# FILED
January 29, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON JANUA

RY 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9702-CR-00081 Appellee, ) ) Shelby County V. ) ) Hon. James C. Be asley, Sr., Specia l Judge ) RICKY JACKSON, ) (Aggravated Rape; Aggravated Robbery) ) Appellant. )

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: A C Wharton, Jr. John Knox Walkup Shelby County Public

Defender Attorney General & Reporter Edward G. Thompson Sarah M. Branch Assistant Public Defender Counsel for the State 616 Adams Avenue 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Memphis, TN 38103 Nashville, TN 37243 William L. Gibbons District Attorney General Lee Coffee Assistant District A

ttorney General 201 Poplar Avenue, Third Fl oor Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMM ERS, Judge

O P I N I O N-2- The appellant Ricky Jack son was convicted by

a jury in the Shelby

County Criminal Court of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. On appeal, the appellant raises the sole issue of whether the ev idence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdic t. After reviewing the r

ecord, we find that the evi dence is sufficient and affirm the appellant’s convictions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an appellant cha llenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, after v iewing the evidenc

e in a light most favorabl e to the prosecution, any rati onal trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doub t. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1985). The weight and credibil ity of a witness’ tes timony are matters entrust ed exclusively

to the jury as the trier

s of fact. State v. Sheffield , 676 S.W.2d 542 (Te nn. 1984); Byrge v. State , 575 S.W.2d 292 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1978). Jury verdicts accredit the state’s witnesses and resolve all evi dentiary conflicts in the state’s favor. State v. Willia ms , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Banes , 874 S.W.2d 73, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). On appeal, th e state is entitled to both the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978). Moreover, guilty

verdicts remove the presumption of innocence, enjoyed by defendants at trial, and replace i t with a presumption of gui lt. State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1973). Appellants, therefore, car ry the burden of overcoming a presumption of guilt when appealing jury convictions

. Id.

EVIDENCE
The victim, seventeen y ears old at the time of the offense, testified that on-3- December 1, 1995, she and her nephew went to a neighborhood st ore around 10:00 p. m. After the victim and her ne phew left the store , she was pa ged by a friend; she walked to a near by phone booth and returned the ca ll. While the victim was on the phone, four people left a bar down the s treet and walked toward the victim. One of the four people, the appellant, w alked over to the phone booth and told the victi m to ask her friend on the phone if she w anted to buy a gun. Neither th e victim nor her nephew knew the appellant. While the victim was on the phone, the appellant told the vic tim’s nephew to be quiet.The area around the phone booth was well lit. The nephew identified the ap pellant’s Nike tennis shoes as the sho es worn by the man at the phone booth.

After the victim finished her phone conversation, she cr ossed the street to walk home with her nep hew. Both the victi m and her nephew testified that th e appellant walked with them and that he moved closer to the victim despite her efforts to move away from him. The appellant grabbed the vi ctim and placed a gun to her side. The appellant told the victim that he would “blow her ass off” if she ran or scream ed. To prevent in jury to her nephew, t he victim told him to go on home without her. As the v ictim’s nephew wal ked home, he saw the appellant and the victim g o behind a white house. Behi nd the house, the appellant to

ok six ri ngs, a beeper, and $35.00 fr om the vict im.
Then, the appellant took the vic tim across the street and r aped her behind an auto parts store. The victim testified that the appellan t told her to undress and get on the groun d. The ap pellant then fo rced the vi ctim at gu npoint t o have oral, vaginal, and anal sex with him. The appellant told the victim that he would kill her and her family if she told the police. After the rape, the victim ran to h er sister’s house and told her what happened. The victim’ s sister testified that the victim was “nerv

ous, shaking and prayi ng” when she returned fr om the store. The victim described her assailant to the police and went to the rape crisis center. She testified that she c ould clearly see the per petrator’s face during the rape as well as w

hen she was at the phone booth. The ex amining nurse testified that the victim was b leeding slightly from the rectum and that tests of the anal-4- area revealed sperm. The amount o f the sperm found was insufficient to conduct DNA analysis. The appellant was not apprehende d.
On January 30, 1996, the vi ctim saw the appellant. H e was walking behind her and asked if she had seen a certain individual. W hen the victim turned, the appellant saw her face and ran. The victim ran to Ada Odu m’s house and told Ms. Odum that she had seen the man who robbed and raped her. Ms. Odum testified that the victi m was visibly upset and shaken. Ms. Odum told the vicitm the appellant’s name and where he lived. The victim called the poli ce. When the police went to the appellant’s hous e to arrest him, the appellant was on the phone calling the fugit ive squad to see if or w hy he was wanted by

the police. The appellant was taken into custody. The v ictim later identified the appellant in a photographic lineup.
The appellant testified at trial that he did not rob or rape th e victim. His defense was that the case wa s one of mistaken identity. O n appeal, the appellant cites testimony to support his claim that the evidence is insufficient t o support the convictions.The appellant testified that he coul d not remember where he was on the night of the offense. In essence, he argues th at the jury should have found him a credible witness because he admitted that he could not remember where he was on December 1, 1995, instead of fabricati ng an alibi. The appellant reasons that most peopl e cannot remember where they were on a particular date. The appellant also argues that the jur y should not have believ ed a police officer’s testimony that most people call the f ugitive squad to make themselves look innocent. The appellant contend s that it is much more reasonable to believe that an innocent man, as oppo sed to a guilty man, would call to ask why he was a suspect. The appellant reasons that the police would be the last person that a guilty man would contact. Lastly, the appellant cites his own testimony in w

hich he denied owning N ike tennis shoes on the date of the offen ses, as id entifie d by the vict im’s neph ew.

LAW AN D CONCLUSION-5- As applicable to this case,aggravated robbery is defined as the intentional or knowing theft of property from a victim accomplished with a deadly weapon. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402(a)(1) (1991). The ap pellant intentionally or knowingly deprived the victim at gunpoint of six rings, worth approximately $350.00; a beeper; and $35.00.
Aggravated rape can be defined as unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a v ictim when force or coer cion is used to accomplish the act and the defendant is armed with a weapon. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502(a)(1) (Supp. 1 995). The victim testified that the appellant pointed a gun at her and told her to undr ess and perform fellatio on him. The appel lant then vaginally and anally penetrated the victim at gunpoint with his penis.
The argument offered by the appellant is essent ially that the jury should have believed his testimony and not that of the vict im and her nephew. As previously stated, the jury resolves questions of credibilit

y. The record contains ample evidence upon which to affirm the appellant’s convi ctions. The area around the phone booth was w ell lit. Both the vi ctim and the victim’s neph ew identified the appellant as the perpetrator. Th e victim testified that she could see the appellant’s face whi le he raped her. The victi m’s identification of the perpetrator after the rape matched the app ellant’s description. The victim unequivocally id entified the appellant in the photog raphic lineup as the person who robbed and raped her.
The judgment of the trial court i s affirmed.

__________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Ju dge
CONCUR:-6- ___________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge

___________________________ JOE G. RILEY, Judge