This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 JOSE CARBAJAL, 2 Worker-Appellant, 3

v. NO. A-1-CA-35263 4 PLAZA LATHING AND PLASTERING, 5 LLC and NEW MEXICO MUTUAL, 6 Employer/Insurer-Appellees. 7 APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 8 Reginald C. Woodard, Workers’ Compensation Judge 9 Garcia Law Office 10 Narciso Garcia, Jr. 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellant 13 Miller Stratvert P.A. 14 Timothy R. Briggs 15 Dan A. Akenhead 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellees 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 ATTREP, Judge. 202 {1} Worker Jose Carbajal injured his back in a work-related accident in 2009. 1 Worker, Employer Plaza Lathing and Plas tering, LLC, and Insurer New Mexico 2 Mutual Casualty Company entered into a settlement agreement in 2010 (the 3 Settlement Agreement) that, among other th ings, entitled Worker to certain medical 4 benefits. In 2015, after an independent medical examination (IME), the Workers’ 5 Compensation Judge (the WCJ) entered an order (the 2015 Order) denying Worker’s 6 claim for further medical benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), 7 NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2017), as not reasonable, 8 necessary, or causally related to Worker’s accident. Worker appeals the WCJ’s 2015 9 Order and argues that the WCJ erred on two grounds: (1) by permitting 10 Employer/Insurer to impermissibly modify the Settlement Agreement, and (2) by 11 finding that Worker’s ongoing medical care was not reasonable, necessary, or causally 12 related to his work accident. With resp ect to the first claim, we hold that 13 Employer/Insurer did not modify the Settlement Agreement. With respect to the 14 second claim, we hold that the WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We, therefore, affirm the WCJ’s 2015 Order. 16 BACKGROUND 17

{2} Worker injured his back on January 6, 2009, while working for Employer. The 18 parties settled Worker’s workers’ compensation claim against Employer/Insurer, and 19 on December 15, 2010, the WCJ entered anorder (the 2010 Order) approving the 203 Settlement Agreement, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-12(D) (2009). The 1 Settlement Agreement specified that Empl oyer/Insurer pay Worker a lump sum of 2 $32,500 in exchange for his waiv er of any and all past, present, and future disability 3 benefits. The Settlement Agreement and the 2010 Order provided that Worker was 4 entitled to future medical benefits that were reasonable, necessary, and causally 5 related to his work accident, and that th e issue of medical benefits remain open 6 pursuant to the Act. The Se ttlement Agreement further provided that “Worker has had 7 long standing physical problems unrelated to his alleged work related accident [and 8 that a]ccording to the physicians who have treated . . . Worker subsequent to his 9 alleged work related accident of January [6], 2009, Worker has been diagnosed as 10 having suffered an aggravation of his pre-existing problems.” 11

{3} In 2013, Employer/Insurer filed an application for an IME “[t]o address 12 [Worker’s] utilization of medical care.” The WCJ granted the application, and Worker 13 underwent an IME. The IME panel, Doctor s Juliana Garcia and Mark Crawford, 14 concluded that the January 6, 2009 accident “exacerbated” Worker’s “pre-existing 15 chronic low back pain,” which had since “returned to baseline.” The IME panel found 16 that Worker’s ongoing medical care was not reasonable, necessary, or causally related 17 to his 2009 work accident. Following the IME report, Employer/Insurer notified 18 Worker it was no longer responsible for his ongoing medical treatment. Worker then 19 filed a complaint seeking, in relevant part, continuing medical care. 204 {4} The WCJ held a hearing and considered the deposition testimony of the IME 1 doctors and Worker’s treati ng physician, as well as Worker’s testimony. After the 2 hearing, the WCJ determined that Worker was not entitled to further medical care for 3 his complaints of back and lower extremity pain. The WCJ specifically found that 4 Worker (1) had “a long history of degenerative changes and pain in his back” and 5 “pre-existing lower back pain” before his January 6, 2009 accident, and (2) did not 6 require any medical treatment that was “causally connected to or reasonably and 7 necessarily related to” the injuries sustai ned from the work accident. Accordingly, the 8 WCJ entered the 2015 Order dismissing Worker’s claim for medi cal benefits with 9 prejudice. Worker timely filed his notice of appeal from the 2015 Order. 10 DISCUSSION 11 I. Employer/Insurer Has Not Modified the Settlement Agreement 12

{5} Worker contends that the parties en tered into a binding agreement that he 13 suffered a permanent aggravation of a pre- existing back condition, and that he was 14 entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care for the aggravation. Worker argues 15 that Employer/Insurer impermissibly modified the Settlement Agreement by later 16 maintaining that Worker’s condition returned to baseline and by discontinuing 17 medical care. 18 A. Judicial Estoppel and Law of the Case Do Not Apply 195 {6} Worker invokes the doctrines of judicialestoppel and law-of-the-case to argue 1 that Employer/Insurer is precluded from changing the position it purportedly took in 2 the Settlement Agreement—i.e., that Worker suffered from a permanent aggravation 3 of a pre-existing back condition. Employer/Insurer argues that Worker failed to 4 preserve his judicial estoppel and law-of-the-case arguments. We agree. Worker did 5 not argue the applicability of these doctrines to the WCJ and raises them for the first 6 time on appeal. As such, these arguments are not preserved. See Rule 12-321(A) 7 NMRA; Wolfley v. Real Estate Comm’n , 1983-NMSC-064, ¶ 5, 100 N.M. 187, 668 8 P.2d 303 (“[I]ssues not raised in administrative proceedings will not be considered for 9 the first time on appeal.”); Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc. , 1987-NMCA-133, ¶ 20, 106 10 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 (“To preserve an issu e for review on appeal, it must appear 11 that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the [lower] court on the same grounds argued 12 in the appellate court.”). 13

{7} Regardless, the doctrines of judici al estoppel and law-of-the-case are 14 inapplicable here. Judicial estoppel does not apply where, as here , the parties entered 15 into a settlement agreement and no judgment wa s entered in favor of the party against 16 whom estoppel is asserted. See Sw. Steel Coil, Inc. v. Redwood Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. , 17 2006-NMCA-151, ¶ 19, 140 N.M. 720, 148 P.3d 806. Likewise , because there was a 18 settlement, the WCJ did not decide any pertinent issue of law that should be given 19 preclusive effect under the law-of-the-case doctrine. See Cordova v. Larsen , 2004- 206 NMCA-087, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 87, 94 P.3d 830 (“Under the law of the case doctrine, a 1 decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent 2 in successive stages of th e same litigation.” (internal quotation marks and citation 3 omitted)); cf. State ex rel. Martinez v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 1995-NMCA-041, ¶ 14, 4 120 N.M. 118, 898 P.2d 1256 (noting that “se ttlements and consent judgments are not 5 normally considered fertile ground for issue preclusion”). 6 B. Worker Preserved His Settlement Modification Argument 7
{8} Even though Worker did not preserve his judicial estoppel and law-of-the-case 8 arguments for review on appeal, he did preserve his broader argument that 9 Employer/Insurer impermissibly modified the Settlement Agreement. Worker invoked 10 a ruling by the WCJ on the same settlement modification issue he now asserts on 11 appeal. In particular, whether Employer/Insurer sought to modify the Settlement 12 Agreement was a disputed issue in the pretrial order. Worker also requested that the 13 WCJ enter a finding that “[t]he parties entered into a binding settlement agreement 14 establishing that [W]orker suffered an aggr avation of his pre-existing condition[, and 15 t]he parties further agreed that Worker was entitled to continuing reasonable and 16 necessary medical care [f]or this aggravation.” Worker “fairly invoked” a ruling by 17 the WCJ on the settlement agreement modi fication issue and, thus, successfully 18 preserved this issue for appeal. See Rule 12-321(A); Wolfley , 1983-NMSC-064, ¶ 5; 19 Woolwine , 1987-NMCA-133, ¶ 20. 207 C. The Settlement Agreement Was Not Modified 1

{9} Worker and Employer/Insurer agreed to a binding contract in the form of a 2 Section 52-5-12(D) lump-sum settlement agreement. Worker contends that the 3 Settlement Agreement included binding stipulations that he suffered a permanent 4 aggravation of a pre-existing chronic b ack condition and that he was entitled to 5 ongoing medical care for the aggravati on. As such, Worker argues that 6 Employer/Insurer impermissibly modified the Settlement Agreement by maintaining 7 that Worker’s condition returned to ba seline and by subsequently discontinuing 8 Worker’s medical benefits. Employer/Insu rer argues that it properly discontinued 9 medical benefits, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement and 2010 Order 10 approving it, after the IME panel determin ed Worker’s medical treatment was not 11 reasonable, necessary, or causally connected to his work accident. “We review a 12 [lower] court’s interpretation of an unambiguous contract de novo.” Smith & Marrs, 13 Inc. v. Osborn , 2008-NMCA-043, ¶ 10, 143 N.M . 684, 180 P.3d 1183 (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted); see Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Kehoe , 2012-NMSC15 020, ¶ 18, 282 P.3d 758 (recognizing that “a c ontract is deemed ambiguous only if it 16 is reasonably and fairly susceptible of di fferent constructions” (alteration, internal 17 quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 18

{10} Contrary to Worker’s contentions, th e Settlement Agreement did not make a 19 binding determination that his injuries werea “permanent aggravation” of his pre- 208 existing back condition. Instead, the Settlement Agreement only recited that, 1 according to physicians who treated him af ter the January 6, 2009 accident, “Worker 2 ha[d] been diagnosed as having suffered anaggravation of his pre-existing [back] 3 problems.” The WCJ correctly determined that“[t]he mere recitation as to Worker’s 4 perceived medical status on [the date of the settlement] does not prohibit the parties 5 from inquiring into [Worker’s] medical status at a later date.” The Settlement 6 Agreement and the 2010 Order additionally made plain that Worker was only entitled 7 to “reasonable and necessary medical care relating to [his] alleged [work] accident . . . 8 pursuant to the . . . Act.” The 2010 Order specifically subjected both parties to NMSA 9 1978, Section 52-1-51 (2005, amended 2013), which provides that contested medical 10 issues be resolved by way of an IME. As such, the WCJ was correct in interpreting the 11 Settlement Agreement as leav ing “medical benefits open for reasonable and necessary 12 medical care, causally related to Worker’s January 6, 2009 accident.” 13

{11} Given the plain terms of the Settlement Agreement and the 2010 Order, 14 Employer/Insurer was within its rights to contest Worker’s ongoing medical treatment, 15 request an IME, and refuseto pay medical benefits that were not reasonable, 16 necessary, or causally connected to th e work accident. Worker’s argument that 17 Employer/Insurer modified the Settlement Agreement is without merit. 18 II. Substantial Evidence Supports the WCJ’s Findings That Worker’s 19 Medical Care Was Not Reasonable, Nece ssary, or Causally Related to His 20 Work Accident 219 {12} Worker next argues that there is in sufficient evidence to support the WCJ’s 1 findings that Worker is not entitled to further medical care. Under the Act, Worker has 2 the burden to establish that the requested medical care is reasonable, necessary, and 3 causally connected tothe work accident. See §§ 52-1-28(B), -49(A); Davis v. Los 4 Alamos Nat’l Lab. , 1989-NMCA-023, ¶ 4, 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304 (“Claimant 5 has the burden of showing that the [medical] expenses were both reasonable and 6 necessary.”); Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc. , 1986-NMCA-020, ¶ 23, 104 N.M. 67, 7 716 P.2d 645 (holding that “the medical bene fits for which recovery is sought must 8 be incidental to and a conc omitant part of the injury sustained in a work-related 9 accident”). 10

{13} We review the WCJ’s 2015 Order “under a whole record standard of review.” 11 Moya v. City of Albuquerque , 2008-NMSC-004, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 258, 175 P.3d 926. 12 “Whole record review contemplates a canvass by the reviewing court of all the 13 evidence bearing on a finding or decision, favorable and unfavorable, in order to 14 determine if there is substantial evidence to support the result.” Leonard v. Payday 15 Prof’l , 2007-NMCA-128, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 605, 168 P.3d 177 (alteration, internal 16 quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole 17 is evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of an agency’s decision, and we neither 18 reweigh the evidence nor replace the factfinder’s conclusions with our own.” Dewitt 19 v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. , 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341 (citation 2010 omitted). “We view the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the decision[.]” Id. 1 “We will affirm the agency’s decision if, after taking the entire record into 2 consideration, there is evid ence for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support 3 the conclusion reached.” Leonard , 2007-NMCA-128, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks 4 and citation omitted). 5

{14} Worker argues that the WCJ’s decision “rests entirely on” the conclusions in 6 the IME report, which Worker contends were based largel y on a dating error 7 contained within his medical records. Worker’s argument is without merit. First, 8 Worker ignores evidence in the record that, when made aware of these dating 9 inconsistencies, both IME panel doctors testified that these errors did not change their 10 medical opinions that Worker’s medicalcare was not reasonable, necessary, or 11 causally related to his work accident. Second, Worker ignores the testimony of his 12 own physician, who agreed w ith the IME panel that Wo rker’s current need for 13 medical care was not causally connected to the work accident. The WCJ was bound 14 by this uncontroverted expert medical testimony. See § 52-1-28(B); Romero v. City 15 of Santa Fe , 2006-NMCA-055, ¶ 26, 139 N.M. 440, 134 P.3d 131 (“[T]he 16 uncontroverted medical evidence rule . . . di ctates that where expert medical testimony 17 regarding the causal connection between disability and accident in a workers’ 18 compensation case is uncontroverted, that testimony is binding on the trier of fact.” 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d)). Finally, expert testimony from the 2011 IME panel doctors supports the WCJ’s findings that Worker failed to meet his burden 1 of proof on the reasonableness and necessity of his medical care. In particular, the 2 IME panel doctors opined that Worker’s b ack condition had returned to baseline and, 3 as such, no medical treatment was reasonably and necessarily related to his work 4 accident. 5

{15} Upon a whole record review, we concl ude that substantial evidence supports 6 the WCJ’s determination that Worker is not entitled to further medical care. 7 CONCLUSION 8

{16} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the WCJ’s 2015 Order. 9

{17} IT IS SO ORDERED. 10

__________________________________ 11 JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge 12 WE CONCUR: 13

_________________________________ 14 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 15

_________________________________ 16 EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge 17