United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-1285 

BLANCA LIDIA MARTÍNEZ-PÉREZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

Before 

Thompson, Selya, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Carlos E. Estrada, Ashley M. Edens and Estrada Law Office, on 

brief for petitioner. 

Michael C. Heyse, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil 

Division, and May Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, on brief for 

respondent. 

July 24, 2018 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Blanca Lidia 

Martínez-Pérez (Martínez-Pérez) seeks judicial review of a 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the 

denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 

Martínez-Pérez argues that the BIA erred by affirming the 

Immigration Judge's (IJ) conclusion that she did not qualify for 

asylum, withholding of removal, or any other basis for relief based 

on her mistreatment in Honduras because of her Afro-Honduran race 

and physical disability caused by polio, and furthermore that the 

IJ violated her due process rights. Before looking at the 

challenges Martínez-Pérez has raised here, we will run through the 

circumstances of Martínez-Pérez's journey to the United States, 

her life in Honduras and the circumstances that led her to come to 

the United States, and the prior proceedings that brought her 

before this court.1

A. BACKGROUND 

1. Facts and Circumstances 

Martínez-Pérez was born in 1976 in Honduras. By the age 

of one she was diagnosed with polio, after which her mother gave 

Martínez-Pérez to her uncle, who in turn left her at an orphanage 

 1 These facts are drawn from the administrative record, 

including Martínez-Pérez's hearing testimony, which the IJ found 

credible. 
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in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras. Because of her childhood 

polio, Martínez-Pérez walks with a limp. She was harassed by staff 

and other children in the orphanage throughout her entire 

childhood, and was sometimes called names relating to her 

disability. She dropped out of school after the sixth grade. 

Martínez-Pérez ultimately left the orphanage at age 

eighteen and moved to a town called Sambo Creek, about six hours 

north of Tegucigalpa. Tegucigalpa and Sambo Creek are the only 

two places Martínez-Pérez lived in Honduras. As an adult, 

Martínez-Pérez continued to experience general mistreatment based 

on her disability and race. She recalled being verbally harassed 

by strangers on the street. She also had difficulty finding a 

job, and supported herself by working as a babysitter for a friend. 

After three incidents in 2014 in which she heard someone threaten 

her life, had a bottle thrown at her, and survived a home invasion, 

all of which we'll get to later, Martínez-Pérez decided to leave 

Honduras and travel to the United States. 

Martínez-Pérez entered the United States on foot, having 

broken her foot in transit, near Brownsville, Texas, on or about 

June 7, 2014. While in custody, she received medical attention 

for her foot and an asylum officer conducted a credible fear 

interview with her for her asylum claim, finding that there was a 

significant possibility that she could prevail on an asylum claim 

at a full hearing. She remained in custody and was transferred to 
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Louisiana, where she was served with a notice to appear on July 

23, 2014, which began the removal proceedings against her. She 

was then released on bond in August 2014. Between 2014 and 2016, 

when Martínez-Pérez ultimately was able to secure counsel and have 

a hearing on her application for asylum, the case was continued 

multiple times and ultimately venue was transferred from Louisiana 

to Boston.2 

2. The IJ Hearing 

At her asylum hearing before the IJ, Martínez-Pérez's 

claims for (i) asylum, (ii) withholding of removal, and (iii) 

withholding of removal under the CAT were principally supported by 

her testimony about three experiences of harassment or threat of 

assault that she argued were past persecution, and thus also 

supported her well-founded fear of future persecution if she 

returned to Honduras.3 First, Martínez-Pérez described an incident 

in February 2014 when a stranger broke into her room at night. 

The intruder tried to attack her but ran away when she screamed. 

 2 Not at issue in this appeal, counsel for Martínez-Pérez 

before the BIA represented that there were several continuances 

"due to the Immigration Judge's scheduling issues," before 

ultimately venue was transferred from New Orleans to Boston on 

April 22, 2015. 

3 Martínez-Pérez also submitted several "country condition" 

documents as exhibits at her asylum hearing that described disabled 

people and people of Afro-Honduran descent as subject to 

discrimination, especially in employment, housing, and public 

services access, as well as the overall poor state of healthcare 

access and quality in Honduras.
- 5 - 

She believes the intruder targeted her and wanted to sexually 

assault her because of her disability. The intruder never spoke 

to her. Because she was afraid that the intruder would come back, 

or hurt her when released from custody, she did not file a 

complaint with the police. 

The last two incidents relate to a single person, a man 

named Charlie who harassed her on multiple occasions in Sambo 

Creek. She encountered Charlie once a month over the course of a 

year. For the most part, Charlie made offensive comments about 

Martínez-Pérez's limp. But one time, Charlie escalated by 

threatening to throw her off a bridge, but said he wouldn't because 

she was carrying her friend's baby. Another time in April 2014, 

he physically threatened her, throwing a bottle at her that hit 

her feet and calling her "renca," which means "gimp." MartínezPérez described this as the reason she left Honduras, leaving for 

the United States a few weeks later. 

At the end of the hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision 

denying Martínez-Pérez's asylum claim. Despite finding her 

testimony "credible" and "truthful," and her case "extremely 

sympathetic," the IJ found that Martínez-Pérez had failed to carry 

her burden in proving either past persecution or a well-founded 

fear of future persecution. In particular, the IJ found that the 

three more serious instances of threats and physical danger 

Martínez-Pérez testified about did not rise to the level of past 
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persecution. As for well-founded fear of future persecution, 

though the IJ found her credible, and thus credited her subjective 

fear in returning to Honduras, the IJ found that the threats she 

faced were from a single person, and therefore did not "present a 

likelihood of persecution if she returned." Under the same 

reasoning, the IJ rejected her claims for withholding of removal 

and protection under the CAT. 

3. Appeal to BIA 

Martínez-Pérez then appealed to the BIA, which affirmed 

the IJ's decision to deny her claims for asylum and withholding of 

removal. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the evidence MartínezPérez presented was not serious enough to "rise[] to the level of 

past persecution." For the same reason, the BIA also agreed with 

the IJ's conclusion that the mistreatment and harassment she faced 

did not rise to the level of a well-founded fear of future 

persecution.4 Because she could not satisfy this lesser asylum 

burden, the BIA agreed that it necessarily followed that she had 

not satisfied the higher burden for withholding of removal. 

This petition for judicial review ensued. Jurisdiction 

of this court is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 

 4 Neither the IJ nor the BIA reached other elements of past 

or future persecution in denying her claims. 
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B. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Martínez-Pérez makes three arguments. First, 

she contends that the IJ and BIA erred by failing to find that she 

had suffered past persecution, thus entitling her to a rebuttable 

presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). Second, Martínez-Pérez argues that the IJ 

and BIA erred in denying her claim for humanitarian asylum based 

on the same body of evidence she says should have sustained her 

past persecution claim. Third, she argues that the IJ failed to 

consider all the evidence at her hearing and applied inapposite 

case law in her decision, thus violating Martínez-Pérez's due 

process rights. We discuss each one in turn. 

1. Standard of Review 

When the BIA "adopts portions of the IJ's findings while 

adding its own gloss," as it did here, "we review both the IJ's 

and the BIA's decisions as a unit." Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 

F.3d 238, 242 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Renaut v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 2015)). We 

review the findings of fact supporting the BIA's denial of an 

asylum application for substantial evidence, meaning we accept the 

findings "as long as they are supported by reasonable, substantial 

and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." Singh 

v. Holder, 750 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). We will reject the BIA's findings 
- 8 - 

only when the record compels a contrary outcome. Carvalho-Frois 

v. Holder, 667 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir. 2012); Lopez Perez v. Holder, 

587 F.3d 456, 460 (1st Cir. 2009). 

2. Asylum 

To qualify for asylum, an applicant must "'demonstrate 

a well-founded fear of persecution on one of five protected 

grounds' -- race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 

membership in a particular social group." Paiz-Morales, 795 F.3d 

at 243 (quoting Singh, 750 F.3d at 86). To show that the 

circumstances the applicant endured constitute persecution for 

purposes of asylum relief, she must show "a certain level of 

serious harm (whether past or anticipated), a sufficient nexus 

between that harm and government action or inaction, and a causal 

connection to one of the statutorily protected grounds." CarvalhoFrois, 667 F.3d at 72 (citation omitted). 

If the applicant establishes past persecution, there is 

"a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future 

persecution." Id. (citation omitted). Without past persecution, 

the applicant can still show a well-founded fear of future 

persecution by showing that "she genuinely fears future 

persecution and that her fears are objectively reasonable." Id. 

(citation omitted). But in either case, "[a]n inability to 

establish any one of the three elements of persecution will result 
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in a denial of [the] asylum application." Id. at 73 (citation 

omitted). 

In this case, Martínez-Pérez argues that the BIA erred 

in affirming the IJ's conclusion that she had not demonstrated 

either past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. 

The BIA and IJ rejected Martínez-Pérez's past and future 

persecution arguments because the harassment she endured in 

Honduras did not rise to the level of persecution. While we too 

find petitioner's plight extremely sympathetic, we must 

nevertheless agree with the BIA's and IJ's assessments. 

a. Past Persecution

An applicant for asylum "'bears a heavy burden,' and 

faces a 'daunting task' in establishing subjection to past 

persecution." Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alibeaj v. Gonzales, 

469 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 2006)). To show past persecution, 

"the discriminatory experiences must have reached a fairly high 

threshold of seriousness, as well as [occurred with] some 

regularity and frequency." Alibeaj, 469 F.3d at 191. Thus, the 

severity and frequency of the harassment identified by the 

applicant are intertwined factors that bear on "the nature and 

extent of an applicant's injuries . . . ." Vasili, 732 F.3d at 

89. In other words, "persecution requires 'more than mere 

discomfiture, unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment' and 
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'implies some connection to government action or inaction.'" Id. 

at 90 (quoting López-Castro v. Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 

2009)). We see more than substantial evidence for the BIA and 

IJ's conclusions that the incidents Martínez-Pérez identified were 

not serious harm rising to the level of past persecution. 

The three incidents Martínez-Pérez pointed to as 

evidence of past persecution--the single death threat and bottlethrow from Charlie, and the home invasion by an unknown 

assailant--while undoubtedly scary, do not compel us to find they 

were serious enough to constitute persecution.5 We have upheld 

BIA decisions concluding that even more frequent and more serious 

experiences than the ones endured here were insufficient to show 

 5 While Martínez-Pérez also argues that the BIA and IJ erred 

by failing to explicitly consider the country-conditions evidence 

she submitted, we need not consider that evidence in the mix of 

Martínez-Pérez's persecution argument for three reasons. First, 

Martínez-Pérez develops no specific arguments about what alleged 

persecution these country conditions would support, or why, and 

instead cites generally to the entire seventy-four pages of 

country-condition evidence. Without more, such an argument is 

insufficiently developed, and thus waived. See United States v. 

Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2014). Second, even if 

it were not waived, "each piece of evidence need not be discussed 

in a decision" in order to satisfy our review. Morales v. INS, 

208 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 2000). And third, even if we were to 

peer into the country conditions, they do not relate in any way to 

the specific instances of harassment or assault Martínez-Pérez 

identified. Instead, they discuss shortcomings in the provision 

of healthcare or other services and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in Honduras, which on their own indicate no 

more than a "general climate of discrimination" and without more 

do not suffice to show persecution. Attia v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 

21, 24 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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past persecution.6 See Attia, 477 F.3d at 23–24 (finding no 

persecution where the applicant was beaten twice over a nine year 

period and experienced a “general climate of discrimination”); 

Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no 

persecution based on seven arrests accompanied by short periods of 

detention and physical beatings over the span of two years); Bocova 

v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no 

persecution based on two death threats and a beating resulting in 

loss of consciousness and hospitalization). And while more 

physical incidents such as arrest or assault are not necessary to 

 6 Martínez-Pérez alternatively argues, by comparison, that 

domestic violence victims have shown persecution in support of an 

asylum claim based on the violence or threats of a single 

tormentor, e.g., a spouse. This argument does not factor into our 

review of the BIA's decision for two reasons. First, this theory 

was not raised before the IJ or BIA, and is therefore waived due 

to lack of administrative exhaustion. See Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 

F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2007). Second, Martínez-Pérez's argument 

relies on misconstruing Matter of A–R–C–G–, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 

(BIA 2014), overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 

(2018), arguing that this case eliminates the frequency issues 

with her persecution evidence, because in the domestic violence 

context a single attacker is sufficient. Instead, that case 

reversed an IJ decision denying that domestic violence victims 

were a sufficiently particular and visible social group to be 

eligible for asylum, rather than analyzing the frequency component 

of the persecution analysis. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388-

89. In other words, A-R-C-G- is readily distinguishable from 

Martínez-Pérez's case. But even if domestic violence cases were 

applicable here, she would fare no better. After the Attorney 

General's decision in A-B- overruled A-R-C-G-, interpreting the 

"causal connection" and "government nexus" prongs of persecution 

analysis to exclude most domestic violence harms from satisfying 

that definition, the comparison Martínez-Pérez tries to make does 

her no favors. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337-38. 
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show past persecution, "the presence or absence of physical harm 

(and, indeed, the degree of harm inflicted) remains a relevant 

factor in determining whether mistreatment rises to the level of 

persecution." Lobo v. Holder, 684 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Gilca v. Holder, 680 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2012)) 

(rejecting past persecution argument supported by "five (or six) 

incidents of threats or extortion"). Here, there is no evidence 

in the record that Martínez-Pérez was even slightly injured in any 

of these three incidents, at least not physically so, and none of 

the incidents compelled her to seek medical attention or help from 

the police. See Vasili, 732 F.3d at 90 (finding no past 

persecution in "traffic stop incident" where applicant was 

assaulted by socialist party members because "the record [was] 

wholly devoid of evidence as to the nature and extent of [his] 

injuries, if any" as well as "whether he sought medical 

attention"). Accordingly, there was substantial evidence to find, 

as the BIA and IJ did, that Martínez-Pérez did not carry her burden 

in showing harm serious enough to constitute past persecution.7

 7 Even if we were to peek into the other elements of past 

persecution, Martínez-Pérez fares no better. First, MartínezPérez has drawn no connection between any of the incidents and 

government action or inaction. At most, she assumes that even if 

she had complained to authorities, they would not have done 

anything due to the general discrimination towards disabled and 

Afro-Honduran people in Honduras. We have held that the nexus 

cannot be shown by "no more than a guess." López-Castro, 577 F.3d 

at 53. Second, as Martínez-Pérez conceded at the hearing, she did 
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b. Future Persecution

As we explained before, even though there was 

substantial evidence supporting the BIA's and IJ's conclusions 

that Martínez-Pérez had not shown past persecution, she can still 

make out an asylum claim based on a well-founded fear of future 

persecution if she can satisfy a two-part inquiry that "she 

genuinely fears future persecution and that her fears are 

objectively reasonable." Carvalho-Frois, 667 F.3d at 72. The IJ, 

finding her testimony credible, assumed that the subjective 

"genuine fear" prong was satisfied. However, the IJ concluded, 

and the BIA agreed, that her fear was not objectively reasonable 

because it was based on the same three incidents that had been 

found to be insufficiently serious to show past persecution. We 

agree that substantial evidence supports this conclusion, and need 

not tread back through the same analysis. See López-Castro, 577 

F.3d at 54 (finding no future persecution where evidence asserted 

in support of past persecution did "not equate with persecution"). 

 

not know who the intruder was in the home-invasion incident, and 

he did not say anything. Accordingly, as to that incident, she 

has additionally not carried her burden in showing that it was 

related to either of her statutorily protected categories: race 

and membership in a particular social group, i.e., people with 

disabilities. Her assumption that she would be targeted for home 

invasion because of her disability "left too much to speculation 

and surmise." Id. 
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3. Humanitarian Asylum

Martínez-Pérez alternatively argues that the BIA erred 

by failing to consider her claim for humanitarian asylum.8 The 

government contends that this argument was waived because 

Martínez-Pérez did not argue it specifically before the IJ. But 

even if it is not waived, the government argues that for the same 

reasons Martínez-Pérez's evidence was insufficient in the asylum 

context, so shall it be in the humanitarian asylum context. On 

this second point, we agree with the government. 

First, we do not find that, because it wasn't 

specifically raised before the IJ, this argument was waived. As 

we have previously held, where the applicant "has consistently 

asserted eligibility for asylum based on [] past harm" based on 

the same protected grounds she now claims for humanitarian asylum, 

the applicant need not "explicitly request[] [humanitarian asylum] 

from the IJ apart from [her] overall past-persecution-based asylum 

claim." Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 95 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Accordingly, this argument is properly before us and may be 

considered on the merits. 

But this is the end of the good news for Martínez-Pérez. 

So-called "humanitarian asylum" provides that an applicant who has 

 8 Having failed to argue in her opening brief any error in 

either the BIA's denial of her claim for withholding of removal, 

or its silence on the IJ's denial of her claim for withholding of 

removal under the CAT, we deem these arguments waived. 
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shown past persecution but failed to show a well-founded fear of 

future persecution can still be granted asylum if "(A) [t]he 

applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling 

or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of 

the past persecution; or (B) [t]he applicant has established that 

there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other 

serious harm upon removal. . . ." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). 

Having failed to show past (or any) persecution, subsection 

(b)(1)(iii) does not apply to Martínez-Pérez, and thus this 

argument fails. See Ayala v. Holder, 683 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 

2012). 

4. Due Process

Finally, Martínez-Pérez argues that the IJ's failure to 

consider all of her supporting evidence, namely, the 

aforementioned country-condition evidence, and its use of 

inapplicable case law violated her due process rights. MartínezPérez did not raise this argument before the BIA and thus has 

"failed to exhaust [her] administrative remedies on that issue, 

and we consequently lack jurisdiction to review the claim." 

Sunoto, 504 F.3d at 59. 

C. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for 

judicial review.