Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 1 of 31

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Eric M. Hylton

Laura S. Reed

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

INDIANA EDUCATION 

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 

BOARD

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Natalie F. Weiss

Aaron T. Craft

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

WEST CLARK COMMUNITY 

SCHOOLS 

Jonathan L. Mayes

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 2 of 31

Culver Community Teachers 

Association, Decatur County 

Education Association, Smith

Green Community Schools 

Classroom Teachers Association, 

and West Clark Teachers 

Association,

Appellant-Petitioners,

v.

Indiana Education Employment 

Relations Board,

Appellee-Respondent,

and

West Clark Community Schools,

Intervenor.

August 12, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PL-2989

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Heather Welch, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D01-1810-PL-41794

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] The Culver Community Teachers Association, Decatur County Education 

Association, Smith-Green Community Schools Classroom Teachers 

Association, and West Clark Teachers Association, (collectively “Teachers 

Associations”), appeal from the trial court’s denial of their joint verified petition 

for judicial review of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board’s

(“IEERB”) final decisions regarding their respective collective bargaining 

agreements (“CBAs”). We reverse and remand.
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Issue

[2] The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied judicial 

review of the IEERB’s final decisions that the CBAs negotiated and ratified by 

the Teachers Associations and their respective school employers each included 

provisions that were contrary to law.

Facts

[3] For the 2017-2018 academic school year, the Teachers Associations’ respective 

school corporations (the “School Employers”) and the exclusive 

representatives1 for the Teachers Associations negotiated and ratified CBAs. 

Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-6.1, the CBAs were submitted for 

review to an IEERB-appointed individual (“compliance officer”) to ensure 

compliance with Indiana law. 

[4] On May 30, 2018, the IEERB compliance officer issued compliance reports and 

recommendations regarding the four CBAs and found that each CBA included 

a provision that was non-compliant with Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4,

which enumerates the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining for teachers.

See infra. 

1 An “exclusive representative” is “the school employee organization which has been . . . recognized by a 

school employer as the exclusive representative of the employees” for purposes of collective bargaining. Ind. 

Code § 20-7.5-1-2(l). 
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[5] The Teachers Associations appealed to the IEERB. On September 18, 2018, 

the IEERB entered individual final reports as to the Teachers Associations’ 

respective CBAs. In each instance, as detailed below, the IEERB affirmed the 

compliance officer’s finding of statutory non-compliance.

I. Culver CBA

[6] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the Culver 

CBA to be non-compliant:

Article III

Compensation

* * * * *

J. Ancillary Duties. Ancillary Duties are defined as meetings, 

professional development trainings, and other school activities 

outside the contractual day or Contractual year. Ancillary 

Duties do not include lesson planning and the grading of student 

work. In a given school year teachers shall be required to 

perform a maximum of ten (10) hours of Ancillary Duties at a

rate of $0 per hours [sic].

Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 207. In affirming the finding of statutory 

noncompliance, the IEERB found that the provision above did not comport 

with Indiana law because the “parties may not bargain a limitation on the 

assignment of an ancillary duty.” Id. at 24. In its final report, the IEERB 

adopted the following provision from the compliance officer’s report:
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Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty, 

they may not bargain what constitutes an ancillary duty. The 

parties have included a definition of “ancillary duties” specifying 

what does and does not constitute an ancillary duty. What 

constitutes an ancillary duty is not a bargainable subject pursuant 

to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not 

compliant.

Id. at 39-40.

II. Decatur CBA

[7] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the Decatur 

CBA to be non-compliant:

Article IV

Salary Regulations

Chapter 1. Salary Requirements

A. The Teacher’s Compensation Model for the 2017-18 school 

year is set forth in Appendix ‘A’, which is attached hereto and

incorporated herein along with the salary schedules referred to 

therein. The attached salary schedule reflects the salary increases 

that were bargained for the 2017-2018 term as compared to the 

2016 2017 schedule.

* * * * *

L. A teacher supervising Friday Night Detention shall be paid a 

flat rate of Seventy five Dollars ($75.00) for 12 students or less. 
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Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 32 (quotation omitted). In affirming 

the finding of statutory noncompliance, the IEERB stated: “[the] parties may 

not bargain a limitation on the assignment of an ancillary duty.” Teachers 

Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 24. In its final report, the IEERB adopted the 

following provision from the compliance officer’s report:

Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty, 

they may not bargain any parameters, restrictions, or limitations 

on the school’s assignment of an ancillary duty. The parties have 

bargained compensation for supervising Friday night detention 

“for 12 students or less.” The conditions of the assignment, i.e. 

for 12 students or less, is not a bargainable subject pursuant to 

Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not 

compliant. 

Id. at 34-35.

III. Smith-Green CBA

[8] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the SmithGreen CBA to be non-compliant:

Article III

Salary and Compensation

* * * * *

9. Every effort shall be made by the corporation to provide a 

substitute teacher when a teacher is absent. In the event a 

substitute is not available for a period of time, upon mutual 

agreement, a teacher may be requested to supervise a class’s
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instructional time during his/her preparation period. The 

teacher shall be compensated with one additional leave day for:

• Each 6 periods in CJSHS

• Each 5 hours in CES

The teacher shall be compensated with one-half of an additional 

leave day for:

• Each 3 periods in CJSHS

• Each 2.5 hours in CES

Teachers are responsible for notifying the attendance secretary in 

CJSHS or the administrative assistant in CES for any instances of 

preparation period supervision.

Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 95. In affirming the finding of 

statutory noncompliance, the IEERB found that the provision did not comport 

with Indiana law because the “parties may not bargain a limitation on the 

assignment of an ancillary duty.” Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 24. In 

its final report, the IEERB adopted the following provision from the compliance 

officer’s report:

The parties have impermissibly bargained restrictions on the 

school’s assignment of a teacher to serve as a substitute for 

another teacher. Although the parties may bargain wages for an 

ancillary duty, they may not bargain any parameters, restrictions, 

or limitations on the school’s assignment of the ancillary duty. 

The parties have bargained that “mutual agreement” of the 

teacher is required before the school can assign the teacher to 

serve as a substitute for another teacher. This is not a 
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bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-

29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not compliant.

Id. at 24-25. 

IV. West Clark CBA

[9] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the West 

Clark CBA to be non-compliant:

APPENDIX E

ANCILLARY DUTIES

* * * * *

Lead Teacher — If a teacher is asked to, and accepts 

responsibility for, writing lesson plans, grading assignments, and 

entering grades for these assignments in the absence of a certified 

teacher for a week or longer, the teacher will receive an 

additional four hours of pay per week. Rate of pay for this duty 

will be at row E, Career Level 1 or Career Level 2, depending on 

the teacher’s current Career Level placement.

Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 167. In affirming the compliance 

officer’s finding of noncompliance, the IEERB found that the “parties may not 

bargain a limitation on the assignment of an ancillary duty.” Teachers 

Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 24. In its final report, the IEERB adopted the 

following provision from the compliance officer’s report:
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Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty, 

they may not bargain any parameters, restrictions, or limitations 

on the school’s assignment of an ancillary duty. The parties have 

bargained that as a condition of the Lead Teacher ancillary duty, 

the teacher must agree to accept the duty (“if a teacher is asked 

to, and accepts responsibility for . . .”). The condition of 

accepting an assignment is not a bargainable subject pursuant to 

Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not 

compliant. 

The Compliance Officer notes that, if the conditioned acceptance 

was not bargained, but is function [sic] of school policy, the 

parties may avoid a future finding of noncompliance by including 

a statement to that effect. 

Id. at 29-30.

[10] On October 17, 2018, the Teachers Associations jointly filed a petition for 

judicial review of the IEERB’s final decisions affirming the compliance officers’ 

findings of noncompliance. The IEERB filed its response on November 9, 

2018. The Teachers Associations, IEERB, and intervenor West Clark 

Community Schools tendered briefs to the trial court, which heard argument on 

September 25, 2019. On November 25, 2019, the trial court entered its order, 

containing findings of fact and conclusions thereon, providing in part as 

follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

* * * * *
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2. In [ ] four [final] decisions, IEERB affirmed that a certain 

provision in each of the [Teachers Associations’] collective 

bargaining agreements (“CBA”) was non-compliant with Indiana 

Code Section 20-29-6-4.

* * * * *

7. Specifically, in each of these four final decisions, IEERB found 

that the school and exclusive representative impermissibly 

bargained for a definition of, or limitation on, what constitutes an 

ancillary duty, in violation of Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, 

which permits bargaining only for salary, wages, and salary and 

wage related fringe benefits.

* * * * *

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

12. According to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-1, [s]chool 

employers and school employees shall: (1) have the obligation 

and the right to bargain collectively the items set forth in section 

4 [IC 20-29-6-4]; (2) have the right and obligation to discuss any 

item set forth in section 7 [IC 20-29-6-7]; an[d] (3) enter into a 

contract embodying any of the matters listed in section 4 [IC 20-

29-6-4] of this chapter on which they have bargained collectively. 

Ind. Code § 20-29-6-1.

* * * * *

14. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, [a] school 

employer shall bargain collectively with the exclusive 

representative on the following: (1) salary, (2) wages, (3) salary 

and wage related fringe benefits, including accident, sickness,

health, dental, vision, life, disability, retirement benefits, and 
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paid time off as permitted to be bargained under IC 20-28-9-11. 

Salary and wages include the amounts of pay increases available 

to employees under the compensation plan adopted under IC 20-

28-9-1.5, but do not include the teacher evaluation procedures 

and criteria, any components of the teacher evaluation plan, 

rubric, or tool, or any performance stipend or addition to base 

salary based on a stipend to an individual teacher under IC 20-

43-10-3.5. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.

15. Also, according to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4.5, [f]or a 

contract entered into after June 30, 2011, a school employer may 

not bargain collectively with the exclusive representative on the 

following: (1) the school calendar; (2) teacher dismissal 

procedures and criteria; (3) restructuring options available to a 

school employer under federal or state statutes, regulations, or 

rules because of the failure of the school corporation or a school

to meet federal or state accountability standards; (4) the ability of 

a school employer to: contract, partner, or operate jointly with an 

educational entity that provides postsecondary credits to students 

of the school employer or dual credits from the school employer 

and the educational entity; or (5) any subject not expressly listed 

in section 4 [IC 20-29-6-4]. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.5.

16. Furthermore, Indiana Code section 20-29-6-2 provides that,

[a]ny contract may not include provisions that conflict with . . . 

section 4.5(a) [IC 20-29-6-4.5(a)]. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2.

a. IEERB’s Interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4

17. IEERB argues that its interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4

was correct. IEERB specifically claims that parties to a CBA 

may not bargain the definition of an ancillary duty or other 

limitation because only schools have the authority to define or

limit an ancillary duty. IEERB also claims that once the school 
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defines an ancillary duty, the parties may then bargain the wage 

for that particular ancillary duty.

18. In support of its argument, IEERB cites to the Indiana Code 

to say that, Indiana law provides that only school[ ] [employer] 

have the authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain 

efficient school operations, Ind. Code § 20-29-4-3(1), (5), and a

CBA may not contain any provision that interferes with the 

school employer’s rights, Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2(a)(3). 

19. IEERB contends that if the parties bargained the definition of 

an ancillary duty, or some other limitation on an ancillary duty, 

then they would be infringing on the school’s sole authority to 

direct the work and operations of the school. IEERB argues that 

the provisions challenged in these four cases show that the parties

bargained limitations on what work teachers may or may not 

perform, which is, impermissible under Indiana law.

20. IEERB claims that Petitioners provide little to no explanation 

as to how the language of this statute (Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4) 

supports their claim that the school and the representative may 

bargain for certain ancillary duties or limitations on ancillary 

duties; and instead, Petitioners rely on dicta in two cases to argue that 

this statute does not prohibit the parties from bargaining the definition of, 

or limitation on, an ancillary duty.

21. The Court notes that the Petitioners rely heavily upon IEERB 

v. Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 26 N.E.3d 47 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015) and Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Corp., 45 

N.E.3d 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) to support their arguments and 

interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.

i. Court Decisions on Bargaining Ancillary Duties
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* * * * *

23. [In Nettle Creek, the] Indiana Court of Appeals held that 

although teachers are not entitled to receive overtime 

compensation for performing normal teaching duties, they may

negotiate for additional wages for responsibilities associated with 

ancillary duties. 

24. In Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n, the Indiana Court of Appeals 

held that “that compensable ‘ancillary duties’ can occur during 

the normal teachers’ workday—where both parties agree to them 

and where they are not otherwise impermissible.” The Indiana

Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on the above issue.

25. This Court finds that, while the Petitioners rely on these two 

cases in support of their arguments, Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers 

Ass’n addressed the question of whether teachers’ ancillary duties 

entitle them to additional compensation rather than whether Ind.

Code § 20-29-6-4 provides teachers the ability to bargain with a 

school corporation as to what constitutes an ancillary duty. In 

Jay Classroom, the Court of Appeals held that the parties could 

bargain for additional compensation for ancillary duties during 

the normal teachers’ workday. This Court does not find that 

Nettle[ ] Creek or Jay Classroom held that the School Corporation 

and Teachers Association could bargain for what the ancillary 

duty is because “Indiana law provides that only schools have the 

authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain efficient 

school operations, Ind. Code § 20-29-4-3(1), (5), and a CBA may 

not contain any provision that interferes with the school

employer’s rights.” Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2(a)(3). Thus, this Court 

finds that neither of these cases under Indiana law allows the 

bargaining of what an ancillary duty is.

26. Based on this Court’s reading of the statute and supporting 

Indiana law, the Court finds that IEERB’s interpretation of Ind. 
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Code § 20-29-6-4 is reasonable, and thus this Court need not 

move forward with any other proposed interpretation. The Court 

holds that the IEERB’s four final decisions were not arbitrary

and capricious, and therefore the Petitioners’ Petition for Judicial

Review is DENIED.

Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II pp. 10, 12-20 (citations and quotations 

omitted) (emphasis added). The Teachers Associations now appeal.

Analysis

[11] The Teachers Associations challenge the trial court’s denial of their petition for 

judicial review. Pursuant to the Indiana Administrative Order and Procedures 

Act, we may only set aside an agency action if “(1) [it is] arbitrary, capricious, 

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to 

constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without 

observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d). The party that seeks judicial review 

bears the burden to prove the agency action is invalid for one of the foregoing 

reasons. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14(a).

[12] When reviewing a challenge to an administrative agency’s decision, this Court 

will not try the facts de novo nor substitute its own judgment for that of the 

agency. Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Corp. (“Jay Classroom II”), 55 

N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). “Rather, we defer to 
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the agency’s findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “On 

the other hand, we review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo.” Id.

[13] Further, this Court “‘employs a deferential standard of review of the 

interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its 

enforcement in light of its expertise in the given area.’” Senter v. Foremost 

Fabricators, 137 N.E.3d 1027, 1031-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). 

Although an agency’s interpretation of a statute presents a 

question of law entitled to de novo review, the agency’s 

interpretation is given “great weight.” In fact, “if the agency’s 

interpretation is reasonable, we stop our analysis and need not 

move forward with any other proposed interpretation.” This is 

true even if another party presents “an equally reasonable 

interpretation.” 

Jay Classroom II, 55 N.E.3d at 816 (citations omitted). We will only reverse the 

agency if it incorrectly interpreted the statute. Senter, 137 N.E.3d at 1032-33. 

[14] The Teachers Associations argue that the IEERB’s final decisions, finding that 

the parties to the respective CBAs impermissibly bargained what constitutes an 

ancillary duty, are “contrary to Indiana law, arbitrary and capricious and 

should be reversed.” Teachers Associations’ Br. p. 15. The Teachers 

Associations maintain that, pursuant to Indiana caselaw, negotiations for 

compensation for ancillary duties are encompassed within the mandatory 

collective bargaining topics for teachers. 
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[15] The IEERB counters that, although teachers associations may bargain wages for 

ancillary duties, teachers associations may not bargain as to what constitutes an 

ancillary duty. The IEERB argues that defining an ancillary duty is not among 

the mandatory bargaining topics enumerated under Indiana law, but, rather, is 

a matter to be left solely to the discretion of the school employer. See IEERB’s 

final report, Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 73 (“Once the ancillary 

duties [ ] are identified by the [School Employer], the parties are permitted to 

bargain the wage for the duty or position. The [collective bargaining 

agreement] would then reflect the [School Employer-]identified ancillary duty[ ] 

and the wage for the specific duty or position . . . .”). 

I. Collective Bargaining by Indiana Schools and School Employees

A. Statutes

[16] The citizens of Indiana have a fundamental interest in the 

development of harmonious and cooperative relationships 

between school corporations and their certified employees. Ind.

Code § 20-29-1-1(1). Recognition of the right of school 

employees to organize and acceptance of the principle and 

procedure of collective bargaining between school employers and 

school employee organizations can alleviate various forms of 

strife and unrest. I.C. § 20-29-1-1(2). 

Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Ass’n (“Jay Classroom I”), 45 N.E.3d 

1217, 1219-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Jay Classroom II, 

55 N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016). 

[17] In 2011, the statutory scheme governing collective bargaining for 

teachers was significantly amended to promote speed and 
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finality. Although those amendments left intact the bargaining 

rights and obligations of teachers and schools, I.C. §§ 20-29-4-1, -

6-1 (Supp. 2011), they reduced the number of bargaining subjects 

. . . .

Specifically, the 2011 amendments eliminated permissive 

bargaining subjects altogether, while also limiting mandatory 

bargaining subjects to just wages, salaries, and related fringe 

benefits . . . .

Jay Classroom II, 55 N.E.3d 813, 817 (Ind. 2016) (citations omitted). 

[18] Several Indiana statutes are pertinent to our review. Indiana Code Section 20-

29-6-1 provides:

(a) School employers and school employees shall:

(1) have the obligation and the right to bargain collectively 

the items set forth in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4];

(2) have the right and obligation to discuss any item set 

forth in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-7] of this chapter; 

and

(3) enter into a contract embodying any of the matters 

listed in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4] of this chapter 

on which they have bargained collectively.

(b) Notwithstanding any other law, before a school employer and 

school employees may privately negotiate the matters described 

in subsection (a)(1) during the time period for formal collective 

bargaining established in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-12] of 

this chapter, the parties must hold at least one (1) public hearing 
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and take public testimony to discuss the items described in 

subsection (a).

[19] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4 delineates the mandatory bargaining subjects of 

collective bargaining: (1) salary; (2) wages; and (3) “[s]alary and wage related 

fringe benefits, including accident, sickness, health, dental, vision, life, 

disability, retirement benefits, and paid time off as permitted to be bargained 

under IC 20-28-9-11.” 

[20] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4.5 provides:

(a) For a contract entered into after June 30, 2011, a school 

employer may not bargain collectively with the exclusive 

representative on the following:

(1) The school calendar.

(2) Teacher dismissal procedures and criteria.

(3) Restructuring options available to a school employer 

under federal or state statutes, regulations, or rules because 

of the failure of the school corporation or a school to meet 

federal or state accountability standards.

(4) The ability of a school employer to contract, partner, or 

operate jointly with an educational entity that provides 

postsecondary credits to students of the school employer 

or dual credits from the school employer and the 

educational entity.

(5) Any subject not expressly listed in [Indiana Code 

Section 20-29-6-4] of this chapter.
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(b) For a contract entered into after January 1, 2015, for a school 

year beginning after June 30, 2015, a school employer may not 

bargain collectively with the exclusive representative for the 

following:

(1) A matter described in subsection (a).

(2) A matter that another statute specifies is not subject to 

collective bargaining, including IC 20-28-9-1.5 and IC 20-

43-10-3.5.

(c) A subject set forth in subsection (a) or (b) that may not be 

bargained collectively may not be included in an agreement 

entered into under this article.

[21] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-2 provides:

(a) Any contract may not include provisions that conflict with:

* * * * *

(6) [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4.5(a)] of this chapter.

(b) A subject that is set forth in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-

4.5(a)] of this chapter may not be included in any contract after 

June 30, 2011.

[22] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-6 provides:

The obligation to bargain collectively does not include the final 

approval of a contract concerning any items. Agreements 

reached through collective bargaining are binding as a contract 

only if ratified by the governing body of the school corporation 
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and the exclusive representative. The obligation to bargain 

collectively does not require the school employer or the exclusive 

representative to agree to a proposal of the other or to make a 

concession to the other.

[23] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-6.1 provides:

(a) After ratification of a contract under [Indiana Code Section 

20-29-6-6] of this chapter, a school employer shall submit the 

[CBA], including the compensation model developed under IC 

20-28-9-1.5, to the [IEERB].

(b) The [IEERB] shall appoint a staff member or an ad hoc panel 

member to review each submitted [CBA] and to make a written 

recommendation concerning the [CBA]’s compliance with this 

chapter, including a penalty for any noncompliance. . . . 

* * * * *

(f) If, following the review of a [CBA], the [IEERB] finds the 

[CBA] does not comply with this chapter, the [IEERB] shall issue 

an order that may include one (1) or more of the following items:

(1) Ordering the parties to cease and desist from all 

identified areas of noncompliance.

(2) Preventing the parties from ratifying any subsequent 

[CBAs] until the parties receive written approval from the 

[IEERB] or the [IEERB]’s agent.

(3) Requiring other action as deemed appropriate by the 

[IEERB] as authorized by state law. . . . 
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B. Caselaw

[24] In support of their argument that negotiations of ancillary duties are 

encompassed within the mandatory collective bargaining topics for teachers, 

the Teachers Associations rely upon Jay Classroom I and Nettle Creek, which we 

discuss in turn below. 

A. Nettle Creek

[25] In Nettle Creek, the Nettle Creek school employer and teachers association 

reached a stalemate in their collective bargaining negotiations regarding the 

teachers association’s request for additional compensation for ancillary duties

that the school employer required its teachers to perform outside the teachers’

normal teaching duties. After the parties were unsuccessful at mediation, the 

parties, as required by statute, tendered their last best offers to the IEERB in 

order for the IEERB to select one party’s last best offer to serve as the parties’ 

bargained contract for the academic year. The school employer’s last best offer 

excluded the additional compensation provision from its last best offer, and the 

teachers association included the provision in its last best offer. 

[26] The IEERB recommended the adoption of the school employer’s last best offer, 

which did not allow for the desired additional compensation for ancillary 

duties. The teachers association filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial 

court reversed the IEERB’s decision as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 

law. The IEERB appealed, and a panel of this Court found that, although 

“teachers are not entitled to receive overtime for performing their ‘normal’ 
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teaching duties, i.e., duties that are completed as part of one’s direct teaching 

function[,] . . . . teachers may negotiate for additional wages for responsibility 

associated with co-curricular duties that are voluntarily assumed by a teacher.” 

Nettle Creek, 26 N.E.3d at 56. The panel remanded to the IEERB to “review the 

parties’ proffered [last best offers] taking into consideration” that “[the] parties

may negotiate for additional wages for required ancillary duties . . . .” Id. at 57.

B. Jay Classroom I and Jay Classroom II

[27] In Jay Classroom I, the Jay teachers association and school employer reached an 

impasse in their collective bargaining negotiations. After a failed mediation, 

the parties tendered last best offers to an IEERB factfinder, who recommended 

the adoption of the school employer’s last best offer as the parties’ master 

contract. The teachers association appealed to the IEERB. After a hearing, the 

IEERB affirmed the factfinder’s recommendation. 

[28] Despite the affirmance, however, the IEERB ordered stricken from the adopted 

contract a provision (“the additional compensation provision”) that appeared in 

both parties’ last best offers. The additional compensation provision authorized 

extra pay and established a pay scale for teachers who, voluntarily or by 

assignment, covered other teachers’ classes. The IEERB reasoned that the 

additional compensation provision was statutorily impermissible and “would 

allow teachers to be double-paid for an assignment of duties.” Jay Classroom I, 

45 N.E.3d at 1221. The teachers association filed a petition for judicial review, 

which was denied by the trial court. The trial court found, in part, that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 23 of 31

additional compensation provision allowed teachers to be doubly-paid for 

performing their duties. 

[29] The teachers association appealed to this Court, which found that the 

additional compensation provision was not prohibited by statute or otherwise 

impermissible and, thus, should not have been stricken. This Court reasoned:

. . . we find that the question of ancillary duties can be 

determined at the local level. Particularly where, as here, both 

the Association and the School included the very same 

additional-compensation provision in their respective [last best 

offers]. This shows a clear agreement and understanding 

between the parties that covering another teacher’s class during 

the normal workday does fall outside the scope of normal 

teaching duties—at least within this school district—and thus 

authorizing additional compensation for this duty does not 

constitute “double payment.” * * * * * In sum, we find that the 

provision was not prohibited by statute or otherwise 

impermissible. See I.C. § 20-29-6-18(b) (providing that the 

[IEERB]’s decision must be restricted to only those items 

permitted to be bargained and included in the collective 

bargaining agreement). 

Id. at 1225. 

[30] Although our Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed this Court’s Jay 

Classroom I judgment on grounds relating to an unrelated provision, Jay 

Classroom II “summarily affirm[ed]” this Court’s holding in Jay Classroom I that

the additional compensation provision was not prohibited by statute or 

otherwise impermissible. Our Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 24 of 31

On direct appeal, the [teachers association] also argued that the 

IEERB improperly struck a contract provision in both parties’ 

[last best offers] that “provid[ed] additional wages to teachers 

who volunteer or are assigned to cover a class.” Jay Classroom [I],

45 N.E.3d at 1223. The trial court had affirmed the IEERB’s 

decision to strike the additional compensation provision, 

concluding that “teachers cannot receive payment above their 

salaries for teaching duties and that this provision allowed 

teachers to be double paid for their assigned duties.” The Court 

of Appeals disagreed and held that the additional compensation 

provision was permissible. We agree and summarily affirm the 

Court of Appeals on this issue. 

Jay Classroom II, 55 N.E.3d at 816 n.1 (citations omitted).

II. Teachers Associations v. IEERB

[31] In applying the pertinent statutes and caselaw to the instant facts, we observe 

that, when the General Assembly limited the mandatory bargaining topics to 

salary, wages, and wage-related benefits, it evinced its intention that school 

employers and teachers associations could rightfully negotiate as to wage and 

wage-related fringe benefits. See I.C. § 20-29-6-4. Moreover, by designating 

certain topics—including wages—for mandatory bargaining, while relegating 

other topics to “discuss[ion]” only at the school employer’s discretion, the 

General Assembly further evinced its intention to allow school employers to 

direct the course of collective bargaining negotiations with teachers. See I.C. § 

20-29-6-7. This is consistent with the following conclusions of law entered by 

the trial court in its order denying the petition for judicial review:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 25 of 31

17. IEERB argues that its interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4

was correct. IEERB specifically claims that parties to a CBA 

may not bargain the definition of an ancillary duty or other 

limitation because only schools have the authority to define or 

limit an ancillary duty. IEERB also claims that once the school 

defines an ancillary duty, the parties may then bargain the wage 

for that particular ancillary duty.

18. In support of its argument, IEERB cites to the Indiana Code 

to say that, Indiana law provides that only schools have the 

authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain efficient 

school operations, Ind. Code § 20-29-4-3(1), (5), and a CBA may 

not contain any provision that interferes with the school 

employer’s rights, Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2(a)(3). 

Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II pp. 17-18 (quotations omitted).

[32] As an initial matter, we note that, although the IEERB artfully frames the issue 

as whether the Teachers Associations impermissibly negotiated what 

constitutes an ancillary duty, the record reveals that the Teachers Associations 

and their respective School Employers agreed as to what constituted an 

ancillary duty and bargained regarding the compensation therefor, as is authorized by 

the Jay Classroom I and Nettle Creek holdings. Identifying agreed-upon ancillary 

duties is not the same as bargaining them.2

 A plain and ordinary reading of the 

2 In reading the CBAs as a whole, and giving the provisions their plain and ordinary meaning, we observe the 

challenged Culver, Decatur, and Smith Green provisions are appropriately catalogued within CBA articles 

governing either salary or compensation; and the challenged provision in the West-Clark CBA is found in an 

appendix labelled, “Ancillary Duties[.]” Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 167. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 26 of 31

CBAs does not indicate that the parties bargained regarding which ancillary 

duties teachers would be required to perform. Rather, the parties identified the 

compensable ancillary duties and bargained the compensation accordingly.

[33] Notwithstanding the IEERB’s repeated acknowledgment of the School 

Employers’ authority to direct the course of collective bargaining regarding

ancillary duties, the IEERB failed to honor the intent of the respective School 

Employers. Just as the last best offers submitted separately by the school 

employer and teachers association in Nettle Creek included the same “additional 

compensation provision[,]” the ratified CBAs here—which reflected the 

bargained agreement of the School Employers and Teachers Associations—

included the challenged provisions pertaining to ancillary duties. It is, 

therefore, undisputed that the School Employers were aligned with the 

Teachers Associations regarding these IEERB-challenged provisions. 

[34] Although the trial court discounted Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom I as mere 

dicta, the holdings of these cases are not dicta. These cases are directly on-point

and set forth legal holdings that directly relate to the issue at-bar. See Sw. Allen 

Cty. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2020) (“[S]tatements that are not necessary in the determination of the issues 

presented are dicta, are not binding, and do not become the law of the case.”). 

The trial court’s findings and conclusions thereon dismissing Nettle Creek and 

Jay Classroom I as dicta are clearly erroneous.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 27 of 31

[35] Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom I presented more of a challenge than the instant 

matter because, in those cases, the parties could not fully agree regarding the 

ancillary duties sought to be bargained. Nonetheless, in Nettle Creek and Jay 

Classroom I, this Court held that teachers may negotiate for additional wages for 

responsibilities associated with ancillary duties. As the Nettle Creek panel 

reasoned:

. . .[W]e interpret the law to provide that although the law does 

not allow for the receipt of overtime compensation by teachers 

related to their direct teaching functions, teachers are not 

necessarily excluded from receiving additional wages for required 

or agreed upon ancillary duties. Notably, counsel for the 

[IEERB] conceded during oral argument that it is possible under 

the relevant statutory authority for a teacher to earn wages in 

addition to the teacher’s salary and that an agreed-upon salary 

for direct teaching functions does not exclude wages for other 

functions completed by the individual teacher. As such, we 

conclude that teachers may negotiate with their employers for the 

receipt of additional wages for these ancillary duties. In reaching 

this conclusion, however, we do not mean to say that a school 

corporation must compensate teachers for the ancillary duties, 

but only that the law allows that teachers may negotiate with 

their employers for additional compensation for said ancillary 

duties.

Nettle Creek, 26 N.E.3d at 56; see Jay Classroom I, 45 N.E.3d 1219 (“We find that 

under both statutory law and Nettle Creek[,] a teacher can receive additional 

compensation for ancillary duties, and that covering another teacher’s class 

during the normal workday can be a compensable ancillary duty outside the 

scope of normal teaching duties—where both parties agreed to the same 
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additional-compensation provision and included it in their respective [last best 

offers].”).

[36] Given the willingness of the School Employers to bargain regarding the 

ancillary duties at issue, we cannot agree with the IEERB’s conclusion that the 

challenged provisions interfered with the School Employers’ collective 

bargaining rights. To the contrary, by including the challenged provisions in 

the final, negotiated, and ratified CBAs, the School Employers assented to and 

permitted bargaining thereon, and the Teachers Associations did not

impermissibly dictate bargaining subjects for negotiation. 

[37] The School Employers and Teachers Associations reached final agreements 

after they followed the collective bargaining processes established by Indiana 

Code Chapter 20-29-6. One of the stated aims of Indiana Code Chapter 20-29-6 

is for school employers and school employee organizations to “develop[ ] 

harmonious and cooperative relationships” by way of a statutory process meant

to “alleviate various forms of strife and unrest.” See Jay Classroom I, 45 N.E.3d 

at 1219-20. The parties accomplished their bargaining purposes here without 

strife and unrest; and we are perplexed by the IEERB’s stance in this case. The

reasoning of the Jay Classroom I panel is especially instructive here:

. . . the question of ancillary duties can be determined at the local 

level. Particularly where, as here, both the Association and the School 

included the very same additional-compensation provision in their 

respective [last best offer]s. This shows a clear agreement and 

understanding between the parties . . . . In sum, we find that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 29 of 31

provision was not prohibited by statute or otherwise 

impermissible. . . .

Jay Classroom I, 45 N.E.3d at 1225 (emphasis added).

[38] For the foregoing reasons, we find the IEERB’s interpretation of the applicable 

statutes to be unreasonable and decline to afford great weight thereto. The 

Teachers Associations have carried their burden to prove that the IEERB’s final 

decisions regarding their respective CBAs are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Accordingly, we find that 

the trial court erred in denying the Teachers Associations’ joint petition for 

judicial review. We reverse and remand to the IEERB with instructions to 

adopt the ratified CBAs of the School Employers and the Teachers 

Associations.

Conclusion

[39] The trial court erred in denying the Teachers Associations’ petition for judicial 

review. We reverse and remand.

[40] Reversed and remanded.

Mathias, J., concurs.

Riley, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 30 of 31

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Culver Community Teachers 

Association, et al.,

Appellants-Petitioners,

v.

Indiana Education Employment 

Relations Board,

Appellee-Respondent,

And

West Clark Community Schools,

Intervenor.

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PL-2989

Riley, Judge dissenting

[41] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the IEERB’s final 

decisions regarding the four CBAs at issue were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, and, thus, that the trial 

court erred in denying the Teachers Associations’ petition for review. Indiana 

Code section 20-29-6-4 limits the mandatory subjects for collective bargaining 

to salary, wages, and salary and wage-related benefits. Accordingly, pursuant 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 31 of 31

to the plain terms of the statute, what constitutes an ancillary duty cannot be a 

subject for collective bargaining. See also I.C. § 20-29-6-4.5 (“[A] school 

employer may not bargain collectively with the exclusive representative on . . . 

[a]ny subject not expressly listed in [I.C. § 20-29-6-4].”). In reaching a contrary 

conclusion, the majority relies on dicta contained in our previous decisions in 

Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Ass’n and Jay Classroom I, neither of which 

addressed the issue at hand, which is properly framed as whether Indiana Code 

section 20-29-6-4 provides teachers the authority to bargain with a school 

corporation as to what constitutes an ancillary duty. 

[42] As the majority acknowledges, we accord deference to an administrative 

agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing. Given the plain 

terms of the statute and the lack of binding legal authority for the Teachers 

Associations’ position, I cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it 

denied the petition for judicial review. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.