alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

**Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section****1350,as Adopted Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of HCC Industries Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ending September 28, 2002 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Richard Ferraid, as ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, and Christopher H. Bateman, as ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to thebest of his knowledge, that:

 

(1)           The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresult of operations of the Company.

 

 

 
|    /s/  Richard Ferraid              |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Richard  Ferraid                                    |
| Chief  Executive Officer                            |
| November 11,  2002                                  |
|                                                |
|                                                |
|                                                |
|                                                |
|     /s/  Christopher H. Bateman |   |
| Christopher  H. Bateman                             |
| Chief  Financial Officer                            |
| November 11,  2002                                  |

 

 

This certification accompaniesthis Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not,except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemedfiled by the Company for purposes of § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, as amended.

 

----
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1873 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for House of 

Representatives, Office of the Minority Whip for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for House 

of Representatives, Office of the Minority Whip for fiscal 

year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

4 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICE OF 

5 THE MINORITY WHIP FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise availVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:53 Apr 13, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1873.IH H1873

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HR 1873 IH

1 able for House of Representatives, Office of the Minority 

2 Whip for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed $1,700,079. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with $$_JOB
Exhibit 32.2

BULOVA TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC. AND CONSOLIDATED AFFILIATES

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Bulova Technologies Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John D. Stanton, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ John D. StantonJohn D. StantonPrincipal Financial Officer
May 27, 2010
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of FieldPoint Petroleum Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ray Reaves, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  ___/s/ Ray Reaves________ Ray Reaves Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer August  12, 2010
**Exhibit 10.76**

 

 

**2006 EXECUTIVE OFFICER BONUS PLAN**

 

The proposed bonus plan covers executiveofficers.

 

The basis for the bonus plan is the XXXXXXXper the plan presented to the Board of Directors on Nov. 10, 2005 (the 2006Plan).  The payout will be linear up toXXX% of the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX in the 2006 Plan, so XXX% of the bonus plan will bepaid at XXX% of the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX in the 2006 plan.  From XXX% of the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX in the 2006Plan up to XXX% of the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX in the plan, the payout will increaselinearly from 100% of the bonus plan to 200% of the bonus plan.  The plan is capped at 200%. The actual bonuspayments under such awards may, at the discretion of the CompensationCommittee, be less than or greater than the target amounts, depending on theCorporation’s business performance, and performance of individuals, regardlessof whether the goals upon which such bonuses are based are achieved.

 

The distribution for the proposed bonus planis contained in the Table below.

 
| **Title  Executive Officers** | ** ** | **Name**          | ** ** | **2006 Base** | ** ** | **2006 Bonus** | ** ** |
|-------------------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|---------------|------------|----------------|------------|
| Pres. & CEO               |       | Ofer Gneezy       |       | 208,000       |       | 400,000        |       |
| Exec. Vice President          |       | Gordon VanderBrug |       | 187,000       |       | 360,000        |       |
| SVP Finance & CFO         |       | Richard Tennant   |       | 185,000       |       | 200,000        |       |
| SVP Engr. & Operations    |       | Paul Floyd        |       | 185,000       |       | 200,000        |       |
| SVP, Retail                   |       | Tim Enright       |       | 180,000       |       | 90,000         |       |
| SVP, Worldwide Sales          |       | Dan Powdermaker   |       | 154,500       |       | 81,000         |       |

 

 

These bonuses will be accrued XXXXX.  It will be paid at the end of the year.  The 2006 Plan includes the accrual for theproposed bonuses.

 

As with the entire employee population, asmall Corporation match for the 401K plan is proposed.  The proposal is for 2% match.

 

 

 

 

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-7739

ERIC C. MCCARTER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of 

Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:16-cv-00022-JAG-DJN)

Submitted: February 23, 2017 Decided: February 28, 2017

Before SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric C. McCarter, Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen Beatty Martin, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE 

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Eric C. McCarter seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) 

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

McCarter has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny McCarter’s motion for a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
3

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0861. ARTHUR STARLING v. THE STATE.

Arthur Starling was convicted of murder and other crimes. He later filed a

motion to vacate a void sentence, which the trial court denied. Starling now appeals

to this Court. Under our Constitution, however, the Supreme Court has appellate

jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be

imposed.” See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (8). Because a penalty

of death can be imposed for the crime of murder, jurisdiction is proper in the Supreme

Court. See OCGA § 17-10-30 (b); Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 572 (722 SE2d 765)

(2012) (Hunstein, J., concurring); see also State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524 (322 SE2d

711) (1984) (directing this Court to transfer “all cases in which either a sentence of

death or of life imprisonment has been imposed upon conviction of murder”).

Accordingly, Starling’s appeal is hereby TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court for

disposition.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

January 09, 2017

01/09/2017
#### Daniel MICHAELESCO, Ortansa Michaelesco, Appellants, v. Molly T. WHITON, Appellee.

No. 09-3294-bk.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Sept. 22, 2010.

Daniel and Ortansa Michaelesco, Fair-field, CT, pro se.

Molly T. Whiton, Hartford, CT, for Ap-pellee.

PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, ROBERT D. SACK, and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

*633
      *SUMMARY ORDER*

Appellants Daniel and Ortansa Michae-lesco, *pro se,*appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing, *sua sponte,*their appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court for failure to comply with Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8006 and 8009. Although the Michaelescos do not assert that they satisfied the procedural requirements of those rules, they contend on appeal that their non-compliance did not warrant dismissal in light of their excusable neglect. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s determination that a party failed to establish excusable neglect. *See In re Lynch,*430 F.3d 600, 603 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). Our review of the record indicates that the district court afforded the Michaelescos more than six months to comply with Rules 8006 and 8009 before *sua sponte*ordering them to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed; that before dismissing their appeal, the district court granted the Mi-chaelescos’ request for an extension to file the necessary documents, which they nonetheless failed to do; and that the Mi-chaelescos never presented any explanation for their inability to comply with these rules. Based on these considerations, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing their appeal. We have considered all of the Michaeles-cos’ arguments and find them to be without merit; accordingly, there is no basis upon which to vacate the district court’s judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Composite Technology Corporation (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2009, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Domonic J. Carney, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
            The Report fully complies with
      the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of 1934; and


(2)
            The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and result of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Domonic J. CarneyDomonic
      J. CarneyChief
      Financial Officer
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-1459-13

DAMIAN RICARDO FLORES, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 20

years in prison. On appeal, he argued, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient

to support the $905 in court costs assessed against him in the judgment. The Court of

Appeals agreed, relying on its opinion in Johnson v. State, 389 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App. –
FLORES - 2

Houston [14 Dist.] 2012). Flores v. State, No. 14-12-00623-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS

th

12248 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 Dist.] October 1, 2013).

th

The State has filed a petition for discretionary review of this decision. We recently

handed down our opinion in Johnson v. State, No. PD-0193-13, 2014 Tex. Crim. App.

LEXIS 240 (Tex. Crim. App. February 26, 2014), in which we set forth a roadmap for

resolving questionsregarding court costs. See also Cardenas v. State, No. PD-0733-13, 2014

Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 236 (Tex. Crim. App. February 26, 2014).

The Court of Appeals in the instant case did not have the benefit of our opinion in Johnson. 

Accordingly, we grant the State’s petition for discretionary review, vacate the judgment of the Court

of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals in light of our opinion in Johnson. We also

this day refuse Appellant’s petition for discretionary review in this case. No motion for rehearing

will be entertained.

Delivered: April 16, 2014

Publish
#### Ana Maria LANZA, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-73371.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 11, 2006.

Filed Sept. 29, 2006.

Daniel M. Kowalski, Esq., Austin, TX, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, WWS-District Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service Office of the District Counsel, Seattle, WA, Genevieve Holm, Esq., Anthony W. Norwood, Esq., DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Offiee of Immigration Lit., Daniel Jerome Davis, Esq., DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, KLEINFELD and BEA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Ana Maria Lanza petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order that upheld the decision of the immigration judge that Lanza’s asylum application was both untimely and without merit. This BIA order was entered after our previous remand in the case to clarify whether the BIA’s affirmance of the Immigration Judge was on timeliness grounds, and hence unreviewable or on the merits, and hence, reviewable to a degree. *See Lanza v. Ashcroft,*389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir.2004).

The BIA has now responded that it relied on both grounds. Lanza petitions for our review of the denial insofar as the denial relied on the merits. Because the BIA decision rested as well on an independent, and non-reviewable, discretionary de*715termination of untimeliness, we must deny relief. This court stated as much in our first *Lanza*decision. *See id.*at 929.

The petition for review is DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Joo Tae Kim, Appellant, v 158 Plaza Corp. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[826 NYS2d 654]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), dated January 6, 2006, as denied his motion, in effect, for leave to enforce a default judgment entered in his favor and against the defendants 158 Plaza Corp., Sun Hee Kim, and Jing Wook Kim in the principal sum of $750,000, on condition that, inter alia, these defendants serve an answer on or before January 20, 2006 and pay him $500 to reimburse him for his costs.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

By order dated September 8, 2005 the Supreme Court granted the respondents’ motion to vacate an order and a judgment entered against them upon their default in appearing or answering the complaint on the condition that they serve their answer upon the plaintiff on or before September 23, 2005. When the respondents failed to serve an answer on or before September 23, 2005 the plaintiff moved, in effect, for leave to enforce the default judgment. The respondents, in opposition, claimed they never received the order dated September 8, 2005. The Supreme Court denied the motion on condition that, inter alia, the respondents serve an answer on or before January 20, 2006 and pay the plaintiff $500 to reimburse him for his costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the respondents’ excuse for failure to comply with the order dated September 8, 2005 was reasonable *(see*CPLR 2005). Furthermore, as noted in the order dated September 8, 2005, the respondents sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a meritorious defense to the ac*543tion *(see Couluris v Harbor Boat Realty, Inc.,*31 AD3d 686 [2006]). Accordingly, given the public policy in favor of determining controversies on their merits, the lack of wilfulness on the part of the defendants, and the lack of prejudice to the plaintiff *(see Scarlett v McCarthy, 2*AD3d 623 [2003]; *Eastern Resource Serv. v Mountbatten Sur. Co.,*289 AD2d 283, 284 [2001]) the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion. Florio, J.E, Ritter, Goldstein and Covello, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Clifford Graham, Appellant.

[967 NYS2d 864]

Motion for writ of error coram nobis denied. Present — Centra, J.P., Fahey, Carni and Whalen, JJ.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1979 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Health 

and Human Services, National Institutes of Health National Intitute 

of Neurological Disorders and Stroke for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health National Intitute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1979 IH

1 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

2 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV3 ICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH NA4 TIONAL INTITUTE OF NEUROLOGICAL DIS5 ORDERS AND STROKE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail8 able for Department of Health and Human Services, Na9 tional Institutes of Health National Institute of Neuro10 logical Disorders and Stroke for fiscal year 2024 may not 

11 exceed $2,216,913,000. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2

BULOVA TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Bulova Technologies Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John D. Stanton, Principal Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ John D. StantonJohn D. StantonPrincipal Financial Officer
February 22, 2011