Docket No . 109014.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E OF I L LIN OI S, Appe llee, v.

ITA LOSA ND ER S, A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed October 7, 2010.

JUSTICE GARMA

N deliv ered t he j udg men

t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi

tzger ald and Justices T h omas , Kilbride, and Karmeier co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Justice Fr eem an sp ecially conc ur re d, wit h op inion, jo ined by Justice Burke.

OPINI ON

In 19 94 , de f

en da n t, Ita l o Sa n ders , w as

con v i cte d in t he cir cu it courtof Cook County of f irst degree m

urderand s ent enced to 40 years in p r iso n. T he ap pe llat e c o ur t affir med his conv i cti on. People v. Sanders , No. 1–94–1710 ( 19 96 ) ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme CourtRul e 23). In Novem ber 200 1, defend ant f

i l ed a p ostc onv

i cti on pet itio n, wh ich t he cir cu it court di sm i sse d. A f ter the a ppel l ate court reman ded f or s ec on d- sta

ge pr oce ed i n gs , the c i

rc ui t cou rt advan ced t he pe ti ti on to thi rd -s tag e p roc ee di

n gs . F oll owi

n g oral argu men t, t he cir cu it court gran

ted the State’s m otion to dis m i ss. Th e a

pp el l ate court aff irm ed. 393 Ill . App. 3d 152.-2- BACK GROUND Defend ant wa s cha

rge d w i th th e m urder of John Pi nkerton, whi ch occurred on Ja

nua ry 24, 199 2. P i

nk erton wa s shot in a st airw ell of t he Robe rt Tay l or Hom esi n C hi cago, where h e w as

wal ki n g w i th Al exan der Ro binson a nd

seve n-year -o ld Manu el Woo ds. Tw o mo nt hs l ater, Pi nk erton died f rom co mplicatio ns o f his in

jur ies

. Pr io rt o t r ial, de fe ndant fil

ed a mot ion in limine t o pr ec lud e t he S t at e fr o m intr od ucing evi

dence related to street gangs. This evi dence cons is

ted of t he t est imony of Michae l St ewa rt , w ho w as P inker t on’ s bro t her . At t he he ar ing o n d efe nd an t ’s mo t io n, de fen se co un se l t o ld the c ourt that two day s af

ter t he sh oot in g, Stewa rt saw def

endan t at the Rob ert Tay l orHomes an

d aske d d efe ndant who had s hot Pinke rt on. De fen da nt alle ge dly

repli ed t ha t he co uld no t t ell S t ew ar t , bu t t ha t it
was “BD b

usi nes s” and th at Pinkerton had n ot been the in tended tar get. Defendan

t asked S tewar t if Pi

nkerto n was dead and Stewa rt sa id no. De f endan t sm i l ed an d wal ked a way

. T he t r ia l c ourt deni ed defend ant ’s mot ion, finding tha t t he propo sed evi dence expl ai ned an ot herwise i nexpl i cab l e m urder a n d th at t he pr oba t ive value o f the
ev i den ce outw ei gh ed an y pote n ti al pr ej udi ce to de f en da n t. Dur ingj ury

selection, defen

se co unse l submitt ed s ever al que st ions to t he trial

court conc ern

i ng p ossi bl e gan g con tact or bi as. Th e court refuse d to ask t he quest ions, st ating t hat an indiv idual j uro r’s opi

ni on about gang s wa s no t re levant and no t ing t hat t he submitt ed q ues t ions
were hig hly subjec t iveand might ser ve t o inflame t he members of t he
veni re. At de f en da n t’s trial, then n in

e-yea r-old Manuel

Woods testifi

ed that on Ja nua ry 24, 199 2, h e live d a t t he Ro be r t T aylo rHo mes

. His
co usin, Mic ha el Ste wa

rt, al so li ved there, on the sam

e fl oor as Ma nu el. A

rou n d di n n er ti me, Pi n kerton an d R ob i n son ca me ov er to Manuel’sapartment. They stayed f or a whil e and then

le ft. Manuel went with them. They were going t o S tew art ’s ap ar tmen t to wat ch a ba sk et ba ll gam e. They started walki

ng down the h

allwa y. Ma nuel was hold ingPi

n kerton ’s h an d. A s th ey app ro ache d t he eleva t or and st air wa y, Manuel

heard gunshots. Pi

nke rton was “j um pi ng.” Manuel
saw de f en da nt a t the top of t he sta

i rc as e. He wa s a pp rox i mate l y 12 to 15 f ee t fro m Manue l. De fendant was hold ing a gu n and s hoo t inga t Pi n kerto n, w h o pu sh

ed Ma n ue l out of th e w ay. M an

ue l ra n to St ewart ’s apa rt ment. Manu el st at ed t hat he wen t to the pol i cesta ti on-3- wi th his mot her and ide

ntif ie d defen dant in a lin eup. He ha d p r ev io us ly
see n de f endan t more than once at the R obert Tay l or Homes. On three oc cas ions, t he jur y was sho wn a p hot og ra ph o f the st air we ll at Ro ber t Ta ylor H omes wher e t he sho ot ing t oo k plac e. The ph oto sho we d g an g g r affit i o n t he wa lls o f t he st air w ell wh ic h read, “GDs Di e, Bds liv e.” Mi cha el St ewa rt t est ifi

ed t hat a few d ays aft er t he sho ot ing, he
saw defend ant walking on t he fi fth f loor o f the Robert T ayl

or Ho mes. Stewar t had seen defendan t in the bui

ldi ng several times , bu t did n ot kn owhi s n am e. S tew art tol

d defen da nt t hat he had see n him i n t he st air we ll th e n i gh t Pi n ke rto n was sho t and he ask ed d efenda nt who had sho t Pinke rt on. Defend ant asked if Pi nkerton was dead an

d, upon being t o ld P ink er t o n w as alive , de fen da nt sa id “i t was BD busi

ness” and all he co uld t ell Stewart was that Pin kerto n was n

ot the in tended tar ge t. Ste wart test if

ied that the t erm “BD” m eant Black Di scipl

es, whi ch wasa stree

t gang. So met ime la

ter, t he polic e recovered

a gun f rom d ef endan t. A fire ar ms expert testifi

ed tha t the bu l l etsrec ove

red f rom Pin kerto n ha d t he sam e cl ass ch aracteristi cs as the gun

and could hav e been

fi red from the gun. However, the expert was un abl e to incl ude or exclude the g un as the m urder weapon

. Defend ant ca lled t hr ee wit ne ss es t o t es t ify. Hi s m other, sist er , a nd girlfriend al

l testi f i ed th at the t hr ee o f t he m an d d efe nd an t we r e in defen dant’s mot her ’s ap ar t ment a t t he Ro ber t Ta ylor H omes at t he t ime of t he sho ot ing. T hey hear d t he sho t s and ra n o ut t o se e what happen ed. Afte rw ar d, t hey went back into t he mot her ’s ap ar t ment and stayed t her e unt il defendant wal

ked hi s gi rlf rien d home about 10 p. m. Dur ingcl osi ng arg um en ts, th e p ros ecutor

re f er re d to defendant’s alleged gang affil

iatio n and t he allege d ga ng mo t ivefor t he sho ot ing by repe ate dl y re f er ri n g to St ewart ’s t es t imo ny t ha t de fen da nt t o ld h im Pinkerto n’s shoot in

g was “ BD busi

ness .” The j ury conv

icted defend ant and t he t rial co ur t sent ence d him to 40 yea rs in pr ison. On direct appeal, t he appellate co urt affi rmed defendant’s
con vi cti on an d s en ten ce . B ef oreth eappella

te court , defen

dant argued, inter alia , that t he trial

court had erred i

n ref us in g to ask potential j urors questions duri

ng voir dire concerning potential b ias agai nst gangs. T he ap pe llat e c o ur t r eje ct ed t his argu men t, co ncluding t hat t he-4- trial court ’s questions were reasonab ly calcul ated to expose latent bi as and prej udice. Sanders , No. 1–94 –1710 (unpub li shed order under Supreme Court Ru

l e 23). On Novem be r 16 , 20 01, de f

en da nt f i l ed a p eti ti on f or po st co nvic t io n r elie f, in

whi ch h e alle ged t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in faili ng to voir d ire pote ntial jurors o n the subj ect o f gang b ias. Defe ndan t alleged that this f

ai lure, together with the State’s reli ance on gang-rel at ed evi

dence at trial , deprived hi m of hi s righ t t o an im partial j ury . In su ppo rt , he cite d t his co ur t ’s de cision in People v. Strain , 194 Il

l . 2d 467(2000 ), in

whi chthe c ourt hel

d tha t, whe re gang ev ide nc e is to b e i

n teg ra l to the def

endan t’s trial , the tri

al court mus t ask pot entia

l jurors during voir dire abo ut any biases they

ma y have agai nstgangs. The tr ial

cour t dismi

ssed the pet ition at the fi

rst stage as un t imely. T he ap pe llat e c o ur t r ev er se d t he dis miss al and
reman ded the c aus e f

or secon d-stag e proce edi

ngs

. People

v. Sanders , No. 1–02–0880 (2003 ) (un pub l i shed order

und er Suprem e Court Ru le 23). On rem an d, th e tri al cou rt f oun d the p eti ti on wa s n ot un ti mel y or barred by res judicata , b as ed

upon a 2002 app ellate co ur t dec ision, People v. Gardner, 331 Ill . App. 3d 358 (2002), which found Strain t o be app licable on c ollat er al review . T hus, t he trial court deni

ed t he St at e’s mo t ion t o d ismi ss o n t hos e gr ou nds. The co ur t adva nced t he pe ti ti on t o t hird- st age pr oc eed ings t o d et er mine whet her t he ga ng evi dence at de fen da nt ’s t r ial was integ ra l to t he t rial wit hin the
mea ning o f Strain . The court r evi ewed transcripts f

rom the trial

and he ard oral argum en t. The c ourt granted

the St ate’s motion to dism iss
on t he ba si s that t he gan

g evi dence could not have b een consi dered i nteg ral to the tri al

. On appe al, the a

pp el l ate co ur t he ld

th at Strain ann

ounced a new
rule and thus could n

ot be appl ie d retro activel

y to defen

dant’s case

. The co ur t r eje ct ed de fen da nt ’s r elia n ce o n Gardner , f i n di n g th at, al though Strain wa s doc t r in ally c o nsis t en t wit h p r io rlaw , it represented

a c l ea r bre ak i n pl ac i n g a “ str i n gen t li mitat ion u po n t he broadra n ge of di scre ti on

tra di ti on al l y af f ord ed to the trial

court .” 393 I ll. App. 3d at16 6. Th e a

pp el l ate cou rt c on cl uded th at, because Strain
was n ot ap

pl i ca b l e to de f en da nt’ s c as e, h

i s p ostc onv

i cti on p eti ti on was barred by res judicata . In

addi ti on , the a

pp el l ate cou rt n oted th at, even i f i t ag re ed wi th t he Gardner

court ’s an

al ys is , it would f

in d that defen dant’s peti

tion was b arredas unti

me ly . 393 Ill . App. 3d at 167.-5- AN AL YSIS Defend ant rais es three argum ents i n thi s appeal : (1) this cour t ’s de ci si on i n St rain di

d n ot an nou nc e a ne w c ons ti tutiona l rul e of crim in al pro cedur e and t herefor e applies retr oac tively to defendant’s case; (2) defen

dant’s po st co nvi ct io n p et it io n is no t ba rr ed by res judicata an d t he lat e filing o f his pe t it io n w as no t du e t o his cu lpa ble negl ige nce; an d (3 ) un de r th e h ol di ng of Strain , the gang evi

dence was in tegral t o de f

en da nt’ s tri al an d the tri al cou rt’ s f ai l ure to voir dire pot entia l jur o r s o n t he iss ue o f ga ng bia s t hu s d ep r ive d h im o f a fa ir tria l

. De fenda nt ar gue s t hat t his co ur t ’s de cision in Strain applie s retroacti ve l y to hi s ca se. A po st co nv ict io n p

roce edi ng i s a col l ateral atta ck on a pri or co nvic t io ni n w

hi ch a d ef en da nt m ay ch al l en gehi s c onv i cti on or sentence on the basi

s that h i s su

bstantial constituti

onal ri ghts were violated. People v. Beaman , 229 Ill . 2d 56, 71 ( 200 8). Pos tcon vi cti on cl aims are li

mi ted to those clai

ms that were not and could not hav e been previously

adj udic ated on di

rect ap peal

. People

v. Johnson , 206 I ll. 2d 348, 356 (2002). Clai ms that were rais ed and deci

ded on direct appeal ar e barred

by res judicataand t hos e claims t hat co uld have be enrai sed , but we

re not, are con sidered

wai ve d. People v. Tow

ns , 182 Ill . 2d 491 , 50 2-03 (1998). Here, t he trial court advan

ced defendant’s peti

ti on t o thi

rd-stag e proce edi

ngs . Howev

er, the court he ard no new ev

i den ce; rathe r, the c ourt re v i ew ed

th e transcri

pts f rom t he t rial and he ard ar

gum en ts of c ouns el . In

add itio n, t he judg e who presi ded ove r t he po st co nvictio n hear ing was not t he same jud ge w ho presi ded at defend ant ’s t rial. D efenda nt ar gue s, a nd the Stat e does not dis agree, that t he j udge had no sp eci al ex perti se or f am i l i ari ty wi th defendant’s trial. In su ch cir cum stances, thi s court has appli ed a de
novo standard of revi

ew. See People v. Caba llero , 206 Ill . 2d65, 88 (2002 ). In a

ddi tion , thi s court

applie s a de novo sta

nd ard of review as to questions of

l aw. In re D.S. , 198 Il

l . 2d 309 , 321 (2 001). In Strain , t he defendant was c harged w ith murder. The St ate ’s theory was that the defen

dant, who was a m

em ber of the Bl

ack Dis ci ple s st re et gang , sho t t he vi ctim whi le attempting to take revenge
on a ri va l ga ng , th e G an

gs ter D i sc i

ples , f or al l eg edl y sh oot in g t he defend ant at an

earl i er t i m e. Durin

g voir dire , the trial

court asked pot entia l jur o r s if t he y, an

y mem be r of the i r f am i l y , or cl ose friend h

ad-6- been in volv ed in a gang. The court refused defense counsel ’s request to ask e ach

prosp ec ti

v e j ur or w

h eth er th e j uror wo uld find t he defend ant less believable if the juro r lear ne d t hat t he de fendant bel onged to a gang. Dur ingt rial, g ang member s t est ifi ed, a st at ement made byde f

en da n t to t he po lice co ncer ning t he ga ng- re late d mo t ive f ort he sho ot ingwas adm

itted in to evi dence, and def

endan t t estif ie d, denying that he m

ade the statemen

t. The tr ia l co ur t allowe d t he Sta

te to in tro duce evi

dence at tri al of other ga ng- related cr

i mes i n a n e f f ort to bolst er t he St at e’s t heo ry re gar ding t he mot ivefor t he mur der . T he defend ant was co nvicte d. Thi s c ourt noted two ma tt ers of crucial im port ance: (1) gang inf

ormation permeated t he testimony of alm ost ev ery wit ness a t t rial; and (2 ) t he o ut co me of t he t rial t ur ned u po n t he
cred i b i l i ty of t he de fendant , t he t est ify ingpol i ce of

f i cers , and m

em bers of the Gan

gster D i sci

pl es. Strain , 194 Ill . 2d at 473. T his cou rt not ed th at ar t icle I , se ct io n 1 3, o f t he I llino is Consti tution of 1970 (I ll. Co nst . 1 970 , a rt . I , § 13) gua ra nt ees a “right of t r ial b y jury as he r et o fo r e e njo ye d.” T he co ur t ha d p r ev io us ly
co nst ru ed t hos e wo rd s t o mea n t he r igh t t o t r ial by ju ry as it exi sted under t he co mmon law, which entai l s th e ri gh t to h av e th e f ac ts d etermi ned, un de rt he su pe rvisio n o f a ju dg e, by t he un an im ou s verdict o f 1 2 i

m partial j urors wh

o posse ss th

e qua l i f i cations a nd a re selectedin

the ma nne r prescrib ed

by la w. The court o bserved that t he scope and ex

tent of the voir dire exam i na ti on i s l ef t to the di screti on of the trial court ; however, that discretion m ust be exer cised in a
ma nne rco nsis t ent wit h t he p ur po se o f voir di re , w hi ch is t o o bt ain enough in form ation ab out the b el

i ef s an d opi ni ons of potential j urors as woul d al l owf

or the re moval of th ose m em bers of the v en i re whose
m i nds areso closed b

y bias and prej udic e that t hey canno t app ly the la was i nstru cte d by t he t rial co ur t . A failur e t o p er mit pe rt inent in quiri es to reveal

an y such pr ej udices may constitute re

versi bl e error. Strain , 194 Ill . 2d at 476-77. T his court noted i

t had prev i ousl y recogn ized th at street ga

ngs are regarded wit h dis favo r by

oth er se gm en ts o f soc i ety an d th at, es pe cia lly in metr op olit an ar eas , t her e may be st ro ng prejudi ce agains t gangs. For t hi s re aso n, t his co ur t has he ld t hat evidenc e o f gang membe r ship o rga ng - r ela t ed ac t ivit y is adm i ssi bl e onl y wh ere thereis sufficient pr oo f tha t suc h memb er ship or act ivity is relat ed t o t he cri m e charged

. Strain sta

ted th at th es e s am e c on cern s d

i cta ted i ts-7- holdi ng that “when t est imony reg ar ding g ang member ship and gangr ela ted act ivity is to be an int egr al par t of t he de fendant ’s t rial, t he defend ant mus

t be aff orded an o ppo rt unit y to que st ion t he pr os pec t ive jurors, ei ther directl y or throughqu esti on s s

ub m i tted to th e tr i al cou rt, concerni ng gan g bias.” Strain , 194 Il

l . 2d at 47 7. The que sti on b ef

ore us i s wh ethe r Strain ann

ounced a new constitutional

rule of cr imi nal pr oc edu re . I n Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 10 9 S. Ct. 1060 ( 1989), the Uni ted St ates Su pr eme Co ur t set for t h st anda rd s for det er mini ng whe n a ca se ann ounces a new rul

e. The Court st ated that a case an nounces a n

ew rule whe n it bre aks new g ro und o r impo ses a new o bligat ion o n t he st ates or federal

governm ent. The resul

t must not be “ dictated

by pr ece dent ex

i sti n g a t th e t im e t he de fen da nt ’s co nvic t io n be ca me f i na l .” (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Teague , 489 U. S. at 301, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 349, 109 S. Ct. at 1070. General ly , new rules are not t o be applie d
r et r o ac t ive ly

to ca se s on

co llat er al r ev iew ex ce pt in two instances : (1) if t he rule pla

ces certain ki

nds of prim ary, pri vate i ndi vi dual conduct beyond the power of

th e cri m i n al -law -m ak i n g a uth ori ty to proscribe;
or( 2) if t he rule requires the observan ce of those procedures that are implic it in the conce p t o f ordered lib erty. The Court describ ed rules that co me within t he second exc eption as “ watershed rul es of cri

mi nal procedure” an

d s tate d that they

sh oul d b e l i m i ted to those n ew procedures withoutwhich t he like liho o d o f an ac cu r at e c o nvic t io n is
se r io us ly di m i nished. Teague , 489 U.S. at 311, 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 35 8, 109 S . Ct. at 1076 , 1077. T he purpose of the Teague fram ework is to pro mote t h e gover nmen

t’s inter est in the fi

nal ity of cri mi nal convicti ons ( Teague , 489 U.S. at 309 , 103 L. E d. 2d at 355, 109 S. Ct . at 1074) and to
v al i da te “rea so nable, go od -fait h inter pr et at ions of ex i sti n g p re ce den

ts
ma de by sta t e co ur t s eve n t hou gh t he y are sh own

to b e c on

tra ry to la ter deci si ons” (

Butler v. McKellar , 494 U.S. 407, 414, 108 L. Ed. 2d 347, 35 6, 110 S . C t. 1212, 121 7 (1 990 )). “ ‘A ppl i ca ti on of constitutional

ru l es n ot i n ex i ste n ce at t he t ime a co nvic t io n be ca me fi nal seri ously underm in es the pri nci ple of f in ality whi ch is essen tial to t he operation of our crim in al jus tice sy stem . W i th ou t finali

t y, t he crim in al l aw i s dep ri ve d of m uc h of its deterrent eff

ect.’ ” People v. Flow ers , 138 Ill . 2d 218, 239 (1990), quot in g Teague , 489 U .S. a t 309, 10 3 L. Ed . 2d at 35 5, 109 S . Ct. at 1074

.-8- It is “often dif

fi cult” to deter mi

ne whether a case ann

ounces a new rule. Teague , 489 U.S. at 301, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 349, 109 S. Ct. at 1070. T his is pa r t icu lar ly

true where the new decisi on is reached by an ex ten si on of the rea soni

ng of prior case s. Butler , 494 U.S. at 412-13, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 110 S. Ct. at 1216. “[T]he f act t ha t a c o ur t sa ys that its d ecisio n is within t he ‘lo gical co mpass’ of a n ear lier de cision,
ori nd ee d that i t i s ‘ con troll ed ’ b y a p riorde ci si

on, i s n ot co nclusive for pur po ses o f deciding wh et he rt he cu rr en t de cis io n is a ‘new rule’ under Teague .” Butler , 494 U.S. at 415, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 11 0 S. Ct. at 1 21 7. Rath er , the ta sk i s to deter

m i n e w h eth er cou rts co nsider ing the d ef

en da nt’ s c l ai m at the ti me h i s or he r con vi cti on be ca me fi nal “woul d have f

el t com pe l l ed b y ex i sti n g p re ce den

t to concl ude t hat t he rule *** was required b

y the Constitution.” Saffle
v. Parks , 494 U.S. 484, 488, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 424, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 126 0 (199 0); People

v. Morris , 23 6 I ll. 2 d 3 45 , 36 0 ( 20 10 )

. T his courtadopted t he Teague re t ro act ivity sta ndar ds in Flowers , which he ld t hat t his co ur t ’s de cision in Peopl e v. Reddick , 123 Ill . 2d 184 (1988 ), constituted a n ewcon sti tution al rule of cri m i na l procedu re and was not app l i cab l e to postconv i cti on proce edi

ngs

. Flowers , 138 Il l . 2d at 24 0. Defe ndan t argues that t his co ur t ’s ho lding in Strain de ri ve s f rom t he constitut ional

princi ple that an accuse d ha s the ri ght to an im partial jur y. H e n o t es t his court has prev iousl y s tated in People v. Cloutier , 156 Ill . 2d 483, 495-96 (1993), t hat t he p ur po se o f voir dire is t o a sce rt ain sufficient i

nf orm ati on ab out the b el

i ef s a nd atti tude s of pr os pec t ivejurors t o allow removal of those veni

re mem bers whose biasesan d p r eju dic es wo uld pr ev en t t he m f r o m appl yi ng the l aw as in structed by

the trial court . Defen

dant argues that Strain ap plie d t his pr inc iple in

li ght of the j udi ci al ly reco gnized bias ag ainst gang af f i l i ati on . D ef en da n t also p oi n ts t o pr io rca se s in wh ich he sa ys t his courtand t he appe l l atecou rt re cog ni ze d the p oten

ti al f orbias against gang s amo ng prospective j urors. T hus, def endan t argues th at Strain
was motivated by

concerns rega rd ing t he pr ejudicial effect of g ang evi dence and i t rel i ed onpri or ca se l aw i n r each i ng i ts h ol di ng . F or thes e rea sons , Strain did n ot ann ounce a new rul

e. Defend ant part icul

arly emph asizes Strain ’s st at ement , a fte r c iting
casest ha t ha d r ec o gn ize d t he pr eju dic e a ga inst ga ng s, t ha t “[ t ] he sa me co ncer ns re gar ding t he pr ejudicial effect of g ang evi dence dictate

our-9- h ol di n g th at, when t est imony

regardin g gang m em bersh ip a nd gangrelated act ivi ty is to be an integr al part of the d efendant’s t r ia l,” t he trial court m ust que sti on poten

tia l j urors about any

bias against gangs. (Em phasi s ad ded.) Strain , 194 Il

l . 2d at 47 7. Defend ant n otes

th at th e a pp el l ate cou rt i n People v. Gardner , 331 Il l . Ap

p. 3d 35 8 (200 2), h el

d th at Strain did n

ot ann ounce a new rule. Gardner

f oun d th at Strain had p re mised its hold ingon p riorcase la wco nce rn ing t he p ur po se o f voir dire , t he pr o ce du r es o ut lined in Ru le 431 (177 Ill . 2d R. 4 31), and co nstitutional saf eguards. Gardner also no ted St rain ’s

ci tation of ca se s rec ogn

izi ng the pos si bi l i ty of st ro ng pr ejudice aga ins t g angs i n l arge m etropol i tan a reas

. Gardner fou nd th at Strain did not announce a new rule, giv en i ts r eli an ceon precede nt and l

ong-standi

ng pri nci ple s surroundi

ng voir dire . Thus, t he Gardner

co ur t st at ed t hat t he h o lding o f Strain ma y b e applie d
r et r o ac t ive ly

to cases on col

la teralrevi ew. Gardner , 331 Ill . App. 3d at 367. The Sta te a rgue s th at, altho ugh Strain may ha ve be en do ct r ina lly
co nsist ent wi

thth e rules

regulati ng voir dire and wi

th case law re gar ding public disa ppr ova l of ga ng m em bersh i p, Strain was the fi

rst t ime t his court had

ma ndated gang-b ias i

nqui ry duri ng voir dire based upo n, not just an ab

use of discretion, but

a deni al of the consti

tut iona l right to an

i m pa rtial j ur y . Th e S tate argu es th i s c onc l

us i on d i d n ot ne ces sari l y f oll ow f rom th i s court’ s rul

es or ex i sti ng c ase l aw. This co ur t has lo ng rec ogn ize d that the s cop e a

nd ex ten t of voir dire examinat ion r est s wit hin the dis cretion of the tria l court. People v. Lobb , 17 I ll. 2d 2 87, 300 (19 59) ; People v. Buss , 187 Ill . 2d 144, 176 (19 99) ; People v. Williams , 164 Ill . 2d 1, 16 (1994). Al though Ru le 431 re quir es t he t rial co ur t t o a llow co unse l to “sup plement t he
exam i na ti on by such di rect i nqu i ry as the court de ems prope r f or a r ea so na ble per iod of t ime depe nding u po n t he lengt h of t he
exam i na ti on b y th e c our t, t he co mplexity o f the cas e, and the n ature of t he ch ar ge s, ” t his c o ur t ha s he ld t hat t he t rial co ur t re t ains di screti on to determi

ne wh at direct questioni

ng wi ll be al lowed, as long as the court exerci ses its d iscre t ion in acc or danc e wit h t he
re qui re men ts of the rul e. See People v. Gars te cki , 234 Ill . 2d 430 (2009 ). I nd ee d, t his c o ur t in Gar stecki even note d that i

t wa s n ot impo ss ible t o c onc eive o f a cas e in which t he t rial co ur t might pr o pe r ly con cl ude , b as ed

upon the fact or s cit ed a bove , t hat no-10- atto rney que sti oni ng sh ou ld be perm i tted. Garstecki , 234 Ill . 2d at 444. Defe ndan t ci t es se ve r al c as es t ha t he be lieve s s up po r t his
con ten ti on th at Strain did no t an no un ce a n ew rule

. His re aso ningis that these cases

rec ogn ize d the di sf

av orin w hic h st r ee t ga ng s a r e h eld by the g eneral

pub l i c, dire ctly leading, in his view, to this cour t’s hold ing in Strain

. In People v. Jimenez , 284 Ill. App . 3 d 90 8 ( 199 6) , t he de fendant
was charged with murder. The shoot in g was gan g-r elat ed a nd t he Sta te fo cu se d o n g an g a ffiliat io n a s t he mo tive f or t he mur der . T he defend ant asked the trial

cou rt to ques ti on th

e i nd i vi dua l mem be rs of the v en i re on whether

t he fa ct t hat t he d efe nda nt wa s a membe r o f a street gang would preven t t hem fro m giving him

a fair t rial. T he trial
co ur t re fused t he qu est ion. On ap pea l, t he de fendant argued t hat t he trial co ur t co mmit t ed r ev er sible er ro r by re fusing t o q ues t ion t he
veni re on t he su bject of g ang aff il ia tion. The appel

la te court reversed and rem anded f or anew t rial . The court not ed that the parties had ci ted no c ase re quir ingt he

tria l court to questi

on pros pecti ve j urors about biases against gang m em bers. The court observed thatin most I llino is cases, the trial

co ur t had p er mitt ed s uch q ues t ions to be asked. The co ur t no t ed t ha t ga ng membe r ship is an area of potential

bias due to a wi despread prej udic e agai nst street gangs. Beca

use the trial

court fai le d to ask a ny

questions c oncerni

ng thi s bi as, the def

endan t was dep rived of t he opp ortu

n i ty t o ex er cis e h is p er emp t o ry cha lleng es in
an ef f ecti ve man ner. Once the tri al

courtde cid ed t o pe rmit evi dence of the def endan t’s ga ng a f f i l i ati on, the

tria l courtwasund

er a “cl ear duty” to ins

ure that the jury

selected was free

from prejudi

ce agains t gan gs. Jimenez , 28 4 I l l . A

pp . 3d at 9 12 . We n

ote th at Jimenez

reli ed
on a Cali fornia case

for t his holding, not ing t hat t he qu est ion wa s o ne of f i rst i m pres sion i n Il l i noi s. Jimenez , 284 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 912. In People v. Pogue , 312 Il l . Ap p. 3d 71 9 (199 9), t he defend ant was charged

wi th sh ootin g a m em ber o f a r iva l ga

n g. Th e a pp el l ate courtrev ers ed an d re man de d f ora n ew t r ial o n t he ba sis that t he trial courthad failed t o q ues t ion in di vi dual mem bers of the v en i re concerni ng the def endan t’s righ t not to testify

as requi redby People
v. Zehr , 10 3 I ll. 2 d 4 72 ( 19 84 )

. Be ca us e t he iss ue wa s lik ely to recur on re trial, the a

pp el l ate cou rt al so a ddre ssed t he defendant’s
con ten ti on that t he trial

court erred by

refusi ng t o ask pr os pec t ive-11- j urors wh et he rt he de fen da nt ’s ga ng affilia t io n w o uld affe ct t he ir ab i l i ty to be fair a nd impar t ial. Relying o n Jimenez , t he appe l l ate court he ld t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t sho uld have que st ioned t he venire co ncer ning gan g bi as. Sp eci f i cal l y , the c ourt noted that, whi le Jimenez

doe s n ot im pose an af

f i rm ative duty on the trial

court to ma

ke gang b ias in quiri es sua sponte , “where

an appropriateque sti

on i s tend ere d pr i or to voir dire , and the ci rcumstances of the case are such that fun dam ental f ai rne ss re qui

res th at the v en i re be probed on thi s i ssue, t he refusa l to do so con sti

tutes rev ersi bl e error.” Pogue , 312 Ill . App. 3d at 727. Defend ant also ci

tes People v. Cruz , 164 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 80 2 (198 7). There, the tr ial

cour t allowed the St ate t o sh o w t he jury a docum en tary vi deo concerni

ng street gangs i

n an attempt to support it s eff ort to establ

i sh a gan g-rel ated m otive f or the shooti

ng. Th e vic t im cl ai med th at he h ad be en har asse d by members o f the defendant’s ga ng t o jo in

t he gang an

d that t he sh

oot in g was part of an attempt to recrui

t hi m . The appe l l ate court

fou nd t he ad mission o f the vi deo to be h

igh ly in fl am ma to ry an d prejudi ci al . The court not ed

that in Chi cago there was a “ ‘ de ep, bi tt er and wi

despread prej udic e agains t street gangs.’ ” Cruz , 164 Ill . App. 3d at 812, quot in g People v. Parr ott , 40 Il l . Ap p. 3d 32 8, 331 ( 1976)

. Defend ant also ci

tes People

v. Smith , 14 1 I ll. 2d 40, 5 8 (199 0), a cap ital ca se invo lving

ex ten si ve ev i de nc e of gan g-rel ated ac tiv i ty. In discu ssing t his evi

dence and i ts relev ance, thi s court not ed that it has been recogniz ed

that, pa rtic ularl y i n m etropol i tan a reas , there

may be strong prej udice a

gai nst street gan

gs. We note tha

t nei ther Cruz nor Smith involved a ny

issue c onc er ning voir dire . Regardin

g Jimenez , t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in Pogue recogniz ed that Jimenez

i m pos ed no sua sp onte

duty on th e tri al cou rt to ques ti on t he veni re reg ardi ng g an g bi as. R athe r, Pogue note d that the th

rust of Jimenez wasthat wh

eregang -bias q ues t ions a re submitt ed a nd “f undam ental fai rness” so dic t at es , a t r ial c o ur t is req ui red to que sti on pot en tial j urors on

gan g bi as. Pogue , 31 2 I ll. A pp

. 3d at 72 7. T his
am oun ts to n o m oreth an sa y i n g th at a tri al cou rt ab us esi ts d i screti on in refusi ng to question the ven

ire conc erni

ng gan g bias in appr opri ate ca se s. T he se ca se s c an no t be sa id t o lea d inevit ably to t he hol di ng of Strain

. T his cou rt has pr ev i ous l y h el d th at a new re quir ement mandat ing-12- ce r t ain questions duri

ng voir dire did no t ap ply

re t ro act ively. In Zehr , t his co ur t held t hat it wa s e rr o r fo r t he trial court to refuse to ask pr os pec t ivejurors, upon the def endan t’s request, whether they unde rst and and accept t he fo llo win g c o nc ep t s: ( 1) t he de fen da nt is presum ed i nno cent u

nti l prov en gui l ty ; ( 2) th

e d ef en da nt i s n ot required to off er an y evi den ce i n h i s own beha l f ; (3 ) the de fendant must be pro ve d gu ilty beyond a r eas ona ble do ubt ; and ( 4) t he de fend ant ’s fa ilur e t o t es t ify in his own be half canno t be held against him. Zehr , 103 Ill. 2d at 477 . I n Zehr , t he Stat e argued t hat because Su pr eme Court Rul e 234 prohibited voir dire que sti ons on matte rs of la wor instr uct ions, t he t rial co ur t pr op er ly refused t o a sk t he defendant’s qu es t io ns. T his courtrejected that argument, noting that t he understandi

ng of the f

our co nce

pts was esse nt ial to t he qua l i f i ca ti on of j urors in a cri

mi nal ca se . If a j uror has a n ob j ec ti on to
an y o f t he se ba sic gua

ran tee s, th e c ourt op i

ne d, a n i ns tructi on giv en at th e en d of

th e tr i al wi l l h av e l i ttl e c ur ati

ve ef f ect. The court observed that each of the m

anda t ed in qu irie s g o es t o t he h ea rt o f a particular bias o r p re

judice t hat wo uld d epr ive a de fendant of t he right to a fai r and im part ial jury . The failure to ask su c h questions thus
resu l ts i n pr ej udicial error. Zehr , 103 Il

l . 2d at 47 7-78. De sp i te t he imp o r t an ce o f t he qu es t io ns man da t ed by Zehr , t his
c ou rt held in People

v. Britz , 112 Ill . 2d 314, 318-19 (1986), a preTeague ca se , t ha t t he ho ldin g o f Zehr wa s t o be giv en o nly pr os pec t iveeff

ec t bec aus e i

t repres en ted a ch ange i n Il l i noi s law. In supp ort o f t his hol

di ng, th e court cit ed Ru le 2 34 ’s p ro hibit io n o f voir dir e questions that di

rectly or indi rectly concern m

atter s of l aw o r in s t ru ct ions an

d n oted th at Zehr

represented a departure from that rule. Defend ant here att empts to distin guish Britz

by no t ing t ha t wh ile Zehr was contr ary to supr eme court r ules, Strain wasi n accord wi th those rules . This

cl ai m i s i naccurate. As pr eviou sly not ed, t he conduct of voir dire h as

h i sto rica l l y b een l ef t t o t he tria

l court. Strain represented

a bre ak fr om t his pre ced ent by remo vingthe t rial court ’s di screti on where gan

g evi dence wi ll be i ntegral t o a d efe nd an t ’s t r ial. Ru le 431 w as a

dopted b y thi s court to re gul ate voir dire exam i na ti on of pr osp ec ti

ve j urors. Th

at rule gi ve s the tria l court the pri

mary di screti on of conductin

g voir dire an d f ordet er mini

ng t he ext ent and scope there of. Strain , 194 Ill . 2d a t 475-76. Th e ho lding o f Strain , rem ovi ng tha t di screti on when g ang e vidence is to be integ ra l to t he-13- tria l , wasnot con si sten

t wi th tha t rul e. In his argu men t th at Strain did n

ot ann ounce a new

ru le, d efenda nt reli es heavily on Strain ’s r eco gnit ion o f the disfavo r inwhi ch gan gs arehe l d by

the ge ne ral publ i c a nd i ts c i tati on of prior casesthat had
comm ented on thi s f act. However, i

t doe s n ot ne ce ss ari

l y f ol l ow f rom t his that Strain was a mere ext ensio n of t his prio r p re ced ent . And even if Strain is vie we d a s a n e xt en sio n o f pr io rpr ec ed en t , t his fact alone
wo uld n ot b e en oug

h to f i n d th at Strain did n

ot ann ounce a new rule. As we noted earlier, “the f act that a co urt says that i ts deci sion i s wit hin t he ‘lo gical co mpass’ of a n ear lier de cision, o rind ee d t ha t it is ‘controll ed’ by

a p riordeci si

on, i s n ot con cl us i ve f or pu rpos esof dec idingwh ethe

r the c urren t decisi on i s a ‘ new rul

e’ u nde r Teague .” Butler , 494 U .S. at 415, 1 08 L. E d . 2d at 356, 110 S. Ct. at 1217. Rather, the key

to the d etermi

nation of whether a n

ew rule was ann ounced is w he t he rco ur t s c o nsid er ing t he de fen da nt ’s cla im at t he t ime his orher co nvictio n beca me final “would ha ve felt co mpelled by
ex ist ing pr ec ed en t t o co nc lud e t ha t t he rule *** was requi redby the Cons tituti on.” Saff le v. Parks , 494 U.S. 484, 488, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 424, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1 990 ); People v. Morris , 236 Ill . 2d at 360. Defend ant has ci

ted no case predating Strai n th at came t o t he
con cl us i on t ha t man da t ed qu es t io ning o f t he ve nir e w as r equ ired by t he Co nstitut i on. The ca se that com es c l oses t to doing so, Jimenez , reli ed on a Cal if ornia case f

or its holdi

ng. Jimenez , 284 Ill . App. 3d at 912-13. The f

ac t i s th at, prior to Strain , as the State n otes, there were very few su bject s co ncer ning which tri al cou rtswerere qui

re d to que sti on pot entia l jurors. So me

of those su bje cts in

cl uded the Zehr f actors ( Zehr , 103 Il

l . 2 d 47 2); vi

ew s c onc ern

i ng the de f ense of i n sa n i ty (People v. Stack

, 112 I ll. 2 d 3 01 ( 19 86 ) ) ; r ac ial bia s in c er t ain
cases(People v. Hope , 18 4 Il l . 2d 39 ( 199 8)) ; a

bor ti on (People v. Muraw ski , 2 Ill . 2d 143 (1954)); dram sho p and temperanc e (

Lavin v. People , 69 I ll . 30 3 (1 873 ); Schneider v. Kirk, 83 Il l. A pp. 2d 170 (1967 )); and life-q ualifyi

ng qu es t io ns in capital cases ( People v. B uss , 187 Ill . 2d 144 (1999)). I nstead, asweha ve note d, th e s cop e of voir dire was co mmi

t t ed in t he vas t major ity o f case s t o t he so und di screti on of the tri al cou rt. F orthese reaso ns, at the t im e defendant’s
con vi cti on bec ame fi

na l, no c ou rt wo uld have felt c omp elled by exist ingpr ece dent to concl ude t hat t he r ule anno unce d in Strain was-14- required by t he Co nst it ut io n. T hu s, t he co nc lus io n is ine sc ap ab le that Strain an noun ced a new rul e. De f en da n t, however, analogizes Strain t o t his c o ur t ’s de cis io n in People v. Moore , 177 Ill . 2d 421 (1997). T here, the i ssue was wh ether t he dec ision in People

v. Kilpatr

ick , 167 Ill . 2d 439 (1995), appli ed
r et r o ac t ive ly

to the def

endan t’s c ase

. Kilpatrick

hel d that sec ti o n 5–8 –1( c) of t he Un

i f i ed Code of Corrections (Code) pro hi bi ts a trial courtf rom imposing a long er sent ence on r eco nsider at ion, even if t he agg re gat e pe rio d o f im

pr isonment re mainsthe s am e. Kilpatrick

, 167 I ll. 2d a t 446 -4 7. The defend ant in Moore had b een gi ven co nsec ut ive sentences. The a

pp el l ate court vacated the sen

tences as impro per and
reman ded for re sent encing. The t rial co ur t re sent ence d t he de fendant to co ncur re nt t er ms of impriso nment t hat equ aled t he com b i n ed l en gth of h i s prior c on se cu

ti v e s en ten ce s. The def

en da n t f iled a pos tcon vi cti on peti tion chal l engi ng th e se nten ces . This court

hel d that Kilpatrick

did n ot ann ounce a new ru le and wa s t he r efo r e a pp lica ble to cases on col

la teral revi ew. In doin

g so, t he court not ed that a case doe s not announce a n ew rule if “ ‘ “ ‘it ha s s imply a pp lied a w ellestabl is hed consti

tut iona l prin ci ple to govern a case

whi ch is c lo se ly anal ogous to those which have been p re viou sly consid er ed in t he pri or case l aw.’ ” [Ci

tations.]’ ” Moore , 177 Ill . 2dat 431, quo ting Penry
v. Lynaugh , 49 2 U .S. 30 2, 3 14 , 10 6 L . Ed . 2d 25 6, 2 74 , 10 9 S . C t. 2934, 2944 ( 1989)

. Moore concl uded that a deci sio n d

oesnot
ann ounce a n

ew ru l e i f i t merel y appl i es ex i sti n g p re ce den

t to an anal ogous set of

f acts. Moore , 17 7 I ll. 2d at 431. The court noted that Kilpatrick

had rel ie d on the Supreme C our t’s deci sion in North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969 ), wh ich st at ed t ha t du e p r o ce ss may p r o hibit a ju dg e fr om imposing a m

ore severe sen

tence wh ere a defe

ndan t has been convi cted aft er a r et r ia l i

n th e a bs en ceof obj ec ti ve ev i de nc e of i de nt ifiab le misc o nd uc t o cc ur r ing aft er t he t ime o f t he o r igin a l sentenci ng. Se ction 5 –8– 1 o f the Co de w as c ons iste nt wit h Pearce

. Moore noted that t hi s court followed Pearce in People v. Baze , 43 I ll. 2d 298 (1 969). Moore no t ed fur t he r t ha t t he le gis la

tur e had in corpo rated t he Pearce

and Baze dec isions int o s ect ion 5 –5– 4 o f the Co de ( app licable in Moore ), w h i ch pr oh i b i ts a more sev ere sentence f rom bei ng i mposed on resentencing unl ess i t i s b as ed on a defendant’s conduct occ

ur ri n g sub se qu en

t to the origi

nal sen tenc i ng. Th us, Moore-15- concl uded t hat this had been

the rule in

Ill in ois for over 20 years. Kilpatrick

mer ely applie d t his pre ced ent t o t he fact s o f tha t cas e. As
suc h, the rule en

unci ated in Kilpatrick

was predicated on well

-settled pri nc i pl es of l aw. Moore , 177 Il

l . 2d at 43 2-33. Moore is dist inguisha b le fr o m Strain . T he h o lding o f Kilpatrick
was a m ere extensi

on of exi stin g la w. It wa s al

read y we ll se t t led in I llino is that due pro cess prohib ited a j udge from in creasi ng a sen tence upon re sent encing unless ju st ifi ed bya de fendant ’s co nduc t oc cur ring af te rthe ori

gi na l sen tenc i ng. I n addi tion , the Il

l i noi s legi slature ha d
en ac ted se cti on 5–5–4 of the Code, in

corpo rating Pearce

and Baze

. Kilpatrick

mer ely a pp li ed the then -exi sti ng prece den

t and statutory la wto t he s et o f f

acts i n that cas e. Strain , on t he other hand, was a cl ear bre ak fr om p re ced ent . N ot hing in the cas e law fo re t old t he hold ingin Strain

. Co mments mad e by t he disse nt ing just ices in Strain conf i rm th i s f ac t. Ju st ice He iple no t ed in hi s di ssen t t hat this court had consi stently

he ld that pot entia

l jurors may

not be asked ab out antic ipa ted responses to specif

ic item s of ev ide nce

. Calli ng Strain ’s hold ing“revol

utionary,” he worried that the court was sett in g a tro ubl in g precedent whi

ch wo uld r es ult in

fut ur e litigant s re que st ing voir dire on any pot entia l bias m erely by showi ng that the ev i de nc e on a particular subj ect wi

l l pl ay a m aj or ro l e i n th e tr i al an d th at s eg men ts of our society v

ie w the subj ect with consi derabl e di sf avor. He expresse d concern that such m

andated questioni

ng o f t h e v en

i re wo uld be counterproduct iv e and m igh t cor rupt a jur y by

pr ema t ur ely expo sing pot en

tia l j urors to evi den

ce. Strain , 194 Ill . 2d at 483-84 (Hei pl e, J., d i sse nti ng, j oin ed b y Bi l andi c, J.). De f en da n t, however, m

ai ntain s that there is a di

ff erence b etween
a new rule and a “chan

ge” i n the l aw an d th at Strain re pr ese nt s t he l atter, thus al lo wing him t o avo id t he b ar o f res judicata . I n making t his ar gument , d efenda nt re lies primar ily on Moore and Kilpatrick

. Al thoughh e a

gr ee s th at Kilpatrick

app lied exist ing pr ece dent and statutory la w to the facts of that case, he argues t hat it nonetheless chang ed t he law, allowing fo r r et ro act ive app licatio n. D efenda nt poi n ts to the f

act tha t the tri al

cour t an d t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in Kilpatrick

had reject ed Kil

pat rick’s clai

m. Def endant also n otes

th at, pri orto this court ’s Kilpatrick dec ision, th e a

pp el l ate co ur t in People
v. Todd , 263 Il l . Ap

p. 3d 43 5 (199 4), reached a c ontrary con cl us i on t o t hat re ache d by

t his c o ur t in Kilpatrick . D ef en da n t f ur th er as se rts-16- that be ca us e n o l ower cou

rt wou l d re ac h th

i s c ontr ary con cl us i on subs equ ent to thi s court ’s Kilpatrick deci sion, Kilpatrick ’s

“ cl ari f i ca ti on of what the law required

re pr ese nt ed a chang e fro m the previous stat e of af

fai rs.” We di sag re e wit h defend ant ’s ar gument . T his co ur t in Moore stated t hat t he ap pe llat e c o ur t ’s de cis io n in Todd wa s no t a r ea so na ble appl i ca ti on of e xisting pr ece dent and t hat it co nfli ct ed w ith Pearce

and wi th the pla in la nguage of s ections 5–8–1 an d 5–5

– 4 of the Code. Moore , 177 Ill . 2d at 435-36. Fu rther , that p ost

- Kilpatrick dec isions of the a ppel l ate court wo uld no t re ac h t he c o nt ra ry p o sit io n o f Todd
merel y re f l ec ts th e f ac t th at Kilpatrick

, as a d ec isio n o f t his c o ur t , is bind ing o n a ll

lower courts. See People v. Artis , 23 2 I ll. 2d 156, 164 (2009 ). We t he r efo r e c o nc lud e t ha t t his co ur t ’s de cision in Strain
ann ounced a n ew con sti tuti o na l r ule of cri mi nal procedure. Under Teague , a new ru le may not be ap plied r et ro act ively exc ep t intwo li mi ted ci rcumstan ces: ( 1) i

f the ne w ru l e p l ac escertai

n k i nds of pr imar y, priv

ate in div idua l co nduc t beyond t he po wer of t he cr iminallaw- making au

th ori ty to pro scribe;or ( 2) if

the rule is a

wa t er she d r ule of cri mi nal procedure, requirin

g the observan

ce of those procedures that are i m pl i ci t i n th e conc ept of

ordered l i berty. Teague , 489 U.S. at 311, 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 358, 109 S. Ct . at 107 6, 107 7. The fi rst excepti on is

obviously not applicabl

e. As t o t he sec ond exce pt ion,
we n ote the Supreme C ourt stated in Teague that it shoul d be l im ited to t hos e new pr oc edu re s wit hou t which t he l i ke l i hood of an ac cu ra te con vi cti on i s se ri ousl y di m i nished. Teague , 489 U .S. at 3 13, 1 03 L. Ed. 2d at 35 8, 10 9 S

. Ct

. at 10 77

. At o r al a r gu men t in this cas e, counsel for def endan t candi dly acknowl edged

that nei ther exce ption appl ie s to Strain and we ag re e. Th us , t he h o lding o f Strain i s n ot retro active and does not apply to cases on col

la teral revi ew. Because Strain anno unc ed a new r ule and i s not to be appl

ie d
r et r o ac t ive ly

to col l ateral proc ee di ng s, d ef en da nt’ s p ostc onv

i cti on pe ti ti on is b ar r ed by res judicata . A postconvic tion procee di ng perm i ts rev i ew of consti tutiona l i ss ue s th at w ere not a nd coul d n ot have been adj udic ated on di

rect ap peal

. People

v. Pitsonbarger, 205 I ll. 2d 444, 4 55-56 ( 2002). Thus, is sues that were decided on di

rect appeal are barred

fro m cons ider at ion by t he do ct rine o f res judicata

. People v. Towns , 182 Ill . 2d 491, 502 (1 998 ). Her e, abse nt t he-17- ap pli ca b i l i ty o f Strain , t he claim raise d by defend ant in hi s pos tcon vi cti on pe ti ti on is the sam e one rai sed and dec ide d in hi s di rect ap pe al. Thus , res judicataba rs de f en da nt’ s p eti ti on. Du e to ou

r di sp osi ti on of thi s case, we n

eed n ot addre ss

the rem ai nd er of def endan t’s a rgum en ts.

CONCLUSION For t he r eas ons st at ed , we ho ld t hat t his co ur t ’s de cision in Strain
ann ounced a new co ns titut iona

l rul e of cri mi nal procedure and that nei ther of the Teague ex ce pt io ns t o no nr et r o ac t ivit y ap pl y. Theref ore, t he ho lding o f Strain doe s n ot appl y retr oac ti ve l y to ca se s on coll ateralreview. Defen

dant’s postconviction petition is thus barred by res judicata

. In

addi ti on, weove

rrul e the a ppe l l atecou

rt’ s dec i si on in People v. Gardner , 3 31 I ll. App. 3d 3 58 ( 200 2) , t o t he ext ent that
cas e i s i nc onsi sten t wi th our h old i ng toda y
. The j udgme

nt of the appel

la te court is aff irm ed.
Aff

irmed.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, speci ally concurrin

g: In i ts opi ni on, the maj ority conc l udes that our prior de cis io n in Peop le v. Strain , 194 Ill . 2d 467 (2000), announced a n ew constitutional

ru le of cr imi

nal pr oc edu re and, t her efo re , may no t be applie d retro activel

y. A lthough I have n o quarrelwith the majority’s hol di ng on t his issue, I be lieve my

co lleague s have er re d by not first add r essing a threshold, pro cedural question: whether Sanders’ pos tcon vi cti on petition was t imely

fil ed. The app ellate co ur t , u sing an in correct st an da r d, de t er mined t ha t Sa nd er s’ pe t it io n was un t imel y. No rmall y, s uc h a

hol di ng en dsthe ca se , as the Pos t-Con

vi cti on Hea ring Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et s eq. (West 2000)) forbi ds any proceedin

gs f il ed beyond the ti

me peri ods i t sets f orth. Howev

er, t he appe l l ate

cou rt nev er th el es s reach ed th e m eri ts of t he su bst ant ive is sue. I n t he ir o pin io n, my co lle a gu es do no t ad dr es s t his t hr es ho ld proceduralissue, anal

yzi ng only Sanders’ subs t ant ive claim. By do ing so, this court creates confus ion f or t he b ench

and b ar in

several-18- respect s: n ot onl

y doe s th e court call i

nto question the proper anal ytical sequence used to review such

clai ms, the court al so leav

es st anding a publ is hed appel la te court opini

on that applies an i

ncorrect stan dard to as se ss the ti mel i ne ss of Sander s’ pet ition. Becau se to day’s opi ni on le aves thes e m

atter s unad

dressed , I a

m com pe l l ed to wr i te se pa r at ely. Sec ti on 122–1(c) of the Act

(725 ILCS 5/122

–1(c) (We st 2000 ))
se ts fo r t h t he sp ec ific t ime p er io d w it hin w hic h a pe t it io ne rsha ll i n i ti ate a p o st co nvict io n pr o ce ed ing. At t he t ime de fend ant fi le d h is petition, the A

ct pro vi ded: “No pr oc eed ing s under thi s Artic le shal l b e comm

enced
more t han 6 mont hs aft er t he de nial of a p et itio n for leave to app eal o r t he da

te f or f i l i ng such a p eti ti on i f non e i s f i l ed or more than 45 da

y s af ter th e d ef en da nt f i l eshi s or he rbr ief in t he appe al

of the se nten ce b ef ore the I l l i

noi s Suprem

e Court (or moreth an

45 da y s af ter th e deadl i n e f or th e fi li ng of t he defendant’s br ief w it h t he I llino is Su pr eme Co ur t if no br ief is fi le d) or 3 yea

rsf rom th e date o f co nvic t io n, wh ich ev er is
sooner, unless the peti

tioner al le ges f acts showi

ng th at the del ay was not due to hi s or her culpa ble negl ige nce.” Thus, the G ener al

Asse mbly has n ot only establ is hed a cl ear f ram ework wit hin the Ac t for asse ssing t he t imeli ne ss of a pos tcon vi cti on peti ti on , but a

l so h as sp ec i f i ed th e te st to b e u se d to
excuse a peti

tione r’s n oncom pli anc e wi

th these requi rem ents: a pe ti ti on fi le d ou t side t he de linea t ed t ime p er io d is co nsid er ed un t imely unl ess “the petitioner al

le ges f acts showi

ng that the del ay

was not due to hi s or her culpa

ble negl ige nce.” 725 ILCS 5/122– 1(c) ( West 2000) ; see also Peo

ple v

. Ris sley , 20 6 Ill. 2d 403 , 42 0 (2 003 ); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Il

l . 2d 444 , 456 (2 002). The appe l l atecou

rt , despite ackn

owledgi ng that the cl ear la

nguage of section 122–1 ( c) man

dates the use of the cul

pabl e negl ige nce stan dard t o a sses s t he t imeli

ness o f Sand er s’ ini

t ial p ostc onv

i cti on pet itio n, inst ea d a pp lied t he ca us e- an d- pr eju dic e s t an da r d s et fo r t h in Pitsonbarger

whi ch i s used to de t er mine t he t imelines s o f successive1 Sec tio n 12 2– 1( f) wa s a dded to the Act in 2 004 , a nd codified the holding of Pi tson barg

er. By its p lain l ang uage , se cti on 122–1( f) app li es

on ly to successive postco

nv ict io n pe titions, and

prov id es that a succ essive petit ion
may be filed only upon leave of co urt w he re “a peti tion er d em on strates cause for his or her failur e to bring the claim in h is or her init ial post -convicti on pr oceedings and

pre judice re sul ts f rom thatfail ure.” 725 ILCS 5/122–1(f) (West 20 04)

. -19- pos tcon vi ci ti on petitions. 1 In appl

yi ng thi s hei

ghtened standa

rd , th e appe l l ate pa ne l r ea son ed that where a “defen dant seeks in the f

irst in stancet o file an u nt imely po st co nvictio n p eti

t io n be ca us e o f a chan ge in the la wt hat oc cur re d aft er t he fili ng de adline had pas sed ,” t his is “an al ogous t o t he si

tuation in wh i ch a def

endan t has al ready fi le d anunsucces sf

ul postconvi

ction petition, but seeks to fi le a suc ces sive postco nvi

ction petition because

of a cha nge i n the l aw that
occurre d after the rej ection of h

is fi rst petition.” 393 Ill . App. 3d a t 171-7 2. Thi

s rea soni ng i s wi thout sup port and i n error. As t his is t he firs t po st co nvic t ion p eti ti on f i l ed b y Sa n ders , b oth t he Act and our case law m ake it clear that chall

enges to t im

eli ness must be ev al uated und er the cul pab l e negl

i gen ce standard

and no t t he
more stringe

nt cause-and-prej udic e test. T he appel la te court ign

ored t he dist inctio n bet wee n initial and su cce ssive pos tcon vi cti on petitions, whi ch ma ndates that each ty

pe of peti ti on be eva luat ed u nder different anal ytical fram ework s. In a ddit ion, t he ap pellat e pa nel’s ho lding ru ns counter not o nl

y to our long-hel

d view that the Act in

general must be “ ‘lib er ally

construed to aff

ord a con v i cte d p er son

an opp ortu n i ty to pre sent questions of

depriv ation of cons

titutional righ ts’ ” (Rissley , 206 Ill . 2d at 421, quo ting People v. Correa , 108 I ll . 2d 541, 546 (1985 )), bu t als o t ha t t he sp ec ific e xc ep t io n containe d i n s ec ti on 122–1(c) all

owing a petitioner

to f i l e a n oth erw i se -un ti mel y pe ti ti on operates as a “ ‘ special

“saf ety val ve” ’ i n the Act.” Rissley , 206 Ill . 2d at 420, quo ting People v. Bates , 124 Il l . 2d 81, 8 8 (198 8). In l i gh t of the ab ove , I c an

not unde rst and why

my coll eagues do not addre ss th

i s thre shold

i ssue an d cl arify that the appe l l ate court used the wrong standard. Th e m aj ori ty ’s si l en ceon this is sue i s even more di stu

rb i ng i n l i gh t of the con ce ss i on made by t he Stat e i

n i ts brie f to th i s c our

t th at t he appe l l ate

cou rt’ s h ol di n g w i th re sp ec t to tim el i ne ss d oes “ not f i nd s upport i n the Act,” an d t ha t t he ap plic ab le-20- timel in ess standard i

n thi s appeal

is one of cul

pabl e neg ligenc e. Furth er, durin g o r al argum

en t, several mem bers of thi s court
r ep ea t ed ly

que st ioned t he pa rt ies co ncer ning t he t imeli ness iss ue a nd t he ma nne rin wh i ch i t wa s h an dled by the appe l l atepa

ne l . Cou ns el f or b oth the Stat e and peti

tioner agr eed that t he cul pabl e negl ige nce stan dard appl i es i n th i s ca se, a nd t ha t t he ap pe llat e c o ur t er r ed in
em pl oy i n g th e c au se -a n d- pr ej udi ce

test. It is my vie w t ha t wh en t he co rr ec t st an da r d is applied to Sanders’ pos tcon vi cti on pe ti ti on, the de l ay i n f i l i ng wa s n ot du e to his c ulp ab le negl ige nce. T his court hasdefined c ulpable ne gligence as “ ‘so mething greater t ha n o r di na ry n egl ige nce’ ” and “ ‘akin to r ecklessness.’ ” Rissley , 20 6 I ll. 2d at 420, quo ting People v. Boclair, 202 Ill . 2d 89, 108 (2002). Sanders had a r gu ed o n d ire ct ap pe al t ha t t he cir cu it
cou rt ’s voir dire was deficient and denied him hi s co nst itu t ional r ight to a f ai r an d i m pa rti al j ury by f ai li ng to que st ion t he jur y reg ar ding pot entia l gang b ias

. Se e 3 93 I ll. A pp

. 3d at 16 0. Be ca us e t his
ar gument was rej ected on direct appea l, Sa nd er s w as ba rr ed by res judicata from re-raisi ng i t in a p o stconv

i cti on petiti

on. People v. Whitehead

, 169 Ill . 2d35 5, 37 1 ( 19 96 )

. As my c o llea gu es ho ld t o da y, t his co ur t ’s de cis io n in Strain an no un ce d a ne w c o nst it ut io na l ru le of
cr iminal p r o ce du r e w hic h imp ac t ed de fen da nt ’s ab ilit y t o o nc e a ga in raiset his is su e in po st co nvic t io n p r o ce ed ing s. T hu s, it was only after Strain was deci

ded that Sander s was ab l e to re su rre ct the i ss

ueof in adequate voir dire wit ho ut be ing ba rr ed by res judicata

. Here , Sanders’ pe

tition f or leave to appeal

to this cour t wit h respectt o his d ire ct ap pe al w as de nie d o n Ap r il 2, 19 97 (People v. Sanders , 172 Il

l . 2d 563 (1997 )), an

d the si x-m onth s tatutory pos tcon vi cti on period f oll owing tha t da te expi red on October 2, 1997. Sin ce he was

sent en ce d on Ma y 4, 1 994 , th e th

ree -y ea r pe riod follow ingth at da t e exp ired on M ay 4, 199 7. The re for e, unde r t he ap plic ab le ve

rs i on of se cti on 1 22– 1(c ), Sa

nd ers ’ p ostc onv

i cti on pe ti ti on wa s d ue o n M ay 4, 1 997 , t he ea rlier o f the t wo dat es. We deci ded Strain on Novem ber 16, 2000, and Sanders f

il ed t he inst ant pos tcon vi cti on pet itio n exac t ly one ye ar later, on Novem ber 16, 2001. Under these f acts, I conclude that Sanders’ del ay in fi li ng was n ot due to his cu lpa ble ne glig en ce , as he r ea so na bly pursued the voir dire is sue ag ain after the new

ru le in Strain was ann

ounced. I note t hat the Act does not specif

y a n add itio nal time pe rio d, aft er t he exp irat ion o f the-21- normal fil ingperiod, durin

g whi ch a peti tioner m ay be fo un d c ulp ab ly negligent in

fil inga po st co nvictio n pet itio n base d up on a chang e in the la w. In addi

tion, our case la

w has n ot squ arely a

ddressed thi s i ssue. We have, howev er, t r ad it io na lly re lied up o n fe de r al c as e la w in inter pr et ing

and app lyi

ng t he Act. People v. Hodges , 234 Ill . 2d 1, 12 (2009 ). In Dodd

v. United States , 545 U.S. 353, 357, 162 L. Ed. 2d 343, 349 , 1 25 S . C t . 2 478 , 2 481 -8 2 ( 200 5) , t he Supreme Court he ld that 28 U. S. C. 22 55 , ¶6 ( 3) es t ab lishe s t ha t a fe de r al p r iso ne rmay file
a motion to vacate, set aside or cor rect his sentence withi n one y ear f rom t he da te on wh i ch th e ri gh t h e a ss er ts was newly rec og nized by t he Co ur t . R elying upo n Dodd , t here is n o qu esti on

th at, at a minimum, San

ders ’ petiti

on f i l ed one y ear af ter Strain was deci

ded
wasnot un

tim el y
. Ac co r di ng ly, after hav

in g survi ved thi s threshold procedural inquiry, it only t hen bec omes app ro pr iate t o e xamine the subs t ant ive is sue of whet

h er Strain app lied re t ro act ively to Sand er s’ ca se. As stated, I am

i n a gre em en t wi th m y col le agu es ’ h

ol di n g th at Strain represents a ne w c o nst it ut io na l ru le of cri m i na l proc ed ure tha t i s n ot to be retroact iv

el y a ppli ed.
JUSTICE BURKE j oins

in this special concurrence.