J-S16033-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

v.

ALEXEI SEMIONOV 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1553 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order June 23, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-14-CR-0000470-2010 

CP-14-CR-0001125-2010

CP-14-CR-0001126-2010 

CP-14-CR-0001127-2010

CP-14-CR-0001129-2010 

CP-14-CR-0001130-2010

CP-14-CR-0001131-2010 

CP-14-CR-0001132-2010

CP-14-CR-0001133-2010 

CP-14-CR-0001134-2010

CP-14-CR-0001135-2010 

CP-14-CR-0001136-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 30, 2018

Appellant, Alexei Semionov, appeals from the order of June 23, 2017, 

that denied, following a hearing, his first petition brought under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, 

Appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons 

discussed below, we quash.
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We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from 

this Court’s opinion on direct appeal and the PCRA court’s June 23, 2017 

opinion and order.

Appellant, Alexei Semionov, appeals from the June 8, 2012 

amended, aggregate judgment of sentence of 35 years and onemonth to 70 years and two-months’ imprisonment, imposed after 

he pled guilty to firearms not to be carried without a license, 

resisting arrest, criminal attempt (burglary), criminal conspiracy 

(to commit criminal mischief), and multiple counts each of 

burglary, robbery, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, theft 

from a motor vehicle, receiving stolen property, simple assault, 

recklessly endangering another person (REAP), criminal mischief, 

criminal attempt (robbery), and criminal conspiracy (to commit 

robbery, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and burglary). 

After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows.

In spring 2010, [Appellant] was charged with 

multiple criminal complaints, encompassing 

numerous charges of various crimes including 

robbery, burglary, and related offenses. Three codefendants, [Anatoliy V. Veretnov (Veretnov), Maksim 

Illarionov (Illarionov), and Dmitriy Litvinov Litvinov),] 

were charged with similar crimes arising out of the 

same activities, and all four defendants’ cases were 

consolidated. Before this consolidated case was 

scheduled for trial, [Appellant] decided to cooperate 

with the Commonwealth. In connection with this 

decision, he made a detailed, taped statement to the 

police in May 2010 that incriminated himself and his 

three co-defendants. A few weeks before trial, 

however, [Appellant] decided to withdraw his 

cooperation and instead continue to trial. In fact, in a 

pre-trial hearing held on February 2, 2011, 

[Appellant] testified under oath that his May 2010 

statement to the police was “not true” and 

“inaccurate.”
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On February 9, 2011, the consolidated trial of 

the four co-defendants began. After three days of 

trial, [Appellant] decided to enter a guilty plea. On 

February 14, 2011, [Appellant] pled guilty to all 

charges except one, in an open plea. A signed, 

attached written [a]ddendum to the written guilty plea 

colloquy states that [Appellant] agrees he may not 

withdraw his guilty plea unless the [trial c]ourt does 

not accept the plea. During the guilty plea hearing on 

February 14, 2011, Attorney [James] Bryant 

([Appellant’s] then counsel) and District Attorney 

Parks–Miller both stated on the record that [Appellant] 

could not withdraw his guilty plea in the future. 

Attorney Bryant stated that his client understood the 

guilty plea was “set in cement.” Several months later, 

at a separate firearm trial for one of the three codefendants, [Appellant] refused to testify against the 

co-defendant. [Appellant] then verbally indicated his 

intent to fire his attorney and withdraw his guilty plea.

Attorney Bryant was released from representing 

[Appellant] on December 1, 2011, and [Appellant] 

filed a pro se [m]otion to [w]ithdraw [g]uilty [p]lea on 

December 2, 2011. On December 9, 2011, Attorney 

Lance T. Marshall entered his appearance on behalf of 

[Appellant]. In an [o]pinion and [o]rder dated 

February 2, 2012, th[e trial c]ourt denied 

[Appellant]’s [m]otion to [w]ithdraw [g]uilty [p]lea, 

and on February 21, 2012, [Appellant] was sentenced 

to a period of incarceration of 36 years and one month 

to 72 years and two months[’] in a state correctional 

institute.

[(]Trial Court Opinion and Order, 5/15/12, at 1–3 (heading 

omitted; internal quotation marks in original)[)].

On March 2, 2012, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence 

motion wherein he sought the withdrawal of his guilty plea and/or 

a modification of his sentence. In said motion, Appellant also 

raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

pursuant to the [PCRA], but later acknowledged that these 

ineffectiveness claims were improperly raised and should be 

dismissed without prejudice. On May 4, 2012, the trial court held 

a hearing on Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Following said 
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hearing, the trial court granted Appellant's post-sentence motion 

in part and denied it in part by opinion and order dated May 15, 

2012. Thereafter, on June 8, 2012, the trial court resentenced 

Appellant on docket numbers CP–14–CR–1132–2010, CP–14–CR–

1133–2010, and CP–14–CR–1135–2010. As noted, Appellant was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of 35 years and one-month to 70 

years and two-months’ imprisonment. . . . 

(Commonwealth v. Semionov, 2013 WL 11253453, at **1-2 (Pa. Super. 

filed Sep. 10, 2013) (unpublished memorandum) (footnotes and record 

citations omitted)).

On September 10, 2013, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

(See id. at *1). On February 27, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied leave to appeal. (See Commonwealth v. Semionov, 87 A.3d 319 

(Pa. 2014)).

On November 4, 2014, Appellant filed the instant, timely PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court subsequently appointed counsel. After seeking leave and 

receiving permission from the PCRA court, counsel filed a first amended PCRA 

petition on August 24, 2015, and a second amended PCRA petition on 

February 5, 2016. The first amended PCRA petition raised a variety of claims 

concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, while the second amended PCRA 

petition raised a single illegality of sentence claim pursuant to Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).

An evidentiary hearing took place on August 5, 2016. On June 23, 2017, 

the PCRA court issued an opinion and order. The court denied Appellant’s first 

amended PCRA petition, but granted petitioner’s second amended PCRA 
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petition and scheduled a resentencing hearing for July 25, 2017. Following 

some delays, the trial court resentenced Appellant on August 24, 2017.1 On 

October 6, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.2 

On November 27, 2017, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to 

why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Appellant filed a 

response on December 4, 2017. On December 29, 2017, this Court 

discharged the rule to show cause and referred the issue of the timeliness of 

the appeal to this panel.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

1) Was [Appellant’s] counsel(s) ineffective for allowing the 

acceptance of an involuntary guilty plea; failing to inform him of 

the deportation consequences; and failing to raise mitigating 

factors at sentencing?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).

Appellant appeals from the denial of his first PCRA petition. It is long 

settled that “[o]ur standard of review from the grant or denial of post-

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1 We note that the resentencing hearing is not listed on the docket and no 

resentencing order appears in the certified record. In its brief, the 

Commonwealth states that resentencing took place on August 24, 2017. (See 

the Commonwealth’s Brief, at 9). Appellant purports to appeal from an order 

dated September 6, 2017, presumably the resentencing order, but there is no 

order dated September 6, 2017, listed in the docket and, as stated above, 

there is no resentencing order in the certified record.

2 Appellant complied with the dictates of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On November 2, 2017, the PCRA 

court issued an opinion in response to matters complained of on appeal 

referencing his June 23, 2017 opinion and order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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conviction relief is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of 

legal error. We will not disturb findings that are supported by the record.” 

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 30 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). “The court’s scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the 

record of the PCRA court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Duffey, 889 A.2d 56, 61 (Pa. 2005) 

(citation omitted). Further, to be eligible for relief pursuant to the PCRA, 

Appellant must establish that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or 

more of the enumerated errors or defects found in Section 9543(a)(2). See 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). He must also establish that the issues raised in 

the PCRA petition have not been previously litigated or waived. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). An allegation of error “is waived if the petitioner could 

have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, 

on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9544(b).

Prior to addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first decide 

if the appeal is properly before us. The Commonwealth argues that we should 

quash this appeal as untimely filed. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13-16). 

We agree.
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It is settled law that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days 

after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a). A party must file the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court; 

“[u]pon receipt of the notice of appeal the clerk shall immediately stamp it 

with the date of receipt, and that date shall constitute the date when the 

appeal was taken, which date shall be shown on the docket.” Pa.R.A.P. 

905(a)(3). We strictly construe time limitations for taking appeals and cannot 

extend them as a matter of grace. See Commonwealth v. Valentine, 928 

A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court can raise the timeliness of an 

appeal sua sponte, as the issue is one of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 

See id. We have no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 960 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2008). Generally, an appellate court may 

not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). We 

permit extension of the appeal-filing period only in extraordinary 

circumstances, such as fraud or some breakdown in the court’s operation. See 

Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 1995), 

appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1996).

In the instant matter, on June 23, 2017, the trial court issued an opinion 

and order denying Appellant’s first amended PCRA petition, which contained 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in this appeal, (see First 

Amended PCRA Petition, 8/24/15, at 3-8), but granted his second amended 
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PCRA petition, which contained solely the illegality of sentence claim (see 

Second Amended PCRA Petition, 2/05/16, at 2). Appellant did not file his 

notice of appeal until October 6, 2017, after resentencing, and nearly four 

months after the PCRA court denied his PCRA petition. This appeal does not 

raise any claims with respect to the resentencing.

In a recent opinion, this Court discussed whether a PCRA petition that 

granted a new resentencing hearing but denied all other PCRA claims was a 

final appealable order. In Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127 (Pa. 

Super. 2017), as in the instant matter, the PCRA court issued an order which 

denied relief on the majority of the petitioner’s claims but granted 

resentencing. See Grove, supra at 1134. The petitioner immediately 

appealed from the portion of the order that denied relief. See id. at 1135. 

On appeal, relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 780 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2001), we held that a PCRA 

order which both denies claims for relief but grants a new sentencing hearing 

is a final appealable order. See id. at 1138; see also Bryant, supra at 647-

48 (holding that in capital case an order dismissing all claims but granting 

resentencing is final appealable order and failing to appeal that order within 

thirty days would result in waiver); Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 

1034, 1039 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 574 (Pa. 2017) 

(holding that order directing resentencing pursuant to Alleyne, supra, but 

denying PCRA relief on all other issues was final appealable order). 
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Here, as in Groves and Watley, the PCRA court denied all of Appellant’s 

claims but the illegality of sentence claim. Accordingly, we hold that the June 

23, 2017 order was a final appealable order. See Bryant, supra at 647-48; 

Groves, supra at 1138, and Watley, supra at 1039 n.3. Therefore, 

Appellant was required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the date

of that order; because he did not do so, the appeal is untimely. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a).

Moreover, the record contains no evidence of extraordinary 

circumstances such as a court holiday or closing, or a breakdown in the 

operations of the court, to excuse Appellant’s untimely filing. See

Braykovich, supra at 136 (stating extension of appeal filing period is 

permitted only in extraordinary circumstances, such as fraud or some 

breakdown in court’s operation). Therefore, Appellant’s failure to file the 

notice of appeal within thirty days of the June 23, 2017 order denying his 

PCRA petition divested this Court of appellate jurisdiction. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a); Patterson, supra at 497-98. Accordingly, we quash this appeal.

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/30/18