alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALVIN THOMAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0534-CG-M

)

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of the issues raised, and there having 

been no objections filed, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that this action be and is hereby DISMISSED without 

prejudice for failure to prosecute and to obey the Court's Order.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00534-CG-M Document 5 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 1
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-30521 Summary Calendar

VOGEL DENISE NEWSOME, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus ENTERGY SERVICES INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 99-CV-3109-G

- - - - - - - - - - July 12, 2000 Before JOLLY, DAVIS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Vogel Denise Newsome, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), filed a complaint alleging, inter alia , violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. She contends that she was subjected to race and gender-based discrimination while working in a temporary assignment for Entergy Services, Incorporated. She filed a motion for appointment of trial counsel, which the district court denied. Newsome wishes to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion for appointment of trial counsel and requests from this court appointment ofNo. 00-30521 -2- appellate counsel to pursue the issue. See Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977)(holding that this court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in the context of a Title VII civil rights’ complaint, even though the case has not yet been resolved on the merits). When the district court considered Newsome’s motion for appointment of counsel, it made findings relating to the “exceptional circumstances” test outlined in Ulmer v. Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982), and applicable to IFP cases.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The district court, however, did not make findings under the appropriate standard for Title VII cases. When a complainant requests appointment of counsel under Title VII, the court must consider: (1) the merits of plaintiff’s claims of discrimination; (2) the efforts taken to obtain counsel; and (3) the plaintiff’s financial ability to retain counsel. See Caston , 556 F.2d at 1308; Gonzalez v. Carlin , 907 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1990). The IFP standard and the Title VII standard for appointment of counsel are not interchangeable. See Gonzalez , 907 F.2d at 580. Although it cited to Gonzalez and the standard for appointment of counsel in Title VII cases, the district court relied solely on the Ulmer factors when it denied Newsome’s request for appointment of trial counsel. Because it did not adequately develop the proper standard, the district court’s order denying appointment of trial counsel is VACATED and the case REMANDED to the district court for further considerationNo. 00-30521 -3- under the appropriate standard. Newsome’s motion for appointment of appellate counsel is DENIED. Cf. Whitehead v. Johnson , 157 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1998). MOTION DENIED; VACATED and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

SUSAN ELAINE BARKER,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-10138

D.C. No. 4:06-CR-01877-CKJ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 6, 2010** 

Before: GOODWIN, RYMER, and GRABER, Circuit Judges. 

Susan Elaine Barker appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking her

supervised release. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

Barker’s counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with

a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant with

FILED

DEC 07 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-10138

the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or

answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80-81 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the district

court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.26





[English Summary]





State-Owned Land Use Rights Agreement





Party A: Yongtai County Municipal Bureau of Land and Resources


Party B: Yida (Fujian) Tourism Group Co., Ltd.





Land Area:


130,513 square meters located in Changkeng, Duishan and Qitou, etc. villages in Xianglu town





Purpose of the Land:


3.6692 hectare for scenic views and facilities; 2.4954 hectare for hotels and restaurants; 6.8867 hectare for entertainment and sports





Term:


Party A agrees to deliver the land use right to Party B by October 19, 2010, for a total of 12,805,000 RMB, for a period of 40 years.





Party B agrees to commence the project under this Agreement before August 4, 2011 and complete it before August 4, 2013.




Jurisdiction:


Laws of China





Dispute:


If there is any dispute between the parties, either party can resolve the dispute by the courts.





Date of the Agreement:


August 9, 2010
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11

- 2993

___________
RUDOLPH CAMPBELL, Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent

________________________ ____________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A018 852 760 ) Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew R. Arthur

____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

Novemb er 23, 2011

Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : November 23 , 2011 )

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Campbell, a Jamaican citizen, was admitted to the United States in 1969. In 2010,

h e was served wit h a Notice to Appear alleging that he was removable as an alien whohad been convicted of a controlled substances offense pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). That Notice to Appear was later amended, and Campbell was ordered

removed as an alien convic ted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) due to a 1998 conviction for possession with intent to distribute

cocaine in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated §§ 2C:35

- 5a(1) and b (3). His

appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed, and he petitions for review.

B ecause he is a criminal alien, this Court has jurisdiction to review his petition only to

the extent it raises constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C),

(D) ; Kamara v. Att ’ y Gen.

, 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005 )

. As a thres hold matter,

such claims must be colorable

. Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. , 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).

Both of the arguments Campbell now raises are without merit. He first claims that

the record does not su pport the finding that he was convicted of an aggravated felony

. As

the Board noted, Campbell conceded that he was removable and an aggravated felon

.

Because that concession alone support s finding that he committed an aggravated felon y ,

this claim is mer itless

. See Hoodho v. Holder , 558 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2009)

(“A dmissions by parties are not subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure that the admissions

are fully supported by the underlying record. ”)

. Campbell ’s argument that the Notice to

Appear with which he was served did not designate his New Jersey conviction as grounds

for removal has no basis in fact

. The Government filed a Form I

- 261 in November 2010

specifying that con viction as grounds for removal, amending the Notice to Appear. See

Duhaney v. AG of the U.S. , 621 F.3d 340, 344 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, neither

claim is colorable

. Pareja v. Att’y Gen. , 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) ( “ Todetermine whether a claim is colorable, we ask whether it is

. . . wholly insubstantial and

friv olous. ”) (quotation omitted)

. We therefore lack jurisdicti on over the petition for

review and will dismiss it accordingly

.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-51144

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MELISSA COCKERHAM,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:07-CR-511-2

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Melissa Cockerham appeals her guilty-plea conviction for conspiring to

commit money laundering. Cockerham contends: her appeal waiver does not

bar her appeal; and, her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated

because the courtroom was closed during her guilty-plea hearing.

The Government does not invoke the appeal-waiver provision of

Cockerham’s plea agreement because that agreement bars only the appeal of her

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 19, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 09-51144 Document: 00511267861 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/19/2010
No. 09-51144

sentence. Therefore, this appeal is not barred. See United States v. Story, 439

F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006).

“We review constitutional challenges de novo.” United States v. Joseph,

333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted); see also United States v.

Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995). Arguably, because the closed-courtroom

issue was not raised in district court, review would be only for plain error.

Under either standard, the claim fails.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a public trial to all criminal defendants.

Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98. A defendant may waive that right, however, by failing

to object to the closing of the courtroom. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923,

936 (1991) (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960)); United

States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155 (5th Cir. 2006).

For the reasons that follow, Cockerham waived her right to public trial.

At the guilty-plea hearing, her husband pleaded guilty first. After his plea, but

before Cockerham’s, the court announced the courtroom had been closed for the

husband’s and Cockerham’s pleas. Cockerham and her counsel were present in

the courtroom at that time; there is no indication in the record either Cockerham

or her counsel objected to the closure of the courtroom before or during the plea

hearing, at any subsequent proceeding, or by way of a written motion. “Where

a defendant, with knowledge of the closure of the courtroom, fails to object, that

defendant waives [her] right to a public trial.” Hitt, 473 F.3d at 155 (citing

Levine, 362 U.S. at 618-19 (1960)). Moreover, “[a] defendant’s attorney’s waiver

of the right to a public trial is effective on the defendant”. Hitt, 473 F.3d at 155

(citing United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1949)).

AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 09-51144 Document: 00511267861 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/19/2010
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATION**I, Leslie Bernhard, certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of AdStar, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.        Date: September 28, 2005   /s/ Leslie Bernhard   Leslie Bernhard   Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32.2

                               TELVUE CORPORATION

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              18 U.S.C. sec. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of TelVue Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John Fell, Controller
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Date: May 15, 2008                      /s/ John Fell
                                        -------------
                                        John Fell
                                        Treasurer (Controller)
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                    Certification Of Chief Executive Officer
               pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350 adopted pursuant to
                 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


I, Richard D. Forman, Chief Executive Officer of Register.com, Inc. (the
"Company"), hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss.1350 adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(i) The Company's accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) The information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Richard D. Forman
-----------------------
Richard D. Forman
Chief Executive Officer


Dated:  April 4, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KAREN PADGETT BROWN, )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00343-KD-C

 ) 

MOBILE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, )

et al., )

Defendants. )

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered on this date, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and 

DECREED that the Mobile County Commissioners’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED and 

all claims asserted against all Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of March 2015. 

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00343-KD-C Document 28 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 1
Document Headings

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                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
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                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### National Archives and Records Administration

          - [NARA-2015-016]

# AGENCY:

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

# ACTION:

Cancellation of notice.

# SUMMARY:

On December 4, 2014, NARA published a notice (79 FR 72033) that the agency was proposing to reinstate the information collection National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC) Grant Program, Budget Form and Instructions (OMB number 3095-0013, agency form number NA Form 17001), which NHPRC uses in its grant program. NARA invited the public to comment on the proposed information collection pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. However, NARA is now cancelling that notice and request for comment, due to errors. NARA will publish a new, corrected notice and request for comments within the week.

# DATES:

                        This cancellation is effective immediately upon publication in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# ADDRESSES:

                        Paperwork Reduction Act Comments (ISSD), Room 4400, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Rd., College Park, MD 20740-6001; or faxed to 301-713-7409; or electronically mailed to                         *tamee.fechhelm@nara.gov.*

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Tamee Fechhelm at telephone number 301-837-1694, or fax number 301-713-7409.

Dated: December 16, 2014.

Penny Ha,

Acting Executive for Information Services/CIO.

[FR Doc. 2014-29854 Filed 12-19-14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7515-01-P
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Julie R. Jenkins, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[971 NYS2d 589]—

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed October 5, 2012, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Substantial evidence supports the factual determination of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that claimant was discharged for misconduct. Claimant was employed as a business office manager and, in that role, had access to gift cards given as employee incentives. She was discharged for activating one of the cards for her personal use without authorization from the executive director. Claimant denied knowing that she was required to obtain authorization and testified that she was entitled to the card, but those explanations for her conduct created credibility issues for the Board to resolve *(see Matter of Andreani [HPP Rinx, Inc.*— Commissioner *of Labor],*44 AD3d 1210, 1211 [2007]). Inasmuch as an employee’s apparent dishonesty or failure to comply with an employer’s policies and procedures can constitute disqualifying misconduct, we perceive no reason to disturb the Board’s decision *(see Matter of Wise [Commissioner of Labor],*19 AD3d 795, 795-796 [2005]; *Matter of Williams [Commissioner of Labor],*262 AD2d 903, 903 [1999]).

Rose, J.E, McCarthy, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GABRIEL V. FRITZ,1

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee.

§

§ No. 125, 2017

§

§ Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 1502012186 (K)

§ 

§

§

§

Submitted: July 3, 2017

Decided: July 13, 2017

ORDER

This 13th day of July 2017, it appears to the Court that, on June 7, 2017, the 

Chief Deputy Clerk issued a notice directing the appellant to show cause why this 

appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to file an opening brief and appendix 

in this matter by May 22, 2017 and his failure to file a completed motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis or to pay the filing fee. The appellant failed to claim the notice to 

show cause sent by certified mail. The appellant also failed to respond to the notice 

to show cause sent by first class mail. The appellant has not responded to the notice 

to show cause within the required ten-day period and therefore dismissal of this 

appeal is deemed to be unopposed.

 

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rules 3(b)

and 29(b), that this appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

Justice
##### 



EXHIBIT 21.1 SUBSIDIARIES OF FOUNDRY NETWORKS, INC. Name
    
    Jurisdiction of RegistrationFoundry Networks International Inc.
    
    BarbadosFoundry Networks Ltd.
    
    United KingdomFoundry Networks GmbH
    
    GermanyFoundry Networks France SARL
    
    FranceFoundry Networks Singapore, PTE Ltd.
    
    SingaporeFoundry Networks Nederland BV
    
    NetherlandsFoundry Networks Canada Co.
    
    CanadaFoundry Networks Italia Srl.
    
    ItalyFoundry Networks Japan KK
    
    JapanFoundry Networks do Brasil Ltda.
    
    BrazilFoundry Networks Holding Co.
    
    Delaware, U.S.AFoundry Networks Japan-U.S., LLC.
    
    Delaware, U.S.A
 63