NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANESHEA MONTANOCORDOBA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; ANN 

SHIRAISHI, Detective, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

T. JACKSON, Deputy; RICHMOND 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

Defendants.

No. 21-15711 

D.C. No. 4:18-cv-05682-PJH 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2022

San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SILVER,** District 

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, United States District Judge for the 

District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 31 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Daneshea Montanocordoba appeals from the district court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Ann Shiraishi, a detective with 

the Richmond Police department, and Contra Costa County. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we 

affirm. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007).

Shiraishi arrested Montanocordoba for assault with a deadly weapon. 

Shiraishi recorded the arrest time as 5:01 p.m. but Montanocordoba contends she 

was arrested prior to 5:00 p.m. Because Montanocordoba was going to be held in 

jail, she attempted to make arrangements with a friend to take custody of her son. 

Shiraishi allegedly dissuaded that friend from taking custody. Shiraishi then, 

allegedly without informing Montanocordoba, contacted Child and Family Services 

who placed Montanocordoba’s son with a relative. Finally, Shiraishi allegedly failed 

to tell the Child and Family Services representative that Montanocordoba had 

attempted to have a friend take custody of her son. 

Based on the allegedly erroneous arrest time recorded by Shiraishi, 

Montanocordoba claims she was held in jail one day longer than she otherwise 

would have been held. While still detained, Montanocordoba attended a juvenile 

dependency hearing where the court awarded temporary custody of her son to 

Montanocordoba’s relative. 

Montanocordoba claims Shiraishi’s actions violated Montanocordoba’s
3 

constitutional right to familial association with her son. See Wallis v. Spencer, 202 

F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). Montanocordoba also claims Contra Costa County 

has policies that violated her right to familial association.

“The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process has a substantive 

component that includes a parent’s right to make decisions regarding the care, 

custody and control of their children.” California Parents for the Equalization of 

Educ. Materials v. Torlakson, 973 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “[C]onduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving parents 

of that [right] is cognizable as a violation of due process.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 

F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Montanocordoba, she has 

not established a genuine issue of material fact that the alleged actions by Shiraishi 

constituted sufficient interference with her parent-child relationship to shock the 

conscience. It is undisputed that Montanocordoba could not retain custody of her 

son while she was detained. Shiraishi’s communications with Montanocordoba’s 

friend and her subsequent communications with Child and Family Services did not 

shock the conscience. Nor did it shock the conscience for Shiraishi not to inform 

Montanocordoba that Child and Family Services had been contacted. Finally, it did 

not shock the conscience for Shiraishi to record an inaccurate arrest time. 

Even if Shiraishi’s actions violated Montanocordoba’s right to familial 
4 

association, Montanocordoba has not carried her burden of establishing that right 

was “clearly established” considering the factual circumstances here. See Gordon 

v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). That is, 

Montanocordoba has not identified the “existing precedent” that placed “the 

lawfulness of the particular [actions] beyond debate.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Therefore, the claims against Shiraishi were barred by qualified immunity. The 

district properly granted summary judgment in Shiraishi’s favor. 

Summary judgment was also proper on Montanocordoba’s municipal liability 

theories against Contra Costa County. Montanocordoba alleged the County had a 

policy of detaining arrestees for the maximum period allowed by state law and the 

County lacked a policy requiring the District Attorney’s Office charging declination 

decisions be communicated immediately to jail officials to facilitate detainees’ 

release. But municipal liability claims “may not be predicated on isolated or 

sporadic incidents; [they] must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 

frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 

carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, 

Montanocordoba did not proffer evidence sufficient to establish a triable factual 

issue as to whether the County has a policy or practice of detaining arrestees for the 

maximum period. Nor did Montanocordoba proffer evidence of other instances 

where charging declination decisions were not immediately conveyed to jail 
5 

officials. Montanocordoba’s own experiences are not sufficient to establish 

municipal liability in this case. See Gordon, 6 F.4th at 974 (“Generally, a single 

incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under 

Monell.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.