NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0397n.06 F iled: July 1, 2008 No. 07-3575 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
OHI O MI DL AND, I

NC., ROGER BARACK, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. O H I O D EPARTMENT OF T RA N S P O R T A T IO N , D IS T R IC T 1 1 , J IM SPAI N, DEPUTY DI RECTOR; THOMAS H. CO L L I NS; JOE MA

NC HI N I I I , W EST V IR G IN IA G O V E R N O R ; N O R F O LK SOUTHE R

N RAI L WAY CO.; CI TY OF BEN WOOD MAYOR’S OF FI CE, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B e fo re : G I L MA

N, RO GE RS, M c KE AG UE , Ci rc uit Judg e s. ROGERS, Circuit J udg e. In this 42 U.S.C . § 1983 action, the plaintiffs a ppeal the district court’s de nial of their motion for lea ve to amend their complaint and appea l the district court’s g rant of summary

judgme nt to defenda

nt Norfolk Southern R ai l wa y o n its countercla im for bre ach of contra ct. Plaintiffs a

re the owner s of a bridg e spanning the Ohio River, and have soug ht to compel the Ohio Depa

rtment of Tra

nsportation either to re build the bridg e ra mp it demolis hed in 1991 or to pay the plaintiffs dama g es re sulting from lack of the ramp, including the br idge ’s long -term non-No. 07-3575

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- 2 - use and the plaintiffs’ potential liability to tear the bridg e down pur suant to a demolition or der f rom the United States Coast Guar d. For the following rea sons, we uphold both the district court’s de nial of leave to amend a

nd its gra nt of summary

judgme nt to Norfolk Southern.
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
On Se pte mbe r 1 2, 19 22 , Co ng re ss a uth or ize d th e I nte rs tate Br idg e Com pa ny (I B C) to construct, maintain, a

nd operate a toll b ri d ge o v er the Ohio River betwe en B ellaire , Ohio, and Be nwood, West V irg inia, rese rving to itself the authority to alter, amend, or re peal the a ct. See H.B. 11901. Be fore c o n s t r

u c t i n g t h e b r i d g e , IB C l e a s e d f r o m t h e P e n n s yl v an i a

R a i l r o a d C o m p a n y a pa rc e l of land on the Oh io s ide of

the ri ve r fo r co ns tr

uc tio n of one of

the br idg e ’s pie rs . T he le a se ag ree ment provided that I BC “sha ll at its o wn co st and expense construc t, maintain, rene w, and ultimately

remove said bridg e and pie r and e ach a nd every part ther eof, upon, ove r and a cross the trac ks and prope rty

owned or controlled by” the Pennsylvania Railroad Company , and also provide d that th e a g re e me nt w ou ld b e bin din g on bo th part ie s’ su c c e sso rs and a ssi g ns . D e fe nd ant N or fo lk Southern Railway

Company

is a succe ssor of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
. The B ellaire Br idge o p er at ed as a toll bridg e until 1991, when the Ohio De partment of Tr ans po rt a tio n ( OD OT ) p ur c ha se d f ro m I B C the br idg e ra

mp on the Oh io sid e of the ri ve r an d it s underlying la

nd for the pur

pose of c onstructing Ohio Route 7, which construc tion would require that the bridg e ra

mp be torn down. The plaintiffs i n t h e i n s tant case alleg e that two contr acts we re involved in this purc hase. Acc ording to the plaintiffs, the first contra ct—executed on De cembe r 5,No. 07-3575

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- 3 - 19 90 —ma de no pr ov isi on fo r d a ma g e s to the re sid

ue of the br idg e ow ne d b y

I B C. Pla int if

fs a lso
c la im that th e De c e mbe r 5 c on tr a c t e nti tle d I B C to sa lva g e mate ri a ls f ro m th e area

of the ra mp acquir ed by

ODOT. Alater c ontrac t executed on J anuar y 7, 1991, howeve r, allege dly require d compensation for damag es to the residue of the bridg e. The plaintiffs claim that the sec ond contra ct is v oid fo r l a c k o f c on sid e ratio n a nd be c a us e I B C did no t sig n it. Ac c or din g ly , th e pla int if fs c la im that th e fi rs t c on tr a c t, i n w hic h c omp ens a tio n f or dama g e to t

he br idg e re sid

ue is n ot p ro vid e d, is
co n t ro l l i n g.
F o ll o w in g s a le o f

th e b r id g e r a mp to O D O T , p la in ti f f Ro g e r B ar a c k p u r c h a s e d

I B C’ s
re ma ini ngint e re st i n th e br idg e on Marc h 2 1, 19 91 . B ara c k a nd I B C a c kn ow le dg e d in

the purc ha se ag ree ment that “the liabilities assumed clearly exceed the assets transf err ed,” a nd in consideration fo r B ara c k’ s a ssumpt ion

of I B C’ s li a bil iti e s, I B C pa id B ara c k $ 70 0, 00 0, le ss t he a mou nt i t w ou ld cost I BC to terminate a d em o l i tion contrac t. The ag ree ment specific ally acknow ledg ed ODO T’s purc ha se of

the br idg e ra

mp a nd pr ov ide d th a t B ara c k w ou ld a ssume , amon g oth e r l ia bil iti e s, a ll li abi li ti es o f I BC arising by rea son of that cer tain Purchase Ag ree ment wher eby the Ohio Depa rtment of Tr ans po rt a tio n p ur c ha se d th e Oh io r a mp t o th e B e lla ir e Brid ge o wn e d b y [I B C] and convey ed therewith by Ag ree ment dated the 5th day of Decembe r, 1990, and as supplemented by

letter a ddendum to said Ag ree ment dated Dec ember 17, 1990, and as supplemented b y C o ntrac t of Sale and Purc hase dated J anuar y 7, 1991, by

and betwee n [ODOT] and [ I BC] . . . .
J A 182-83. The ag ree ment also provided that B ara ck would assume “ [a] l l l i ab i l i ties or future obligations of [ I BC] arisin g b y re as o n of the owne rship of the B ellaire Br idge , including a nyNo. 07-3575

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- 4 - obligation on the part of [I BC] to demolish, raze and remove the re maining br idge structure . . . .” Pla int if fs c la im that, a

ro un d th e same tim e that ODO T tor e do wn the ra mp a nd c on str uc te d Ro ute 7 in its pl ace , ODOT boug ht land and pre pare d plans to rebuild the ra mp over the ne wly

constructe d Route 7, wh ic h wou ld have a llo we d the br idg e to co nti nu e op e ra tio n a s a tol l br idg e . B ara c k c la ims t h at , b el i ev i n g OD OT i n t en d edt o re b u i l d t h e r am p , h e i n t en d ed t o re s u m e o p er at i o n o f t h e b ri d ge as a toll bridg e.
ODOT de nies havinghad any plans to rebuild the ra

mp, however , and has n o t re b u i lt the ramp. In his origina l complaint, Ba rac k alleg ed that afte r he pur chase d the re maining por tion of the bridg e, ODO T “a

borted its plans to build a ramp over St ate Rout e 7 in its newly acquir ed rig ht-ofway obtained espe cially

for the ramp,” and that ODOT would not permit him to build his own ramp. I n his unsuccessf

ul attempt to amend his complaint, Bar ack a lleg ed that he “ observe d that ODOT did no t pr oc e e d w ithits pla

ns to b uil d a

ne w r a mp” and

tha t he “ the n ma de re pe a te d r e qu e sts to ODOT ove r a numbe r of y ear s to gr ant him pe rmission to build the ramp,” w hich ODOT did not act
on and “ ne ith e r g ra

nte d [n]o r r e fu se d Pl a int if fs pe rm iss ion

to b uil d a n e w r a mp. ” I t is dif fi c ult to pinpoint ex actly

when these events or non- events oc curr ed, but all par ties appea r to operate on the
a ssumpt ion

that if ODOT had plans to rebuild t he ra mp after constructingRoute 7, such plans we re abandone d in the ear ly

1990s. I n 1996, Ba

rac k assig ned all of his intere st in the remaining portion of the bridg e to co- plaintiff Ohio Midland, I nc.
I n N ov e mbe r 1 99 8, up on an in iti a l de te rm inatio n th a t th e bri dge wa s an unr e a so na ble obstruction to navig ation g iven that it had lo n g ce as ed t o operate, the United States Coast Gua rdNo. 07-3575

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Named as defe ndants wer e Gordon Proctor, Dire ctor of O DOT; Ji m Spain, Deputy Direc tor 1 of ODO T; Admiral Thomas Collins, U.S. C oast Guar d Commandant; J oe Manc hin I I I , Gover nor of Wes t V ir g ini a ; N or fo lk S ou the rn Ra ilw ay ; and

the Ma y or ’s Of fi c e of the City of Benwo od, We st Virg inia. - 5 - iss ue d B arack a

no tic e to d e mol ish

the br idg e and

pr ov ide de mol iti on

pla ns wi thi n 6 0 d ay s. Acc ording to the Coast Guard, B ara ck “ne ither subm itted demolition pl ans . . . nor made any
a tte mpt s to dis c us s th e matte r w iththe Coa st G ua rd .” As a re su lt, on No ve mbe r 1 4, 20 01 , th e Coa st Guar d order ed B ara ck to remove the bridg e. B ara ck did not remove the bridg e, and in Septembe r 20 02 the Co ast G ua

rd br ou g ht a

n a dmi nis tr a tiv e a c tio n a g a ins t B ara c k to imp os e c ivi l pe na lti e s, which we re imposed by a hear ing office r on April 21, 2004. On October 18, 2005, the Coast Guar d Commandant aff

irmed the orde r to remove the bridg e, but re duced B ara ck’s ci v i l penalties fr om $598,200 to $300,000 plus int ere st and costs.
On N o vember

17, 2005, Ba

rac k filed a c omplaint ag ainst the Commandant under the Administrative Procedur e Ac t, challeng ing the Coast Guard’ s October 18, 2005, decisions (C a s e N o. C2- 05 -1 04 4) . T hr e e we e ks late r, pla int if fs B ara c k a n d O h i o Mid land

fi le d a no the r c omp la int

a g a ins t
nume ro us de fe nd ants , in c lud ingthe Com mand ant ( Ca se No . C2 -0 5- 10 97 ). Ca se 10 97 is the c a se 1

curr ently befor e this court. The district cour t consolidated Cases 1044 a nd 1097, finding that the
case s contained common questions of law and fac t. I n May 2006, the Commandant filed a motion fo r v olu nta ry re mand in C a se 10 44 to p e rm it the Coa st G ua rd to c on du c t a de ta ile d inv e sti g a tio n in to wh e the r t he br idg e c on stitu tes an unr e a so na ble ob str uc tio n to navig a tio n a

nd to r e c on sid e r i ts decision to impose civil penalties. The district c ourt g rante d the motion. The court then dismissedNo. 07-3575

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- 6 - the Com mand ant f

ro m Ca se 10 97 , th e c a se be fo re thi s c ourt , o n th e bas is th a t B ara c k’ s c la ims ag ainst the Commandant in Case 1097 wer e duplicative of his claims in Case 1044.
I n Claim One of Case 1097 c urre ntly befor e this court, the plaintiffs alleg ed that, as
s u cc es s o rs t o I BC , t h ey

ar e e n t i t l edt o co mp en s at i o nfo r th e da m age t o t h e re m ai n d er o f t h e b ri d ge
c a us e d b y OD OT ’s a lle g e d tak ingof the ra mp. Th e pla int if

fs a lso c la ime d th a t O DO T b re a c he d it s contra ct with I BC, and there fore with the plaintiffs, by not providing I BC the sa lvag e mater ials from the de mol iti on

of the ra mp ( Clai m Two ), and tha t O DO T v iol a te d th e pla int if fs ’ c ivi l r ig hts “ to construct, maintain, a

nd operate” the br idge beca use ODO T violated House B ill 11901 by closing th e b r id g e without fede ral pe rmission (Claims Three and F our). As r emedies, the plaintiffs reque sted the fa ir mark e t val ue of the sa lva g e mate ri a ls, and re qu e ste d that ODO T be or de re d to c on str uc t a
n e w r a mp an d

p a y d a m a g e s f

o r l o s s o f t o l l p r o f i t s d a t i n g f

r o m O D O T ’ s r e m o v a l o f t h e r a mp . If OD OT wa s n ot o rd e re d to con st ruct a new ra mp, the pla int if

fs so ug ht t o c omp e l O DO T t o f ile appropr iation proce eding s to determine the a mount of damag es due to the pl ai n t i ff s cause d by ODOT’ s alleg ed takingof the ra mp. The plaintiffs a lso requeste d that ODOT be order ed to pay the plaintiffs’ civil pena lties and cost of bridg e re moval i f t he cour t did not enjoin the Coast Guard’s
remova l o rd er . Fi n al ly , the plaintiffs re quested in Claim Five that “ if Def endants OD OT ar e not compelled to construc t a new r amp . . . and the bridge is deeme d abandone d then t he re mainder of the br idg e a s a

str uc tur e sh ou ld b e ordered to r e ve rt to t he ow ne rs of

the land ,” wh ic h a lle g e dly inc lud e s th e State of

Wes t V ir g ini a , th e City of B e nw oo d, the U. S. Co a st G ua rd , a nd No rf olk Southern Railway
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- 7 - Subsequently , West Virg inia Gover nor J oe Manchin I I Ifiled a motion to dismis s Claim Five reg ardingwhat should happe n if the bridg e is de emed abandone d, which the district court g rante d, finding that the claim wa s “pure ly conjec tural” and there fore not r ipe. I n response , the plaintiffs filed bo th a mot ion fo r r e c on sid e ratio n o f t

he c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of Cla im Fi ve and a mot ion fo r l e a ve to file an a mended c omplaint. Both motions were filed on the same day
. The district court interpr eted this as an effor

t to cure the ripene ss defe ct in Claim Five and de nied both motions. I n considering the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, the c ourt focuse d entirely on Claim Five, conc luding that amendment would be futile bec ause it would not cure the ripene s s p ro b l em. The c ourt did not addre ss the plaintiffs’ propose d amendments to Claims One, Two, Thr ee, F our, or Eig ht, which, among other thing s, clarif ied: that Claims One and Two wer e taking s claims broug ht pursuant to 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3; that ODOT e mpl o y ee s P ro ctor and Spain were being sued in their individual capac i t i es; and that Proctor a nd Spain violated 33 U.S.C. § 491 by deviating from the a

pproved bridg e plans without permission from the United States Secre tary of Transpor tation. T he plaintiffs subsequently

filed a motion for c larification rega rding whether

the district court intende d to deny plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend w ith respec t to all claims, or mere ly Claim Five.
I n th e me anti me , th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d th e OD OT de fe nd ant s’ motio n to dis mis s, concludingthat they

are shielded from monetary liability by sovere ign immunit y and that all of the pla in ti ffs’ c la ims are ba

rr e d b y the a pp lic a ble statut e of

lim itatio ns . Re fe rr ing

to t he pla int if

fs ’ orig inal complaint, the cour t acknowle dg ed conf

usion reg ardingwhether

Proctor a n d Sp a in h a d been
su e d in the ir of fi c ia l or pe rs on a l c a

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- 8 - Plaintiffs admit that their orig inal Complaint di d not m ak e ex p licit alleg ations of pe rs on a l li a

bil ity , so tha t one mig ht re a so na bly int e rp re t the Com

pla int a s se e kin g to imp os e of fi c ia l li a bil ity e nf or c e a ble a g a ins t State fu

nd s. Th e y

se e k to c lari fy

the ir int e nt i n th e Pr op os e d A me nd e d Co mpl a int , w hic h h a s b e e n d e nie d. Th is C ourt wi ll, ho we ve r, c on sid e r P la int if fs ’ cl a ims in lig ht of the ir int e nt se t for th i n th e ir Re sp on se in Opposition.
J A 382 n.7. Findingthat both parties had tr eate d the suit as an off icial-c apac ity

suit, the court conclude d that the plaintiffs’ c laims were barr ed by the Eleve nth Amendment insofar as they soug ht money damag es. To the ex tent that the pl aintiffs sought prospec tive relief , the cour t concluded that the plaintiffs’ c lai m s we re barr ed by the applica

ble statute of limitations. Reasoning that the plaintiffs knew of

their injury

in 1990-91 at the ear liest a nd in 2001 at the latest, the c ourt conc luded that the pl aintiffs’ claims acc rued much longe r t han two y ear s befor e sui t was ini tiated i n 2005. The court additionally reje cted plaintiffs’ argument that ODOT’ s “continued de cision” not to rebuild the bridg e wa s a “c ontinuing violation” that tolled the statute of limitations.
I n response to the plaintiffs’ motion for cla rification, the district co urt clar ified in Marc h 2007 that its “ November 28, 2006 Orde r denying leave [t o amend] applied to P l ai n t i ff s ’ e nti re proposed a

mended c omplaint, not only to Claim 5.” The cour

t offer ed no ela

boration, other tha

n that “Plaintiffs have not thus far submitted a propose d amende d complaint that satisfies Rule 15(a) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e.” Duringthe cour se of pr ocee dings, de fenda nt Norfolk Southern Railway had both filed a counter claim ag ainst plaintiffs for br eac h of contra ct and moved f or su m m ar y

judgme nt on that
c laim
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- 9 - Ag ree ment with the Pennsy lvania R ailroad Company , Norfolk’ s prede cessor , to “at its own cost and
e xpe ns e . . . u lti mate ly

re mov e [the ] br idg e and

pie r a nd e a c h a nd e ve ry pa rt the re of ,” the pla int if

fs , having assumed for considera tion a ll of I BC’s liabiliti es conce rning the bridg e, owe an oblig ation to No r f o lk to c o mp ly

w it h th e te r ms o f th e L e a s e A g r e e me n t a

n d h a v e th e r e f

o r e b r e a c h e d

the contra ct by

failing to remove the bridg e. The district c ourt g rante d Norfolk Southern’ s motion for summary judgme nt, holding that the plaintiffs’ contra ctua l duty to remove the bridg e had a risen beca use of the long -term non- use of the br idge , and reje cting plaintiffs’ argument that its obli g ation to remove the bridg e had not be en trig g ere d beca use the Coast Gua

rd may ultimately

reve rse its order to demolish the bridge
. On appeal, t he plainti ffs arg ue that the di strict court a bused its discretion by

denying le ave to amend Claims One, Two, Thr ee, F our, and Eig ht ag ainst Proctor and Spain, and that the court
e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt to No rf

olk Southe rn on its c ounte rc la im f or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t.
II. M ot ion to Am e nd
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe pla int if

fs le a ve to a

me nd the ir complaint. Although de ni al of leave to ame nd with no acc ompanying e x planation is g ener ally an abuse of discretion, se e Fo ma n v . D av is , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), failure to provide an e x planation is n ot per se ana

b u s e o f d is c r e ti o nif

, a s h e r e , th e r e a s o n s ar e r e a d il y a p pare nt, s ee Troxe ll v. Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn Bicyc le Co. , 48 9 F .2 d 96 8, 97 1 (6 th Ci r. 1 97 3); Miller v. Ad mi nis tra tiv e Of

fic e of C ou rts , 448 F.3d 887, 898 ( 6th Cir
. 2 0 0 6 ). It is clear f rom the districtNo. 07-3575

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When a d i s t ri ct court denies leave to amend on the g round that the propose d amendment 2 wo uld no t surv ive a

mot ion to d ism iss , th e sta

nd ard of re vie w i s de novo
. Gree nberg v. Life Ins. Co. of V irg ini a , 177 F.3d 507, 522 (6th Cir. 1999)
. Although the district court did not expl icitly provide futil ity a s it s re a so n for de nying le a ve to am e nd Cla ims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, we re vie w i ts d e nia l de novo in a ccor dance with our conclusion that futility is the rea son rea dily appar ent from the rec ord for the de nia l. - 10 - court’s dismissal o f p l ai n t i ff s ’ o ri gi n al cl ai m s aga i n s tt h e O DO T d ef en d an t s t h at t h e c o u rt co n s i d er ed those claims to be time-ba rre d. The c ourt conc luded that the applica ble statute of li m i t at ions had l o n g ex p i re d , an d

re j ec t edp l ai n t i ff

s ’ a rgu m en tt h at t h e s t at u t e h a d b e e n t o l l edo na c o n t i n u i n gviolation theory . Although the district court wa s consideringthe plaintiffs’ c laims for prospe ctive
re lie f i n s o c on c lud ing , th e pla int if fs ’ a me nd e d c la ims a g a ins t Proc tor and Spa in fo r d a ma g e s w ou ld fail for the same r eason. It i s t h u s rea dily appar ent from the district c ourt’s ea rlier r easoningthat leave to amend Claims One, Two, Thr ee, F our, and Eig ht was denie d beca use the c ourt conc luded that amendment would be futile.
Mo re ov e r, we a g re e that ame ndme nt o f C la ims On e , T wo , T hr e e , F our, and Ei g ht w ou ld indeed have bee n fut i l e. Be cause the plaintiffs’ amended c laims acc rued muc h longe r than two 2 y e ars be fo re su it w a s c omm e nc e d a nd do no t f a ll into the “ c on tin

uin g vio latio n” c a te g or

y of c la ims fo r whic h to lli ngis ap pr op ri a te , the pla int if fs ’ am e nd e d cla ims are a ll b arr e d b y the a pp lic a ble statut e of limitations. The plaintiffs’ theory

of takingis that a taking occur red be cause the economic value of the bridg e wa s destroy ed. The economic value of the bridg e was destroy ed beca use the Ohio ra

mp was not rebuilt, thus effe ctively closing the bridg e. See Proposed Amended Complaint ¶¶ 19- 20 (“SuchNo. 07-3575

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- 11 - closure pr evente d any

use of the B ridg e and substantially reduc ed or destroy ed the f air mar ket value of the re sidue of the B ridg e, and constitutes a taking . . . .”). U nder the plaintiffs’ theor y , then, the rele vant time that plaintiffs would be “ on notice” of the t aking is the t ime they wer e on notice that they would not be re ceivinga new ramp. See R uff v. Runyon , 2 5 8 F
. 3 d 4 9 8 , 5 0 0 ( 6 th Cir. 2001) (holding that the statute of limitations beg ins to ru n u n d er fe d er al law “ when plaintiffs kne w or sh ou ld h a ve kn ow n o f t

he inj ur y wh ic h f or ms the ba sis of

the ir c la ims ” ); Kuhnle Bros. , In c. v. County of Geauga , 103 F.3d 516, 520 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (“In deter mining whe n the ca

use of a ction
acc rues in section 1983 actions, [ courts] have looked to what event should have a lerted the ty pical lay persons to protec t his or her rig hts.”).
Acc ording to the plaintiffs, the Ohio ramp was not r ebuilt f or two rea sons: ( 1) ODO T ref used to r e bu ild the ra mp; and (2 ) O DO T n e ve r r e sp on de d to B ara c k’s requ est s to bu ild a ne w r a mp hi mself. As stated a

bove, althoug h the pre cise timing is not clea r fr om the rec ord, it is clear that Ba rac k would have be en on notice dur ing the ear ly 1990s that ODOT did not intend to r ebuild the
ra mp. Mo re ov e r, B ara c k r e a lis tic a lly wa s on no tic e that OD OT did no t in te nd

to a llo w h im t o b uil d his own ramp sometime during the early 1990s, when ODOT i s alleg ed to have repe atedly ref used to gr ant B ara ck per

mission t o build his own ramp, whether thr oug h an outrig ht denial of pe rmission or inac tion on his requests. Even giving plaintiffs the benefit of t he doubt, Ba rac k was certainly

on notice that there would be no new ramp in 1998, when ODO T was pr epar ed to stand by and allow the bridg e to be r azed foll owing the C oast Guar d’s demolition order. Conseque ntly , the plaintiffs had re ason to know of their injur y i n t h e ea rly

1990s, and in 1998 at the late st, and the statute ofNo. 07-3575

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The for eg oing statute-of- limit ations analy sis applies to e a c h o f p la in ti f f s ’ p r o p o s e d

amende d 3 claims (1, 2, 3, 4, and 8). A s the ODOT de fenda nts ex plained, “Plaintiffs’ c laims are a ll premised up on a c tio ns take n in 19 90 -1 99 1 re g ard ing the re mov a l of the br idg e ra mp. Th is i s w he n th e y

did not r ece ive compensation, it is w hen they wer e not a llowed to r emove sa lvag e mater ials, and whe n the bridg e wa s closed without fede ral pe rmission.” - 12 - limit ations theref

ore a ccr ued much long er tha

n two y ear s befor e plaintiffs commence d suit in 2005. Ow e ns v . O k

ur e , 488 U.S. 235, 239-41, 250 (1989) ( holding that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is the most closely analog ous state li m i t at i o n s period for g ener al per sonal injury

claims); Browning v. Pendleton , 869 F.2d 989, 992 ( 6th Cir. 1989) (h old ingthat th e ana log ou s Oh io s tatut e is O.R.C. § 2305.10(A), which provide s a limitations period of 2 year s). The pla intiffs’ amende d Claims One, Two, Thre e, F our, and Eight, all stemming from the same eve nts, are the refore timebarr ed. 3
Th e pla int if

fs se e k to a vo id t

his c on c lus ion

by arguin g that, be c a

us e the OD OT de fe nd ants
c o u l d t h e o r e t i c a l l y h a v e a u t h o r i z e d t h e c o n s t r

u c t i o n o f a n e w r a mp u n t i l t h e C o a s t G ua rd fi na lly
or de re d th e br idg e ’s de mol iti on , the pla int if fs ’ inj ur y did no t be c ome pe rm ane nt, and thu s th e statut e of limitations d i d n o t beg in to accr ue, until October

2005. This argument is unpersuasive. As sumin g pla int if

fs are c or re c t th a t th e statut e of

lim itatio ns did no t be g in t o a c c ru e un til it b e c a me clea r that their injury

was pe rmane nt, the rele vant inquiry is permane n t v er s u s temporar y , not p h ys i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y v e r s u s i mp o s s i b i l i t y. On plaintiffs’ theor y of taking , the time at which the de pr ivatio n b e c a me “ pe rm ane nt rathe r tha n te mpo ra

ry” is de te rm ine d by

OD OT , n ot b y

the Coa st Guar d’s actions. After all, the pl aintiffs’ theory is that ODOT’s r efusa l to build or allow construction of a ne w ramp has rende red the bridg e ec onomically valueless. Reg ardle ss o f t h e C oast Guar d’sNo. 07-3575

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The plaintiffs a lso emphas i z e t h e fi nality of the Coast Gua

rd’s de cision. See Blue Br . 27 4 (“Simply put, the 1998 notice, 2001 orde r and 2004 hear ing of fice r dec ision were not f

inal ag ency action.”) . But this does not say when the statute of limitations bega n to acc rue. - 13 - actions, the bridge is economica lly valueless on this theory as l ong as ODO T maintains its posit ion
no t to all ow c on str

uc tio n o f a

ne w r a mp. Con se qu e ntl y , w hil e it i s e a sy to s e e ho w the Coa st Gu ard ’s or de r t o de mol ish the br idg e re nd e rs the br idg e ’s la c k o f v a lue “ pe rm ane nt, ” the pla int if fs ’ injury was “ perma

nent rather than te mporary” in the re levant sense when it was c lear that ODOT
wo uld ne ith er bu il d no r a llo w c on str uc tio n o f a

ne w r a mp. As e xpla ine d a bo ve , th is o c c ur

re d in 19 98 a t th e late st. 4
The plaintiffs also seek to a void the conclusion that their amende d claims are time-barr ed by arguing that the s tatute of limit ations was tol led because the ODOT defenda nts’ actions or inac tions
c on sti tut e d a

“ c on tin uin g vio latio n” that r e c ur

re d e ve ry se c on d th e vio latio n wa s n ot s top pe d. Th is
argume nt i s a lso un

pe rs ua siv e . Con tr ary

to t he pla int if

fs ’ a sse rt ion s, the fa c t th a t Pr oc tor and Spa in did not rever se OD OT ’s early -1990s dec isions does not fit int o the “c ontinuing violation” framework.
Courts have a llowed the statute of limitations t o be tolled when: ( 1) “the re is some e vidence of pre sent [prohibit ed] activity g iving rise to a claim of a continuing violation” a

nd “at lea st one of the forbidde n . . . acts occur s within the rele vant limit ations period” ; or (2) there is a “long standing and demonstra

ble policy ” of the fo rb i d den ac tivity
. See Trzebuc kowski v. City of Cleveland , 319 F.3d 853, 857 ( 6th Cir. 2003). This court has distinguishe d betwee n “contin u i n g v i o lations” andNo. 07-3575

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The plaintiffs c ite Gordon v. City of W arren , 5 79 F.2 d 3 86 (6 th C ir . 1 97 8) , in wh ic h th is 5 c ourt he ld that, by imp os ing a sto p o rd e r a g a ins t th e pla int if fs ’ u se of pr op e rt y in a c c or da

nc e wi th a loca l ordinance , seekingan injunction, defe nding the appe als of that injunction, and maintaining the stop order

throug hout the enti re c ourse of the litigation, the loca lity eng ag ed in a “ continuing course of ac tion which made it impossible f or the plaintiffs to e njoy

the full use of the ir proper ty ,” there by tolling t he st atute of limit ations. The inst ant ca se is distinguishable in that all Proctor a nd S p ai nar e a l l ege d

t o h av e d o n e i s n o tre v er s e w h at p l ai n t i ff s co n s i d e r t o b e t h e o ri gi n al t ak i n g. Moreove r, Gordon has bee n repe atedly distinguished in t h i s an d other c ircuits. Se e Kuh nleBr os . v. County of

Geauga , 1 03 F .3 d 5 16 , 5 21 n. 4 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 7) ; Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleve land , 319 F .3 d 8 53 , 8 58 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) ; Cowell v. Palmer Tp. , 263 F .3 d 286 , 2 93 (3 d Ci r. 20 01 ); Oce an Acres Ltd . v . D ar e Cou nty

Bd . o f H e alt h , 707 F.2d 103, 106 ( 4th Cir. 1983).

- 14 - “ c on tin uin g e ff e c ts o f p ri or

vio latio ns ,” ho we ve r, and c lari fi ed th at “th e pr e se nt e ff e c ts o f p a st discrimination
. . . do not trig g er a continuing violations exception.” Te ne nb au m v . Ca lde ra , 45 F. App’x 416, 419 (6th Ci r 2002) ( cit i n g Dixon v. A nderson , 928 F.2d 212, 216 ( 6th Cir. 1991) (a br og a te d o n o th er g ro un ds )) . A nd , a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d, c ourt s h a ve be e n “ e xtre me ly reluc tant to apply

[t he cont i n u i n g v i o l ations] doctrine outside of the conte x t of Title VI I .” LRL Props. v. Portage Me tro Hous. Auth. , 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.3 ( 6th Cir. 1995)).
The instant c ase is not one in which a ser ies of re peate d constitutional viol ations occur red. Rather, one alleg ed constitutional violation occurr ed in the early 1990s that simply was not re verse d. As the dis tr ic t c ourt

e xpla ine d, the OD OT de fe nd ants ’ al le g e d “c on tin ue d d e c isi on ” no t to re bu ild the ra mp wa s me re ly a manif

e statio n of the a lle g e d pr ior takin g . Th e pla int if fs ’ a me nd e d cl aims 5 there fore do not fit within t he continuing -violations frame work.
T h a tt h i s c a s e d o e s n o tf

a l l i n t o t h e “ c o n t i nu i n g v i o l a t i o n s ” f r a m e w o r k a l s o m a k e s s e n s e . If thi s c ourt we re to a c c e pt the pla int if fs ’ the or y that a takin g is c on tin

uo us un til it i s r e ve rs e d, the n a llNo. 07-3575

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- 15 - takin g s w ou ld c on sti tut e “ c on tin uin g vio latio ns ,” tol lin g the st atut e of lim ita tio ns . T he re wo uld eff ectively be no statute of limitations, and the plaintiffs’ theory could easily be extended to many other violations outside of the taking s context. This is not the law.
III. Su m m ary Judgm ent to Nor fol k Sou thern
We a lso a ff

i r m th e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s g r an t o f s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t t o N o r f

o l k S o u t h e r

n on its
c ounte rcl aim for brea c h o f c on tr a c t. T he pla int if fs are bo un d to No rf

olk Southe rn by the L e a se Ag ree ment executed betwe en the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and I BC and ha ve a c ontrac tual obligation to “ultim ately

remove ” the br idge . The plai n t i ff s ar g ued bef

ore the district court that “per formanc e of the promise to ‘ultimately remove ’ the B ridg e is not due at this time beca use the iss ue wh e the r i t mu st b e re mov e d h a s n ot b e e n b ro ug ht final ly to t he e nd ,” no tin g that th e Coa st Guar d had soug ht a voluntary rema nd for further

consideration of its orders and that the district court had not y et ruled on the i ssue of the bridge’ s remova l. The court disag ree d. On the district cour t’s
rea ding of the L ease Ag ree ment, “the contrac t as a whole .
. . implies that, once the land i s no longe r being used for

the B ridg e, the lessee [ plaintiffs] must remove the s tructure .” The court conclude d on this basis that plainti ffs’ c ontrac tual duty to remove t h e b ri d ge had, indeed, bec ome due, reg ardle ss of the Coast Guar d’s ultimate deter mination reg ardingwhe t h er t h e bridge is an
unrea sonable obstruc tion to navigation, because “[t] he Bridg e has been non-functioning for y ear s,”
and “ the te rm ‘u lti mate re mov a l’ do e s n ot r e ly on ou tsi de de te rm inatio ns ” and “ [t]he pa rt ie s’ int e nt,
un de r t he pla in m e anin g of

the c on tr a c t, g ive s n o r e g ard to a ny de termin a tio ns ma de by

the Coa st Gu ard .” Ac c or di ngly , the d istri c t c ourt c on c lud e d th a t th e pla int if fs br e a c he d th e ir

c on tr a c t w ithNo. 07-3575

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- 16 - Norfolk Sout h er n by

failing to remove the bridg e and or dere d Ba rac k to remove it for

“‘the pr ote c tio n a

nd sa fe ty of the pr op e rt

y ow ne d
. . . a s w e ll a s th e pr ote c tio n a nd sa fe ty of the e mpl oy e e s, patrons and lice nsees’ of Norf olk.” J A 425 (c iting the L ease Ag ree ment). On appe al, the plaintiffs have conc eded—both in their br iefs and at oral ar g u m ent—t he district court’s pre mise that the L ease Ag ree ment require s them to r emove the bridg e once it can no longe r be use d as a br idge : “I f [plaintiffs] . . . wer e g rante d the injunctive re lief they have r equeste d,
a new ramp would be built and they would be able . . . to operate the B ridg e. They would not have
a du ty to ‘ ult imate ly

re mov e ’ t

he po rt ion o n and ov e r N or fo lk S ou the rn ’s pr op e rt y , s o lo nga s it
rema ined in operation.” The plaintiffs made simil ar statements in their re ply brief, e x plaining that if the Coast Guar d allows the bridg e to stand and the court order s ODOT to a llow construction of
a new ramp, “ then the B ridg e ca n or will sti ll be opera

ble. In that case Ohio Midland and B ara ck wi ll n ot h a ve a

c on tr a c tua l du ty a t that tim e to ‘ ult imate ly re mov e ’ t

he B ri dg e be c a

us e it m ay

sti ll be used as a Br idge .” Be cause all parties a g ree that the plaintiffs have a contr actua l duty to remove the bridg e once it can no long er be used as a bridg e, it is fair to sa y —as the district c ourt did— that thi s d uty wa s tr ig g e re d s ome tim e in t he sixte e n y e ars duri ng wh ic h the br idg e ha s b e e n in op e ra ble wi th n o r e a so na

ble e xpe c tatio n o f r e -u se . T his du ty in no wa y hin g e s o n th e a c tio ns of

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F or thi s r e a so n, the pla int if

fs ’ exte nd e d disc us sio n of pr ima ry jur isd ic tio n is no t on

po int
. 6 We do no t addre ss the plaintiffs’ ar g uments conce rning mutual mist ake of fac t and 7 frustration of purpose be cause these a rg uments were not raised be low. - 17 - Guar d. Consequently , the plaintiffs’ sixt een- y ear failure to remove the bridg e constitutes a br eac h 6 of c on tr a c t. 7
IV. Conclusion
The district cour

t did not abuse its discretion in denying pla intiffs’ motion for leave to amend the ir c omp la int

and th e cou rt pr op e rl y

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt t o N or fo lk S ou the rn on its
c ounte rc la im f

or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. We the re fo re a ff ir m.