COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements 

THERESA JONES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2110-00-2 PER CURIAM 

 FEBRUARY 13, 2001 

RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Melvin R. Hughes, Judge 

 (Robert D. Shrader, Jr.; Steingold and 

Shrader, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Alexandra Silva, Assistant City Attorney; 

Karen Matthews, guardian ad litem for the 

minor child, on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Theresa Jones appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter. She contends the 

evidence was insufficient to show that she "was without good 

cause, unwilling or unable to substantially remedy the conditions 

leading to the removal." Upon reviewing the record and briefs of 

the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Rule 5A:27. 
BACKGROUND 

 On June 2, 1998, Richmond Department of Social Services (DSS) 

obtained temporary custody of Jones' then twenty-two-month-old 

daughter, Crystal, while Jones began serving a six-month jail 

sentence.1 According to Kelly Davis, a DSS social worker, none of 

appellant's relatives were "interested in getting custody" of the 

child at that time. Moreover, the man with whom Jones lived at 

the time refused to assume custody of the child. 

 Davis testified that she spoke with Jones in June of 1998 and 

told her that she was to get into a substance abuse program upon 

her release from jail. Davis also told Jones that she "would help 

her as far as finding housing and employment as well." 

 On June 16, 1998, the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court (juvenile court) entered a preliminary protective 

order directing Jones "[t]o cooperate in the provision of . . . 

reasonable services or programs designed to protect the child's 

life, health and normal development." The order instructed Jones 

to attend TASC, which is a substance abuse program, to "follow 

treatment recommendations to completion," to "obtain stable 

housing and employment," to "enter and complete a parenting 

class," and to "cooperate w[ith] RDSS." 

 1

 This incarceration was the first of four incarcerations 

involving Jones during the time period that DSS had custody of 

the child. 

- 2 -
 In November 1998, one month before Jones' release from jail, 

DSS placed the child in the custody of Cindy May Jones, Jones' 

mother and the child's grandmother.2 Years earlier, grandmother 

had obtained custody of another child born to Jones. That child, 

who was fourteen years old at the time of the hearing, was eight 

months old when grandmother acquired custody of him. 

 Jones was released from jail on December 14, 1998. She 

contacted her social worker, Davis, saying she was staying with 

her mother, Cindy Jones. 

 Grandmother testified as follows regarding the period after 

Jones' December 1998 release from jail: 

[W]e had agreed that I was working at night 

and she was going to keep the—her baby at my 

house and she was going to get a job working 

the daytime, but she never wanted to do 

that. So I had to get my other daughter to 

keep Crystal at night, and [Jones] went on 

her way[;] she wanted to go out at night. 

 Grandmother noticed that Jones "was doing drugs" after her 

December 1998 release. She recalled incidents where Jones would 

go into the bathroom and return with blood running down her arm. 

Grandmother testified that Jones spent little time with the 

child. According to grandmother, Jones became violent when she 

was unable to obtain heroin. Jones stayed with the grandmother 

 2

 Davis explained that she placed the child with the 

grandmother "in November of '98 with the possibility when 

[Jones] got out [in December 1998], [Jones] would soon live with 

Grandmother and child in the grandmother's home." 

- 3 -
approximately two weeks before moving out and leaving the child 

with grandmother. 

 On December 29, 1998, Jones telephoned Davis and asked for 

assistance with her substance abuse problem. On January 5, 1999, 

Davis tried to contact Jones to tell her that she had scheduled an 

appointment for her at the Richmond Behavioral Health Authority 

(RBHA) for a drug treatment assessment and evaluation; however, 

Davis was informed that Jones had been jailed again (the second 

incarceration). As a result, treatment was again postponed. 

 After Jones' second release from jail, Davis contacted Jones 

to inform her that she, Davis, had made another appointment for 

her at RBHA for a February 3, 1999 assessment and evaluation. 

Davis accompanied Jones to this assessment. RBHA scheduled Jones 

to enter a detox program on February 16, 1999. On February 17, 

1999, Jones informed Davis she did not attend the detox program 

because they would not give her enough medication to detox. Jones 

told Davis that she called Human Resources, Incorporated and that 

they would help her enter the methadone clinic on March 8, 1999. 

 Paige Brodie, a substance abuse counselor with Human 

Resources testified that Jones was on methadone maintenance from 

1996 until 1998, but "was discontinued from the Methadone program 

for noncompliance." On March 8, 1999, Jones entered the relapse 

prevention program. "She left of her own accord" on March 11, 

1999, without explanation. Brodie stated that the programs last 

twenty-one or twenty-eight days "depending on what they are 

- 4 -
approved for." After a participant finishes a twenty-one or 

twenty-eight day program, counselors determine what individualized 

aftercare treatment is required. Because Jones was not in the 

initial program long enough, Brodie was unable to determine what 

type of aftercare she would need. 

 Because Jones was not making progress towards being 

responsible and because grandmother was already raising one of 

Jones' children, grandmother relinquished custody of the child in 

March 1999. In April 1999, DSS placed the child into foster care 

with foster mother Cheryl Turner and Turner's husband. Turner 

explained that the child exhibited problems with her eyes and 

speech when she first arrived, but she had made much progress and 

improvement while in Turner's care. 

 In late April or early May of 1999, Jones was incarcerated 

for the third time, this time for violating the terms of her 

probation. Specifically, Jones failed to pass a urine screening 

for illegal drugs. At the time, Jones was unemployed. 

 On July 13, 1999, DSS filed a foster care service plan and 

foster care service plan review with a goal of adoption and a 

target date of December 1999. 

 Jones was released from her third incarceration in September 

1999. Shortly thereafter, she began using drugs again. 

 On November 18, 1999, DSS petitioned the juvenile court to 

terminate Jones' residual parental rights. The petition cited 

Code §§ 16.1-283(C)(1) and (C)(2) as the basis for termination. 

- 5 -
 Jones was incarcerated again in December 1999 until March 13, 

2000, at which time the court ordered her to enter the Rubicon 

Treatment Center. According to Jones, she entered Rubicon's 

ninety-day substance abuse program and completed it on June 13, 

2000. Although Jones indicated she had overcome her addiction, 

she testified, "I try to attend NA meetings when I get a chance 

and work and just try to focus on positive things besides using 

[drugs] even though it crosses my mind every day." Jones said she 

obtained a job at a motel on June 12, 2000. Jones stated that she 

does not get along with any of her relatives, thus diminishing the 

possibility that they will provide any assistance. At the time of 

the July 2000 hearing, Jones was living with the man who had been 

her boyfriend for the previous eight years. 

 At the July 17, 2000 hearing, Jones conceded that Davis tried 

to get her into a drug treatment program when she was released 

from jail in December 1998, but, "[a]t that time," Jones "felt 

like [she] wasn't ready to get into a program." Jones admitted 

using heroin after her December 1998 release. 

 Social worker Davis testified that she arranged for Jones to 

visit Crystal at the DSS office and provided transportation for 

the child at those visits. Although Jones "was welcomed to have 

any visitation she wanted" during those periods when she was not 

incarcerated, Jones often would telephone and cancel scheduled 

visits. According to Davis, Jones visited the child approximately 

seven times from February 1999 until July 2000. 

- 6 -
 By order dated August 17, 2000, the trial court found that 

DSS made reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal from 

the home, to return the child to Jones, and to locate suitable 

relatives for alternative placement. "Despite the efforts of 

social, mental health, and other rehabilitative agencies to remedy 

the situation that led to, and required the continuation of, the 

placement of this child in foster care, Ms. Jones failed, without 

good cause, to remedy substantially these conditions." Finding 

that the best interests of the child will be served by termination 

and "proceeding towards adoption," the trial court terminated 

Jones' residual parental rights. 

ANALYSIS 

 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the 

paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best 

interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. 

App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 

"In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in 

making the decisions necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests." The 

trial court's judgment, "when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 The residual parental rights of a parent may be terminated 

if a parent 

- 7 -
without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or 

unable within a reasonable period of time 

not to exceed twelve months from the date 

the child was placed in foster care to 

remedy substantially the conditions which 

led to or required continuation of the 

child's foster care placement, 

notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to such end. Proof that the parent 

. . . without good cause, [has] failed or 

been unable to make substantial progress 

towards elimination of the conditions which 

led to or required continuation of the 

child's foster care placement in accordance 

with their obligations under and within the 

time limits or goals set forth in a foster 

care plan filed with the court or any other 

plan jointly designed and agreed to by the 

parent . . . shall constitute prima facie 

evidence of this condition. The court shall 

take into consideration the prior efforts of 

such agencies to rehabilitate the parent or 

parents prior to the placement of the child 

in foster care. 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 

 Jones contends the trial court erred in finding that she 

failed, without good cause, to remedy substantially the conditions 

that led to or required continuation of placement of the child in 

foster care. 

 The child was placed in foster care on June 2, 1998, and 

remained in foster care until the July 17, 2000 hearing, a period 

in excess of two years. On June 16, 1998, the juvenile court 

issued a protective order directing Jones to obtain and complete 

treatment, find stable housing, get a job, complete a parenting 

class and cooperate with DSS upon her release. DSS removed the 

- 8 -
child from foster care in November 1998 and placed her with the 

grandmother in hopes of reuniting Jones and her daughter upon 

Jones' December 1998 release from jail. Jones remained with the 

grandmother and child for approximately two weeks, after which she 

chose to leave. She never obtained employment, and, although she 

had not taken any heroin during her six-month period of 

incarceration, she resumed taking heroin upon her release. 

Despite asking for help in obtaining treatment in late December 

1998, Jones was incarcerated a second time when the social worker 

tried to contact her in early January 1999 about a scheduled 

appointment for treatment. 

 The social worker made another appointment for Jones to 

receive treatment on February 16, 1999, following her second 

release from jail. Jones, however, decided not to enter that 

program and notified the social worker of that fact a day after 

failing to attend. 

 On March 8, 1999, Jones entered another treatment program, 

but left after three days without explanation and without 

completing the program. 

 In March 1999, grandmother returned the child to DSS, which 

placed her in another foster home. This was the child's third 

placement by DSS since June 2, 1998. 

 Jones continued using heroin in February and March of 1999 

and, in April or May of 1999, she was incarcerated for the third 

time. Upon her release in September 1999, Jones did not obtain 

- 9 -
employment or get substance abuse treatment. Instead, she began 

using heroin again. 

 In December 1999, one month after DSS petitioned to terminate 

Jones' parental rights, Jones was incarcerated for the fourth 

time. At that time, the child had been in the care of DSS for 

seventeen months. 

 Although Jones completed a court-ordered ninety-day 

in-patient program on June 13, 2000, at the time of the July 17, 

2000 hearing in the trial court, the child had been under the care 

of DSS for over two years. According to Jones, she had only 

recently obtained a job and completed a substance abuse program. 

In light of Jones' past noncompliance in 1998 with the methadone 

program, her conduct over the two years that DSS had custody of 

the child, her lack of any support from family or friends, her 

belated treatment that was forced on her while incarcerated, and 

her brief period of employment following release, the evidence 

showed that Jones had not remedied substantially the conditions 

that led to foster care placement. Moreover, Jones testified that 

she thinks about using heroin every day. 

 The record supports the trial court's finding that DSS 

presented clear and convincing evidence satisfying the statutory 

requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and established that 

termination of Jones' parental rights was in the child's best 

interests. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision. 

Affirmed.

- 10 -