NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0263 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD21000 

The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa 

By H. Clark Jones 

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson 

By Jennifer L. Thorson 

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 5-9-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 J.G.’s father (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights. Because the superior court made all 

required statutory findings and reasonable evidence supports those 

findings, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In October 2020, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took 

custody of J.G. because, at birth, he and his mother tested positive for 

methamphetamine. At that time, Father was incarcerated for 

methamphetamine possession and had used the drug for over twenty 

years. Father did not contest the dependency petition DCS filed, and the 

court adjudicated J.G. dependent. 

¶3 The superior court ordered DCS to provide Father with 

paternity testing and, upon his release, with substance-abuse testing and 

treatment and parenting services. The DCS investigator spoke with Father, 

and Father expressed interest in engaging in services after release. DCS 

reported it was, thereafter, difficult to maintain regular contact with Father 

or visit him in person due to COVID-19 restrictions. Nonetheless, DCS 

asked him to self-refer for any services available in his detention facility, 

such as parenting classes, substance-abuse treatment, or self-improvement 

courses. The case manager attempted to contact Father but could not reach 

anyone at the prison. DCS also could not provide Father with a paternity 

test while in prison. 

¶4 In May 2021, Father was released from custody. The case 

manager’s efforts to contact him proved unsuccessful until August when 

he appeared in court and provided updated contact information. The case 

manager then set up monthly appointments to discuss services and referred 

Father for substance-abuse testing and treatment as well as supervised 

visits with J.G. Afterward, Father maintained inconsistent communication 

with the case manager. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

¶5 Father failed to participate in substance-abuse services, and 

those referrals were closed. Additionally, Father completed only five visits 

with J.G., the last occurring in November 2021—a year before the severance 

trial. Around the time of the last visit, Father was again incarcerated on 

drug charges and was not released until early 2022. He did not re-engage 

with DCS until October 2022, when he told the case manager he did not 

want to participate in services until he had confirmation of paternity. 

Father obtained confirmation of paternity the following month but did not 

act on DCS’s renewed referrals for substance-abuse services and visitation 

before the severance trial. 

¶6 DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights under the 

six- and fifteen-month out-of-home placement grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(b)–(c). After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the superior 

court severed Father’s parental rights. Under the six-month ground, the 

court found the following: 

Father neither engaged with the Department nor did he visit 

with the child. While it is possible that Father engaged in 

some services as a condition of his probation, he did not seek 

a Release of Records from APD [Adult Probation 

Department] until October of 2022. Father acknowledged 

there was no excuse for his failure to stay in communication 

with his attorney, or his case manager. While he testified to 

doing services through APD those services were not the same 

expectations as the Department’s expectations. While the 

Court acknowledges and commends Father for his recent 

probation compliance, two negative drug tests for APD and 

one DCS test that was positive for THC do not negate years of 

substance abuse as evident by Father’s criminal history. 

Father has refused to participate in reunification services that 

would have allowed him to bond with his child and 

demonstrate appropriate parenting capacities. 

¶7 Father timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 8-235(A). 

DISCUSSION 

¶8 Father challenges whether sufficient evidence supports the 

severance order. A parent’s right to custody and control of his child, while 

fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 248 ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). Severance of a parental relationship may be 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

warranted where the state proves one of the statutory grounds in A.R.S. § 

8-533 by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 248 ¶ 12. “Clear and 

convincing” means the grounds for severance are “highly probable or 

reasonably certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284–85 ¶ 25 (2005). 

The court must also find that severance is in the child’s best interest by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 288 ¶ 41. 

¶9 This Court “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact 

unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This Court does not reweigh 

the evidence, but “look[s] only to determine if there is evidence to sustain 

the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 

¶ 8 (App. 2004). 

¶10 Father first argues DCS failed to make diligent efforts to 

provide him with appropriate reunification services. Before seeking to 

terminate a parent’s rights under the six-month out-of-home placement 

ground, DCS must make diligent efforts to provide a parent with 

appropriate reunification services. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). To do so, 

DCS must provide a parent “with the time and opportunity to participate 

in programs designed to help [him] become an effective parent[.]” Maricopa 

Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). It must 

undertake rehabilitative measures that have “a reasonable prospect of 

success.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192 ¶ 34

(App. 1999). Nevertheless, DCS is not required to ensure a parent 

participates in services, and it is not required to provide futile services. Id.; 

JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353. 

¶11 DCS asserts Father waived his argument by failing to raise it 

in the superior court. Indeed, Father attended several hearings and had the 

case manager’s contact information, but he never raised this issue until the 

severance hearing. The superior court considered three separate motions 

requesting confirmation that DCS was making reasonable efforts to finalize 

permanency, and each resulting minute entry contained findings that DCS 

made reasonable efforts. Father did not object to any of the three motions 

and did not otherwise request additional services before the severance 

hearing. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178; 241 

¶¶ 13; 18 (App. 2014) (A parent must “promptly bring [his] concerns to the 

attention of the juvenile court, thereby giving that court a reasonable 

opportunity to address the matter and ensure that [DCS is] in compliance 

with its obligation to provide appropriate reunification services. . . .”). 

Because Father did not raise his concerns with the juvenile court, we decline 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

to address his arguments here. Notwithstanding waiver, we have reviewed 

the record and conclude that it contains sufficient evidence supporting the 

juvenile court’s conclusion that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide 

Father appropriate reunification services. 

¶12 Next, Father argues the court did not make required 

“forward-looking” findings under the six- and fifteen-month time-in-care 

grounds, or alternatively, these findings were insufficient. DCS asserts 

Father waived his argument that the court failed to make required findings 

by failing to raise objections in the superior court. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

317(b)(1) (party seeking to amend a final order based on insufficient factual 

findings must move for relief within twelve days of order entry); Christy C. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 452 ¶¶ 20–21 (App. 2007) (This 

Court generally does not consider arguments raised for the first time on 

appeal, “particularly so as it relates to the alleged lack of detail in the 

juvenile court’s findings.”). Because Father’s argument that the court failed 

to make the required findings is intertwined with his argument that the 

court’s findings were insufficient, and because Father’s argument 

misinterprets A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b), we exercise our discretion and reach 

the merits. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536 ¶ 9 (App. 

2018) (“[T]he decision to find waiver is discretionary.”). 

¶13 Father argues that the six-month ground requires a “forwardlooking finding that the parent’s impediments to being able to parent are 

going to continue,” which the superior court failed to make. Under the sixmonth ground, the superior court may terminate a parent’s rights to his 

child if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) DCS made diligent 

efforts to provide the parent with appropriate reunification services, (2) the 

child is under three years of age and under court order, has been in an outof-home placement for six months or longer, and (3) the parent has 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement, including refusal to 

participate in reunification services offered by DCS. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). 

¶14 The text of the statute does not support Father’s suggestion 

that the six-month ground required the superior court to find whether 

Father would be able to parent in the near future—there is no such 

requirement in the statute. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (requiring the 

court to find “a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near 

future”) with -533(B)(8)(b) (requiring only that the court find “the parent 

has substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement”). We 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

will not judicially superimpose such a statutory element. The reason 

behind the six-month ground similarly cuts against Father’s argument. The 

six-month ground, like its nine-month counterpart, “focuses on the level of 

the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances rather than the parent’s success 

in actually doing so.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 

329, ¶ 20 (App. 2007). It “was written ‘in response to the increasing number 

of children in foster care whose parents maintain parental rights but refuse 

to assume their parental responsibilities.’” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994) (quoting Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile 

Action No. JS-6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 243 (App. 1988)). Adopting Father’s 

argument would exacerbate that problem, not resolve it. 

¶15 We next reject Father’s argument that the court’s factual 

findings are “not supported by reasonable evidence, fail to show unfitness, 

and improperly shift[ed] the burden to Father to prove his parental fitness.” 

Here, the main circumstances preventing J.G.’s return were Father’s history 

of substance abuse and an inability to meet the child’s needs. The record 

shows Father had over a year to participate in DCS services after his release 

in May 2021. Yet he failed to maintain contact with DCS despite its attempts 

to engage him, submitted to a single drug test that returned positive for 

THC, never completed a substance-abuse assessment (which prevented 

treatment recommendations), and attended only five visits. The record, 

therefore, adequately supports the superior court’s finding that Father 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

causing J.G.’s out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b) 

(substantially neglecting or willfully refusing to remedy the circumstances 

includes a finding that the parent “refus[ed] to participate in [DCS] 

reunification services”). 

¶16 Father nonetheless suggests that despite failing to participate 

in DCS services, he remedied his drug abuse and parenting deficits. At trial, 

Father testified he had been sober for two years and had stable employment 

and housing. He also testified that he had completed treatment and various 

classes at a rehabilitation center and had signed up for parenting classes 

through adult probation. But Father’s probation records include only a few 

drug tests. As the superior court found, those tests alone “do not negate 

years of substance abuse” because they do not demonstrate consistent 

sobriety. Moreover, although he may have established some employment 

and housing, Father had visited J.G. only five times in two years, and, as 

the superior court found, had failed to demonstrate appropriate parenting 

capacities or a significant bond with J.G. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.G. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

¶17 Father makes another similar argument—the statute “cannot 

be interpreted in a manner that allows a parent” to lose his parental rights 

when he “ignores services, yet still manages to ‘remedy the 

circumstances,’” suggesting he had done so here. Contrary to Father’s 

argument, our Supreme Court recently held that the statutory severance 

grounds are synonymous with parental unfitness and confirmed they 

“ensure[] compliance with the due process requirement that a court find, 

by clear and convincing evidence, parental unfitness when a severance is 

contested.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 9 (2018). We 

affirm the juvenile court’s severance decision because the record contains 

sufficient evidence to establish the six-month ground and to support the 

juvenile court’s conclusion that Father had not remedied the circumstances 

leading to out-of-home placement. There is no indication in the record that 

the juvenile court severed Father’s parental rights simply because he 

“ignore[d] services.” 

¶18 Finally, Father asserts the juvenile court improperly shifted 

the burden to him to demonstrate he could care for J.G. But he cites a 

finding in the court’s order pertaining only to the fifteen-month ground. 

Because we hold that reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s 

termination order under the six-month ground, we do not address any of 

Father’s arguments relative to the fifteen-month ground. See Jesus M., 203 

Ariz. at 280 ¶ 3 (“If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the 

statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need 

not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.”). 

CONCLUSION 

¶19 We affirm.