To: Technical   Guidelines Development Committee

From:   Association of Assistive Technology Act Programs  The Arc of the United States  National Disability Rights Network  United Cerebral Palsy

Date: August 16,   2007

Re: Comments on   TGDC’s Draft Volunteer Voting System Guidelines Regarding Paper Ballot Accessibility  _________________________________________________________________________

We write to comment   on the latest iteration of the Volunteer Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) that   that the TGDC will consider at its meeting on Friday, August 17, 2007. During   adoption of the VVSG in 2005, the Election Assistance Commission acknowledged   that if a paper ballot is or can be the determinative ballot of record, it must   be accessible. With more and more states adopting paper trail and/or paper ballot   mandates and Congress considering bills to amend HAVA to require voter verified   paper ballots, it is critical for this update of the VVSG to clearly ensure   paper ballot accessibility at a level comparable to the accessibility of electronic   ballots. Four specific areas of concern need to be addressed based on the August   7, 2007 draft of the VVSG.

1) The current   version of VVSG 3.3.1-F needs to be reworded to make clear that the vote verification   provisions apply to accessible voting systems beyond DREs with Voter Verified   Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT). The current standard requires an accessibility feature   be provided “for the purpose of allowing voters to verify their votes”.   Unlike DREs with VVPATs where the paper trail is used primarily to supplement   the electronic vote with paper verification, ballot marking devices and other   paper based voting systems use paper as the core countable ballot, the primary   purpose of which is not for verification. The wording of this standard should   be modified to make clear that paper ballot based systems designated as the   accessible system are also covered by the provision, regardless of the main   purpose the paper serves.

2) VVSG 3.3.1-F   also needs to clarify that the read-back or re-display of write-in text is required   for verification purposes. Many current ballot-marking devices do not provide   write-in text in accessible form leaving voters with disabilities that use the   voting system’s audio mechanism or large print visual display with no way   to verify their votes for races in which they choose to write-in candidates.   .

3) The current   VVSG draft does not ensure to individuals with low vision an equal level of   accessibility in vote generation and vote verification of paper ballots as it   does to voters who are blind. Individuals who are blind are ensured the same   level of access for both vote generation and verification of a paper ballot   through a required audio-tactile interface (3.3.1-F.1). Unfortunately, a comparable   standard is not in place that ensures that individuals who are visually impaired   can generate and verify their paper ballots through enhanced visual display,   i.e., large text size. While two text sizes ARE required for individuals with   low vision to generate their vote (3.2.5-E), that same level of access is NOT   required for verification of a paper ballot.

Even more worrisome,   the discussion associated with 3.3.1-F references 3.2.5-G as being applicable   and that standard expressly sanctions a significantly lesser level of access   for vote verification for the Acc-VS than is required for vote generation for   individuals with low vision. The standard only requires the voting system to   “provide features that assist in reading a paper ballot” instead of requiring   delivery of a specific access feature to meet the needs of individuals who have   low vision. Further, this deficient standard then allow for “optical devices   for magnification”. This wording authorizes an individual accommodation approach   to enlarging print text through the use of manual magnifiers with no requirement   to deliver any specific level of access, (i.e. a measurable enlarged text size.)   It is impractical, and perhaps impossible, to deliver the variety of individual   magnification devices necessary to accommodate the differing level of vision   loss that may be required by a multitude of different voters. As a result, voters   with vision disabilities have no assurance that they will be able to verify   their paper ballot.

It is perplexing   to understand why the standards would require manufacturers to deliver two text   sizes for vote generation as required in 3.2.5-E, but then allow for alternative   forms of magnification (in lieu of electronic enlargement provided by the voting   system) for vote verification. Moreover, if two text sizes are required, there   is nothing that prohibits a manufacturer from utilizing alternative magnification   to deliver the required text output. Requiring two sizes of text output merely   ensures the Acc-VS provides an equal level of access for both vote generation   and verification for individuals with low vision – it does not prescribe how   that output be delivered.

4) The current   version of 3.3.3-E and 3.3.4-C must be clarified to ensure private and independent   ballot submission and vote verification is provided by the Acc-VS for individuals   who are visually impaired and those with dexterity disabilities. HAVA requires   that all voters, including individuals with disabilities, be able to privately   and independently verify and cast their ballots. However, these VVSG standards   begin with a caveat: “[i]f the voting station supports ballot submission or   vote verification for non-blind or non-disabled voters . . .” To conform with   HAVA, an accessible voting station must offer a voter with a disability the   opportunity to verify their ballot--whether it is paper or electronic—and   the ability to cast that ballot privately and independently. Accessible ballot   verification and ballot casting should not be contingent on what the voting   station supports for other voters.

**Recommendations:**   To address the above concerns the following revisions are suggested  (NEW LANGUAGE IN BOLD CAPS)--

> 
3.3.1-F Accessibility     of Paper-based Vote Verification    If the Acc-VS **USES OR** generates a **VOTER VERIFIABLE** paper record     (or some other durable, human-readable record) **THAT CAN BE THE OFFICAL     BALLOT OR DETERMINATIVE VOTE RECORD** [comment: begin strikout] [for the     purpose of allowing voters to verify their votes}[comment: end strikout],     then the system shall provide a means to ensure that the PAPER verification     record is accessible to all voters with disabilities, as identified in section     3.3 XREF.

DISCUSSION --     While paper records generally provide a simple and effective means for technology-independent     vote verification, their use can present difficulties for voters with certain     types of disabilities. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that all     voters have a similar opportunity for vote verification **OF ANY PAPER RECORD     THAT IS OR CAN BE AN OFFICIAL OR DETERMINATIVE VOTE**. Note that this requirement     addresses the special difficulties that may arise with the use of paper. Verification     is part of the voting process, and all the other general requirements apply     to verification, in particular those dealing with dexterity (e.g. 3.3.4-C     “Ballot Submission and Vote Verification”*) **AND** blindness (e.g.     3.3.3-E “Ballot Submission and Vote Verification”[comment: begin strikout][**),     and partial vision issues (e.g. 3.2.5-G “Legibility of Paper Ballots and     Verification Records”***).][comment: end strikout]

3.3.1-F.1 Audio     Readback for Paper-based Vote Verification.    If the Acc-VS **USES OR** generates a **VOTER VERIFIED** paper record     (or some other durable, human-readable record) **THAT CAN BE THE OFFICAL     BALLOT OR DETERMINATIVE VOTE RECORD** [comment: begin strikout][for the     purpose of allowing voters to verify their votes][comment: end strikout],     then the system shall provide a mechanism that can read that record and generate     an audio representation of its ENTIRE VOTE contents, INCLUDING WRITEIN VOTES.

**3.3.1-F.2     ENHANCED VISUAL DISPLAY FOR PAPER-BASED VOTE VERIFICATION.    IF THE ACC-VS USES OR GENERATES A VOTER VERIFIED PAPER RECORD (OR SOME OTHER     DURABLE, HUMAN-READABLE RECORD) THAT CAN BE THE OFFICAL BALLOT OR DETERMINATIVE     VOTE RECORD, THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL PROVIDE A MECHANISM THAT CAN READ THAT     RECORD AND GENERATE A VISUAL DISPLAY OR OTHER OUTPUT REPRESENTATION OF ITS     ENTIRE VOTE CONTENTS, INCLUDING WRITE-IN VOTES, IN AT LEAST TWO FONT SIZES     (A) 3.0-4.0 MM AND (B) 6.3-9.0 MM.**

These revisions   and additions clarify that any paper ballot that can be a determinative vote   record must have accessible verification and that includes audio AND enhanced   visual output of the entire vote record including a write-in vote. These revisions   and additions will ensure an equal level of access in both vote generation and   verification of a paper ballot for individuals with vision impairments.

> 
3.3.3-E Ballot     Submission and Vote Verification    [comment: begin strikout][If the voting station supports ballot submission     or voter verification for non-blind voters, then it][comment: end strikout]**THE     Acc-VS** shall [comment: begin strikout][also][comment: end strikout]provide     features that enable voters who **HAVE VISION IMPAIRMENTS** [comment: begin     strikout][are blind to perform these actions][comment: end strikout] **TO     VERIFY AND SUBMIT THEIR BALLOTS PRIVATELY AND INDEPENDENTLY.**

3.3.4-C Ballot     Submission and Vote Verification    [comment: begin strikout][If the voting station supports ballot submission     or voter verification for non-disabled voters, then it][comment: end strikout]     **THE Acc-VS** shall [comment: begin strikout][also][comment: end strikout]     provide features that enable voters who lack fine motor control or the use     of their hands [comment: begin strikout][to perform these actions][comment:     end strikout] **TO VERIFY AND SUBMIT THEIR BALLOTS PRIVATELY AND INDEPENDENTLY.**

These revisions   and additions clarify that the verification and submission access features must   be available on all Acc-VS. 

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