IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 41

Henry Hill Oil Services LLC, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Abner C. Tufto, Eric Ted Tufto,

Darla Tufto a/k/a Darla O’Donnell,

Kris Bradley Tufto, RWS Holdings, LLC, 

and Regional Water Service, LLC, Defendants 

and

Lane A. Knudsen, Marcia K. Talley and

David H. Talley, Trustees of the

Marcia K. Talley Living Trust,

and Ann E. Gochnour, Defendants and Appellants

----------

Regional Water Service LLC, Plaintiff 

v.

Henry Hill Oil Services LLC, Defendant and Appellee

No. 20220212

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial 

District, the Honorable Joshua B. Rustad, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Mark W. Vyvyan (argued), Minneapolis, MN, and Lawrence Bender (appeared), 

Bismarck, ND, for for plaintiff and appellee.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

MARCH 3, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Erich M. Grant, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellant Lane A. Knudsen.

Nicholas C. Grant (argued), and Marissa R. Cerkoney (on brief), Dickinson, 

ND, for defendants and appellants Marcia K. Talley and David H. Talley, 

Trustees of the Marcia K. Talley Living Trust, and Ann E. Gochnour.
1

Henry Hill Oil Services v. Tufto, et al.

No. 20220212

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Lane Knudsen, Ann Gochnour, and Marcia Talley and David Talley, 

Trustees of the Marcia K. Talley Living Trust (Landowners), appeal from a 

district court judgment foreclosing Henry Hill Oil Services LLC’s construction 

liens against the Landowners’ properties and awarding Henry Hill Oil its costs 

and attorney’s fees. We conclude the court erred in determining the 

Landowners’ properties were subject to Henry Hill Oil’s construction liens. We

reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of the Landowners’ costs 

and attorney’s fees.

I

[¶2] Landowners own real property in Williams County. In 2017 and 2018, 

the Landowners executed water pipeline easements with RWS Holdings, LLC. 

The agreements granted RWS Holdings 75-foot-wide temporary easements for 

constructing a water pipeline and related facilities across and under the 

Landowners’ properties. The agreements granted RWS Holdings 30-foot-wide

permanent pipeline easements on the properties. The temporary easements 

expired upon completion of the water pipelines.

[¶3] The Talley-Gochnour Defendants also granted RWS Holdings an 

easement for constructing a freshwater reservoir on their property. The 

easement term was 20 years or “until Grantee permanently removes” the 

reservoir from the property. Lane Knudsen and RWS Holdings executed a 10-

year Water Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding. Knudsen granted

RWS Holdings the right to access his property to install “equipment deemed 

necessary for the purposes of capturing, transporting and using water.” 

[¶4] RWS Holdings hired Regional Water Service, LLC, which then hired 

Henry Hill Oil, to construct water reservoirs on the properties. Henry Hill Oil 

worked on the Landowners’ properties from June 2018 to October 2018. Henry 

Hill Oil recorded construction liens against the Landowners’ properties after it 

was not paid for its work. In May 2019, Henry Hill Oil sued Regional Water 
2

Service for breach of contract. In October 2019, Henry Hill Oil sued the 

Landowners to enforce the construction liens. 

[¶5] All parties moved for summary judgment. Henry Hill Oil argued it held 

valid construction liens against the Landowners’ properties. The Landowners 

claimed they did not contract with Henry Hill Oil to perform work on their 

properties, and the liens are only effective against RWS Holdings’ easement 

interests. 

[¶6] After a hearing, the district court granted Henry Hill Oil’s motions for 

summary judgment. The court concluded that under the construction lien 

statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 35-27, the Landowners are “owners” who authorized 

Henry Hill Oil to work on their properties, and Henry Hill Oil’s liens covered 

all of the Landowners’ properties. The court also concluded Henry Hill Oil was 

entitled to its costs and attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the liens.

[¶7] The district court entered a judgment foreclosing the construction liens 

and awarding Henry Hill Oil $89,709.79 in costs and attorney’s fees. The court 

also awarded Henry Hill Oil $660,228.40 in damages against Regional Water 

Service. The judgment against Regional Water Service is not subject to this 

appeal.

II

[¶8] This Court’s standard of review for summary judgments is well

established:

“Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt 

resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there 

are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can 

reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to 

be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary 

judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues 

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was 

appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be 

given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably 
3

be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether 

the information available to the district court precluded the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the 

moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district 

court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law 

which we review de novo on the entire record.”

Pennington v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2019 ND 228, ¶ 6, 932 N.W.2d 897 (quoting 

Horob v. Zavanna, LLC, 2016 ND 168, ¶ 8, 883 N.W.2d 855).

III

[¶9] The Landowners argue the district court erred in granting Henry Hill 

Oil’s motions for summary judgment. They claim the court erred in concluding 

they were “owners” under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(5) who contracted with Henry 

Hill Oil to improve their property. They argue the court erred in concluding

under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-19 that Henry Hill Oil’s liens attached to the 

Landowners’ fee simple interests in the properties instead of only RWS

Holdings’ easement interests.

[¶10] Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to determine the intent 

of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of the statute and 

give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning. Laufer v. Doe, 2020 ND 

159, ¶ 11, 946 N.W.2d 707; N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. “When the wording of a statute 

is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under 

the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05. We presume the 

legislature did not intend an absurd result or unjust consequences, and we 

construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of 

the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted. Laufer, at ¶ 11.

Statutes relating to the same subject matter shall be construed together and 

should be harmonized, if possible, to give meaningful effect to each, without 

rendering either one useless. Id. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, 

fully reviewable on appeal. Id.

[¶11] Construction liens are authorized by N.D.C.C. ch. 35-27. This case 

involves three statutes, N.D.C.C. §§ 35-27-02, 35-27-01(5) and 35-27-19. Under 

N.D.C.C. § 35-27-02, the following persons are entitled to a construction lien:
4

“Any person that improves real estate, whether under contract 

with the owner of such real estate or under contract with any 

agent, trustee, contractor, or subcontractor of the owner, has a lien 

upon the improvement and upon the land on which the 

improvement is situated or to which the improvement may be 

removed for the price or value of such contribution.”

An “‘[o]wner’ means the legal or equitable owner and also every person for 

whose immediate use and benefit any building, erection, or improvement is 

made, having the capacity to contract, including guardians of minors or other 

persons, and including any agent, trustee, contractor, or subcontractor of such 

owner.” N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(5). A construction lien covers “[t]he entire land 

upon which any building, structure, or other improvement is situated . . . to 

the extent of all the right, title, and interest of the owner for whose immediate 

use or benefit the labor was done or materials furnished.” N.D.C.C. § 35-27-19.

Reading the statutes together, a person is entitled to a construction lien if they 

contract with an owner to improve real property. The lien covers the

contracting owner’s interest in the property.

[¶12] The district court concluded Henry Hill Oil’s construction of water 

reservoirs improved the Landowners’ properties. See N.D.C.C. §§ 35-27-01(2) 

and (3) (defining “improve” and “improvement”). The Landowners dispute the 

court’s conclusion; however, determining whether Henry Hill Oil improved the 

Landowners’ properties is not dispositive. Therefore, we assume without 

deciding Henry Hill Oil improved the Landowners’ properties.

[¶13] The district court concluded the Landowners were “owners” as defined 

in N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(5) because they were the legal owners of the properties

improved by Henry Hill Oil. The court determined the easements to RWS 

Holdings did not transfer ownership of the properties, they only granted RWS 

Holdings a right to use a portion of the properties for a specific purpose. The 

court said the easements did not change the fact that the Landowners 

remained the legal owners of the fee simple interests in the properties, and 

concluded that the liens therefore attached to the Landowners’ full property 

interests.
5

[¶14] The district court also concluded that through the agreements with RWS 

Holdings, the Landowners authorized Henry Hill Oil to work on the properties. 

“[The Landowners] do not dispute that RWS Holdings hired 

Regional Water Service to commence the construction of certain 

water pipelines and reservoirs on [their properties], nor do they 

dispute that Regional Water Service in turn made Henry Hill its 

subcontractor. See N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(7) (defining subcontractor 

as ‘all persons contributing any skill, labor, or materials to the 

improvement except such as have contracts therefor directly with 

the owner’). Accordingly, [the Landowners] authorized Henry Hill 

to work on [their properties].”

[¶15] Under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(5), an “owner” is the “legal or equitable owner 

and also every person for whose immediate use and benefit any . . .

improvement is made, having the capacity to contract, . . . and including any 

agent, trustee, contractor, or subcontractor of such owner.” The easements 

granted RWS Holdings limited possessory rights within defined areas of the 

Landowners’ properties. The easements did not grant RWS Holdings authority 

to contract on behalf of the Landowners. Although the Landowners hold fee 

title to the properties, Henry Hill Oil has cited no easement language or legal

authority supporting its claim RWS Holdings became the Landowners’ agent 

or trustee through the easement agreements.

[¶16] Henry Hill Oil made the improvements for the immediate use and 

benefit of RWS Holdings but not to the Landowners’ properties generally. As 

the easement owner, RWS Holdings had the capacity to contract for the 

improvements relating to the easements. RWS Holdings contracted with 

Regional Water Service, and Regional Water Service contracted with Henry 

Hill Oil. Under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(7), Henry Hill Oil was a subcontractor of 

RWS Holdings, not the Landowners.

[¶17] Here, the district court erred in concluding the Landowners are “owners” 

under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-01(5) by interpreting the definition of “owner” too 

broadly. The easements did not grant RWS Holdings the authority to act as the 

Landowners’ agent. The Landowners did not become guarantors of RWS 

Holdings by executing the easements. To conclude otherwise would expose 
6

easement-granting landowners to untold liability for utility, roadway or other 

projects knowingly constructed on or across their property.

[¶18] A construction lien covers “[t]he entire land upon which any . . . 

improvement is situated . . . to the extent of all the right, title, and interest of 

the owner for whose immediate use or benefit the labor was done or materials 

furnished.” N.D.C.C. § 35-27-19. Henry Hill Oil improved the properties for the 

immediate use and benefit of RWS Holdings, the owner of the easements. Thus,

assuming Henry Hill Oil otherwise was entitled to construction liens for its 

work, the liens would only cover RWS Holdings’ easement interests. The 

district court erred in concluding Henry Hill Oil’s liens covered all of the 

Landowners’ properties.

[¶19] Henry Hill Oil does not have valid construction liens against the 

Landowners’ properties. We reverse the portion of the district court’s judgment 

foreclosing Henry Hill Oil’s construction liens against the Landowners’ 

properties, and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Landowners.

IV

[¶20] The Landowners claim the district court erred by awarding Henry Hill 

Oil its attorney’s fees. They contend the court misapplied N.D.C.C. § 35-27-

24.1, dealing with costs and attorney’s fees. We agree.

[¶21] Under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-24.1, “Any owner that successfully contests the 

validity or accuracy of a construction lien by any action in district court must 

be awarded the full amount of all costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred 

by the owner.”

[¶22] The district court concluded N.D.C.C. § 35-27-24.1 was ambiguous.

“First, in reviewing the plain language used in N.D.C.C. § 

35-27-24.1, the Court finds that this statute is broad by nature, 

including phrases such as ‘any owner,’ and ‘any action.’ Second, the 

Court finds that in an action to foreclose on a construction lien, as 

in this present matter, the contractor must defend the validity or 
7

accuracy of its construction lien, and N.D.C.C. § 35-27-24.1 is 

meant to apply in ‘any actions’ to do the same.”

The court also acknowledged the remedial nature of N.D.C.C. ch. 35-27 and its 

purpose to protect those who improve real estate. See Nesdahl Surveying & 

Eng’g, P.C. v. Ackerland Corp., 507 N.W.2d 686, 689 (N.D. 1993) (stating the 

construction lien laws “should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose,” 

which is “to protect those persons who improve real estate by the contribution 

of labor, skill, or materials”).

[¶23] The district court misconstrued N.D.C.C. § 35-27-24.1 in awarding 

Henry Hill Oil its costs and attorney’s fees. The statute is not ambiguous about 

which party can recover costs and attorney’s fees. The plain language provides

that only an owner (or in this case, one claimed to be an owner) may be awarded 

attorney’s fees for successfully contesting a construction lien. The statute does 

not allow a contractor to recover its costs and attorney’s fees for successfully 

enforcing a construction lien. Henry Hill Oil is not an “owner” under N.D.C.C. 

§ 35-27-01(5). Henry Hill Oil sued the Landowners to enforce its liens, and did 

not contest the validity or accuracy of its own liens.

[¶24] The Landowners successfully contested the validity of Henry Hill Oil’s 

construction liens. The district court erred in awarding Henry Hill Oil its costs 

and attorney’s fees. We reverse that part of the judgment awarding Henry Hill 

Oil its costs and attorney’s fees, and remand for a determination of the 

Landowners’ costs and attorney’s fees for successfully contesting the validity of 

Henry Hill Oil’s construction liens. See Northern Excavating Co. v. Sisters of 

Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care, 2012 ND 78, ¶ 11, 815 N.W.2d 280 

(holding that under N.D.C.C. § 35-27-24.1, “a party who successfully contests 

the accuracy or validity of a construction lien is limited to recovering only those 

costs and fees reasonably expended contesting the lien”).

V

[¶25] The parties’ remaining arguments have been considered and are either 

without merit or not necessary to our decision. The judgment is reversed and 

the case is remanded.
8

[¶26] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Lisa Fair McEvers 

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr