IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES N. STRAWSER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0424-CG-C

)

LUTHER STRANGE, in his official 

capacity as Attorney General for 

the State of Alabama, et al.,

)

)

)

)

Defendants )

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the motion of Defendant Luther Strange to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (Doc. 101), and Plaintiffs’ opposition (Doc. 105). For 

the reasons explained below, the court finds that Strange’s motion to dismiss should 

be denied.

Standing is an Article III doctrine limiting the jurisdiction of the federal 

courts to actual “cases” and “controversies.” Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 

F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 1998). In order to establish standing, a plaintiff “must 

demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 

1273, 1278 (11th Cir .2014). As the parties invoking this court’s jurisdiction, 

Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). There are three requirements for standing:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally 

protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. Third, it must be 

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likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision. 

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742–43 (1995).

Attorney General Strange argues that it has become evident that he does not 

enforce marriage laws, did not cause the Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, and cannot 

redress the Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Specifically, Attorney General Strange 

asserts that he has no authority to issue marriage licenses and has no authority to 

address their alleged injuries as a member of the Executive Branch of Alabama 

government. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that they seek more than the 

issuance of marriage licenses. Plaintiffs have broadly challenged all Alabama laws 

that prohibit marriage by same-sex couples or that prohibit recognition by the State 

of the marriages of same-sex couples. As the Attorney General of Alabama, Strange 

has the responsibility of appearing in federal courts “in any case in which the state 

may be interested in the result.” ALA. CODE § 36-15-1(2). Strange has appeared in 

several cases to defend the validity of Alabama’s laws that prohibit same-sex 

marriage. Strange admitted in a Northern District case that he “maintains 

enforcement authority regarding the Alabama Marriage Prohibitions and their 

application to conduct of the State and its subdivisions and court system.” AaronBush v. Strange, Case No. 1:14-cv-01091-RDP (N.D. Ala.) (Docs. 1, ¶ 18; Doc. 13, ¶ 

18).

The court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating 

standing against Attorney General Strange. As this court has previously explained, 

this case is about more than the issuance of formal pieces of paper that state that 

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the Plaintiff couples are married. If Plaintiffs’ marriages are not recognized as 

valid in Alabama then their marriage licenses will be inconsequential. Plaintiffs’ 

alleged injuries cannot be fully redressed by the other defendants in this case. 

Probate judges can issue marriage licenses to the Plaintiffs, but for their marriages 

to have any meaning, the Attorney General must recognize those marriages as 

valid. The laws of Alabama expressly state that “[a] marriage contracted between 

individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state” and “[t]he State of Alabama shall 

not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was 

alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of 

whether a marriage license was issued.” ALA. CODE § 30-1-19. Thus, a Plaintiff’s 

receipt of a marriage license from a probate judge will not result in a valid marriage 

absent the Attorney General being bound by the rulings in this case. 

If not subject to an injunction, Strange could even initiate or direct that 

actions be filed against the Plaintiffs for falsely declaring their marital status in 

state forms. See e.g. ALA. CODE § 40-18-27(d) (prohibiting false statements in tax 

returns); ALA. CODE. § 22-1-11 (false statement in applications for Medicaid). 

Strange could also prosecute any person who performed a marriage ceremony for a 

same-sex couple. See ALA. CODE § 30-1-11 (penalizing solemnization of marriage 

without a license). 

Federal courts in other states have found standing existed to sue the state 

Attorney General in suits asserting constitutional claims against state laws that 

prohibited same-sex marriage. See e.g. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F.Supp.3d 1144 (S.D. 

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Ind.) aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 316(2014); Citizens 

for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). For instance, the 

Baskin court found that because the plaintiffs had broadly challenged Indiana’s law 

that prohibited same-sex marriage and the Attorney General had broad powers to 

enforce criminal statutes that could result in criminal penalties, that the Attorney 

General had a sufficient connection and role in enforcing such statutes for the 

plaintiff couples to have standing against him. Baskin, 12 F.Supp.3d at 1152-53. As 

in the Baskin case, the Plaintiffs in this case have broadly challenged Alabama’s 

laws that prohibit same-sex marriage and the Attorney General has broad powers 

to enforce statutes that provide criminal penalties relating to same-sex marriages. 

In light of all of the above, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their 

burden of showing that they have standing against Attorney General Strange. 

Accordingly, the motion of Defendant Luther Strange to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b) (Doc. 101), is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 2015.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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