NO. 03-15-00497-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

KAREN E. LANDA, Appellant

v. CHARLES L. FARRIS, Appellee. On Appeal from the 98 th Judicial District Court, Travis County Honorable Judge Triana Presiding

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

HANCE SCARBOROUGH LLP Terry L. Scarborough State Bar No. 17716000 TScarborough@hslawmail.com V. Blayre Pena State Bar No. 24050372 BPena@hslawmail.com 400 W. 15 th Street, Ste. 950 Austin, TX 78701 Telephone: (512) 479-8888 Facsimile: (512) 482-6891 A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLANT K AREN E. L ANDA O RAL A RGUMENT R EQUESTED ACCEPTED 03-15-00497-CV 7485009 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/21/2015 5:48:53 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERKii I. IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a), the parties to the judgment at issue in this appeal are: APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Karen E. Landa Trial and Appellate Counsel Terry L. Scarborough V. Blayre Pena Hance Scarborough LLP 400 W. 15 th Street, Ste. 950 Austin, Texas 78701 APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Charles L. Farris Trial and Appellate Counsel Guillermo Ochoa-Cronfel The Cronfel Firm 2700 Bee Cave Rd., Ste. 103 Austin, Texas 78746iii II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IDENTITY OF PARTIES & CO UNSEL ..........................................ii
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................iii
III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIE S ....................................................iv, v
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CA SE ....................................................vi
V. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ..........................vii
VI. ISSUES PRESENTED... ..........................................................viii
VII. STATEMENT OF THE FACT S ....................................................1 A. Background Information about Landa..........................................1 B. Facts Related to the Transac tion in Dispute ....................................2 C. Other Intermittent Contacts with Texas After Transaction until Suit Filed.................. ...................................................4 D. Procedural Histor y.................................................................5
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE AR GUMENT..............................................

. 6
IX. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORIT IES................................................7 A. Standard of Revie w................................................................7 B. The Texas long-arm statute........................

................. ...........................8 C. Farris failed to meet his initial bur den to bring Landa under the Texas long-arm statute (Issue 1) ........................................................8 D. The trial court does not have sp ecific jurisdiction over Landa (Issue 2).................................... ........................................10 E. The trial court does not have ge neral jurisdiction over Landa (Issue 3)......

... ........................... ...... ...... ...... ......................16
X. CONCLUSION.................. ........................................................19 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLI ANCE...........................

... ... ... ... ... ... .........21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

... ... ... ... ...... ...... ...... ..............................22
APPENDIX..................

............... ................................................. . 23iv III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Argo Data Res. Corp. v. Shagrithaya , 380 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied ) .................................................................................................... 14, 15 BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) ..................7, 8 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462 ( 1985) ........................................... 11 Citrin Holdings, L.L.C. v. Minnis , 305 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ............

........... ........... ............. ........... . .................... . . ........ 12 , 13 CSR, Ltd. v. Link , 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex . 1996) ............................................... 10, 16 Daimler AG v. Bauman , 132 S. Ct. 746 (2014) .................................................. 7, 16 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Oper ations, S.A. v. Brown , 131 S. Ct. 2846 ( 2011) .. 16, 17 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ............. 10 Johnston v. Multidata Sy stems Intern’l Corp. , 523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) ......... 17 Kelly v. General Interior Constr. Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 653, (Tex. 2010) .............. 7, 8, 9 Locke v. Ethicon, Inc ., 58 F. Supp. 3d 757 (S.D. Tex. 2014) .................................. 17 Mi Gwang Contact Lens Co. v. Chapa , 2015 Tex. App. LE XIS 5872 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2015, no pet. h.) ........................................................................... 17 Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005) ......... 10 Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (T ex. 2007) .................... 10 Monkton Ins. Servs. , Ltd. v. Ritter , 768 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2014) ........................... 17 PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp ., 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007)............................................. ..............................7, 16, 17 Pillai v. Pillai , 2015 Tex. App. LE XIS 2446 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................................................................................ 11, 13, 14 Retamco Operating Inc. v. Republic Drilling, Inc. , 278 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. 2009) .. 11v Turner Schilling, L.L.P. v. Gaunce Mgmt. , 247 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet. ) ........................................................................................................ 12 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Ruiz , 355 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. de nied) ................................................................................................... 8 Statutes Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§17.041- .045 ............................................................ 8vi IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of Case: Charles L. Farris (“Farris” or “Appellee”) is an individual residing in Travis County, Texas who brought suit against Karen E. Landa (“Landa” or “Appellant”), a resident of Iowa, alleging breach of contr act and fraud in relation to money given by Farris to Landa to make a down payment on a home, located in West Des Moines, Iowa, purchased by Landa. Landa subsequently filed a Special Appearance challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over her. Trial Court: The Honorable Gisela Triana of the 200 th Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas. Trial Court’s Actions: The trial court denied Landa ’s Special Appearance.vii V. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Landa requests oral argument. Oral argument would assist this Court in understanding the underlying facts of th e case and how the governing law should apply to them as the trial court declined to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.viii VI. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented on a ppeal are as follows:
1. The trial court erred in holding that Fa rris met his initial burden to bring Landa under the Texas long-arm statute.
2. The trial court erred in finding that it has specific jurisdiction over Landa.
3. The trial court erred in finding that it has general jurisdiction over Landa. 1

1 The trial court’s order denying Landa’s special appearance does not specify whether the court found that it had specific or gene ral jurisdiction over La nda (or both). As such, this appeal addresses how a finding of either constitutes reversible error by the trial court.1 TO THE HONORABLE THIR D COURT OF APPEALS: This appeal arises out of the Trial Court’s decision to de ny Karen E. Landa’s (“Landa”) special appearance , when Charles L. Farris (“Farris”) failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating the court ha d jurisdiction, and when the evidence conclusively established La nda is an Iowa resident and the dispute concerned property located in Iowa. Deciding the cour t has jurisdiction over Landa violates all notions of fair play and due process, and as such, the Trial Court’s ruling should be reversed.
VII. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS This lawsuit concerns allegations by Farr is that Landa breach ed a contract and committed fraud in relation to money Farris provided to La nda for the purchase of real property in Iowa. 2 Specifically, in February 20 11 Farris gave Landa money to serve as the down payment on a house she purch ased in West Des Moines, Iowa that same month. 3
A. Background Information about Landa Landa is an individual who resides in Urbandale, Iowa and is thus a nonresident defendant. 4 Farris and Landa are former spouses, having been married

2 Clerk’s Record (“CR”) pp. 15-19. 3 CR p. 4. Whether the money was a gift or a loan is an is sue in dispute. 4 See CR p. 3; CR pp. 9-11; See also Reporter’s Reco rd (“RR”) p. 80. Note that all citations to specific pages of the Reporter’s Record shall refer to Volume 2 of the Reporter’s Record, and that all references to exhibits shall be Volume 3.2 from approximately 1985 to 1991. 5 Farris and Landa have one child together (a son), and Farris also adopted Landa’s daughter from a prior marriage. 6
Landa moved to Texas from Iowa in 1978 7 and lived in either Travis County or Williamson County from 1978, until the summer of 2010. 8 In the summer of 2010 Landa left Austin to reside in Michig an until September 2010, at which point she traveled to New York where she resided until late October 2010. 9 On or about November 1, 2010, Landa moved to Des Moin es, Iowa to reside with her mother who was suffering from terminal cancer. 10 Landa continued to re side in Iowa at all relevant times to this dispute. Landa in tended to keep her residence in Iowa as demonstrated by the fact that she filed stat e tax returns in Iowa for the last five
years. 11
B. Facts Related to the Transaction in Dispute On December 17-19, 2010, Landa traveled to Dallas, Texas, to spend the weekend with Farris at the suggestion of Farris. 12 During this weekend the parties generally discussed the possi bility of Farris providing a down payment to assist

5 RR p. 96. 6 RR p. 48. 7 RR p. 32. 8 RR p. 34. 9 RR pp. 37-39. 10 RR p. 39. 11 RR pp. 62-63; RR Landa’s Exhibits 1-4. 12 RR pp. 49-50.3 Landa in purchasing a house in Iowa. 13 However, per Farris’s testimony, the focus of the weekend was not to discuss the mone y, but “just to get together and enjoy each other’s company and have a good time in Dallas.” 14 During this meeting, the parties did not discuss a specific amount of money, a specific house, or any loan terms. 15 It was not until Landa returned to Iowa that she chose a house. 16 Farris subsequently agreed to provide the down payment for the house. 17 No written agreement, such as re-pay ment terms, interest rate, or place of payment, was entered in to between Farris and Landa, and Farri s has failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary. In order to qualify for fina ncing, Farris and Landa we re required to open a joint checking account with Bankers Trust in Iowa, which they did. 18 On February 24, 2011, Farris transferred $22,179.86 to the Iowa Banke rs Trust joint checking

account. 19 On February 25, 2011, Farris transf erred $67,000.00 to the Iowa Bankers Trust joint checking account. 20 Landa closed on the house in Iowa on February 28,
2011. 21 On April 21, 2011, La nda mailed a copy of the wa rranty deed for the house,

13 RR pp. 50-51 14 RR pp. 116-17. 15 RR p. 116. 16 RR p. 99. 17 RR pp. 51-52. 18 RR pp. 66-67; CR p. 17. 19 RR p. 102 and RR Farris’s Exhibit 6. 20 RR p.102 and RR Farris’s Exhibits 6 and 7. 21 RR p. 68.4 along with other closing documents, to Farris. 22 The documents were deposited into a mailbox in West Des Moines, Iowa. 23 Landa resided in the house in Iowa until selling it in July 2013. 24 In sum, every important facet of the transaction in question occurred in Iowa. C. Other Intermittent Contacts with Texas After Transaction until Suit Filed Landa’s only contacts with Texas afte r the transaction in dispute are as follows:

 In February 2012, Landa traveled to Texas to attend a ceremony in Farmersville, Texas to bury her moth er’s ashes at a family grave. 25

 On the weekend of May 12, 2012, Landa tr aveled to Austin, Texas to attend the 80 th birthday party of a close friend. 26 While in Austin during this trip, Landa hand delivered a check to Farris for $15,000.00 because he had
informed Landa that he needed some financial assistance. 27

 In June 2013, Landa travel ed to Austin to interview for a potential job in furtherance of possibly moving back in an attempt to reconnect with her son. 28

22 RR p. 56. 23 RR Farris’s Exhibit 8. 24 RR p. 80 25 RR p. 56. 26 RR p. 57-58. 27 RR p. 58. 28 RR p. 58-595  On August 1, 2013, and for approximate ly eight months, Landa temporarily stayed in Travis County for the purpos e of trying to reconnect with her children, and to hopefully partic ipate in her son’s upcoming wedding. 29 However, Landa left the majority of her personal belongings in Iowa because she did not know how long she was going to stay. 30 Landa did not purchase or lease a house, but inst ead stayed at a friend’s house in Lakeway, Texas. 31

 In order to have income during her stay in Travis County, Landa, for a brief period, sold insurance in Texas. 32 Landa maintains a nonresident insurance license in Texas, although she has not engaged in selling insurance in Texas since spring of 2014. 33 In April 2014, Landa move d back to Iowa, where she has resided ever since. 34 Landa has no other significant contacts with Texas over the last five years except for those set forth above.
D. Procedural History On November 7, 2014, after Landa move d back to Iowa, Farris filed suit against Landa alleging breach of contract and fraud, in relation to money given to

29 RR p. 42. 30 RR p. 59. 31 Id

. 32 RR pp. 44-45. 33 RR p. 35 and 44-46. 34 RR p. 60.6 Landa. 35 Landa was served at her residence in Urbandale , Iowa. Landa filed a Special Appearance challenging the tria l court’s personal ju risdiction over her. 36 An evidentiary hearing was held on Landa ’s Special Appearance on July 2, 2015. 37 On July 21, 2015, the Trial Court issued an order denying Landa’s Special Appearance. 38 Although Landa requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, none were entered. 39 Landa subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on August 6, 2015. 40
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The trial court committed three reversib le errors in denying Landa’s special appearance. First, the trial court erred in holding that Farris met his initial burden to allege sufficient facts to bring Landa within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute. Farris’s First Amended Petiti on does not contain sufficient allegations to bring Landa within the trial court’s jurisdiction, and as such the trial court should have granted Landa’s special app earance when Landa es tablished that she is a nonresident of Texas. Second, the alleged liability in this case does not arise from any of Landa’s contacts with the forum, and thus the tria l court does not have specific jurisdiction

35 CR pp. 4-7. 36 CR pp. 9-11. 37 RR p. 1. 38 CR p. 31. 39 CR pp. 37-38. 40 CR p. 32.7 over Landa. Accordingly, the tria l court erred to the extent that its denial of Landa’s special appearance is based on a fi nding of specific jurisdiction. Third, Texas has historically imposed a very high standard to find general jurisdiction, and the United States Supreme Court has recently all but shut the door on general jurisdiction based on a defendant’s contacts with the forum, when those contacts are not related to the claim. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman , 132 S. Ct. 746 (2014); PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007). The evidence in this matter shows that Landa’s general contacts with the forum come nowhere near m eeting the high standard required for such a finding. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the ex tent that its denial of Landa’s special appearance is based on a finding of general jurisdiction.
IX. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A. Standard of Review Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); see also Kelly v. Genera l Interior Constr. Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). Before determining the juri sdictional question, the trial court must frequently resolve questions of fact. Id . If a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. Id . at 795.8 However, when the appellate record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged fo r legal and factual sufficiency on appeal. Id . To the extent that the underlying facts are undisputed, the Court of Appeals conducts a de novo review. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Ruiz , 355 S.W.3d 387, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Here, findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested, but not entered. The reporter’s record and clerk’s record ha ve been filed, and as such, any potential implied findings are not conclusive in this case.
B. The Texas long-arm statute. The Texas long-arm statute governs Texa s courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code §§17.041-.045. However, while the language of this statute is broad, it is limited by the federal constitutional requirements of due process. BMC Software , 83 S.W.3d at 795. Thus, Texas courts rely on precedent from the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts, as well as their own deci sions, in determining whether a nonresident defendant has negated all base s of alleged jurisdiction. Id . at 795-96. C. Farris failed to meet his initial bur den to bring Landa under the Texas long-arm statute (Issue 1). A plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute (i.e. that the9 defendant committed a tort in Texas or conducted business in Texas). See Kelly , 301 S.W.3d at 658-59. If a plaintiff does not allege a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant, then the de fendant need only prove that she is a nonresident to negate jurisdiction. Id . Because Farris failed to meet his initial burden, Landa’s special appearance should have been granted. Farris’s First Amended Petition contains no allegations that Landa committed a tort in Texas. 41 Similarly, it contains no allega tions that Landa conducted business in Texas as to the transaction in question. To the contrary, the vast majority of the “facts” alleged in Farris’s First Amended Pe tition admit that the relevant issues in this case occurred in Iowa. For example, Plaintiff admits that the house to be purchased was in Iowa, that the lender was in Iowa and that he wired money to a joint bank account in Iowa. 42 The only mention of any activity related to the transaction that occurred in Texas is a brief initial meeting in Dallas between the parties (during which no agreement was ente red into, as set forth in more detail below) and some of Farris’s alleged cont ractual obligations, which are irrelevant, such as his allegation that he liquidated a CD with his bank in Austin to fund the transfer and that he sent the f unds to Iowa from a bank in Austin. 43

41 CR pp. 15-21. 42 CR p. 17. 43 Id

.10 Accordingly, Farris failed to meet his initial burden as his allegations do not sufficiently allege a basis for personal juri sdiction over Landa. Thus, Landa negated personal jurisdiction when she affirmed that she is not a resident of Texas. 44 The trial erred when it did not grant Landa ’s special appearance on this basis. 45
D. The trial court does not have specifi c jurisdiction over Landa (Issue 2). Specific jurisdiction is defined as jurisd iction “arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984); see also CSR, Ltd. v. Link , 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996). In other words, there must be "a substantial connection between [the nonresident's contacts with the fo rum] and the operative facts of the litigation." Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585 (Tex. 2007). Specific jurisdiction is not establis hed merely by allegations or evidence that a nonresident committed a tort in the forum state or "dir ected a tort" at the forum

state. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 790-92 (Tex. 2005). Instead, the touchstone is whether the Landa purposefully availed herself of conducting activities within the forum stat e, thus invoking the benefits and

44 CR pp. 9-11. 45 The trial court did not rule on this issue during the hearing, instead opting to carry the issue and to continue with hearing under th e trial court’s assumption that th e plaintiff had met his burned. RR p. 31. Thus, the court’s denial of Landa’s special appearance indi cates that it ultimately found that the Farris met his initial burden.11 protections of its law. Retamco Operating Inc. v. Republic Drilling, Inc. , 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. 2009). Whether the touchstone has been met does not turn on the “application of mechanical tests or conceptualistic theories relating to the place of contracting or of performance.” Pillai v. Pillai , 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2446, *4-5 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Rather, the approach must be ‘highly realistic,’ and, under it, the contract’s creation is norma lly an intermediate step serving to tie prior business negotiations with future cons equences which themselves are the real object of the business transaction.” Id ., citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 105 (1985). “So, it is the indici a of prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing that are evaluated when assessing if the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum.” Id

. Looking to Farris’s pleadings, which define the scope of the jurisdiction inquiry, Farris alleged that the Court has jurisdiction because “Defendant conducted business with Plaintiff in Austin. Plainti ff and Defendant entere d into an agreement whereby Plaintiff would loan Defendant money towards the purchase of a house, and Plaintiff was to perform his obligations...in whole or in part in the state.” 46 This allegation illustrates the funda mental flaw in Farris’s specific jurisdiction argument

46 CR p. 16.12 and why the trial court does not have specific jurisdicti on over Landa. Specifically, Farris’s focus, both in his pleading and at the hearing on this matter, is on his own contacts with forum, not Landa’s. Howeve r, it does not matter that Farris was to conduct his obligations in the state. See Turner Schilling, L. L.P. v. Gaunce Mgmt. , 247 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pe t.) (“the plaintiff’s performance of part of its contact duties in Texas is not a purposeful contact of the defendant with Texas.”). As set forth above, when determining specific jurisdiction the focus is on whether the liability arose out of the defe ndant’s contacts with the forum, not the plaintiff’s. The lack of specific jurisdic tion becomes more appa rent when reviewing cases where specific jurisdiction was found versus cases where it was not found.
In Citrin Holdings , a case relied on by Farris, the court found that specific jurisdiction existed over a nonresident defendant. Citrin Holdings, L.L.C. v. Minnis , 305 S.W.3d 269, 278-279 (Tex . App.—Houston [14th Di st.] 2009, no pet.). However, that case is easily distinguishable. Citrin Holdings concerned a partnership agreement where 1) the nonresid ent defendant traveled to Texas multiple times over a period of months to have face-to-face meeti ngs with a Texas resident, 2) a partnership document was drafted in Texas and signed in Texas, and 3) the partnership agreement specifically contempl ated that the plaintiff would develop potential projects for the partnership in Te xas and would participate in management13 of the partnership in Texas. Id . at 282-84. Thus, the court held that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of conducting business in Texas. Here, Landa did not have mu ltiple face to face meeti ngs in Texas over a period of months to negotiate the “loan.” There was no loan agreement drafted in Texas or anywhere. The performance and purpose of the loan took place in Iowa when the parties opened a bank account in Iowa, th e money was deposited into that account in Iowa, and the property was purchased in Iowa. By way of contrast to Citrin Holdings , in a recent case out of the Amarillo Court of Appeals, the trial court’s finding of specific jurisdiction was overturned. Pillai , 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2446. In Pillai , two brothers entered into a loan agreement whereby the brother who lived in Texas loaned his brother, who lived in Canada, money to purcha se a house in Canada. Id . at *1-2. To document the loan, they entered into a written contract which required repayment in monthly installments in Amarillo and that the cont ract would be constr ued under Texas law. Id . at *2. Further, the Canadian brother vi sited his brother in Texas several times, though none of trips were related to the loan. Id . at *6. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that a court must use a “h ighly realistic” approach when determining specific jurisdiction which “focuses not on ly on prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, but also the terms of th e contract and the parties’ actual course of dealings.” Id . at *8.14 Using that approach, the court held that an agreement to send payments to an address in Texas and a commitment that a written note be construed in accordance with Texas law was not the stuff of purposef ul availment so as to establish specific jurisdiction. Id . The Court also noted that plain tiff residing in Texas was of no relevance. Id

. When looking at the case at hand, Pillai is more analogous than Citrin Holdings . The sum total of the links between La nda, the transaction, and Texas, is that Landa and Farris met in Dallas for two days at wh ich point there was some general discussion of Farris gi ving her some money. Howe ver, the contacts in this case are even further re moved than those in Pillai , when there was no loan agreement drafted or entered into, there was no speci fic requirement to make payments in Texas, and there was no agreement of the applicability of Texas law. Furthermore, as to the meeting in Dallas, there is no evidence that a contract was entered into at that meeting. For a c ontact to be formed, the minds of the parties must meet with respect to th e subject matter of the agreem ent and all of its essential

terms. See, e.g., Argo Data Re s. Corp. v. Shagrithaya , 380 S.W.3d 249, 275 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied). The parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense at the same time. Id . Their assent must comprehend the whole proposition, and the agreement must comprise all of the terms that they intend to15 introduce into it. Id . Additionally, the legal oblig ations and liability of the parties must be sufficiently definite. Id

. Here, even assuming everything Farris stat ed or pleaded is true, there could have been no contract entered into in Dallas because the Parties did not know the amount, the house, or even if a house would be purchased. 47 Thus, there could not have been a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a contract in Dallas. Even assuming arguendo that a contract was entere d into, it was entered into in Iowa once the terms became more definite and not in Dallas. This is demonstrated by the fact that Landa was in Iowa when : (1) she chose the house that would be purchased; (2) decided how much money w ould be needed; and (3) all negotiations with the lender took place. 48 Further, the funds were wired to a bank account in Iowa, 49 the house was purchased in Iowa 50 and the transaction was closed in Iowa. 51 All the operative facts, therefore occurred in Iowa, and this case falls under the same category as the Pillai case, as opposed to the Citrin Holdings case. Since the contacts
in Pillai , which were more than here, we re not enough to establish specific jurisdiction, it is error to find specific jurisd iction in this case. Accordingly, the Trial Court’s finding of jurisdic tion should be reversed.

47 RR p. 116. 48 RR p. 52. 49 CR p. 17. 50 Id

. 51 RR p. 30.16 E. The trial court does not have genera l jurisdiction over Landa (Issue 3). General jurisdiction exists when the cl aims do not arise out of and are not related to the activities in the forum st ate, but the nonresident defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state. See PHC-Minden , 235 S.W.3d at 168. In the case of general jurisdiction, th e Court must find that the defendant’s contacts with the forum are so “continuous and systematic” that an exercise of jurisdiction is warranted even though the claim does not arise out of those

contacts. This involves a more demanding standa rd that specific jurisdiction. CSR, Ltd. , 925 S.W.2d at 595. Further, the Supreme Court of the Unite d States has all but shut the door on general jurisdiction, when the alleged contacts are not related to the claims at issue.
In Daimler AG v. Bauman , the Supreme Court established a strict and clear standard for general jurisdiction over a non-resident by stating that it is permissible “only when the [Defendant’s] affiliations with th e state in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render it esse ntially at home in the forum state.’” 2014 132 S. Ct. at 751 (emphasis added), quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown , 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). It also noted that general jurisdiction requires affiliation with the forum that is “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that [s]tate.” Id. at *31, n. 11, citing Goodyear , 131 S. Ct. at 2851. The Fifth Circuit subsequently opined on the diff iculty of establishing gene ral jurisdiction stating, “It17 is ... incredibly difficult to establish gene ral jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or pr incipal place of business.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v.
Ritter , 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). 52 Note that while the Daimler and Goodyear cases both involved corporate defendants, nothing in those opinions would suggest that the same clear and high st andard is not equally applicable in the case of an individual. In fact, in the Goodyear case the Court noted in its opinion that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm fo rum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile .” 131 S. Ct. at 2846. These cases make clear that it is only in extremely rare cases that a court should find general jurisdic tion, which has been the longstanding position of both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Supreme Court. See, e.g., Johnston v. Multidata Systems Intern’l Corp. , 523 F. 3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Before we apply these principles to this case, it is worthwhile to review past cases to illustrate just how difficult it is to establish general jurisdiction.”); PHC-Minden , 235 S.W.3d at 163 (a general jurisdiction analysis requi res a “more demanding minimum contacts analysis” with a “substantially higher threshold.”).

52 This precedent has also been cited to by Texas Federal Court and Texas State Courts in finding no general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Locke v. Ethicon, Inc ., 58 F. Supp. 3d 757, 762 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Mi Gwang Contact Lens Co. v. Chapa , 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5872, *14-15 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet. h.).18 Farris pleaded that “The Court has ju risdiction over Defenda nt as a result of her continuous and systematic contacts, both personal and professional, with Austin, Travis County, Texas, for well over twenty (20) years, up to an including the time this suit was filed.” 53 This is not a true statement. As set forth by the evidence, si nce 2010 Landa only had limited and intermittent contacts with Te xas, and has had none sinc e spring 2014, well before this lawsuit was filed. She is domiciled in Iowa. Landa lived and worked in Iowa, and has done so for the past five years, other than the short period of time she spent in Travis County trying to reconnect with her son. 54 Furthermore, Landa filed state income tax returns for the last five years, 55 demonstrating her intent to remain in Iowa. She does not currently en gage in any business in Te xas. Looking to the clear guidance provided by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that Landa’s former contacts with Texas make her at home in the forum. Accordingly, the trial court did not have general jurisdic tion over Landa, and Landa’s special appearance should have been granted.

53 CR p. 16. 54 RR p. 80. 55 RR pp. 62-63; RR Landa’s Exhibits 1-4.19 X. CONCLUSION As established herein, Farris did not plead sufficient facts to bring Landa under the Texas long-arm statue, and the tr ial court should have granted Landa’s special appearance based on her testimony th at she is not a resident of Texas. However, even had Farris pleaded sufficient facts, the evidence established that the Court does not have specific jurisdiction ov er Landa because the alleged liability of Landa does not arise out of and is not re lated to her contacts with the forum. Similarly, general jurisdic tion does not exists because Landa does not have such systematic and continuous contacts so as to render her at home in the forum. As Landa negated all bases of alleged jurisdiction, the trial court should have found that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Landa , and granted her Special Appearance. The failure to do so constitute s reversible error. Accordingly, Landa requests that the court reverse the Tria l Court’s order denying Landa’s Special Appearance, and dismiss this case in its entirety. Landa requests such other and further relief to whic h she may be entitled.20 Respectfully submitted,
H ANCE S CARBOROUGH , LLP 400 W. 15 th Street, Ste. 950 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: (512) 479-8888 Facsimile: (512) 482-6891 By: /s/ Terry L. Scarborough Terry L. Scarborough State Bar No. 17716000 tscarborough@hslawmail.com V. Blayre Pena State Bar No. 24050372 bpena@hslawmail.com21 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, I hereby certify that this brief contains 4383 words. This is a computer generated document created in Microsoft Word, using 14 point typeface for a ll text, except for footnotes, which are in 12-point typeface. In making this certif icate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.

/s/ Terry L. Scarborough Terry L. Scarborough22 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of Appella nts’ Brief was served on the following counsel of record on October 21, 2015, via certified mail, return receipt requested, and/or the electronic filing system:
Counsel for Charles L. Farris The Cronfel Firm Guillermo Ochoa-Cronfel 2700 Bee Cave Rd. Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 347-9600 Phone (512) 347-9911 Fax

/s/ Terry L. Scarborough Terry L. Scarborough23 APPENDIX

1. Order Denyin g S pecial App earance of Defendant, Ka ren E. Landa

# APPENDIX 1