Filed 1/29/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ASSOCIATION FOR LOS 

ANGELES DEPUTY 

SHERIFFS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B296425

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS173389)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski 

and Brian P. Ross for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall, Andrew H. Dubin and 

Emily A. Sanchirico for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________
2

SUMMARY

The Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) 

sought a writ of mandate and declaration that a provision of the 

memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ALADS and the 

County of Los Angeles is unenforceable, on the ground it violates 

wage garnishment law and the Labor Code. In the provision at 

issue, the parties agreed on how paycheck errors would be 

corrected, including how overpayments to employees would be 

recovered by the county.

The trial court sustained the county’s demurrer to the 

petition on the ground ALADS did not exhaust administrative 

remedies. We follow the analysis in an appellate case decided 

after the trial court’s ruling in this case and conclude ALADS’s 

administrative remedies are inadequate, so dismissal on that 

ground was improper. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy 

Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 918

(ALADS 2019).) We further conclude, however, dismissal was 

proper because ALADS’s petition does not state valid claims 

against the county. The home rule doctrine gives the county the 

exclusive right to regulate matters relating to its employees’ 

compensation. The county’s MOU with ALADS, approved by the 

board of supervisors, is a lawful exercise of that exclusive right, 

and the Labor Code provision at issue does not apply to a charter 

county. Consequently, ALADS cannot allege sufficient facts to 

state a cause of action.

FACTS

ALADS is the recognized employee organization that 

represents sworn nonmanagement peace officers employed by the 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. An MOU sets forth 

the understanding of ALADS and the county “regarding the 
3

wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment” of 

the covered employees. 

Article 18 of the MOU governs “Paycheck Errors,” including 

both “Underpayments” (part A) and “Overpayments” (part B). 

The “Overpayments” provision states: “1. Employees will be 

notified prior to the recovery of overpayments. [¶] 2. Recovery of 

more than 15% of net pay will be subject to a repayment schedule 

established by the appointing authority under guidelines issued 

by the Auditor-Controller. Such recovery shall not exceed 15% 

per month of disposable earnings (as defined by State law), 

except, however, that a mutually agreed-upon acceleration 

provision may permit faster recovery.” 

In April 2012, during conversion to a new payroll system, 

the county failed to apply an agreed-upon cap to certain bonus 

payments. This error resulted in salary overpayments to 

107 deputies.

In May 2017, the county sent letters to the overpaid 

deputies, informing them of the overpayment, and giving them 

two repayment options: remitting payment in full, or repaying 

the amount through payroll deductions at a specified rate. A 

spreadsheet was enclosed with each letter, specifying the 

amounts overpaid, “dating back, in some cases, to April 2012.” 

ALADS’s counsel wrote to the county, asserting the actions 

described in the May 2017 letters were unlawful. After a 

meeting, the county sent letters suspending its efforts to collect 

funds for 90 days so the parties could discuss a potential 

resolution. Apparently there was none, and on April 2, 2018, the 

county sent new letters stating it would deduct the overpayments 

as described in the May 2017 letters. 
4

Beginning on May 15, 2018, the county began the paycheck 

deductions as described in the May 2017 and April 2018 letters. 

Meanwhile, on April 19, 2018, ALADS filed its initial 

petition. After the trial court sustained a demurrer to ALADS’s 

first amended petition, ALADS filed the operative second 

amended petition, alleging the facts we have described. Further, 

the petition alleged that, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution,” 

grievances had been filed on behalf of the affected employees, 

challenging the unilateral deductions “in order to prevent the 

waiver of rights in the event that it was later determined that 

such actions were subject to the grievance procedure in the 

MOU.” 

The first and second causes of action, seeking declaratory 

relief and a writ of mandate, challenged the lawfulness of the 

county’s deductions and sought to compel the county to comply 

with state laws and statutes of limitations. ALADS alleged the 

wage garnishment law (Code Civ. Proc., § 706.010 et seq.) 

provided the exclusive procedure for withholding an employee’s 

earnings, and those earning are exempt from prejudgment 

attachment (§ 487.020, subd. (c)). 

ALADS further alleged the deductions violated Labor Code 

section 221, which makes it unlawful “for any employer to collect 

or receive from an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by 

said employer to said employee.” The petition alleged the MOU 

“does not and could not lawfully authorize Defendants to 

unilaterally deduct from [the employees’] wages in order to 

recoup alleged overpayments.” In the event the court were to 

hold otherwise, the petition alleged, the county failed to 

demonstrate that any amounts had been overpaid; in cases 

dating back to April 2012, a three-year statute of limitation 
5

applied and had expired; and the overpaid employees were 

entitled to offsets for overpaid taxes. The petition also alleged 

administrative remedies were inadequate. 

A third cause of action sought declaratory relief on the 

same bases, alleging the county had a “pattern and practice of 

unilaterally deducting the wages of ALADS-represented 

employees.” 

The county demurred, contending ALADS failed to exhaust 

its remedies under the MOU and those remedies were adequate. 

The county also asserted the petition failed to state valid claims, 

contending the home rule doctrine applied, Labor Code 

section 221 does not apply to the county, the MOU governs 

overpayments and recoupment, and the wage garnishment law 

does not apply. ALADS filed its opposition arguing to the 

contrary. 

On January 29, 2019, the trial court sustained the county’s 

demurrer without leave to amend on the ground ALADS failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies. The court granted judicial 

notice of a request for arbitration ALADS filed on behalf of one of 

its members, and also judicially noticed a November 26, 2018 

letter from ALADS’s attorney to the Employee Relations 

Commission stating “the parties have selected arbitrators for 

about 106 grievances.” From the petition and judicially 

noticeable record, the court concluded the MOU provided an 

adequate administrative remedy to resolve the dispute at issue. 

The court rejected several other contentions raised by ALADS, 

including that the MOU remedies were inadequate because they 

did not allow for resolution of issues on behalf of an entire class of 

persons. The court was “not persuaded that a representative 

action by a union is functionally equivalent to a class action.” 
6

The court did not reach the county’s arguments that 

ALADS did not allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action.

The court entered judgment of dismissal on February 20, 

2019, and ALADS filed a timely notice of appeal.

Both parties have filed requests for judicial notice. The 

county requested judicial notice of its petition to confirm a 

November 21, 2019 arbitration award in favor of the county and 

against Deputy Sheriff Robert Harris, one of the overpaid 

employees, with exhibits including the MOU, the July 19, 2018 

request for arbitration, and the arbitrator’s award. ALADS 

requested judicial notice of Mr. Harris’s “Response and Notice of 

Non-Opposition” to the county’s petition to confirm the award, 

and of the trial court’s September 11, 2020 ruling confirming the 

award. We grant both requests.

DISCUSSION

1. The Standard of Review

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. We 

review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges 

facts sufficient to state a cause of action. For purposes of review, 

we accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, but 

not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also 

consider matters that may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. 

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we 

decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect 

can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has 

abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no 

abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 

39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Plaintiff has the burden to show a 
7

reasonable possibility the complaint can be amended to state a 

cause of action. (Ibid.)

2. Exhaustion of Remedies

a. The legal principles

The principle that a party must exhaust administrative 

remedies before resorting to the courts has been described many 

times, including in ALADS 2019. The exhaustion doctrine “ ‘ “is 

principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative

autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency 

determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and 

judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to 

intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely 

necessary).” ’ [Citation.] In addition, even if an administrative 

proceeding does not eliminate the need for a subsequent judicial 

action, it ‘will still promote judicial efficiency by unearthing the 

relevant evidence and by providing a record which the court may 

review.’ ” (ALADS 2019, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 927–928.)

The exhaustion doctrine is subject to exceptions. “In 

particular, the doctrine does not apply when the available 

administrative remedy is inadequate or when it is clear that 

pursuing that remedy would be futile.” (ALADS 2019, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 928.)

b. ALADS 2019

ALADS argues its administrative remedy is inadequate for 

the same reasons described in ALADS 2019. There, the court 

found the remedy inadequate because it did not provide 

“classwide” relief. The same principle applies here.1

1 Our conclusion the administrative remedy is inadequate 

makes it unnecessary to discuss ALADS’s further argument that 

the dispute does not fall within the definition of a grievance. Nor 
8

i. The grievance procedure

ALADS 2019 involves the same MOU and grievance 

procedures that govern this case. Those procedures are described 

in detail in ALADS 2019, and there is no need to recite the 

details here. (See ALADS 2019, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 925–926.) Suffice it to say that, after various informal and 

formal steps, grievances that “directly concern or involve the 

interpretation or application of the specific terms and provisions 

of [the MOU] and which are brought by an employee who was 

represented by ALADS in any steps of the grievance procedure 

may be submitted to arbitration.” The decision of the arbitrator 

“shall be binding upon ALADS,” and “[t]o the extent the decision 

and award . . . does not require legislative action by the Board of 

Supervisors,” it is binding upon the county. 

However, as ALADS 2019 pointed out, “[i]t is undisputed 

that classwide relief is not available under the administrative 

procedures set out in the MOU.” (ALADS 2019, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 930.) And here, as in ALADS 2019, it 

appears there is no dispute that, although the same issues “would 

arise in each individual grievance, a decision on that issue in one 

member’s proceeding would not have any binding effect on other 

members’ claims.” (Ibid.) 

ii. The ALADS 2019 decision

In ALADS 2019, the complaint alleged the county failed to 

comply with compensation provisions in the MOU that required 

the county to match compensation increases given to other county 

need we discuss ALADS’s claim that it is not obligated to pursue 

the administrative remedies available to its members; ALADS 

2019 held otherwise, and ALADS has conceded the point in its 

reply brief. 
9

safety employee unions. (ALADS 2019, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 922–923.) The issues raised and the relief sought applied to 

all ALADS members. (Id. at p. 923.) Because the grievance 

procedures in the MOU “would require each of the thousands of 

individual ALADS members to pursue a grievance through 

arbitration to obtain the relief that ALADS seeks in this lawsuit, 

they are not adequate.” (Ibid.; see id. at p. 930 [“such an onerous 

and time-consuming process precludes adequate relief”].) The 

court relied on such precedents as Tarkington v. California 

Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1494. 

Tarkington concluded that, when a judicial action seeks relief on 

behalf of a class, “[i]f the [available administrative] remedies do 

not provide classwide relief, then no plaintiff need exhaust them 

before suing.” (Tarkington, at p. 1510; ALADS 2019, at pp. 931–

932.)

ALADS 2019 rejected the county’s claim the case was not a 

class action, stating: “However, it is a representative action.

Like the named plaintiff in a class action, ALADS seeks relief on 

behalf of a designated group of persons (i.e., its members). The 

form of the action is therefore not material. (Cf. [Glendale City 

Employees’ Assn., Inc. v.] City of Glendale [(1975)] 15 Cal.3d 

[328,] 341 [the plaintiff’s class allegations were ‘superfluous,’

because the plaintiff association, ‘as the recognized 

representative of city employees, may sue in its own name to 

enforce the memorandum of understanding’].) The material issue 

is whether the relief available through the administrative process 

would apply to the class of employees that ALADS represents. It 

is undisputed that it would not.” (ALADS 2019, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 932.)
10

iii. This case

The county does not contend ALADS 2019 was wrongly 

decided. The county instead asserts this case is distinguishable

and ALADS 2019 does not control, because this case involves only 

107 members rather than all the members. The county cites no 

authority and articulates no reason why that distinction makes a 

difference. Nor have we found any such authority or any reason 

for a meaningful differentiation in this case.

In a class action, “[t]here is no set number required” to 

maintain the action, and the statutory test “is whether a class is 

so numerous that ‘it is impracticable to bring them all before the 

court . . . .’ ” (Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation, 

Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1223, italics omitted, quoting 

Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) We see no reason why the same principle 

would not apply in the context of a representative action, where 

the number of members the union is representing is so numerous 

that bringing them all before the court is impracticable. 

As we have seen, a union may bring a representative action 

on behalf of its members, and we have found no precedents 

suggesting this is so only when the entire membership is affected. 

Quite the contrary. (See Anaheim Elementary Education Assn. v. 

Board of Education (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1153, 1157, 1155 [“It is 

settled that ‘[a] labor union is entitled to represent its members 

in an action which is inseparably founded upon its members’

employment’ ”; lawsuit sought relief for two temporary teachers 

and others similarly situated].)

We believe the number of affected employees here—107—is

sufficiently numerous that, if this were a class action, the 

numerosity requirement would be met. And, regardless of the 

size of the class, when the county disputes the precedential effect 
11

of any individual arbitration decision and does not agree to be 

bound by any single arbitration, it would seem there is no 

adequate alternative to a representative court action.

We therefore conclude the rule stated in ALADS 2019 

applies. The relief available through the administrative process 

would not apply to the class of employees that ALADS is 

representing. As in ALADS 2019, “administrative relief is not 

adequate in a class or representative action if it does not apply to 

the class.” (ALADS 2019, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 934.)

3. ALADS’s Petition Does Not State Valid Claims 

Against the County

“A judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been 

sustained without leave to amend will be affirmed if proper on 

any grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court 

acted on that ground.” (Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 

324.) 

As indicated at the outset, we conclude ALADS has not 

stated valid claims as a matter of law. This conclusion flows 

principally from the home rule doctrine. That doctrine gives the 

county—a charter county—the exclusive right to regulate matters 

relating to its employees’ compensation. The county has done so 

through its MOU with ALADS, approved by the board of 

supervisors, lawfully governing (among other things) 

compensation and overpayments of compensation. Neither Labor 

Code section 221 nor the wage garnishment law renders the 

recoupment provision of the MOU unlawful. 

We discuss below the various arguments and legal 

authorities ALADS proffers in opposition to this conclusion and 

explain why we find no merit in any of them.
12

a. The home rule doctrine and Labor Code 

section 221

We begin with some general principles.

The California Constitution specifically reserves to counties

(not just charter counties) the authority to provide for the 

compensation of their employees. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, 

subd. (b), see also §§ 3 & 4.) “The constitutional language is quite 

clear and quite specific: the county, not the state, not someone 

else, shall provide for the compensation of its employees. 

Although the language does not expressly limit the power of the 

Legislature, it does so by ‘necessary implication.’ ” (County of 

Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 285 (County of 

Riverside).)

As mentioned earlier, Labor Code section 221 states that 

“[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or receive from 

an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer 

to said employee.”

2 But, “unless Labor Code provisions are 

specifically made applicable to public employers, they only apply 

to employers in the private sector.” (Johnson v. Arvin-Edison 

Water Storage Dist. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 729, 733.) 

“[T]raditionally, ‘absent express words to the contrary, 

governmental agencies are not included within the general words 

of a statute.’ (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation [(2006)] 

39 Cal.4th [1164,] 1192.) The Legislature has acknowledged that 

2 Because we find Labor Code section 221 does not apply to 

the county, we do not address the county’s alternative argument 

that the collective bargaining exception in section 224 takes this 

dispute over the MOU overpayment provision outside the scope of 

section 221.
13

this rule applies to the Labor Code.” (Johnson, at p. 736; see 

Stoetzl v. Department of Human Resources (2019) 7 Cal.5th 718, 

752 [“ ‘ “Generally, . . . provisions of the Labor Code apply only to 

employees in the private sector unless they are specifically made 

applicable to public employees.” ’ ”].)

Two cases have expressly held that various sections of the 

Labor Code do not apply to charter counties under the doctrine of 

home rule. 

Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629

(Curcini) explains that, among the powers specifically delegated 

to charter counties under section 4 of article XI of the California 

Constitution “is control over matters of employee compensation.” 

(Curcini, at p. 640.) As Curcini observes, the Supreme Court has 

held that “ ‘the determination of the wages paid to employees of 

charter cities as well as charter counties is a matter of local 

rather than statewide concern.’ ” (County of Riverside, supra, 

30 Cal.4th at p. 288, quoting Sonoma County Organization of 

Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 317; 

Curcini, at p. 641.)

Curcini concluded that Labor Code provisions on overtime,

meal periods, and payment of a premium wage to compensate for 

missed meal and rest periods, “are matters of compensation 

within the county’s exclusive constitutional purview. . . . [W]e 

agree with those cases that have concluded that such 

compensation matters are of local rather than statewide 

concern.” (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 645.)

Dimon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 

1276 (Dimon) similarly held: “[T]he County has exclusive 

authority, as a charter county, to provide for the compensation

and conditions of employment of its employees, and has done so 
14

with respect to probation officers through a collective bargaining 

agreement adopted by resolution. It is thus exempt from state 

statutes and regulations governing meal breaks.” (Id. at p. 1279.) 

Dimon elaborated: “The state Constitution’s express grant 

of authority to charter counties necessarily implies that the 

Legislature lacks the authority to provide for compensation of the 

County employees. [Citation.] In other words, the determination 

of wages to be paid to employees of charter counties ‘is a matter 

of local rather than statewide concern.’ [Citation.] Consequently, 

‘[w]hen a California County [such as Los Angeles County] adopts 

a charter, its provisions “are the law of the State and have the 

force and effect of legislative enactments.” [Citations.] Under 

the “home rule” doctrine, county charter provisions concerning 

the operation of the county, and specifically including the county’s 

right to provide “for the number, compensation, tenure and 

appointment of employees” (that is, a county’s core operations) 

trump conflicting state laws.’ ” (Dimon, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1281–1282, first & second brackets added.)

ALADS contends Curcini and Dimon do not apply, “because 

the issue here is not one of employee compensation,” but rather a 

matter of statewide concern, whether an employer “may deduct 

from those wages without any legal process.” ALADS points out 

the state can regulate matters of statewide concern “even if they 

impinge to a limited extent upon some phase of local control” 

(Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 139), and a “factor to be 

considered in determining if a state law reflects a matter of 

statewide concern so that it applies to a charter county is 

whether the law is procedural or substantive” (Dimon, supra, 

166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1289).
15

ALADS contends Labor Code section 221 (and the wage 

garnishment law, discussed in more detail post) regulate only the 

methods by which the county may recover overpayments, and so 

this is a procedural matter that does not infringe on the county’s 

home rule power over employee compensation. According to 

ALADS, the garnishment and attachment laws “provide the 

framework for how an employer may deduct wages from its 

employees to collect an alleged debt,” and “leave the substantive 

ultimate decision making authority to the charter city or county 

as to whether and when to pursue recoupment for alleged debts 

owed by employees.”

We are not persuaded. As Curcini put it, in the context of

overtime, meal periods, and premium wage payment, “the link to 

compensation seems clear.” (Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 644.) In our view, the recovery of overpayments of wages 

concerns the compensation of county employees no less than the 

payment of wages in the first instance. Therefore, the recovery of 

overpayments of wages is within the county’s “exclusive 

authority, as a charter county” (Dimon, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1279) to provide for compensation, and to do so (as in Dimon)

through a collective bargaining agreement approved by the 

county board of supervisors. 

Further, we observe that the State of California can recover 

overpayments of wages from state employees notwithstanding 

Labor Code section 221 and the wage garnishment law. 

Government Code section 19838 requires reimbursement to the 

state of overpayments made to state employees through a process 

similar to that in the MOU.3 If the state can do it, we see no 

3 Government Code section 19838 states, in part: “(a) When 

the state determines an overpayment has been made to an 
16

reason why a charter county should not be able to do likewise, by 

means of the MOU which was approved by the board of 

supervisors. In short, this is fundamentally a dispute about 

wages overpaid and their recoupment by payroll deductions, and 

these are matters properly and exclusively governed by the 

agreed and approved MOU.

ALADS asserts another rationale for its claim that Labor 

Code section 221 necessarily applies to charter counties, but it 

fails as well. ALADS points out that section 220 specifies a 

number of sections of the Labor Code that do not apply to public 

employees. Section 220, subdivision (a) lists sections that do not 

apply to the payment of wages to employees of the state, and 

subdivision (b) lists sections that do not apply to the payment of 

wages of employees of any county. The latter subdivision states, 

in part: “Sections 200 to 211, inclusive, and Sections 215 to 219, 

inclusive, do not apply to the payment of wages of employees 

employee, it shall notify the employee of the overpayment and 

afford the employee an opportunity to respond prior to 

commencing recoupment actions. Thereafter, reimbursement 

shall be made to the state through one of the following methods 

mutually agreed to by the employee and the state: [¶] (1) Cash 

payment or payments. [¶] (2) Installments through payroll 

deduction to cover at least the same number of pay periods in 

which the error occurred. When overpayments have continued 

for more than one year, full payment may be required by the 

state through payroll deductions over the period of one year. [¶] 

(3) The adjustment of appropriate leave credits or compensating 

time off . . . . [¶] Absent mutual agreement on a method of 

reimbursement, the state shall proceed with recoupment in the 

manner set forth in paragraph (2).”
17

directly employed by any county, incorporated city, or town or 

other municipal corporation.” (§ 220, subd. (b).)

ALADS finds it “notable” that Labor Code section 221 is not 

listed in section 220, and concludes this means, under the 

statutory construction canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius,

that section 221 does apply. We do not see why that should be so, 

particularly as to a charter county. The Curcini court found a 

similar argument not only weak but also beside the point. Like 

the Curcini court, we find the question does not turn on 

principles of statutory interpretation but on the scope of the 

constitutional grant of power to the county.

Curcini said this: “[T]he express recognition by Labor Code 

section 220, subdivision (b), that ‘[s]ections 200 to 211, inclusive, 

and [s]ections 215 to 219, inclusive, do not apply to the payment 

of wages of employees directly employed by any county . . .’ 

provides no support for appellants’ argument that Labor Code 

sections 510, 512, 226.7 and 1194 apply to counties, because they 

are not expressly made inapplicable by section 220. The 

argument appears weak in any event, but to the extent it is based 

on a view of legislative intent, it is also beside the point.” 

(Curcini, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 641, fn. 11; ibid. [“the 

question is not what was the Legislature’s intent, but what is the 

scope of the constitutional grant of power to the county”]; accord, 

California Correctional Peace Officers’ Assn. v. State of 

California (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 646, 653–654 [rejecting claim 

that, because the Legislature expressly exempted public entities 

from specific Labor Code provisions referred to in subdivision (a) 

of section 220, the Legislature must have intended the entirety of 

the chapter on payment of wages to be generally applicable to 

public entities, referring to this as a “bald assertion,” and finding 
18

specific exemptions “cannot, by implication, be read as making” 

that entire chapter of the Labor Code generally applicable to 

public entities].) 

ALADS further contends City of Oakland v. Hassey (2008) 

163 Cal.App.4th 1477 (Hassey) shows that Labor Code 

section 221 applies “even to charter cities and counties.” We 

cannot agree.

In Hassey, the city of Oakland sued defendant Hassey, a 

police officer, for breach of an agreement he made to reimburse 

the city for the costs of his training if he left Oakland’s police 

force after less than five years. (Hassey, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1482–1484.) The court concluded the reimbursement 

agreement was valid under federal and state law, but it was 

improper to withhold the defendant’s final paycheck, because he 

was entitled to at least the statutory minimum wage under 

federal law. (Id. at pp. 1486, 1490–1493.)

As pertinent here, Hassey also concluded a triable issue 

existed as to whether the city’s seizure of the defendant’s final 

paycheck violated Labor Code section 221, since nothing in the 

record showed he agreed to the withholding of wages owed to 

him. (Hassey, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500.) The court 

observed that an MOU allowed the deduction of training costs 

from the employee’s final paycheck, but section 224 of the Labor 

Code restricted the type of deductions permitted. (See fn. 2, 

ante.) Oakland is, as ALADS pointed out below by way of judicial 

notice, a charter city. But Hassey does not stand for the 

proposition that section 221 applies to charter counties. The 

issue of whether section 221 applied to a charter city (or county) 

was nowhere raised or discussed in Hassey. A case is not 
19

authority for a proposition not even mentioned, much less 

discussed, in it. 

b. The home rule doctrine and the wage 

garnishment law 

The same principles apply to ALADS’s contention that the 

wage garnishment law makes the MOU provision on 

overpayments unlawful. 

ALADS cites several cases that have held recoupment of 

salary overpayments by payroll deductions violated the wage 

garnishment law. These do not control here, where a charter 

county, not the state, has the exclusive right to regulate matters 

relating to its employees’ compensation. 

ALADS first relies on California State Employees’ Assn. v. 

State of California (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 374 (CSEA), a case that 

predated the statute requiring the state to recoup overpayments 

of salary. CSEA held that salary deductions by the State to 

recoup overpayments to state employees violated the thenrecently-enacted (1983) wage garnishment law (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 706.010 et seq.). (CSEA, at p. 375.) The court noted that the 

wage garnishment law applies to public employees. (Id. at p. 377, 

fn. 3, citing § 708.720, subd. (b).) 

CSEA was decided in 1988. In 1989, the state enacted 

Government Code section 19838. As discussed above,

section 19838 requires reimbursement to the state of 

overpayments made to state employees, with payroll deduction as 

the default method if the parties do not agree. So, the proposition

that the wage garnishment law “applies to public employees” no

longer prevents a public employer—the state, at least—from

recouping overpayments by payroll deductions. 
20

ALADS answers this by saying that no state statute 

authorizes the county to do what the state does. That, of course, 

ignores the home rule principle we have already discussed at 

length. The county is a charter county, and its board of 

supervisors approved the MOU to which ALADS and the county 

agreed. Just as the state has authorized recoupment of 

overpayments to its employees, so has the governing body of the 

county.4

4 The county points out that Social Services Union v. Board 

of Supervisors (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 279 held a union could 

voluntarily agree through collective bargaining to collection of 

accumulated insurance premiums by way of payroll deductions, 

and the deductions “were not prohibited by the attachment and 

garnishment laws.” (Id. at p. 286; see id. at p. 287 [observing 

that both the obligation to pay the increased premiums and the 

method of payment were a result of collective bargaining, and 

“[t]herefore, the payroll deductions did not constitute 

extrajudicial seizures condemned in CSEA”].) The Social 

Services court also rejected the union’s alternative argument (like 

ALADS’s here) that “the union cannot voluntarily waive its 

members’ rights under the attachment and garnishment laws.” 

(Ibid.) But the court appears to have done so on the basis that 

Labor Code section 224 expressly authorizes agreements for the 

payment of health care costs through payroll deductions. (Social 

Services, at p. 287.) Here, the county is a charter county and 

section 224 does not apply, so Social Services (which did not 

involve a charter county) is of limited relevance on this point. 

The court ultimately concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances 

presented here, public policy would not be promoted by limiting 

the County’s recourse to the filing of individual lawsuits against 

each of its affected employees.” (Social Services, at p. 288.) 
21

ALADS next argues that a 2012 decision by the Public 

Employee Relations Board (PERB) “should be considered 

precedential,” referring us to Berkeley Council of Classified 

Employees v. Berkeley Unified School District (2012) PERB 

Decision No. 2668 <https://perb.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/

decisionbank/2268E.pdf> [as of Jan. 25, 2021], archived at 

<https://perma.cc/9BV7-8UXD> (Berkeley Council). In that case,

an expired collective bargaining agreement had a provision for 

recoupment of erroneous overpayments in salary, but the union 

declined to negotiate renewal of the provision, contending it 

improperly waived statutory rights and was a nonmandatory 

subject of bargaining. PERB agreed, concluding “the District’s 

proposed recoupment procedure for wages allegedly overpaid to 

individual employees exceeds the ambit of negotiable exceptions 

to California’s policy protecting employee wages from 

prejudgment attachment, and that the District’s proposal is 

therefore a non-mandatory bargaining subject to which the 

parties had no right to agree in the first place as it was at 

variance from mandatory external law and thus nonnegotiable.” 

(Id. at p. 11.)

Berkeley Council is not binding on this court, and we do not 

find it persuasive either, in the circumstances before us. For one 

thing, both the city and the county of Los Angeles are “expressly 

exempted . . . from PERB’s jurisdiction.” (City of Los Angeles v. 

City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Board (2016) 

7 Cal.App.5th 150, 161.) More to the point, Berkeley Council’s 

conclusion that the state policy codified in the wage garnishment 

law (and in Labor Code sections 221 to 224) “establishes an 

inflexible standard and immutable provisions” (Berkeley Council, 

supra, at p. 9) seems contraindicated by state law allowing the 
22

state to recoup overpayments (Gov. Code, § 19838, discussed 

ante). And, of course, Berkeley Council does not involve a charter 

county and does not address the home rule doctrine. Berkeley 

Council does not address whether Labor Code sections 221 to 224 

apply to public employers in the first place. As we have 

concluded and discussed in the preceding part, those provisions

do not apply to a charter county.

c. Other contentions

ALADS also argues the MOU overpayments provision “does 

not authorize the County to unilaterally deduct wages,” and does 

not permit the county to “deduct wages for alleged debts beyond 

any relevant statute of limitations.” These arguments fail as 

well.

First, despite the constant repetition of the claim the 

county is acting “unilaterally,” that is no more the case than for 

any other action taken under an MOU to which ALADS and the 

county both agreed. ALADS complains the overpayment 

provision does not use the word “deduction,” and does not 

expressly say the county may recover overpayments without first 

bringing a legal proceeding to prove the overpayments. But the 

plain meaning of the overpayment provision is clear. We have 

already determined the overpayment provision is not unlawful, 

and we see no reason why it must be any more explicit than it is. 

Second, ALADS contends that, even if the deductions are 

permitted, the three-year statute of limitations for mistake (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d)) should apply, and the county’s 

deductions dating to 2012 violate that limitation. ALADS cites 

no authorities, and is mistaken.

The county sought recoupment of the overpayments

through the administrative process specified in the MOU, not in 
23

a judicial action. “[W]hen, as here, recoupment is obtained 

through an administrative process, rather than through a lawsuit 

filed in court, the statute of limitations does not apply.” 

(Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System 

(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537, 559; id. at p. 560 [where a retirement

system “did not file a lawsuit to recoup the [pension] 

overpayments, but instead pursued recoupment through its own 

internal administrative process, it is not subject to a statute of 

limitations period set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure”]; see 

also 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Actions, § 430 [“The 

general and special statutes of limitation referring to actions and 

special proceedings are applicable only to judicial proceedings; 

they do not apply to administrative proceedings.”].) They 

likewise do not apply to the overpayment procedure in the MOU.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The county shall recover costs 

on appeal.

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, J. OHTA, J.*

* 

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.