O p i n i o n f il e d Dec ember 21 , 2017



### I n T he 

# E l e v e n t h C o u r t o f Ap p ea ls

N o . 11

- 12

- 002 0 1

- CV

D L A P I P E R LL P (US) , A p pell a nt

V.
C H R I S LI N EG A R, A p pellee

On A ppe a l fr o m the 2 0 1 s t D is t r i c t C o urt

Tr a v i s C o un t y , T e x as Tr i a l Co urt C a u s e N o . D

- 1

- G N

- 10

- 0 0 0 7 89

O P I N I O N O N R E M A N D
T h i s court previously determined that Chris Linegar lacked standing to bring suit against DLA Piper LLP (US) ; however , the Texas Supreme Court granted Linegar’s petition for discretionary review, determined that Linegar did have standing to sue DLA Piper for legal malpractice
, and remanded the cause to this court to address the remaining issues. Linegar v. DLA Piper LLP (US) , 495 S.W.3d2

276 (Tex. 2016), rev’g 507 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2014). We now affirm the trial court’s judgment

. 1

L in e g ar , a n Aus t r a l i an f

i n a n c i er a n d i n v e s t o r , f

o r m ed a company called K ey O v a t i o n

. H e l a t er d i v i d e d t h at c o m p a n y in t o t w o c o m

p a ni e s : K ey O v a ti o n , LL C

a n d I d e nt i P H I, LL C , both of which w e re b a s e d i n Aus t in, T e x a s

. I n 20 08
, I d e n t i P H I , LLC m

er g ed w i t h Saf

l i n k C o r p o ra ti o n , a Se a t t l e c o m p a n y

. In t h e

m er g er, Sa f l i n k w as r e p re s e n t e d b y DL A P ip e r , a n d I d e n ti P H I , LLC w a s re p r e s e n t ed
b y A k i n & A l m a n za. I d e n t i P H I
, I n c. (IdentiPHI) was th e n a m e o f t h e m

er g e d

c o m p a n y , a n d Li n e g ar was a major stockholder in that c o m p a n y

. After the merger, DLA Piper represented IdentiPHI as corporate counsel. During the merger p r o ce s s, i t b ec a m e a pp a r e n t t h at I d e n ti P H I n e e d e d ca pi t a l

t o s t ay i n b u s i n e s s while it attempted to secure permanent financing. L i n e g ar
p r o po s e d a “

b r id g e lo a n ” f

r o m hi s su p er a n nu a

t i o n f und ( a self

- managed re t i re m

e n t

trust ) i n A u s t r a l i a. Linegar , as chairman, direc tor, and majority shareholder of
Z a y c h an P t y L i m

it e d
, a n A u st ra l i an c o r

p o ra tion that s e r v e d as trustee for the

r e t i re m e n t f u n d , arranged f

o r a b r id g e l o a n of 1

. 7 5 m illi o n Au s t r a l i an d ol l a r s (AUD)

— which was equivalent to approximately 1.6 4 million U.S. dollars (USD)

— from the retirement fund

. In conjunction with the bridge loan, IdentiPHI executed a promissory note on March 12, 2008; the p romissory note contained a clause granting Zaychan a security interest in all of IdentiPHI’s assets. T h e note w as payable on or
before Jun e 29
, 2 0 08.
Pr i o r t o th e e x e c u t io n o f t h e no t e, L in e g a r a tt e n d ed a di n n er p ar t y w it h t he
b o ard m e m b ers o f I d e n t i P H I a n d s e v e r al o t h er in d iv i d u a ls

. L in e g ar c l a i m ed th a t
h e s a t n e x t t o M i c h ael Hu t c h in gs , a partner at DL A P ip er, a n d that they d i s c u s s e d

1 We note that this case was transferred to this court from the Third Court of Appeals u nder a docket equalization or der. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 73.001 (West 2013) ; see also T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 41.3 (regarding controlling precedent)

.3

Linegar’s c o n ce r n s re g ar di n g th e bridge l o a n. L in e g a r t e st i fied th a t H ut c h in g s

a s s u red hi m th at hi s s e c u r it y i n t er e s t w as n o t at r i s k a n d th a t “ e v er y th i n g wo u l d b e

t a k e n care o f

. ” Li n e g ar t e s t i f i ed t h a t h e b e l i e v ed t h a t DLA P i p er r e p r e s e n t ed hi m i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e l o a n

. DL A P i p e r d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t o L in e g ar t h a t i t w as n o t

r e p r e s e nt i n g h i m a n d th a t hi s i n t e r e s t s w ere a d v er s e t o I d e n t i P H I ’ s i nt e re st s.
In m id

- J u n e , Li n e g ar b eca m

e c o n ce r n e d th at I d e n t i P H I w as n o t g oi n g t o p ay b a c k t h e l o an b y Ju n e 2 9

. H e c o ns u l t e d wit h R i c k A k i n o f A k i n & A l m a n za

re g a r d i n g hi s o p ti o n s i n t h e e v e n t that h e h ad t o “ ca l l u p t h e lo a n

. ” A ki n d i s c o v er e d th a

t DL A P i p er h ad n o t f

il e d t h e U CC

- 1 f

i n a n c i n g s t a t e m

e n t ; t hu s , Z a y c h a n ’ s security interest h ad n o t b e e n p e r fe c t e d

. D u e t o s t r i ct r e g u l a t i o n s o n

m a ki n g l o a ns fr o m su p er a n n u a t io n f u nd s i n A u s t r a l i a, th e l o a n h ad t o b e p a i d b a c k
b y J u n e 30, 2 00 8 . In o r d e r t o m itig a t e h i s l os s a n d t o k e ep h i s su p e r a n nu a t i o n f u n d
i n c o m pli a n ce wit h Au st r a l i a n l a w , L i n e g a r t o o k o u t a m

o r tg a g e o n h i s h o m

e a nd

re p a i d h i s s u p e r a nnu a t io n f u nd

. Z a y c ha n a s s ig n e d th e no t e t o K ey O v a t io n , a n d
K ey O v a ti o n a m

e nd e d t h e n o t e t o e x t e n d t h e p a y m e n t d e a d l i n e. K ey O v a t i o n then
f i l ed th e U CC

- 1 f

i n a n c i n g s t a t e m

e n t

. K ey O v a t i o n a lso i s s u ed a p r o m is s o ry n o t e

t o Li n e g ar i n w hi c h K ey O v a t i o n w as r e q u i r e d t o p ay L in e g ar t h e a m oun t o f t h e

o r i gi n al l o a n i f a n d wh en K ey O v a t i o n c o l l e c t e d o n t he lo a n f r o m I d e n t i P H I.
Ca s h

- st r a p p e d, I d e n t i P H I u l ti m a t e l y f il ed f o r b a nk r u pt c y

. K e y O v a t i o n

r e c o v e r ed $ 1 5 0
, 0 0 0 (USD) o f t h e $1

. 7 5 m il li o n (AUD) l o an and g a v e t hat m on ey di r ec t l y t o Li n e g ar “[b]ecause it was his money.” Key Ovation and Linegar did not

p u r s u e th e f

u l l amount of the n o t e i n the IdentiPHI b a n k r u p t cy b eca u s e t h e s e c u r i t y int e re s t w as su b

j ect t o a t t a c k d u e t o its belated p erfe c t i o n.
L in e g ar, Z a y c h a n , a n d K ey O v a t io n sued DL A P ip e r and Hutchings for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices

. They claimed that DLA Piper and Hutchings advised Linegar individually regarding the loan, including4

assuring him that it would be perfected, and t h ey so u g h t a c t u a l a n d p u n it iv e d a m a g e s

. Z a y c h a n ’ s c l a i m s w ere d is m is s ed w i t h p re

jud i ce o n s u m m a r y j udg m e nt

. K ey O v a t io n f

il e d a n o t i c e o f no n su i t i n w h i ch i t d i s m is s ed i t s c l a i m s w i t h ou t

p r e j u d i ce. Li n e g ar ’ s c l a i m s against DLA Piper and Hutchings p r o c e e d ed t o a j u ry

t r i a l. However, in order t o simplify the jury charge, Linegar nonsuited his claims against Hutchings. T h e j u ry f o un d f o r Li n e g a r o n h i s claims of n e g li g e n t fa i lu r e

t o w a r n , n e g l i g e n t m

is r e p r e s e nt a

t i o n , fr a u d b y fa i l u re t o d i s c l os e , l e g al m a lp ra c t i ce,

a n d b r e a ch o f f

i d u c i ary d u t y. T h e j u ry f o u n d d a m a g es i n t he a m ou n t o f $1
, 2 9 3
, 6 0 6
and apportioned 90% responsibility to DLA Piper
, 10% t o Li n e g ar , and 0% to
Akin & Almanza

. Based on the jury’s verdict, the t r i al c o u r t r e n d er e d j u d g m e n t f o r
L in e g a r i n t h e a m

oun t o f $1
, 1 6 4
, 2 4 5 .4 0 , plus interest

. Because DLA Piper’s first issue on appeal challenging Linegar’s standing has
been resolved in Linegar’s favor , we address Issues Two through Eight in this opinion
on remand. In its second issue, DL A P ip e r asserts that t h e t r i al c o u r t e r r ed w h en i t

e x c l u d ed e v i d e n ce a n d ref u s e d j u ry qu e s t i o n s regarding t h e c o nd u c t o f Z a y c h an a n d
K ey O v a ti o n , which DLA Piper asserts are r e s p on s ibl e t h i r d p a r t i e s . In the third issue, DLA Piper contends that t h e t r i a l c o u rt er r ed wh en i t a d m itt e d a W a s h i n g to n

r u l e o f p r o f

e s s i o n a l c o nd u ct r e g ar d i n g a l a w y e r ’ s o b l i g a t i o n s t o n o n

- c li e n t s w h e n t h e W a s hi n g t o n r

u l e v ar i ed fr o m T e x as l a w . In the fourth issue, DLA Piper contends that

t h e t r i al c o u rt e r

red w h e n i t a d m

itt e d ce r t a i n e v i d e n ce r e g a r d i n g S E C f i li n g s yet
excl u d e d ot h er e v id e n ce r e g a r d i n g S E C f ili n gs . In its fifth issue, DLA Piper complains that t he t

r i al c o u r t er r ed w h e n i t lu m p ed L i n e g a r’ s c l a i m s in t o o n e
q u e st i o n i n t h e j u ry c h a r g e even though t h e d a m a g es f lo w e d f r o m th r ee di s t i n ct
d r a w d o wn s o n t h e l o a n . In the sixth and seventh issues, DLA Piper challenges the legal sufficiency of the e v id e n c e to show that an a g r e e m e n t existed bet w e e n DL A
P ip er a n d L i n e g ar t o f

o rm an a tt o r n e y

- c li e nt re l a t io n s h i p and to show the existence

o f a ny n e g l ig e n t m

is re p r e s e n t a t io n o r f

r a u d u l e n t o m

issi o n on the part of DLA5

Piper. In its final issue, DLA Piper urges that the amount of d a m a g e s awarded to Linegar wa s e x c e s s iv e

. In its second issue, DLA Piper contend s that it should have been permitted to
introduce evidence and obtain jury finding s on the responsibility o f both Zaychan and Key Ovation for the harm suffered by Linegar. See T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE
A NN

. ch. 33 (West 2015 ). DLA Piper asserts that Zaychan is a responsible third party because, as trustee of Lineg ar’s superannuation fund, Zaychan violated its duties under
Australian law whe n it loaned money to IdentiPHI. DLA Piper asserts that Key Ovation is a responsible third party because it “accepted less than 10% of the Note’s
value in an unreasonable sett lement.” A responsible third party is “any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.”
Id. § 33.011(6). “ The trier of fact, as to each cause of action asserted, shall determ ine the percentage of responsibility

. . . with respect to each person ’ s causing or contributing to cause in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought

. . . .” Id. § 33.003(a). As pointed out by the Texas Supreme Court, this is not
a suit on the note; it is a suit for legal malpractice and other torts committed by DLA Piper during its alleged representation of Linegar. 495 S.W.3d at 280. The harm for which damages were sought in this case related to the failure to timely perfect the

secur ity interest in the note. See, e.g.
, City Nat’l Bank of Sulphur Springs v. Smith
, No. 06

- 15

- 00013

- CV, 2016 WL 2586607, at *7

– 8 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana May 4, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (determining that the harm or injury for which recovery of damages could be sought in a legal malpractice suit that involve d a missed deadline
under statute of limitations wa s the loss of the cause of action and holding that “only those persons who contributed in causing the loss of [the] cause of action against the
Bank should be considered by the jury in the proportionate responsibility issue”). Thus, only those persons or entities who contributed to causing the untimely perfection6

of the security interest in the note are responsible third parties. DLA Piper did not

as sert at trial and does not assert on appeal that Zaychan or Key Ovation contributed to the untimely filing of the UCC

- 1 financing statement

. Additionally, Linegar

— not Key Ovation

— was responsible for making the decision to accept the bankruptcy settlement t hat DLA Piper contends was
unreasonable

. The reasonableness of th at decision , which was based on the advice and recommendation of Akin & Almanza, was addressed in depth at trial. In this regard,
we note that t

he jury determined that Akin & Almanza ’s negligence, if any, did not cause the injury in this case

. N either Zaychan nor Key Ovation is a responsible third party under the
circumstances in this case

. Thus , the trial court did not err when it refused to submit jury questions as to their responsibi lity. DLA Piper also argues in its second issue that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence regarding Zaychan’s breach of duty under Australian law with respect to the loan to IdentiPHI because, but for that breach of duty, Zaychan
would not have made the loan and Linegar would not have suffered any loss. While it is true that, if the loan from Linegar’s retirement fund had not been made to IdentiPHI, Linegar would not have suffered the loss sued upon in this case , the proffered ev idence
relates to an attenuated cause that is only remotely connected to DLA Piper’s conduct

. See I H S Cedars Treatment Ctrs. o f DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason , 143 S.W.3d 794, 799

– 800 (Tex. 2004) (addressing attenuation of the causal connection b etween condu ct and liability).
The decision whether to admit evidence rests within th e discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate court would have ruled diffe rently or because the trial court committed an error in judgment

. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson
, 923 S.W.2 d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995). We cannot hold that the trial court abused its7

discretion when it excluded the proffered evidence as irrelevant. See T EX

. R. E VID

. 401(b) (to be relevant, a fact must be “of consequence in determining the action”). We
overrule DLA P iper’s second issue on appeal. In its third issue, DLA Piper argues that the trial court erred when it permitted Linegar to introduce into evidence a Washington rule of professional conduct and expert testimony based on that rule. The evidence was admitted to show the standard of care that applied to Hutchings , who was licensed in the state of Washington . T he parties did not dispute at trial that the Washington rules would appl y to Hutchings’s
conduct. 2 The dispute centered on whether the rule and evidence thereon were admissible into evidence . DLA Piper contended that the rule was not relevant and
that the evidence was prejudicial in that it allowed Linegar “to use that rule to imply a duty that exists and is different from Texas law with regard to negligently failing to clarify.” The rule at issue provides as follows: “In dealing with an organization’s directors, offic ers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer i s dealing .” W ASH

. R ULES P ROF ’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.13(f)

. We agree with DLA Piper that neither the Washington rules nor the Texas rules give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer and that neither state’s rules may form the basis for civil liability

. See id. preamble ¶ 20; T EX

. D ISCIPLINARY R ULES
P ROF ’ L C ONDUCT preamble ¶ 15. However, we disagree with DLA Piper’s
contention that these rules cannot be used as evidence of a violati on of an existing duty of care. See W ASH

. R ULES P ROF ’ L C ONDUCT preamble ¶ 20 (stating that, “since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a

2 We note that the Washington rule at issue is substantially similar to the corresponding Texas rule. Cf. W ASH

. R ULES P ROF ’ L C ONDUCT R . 1.13(f)
, with T EX

. D ISCIPLINARY R ULES P ROF ’ L C ONDUCT R

. 1.1 2 ( e )
, reprinted in T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN ., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013 & Supp. 2017 ) (T ex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9).8

Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct” ) ; Two Thirty
Nine Joint Venture v. Joe , 60 S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001 ), rev’d on other grounds , 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) (applying Texas rules and holding that a trier of fact may consider a relevant rule “as evidence of the standard of care and breach of the standard”)

. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury prio r to opening statements that a “violation of the [disciplinary] rules does not itself
establi sh any liability in this case.” We cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence Rule 1.13 and expert testimony about Hutching s ’s conduct with respect to that rule. We overrule DLA Piper’s third issue on appeal. In its fourth issue, DLA Piper complains that the trial court erred when it permitted Linegar to introduce evidence related to SEC filings made by DLA Piper
on L inegar’s behalf but refused to permit DLA Piper to introduce evidence that DLA Piper made similar SEC filings for other officers and directors of IdentiPHI and that
those officers and directors did not believe that such filings created an attorney/client

r elationship with DLA Piper. DLA Piper argue s that evidence of communications between Linegar and DLA Piper that (1) related to SEC filings and (2) were made after March 12, 2008, the date of the first drawdown on the note, merely served to “confuse and pr ejudice the jury.” DLA Piper argued similarly at trial, and the trial court overruled DLA Piper’s relevance and Rule 403 objections. See T EX

. R. E VID

. 401

– 403. Although the relevance of several of the e

- mails that were dated after
March 12 and related to SEC filings do not seem to be particularly relevant to the issues in this case, we must keep in mind that an appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate court would have ruled
diff e rently or because the trial court committed an error in judgment

. Robinson , 923
S.W.2 d at 558. T he jury was asked to determine, in Question No. 5, whether there9

was an attorney

- client relationship between DLA Piper and Linegar “at any time from February 18, 2008 to June 17, 2008
, ” which was the date of the last drawdown.
Some of t he evidence about which DLA Piper complains in this issue was relevant to a determination of that question. Evidence of others’ beliefs with respect to their relationship with DLA Piper as a result of the SEC filings did not controvert Linegar’s testimony and was not relevant to any fact of consequence. Furthermore, especially in light of DLA Piper’s inaccurate opening statement, 3 it was within the

tr ial court’s discretion to rule that the probative value of the evidence was relevant
and was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or undue delay. See T EX

. R. E VID

. 401

– 403. W e cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to the admission and exclusion of evidence related to the SEC filings. DLA Piper’s fourth issue on appeal is overruled. In its fifth issue, DLA Piper contends that the trial court erred when it “refused to granulate the jury charge” and “lump[ed] the plaintiff’s claims into one question, even though the damages flowed from three distinct drawdowns on the loan.” In its brief, DLA Piper specifically mentions Question No. 1 (negligent fail ure to advise Linegar that DLA Piper did not represent him)
, No. 5 (existence of attorney

- client relationship at any time between February 18 and June 17, 2008 ), and No. 10 (amount of damages caused by DLA Piper’s conduct). A trial court “shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad

- form questions.” T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 277. The loss in this case stemmed from DLA Piper’s advice to Linegar with respect to the original loan, not from each drawdown

3 During his opening statement, counsel for DLA Piper stated: And by the way, when we talk about e

- mails, I want to make one thing very clear. Not only were there no let ters between my clients and Chris Linegar, ever, there were no e

mails between my clients and Chris Linegar. DLA Piper never sent Mr. Linegar an e

- mail. Mr. Linegar never sent DLA Piper an e

- mail.10

separately. The trial c ourt properly refused to distinguish between the three drawdowns in its submission of the charge to the jury. While we agree with DLA Piper’s assertion that the extended timeframe used
in Question No. 5 did not properly limit the jury’s consideration of th e existence of
an attorney

- client relationship to the occurrence or transaction at issue, we do not
find that the error in Question No. 5 “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 44.1(a). W e must consider the entire jury charge w hen determining whether an improper charge caused harm

. Thota v. Young
, 366 S.W.3d 678, 694 (Tex. 2012)

. The trial court properly limited the damage question, Question No. 10 , as follows:

What sum of money, if paid now in cas h , would fairly and reasonably compensate Chris Linegar for the injury to him, if any, caused by the conduct of DLA Piper ?

C onsider only the difference, if any, between the amount awarded on the Note to Chris Linegar, through Key Ovation, in the IdentiPHI bankruptcy and the amount Chris Linegar would have received on the Note if not for the conduct of DLA Piper

. (Emphasis added). Any damages that stemmed from DLA Piper’s representation of Linegar, as found by the jury in answer to Question No. 5, were limited to the injury caused by DLA Piper with respect to the note. Because the trial court submitted appropriat e broad

- fo r m questions and because the error in Question No. 5 is not reversible, w e overrule DLA Piper’s fifth issue

. In its sixth and seventh issues, DLA Piper challenges the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury’s answers to some of the liability questions: specifically, that DLA Piper and Linegar agreed to form an attorney

- client relationship and that DLA Piper made a negligent misrepresentation or committed fraud by omission. However, DLA Piper does not challenge the sufficiency of the11

evidence with respect to the jury’s finding that DLA Piper proximately caused injury

to Linegar by negligently failing to advise Linegar that DLA Piper did not represent him, which DLA Piper refers to as “the confusion claim

. ” The trial court’s judgment can be upheld on that theory of liability ; therefore, we need not address the merits
of DLA Piper’s sixth and seventh issues. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.1 ; Natho v. Shelton
, No. 03

- 11

- 00661

- CV, 2014 WL 2522051, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Austin May 30, 2014, no pet.) ; Adams v. Petrade Int’l, Inc. , 754 S.W. 2 d 696, 708

– 09 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). In its final issue, DLA Piper contends that the damages are excessive “given that [Linegar’s ] damage model was based on a crucial assumption about the funds available in bankruptcy court that [ Linegar ] never proved.” DLA Piper asserts that Linegar did not prove that he would have recovered more than an additional $587,145 in the IdentiPHI bankru ptcy. Although we agree that DLA Piper’s assertion would be correct if one was to merely consider the amount of money that Linegar would have recovered from the proceeds of the bankruptcy after Passlogix,
wh ich held a primed security interest due to its b ankruptcy loan, was paid. However, DLA Piper’s argument does not take into account all of the evidence presented by Linegar or the probability that, if Linegar’s security interest had been timely perfected, Passlogix would not have been in the picture

. Th e jury found that the difference be tween the amount awarded to Linegar on the note in the IdentiPHI bankruptcy and the amount that Linegar would have
received on the note but for DLA Piper’s conduct was $1,293,606. The re was some evidence that, if the sec urity interest had been timely perfected, Linegar would have
been the “800

- pound gorilla” and could have either foreclosed on IdentiPHI’s assets
or bid on those assets in the bankruptcy proceeding using a credit for the amount of
debt that was owed to him. The total amount of debt that IdentiPHI owed to Linegar, including both the original loan and subsequent additional loans (which were12

properly perfected ) , was approximately $2.1 million, plus interest ; IdentiPHI’s assets were sold in bankruptcy for $2

. 35 million

. Th e evidence showed that , had the security interest been timely perfected, Linegar could have obtained the $2.35
million worth of IdentiPHI assets in the bankruptcy sale without taking a penny out of his pocket. We cannot hold that t he jury awa rd ed excessive damages , and we note that the supreme court stated in its opinion in this case: “Had the security interest in the March 2008 note to Zaychan been timely perfected, Key Ovation, and thus Linegar, would have recovered the full amount due under the note

— approximately $1.67 million.” 495 S.W.3d at 278. We overrule DLA P iper’s eighth issue on appeal.
We affirm t h e jud g m

e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt.

J IM R. W RI GH T

C H I E F J U S T ICE

Decem ber 21 , 2017
Pa n e l c on s is t s o f: W

r i g ht
, C

. J

. , W ill so n , J

. , a n d B a il e y , J

.