2021 UT 48 

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CATHY MCKITRICK, 

Appellant, 

v. 

KERRY GIBSON, CITY OF OGDEN, AND OGDEN CITY RECORDS REVIEW 

BOARD, 

Appellees.

No. 20190811 

Heard March 5, 2021 

Filed August 19, 2021 

On Appeal of Interlocutory Order 

Second District, Weber 

The Honorable Noel S. Hyde 

No. 180906947 

Attorneys: 

Jeffrey J. Hunt, David C. Reymann, Jeremy M. Brodis, Salt Lake 

City, for appellant 

Peter Stirba, Valerie Wilde, Salt Lake City, for appellee Kerry 

Gibson 

Stephen F. Noel, Ogden, for appellee Ogden City 

Clinton R. Drake, Bountiful, for appellee Ogden City Records 

Review Board 

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE 

HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined. 

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court: 

INTRODUCTION 

¶1 Cathy McKitrick, a freelance journalist, sought 

government records related to an investigation into alleged 

official misconduct by Kerry Gibson, a former Weber County 

Commissioner. The Ogden City Records Review Board granted 

her records request. But Gibson petitioned for judicial review of 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

2 

that decision. In the district court, McKitrick moved to dismiss. 

She argued that Gibson lacks standing under the Utah 

Government Records Access and Management Act to seek judicial 

review of an appeals board’s access decision. Gibson opposed, 

arguing that his petition should proceed—statutory standing 

aside—because he meets the tests for traditional and public 

interest standing. 

¶2 This case therefore poses the question contemplated by 

the concurrence in Haik v. Jones: May a statutory claimant who 

lacks statutory standing proceed on the basis of traditional or 

alternative standing? 2018 UT 39, ¶ 41 & n.11, 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, 

A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). We 

did not answer that question in Haik, but we do so now. And we 

hold that the answer is no. A statutory claimant must have 

statutory standing, and the presence of traditional or alternative 

standing will not cure a statutory standing deficiency. We 

therefore reverse the district court’s interlocutory order denying 

McKitrick’s motion to dismiss and remand for dismissal of 

Gibson’s petition for judicial review. 

BACKGROUND1

¶3 In late 2017, then Weber County Commissioner Kerry 

Gibson was accused of misusing public resources for personal 

benefit, including, among other things, misappropriating county 

equipment to make improvements to the Gibson family farm. 

Shortly thereafter, the Ogden City Police Department opened an 

investigation into the allegations against Gibson and subsequently 

referred the matter to Davis County.2 The Davis County 

Attorney’s Office found no illegality related to the work done on 

the farm and insufficient evidence to support the other 

allegations. So Davis County declined to bring formal charges 

against Gibson. 

__________________________________________________________ 

1 “On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we . . . accept the 

factual allegations in the complaint as true and view all 

reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71, n.3, 456 P.3d 750 (citation 

omitted). Accordingly, we recite the facts as alleged in Gibson’s 

petition for judicial review. 

2 The matter was referred to Davis County “because the Weber 

County Attorney’s Office had a conflict of interest.” 
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Opinion of the Court 

3 

¶4 After Davis County closed its investigation, McKitrick 

filed a records request under the Utah Government Records 

Access and Management Act (GRAMA), UTAH CODE §§ 63G-2-

101–901, seeking “the contents and findings of the police 

investigation.” Gibson objected. And Ogden City denied 

McKitrick’s request. The City determined that “the public’s 

interest in disclosure does not outweigh the City’s interest in 

classifying [the] records as private and protected,” and it 

classified the records accordingly.3

¶5 As permitted by GRAMA, McKitrick appealed the denial 

to the Ogden City Chief Administrative Officer. See id. § 63G-2-

401(1). The chief administrative officer affirmed the decision 

below, concluding that the records had been properly classified 

by Ogden City as private and protected under GRAMA. 

¶6 McKitrick again appealed, this time to the Ogden City 

Records Review Board (Review Board), a local appeals board 

established by Ogden City as authorized by GRAMA. See id. 

§ 63G-2-701(5)(c). Ogden City was the named respondent in the 

appeal. At the Review Board hearing, Ogden City argued against 

disclosure because, among other things, releasing the records 

would compromise the identities of other persons involved in the 

investigation of Gibson. 

¶7 Although Gibson was not an official party to the Review 

Board proceedings, he had the opportunity to be heard at the 

hearing through his attorney. Gibson argued that disclosure of the 

records would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of [his] 

personal privacy” because, as evidenced by the decision of the 

Davis County Attorney’s Office not to file charges, the allegations 

underlying the investigation proved “unsubstantiated.” 

¶8 After reviewing the records and “carefully considering 

the interests favoring access and the interests favoring 

restriction,” the Review Board reversed the denial and ordered 

release of the records with limited redactions. In making its 

decision, the Review Board reasoned that while the names of any 

complainants or witnesses were properly classified as private 

under GRAMA subsection 302(2)(d), “the public’s right [to] access 

__________________________________________________________ 

3 Specifically, Ogden City classified the records as private 

pursuant to GRAMA subsection 302(2)(d) and protected pursuant 

to GRAMA subsections 305(10)(d)–(e).
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

4 

and to know the information regarding the investigation of Mr. 

Gibson as a public official and the alleged misuse of public funds 

outweigh any interest in restricting the records.” In its order 

authorizing release, the Review Board noted the right of “any 

party” to appeal the decision to the district court as governed by 

GRAMA sections 701(6) and 404. 

¶9 Respondent Ogden City elected not to appeal the 

decision. And as the prevailing party, McKitrick did not appeal 

the decision. But Gibson, claiming standing under Ogden City 

Municipal Code subsection 4-5-25(G)(3) and section 4-5-25(H) 

(2018),4 filed a petition for judicial review. In his petition, Gibson 

argued that disclosure of the records “would constitute a ‘clearly 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ . . . not outweighed by 

any public interest” because, among other reasons, release of the 

records could cause significant personal and professional harm. 

Gibson’s petition named only Ogden City and the Review Board 

as respondents. 

¶10 McKitrick moved to intervene. She subsequently filed a 

motion to dismiss Gibson’s petition, alleging, in relevant part, that 

because Gibson is neither a “political subdivision” nor a 

“requester,” he lacks standing under GRAMA to petition the 

district court for review of the Review Board’s decision. Gibson 

opposed, claiming that under our precedent, his satisfaction of the 

requirements for traditional or public interest standing renders 

“a[ny] lack of statutory standing . . . immaterial.” 

¶11 Following oral argument, the district court concluded 

that in light of “ambiguities in GRAMA” and constitutional 

concerns surrounding the right to privacy, “a person who asserts 

__________________________________________________________ 

4 Gibson cited—and we cite herein—to the portions of the 

Ogden City Municipal Code in effect in 2018, when Gibson filed 

his petition for judicial review. Ogden City Municipal Code 

subsection 4-5-25(G)(3) (2018) provides that “any party to the 

appeal may appeal the decision of the records review board to 

district court . . . .” But McKitrick and Ogden City were the only 

named parties to the Review Board appeal. See supra ¶¶ 6–7. And 

Ogden City Municipal Code section 4-5-25(H) (2018) permits 

appeals to the district court from a final decision of a local appeals 

board only “in accordance with [GRAMA] and the Utah rules of 

civil procedure.” See infra ¶ 42. 
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Opinion of the Court 

5 

a privacy interest in records has standing to appeal the decision of 

a local appeals board granting access to those records.” It 

therefore denied McKitrick’s motion to dismiss. 

¶12 We granted leave to McKitrick to appeal from the district 

court’s interlocutory order denying her motion to dismiss. 

¶13 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-

102(3)(j). 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

¶14 “A ruling on a motion to dismiss presents a legal 

question that we review for correctness, affording no deference to 

the district court’s decision.” Turner v. Staker & Parson Cos., 2012 

UT 30, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 600. Likewise, “[t]he interpretation . . . of a 

statute [is a] question[] of law that we review for correctness.” 

Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71, ¶ 11, 456 P.3d 750 (citation omitted). 

And while standing generally presents a mixed question of law 

and fact “because it involves the application of a legal standard to 

a particularized set of facts,” the question of whether a specific 

individual has standing to assert a claim is primarily a question of 

law. Hinkle v. Jacobsen, 2019 UT 72, ¶ 18, 456 P.3d 738 (citation 

omitted). We review factual findings with deference, but “we give 

minimal discretion to the district court on determinations of 

whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for 

standing.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

ANALYSIS 

¶15 McKitrick argues that Gibson lacks standing under the 

plain language of GRAMA. And she contends that because 

Gibson is a statutory claimant—as he is proceeding under the 

mechanism established in GRAMA for judicial review of a local 

appeals board decision—he must have statutory standing to 

proceed and may not resort to any other form of standing to gain 

access to the courts. Gibson disagrees. He argues both that he has 

statutory standing under GRAMA and that because he meets the 

requirements for traditional standing, “he [nonetheless] need not 

rely upon the statute for authority” to judicially challenge the 

records’ release.5

__________________________________________________________ 

5 In the alternative, Gibson asserts that he has public interest 

standing, also commonly referred to as “alternative standing.” We 

(continued . . .) 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

6 

¶16 The Utah Legislature has seen fit to establish, under the 

rubric of GRAMA, a process for appellate review of governmental 

entities’ GRAMA-related decisions. And despite his status as the 

subject of the records here, we conclude that Gibson is not within 

the scope of those authorized by the legislature to seek such 

review. Further, we hold that because Gibson lacks standing 

under the plain terms of the statute (GRAMA) through which he 

stakes his claim, that claim may not proceed even though Gibson 

has traditional standing. 

I. STATUTORY STANDING 

¶17 “[I]n Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a 

[threshold] jurisdictional requirement.” Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 

UT 18, ¶ 11, 299 P.3d 1098 (first alternation in original) (citation 

omitted). And it is axiomatic that where the right of action is one 

created by statute, “the law creating the right can also prescribe 

the conditions of its enforcement.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 

Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parmley v. Pleasant 

Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557, 560 (Utah 1924)). 

¶18 Gibson is a statutory claimant, relying on provisions of 

GRAMA to seek judicial review of an appeals board’s access 

decision. Accordingly, we first ask whether Gibson meets the 

requirements for standing under GRAMA—in other words, 

whether he is one of the persons the statute allows to seek judicial 

review of appeals board decisions regarding access to government 

records. 

¶19 “When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to 

ascertain the intent of the legislature.” Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71, 

¶ 17, 456 P.3d 750 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Because “[t]he best evidence of the legislature’s intent is 

the plain language of the statute itself,” we look first to the 

statutory text. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But we 

do not interpret statutory text in isolation. Olsen v. Eagle Mountain 

City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248 P.3d 465. Instead, we “determine the 

meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute 

(including, particularly, the structure and language of the 

statutory scheme).” Id. In doing so, we presume, “absent a 

 

need not reach the merits of this argument, however, because 

(1) Gibson’s lack of statutory standing is dispositive regardless of 

whether he has traditional or alternative standing, and (2) there is 

no dispute that Gibson has traditional standing here. 
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Opinion of the Court 

7 

contrary indication, that the legislature used each term 

advisedly.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 

¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (citation omitted). “When the meaning of [a] 

statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive 

tools are needed.” Id. ¶ 15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶20 GRAMA establishes a process through which an 

individual may request access to a government record. UTAH 

CODE § 63G-2-204(1). And when a governmental entity denies 

such a request, GRAMA establishes a process to appeal that 

decision. Id. §§ 63G-2-401–404, -701(5)–(6). We look at the specific 

provision at issue here—subsection 701(6)(a), which provides for 

appeals from access decisions of a local appeals board—within the 

context of this overarching appellate scheme. We conclude that 

when reading subsection 701(6)(a) in context, it is clear that only a 

political subdivision or a requester may appeal the decision of a 

local appeals board. And Gibson is neither a political subdivision 

nor a requester. 

A. The GRAMA Appeals Process6

1. The Initial Record Request to the Governmental Entity 

¶21 The process of requesting a government record through 

GRAMA begins with a record request to a governmental entity. 

UTAH CODE § 63G-2-204(1)(a). Here, McKitrick requested the 

investigative records through a GRAMA request to the Ogden 

Police Department. Ogden City responded to her request and 

denied it. 

__________________________________________________________ 

6 We address only who has standing to appeal access decisions 

of a local appeals board to the district court. The statute provides 

a process for appealing other GRAMA-related decisions, such as a 

governmental entity’s classification or designation of a record as 

public, private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure. 

UTAH CODE § 63G-2-401(8). But these provisions are not at issue 

here. GRAMA also contains provisions that are specific to 

business confidentiality claimants, which we also do not address. 

See, e.g., id. §§ 63G-2-401(4)(a), -404(3). And finally, our analysis is 

specific to petitions for judicial review of a local appeals board’s 

decision. We do not address appeals that proceed to or from the 

State Records Committee. 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

8 

¶22 When a governmental entity denies a record request, 

GRAMA establishes a process for appealing that decision. This 

process is generally laid out in Part 4 of GRAMA. See id. §§ 63G-2-

400.5–406. However, because Ogden City—the governmental 

entity in control of the record here—is a “political subdivision,”7

Part 7 of GRAMA is relevant. See id. §§ 63G-2-103(11)(a)(v), -701. 

Part 7 permits political subdivisions to “adopt an ordinance or a 

policy applicable throughout its jurisdiction relating to 

information practices including classification, designation, access,

denials, segregation, appeals, management, retention, and 

amendment of records.” Id. § 63G-2-701(2)(a) (emphases added). 

¶23 Ogden City has chosen to enact its own ordinances 

related to information practices pursuant to Part 7. See OGDEN 

CITY, UTAH MUN. CODE § 4-5-1(A)–(B) (2018). So here we review 

the relevant provisions in both Part 4 and Part 7 of GRAMA. 

2. Appeal of a Governmental Entity’s Denial to the Chief 

Administrative Officer 

¶24 If the governmental entity grants a records request, 

GRAMA provides no mechanism to appeal that decision. 

However, if the governmental entity denies a record request, as 

did Ogden City, GRAMA permits the “requester” or an “interested 

party” to appeal the “access denial” to the governmental entity’s 

designated chief administrative officer. UTAH CODE § 63G-2-

401(1)(a) (emphases added). In Part 7, GRAMA requires a political 

subdivision to “include a process for a requester or interested party

to appeal an access denial to a person designated by the political 

subdivision as the chief administrative officer” for such purposes. 

Id. § 68G-2-701(5)(b) (emphases added). 

¶25 Both “requester” and “interested party” are defined 

terms. See id. § 63G-2-701(1)(c) (referencing id. § 63G-2-400.5). A 

requester is “a person who submits a record request to a 

governmental entity.” Id. § 63G-2-400.5(7). Here, that is McKitrick. 

__________________________________________________________ 

7 GRAMA itself does not define “political subdivision,” but 

other sections of Title 63G define the term similarly, as “any 

county, city, town . . . or other governmental subdivision or public 

corporation.” Id. § 63G-7-102(8); see also id. §§ 63G-9-201(1)(a), -22-

102(1). Under any of these definitions, Ogden City is a political 

subdivision. 
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Opinion of the Court 

9 

¶26 And an “interested party” is a person, other than the 

requester, who is “aggrieved” by the denial of a record request. Id.

§ 63G-2-400.5(3).8 Notably, the statutory definition does not 

include a person who is aggrieved by the grant of a record 

request. So Gibson is not an “interested party” under GRAMA. 

¶27 Because Ogden City denied McKitrick’s request, she 

appealed the access denial to Ogden City’s chief administrative 

officer for GRAMA appeals. And the chief administrative officer 

affirmed the city’s access denial. 

3. Appeal of a Chief Administrative Officer’s “Appellate 

Affirmation” of the Governmental Entity’s Denial 

¶28 If a chief administrative officer reverses the governmental 

entity’s decision to deny access to a record, and thereby grants the 

record request, GRAMA does not provide an avenue to appeal the 

decision. But if the chief administrative officer affirms the 

governmental entity’s denial of the request (an “appellate 

affirmation”), GRAMA allows the requester to appeal the decision 

to the State Records Committee, a local appeals board, or the 

district court through a petition for judicial review. Id. § 63G-2-

402(1)(a)–(b). But where, as here, the governmental entity is a 

political subdivision that has established its own local appeals 

board pursuant to Part 7, GRAMA requires any appeal of a chief 

administrative officer’s decision to go to the local appeals board. 

Id. § 63G-2-701(5)(c)(iii). 

¶29 It is notable that at this juncture, GRAMA distinguishes 

between the appellate rights of the requester and an interested 

party. While a requester has three avenues of appeal (unless the 

governmental entity is a political subdivision), the statute does 

not give an interested party the same options. Rather, it directs an 

__________________________________________________________ 

8 An “interested party” is “a person, other than a requester, 

who is aggrieved by an access denial or an appellate affirmation 

. . . .” Id. § 63G-2-400.5(3). Both an “access denial” and an 

“appellate affirmation” refer to denials of record requests. An 

“access denial” means a governmental entity’s initial denial of a 

record request, in whole or in part. Id. § 63G-2-400.5(1). And an 

“appellate affirmation” is “a decision of a chief administrative 

officer, local appeals board, or State Records Committee affirming 

an access denial.” Id. § 63G-2-400.5(2) (emphasis added). 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

10 

interested party to appeal an appellate affirmation to the State 

Records Committee. Id. § 63G-2-402(3). 

¶30 Here, Ogden City’s chief administrative officer affirmed 

the city’s access denial. So GRAMA provided McKitrick the right 

to appeal that decision to the Ogden City Records Review Board. 

And the Review Board rejected the chief administrative officer’s 

decision and granted McKitrick’s records request. It is the appeal 

of this decision—specifically, Gibson’s petition for judicial review 

of the Review Board’s decision to grant McKitrick’s records 

request—that is before us. 

4. Appeal of a Local Appeals Board Decision 

¶31 GRAMA subsection 701(6)(a) governs this specific 

situation. It states that “[a] political subdivision or requester may 

appeal an appeals board decision . . . by filing a petition for 

judicial review with the district court.” Id. § 63G-2-701(6)(a)(ii) 

(emphases added). Notably, this is the first procedural stage at 

which GRAMA provides for an appeal of a grant—in addition to a 

denial—of a record request.9 And it allows either a “political 

subdivision” or a “requester” to appeal the board’s decision. As 

discussed, both “political subdivision” and “requester” are 

defined terms. See supra ¶¶ 22 n.7, 25. The “requester” here is 

McKitrick. And Ogden City is the “political subdivision” in this 

case. 

¶32 McKitrick, as the prevailing party, had no need to appeal. 

Ogden City chose not to appeal. And GRAMA does not provide 

any other person or entity with the right to appeal the Review 

Board decision. 

B. Gibson’s Statutory Standing 

¶33 Gibson, however, did appeal. Gibson agrees that he is not 

a political subdivision or requester under GRAMA and is 

therefore not “specifically enumerated as the type of appellant the 

statute contemplates will seek judicial review.” But he argues that 

GRAMA nonetheless grants him standing for the following 

reasons. 

__________________________________________________________ 

9 Section 701(6) states that an appeals board “decision” may be 

appealed. Id. § 63G-2-701(6)(a). Unlike other sections of GRAMA, 

it does not specify that only denials may be appealed. See supra

¶ 24. 
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Opinion of the Court 

11 

¶34 First, Gibson notes GRAMA’s recognition of “the right of 

privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental 

entities.” UTAH CODE § 63G-2-102(1)(b). He then argues that as the 

subject of the investigative records at issue, he has standing as an 

“interested party” under the statute because his right to privacy is 

at stake.10

¶35 This is incorrect. As discussed, Gibson is not an interested 

party under the statute. See supra ¶ 26. And while it is true that 

GRAMA recognizes the importance of both “the public’s right of 

access to information concerning the conduct of the public’s 

business” and “the right of privacy in relation to personal data 

gathered by governmental entities,” UTAH CODE § 63G-2-102(1), 

this recognition does not amount to a grant of standing. See Wash.

Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶¶ 8–10, 82 

P.3d 1125 (concluding that “broad statements of purpose” are 

“insufficient to establish statutory standing” and declining to infer 

from such statements a legislative intent to confer statutory 

standing).11

¶36 Gibson next asserts that the language in subsection 

701(6)(a) granting political subdivisions and requesters the right 

to appeal is “not exclusive.” So he argues that while the 

__________________________________________________________ 

10 Gibson has not made any claim that the relevant GRAMA 

provisions are unconstitutional as applied to him. The only 

question before us is whether Gibson has standing to pursue his 

GRAMA petition for judicial review. 

11 We note that GRAMA protects individuals whose data 

appears in government records in other ways. For example, 

GRAMA allows any person “aggrieved by a governmental 

entity’s classification or designation determination” to appeal the 

classification or determination. UTAH CODE § 63G-2-401(8). And it 

directs decisionmakers at various stages of the record request and 

appeals processes to weigh the interests favoring disclosure 

against the interests favoring nondisclosure. See, e.g., id. § 63G-2-

401(6) (consideration by a chief administrative officer); id. § 63G-2-

403(11)(b) (consideration by the State Records Committee); id.

§ 63G-2-404(7)(a) (consideration by the district court). However, 

the statute stops short of granting standing to appeal an access 

decision on the basis of a person’s privacy interests. 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

12 

subsection does not explicitly include someone in his 

circumstance, it does not necessarily exclude him either. 

¶37 This is a misreading of the statute. Because “we presume, 

‘absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each word 

advisedly,’” Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (citation omitted), we 

consequently anticipate “that the expression of one [term] should 

be interpreted as the exclusion of another.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 

UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). “We therefore seek to give effect to omissions in 

statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.” 

Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14. 

¶38 The associated canon of construction—expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius (expressio unius)—holds that “to express or include 

one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” 

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 

ed. 2019); see also Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶ 30 n.9, 443 P.3d 

1217 (citing the above definition). And while canons of 

construction “are not formulaic, dispositive indicators of statutory 

meaning,” they serve as “tools that guide our construction of 

statutes in accordance with common, ordinary usage and 

understanding of language—in this instance, the expectation that 

legislators typically use language advisedly and tend not to speak 

in superfluous terms.” Olsen, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 19. 

¶39 On this basis—and absent any contrary indication in the 

statutory text itself—we assume that the legislature used 

“requester” and “political subdivision” advisedly in crafting 

GRAMA’s appellate review language, and to the exclusion of 

other persons or entities that might have an interest in appealing a 

local review board’s access decision. Cf. In re Gestational 

Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 20, 449 P.3d 69 (assuming the term 

“mother” in the pertinent statute was used advisedly and to the 

exclusion of words like “father” or “parent”). 

¶40 Of course, the legislature’s inclusion of specific terms 

does not always exclude others. In general, 

[t]he inclusion of specific matter in a statute implies 

the exclusion of something else “only where in the 

natural association of ideas the contrast between a 

specific subject matter which is expressed and one 

which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the 

latter was not intended to be included within the 

statute.” 
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Opinion of the Court 

13 

Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993) (citation 

omitted). For example, where a statute sets forth a list of 

considerations to be included among relevant facts a court might 

consider, such a list is “exemplary—an indication of some of the 

considerations that may be relevant,” but not all. State v. 

Wadsworth, 2017 UT 20, ¶ 8, 393 P.3d 338. When specific terms are 

not intended to be exclusive, we expect to see textual indicators 

such as “for example” or “including,” or for the context of the 

provision to otherwise suggest that it is not meant to be 

exhaustive. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 317 (2010) 

(“[U]se of the word ‘include’ can signal that the list that follows is 

meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.”); Graves v. N.E. 

Servs., Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 53, 345 P.3d 619 (“In statutory cases far 

and wide, [the term ‘including’] is routinely construed as 

introducing a non-exclusive, exemplary list.”). 

¶41 But subsection 701(6)(a) does not bear such a reading. It 

says simply that: “A political subdivision or requester may appeal 

an appeals board decision . . . by filing a petition for judicial 

review with the district court.” UTAH CODE § 63G-2-701(6)(a)(ii). 

There is no textual suggestion that the terms “political 

subdivision” and “requester” are meant to be merely illustrative 

or otherwise non-exclusive. And as our discussion of this 

provision and the other relevant GRAMA appeals provisions 

makes clear, the legislature carefully chose which access decisions 

were subject to appeal and which persons could pursue those 

appeals. Accordingly, we reject Gibson’s assertion that the 

legislature’s specific identification of these two terms in 

subsection 701(6)(a) does not limit appellate standing accordingly. 

¶42 Gibson’s final argument is that the Ogden City Municipal 

Code grants him standing to petition for judicial review of the 

Review Board’s decision. However, the provision he cites does not 

grant broader standing than GRAMA subsection 701(6)(a). Rather, 

it explicitly affirms that appeal of a final decision of the Review 

Board “may be made to the district court, in accordance with 

[GRAMA] and the Utah rules of civil procedure.” OGDEN CITY,

UTAH, MUN. CODE § 4-5-25(H) (2018). And as we have explained, 

GRAMA permits only a political subdivision or the requester to 

appeal a decision of the Review Board. See UTAH CODE § 63G-2-

701(6)(a). 

¶43 Accordingly, we conclude that under the plain language 

of GRAMA, only a requester of a record—in this case, 

McKitrick—or a political subdivision—here, Ogden City—may 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

14 

petition for judicial review of a local appeals board decision in the 

district court. See id. Gibson, who is neither a requester nor a 

political subdivision, therefore lacks statutory standing in this 

case. 

II. TRADITIONAL STANDING 

¶44 We next turn to whether, despite lacking statutory 

standing, Gibson may nonetheless proceed as a statutory claimant 

because he has traditional standing. Neither party—nor the court 

below—contests that Gibson in fact possesses traditional standing. 

To establish traditional standing, “the petitioning party must 

allege that it has suffered or will suffer[ ] some distinct and 

palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the outcome of 

the legal dispute.” Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 

2006 UT 74, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 960 (alterations in original) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the subject of the 

records, Gibson clearly meets this test. 

¶45 But the parties disagree on whether the presence of 

traditional standing can cure Gibson’s lack of statutory standing 

in this case. McKitrick argues that individuals like Gibson, who 

assert “some interest in government records [but] are not within 

the terms of the statute,” have no right to seek judicial review of a 

local appeals board decision. Gibson argues that a plaintiff 

without statutory standing may in the alternative demonstrate 

that he meets the test for traditional or alternative standing12 and 

proceed on those grounds.13

__________________________________________________________ 

12 See supra ¶ 15 n.5, for why we need not address Gibson’s 

alternative standing claim. 

13 Gibson cites National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Board of 

State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993); Utah Chapter of the Sierra 

Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960; and Morra 

v. Grand County, 2010 UT 21, 230 P.3d 1022, for the proposition 

that “Utah case law shows a wide variety of circumstances under 

which traditional standing has been granted despite a statutory 

limitation.” But in National Parks and Sierra Club, we looked solely 

at whether petitioners had constitutional standing under the 

traditional or alternative tests. See Nat’l Parks, 869 P.2d at 913–14 

(applying the tests for and articulating the rationale behind the 

traditional and alternative standing doctrines); Sierra Club, 2006 

UT 74, ¶¶ 17–44 (same). And Morra, like Cedar Mountain, see infra 

(continued . . .) 
Cite as: 2021 UT 48 

Opinion of the Court 

15 

¶46 While we have never squarely held that a petitioner who 

lacks statutory standing for a statutory claim may nevertheless 

proceed on traditional or alternative standing grounds, our dicta 

in past cases may have contributed to confusion in this area. In 

Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc. v. Tooele County ex. rel. Tooele 

County Commission, 2009 UT 48, 214 P.3d 95, for example, we 

analyzed whether the petitioners met the test for alternative 

standing in spite of previously holding that they had adequately 

alleged statutory standing.14 But because the alternative standing 

analysis was unnecessary to our decision in that case, any 

language in Cedar Mountain “arguably suggest[ing] that a plaintiff 

could overcome a lack of statutory standing by satisfying the 

elements of ‘alternative’ constitutional standing,” Haik v. Jones, 

2018 UT 39, ¶ 41 n.11, 427 P.3d 1155 (citation omitted) (Lee, A.C.J., 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), was merely 

dicta, and we disavow it here. 

¶47 Gibson’s reliance on the language in Washington County 

Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125, is 

similarly misplaced. Gibson cites Washington County for the 

proposition that a “plaintiff who has not been granted standing to 

sue by statute must either show [traditional standing] or meet one 

of the two exceptions to standing recognized in cases involving 

‘important public issues.’” (Quoting id. ¶ 17.) But Washington 

County involved a statute that granted a right to judicial review 

that was “consistent with our traditional standing requirement,” 

blurring the distinction between the statutory and constitutional 

standing analysis. Id. ¶ 14. Moreover, this language—like that in 

 

¶ 46 n.14, addressed a statutory right of review that we found 

“equivalent in scope to our traditional judicial test for standing.” 

Morra, 2010 UT 21, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). We therefore did not 

grapple in any of these cases with the question presented here—

whether traditional standing may cure a lack of statutory standing 

where the petitioner seeks a statutory remedy. 

14 Because Cedar Mountain featured a statutory right of review 

that was coextensive with the traditional standing test, “we 

rel[ied] on traditional standing case law to interpret the statutory 

requirement.” See Cedar Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Tooele Cnty. ex rel. 

Tooele Cnty. Comm’n, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 9, 214 P.3d 95. 
MCKITRICK V. GIBSON

Opinion of the Court 

16 

Cedar Mountain—is dicta, because we found all three types of 

standing lacking. See id. ¶¶ 5–28. 

¶48 The facts in In re Questar Gas Co.—in which we implicitly 

recognized the principle that statutory standing is mandatory for 

statutory claims—are more apposite to the facts here. 2007 UT 79, 

175 P.3d 545. In In re Questar, we dismissed a petition for judicial 

review of an agency decision for lack of statutory standing even 

though the dismissed petitioners would have satisfied the test for 

traditional standing. Id. ¶ 57 (“[A]lthough [petitioners] are 

‘aggrieved’ by the increase to their gas bill resulting from the 

[agency’s] decision, they lack appellate standing because they . . . 

do not fall within the classes of persons to whom standing is 

granted [under the statute].”). And we now make explicit what In 

re Questar Gas made implicit: traditional or alternative standing 

cannot excuse a lack of statutory standing where the petitioner is 

a statutory claimant. In other words, 

If a plaintiff is asserting a statutory claim[,] the 

constitutional standing question arises if and only if 

the plaintiff has statutory standing. If the plaintiff is 

not within the class of parties that the legislature has 

authorized to file suit, it does not matter whether 

that plaintiff could identify some sort of “distinct 

and palpable injury” or a basis for “public interest” 

standing. 

Haik, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 41 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment). 

¶49 Accordingly, because GRAMA does not grant standing to 

Gibson, he cannot proceed under that statute. 

CONCLUSION 

¶50 We hold that a statutory claimant may not overcome a 

lack of statutory standing by satisfying the elements of some other 

doctrine of standing. Here, Gibson lacks standing under GRAMA 

to seek judicial review of the Review Board’s decision to disclose 

Ogden City’s records to McKitrick. And because he lacks standing 

under the plain language of the statute under which he is a 

claimant, Gibson may not proceed on traditional or alternative 

standing grounds. We therefore reverse the order of the district 

court denying McKitrick’s motion to dismiss and remand for the 

dismissal of Gibson’s petition.