### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLANT Joel M. Schumm Indianapolis, Indiana Alexander Van Gorp Certified Legal Intern Indianapolis, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorne y General of Indiana Christina D. Pace Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

G.I. , Appellant

- Responde nt,
v. 

### State of Indiana , Appellee

- P

etitioner

. January 6, 2016 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 49A05

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- 166 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate. Cause No. 49D09

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### Friedlander , Senior Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 166 | J a n u a r y 6 , 2 0 1 6 Page 1 of 5[1] G.I. appeals her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent based upon a true finding for the offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. 1 We reverse.

[2] G.I. presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether there was sufficient evidence to support her juvenile delinquency adjudication for receiving stolen auto parts.

[3] On De cember 28, 2014, India Simms’ silver Monte Carlo automobile was stolen. Two days later on December 30, 2014, M.B. asked her friend P.D. to hang out and ride with M.B. when she drove her cousins to a party. P.D. agreed, and M.B. arrived to pick up P.D. dr ivin g a silver car in which G.I. was a passenger. A t some point a fter picking up P.D., M.B. stopped the car and got in the back seat with P.D. while G.I. drove. Due to a non

- illuminated headlight, Officer Rabensteine initiated a traffic stop on the silve r Monte Carlo being driven by G.I. He also performed a check of the license plate on the Monte Carlo , which showed that the plate was stolen. Before Officer Rabensteine exited his car, a door of the Monte Carlo opened, and M.B. and P.D. fled from the car . Another officer chased M.B. and P.D. while Officer Ra bensteine approached the car to speak with G.I. , who had remained in the
car. Officer Rabensteine performed a check of the Monte Carlo ’s VIN, which showed that the car was stolen, and G.I. was arrest ed.

1 Ind. Code § 35

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- 2.5 (c) (2014). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 166 | J a n u a r y 6 , 2 0 1 6 Page 2 of 5[4] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that G.I. had committed the offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. Following a fact

- finding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding. G.I.
was placed on formal probation, and this appeal followed.

[5] G .I. contends the State failed to prove that she knew the car was stolen. W hen the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. C.L. v. State , 2 N.E.3d 79 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When reviewing on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile adjudication, we neither reweigh the evi dence nor judge t he credibility of the witnesses. Z.A. v. State , 13 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and we will affirm if the evidence and those infere nces constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. C.L. , 2 N.E.3d 798

.
[6] In order to make a true finding of delinquency against G.I. for receiving stolen auto parts, the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that G.I . (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) received, retained, or disposed of (3) Simm s ’ silver Monte Carlo (4) that had been the subject of theft. See Ind. Code § 35

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- 2.5 (c). In addition to proving the explicit elements of the crime, the State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knew the property was stolen. Fortson v. State , 919 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. 2010)

. Knowledge that property is stolen may be established by circumstantial evidence; however, such Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 166 | J a n u a r y 6 , 2 0 1 6 Page 3 of 5knowledge may not be inferred sole ly from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property

. Id

.
[7] Simms testified at the fact

- finding hearing that her silver Monte Carlo was stolen while it was running with the keys in the ignition. She also testified that the car was damaged prior to it being stolen, including damage to the drive r’s side and the front bumper and that there was further damage when her car was returned to her, including ashes and food on the inside, damaged air vents, paint scratches on one side, and a door not closin g completely. P.D. testified that M.B. contacted her to “come and chill” and ride with her when she took her cousins to a party. Tr. p. 12. M.B. was driving G.I. and another girl when they picked up P.D. in a two

- door gray car that P.D. had not seen bef ore. At some point, M.B. and P.D. got into the back seat together, and G.I. drove. The fourth girl was dropped off before they were stopped by Officer Rabensteine. P.D. testified that when they were pulled over, M.B. suggested they run, and she followed M.B. P.D. further testified that she did not know who owned the
car. Officer Rabensteine testified that M.B. told him that P.D. had stated the car belonged to her. M.B. did not testify at the fact

- finding hearing.

[8] Here, i t is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented at the fact

- finding hearing that G.I. believed the car to belong to M.B

. T eenagers driving a used car and/or one that is messy and has bumps and scrapes is not unusual. Further, the evidence shows the car was stolen with the keys in it, and th ere was no evidence presented of any damage to the steering colum n or other components which w ould be indicative of a stolen vehicle. Moreover, G.I. did Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05

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- 166 | J a n u a r y 6 , 2 0 1 6 Page 4 of 5not flee when the car was stopped by Officer Rabensteine. Fr om this evidence

w e determin e that the circumstances do not support a reasonable inference that G. I. knew, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the car she drove only briefly was stolen. We therefore conclude that the evidence presented to support G.I.’s delinquency adjudication was not sufficient.

[9] Revers ed.

[10] Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

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