UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

GARY PETERSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF 

AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 

 

Defendant. 

 

Case No. 1:13-cv-00170 (CRC) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This putative class action is the latest skirmish in a long-running dispute among 

mechanics at American Airlines over which union should represent them. Following American’s 

bankruptcy in November 2011, its mechanics narrowly ratified a collective bargaining agreement 

between the airline and the Transportation Workers Union (“TWU”). A group of American 

mechanics who would prefer to be represented by another union—the American Mechanics 

Fraternal Association (“AMFA”)—has filed suit over the process that led to the ratification of 

that agreement. They contend that in negotiating the agreement with the airline, TWU leadership 

favored mechanics who work at American’s principal maintenance base in Tulsa, Oklahoma at 

the expense of Plaintiffs and others who work elsewhere. This preferential treatment, they 

allege, breached the union’s duty of fair representation and violated their voting rights under the 

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 

Plaintiffs do not seek monetary damages or the invalidation of the collective bargaining 

agreement. They request instead a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction requiring the 

TWU to refrain from the alleged unfair practices in future contract negotiations. Because 
2 

Plaintiffs have not identified any impending injury that could be prevented by the relief they 

seek, the Court concludes that they lack standing to bring this suit. For similar reasons, the Court 

also concludes the suit is unripe. The Court therefore will grant the TWU’s motion to dismiss 

the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

I. Background 

Plaintiffs and their proposed class members are part of a “craft or class” of mechanics 

and related employees at American Airlines.1

 They and workers in six other employee 

classifications are represented by the TWU. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 18 (“SAC”). 

Roughly half of the mechanics and related employees perform heavy maintenance and overhaul 

aircraft at American’s primary maintenance base in Tulsa, Oklahoma. SAC ¶ 24. The others 

work at other maintenance bases in Fort Worth or Dallas, Texas, or perform lighter “line” service 

at airports served by American throughout the country. SAC ¶¶ 22–23. 

Soon after filing for bankruptcy protection in November 2011, American took steps to 

reject its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the TWU and renegotiate a modified 

agreement. American’s first “last best offer” during the negotiations proposed to eliminate 

almost 4,000 line and maintenance base jobs. SAC ¶ 57. This offer failed a ratification vote. 

SAC ¶ 58. After further negotiations, American’s second “last best offer” proposed to save 

1,439 jobs at the Tulsa maintenance base from the 2,358 that would have been eliminated under 

the prior offer. SAC ¶ 60. Non-Tulsa maintenance base workers and line mechanics, however, 

saw their job losses increase slightly from the first to the second offer. SAC ¶ 62. Largely on 

the support of employees at the Tulsa maintenance base, a CBA reflecting American’s second 

offer was ratified by the narrowest of margins: 50.25% to 49.75%. SAC ¶ 78. The CBA went 

 

1

 A “craft or class” under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., which governs 

American’s relationship with its mechanics, is similar to a bargaining unit under the National 

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. 
3 

into effect in the fall of 2012 following bankruptcy court approval. SAC ¶ 80. The agreement 

runs through September 2018 and will not be subject to renegotiation until September 2016. 

Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex 12. 

The CBA negotiations described above followed a history of sparring between the TWU 

and AMFA. In 1998, 2003, and earlier in 2012, AMFA had organized campaigns to replace 

TWU as the collective bargaining representative of American’s mechanics and related 

employees. SAC ¶¶ 26, 33. See Opinion and Order, Schalk v. Transp. Workers Union, No. 03-

804, 2007 WL 1310171, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2007) (describing a bitter rivalry between 

AMFA and TWU over representation of American mechanics). Each of those drives failed, 

according to Plaintiffs, because the Tulsa mechanics consistently opposed any switch to AMFA. 

SAC ¶¶ 24, 33. Several TWU members have been removed from leadership positions in the 

union due to their public support of AMFA. SAC ¶¶ 30–32. 

Against that historical backdrop, Plaintiffs allege the TWU engaged in a number of unfair 

practices during the 2012 CBA negotiations to protect its supporters in Tulsa and inflict 

disproportionate losses on what it viewed as troublesome dissenters. They claim TWU 

leadership was “openly hostile” during the negotiations to the presidents of the non-Tulsa local 

unions, whom it considered to be loyal to AMFA. SAC ¶ 42. Plaintiffs also contend that the 

TWU allowed the Tulsa local to negotiate directly with American bargaining representatives, 

resulting in reduced job losses and improved working conditions, while other locals were denied 

this access. SAC ¶¶ 49, 64. When it came time for ratification, Plaintiffs maintain the TWU 

refused to hold meetings outside the Tulsa base to educate members about the proposed offer. 

SAC ¶ 77. The TWU’s “fail[ure] to devote time and effort” on behalf of the line mechanics and 

non-Tulsa maintenance workers, according to Plaintiffs, resulted in a contract with inferior work 
4 

rules in areas such as overtime and vacation days, loss of seniority, and increased job losses for 

those whom TWU leadership perceived were supporting AMFA. SAC ¶¶ 73, 74, 85. 

 Plaintiffs filed suit in February 2013. After an interim amendment, they filed a second 

amended complaint in August 2013 alleging the TWU’s actions breached the union’s duty of fair 

representation to them and other putative class members. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 

(1967) (unions have a duty “to serve the interests of all members without hostility or 

discrimination towards any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and 

to avoid arbitrary conduct”). Plaintiffs also allege that the TWU’s conduct during the CBA 

ratification process violated their right under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 

Act (“LMRDA”) to have a “meaningful” vote in union elections. See Bunz v. Moving Picture 

Mach. Operators’ Protective Union Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 

Soon after Plaintiffs filed suit, American announced a proposed merger with US Airways. 

The merger was consummated in December 2013. Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Second Mot. Leave to 

File Supplement Ex. A, at *1. In the wake of the merger, the TWU entered into an association 

with the International Association of Machinists (“IAM”), which represents mechanics and other 

workers at US Airways. Id. at *2. The two unions petitioned the National Mediation Board on 

August 6, 2014 for a finding that the merged airline is operating as a single carrier. Id. at *1. 

This finding is a first step to certifying a TWU-IAM joint council as the exclusive bargaining 

representative of the combined airline’s mechanics. 

 The TWU has moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). At the threshold, the union contends that the Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over the case because Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact 

requirement of Article III standing in light of the numerous contingencies and uncertainties 
5 

surrounding the timing of any future bargaining with the merged airline and the role of the TWU 

in that bargaining. The union points out that there are currently no planned system-wide contract 

negotiations between the TWU and American and, due to the uncertainty over who will be 

representing the combined carrier going forward, there may never be. It also asserts that the 

TWU has installed new leadership since the last round of collective bargaining that could take a 

different negotiating position from prior leadership. The TWU thus argues the Plaintiffs have 

failed to allege a substantial likelihood of future harm as required to establish standing. It 

asserts, in a similar vein, that the action is unripe. As for the merits, TWU contends that 

Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts that would support a finding that the union breached its duty 

of fair representation or violated their voting rights under the LMRDA. Because the Court will 

dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of standing, it does not address the union’s 

arguments that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. Analysis

A. Standing 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The Court must accept all factual allegations as true, and plaintiffs 

receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the alleged facts. Little v. 

Fenty, 689 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2010). But a court scrutinizes factual allegations more 

closely in resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Id. A court may also examine evidence outside the complaint to decide a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 

to dismiss. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005). 
6 

 To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and 

particularized” and “actual or imminent,” (2) a causal connection between the injury and the 

offensive conduct, and (3) likely redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. In cases seeking an 

injunction or other prospective relief, a plaintiff must identify a threatened injury that is 

“certainly impending” and not simply “possible.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 

1138, 1147 (2013).2 “Certainly impending” does not mean that the injury must be certain to 

occur. Id. at 1150 n.5 (“Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is 

literally certain that the harms they identify will come about.”). But there must be a “substantial 

risk” that the alleged injury will occur. Id. The threatened injury must also be “imminent” in the 

temporal sense. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 226 (2003) (holding that a 

political candidate’s alleged injury was “too remote” to satisfy Article III standing because it 

would not occur until his reelection campaign, if at all). A court may reasonably infer future 

injury when a party is openly committed to the action challenged by the plaintiff. E.g., 

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 152–53 (2010); Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 

F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But an alleged injury cannot support standing if it is based primarily 

on conjecture about future actions and responses. E.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 

332, 344 (2006). 

Plaintiffs have identified three alleged future injuries from which they seek relief. The 

first, which Plaintiffs outline in the prayer for relief section of the second amended complaint, is 

discriminatory conduct during future negotiations between the TWU and American (or its 

 

2

 Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment does not relieve them from pleading impending 

injury. The Declaratory Judgment Act widens the range of remedies a federal court may order, 

but does not enlarge federal jurisdiction. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 

185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 n.4 (D.D.C. 2001). Therefore a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment 

must still present a “substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality” in order to 

have standing. Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 67 F.3d 961, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
7 

successor) concerning a new CBA or amendments to the present agreement. SAC ¶ D. The 

second is unfair treatment during negotiations over a new CBA between a potential TWU-IAM 

joint council and the now-merged airline. Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 16. And the third, which 

Plaintiffs raise for the first time in their opposition papers, is bias against them in connection 

with day-to-day implementation of the existing CBA. Id. at 13–16. The Court will apply the 

standing principles discussed above to each of these alleged future injuries. 

i. System-Wide CBA Negotiations Between the TWU and American 

 The crux of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the TWU favored Tulsa-based mechanics in its 

negotiations with American over the current CBA. They therefore seek to prevent the TWU 

from engaging in similar favoritism in future system-wide negotiations.3 These allegations, 

however, do not describe a substantially likely future injury for two reasons. First, as noted 

above, the TWU and IAM have petitioned the National Mediation Board to find that the merged 

American/US Airways is operating as a single carrier. Should the Board make that finding—and 

Plaintiffs do not suggest it will not—the TWU and IAM have indicated they will form a joint 

council to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the combined airline’s mechanics.4 The 

 

3

 The Plaintiffs’ primary focus on injuries stemming from further system-wide bargaining is 

evident from the prayer for relief in the second amended complaint. Plaintiffs request a 

permanent injunction requiring the TWU to “[r]efrain from participating in secret bargaining 

sessions with the company that are undisclosed to, or unauthorized by, any full negotiating 

committee[; and] . . . [r]efrain from negotiating with the company with less than the full 

complement of any constitutionally designated negotiating committee.” SAC ¶ D. The 

injunction would also require the TWU to “[p]rovide reasonable advance notice to all designated 

members of the full or any sub negotiating committees, of any bargaining sessions[; and] . . . 

hold meetings at all stations, line or base, if any meetings are held at any station, for the purpose 

of educating members about the contents of a proposed contract or amendment in advance of a 

ratification vote.” Id. All of these requirements relate only to future system-wide bargaining. 

4

 Although Plaintiffs do not dispute the merged airline is operating as a single carrier, they are 

contesting before the National Mediation Board whether the joint council may be listed as the 

incumbent on a single carrier union election ballot, an advantage they describe as “virtually 

insuperable.” Pls.’ Second Mot. Leave to File Supplement Ex. 9. Plaintiffs’ challenge before the 
8 

TWU itself would no longer serve that role and, therefore, could not engage in the types of unfair 

practices that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin. 

Second, the current CBA will not expire until September 2018, and the union cannot seek 

to amend it before September 2016. As a result, even if the TWU remained the exclusive 

bargaining representative of the combined airline’s mechanics, the potential for system-wide 

unfair negotiating practices will not arise until sometime after 2016. Plaintiffs have not alleged 

when the TWU or the airline intends to reopen negotiations, what the bargaining position of the 

TWU will be, or how that position will harm the Plaintiffs’ interests. The alleged injury is 

therefore not sufficiently “imminent” or “impending” to confer standing. McConnell, 540 U.S. 

at 226. 

Given the distinct possibility that the TWU will not be the exclusive bargaining 

representative in negotiations over the next CBA, and the lack of information regarding when 

and how negotiations can be expected to unfold, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial 

risk that TWU’s alleged favoritism towards the Tulsa mechanics in the last round of system-wide 

bargaining will reoccur. This source of alleged future injury is therefore insufficient to establish 

standing. 

ii. System-Wide CBA Negotiations Between a Joint Council and the Airline 

In response to the TWU’s argument that any risk of future injury would be reduced by the 

formation of a joint council, Plaintiffs contend that the TWU, as a member of the joint council, 

would nevertheless be in a position to influence future system-wide negotiations to Plaintiffs’ 

detriment. Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 19–20. The distribution of powers in and composition of 

any joint council have yet to be determined, however. Plaintiffs have not alleged who the TWU 

 

Board only heightens the uncertainty regarding what entity will represent mechanics at the 

merged airline going forward. 
9 

representatives on the joint council will be; how the TWU’s stance might be adverse to the 

Plaintiffs’ interests; or, even if it proves to be adverse, whether the TWU representatives would 

be in a position to compel the joint council to engage in the types of unfair practices alleged in 

the second amended complaint. Given these uncertainties, the possibility that the TWU might 

harm the Plaintiffs via its influence over any future joint council is too speculative to satisfy 

Article III standing requirements.5

 

iii. “Day-to-Day” Negotiations over Implementation of the Current CBA 

Finally, Plaintiffs oppose the union’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the relief they 

seek is necessary to protect them from unfair treatment in the administration of the current CBA. 

Emphasizing the general principle that collective bargaining is an ongoing, day-to-day process, 

e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957), Plaintiffs assert that continuing negotiations 

between the TWU and American “on a variety of subjects” expose them to harm. Pls.’ Opp’n 

Mot. Dismiss at 13. Yet the second amended complaint fails even to mention any specific dayto-day negotiations, let alone allege injuries stemming from them. Although the Court may 

examine evidence outside the complaint to decide a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, see Jerome 

Stevens Pharmaceuticals, 402 F.3d at 1253, Plaintiffs still have not meet their burden to allege 

likely injury arising from day-to-day representation. 

In support of their allegations of day-to-day harm, Plaintiffs quote excerpts from several 

“letters of memorandum” concerning issues the parties apparently left open for further discussion 

during the 2012 CBA negotiations. As the TWU points out, however, the portions of the letters 

quoted by Plaintiffs reveal that the covered topics may never be the subject of negotiations. 

Def.’s Reply Mot. Dismiss at 4 n.16 (Letter 9 (“referring to a Committee that may ‘recommend 

 

5

 The Court notes that the requested declaratory judgment and injunction against the TWU 

would not bind any future joint council, which would be a different entity. 
10 

possible changes’) . . . ; Letter 15 (recognizing need for negotiations ‘if the Company designs a 

schedule that consists of more than an eight (8) hour workday’) . . . ; Letter 18 (stating that the 

parties ‘may revisit [certain] practices if necessary’”)) (emphasis added).6

 Plaintiffs do not allege 

that either side intends to open negotiations over the topics covered by these letters, or, if it did, 

when those negotiations might occur or what their outcome might be. 

The TWU also contends that any day-to-day negotiations on topics left open in the CBA 

would be conducted by TWU locals, which are not hostile to Plaintiffs. Indeed, two of the 

Plaintiffs are presidents of local unions. Id. at 4–5; Drummond Decl. ¶ 3, Jan. 15, 2014. 

Plaintiffs counter that the national union would nonetheless have veto power over local 

decisions. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite a June 2014 letter from TWU International 

to two union locals ordering them to cease negotiations with the merged airline. Pls.’ Opp’n 

Mot. Dismiss Ex. 6. Plaintiffs argued at the hearing that this letter demonstrates that TWU 

refuses to let union locals conduct negotiations. The letter, however, concerned bargaining over 

a new general contract, not local work arrangements. Id. It therefore does not rebut the union’s 

argument that authority over day-to-day CBA implementation lies with the locals. Given the 

uncertainty regarding the likelihood of future discussions under the letters of memorandum and 

the degree of local control over such day-to-day contract administration, Plaintiffs have not 

established that the letters of memorandum give rise to a “substantial risk” of future injury. 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). In sum, because none of the 

Plaintiffs’ alleged future injuries is “certainly impending,” they have not met their burden to 

establish standing. 

 

6

 Aside from Letter of Memorandum 8, Pls.’ Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. 8, which merely lists local 

letters of agreement that are no longer in force, Plaintiffs did not include these letters of 

memorandum as exhibits to their opposition brief, so the complete letters are not a part of the 

record before the Court. 
11 

B. Ripeness 

This case is also unripe. Article III prohibits “courts from issuing advisory opinions on 

speculative claims.” Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 

387, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Thus, the Court may not entertain a claim unless it is constitutionally 

ripe. Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The ripeness doctrine 

requires the Court to examine “the ‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the ‘hardship to 

the parties of withholding court consideration.’” Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 

136, 149 (1967)). 

Here, the ripeness analysis overlaps substantially with the standing inquiry discussed 

above; the lack of an impending injury means this Court does not have jurisdiction under Article 

III. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a similar case due to lack of ripeness. 

Addington v. U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 606 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2010). In that matter, the union 

was “constitutionally committed” to a bargaining position in upcoming CBA negotiations that 

the plaintiffs considered adverse to their interests. Id. at 1177. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless 

found that multiple contingencies—concerning what proposal would be acceptable to the airline 

and whether members would ratify it—made the claims unduly speculative. Id. at 1179–80. 

Here, system-wide negotiations may not reoccur as alleged, or at all, and there are no concrete 

effects or actions to evaluate against the union’s obligations. The second amended complaint is 

therefore unripe for adjudication. 
12 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the TWU’s Motion to Dismiss the 

complaint. The TWU’s motions to supplement the record also will be granted. Plaintiffs’ 

motion to certify the class will be denied as moot. The Court will issue a separate Order 

consistent with this Opinion. 

 

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER 

United States District Judge 

Date: December 1, 2014