1

Filed 1/7/21 In re J.A. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re J.A., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Laws

__________________________________

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A159453

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. J44745)

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 602, the minor J.A. challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

and dispositional orders, contending the evidence did not support the 

sustained allegation of carrying a loaded firearm in a public place (Pen. Code, 

§ 25850), the court miscalculated his maximum term of confinement (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 726), and the court abused its discretion in imposing gang 

conditions on his probation. We will order a modification of his maximum 

term of confinement and affirm the orders in all other respects.
2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A juvenile wardship petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 602, subdivision (a), charged appellant with assault with a firearm 

(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, 

subds. (a) & (c)(6)), and being a minor in possession of a firearm (§ 29610).1

The petition further alleged a firearm enhancement and a great bodily injury 

enhancement as to the assault (§ 12022.5, subd. (a); § 12022.7). 

A. Contested Jurisdictional Hearing

At a contested jurisdictional hearing in Sacramento County Juvenile 

Court on October 7-9, 2019, the evidence included the following.

In May 2019, victim Jonah Munger-Bounds and Griffin Campbell were 

roommates at an apartment on Summersdale Drive in Sacramento. On the 

afternoon of May 28, 2019, Munger-Bounds received a SnapChat message 

from a friend, M.R., regarding a party Munger-Bounds had thrown the day 

before. M.R. was upset that Munger-Bounds had invited a person to the 

party with whom M.R. “had problems.” They argued over SnapChat for three 

hours; M.R. ultimately told Munger-Bounds that he was coming to MungerBounds’ apartment, uninvited, and threatened to shoot him.

Munger-Bounds and Campbell left their apartment and spoke with 

their neighbors, Robert Haberern and Adrianna Heltman, on the neighbor’s 

front porch in the same apartment complex. They were approached by M.R. 

and appellant, whom Munger-Bounds had met a few times before. Heltman 

testified that M.R. and appellant entered the apartment complex through the 

gate behind her apartment. Haberern had seen them walking up the street. 

1 Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references hereafter 

are to the Penal Code.
3

Immediately, M.R. began to fight Munger-Bounds. After several 

minutes, Munger-Bounds placed M.R. in a “rear naked choke,” at which point 

Campbell pulled him off of M.R. Munger-Bounds thought the fight was over 

and he had won; Campbell believed the two looked ready to resume the fight 

and stood between them. 

“[I]n a split second,” appellant pulled a .38-caliber special revolver from 

his jacket and shot Munger-Bounds in the torso. Appellant and M.R. fled the 

scene. Campbell helped Munger-Bounds back to their apartment and called 

911. 

Sacramento Police Officer Colby Anderson arrived at the scene and 

observed the gunshot wound to Munger-Bounds’s lower left abdomen. 

Munger-Bounds identified appellant and M.R. as being involved in the 

shooting. 

Officer Anderson provided appellant’s and M.R.’s names to Detective 

Michael Loscher, who was assigned to investigate the shooting. A Vacaville 

police officer informed the detective that M.R. was being treated at a 

Vacaville hospital. Detective Loscher and another detective met M.R. at the 

hospital and confirmed his involvement in the shooting. The detectives 

contacted appellant’s parents, who brought him to the police station around 

3:00 a.m. on May 29, 2019. 

At the jurisdictional hearing, Munger-Bounds identified appellant as 

the person who shot him. Campbell was “very confident” that appellant, not 

M.R., had fired the gun. Haberern also saw appellant fire the gun. Heltman

thought M.R. had fired the gun, but she was not “fully paying attention.” 

The Sacramento County Juvenile Court found true all the allegations 

and enhancements. The court transferred the matter to Solano County for 

disposition and further proceedings. 
4

B. Contested Dispositional Hearing

On January 24, 2020, the Solano County Juvenile Court adjudged 

appellant a ward of the court, granted him probation, and committed him to 

the custody of the probation department. The court calculated his maximum 

term of confinement at 21 years 120 days, and imposed terms and conditions

on his probation, including gang conditions discussed post. This appeal 

followed.2 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence of Section 25850 Violation

As mentioned, the court found true the allegation that appellant 

violated section 25850, subdivision (a), which provides: “A person is guilty of 

carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the 

person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an 

incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited 

area of unincorporated territory.” (§ 25850, subd. (a), Italics added; see 

CALCRIM No. 2530.)

Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence that he was 

carrying the loaded firearm in a public place or on a public street. We review 

for substantial evidence. (In re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605; 

In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) 

For purposes of section 25850, whether a firearm was carried in a 

public place turns not on whether the location was public property or private 

2 The notice of appeal states that the appeal is from “the sustaining of 

the petition following contested jurisdictional hearing on October 9, 2019; and 

the gang terms imposed as part of the disposition on January 24, 2020.” We 

construe the notice of appeal broadly to include the unlawful calculation of 

the maximum term of confinement, which was included as part of the 

disposition order and which both parties agree must be modified to comply 

with the law.
5

property, but on whether the location was “reasonably accessible” to the 

public, even if privately owned. (See, e.g., People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 

Cal.App.4th 303, 318–319 [private driveway was a public place for purposes 

of carrying a loaded firearm in public under § 12031, subd. (a), because the 

driveway was reasonably accessible to the public, without obstacles to 

access]; People v. Jimenez (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 54, 59–60 [residential 

driveway was a “public area” for purposes of Health & Saf. Code, § 11353.6]; 

People v. Olson (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 592, 598 [driveway, lawn, and front 

porch of private home was a public place for purposes of § 647, subd. (f),

where the defendant, a stranger, was able to walk through the area to the 

front door without challenge]; People v. Vega (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 954, 958

[privately-owned market parking lot was accessible to the public and thus a 

public place for purposes of § 12031].) 

In People v. Perez (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 297 (Perez), the court held that 

an apartment hallway was a public place for purposes of public intoxication 

under section 647, subdivision (f), where there were “no locked gates or doors 

to keep the public from entering” and the hallways and stairways—both 

interior and exterior—were “open to delivery men, service men, solicitors, 

visitors and other strangers.” (Id. at p. 301.) A “public place,” the court 

explained, “is a location readily accessible to all those who wish to go there 

rather than a place which the general public frequents.” (Ibid.) 

Here too, a reasonable inference from the evidence is that the 

apartment complex was “readily accessible to all those who wish[ed] to go 

there.” (Perez, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 301.) According to Heltman, 

appellant and M.R. “came up” the street and “came in the gate” behind her 

apartment. There was no indication that the gate was locked or their access 

was in any way challenged. 
6

Appellant’s reliance on People v. Strider (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393

(Strider) is misplaced. In Strider, police officers observed the defendant 

standing in a fenced front yard near the porch of a single-family residence. 

(Id. at p. 1396.) When the officers noticed a gun in the defendant’s back 

pocket, one of the officers ran toward him through a gate in the fence. (Id. at 

pp. 1396–1397.) The defendant retreated into the house, and the officer 

pursued him inside. There, the defendant dropped a baggie of cocaine, 

complied with the officer’s demand to stop, and was found to be carrying a 

gun in his pocket. (Ibid.) To justify the warrantless detention and search, 

the People suggested that the officers had suspected the defendant was 

carrying a loaded firearm in the front yard, which the People claimed was a 

public place. (Id. at p. 1400.) 

The court of appeal rejected the People’s theory, asserting that “ ‘a 

location guarded by a fence or locked door is not readily accessible to the 

public, and is not a public place.’ ” (Strider, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1404, italics in original.) The porch and area inside the fenced yard was 

not a public place for purposes of section 12031, the court concluded, because 

the area was completely surrounded by a fence approximately five feet high, 

the only access was through a single gate, the high metal fence posed a 

“considerable challenge,” and “its appearance suggests its purpose is to block 

entry into the yard and act as a barrier to common or general use.” (Id. at 

p. 1405.) Further, the court noted, “[t]he fact the gate was not locked at the 

time the deputies entered does not show the area was public,” and the People 

had presented no evidence that the gate was typically open or unlocked. (Id. 

at p. 1407.) The court found the single-family residence “not comparable” to 

the multiunit, multistory apartment complex in Perez, noting also that a 

common area of a multiunit apartment complex had been held nonpublic in 
7

People v. Krohn (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1294 (Krohn), where the complex was 

gated and fenced. (Strider, at p. 1407; see Krohn, at p. 1299 [courtyard of 

apartment complex was not a public place where the front entryway was 

“guarded by an imposing metal fence and an automatically locking gate,” 

“[n]othing in the record suggest[s] that the gate was open when the officer 

detained [the] defendant,” and the “driveway to the private parking area 

behind the courtyard [was] guarded by an electric gate, which automatically 

close[d] and lock[ed] behind cars” and was closed when police arrived].) 

Strider and Krohn are distinguishable. Unlike the fenced-in front yard 

of the single-family residence in Strider, the location here was a multi-unit 

apartment complex with multiple residents. Unlike the evidence in Strider of 

a high metal fence imposing a “considerable challenge,” and the evidence in

Krohn of an imposing metal fence and automatically-locking gate, there is no 

evidence in this case that any fence posed a challenge to entry or that the 

gate through which appellant travelled was locked, locked automatically, or 

limited anyone’s access. 

From the record on appeal, therefore, it was reasonable to conclude 

that the victim’s apartment complex was readily accessible to members of the 

public—including appellant and M.R. as they walked from the street to the 

area where appellant shot Munger-Bounds in front of his neighbors. 

Sufficient evidence supported the sustained allegations.

3

3 In addition, a conviction may be obtained under section 25850, 

subdivision (a) where the loaded firearm was carried on a “public street.” 

Here, the evidence was that appellant and M.R. entered the apartment 

complex from a “street” where a white van was located. It is reasonable to 

infer that appellant was carrying the loaded firearm on a public street just 

before he walked into the apartment complex. Reversal is not compelled 

“ ‘unless it clearly appears that upon no hypothesis whatsoever is there 

sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by the court 

below.’ ” (In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 482.
8

B. Section 654 and Maximum Term of Confinement

The juvenile court calculated appellant’s maximum term of 

confinement under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 to be 21 years 

120 days, based on 17 years for the assault with a firearm (count 1), three 

years eight months for carrying a loaded firearm in public (count 2), and 

eight months for being a minor in possession of a firearm (count 3). 

Appellant argues that the court erred in imposing punishment on both 

count 2 and count 3, because he did not have independent criminal objectives 

as to those offenses.4 He adds that the sentence on count two should have 

been eight months (one-third the midterm) rather than three years eight 

months, and the maximum term of confinement was erroneously stated as 

well. Respondent agrees. We address section 654 first, and then put it in 

proper context.

1. Section 654

Section 654, subdivision (a), provides: “An act or omission that is 

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished 

under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of 

imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under 

more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) 

“Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a single physical act 

that violates different provisions of law.” (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 

350, 358.) “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore 

gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on 

the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one 

4 Appellant’s trial attorney did not object on the ground of section 654, 

but a defendant may raise a section 654 issue on appeal even if no objection 

was made in the trial court. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) 
9

objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not 

for more than one.” (People v. Neal (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.) 

As applied here, “the single possession or carrying of a single firearm 

on a single occasion may be punished only once under section 654.” (Jones, 

supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 357.) Appellant’s offenses for carrying a loaded 

firearm (count 2) and being a minor in possession of a firearm (count 3) were 

based on his single act of carrying the .38-caliber revolver used to shoot 

Munger-Bounds. 

Respondent agrees that the court should have “stayed” the “sentence”

on count 3. More accurately, the court should not have included a 

consecutive term on count three in calculating appellant’s maximum term of 

confinement—as we discuss next.

2. Maximum Confinement Time

When a minor is removed from the parent’s physical custody, “the order 

shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a 

period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be 

imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or 

continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (c).) The 

“maximum term of imprisonment” means “the longest of the three periods set 

forth in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, 

but without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section 

1170 of the Penal Code”—that is, a felony is deemed to carry the upper term. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1).)

Enhancements, as well as running terms consecutively, generally 

increase the maximum term of confinement as they would increase an 

aggregate sentence in adult court. (In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 
10

376, 381–382; In re Prentiss C. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1488; In re Jesse 

F. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 164, 168–170; see § 1170.1.) Thus, the maximum 

confinement term under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 is 

calculated by adding the upper term for the principal offense (plus 

enhancements) and one-third of the middle term for each of the remaining 

subordinate felonies or misdemeanors. (In re David H. (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 1131, 1133–1134.) However, the maximum term of confinement 

cannot be extended by any consecutive term subject to section 654. (In re 

Michael B. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 548, 556 fn. 3.)5 

Appellant’s principal offense was assault with a firearm (count 1), 

which has a maximum prison term of four years. (§ 245, subd. (a).) The 

firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) adds a maximum term of 10 

years, and the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7) adds a term of 

three years, rendering a total maximum confinement of 17 years as to count 

1. Carrying a loaded firearm in public (count 2) and being a minor in 

possession of a firearm (count 3) each carry a midterm of two years. 

(§§ 25850, subd. (c)(6), 29610, 1170, subd. (h).) Because punishment for 

carrying a loaded firearm in public was a subordinate term, it should have 

been calculated at one-third the midterm pursuant to section 1170.1, which 

results in a term on count 2 of eight months, rather than three years eight 

months as calculated by the probation department and trial court. As 

5 Unlike adult sentencing, section 654 has no effect if the term is 

imposed concurrently, because the term does not increase the theoretical 

maximum length of the juvenile’s confinement. (In re Robert W. (1991) 228 

Cal.App.3d 32, 34; cf. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 353 [where § 654 applies

(when sentencing an adult defendant), the sentence must be stayed even if 

imposed concurrently rather than consecutively].) Here, the juvenile court 

calculated appellant’s maximum term of confinement by running the count 3 

term consecutive to the count 2 term.
11

discussed ante, section 654 precludes extending the maximum term of 

confinement with a term on count 3. Therefore, appellant’s total maximum 

term of confinement should be 17 years eight months. The order of 

disposition shall be modified accordingly. 

C. Gang Condition

Appellant contends, as did his counsel at the dispositional hearing, that 

the gang conditions imposed by the juvenile court are unreasonable under 

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 1113. The record indicates otherwise.

1. Background

a. Probation Report

In his report dated October 30, 2019, Contra Costa County Probation 

Officer Cesar Estrada-Ramirez advised that appellant admitted he had 

friends who were in gangs, including “Sacramento sect gangs, Piru gang, 

Bloods, Crips, and Norteños.” Appellant denied any gang membership or 

association, but acknowledged he wanted to “ ‘make better choices’ with 

friends.” His “association with peers involved in gang conflicts” was 

concerning to the probation department. Estrada-Ramirez wrote: 

“[Appellant’s] mentality indicates he fails to see the risk in associating with 

individuals with gang ties. This failure to choose prosocial peers, and display 

appropriate decision-making skills has led [appellant] to engage in risky 

behavior.” 

The probation report further advised that, according to victim MungerBounds, the dispute between Munger-Bounds and M.R. “originated after 

[Munger-Bounds] had brought a Sureño gang member to [M.R.’s] party,” and 

M.R. “associated as a Norteño[].” According to a Snapchat message stored on 

Munger-Bounds’s phone, M.R. told Munger-Bounds that he was going to 
12

“shoot [his] ass.” The probation department was concerned that appellant’s 

actions during the offense “indicated he was aware of [M.R.’s] threats to shoot 

the victim” and appellant “was the individual to carry out the threats.” 

The probation department recommended that appellant be committed 

to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), with participation in specified 

treatment and training. 

b. Dispositional Hearing

At the contested dispositional hearing on January 24, 2020, 

Sacramento County Probation Officer Eric Davis testified that he knew 

appellant from his residency in the maximum-security unit of the county’s 

juvenile hall. Davis never heard appellant discuss a gang affiliation, but he 

had never asked appellant if he had one. Randal Broadhurst, the director of 

the Gang Awareness and Prevention program, saw appellant on a weekly 

basis during his relatively limited time in detention at the Sacramento Youth 

Detention Facility and did not recall appellant being affiliated with a gang; 

nor did his notes indicate appellant had a gang affiliation. 

Probation Officer Estrada-Ramirez, however, testified that he had 

interviewed appellant and conducted a thorough assessment of his needs. 

While appellant “did not claim a specific gang membership,” appellant said 

he “associated with individuals of a wide variety of gang affiliations.” In 

addition, “the offense had an underlying issue with gangs,” in that “one of the 

individuals was upset that the victim had brought somebody that was 

associated with a different gang to a party.” Estrada-Ramirez expressed 

additional concern about appellant’s substance abuse issues and troubling 

behavior at school, and he reiterated the probation department’s 

recommendation that appellant be sent to DJJ. 
13

The prosecutor told the court: “This is the type of behavior and the 

type of conduct that screams DJJ. This is the type of offense that typically 

is—sends people to DJJ.” 

The court, however, rejected the DJJ recommendation, ordered 

appellant to the county “Challenge Academy” program, and granted him 

probation. The court imposed the following gang-related probation 

conditions: “1) The Minor shall not be a member of any gang, meaning a 

‘criminal street gang’ as defined in Penal Code Section 186.22(f), nor 

associate with any person known by the Minor to be a gang member. [¶] 2) 

The Minor shall not associate with anyone identified to the Minor in writing 

by his Probation Officer or parent as a person or persons to whom he/she is 

prohibited from contacting or associating with except in the form of incidental 

contact in a school setting or school-related activity. [¶] 3) The Minor shall 

not . . . be in the presence of any person or persons . . . who the Minor knows 

are gang members and possess a firearm, ammunition, or other deadly or 

dangerous weapons. [¶] (4) The Minor shall not be in any ‘specific locations’

where gang members are known by the Minor to meet or gather, or ‘specific 

locations’ known by the Minor for gang-related activity, or specified by 

his/her Probation Officer or parent in writing as involving gang-related 

activity, nor shall he/she participate in any gang-related activity. [¶] (5) The 

Minor shall not post, display or transmit through a computer, cellular phone 

or other means of electronic communication any symbols, photographs or 

other information that the Minor knows to be, or that the Probation Officer 

informs the Minor to be, gang-related. [¶] (6) The Minor shall not wear any 

clothing or emblems . . . that he/she knows are gang-related or that the 

Probation Officer informs him/her are gang related, including, but not limited 

to gang graffiti, symbols, photographs, members rosters or other gang 
14

writings and publications. [¶] (7) The Minor shall not possess any 

paraphernalia that the Minor knows are gang-related or that the Probation 

Officer informs him/her are gang-related, including but not limited to gang 

graffiti, symbols, photographs, members rosters or other gang writings and 

publications. [¶] (8) The Minor shall not acquire any new tattoos, either 

permanent or temporary, that he/she knows to be, or that his/her probation 

Officer informs the Minor to be, gang related. [¶] (9) The Minor shall not be 

present at any Court proceeding that the Minor knows is gang-related unless 

the Minor is a party, defendant, or a subpoenaed witness or is permitted to be 

present by the Court or his/her Probation Officer.”

2. Law

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), a 

juvenile court may impose any reasonable condition that is “fitting and 

proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and 

rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” The court has broad discretion to select 

appropriate probation conditions. (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5

(Josh W.).) This discretion is designed to advance the minor’s rehabilitation 

and preserve family ties. (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99–100.) 

Further, minors require more guidance and supervision than adults, and 

their constitutional rights are more circumscribed. (In re Antonio R. (2000) 

78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) The court may “impose a condition of probation

that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored 

to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile.” (Josh W., at p. 5; see In re 

Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) 

Nonetheless, a probation condition will be invalid if it “(1) has no 

relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to 

conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct 
15

which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” (Lent, supra, 15 

Cal.3d. at p. 486, italics added; Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119 [“[T]he 

Lent test governs in juvenile and adult probation cases alike”].) 

3. Relationship to Appellant’s Offense

As to the first prong of the Lent test, the gang conditions imposed by 

the juvenile court bore a relationship to appellant’s crimes. M.R., who 

claimed association with the Norteños, wanted to fight Munger-Bounds for 

inviting a Sureño to his party and threatened to shoot him. Appellant 

accompanied M.R. to Munger-Bounds’s home—armed with a loaded .38 

caliber firearm—and stood by as M.R. fought with Munger-Bounds; when the 

fight had stopped and Munger-Bounds appeared the victor, appellant pulled 

out the gun from his jacket and shot Munger-Bounds in the stomach. A 

reasonable inference is that appellant was participating with M.R. in a 

defense of what they saw as an affront to the Norteños. Because of the 

relationship of his crimes to committing violence for the benefit of a gang, the 

probation conditions were valid. (See Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)

4. Reasonable Relation to Future Criminality

As to the third prong of the Lent test, the probation conditions were 

reasonably related to appellant’s future criminality. Instructive in this 

regard is In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496 (Laylah K.). 

In Laylah K., the minor Laylah and three other girls accosted a woman 

who was walking a dog, demanded to know why she was wearing red 

clothing, shouted obscenities at her, and challenged her to fight. Laylah hit 

the woman twice in the face. (Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1499.) 

The probation report recommended that gang conditions be imposed in 

regard to Laylah’s probation, indicating that the offense had “ ‘gang 

overtones’ ” and noting a family member’s conclusion that the defendants 
16

were “ ‘gang associates’ ” if not gang members. (Id. at pp. 1500–1501.) In 

addition to the evidence that their victim was wearing red clothing, the 

defendants admitted they had friends who were members of the Crips gang 

and one of the defendants was a Crips member. (Ibid.) The juvenile court 

imposed the gang conditions on Laylah, even though there was no evidence 

she was a gang member. (Ibid.) 

The court of appeal affirmed, ruling that the juvenile court “reasonably 

relied upon the probation officer’s conclusion Laylah and [her co-defendant] 

participated in an apparent defense of what they perceived to be a symbolic 

challenge to Crips’ territorialism.” (Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 1501.) The court rejected Laylah’s argument that her mere association 

with gang members did not justify the conditions, observing that 

“[a]ssociation with gang members is the first step to involvement in gang 

activity.” (Id. at p. 1501.) Noting that Laylah had displayed increasingly 

violent conduct and believing she was “in danger of succumbing to gang 

pressures,” the court saw “no logical or beneficial reason to require a court to 

wait until a minor has become entrenched with a gang, only then to apply 

mere prophylactic remedies.” (Id. at p. 1501.) The court concluded: “Where 

a court entertains genuine concerns that the minor is in danger of falling 

under the influence of a street gang, an order directing a minor to refrain 

from gang association is a reasonable preventive measure in avoiding future 

criminality and setting the minor on a productive course. Evidence of current 

gang membership is not a prerequisite to imposition of conditions designed to 

steer minors from this destructive path.” (Id. at p. 1502.) 

Here, as in Laylah K., appellant’s offenses had “gang overtones.” 

(Laylah K., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1500.) Although appellant did not 

admit being a gang member or associate, he had friends who were gang 
17

members, he associated with M.R. (who associated with a criminal street 

gang), he accompanied M.R. in his attack on Munger-Bounds for inviting a 

rival gang member to a party, he arrived at the scene with a loaded gun, and 

he shot Munger-Bounds in defense of M.R. In addition, the probation report 

warned that appellant failed to see the risk in associating with individuals 

with gang ties, and appellant acknowledged that he needed to make better 

choices with friends. It was not irrational to conclude that appellant was in 

danger of falling under the influence of a street gang and would benefit from 

gang conditions as “a reasonable preventive measure in avoiding future 

criminality and setting [appellant] on a productive course.” (Id. at p. 1502.) 

Appellant’s reliance on In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228 is 

misplaced. There, the court struck a gang condition where there was no 

evidence the defendant was a gang member or his friends affiliated with 

gangs, except statements by his father that the defendant’s former friend had 

some involvement with a criminal street gang, an older individual reportedly 

drove the defendant around before the offense, and the father believed that 

the defendant had been instructed to commit the offense. (Id. at p. 1234.) 

Here, by contrast, appellant admitted that he had friends in many different 

gangs, and he pulled the trigger in a shooting precipitated by gang rivalry. 

We find no abuse of discretion.

III. DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional order of October 9, 2019 is affirmed. The 

dispositional order of January 24, 2020 is modified to reflect a total maximum 

confinement term of 17 years eight months; as so modified, the dispositional 

order is affirmed.
18

NEEDHAM, J.

We concur.

SIMONS, Acting P. J.

REARDON, J. *

In re J.A. / A159453

* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.