IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 )

v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 16-0018-WS

 )

PEDRO PICASSO GARCIA and )

JACQUELINE BUSTAMANTE, ) PUBLISH

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendants’ motions to suppress. (Docs. 54, 

57). The government has filed a response, (Doc. 60), and the defendants a reply. (Docs. 

63, 66).

On December 15, 2015, defendant Garcia was driving a vehicle east on Interstate 

10; defendant Bustamante was his passenger. The defendants were pulled over by 

Lieutenant Cayton for changing lanes without signaling, and a search of the stopped 

vehicle uncovered suspected narcotics. The defendants are charged with drug offenses, 

and Garcia is also charged with an immigration offense.

The defendants raise the following challenges: (1) the traffic stop was illegal; (2) 

the detention was illegally extended; (3) the defendants were seized/arrested without 

probable cause; and (4) the search was conducted without a warrant or valid consent.1 

The first of these challenges implicates a purely legal threshold issue, which the Court 

resolves herein. Resolution of the remainder of the first challenge, and resolution of the 

other challenges, depends upon a determination of facts, for which an evidentiary hearing 

is required.

As the defendants concede, (Doc. 55 at 3), “[a]s a general matter, the decision to 

stop an automobile is reasonable [under the Fourth Amendment] where the police have 

 1 In her reply brief, Bustamante extends her challenge to the search of her purse. (Doc. 

63 at 7).

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probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 

517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “An officer’s mistake of fact may provide the objective basis 

for reasonable suspicion or probable cause under the Fourth Amendment ....” United 

States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). However, “a mistake of 

law cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop.” Id. at 

1279. The defendants argue it is not illegal under Alabama law to change lanes without 

signaling, such that Lt. Cayton made a mistake of law that cannot justify the initial 

detention. 

“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and 

shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such 

movement can be made with safety.” Ala. Code § 32-5A-88(1). The defendants 

correctly note that nothing in this provision requires the use of a signal when changing 

lanes, (Doc. 55 at 4), but they have cited the wrong provision. As the government points 

out, (Doc. 60 at 5), the provision at issue is Section 32-5A-133.

“No person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and 

until such movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 

appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.” Ala. Code § 32-5A-133(a). The 

defendants do not deny that “moving right or left upon a roadway” includes changing 

lanes, and it clearly does so.2 They argue, however, that Section 32-5A-133(a) does not 

require a signal if “such movement can be made with reasonable safety” without one. 

(Doc. 63 at 3, 5). 

For this proposition, the defendants first rely on United States v. One 1993 Ford 

F150 Pickup, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (M.D. Ala. 2001). Judge Thompson, without 

discussion, described Section 32-5A-133(a) as “requir[ing] a motorist to use his turn 

signal whenever moving his vehicle left or right ‘unless and until such movement can be 

 2 Indeed, the defendants insist that the phrase encompasses “even the most miniscule 

migration of a vehicle in either direction.” (Doc. 63 at 2).

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made with reasonable safety.’” Id. at 1262.3 He then ruled that the arresting officer had 

probable cause to stop the defendant when he merged into a turn-only lane without giving 

an appropriate signal. Id. at 1262-63. The arresting officer “also could conclude 

reasonably that the lane change could not be made with reasonable safety absent the use 

of a turn signal.” Id. at 1263. The defendants glean from 1993 Ford “the implication ... 

that if the lane change could occur with reasonable safety, a turn signal would not be 

required.” (Doc. 63 at 5).4

As a matter of policy, the defendants’ position may be defensible; there may or 

may not be a good reason to require motorists to signal a lane change when, for example, 

no one else is there to see it.5 The Court, however, has not been commissioned to 

develop Alabama policy; its function is only to construe Section 32-5A-133(a) as it is 

written. And the Court can discern no principled way to construe the clear language of 

that provision as requiring a signal only when a lane change cannot safely be negotiated 

without one. 

Section 32-5A-133(a) identifies two restrictions on turning or changing lanes. 

First, the movement must be capable of being made with reasonable safety. Second, the 

driver must give an appropriate signal. The two restrictions are introduced by “[n]o 

person shall” and connected with “nor.” The word “nor” means “[a]nd not; or not; not 

either.”6 It therefore denotes a second, additional negative. Section 32-5A-133(a) thus 

signifies that a driver shall not change lanes when it is unsafe and shall not change lanes 

 3 Several years later, Judge Thompson reached a different conclusion in United States v. 

Dorsey, 2003 WL 23306149 (M.D. Ala. 2003). See infra note 15.

4 It is not clear that the defendants seriously advance this argument, since they elsewhere 

acknowledge that Section 32-5A-133(a) “states that once a driver is confident reasonable safety 

exists to either turn or move right or left upon a roadway, he must give an appropriate signal.” 

(Doc. 63 at 1-2). Since the argument is asserted, however, the Court addresses it.

5 On the other hand, it might not be prudent policy to encourage motorists not to use turn 

signals whenever they decide one is unnecessary.

6 American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1201 (5th ed. 2011); Webster’s 

New College Dictionary 763 (3rd ed. 2008).

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without a signal. Nothing in the statutory language supports the idea that the two 

provisions are alternative restrictions rather than cumulative restrictions. Indeed, if they 

were alternative restrictions, as the defendants propose, it would be equally permissible 

for a driver to change lanes when it is manifestly unsafe, so long as he uses a signal. The 

text of Section 32-5A-133(a) does not support such a nonsensical reading.

The Alabama Legislature did not create Section 32-5A-133 from whole cloth. 

Rather, that section – and much of the 1980 Alabama Rules of the Road Act7 generally –

was derived from the Uniform Vehicle Code (“UVC”). See, e.g., Swann v. City of 

Huntsville, 455 So. 2d 944, 948 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (Section 32-5A-194(a)(4) was 

derived from the UVC).

8 Section 32-5A-133(a) is itself a verbatim repetition of Section 

11-604 of the UVC as it existed in 1979. Traffic Laws Annotated 1979 at 197 (“TLA 

1979”).9 Prior to 1962, Section 11-604 provided that “[n]o person shall so turn any 

vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the 

event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.” Id. (emphasis added).10 A 

1962 amendment deleted the italicized language, and “[t]he purpose of this amendment 

was to require a turn signal even though a turning movement may not apparently affect 

other traffic.” Id. A 1971 amendment produced the language adopted by the Alabama 

Legislature in 1980, and after that amendment “[t]he important rule that remains is that 

drivers should always give a signal before turning or before moving right or left upon a 

 7 Ala. Code §§ 32-5A-1 et seq.

8 See also Ala. Code §§ 32-5A-7 to -11, -30, -36, -54, -56 to -59, -89, -113, -115, -136, 

-151, -154, -155, -178, -215, -243 commentary (noting derivation from UVC).

9 TLA 1979 was produced by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and 

Ordinances (“the Committee”) and is available online at Google Books.

10 Prior to the 1980 revisions, Alabama law used identical language. Cox v. Miller, 361 

So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Ala. 1978).

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roadway.” Id. (emphasis added).11 Because Section 32-5A-133(a) is a verbatim adoption 

of Section 11-604, it inescapably is subject to the same, textually obvious construction. 

Unable to support their construction within the four corners of Section 32-5A133(a), the defendants turn to subsection (b), which provides that “[a] signal of intention 

to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 

100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Ala. Code § 32-5A-133(b) (emphasis 

added). The defendants rely on Bowers v. State, 473 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. App. 1996), which, 

in interpreting Georgia’s similar (but not identical) statute, concluded that the quoted 

phrase would be superfluous if a signal were always required. Id. at 203. The Bowers 

Court avoided this superfluity by construing the statute to require a signal only if the lane 

change cannot be accomplished with reasonable safety. Id.

12

The Bowers Court, like the defendants, failed to address the UVC from which the 

lane-changing statute was derived. Section 11-604(b) has included the phrase, “when 

required,” since 1944. TLA 1979 at 198. The phrase was added when Section 11-604(a) 

still required a signal only when “other traffic may be affected by such movement,” and it 

was never deleted by the Committee after the 1962 deletion of the qualifying language 

from Section 11-604(a). Because, in the post-1962 world, Section 11-604(a) always 

requires a signal when changing lanes, the “when required” language of Section 11-

604(b) and Section 32-5A-133(b) is indeed a superfluous artifact of that earlier period.

13 

But precisely because the clear intent of Section 11-604(a) and Section 32-5A-133(a) is 

 11 Consistent with the defendants’ concession, TLA 1979 confirms that “moving right or 

left upon a roadway” includes “when a driver changes lanes.” Id. at 198.

12 “As [a] decisio[n] not concurred in by all panel members, Bowers ... do[es] not 

constitute binding precedent.” Morgan v. State, 710 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Ga. App. 2011). 

However, because the Eleventh Circuit has assumed that Bowers reflects Georgia law, see 

Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1296 n.6 (11th Cir. 2000), the Court does so as well. 

13 While “there is a presumption ... that no superfluous words ... were used” in a 

legislative enactment, State Superintendent of Education v. Alabama Education Association, 144 

So. 3d 265, 273 (Ala. 2013) (internal quotes omitted), the discussion in text rebuts that 

presumption. 

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to “always” require a signal, it would be improper to nullify that clear intent for the mere 

sake of avoiding a nominal superfluity. It is, after all, “th[e] Court’s responsibility in a 

case involving statutory construction to give effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting a 

statute when that intent in manifested in the wording of the statute ....” City of Prichard 

v. Baizer, 95 So. 3d 1, 3 (Ala. 2012) (internal quotes omitted). Following Bowers as the 

defendants suggest would violate that duty.14 

The defendants complain that the cases cited by the government do not actually 

state that a signal is required even when it is safe to change lanes without one. (Doc. 63 

at 3-4). Given the clarity of the result, the absence of such authority would not be

significant but, in any event, several federal cases have in fact reached the same 

conclusion as the Court, albeit with less analysis.15 

Finally, the defendants argue that Section 32-5A-133, even if it requires a signal 

with each lane change, does not provide drivers with constitutionally sufficient notice as 

to what sort of signal is adequate and is thus unconstitutionally vague. The asserted 

vagueness arises because, while subsection (a) states that the “appropriate signal” will be 

described “hereinafter,” subsection (b) addresses only the appropriate signal when 

turning, not when changing lanes, leaving motorists to guess at how much signal is 

needed. (Doc. 63 at 1-3). 

 14 Even were the Court to adopt the Bowers approach, under Georgia law a turn signal is 

always required when another vehicle is in the vicinity. United States v. Frazier, 2008 WL 

5245876 at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2008); accord United States v. Woods, 385 Fed. Appx. 914, 916 (11th

Cir. 2010). The defendants have not suggested that no vehicles were in the vicinity when Garcia 

changed lanes. 

15 See Brown v. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1325 n.13 (S.D. Ala. 

2014) (“Alabama drivers are not permitted to change lanes without activating their turn signals 

....”); United States v. Scott, 2014 WL 948471 at *3 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (“Based on the court’s 

finding that Scott activated his turn signal at the same time he began to move into the turn lane, 

the court finds Captain Amos had probable cause to stop Scott for failing to signal his move into 

the turn lane in accordance with Alabama law.”); United States v. Dorsey, 2003 WL 23306149 at 

*3 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“Rather than creating an exception to the turn signal requirement when a 

turn can be executed safely, the statute provides that a driver must both turn only when it is safe 

to do so and signal his turn before making it.”). 

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Assuming without deciding that Section 32-5A-133 is impermissibly vague in this 

regard, the defendants do not explain how such vagueness could help them. They do not 

assert that Garcia gave a signal that Lt. Cayton deemed inadequate, and the government 

represents without contradiction that Garcia gave no signal at all. (Doc. 60 at 1).16 In the 

absence of any signal, Garcia unquestionably violated the statute’s clear command to 

give some signal, and that clear violation provided Lt. Cayton probable cause for the stop, 

regardless of whether he could have lawfully stopped Garcia under different 

circumstances.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court rules that it is a violation of Alabama 

law to change lanes without a signal, even if the lane change can be safely accomplished 

without such a signal. To the extent Lt. Cayton stopped the vehicle for changing lanes 

without a signal, he did not act under a mistake of law such as to eliminate probable 

cause justifying a traffic stop.

The defendants’ motions to suppress are hereby set for an evidentiary hearing on 

April 25, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2-A. 

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 16 Without asserting that Garcia signaled his lane change, the defendants state that Lt. 

Cayton was parked alongside the interstate and so could not have observed whether Garcia 

signaled. (Doc. 57 at 2, 3). (According to the government, Lt. Cayton was not stopped but was 

driving behind Garcia’s vehicle. (Doc. 60 at 1).) What Lt. Cayton did observe or could have 

observed cannot be determined prior to an evidentiary hearing, but in any event the defendants’ 

assertion does not undermine the government’s position that the stop was based on the failure to 

give any signal at all, not on the giving of an inadequate signal. 

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