REVISED FEBRUARY 5, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-20616

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, Local 5; TOMASA

COMPEAN; AUSTRABERTA RODRIGUEZ

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CITY OF HOUSTON

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:

A labor union in Houston, Texas sought permits from the City for parades

and rallies in support of a strike. The City gave only partial approval. The union

sued, claiming the ordinances under which the permits were processed violated

the First Amendment. The district court granted some relief. We proceed

slightly further in invalidating the City’s rules than did the district court but

leave most of the City’s scheme intact. We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,

and REMAND.

I. FACTS

The Service Employees International Union, Local 5 (“SEIU”) is the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 28, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
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2

plaintiff. Among its members are 5,300 janitors in Houston. While in contract

negotiations in October through November 2006, SEIU staged a strike. The goals

of the strike were to be furthered by parades, marches, and rallies in downtown

Houston. The target audience for these highly visible protests was those who

worked in the Houston office buildings in which many SEIU janitors were

employed. Optimal visibility, therefore, would have been in the middle of the

workday. SEIU members planned to use megaphones and bullhorns to amplify

their message.

SEIU applied for permits to conduct the parades, marches, and rallies it

planned. The City denied several of its requests. SEIU’s suit challenged three

of the ordinances that restricted its plans. A preliminary injunction was entered

permitting SEIU to proceed with some of its planned activities. The labor dispute

has been resolved. The legal dispute continues. 

A summary of the relevant ordinances is where we begin.

A. The Ordinances

The three challenged City ordinances require permits for certain categories

of noise, authorizing parades, and controlling some uses of parks. During the

course of the litigation, there have been amendments to some of the ordinances.

Because SEIU seeks to have us invalidate many of the restrictions, the relevant

language is found in the latest version of the ordinances that has been included

in the record. A sketch of each current ordinance follows.

1. The Sound Ordinance

The Sound Ordinance bans noise “that annoys, disturbs, injures, or

endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace, or safety of others.” Sound

Ordinance, Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 30, § 30-2(a). There are several

enumerated exemptions. Among them is an exemption for church bells “when
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used as part of a religious observance or service during daytime hours,” but only

if limited to no more than five minutes per hour. Id. § 30-9(j). Also exempted are

sounds produced by activities on public parks and playgrounds, and on public or

private school grounds, “including, but not limited to, school athletic and school

entertainment events.” Id. § 30-9(k). 

Sound amplification, including by a bullhorn or a megaphone, is generally

prohibited. Id. § 30-4(a). Amplification of sound above a certain decibel level

requires a permit. Id. § 30-8. The Sound Ordinance limits permits for the same

location to two per thirty-day period. Id. § 30-8(a)(4).

2. The Parade Ordinance

The City regulates processions on its roadways. Parade Ordinance,

Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 45, art. IX. The regulation defines the

covered processions this way:

Parade means a procession of pedestrians, vehicles, or animals, or

any combination thereof, traveling in unison along or upon a street,

road, or highway, organized and conducted for the purposes of

attracting the attention of the general public and/or expressing or

celebrating views or ideas by use of verbal, visual, literary, or

auditory means of communication. 

Id. ch. 45, art. IX § 45-231.

That definition of “parade” closes with the statement that “a procession of

vehicles operated in compliance with ordinary traffic laws or a procession of

pedestrians along or upon public sidewalks or private property,” is not a parade

under the terms of the Ordinance. Id.

Parades are prohibited except on issuance of a permit by the City. Id. § 45-

232(a). A traffic and security control plan may be required of the permit-seeker

if it opts against using City-provided police services. Id. § 45-232(g). Weekday
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parades in downtown Houston may begin either at 10:00 a.m. or 2:00 p.m., must

last no more than an hour, and cannot extend for more than ten street

intersections. See id. § 45-233(b)(2).

3. The Parks Ordinance

Permits generally are not required to use City parks but are necessary in

order to hold “any public meeting or gathering” in certain designated locations.

Parks and Recreation Ordinance, Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 32, art.

III. § 32-61(a). Some of those locations are described generically – “building or

facility for which a rental fee is imposed,” or a “baseball field, . . . or other area

specifically designated and equipped for sporting or recreational events . . . .” Id.

§ 32-61(a)(1) & (2). Gatherings in certain specific locations, such as the Houston

Zoo or the Arboretum, also require permits. Id. § 32-61(a)(3) & (4). A catch-all

provision concludes the listing: “Any other improved and specially maintained

area so designated by a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant” to section 32-5

of the Ordinances. Id. § 32-61(a)(5). A map is to be maintained by the parks

director indicating the areas requiring permits for “public meetings or

gatherings.” Id. § 32-61(b). The City concedes that no such map exists.

The Parks Ordinance requires the permit to be issued if the objective

requirements for the permit are met, but denied if certain subjective failings

exist. Id. § 32-64(1)-(5). The latter failings include the “size and nature of the

meeting is inappropriate for the designated area requested” or the “proposed

function would be disruptive to or incompatible with, or cause an adverse effect

on the use of the designated area by others.” Id. § 32-64(4) & (5).

B. Claimed Deficiencies in Ordinances 

The following are the features of the ordinances that are still in issue and

are said to have unconstitutionally limited SEIU’s activities:
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(1) The Sound Ordinance’s limit of two permits for any single location in a

thirty-day period.

(2) The Parade Ordinance’s restrictions on downtown weekday parades to

two one-hour windows.

In addition to specific features of the ordinances that impacted SEIU, it is

also claimed that each ordinance is unconstitutional in its entirety for more

general reasons:

(3) The Sound Ordinance contains content-based exceptions that are not

narrowly tailored.

(4) The Parade Ordinance’s definition of a “parade” is contest-based, vague

and not narrowly tailored.

(5) The Parks Ordinance’s failure to define what constitutes a “public

meeting or gathering” and to designate the relevant areas in parks create vague

and inadequately tailored provisions.

The claims before the district court were more numerous. On some, relief

was granted and the City has not appealed. On others, no ruling on summary

judgment was made. SEIU voluntarily dismissed the latter in order to proceed

with an appeal. The only remaining challenges are what we have just described.

C. District Court Proceedings

On October 19, 2006, SEIU filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the

Southern District of Texas challenging the constitutionality of the three

ordinances. Two individuals and SEIU are the current plaintiffs, all of whom are

meant when we refer to SEIU, unless in context it is clear that we are referring

only to the Union. The only current defendant is the City. 

SEIU contended that all three ordinances were facially invalid in their

entirety. SEIU sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
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barring the City from enforcing portions of the Ordinances. A preliminary

injunction was granted on October 23, 2006, prohibiting enforcement against

SEIU of certain provisions of the Parade and the Sound Ordinances.

In August 2007,the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On

March 31, 2008, the motions were granted in part and denied in part. The court

invalidated (1) a Parks Ordinance provision requiring permit-seekers to obtain

additional security, concluding it to be impermissibly content-based and vague,

and (2) a Parade Ordinance provision requiring ten-days notice for obtaining a

parade permit which was held to be a prior restraint on speech. The district

court also found that an as-applied challenge to a provision of the Sound

Ordinance raised a genuine issue of material fact and denied summary judgment

as to that issue. The court granted summary judgment to the City on all other

claims and denied damages. 

SEIU dismissed all claims on which the district court did not rule. It then

appealed on the issues we earlier identified. There is no cross-appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Sossamon v.

Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009). We apply the same

standards in reviewing the evidence and applying the law as the district court.

Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). If the movant demonstrates that there

are no genuine issues of material fact, the burden shifts to the opponent of the

motion to establish that there are. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 326.

On appeal, SEIU arguments raise four issues of First Amendment
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jurisprudence: content-based regulations; narrowly tailored regulation of time,

place, and manner of expression; prior restraints; and vagueness. We begin by

reviewing First Amendment principles relevant to those issues.

A. First Amendment Principles

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .

abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. It applies to the states

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chiu v. Plano

Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 344 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing cases). The state

is “sharply circumscribed” in its right to restrain expression in “places which by

long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Among

such places identified by tradition or fiat are “streets and parks.” Id. Generally,

a park or a street will be considered a traditional “public forum” in which

“government entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech

. . . .” Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (citing

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).

The foundation on which we build our understanding is that a municipality

may regulate expressive conduct in a public forum to protect public health,

safety, or welfare. Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, Miss., 664 F.2d 502, 509-10 (5th

Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981). If a content-based regulation is to be allowed, the state

“must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest

and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). That standard is one of “strict

scrutiny.” Chiu, 260 F.3d at 344-45. A content-based regulation of speech will

not satisfy strict scrutiny if there is a less restrictive means that “would be at

least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose” that is being served. Reno
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v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).

A content-based regulation has been defined as one that creates

distinctions between “favored speech” and “disfavored speech.” Horton v. City of

Houston, Tex., 179 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1999). Such regulation also can be

identified when it creates a “substantial risk of eliminating certain ideas or

viewpoints” from the public forum. Id. A regulatory scheme that requires the

government to “examine the content of the message that is conveyed” is contentbased regardless of its motivating purpose. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,

481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Calif., 468

U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).

On the other hand, content-neutral regulations of“time, place, and manner

of expression” in a public forum are permitted when they are “narrowly tailored

to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative

channels of communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Using this test to judge the

constitutionality of a regulation is an application of “intermediate scrutiny.”

Horton, 179 F.3d at 192-93. In the context of intermediate scrutiny, narrow

tailoring does not require that the least restrictive means be used. Ward v. Rock

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). As long as the restriction promotes a

substantial governmental interestthat would be achieved less effectively without

the restriction, it is sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id. at 799.

Regulations that require speakers to obtain permits before speaking – prior

restraints – are disfavored and must be confined by “narrow, objective, and

definite standards.” Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147,

150-51 (1969). “The relevant question is whether the challenged regulation

authorizes suppression of speech in advance of its expression.” Ward, 491 U.S.

at 795 n.5 (emphasis in original). There is a “heavy presumption” of invalidity
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for prior restraints that grant the licensing authority broad discretion. Forsyth

County, Ga., v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).

Finally, regulations should not be vague. Because the First Amendment

needs “breathing space,” government regulation must be drawn with some

specificity. Howard Gault Co. v. Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 559

(5th Cir. 1988). Regulation of speech must be through laws whose prohibitions

are clear. Flexibility in a statute is permissible, but the statute must provide

“fair notice” so that its prohibitions may be avoided by those who wish to do so.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1972). Vagueness challenges

usually must show thatthe law has a capacity “to chill constitutionally protected

conduct, especially conduct protected by theFirst Amendment.” Roark & Hardee

LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 546 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.

Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988)).

Vagueness can be ameliorated by a state court’s authoritative

interpretations, if they provide sufficient clarity. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

U.S. 601, 613 (1973). We also have searched in some situations for binding limits

placed on an ordinance by a municipality’s governing body. Beckerman, 664 F.2d

at 509. There is, though, no authority lying in a federal court to conduct a

narrowing of a vague state regulation. Id. We take the state and local

regulations as we have been given them.

Itis againstthis constitutional backdrop that we consider SEIU’s challenge

to the three Houston ordinances. 

B. Constitutionality of the Three Houston Ordinances 

We will first discuss the relevant sections of the Sound Ordinance, then

those of the Parade Ordinance, and finally, those of the Parks and Recreation

Ordinance. There will be some references to prior discussions as we proceed.
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1. Sound Ordinance 

SEIU has two kinds of complaints about the Sound Ordinance. The broad

challenge is that content-based exceptions to the permitting requirements cause

the Ordinance notto be a narrowly tailored regulation oftime, place, and manner

of expression. The narrower challenge concerns a limit on the number of sound

amplification permits granted per month. 

We start with claims that some exceptions are content-based. The Houston

Sound Ordinance, section 30-9, lists sixteen sounds that do not require permits,

classifying them as “defenses” to charges of violations of the Ordinance. These

sixteen defenses include sounds generated by church bells, school-related

activities, construction, and events at public parks. 

SEIU does not argue that these defenses interfered with its planned

activities. That is important because a lawsuit is not a general license for a

federal court to examine all provisions of a municipal ordinance and decide if any

are flawed. First Amendment challenges do not eliminate the need for a party

to demonstrate it has constitutional standing. SEIU must show that “(1) it has

suffered, or imminently will suffer, a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) a favorable

judgment is likely to redress the injury.” Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. City of

League City, Tex., 488 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

These elements of injury, causation, and redressability are an “irreducible

constitutional minimum,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, no more subject to being

waived in First Amendment cases than in any other. Reflective of this, the

Supreme Court carefully examined claims against municipal ordinances to

determine, provision by provision, if there were a claimant with standing to
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challenge it. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 233 (1990). 

Beyond this minimum, certain court-created requirements for standing

exist, ones arising from judicial prudence and not from the constitution. Ward v.

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 F.3d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 2004). The one potentially

relevant here is usually called “third party standing,” or more descriptively, that

litigants must assert their own legal rights and not those of others. Id. (citing

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).

The prudential consideration of third-party standing is not applied when

a plaintiff demonstrates that a provision that validly restricts its own speech is

overbroad. Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57

(1984); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONST. LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICES § 2.5, at 87

(3d ed. 2006). An overbroad statute validly regulates some expressive conduct

but also reaches substantial protected speech. City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482

U.S. 451, 456-57 (1987). If there is “a case or controversy, a litigant whose own

activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that

it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before

the court.” Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634

(1980). The refusal to apply the usual bar to asserting the rights of third-parties

is because “protected speech . . . may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the

statute.” Id.

We agree with the clarity brought to the issue by one of our sister circuits

that the plaintiff must establish injury under a particular provision of a

regulation that is validly applied to its conduct, then assert “a facial challenge,

under the overbreadth doctrine, to vindicate the rights of others not before the

court under that provision.” CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451

F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Thus, if SEIU is limited by
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one provision of an ordinance and makes a facial challenge due to the

overbreadth of a different provision,there is no constitutional standing, i.e.,there

is no “case or controversy,” as to the separate provision.

We now apply these principles. As to the Sound Ordinance, SEIU claims

that provisions regarding historical re-enactments, construction noises, noises

from parks and school grounds, and church bells, are content-based. No

overbreadth challenge is made on appeal, which means SEIU has no standing to

seek to vindicate the rights and interests of others as to them.

It is argued, though, that these defenses so undermine the reasonableness

of the entire Ordinance as to prevent it from being a narrowly tailored regulation

of time, place, and manner of expression. We examine the questioned defenses

to determine how fundamentally whatever defects they may have would affect

the reasonableness of the entire Sound Ordinance

We note that the district court held the Sound Ordinance to be contentneutral. Content-neutral restrictions are those that are “‘justified without

reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,

320 (1988) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,

Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). Houston justifies its Sound Ordinance generally

by noting that noise regulation is a legitimate state interest, and the City’s

prohibitions on certain sounds serve that interest. 

Among the questioned exceptions is for “activities conducted on public

parks, public playgrounds, and public or private school grounds. . . . “ The City

has not excepted noise that arises only from specific kinds of activity at those

sites or excepted educational groups to make noise anywhere in the City on the

basis of their status. Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 30, § 30-9(k).

Construction noises are excepted from permit requirements, but,
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presumably, building permits have been issued. See id. § 30-9(e). Other

exceptions are for events occurring in facilities permanently erected for purposes

of large-scale public events. See id. § 30-9(d)(1) & (3). Another exception is

explained by the fact that the City likely lacks authority to regulate noise made

by railroad operations or aircraft in flight. Id. § 30-9(f). 

Most of the sounds that appear as “defenses” are the unavoidable

consequences of daily life in a modern urban environment or emanate from other

permitted or protectable speech events. The City does not have to regulate what

is basically unregulatable, the municipal equivalent of a household trying to say

it is unacceptable for a baby to cry. The argument that Houston must require

permits for noises such as those generated at a playground, a sports stadium, and

a construction site in order to make its Sound Ordinance proper is premised on

a non-existent world. Allowing them does not bar Houston from requiring

permits for other sounds. Within that context, most of the excepted sounds are

a “traditional and generally unobtrusive aspect” of the urban environment.

Stokes v. City of Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir. 1991).

If any of the exceptions identified by SEIU raises a question of being

content-based, it is only the following two. One allows, without a permit, the

ringing of “church bells or church chimes when used as part of a religious

observance or service during daytime hours,” for a maximum of five minutes per

hour. Houston, Tex., Code ch. 30, § 30-9(j). The other provision is for noise

produced by “patrons and participants using cannons and gunfire during

historical battle re-enactments for which a pyrotechnic permit was obtained and

the explosives were inspected by the fire marshal.” Id. § 30-9(d)(4). Because the

Ordinance excepts only cannon and gunfire sounds that are part of a “historical

battle re-enactment,” the content – the message – of the explosive conduct is said
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to be relevant.

We know that protecting the public from excessive noise is a significant

government interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796. The question is whether the Sound

Ordinance is narrowly tailored in satisfying that interest. There has not been

narrow tailoring if the ordinance “‘sweeps far more broadly than is necessary to

further the city’s legitimate concern’” of noise control. Knowles v. City of Waco,

Tex., 462 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 801). 

What constitutes a reasonable, narrowly tailored regulation depends on a

variety of factors, including the character of the place in which the regulation is

enforced. Noise restrictions applicable to busy downtown centers will be viewed

differently than those applicable to quiet residential neighborhoods. Grayned, 408

U.S. at 116. Greater or lesser efforts to minimize noise and traffic depending on

the time of day and location in order to protect the “well-being, tranquility, and

privacy of the home” have been held to be significant government interests.

Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 (citation omitted).

In one of our precedents, we held that exceptions could invalidate

ordinances by undermining the ostensible purpose of the measure, making them

“unconstitutionaltime, place, and manner regulations.” Knowles, 462F.3d at 433

& 436. We considered a parade ordinance adopted by the City of Waco that

exempted, with only minor variation, groups of students engaged in “educational

or recreational” activities, “and all government agencies acting within the scope

of their official functions.” Id. at 436-37. Traffic control was the significant

government interest said to motivate the ordinance, but we concluded that the

breadth ofthe exceptions belied the argumentthatthe ordinances were narrowly

tailored for purposes of traffic flow and safety. Id.; see also Beckerman, 664 F.2d

at 513 (striking down similar regulation as unconstitutional). The City of Waco
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could offer no rational explanation of how the traffic disruption caused by one

hundred students marching down the street was any different than the

disruption caused by one hundred protestors doing the same. Knowles, 462 F.3d

at 437. See also Beckerman, 664 F.2d at 514 (same). 

In Knowles, the court struck down the entire parade ordinance. Knowles,

462 F.3d at 437. That remedy was necessary because the ordinance “potentially

criminalizes such a broad range of expressive and legitimate conduct that it is

hardly tailored at all,” and certainly not narrowly tailored. Id. at 435. 

In Beckerman, we found some provisions in a Tupelo, Mississippi parade

ordinance to be a prior restraint, while others were overbroad or vague.

Beckerman, 664 F.2d at 509, 511-16. The plaintiffs had not sought a permit, and

the court stated that their challenges were “anticipatory.” Id. at 506. Standing

had not been challenged. We briefly reviewed precedents that allowed facial

challenges to ordinances that provided overly broad discretion to officials. Id.

Only some of the provisions were stricken, as opposed to the entire ordinance.

Id. at 517. That was appropriate because, once substantial overbreadth is shown,

only the offending portions should be stricken if that is practicable. Brockett v.

Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1985).

We conclude that Houston’s Sound Ordinance does not suffer from the kind

of fundamental flaws identified in these precedents. It makes reasonable

distinctions among categories in the level of disruption caused by noise that

requires a permit and noises that come from exempted sources. Out of sixteen

defenses, only two raise some analytical questions. Though churches are

numerous, historical cannon fire presumably is not. These exceptions limit the

reach of the Ordinance, a fact that does not equate to insufficiently narrow

tailoring. If there are defects in the church bell and historical reenactment
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exceptions, and we do not so conclude, they do not result in a fatal absence of

narrow tailoring. If pruning of those two defenses is required by the First

Amendment, it cannot be done in this suit. 

SEIU has a personal stake in the remaining part of its challenge to the

Sound Ordinance. It argues that a limitation of two permits per location per

thirty-day period is invalid. Narrow tailoring is again the concern. SEIU argues

that the Ordinance’s failure to distinguish between the needs of different parts

of the City in imposing the twice per thirty-days restriction is strong evidence

thatthe Ordinance is not narrowly tailored. “‘The crucial question is whether the

manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a

particular place at a particular time.’” Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 384 (5th

Cir. 1980) (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116).

In Reeves, we struck down a Houston ordinance banning all amplification

in the “downtown business district” except between the hours of 1:00 p.m. and

7:00 p.m. on Sundays. Id. at 385. The City had argued that this limitation was

justified “1) to prevent disruption of the normal business activity on the crowded

streets in this district and 2) to prevent distraction of pedestrians and drivers .

. . .” Id. at 384. Although we agreed that these were “proper” governmental

interests, we concluded that “the blanket prohibition by which [the City] seeks

to achieve those ends is far too broad.” Id. We required that the City “tailor its

ordinance to reach those activities that actually cause, or immediately threaten

to cause, the consequences it fears.” Id.

Here, the City argues that an underlying distinction between residential

and non-residential areas is present in the Ordinance, as the maximum decibel

levels vary at which a permit is required. It also claims that the Ordinance here

is less restrictive than the ordinance in Reeves. 
No. 08-20616

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First, the fact that the City has made some distinctions, namely on the

basis of decibel levels, highlights its failure also to adjust the number of permits

to the different circumstances around the City. As in Reeves, the City must do

more than enact blanket restrictions in furtherance of clearly legitimate, but

inconsistently justified, interests in tranquility and repose. The maximum

number and frequency of permits that might be reasonable for protests on a quiet

neighborhood street is unlikely to be the same as is reasonable in already-noisy

downtown Houston. 

Second, the holding in Reeves did not depend on how restrictive the

ordinance was in absolute terms. There are four or five Sundays per month, but

Houston’s Ordinance limits protests to twice per month. The City also claims it

is significant that the Reeves ordinance banned all amplification, but that the

Sound Ordinance here restricts (in nonresidential areas) only amplification above

68 decibels. Nothing in the record indicates, though, how such a level

corresponds to unamplified conversation. The Ordinance itself suggests that the

permitted decibel level is meant to be usual, unamplified voices. If so, then in

practice this Ordinance provides no benefit over the one in Reeves. 

The limit of two permits per location per thirty-day period is not narrowly

tailored and is unconstitutional. The provision limited the Union’s effort to

amplify its downtown voice during its 2006 labor action. The Ordinance must

differentiate among the needs and occupants of different parts of Houston and

base frequency and time on such distinctions. See Reeves, 631 F.2d at 384 (“the

nature of a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of

regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable”) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

2. The Parade Ordinance
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SEIU contends generally that Houston’s Parade Ordinance is

unconstitutional because it is (1) too vague, (2) not content-neutral, and (3) not

narrowly tailored. 

The vagueness alleged is that the definition of parade is not clear as to the

activities covered. We repeat the Ordinance’s definition, that parades are 

a procession of pedestrians, vehicles, or animals, or any combination

thereof, traveling in unison along or upon a street, road, or highway,

organized and conducted for the purposes of attracting the attention

of the general public and/or expressing or celebrating views or ideas

by use of verbal, visual, literary, or auditory means of

communication.

Houston, Tex., Code ch. 45, art. IX § 45-231. Excluded is a “procession of vehicles

operated in compliance with ordinary traffic laws” or a procession of pedestrians

along sidewalks or on private property. Id. SEIU contends that the Parade

Ordinance gives no guidance on what constitutes “attracting the attention of the

general public” or “expressing or celebrating views.” 

SEIU relies on a series of examples to demonstrate why the Parade

Ordinance requires persons of common intelligence to guess at its meaning, i.e.,

the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. For example, SEIU contends that a

procession of banner-bearing school buses on their way to a state athletic

championship, escorted through intersections by police, may or may not

constitute a parade under the Parade Ordinance. The Ordinance provides an

answer to that example, because school buses following the ordinary rules of

traffic would not constitute a parade. Id. § 45-231 (defining “Parade”). When

such a procession requires a police escort and, albeit permissibly, runs red lights,

the Parade Ordinance as written is triggered. Id.

The Parade Ordinance’s application clearly turns on whether traffic laws

will be followed while expressive or attention-seeking activity is occurring.
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Despite the clarity of this part of the Ordinance, we realize the “imagination can

conjure hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these terms will be in nice

question. The applicable standard . . . is, rather, the practical criterion of fair

notice to those to whom the statute is directed.” Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v.

Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540

U.S. 93, 194 (2003) (holding a definition was not vague because its elements were

“easily understood and objectively determinable”). 

The Parade Ordinance provides a discernible and objective standard. 

SEIU next contends that the exceptions to the Parade Ordinance render it

content-based. SEIU finds two faults in the definition of “parade” in section 45-

231: (1) the section applies only to conduct “expressing or celebrating views or

ideas,” and (2) it contains an exemption for funeral processions.

With respect to the first distinction, SEIU contends that the focus on

expressive content contradicts Houston’s purported justification of traffic safety.

Houston responds that SEIU’s argument is misplaced because the content of the

expressed views is irrelevant to enforcement of the Ordinance. 

Enforcing the Parade Ordinance requires only that the authorities

determine that a procession is expressing a message – any message, regardless

of content – or intentionally attracting attention. An ordinance is content-neutral

if it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” which

means that enforcement would not require looking behind the simple fact that

speech is occurring. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.

Enforcement of Houston’s Parade Ordinance does not turn on whether paraders

are protesting as opposed to celebrating. Cf. Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 659

(8th Cir. 1996) (ordinance regulated conduct intended to persuade or protest).

Houston’s Parade Ordinance treats parades the same regardless of the content
No. 08-20616

20

or subject of the message. The Parade Ordinance regulates a non-accidental

procession as a method of distinguishing “parades” from the ordinary traffic of

vehicles or pedestrians traveling along a road in the same direction. 

With respect to SEIU’s second perceived flaw, Houston contends that the

Parade Ordinance no longer contains a funeral exception. Houston amended the

Parade Ordinance’s explicit exception for funeral processions after the filing of

this lawsuit. Houston claims the amendment moots this part of SEIU’s

challenge. SEIU contends that, because Houston did not amend the Ordinances

or the City’s other funeral-specific provisions, the exception remains and the

issue is not resolved. We find that the current Parade Ordinance does not except

funeral processions. The 2006 version of the Ordinance explicitly did so, and that

exception has been eliminated. 

The definition of “parade” in section 45-231 can be understood to include

funeral processions such that they, like other parades, are subject to its

governance. Although chapter 45 of the Houston Code contains separate

provisions governing funeral processions, none obviously exempts them from the

Parade Ordinance’s permit requirements. See Houston, Tex., Code ch. 45, art. IX

§ 45-251 et seq. Indeed, the definition distinguishes parades from processions of

cars “operated in compliance with ordinary traffic laws.” Id. § 45-231. A funeral

procession in which cars following the lead car do not obey ordinary traffic laws

would, by implication, require a permit. Accordingly, we hold the change in the

Houston Parade Ordinance and related provisions has mooted this aspect of

SEIU’s challenge.

Finally, SEIU contends that the Parade Ordinance’s definition of “parade”

is not narrowly tailored because it appears to apply to processions of as few as

two vehicles, persons, or animals. SEIU argues that, as small processions do not
No. 08-20616

21

interfere with traffic safety in the same manner as large processions do, the

Ordinance does not narrowly address the putative traffic-safety justification. 

We reject this argument factually, because the Parade Ordinance treats

small parades differently. Section 45-244 exempts small parades (categorized

based on number of participants, length of route, and certain other criteria) from

the permit requirement, thus distinguishing their lesser effects on safety and

congestion concerns from those of larger parades. This careful distinction is in

accord with principles of narrow tailoring. It demonstrates an effort not to

“burden substantially more speech than is necessary.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 

The Parade Ordinance is not unconstitutional as a whole.

SEIU next contends that the Parade Ordinance is not narrowly tailored

because it confines downtown weekday parades to two one-hour windows: 10:00

a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances

ch. 45, art. IX § 45-233(b)(2). Parades outside of downtown may be held during

the additional hour of 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Id. § 45-234(b)(3).

SEIU complains thatthese short periods hinder its effective communication

of its message by preventing its members from parading during hours when the

largest audience for its message are available to receive it. The restrictions do

not coincide with peak rush hours, in SEIU’s view, while funeral processions are

restricted during different time periods that do coincide with rush hour. As a

result, the time limits effect a citywide ban on parades between 11:00 a.m. and

2:00 p.m., the middle of the day when parading would be most visible to SEIU’s

intended audience, as well as banning them before 10:00 a.m. and after 3:00 p.m.

Houston justifies the time limits by claiming they further traffic safety.

Also, the City argues, the narrow time limits minimize the problem of

discretionary decision making.
No. 08-20616

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Although there are traffic safety interests in confining when parades are

held, limiting parades to two one-hour windows is not narrowly tailored. It is an

overly restrictive approach to traffic safety for which Houston offers no further

justification. Houston does not offer any reason at all for barring parades in the

evenings when downtown is relatively quiet. 

The time limits on funeral processions underscore this point. Those

processions are barred from 7:00 a.m.to 9:00 a.m. and from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

These limits presumably are tailored to avoid high vehicular traffic hours. Id. §

45-252. The reasonableness of a municipality’s choice of statute “will be viewed

‘in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.’” Reeves,

631 F.2d at 386 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). Even

allowing for distinctions between funeral processions and parades, the different

time limits for funeral processions illustrate that Houston itself has conceived a

less drastic means for achieving the basic purpose of traffic control. 

SEIU contends that the two one-hour windows unduly curtail would-be

paraders’ ability to spread their message, heavily burdening their speech rights

without a commensurate safety or traffic benefit. If traffic control services to

accommodate parades are limited anyway, restricting when they are permitted

to two particular hours out of every twenty-four hours appears to do little to

address that concern. 

Houston responds thatthe time limits prevent permitting authorities from

having too much discretion. Yet, allowing parades at more times of day does not

lead to unbridled discretion by permitting officials, so long as the permitting

standards remain in place.

A previous decision of this court, concerning a smaller municipality,

invalidated an ordinance barring parades between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. on the
No. 08-20616

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basis that it was too restrictive. Beckerman, 664 F.2d at 516-17. There, Tupelo’s

argument that maintaining public safety was more difficult after dark failed

because during the summer, daylight hours extended well past 6:00 p.m.;

therefore, the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. Id. Although Tupelo’s

ordinance permitted parades during twelve hours of the day, we struck the

provision because it did not include extra hours for the months of the year when

such an inclusion was feasible. Likewise, in Reeves we held that a citywide

prohibition on sound amplification that applied fifteen hours a day “cannot be

viewed as narrowly tailored.” Reeves, 631 F.2d at 385 (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). 

Houston has barred downtown parades for all but two one-hour periods a

day on weekdays. Its asserted justification of preventing traffic congestion is

arguably confined to the morning and evening rush hours. We are not writing on

a blank slate when it comes to overly restrictive hours for parades, as Reeves and

Beckerman compel us to find invalidity. Houston should “tailor its ordinance to

reach those activities that actually cause, or immediately threaten to cause, the

consequences it fears.” Reeves, 631 F.2d at 384 (emphasis added). As it stands,

there is scant connection between the restrictive parade hours and the putative

consequences that are the justifications for the Ordinance.

These particular limits on the hours for parades are invalid.

D. Parks Ordinance

SEIU challenges the Parks Ordinance on two grounds: (1) it is

unconstitutionally vague, and (2) it is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant

government purpose. We need reach only the first contention.

The alleged vagueness is based on the Ordinance’s failure to define “public

gathering” in a reasonably decipherable manner or to identify discrete areas of
No. 08-20616

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the parks that require permits for public gatherings. Houston, Tex., Code of

Ordinances ch. 32, art. III § 32-61. Houston stipulates that its Parks and

Recreation Department does not have a list that designates specific areas of the

parks for which permits are required. A group cannot know whether it must

apply for a permit if the Parks Department has failed to specify which areas of

the City’s parks require permits. We hold that Houston must identify the areas

requiring permits pursuant to Section 32-61(a)(5) or eliminate the provision.

SEIU also highlights that compliance with the permitting duty requires

knowing what constitutes a “public gathering” and what areas ofthe City’s parks

require permits for such gatherings. See id. § 32-62 (requiring a permit for a

“public meeting or gathering in any of the areas [designated] in or pursuant to

section 32-61”). The Parks Ordinance is silent on both matters. 

Houston asserts that a precise definition is not required. It claims that

“public gathering” is a concept so well understood by persons of ordinary

intelligence as not to be vague. At some colloquial level, we can agree that

“public gathering” is not a mysterious concept. But permitting obligations

require more than a loose understanding. We perceive no manner by which a

group of reasonable persons, perhaps somewhat small in number, whose purpose

is more private than a rally for a popular political candidate and more public

than a family lunch, would know what they are obligated to do and to avoid

doing. Sections 32-61 and 32-62 are invalid as presently written. It would seem

no more difficult to define these terms than it is to define “parade.”

Until the City provides the necessary definition of “public gathering” and

a designation of the relevant areas of the park to which the permitting

requirement applies,the Parks Ordinance’s permitting regime, Sections 32-61 to

32-70, are not enforceable.
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III. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the judgment of the district court in part and hold

unconstitutional: (1) the Sound Ordinance’s two-permits-per-thirty-days

limitation; (2) the Parade Ordinance’s time limitations, and (3) all the Park

Ordinance’s permitting requirements. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment

in all other respects. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.