MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Indianapolis, Indiana

Alexander Van Gorp

Certified Legal Intern

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

G.I.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 6, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1504-JV-166

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, 

Magistrate.

Cause No. 49D09-1501-JD-27

Friedlander, Senior Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 1 of 5
[1] G.I. appeals her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent based upon a true finding 

for the offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by 

an adult.1

 We reverse.

[2] G.I. presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether there was 

sufficient evidence to support her juvenile delinquency adjudication for 

receiving stolen auto parts.

[3] On December 28, 2014, India Simms’ silver Monte Carlo automobile was 

stolen. Two days later on December 30, 2014, M.B. asked her friend P.D. to 

hang out and ride with M.B. when she drove her cousins to a party. P.D. 

agreed, and M.B. arrived to pick up P.D. driving a silver car in which G.I. was 

a passenger. At some point after picking up P.D., M.B. stopped the car and got 

in the back seat with P.D. while G.I. drove. Due to a non-illuminated 

headlight, Officer Rabensteine initiated a traffic stop on the silver Monte Carlo 

being driven by G.I. He also performed a check of the license plate on the 

Monte Carlo, which showed that the plate was stolen. Before Officer 

Rabensteine exited his car, a door of the Monte Carlo opened, and M.B. and 

P.D. fled from the car. Another officer chased M.B. and P.D. while Officer 

Rabensteine approached the car to speak with G.I., who had remained in the 

car. Officer Rabensteine performed a check of the Monte Carlo’s VIN, which

showed that the car was stolen, and G.I. was arrested.

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5 (c) (2014).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 2 of 5

 
[4] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that G.I. had committed the 

offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. 

Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding. G.I. 

was placed on formal probation, and this appeal followed.

[5] G.I. contends the State failed to prove that she knew the car was stolen. When 

the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an 

act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every 

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. C.L. v. State, 2 N.E.3d 798 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When reviewing on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a juvenile adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

the credibility of the witnesses. Z.A. v. State, 13 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom, and we will affirm if the evidence and those 

inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the 

judgment. C.L., 2 N.E.3d 798.

[6] In order to make a true finding of delinquency against G.I. for receiving stolen 

auto parts, the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that G.I. (1) 

knowingly or intentionally (2) received, retained, or disposed of (3) Simms’

silver Monte Carlo (4) that had been the subject of theft. See Ind. Code § 35-43-

4-2.5 (c). In addition to proving the explicit elements of the crime, the State 

must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knew the property 

was stolen. Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. 2010). Knowledge that 

property is stolen may be established by circumstantial evidence; however, such 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 3 of 5
knowledge may not be inferred solely from the unexplained possession of 

recently stolen property. Id.

[7] Simms testified at the fact-finding hearing that her silver Monte Carlo was 

stolen while it was running with the keys in the ignition. She also testified that 

the car was damaged prior to it being stolen, including damage to the driver’s 

side and the front bumper and that there was further damage when her car was 

returned to her, including ashes and food on the inside, damaged air vents, 

paint scratches on one side, and a door not closing completely. P.D. testified 

that M.B. contacted her to “come and chill” and ride with her when she took 

her cousins to a party. Tr. p. 12. M.B. was driving G.I. and another girl when 

they picked up P.D. in a two-door gray car that P.D. had not seen before. At 

some point, M.B. and P.D. got into the back seat together, and G.I. drove. The 

fourth girl was dropped off before they were stopped by Officer Rabensteine. 

P.D. testified that when they were pulled over, M.B. suggested they run, and 

she followed M.B. P.D. further testified that she did not know who owned the 

car. Officer Rabensteine testified that M.B. told him that P.D. had stated the 

car belonged to her. M.B. did not testify at the fact-finding hearing. 

[8] Here, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented at the fact-finding 

hearing that G.I. believed the car to belong to M.B. Teenagers driving a used 

car and/or one that is messy and has bumps and scrapes is not unusual. 

Further, the evidence shows the car was stolen with the keys in it, and there 

was no evidence presented of any damage to the steering column or other 

components which would be indicative of a stolen vehicle. Moreover, G.I. did 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 4 of 5
not flee when the car was stopped by Officer Rabensteine. From this evidence 

we determine that the circumstances do not support a reasonable inference that 

G.I. knew, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the car she drove only briefly was 

stolen. We therefore conclude that the evidence presented to support G.I.’s 

delinquency adjudication was not sufficient.

[9] Reversed.

[10] Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1504-JV-166 | January 6, 2016 Page 5 of 5