National Construction Safety Team (NCST)

Advisory Committee (Committee) Meeting

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Gaithersburg, Maryland 

December 10-11, 2013

Meeting Summary _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Advisory Committee Members: 

Jeremy Isenberg, Chair AECOM 

Ronny J. Coleman Fireforceone 

Paul A. Croce FM Global (retired)

Susan L. Cutter* University of South Carolina

Carlos Fernandez-Pello University of California, Berkeley

Jeffrey L. Garrett* CTLGroup 

Anne S. Kiremidjian* Stanford University

R. Shankar Nair exp US Services Inc. 

James R. Quiter Arup 

Sarah A. Rice The Preview Group, Inc.

NIST Representatives and Guests: 

Howard Harary Acting Director, Engineering Laboratory, Designated Federal 

Officer, NIST

Eric Letvin Director, Disaster and Failure Studies Program (DFSP), NIST

Jason Averill Acting Chief, Materials and Structural Systems Division, NIST

Marc Levitan Lead, National Windstorm Impact Reduction Program (NWIRP) 

R&D, NIST

Erica Kuligowski Joplin Task Leader, Engineering Laboratory, NIST

Frank Lombardo Joplin Task Leader, Engineering Laboratory, NIST

Long Phan Joplin Task Leader, Engineering Laboratory, NIST

Dave Jorgensen Joplin Task Leader, National Severe Storms Laboratory, NOAA

Jack Hayes Director, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program 

(NEHRP), NIST

Stephen Cauffman NIST 

Anthony Hamins NIST 

Nancy McNabb NIST 

Nelson Bryner NIST 

Fahim Sadek NIST

Michael Newman NIST 

Tina Faecke Management and Program Analyst, NIST 

Sonum Chaudhari Administrative Assistant, NIST 

Vivian Seager Senior Administrative Associate, WJE

Matt Heymann Applied Research Associates (ARA)

*Committee members not in attendance.

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Summary of Discussions 

I. Opening Remarks 

Dr. Jeremy Isenberg, Chair of the Committee, opened the first day of the meeting on December 10, 2013 

and welcomed the NCSTAC members and the NIST representatives to the meeting.

Dr. Howard Harary, Acting Director of Engineering Laboratory and Designated Federal Officer, read 

NIST’s responses to the committee’s recommendations in their 2012 report to Congress

(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NISTresponseToNCSTAC2012Recommendations.pdf

).

The Committee asked about the status of H.R.2132, the Natural Hazards Risk Reduction Act of 2013. 

NIST reported that the bill had been referred to the Subcommittee on Research and Technology, but no 

further action had occurred. NIST also described a related bill, H.R. 1786, the National Windstorm 

Impact Reduction Act Reauthorization of 2013.

The Committee asked about the behavioral/social science staffing within NIST. 

NIST reported on the accomplishments of the behavioral science program and the new social science 

position at NIST to support the Program. 

The Committee asked about the wildfire work that NIST has recently completed in Colorado. The 

Committee brought up the possibility of better coordinating the data to be stored in the repository and the 

data that is in NFIRS. The Committee then asked how the NIST repository effort is being coordinated 

with the National Association of State Fire Marshalls (NASFM) and about who controls the data at the 

International FORUM of Fire Research Directors.

II. Joplin Tornado Report 

A. Overview 

Dr. Marc Levitan, Lead, National Windstorm Impact Reduction Program (NWIRP) R&D, provided an 

overview and progress update of the NIST Technical Investigation of the May 22, 2011, Tornado in

Joplin, 

Missouri(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013LevitanJoplin.pdf).

The draft Joplin tornado report is available for public comment at: http://www.nist.gov/manuscriptpublication-search.cfm?pub_id=914787.

The Committee asked if NIST had an estimate of how many comments that they expect to receive on the 

Joplin tornado technical investigation. 

NIST responded that it does not have an estimate, but expects a fair number of comments given the 

strength of the recommendations NIST made in the draft report.

The Committee asked what else NIST can do to help implement the recommendations.

NIST responded that it can provide technical guidance, submit code changes, and partner with other 

agencies/organizations. Additionally, Dr. Jorgensen informed the Committee of activities related to the 

implementation of some of the recommendations within NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration), and that NOAA had released a statement supporting the NIST Joplin tornado effort. 

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B. Tornado Hazard Characteristics 

Dr. Frank Lombardo, Joplin Task Leader, presented a summary of the tornado hazard characteristics 

associated with the May 22, 2011 Joplin tornado

(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013LombardoJoplin.pdf). 

The Committee asked how NIST established a region with respect to the spatially-based approach to 

tornado risk estimation. 

NIST responded that there is concern that tornado risks to a community are underestimated when using 

the point-based probabilistic analysis methods. The spatially-based probabilistic analysis method 

presented in Chapter 2 of the draft report considers the area of a community (e.g., the City of Joplin) in 

relation to the tornado climatology of the surrounding region. 

The Committee stressed the need for a risk-based map for tornado design of buildings and asked how 

NIST determined the sequence of structural failure for certain buildings during the tornado and whether

the effects of aging infrastructure/buildings were considered in the structural performance evaluation. 

NIST responded that the sequence of building failure was determined based on observations made during 

on-site inspection of failed buildings shortly after the tornado, interviews of building occupants, review of 

security camera video that contained information related to the failure sequence at some building, as well 

as structural analysis of the failed buildings (NIST obtained building plans and compute estimated failure 

loads and corresponding wind speeds for some buildings, which were used to confirm and/or refine the 

failure hypotheses). The NIST study did not consider the effects of aging on building performance.

A Committee member commented that structures are generally assumed not to weaken with age, although 

corrosion and deterioration can reduce strength. Thus it’s reasonable that NIST did not consider the 

effects of aging in evaluating the performance of buildings in the Joplin tornado.

In the discussion that pertains to NIST recommendation 1 regarding wind speed measurement, a

Committee Member stated that NIST probably wants to collect vertical profiles of wind velocities, not

just at 10 m height. The recommendation should be rewritten to be more generic and not precise to a 

specific height. The Committee suggests changing the wording of the recommendation to “including nearsurface”. 

A Committee Member expressed concern that they did not see mention of retrofitting older buildings in

tornado areas in addition to the information on new construction in the report.

C. Performance of Buildings, Designated Safe Areas and Lifelines

Dr. Long Phan, Joplin Task Leader, presented on the performance of buildings, designated safe areas, and 

lifelines (http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013PhanJoplin.pdf). He

discussed the response of residential, commercial, and critical buildings, including performance of 

designated safe areas and the performance of lifelines as it relates to the continuity of operation of the

buildings.

The Committee asked if the takeaway from Finding 11 is that the tornado hazard map is inadequate? 

NIST responded that Finding 11 relates to the performance of structures with box-type construction such 

as those used in large retail buildings or school gymnasiums. Tornados are not considered in current 

building codes and standards for design of such structures. The code-level design wind speed is 115 or 

120 mph for these types of structures in Joplin, which represents wind hazards from thunderstorms and 

other windstorms, but not including tornadoes. Wind speeds at the locations of the building failures 

referred to were likely greater than 115-120 mph. Structural failure collapses began with failed roof 

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systems that provided lateral bracing for the walls. There was no redundancy to keep the rest of the 

building from collapsing when the roof was lost. We cannot rely on the roof connection to protect the 

occupants from tornadoes.

A Committee Member commented on how they thought that more attention to design and retrofitting is 

needed for tornado resistance in buildings.

A Committee Member also commented on how it is problematic that there is no mandate on resisting 

uplift loads in building design as the buildings were not able to withstand the uplift forces due to the 

tornado.

The Committee asked how NIST determined what failed first in the building.

NIST responded that it was based on calculations from obtained building plans, field observations by 

NIST, interviews with people who were in the buildings, and in a few instances, information from

surveillance videos. 

The Committee asked why there was a loss of water pressure after the event. 

NIST responded that there were thousands of leaks in the system after the event due to damage or 

destruction of homes and buildings that left water flowing from broken pipes in buildings, and uprooted 

trees that tore underground water lines. Broken gas lines presented a safety issue for the first 

responders. 

The Committee asked about the communication system and how many cell towers were damaged. 

NIST responded that twenty-one cell towers were damaged. Mobile cellular towers were brought in very 

quickly. This is an issue for first responders because many fire departments across the United States are 

using wireless devices for communication. 

D. Emergency Communications and Public Response and Tornado Deaths 

and Injuries

Dr. Erica Kuligowski, Joplin Task Leader, presented on emergency communications, public response, and 

tornado deaths and injuries

(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013KuligowskiJoplin.pdf). She 

reported on how NIST determined the pattern, location, and cause of fatalities and injuries, and associated 

emergency communications systems and public response.

The Committee asked why death certificates were issued by different states.

NIST responded that the state where the person died issues the death certificate. Some of the people 

injured during the Joplin tornado were taken to hospitals in Kansas and Oklahoma, where they 

subsequently perished. 

The Committee asked what constitutes a false alarm. A discussion followed regarding how it is 

problematic that the public’s perspective is that false warnings/alarms happen all the time and how that 

leads to an increased chance of them not taking heed of alarms in a real emergency. 

NIST responded that the definition of a false alarm is when a tornado warning is issued and no tornado is 

verified by direct observation, and then explained the process that the National Weather Service (NWS)

uses to issue a warning. When there is a false alarm, a tornado may have occurred, but there was no 

observer present or verification of the tornado.

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The Committee asked if citizens of Joplin received the alerts via mobile or social media-based 

technologies. 

NIST responded that at the time of the Joplin tornado, citizens of the area had to opt-in for alerts. Since 

the event, a new nation-wide system has been developed allowing users of cellular phones within a 

certain area surrounding the event to receive alerts automatically. 

The Committee asked how the people died at the St. John’s Regional Medical Center.

NIST responded that the cause of death was likely due to blunt force trauma caused by tornado 

debris/impact.

The Committee stated that Finding 45 is not specific to tornadoes. The Committee asked how many 

people over 60 years of age perished. The Committee stated that it takes a lot of effort to understand the 

text and suggests rewriting to clarify. The Committee asked about the cause of higher fatality rates 

among the elderly. 

NIST responded that it was likely that people over 60 were not able to withstand their injuries and had a 

poor warning and/or support network. 

E. Joplin Tornado Report Recommendations 

Dr. Erica Kuligowski then presented the sixteen recommendations NIST made in Joplin Tornado Report 

(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013JoplinTeamRecommendations.

pdf). 

Recommendation #1

The Committee asked how this recommendation can be implemented. 

NIST Response: Dr. Jorgensen explained the strategy within NOAA to implement this recommendation 

by placing numerous small radars on cell phone towers to provide more complete radar coverage. 

The Committee thought the recommendation should be more definitive. They stressed the importance of 

identifying an agency to implement this and that it needs to be developed to the point that it is affordable 

so that it gets picked up.

Recommendation #2 

The Committee asked how this recommendation relates to the repository. 

NIST Response: The repository will house data for the small number of tornadoes that NIST investigates. 

Recommendation #2 is intended to expand data collection and archival for all of the tornadoes occurring 

annually in the US (over 1,200 per year on average).

Discussion followed that focused on the types of data that NOAA collects and how that is different than 

the building/infrastructure data that NIST wants to place in the repository. NOAA has the capability to 

implement this recommendation and needs to implement it. 

Recommendation #3 

The Committee agreed that the engineering design of buildings should be based on a spatially-based 

estimate of tornado hazards. The Committee stated that the area used for normalization of the spatiallybased estimates of tornado hazards should be consistent (e.g., the estimate for Chicago does not currently 

use the same area as the estimate for Joplin). A Committee member remarked that if this recommendation 

is implemented, that it would lead to new code requirements for new construction.

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Recommendation #4

The Committee asked if the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) would develop a standard for 

the Enhanced Fujita (EF) Scale and if the government would maintain it. The Committee also asked what 

the Plan B is for NIST if the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) process doesn’t move forward. 

NIST Response: NIST described a proposal that has recently been submitted to ASCE to develop an 

ANSI/ASCE standard for estimation of extreme wind speeds in tornadoes, including improvements to the 

EF scale and potential incorporation of other methods (e.g., analysis of tree fall patterns). If ASCE 

doesn’t accept the proposal, another standards developing organization (SDO) would be approached. 

The standard would not be maintained by the government, but rather by the SDO that developed it.

A member added that if this goes to the private sector to develop and a consensus process is used, that 

NIST may not get all that it intends to with this recommendation. Another committee member remarked 

that implementation of this recommendation would help improve the scientific basis for the EF scale.

Recommendation #5

The Committee suggested that this recommendation on development and adoption of standards for 

tornado-resistant design covered a broad range of topics and that NIST should consider breaking it into 

separate recommendations to facilitate ease of implementation. The Committee suggested separating into 

three areas - lifelines, residential construction and nonresidential construction. The Committee felt NIST 

would have a better chance of having the recommendations adopted if it did this.

Recommendation #6

The Committee suggested that NIST replace “risk-consistent” with “risk-balanced”. The Committee also 

suggested that NIST replace the term “to ensure” here and in the other recommendations where it appears, 

because we cannot guarantee safety. One suggestion was to replace it with “such that”. 

Recommendation #7 

The Committee asked why the recommendation does not include hospitals. 

NIST Response: This recommendation may not apply to hospitals because if recommendation #5 was

implemented, hospitals would already be required to remain operational during and after an event.

The Committee asked that NIST look at Recommendations #5 and #7 again and ensure that there is 

consistency throughout the recommendations section. 

Recommendation #8 

The committee suggested that NIST take out the comma after ‘planning for’. 

Recommendation #9 

The Committee asked why NIST does not take this recommendation out and focus on just

Recommendations 5 and 7 instead. They asked what the benefit of this recommendation is and warned 

that it could be controversial. The Committee also stated that NIST needs to clarify what it means by ‘risk 

assessments’. A member raised concern of the possibility of lawsuits if wind refuge areas were 

designated in design drawings and then in a tornado event people die in the designated shelter area. 

Another member added that some facilities may get around t by designating a “best available refuge area” 

as opposed to taking the responsibility of a designed shelter area.

NIST Response: Recommendations 5 and 7 will require changes to construction and will take years to 

fully implement, particularly for existing buildings. Recommendation #9, to identify the best available 

refuge areas in buildings, can provide at least some benefits at very little cost in a much shorter time 

frame, until measures fully consistent with recommendations 5 and 7 are implemented.

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Recommendation #10

The Committee questioned the need for this recommendation to if it is considering all of the other 

recommendations, particularly Recommendation #5. The Committee felt that NIST will likely receive a 

lot of resistance to this potential code change and recommends that the word “prohibited” not be used. 

NIST Response: Roof aggregate contributed to the windborne debris field that caused damage to building 

envelopes.

Recommendation #11 

There were no comments to NIST on this recommendation.

Recommendation #12

There was significant discussion on what constitutes a ‘tornado-prone’ area and the Committee stated that 

this may need to be clarified in the final report. 

Recommendation #13

The Committee asked the following: (1) Does this recommendation mean more warnings? (2) Does this 

propagate the false alarm issue? (3) What does NIST mean by ‘timely response’? and (4) Will this 

recommendation that is aimed at better messages in a timely manner have unintended consequences? 

Significant discussion followed regarding clear, consistent, and accurate emergency communications. In 

the Joplin event, there was confusion with the sounding of the second siren as some misunderstood it to 

be an “all clear”. Concern was expressed with how the public associates the sounding of the siren with 

testing. Voice warnings were considered to be much more effective than alarms or sirens. The Committee 

stated that the word ‘recognizable’ should be added and a different phrase for “false alarm” should be 

coined as that phrase is already defined and understood differently by people in the fire field.

NIST Response: While false alarm has one meaning in the fire area, it is also an accepted term in 

meteorology, albeit with a somewhat different meaning. A false alarm for a tornado warning means that 

a warning was issued by the National Weather Service but it was not followed by a verified tornado. 

False alarm rates for tornado warnings are one of the performance metrics NOAA is required to report to 

Congress.

Recommendation #14 

The Committee asked NIST to review the use of the terms ‘widely’ and ‘maximize’ as they may not be 

the best words to use. The Committee stated that the most important thing is that the emergency 

communication is deployed and effective. 

Recommendation #15

The Committee stated that this research should not be just limited to tornadic events because people act 

the same way with different types of disaster events. The Committee suggested changing the wording to 

place an emphasis on the factors and not the research. A member suggested having a “tornado day” as an 

educational event similar to the Great California ShakeOut that is used to raise public awareness for 

earthquake preparedness.

Recommendation #16 

The Committee suggests that the recommendation be rewritten more strongly to make it a ‘true’ 

recommendation. One possible change would be to simply put a period after “... real-time basis.” and 

end the recommendation there. There needs to be more discussion on the term ‘false alarm’. A member 

stressed the importance of educating emergency managers on how to assess and communicate the level of 

risk so that the public has an accurate perception of the risk and reacts appropriately in an emergency 

situation. 

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III. Disaster and Failure Studies Program Updates

On December 11, Mr. Eric Letvin provided an update on the work of the Disaster and Failure Studies 

Program over the last year 

(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013Letvin_DFS-Overview.pdf). 

He reported that NIST had updated its decision criteria that provided a rational basis for evaluating 

whether NIST should conduct a study under NCST authority. The revisions in part reflected previous 

discussions with the National Construction Team Advisory Committee. The updates specifically broaden 

consideration for, and give greater weight to, damage that causes loss in building functionality. This loss 

of functionality directly affects the resilience of the community. Eric Letvin reviewed the six questions 

addressing general principles that will be used to aid in this process. 

A Committee member asked if these questions are meant to cover wildland urban-interface (WUI) firerelated incidents and Letvin responded that the decision criteria covers all types of hazards including WUI 

fires. The Committee members were especially interested in the question “Do we have sufficient 

resources (people and funding) to support a study?” and the costs for conducting such studies. NIST 

officials noted that resources were always an issue in considering whether or not to undertake a study and 

they reviewed the variety of options when the availability of sufficient funding was a problem. These 

could include making a request for additional funding as part of a larger supplemental disaster assistance 

proposal that might be made by the Administration. Other options include identifying funding that might 

be available at the Engineering Laboratory or NIST level. Costs of studies were reported to vary greatly, 

and included staff expenses as well as contractors if needed; even information technology and graphics 

expenses could be very large for studies undertaken by NIST. 

Eric Letvin noted that advances in technology including reporting mechanisms such as social media 

(notably Twitter feeds) and Wikipedia as well as the reports coming from traditional news media are an 

increasingly valuable tool in helping NIST to answer questions about what new information was likely to 

be gained if the agency were to undertake a study. Those media channels also were enormously helpful in 

conducting NIST’s investigations, as demonstrated in the Joplin study.

Eric Letvin provided scoring for nine disasters during 2013 and reviewed NIST’s decisions based on that 

scoring. The Committee was especially interested in NIST’s decision not to study the Yarnell Hill 

Wildfire (in Arizona on6/13). NIST officials explained that this event’s outcome was determined to be 

tied closely to firefighter tactics in combating wildland fires, an area in which the agency lacked enough 

relevant expertise to make a major contribution. A brief discussion followed about NIST’s past 

involvement in incidents involving firefighter-related tactics and deaths. Another discussion point 

addressed a recent proposal by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International 

Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) for a blue ribbon panel to address Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) 

challenges, and the degree to which NIST might become more active in filling the gaps in WUI 

knowledge if additional resources were available.

Eric Letvin also informed the Committee that an Engineering Laboratory Management Memo providing 

internal guidance regarding the Disaster and Failure Studies Program was revised, replacing the 1999 

version. This memo, and an accompanying draft SOP document, will help to ensure clear processes for 

making decisions regarding initiating, planning, and executing disaster and failure-related studies and 

activities. 

The Committee was provided with an update on NIST’s activities following Hurricane Sandy. In early 

FY 2013, NIST assigned a staff member (Dr. Therese McAllister) to participate in the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) study to examine the storm surge 

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and flood effects from Hurricane Sandy (October 2012) on critical facilities in the affected area (New 

York and New Jersey). The MAT report was released on November 27, 2013, and includes findings 

contributed by the NIST staff member. Committee members had several questions about the scope of 

work and the findings. Letvin described NIST’s work with the MAT as a good example of the decision 

criteria being applied to disasters. In this case, NIST contributed specific expertise to a study that was 

much broader and larger than would have been appropriate for NIST to undertake on its own. Beyond 

contributing expertise to the MAT, Letvin said that the findings will provide additional value as a case 

study for NIST research on community resilience.

Eric Letvin reported on one recent significant code change activity based on the NCST-based World 

Trade Center investigation. A new ASCE/SEI Standards Committee (“Disproportionate Collapse 

Mitigation Standard”) has been established as a result of NIST’s recommendation regarding progressive 

collapse. That committee plans to have a standard drafted within three years. 

Eric Letvin and staff also informed the Committee that based on recommendations from NIST’s 

Charleston Sofa Super Fire (a non-NCST) study, several code changes were moving through ICC’s Code 

Technology Committee. One proposal that would require risk-based periodic fire safety inspection was 

withdrawn by the relevant ICC committee; this issue is likely to be pursued by others, the Committee was 

told. A Committee member suggested that this proposal might more appropriately be embraced by state 

legislatures rather than by the ICC.

Letvin updated the Committee on NIST’s progress in developing a Disaster and Failure Events Data 

Repository that will be an archival database of significant hazard events

(http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/ncst/upload/NCSTACmtgDec2013LetvinRepository.pdf). The 

repository, which is accessible on NIST’s website, also will help ensure that this valuable information is 

organized and maintained to enable study and analysis of, and comparison with, subsequent severe 

disaster events. The repository will contain information gathered during NCST investigations as well as 

other NIST led studies. It may also hold information from non-NIST events. 

The data repository is being established in three phases:

Phase 1 (launched August 2011) includes data from NIST's six-year investigation of the collapses of three 

buildings at New York City's World Trade Center (WTC 1, 2 and 7) as a result of the terrorist attacks on 

Sept. 11, 2001. 

Phase 2 made significant progress in FY 2013, including major development work on database software 

from Purdue that will offer enhanced features and enable easy and appropriate accessibility. The data 

repository also will support the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP). The 

repository next will be populated with datasets from the 2010 earthquake in Chile and the 2011 Joplin, 

MO, tornado investigation that will serve as a pilot for this new software. NIST plans an initial release of 

the Chile and Joplin datasets on the NIST website in FY 2014. 

Phase 3 includes the implementation plan for the repository. This includes:

1. Finalizing user requirements and the creation of a system design document;

2. Developing standard data collection systems for different kinds of events;

3. Selecting the operating platform based on user requirements;

4. Populating the repository with selected high-impact data from historical and future events;

5. Developing a plan to maintain, update, operate and improve accessibility of the repository; and,

6. Establishing a process for stakeholder outreach.

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In addition to providing high-value information for researchers and the building community, the 

repository will speed NIST’s response to public requests for information, Letvin told the Committee. He 

also described NIST’s staffing plans to support the repository. 

Mr. Nelson Bryner described and demonstrated NIST’s iPhone and tablet-based applications for 

collecting WUI data and explained how this information would be integrated within the repository’s 

structure. The Committee asked multiple questions about the relationship of the WUI application to data 

formats required by the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

Several Committee members asked about NIST’s overarching strategy for the repository, and expressed 

concern that the inclusion of data from non-NIST studies might overpopulate the repository and actually 

cause it to be less, rather than more, useful. The discussion on this topic included detailed questions about 

how the repository would be managed, suggestions that NIST provide clear guidance to those seeking to 

provide data in terms of requirements, and a verbal recommendation that NIST should have a clear 

strategy going forward for how inclusive this database would be. Eric Letvin said that the discussion and 

ideas were helpful and told the Committee that these issues would be addressed in Phase 3 of the 

program.

IV. NCSTAC Discussion 

The Chair asked Committee Members Ronny Coleman and Carlos Fernandez-Pello to draft bullet points 

on the wildland urban-interface (WUI) and Shankar Nair to draft a statement to Tina Faecke (NIST) 

before Christmas.

The Committee Members asked NIST to provide input to ASCE7 and to develop a tornado hazard map. 

The Chair endorsed the idea of NIST developing a tornado hazard map and suggested that NOAA would 

be a good and appropriate partner for them.

The Committee Members discussed the protocol for the alert systems and how to get the right information 

into the hands of the decision makers. There needs to be a standard nationwide protocol and use of new 

technologies such as reverse 911 and improvement of systems for getting people to safety quickly with 

timely alerts and few false alarms. They agreed on the need to educate the public and the need for 

standards and protocols to be in place and discussed how to teach a standard response plan.

A Committee Member commented on how the NIST Recommendation # 16 read more like a request for 

funding instead of a plan. 

A Committee Member raised concern about the data repository and how maintaining it will become 

increasingly cumbersome. They suggested that it be used for comprehensive events data collection with 

links to data sets instead of all data being individually tagged, which in their opinion, would make it more 

manageable and use fewer resources. They noted that FM Global uses an event based system 

successfully.

NIST Response: NIST plans to meet with the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2014 to learn how 

they handle their data management and to see if they have any recommendations for effective data 

management for NIST. 

The Chair asked NIST about who makes the decisions regarding the data repository.

NIST Response: Letvin responded that as the Director of the Disaster and Failure Studies Program, he 

makes the final decisions, but others contribute to the decision making process. NIST initially tried to 

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hire one person to assist with the data repository, but it was too broad a task for one person. NIST plans 

to hire three people, each having as part of their duties to assist with the data repository in the future.

The Chair asked how NIST is designing the NIST website with IT Personnel so that it will also be 

intuitive and user friendly for architects and engineers to use.

NIST Response: Letvin acknowledged that it is a challenge to balance having the NIST website 

developed with IT Personnel and make it user friendly to architects and engineers. They are working with 

Purdue and it is a give and take process and involves much collaboration. They tested this with the Chile

data set and had good feedback. Marc Levitan (NIST) is the lead for the Joplin data set.

A Committee member commented that Eric Letvin was managing the data repository well and that they 

understand the challenge behind trying to please everyone with a task this huge. They suggested that 

NIST take advantage of data sets that are collected from other agencies/groups, but another Committee 

Member disagreed as they thought this would be a shift away from what was agreed upon. Another 

Committee Member suggested using only NIST data as that would limit the events and make it more 

manageable.

A Committee Member suggested linking the NIST website with another entity such as NSF. Another 

Committee Member responded by saying if NIST did that, they would have to post a disclaimer on their 

website.

The Chairman asked if NIST envisions publishing a set of data collection standards and if they did, would 

they post it in the NIST repository.

NIST Response: Letvin said yes, but they would have to do this for flood, wind, fire and earthquakes. 

Right now they have just completed the event data repository for WUI. He added that for the repository to 

be successful, this needs to be done for all disaster types, which is part of Phase 3.

A Committee Member mentioned that there were six recommendations last year and that lifelines 

remained an important recommendation this year.

Eric Letvin asked how the Committee Members planned to submit their comments on the Joplin tornado 

investigation draft report. The Chair asked the Members to submit their comments individually.

The Chair thanked the Committee members for their assistance in arranging this meeting and stated that 

they were very impressed with the progress that NIST has made. The Chair asked if another meeting was 

scheduled before this time next year and the Committee stated their preference in meeting in the Fall 

instead of December.

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