IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARTHA J. HENDERSON, *

*

 Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00454-B

*

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

ORDER

Plaintiff Martha J. Henderson (hereinafter “Plaintiff”)

seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability, 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income 

under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

401, et seq., and 1381, et seq. On October 29, 2015, the 

parties consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all 

proceedings in this case. (Doc. 19). Thus, the action was 

referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order 

the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Upon careful consideration 

of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, 

it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner be 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for benefits

on July 11, 2011. (Tr. 156). Plaintiff alleged that she has

been disabled since May 5, 2011, due to “seizures” and “problems 

with neck and back.” (Id. at 149, 155).

Plaintiff’s applications were denied and upon timely 

request, she was granted an administrative hearing before 

Administrative Law Judge Marni McCaghren (hereinafter “ALJ”) on 

January 16, 2013. (Id. at 23). Plaintiff attended the hearing 

with her counsel and provided testimony related to her

impairments. (Id. at 26). A vocational expert (“VE”) also 

appeared at the hearing and provided testimony. (Id. at 55). 

On February 13, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision 

finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 18). The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 

6, 2014. (Id. at 1-2). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision dated 

February 13, 2013, became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff 

timely filed the present civil action. (Doc. 1). The parties 

waived oral argument on October 29, 1015 (Doc. 18), and agree 

that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly 

before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3).

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II. Issues on Appeal

A. Whether the ALJ erred in finding that 

Plaintiff had transferrable skills from 

past relevant work as a hospital 

admissions clerk and, thus, was not 

disabled?

B. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Stanley Barnes, M.D.?

C. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to 

articulate a linkage between the RFC and 

the evidence?

III. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on July 1, 1959, and was fifty-three

years of age at the time of her administrative hearing on 

January 16, 2013. (Tr. 23, 155). Plaintiff testified that she 

graduated from high school and completed one year of college. 

(Id. at 27). She also received training to become a nursing 

assistant. (Id.).

According to Plaintiff’s testimony and Work History Report, 

she last worked from approximately 2010 to 2011 as a part-time 

cashier in a convenience store, averaging about thirty hours a 

week. (Id. at 28). In addition to being a cashier, Plaintiff 

was responsible for cleaning, mopping, sweeping, and putting out 

stock. (Id.). Her employment was terminated in May 2011, along 

with all of the other employees at the store, when inventory was 

discovered missing. (Id. at 28, 150). Prior to that, Plaintiff 

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worked at other convenience stores from approximately 1987 to 

1990 and then again from 1995 to 2011. 1 (Id. at 150, 166). 

Also, from 1999 to 2001, Plaintiff worked as the assistant 

manager of a retail clothing shop, and her duties included 

managing day-to-day operations, ordering merchandise, and 

cleaning. (Id. at 31). Plaintiff also worked for approximately 

eight years from 1991 to 1999 in medical admissions at Atmore 

Community Hospital, admitting and discharging patients.2 (Id. at 

29, 33, 197). She was terminated from that job after her mother 

became ill. (Id.). Prior to that, Plaintiff worked as a 

private duty nurse in the 1980’s for approximately four years, 

working approximately thirty-two hours a week, but ceased

working when her employer died. (Id. at 30-31). She last 

applied for a receptionist type job in 2010 but did not get it. 

(Id. at 33-34). She also applied for a job as a certified 

nursing assistant (“CNA”) at a nursing home in 2011, but she did 

not get the job because she was not certified. (Id. at 34).

Plaintiff testified that she currently has problems with 

her neck and back, gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), and 

 1 The dates during which Plaintiff worked at her various jobs is 

confusing, with the dates often overlapping. (Tr. 31, 150, 

166).

2 While Plaintiff reported working as a hospital admissions clerk 

from January 1991 to February 1999, her earnings report reflects

that 1998 was the last year she worked in that position, and 

her earnings in that position for 1998 were $1,755.36.

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that she has had seizures. (Id. at 35-36, 44). Plaintiff 

testified that she last had a seizure in May of 2012 and that it 

was the only one that she had that year. (Id. at 40). She

testified that she generally has about one seizure a year and 

that she worked for a couple of decades with that condition. 

(Id. at 40-41). Plaintiff also testified that she had a “MRSA”

(Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus) infection in 2008. 

(Id. at 35-36). Plaintiff’s medications include Dilantin (for 

seizures), 3 Lortab (for back pain), and Bisoprolol (for high 

blood pressure). (Id. at 40-42). 

Plaintiff testified that she lives with her daughter and 

her two grandchildren, ages five and eight. (Id. at 26). On a 

typical day, she gets up at 6:00 a.m., sits in a chair, and 

reads her bible for about thirty minutes. (Id. at 45). Then, 

she cooks breakfast, washes the dishes, takes a bath, walks 

around the house for about thirty minutes, and watches 

television. (Id. at 44-48). She participates in her 

grandchildren’s activities at school and attends church 

regularly on Sunday and Tuesday nights. (Id. at 48-49). She 

does her own laundry and housework. (Id. at 51). She shops for 

groceries and drives. (Id.). 

Plaintiff also reported in her Function Report that she can 

 3 Plaintiff reported that she has no side effects from the 

Dilantin. (Tr. 178).

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lift approximately ten pounds, can squat but not for too long, 

can walk for approximately fifteen minutes, cannot stand or sit 

for too long, and reaching causes her arm to hurt. (Id. at 

163). She can pay attention for “a good while;” she finishes 

what she starts; she follows written instructions “okay;” and 

she follows spoken instructions “very well.” (Id.). She 

reported that she does not handle stress well. (Id. at 164). 

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review 

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s 

role is a limited one. The Court’s review is limited to 

determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is 

supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct 

legal standards were applied. 4 Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may not decide the facts 

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that 

of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th 

Cir. 1986). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be 

affirmed if they are based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. 

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding 

substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla, but 

 4 This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal 

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

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less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.”). In determining whether substantial 

evidence exists, a court must view the record as a whole, taking 

into account evidence favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the 

Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 

(11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10163, *4

(S.D. Ala. June 14, 1999).

B. Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability 

benefits must prove his or her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1512, 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations 

provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for 

determining if a claimant has proven his disability.5 20 C.F.R. 

 5 The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the 

claimant to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant 

proves that the impairment or combination of impairments meets 

or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is 

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§§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

In the case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

has not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since 

May 5, 2011, the alleged onset date, and that she has the severe 

impairments of seizure disorder, osteoarthritis, degenerative 

disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, status-post 

anterior cervical discectomy and fusion, with residual right 

shoulder pain, and chronic laryngitis. 6 (Tr. 13). The ALJ 

further found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of 

 

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or 

work experience. If the claimant cannot prevail at the third 

step, he or she must proceed to the fourth step where the 

claimant must prove an inability to perform their past relevant 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In 

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the 

examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective 

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, 

education and work history. Id. Once a claimant meets this 

burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the 

fifth step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment which exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy, given the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 

1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such 

jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability 

to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. 

Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

6 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s menorrhagia and anemia were 

non-severe. (Tr. 14).

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the listed impairments contained in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 14). 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retains the residual 

functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to perform a range of 

sedentary work, with the restrictions that Plaintiff “is to 

avoid all crouching, kneeling, crawling, driving, use of heavy 

hand controls with the right hand, overhead reaching with the 

right arm, climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, or exposure 

to moving machinery or unprotected heights. She is to avoid 

frequent communication, whether in person or by telephone; and, 

due to pain and potential side effects of medication, she is 

expected to be off-task for approximately 5% of the work day.”

(Id. at 14-15). The ALJ also determined that while Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected 

to produce the alleged symptoms, and her statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the alleged 

symptoms were credible, they did not support a finding of 

disability. (Id. at 15).

Utilizing the testimony of a VE, the ALJ found that

considering Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for a range 

of sedentary work, with the stated restrictions, as well as her

age, education, and work experience, Plaintiff is not capable of 

performing her past work as a hospital admissions clerk, 

cashier, nurse’s aide, apparel salesperson, and inventory clerk. 

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(Id. at 16). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s past work 

as a hospital admissions clerk (which was semi-skilled) was 

“past relevant work” with skills that were transferrable to 

sedentary work, and, thus, under Medical Vocational Rule 201.15,7

Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 17). 

The Court now considers the foregoing in light of the 

record in this case and the issues on appeal. 

1. Issue

A. Whether the ALJ erred in finding that 

Plaintiff had transferrable skills from 

her past relevant work as a hospital 

admissions clerk and, thus, was not 

disabled?

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in identifying the 

position of hospital admissions clerk as “past relevant work”

with skills that are transferrable to other work in the national 

economy that she is able to perform. Specifically, Plaintiff 

argues that her work as a hospital admissions clerk does not 

constitute “substantial gainful activity” under the regulations

and, thus, cannot constitute “past relevant work” for purposes 

of finding her not disabled. (Doc. 13 at 6-13). The 

Commissioner counters that Plaintiff’s work as a hospital 

 7 Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s past work as a 

hospital admissions clerk had skills (such as record keeping and 

organization) that were transferrable to other work in the 

national economy that Plaintiff is able to perform, such as 

timekeeper, medical voucher clerk, and laundry pricing clerk 

(all of which are semiskilled and sedentary). (Tr. 17).

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admissions clerk does constitute “substantial gainful activity” 

(“SGA”) and, thus, was properly considered by the ALJ as “past 

relevant work” with transferrable skills, rendering Plaintiff 

not disabled. (Doc. 16 at 4-5). Having reviewed the record at 

length, the Court finds that this case must be reversed and 

remanded due to the ALJ’s failure to analyze whether Plaintiff’s 

past work as a hospital admissions clerk constitutes 

“substantial gainful activity” (thereby constituting “past 

relevant work”), a prerequisite to finding that Plaintiff is not 

disabled under Medical Vocational Rule 201.15. 

Medical Vocational Rule 201.15, relied on by the ALJ (Tr. 

17), provides that a person is not disabled if she is closely 

approaching advanced age, if she is a high school graduate, and 

if her “past relevant work” is at least semi-skilled and the 

skills are transferable. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.

2; see also Taylor v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 891 

F.2d 292, *3 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished). To qualify as “past 

relevant work,” the work must have been done: 1) within the last 

fifteen years; 2) long enough for the claimant to learn to do 

it; and 3) at a level constituting substantial gainful activity. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a); see also Clark v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 30709, *13, 2009 WL 943537, *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 

2009). Under the regulations, “substantial gainful activity” is 

“work activity that is both substantial and gainful.” See 20 

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C.F.R. § 416.972. Substantial work activity is “work activity 

that involves doing significant physical or mental activities . 

. . even if it is done on a part-time basis,” and gainful work 

activity is work activity done “for pay or profit.” Id.

“In evaluating work activity for substantial gainful 

activity purposes, the primary consideration is the claimant’s 

earnings from work activity.” Green v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 555 F. Appx. 906, 908 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). 

The regulations use earnings guidelines with monthly minimum 

thresholds to assist in the determination of whether a 

claimant’s past work was substantial gainful activity. See 20 

C.F.R. § 416.974(b). “If a claimant receives wages exceeding 

those set out in an earnings guidelines table, a presumption 

arises that she was engaged in substantial gainful activity 

during that period.” Sommers v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

101152, *35, 2015 WL 4633516, *11 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2015)

(quoting Green, 555 Fed. Appx. at 908).

“When comparing a claimant’s average monthly income to the 

earnings guidelines, the claimant’s income is generally averaged 

over the actual period of work involved.” Gentile v. 

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121093, *8, 

2014 WL 4279057, *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2014) (citing SSR 83–35, 

1983 WL 31257, at *1–3 (1983) (“for example, the earnings of a 

hypothetical claimant working from January 1982 to August 1982 

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are divided by eight (8) -- the number of months actually worked

-- and not by twelve (12).”). However, “[w]hen an individual 

works over a period of time during which the SGA level changes, 

earnings are not averaged over the entire period of work 

involved; rather, they are averaged over each period for which a 

different SGA level applies.” SSR 83-35, 1983 WL 31257. 

Likewise, “[w]hen there is a significant change in work patterns 

or earnings, the earnings must be averaged over each separate 

period of work involved to determine if either effort was SGA.” 

Id. 

SSR 83–35 explains: “If the individual’s pattern of work 

was (or is) continuous without significant change in work 

patterns or earnings, and there was no change of SGA earnings 

levels during the period involved, earnings are to be averaged 

over the entire period of work requiring evaluation.” Id., 1983 

WL 31257. “However, when an employee’s earnings or work 

activities vary somewhat from month-to-month, it may be 

necessary to average the ‘countable earnings’ reported over a 

number of months in order to compare those earnings with the 

applicable monthly amount in the Earnings Guidelines.” Id. 

In addition, even if the claimant’s earnings are 

insufficient to raise a presumption of substantial gainful 

activity, the ALJ can still consider other information which may 

indicate that the claimant engaged in SGA. See Sommers, 2015 

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101152 at *35, 2015 WL 4633516 at *11 (citing 

Eyre v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec., 586 F. Appx. 521, 524 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (stating that “[e]ven where the claimant’s average 

monthly earnings were below the amount established by the 

earnings guidelines, if other evidence indicates that the 

claimant was engaged in substantial gainful activity” that 

information may be considered, such as “whether the work 

performed was ‘comparable to that of unimpaired people in [the 

claimant’s] community who [were] doing the same or similar 

occupations as their means of livelihood, taking into account 

the time, energy, skill, and responsibility involved in the 

work.’”)). Indeed, “[a]lthough earnings below the threshold 

amount ordinarily show that an employee has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity, the fact that earnings are below 

the guidelines is not dispositive.” Hunsberger v. Colvin, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79174, *11, 2015 WL 3793615, *4 (M.D. Fla. June 

18, 2015) (citing cases: Reeder v. Apfel, 214 F.3d 984, 989 (8th 

Cir. 2000) (noting that a claimant’s “low earnings are more the 

result of her choice to work only seasonally than an indicator 

of a physical or mental inability to work the entire year”); 

Fuentes v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17915, *28, 2015 WL 

631969, *10 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015) (affirming ALJ’s 

determination that claimant’s previous work was substantial 

gainful activity “especially considering that [the claimant’s] 

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earning records reveal that he had multiple jobs . . . 

suggesting that he was employed as an office cleaner on a parttime basis because it was not his primary employment”); Nishke 

v. Astrue, 878 F. Supp. 2d 958, 987 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (evidence 

showed that “plaintiff’s low earnings in the cited jobs were 

more likely the result of her choice regarding her work schedule 

than an indication of a mental inability perform the jobs at the 

presumptive substantial gainful activity level”); Hearod v. 

Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92233, *40-41, 2011 WL 3648269, 

*14 (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2011) (finding that the claimant’s “low 

earnings appear to be more the result of her choice to obtain 

work through a temporary agency, rather than an indication of a 

physical or mental inability to perform the work throughout the 

year.”)). 

As this Court noted in Clark, “[t]he problem in this case 

is that the ALJ failed to identify and discuss in any meaningful 

manner the evidence that supports a conclusion that plaintiff’s 

past work . . . rises to the level of substantial gainful 

activity, thereby constituting past relevant work.” Clark, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30709 at *14, 2009 WL 943537 at *5 (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 416.960). In the present case, the ALJ did not mention

Plaintiff’s average monthly earnings as a hospital admissions 

clerk, nor did she identify the period of work under evaluation 

or discuss any evidence related to the issue of whether that 

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work rose to the level of substantial gainful activity, thereby 

qualifying as past relevant work. Rather, the ALJ simply stated 

that “[t]he claimant has past relevant work as a hospital 

admissions clerk . . .” and, based on the VE’s testimony that 

her past work as a hospital admissions clerk was semi-skilled

and had skills in record keeping and organization that were 

transferrable to sedentary work, she is not disabled. (Tr. 16-

17). 

Contrary to the ALJ’s conclusory statement that Plaintiff 

has “past relevant work” as a hospital admissions clerk, the 

evidence of Plaintiff’s earnings during the fifteen years 

preceding the ALJ’s decision seems to indicate that it was not 

substantial gainful activity. The record shows that Plaintiff

reported working as a hospital admissions clerk from January 

1991 to February 1999 (see “Claimant’s Work Background,” id. at 

197); however, her earnings report shows that the last year that 

she worked in that job was actually 1998. (Id. at 142). The

record also reflects earnings from Plaintiff’s work as a 

hospital admissions clerk as follows: $0 in 1999;8 $1,755.36 in 

1998; 9 $14,096.37 in 1997; $12,314.76 in 1996; $12,743.72 in 

1995; $12,372.49 in 1994; $11,560.91 in 1993; $12,404.94 in 

 8 Plaintiff’s income from 1999 was from self-employment earnings, 

not from her work as a hospital admissions clerk. (Tr. 142).

9 The balance of Plaintiff’s earnings for 1998 was selfemployment earnings in the amount of $4,372.00. (Tr. 142).

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1992; and $16,487.90 in 1991. (Id. at 140-42). 

It is indiscernible from the ALJ’s decision what period of 

time she evaluated in calculating Plaintiff’s average monthly 

earnings for purposes of determining if the work constituted 

SGA, thereby constituting past relevant work. As previously 

discussed, the Eleventh Circuit has defined “past relevant work” 

as “work that you have done within the past 15 years, that was 

substantial gainful activity.” Mosley v. Acting Commissioner of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21193, *10, 2015 WL 

8105166, *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2015). In this case, the fifteen 

year period preceding the ALJ’s decision denying benefits would 

encompass the period from February 1998 to February 2013. As 

discussed, during this fifteen year period, Plaintiff worked as 

a hospital admissions clerk only in 1998. Assuming that 

Plaintiff performed that job the entire year, as indicated by 

her “Work Background” report (id. at 197), and given that her 

total earnings from the job in 1998 were $1,755.36, as indicated 

by her earnings record (id. at 142), her average monthly 

earnings (if based on eleven months from February through 

December 1998) would be well below the $500 monthly minimum 

designated by the Agency as ordinarily showing substantial 

gainful activity in 1998. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(b)(2)(i), 

416.974(b)(2)(i). While it is possible that the ALJ could have 

determined that a different (shorter) period of evaluation 

Case 1:14-cv-00454-B Document 22 Filed 03/24/16 Page 17 of 19
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applied or that other factors rebutted the presumption of no 

SGA, the ALJ wholly failed to discuss this issue. Therefore, 

the Court must conclude, based on the evidence before the Court, 

that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s earnings from her 

job as a hospital admissions clerk in 1998 constituted SGA. 

Consequently, it was reversible error for the ALJ to conclude 

that this past work constituted past relevant work for purposes 

of finding Plaintiff not disabled under Medical Vocational Rule 

201.15. 

In sum, because there is no substantial evidence to support 

the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s work as a hospital admissions 

clerk constituted substantial gainful employment, thereby 

constituting “past relevant work” with skills transferrable to 

other work in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, 

the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff is not disabled under 

Medical Vocational Rule 201.15, and this case must be remanded 

for further administrative proceedings.10

 10 On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate whether Plaintiff 

performed substantial gainful activity as a hospital admissions 

clerk pursuant to the applicable regulations and SSA policy. If 

the ALJ believes that Plaintiff’s earnings during the relevant 

work period meet the presumptive SGA levels or if the ALJ finds 

that Plaintiff engaged in SGA even though her earnings did not 

meet presumptive SGA levels, the ALJ should explain this in her 

decision. In addition, on remand, the ALJ should explain how 

she determined the relevant period of work requiring evaluation 

and how she averaged Plaintiff’s earnings. See SSR 83–35, 1983 

WL 31257.

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V. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful 

consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the 

parties, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for a 

period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income be REVERSED and REMANDED.11

DONE this 24th day of March, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 11 Having determined for the reasons discussed herein that this 

action must be remanded, the Plaintiff’s remaining issues are

pretermitted. 

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