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Filed 3/4/15 Mardikian v. Wawanesa General Ins. CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

LILLIAN MARDIKIAN, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

WAWANESA GENERAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

 Defendant and Respondent. 

 A144039 

 (San Mateo County 

 Super. Ct. No. CIV526757) 

I. 

INTRODUCTION 

 In this insurance coverage dispute, the trial court entered judgment against Lillian 

Mardikian (plaintiff) after granting a summary judgment motion by Wawanesa General 

Insurance Company (defendant). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal more than 60 days 

after defendant served her with notice of entry of the judgment. Accordingly, we grant 

defendant’s motion to dismiss this appeal. 

II. 

PROCEDURAL FACTS 

 On September 17, 2014, the trial court granted a defense motion for summary 

judgment as to plaintiff’s complaint for breach of contract and breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of the denial of an automobile 

insurance claim. The trial court found that there was no triable issue of material fact 

because undisputed evidence established that plaintiff was not a named insured or 
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otherwise entitled to insurance coverage under the subject policy. In reaching this 

conclusion, the court expressly found that plaintiff’s “self-serving” declarations 

attempting to create a triable issue of fact directly contradicted earlier sworn statements 

made by her son who was the named insured under the policy. 

 The resulting judgment was signed by the court on October 31, 2014, and filed on 

November 6, 2014. Defendant served notice of entry of judgment by mailing a copy of 

the notice to plaintiff’s counsel on November 7, 2014. Defense counsel also emailed a 

courtesy copy of the notice to plaintiff’s counsel. On November 13, 2014, defendant 

filed a copy of the notice of entry of judgment with an attached proof of service that was 

completed on November 7, 2014. 

 On January 12, 2015, plaintiff filed an in pro. per. notice of appeal which 

erroneously stated that the judgment in this case was entered on November 13, 2014. In 

her “Civil Case Information Sheet,” plaintiff correctly stated that judgment was entered 

on November 6, but erroneously stated that notice of entry of judgment was served on her 

on November 13, 2014. 

III. 

DISCUSSION

 Rule 8.104 of the California Rules of Court (rule 8.104) provides that, absent 

circumstances not present here, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest 

of three dates: “(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the 

notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy 

of the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing 

the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of 

Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of 

service; or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” (Rule 8.104(a)(1).)1

 “. . . If a 

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 The time period is not extended by Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 

because subdivision (a) of that statute explicitly states that the five-day extension “ ‘shall 

not apply to extend the time for filing . . . notice of appeal.’ ” (Casado v. Sedgwick, 

Detert, Moran & Arnold (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1286.) 
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notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss the appeal.” (Rule 

8.104(b).) 

 In this case, defendant served plaintiff with a document entitled notice of entry of 

judgment on November 7, 2014. Therefore, plaintiff was required to file her notice of 

appeal within 60 days after that date, on or before January 6, 2015. (Rule 

8.104(a)(1)(B).) However, plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal until January 12, 

2015. Since the notice of appeal was filed late, this appeal must be dismissed. (Rule 

8.104(b).) 

 Pointing out that the copy of the notice of entry of judgment submitted in support 

of defendant’s motion to dismiss this appeal contains a court-stamped date of 

November 13, 2014, plaintiff argues that “[i]t is impossible for this ‘complete document’ 

to have been served on any date prior to November 13, 2014.” However, the courtstamped date that plaintiff references is the date that defendant filed a copy of its notice 

of entry of judgment with the proof of service attached. The date defendant filed that 

document in the superior court is irrelevant to our inquiry; it does not alter the fact that 

the notice itself was served on plaintiff on November 7, 2014. 

 Alternatively, plaintiff contends that defendant’s service of the notice must be 

“presumed invalid.” To support this claim, plaintiff relies on the following standard 

language that appears on the printed proof of service form that defendant used in this 

case: “I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if 

postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit 

for mailing an affidavit.” Plaintiff mistakenly invokes this proof of service language 

because she is the “party served,” and she did not file a motion challenging the affidavit 

of service. Plaintiff insists that defendant cannot verify the date of service because it 

allegedly used “ ‘stamps.com’ instead of traditional US [sic] postage” to mail the notice 

to plaintiff. First, contrary to plaintiff’s premise, the defendant did verify service by 

completing and filing a proof of service. Second, even if plaintiff could verify her 

contention that the defendant used “stamps.com,” she fails to explain how this 
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circumstance would show that the postal cancellation date or postage meter date was 

more than one day after date of deposit. 

 Citing Glasser v. Glasser (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1004 (Glasser), plaintiff 

contends that an evidentiary hearing must be held before the motion to dismiss may be 

granted. The Glasser plaintiff opposed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the 

defendant’s notice of entry of judgment was not mailed. His opposition was supported 

by a declaration from plaintiff’s counsel who “aver[red] that he never received the 

judgment, proposed judgment, or a notice of entry of judgment,” and that on prior 

occasions during the litigation he did not receive other documents that had purportedly 

been served on him by the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1008-1009.) In its summary of the 

factual and procedural background of the case, the Glasser court noted that the issue of 

whether notice had been served was submitted for an evidentiary hearing which resulted 

in a finding that notice of entry of judgment had been mail-served by the defendant. (Id. 

at p. 1009.) 

 Nothing in Glasser supports plaintiff’s demand for an evidentiary hearing under 

the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff does not actually dispute that notice of entry of 

judgment was mailed or that she received that notice. Further, there is no conflict in the 

evidence which establishes that plaintiff was mail-served with notice of entry of 

judgment on November 7, 2014, and that her untimely notice of appeal was filed more 

than 60 days later on January 12, 2015. 

 “Under California law, if an appeal is untimely, the appellate court has no 

jurisdiction to consider its merits and the appeal must be dismissed. [Citations.]” 

(Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758, 762; see also Van Beurden Ins. 

Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 

56 [“The time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional; once the deadline expires, the 

appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal. [Citation.]”].) 

IV. 

DISPOSITION 

 The appeal is dismissed. 
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 _________________________ 

 RUVOLO, P. J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

REARDON, J. 

_________________________ 

RIVERA, J.