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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Jared M.,

Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 19-0764 (Monongalia County 19-C-30)

Molly A., 

Respondent Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Jared M., by counsel Martin F. Mazezka, appeals the August 1, 2019, order of 

the Circuit Court of Monongalia County that affirmed two orders from the Family Court of 

Monongalia County.1 The family court’s January 16, 2019, order denied petitioner-father’s motion 

to modify his and Molly A.’s, respondent-mother’s, parenting plan. The family court’s February 

8, 2019, order awarded respondent attorney’s fees. Respondent, by counsel Alyson A. Dotson and 

Michelle L. Bechtel, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed a reply. 

This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” provision of Rule 21(d) of the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure; thus, a memorandum decision is appropriate. As more fully explained below, 

the Court is of the opinion that, in the order on appeal, the circuit court failed to set forth findings 

of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. We, therefore, 

reverse the circuit court’s August 1, 2019, order and remand the case to the circuit court with 

instructions to draft a new order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient for 

meaningful appellate review. 

The parties, who were never married, have one child together, a daughter, who was born 

in February of 2012. In September of 2013, the child was diagnosed with craniopharyngioma, a 

large benign tumor of the brain, and obstructive hydrocephalus. Thereafter, the tumor and the 

child’s pituitary gland were removed. As a result, her growth, thyroid function, fluid retention, 

adrenal response, and metabolism are compromised. The surgery also affected her hypothalamus; 

therefore, she cannot regulate her temperature, and her thirst and hunger response may be affected. 

She also has diabetes insipidus. Finally, she is unable to produce cortisol, which helps maintain 

1 Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1983); State v. 

Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990).

FILED

December 7, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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blood pressure. Due to these conditions, the child must take numerous medications throughout the 

day to maintain her health.

In December of 2013, the parties separated. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition in the 

Family Court of Monongalia County to establish custody and a parenting plan. 

In August of 2014, doctors determined that the child’s tumor had returned. Thereafter, the 

child received treatment that eventually eradicated the tumor. Since that time, the tumor has not 

recurred. 

In September of 2014, the parties agreed to a parenting plan wherein respondent was 

allocated approximately 70% (ten out of fourteen days) of the parenting time and petitioner was 

allocated approximately 30% (four out of fourteen days) of parenting time. The child was then 

two-and-a-half years old. The family court adopted the “Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan” by 

order entered November 13, 2014. At the time, the parties lived in Morgantown, as they do to this 

day. However, in 2014, petitioner was commuting three to four days a week to and from Bridgeport 

(forty-five minutes each way), and he often worked more than forty hours per week. Respondent

stayed home and cared for the child full-time and took the child to her many doctor appointments. 

Petitioner avers that he sacrificed parenting time with the child in 2014 so he could provide for her 

financially and so she could have consistent, full-time care from respondent. Petitioner claims that 

when the parties filed their parenting plan, they could not know how or if their daughter would 

recover given the state of her health at the time. 

More than three years later, on December 13, 2017, petitioner filed a motion to modify the 

parties’ 2014 parenting plan to a 50/50 division of parenting time due to his claim of a substantial 

change of circumstance, i.e., the significant improvement in the daughter’s health. In that motion, 

petitioner claimed that the child (1) is now essentially normal due to her therapy and many 

medications; (2) is in second grade, can communicate when she is feeling unwell, and is able to 

regulate her health with adult supervision; and (3) participates in many activities including 

attending sporting events, going to the beach, and playing at a trampoline park. Petitioner also 

claims that respondent (1) has worked at least full-time since February of 2017: (2) has a fortyfive minute commute to and from work; (3) stopped working full-time for a period of time after 

he filed his petition for modification of parenting time but has now returned to full-time

employment; (4) recently traveled out of the country for work; (5) often leaves the child in the care 

of other adults, such as those at after-school care, whom he claims do not have the expertise to 

deal with the child’s medical issues; and (6) leaves the child with her own mother during 

respondent’s annual, week-long vacations outside the United States. Petitioner further claims he is 

now an independent contractor, which gives him flexibility in his work schedule. Finally, 

petitioner avers that he has a very warm relationship with the child, he is attentive to her needs, 

and he always makes the child his first priority.

Respondent claims that petitioner, in his December 13, 2017, petition, sought not only to 

increase his parenting time but to reduce his child support obligation, modify the medical decisionmaking provision, and modify the “babysitter rule.” Respondent answered petitioner’s petition 

claiming that petitioner would not be able to prove a substantial change of circumstances since the 
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entry of the November 13, 2014, order affirming the parties’ parenting plan. Respondent also filed 

a “Motion to Dismiss and for Attorney Fees.” 

On October 26, 2018, the family court held a day-long hearing on the petitioner’s motion 

to modify the parenting plan. Eleven witnesses were called, and thirty-two exhibits were entered 

into evidence. 

By order entered on January 16, 2019, the family court denied petitioner’s motion to 

modify the parties’ “Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan.” The family court found that (1) the child’s 

three-year age difference (from the 2014 order to petitioner’s filing in 2017) was not a significant 

change in circumstance; (2) in 2014, it was anticipated that respondent would begin to work outside 

the home so she could support herself and the child, as petitioner could not be expected to support 

respondent indefinitely; (3) it was not a significant change of circumstance that respondent started 

working full-time when the child started school; and (4) petitioner’s job change was not a 

significant change of circumstance given that he had been a full-time employee since the case 

began. 

On February 8, 2019, the family court heard testimony on respondent’s motion regarding 

child support and attorney’s fees. Prior to that hearing, respondent filed a “Renewed Motion for 

Attorney’s Fees” in which she alleged that (1) she had spent more than $30,000 in attorney’s fees 

for discovery and to prepare for the hearings on petitioner’s motion to modify the parenting plan; 

(2) petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving a substantial change of circumstances; and (3) 

petitioner had acted in bad faith, wantonly, and for oppressive purposes. Petitioner responded with 

a motion to dismiss and a response to respondent’s renewed motion for attorney’s fees. Following 

the second hearing, the family court entered its “Final Modification Order” on February 8, 2019, 

which addressed medical insurance for the child, the division of payment for the child’s medical 

expenses that are not covered by medical insurance, attorney’s fees, and child support. The family 

court found that respondent had incurred $32,819 in attorney’s fees and costs and that petitioner

had incurred $32,822 in attorney’s fees and costs. The family court further found that petitioner

should have known there was no substantial change in circumstance to warrant a modification of 

the parties’ parenting plan and awarded respondent $5,000 in attorney’s fees.

Petitioner separately appealed both the January 16, 2019, order and the February 8, 2019, 

order to the circuit court, which consolidated the appeals and heard argument. Thereafter, the 

circuit court, on August 1, 2019, issued a scant ten-paragraph order addressing both orders. In that

order, which is the order on appeal, the circuit court provided a very brief recitation of the “Facts 

and Procedural History,” followed by some relevant law. The court’s findings and conclusions

regarding both family court orders, is five sentences long, and provides only the following: 

[Petitioner] argues that four substantial changes of circumstances have 

occurred since the November 2014 parenting plan was entered. These are (1) the 

child’s improved medical condition[;] (2) [respondent] starting to work full-time in 

February 2017; (3) [petitioner’s] changed employment in January 2017; and (4) the 

child’s advancement in age and maturity. After listening to the testimony of eleven 

(11) witnesses and reviewing 32 exhibits, the Family Court found that [petitioner] 

failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances has occurred. 
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The [c]ourt finds that the Family Court’s decision denying [petitioner’s] 

request to modify the parenting plan is not clearly wrong. Additionally, this [c]ourt 

cannot discern an abuse of discretion in the Family Court Judge’s ruling. Therefore, 

this court is of the opinion that the Family Court’s Order[s] of January 16, 2019, 

and February 8, 2019, should be AFFIRMED.

We have previously remanded such wholly insufficient orders to the circuit court finding 

that 

to properly review an order of a family court, “[t]he order must be sufficient to 

indicate the factual and legal basis for the [family court]’s ultimate conclusion so 

as to facilitate a meaningful review of the issues presented.” Province v. Province, 

196 W.Va. 473, 483, 473 S.E.2d 894, 904 (1996); see also Nestor v. Bruce 

Hardwood Flooring, L.P., 206 W.Va. 453, 456, 525 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1999) (“[O]ur 

task as an appellate court is to determine whether the circuit court’s reasons for its 

order are supported by the record.”). “Where the lower tribunals fail to meet this 

standard—i.e. making only general, conclusory or inexact findings—we must 

vacate the judgment and remand the case for further findings and development.” 

Province, 196 W.Va. at 483, 473 S.E.2d at 904.

Collisi v. Collisi, 231 W. Va. 359, 363–64, 745 S.E.2d 250, 254-55 (2013).

Here, the circuit court clearly neglected to provide sufficient findings and conclusions in 

support of its ultimate decision. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order is insufficient as a matter of 

law and cannot be upheld. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand the case to the circuit 

court for the entry of an order containing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to support 

its ruling. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order on appeal and remand this case to the circuit 

court with instructions to enter a new order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law

sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review.

Reversed and remanded.

ISSUED: December 7, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison

DISSENTING: 

Justice Margaret L. Workman