IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANARIOUS SMITH

(AIS# 268812),

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-0299-WS-M

:

RONZELLA HOWARD, et al.,

Defendant.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 

72.2(c)(4), and is now before the undersigned on the motion 

for summary judgment of Defendants, Ronzella Howard, Dexter 

Brown, and Sharon Langham. For the reasons stated below, 

it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment of 

Defendants be granted and that Plaintiff’s action against 

these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

Plaintiff Smith is currently serving a 21-year 

sentence for robbery and is within the custody of the 

Alabama Department of Corrections. (Doc. 1 at 6). Since 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
2

the inception of his sentence he has been imprisoned at 

multiple state facilities, including G.K. Fountain 

Correctional Center, Holman Correctional Facility, and St. 

Clair Correctional Facility. (Doc. 25-7 at 3-5). Smith 

brings this suit against the defendants for failing to 

protect him from an alleged assault by another inmate that 

occurred while incarcerated at Holman Correctional Facility 

(“Holman”), a state maximum security prison, on April 30, 

2014. (Doc. 1 at 8-10). 

While imprisoned at Holman, Smith was consistently 

held in the Segregated Housing Unit rather than general 

population due to poor behavior.1 (Doc. 1 at 8, Doc. 25 at 

3-4). The Segregation Unit at Holman is comprised of two 

facilities: 1) the segregation annex (a three tier building 

which holds units K, L, M) and 2) the Q-side (which holds 

unit Q). (Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 25 at 4; Doc. 25-3 at 2). The 

Q-side of the segregation unit is located approximately 

sixty yards east of the segregation annex and is used for 

as a holding unit for processing inmates into segregation 

																																																							 1 Smith has received 35 disciplinary charges since he 

began serving his prison sentence in 2009. (Doc. 25-7 at

3). Due to this pattern of troublesome behavior, Smith was 

placed on “routine segregation rotation” which entailed 

being transferred quarterly between the three level five 

security prisons in Alabama, Holman, St. Clair Correctional 

Facility and Donaldson Correctional Facility. (Doc. 25-6 

at 2; Doc. 25-11 at 7-8).

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 2 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
3

and for holding inmates removed from the segregation annex 

due to excessive negative behavior or maintenance issues. 

(Doc. 25-3 at 1). Q-side is a two-tier facility with 

fourteen single-man cells on each tier. (Doc. 25-3 at 2). 

On April 24, 2014, Smith was moved from the 

segregation annex to Q-side,2 and the following day Smith’s 

validated enemy, 3 Terrance Mosley, was also transferred to 

Q-side.4 Mosley was placed in cell 16, located on the top 

tier of unit Q, while Smith was housed in cell 2, located 

on the bottom tier of unit Q. (Doc. 25 at 4-5). The two 

																																																							 2 The records of the Alabama Department of Corrections 

reflect that Smith was suffering from paranoid delusions on 

April 24, 2014 and was given medication to treat the same. 

(Doc. 25-10 at 13). He indicated to his mental health 

provider on April 25, 2014 that he had been transferred to 

unit Q for a “time-out.” (Id. at 10).

3 On April 23, 2013, at St. Clair Correctional Facility, 

inmate Mosley attempted to attack Smith with a handmade 

knife before being restrained by a correctional officer. 

(Doc. 25 at 3). Due to the incident, Smith and Mosley were 

validated as enemies on May 21, 2013 (Doc. 25-7 at 6-7). 

While Smith and Mosley both submitted written requests on 

or about April 1, 2014 to have their enemy status revoked, 

the requests were denied, and at the time of the allegation 

contained in this § 1983 action, Smith and Mosley were and, 

to the Court’s knowledge, are validated enemies. (Doc. 25-

7 at 25) 

The Alabama Department of Corrections records also 

list two other inmates who were validated as enemies of 

Smith after Smith slipped his handcuffs off his wrists on 

two separate occasions while housed in the segregation unit 

and stabbed and attempted to stab other inmates. (Doc. 25-

7 at 7). 

4 Inmate Mosley was moved due to his throwing an unknown 

liquid from his assigned cell in attempt to hit a “runner.” 

(Doc. 25-3 at 2). 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 3 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
4

inmates were housed alone in single-man cells, secured 

within barred doors, and located on different tiers of the 

facility, where entrance to the tiers is obtained only 

through locked gates which are videoed monitored. (Doc. 

25-2 at 2; Doc. 25-3 at 2-3). 

Once aware that Mosley was being housed in Q-side with 

him, Smith claims he informed Lieutenant Langham “that 

Terrance Mosley was [his] enemy and he’d tried to kill 

[him] in the past.” (Doc. 1 at 8). To the contrary, 

Defendant Langham avers that Smith told her he did not like 

inmate Mosley, but never explained why, never mentioned 

Mosley was his enemy, and never expressed fear for his 

safety. (Doc. 25-2 at 2-3). 

Smith claims, and Defendant Lieutenant Brown affirmed 

by affidavit, that Smith asked Brown to let Captain Howard 

know he needed to speak with her. (Doc. 1 at 8-9). Upon 

conveying this request to Captain Howard, Defendant Brown 

was instructed by Howard to attempt to handle Smith’s 

concern. (Doc. 25-1 at 1). Due to his meeting with Howard 

being denied, Smith informed Defendant Brown that “Terrance 

Mosley was [his] validated enemy and [he] needed to move 

out the block with him.” (Doc. 1 at 9). Brown relayed 

Smith’s concerns to Captain Howard but insisted Smith was 

safe and should never come in contact with Mosley since the 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 4 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
5

two inmates being located on separate tiers. (Doc. 25-2 at 

1). Smith further alleges, and Brown denies, that 

Defendant Brown told inmate Mosley “he needed to kill”

Smith. (Id.; Doc. 1 at 9). 

On April 30, 2014, Smith claims that from his cell he 

called for an officer but was told there were none 

available, and “moments later Terrance Mosley snuck up on 

[him] and grabbed [his] arm. [Mosley] cut [Smith] several 

times before [Smith] was able to pull away.” (Doc. 1 at 

9). According to Smith, Mosley then walked away, and, 

thereafter, Smith overheard Captain Howard speaking with 

Mosley. (Id.). After Mosley was secured in his cell, 

Smith requested medical treatment, and Officers Owens and 

Daily responded to his call. (Id.). The officers 

handcuffed Smith and began escorting him to the healthcare 

unit, but Smith interrupted the transfer and requested to 

speak with Captain Howard instead of a doctor. (Id.). 

This request was refused, and Smith was returned to his 

cell where he declined to have his handcuffs removed. 

(Id.). The officers, therefore, left Smith in his cell 

wearing his handcuffs, but returned shortly and informed 

Smith that Captain Howard had agreed to meet with him. 

(Id. at 10). 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 5 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
6

During his meeting with Howard, Smith inquired why 

Mosley was housed in the same unit as he, and according to 

Smith, Howard maintained she thought the two inmates “would 

be alright.” (Id.). Smith was then sent to the healthcare 

unit and received a body chart that reflected “superficial 

scratches” on his left chest area and one scratch on his 

left forearm.5 (Doc. 25-7 at 10). Following his 

examination in the healthcare unit, Smith was transferred 

from Q-side and placed within the segregation unit. (Doc. 

1 at 10). 

In response to the allegations in Smith’s complaint, 

the defendants produced records from the Alabama Department 

of Corrections, incident and medical reports related to the 

complaint allegations, and affidavits from the defendants 

and other officers with personal knowledge of the details 

of this action. (Docs. 25, 29). These materials shine a 

different light on Smith’s unsupported allegations, and,

notably, Smith has failed to respond to Defendants’ 

statements of events which are as follows: 

Officer Burroughs avers by affidavit that on April 30,

2014, at approximately 11:30 am he observed Mosley out of 

his top tier Q-side cell. (Doc. 25-4 at 1). Mosley came

																																																							 5 While receiving his body chart, Smith stated to the 

nurse in the healthcare unit, “I’m gonna kill that ass 

nigga.” (Doc. 25-7 at 10). 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 6 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
7

down to the lower tier and stood within the grill gate area 

and requested to see Captain Howard. (Id. at 2). However, 

Mosley never approached the locked gate that gives access 

to the bottom tier. (Id.). Consequently, Mosley never 

entered into the lower tier where Smith was housed. (Id. 

at 1-2). Captain Howard and another officer secured Mosley 

in handcuffs, escorted him to the shift office, and then

Mosley returned to his cell without incident. (Id. at 1-

2). 

Officer Owens affirmed by affidavit that at 

approximately 2:30 p.m. on April 30, Smith reported 

suffering from chest pains and requested a transfer to the 

healthcare unit. (Doc. 25-5 at 1). Upon handcuffing Smith 

with his hands behind his back and removing him from his 

cell, Smith denied any chest pains and requested instead to 

speak with Captain Howard. (Id.). Officer Owens 

communicated to Smith that Captain Howard was unavailable 

at that time, and Smith was returned to his cell. (Id. at 

1-2). Once secured in his cell, he refused to allow the 

removal of his handcuffs. (Id. at 2). Approximately 10 

minutes later, Defendant Langham and Officer Owens returned 

to Smith’s cell to remove his handcuffs, when they observed 

Smith was shirtless and had removed his left hand from the 

cuffs. (Id.). The officers also noticed bleeding 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 7 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
8

scratches on the left side of Smith’s chest, but no blood 

was seen on his shirt. (Id.). When questioned about the 

superficial wounds, “Smith responded that an unknown inmate 

had scratched him with a razor,” but Smith could not 

explain how he received the cuts while housed alone in a 

single-man cell, nor would Smith identify the inmate who 

allegedly attacked him. (Doc. 25-2 at 2; Doc. 25-5 at 2; 

Doc. 25-7 at 8). 

Smith filed this § 1983 action with the Court on June 

27, 2014 claiming that Ronzella Howard, as supervisor of 

the segregation unit, and Dexter Brown and Sharon Langham, 

as officers who knew he was in danger, failed to protect 

him from being attacked by inmate Mosley in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 7). He seeks injunctive 

and monetary relief in the amount of $20,000.00.6 (Id.). 

Defendants answered the suit and filed special reports 

(docs. 24, 25, 28, 29), which the Court converted to a 

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 30). Although provided

ample opportunity, Smith has failed to respond to 

																																																							 6 The requested injunctive relief is moot as Smith is no 

longer imprisoned at Holman but has been transferred to St. 

Clair Correctional Facility in Springville, Alabama. (Doc. 

18). 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 8 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
9

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.7 As such, the 

motion is ripe for consideration. 

II. SUMMRY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 

91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("The mere existence of some alleged 

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 

otherwise properly supported motion for summary 

judgment."); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 

(11th Cir. 2009) ("[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even 

if 'some alleged factual dispute' between the parties 

remains, so long as there is 'no genuine issue of material

fact.'").

																																																							 7 Defendants’ responses were converted to a motion for 

summary judgment on December 30, 2014. (Doc. 30). On 

January 28, 2014, Smith filed a motion to appoint counsel 

(doc. 32), which was denied by the Court on January 30. 

(Doc. 33). Smith has subsequently failed to submit any 

other filings or documents pertaining to this action. A 

district court, however, may not “base the entry of summary 

judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed 

but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.” Trs. 

Of Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs & 

Participating Emp’rs v. Wolf Crane Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d 

1035 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 9 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
10

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the 

motion and of establishing, based upon the discovery 

instruments outlined in Rule 56(c), that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 

L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for 

Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The 

moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, 

by reference to materials on file, that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at 

trial."). Once this initial demonstration is made, the 

"responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show 

the existence of a genuine issue . . . [of] material fact." 

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th 

Cir. 1993); see also Allen, supra, at 1314 ("'When a moving 

party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must 

then "go beyond the pleadings," and show by its own 

affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial.'") (internal 

citations omitted); see Comer v. City of Palm Bay, Fla.,

265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Once the moving 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 10 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
11

party discharges its initial burden of showing that there 

is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's 

case, the non-moving party must specify facts proving the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial 

confirmed by affidavits, ‘depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

Forbidding reliance upon pleadings precludes a 

party from "choos[ing] to wait until trial to 

develop claims or defenses relevant to the 

summary judgment motion." . . . This effectuates 

the purpose of summary judgment which "'is to 

pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in 

order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.'" . . . Thus, "mere general allegations 

which do not reveal detailed and precise facts" 

will not prevent the award of summary judgment

upon a court's determination that no genuine 

issue for trial exists.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Resolution 

Trust Corp., 516 U.S. 817, 116 S. Ct. 74, 133 L.Ed.2d 33 

(1995); see also LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 

F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[The nonmoving party] must 

raise 'significant probative evidence' that would be 

sufficient for a jury to find for that party."). In other 

words, there is no genuine issue for trial "[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 

fact to find for the non-moving party[.]" Matsushita Elec. 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 11 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
12

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 

106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Comer, 

supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("Summary judgment is 

required where the non-moving party's response to a motion 

is merely 'a repetition of his conclusional allegations' 

and is unsupported by evidence showing an issue for 

trial.").

In considering whether Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment in this action, the Court has viewed the 

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Comer, 

supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("We view the evidence and all 

factual inferences raised by it in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts 

about the facts in favor of the non-moving party.").

The requirement to view the facts in the 

nonmoving party's favor extends only to "genuine" 

disputes over material facts. A genuine dispute 

requires more than "some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts." A "mere scintilla" of 

evidence is insufficient; the non-moving party 

must produce substantial evidence in order to 

defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Garczynski, supra, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations 

omitted). In addition, "[t]here is no burden upon the 

district court to distill every potential argument that 

could be made based upon the materials before it on summary 

judgment." Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 43 F.3d at 599.

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 12 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
13

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Smith alleges Defendants violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by failing to protect him from the 

physical attack of inmate Mosley, who was known to be his 

enemy. Defendants, however, deny the allegation and 

further assert that they are entitled to summary judgment 

on Smith’s claims against them as they are protected by the 

affirmative defenses of sovereign and qualified immunity. 

A. Immunity Defenses.

The Eleventh Amendment protects Defendants in their 

official capacities from Smith’s claims. See, e.g., 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 

100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (With some 

exceptions, "a suit in which the State or one of its 

agencies or departments is named as the defendant is 

proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. This jurisdictional 

bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." 

(citations omitted)); Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 

F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[S]tate officials sued 

in their official capacity are []protected by the [Eleventh 

A]mendment." (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 

105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985))). In addition, 

"a state agency[] and a state official sued in his official 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 13 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
14

capacity are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983, 

thus damages are unavailable..." Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. 

Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 

2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)). Thus, Smith may not sue 

Defendants in their official capacities. 

Defendants, however, are not absolutely immune from 

suit in their individual capacities, but are protected by 

qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity protects government officials 

from liability for civil damages unless they 

violate a statutory or constitutional right that 

was clearly established at the time the alleged 

violation took place. See Pearson v. Callahan, 

555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 

565 (2009); Amnesty Int'l, USA v. Battle, 559 

F.3d 1170, 1184 (11th Cir. 2009). "The purpose of 

[qualified] immunity is to allow government 

officials to carry out their discretionary duties 

without the fear of personal liability or 

harassing litigation, protecting from suit 'all 

but the plainly incompetent or one who is 

knowingly violating the federal law.'" Lee[ v. 

Ferraro], 284 F.3d [1188,] 1194 [(11th Cir. 2002) 

](citation omitted) (quoting Willingham v. 

Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

Qualified immunity is a defense not only from 

liability, but also from suit... See id.

"Under the well-defined qualified immunity 

framework, a 'public official must first prove 

that he was acting within the scope of his 

discretionary authority when the allegedly 

wrongful acts occurred.'" Terrell v. Smith, 668 

F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lee, 

284 F.3d at 1194). Once the official has done so, 

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy the 

following two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 14 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
15

facts that a plaintiff has shown make out a 

violation of a constitutional right; and (2) 

whether the right at issue was clearly 

established at the time of the defendant's 

alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 

S. Ct. 808...The Supreme Court recently has made 

it clear that [courts] need not employ a rigid 

two-step procedure, but rather may exercise 

[their] discretion to decide "which of the two 

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should 

be addressed first in light of the circumstances 

in the particular case at hand." Id. at 236, 129 

S. Ct. 808.

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272-73 (11th Cir. 2013).

“Under controlling law, the plaintiff[] must carry [his]

burden by looking to the law as interpreted at the time by 

the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or 

[the highest court of the state from which the case 

arose].” Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 

(11th Cir. 2002).

The record evidence amply supports the determination 

that all Defendants were acting within the scope of their 

discretionary authority as prison officials at the time of 

the wrongful act at issue, and Smith offers no evidence or 

argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the burden now 

shifts to Smith to show why the defendants are not entitled 

to qualified immunity. 

B. Failure to Protect.

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 15 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
16

Prison officials have an obligation to protect 

prisoners from violence inflicted upon them by 

other prisoners. "It is not, however, every 

injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of 

another that translates into constitutional 

liability for prison officials responsible for 

the victim's safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 

(1994). Prison officials must "take reasonable 

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S. 

Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). Only 

"[a] prison official's deliberate indifference to 

a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an 

inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Marsh v. 

Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Thus, a prisoner-plaintiff must first demonstrate 

"an objectively substantial risk of serious harm 

to prisoners." Id. at 1028-29. Then, the 

plaintiff must show that the defendant was 

deliberately indifferent, which requires the 

following: "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of 

serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by 

conduct that is more than gross negligence." 

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331-32 

(11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014).

The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

described above requires that the alleged deprivation be 

“objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 

The objective standard “embodies broad and idealistic 

concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and 

decency. . ., but must be balanced against competing 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 16 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
17

penological goals.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535

(11th Cir. 1993)) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

102 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim 

generally “inquires whether the officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Sims v. Mashburn, 25 

F.3d 980, 983-84 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). This component “follows 

from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 

Smith must prove Defendants acted with the required state 

of mind, which is “deliberate indifference” to his safety. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

There is no liability for “an official’s failure to 

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived 

but did not. . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. It is not 

enough that a plaintiff proves that the defendant should 

have known of the risk; conscious awareness is the key. 

See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th 

Cir. 1996). “‘Whether a prison official had the requisite 

knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact 

subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 

inference from circumstantial evidence.’” Hale v. Talapoosa 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 17 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
18

Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 842). “Thus, ‘a factfinder may conclude that a 

prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very 

fact that the risk was obvious.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 842). “Whether one puts it in terms of duty or 

deliberate indifference, prison officials who act 

reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 

Having set forth the general legal principles relevant to 

Plaintiff’s claims, the Court now turns to the application 

of those principles to the facts before the Court.

Smith claims that Defendants Brown and Langham “knew 

that plaintiff was in danger [by being housed in Unit Q 

alone with Mosley] and had a duty to protect plaintiff” 

from Mosley but failed to do so. (Doc. 1 at 5-6). The 

record before the Court however belies this claim. 

The law is clear “that a prison guard violates a 

prisoner's Eighth Amendment right when that guard actually 

(objectively and subjectively) knows that one prisoner 

poses a substantial risk of serious harm to another, yet 

fails to take any action to investigate, mitigate, or 

monitor that substantial risk of serious harm." Caldwell, 

748 F.3d at 1102 (citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 

1358-60 (11th Cir. 2003); Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584; and 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 18 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
19

LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1536-38). However, the uncontroverted 

evidence before the Court shows that Defendants took 

sufficient and abundant precautions to prevent harm to 

Smith while incarcerated at Holman. For instance, at 

Holman Smith was constantly housed in the segregation unit, 

solitarily confined away from his known enemies. (Doc. 25 

at 3-4). On April 30, 2014, while being held in unit Q 

along with Mosley, the two inmates were placed in 

individual cells, with barred doors; they were housed on 

separate tiers that where secured by locked, video 

monitored gates. (Doc. 25-4 at 1). The sworn affidavits 

produced, along with Smith’s recitation of facts, evidence 

that when inmates were moved from unit Q, they were 

handcuffed and escorted by guards. These safeguards and 

procedures not only refute acts of deliberate indifference, 

they reflect that Defendants endeavored to protect Smith.

The design of Q-side and the placement of enemy inmates on 

different tiers provides sufficient separation of the 

inmates and substantiates that the defendants were mindful 

of security issues and took necessary precautions to ensure 

the safety of inmates, including Smith on April 30, 2014. 

Thus, Smith has failed to show that simultaneous 

housing of validated enemies within Q-unit, as described in 

his complaint, is an objectively serious risk, and, 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 19 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
20

therefore, Smith has failed to carry his burden of proving 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety.8 

 

Additionally, while prison officials have a duty under 

the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “reasonable safety” of 

inmates, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, "[m]erely negligent 

failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify 

liability under section 1983...The known risk of injury 

must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility 

before a guard's failure to act can constitute deliberate 

indifference." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th 

Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). To prove his

asserted claim of failing to protect, Smith is "required to 

produce evidence that, with knowledge of the substantial 

risk of serious harm, [Langham and Brown] knowingly or 

recklessly 'disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take 

reasonable measures to abate it.'" Hale v. Tallapoosa 

Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 

2d 811 (1994)). Taking all of Smith’s allegations as true, 

																																																							 8 In the alternative, had Smith successfully shown a 

constitutional violation due to his housing situation, 

Defendants Brown and Langham would be entitled to qualified 

immunity as Smith has failed to provide any law providing a 

clearly established right at the time of the complained of 

incident for inmate enemies to be housed in separate 

segregation facilities. See Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 

266, 272-73 (11th Cir. 2013).

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 20 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
21

including being assaulted by Mosley, Smith has failed to 

show that Defendants had the requisite subjective knowledge 

of harm necessary to prove a constitutional violation given 

that he never reported an actual threat of harm to any 

defendant. 

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly found a prisoner’s 

informing (or the failure to inform) of a threat or fear of 

one’s life to officers, while not dispositive, is a 

significant factor in assessing failure to protect claims. 

Compare Brown, 894 F.2d at 1537 (Plaintiff’s report of a 

“racial problem,” without specifying a threat, imminent 

attack, or fear of an attack, was insufficient to carry his 

burden of proving defendants had subjective knowledge of a 

risk of harm.); Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 

(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“[G]eneralized awareness of 

risk” to plaintiff, supported by plaintiff’s complaints 

that cellmate “acted crazy, roam[ed] his cell like a ‘caged 

animal’” coupled with defendants knowledge of cellmate’s 

history of violent behavior, was insufficient to prove 

“subjective awareness” of a risk of harm.); Chatham v. 

Adcock, 334 F. App’x 281, 293-94 (11th Cir. 2009) (per 

curiam) (No subjective knowledge or deliberate indifference 

shown where plaintiff failed to identify a specific 

“serious threat” reported to defendant officers, despite 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 21 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
22

claims that he was repeatedly threated prior to being 

assaulted.); Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863-64 

(11th Cir. 2006) (“General knowledge about an inmate’s 

violent tendencies, without more specific information about 

the risk, does not constitute deliberate indifference.”).

Smith alleges he told Defendants Langham and Brown 

that Mosley was his enemy and requested to be moved from 

the housing unit. Defendant Langham affirmed that Smith 

“never verbalized that he feared for his safety or believed 

that inmate Mosley would attack him” (Doc. 25-2 at 2-3). 

Similarly, Defendant Brown affirmed that he believed the 

two inmates were safe given that they were being held on 

separated, locked tiers, in locked single-man cells, and 

were handcuffed and escorted by officers whenever moved 

from their cells. (Doc. 25-1). Brown informed Smith that 

he and Mosley should never come in contact given the 

security measures in force. (Id.). Notably, Smith’s 

complaint is devoid of any allegation that he articulated 

an actual threat to any defendant; nor does Smith deny 

Defendants’ claims that they were not notified of an actual 

threat. Just as in the cases cited above, Smith’s 

complaint lacks facts evidencing the defendants’ knowledge 

of an actual, specific threat; therefore, Smith has failed 

to carry his burden of proving defendants had subjective 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 22 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
23

awareness that Smith was at a sufficient risk of harm. 

Also, Smith relies solely on the conclusory allegations of 

his complaint and provides no further support of his claims 

to overcome Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See

Allen, supra, at 1314 ("'When a moving party has discharged 

its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the 

pleadings," and show by its own affidavits, or by 

"depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file," designate specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.'") (internal citations omitted); 

see also Comer v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 265 F.3d 1186, 

1192 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Once the moving party discharges 

its initial burden of showing that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the nonmoving party must specify facts proving the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact for trial confirmed by 

affidavits, ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file.’”) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 

538 (1986)(there is no genuine issue for trial "[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 

fact to find for the non-moving party[.]"). Therefore, 

given that Smith fails to plead that he disclosed a threat 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 23 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
24

of harm to defendants and Smith fails to dispute the 

affirmations of Defendants Langham and Brown, the 

undersigned concludes there is no evidence of deliberate 

indifference in this action. 

Defendants knew Smith and Mosley were enemies but 

never did any Defendant believe Smith was in danger due to 

the extreme safe guards in place within the segregation 

unit. See Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 

611, 619-20 (11th Cir. 2007) ("'[P]rison officials who 

actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or 

safety may be found free from liability if they responded 

reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not 

averted.' More succinctly, 'prison officials who act 

reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause.'" (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

844-45) (internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, taking 

the entirety of Smith’s claims as true, despite many of his 

allegations being refuted by record evidence, Smith fails 

to prove deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants; 

it is therefore recommended that motion for summary 

judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants Brown and 

Langham. 

C. Respondeat Superior Liability.

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 24 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
25

In his complaint, Smith claims Defendant Howard is 

liable for failing to protect him based on the fact that 

she is the Captain of the Segregation Unit “and is 

responsible for the administration of Holman Segregation, 

i.e., the placement and security of inmates.” (Doc. 1 at 

5). This claim is rooted in the theory of respondeat 

superior, that is, that Captain Howard, as a supervisor, is 

responsible for the prison staff’s failure to protect 

Plaintiff from an inmate attack or for allowing 

simultaneous placement of two inmate enemies within the 

segregation unit. In order to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must 

establish a causal connection between each defendant’s 

“actions, orders, customs, policies, or breaches of 

statutory duty and the alleged deprivation of his 

constitutional rights.” Frankum v. Chapman, 2009 WL 

1118875, *3 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (citations omitted). 

Liability for an alleged constitutional violation cannot be 

established on the basis of a theory of respondeat 

superior. See Edwards v. Alabama Dep’t of Corrs., 81 F. 

Supp. 2d 1242, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“A theory of 

respondeat superior is not sufficient to support [a] § 1983 

claim. . . .”).

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 25 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
26

“It is well established in this Circuit that 

supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 

for the unconstitutional acts of their 

subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior 

or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 

F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); Gonzalez, 

325 F.3d at ----, 2003 WL 1481583, at *4 

(concluding supervisory officials are not liable 

on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious 

liability). Instead, supervisory liability under 

§ 1983 occurs either when the supervisor 

personally participates in the alleged 

unconstitutional conduct or when there is a 

causal connection between the actions of a 

supervising official and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 

----, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5; Brown v. Crawford, 

906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). The necessary 

causal connection can be established “when a 

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible 

supervisor on notice of the need to correct the 

alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.” 

Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at ----, 2003 WL 1481583, at 

*5 (quoting Braddy v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & 

Employment, 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.1998)); 

Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Alternatively, the causal 

connection may be established when a supervisor’s 

“‘custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights’” or when 

facts support “an inference that the supervisor 

directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or 

knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully 

and failed to stop them from doing so.” Gonzalez, 

325 F.3d at ----, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5 (quoting 

Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 

1991)); Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1263; see also Post 

v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1560-61 

(11th Cir. 1993). “The standard by which a 

supervisor is held liable in [his] individual 

capacity for the actions of a subordinate is 

extremely rigorous.” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at ----, 

2003 WL 1481583, at *4 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 26 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
27

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). In 

instances where supervisory liability is based on a 

supervisor’s custom or policy, a plaintiff must show that 

the custom or policy was “the ‘moving force [behind] the 

constitutional violation.’” Pinkney v. Davis, 952 F. Supp. 

1561, 1569 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (citations omitted). “[I]t is 

clear that not only must there be some degree of ‘fault’ on 

the part of [defendant] in establishing the policy or 

tolerating the custom, but there must be a causal link 

between the custom or policy and the constitutional 

deprivation.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While Defendant Howard is the supervisor in charge of 

placement of inmates within the segregation unit, Smith has 

failed to prove that housing him and Mosley in Q-side

equates to a constitutional violation. Defendants on the 

other hand have produced sufficient documentation and 

support that the housing of inmates in the same facility or 

unit is an acceptable practice per Holman prison and the 

Alabama Department of Corrections. (See Doc. 25-6 at 1

(Affidavit of Classification Specialist Angie Baggett 

affirming the practice of housing validated enemies in the 

same units when each is separated and housed in a singleman cell.); Doc. 25-3 at 2 (Affidavit of Warden Gwendolyn 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 27 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
28

Givens corroborating that “Q-side does provide sufficient 

separation of the inmates” and allows for enemy inmates to 

be safely confined to the same segregation unit.); Doc. 25-

11 at 2-3 (Copy of the Alabama Department of Corrections 

Classification Manual dictating the transfer of validated 

enemies housed in general population but not requiring the 

transfer of enemies in segregation units). Smith has 

failed to refute any of the defendants’ statements or 

evidence. Thus, even if Smith could show a constitutional 

violation to the custom or policy of housing inmate enemies 

in single-man segregation cells, Defendant Howard would be 

entitled to qualified immunity against this suit as Smith 

has failed to show the right was clearly established at the 

time of this action. Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272-

73 (11th Cir. 2013).

Additionally, Smith has failed to prove any possible 

allegation of deliberate indifference on the part of 

Defendant Howard. The record is devoid of evidence showing 

Howard placed the enemy inmates in Q-side with the purpose 

of causing harm, and the record indicates that in fact 

Howard appropriately investigated the alleged assault and 

responded proactively. Defendant Howard submits via her 

affidavit that she questioned Smith who stated “Mosley, his 

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 28 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
29

documented enemy, got out his cell and stabbed him thru the 

cell door.” (Doc. 29-1 at 3). She also questioned Mosley 

who denied the allegation. (Id.). And, she further 

inquired about the situation with Officer Owens who 

reported that Smith did not have the scratches at the time 

he was secured in his cell with his handcuffs on. (Id.). 

Although Howard was unable to substantiate Smith’s assault 

allegation, out of an abundance of caution, Howard removed 

him from Q-side and placed him in a cell in the segregation 

annex. (Id.). Therefore, the record is evident, and Smith 

fails to refute, that Q-side had sufficient safe guards in 

place to protect him, that the defendants lacked knowledge 

of any actual threat of harm to him, and that Defendant 

Howard took appropriate action to protect him upon learning 

of a threat of harm. See Rodriguwz v. Sec’y for Dep’t of 

Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 619-20) (11th Cir. 2007) (“’[P]rison 

officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate 

health or safety may be found free from liability if they 

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm 

ultimately was not averted.’” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

844-45)). Thus, it is recommended that summary judgment be

granted in favor of Defendant Howard. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 29 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>
30

Smith has failed to show an Eighth Amendment 

constitutional violation on the part of the defendants. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that summary 

judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants Howard, 

Brown, and Langham and that Plaintiff Smith’s action 

against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. 

Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. L.R. 72.4. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this 31st day of March, 2015. 

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00299-WS-M Document 34 Filed 03/31/15 Page 30 of 30 PageID #:

<pageID>