the 

claimant from disability, Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir.1997), 

that does not mean it is improper for the ALJ to consider a claimant's daily 

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activities at all. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (specifically 

listing the claimant's daily activities as one of the factors to consider in evaluating 

the claimant's symptoms).”). 10 Here, Simpson’s daily activities do not appear 

dramatically inconsistent with the level of impairment to which she testified, and 

the Commissioner conceded at oral argument that, standing alone, consideration of 

her daily activities is not a sufficient reason to discredit Simpson. However, the 

ALJ also properly considered the conservative treatment plan of Simpson’s treating 

psychiatrist in assessing Simpson’s credibility, finding that it did not correspond to 

the severity of her symptoms Simpson claimed. See Sheldon v. Astrue, 268 F. App'x 

871, 872 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“A doctor's 

conservative medical treatment for a particular condition tends to negate a claim of 

 10 Cf. Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“The Appeals 

Council's second justification—that her daily activities and her ability to care for her 

personal needs have not been significantly affected—is not supported by substantial 

evidence on the record as a whole. This explanation is apparently based on Parker's 

testimony that she could do simple household chores. The Appeals Council, however, 

ignored other evidence that her daily activities have been significantly affected. For 

example, she testified that she had to lie down every two hours, and Dr. Wheeler discussed 

the problems she had experienced at work (difficulty in standing, fatigue and blurred 

vision).” (record citations omitted)); Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1981) 

(“The ALJ seems to have relied heavily on the fact that claimant had testified that he had 

full use of his hands, arms and legs, does shopping and last fall went hunting twice. Yet, 

statutory disability does not mean that a claimant must be a quadriplegic or an amputee. 

Similarly, shopping for the necessities of life is not a negation of disability and even two 

sporadic occurrences such as hunting might indicate merely that the claimant was partially 

functional on two days. Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark 

room excluded from all forms of human and social activity...It is well established that 

sporadic or transitory activity does not disprove disability.” (citation and quotation 

omitted)); Easter v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n applicant need not be 

completely bedridden or unable to perform any household chores to be considered disabled. 

See Yawitz v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1974). What counts is the ability to 

perform as required on a daily basis in the ‘sometimes competitive and stressful’ 

environment of the working world. Douglas v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc)).”).

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16

disability.” (citing Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996)); Brown, 425 

F. App'x at 817 (“[E]ven if we were to accept Brown's interpretation that the ALJ 

drew an adverse inference from the fact that he did not seek treatment between 

November 2007 and May 2008, Brown has not shown reversible error. The main 

reason why the ALJ discredited Brown's testimony was that his assertions of 

disabling pain were not supported by the medical evidence in the record, which 

described a relatively conservative pattern of treatment. Because the gap in medical 

treatment did not play a major role in the ALJ's decision, any error in considering 

that gap in treatment was harmless.”). The ALJ also noted that Simpson had failed 

to list attention deficit disorder in her application for SSI benefits, suggesting that 

she did not consider it to be significant at the time. (R. 35).

The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed an ALJ’s credibility determinations, even 

in the absence of explicitly stated reasons for discrediting, when the record 

adequately reflects that the ALJ considered the claimant’s allegations in light of the 

record as a whole. See Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 442 F. App'x 507, 513-14 (11th 

Cir. Oct. 6, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Here, the ALJ sufficiently assessed 

Brown's testimony as to her limitations. The ALJ was not required to make any 

explicit credibility finding because the decision includes a thorough discussion of 

Brown's allegations in light of the record as a whole. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Brown had moderate limitations in daily living 

activities, social functioning, and concentration based on her testimony that she had 

trouble completing chores and getting along with others, the fact that she had not 

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17

had any ‘serious incident[s]’ with others, and the fact that she had not been 

hospitalized during the relevant period. Based on these factors, the ALJ determined 

that Brown was able to work, despite her depression and anxiety, so long as she had 

no interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with 

coworkers and supervisors. The implication of the ALJ's credibility finding—that 

Brown's complaints were ‘not fully credible’—is thus clear to us. See Dyer, 395 F.3d 

at 1210. That is, it is clear that the ALJ found Brown's complaints credible, but that 

he found her complaints as to the severity of her limitations not credible. Therefore, 

the ALJ considered Brown's subjective complaints in light of the record as a whole 

and adequately explained his decision not to fully credit Brown's alleged limitations 

on her ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4).”); Weekley v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App'x 806, 809 (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (“Here, the ALJ did not err by failing to explicitly cite to our threepart standard because the record reflects that the ALJ considered and cited to the 

regulations on which the standard is based and applied the standard correctly. 

Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Weekley's 

subjective complaints of pain were not credible. When making a credibility 

determination, the ALJ must show that he considered the claimant's ‘medical 

condition as a whole,’ and in this case, the ALJ's analysis of the objective medical 

evidence and other evidence in the record complies with this requirement. See Dyer,

395 F.3d at 1210.”). Here, the ALJ’s detailed discussion of the objective medical 

evidence of record sufficiently indicates that she considered Simpson’s medical 

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condition as a whole in making her credibility determination.

Considered in conjunction with her express reasons for discrediting Simpson, 

see supra, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision in this regard is 

supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is due 

to be affirmed as to the error alleged in Claim 2.

B. Claim 1 (Rejecting Treating Physician Opinion)

“ ‘Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other 

acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of 

[the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and 

prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the 

claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)). “In assessing medical opinions, 

the ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give 

to each medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the 

claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship 

with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the 

physician's opinion; (4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as 

a whole; and (5) the physician's specialization. These factors apply to both 

examining and non-examining physicians.” Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 

F. App'x 521, 523 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 

416.927(c) & (e)). “[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to 

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different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 

(citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). 

However, the ALJ “may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence 

supports a contrary conclusion.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. Accord, e.g., 

Anderson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 427 F. App'x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 

(unpublished).

“A ‘treating source’ (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's ‘own physician, 

psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[], or has provided[],[ 

the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an 

ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].’ ” Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 179 F. App'x 589, 591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). “Absent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical 

opinions of treating physicians ‘substantial or considerable weight.’ ” Winschel, 631 

F.3d at 1179 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). “Good cause exists ‘when the: (1) 

treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence 

supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or 

inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.’ With good cause, an ALJ may 

disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he ‘must clearly articulate [the] 

reasons’ for doing so.” Id. (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41) (internal citation 

omitted). See also, e.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (“[T]he opinion of a treating 

physician may be rejected when it is so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive 

weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings. 

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20

Further, the Secretary may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence 

supports a contrary conclusion.” (citation omitted)).

Simpson argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the medical opinions her

treating psychiatrist, Dr. George Davis. The ALJ summarized Dr. Davis’s opinions

as follows:

In his first opinion[, a Medical Source Opinion Form dated May 2012,] 

Dr. Davis found that the claimant has marked limitations in using 

judgment in detailed or complex work-related decisions, marked 

limitations in dealing with changes in routine work setting, marked 

limitations in understanding, remembering and carrying out detailed 

or complex instructions, and marked limitations in maintaining 

attention, concentration or pace for periods of at least 2 hours. 

(Exhibit 18F[ (R. 365-367)]). Dr. Davis opined that the claimant has a 

short attention span, is easily distracted, and has an inability to 

concentrate. (Exhibit 18F). Dr. Davis also noted that the claimant has 

chronic anxiety with panic attacks, is uncomfortable around people, 

isolates herself, and is uncomfortable away from home. (Exhibit 18F). 

Dr. Davis stated that the claimant has had mood swings and chronic 

depression over the past 11 years, with only partial response to various 

medications tried over time. (Exhibit 18F). Dr. Davis diagnosed the 

claimant with bipolar disorder depressed and adult attention deficit 

disorder. (Exhibit 18F). According to Dr. Davis, the claimant 

manifests signs and symptoms of an ongoing anxiety problem with 

recurrent panic attacks. At the time of the opinion, Dr. Davis stated 

that the claimant was being treated with a mood stabilizer, an 

antidepressant, and a tranquilizer with only partial success. (Exhibit 

18F). Dr. Davis opined that the claimant is unable to work due to her 

“disabling” mental illnesses. (Exhibit 18F). Subsequently, in his 

statement made in September 2012, Dr. Davis noted that the claimant 

“continues to have symptoms of her mental disorder rendering her 

incapable of maintaining employment.” (Exhibit 21F[ (R. 374)]). Dr. 

Davis also noted that the claimant had been compliant with her long 

term treatment but “only partially responsive to a variety of 

medication aimed at giving her adequate relief so that she can function 

in the work place.” (Exhibit 21F). Dr. Davis opined that the claimant 

is not able to function in the work place. (Exhibit 21F).

(R. 36-37).

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The ALJ assigned “no weight” to Dr. Davis’s opinions (R. 36), explaining:

Dr. Davis’s treatment records...are inconsistent with the opinion he

offers in this case. (Exhibits 6F, 15F, 20F, 24F). From time to time, 

Dr. Davis notes in the claimant’s treatment records that she is doing 

well. For example, in January 2011, it was noted that the claimant 

was doing fairly well. (Exhibit 6F). Again, in June 2011, Dr. Davis 

stated that the claimant was doing “alright” and that she was more 

stable than ever on her present medication. (Exhibit 15F). In August 

2011, Dr. Davis stated that the claimant had run out of her medication 

and gotten depressed but that she was “improving once back on the 

meds.” (Exhibit 15F). In May 2012, it was noted that Inderal was 

helping. (Exhibit 20F). In September 2012, Dr. Davis noted that the 

claimant “got detached” when she was off of Abilify for 3 weeks, 

suggesting that the medication is helping her when she takes it 

properly. (Exhibit 24F). However, the claimant admittedly runs out of 

her medication around 3 times a year. (hearing testimony). Dr. Davis 

consistently assigned the claimant GAF scores of 65, with the 

exception of once in March 2012. (Exhibits 6F, 15F). A GAF score of 

65 is indicative of only mild symptoms or mild in occupational or social 

functioning. Dr. Davis’s treatment records consist primarily of the 

claimant’s subjective complaints with very few objective findings. 

(Exhibits 6F, 15F, 20F, 24F). Further, Dr. Davis’s treatment records 

reflect short visits with the claimant, with each visit generally lasting 

less than 20 minutes. (Exhibits 15F, 6F). Despite the opinion he 

offers, Dr. Davis has not recommended hospitalization for the 

claimant’s mental health issues. Dr. Davis’s opinion is also 

inconsistent with the fact that the claimant lives alone, performs her 

own household chores, cooks simple meals, cares for her dog, grocery 

shops and attends church. (hearing testimony and Exhibit 5E).

(R. 37).

The ALJ expressly articulated “good cause” for rejecting Dr. Davis’s opinions, 

finding that they were not bolstered by the evidence and were inconsistent with the 

doctor’s own medical records. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. As she did when 

addressing the credibility of Simpson’s subjective testimony, see supra, the ALJ 

properly considered the conservative nature of Dr. Davis’s treatment, noting that it 

consisted of short visits with Simpson every two months. Cf. Petteway v. Comm'r of 

Case 1:14-cv-00288-N Document 27 Filed 05/29/15 Page 21 of 27
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Soc. Sec., 353 F. App'x 287, 290 (11th Cir. Nov. 18, 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(“[G]ood cause existed to reject the opinion because Dr. Leber's conclusion was 

inconsistent with Petteway's medical records, which showed infrequent medical 

visits at intervals of two or more months.”); Harrison v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 569 F. 

App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. June 24, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Dr. Davina–

Brown's physical examinations of Harrison were consistently unremarkable, and 

she never found that Harrison suffered from any of the paradigmatic symptoms 

frequently associated with the most severe cases of fibromyalgia, such as joint 

swelling, synovitis, or tender trigger points. For example, Dr. Davina–Brown 

prescribed medications for Harrison's chronic pain but never recommended more 

aggressive treatment, such as visits to the emergency room for pain or trigger point 

injections. The conservative and routine nature of Dr. Davina–Brown's treatment 

plan suggests that Harrison's impairments—while significant—were not so severe 

that Harrison could not perform any job duties.”). The ALJ thoroughly discussed 

Dr. Davis’s treatment records prior to weighing his opinions (see R. 34-35), which 

were replete with notations that Simpson was “doing well,” “alright,” “stable,” etc., 

and that her medications were working. Cf. Jarrett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 422 F. 

App'x 869, 873 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“The ALJ 

articulated specific reasons for not giving Dr. Mian's opinion controlling weight, 

noting that the opinion was inconsistent with Jarrett's treatment records and her 

ability to perform work between 1999 and 2004. Indeed, Dr. Mian's treatment 

records show numerous instances in which he indicated that Jarrett's medications 

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were working, she was satisfied with the medications, her condition had improved, 

and she was stable.”). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Davis consistently assigned

Simpson GAF (“global assessment of functioning”) scores indicative of only mild 

symptoms, with only one GAF score indicating more serious impairments.11

In arguing Claim 1 in her brief, Simpson did not address at all the ALJ’s 

reference to Simpson’s GAF scores in rejecting Dr. Davis’s opinion. However, at 

oral argument, Simpson’s counsel downplayed the significance of such scores, and 

indeed, “the Commissioner has indicated that GAF scores have no ‘direct correlation 

to the severity requirements of the mental disorders listings.’ ” Lacina v. Comm'r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 14-11051, 2015 WL 1453364, at *6 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2015)

(per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764–65). Accord, e.g., 

 11 “Mental health professionals use GAF scores to rate a patient's social, occupational 

and psychological functioning.” Luterman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 518 F. App'x 683, 684 

(11th Cir. May 2, 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). “A GAF score is a subjective

determination that represents ‘the clinician's judgment of the individual's overall level of 

functioning.’ The GAF scale accounts for psychological, social, and occupational limitations, 

but not environmental or physical impairments.” Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

597 F. App'x 604, 613 (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Am. 

Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32, 34 (4th ed., 

Text Revision 2000)) (citation omitted).

“The GAF is a 100–point scale divided into 10 numerical ranges, which permits 

clinicians to assign a single-ranged score to a person's psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning.” Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 586 F. App'x 505, 509 n.2 (11th 

Cir. Sept. 26, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Keyes–Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 

1156, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic & Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders 32, 34 (Text Revision 4th ed. 2000))). “GAF scores of 41 to 50 

indicate serious symptoms (suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, or frequent 

shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (having 

no friends or being unable to keep a job); scores of 51 to 60 indicate moderate symptoms 

(flat affect and circumstantial speech or occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in 

social, occupational, or school functioning (having few friends or conflicts with peers or 

coworkers).” Id. “GAF scores between 61 and 70 reflect mild symptoms, with some 

difficulty in social and occupational functioning.” Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F. App'x 684, 687

n.1 (11th Cir. June 2, 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing American Psychiatric Ass'n, 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000)). 

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Nye v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 524 F. App'x 538, 543 (11th Cir. July 26, 2013) (per 

curiam) (unpublished); Luterman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 518 F. App'x 683, 688

(11th Cir. May 2, 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[T]he Social Security 

Commission had declined to endorse the use of GAF scores in social security 

disability programs because they have no direct correlation to the severity 

requirements of the mental disorders listings. See Revised Medical Criteria for 

Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 

50764–65 (Aug. 21, 2000).”). “Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has recognized that a 

GAF score may have little or no bearing on a claimant’s social and occupational 

functioning.” Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 613 (11th 

Cir. Feb. 11, 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 

973 (8th Cir. 2010)). Nevertheless, “[a]s the Sixth Circuit has observed,” while “not 

essential to the RFC’s accuracy,” “GAF scores may be helpful in formulating a 

claimant’s RFC...” Id. (citing Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th 

Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in attaching at least some significance 

to Simpson’s GAF scores. See Jarrett, 422 F. App'x at 873-74 (noting that 

claimant’s GAF scores were inconsistent with the marked limitations assigned in 

treating physician’s opinion).

The ALJ also rejected Dr. Davis’s opinions because they “consist primarily of 

the claimant’s subjective complaints with very few objective findings.” Simpson has 

cited to opinions from other Alabama federal district courts 12 that, relying on 

 12 Specifically: Matthews v. Barnhart, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (M.D. Ala. 2003); Haag v. 

Barnhart, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Barber v. Barnhart, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1168 

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persuasive authority from other circuits, have suggested that the opinions of mental 

health professionals should be given more deference because they are, by the very 

nature of the field, often based largely on the subjective complaints of claimants. 

(See Doc. 16 at 17). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the 

Commissioner’s decisions to reject the opinions of treating mental health 

professionals because they were based largely on the subjective testimony of 

claimants with little objective support. See Harrison, 569 F. App'x at 878 (“We also 

conclude that adequate evidence supported the ALJ's decision to give minimal 

weight to the opinions of Dr. DeLuca, Harrison's psychiatrist. Like Dr. Davina–

Brown, Dr. DeLuca described Harrison as ‘totally and permanently disabled’

because she suffered from bipolar disorder with psychotic features such as 

delusions. He did not explain, however, why this diagnosis prevented her from 

performing any job-related activities. Additionally, Dr. DeLuca's records did not 

contain any objective findings regarding Harrison's limitations or examination 

results supporting his conclusions. Because of this lack of evidentiary support, the 

ALJ was not required to give great weight to Dr. DeLuca's conclusory statements 

regarding Harrison's ability to work.”); Forsyth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 503 F. App'x 

892, 893 (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Here, there is 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that there was good cause to 

afford more weight to the opinion of Dr. Goren, a nonexamining board-certified 

neurologist, than to the opinions of Dr. Vernacchio and Dr. Kantor, who were 

Forsyth's treating physicians. As explained by the ALJ and the magistrate judge, 

 

(N.D. Ala. 2006).

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Vernacchio did not conduct a proper neurological exam of Forsyth, and Kantor 

relied too significantly on Forsyth's subjective reports.”); Anderson v. Comm'r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 441 F. App'x 652, 653 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2011) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (“With respect to the opinion of Dr. Beaty, a psychiatrist who treated 

Anderson for two years, the ALJ provided specific, adequate reasons for not giving 

his opinion controlling weight, and those reasons were supported by substantial 

evidence. For example, although Beaty stated that his functional assessment of 

Anderson was based on two years of clinical observation, his findings were not 

supported by objective evidence: his treatment notes for Anderson primarily 

provided only the diagnosis or simply documented Anderson's subjective complaints 

during each visit.”).13

Finally, an “ALJ is not required to give a treating physician's opinion 

considerable weight if the claimant's own testimony regarding her daily activities 

contradicts that opinion. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241 (finding that an ALJ's 

decision to give a treating physician's opinion little weight was supported by 

substantial evidence because the claimant's admissions concerning her activities 

were at odds with the treating physician's assessment).” Leiter v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 377 F. App'x 944, 949 (11th Cir. May 6, 2010) (per curiam) 

(unpublished). See also Crow v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 F. App'x 802, 806-07 

 13 The ALJ was also not required to accept Dr. Davis’s opinion that Simpson had a 

“disabling” mental illness and was “not able to function in the work place” because “the 

resolution of that issue is reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 

416.927(d). ‘A statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] “disabled” or “unable to 

work” does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that [the claimant is] 

disabled.’ Id. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1).” Forsyth, 503 F. App'x at 894.

Case 1:14-cv-00288-N Document 27 Filed 05/29/15 Page 26 of 27
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(11th Cir. July 7, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[E]vidence of Crow's daily 

activities also provided good cause to discount his treating physician's opinion. 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.”). Here, the ALJ found Dr. Davis’s opinion to be 

inconsistent with Simpson’s testimony of her daily activities, and Simpson has 

offered no persuasive argument why this finding is not due deference.

In sum, the Court finds that the Commissioner stated good cause, supported 

by substantial evidence, for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Davis. Accordingly, the 

Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed as to the error alleged in Claim 1.

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the 

Commissioner’s final decision issued May 15, 2014, denying Simpson’s application 

for SSI benefits is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 29th day of May 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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