alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D23-1698

LT Case No. 2022-CF-007448-A

_____________________________

DANIELLE ELAINE FAHEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

R. Anthony Salem, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Teresa D. Sutton, 

Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Amanda A. Uwaibi, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

December 5, 2023 

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT, KILBANE, and MACIVER, JJ., concur.
2

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 7**  **739**

ERIC C. MCCARTER , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:16

- cv - 00022

- JAG

- DJN )

Submitted : February 23, 2017 Decided: February 28, 2017

Before SHEDD and DIAZ , Circuit Judges , and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Eric C. McCarter, Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen Beatty Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Ri chmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Eric C. McCarter seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) ( 2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition s tates a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that
McCarter has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny McCarter’s motion for a certificat e of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the3 materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSE D
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Benton H Wilcoxon, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Amendment
No. 1 to Quarterly Report of Composite Technology Corporation on Form 10-Q for
the period ended June 30, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Amendment No. 1 to Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of Composite
Technology Corporation.


Date: August 8, 2006

By: /s/ Benton H Wilcoxon
    -------------------------
    Benton H Wilcoxon
    Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1687 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

6444 San Fernando Road in Glendale, California, as the ‘‘Paul Ignatius 

Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 21, 2023 

Mr. SCHIFF (for himself, Mr. AGUILAR, Ms. BARRAGA ́N, Mr. BERA, Ms. 

BROWNLEY, Mr. CARBAJAL, Mr. CA ́RDENAS, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. CORREA, 

Ms. CHU, Mr. COSTA, Mr. DESAULNIER, Mr. DUARTE, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. 

GARAMENDI, Mr. MIKE GARCIA of California, Mr. ROBERT GARCIA of 

California, Mr. GOMEZ, Mr. HARDER of California, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. 

ISSA, Ms. JACOBS, Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. KILEY, Mrs. 

KIM of California, Mr. LAMALFA, Ms. LEE of California, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. 

LIEU, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. MCCLINTOCK, Mr. MULLIN, Mrs. 

NAPOLITANO, Mr. OBERNOLTE, Mr. PANETTA, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. PETERS, 

Ms. PORTER, Mr. RUIZ, Ms. SA ́NCHEZ, Mr. SHERMAN, Mrs. STEEL, Mr. 

SWALWELL, Mr. TAKANO, Mr. THOMPSON of California, Mrs. TORRES of 

California, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. VARGAS, and Ms. WATERS) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 6444 San Fernando Road in Glendale, California, as the ‘‘Paul Ignatius Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1687 IH

1 SECTION 1. PAUL IGNATIUS POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 6444 San Fernando Road in 

4 Glendale, California, shall be known and designated as the 

5 ‘‘Paul Ignatius Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Paul Ignatius Post 

10 Office’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DERRICK WALKER, )

)

Petitioner/Defendant, ) Civil Action No. 14-00202-WS

)

v. ) Criminal No. 09-00236-WS-N

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of the issues raised, and there having 

been no objections filed, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) and dated March 19, 2015 is ADOPTED as the opinion of 

this Court.

DONE and ORDERED this the 20th day of April, 2015.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cr-00236-WS-N Document 231 Filed 04/20/15 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Miguel BARAJAS-SERRATO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-10408.

D.C. No. CV-00-00017-SI.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.1

Decided May 30, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and WARD LAW, Circuit Judges.

1

. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM2

Miguel Barajas-Serrato appeals the judgment of conviction and 40-month sentence imposed after his guilty plea to being an illegal alien found in the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Barajas-Serrato contends that in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), section 1326(b)(2) is unconstitutional because it allows a court to increase the maximum penalty at sentencing, based on whether a defendant was deported subsequent to a prior conviction for an aggravated felony, without submitting this fact to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This contention is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (upholding enhancement where the defendant admitted to underlying felony convictions and subsequent deportation) and by *United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda,*234 F.3d 411 (9th Cir.2000), *as amended*(Feb. 8, 2001), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 1503, — L.Ed.2d — (2001). *See United States v. Castillo-Rivera,*244 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.2001).

AFFIRMED.

2

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 23-0539 

BRIAN TACKETT, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

KATRINA FELLER, COCKRELL, 

GOICOCHEA AND JOHNSON, 

Defendants and Appellees. 

FILED 

OCT 10 2023 

Bowen Greenwood 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State of Montane 

NOTICE RESCINDING ORDER 

OF MEDIATOR APPOINTMENT 

Therese Fox Hash, the mediator previously appointed in this matter, has notified the 

parties that this appeal appears NOT to be subject to Mediation as there is no money judgment 

involved and it is not a domestic relations or a workers' compensation case. Accordingly, Ms. 

Hash's order of mediator appointment is hereby rescinded. 

If this case is SUBJECT TO MEDIATION, the Appellant shall file a notice clarifying 

the type of case this is and another mediator will be appointed. 

A true copy of this order is being mailed to counsel of record for the parties, or to the 

parties individually if not represented by counsel, on the date hereof. 

DATED this 10th day of October, 2023. 

Bowen Greenwood, Clerk of the Supreme Court 

c: Brian Tackett, tackett59935(&,gmail.com 

Matthew Hayhurst, mhayhuurst@boonekarlberg.corn 

Tyler M. Stockton, tstockton@boonekarlberg.com 

Therese Fox Hash, tfh.hashlaw@gmail.com 

10/10/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0539
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1966 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Health 

and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Public 

Health Scientific Studies for fiscal year 2024. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 29, 2023 

Mr. BIGGS (for himself, Mr. ROSENDALE, Mr. GAETZ, Mr. GOOD of Virginia, 

Mr. ROY, and Mr. CRANE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To provide for a limitation on availability of funds for Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Scientific 

Studies for fiscal year 2024. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1966 IH

1 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 

2 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV3 ICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 

4 PREVENTION PUBLIC HEALTH SCIENTIFIC 

5 STUDIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024. 

6 Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, 

7 amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise avail8 able for Department of Health and Human Services, Cen9 ters for Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Sci10 entific Studies for fiscal year 2024 may not exceed 

11 $496,397,000. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### Nathan Harry Spanier, Appellant, *v.*John Lazar and Another, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

February 27, 1925.

Duress — threats of arrest, prosecution. and forcible retaking of property — action to recover damages for money and property given defendants to prevent execution of threats — question of fact for jury — error to dismiss complaint.

It was error to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in an action to recover for money and property obtained by duress, to prevent the execution of threats of arrest, criminal prosecution and forcible retaking of property, where the evidence *552warrants an inference that the threats were intended to produce a money settlement, since a question of fact for the jury was raised as to whether or not the settlement was obtained by duress.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York, Borough of Manhattan, Second District, in favor of defendants after trial by the court and a jury.

*Edward Kuntz,*for the appellant.

*Van Ness & Van Ness [Roderick Begg*of counsel], for the respondents.

Per Curiam:

At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case the complaint was dismissed in this action to recover for money and property obtained by duress. Plaintiff’s evidence showed that he' had loaned $400 to one Silver. Silver thereafter sold to him a diamond ring, for which plaintiff agreed to surrender a note and to pay an additional $150. Thereafter defendant Lazar, with his codefendant, who purported to be a city detective, claimed that the ring had been illegally obtained from Lazar by Silver and that irrespective of plaintiff’s innocence of wrongful intent they proposed to prosecute him for receiving stolen goods, have him arrested and also go to the home of his *fiancee,*to whom he had given the ring, and take it from her finger, unless he settled the matter. To prevent the execution of these threats, plaintiff gave to Lazar $260 in money and a diamond ring of the value of $250. The purpose of these threats, if they were made, was illegal. If Spanier was guilty, Lazar was compounding a felony. At all events the testimony warrants the inference that the threats of arrest, prosecution and forcible retaking of the ring were intended merely to produce a money settlement. A question of fact for the jury was clearly raised. *(Dunham*v. *Griswold,*100 N. Y. 224; *Barrett*v. *Weber,*125 id. 18.)

As was said by Earl, J., in *Dunham*v. *Griswold (supra,*226): “ When there is no arrest, no imprisonment, no actual force, and it is claimed that a promise was obtained by duress *per minas,*then whether or not the promise was obtained by duress must usually be a question of fact, and the question cannot be determined as one of law.”

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with thirty dollars costs to the appellant to abide the event.

All concur; present, Guy, McCook and Proskauer, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE SEPTEMBER
30, 1999 UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF VINEYARD NATIONAL BANCORP AND
SUBSIDIARIES AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       7,471,683
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       1,089,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             3,675,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 10,625,969
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                     83,560,644
<ALLOWANCE>                                    701,753
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             115,247,963
<DEPOSITS>                                 104,160,124
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          2,011,080
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,106,258
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,970,501
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             115,247,963
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              6,229,259
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              362,830
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               278,004
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             6,870,093
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           1,691,300
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,691,300
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        5,178,793
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   41,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              5,574,098
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                687,477
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   405,477
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.20
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    9.30
<LOANS-NON>                                     43,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                   133,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                              1,981,000
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               686,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  120,000
<RECOVERIES>                                    95,000
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              702,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           702,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 246 (Tuesday, December 23, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Page 76955]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-30067]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Forest Service


Northern Research Station, Timber & Watershed Laboratory, RWU 
NRS-01, West Virginia, Fernow Experimental Forest 2016 to 2020

AGENCY: Forest Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Forest Service published a document in the Federal 
Register of December 12, 2014, concerning a notice of intent to prepare 
an environmental impact statement. The document contained incorrect 
dates for the estimated publication of draft and final environmental 
impact statements. We anticipate completing the draft environmental 
impact statement in April 2015 and the final environmental impact 
statement is expected in June 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Schuler, Project Leader at USDA 
Forest Service, 304-478-2000. Individuals who use telecommunication 
devices for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay 
Service (FIRS) at 1-800-877-8339 twenty-four hours a day, every day of 
the year, including holidays.

Correction

    In the Federal Register of December 12, 2014, in FR Vol. 79, No. 
239, on page 73880 in the third column correct the ``Dates'' caption to 
read:

DATES: Comments concerning the scope of the analysis must be received 
by January 26, 2015. The draft environmental impact statement is 
expected April 2015 and the final environmental statement is expected 
June 2015.

    Dated: December 16, 2014.
Thomas Schuler,
Project Leader, NRS-01.
[FR Doc. 2014-30067 Filed 12-22-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3411-15-P
#### Marilena Katopodis et al., Respondents-Appellants, v Marvin Windows and Doors, Appellant-Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[964 NYS2d 123]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Anil C. Singh, J.), entered March 22, 2012, which denied defendant Marvin Windows and Door’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action as time-barred, and denied plaintiffs’ cross motion for partial summary judgment on their first cause of action, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant defendant’s motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action alleging breach of express warranty should have been granted. Defendant argues that the four year statute of limitations runs from the date the windows and doors were delivered in December 2004 or January 2005, which means the action was time-barred when it was filed in June 2010 (UCC 2-725 [2]; *see Richard A. Rosenblatt & Co. v Davidge Data Sys. Corp.,*295 AD2d 168, 168-169 [1st Dept 2002]). Even if the statute of limitations ran from when the defect was discovered in June 2005, plaintiffs’ claim would have expired no later than June 2009, a year before the commencement of this action *(see*UCC 2-725 [2]).

*634There was no basis for the court to extend the statute of limitations based on a September 9, 2009 letter sent by defendant, which offered to provide certain replacement parts pursuant to the terms of the express limited warranty. First, the statute of limitations already had expired at the time the letter was sent. In any event, nothing in the September 9, 2009 letter could be construed as intending, by fraud, misrepresentation or deception, to induce plaintiffs to refrain from timely commencing an action *(see Wiesel v 310 E. 46 LLC,*62 AD3d 516 [1st Dept 2009]). Thus, the statute of limitations cannot be extended based on an estoppel theory.

Although initially it may seem somewhat unfair for defendant to have given plaintiffs a 10-year warranty and then argue that plaintiffs cannot sue for breach of warranty at any time during that 10-year period, the case law is clear on when this cause of action accrues *(see Heller v U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.,*64 NY2d 407, 410 [1985]). Moreover, even if we were to give plaintiffs a longer period than defendant wants, and determine that the statute of limitations runs from the date the defect was discovered, plaintiffs here still waited too long. In fact, at oral argument, plaintiffs could not explain why they waited several years before commencing this litigation.

Furthermore, plaintiffs do not argue, and therefore we need not reach, whether defendant violated any duty to repair the damaged items. Plaintiffs solely contend that this is a breach of warranty case.

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

Concur—Friedman, J.E, Moskowitz, DeGrasse, Richter and Gische, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32 (a)

                             CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of Enzo  Biochem,  Inc.,  and
Subsidiaries ("the Company") on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended April 30,
2006 as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof
(the  "Report"),  I,  Elazar  Rabbani,  Ph.D.,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a)
or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


          (2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.





Dated: June 9, 2006                          By:  /s/ Elazar Rabbani, Ph.D.
                                                  -------------------------
                                             Elazar Rabbani, Ph.D.
                                             Chief Executive Officer




     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906, or
other  document  authenticating,   acknowledging,   or  otherwise  adopting  the
signature  that  appears in typed form  within  the  electronic  version of this
written statement  required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Act
Commission or its staff upon request.