1

 The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa, presiding by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-3480

No. 10-1507

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Daniel J. Kaufmann, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc., *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: February 15, 2011

Filed: April 14, 2011

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Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Kaufmann appeals the district court’s1

 grant of summary judgment to

Siemens Medical Solutions (“Siemens”) on his claim for unpaid wages for fiscal year

2003 under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (“IWPCL”) and the district

court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to Siemens on his claim for liquidated
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damages based on unpaid wages for fiscal year 2004 under the IWPCL, Iowa Code

§ 91A. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Kaufmann has worked in various sales-related capacities for Siemens since

2000. During fiscal year 2004 (October 1, 2003, to September 30, 2004), Kaufmann

worked as the national sales director for Siemens’s Specialty Markets and Alternate

Channels division. In this position, Kaufmann supervised a sales force from

Millennium Solutions (“Millennium”), a company with which Siemens contracted to

be its exclusive dealer of Siemens ultrasound equipment in the United States. In this

capacity, Kaufmann was tasked with supervising and training the Millennium sales

force. Kaufmann played no role in supervising or training any member of Siemens’s

direct sales force. Although Siemens mandated its direct sales force to “defer and

refer” sales leads to the Millennium sales force, they were not cooperative and

continued to sell Siemens ultrasound equipment in Millennium’s territory. 

Kaufmann’s compensation for fiscal year 2004 was governed by Siemens’s

Sales Compensation Plan Component Summary and the 2004 Sales Variable Pay Plan

(collectively, “Pay Plan”). The Pay Plan entitled Kaufmann to variable pay based on

four metrics, including commissions based on sales. Pursuant to the Pay Plan,

commissions were to be paid monthly. Commissions were only “credited or payable

to the participant . . . assigned to the territory within which the sale occurred.”

Likewise, “[i]t is necessary, to be entitled to commission, that the participant be

personally and directly responsible, and have been assigned such responsibility, for

such sales.” Because Kaufmann was not directly responsible for sales made by

Siemens’s direct sales force—and consequently would not be entitled to commissions

for those sales—Kaufmann viewed the direct sales force’s practice of selling Siemens

ultrasound equipment in Millennium’s territory as “poaching” sales from the
2

 Kaufmann does not appeal this decision.

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Millennium sales force which, in turn, reduced the amount of Kaufmann’s

commission. 

Kaufmann testified that he asked Sam Patton, a vice president at Siemens, for

additional compensation based on the sales by Siemens’s direct sales force in

Millennium’s territory. Kaufmann testified, and produced evidence in the form of an

e-mail from Patton, that Patton agreed to compensate him for these sales. Ultimately,

however, Siemens reversed Patton’s decision and did not compensate Kaufmann for

the sales made by the direct sales force in Millennium’s territory. Nonetheless,

Siemens did give Kaufmann credit for attaining his sales targets for fiscal year 2004,

which he had not met, based on sales by the Millennium sales force. However,

Kaufmann still failed to qualify for various sales incentives awarded by Siemens

during fiscal year 2004.

Kaufmann filed his complaint against Siemens on September 7, 2006, in Iowa

state court, seeking recovery of unpaid wages for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005.

Siemens removed the action to federal district court and, soon after, moved for

summary judgment on all of Kaufmann’s claims. The district court granted Siemens’s

motion as to Kaufmann’s wage claim for fiscal year 2003 because the claim was

barred by Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for wage claims. The district court

also granted Siemens’s motion as to Kaufmann’s claim for unpaid sales incentives for

fiscal year 2004.2

 

A jury trial was held on the remaining wage claims for fiscal years 2004 and

2005. At the close of the evidence, Siemens moved for judgment as a matter of law

on both claims. The district court denied this motion. The jury returned a verdict for

Kaufmann on the fiscal year 2004 wage claim in the amount of $125,819 and a verdict
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for Siemens on the fiscal year 2005 wage claim. The jury also found that Siemens

intentionally withheld Kaufmann’s wages for fiscal year 2004, potentially subjecting

Siemens to liability for liquidated damages under the IWPCL. 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), Siemens renewed its motion for judgment as

a matter of law on the fiscal year 2004 claim. The district court denied the motion as

to the wage claim but granted the motion as to the liquidated damages claim.

Kaufmann appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to his

wage claim for fiscal year 2003 and the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter

of law on his liquidated damages claim based on his wage claim for fiscal year 2004.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Fiscal Year 2003

Kaufmann first challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Siemens on his claim for unpaid wages for fiscal year 2003. We review the district

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Taylor v. St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Election

Comm’rs, 625 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Summary judgment is

appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Id. Our subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based

upon diversity of citizenship, and the parties agree that Iowa law governs our analysis.

See Friedman & Friedman, Ltd. v. Tim McCandless, Inc., 606 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir.

2010).

A two-year limitations period applies to wage-claim actions under the IWPCL.

See Iowa Code § 614.1(8). “The two-year statute of limitations for wages commences

as each payment comes due.” Gabelmann v. NFO, Inc., 571 N.W.2d 476, 482 (Iowa
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1997). “Thus, an employee may recover only so many payments as are within two

years of when the petition is filed.” Id.

Siemens’s 2003 fiscal year ended on September 30, 2003. According to the Pay

Plan, Commission payments were due to be paid by the last day of the following

quarter, December 31, 2003. Therefore, the limitations period for wage claims from

Siemens’s fiscal year 2003 ended on December 31, 2005. Kaufmann filed his

complaint on September 7, 2006. The district court held that Kaufmann’s claim fell

outside of the two-year limitations period: “Kaufmann says he was promised

compensation for the [fiscal year 2003] sales as early as February 2003, he did not

receive the compensation, he knew at December 31, 2003 that he had not received the

compensation, and his commission payments were due by that date.” 

Kaufmann argues, however, that we should apply principles of equitable

estoppel to toll the limitations period because Siemens allegedly has a practice of

revising payments to its employees beyond the date when payment is due. According

to Kaufmann, an “inference [can] be drawn from this knowledge . . . that no wage paid

by Siemens is ever final” and, therefore, equitable estoppel should apply to toll the

limitations period indefinitely.

Under Iowa law, “a party who has fraudulently prevented the other party from

seeking redress within the limitations period cannot benefit from the statute of

limitations.” Boehme v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa 2009). “A

party asserting equitable estoppel must demonstrate the following by clear and

convincing evidence: ‘(1) The defendant has made a false representation or has

concealed material facts; (2) the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the true facts; (3) the

defendant intended the plaintiff to act upon such representations; and (4) the plaintiff

did in fact rely on such representations to his prejudice.’” Id. at 146-47 (quoting Hook

v. Lippolt, 755 N.W.2d 514, 525 (Iowa 2008)). 
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We find that Kaufmann’s equitable estoppel argument fails on the first

requirement of the test detailed in Boehme. “To establish false representation or

concealment, there must be evidence the party acted ‘with the intent to mislead the

injured party.’” Id. at 147 (quoting Hook, 755 N.W.2d at 525). Even if we were to

credit Kaufmann’s assertion that Siemens revised payments to employees after the

payment deadline, Kaufmann produced no evidence that such a practice was done

“with the intent to mislead” him. Accordingly, because Kaufmann has failed to meet

the first prerequisite to applying equitable estoppel, we need not proceed further, and

we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Siemens on Kaufmann’s

wage claims for fiscal year 2003. 

B. Fiscal Year 2004

Kaufmann next appeals the district court’s grant of Siemens’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on his claim for liquidated damages

under the IWPCL based on unpaid wages for fiscal year 2004 that the jury determined

Siemens intentionally withheld. We review the district court’s grant of judgment as

a matter of law de novo. Fuller v. Fiber Glass Sys., LP, 618 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir.

2010). “Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when no reasonable jury

could have found for the nonmoving party.” Mattis v. Carlon Elec. Prods., 295 F.3d

856, 860 (8th Cir. 2002). In deciding whether to affirm the grant of judgment as a

matter of law, “we consider all evidence in the record without weighing credibility,

and resolve conflicts and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving

party.” Schooley v. Orkin Extermination Co., Inc., 502 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2007).

The IWPCL is “remedial” in nature and “is meant to facilitate the public policy

of allowing employees to collect wages owed to them by their employers.” Hornby

v. State, 559 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1997). The term “wages” in section 91A.2(7)(a)

includes commissions and bonuses for labor or services rendered by an employee.

Accordingly, an employee may bring an IWPCL wage claim for unpaid commissions
3 Liquidated damages are calculated using the following formula: “the sum of

five percent multiplied by the amount of any wages that were not paid or of any

authorized expenses that were not reimbursed on a regular payday or on another day

pursuant to section 91A.3 multiplied by the total number of days, excluding Sundays,

legal holidays, and the first seven days after the regular payday on which wages were

not paid or expenses were not reimbursed. However, such sum shall not exceed the

amount of the unpaid wages.” Iowa Code § 91A.2(6). 

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and unpaid bonuses. Dallenbach v. MAPCO Gas Prods., Inc., 459 N.W.2d 483, 488

(Iowa 1990). 

Furthermore, pursuant to the IWPCL, “[w]hen it has been shown that an

employer has intentionally failed to pay an employee wages . . . pursuant to section

91A.3, . . . the employer shall be liable to the employee for any wages . . . that are so

intentionally failed to be paid or reimbursed, plus liquidated damages, court costs and

any attorney’s fees incurred in recovering the unpaid wages and determined to have

been usual and necessary.” See § 91A.8 (emphasis added). “In other instances the

employer shall be liable only for unpaid wages[,] . . . court costs and usual and

necessary attorney’s fees incurred in recovering the unpaid wages.” Id. (emphasis

added). Thus, under the IWPCL, liquidated damages are available only for an

employer’s intentional failure to pay wages “pursuant to section 91A.3.”3

 

Section 91A.3 provides that “[a]n employer shall pay all wages due its

employees . . . at least in monthly, semimonthly, or biweekly installments on regular

paydays.” According to the Supreme Court of Iowa, “[t]he periodic payment

requirement of section 91A.3(1) does not modify the section 91A.2([7]) definition of

‘wages.’” Dallenbach, 459 N.W.2d at 488. “In turn, just because a given bonus is

wages under section 91A.2([7]) does not mean that it must be paid at least monthly;

only wages due need be paid at least monthly.” Id. Therefore, “[t]he question of

whether [a] bonus is wages under section 91A.2([7]) is separate from the question of

whether section 91A.3(1) was violated.” Id. 
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In Dallenbach, the court concluded that Dallenbach’s claim for an intentionally

withheld annual bonus met the definition of “wages” in section 91A.2(7). However,

because “it would make little sense to say that an annual bonus is ‘wages due’ and

must be paid in at least monthly installments,” id. at 489, the court held that

Dallenbach’s employer did not “intentionally fail[] to pay an employee

wages . . . pursuant to section 91A.3,” see § 91A.8. As such, Dallenbach’s claim fell

within the “other instances” provision of section 91A.8 and, therefore, he could not

recover liquidated damages as a matter of law. Dallenbach, 459 N.W.2d at 489.

The court’s decision in Dallenbach—that an employee is not entitled to

liquidated damages for an employer’s intentional failure to pay a bonus—was

reaffirmed in Runyon v. Kubota Tractor Corp. 653 N.W.2d 582, 588 (Iowa 2002).

In Runyon, the court reiterated that “the [Iowa] legislature intended to reserve the

liquidated damages provision of section 91A.8 for situations involving the intentional

withholding of regular paychecks and commissions, rather than for disputes over the

calculation of discretionary bonuses.” Id. The court went on to reassert that “section

91A.8 limits the recovery of liquidated damages to unpaid wages as defined by section

91A.3, that is, ‘wages due . . . in monthly, semimonthly, or biweekly installments on

regular paydays.’ A bonus . . . does not commonly fit that definition.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). Federal district courts applying Iowa law have extended this

reasoning to foreclose the availability of liquidated damages based on wage claims for

unpaid severance pay and unused vacation time. See Hinshaw v. Ligon Indus., L.L.C.,

551 F. Supp. 2d 798, 818 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (liquidated damages unavailable in a

claim for unpaid severance pay); Canterbury v. Federal-Mogul Ignition Co., 418 F.

Supp. 2d 1112, 1119 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (liquidated damages unavailable in a claim for

unused vacation time). 

Before the district court, Siemens argued that Kaufmann’s fiscal year 2004

wage claim was for compensation more akin to a bonus than regular, monthly

commissions under the IWPCL. This was true, Siemens argued, because Kaufmann

was not actually entitled to commissions based on sales by the direct sales force
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within Millennium’s territory under the Pay Plan. The district court agreed, holding

that Patton’s agreement with Kaufmann to compensate him for “poached” sales by the

direct sales force “was a discretionary accommodation to Mr. Kaufmann,” and, thus,

his wage claim was more akin to a claim for an unpaid bonus, rather than regular

commissions. 

Kaufmann challenges the district court’s conclusion by first arguing that the

question of whether he is entitled to liquidated damages is a question of fact that the

jury decided in his favor when it answered affirmatively the question of whether

“Kaufmann proved Siemens intentionally failed to pay commissions.” We find

Kaufmann’s argument unavailing. While the question of intent is a question of fact

properly left to the jury, the question of whether Kaufmann’s claim satisfies the

statutory requirements for liquidated damages involves interpreting the IWPCL and

the Pay Plan. A question of statutory interpretation is always a question of law, State

v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 2001), superseded by statute on other grounds,

2002 Iowa Acts, ch. 1094, § 1, as are questions of contract interpretation, Van Sloun

v. Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Iowa 2010). Therefore, while the jury

resolved the factual dispute over whether Siemens intentionally withheld Kaufmann’s

compensation, the jury did not answer—nor should it have answered—the legal

question of whether Kaufmann’s wage claim satisfied section 91A.3 and

section 91A.8 of the IWPCL. See Runyon, 653 N.W.2d at 587-88 (holding that the

state district court did not err “when it refused to . . . submit a jury instruction[] on the

question of [Runyon’s] entitlement to liquidated damages” because Runyon’s claim

involved “the intentional withholding of regular paychecks and commissions, rather

than [a] dispute[] over the calculation of discretionary bonuses payable at year-end”).

Kaufmann next contests the district court’s ultimate determination that he is not

entitled to liquidated damages. To show that Siemens intentionally failed to pay him

“wages . . . pursuant to section 91A.3,” Kaufmann must demonstrate that he was owed

commissions for sales of ultrasound equipment by Siemens’s direct sales force under
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the Pay Plan and that those commissions were to be paid in at-least-monthly intervals

on regular paydays. 

We have found nothing in the Pay Plan that mandates Siemens to pay

Kaufmann commissions for, as he argues, “sales within the [Millennium] territory,

regardless of who made the sale.” To the contrary, the Pay Plan includes the

following caveat: “Commission is credited or payable to the participant who is

assigned to the territory within which the sale occurred. It is necessary, to be entitled

to commission, that the participant be personally and directly responsible, and have

been assigned such responsibility, for such sales” (emphasis added). Kaufmann was

neither “personally and directly responsible” nor had he been “assigned such

responsibility” for sales by Siemens’s direct sales force during fiscal year 2004. In

fact, Kaufmann’s counsel candidly admitted at oral argument that Kaufmann had no

responsibility for Siemens’s direct sales force. At its core, Kaufmann’s wage claim

is based on an accommodation made by Patton, on behalf of Siemens, to compensate

him for sales “poached” from the Millennium sales force by Siemens’s direct sales

force, and not on any provision of the Pay Plan entitling Kaufmann to commissions.

This payment—intended to accommodate Kaufmann and resolve the compensation

dispute between Kaufmann and Siemens—is more akin to the bonuses discussed in

Runyon and Dallenbach than to regular, monthly commissions. It would “make little

sense to say that” this accommodation “is ‘wages due’ and must [have] be[en] paid

in at least monthly installments.” See Dallenbach, 459 N.W.2d at 489.

Because Kaufmann’s Pay Plan does not entitle him to compensation for sales

made by Siemens’s direct sales force, we agree with the district court that Kaufmann’s

claim is for compensation more akin to a discretionary bonus than regular

commissions to be paid at least monthly. Therefore, because Siemens did not

intentionally fail to pay Kaufmann wages “pursuant to section 91A.3” when it reneged

on Patton’s promise to resolve Kaufmann’s compensation dispute, we find that the

district court did not err in granting Siemens’s renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law on Kaufmann’s claims for liquidated damages under the IWPCL.
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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