COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Before: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Elder, Bumgardner, Frank, Humphreys, Clements, Felton, Kelsey, McClanahan and Senior Judge Annunziata ∗ Argued at Richmond, Virginia

ANGELA M. HODGES OPINION BY v. Record No. 2182-03-3 JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN FEBRUARY 15, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHIL D SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

ex rel . COMPTROLLER OF VIRGINIA

ex rel . PHYLLIS HODGES

UPON REHEARING EN BANC

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY James W. Updike, Jr., Judge David D. Beidler (Legal Aid Society of Roanoke Valley, on briefs), for appellant. Jack A. Maxwell, Special Counsel (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Craig M. Burshem, Seni or Assistant Attorney General; Beth J. Edwards, Regional Special Counsel; Alice G. Burlinson, Regional Special Counsel, on brief), for appellee.

This matter comes before the Court on a rehearing en banc from a divided panel decision, Hodges v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Div. Of Child Support Enforcement , 43 Va. App. 463, 598 S.E.2d 778 (2004), decided July 13, 2004. Angela Hodges appeals the trial court’s decision affirming an administrative support order issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support En forcement (DCSE), requiring reimbursement of

∗ Judge Annunziata participated in the heari ng and decision of this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on Decembe r 31, 2004 and thereafter by her designation as a senior judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401.- 2 - a public assistance debt incurred on behalf of her minor child. She contends that Code § 63.2-1908 precludes DCSE from collecting the debt from her. Upon rehearing en banc , we lift the stay of this Court’s July 13, 2004 mandate. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the

reasons that follow. I. Background Angela M. Hodges and Ronald R. Hodges ar e the parents of N., born in 1989. From 1990 to 1995, N. resided with her paternal grandm other, Phyllis Hodges. During that time, Phyllis Hodges received Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits from the Department of Social Services for the care of N. Ronald Hodge s reimbursed the Department of Social Services for all but $2,860 of the TANF m oneys paid for N.’s benefit. In 1995, N. returned to Ronald and Angela Hodges’ home. Angela Hodges was not then receiving any public assistance moneys, includ ing TANF. However, the hous ehold did receive food stamps

and Medicaid assistance for th e benefit of her children. In 2002, DCSE issued an administrative s upport order seeking reimbursement from Angela Hodges for the balance of the TANF mone ys paid on behalf of N. The order required that Angela pay $65 per month toward the debt . Angela Hodges appealed the administrative support order to the juvenile and domestic relations district cour t, which dismissed the order. DCSE appealed the decision to the circuit court, which found that Code § 63.2-1908 did not bar

DCSE from collec ting the debt. II. Analysis On appeal, questions of statut ory interpretation are reviewed de novo by this Court. Issues of “pure statutory interpretation [are] th e prerogative of the judici ary.” Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp. , 251 Va. 398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996). “This axiom stems from basic principles of separati on of powers. ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the- 3 - judicial department to say what the law is.’” Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc. , 42 Va. App. 628, 635, 593 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2004) (quoting Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). Therefore, “we review the trial court’s stat utory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo .”

Rollins v. Commonwealth , 37 Va. App. 73, 79, 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001) (citing Timbers v.

Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 187, 193, 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998)). Angela Hodges contends that Code § 63.2-1908 precludes DCSE from assessing or collecting a TANF debt from her because she is receiving food stamps and Medicaid for children living in her home. Co de § 63.2-1908 provides: Any payment of public assistance m oney made to or for the benefit of any dependent child or children or their custodial parent creates a debt due and owing to the Department by the person or persons who are responsible for support of such children or custodial parent in an amount equal to the amount of public assistance money so paid. When DCSE makes payments of public assi stance money on behalf of the child of a noncustodial parent, under Code § 63.2-1908, the noncustodial parent becomes obligated to DCSE for the debt. Code § 63.2-1900 defines a noncustodial parent as “a responsible person who is or may be obligated under Virginia la w for support of a dependent child or child’s caretaker.” DCSE paid TANF to Phyllis H odges, while Angela Hodges was a noncustodial parent, on behalf of Angela Hodges’ child, N. Therefore, Angela Hodges, as a person responsible for the support of N., is a parent obligat ed under the statute. However, Code § 63.2-1908 includes a proviso: the debt is not to be incurred or collected from a noncustodial parent while she is receiving “public assistance moneys” for the

benefit of the child. Debt created by an administrative support order unde r this section shall not be incurred by nor at any time be collected from a noncustodial parent who is the recipient of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor depe ndent children for the period such person or persons are in such status.- 4 - (Emphasis added.) 1 Hodges contends that in Code § 63.2-1908, the term “public assistance” means the same thing as “public assistance mone y.” She contends that because her household

1 We do not agree with the premises of the concurring opinion for several reasons. First, the concurrence urges the Court to decide this case on the gr ound that the proviso does not apply due to the trial court’s finding that Hodges is “n ot now a noncustodial pare nt,” a prerequisite to application of the exemption. Neither party que stioned that finding, nor did they question the trial court’s application or th e meaning of “noncustodial pare nt” as it is used in Code § 63.2-1908 at the three-judge panel st age of these proceedings. See Hodges , 43 Va. App. at 467 n.1, 598 S.E.2d at 789 n.1. The Court could not have addressed the noncustodial parent issue at the panel stage because it was not made pa rt of the “questions presented.” See Cirrito v. Cirrito , 44 Va. App. 287, 309, 605 S.E.2d 268, 278 (2004) (noti ng that arguments not presented in the “questions presented” will not be considered (citing Rule 5A:20(c)-(e)). In an analogous context, we have held that, generally, we will not consider “additional authority on rehearing that could have been presented befo re the original panel.” Rusty’s Welding Serv., Inc. v. Gibson , 29 Va. App. 119, 124 n.1, 510 S.E.2d 255, 258 n.1 (1999) ( en banc ); see also Coleman v. City of Richmond , 6 Va. App. 296, 297 n.1, 368 S.E.2d 298, 300 n.1 ( 1988). It follows that the Court should not base its decision on grounds not raised at the panel level and not argued by either party. In short, the issue as to whether Hodges is a “noncustodi al parent” has been defaulted on appeal. Therefore, we cannot agree with th e “narrower grounds” upon which the concurrence rests its opinion. Second, the concurring opinion’s sua sponte interpretation of the meaning of “noncustodial parent” is misplaced. Code § 63.2-1900 defines “noncustodial parent” not in terms of physical custody, but as the “responsible person who is or may be obligated under Virginia law for support of a depende nt child or caretaker.” See also 22 VAC § 40-880-10. We are bound by the plain language of the statutory definition of “noncustodial parent.” See Beck v. Shelton , 267 Va. 482, 488, 593 S.E.2d 195, 198 (2004) (holding that courts are bound by the plain meaning of statutory language). Third, the concurring opinion interprets the phr ase “for the period such person or persons are in such status,” Code § 63.2-1908, as applying to both (1) a noncustodial parent, and (2) one who is receiving public assistance moneys. The concurrence states that “[I]f one of these prerequisites is not met (i.e., the individual is not a non-custodial parent or is not receiving public assistance money), then this limited exception does not apply . . . .” Such reasoning fails to properly apply the statutory defini tions of “noncustodial parent” a nd “debt” within the context of the statutes. A “debt” is “the total unpaid support obligation esta blished by . . . the payment of public assistance and owed by a noncustodial pare nt . . . .” Code § 63.2-1900. There is no statutory provision allowing Hodges to change her status from a noncustodial parent to “not a non-custodial parent” once the debt has been incu rred. The only status th at can change is the time period in which a debt can be incurred or the time period in which an obligation must be repaid. Therefore, the “period” to which th e proviso refers is the period in which the noncustodial parent is “the re cipient of public assistance mone ys for the benefit of minor dependent children.” Code § 63.2-1908. Immun ity from paying that debt does not depend on whether the noncustodial parent ta kes physical custody of the child. The noncustodial parent has debt immunity only when she is receiving publ ic assistance moneys for the benefit of her dependent child.- 5 - receives “public assistance” in the form of f ood stamps and Medicaid for the benefit of her children, DCSE is prohibited by the statute from collecting the outsta nding TANF debt. The Virginia Code does not define “public a ssistance moneys.” However, it does define “public assistance” to mean “Temporary Assi stance for Needy Families (TANF); auxiliary grants to the aged, blind and disabled; medi cal assistance; energy a ssistance; food stamps; employment services; child care; and general relief.” Code § 63.2-100. In some parts of Code § 63.2-1908, the legislature used the phrase “public assistance,” and in other parts it used the phrase, “public assistance moneys.” The ques tion then becomes what the legislature meant by the phrases “public assistance” and “public assistance moneys” in th e same statute. The General Assembly is presumed to have given the two di fferent phrases two different meanings. “‘When the General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two different things.’” Klarfeld v. Salsbury , 233 Va. 277, 284-85, 355 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1987) (quoting Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Marketing Coop., Inc. , 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981)); see also Morris v. Va. Retirement Sys. , 28 Va. App. 799, 805-06, 508 S.E.2d 925, 928 (1999) (“Had the legislature intended that the phrases ‘any payments’ . . . and ‘periodic payments for disability or death’ . . . [in the same statute] meant the same thing, they would have used the same terms.”). Clearly, Code § 63.2-100 defines food stamps and Medicaid as “ public assistance.” However, that does not make them “public assistance moneys .” If the legislature intended to include all forms of public assistance as defi ned by Code § 63.2-100, it would have only used the phrase “public assistance” in C ode § 63.2-1908. If we interpret th e phrase “public assistance moneys” to mean all forms of public assistance, the word “moneys” would add nothing to the

term “public assistance” and would be deprived of any effect. The word “moneys” would be rendered superfluous. The Virginia Supreme C ourt has long held that “[w]hen analyzing a- 6 - statute, we must assume that ‘t he legislature chose, with care, the words it used . . . and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute. ’” City of Va. Beach v. ESG Enters., Inc. , 243 Va. 149, 153, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992) (quoting Barr v. Town and Country Props. , 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990)); see also Huffman v. Kite , 198 Va. 196, 199, 93 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1956); Frazier v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998). Virginia courts are bound, where possi ble, to give meaning to every word of a statute. See, e.g. , Monument Assocs. v. Arlington County Bd. , 242 Va. 145, 149, 408 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1991);

Baker v. Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998). “It is the duty of the courts to give effect, if possible, to every word of the written law.” Moyer v. Commonwealth , 33 Va. App. 8, 35, 531 S.E.2d 580, 593 (2000). A word or clause contained in a statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it “ap pears to have been inserted th rough inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable of any sensible meaning,” or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.

Burnette v. Commonwealth , 194 Va. 785, 788-89, 75 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1953). “[N]o part of an act should be treated as meaningless unless abso lutely necessary.” Garrison v. First Fed. Savings

and Loan Ass’n of S.C. , 241 Va. 335, 340, 402 S.E.2d 25, 28 (1991) (citing Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher , 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929)). Therefore, to ensure that the word “moneys” in the phrase “ public assistance moneys” is give n meaning, its definition must exclude food stamps and Medicaid assistance. “It is a well established rule of construction that a statute ought to be interp reted in such a manner that it may have effect, and not found to be vain

and elusive.” Barnett v. D.L. Bromwell, Inc. , 6 Va. App. 30, 34, 366 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1988) ( en

banc ) (quoting McFadden v. McNorton , 193 Va. 455, 461, 69 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1952)). “We must assume that the legislature did not inte nd to do a vain and useless thing.” Williams v.

Commonwealth , 190 Va. 280, 293, 56 S.E.2d 537, 543 (1949).- 7 - Some forms of public assistance are provide d as cash transfers and others are not. 2 Virginia TANF is defined as a program in which a “relative can receive m onthly cash assistance for the support of his eligible children.” Code § 63.2-100; see also 42 U.S.C. § 601 (providing that the purpose of TANF is to “provide assist ance to needy families so that children may be

cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives”). On the other hand, some forms of public assistance are provided as non-cash transf ers for specific goods and/or services. “The food stamp program allows qualified stores to a ccept food stamps instead of cash for certain food items. The store can then redeem the stamps for their cash value.” Traficanti v. United States , 227 F.3d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. ). “Coupons issued to eligible households shall be used by them only to purchas e food in retail food stores which have been approved for participation in the food stamp program at prices prevailing in such stores.” 7 U.S.C. § 2016(b). 3 “Coupons issued and used as provi ded in [the Food Stamp Act are] redeemable [by the retail food stores] at face value by the Secretary [of Agriculture] through the facilities of the Treasury of th e United States.” 7 U.S.C. § 2013. Medicaid consists of reimbursements from the Department of Medica l Assistance Services directly to medical

2 “Cash” in this context should also be unders tood to include other forms of universally accepted fungible currency, such as checks. The di ssent charges that we have “adopted the most narrow and restrictive meaning of the word ‘mon eys,’ in disregard of the ‘everyday, ordinary’ meaning of the word in the context of the legislat ure’s intent.” But, in fact, the definition used by the dissent supports our analys is. The dissent relies on the definition of “money[s]” from Black’s Law Dictionary 1021 (7th ed. 1999): “assets that can eas ily be converted to cash.” That meaning requires fungibility. As we point out below, food stamps and Medicaid assistance are not fungible, nor are they assets that can legally be converted to cash. Therefore, we do not agree that our meaning of moneys ignores the “e veryday, ordinary” understanding of the word.

3 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) details the fines and pr ison terms that may be levied against an individual convicted of the unauthorized use, transfer, acquisition, alte ration, or possession of food stamp coupons or authorization cards. Buyi ng or selling food stamps for any purpose other than that provided in 7 U.S.C § 2011 et seq. , which is anything other than the sale or purchase of eligible food items from appr oved retail food stores, is an unauthorized use. See, e.g. , Kim v. United States , 121 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 1997).- 8 - providers for eligible services they render to eligible patients. See generally 12 VAC 30; Code §§ 32.1-310, -325. Recipients do not receive the be nefit in any form other than services provided. The difference between TANF, food stamps and Medicaid is that the latter two forms of public assistance entail transfers to third part ies. Neither food stamps nor Medicaid assistance consist of a fungible payment to the recipients . These forms of assistance are for goods or services supplied by third-party providers who are approved by the respective program administrators. The payments are then made to the third-party providers by government agencies. The only other court that has addressed this sp ecific issue has held that food stamps and medical benefits are not “public assistance moneys .” In Dep’t of Soc. and Health Services v.

Gerlack , 612 P.2d 382 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), a Wash ington appeals court interpreted a Washington statute almost identical to the Virginia statute at issue. It concluded that “public assistance moneys” had to denote something different from “public assistance,” “because each

word of a statute is to be given significance.” Id. at 385 (citation omitted). The relevant facts in

Gerlack were almost identical to those in the instant case. 4 In addition, the United States Court of Appeal s for the Ninth Circuit has held that food stamps are not “public assistance payments.” Siemens v. Bergland , 591 F.2d 1263, 1264 (9th Cir. 1978). In the Siemens case, recipients of payments under a Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program wanted the Secr etary of Agriculture to include weekly CETA program payments in calculating their incomes for the purposes of food stamp eligibility.

4 The Washington statute at i ssue read, in releva nt part, that “the payment of public assistance moneys for the benefit of a dependent child created a debt owed to the state by those parents responsible for the child’s support,” and, “[d]ebt under this section shall not be incurred by nor at any time be collected from a parent or other person who is the recipient of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor depe ndent children for the period such person or persons are in such status.” Gerlack , 621 P.2d at 384, 384 n.2. That statute has since been amended. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 74.20A.030 & 74.20A.270 (2004).- 9 - However, a CETA statute provided that the week ly payments were to be “disregarded in determining the amount of public assistance paymen ts under Federal or Fede rally assisted public assistance programs.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 821(a)). If food stamps were “public assistance payments,” then the Secretary could not include the CETA payments in the income calculations. If food stamps were not “public assistance paymen ts,” the statute did not prohibit the Secretary from including the payments as income. The Court held that “food st amps are not ‘public assistance payments’ as defined in the CETA statute . . . .” Id. If food stamps and Medicaid are included in the Virginia statutory phrase “public assistance moneys,” as Hodges urges, Code § 63.2-1908 would then also mean that DCSE could collect from a noncustodial parent the amount of food stamps and Medicaid expended on behalf

of his/her child. The first se ntence of Code § 63.2-1908 states, Any payment of public assistance money made to or for the benefit of any dependent child or children or their custodial parent creates a debt due and owing to the Department by the person or persons who are responsible for support of such children or custodial parent in an amount equal to the amount of public assistance money so paid. (Emphasis added.) In fact, if “public assist ance moneys” includes food stamps and Medicaid payments, then DCSE would have a statutory obligation to collect the amount of those forms of public assistance expended on behalf of the de pendent child from the noncustodial parent. Otherwise, the exact term, “public assistance m oneys,” would be given a different meaning in the same statute. In the first sentence, “public assistance moneys” would mean “TANF payments,” and in the second to last sentence of the statute, the proviso at issue in this appeal, “public assistance moneys” would mean “T ANF payments, food stamps and Medicaid assistance.” Considered as a whole, the legisl ature could not have po ssibly intended to assign- 10 - two different meanings to the phrase “public assistance moneys” in the same statute. 5 If the plain meanings of the words are adopted, it must be presumed that the legislature intended to give separate meanings to the phrases “public assistance” and “public assistance moneys” and did not intend merely to incor porate superfluous language. See Burnette , 194 Va. at 788-89, 75

S.E.2d at 484-85. 6

5 We also note that the second and thir d sentences of Code § 63.2-1908 support the interpretation that the phrase “public assistance moneys” doe s not include food stamps and Medicaid assistance. If food stamps and/or Medicaid assi stance are being received for the benefit of a child in the household who is not receiving TANF payments, the parent is not obligated to pay back the amount of the food stamps/Medicaid assist ance. The obligation created is only for the amount of moneys paid, i.e., TANF paym ents or other types of cash assistance. Those sentences state, However, if a custodial parent r eceives TANF payments for some of the custodial parent’s dependent children pursuant to § 63.2-604, the custodial parent shal l receive the total amount of support collected for the children for whom no TANF benefits are received. Such support payments shall not create a debt due and owing to the Department and the value of such payments shall not be counted as income for purposes of TANF eligibility and grant determination. Moreover, if the intent of the pr oviso is, as Hodges asserts, to prevent the state from collecting any welfare debt from families with limited financ ial resources, the legislature would not allow DCSE to offset child support payments from the noncustodial pare nt against the public assistance moneys being paid. DCSE is not permitted to keep child support payments for children who are not receiving TANF or other cash assistance, even if food stamps and/or Medicaid assistance is being paid for their benefit.

6 The dissent contends that the meaning of § 63.2-1908 should be ascertained by viewing it in relation to Code §§ 63.2-1909 and -1910. Wh ile those statutes fall successively under Subtitle V, Administrative Ch ild Support, Title 19, Child Support Enforcement, Article 2, Public Assistance, they are not part of a larger “act.” But cf. , Moreno v. Moreno , 24 Va. App. 190, 197, 480 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997) (“When the General Assembly uses different terms in the same act , it is presumed to mean different things. . . . ‘In construing a statute th e court should seek to discover the intention of the legislature as ascertained from the act itself when read in the light of other statutes relating to the same subj ect matter.’” (quoting Campbell v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 33, 38, 409 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1991) (emphasis added))). In any event, if you apply Code § 63.2-1909 to our analysis, the trea tment of the phrases “public assistance” and “public assi stance moneys” is consistent with our interpretation of those phrases. Code § 63.2-1909 states that anyone who r eceives public assistance on behalf of a child is deemed to have assigned to DCSE any righ ts to any support payments up to the amount of- 11 - Defining the phrase to include TANF paym ents, as opposed to TANF payments, food stamps and Medicaid, provides consistency and gi ves meaning to every word and phrase within the statute. “When analyzing a statute, we must a ssume that ‘the legislature chose, with care, the

words it used when it enacted the relevant st atute, and we are bound by those words as we

public assistance moneys expended. It also allows DCSE to collect any outstanding support obligation from a noncustodial parent up to the amount of moneys expended on behalf of a child until that debt is repaid. The debt consists of the amount of moneys expended, not the amount of assistance provided. In addition, although the statutes all concern obligations cr eated as a result of the payment of federally funded public assistance moneys on behalf of a child, the subject matter of each statute is different. Code § 63.2-1908 a ddresses TANF debt; Code § 63.2-1909 addresses the assignment of child support obligations; and Code § 63.2-1910 addr esses foster care maintenance payments debt. The Federal code requires states receivi ng Federal TANF block grants to include a process for an assignmen t of support rights as a condition of providing assistance to a family. 42 U.S. C. § 608(a)(3); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq . Support rights secured by a state as a condition for receivi ng TANF assistance (pursuant to Title IV, Part A of the Social Security Act) or on behalf of a child receiving foster care maintenance payments (pursuant to Title IV, Part E of the Social Se curity Act) creates an obligation in the person responsible for supporting the child. 42 U.S.C. § 656( a)(1). Such obligations are to be collected by the state, 42 U.S.C. § 656; however, the fede ral government does not prescribe the process under which those obligations are to be collect ed. 42 U.S.C. § 617. Because the Commonwealth is required by the federal government to coll ect debt created by TANF/support payments and foster care maintenance payments, the General A ssembly enacted statutes to meet those federal requirements. In doing so, the le gislature enacted separate stat utes for purposes of collecting TANF/support debt, Code § 63.2-1908, and fost er care maintenance payments, Code § 63.2-1910. The legislature could have elected to enact one statute to cover both types of debt. However, it chose to treat TANF/support debt se parately, and differently, from foster care maintenance payments debt. In the case of TANF , the legislature allows the noncustodial parent an exemption from paying back the debt while sh e is receiving money payments on behalf of the child. In the case of foster care maintenance payments, the legislature allows the noncustodial parent an exemption while she is receiving any kind of public assistance for the benefit of the child. Without enumerating them, we note that the eligibility requirements for receiving TANF assistance and the eligibility requirements for receiving foster care maintenance payments are different. Therefore, the intent of the legislature may have been to treat the collection of the different types of debt under each program differ ently. There is no requirement, federal or otherwise, that the General Assembly enact congruent provisos in the two statutes. Simply put, in each of the statutes, Code §§ 63.2-1908, -1909, and -1910, if any kind of public assistance is provided on behalf of a ch ild, the noncustodial pa rent must pay back moneys expended for the benefit of the child, unless the noncustodial pa rent is exempted. We must presume that the legislature chose its words with care and that each of th e words has a specific meaning and is not superfluous. ESG Enters., Inc. , 243 Va. at 153, 413 S.E.2d at 644; Burnette , 194 Va. at 788-89, 75 S.E.2d at 485.- 12 - interpret the statute.’” Frazier , 27 Va. App. at 135, 497 S.E.2d at 881 (quoting ESG Enters., Inc. , 243 Va. at 153, 413 S.E.2d at 644). When the statut ory language is clear and unambiguous, then the Court “must give the words their pl ain meaning.” Crislip v. Commonwealth , 37 Va. App. 66, 71, 554 S.E.2d 96, 98 (2001). “‘Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This is a legislative

function.’” Barr , 240 Va. at 295, 396 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth , 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944)). “‘Where the le gislature has used words of a plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon them a constructio n which amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed.’” Crislip , 37 Va. App. at 71-72, 554 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Dominion Trust Co. v. Kenbridge Constr. , 248 Va. 393, 396, 448 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1994)). Moreover, “[i]f the comparison of one clause with the rest of the statute makes a certain proposition clea r and undoubted, the act must be construed accordingly and ought to be so construed as to make it a consistent whole. If after all it turns out that that cannot be done, the construction that produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency is that which ought to prevail.” Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:05 (6th ed. 2000) (quoting Att’y

Gen. v. Sillem , 2 H&C 432, 159 Eng. Repr. 178 (1864)). Interpreting th e phrase “public assistance moneys” throughout the statute to ex clude food stamps and Medicaid assistance provides the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency.

III. Conclusion We hold that food stamps and Medicaid assist ance are not “public assistance moneys” as contemplated in Code § 63.2-1908. The legislat ure did not exempt noncustodial parents receiving those forms of public assistance fr om reimbursing DCSE for moneys expended on behalf of their children. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.- 13 - Humphreys, J., concurring in result. I concur in the plurality’s deci sion to affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case, but I write separately because I believe the ca se can and should be decided on narrower grounds. Because I believe that both the plurality and diss enters are vying to issue what, on this record, can be nothing but an advisory opinion, I do not join in the analysis of either Judge McClanahan or Judge Elder and would leave for another day th e issue of whether food stamps are equivalent to “public assistance moneys.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Harley , 256 Va. 216, 219-20, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998) (declining the appell ant’s invitation “to render an advisory opinion on a moot question based upon speculative facts,” reasoning th at “courts are not constituted . . . to render advisory opinions, to decide moot questions or to answer inquiries which are merely speculative,” and concluding that the court would instead “await the arrival of a case in which” the issue was properly presented). Under Code § 63.2-1908, [a]ny payment of public assistance money made to or for the benefit of any dependent child or children . . . creates a debt due and owing to the Department by the person or persons who are responsible for support of such chil dren . . . in an amount equal to the amount of public assistance money so paid. Thus, where TANF funds are distributed fo r the benefit of a minor child, the person “responsible” for supporting that child incurs a debt and is obligated to repay the Department an amount equivalent to the funds distributed. Here, Hodges does not ar gue that she was not “responsible” for supporting her child, nor does sh e argue that no TANF debt was incurred. Code § 63.2-1908 also provides that: “Debt created by an administrative support order

shall not be . . . collected from a noncustodial parent who is the recipient of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent childr en for the period such person or persons are in such status.” (Emphasis added). Thus, to qua lify for this limited statutory reprieve, the- 14 - individual must be both: (1 ) a non-custodial parent, (2) who is receiving public assistance moneys. If one of these prerequisites is not me t (i.e., the individual is not a non-custodial parent or is not receiving public assist ance money), then this limite d exception does not apply, and the Department is free to pursue the indivi dual for any debt that might be owed. 7 Here, Hodges is contending that this statut ory exception should apply because she is currently receiving public assist ance moneys in the form of food stamps and Medicaid. The plurality has rejected her argument, holding that food stamps and Medicaid are not equivalent to “public assistance moneys.” However, I would hold that the statutory exception my colleagues seek to interpret does not apply in this case because the trial c ourt expressly found that Hodges is “not now a noncustodial parent.” Hodge s has not appealed this factual finding. 8 Thus, because Hodges is not currently a “nonc ustodial parent,” the statut ory exemption does not apply, regardless of whether she is currentl y receiving public assistance moneys. Hodges argues on appeal that the parties have im plicitly, if not directl y, agreed that she is a non-custodial parent. However, where the partie s fail to appeal a finding of fact, that finding becomes conclusive and binding on this Court. See, e.g. , Tran v. Gwinn , 262 Va. 572, 582, 554 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2001). The parties simply cannot di spose of an issue on appeal by rewriting the

7 Code § 63.2-1908 also provides that a parent will not in cur a TANF debt during the period of time that she is both: (1) a non-cu stodial parent, and (2) receiving public assistance moneys. So, for example, if Hodges had receiv ed public assistance moneys while the child was living with her grandmother, there woul d have been no TANF debt to collect.

8 Hodges did object to the tria l court’s final order on the gr ound that she “believes that she is a non-custodial parent.” Although Hodges asserts that th e “Question Presented” in her opening brief encompasses this issu e, she did not include it in her initial assignments of error to this Court. Thus, we are barred from considering it. See Mengel v. Commonwealth , 37 Va. App. 676, 679, 561 S.E.2d 21, 22 (2002) (noting that, “on appeal, we will consider only those arguments presented in the petition for appeal and granted by th is Court” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Cirrito v. Cirrito , 44 Va. App. 287, 309, 605 S.E.2d 268, 278 (2004).- 15 - trial court’s findings of fact – they may as eas ily agree that the sky is green, but such an agreement would hardly make it so. Moreover, the trial court’s finding that Hodge s is “not now a noncustodial parent” is supported by evidence in the record. The resoluti on of this issue necessitates an inquiry into who, exactly, is a “noncustodial pa rent” within the meaning of the statute. Because I am of the opinion that a “noncustodial parent ” is not necessarily equivalent to an “obligor parent,” I

believe the trial court co rrectly found that Hodges – although an obligor pa rent – is “not now a noncustodial parent.” “Noncustodial parent” is defi ned as a “responsible person who is or may be obligated under Virginia law for support of a dependent child or child’s caretaker.” Code § 63.2-1900; see

also 22 VAC 40-880-10. Although the current statut e does not define “responsible person,” former Code § 63.1-250 defined “responsible pers on” as “any obligor or person obligated under Virginia law for support of a dependent child or the child’s caretaker.” See 22 VAC 40-880-10 (defining “non-custodial parent” and incorpora ting by reference definition of “responsible person” from “Code § 63.1-250”). Because a “r esponsible person” encompasses “any obligor or

person ,” a non-custodial parent is , therefore, “any ‘obligor or person ’ who is or may be obligated under Virginia law for support of a depe ndent child or child’s caretaker.” Both the plurality and the dissent suggest th at a “noncustodial parent” is merely an obligor, or a parent who has already incurred a TANF debt. However, the definition of “noncustodial parent” does not specifically inco rporate the phrase “obligor,” instead using the term “responsible person.” And, as noted above, a “responsible person” is “any obligor or

person obligated under Virginia law fo r support of a dependent child or the child’s caretaker.” Code § 63.1-250 (repealed effective Oct. 1, 2002) (emphasis added). A “responsible person,” then, is not necessarily an “obligor.” As a result, a “noncus todial parent” might be, but is not- 16 - necessarily, an obligor. See, e.g. , Smith v. Commonwealth , 17 Va. App. 37, 40, 434 S.E.2d 914, 915 (1993) (“While certain conduct might be constr ued to fall within the definitions of both “use” and “display,” the two words are not synony mous. The definition of neither necessarily includes the definition of the other.”). Thus, I cannot agree that “noncus todial” is synonymous with “obligor.” This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the General Assembly defined “obligor” separately from, and more broa dly than, “noncustodi al parent.” See Code § 63.2-1900. And, as the plurality and dissent correctly point out, “[w]hen the General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two different things,” Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop. , 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981), and “no part of an act should be treated as meaningless unl ess absolutely necessar y,” Garrison v. First Fed.

Sav. & Loan Assoc. , 241 Va. 335, 340, 402 S.E.2d 25, 28 (1991). Thus, the terms “noncustodial” and “obligor” cannot be read interchangeably, but mu st instead be given separate and distinct meanings. See Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Bd. of Supervisors , 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002) (“When the General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, those terms are presumed to have distinct and different meanings.”). Moreover, “[i]n interpreting a st atute, we ‘assume that the legislature chose, with care,

the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.’” Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Beverly Healthcare , 41 Va. App. 468, 493-94, 585 S.E.2d 858, 871 (2003) (quoting City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enters., Inc. , 243 Va. 149, 153, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d , 268 Va. 278, 601 S.E.2d 604 (2004). Here, had the General Asse mbly intended for the statutory exception contained in Code § 63.2-1908 to apply to “oblig or” parents who are receiving public assistance money, it presumably would have used the te rm “obligor” – which is defined and used- 17 - throughout the statute – rather th an the term “noncustodial.” Interposing “obligor” in Code § 63.2-1908 in place of “noncustodial” would effec tively rewrite the statut ory provision – a task suited for the legislature, not this Court. See Barr v. Town & Country Props., Inc. , 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (“‘Courts are not perm itted to rewrite statutes. This is a legislative function.’” (q uoting Anderson v. Commonwealth , 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944))). In my view, then, the statutory definition of “noncustodial parent” encompasses any person who “is or may be obligated under Virg inia law for support of a dependent child.” 9 Under Virginia law, all parents owe a duty of support to th eir children, with the exception of parents whose parental rights ha ve been terminated through adop tion or another formal legal proceeding. See, e.g. , Featherstone v. Brooks , 220 Va. 443, 448, 258 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1979) (“Both parents of a child owe that child a duty of support during minority.”). Accordingly, to give effect to the adjective “non-custodial,” I be lieve this statutory definition must be read in conjunction with the phrase “cust odial parent,” which is define d as “the natural or adoptive parent with whom the child resi des; a stepparent or other pers on who has physical custody of the

child and with whom the child resi des; or a local board that has le gal custody of a child in foster care.” Code § 63.2-1900; see also Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Beverly Healthcare , 268 Va. 278, 285, 601 S.E.2d 604, 608 (2004) (“[T]he vari ous parts of [a] statute should be harmonized so that, if practicable, each is given a sensible and intelligent effect.”). Thus, if a

9 Compare Code § 63.2-1900 (defining “ noncustodial parent” as “a responsible person who is or may be obligated under Virginia la w for support of a dependent child or child’s caretaker” (emphases added)); with 22 VAC 40-880-10 (defining “ non-custodial parent” and incorporating by reference the definition of “responsible person” contained in “Code § 63.1-250”); and Code § 63.1-250 (repealed effective Oc t. 1, 2002) (defining “responsible person” as “any obligor or person obligated under Virginia law fo r support of a dependent child or child’s caretaker” (emphasis added)).- 18 - parent is obligated under Virginia law to suppor t a child, but does not othe rwise fall within the definition of “custodial parent,” th at parent is “noncustodial” within the meaning of the statute. In the parties’ written statement of facts, th ey jointly assert that the child “returned to [Hodges’] home in 1995 and has continued to reside in the home with [Hodges] and her younger sibling.” This statement clearl y supports the trial c ourt’s conclusion that Hodges is “not now a noncustodial parent.” That is, because the child currently “reside[s]” w ith Hodges, her natural parent, Hodges is a “custodial parent” w ithin the meaning of the statute. See Code § 63.2-1900 (defining “custodial parent” as, inter alia , a “natural . . . parent with whom the child resides (emphasis added)). And, because Hodges is a “cu stodial parent,” she is, as the trial court found,

“not now a noncustodial parent .” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, I do not believe that we either need to or should reach the issue of whether Hodges’ receipt of food stamps and Medicaid qu alify her as an individual who is “receiving public assistance moneys” within the meaning of the statute. Rather, because Hodges is not a non-custodial parent, the limited exemption c ontained in Code § 63.2-1908 simply does not apply. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, and I therefore concur in the result reached by the plurality.- 19 - Elder, J., with whom Fitzpatrick, C.J., Be nton, Annunziata and Felt on, JJ., join, dissenting. A majority of six members of this Court agree to affirm the judgment of the trial court permitting the Department of Social Services (D SS) to recover from Angela Hodges (appellant) payments of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). These judges agree that the exemption from repayment set out in paragra ph 4 of Code § 63.2-1908 does not apply under the facts of this case. However, they disa gree over why the exemp tion is inapplicable. The first paragraph of Code § 63.2-1908 pr ovides in relevant part as follows: Any payment of public assistance m oney made to or for the benefit of any dependent child or children or their custodial parent creates a debt due and owing to the [State ] Department [of Social Services (DSS)] by the person or persons who are responsible for support of such children or custodial parent in an amount equal to the amount of public assistance money so paid.

See Code § 63.2-100 (defining “Department”). The fourth paragraph of Code § 63.2-1908 contains the following proviso: Debt created by an administrative support order unde r this section shall not be incurred by nor at any time be collected from a noncustodial parent who is the recipient of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent children for the period such person or persons are in such status. Judge Humphreys interprets the exemption as requiring a finding that the person seeking to block repayment “must be both: (1) a non-cust odial parent [and] (2) . . . receiving public assistance moneys.” He concludes the trial court’s finding that appellant is “not now a noncustodial parent” was unappealed and now co mpels the conclusion that the exemption does not apply, obviating the need to consider the second requirement for the exemption, that the

individual must be “receiv ing public assistance money.” In their separate plurality opinion, the remain ing five members of the majority conclude appellant was a “noncustodial parent” within the meaning of Code § 63.2-1908. They reject Judge Humphreys’ reasoning a nd reach the second part of the Code § 63.2-1908 repayment- 20 - exemption, which requires consideration of the scope of the terms “public assistance” and “public assistance money.” Like the five-judge plurality, I reject Judge Humphreys’ conc lusion that the trial judge’s statement--that appellant is “not now a nonc ustodial parent”--sta nding alone, compels the conclusion that the Code § 63.2-1908 repayment ex emption does not apply. Like the five-judge plurality, I believe the procedural posture of this case requires us to consider the scope of the terms “public assistance” and “ public assistance money” as us ed in Code § 63.2-1908. However, I disagree with the plurality’s interpretation of th e term “public assistance money” as used in Code § 63.2-1908. I would hold the legislature in tended the meaning of that term in Code § 63.2-1908 to be coextensive with the term, “pub lic assistance,” as defined in Code § 63.2-100.

I believe an examination of these terms as used in Code § 63.2-1908 and related statutes reveals that this interpretation is the only one that yields consistent results. Thus , I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affi rm the ruling of the trial court.

I. “NONCUSTODIAL PARENT” UNDER CODE § 63.2-1908 The trial court found appellant is “not now a noncustodial parent.” However, it permitted

DSS to recover the debt from her under C ode § 63.2-1908. Assuming we are bound by the trial court’s finding that appellant is “not now a noncus todial parent,” we must interpret that finding in the context of its ruling permitting DSS to recover the debt. On appeal, a ruling is entitled to a presumpti on of correctness; a trial court is presumed to have known and properly applied the law, abse nt clear evidence to the contrary. See Yarborough

v. Commonwealth , 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977); Oliver v. Commonwealth , 35 Va. App. 286, 297, 544 S.E.2d 870, 875 (2001). Applyi ng this principle to the trial court’s ruling permitting DSS to recover the debt from appellant, we are compelled to conclude the court- 21 - determined that, at the time the debt was incurred , appellant was, in fact , a “noncustodial parent” within the meaning of Code § 63.2-1908, defined in Code § 63.2-1900 me rely as an “obligor,” “a responsible person who is or may be obligated under Virginia law for support of a dependent child.” Viewed in this context, we are compelled to conclude the trial court’s finding that appellant is “not now a noncustodi al parent” means simply that, at the time of the collection efforts , appellant was a “custodial pare nt,” defined in Code § 63.2-1900 as, inter alia , “the natural or adoptive parent w ith whom the child resides.” Accordingly, I believe the decision of ten memb ers of this Court to consider the scope of the terms “public assistance” and “pub lic assistance money” is proper.

II.

“PUBLIC ASSISTANCE” AND “P UBLIC ASSISTANCE MONEY” UNDER CODE § 63.2-1908 Code § 63.2-100 defines “public assistance ” as “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); auxiliary grants to the aged, blind and disabled; medical assistance; energy assistance; food stamps; employment services; ch ild care; and general re lief.” Code § 63.2-1908 refers not only to “public a ssistance” but also to “public assistance money” and “public assistance moneys.” Examining the usage of these terms in Code § 63.2-1908, the plurality concludes that “public assist ance moneys” include only thos e types of fungible “public assistance” paid, by cash or chec k, directly to the person receiv ing the aid, such as TANF, and not sums paid to third parties on behalf of th e person entitled to aid, such as through the food stamp and Medicaid programs. By construing th e word “money[s]” so narrowly as to include only direct transfers by cash or ch eck, the plurality disregards th e ordinary meaning of the word “money” in the modern world of business and governme nt and fails to give effect to the intent of the legislature.- 22 - Here, the obvious intent of the legislatur e in enacting the part of Code § 63.2-1908 under review was to relieve a noncustodial parent of having to repay a debt created by an administrative support order during such time that th e parent “is the recipien t of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent chil dren.” As appellant noted, “the obvious reason for the statutory exception to assessment and co llection is to prohibit the Commonwealth from depleting the extremely limited financial resources of families with children as needing and receiving public assistance.” The legislature merely acknowledged the unfairness of collecting from the noncustodial parent, during the time th at the parent is rece iving “public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor de pendent children,” a debt for T ANF benefits previously paid. Here, the public assistance moneys being paid for the minor dependent children were food stamps and Medicaid benefits. Public polic y does not condone taki ng “public assistance moneys” paid to a parent for a minor dependent child, during the time th e parent is receiving such benefits, to repay other public assistance f unds previously paid on behalf of that parent. The plurality has adopted the most narrow a nd restrictive meaning of the word “moneys,” in disregard of the everyday, ordinary meaning of the word in the context of the legislature’s intent. Black’s Law Dictionary 1021 (7th ed. 1999), defines “m oney[s]” as “assets that can easily be converted to cash.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1160 (2d ed. 1983), variously defines “money[s]” as “any substance or article used as money, as bank notes, checks, etc.” and as “property, possessions, wealth.” This broa der definition of “money[s]” was clearly what the legislature intended by enacting Code § 63.2-1908 and is the only construction that achieves a reasonable and meaningful result, especially when viewed in light of the way the terms “public assistance” and “public assistance money” are used in Code §§ 63.2-1909 and -1910.- 23 - Code § 63.2-1910 10 applies to foster care expenditure s and creates a debt owed to the local department of social services, similar to the one owed to DSS as provided for in Code § 63.2-1908, for any “payment . . . for room, board, a nd social services for a child in the custody of the local department or [designated] public agency.” Code § 63.2- 1910 contains a proviso almost identical to the one in paragra ph 4 of Code § 63.2-1908, stating as follows: Debts created by an administrativ e support order under this section shall not be incurred by nor at any time collected from a noncustodial parent who is the recipient of public assistance for the benefit of minor dependent ch ildren for the period such person is in such status. (Emphasis added). These portions of the two code sections are identical in key respects except that Code § 63.2-1908 refers to “public assistance moneys ” whereas Code § 63.2-1910 refers only to “public assistance.” I agree with the general principles of statut ory construction set out in the plurality opinion that “[w]hen the General Assembly uses two diffe rent terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two different things,” Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop. , 222 Va. 270, 278, 279 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981), and that “no part of an act should be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary,” Garrison v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. , 241 Va. 335, 340, 402 S.E.2d 25, 28 (1991). However, settled principles of statutory construction also provide that Proper construction seeks to harm onize the provisions of a statute both internally and in relation to other statutes . . . . [L]egislative purpose can best be “‘ascertained fr om [a particular statute] when read in light of other statutes relating to the same subject matter.’” Moreno v. Moreno , 24 Va. App. 190, 197, 480 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997) (citation omitted). The doctrine of pari materia teaches that “‘statutes are not to be cons idered as isolated fragments of

10 Appellant specifically mentioned Code § 63.2-1910 on brief on appeal. Whether appellant cited this statute in the trial court or on appeal is irrelevant to our ability to consider it in interpreting Code § 63.2-1908. Lash v. County of Henrico , 14 Va. App. 926, 929, 421 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1992) (en banc) (noting that Rule 5A:18 “does not prohibit reli ance on statutes or cases not presented to the trial court to suppor t, on appeal, a position otherwise adequately presented at trial”).- 24 - law, but as a whole, or as part s of a great, connected homogenous system, or a simple and complete statutory arrangement.’” Id. at 198, 480 S.E.2d at 796 (citation omitted).

DMV v. Wallace , 29 Va. App. 228, 233-34, 511 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1999) (citation omitted) (first emphasis added). Under the plurality’s interpretation of “pub lic assistance money,” a noncustodial parent receiving food stamps or Medicaid payments but not TANF payments would not be responsible under Code § 63.2-1910, while receiving such benef its, for paying back “[a]ny [foster care] payment made by a local department . . . for room , board, and social services”; however, such a parent would, nevertheless, be responsible und er Code § 63.2-1908 for paying DSS back for any TANF payments previously received. I would hol d that in light of the clear meaning of Code § 63.2-1910, such a construction of Code § 63.2-1908 fails to give proper consideration to the parallel language of Code § 63.2-1910 a nd would lead to an incongruous result. Further, in Code § 63.2-1909, the Genera l Assembly used these terms--“public assistance,” “public assistance money,” and “ public assistance moneys”--in a seemingly interchangeable fashion. That c ode section provides as follows: By accepting public assistance for or on behalf of a child or children, the recipient shall be deem ed to have made an assignment to the Department of any and all right, title, and interest in any support obligation and arrearages ow ed to or for such child or children or custodial parent up to the amount of public assistance money paid for or on behalf of such child or children or custodial parent for such term of time as such public assistance moneys are paid; provided, however, that th e Department may thereafter continue to collect any outstand ing support obligation or arrearage owed to the Department as a resu lt of such assignment up to the amount of public assistance money pa id for or on behalf of such child or children or custodial pare nt which has not been paid by the noncustodial parent. The recipien t shall also be deemed, without the necessity of signing any docum ent, to have appointed the Commissioner as his or her true a nd lawful attorney-in-fact to act in his or her name, place, and stead to perform the specific act of endorsing any and all drafts, ch ecks, money orders or other negotiable instruments represen ting support payments which are- 25 - received on behalf of such child or children or custodial parent as reimbursement for the public assist ance moneys previously paid to such recipient. Applying the plurality’s defi nition of “public assistance moneys,” Code § 63.2-1909 would permit DSS to seek reimbursement only for TANF benefits and other payments made by cash or check and not for benefits paid to third partie s, such as food stamps or Medicaid. Had the General Assembly intended to limit recoupment to the amount of moneys actually paid to the recipient, it would have had no need to menti on all “public assistance” in the first portion of Code § 63.2-1909. Thus, the most logical interp retation of Code § 63.2-1909, especially when

read in pari materia with Code §§ 63.2-1908 and -1910, is that the General Assembly used interchangeably the terms “public assistance,” which it defined in the code, and “public assistance money” and “moneys,” whic h it did not separately define.

III. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the ruling

of the trial court.Tuesday 10th August, 2004.

Angela M. Hodges, Appellant, against Record No. 2182-03-3 Circuit Court No. CH03020866-00 Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement,

ex rel . Comptroller of Virginia, ex rel . Phyllis Hodges, Appellees.

Upon a Petition for Rehearing En Banc Before Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Elder, Annunziata, Bumgardner, Frank, Humphreys, Clements, Fe lton, Kelsey and McClanahan

On July 27, 2004 came the appellant, by counsel, a nd filed a petition prayi ng that the Court set aside the judgment rendered herein on July 13, 2004, and grant a rehearing en banc thereof. On consideration whereof, the petition for rehearing en banc is granted, the mandate entered herein on July 13, 2004 is stayed pending the decision of the Court en banc , and the appeal is reinstated

on the docket of this Court. The parties shall file briefs in compliance with Rule 5A:35. The appellant shall attach as an addendum to the opening brief upon rehearing en banc a copy of the opinion pr eviously rendered by the- 2 - Court in this matter. It is further ordered that the a ppellant shall file with the clerk of this Court twelve additional copies of the appendix previously filed in this case.

A Copy,

Teste: Cynthia L. McCoy, Clerk By: Deputy ClerkCOURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Mc Clanahan and Senior Judge Coleman Argued at Salem, Virginia

ANGELA M. HODGES OPINION BY v. Record No. 2182-03-3 JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN JULY 13, 2004 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ex rel. COMPTROLLER OF VIRGINIA, ex rel. PHYLLIS HODGES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY James W. Updike, Jr., Judge David D. Beidler (Legal Aid Societ y of Roanoke Valley, on briefs), for appellant. Jack A. Maxwell, Special Counsel (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Craig M. Burshe m, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Beth J. Edwards, Regional Special Counsel; Alice G. Burlinson, Regional Special Counsel, on brief), for appellee.

Angela Hodges appeals a circuit court orde r affirming an administrative support order issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia, Depart ment of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE), requiring reimburseme nt of a public assistance debt incurred on

behalf of her minor child. Sh e contends that Code § 63.2-1908 precludes DCSE from assessing the debt against her. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court. I. Background Angela M. Hodges and Ronald R. Hodges ar e the parents of N., born in 1989. From 1990 to 1995, N. resided with her paternal grandm other, Phyllis Hodges. During that time, Phyllis Hodges received Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits from the- 2 - Department of Social Services for the care of N. Ronald Hodge s reimbursed the Department of Social Services for all but $2,860 of the TANF monies paid for N’s benefit. In 1995, N. returned to her parents’ home and con tinues to reside there. In 2002, DCSE issued an administrative s upport order seeking reimbursement from Angela Hodges for the balance of the TANF moneys paid on behalf of N. The order allowed for a payment of $65 per month for each of the months TANF benefits were received for N. Angela Hodges is not currently receiving any public assistance moneys, including TANF. However, the household does receive food stamps in the form of an elect ronic benefit card, and

Medicaid assistance for the benefit of the children. Angela Hodges appealed the administrative s upport order to the j uvenile and domestic relations district court, which dismissed the order. DCSE appealed the decision to the circuit court, which found that the code section di d not bar DCSE from collecting the debt. 11 This appeal followed. II. Analysis On appeal, questions of statut ory interpretation are reviewed de novo by this Court. Issues of “pure statutory interpretation [are] th e prerogative of the judici ary.” Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp. , 251 Va. 398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996). “This axiom stems from basic principles of separati on of powers. ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’” Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc. , 42 Va. App. 628, 635, 593 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2004) (quoting Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 1 (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). Therefore, “we review the trial court’s stat utory interpretations and legal conclusions de

11 The trial court also found that Angela Hodges was not a noncustodial parent as contemplated in Code § 63.2-1908, but appellant does not appeal that part of the trial court’s finding.- 3 - novo .” Rollins v. Commonwealth , 37 Va. App. 73, 79, 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001) (citing

Timbers v. Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 187, 193, 503 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1998)). Code § 63.2-1908 provides that payment of public assistance money for a child constitutes a debt to DCSE by noncustodial pare nts. In pertinent part, the statute states: Debt created by an administrative support order unde r this section shall not be incurred by nor at any time be collected from a noncustodial parent who is the recipient of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent children for the period such person or persons are in such status. The issue in this appeal is si mply whether, in the context of the statute, the term “public assistance moneys” includes food stamps and Medi caid assistance. The a ppellant contends that

because her household receives th ese two forms of public assistance for the benefit of her children DCSE is prohibited by the statute from collecting the outstanding TANF debt. “In construing statutes, courts are charged with ascertaining a nd giving effect to the intent of the legislature

. ” Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Hill , 254 Va. 88, 91, 488 S.E.2d 345, 346 (1997) (citing City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp. , 250 Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995)). In Code § 63.2-1908, the legislature chose to use the phrase “public assistance moneys” rather than simply “public assistance.” In some parts of the statute, the phrase “public assistance” is used; in other parts, “public assistance moneys” is used. The question then becomes what the legislature meant by including the word “moneys.”

“It is a basic rule of statutor y construction that a word in a statute is to be given its everyday, ordinary meaning unless the word is a word of art.” Stein v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 65, 69, 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991) (citing Lovisi v. Commonwealth , 212 Va. 848, 850, 188 S.E.2d 206, 208, cert. denied , 407 U.S. 922 (1972)). The ordi nary use of the word money, or moneys in plural, is cash or currency. See Black’s Law Dictionary 695 (abridged 6th ed. 1991) (defining money as “coins and paper currency used as circulating medium of exchange”).- 4 - Money, including forms other than cash or currency (i.e. checks, debit card s, credit cards), is a medium of exchange that is universally accepted across the country for the purpose of purchasing, or paying for, a wide variety of commodities, which includes both goods and

services. In the two code sect ions of the Act where the legi slature used the words “public assistance moneys,” Code §§ 63.2-1908 and 63.2-1909, it is placed in the context of a payment, or money being paid. “Proper construction seeks to harmonize the prov isions of a statute bot h internally, and in

relation to other statutes.” Commonwealth v. Wallace , 29 Va. App. 228, 233, 511 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1999). In Wallace this Court wrote: The words chosen by the legislatur e in drafting a statute derive meaning from both definition and co ntext and, therefore, we divine legislative intent by construing an enactment as a whole, together with companion statutes, if any. The legal maxim, noscitur a sociis , instructs that “a word takes color and expression from the purport of the entire phrase of whic h it is a part, and . . . must be read in harmony with its cont ext.” Turner v. Commonwealth , 226 Va. 456, 460, 309 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1983). Similarly, legislative purpose can best be “‘ascertained fr om the act itself when read in the light of other statutes relati ng to the same subject matter.’” Moreno v. Moreno , 24 Va. App. 190, 197, 480 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997). The doctrine of pari materia teaches that “‘statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragme nts of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great, connected homogenous system, or a simple and complete statutory arrangement.’” Id. at 198, 480 S.E.2d at 796.

Id. at 233-34, 511 S.E.2d at 425. Some forms of public assistance are provided as cash transfers 12 and others are not. Code § 63.2-100 provides definitions for some of the appli cable terms. “Public assistance” is defined as “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF ); auxiliary grants to the aged, blind and disabled; medical assistance; en ergy assistance; food stamps; empl oyment services; child care;

12 “Cash” in this context should also be unders tood to include other forms of universally accepted currency, such as checks.- 5 - and general relief.” TANF is defined as a progr am in which a “relative can receive monthly cash assistance for the support of hi s eligible children.” Code § 63.2-100. On the other hand, food stamps are distributed in the form of coupons or an electronic benefit card in order to obtain nutritional food (see 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (2004)). Food stamps are food-only assistance and by law are not to be used to purchase or pay fo r anything other than foodstuffs that are approved by the food stamp program. Medicaid consists of reimbursements to medical providers for eligible services they have rendered to eligible patients (see, e.g. , Code § 32.1-310). Neither food stamps nor Medicaid assistance provide a cash payment to the re cipients that allows them to use that benefit to purchase or pay for goods or services other than those approved by the respective programs. In the case of Medicaid, reci pients do not receive the benefit directly. The government pays the medical providers directly. If the legislature intended to include all forms of public assistance as defined by Code § 63.2-100, it would have only used the phrase “public assistance.” To interpret the phrase “public assistance moneys” to mean all forms of public assistance, the word “moneys” would add nothing to the term “public assistance” and would be deprived of any effect. The word “moneys” would be rendered superfluous. The Virginia Supreme Court has long held th at “when analyzing a statute, we must assume that ‘the legislature chose with care, the words it used . . . and we are bound by those words when we interpret the statute.’” City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enters., Inc. , 243 Va. 149, 153, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992) (quoting Barr v. Town and Country Props. , 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990)); see also Huffman v. Kite , 198 Va. 196, 199, 93 S.E.2d 328, 330-31 (1956); Frazier v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998). Virginia courts are bound, where possible, to give meaning to every word of a statute. See, e.g. , Monument Assoc. v. Arlington County Bd. , 242 Va. 145, 149, 408 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1991);- 6 - Baker v. Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998). A word or clause contained in a statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it “appears to have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable of any sensible meaning,” or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the st atute. Burnette v. Commonwealth , 194 Va. 785, 788-89, 75 S.E.2d 482, 484-85 (1953). “[N]o part of an act should be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary.” Garrison v. First Federal Savings and Loan of South Carolina , 241 Va. 335, 340, 402 S.E.2d 25, 28 (1991) (citing Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher , 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929)). To ensure that the word “moneys” is given meaning this Court must interpret the phrase “public assistance moneys” to exclud e non-monetary public assistance. When the legislature exempted recipients of monetary public assistance from the obligation of repaying prior suppo rt, it intended to avoid a meani ngless and inefficient exercise of giving money to those in need with one hand while requiring it to be paid back with the other.

That would be the result if the noncustodial parent received mone tary public assistance at the time DCSE sought repayment of prior public assist ance. However, in the case of non-monetary support, no such result is reached. Neither food stamps, Medicaid benefits, nor other forms of non-monetary assistance, can legally be converted to cash. The Court finds that holding recipients of non-monetary assistance subject to the obligations of Code § 63.2-1908 doe s not frustrate the purpose of that statute. The “public assistance moneys” exception applies only to those receiving actual monetary assistance from the Commonwealth. Food stamps and Medicaid assi stance are not “public assistance moneys” as contemplated in Code § 63.2-1908. The legisl ature did not exempt noncustodial parents receiving those forms of public assistance fr om reimbursing DCSE for moneys expended on- 7 - behalf of their children. As a result, Hodges does not come under the statutory exception, and, as N.’s parent, must repay the support obligation pu rsuant to the administrative support order.

III. Conclusion Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’ s decision upholding the administrative support order requiring the appellant to re imburse DCSE for benefits exte nded on behalf of her child.

Affirmed.- 8 - Coleman, J., dissenting. I agree with the majority that when we ar e called upon to interpret a statute we are not bound by a trial court’s construction of the statute and that upon our de novo review and determination we are required to give “effect to the intent of the legi slature.” Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Hill , 254 Va. 88, 91, 488 S.E.2d 345, 346 (1997) (citing City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp. , 250 Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995)). Moreover, I agree with the majority that a word in a statut e is to be given “its everyday, ordinary meaning

unless the word is a word of art.” Stein v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 65, 69, 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991) (citing Lovisi v. Commonwealth , 212 Va. 848, 850, 188 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1972)). However, by construing the word “money[s]” so narrowly as to include only “coins and paper currency” the majority disregards the “everyday, or dinary meaning” of the word “money” in the modern world of business and government and fa ils to give “effect to the intent of the legislature.” Here, the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the part of Code § 63.2-1908 under review was to relieve a noncustodial parent of having to repay a debt created by an administrative support order during such time that th e parent “is the recipien t of public assistance moneys for the benefit of minor dependent chil dren.” As appellant noted, “the obvious reason for the statutory exception to assessment and co llection is to prohibit the Commonwealth from depleting the extremely limited financial resources of families with children as needing and receiving public assistance.” The legislature merely acknowledged the unfairness of collecting a debt for TANF benefits paid from the noncustodi al parent during the time that the parent is receiving “public assistance moneys for the bene fit of minor dependent children.” Here, the public assistance moneys paid for the minor depe ndent children were food stamps and Medicaid benefits. In other words, public policy did not condone taking “ public assistance moneys” paid- 9 - to a parent for a minor dependent child during the time the parent is receiving such benefits to repay other public assistance funds that were paid on behalf of the noncustodial parent. Furthermore, in today’s world I seriously doubt that any public assistance benefits or “moneys” are paid in “coins and paper currency ” or cash. Proper government accounting would require that such public assi stance benefits be paid by check, voucher, coupon, etc.; not by “coins or paper currency.” The majority has ad opted the most narrow and restrictive meaning of the word “moneys,” in disregard of the “everyday, ordinary” meani ng of the word in the context of the legislature’s intent . Black’s Law Dictionary 1021 (7th ed. 1999) defines “money[s]” as “assets that can be easily converted to cash.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1160 (2d ed. 1983) variously defines “money[s]” as “any substa nce or article used as money, as bank notes, checks, etc.;” and as “property, possessions, wealt h.” This broader definition of “money[s]” was clearly what the legislature intended by enacting Code § 63.2-1908 and is the only construction that achieves a reasonable and meaningful result. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and I would reverse the tr ial court’s decision upholding the administrative support order.