This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

C.R. ENGLAND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY;

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY OF ARIZONA;

and SWIFT TRANSPORTATION SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20170561

Filed February 27, 2019

On Certification from the 

United States District Court for the District of Utah

The Honorable Dee V. Benson 

Case No. 2:14-CV-781-DB

Attorneys:

Scott A. Hagen, Robert O. Rice, Michael K. Erickson, 

Salt Lake City, for appellant

Stephen E. Hale, Bryan S. Johansen, Rachel L. Wertheimer, 

Salt Lake City, for appellees

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, 

JUSTICE PEARCE and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 In this case1 we are asked to interpret, and ultimately 

overturn, a rule we established in St. Benedict’s Development Co. v. 

_____________________________________________________________

1 This case comes to us as a certified question from the Federal 

District Court, District of Utah.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

2

St. Benedict’s Hospital.2 In St. Benedict’s we held that to prevail on a 

claim for intentional interference with contract, the plaintiff must 

show that the defendant interfered through “improper means.”3 C.R. 

England, Inc. (England) argues that St. Benedict’s was wrongly 

decided and should, therefore, be overruled.

¶2 In so arguing, England asserts that the factors for overruling 

precedent we established in Eldridge v. Johndrow4—(1) the 

persuasiveness of the authority and (2) how firmly the precedent has 

become established in law—weigh in England’s favor. We disagree. 

Because the “improper means” element has become firmly 

embedded in Utah law since St. Benedict’s was decided, and because 

it remains a good rule, we decline to overturn it.

¶3 Additionally, we are asked to clarify what constitutes 

improper means for the purposes of a claim for intentional 

interference with contract. In Leigh, we explained that the element of 

“improper means is satisfied where the means used to interfere with 

a party’s economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of 

statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules,” or if “they 

violate an established standard of a trade or profession.”5 And in 

St. Benedict’s we applied this definition of improper means to claims 

involving existing contracts.6 We reaffirm this definition7 and clarify 

_____________________________________________________________

2 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

3 The court in St. Benedict’s actually held that the plaintiff must 

show that the defendant interfered through improper means or with 

an improper purpose, but our decision in Eldridge v. Johndrow

subsequently eliminated the improper purpose prong. 2015 UT 21, 

¶ 14, 345 P.3d 553. For this reason, we do not refer to the improper 

purpose prong when discussing St. Benedict’s or Leigh Furniture &

Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the case upon which our 

decision in St. Benedict’s relied.

4 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22.

5 Leigh, 657 P.2d at 308 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

6 811 P.2d at 201.

7 We note, however, that we have defined improper means by 

referring to a non-exhaustive list. In other words, by reaffirming the 

language in Leigh we are not suggesting that the improper means 

(continued)
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Opinion of the Court

3

that to constitute an “established standard of a trade or profession,” 

the standard or rule must be an objective one accepted throughout 

the relevant industry.

Background8

¶4 England is a trucking company. As part of its business, it 

trains and hires individuals to work as truck drivers. To protect its 

investment in training individuals to work as truck drivers, England 

enters into employment contracts wherein the truck drivers agree to 

work exclusively for England for a nine-month period.9 England 

alleges that it has previously provided notice of these agreements to 

other trucking companies, and that it also provides notice on an 

ongoing basis when competing companies seek to hire England 

drivers who are still within the nine-month period.

¶5 Swift Transportation Company (Swift) is also a trucking 

company. England alleges that Swift regularly and knowingly 

induces England’s truck drivers to breach their employment 

contracts with England by offering higher wages and better benefits.

¶6 In response to this activity, England filed suit against Swift, 

alleging that Swift intentionally interfered with England’s contracts 

with its employees. Swift filed a motion for summary judgment 

against England on the ground that England failed to provide proof 

of “improper means”—an allegedly essential element of the tort—to 

support its claim.10 In its opposition, England argued that “improper 

means” is not an element of the tort of intentional interference with 

 

prong of the tort could not be satisfied by improper conduct that 

does not fit squarely in one of the categories set out in Leigh.

8 The information set out in this background section comes from 

the federal district court’s order certifying questions to us.

9 Each agreement also provides that England will forgive the 

driver’s tuition debt if the driver completes the nine-month exclusive 

work period.

10 Swift argues that the elements of the tort of intentional 

interference with contract are found in St. Benedict’s Development Co. 

v. St. Benedict’s Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). Under 

St. Benedicts, the elements of the tort are “(1) that the defendant 

intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or potential 

economic relations (2) . . . by improper means, (3) causing injury to 

the plaintiff.” Id. at 200.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

4

contract in Utah. Instead, it maintained that it must prove only that 

(1) Swift had knowledge of England’s employment agreements with 

its truck drivers, (2) Swift recruited the drivers, (3) the drivers went 

to work with Swift, and (4) England suffered damages as a result, 

unless the “action causing the breach was done with just cause of 

excuse.”11

¶7 Noting conflicting holdings in the federal district court of 

Utah regarding the elements of the tort of intentional interference 

with contract, the federal court requested supplemental briefing 

from the parties. Upon reviewing the briefing, the court concluded 

that there appears to be no “clear, controlling Utah law” regarding 

whether “improper means” is required as part of the tort. 

Additionally, the court concluded that if improper means is 

required, there is no clear law regarding what would constitute 

improper means.

Standard of Review

¶8 This case comes to us by certified question from the federal 

district court. “A certified question from the federal district court 

does not present us with a decision to affirm or reverse a lower 

court’s decision; as such, traditional standards of review do not 

apply.”12 Instead, we merely answer the question presented without 

resolving the underlying dispute.13 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Utah Code section 78A-3-102(1) and article VIII, section 3 of the Utah 

Constitution.

Analysis

¶9 This case requires us to answer two questions. First, does 

the tort of intentional interference with contract require proof of 

“improper means”? And second, if it is required, what constitutes 

“improper means” in the context of tortious interference with 

contract?

¶10 England argues that the elements of the tort of intentional 

interference with contract come from our opinion in Bunnell v. Bills.14

_____________________________________________________________

11 Quoting Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602 (Utah 1962).

12 U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co. v. U.S. Sports Specialty Ass’n, 2012 UT 

3, ¶ 9, 270 P.3d 464 (citation omitted).

13 Id.

14 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962).
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Opinion of the Court

5

In Bunnell, we adopted the rule that “one who persuades another or 

conspires with another to breach a contract is guilty of an actionable 

tort, unless such persuasion or other action causing the breach was 

done with just cause of excuse.”15 England argues that this should 

still be the law in Utah, and, to the extent subsequent cases have 

stated a different rule, we should overrule them under the factors for 

overturning precedent we articulated in Eldridge v. Johndrow.16

¶11 Swift, on the other hand, argues that our decisions in Leigh 

Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom17 and St. Benedict’s Development Co. v. 

St. Benedict’s Hospital18 govern. According to Swift, Leigh established 

a three-part test for the tort of intentional interference with economic 

relations, which includes interference with both existing and 

prospective contracts. We agree with Swift.

¶12 Although the court in Leigh did not clearly state whether its 

three-part test applied to the tort of intentional interference with 

contract, the court in St. Benedict’s later interpreted Leigh as having 

done so.19 And following St. Benedict’s, Utah courts have regularly 

stated that the element of “improper means” is part of the prima 

facie case for intentional interference with contracts.20 Because the 

rule established in St. Benedict’s has become firmly established in 

Utah caselaw, and the reasoning behind it remains persuasive, we 

decline to overturn it.

I. We Decline to Overturn St. Benedict’s and We

Hold that “Improper Means” is an Element of the

Tort of Intentional Interference with Contract

¶13 We first consider whether “improper means” is an element 

of the tort of intentional interference with contract. England argues 

_____________________________________________________________

15 Id. at 602.

16 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553.

17 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

18 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

19 Id. at 200.

20 See Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 13; Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. 

Lowry, 2010 UT App 113, ¶ 17, 233 P.3d 538; ProMax Dev. Corp. v. 

Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other 

grounds by Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 37.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

6

that we should disavow any language from our decision in 

St. Benedict’s Development Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hospital21 that includes 

the element of “improper means” as part of the tort of intentional 

interference with contract. The court in St. Benedict’s based its 

decision on language in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom.22 But, 

according to England, the language in Leigh applied only to the 

related, but distinct, tort of intentional interference with prospective 

economic relations. For this reason, England argues that St. Benedict’s

interpretation of Leigh—as including the “improper means” element 

in the torts of intentional interference with contracts and prospective 

contracts—is incorrect.

¶14 Swift disagrees with England’s reading of our caselaw. 

According to Swift, our decision in Leigh established elements for the 

tort of interference with economic relations, which “protects both 

existing contractual relationships and those not yet reduced to 

formal contract or not expected to be.”

¶15 Although Leigh is best read as having applied only to the 

tort of intentional interference with prospective contracts, 

St. Benedict’s clearly extended the Leigh test so that it applied to 

claims involving existing contracts as well as prospective ones. 

Because this resulted in a sound rule that has become firmly 

embedded in Utah law, we decline to overturn it.23

A. Before Leigh, the tort of intentional interference

with contract required some showing of improper

or unprivileged conduct by defendant

¶16 Due to the debate surrounding the development of the tort 

of intentional interference with economic relations, we first consider 

_____________________________________________________________

21 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

22 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

23 We also note that it is possible that “improper means” would 

be part of Utah law even in St. Benedict’s absence. This is so because

dicta in Leigh, which stated that under previous cases something 

equivalent to a lack of improper conduct was an affirmative defense 

rather than part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, appears to have 

incorrectly stated the law in Utah. In other words, the cases decided

before Leigh also arguably required some showing of improper 

conduct as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie intentional interference 

with contract claim.
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Opinion of the Court

7

the origins of the legal theory in Utah. Specifically, it should be noted 

that Utah’s caselaw has always held that a defendant could not be 

found liable for intentionally interfering with an existing contract 

absent proof that the interference was unexcused or unjustified. 

And, based on a review of the caselaw from other jurisdictions, it 

appears that an unexcused or unjustified interference is widely 

viewed as the functional equivalent of interference by an “improper 

means” or an “improper purpose.”24

_____________________________________________________________

24 See Elgin v. Montgomery Cty. Farm Bureau, 549 So. 2d 486, 488–89

(Ala. 1989) (explaining that the plaintiff could not prove lack of 

justification because the insurance company acted pursuant to its 

contractual right); Waldroup v. Lindman, 28 P.3d 293, 296–97 (Alaska 

2001) (holding that the plaintiff had to show that the defendant’s 

actions were motivated by spite rather than economic interest to 

fulfill “lack of justification” requirement); Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz.

Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 

38 P.3d 12, 31–32 (Ariz. 2002) (stating that the most important factors 

in the improper conduct test are the nature of the conduct and the 

motive). A statement in Leigh clearly shows that a lack of justification 

is the equivalent to “improper means” or “improper purpose.” See

Leigh, 657 P.2d at 305. In Leigh, the jury instructions only required the 

jury to find that the defendant’s action was “[w]ithout justification.” 

Id. Although the court in Leigh determined that improper means or 

purpose must be found, it affirmed the jury’s finding of liability 

because “[u]nder the trial court’s definition of ‘justification,’ the jury 

had to find that the Corporation’s conduct was ‘wrongful or 

malicious’ before they could find for [the plaintiff],” and according 

to the court “[t]hose terms are functionally equivalent to ‘improper 

means or improper purpose.’” Id.

Additionally, we note that many of the cases we cite in this 

opinion refer to “spite,” “motive,” or some other analog to the 

element of “improper purpose.” Although the “improper purpose” 

prong is no longer part of the tort in Utah, see generally Eldridge v. 

Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, 345 P.3d 553, we nevertheless rely on these 

cases for the proposition that those courts require some level of 

impropriety, even where the operative language in their caselaw 

calls for a showing of a lack of justification or excuse. In citing these 

cases we in no way suggest that proof of an improper purpose is an 

element of the tort in Utah.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

8

¶17 In Utah, the tort of intentional interference with contract has 

always required some proof that the alleged interference was done 

with some level of impropriety. In Bunnell v. Bills, the case on which 

England’s entire argument relies, the court held that “one who 

persuades another or conspires with another to breach a contract is 

guilty of an actionable tort, unless such persuasion or other action 

causing the breach was done with just cause of excuse.”25 It also explained 

that “even though a defendant’s action brings about a breach of 

contract, he is not liable where the breach was caused by the doing of 

an act which he had a legal right to do.”26 The court then explained 

that “[w]here persons have merely pursued their own ends without 

any desire or intention of causing another to breach his contract, they 

should not be held liable for the other’s breach.”27 So under Bunnell, 

a person could be held liable for the tort of intentional interference 

with contract only if the person interfered in a way in which the 

person was not legally entitled to have interfered. Bunnell’s inclusion 

of an “unexcused conduct” component was consistent with the 

approach followed in other jurisdictions at that time and since.

¶18 The court in Bunnell purported to ground its decision in 

“generally recognized [law] in a majority of jurisdictions.”28 Because 

Bunnell was decided in 1962—twenty-three years after the first 

_____________________________________________________________

25 368 P.2d 597, 602 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added).

26 Id.

27 Id. at 603. In support, the court in Bunnell cites Gammon v. 

Federated Milk Producers Ass’n, which states that “there is no liability 

for procuring a breach of contract where the breach is caused by the 

exercise of an absolute right—that is, an act which a person has a 

definite legal right to do without any qualification.” 360 P.2d 1018, 

1022 (Utah 1961). And Gammon, in turn, cites the American Law 

Reports, which states that “a party to a contract, whether of 

employment or otherwise, has a right of action against a person who 

has procured a breach of such contract by the other party thereto 

otherwise than in the legitimate exercise of his own rights” and “it is 

universally recognized that an action will lie for inducing breach of 

contract by resort to means in themselves unlawful.” M.C. Dransfield, 

Annotation, Liability for Procuring Breach of Contract, 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 

(originally published in 1952) (emphasis added).

28 Bunnell, 368 P.2d at 602.
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9

Restatement was published and seventeen years before the second 

Restatement was published, the first and second Restatements act as 

helpful bookends in our survey of the “generally recognized [law] in 

a majority of jurisdictions” at the time.29 Accordingly, we look to the 

Restatements of Torts, and cases in other jurisdictions that have 

interpreted the Restatements’ language, as persuasive authority.

¶19 These sources suggest that the unexcused or unjustified 

conduct element discussed in Bunnell is synonymous with the 

“improper” interference element adopted in Leigh and St. Benedict’s. 

For example, even though the first Restatement describes the tort as 

an interference done by “one . . . without a privilege to do so”30 and 

the second Restatement describes it as an interference done by “[o]ne 

who intentionally and improperly interferes,”31 the factors provided 

by the first and second Restatements for determining whether an 

interference was actionable—i.e. lacked privilege or was improper—

are substantially similar.32 So between the first and second 

Restatements there is no substantive difference between an 

unexcused interference and an improper one.33

_____________________________________________________________

29 Id.

30 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).

31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).

32 For example, the first Restatement lists five factors for 

determining whether an interference lacked privilege: “(a) the nature 

of the actor’s conduct, (b) the nature of the expectancy with which 

his conduct interferes, (c) the relations between the parties, (d) the 

interest sought to be advanced by the actor and (e) the social 

interests in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and the actor’s 

freedom of action on the other hand.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). And the second Restatement lists all of 

the same factors for determining whether an interference is 

improper. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 

1979). The second Restatement also adds two other factors: “the 

actor’s motive” and “the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s 

conduct to the interference.” Id.

33 Importantly, neither Restatement describes who has the burden 

of proving, or disproving, the wrongful nature of the interference.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

10

¶20 The same is true in other jurisdictions.34 For example, in 

RAN Corp. v. Hudesman, the Supreme Court of Alaska noted a 

discrepancy in the terminology used in previous cases.35 Alaska’s 

prima facie intentional interference with contract case required the 

plaintiff to prove that “the defendant’s conduct was not privileged 

or justified.”36 On the other hand, it noted that the second 

Restatement “speaks not in terms of ‘privilege,’ but requires that the 

actor’s conduct not be ‘improper,’” while “[o]ther authorities use the 

catch word ‘malice.’”37 Ultimately, the court concluded that 

“[r]egardless of the phrase that is used, the critical question is what 

conduct is not ‘privileged’ or ‘improper’ or ‘malicious.’”38 In other 

words, the Hudesman court concluded that even though different 

authorities use different terms, each authority is attempting to 

identify certain conduct that is improper in the context of the tort of 

intentional interference with contract.

¶21 As these additional authorities suggest, there is little 

substantive difference between requiring the plaintiff to prove that 

an intentional interference with a contract was without justification 

and requiring the plaintiff to prove that it was improper. So even 

though the court in Bunnell used the “without justification” 

terminology in describing the elements of the tort, it is clear that 

even under that decision some intentional interferences with a 

_____________________________________________________________

34 See, e.g., WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., 

L.P., 49 A.3d 1168, 1173–74 (Del. 2012) (explaining that the element of 

absence of justification is the equivalent of improper means); Martin 

v. Fed. Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1007–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)

(explaining that the element of “intentional and malicious 

inducement” is the equivalent of without justification or privilege), 

abrogated on other grounds by McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 680 

N.E.2d 1347 (Ill. 1997); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 317 

(Mo. 1993) (explaining that the element of absence of justification is 

the equivalent of improper means); Kenty v. Transamerica Premium 

Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio 1995) (same).

35 823 P.2d 646, 648 (Alaska 1991).

36 Id. (citation omitted). The “privilege” language used in Alaska’s

caselaw is the same language used in the first Restatement.

37 Id. (citation omitted).

38 Id.
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Opinion of the Court

11

contract do not rise to the level of tortious conduct. So before a 

plaintiff prevails on an intentional interference with contract claim, 

the trial court must decide whether the interference was unexcused 

or improper.

B. It is unclear if Bunnell decided the question of whether

a showing of improper conduct is part of the prima facie

case or whether the lack of improper conduct is

an affirmative defense

¶22 Although it is clear that Bunnell included an unexcused or 

improper conduct component in the tort of intentional interference 

with contract, this does not answer the key question in this case. This 

is so because it is unclear whether Bunnell placed the burden for 

showing that an alleged interference occurred without an excuse on 

the plaintiff, as part of the prima facie case, or on the defendant, as 

an affirmative defense. In other words, although Bunnell suggests 

that a defendant is not liable for intentionally interfering with a 

contract unless the defendant’s conduct was unexcused or improper, 

this does not necessarily mean that “improper means” is an element 

of a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Instead, Bunnell could be interpreted 

as adopting what is called the prima facie approach. Under this 

approach, “the plaintiff need only prove . . . that the defendant 

intentionally interfered with his [contractual] relations and caused 

him injury.”39 Once this is proven, “the burden . . . then shifts to the 

defendant to demonstrate as an affirmative defense that under the 

circumstances his conduct, otherwise culpable, was justified and 

therefore privileged.”40

¶23 Even though Bunnell does not clearly state who has the 

burden of showing that an interference was improper (or proper in 

the case of the defendant), dicta in Leigh suggests that Bunnell placed 

the burden on the defendant.41 While the court in Leigh considered 

which elements to include in the related tort of intentional 

interference with prospective economic relations, it mentioned that 

Bunnell had “assumed” the prima facie approach in the context of 

the tort of intentional interference with contract. But the Leigh court 

_____________________________________________________________

39 Leigh, 657 P.2d at 302.

40 Id. at 302–03.

41 Id.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

12

does not explain why it believed that Bunnell followed the prima 

facie approach, and the court in Leigh may have erred on this point.42

¶24 After stating that Bunnell assumed the prima facie approach 

for the tort of intentional interference with contract, the court in Leigh

declined to apply the prima facie approach for the tort of 

interference with prospective economic relations because it “requires 

too little of the plaintiff.”43 And after considering and rejecting a 

second approach to the tort,44 the Leigh court decided to adopt a 

third approach that had been established in Oregon.

¶25 Under this third approach, the plaintiff “must prove (1) that 

the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or 

potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 

improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.”45 Significantly, 

the court announced this test as part of what it considered to be 

Utah’s first instance of formally recognizing the “common–law cause 

of action for intentional interference with prospective economic 

relations.”46 For this reason, it appears the Leigh court’s standard was 

meant to apply only to the tort of intentional interference with 

_____________________________________________________________

42 The Leigh court’s reading of Bunnell could be based on an 

assumption that when the court in Bunnell used the term 

“justification,” it was referring to an affirmative defense. Although it 

is true that “justification” is typically a term used to describe an 

affirmative defense, this does not seem to be the case when it is used 

in the context of the tort of intentional interference with contract. See, 

e.g., RAN Corp., 823 P.2d at 648 (explaining that Alaska’s prima facie 

intentional interference with contract case required the plaintiff to 

prove that “the defendant’s conduct was not privileged or justified”

(citation omitted)). So it appears that the dicta in Leigh was based on 

an incorrect assumption regarding the “lack of justification” 

component of the tort.

43 Leigh, 657 P.2d at 303.

44 The court considered the second Restatement approach, which 

requires the court to consider several factors before deciding 

whether the defendant’s conduct was “improper.” See id. at 303–04.

45 Id. at 304.

46 Id.
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Opinion of the Court

13

prospective economic relations, and not to the already-existing tort 

of intentional interference with contract.

C. St. Benedict’s interpreted Leigh as holding that

a showing of improper means is part of the plaintiff’s

prima facie case for claims involving existing

contracts as well as prospective ones

¶26 Although it appears that the court in Leigh was not 

attempting to alter the elements for the tort of intentional 

interference with contract, this court later interpreted Leigh as if it 

had.47 In St. Benedict’s Development Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hospital, we 

noted that Leigh was the first case to “recognize[] the tort of 

intentional interference with economic relations.”48 And we 

explained that the “tort protects both existing contractual 

relationships and prospective relationships of economic advantage 

not yet reduced to a formal contract.”49 We then announced that the 

three-part test first articulated in Leigh, including the improper 

means element, applied to situations involving existing contracts.50

So following St. Benedict’s, a showing of improper means became 

part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case for claims involving existing 

contracts as well as prospective ones. This rule has never been 

questioned by a Utah state court.

D. Under the factors established in Eldridge,

we decline to overrule St. Benedict’s

¶27 Because St. Benedict’s clearly extended Leigh’s three-part test 

to claims involving existing contracts, England asks us to overrule it. 

England argues that the court in St. Benedict’s misread Leigh, and 

therefore the rule set out in St. Benedict’s should be disavowed. 

Although we agree that the court in St. Benedict’s misread Leigh, we 

do not believe—under the test for overturning precedent we 

_____________________________________________________________

47 St. Benedict’s, 811 P.2d at 200.

48 Id. In doing so, the court adopted the term “interference with 

economic relations” as an umbrella term for the torts of intentional 

interference with contracts and intentional interference with 

prospective contracts.

49 Id.

50 Id.
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Opinion of the Court

14

established in Eldridge—that this error warrants overturning the law 

St. Benedict’s established.

¶28 In Eldridge,51 we established two factors to consider before 

overturning an earlier case: “(1) the persuasiveness of the authority 

and reasoning on which the precedent was originally based, and (2) 

how firmly the precedent has become established in the law since it 

was handed down.” Neither of these factors weighs in favor of 

overturning the rule established in St. Benedict’s.

¶29 First, the rule St. Benedict’s established rests on a firm legal 

footing. Although St. Benedict’s application of Leigh’s three-part test 

to alleged interferences with existing contracts appears to have been 

the result of a misreading of the Leigh opinion, England fails to 

present a compelling reason for getting rid of it. 

¶30 As our discussion of Bunnell illustrates, even before Leigh

and St. Benedict’s, Utah law most likely required a plaintiff to show 

that a defendant had interfered in an improper or inexcusable way to 

prevail on a claim for intentional interference with contract. So even 

if the St. Benedict’s court erred by attributing the inclusion of the 

“improper means” element to Leigh, it was nevertheless correct in 

requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had interfered 

with the contract through something akin to improper means.

¶31 What is more, by requiring a plaintiff to prove some form of 

improper, wrongful, unexcused, or unjustified conduct as part of its 

prima facie case, St. Benedict’s merely adopted the approach followed 

in the vast majority of jurisdictions that recognize the tort of 

intentional interference with contract.52 So even if the court in 

_____________________________________________________________

51 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22.

52 Ventas, Inc. v. Health Care Prop. Inv’rs, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 612, 

620–21 (W.D. Ky. 2009); Mina Inv. Holdings Ltd. v. Lefkowitz, 184 

F.R.D. 245, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Waldroup v. Lindman, 28 P.3d 293, 

296–97 (Alaska 2001); Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & 

Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 31 (Ariz. 

2002); Vowell v. Fairfield Bay Cmty. Club, Inc., 58 S.W.3d 324, 328–29 

(Ark. 2001); Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Cos., 90 P.3d 859, 871 (Colo. 

2004); Varley v. First Student, Inc., 119 A.3d 643, 655 (Conn. App. Ct. 

2015); WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 49 

A.3d 1168, 1173–74 (Del. 2012); Kirkland v. Tamplin, 645 S.E.2d 653, 

655 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 957 P.2d 1076, 1087 

(Haw. Ct. App. 1998); Mitchell v. Weiger, 409 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Ill. App.

(continued)
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15

St. Benedict’s based its rule on an incorrect reading of Leigh, it 

nevertheless articulated a sound rule53 with which the majority of 

other jurisdictions agree.54

¶32 The second Eldridge factor also weighs in favor of 

reaffirming St. Benedict’s. In determining how firmly precedent has 

become established in the law, we typically consider “the age of the 

precedent, how well it has worked in practice, its consistency with 

 

Ct. 1980); G.S. Enters., Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1363, 

1370 (Mass. 1991); Wood v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc., 465 

N.W.2d 5, 8 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Furlev Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. N. 

Am. Auto. Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn. 1982); Collins v. 

Collins, 625 So. 2d 786, 790 (Miss. 1993); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 

S.W.2d 303, 317 (Mo. 1993); Nostrame v. Santiago, 61 A.3d 893, 901–02 

(N.J. 2013); Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & Tr., 837 N.W.2d 

327, 334 (N.D. 2013); Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 

N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio 1995); Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Vernon 

Klein Truck & Equip., 919 P.2d 443, 446 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994); 

Willamette Quarries, Inc. v. Wodtli, 781 P.2d 1196, 1200 (Or. 1989); 

Triffin v. Janssen, 626 A.2d 571, 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). And in most 

jurisdictions where the plaintiff must show a lack of justification or 

privilege, the courts equate a lack of justification or privilege with 

“improper means.” See, e.g., WaveDivision Holdings, LLC, 49 A.3d at 

1173–74; Kutcher, 957 P.2d at 1088; Triffin, 626 A.2d at 574.

53 The rule is sound because it furthers the principle first 

articulated in Bunnell, and reiterated in Leigh and Eldridge, that a 

defendant should not be held liable for conduct in which the 

defendant had a legal right to engage. See Bunnell, 368 P.2d at 602 

(explaining that a defendant “is not liable where the breach was 

caused by the doing of an act which he had a legal right to do”); 

Leigh, 657 P.2d at 307 (explaining that “[t]he law offers no remedy 

for” the “inevitabl[e] damage” one competitor causes another “[i]n 

the rough and tumble of the market place”); Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, 

¶ 50 (disavowing the improper purpose prong of Leigh because it 

“allow[ed] juries to find even the most commonplace commercial 

conduct tortious”).

54 We are not bound, of course, by the rules established in other 

jurisdictions. But the fact that our approach is consistent with the 

approach followed by a majority of jurisdictions is evidence that we 

have adopted a rule that works well in practice.
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Opinion of the Court

16

other legal principles, and the extent to which people’s reliance on 

the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it were 

overturned.”55 These factors support reaffirming St. Benedict’s. 

¶33 First, we decided St. Benedict’s approximately twenty-eight

years ago, and since that time, Utah appellate courts have 

consistently noted that “improper means” is an element of a claim 

for intentional interference with contract.56

¶34 For example, in Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, the 

court of appeals dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because of a lack of 

evidence of an improper means or purpose.57 In that case, the 

district court had granted summary judgment against the plaintiff 

due to insufficient evidence supporting its claim for intentional 

interference with contract. The court of appeals affirmed the district 

court because the evidence that allegedly supported the plaintiff’s 

claim was inadmissible, and even if it were admissible, it “d[id] not 

demonstrate an improper purpose or means.”58 Accordingly, the 

court of appeals applied Leigh’s three-part test to a claim for 

interference with an existing contract and affirmed summary 

judgment for a lack of evidence supporting the improper means 

prong. So Jones (as well as the other cited cases) suggests that the 

element of “improper means” has been consistently applied since we 

decided St. Benedict’s.59

_____________________________________________________________

55 Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22.

56 Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2010 UT App 113, ¶ 17, 233 

P.3d 538; ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 254 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1997); Mumford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1043

(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 

57 2010 UT App 113, ¶ 17.

58 Id.

59 As further evidence that St. Benedict’s has been consistently 

applied, we note that Utah’s model jury instruction includes 

“improper means” as an element for the tort of intentional 

interference with economic relations, which encompasses claims for 

interference with existing contracts as well as prospective ones. See

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTION 2D CV 1401. Although we do not 

review our model jury instructions for correctness, and have noted 

that they may not correctly state the law in Utah, see Jones v. Cyprus 

Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997) (explaining that 

(continued)
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Opinion of the Court

17

¶35 Second, as we have already stated, the rule established in 

St. Benedict’s is a sound one that works well in practice.60 It is clear 

and straightforward, and it ensures that a party will not be found 

liable for engaging in conduct in which the party was legally entitled 

to engage. For these reasons, the rule is one on which people can 

reasonably rely. Because the rule established in St. Benedict’s has 

been applied consistently for twenty-eight years, and is one on 

which people can reasonably rely, we conclude that it has become 

firmly established in Utah law.

¶36 England argues, however, that St. Benedict’s has not become 

firmly embedded in Utah law because three cases, decided after 

St. Benedict’s, cited Bunnell without discussing St. Benedict’s

three-part test.61 But upon closer scrutiny, none of those cases 

supports England’s position. For example, in Retherford, we cited 

Leigh and Bunnell for the proposition that to prevail on its “claim of 

malicious interference with contractual relations,” the plaintiff had 

to prove that the defendant “intentionally and improperly 

persuaded [a contract party] to breach its implied employment 

contract with [the plaintiff].”62 By citing Leigh for the proposition that 

a claim for interference with an existing contract required proof that 

a defendant had “improperly” interfered with the contract, 

Retherford supports, rather than contradicts, St. Benedict’s reading of 

Leigh. And the same is true of the other two cases England cites.63

 

the model jury instructions “are merely advisory and do not 

necessarily represent correct statements of Utah law”), the inclusion 

of the “improper means” element in the model instructions suggests 

that Utah’s district courts regularly apply the “improper means” 

element to claims involving existing contracts, and that people 

generally have begun to rely on the rule.

60 See supra ¶ 31 & n.53.

61 England cites Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain 

States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 967 (Utah 1992); Hill v. State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); and

American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 413 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992).

62 Retherford, 844 P.2d at 967.

63 Christensen, 967 F.2d at 413 n.4 (noting that it did not matter 

whether it applied the standard set out in Bunnell or the standard in 

Leigh, because the result would be the same); Hill, 829 P.2d at 149 

(continued)
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

18

¶37 England also argues that St. Benedict’s is not firmly 

embedded because “in subsequent years . . . courts applying Utah 

law have adopted various approaches to the relationship between 

the two interference torts.” But England is able to cite only federal 

district court cases for this proposition. And, once again, those cases 

do not stand for what England claims they do. For example, only one 

of the cases England cites stands for the assertion that “a claim of

tortious interference with contract does not require proof of 

improper means.”64 But that assertion is based solely on a Tenth 

Circuit case that was decided five years before our decision in 

St. Benedict’s.65

¶38 The other cases England cites provide even less support for 

its position. Although the cases appear to make some distinction 

between the tort of intentional interference with contract and the tort 

of intentional interference with prospective contracts rather than 

using the umbrella term “intentional interference with economic 

relations,” each of the cases nevertheless requires a defendant to 

have interfered “improperly” before liability for interference with a 

contract is found.66 So even in the instances where federal courts did 

 

(requiring proof that defendant “improperly” interfered with an 

existing contract).

64 Advanced Recovery Sys., LLC v. Am. Agencies, LLC, No. 

2:13CV283DAK, 2017 WL 680391, at *6 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2017). In its 

order certifying these questions to us, the federal district court cited 

this case as evidence that Utah’s caselaw is unclear. Because this case 

relies on a single Tenth Circuit case decided before St. Benedict’s, it is 

a poor indication of any alleged confusion surrounding this area of 

law.

65 Id. (citing Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 554 

(10th Cir. 1986)), abrogated by Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 

U.S. 820 (1990).

66 StorageCraft Tech. Corp. v. Persistent Telecom Sols., Inc., No. 2:14-

CV-76-DAK, 2016 WL 7155782, at *10 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2016) 

(requiring an intentional and improper interference); Critical Nurse 

Staffing, Inc. v. Four Corners Health Care Corp., No. 2:13-CV-646 TS, 

2014 WL 2739279, at *3 (D. Utah June 17, 2014) (same); Ecosure Pest 

Control, Inc. v. Eclipse Mktg., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1108, 2010 WL 

3363071, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 23, 2010) (same); MacArthur v. San Juan 

Cty., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1182 (D. Utah 2005) (same).
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Opinion of the Court

19

not adopt St. Benedict’s formula verbatim, they have required 

plaintiffs to plead and to prove something roughly equivalent to 

“improper means.”

¶39 Because the weight of authority supports St. Benedict’s

adoption of the “improper means” element for the tort of intentional 

interference with contract, and because this element has become 

firmly embedded in Utah law, we reaffirm it.67

II. We Hold that “Improper Means” Requires Proof

that an Action was Contrary to a Statute, 

Regulation, Common Law Rule, or an

Established Standard of a Trade or Profession

¶40 Next, we must determine what constitutes “improper 

means.” England argues that inducement of a breach of an existing 

contract constitutes improper means. Swift, on the other hand, 

argues that improper means is conduct “contrary to law, such as 

violations of statutes, regulations, . . . recognized common-law rules” 

or “the violation of an established standard of a trade or profession.” 

We agree with Swift.

¶41 Since Bunnell v. Bills, we have recognized that a defendant 

should not be liable for interfering with a contract where the 

interference was caused by the defendant’s “doing of an act which 

he had a legal right to do.”68 In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom69

_____________________________________________________________

67 Throughout its brief, England argues that we must eliminate 

the improper means element for claims involving existing contracts 

in order to distinguish between interferences with existing contracts 

and interferences with prospective contracts. But we do not believe 

that this is necessary, because the nature of a contract already 

provides such a distinction. This is so for three reasons. First, the 

existence of a prospective contract will be much more difficult to 

prove than the existence of an existing contract. Second, causation 

and damages will also be more difficult to prove for an alleged 

prospective contract than they will for an existing contract. And 

third, improper means will be easier to prove with existing contracts 

than with merely prospective contracts because of the greater 

protection laws, regulations, and customs provide for existing 

contracts.

68 368 P.2d 597, 602 (Utah 1962).

69 657 P.2d 293, 307 (Utah 1982).
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Opinion of the Court

20

and St. Benedict’s Development Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hospital,70 we 

followed this principle by including the element of “improper 

means” as part of a claim for tortious interference with economic 

relations—either with existing contracts or merely prospective 

economic relationships. In Leigh we acknowledged that “[i]n the 

rough and tumble of the marketplace, competitors inevitably 

damage one another in the struggle for personal advantage,” but we 

explained that “[t]he law offers no remedy for those damages—even 

if intentional—because they are an inevitable byproduct of 

competition.”71 For this reason, it was necessary to limit the scope of 

actionable conduct, by including an improper purpose or means 

element, to conduct in which the defendant did not have a 

recognized legal right to engage.

¶42 In doing so, we defined improper means narrowly to 

include only those actions that “are contrary to law, such as 

violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules,” 

or actions that violate “an established standard of a trade or 

profession.”72 After defining improper means in this way, the court 

in Leigh provided a non-exhaustive list of conduct that would 

constitute improper means: “violence, threats or other intimidation, 

deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 

defamation, or disparaging falsehood[s].”73 And we noted that 

because “[s]uch acts are illegal or tortious in themselves” they “are 

clearly ‘improper’ means of interferences.”74

¶43 When we expanded the Leigh test to apply to interference 

with existing contracts in St. Benedict’s, we also adopted the Leigh

standard for what constitutes improper means.75 Following our 

decision in St. Benedict’s, courts have consistently interpreted the 

_____________________________________________________________

70 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991).

71 657 P.2d at 307.

72 Id. at 308 (citation omitted).

73 Id. (citation omitted).

74 Id. In contrast to the clearly improper means described, the 

court in Leigh explained that “[a] deliberate breach of contract, even 

where employed to secure economic advantage, is not, by itself, an 

‘improper means.’” Id. at 309.

75 St. Benedict’s, 811 P.2d at 201.
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Opinion of the Court

21

“improper means” element in accordance with the definition 

outlined in Leigh and St. Benedict’s.76

¶44 More recently, in Eldridge v. Johndrow,77 we emphasized once 

again that a person is not liable for intentional interference where the 

person engaged only in conduct in which he or she was legally 

entitled to engage. In that case we disavowed the “improper 

purpose” prong that had previously been part of the Leigh standard 

because it “allow[ed] juries to find even the most commonplace 

commercial conduct tortious.”78 We noted that this was problematic 

because “such a tort would interfere with ‘much competitive 

commercial activity, such as a businessman’s efforts to forestall a 

competitor in order to further his own long-range economic 

interests.’”79 So by eliminating the improper purpose prong, Eldridge

furthered our expressed goal of limiting the scope of actionable 

conduct to that conduct in which the defendant did not have a 

legally recognized right to engage.80

¶45 Accordingly, from Bunnell to Eldridge, we have been careful 

to limit the scope of actionable conduct within the tortious 

interference context to those situations where a defendant employs a 

_____________________________________________________________

76 Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994) (citing Leigh), 

overruled on other grounds by Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 70, 

345 P.3d 553; Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 

1989) (same); see also Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, 

¶ 36, 221 P.3d 205 (“Defamation would be a means contrary to the 

common law.”); Mumford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 

1044–45 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that conduct amounting to 

common law conversion would constitute improper means).

77 2015 UT 21, ¶ 50.

78 Id. As a result of our decision in Eldridge, a plaintiff must prove 

that a defendant interfered by using improper means—proof of an 

improper purpose is no longer sufficient.

79 Id. ¶ 46 (citation omitted).

80 To be clear, under our improper means standard the conduct 

need not constitute illegal conduct under a criminal statute. Instead, 

it need only be contrary to law in a general sense, such as a violation 

of a statute, regulation, recognized common-law rule, or an 

established standard of a trade or profession.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

22

means that is independently tortious or wrongful.81 We see no 

reason to depart from this approach.

¶46 As a final note, Swift asks us to clarify what would 

constitute a violation of an established standard of a trade or 

profession. Specifically, Swift argues that our standard is the 

equivalent of the standard adopted in California, which specifies 

that only violations of rules or standards that “provide for, or give 

rise to, a sanction or means of enforcement for a violation” should suffice 

for improper means.82 But California’s standard is more limited than 

any standard ever applied in a Utah appellate court. Instead, Utah 

appellate courts typically require only that the industry standard or 

rule “be an external and objective one, rather than the individual 

judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor.”83

_____________________________________________________________

81 This definition is consistent with the definition given in other 

jurisdictions. See Ventas, Inc. v. Health Care Prop. Inv’rs, Inc., 635 F. 

Supp. 2d 612, 622 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (“Under Kentucky law, 

significantly wrongful conduct certainly includes fraudulent 

misrepresentation, deceit, coercion, threats of illegal conduct, and 

physical violence, which are specifically highlighted as improper 

acts.”); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 818 N.E.2d 1100, 1102–03 (N.Y. 2004) 

(requiring proof of an “independently unlawful act” to prevail on a 

tortious interference claim); Thimjon Farms P’ship v. First Int’l Bank & 

Tr., 837 N.W.2d 327, 335 (N.D. 2013) (“[I]n order to recover for 

wrongful interference with business, the plaintiff must prove the 

defendant’s conduct was independently tortious or otherwise 

unlawful.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 

S.W.3d 711, 725–26 (Tex. 2001) (“It appears that in most Texas cases 

in which plaintiffs have actually recovered damages for tortious 

interference with prospective business relations, the defendants’

conduct was either independently tortious—in the four cases noted, 

defamatory or fraudulent—or in violation of state law.”).

82 Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate 

Servs., Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis 

added).

83 Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2013 UT App 

202, ¶ 20, 309 P.3d 267 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
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Opinion of the Court

23

¶47 For example, in Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Insurance 

Agency, Inc., the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment 

against a plaintiff’s tortious interference claim because “the evidence 

[the plaintiff] offer[ed] [was] legally insufficient to establish a title 

insurance industry standard,” and, therefore, the plaintiff could not 

prove improper means.84 In doing so, the court explained that 

“[e]stablishing an industry standard requires more than evidence of 

a particular company’s rules and policies.”85 Instead, the court 

explained that the plaintiff needed to provide evidence “to establish 

the existence of an industry-wide standard.”86 This could be done, 

according to the court, in the same way an industry standard is 

established in the negligence context.87 We adopt Walker’s approach 

to this issue.

¶48 In sum, we reaffirm our definition for improper means as 

conduct contrary to law—such as violations of statutes, regulations, 

or recognized common-law rules—or the violation of an established 

standard of a trade or profession.88 Additionally, in regards to 

established standard of a trade or profession, we adopt the approach 

followed in Walker, and hold that the violation of an objective, 

_____________________________________________________________

84 Id. ¶ 19.

85 Id. ¶ 20.

86 Id. ¶ 21.

87 See id. ¶ 20; see also Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 

250, 253–54 (Utah 1985) (relying on the Uniform Building Code to 

establish an industry standard for construction of a retaining wall); 

Crandall v. Ed Gardner Plumbing & Heating, 405 P.2d 611, 612 (Utah 

1965) (relying on testimony from other plumbers about general 

practices to establish that a defendant-plumber violated industry 

standards); Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wright, 774 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ind. 

2002) (noting that the mere existence of a company’s internal 

corporate policy did not create a legal duty to a plaintiff); Wal–Mart 

Stores, 774 N.E.2d at 895 (explaining that “[t]he standard of conduct 

which the community demands must be an external and objective 

one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the 

particular actor.” (alteration in original) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET 

AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173–74 & n.3

(5th ed. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).

88 Once again we emphasize that this is a non-exhaustive list.
C.R. ENGLAND v. SWIFT

Opinion of the Court

24

industry-wide standard or rule may constitute improper means. And 

under the Walker approach, the existence of an objective, industrywide standard may be established in the same way it is established 

in the negligence context (through expert testimony regarding 

industry-wide customs or practices, uniform codes, industry-specific 

regulations, etc.).

Conclusion

¶49 Because the element of improper means is firmly established 

in Utah law, and rests upon a firm legal footing, we decline to 

overturn St. Benedict’s Development Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hospital.89 We 

also reaffirm the definition of improper means provided in Leigh 

Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom90 and St. Benedict’s. And we clarify that 

to prove the element of improper means based on an alleged 

violation of an established industry rule or standard, the plaintiff 

must provide evidence of an objective, industry-wide standard.

_____________________________________________________________

89 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

90 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).