SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2523-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JERYL MIDDLETON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted March 21, 2022 – Decided June 23, 2022

Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-01-

0101.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2523-19

Defendant Jeryl Middleton appeals from a judgment of conviction that 

was entered on November 14, 2018, after defendant pled guilty to one count of 

second-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(b), and second-degree 

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). The trial 

court sentenced defendant consistent with his plea agreement to an aggregate 

seven-year term with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility. 

On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction by arguing the trial court 

erred by denying his motion to suppress the inculpatory, custodial statement he 

gave to law enforcement. Specifically, defendant argues the following one 

point:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS 

STATEMENT BECAUSE THE RECORD CLEARLY 

DEMONSTRATES THAT HIS PROLONGED 

CONFINEMENT AMONG CO-DEFENDANTS WHO 

PRESSURED HIM TO TALK RENDERED HIS 

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 

INVOLUNTARY.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we disagree with defendant's 

contention and affirm.

The facts leading to defendant's arrest and conviction are well-known to 

the parties and for our purposes need not be set forth at length in this opinion. 
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Suffice it to say that defendant was arrested after pointing a handgun at an 

individual in order to scare that person into not reporting him to police about an 

unrelated alleged criminal act. A day after his August 16, 2017 arrest, defendant 

provided an inculpatory statement to police in response to their interrogation. 

Thereafter, a grand jury issued an indictment charging defendant with various 

offenses, including the two to which he ultimately pled guilty. 

Prior to pleading guilty, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement 

he gave to police. In response, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 

at which the only witnesses were Perth Amboy Police Officers George Irizarry 

and Davis Salazar, and defendant. Prior to considering the testimony, the trial 

court reviewed the video tape of defendant's interrogation, portions of which 

were played back again during the hearing. 

Officer Irizarry was the first to testify. He confirmed that he and other 

officers like him who are assigned to desk duty are responsible for checking 

holding cells prior to a prisoner being placed inside and ensuring that all 

dangerous items are removed from prisoners before they are placed in the cell. 

They are also responsible for performing inspections of the prisoner every thirty 

minutes while he or she is inside the holding cell. When not conducting those 
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inspections, the on-duty officer has cameras at the desk that provide the officer 

with the ability to see the holding cell area at all times.

As to defendant, Irizarry testified about the completion of the confinement 

report for defendant and the monitoring records that were prepared during his 

incarceration in the holding cells. According to the records that were admitted 

into evidence, defendant was placed in a cell at 6:41 p.m. on August 16 by 

another police officer. The next morning, Irizarry assumed responsibility for 

defendant and made various entries in the monitoring records, indicating notes 

about his observations of defendant. 

Those records indicated that defendant received food once and was lying 

in his cell at various times during the night. Irizarry had no recollection of 

whether defendant was sleeping soundly or if defendant ever asked for any 

medical attention. If he had, then an ambulance would have been called to attend 

to defendant and the request would have been noted on the records. There were 

no such notations.

The records also did not indicate that defendant got sick to his stomach or 

vomited in his cell. If he had, it would have been notated in the records and he 

would have been removed from his cell so that it could be cleaned. 
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Officer Salazar testified next. He was the desk monitor prior to Irizarry 

beginning his shift. According to Salazar, he conducted the inspections every 

thirty minutes between 3:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and defendant appeared to be 

sleeping the entire night. Although Salazar could not be sure defendant was 

sleeping, he did note that his eyes were closed during the inspections. Salazar 

did not notice whether defendant got sick or vomited. 

Salazar also confirmed his notations in the monitoring records that were 

made during his shift, which did not include any indication that anyone removed 

defendant from the cell or went into the cell. Salazar also confirmed that 

defendant never made any complaints.

Defendant was the last witness to testify. According to defendant, prior 

to being taken for interrogation, he was intimidated by detectives and his 

codefendants, who were incarcerated in the next cell, in an effort to pressure 

him to give a statement to the police. Defendant began to become anxious and 

eventually started feeling sick. He confirmed that he was given a "fast-food 

meal" that made him vomit in his cell within an hour after eating the meal. 

Thereafter, he requested medical attention but was told that it would not be 

provided until he gave a statement. 
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Defendant disagreed with the officers' testimonies that he was lying down 

in his cell during the night. According to defendant, he spent most of the time 

on his feet, feeling exhausted and ill. Defendant also claimed that he got into 

an altercation with one of the police officers who was conducting inspections of 

his cell and, despite his request for medical attention, he did not receive any 

until he gave his statement, just before he was taken to the county facility. 

According to defendant, it was only after being in custody for nineteen 

hours under these conditions that he finally gave the statement to police because 

he believed that was the only way he could be released from custody. Although 

he still felt ill at the time, defendant confirmed that at 9:32 a.m. on August 17 

he signed the Miranda1 waiver form and provided a statement to the police.2 

Notably, defendant did not dispute that he received the correct warnings or that 

he understood them. And, in response to questions posited by the trial court, 

defendant confirmed that he made no request for medical attention during the 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2

 There were inconsistencies between the monitoring records' time entries as 

compared to the interrogating officers' recording of the times defendant was 

questioned and returned to his cell. Those inconsistencies are not pertinent to 

the appeal. 
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time that he was giving his statement to police or otherwise indicate he was not 

feeling well during that time.

After the completion of the testimony, counsel presented closing 

arguments to the trial court. Defendant specifically argued that 

under the totality of the circumstances [defendant's] 

statement [could not] be considered to be knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent[ as] [h]e was deprived of 

sleep after a too lengthy detention, and it certainly, in 

any objective person, would create the impression I'm 

not going to get out of here until I tell them what they 

want to hear. . . . . 

Additionally, [the police] added the extra layer of 

pressure of obviously agitating his co-defendants 

against him . . . with the theory of . . . you're only here 

because of [defendant]. So he had the pressure of both 

the codefendants and law enforcement pressuring him. 

He wasn't feeling well. . . . . He reacted poorly

to the . . . food . . . . No sleep, feeling ill, asked for 

medical attention, pressured by law enforcement and 

his co-defendants who strategically placed them by him 

so he could be pressured without any hope of ever 

leaving until he gave the statement.

Counsel was also concerned about the State's failure to produce the video 

of the holding cell taken during the defendant's confinement.

After considering the parties' arguments, the trial court placed its reasons 

on the record. The court found that both officers were credible; and as to 

defendant there was not "anything to corroborate" defendant's self-serving 
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statements that he was deprived of sleep, felt ill after he ate at 12:40 a.m., and

that he vomited, which were contradicted by the confinement records. The court 

noted defendant testified that an ambulance arrived there after he gave his 

statement, but it was determined that he was not sick and he was transferred to 

the county jail.

After reviewing the case law, the court found that defendant was subject 

to custodial interrogation and that, based on its review of the video tape,

"defendant was properly advised of his Miranda warnings" and confirmed that 

he understood them verbally as well as when he signed the waiver certificate at 

9:32 a.m.

The court turned next to the issue about whether the waiver was 

"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." The court observed that the defendant 

gave two statements, one that lasted from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.

and then he was briefly brought back for additional questioning for "just several 

minutes." The court also noted that defendant was initially given his Miranda

warning, and at the second interrogation he "was informed that his Miranda

rights still apply and [asked] if he had any questions regarding his Miranda

rights" to which defendant confirmed "he understood." 
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The court was satisfied from the video tape that the State met its burden 

of proof. The court highlighted that there was no indication that "defendant 

[was] in any distress at the time of the questioning." The court rejected 

defendant's contentions, finding "for the majority of the time [d]efendant was in 

the cell, he was at least lying down and not in any discomfort or distress." Based 

on that evidence, the court found that defendant's contentions were "not only 

disingenuous, but frankly without merit." 

According to the court, in the video, defendant appeared "relaxed, 

somewhat comfortable." The court found there was no "pressure applied or any 

deception involved, and at no point [did] . . . defendant ever ask for an attorney 

during the interview," and "it[ was] evident that he[ was] not tired, even though 

he had been detained for some time there." 

Turning to defendant's demeanor during his interrogation, the court 

observed that defendant was "calm, willing to describe the assault in question"

and "[h]e [gave] some significant details as to the reason behind, [the] 

motivation in . . . assaulting the victim. The officers don't appear to intimidate 

the defendant in any manner."
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order memorializing 

its decision. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty as noted earlier and was 

subsequently sentenced. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues that, while the trial court found insufficient 

evidence that defendant was ill or deprived of sleep, the court did not make any 

findings that, as defendant argued, his waiver was involuntary because he spent 

nineteen hours in confinement, was subjected to pressure from his co-defendants 

who were in adjacent cells, or because "he was suffering from anxiety and was 

repeatedly pressured by police to waive his right to remain silent." According 

to defendant, if the trial court had accounted for those circumstances, it could 

not have found that defendant's waiver was "knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary." We disagree. 

Our "review of a trial court's factual findings at an evidentiary hearing is 

limited." State v Cotto, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2022) (slip op. at 

20) (citing State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015)). We give deference to 

a trial court's findings of fact on pre-trial suppression motions and will not 

reverse unless the findings are so mistaken and unsupported by the evidence that 

it is necessary to intervene. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017); see also

State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 210 (2022) (stating "we defer to the factual findings 
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of the trial court if those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record"). Of particular significance to this case, in S.S., the Supreme 

Court held that this deferential standard of review applies to the interpretation 

of video and documentary evidence, as well as to live testimony taken at pretrial 

hearings. 299 N.J. at 374. "In contrast to the deference we owe to a trial court's

factual findings, a trial court's interpretation of the law and 'the consequences 

that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" 

Cotto, ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 20) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 

412, 425 (2014)).

In reviewing whether a trial court correctly denied a motion to suppress 

an inculpatory statement given to police by a defendant while in custody, we 

weigh the facts found by the trial court against the well-settled ideal that "[t]he 

privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, is one of the most important protections of the 

criminal law." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 19) (alteration in original) (quoting Sims, 

250 N.J. at 211). As the Supreme Court has explained, "New Jersey law 

'maintains "an unyielding commitment to ensure the proper admissibility of 

confessions."'" Ibid. (quoting Sims, 250 N.J. at 211).
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Here, the question before the court was not whether the defendant waived 

his rights, but whether "the State [proved] beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

waiver was given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently in light of all the 

circumstances." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 20-21). When a trial court determines the 

State met its burden and admits the statement into evidence, "[we] engage in a 

'searching and critical' review of the record to ensure protection of a defendant's 

constitutional rights." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 19-20) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 

N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)). In doing so, we hew to our already noted mixed 

standard of review. Like the trial court, we consider "the totality of the 

circumstances," based on the facts as found by the trial court that were supported 

by the evidence, to determine whether the trial court correctly admitted an

inculpatory custodial statement. State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 42-43 (2019). 

Here, we conclude the trial court properly considered the totality of the 

circumstances in deciding whether defendant's statement was given knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently based on the evidence presented at the hearing, 

including the video tape. We agree with the trial court's conclusions that no 

evidence demonstrated defendant's statement was coerced as there was no 

indication in the record that his will was overborne or that his statement was 

otherwise given involuntarily.
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We affirm therefore for the reasons stated by the trial court in its cogent

oral decision. We conclude defendant's argument to the contrary is without 

sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-

3(e)(2), as there is nothing in the record to support defendant's allegations that 

his statement was given as a result of being harassed by police or co-defendants 

or the result of being ill, either while incarcerated or while he gave his 

statement.3 

Affirmed.

3

 We note that we also conclude that defendant's reliance on State v. Kelly, 61 

N.J. 283, 286-87, 294 (1972), is inapposite because there the issue was whether 

defendant was entitled to a hearing on the admission of inculpatory statements 

given to private citizens, as compared to law enforcement personnel, in response 

to alleged physical coercion.