IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICIA A. REYNOLDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00235-CG-N

)

MEGAN BRENNAN,1 )

United States Postmaster General )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the 

Alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. 19) brought under FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(e). The Plaintiff, Patricia A. Reynolds, has timely filed a 

response in opposition (Doc. 23). The motion is now under submission and is ripe for 

adjudication. See Doc. 21. The present motion has been referred to the undersigned 

United States Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(1). Upon consideration, the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) be 

DENIED and the Defendant’s Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement

(Doc. 19) be GRANTED. 2

 1 Plaintiff sued Patrick Donahoe, the Postmaster General, in his official capacity in May 2014. Doc. 1. 

Megan Brennan was installed as the Postmaster General by the U.S. Postal Service Board of 

Governors effective February 1, 2015.

2 The deadlines imposed by the Preliminary Scheduling Order (Doc. 20) have previously been stayed 

pending disposition of the present motion. Doc. 25. Should the recommendation of the undersigned 

be adopted, the Parties will have fourteen (14) days to confer and file a supplementary Rule 26(f)

report proposing a further schedule for this case, per the previous Order of this Court. Id.

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I. Applicable Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court construes the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, “accepting all well-pleaded facts that are 

alleged therein to be true.” Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.

2006)). “ ‘To survive . . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” ’ ” Id. (quoting 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). “The plausibility standard ‘calls for enough fact to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the defendant's 

liability.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not 

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but [rather] asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendants liability, it ‘stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). “[W]here the 

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, quoting in part FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a 

pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 

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ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must 

be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects 

complained of and the details desired.” Whether to grant relief under Rule 12(e) is 

left to the Court’s discretion. See Porter v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 406 F. App'x 460, 

461 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“We review for abuse of discretion 

a district court's grant of a motion for a more definite statement.” (citing Mitchell v. 

E–Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1959)).

II. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on May 27, 2014, by filing a Complaint with the 

Court alleging a discrimination claim against the Postmaster General. See Doc. 1. It 

is unclear from the face of the Complaint what basis she alleges she was 

discriminated on. Id. The Court ordered that the Plaintiff file a supplement to her 

original Complaint “that clearly states the basis for the discrimination she alleges.” 

Doc. 3 at 3. The Plaintiff responded to this Order with miscellaneous documents, 

but still failed to allege a plain basis for discrimination. See Docs. 5, 6. The following 

factual allegations3 concerning the Plaintiff’s employment with the United States 

Postal Service are accepted as true for purposes of the present motion:4

 3 Out of an abundance of caution concerning Ms. Reynolds’s status as a pro se litigant, the Court 

gives credence, for the purpose of this Motion, both to the allegations made in her Complaint (Doc. 1) 

and to those made in her Response (Doc. 23) to the Defendant’s present Motion. The Plaintiff’s 

Response (Doc. 23) is construed as a supplement to her original Complaint (Doc. 1).

4 The Supreme Court has stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)) that:

[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings 

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 

of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual 

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[Plaintiff] filed an EEOC discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal 

Service because they promoted 16 people over me during my 26 years 

of working at the post office in Atmore, Alabama. They knew that I 

wanted to be a Supervisor from the time that it was asked when I was 

hired in 1986. I was told that I would always be the next in line but 

was always overlooked and someone else was chosen. People were 

chosen from other offices and the office here. Carriers that I trained to 

carry mail so I could be trained as Supervisor were later chosen as 

Supervisor over me. I was told that I was not hired to be a Supervisor, 

I was hired to carry mail but all the other carriers could be trained to 

be Supervisors and they could also be carriers. Doc. 1 at 1-2.

Mrs. Hayes was Postmaster when I was hired . . . . I worked for 9 

months and only missed 4 hours of work because I became sick at work 

with the flu . . . . After finishing my 9 months she walked me out the 

Post Office and told me that the Post Office did not need any more 

people like me there because one was enough (David McCants, he was 

the only other black in the office). I did tell Wendell Middleton, who 

was shop steward at the time and he told her she could not fire me 

because a dog bit me. Doc. 23 at 2. 

Rudy Blystrock hired me on August 31, 1986 as a Clerk/Carrier . . . . It 

was during this time that Mr. Blystrock stated that anyone who 

wanted to [ ] move up in the Post Office, put it in writing and have a 

clerk stamp it and it into him and they will be trained. At that time 

only Patricia Stone and myself wrote out our wish to be trained. She 

began her training immediately because she was hired two months 

before me . . . . Id.

Gary Vincent came in as supervisor from the Brewton office and 

Patricia Stone was still being trained . . . . All during the time I was 

still doing clerk work and carrying mail and continuously asking to get 

some of the training . . . . Id.

Alfonse Russell came in as Supervisor after Gary Vincent left and 

[Plaintiff] asked the same question again about being trained as 

Supervisor. He told me that I needed other training and education to 

get trained and I didn’t really know where this was coming. Patricia 

Stone was not told any of that . . . . Then I decided I would asked Mr. 

Russell what kind of training that I needed and he said that I needed 

to know all the aspects of the Postal Facility. I told him Patricia Stone 

didn’t have to do this and he told me that her situation was different. I 

 

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

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was never told what the difference was. I transferred into Mobile and 

started training with Billy Spence (deceased). I went through all the 

training there in Mobile, Mail Handler, LSM Operator, Flat Sorter 

OCR and BCS machines, OJT training. I also took all the Postal 

Courses that were offered in PEDC either before I started my shift or 

after my shift was over. This was while I was still going to college. I 

returned to Atmore after I was accepted into the University of Mobile. 

I had some courses to finish and I went to Faulkner Community 

College and obtain[ed] my AA in Liberal Arts. I started the University 

of Mobile the following January 1992 and finished in 1994. Id. at 2-3.

When I returned to Atmore, Betty Coker was Supervisor . . . . I asked 

her if I could used her 991 [Application for Promotion or Assignment] 

as a model to put one in for a Supervisor position. She allowed me to 

use it. I find that she was a letter carrier and had limited training in 

any area and no college but did some training in other areas. I took my 

991 to several other Postmasters and asked them to go over it and help 

me to correct it. All of them thought that I had a very good 991 and 

didn’t need any correction. I sent in several 991 job vacancies and 

never heard anything from them . . . . I found out later that the 

Postmaster and the supervisor had to fill out their recommendation for 

you to get into the program and not one of them filled out the 

paperwork for me. Id. at 3.

Jim Hoobler came in as Postmaster and Jeff Daniels as Supervisor. 

Again I asked to be trained as Supervisor. This is ten years of begging 

to be trained as Supervisor. As soon as a new clerk (PTF) came in 

within a year that person was being trained as supervisor. As soon as I 

would say something about asking or that I have been asking to be 

trained, I was told that a letter [carrier] cannot be a Supervisor, it was 

against policy . . . Then I learned that he [Hoobler] and the Supervisor 

had carried mail. I asked him again what was the reason that I 

couldn’t be trained and then I was called names (Nigger), stupid, 

uneducated. I was belittled on every hand. I was told I would never sit 

behind that desk as long as he was Postmaster in that office . . . . Mr. 

Hoobler and Jeff Daniels made my life miserable. I was constantly 

being written up and after I filed the EEOC charges against them it 

got worst. Mr. Hoobler accused me of wrecking every [delivery vehicle] 

in the office. I was constantly being watched and written up. I kept 

putting in 991 for vacancies and never hearing back from Birmingham 

. . . . I was bitten [by] a bull dog and I was written up for that. Three 

pit bulls broke [ ] loose from their chains and . . . I had to climb up on 

top of the jeep to get away from them. I was written up for that. I 

stepped into a hold on Brown Street that I didn’t know was there and .

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. . I was put in a boot and on crutches. I was placed on light duty, no 

standing. Mr. Hoobler had me standing and cleaning a supply closet. 

Then I had to straighten[ ] out a filing cabinet. I laid my crutch next to 

the cabinet and Jeff Daniels threw my crutch across the floor and I 

couldn’t get it. I was sent to Brewton, Ala., under Lynn Reeves for 

training but Mr. Hoobler kept calling saying I was needed back in 

Atmore . . . . When I returned to Atmore, I was not put on the schedule 

and had to use annual leave to make a pay check . . . . Id. at 4.

I filed my EEOC complaint against Mr. Hoobler and the Post Office in 

1998 and the EEOC found in my favor and I took my claim to court 

because the Post Office would not train me and all I wanted was to be 

trained at the time . . . . My case was dismissed . . . . After that case 

was closed things got worse between Mr. Hoobler and myself. I was 

written up basically for everything or anything. I literally had to beg 

for time off, my 3971’s [Request for or Notification of Absence] were 

denied, if I took a day off I had to have a reason for it or I had to come 

to work. I filed grievance after grievance in order to get him to leave 

me alone . . . . Id. at 4-5.

Lester Coggola became Supervisor after Jeff Daniels left. I

immediately asked him about the training for 204-B (supervisor). 

Again I put it in writing and kept asking him about it. Jim Hoobler 

finally left the Atmore Office and Lester Coggola became Postmaster 

and from there we had a succession of supervisors. The more I asked 

him about the training, the more he kept putting me off. He would tell 

me I should wait my turn. He hires in Tonya Rabon as a PTF, I trained 

her [as] a letter carrier, he tells me as soon as she is trained I will be 

trained as a Supervisor, instead she was trained as a supervisor and 

when I asked him how did that happen since . . . [h]e tells me that I’m 

needed to carry the mail instead of being a supervisor. Then he started 

writing me up because I kept asking him why did he choose a PTF over 

me and I had the education and some of the training, he stated that 

the other people in the office didn’t like me. He started quoting things 

that Jim Hoobler was saying to me about always having accidents and 

wrecking all the jeeps. He couldn’t trust me. I lacked integrity to do 

things but he was going to coach [ ] me on the things that I need[ed] to 

learn. He never did any of this because he was lying. No one in the 

office said those things to him at all. I asked the entire office one 

morning and he was very upset that I would question what he said and 

that everyone called him a liar. He said that I misunderstood what he 

said. Id. at 5.

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Lester Cogolla kept bringing in people and training them in 

Supervisory positions from other offices . . . . I had been there in that 

office for nearly 20 years at that time and still I was not promoted and 

kept asking over and over, kept filing EEOC complaints . . . following 

proper procedures, and talking to the mediators and nothing 

happened. Mr. Cogolla kept telling me to wait my turn. Still calling me 

names, still writing me up, threatening me and trying to control my 

sick leave. He came to my home on several occasions to get me to come 

to work when that was my only day off in days . . . . He would tell us 

not to use our cell phones but would call me on my cell hoping that I 

would answer and I did not . . . . Id. at 6.

Based on the preceding factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts in her Complaint 

(Doc. 1) that she has been the object of “discrimination,” and asserts in her 

Response (Doc. 23) that she “was systematically discriminated, intimidated, 

threatened, ridiculed, and harassed” during her employment with the U.S. Postal 

Service. Plaintiff does not make specific legal allegations, nor does she state 

specifically on what basis she has been discriminated. See Doc. 1, 23.

III. Analysis

“FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give 

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.’ ” American Dental Association v. Cigna Corporation, 605 F. 3d 1283, 1288 

(11th Cir. 2010), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Additionally, a 

complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the 

material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” 

Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701, 707 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010), quoting Bryson v. 

Gonzalez, 534 F. 3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Despite numerous filings concerning her employment experience with the United 

States Postal Service (see Docs. 1, 1-1, 5, 5-1, 6, 6-1, 23, 24), Plaintiff has failed to 

advance any legal theory, state any cause of action, or show why she is in entitled to 

the relief which she seeks (“The relief I am requesting is that I be made Postmaster 

with all benefits and retirement (retroactive) and a sum of $750,000 cash.” Doc. 1 at 

3). While her complaint mentions Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, she fails to allege the essential elements relating to any 

cause of action under either piece of legislation. See Docs. 1, 23. Plaintiff fails to 

allege that she is the member of any protected class or to state that the U.S. Postal 

Service’s employment or promotion decisions were motivated by any discriminatory 

animus. Id.

The Plaintiff finds herself in the difficult situation of proceeding pro se.5

However, while the Court may “construe pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings liberally, courts 

may not act as de facto counsel or ‘rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order 

to sustain an action.’ ” Porter v. Duval County School Bd., 406 Fed. Appx. 460, 462 

(11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 

F. 3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds). “[T]he Twombly

pleading standard, even when applied to pro se plaintiffs, simply does not permit a 

Court to ‘reverse-engineer’ a plaintiff’s conclusion that [s]he is entitled to relief. 

 5 Plaintiff has brought employment discrimination claims against the United States Postal Service 

on two previous occasions. The first action was brought pro se in 1997 alleging discrimination on the 

basis of race. Reynolds v. Runyon, et al, Civil Action No. 97-cv-00790-AH-S. The second action was 

brought through counsel in 2004; it alleged discrimination on the basis of age and race in 

determining whether to train employees for supervisor positions. Reynolds v. Potter, Civil Action No. 

04-cv-00047-CB-C, Doc. 28 at 4. It further alleged retaliation and a hostile work environment. Id. at 

4-5. Both cases were dismissed following motions for summary judgment by the Defendant and both 

dismissals were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

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Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts and law showing why [s]he is entitled to 

relief. [Sh]e thus must assert non-conclusory allegations supporting the elements of 

[her] claims.” Washington v. CSX Transp. (R.R.), 2009 WL 1289032, *2 (S.D. Ga. 

2009). Thus far, no “short and plain statement” has come from the Plaintiff 

detailing how she is entitled to the relief sought.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the above-stated analysis, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that:

1. The Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 19) Motion to Dismiss be DENIED in 

order to allow the pro se Plaintiff to amend her complaint.

2. The Defendant’s Rule 12(e) Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement

(Doc. 19) be GRANTED and the Plaintiff should be given fourteen (14) days 

from the adoption of this recommendation by the district judge to amend her 

complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve this Order on the Plaintiff by regular and 

certified mail.

V. Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything 

in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. In order to be specific, an objection must 

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identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 14th day of July 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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