COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judg es Willis, Fran k and Clements

THERESA JONES MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 21 10-00-2 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 13, 2001 RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Melvin R. Hu ghes, Judge (Robert D. Shrader, Jr.; Steingold and Shrader, on brief), for appellant. (Alexandra Silva, As sistant City Attorney; Karen Matthews , guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Theresa Jones appe als the decisi on of the ci rcuit court terminating her pa rental rights to her daug hter. She contends the evidence was insufficie nt to show that sh e "was without good cause, unwilling or un able to substa ntially remedy the conditions leading to the removal. " Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appe al is withou t merit. Accordingly, we su mmarily affirm the decision of the tria l court. Rule 5A:27.BACKGROUND On June 2, 1998, Ri chmond Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained temporary cust ody of Jones' then twenty-two-m onth-old daughter, Crysta l, while Jones began se rving a six- month jail

sentence. 1 According to Kelly Davis, a DSS social worker, none of appellant's re latives were "interested in getting cust ody" of the child at that time. Moreover, the ma n with whom Jo nes lived at the time refused to assume custody of the child. Davis testified that she spoke with Jone s in June of 1998 and told her that she was to get into a substanc e abuse prog ram upon her release from jail. Davis also told Jo nes that she "would help her as far as findin g housing and employment as well." On June 16, 1998 , the juvenile and domestic relations district court (juvenil e court) entered a pr eliminary pr otective order directing Jo nes "[t]o cooper ate in the prov ision of . . . reasonable services or programs designed to protect th e child's life, health and normal development." The or der instructed Jones to attend TASC, which is a substance abuse program, to "follow

treatment recomm endations to completion ," to "obt ain stable housing and empl oyment," to "e nter and comple te a parenting class," and to "coopera te w[ith] RDSS."

1 This incarceration was the first of four incarcerations involving Jones during the time period that DSS had custody of the child.

- 2 -In November 1998, one month before Jones' release from jail, DSS placed the child in the custody of Cind y May Jones, Jones' mother and the ch ild's gran dmother. 2 Years earlier, grandmother had obtained custody of another child bo rn to Jones. That child, who was fourteen years old at the time of th e hearing, was eight months old when grandm other acquired custod y of him. Jones was rele ased from jail on De cember 14, 1998. She contacted her soci al worker, Davis, saying she was st aying with her mother, Ci ndy Jones. Grandmother te stified as follows rega rding the pe riod after Jones' December 1998 release from jail: [W]e had agreed that I was working at night and she was going to keep the—her baby at my house and she was going to get a job working the daytime, but she never wanted to do that. So I had to get my other daughter to keep Crystal at night, and [Jones] went on her way[;] she wanted to go out at night. Grandmother noticed that Jones "was doing drugs" after her December 1998 release. She recalled incidents where Jones would go into the bathroom and return with blood running down her arm. Grandmother testified that Jones spent little time with the child. According to grandmother, Jones became violent when she was unable to obtain heroin. Jones stayed with the grandmother

2 Davis explained that she placed the child with the grandmother "in November of '98 with the possibility when [Jones] got out [in December 1998], [Jones] would soon live with Grandmother and child in the grandmother's home."

- 3 -approximately two weeks before moving out and leaving the child with grandmother. On December 29, 19 98, Jones tele phoned Davis and asked for assistance with her substance abus e problem. On January 5, 1999, Davis tried to contact Jones to tell her that she had sc heduled an appointment for he r at the Richmond Behavioral Health Authority (RBHA) for a drug trea tment assessment and evaluati on; however, Davis was informed that Jones had been ja iled again (the second incarceration) . As a result, treatment was agai n postponed. After Jones' second release from jail, Davis contac ted Jones to inform her that sh e, Davis, had made an other appoin tment for her at RBHA for a Febr uary 3, 1999 assessme nt and evaluation. Davis accompan ied Jones to this assessment. RBHA scheduled Jones to enter a detox progra m on February 16, 1999 . On February 17, 1999, Jones inform ed Davis she did not at tend the detox program because they would not gi ve her enough medicati on to detox. Jones told Davis that she ca lled Human Resources, Incorporated and that they would help her ente r the methadone clinic on Marc h 8, 1999. Paige Brodie, a su bstance abuse coun selor with Human

Resources test ified that Jones was on me thadone mainte nance from 1996 until 1998, but "w as discontinued from the Methadon e program for noncomplia nce." On March 8, 1999, Jones entered the relapse prevention program. "She left of her own accord" on March 11, 1999, without expl anation. Brodie stated that th e programs last twenty-one or tw enty-eight days "depending on what they are
- 4 -approved for." Afte r a participant finishes a twenty-one or twenty-eight day progra m, counselors determin e what individualized aftercare trea tment is required. Beca use Jones was not in the initial program lo ng enough, Brodie was un able to dete rmine what type of aftercar e she would need.

Because Jones was not making progre ss towards being responsible and because grandmot her was already raising one of Jones' children, grandm other relinquish ed custody of the child in March 1999. In April 1999, DSS pl aced the child in to foster care with foster mother Ch eryl Turner and Turner 's husband. Turner explained that the ch ild exhibited pr oblems with her eyes and speech when she first arrived, but she had made much progress and improvement wh ile in Turner's care. In late April or early May of 1999, Jo nes was inca rcerated for the third ti me, this time for viol ating the te rms of her probation. Spec ifically, Jones fa iled to pass a urine screening for illegal drug s. At the time, Jone s was unempl oyed. On July 13, 1999, DSS filed a fost er care serv ice plan and foster care serv ice plan review with a goal of adoption and a target date of December 1999. Jones was releas ed from her third inca rceration in September 1999. Shortly ther eafter, she be gan using dr ugs again. On November 18, 19 99, DSS petition ed the juvenile court to terminate Jone s' residual parental righ ts. The petition cited Code §§ 16.1-283 (C)(1) and (C)(2) as th e basis for te rmination.

- 5 -Jones was incarc erated again in December 1999 until March 13, 2000, at which time the court ordere d her to ente r the Rubicon Treatment Center . According to Jones, she entere d Rubicon's ninety-day substance ab use program and completed it on June 13, 2000. Although Jones indicated she ha d overcome her addiction, she testified, "I try to attend NA meetin gs when I get a chance and work and just try to focus on positive things besides using [drugs] even though it crosses my mind every day." Jones said she obtained a job at a mote l on June 12, 2000. Jones stated that she does not get along with any of her relatives, thus dimi nishing the possibility that they will provid e any assistan ce. At the time of the July 2000 he aring, Jones was living with the man who had been her boyfriend fo r the previous eight years. At the July 17, 2000 hearing, Jones conceded that Davis tried to get her into a drug treatment prog ram when she was released from jail in December 1998, but, "[a]t that time," Jones "felt like [she] wasn't read y to get into a progra m." Jones admitted using heroin after her De cember 1998 release. Social worker Davis testified that she ar ranged for Jones to visit Crystal at the DSS office and provid ed transportation for the child at those visi ts. Although Jones "w as welcomed to have any visitation she want ed" during those peri ods when she was not incarcerated, Jo nes often would telephone and ca ncel scheduled visits. According to Davis, Jones visited th e child appr oximately seven times from February 1999 until July 2000.
- 6 -By order dated Augu st 17, 2000, the trial court found that DSS made reasonable ef forts to prevent the child's remo val from the home, to return the child to Jones, and to locate suitable relatives for alte rnative placemen t. "Despite the efforts of social, mental health, and other rehabi litative agencies to remedy the situation that led to, and requ ired the contin uation of, the placement of this child in foster care, Ms. Jones fail ed, without good cause, to remedy substantially these conditions ." Finding that the best interests of the child will be served by termination and "proceeding towards adoption ," the trial co urt terminated Jones' residual pa rental rights. ANALYSIS "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S. E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best interests." The trial court's judgment, "when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Id. (citations omitted). The residual parental rights of a parent may be terminated if a parent

- 7 -without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child's foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof that the parent . . . without good cause, [has] failed or been unable to make substantial progress towards elimination of the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child's foster care placement in accordance with their obligations under and within the time limits or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court or any other plan jointly designed and agreed to by the parent . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of this condition. The court shall take into consideration the prior efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in foster care. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Jones contends the trial cour t erred in finding that she failed, without go od cause, to remedy subs tantially the conditions that led to or required continuation of placement of the child in foster care. The child was pl aced in foster care on June 2, 1998, and remained in foster care until the July 17, 2000 hearing, a period in excess of two year s. On June 16, 1998 , the juvenile court issued a protective or der directing Jo nes to obtain and complete treatment, find stable housing, get a jo b, complete a parenting class and cooperat e with DSS upon her rele ase. DSS removed the

- 8 -child from foster care in November 1998 an d placed her with the grandmother in hopes of reuniting Jones an d her daughter upon Jones' December 1998 release from jail. Jo nes remained with the grandmother and child for approximat ely two weeks, after which she chose to leave. She never obtained employme nt, and, although she had not taken any he roin during her si x-month period of incarceration, she resumed taking heroin upon her release. Despite asking for help in obtaining treatment in la te December 1998, Jones was in carcerated a seco nd time when th e social worker tried to contact her in early January 1999 ab out a scheduled appointment fo r treatment. The social worker made another appoin tment for Jones to receive treatmen t on February 16, 1999 , following her second release from jail. Jo nes, however, decided not to enter that program and notifi ed the social worker of that fact a day after failing to attend. On March 8, 1999, Jones entered another treatm ent program, but left after thre e days without expl anation and without completing the program. In March 1999, grandmother returned the child to DSS, which placed her in another foster home. This was the chil d's third placement by DSS si nce June 2, 1998. Jones continued using heroin in February and March of 1999 and, in April or May of 1999, she was incarc erated for the third time. Upon her releas e in September 1999, Jones did no t obtain
- 9 -employment or ge t substance abuse treatment. Inst ead, she began using heroin again. In December 1999, on e month after DS S petitioned to terminate Jones' parental righ ts, Jones was in carcerated for the fourth time. At that time, the child had be en in the care of DSS for seventeen months. Although Jones completed a court-ordere d ninety-day in-patient program on June 13, 20 00, at the time of the July 17, 2000 hearing in the tr ial court, the child ha d been under the care of DSS for over two ye ars. Accordin g to Jones, she had only recently obtained a jo b and completed a substance abus e program. In light of Jones' pa st noncomplianc e in 1998 with the methadone program, her conduct ov er the two years that DSS had custody of the child, her lack of any support fr om family or friends, her belated treatm ent that was forced on he r while incarc erated, and her brief period of employment following release, the evidence showed that Jone s had not remedied substantially the conditions that led to foster care placement. Moreover, Jones testified that she thinks about usin g heroin every day. The record supports the tr ial court's find ing that DSS presented clear an d convincing evidence sa tisfying the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-2 83(C)(2) and es tablished that termination of Jones' parental rights was in the child's best interests. Accordingly, we summ arily affirm the decision. Affirmed.
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