1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 15-CR-00231-KD-N-1

)

WILLIE JAMES HENRY )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to suppress. A hearing on this 

matter was held January 14, 2016 before the undersigned.1 The United States was represented by 

Assistant United States Attorney Gloria Bedwell.2 The Defendant and his counsel, Paul Brown, 

were also present. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion to suppress is DENIED. 

I. Background

In August 2015, Mobile Police Department detectives were investigating several

robberies that took place in July and August 2015. As a result of their investigation, they 

determined that the robberies were likely connected. This conclusion was based on the fact that 

in each of the robberies, a black male wearing a hat, sunglasses, and black shirt with a white 

stripe entered a gas station with a handgun, and demanded money. On a fifth occasion, a person 

matching this description, wearing these items, and carrying a handgun entered a gas station, but 

the employee was in the restroom, so the robber exited without completing a robbery. The last 

robbery under investigation occurred on August 20, 2015. 

On August 21, 2015, local news displayed photographs of the suspect taken from robbery 

surveillance footage. After the broadcasts, police received an anonymous tip via telephone. The 

 1 For the reasons set forth on the record, Defendant’s motion for a Franks hearing was DENIED. 2 Detectives Deon Thornton and John Walstad were assigned to the investigation and Detective Thornton testified 

on behalf of the government at the suppression hearing.

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caller identified the suspect in the photographs as Willie Henry. The caller gave a physical 

description, date of birth, and said that Henry was employed by Empire Scaffolding. 

After receiving this information, the police generated a photo spread including Henry’s 

picture. Upon review of the spread, one of the robbery victims identified Henry as the robber. 

Two other victims were shown the spread, but neither identified the person who robbed them.

On August 24, 2015, detectives spoke with Empire Scaffolding Regional Manager Jay 

Kemp and Foreman Taylor Hardy. Detectives confirmed that Henry was employed by Empire 

Scaffolding and learned that the job site he was assigned to at the time was in Brewton, 

Alabama, which is over an hour away from Mobile. Detectives also learned that Henry 

carpooled with Hardy from the Mobile area.

From their conversation with Hardy, detectives learned that three or four days before the 

interview, Henry asked Hardy if they could change their carpool meeting location to the 

Academy store parking lot (“Academy”) on Montlimar Drive in Mobile, Alabama.

3 Henry told 

Hardy that his child was sick and that he was now living near the Academy to be with her.4

Hardy also told detectives that Henry left his blue Chevrolet Cavalier at Academy while they 

were at the job site.

On August 24, 2015, detectives went to the Academy to await Henry’s arrival from the 

carpool. While there, they observed a blue Chevrolet Cavalier in the parking lot and determined 

that it was registered to Henry, at an address on Opp Avenue.

5 They waited until Henry arrived 

at the parking lot, entered his car, and drove away. Detectives followed him to the Seabreeze 

 3 Prior to meeting at the Academy, Henry and Hardy had been meeting at the Saraland, Alabama Wal-Mart. 4 Henry’s affidavit, submitted in support of the his motion, states, “On August 21, 2015, I called Taylor Hardy to 

request that we move the location for us to meet for me to go to the job site in Brewton and told him that I needed to 

change the location because my child was sick and I was going to be living in a new location.” (Doc. 22-1 at 3, 

emphasis added). This is consistent with what Hardy told detectives with regard to Henry living near the Academy.

5 The Opp Avenue address is closer to the Saraland Wal-Mart location where Henry and Hardy had previously been 

meeting to carpool.

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Apartments, which Detective Thornton testified was about 2 miles from the Academy.6 Henry 

exited the car and entered apartment 313A. Detective Thornton testified that Henry did not 

knock or hesitate before entering the apartment, but could not remember whether Henry used 

keys to enter. 

The next day, August 25, 2015, detectives submitted an affidavit to a state court judge 

and obtained a warrant to search the apartment. Before executing the search warrant, the 

detectives learned from the apartment manager that Henry was not listed on the lease of 

apartment 313A.

The apartment was searched and, among other things, detectives recovered several

firearms. Henry was indicted based on an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).7

II. Analysis

Henry moves for suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the warrant executed at

apartment 313A. Initially, and as discussed at the hearing, the affidavit submitted in support of 

the search warrant contained sufficient basis for probable cause that Henry had committed the 

robberies in question based on the positive identification of the Henry’s photograph by one of the 

robbery victims and the anonymous tip.

However, the affidavit lacked probable cause to support a search of the apartment due to 

its failure to sufficiently link the Defendant with the searched apartment. The government has 

conceded the latter in its response to Henry’s motion to suppress. (Doc. 18). Despite this defect, 

the government contends that the Leon good faith exception, as established in United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is applicable here. 

 6 The Opp Avenue address to which Henry’s car was registered, is approximately 7 miles from the Academy. 7 Henry was initially arrested on state charges of robbery and jailed for 53 days. During his incarceration a robbery 

occurred which was consistent in detail to the prior robberies. The state charges against Henry were dismissed. 

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The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence seized as the result of an illegal search may not 

be used by the government in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). The 

exclusionary rule, as it is known, is “a judicially created remedy designed to 

safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” 

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 

(1974). One exception to this exclusionary rule is the Leon good faith exception.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), 

stands for the principle that courts generally should not render inadmissible 

evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance upon a search 

warrant that is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. The Leon 

good faith exception applies in all but four limited sets of circumstances. Id. at 

923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The four sets of circumstances are as follows: (1) where “the 

magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit 

that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his 

reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) “where the issuing magistrate wholly 

abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in” Lo–Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 

York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); (3) where the affidavit 

supporting the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) where, depending 

upon the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant is “so facially deficient—

i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—

that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002)(footnote omitted). Before the 

Court examines “whether the Leon good faith exception applies in this case, [it] must determine 

whether this case fits into one of the four limited sets of circumstances where the Leon good faith 

exception does not apply.” Id. at 1313. 

Defendant argues that the Leon good faith exception should not apply as “the affidavit 

supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable.”8 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Defendant 

states “...[A] reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the affidavit failed to 

establish probable cause as to the essential ‘nexus’ element of probable cause.” (Doc. 13 at 7). 

 8 The Court explained on the record why the other three circumstances are inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

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The Eleventh Circuit has provided guidance with regard to Leon and good faith:

Our reading of Leon persuades us that the proper test is whether the officer acted 

in objective good faith under all the circumstances. The focus in Leon is on the 

officer. “[T]he officer’s reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination 

and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively 

reasonable....” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3420. The “good-faith inquiry 

is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well 

trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the 

magistrate's authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances 

... may be considered.” Id. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 23. See also Illinois 

v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 1170, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (“Nor 

can a law enforcement officer be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a 

statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have known that 

the statute was unconstitutional.”); United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 

(10th Cir.1985) (“the knowledge and understanding of law enforcement officers 

and their appreciation for constitutional intricacies are not to be judged by the 

standards applicable to lawyers”)... Thus, we subscribe to a standard which is 

focused on a reasonably well-trained officer and is based upon the totality of the 

circumstances. Our standard comports with the language used in Leon, 468 U.S. 

at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 23 (“whether a reasonably well trained officer 

would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's 

authorization”) (“all of the circumstances ... may be considered”), and is also 

consistent with the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule and the good faith 

exception, id. at 916, 919, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 3418 (“the exclusionary rule is 

designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and 

magistrates”) (the exclusionary rule “cannot be expected, and should not be 

applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity”).

United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 871-72 (11th Cir. 1990)(emphasis in original).9 “The 

‘totality of the circumstances’ [the Eleventh Circuit] considered in Taxacher included facts not 

presented to the issuing judge...While not explicitly saying so, Taxacher suggest that facts 

outside the affidavit should be considered.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th 

Cir. 2002)(quoting Taxacher at 871-72).

With this in mind, the Court considers all of the information available to the detectives 

executing the search warrant at apartment 313A. Prior to entering the apartment, the detectives 

 9 The Court has been unable to locate any reported Eleventh Circuit case where the Leon exception was considered 

and found inapplicable based upon a finding that a warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 

2002)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

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knew of a series of robberies or attempts in which a black male wearing a hat, sunglasses, and 

black shirt with a white stripe entered a gas station with a handgun, and demanded money. They 

moved forward in their investigation based on an anonymous tip identifying Willie Henry as the 

suspect and giving his place of employment. After speaking with Henry’s employer, detectives 

learned that Henry had recently changed his carpool location to be closer to where he was living.

Detectives waited at the Academy, saw Henry dropped off at his car after work, and followed 

him to an apartment approximately 2 miles from the drop off location. Once at the apartment, he 

exited his vehicle, and entered the apartment without hesitation. Thus, there was at least minimal 

information to believe that Henry resided at this location.10

Moreover, the robberies at issue occurred between July 27 and August 20, 2015. The 

same items of clothing were used in each of the robberies. The apartment was searched August 

25, 2015. It is not entirely unreasonable to expect that the robber would continue to keep these 

items and would keep these items at his home. Thus, it is not entirely unreasonable for detectives 

to believe that evidence would be located where the robber resided.

III. Conclusion

Though the officers did not have sufficient probable cause to link Henry and the 

apartment to be searched, based on the totality of the circumstances, including all of the

information known to detectives, the Court concludes that the detectives “acted in objective good 

faith, and that the warrant was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 

 10 In supplemental briefing, Henry has cited two cases, both distinguishable, wherein courts in other jurisdictions 

have held that the good faith exception did not apply because there was no evidence of a connection between the 

place searched and the defendant. However, in United States v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005), there was 

no evidence indicating that the residence to be searched even belonged to Gonzalez. In United States v. McNeal, 82 

F.Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Ind. 2000), the court did not apply Leon because the affiant merely concluded that the 

defendant “controlled” the residence without giving any supporting facts. The court noted that one such supporting 

fact could have been that he was observed at the residence. Id. at 952.

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belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable.” Taxacher at 872. Accordingly, 

Defendant’s motion to suppress is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of January 2016.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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