UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LARRY DRAKE HANSEN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 18-4104 

(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00722-JNP) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Larry Drake Hansen, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his civil rights action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and its order denying 

his post-judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and (b). Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 4, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Background 

In 2012, Hansen was assaulted during a late-night walk down Main Street in 

Salt Lake City, Utah. He suffered numerous injuries, including bruises, abrasions, a 

broken nose, and damage to his hamstring ligament. Although other people in the 

area witnessed the attack, Hansen did not see his assailant and was unable to identify 

him later in a police line-up. But he believes the police photographed the suspects, 

and a bystander told him the assailant was wearing a black jacket and a white t-shirt 

with red stains (possibly blood). No arrests were made, and no criminal charges were 

filed relating to the assault on Hansen. 

In 2015, Hansen filed a civil rights action against the Salt Lake City Police 

Department (“the Police Department”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though the Salt Lake 

City Corporation was later substituted as the proper defendant. The operative 

(second amended) complaint asserts state law claims for gross negligence, due 

process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal and state 

constitutions, and a violation of Hansen’s constitutional right to access the courts. 

Relevant to this appeal, Hansen alleges that the police failed to adequately, 

diligently, thoroughly, and timely investigate the assault, such that he was precluded 

from filing a civil action against his unidentified assailant. He seeks over $5.7 

million in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages. 

The Police Department filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The 

magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the 

motion to dismiss be granted and that the entire action be dismissed with prejudice. 
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Hansen conceded several claims within his objections, leaving only his federal 

access-to-the-courts claim and his state constitutional claims. The district court 

limited its analysis accordingly. It adopted the Report and Recommendation in part, 

dismissing the federal claim with prejudice; however, it declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims and dismissed them 

without prejudice. Hansen filed a Rule 60 motion for reconsideration, which was 

denied. Hansen timely appealed both the dismissal order and the order denying his 

Rule 60 motion. 

Analysis 

I. Motion to Dismiss 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must 

allege specific facts that would support the conclusion that he is entitled to relief. Khalik 

v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere labels and 

conclusions . . . will not suffice.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is subject to de novo review. SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 

633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014). 

Because Hansen is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, “we construe 

his pleadings liberally.” Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 

2003). We make some allowances for deficiencies, such as unfamiliarity with 

pleading requirements, failure to cite appropriate legal authority, and confusion of 
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legal theories. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 

(10th Cir. 2005). But “the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the 

litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id. Nor will 

we “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or 

construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 

1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). 

We turn first to the access-to-the-courts claim. Hansen asserts that he could 

not file a state-court civil action against his assailant before the statute of limitations 

expired because the Police Department did not process crime-scene evidence or 

identify his assailant. This type of claim is known as a “backward-looking” access 

claim. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 405, 412-15 (2002) (in which the 

plaintiff alleged government deception prevented her from bringing a lawsuit that 

might have saved the life of her husband, who was a foreign dissident). The district 

court traced the history of such a claim back to Harbury. R. at 136. It then explained 

how the circuit courts recognizing such a claim have done so only where obstructive 

actions by state actors (such as destruction or concealment of evidence) prevented an 

individual from pursuing a civil claim. R. at 137-38. It found Hansen’s claim to be 

“qualitatively different” in that he alleged “the city did not try hard enough to assist 

his civil litigation efforts against an unknown third party.” R. at 138. Ultimately, the 

district court held that his claim fails as a matter of law “[b]ecause the Constitution 

does not impose a duty on government entities to actively assist the civil litigation 

efforts of crime victims.” R. at 139. 
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We affirm the dismissal of the access-to-the-courts claim for the reasons set 

forth in the district court’s well-reasoned order. We agree Hansen’s theory has no 

basis in Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case law. Hansen’s claim rests on a 

purportedly “reckless investigation,” see R. at 11, which is not the type of wrongful 

or intentional police behavior that a backward-looking access claim seeks to redress. 

Moreover, in attacking the Police Department’s due diligence, Hansen effectively 

asks the judiciary to micromanage how the Police Department performs 

investigations and allocates its resources. We decline to enter such a morass, and 

indeed it would be inappropriate for us to do so. See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 

544 U.S. 93, 110 (2005) (“[A] court should not ordinarily question the allocation of 

police officers or resources[.]”). 

We also agree with, and therefore affirm, the district court’s decision to 

dismiss the state constitutional claims without prejudice. It is well established that 

when all federal claims have been dismissed, as is the case here, “the court may, and 

usually should, decline to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over any remaining 

state claims.” VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch Cty., 853 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 

2017) (quoting Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 

(10th Cir. 1998)). 

II. Motion for Reconsideration 

Hansen moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order under Rule 

60(a), (b)(1), and (b)(6), alleging mistake and clear error. He reiterated his earlier 

arguments for his federal access-to-the-courts claim, albeit with a focus on the Police 
6 

Department’s failure to process material evidence, and posited that the district court’s 

ruling will force assault victims around the country to take matters into their own 

hands to “‘settle the score’ with their attacker(s)” and “to reap ‘justice.’” R. at 146. 

He also asked the district court to examine his state constitutional claims “following 

certification to, and determination by, . . . the Utah Supreme Court.” R. at 148. 

The district court denied the motion. It reasoned that relief was inappropriate 

under Rule 60(a) because Hansen did not identify “a clerical mistake or a mistake 

arising from oversight or omission,” as required, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), and 

because “Rule 60(a) may not be used to change something which has been 

deliberately done,” R. at 153-54 (quoting Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century Cas. Co., 

621 F.2d 1062, 1065 (10th Cir. 1980)). It also found relief was unwarranted under 

Rule 60(b)(1) due to Hansen’s failure to identify a mistake of law or fact by the 

district court or, alternatively, to provide persuasive reasons why the court should 

adopt his position. Finally, it concluded Hansen was not entitled to relief under Rule 

60(b)(6) because his argument was impermissibly duplicative of his Rule 60(b)(1) 

argument. See State Bank of S. Utah v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1080 

(10th Cir. 1996) (“A court may not premise Rule 60(b)(6) relief . . . on one of the 

specific grounds enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).”). 

We review the district court’s denial of Hansen’s Rule 60 motion for an abuse 

of discretion. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Cade, 510 F.3d 1277, 

1278 (10th Cir. 2007) (Rule 60(a) motion); Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 854 

(10th Cir. 2005) (Rule 60(b) motion). We will reverse the district court’s 
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determination “only if we find a complete absence of a reasonable basis and are 

certain that the decision is wrong.” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1232 

(10th Cir. 1999) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, too, we agree 

with the district court’s sound reasoning. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

Conclusion 

We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing this action under Rule 

12(b)(6) and its order denying Hansen’s motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(a) 

and (b).

Entered for the Court 

Allison H. Eid 

Circuit Judge