IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LILLIE P. WATTS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 14-00052-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Lillie P. Watts (“Watts”) has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (“the Commissioner”). (See Doc. 1). By the consent of the parties (see Doc. 

17), the Court has designated the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to 

conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.1 (See Doc. 18).

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 13, 14), the relevant portions 

of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s)])”), 

and oral argument conducted August 26, 2014, the Court finds that the 

Commissioner’s decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED.

I. Procedural Background

On January 13, 2011, Watts protectively filed with the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) an application for a period of disability and disability 

 1 Thus, an appeal taken from the judgment entered in this action may be made directly to 

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See § 636(c)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(c).

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 1 of 13
2

insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

401-433, alleging disability beginning March 14, 2003.2 After her application was 

initially denied on June 3, 2011, Watts requested a hearing. A hearing on Watts’s 

application was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in Mobile, 

Alabama, on December 4, 2012, at which Watts, represented by counsel, appeared 

and testified. (See R. 27).

On January 24, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Watts’s 

application, finding that Watts “was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of 

the Social Security Act through September 30, 2011, the date last insured.” (R. 24-

37). Watts requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council for the 

SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. On December 9, 2013, the 

Appeals Council issued its decision declining review (R. 13-15), thus making the 

ALJ’s January 24, 2013 decision the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.981 (2014) (“The Appeals Council's decision, or the decision of the 

administrative law judge if the request for review is denied, is binding unless you or 

another party file an action in Federal district court, or the decision is revised. You 

may file an action in a Federal district court within 60 days after the date you 

receive notice of the Appeals Council's action.”); Crow v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

571 F. App’x 802, 805 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)3 (“When the Appeals Council 

 2 “The Social Security Act's general disability insurance benefits program (‘DIB’) provides 

income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they 

are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence.” Sanders v. Astrue, Civil Action No.

11-0491-N, 2012 WL 4497733, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. 423(a)).

3 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they 

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 2 of 13
3

denies review of the ALJ's decision, we review the ALJ's decision as the 

Commissioner's final decision.” (citing Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th 

Cir. 2001)).

On February 7, 2014, Watts filed this action for judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s final decision under § 405(g). (See Doc. 1).

II. Standard of Review

In all Social Security cases, a plaintiff (sometimes referred to as a claimant) 

bears the burden of proving that he or she is unable to perform his or her previous 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether 

that burden has been met, and thus whether a claimant has proven that he or she is 

disabled, the examiner (most often an ALJ) must consider the following four factors: 

(1) objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining 

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the plaintiff’s age, education, and work 

history, see id.; and, in turn,

uses a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether the 

claimant is disabled, which considers: (1) whether the claimant is 

engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe impairment 

meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments in the 

regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the [residual 

functional capacity, or] RFC[,] to perform her past relevant work; and 

(5) if not, whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education and 

work experience, there are other jobs the claimant can perform.

Watkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 868, 870 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (per 

curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips v. 

 

may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (effective Aug. 1, 2014).

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 3 of 13
4

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted).4

If, in steps one through four of the above-articulated five-step evaluation, a

plaintiff proves that he or she cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then 

becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at the fifth step, to prove that the plaintiff is 

capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Id.; 

Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 

834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although “the [plaintiff] bears 

the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant 

work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and 

fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations 

omitted).

The task for this Court on judicial review is to determine whether the 

Commissioner’s decision to deny a plaintiff benefits is supported by substantial 

evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla” and means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). “In determining 

whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must view the record as a whole, 

taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the 

[Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Courts are precluded, however, from “deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the 

 4 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual 

steps of this five-step sequential evaluation.

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 4 of 13
5

evidence.” Davison v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 995, 996 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 

(citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). And, “[e]ven if the 

evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a court] must affirm 

if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Crawford 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). 

“There is no presumption, however, that the Commissioner followed the appropriate 

legal standards in deciding a claim for benefits or that the legal conclusions reached 

were valid. Instead, [the court] conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these 

factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing 

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)) (internal citation omitted).

III. Claims on Appeal

(1) “The Administrative Law Judge’s residual functional capacity 

determination at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process was 

not supported by substantial evidence and entirely abrogated the 

medical opinions by Plaintiff’s treating physician that indicated 

Plaintiff could not perform substantial gainful activity.” (Doc. 13 at 2).

(2) “The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible error by failing 

to give adequate and controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, Dr. Cecil Parker, M.D., in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527 and Social Security Ruling 96-2p.” (Id.).

IV. Analysis

At Step Four,

the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant's RFC, the 

regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do 

despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about 

[the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant 

medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 5 of 13
6

Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine 

whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under 

the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth step, 

discussed below. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will 

conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past 

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.

In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant 

work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant 

medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That 

is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular 

work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.4 Once the ALJ assesses the 

claimant's RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her 

prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted).

“For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates 

disability on or before the last date for which she were insured.” Moore v. Barnhart, 

405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) 

(2005)). “Because [Watts]’s last insured date was [September 30, 20115], her DIB 

appeal requires a showing of disability on or before that date.” Id.

The ALJ, “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record,...f[ound] that, 

through the date last insured, [Watts] had the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can perform only 

frequent reaching both overhead and other reaching. She can only occasionally

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. [She] can never climb ladders, scaffolds, 

and ropes. She can perform no work around unprotected heights or dangerous 

moving equipment. She must avoid crowds, and can have only occasional contact 

 5 (R. 27, 37).

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 6 of 13
7

with the public. She must avoid tasks involving a variety of instructions or tasks 

but is able to understand to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions and is 

able to understand to carry out ‘detailed but uninvolved’ written or oral instructions 

involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations. She can 

manage only minimal changes in the work setting and routines. She can be called 

on to make judgments on only simple, work-related decisions.”6 (R. 32).

Watts argues that the ALJ, in making this determination, erred in 

discounting the medical opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Cecil L. Parker, Jr., 

M.D. 7 Dr. Parker completed two form evaluations – a Physical Capabilities 

Evaluation (R. 410) (“PCE”) and a Clinical Assessment of Pain Form (R. 411-12)

(“CAP Form”) – regarding Watts on September 14, 2012. Regarding Dr. Parker’s 

opinions, the ALJ’s decision in Step Four states as follows:

Treatment notes from Cecil L Parker Jr., M.D., between April 6, 2009 

and January 20, 2012, indicate that the claimant presented with minor 

complaints of back pain. Dr. Parker noted that the claimant was obese 

and had performed heavy work in the past. Dr. Parker’s notes do 

indicate a reference to arthropathy, as well as a reference to elbow 

tendinitis in 2009 (8F/24[8]). However, Dr. Parker’s notes do not 

contain specific diagnoses. The records do not support the claimant’s 

allegations of disability.

 6 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the 

national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 

very heavy.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4.

7 “ ‘Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable 

medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] 

impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the 

claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental 

restrictions.’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)).

8 (R. 376 [Dr. Parker’s 9-29-09 Treatment Notes]).

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 7 of 13
8

...

Dr. Parker submitted a physical capacities evaluation dated 

September 14, 2012, in which he opined that the claimant could 

perform no sitting [sic] standing or walking during an eight hour day, 

that she could lift a total of up to 5 pounds for one hour during an eight 

hour workday, that she could perform no grasping, pushing [sic] 

pulling, or fine manipulation on a repetitive basis, and that she could 

not use her legs or feet for repetitive action such as pushing or pulling 

of leg controls. Dr. Parker also found that the claimant was unable to 

perform any bending, squatting, crawling, climbing, or reaching in an 

eight hour workday. Dr. Parker opined that the claimant had been 

thus impaired since December 29, 2009 (12F[9]). Dr. Parker’s opinion 

as a treating physician is considered. However his opinion is not 

reflective of his earlier prepared treatment notes. While it is 

understandable that a treating physician may be sympathetic to the 

claimant, when the treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with 

other evidence, including his own treatment findings, the opinion must 

be disregarded. In this case, Dr. Parker’s assessment is completely 

inconsistent with not only the other evidence of record, including other 

examinations of the claimant, but is also totally inconsistent with his 

prior treatment findings. Thus Dr. Parker’s opinion rendered on 

September 14, 2012 is given no weight...

(R. 34-36).

Social Security Ruling 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (effective July 2, 1996),10

states: “If a treating source's medical opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent 

with the other substantial evidence in the case record, it must be given controlling 

weight; i.e., it must be adopted.” However, “[i]t is an error to give an opinion 

 9 (R. 410 [Dr. Parker’s PCE]).

10 “ ‘Social Security Rulings are agency rulings published under the authority of the 

Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the Administration.’ 

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 n.9, 110 S. Ct. 885, 891 n.9, 107 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1990) 

(internal quotations omitted). Although SSA rulings are not binding on this Court, we 

accord the rulings deference. See Fair v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1466, 1468–69 (11th Cir. 1994).” 

De Olazabal v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, No. 13-15285, 2014 WL 4364889, at *4 (11th Cir. 

Sept. 4, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 8 of 13
9

controlling weight simply because it is the opinion of a treating source if it is not 

well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques or if it is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case 

record.” SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188.

Moreover, “a finding that a treating source medical opinion is not wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or 

is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record means only 

that the opinion is not entitled to ‘controlling weight,’ not that the opinion should be 

rejected. Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must 

be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927. In 

many cases, a treating source's medical opinion will be entitled to the greatest 

weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling 

weight.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit has held:

Absent “good cause,” an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating 

physicians “substantial or considerable weight.” Lewis[ v. Callahan], 

125 F.3d [1436,] 1440[ (11th Cir. 1997)]; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(d)(1)-(2), 416.927(d)(1)-(2). Good cause exists “when the: (1) 

treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) 

evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's 

opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical 

records.” Phillips[ v. Barnhart], 357 F.3d [1232,] 1241[ (11th Cir. 

2004)]. With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's 

opinion, but he “must clearly articulate [the] reasons” for doing so. Id.

at 1240–41.

Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011). The 

Court will not find reversible error “when the ALJ articulated specific reasons for 

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 9 of 13
10

declining to give the treating physician's opinion controlling weight, and the reasons 

were supported by substantial evidence.” Forrester v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 455 F. 

App'x 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 

1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).

Both parties argue at length why the ALJ correctly or incorrectly discounted 

Dr. Parker’s opinions in both the PCE and the CAP Form. It is difficult to address 

these arguments as to the CAP Form, however, because, unlike the PCE, the ALJ 

does not specifically reference or discuss the opinions in the CAP Form or indicate 

what weight she assigned them. The Court notes that, unlike the PCE, the CAP 

Form does not indicate that its findings apply before Watts’s last insured date. (R. 

415-16). In fact, in response to Question 9, which asks “How long has the patient’s 

pain been at the level indicated above,” Dr. Parker wrote “pain level 8/10 since” but 

did not specify a date. (R. 416). Moreover, as the Commissioner notes (see Doc. 14 

at 8), in support of his determinations in the CAP Form, Dr. Parker cites only to 

clinical and laboratory findings regarding the fracture of Watts’s right tibia and 

fibula resulting from a May 2012 automobile accident, which occurred after the last 

insured date. (See R. 30 (“The claimant reported having a fracture of the leg in 

2012 secondary to a motor vehicle accident. However, this injury occurred after her 

date last insured. Therefore, it is found not to be a severe impairment relative to a 

determination of disability.”)).

Like the PCE, Dr. Parker’s CAP Form suggests that Watts is burdened by 

significant impairments, as it opines that she is experiencing “intractable and 

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 10 of 13
11

virtually incapacitating” pain, that physical activity will cause “[i]ncrease of pain to 

such an extent that bed rest is necessary[,]” and that she “will be totally restricted 

and thus unable to function at a Productive level of work” due to her level of pain. 

(R. 415-16). While it is entirely possible that the ALJ discounted the CAP Form for 

the same reasons she rejected the PCE, or because there was no indication Dr. 

Parker’s opinions therein applied on or prior to Watts’s date last insured, the ALJ’s 

complete failure to reference this opinion of a treating physician is reversible error. 

As noted above, while the opinion of a treating physician may be disregarded for 

good cause, the ALJ “must clearly articulate his reasons for doing so.” Lawton v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App'x 830, 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240–41). 

Moreover, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to 

different medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 

825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “In the absence of such 

a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine 

whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational 

and supported by substantial evidence.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 

731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). Therefore, when the ALJ fails to “state with 

at least some measure of clarity the grounds for his decision,” we will 

decline to affirm “simply because some rationale might have supported 

the ALJ's conclusion.” Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir.

1984) (per curiam). In such a situation, “to say that [the ALJ's] 

decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication 

of the court's duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine 

whether the conclusions reached are rational.” Cowart, 662 F.2d at 735 

(quoting Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1979)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. See also Davis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 449 F. App'x 828, 

833 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“The ALJ must clearly articulate his reasons for 

disregarding a treating physician's opinion. Moreover, his explanation must include 

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 11 of 13
12

good reasons. We will not affirm an ALJ's decision without adequate explanation 

because, without such an explanation, it is impossible for a reviewing court to 

determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and 

supported by substantial evidence.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).

Because the ALJ failed to expressly consider and assign weight to the 

medical opinion of a treating physician, it is impossible for the Court to determine 

whether the ultimate decision on the merits of Watts’s claim is rational and 

supported by substantial evidence.11 Because the Court finds this error alone 

requires remand to the Commissioner, there is no need to consider the other 

asserted claims of error at this time. Cf. Salter v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 11–

00681–C, 2012 WL 3817791, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2012) (“Because the Court 

determines that the decision of the Commissioner should be reversed and remanded 

for further proceedings based on the plaintiff’s second claim, regarding the RFC 

determination, there is no need for the Court to consider the plaintiff’s other 

claims.” (citing Robinson v. Massanari, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280 & n.2 (S.D. Ala. 

2001); Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Because the 

‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone warrants reversal,’ we do not consider the 

appellant’s other claims.”))).

Therefore, the Commissioner’s final decision in this action is due to be 

 11 While it could be argued that the ALJ might simply have lumped the opinions in the CAP 

Form together with those in Dr. Parker’s PCE and/or treatment notes, the record does not 

support such a determination. The ALJ’s opinion specifically references Dr. Parker’s 

treatment notes and the CPE, both by name and by the exhibit numbers corresponding to 

those particular pieces of evidence (Exs. 8F and 12F, respectively). The CAP Form is not 

referenced either by name or exhibit number (13F), and the ALJ’s decision does not discuss 

the opinions expressed therein regarding Watts’s level of pain and its impact.

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 12 of 13
13

REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).12

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Watts benefits is REVERSED and

REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. 

Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 

decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes Watts a 

prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, 

see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and terminates this Court’s 

jurisdiction over this matter.

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this Order and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 1st day of December 2014.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 12 See Lawton, 431 F. App'x at 835 (“There is language in MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 

1050 (11th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that, if an ALJ fails clearly to articulate reasons 

for discounting the opinion of a treating physician, that evidence must be accepted as true 

as a matter of law. However, our earlier decisions had remanded cases to the agency when 

there was a failure to provide an adequate credibility determination. See, e.g., Owens, 748 

F.2d at 1516; Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1390 (11th Cir. 1982). Pursuant to the 

prior precedent rule, we are bound by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of 

law, unless and until it is overruled by this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court. 

United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc). Accordingly, rather 

than broadly accept the doctors' opinions as true, we will remand to the agency so that it 

can make a determination in the first instance of the proper weight to be afforded to those 

opinions.”); Davis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 449 F. App'x 828, 833 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (same).

Case 1:14-cv-00052-N Document 19 Filed 12/01/14 Page 13 of 13