IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERESA LAWSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 15-00026-N

)

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY )

COMPANY, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the undersigned on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 

12) filed on February 20, 2015, Defendant’s response in opposition (Doc. 14) and 

Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 17). By the consent of the parties, the Court has designated 

the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of 

judgment in this civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 73. (Docs. 16, 20) Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 12) is DENIED.

I. Background

On December 17, 2014, Plaintiff Teresa Lawson (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 

against Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. (“Defendant”) in the 

Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama. (See Doc. 1-1 at 1-2). On January 22 

2015, Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 

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1446, alleging diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) as the sole basis for the Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. (See generally Doc. 1). Plaintiff has filed a motion to 

remand (Doc. 12) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that Defendant has failed 

to meet its burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction in this action. 

Defendant has timely filed a response (Docs. 14) in opposition to the motion.

II. Analysis

“It is . . . axiomatic that the inferior federal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction. They are ‘empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power 

of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,’ and which have 

been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress.” Univ. of 

S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. 

Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). 

Generally, a defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court 

of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction...to the 

district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place 

where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See also Roe v. Michelin N. 

Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1060 (11th Cir. 2010) (“If a state-court complaint states a 

case that satisfies federal jurisdictional requirements, a defendant may remove the 

action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).”). “Just as a plaintiff 

bringing an original action is bound to assert jurisdictional bases under Rule 8(a), a 

removing defendant must also allege the factual bases for federal jurisdiction in its 

notice of removal under [28 U.S.C. ]§ 1446(a)[,]” Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 

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F.3d 1184, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2007), and “bears the burden of proving that federal 

jurisdiction exists.” Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Moreover, the law is clear that, “ ‘[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant 

federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes 

strictly. Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand 

to state court.’ ” City of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 

(11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 411 (citation omitted)).

Defendant’s sole basis for removal is diversity of citizenship. Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a), federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions between 

citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or 

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See Darden v. Ford Consumer 

Finance Co., 200 F.3d 753, 755 (11th Cir.2000) (to qualify for diversity jurisdiction, 

complaint must establish “complete diversity of the parties’ citizenship and an 

amount in controversy exceeding $75,000”); Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc ., 154 

F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.1998) (similar). “In light of the federalism and separation 

of powers concerns implicated by diversity jurisdiction, federal courts are obligated 

to strictly construe the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction ... [and] to 

scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute 

has defined.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir.2000) 

(citations omitted).

In its notice of removal, Defendant has properly alleged facts establishing 

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that this is a civil action “between citizens of different States[,]”1 § 1332(a)(1), and 

Plaintiff does not challenge the allegations supporting diversity of citizenship. (Doc. 

12 at 2, ¶ 5). Plaintiff does, however, challenge whether the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges state law claims for breach of contract and bad 

faith arising from Defendant’s denial of her claim under an uninsured motorist auto 

insurance policy for a “loss or damage” suffered by her “on or about November 12, 

2013.” (Doc. 1-1 at 2-5). Plaintiff’s accident occurred in Foley Alabama, and 

involved an unknown motorist who left the scene. (Id. at 3-13). The complaint does 

not plead a specific amount of damages, instead demanding “compensatory and 

punitive damages” for “past and future pain and suffering; ...metal anguish;... lost 

wages and/or lost earning capacity;... loss of enjoyment of life;...medical expenses; 

permanent injuries and/or disabilities; and or others as proven.” (Id. at 2-3). 

Plaintiff does not contend that the amount in controversy is below the 

$75,000 threshold, nor does she deny that she is claiming damages of at least that 

amount. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to establish the jurisdictional 

amount by a preponderance of the evidence, and is instead improperly relying on 

sheer speculation as to amount in controversy.

 1 Specifically, Plaintiff, a natural person, is alleged to be a citizen of Alabama, while 

Defendant, a corporation, is alleged to be a citizen of Illinois, as it was incorporated under 

that state’s laws and has its principal place of business there, see § 1332(c)(1) (generally, 

“for the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title...a corporation shall be 

deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated 

and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business...”).

While Plaintiff has also sued fictitious defendants, “[i]n determining whether a civil 

action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a)..., the citizenship 

of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” § 1441(b)(1).

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“If a plaintiff makes an unspecified demand for damages in state court, a 

removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” 

Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061 (quotation omitted). See also Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319 

(“Where, as here, the plaintiff has not pled a specific amount of damages, the 

removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.”). “In some cases, 

this burden requires the removing defendant to provide additional evidence 

demonstrating that removal is proper.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061 (citing Pretka v. 

Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2010)). The Eleventh Circuit has 

explained that “if the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face of the 

documents before the court, or readily deducible from them, then the court has 

jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand.” Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1211. Moreover, 

because “the district court has before it only the limited universe of evidence 

available when the motion to remand is filed-i.e., the notice of removal and

accompanying documents,” if that evidence is inadequate to establish jurisdiction, 

then “neither the defendants nor the court may speculate in an attempt to make up 

for the notice’s failings.” Id. at 1214-15 (footnotes omitted). The law is clear that 

“the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking to the stars.” Id. at 

1215.

Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s motion to remand makes the following 

allegations in support of requisite amount in controversy, appearing to argue that 

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the amount in controversy is apparent from the complaint and supporting exhibits:

The evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff’s compensatory 

damages for UM benefits likely equal an amount of at least $100,000 

or greater. Plaintiff shows in her counsel’s letter to State Farm, in the 

Complaint, and in the motion to remand that she seeks the separate 

$50,000 benefits of all of the “policies” and will therefore at least seek 

more than the maximum benefit of two of the three policies of $50,000.

In the August 19, 2014 letter, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that “we plan 

on pursuing not only the medpay benefits under her 3 policies that 

were in effect, but also the UIM coverage as it relates to this accident.” 

(Doc. 1-1, at 34). The Complaint further noted an intent to pursue all of 

the $50,000 policies. It alleged that “policies were in full force and 

effect at the time of the incident made the basis of this suit, and . . . 

each policy provided $50,000 of uninsured motorist coverage per 

person.” (Compl., at 2, ¶ 3). Plaintiff admitted in her motion to remand 

that “Plaintiff is seeking uninsured motorist benefits under the 

insurance policies issued by Defendant.” (Doc. 12, at 1) (emphasis 

added). Nothing in the record refutes her expressed desire to seek the 

benefits of all policies. Accordingly, the value of the compensatory 

damages on the UM benefits claim alone is likely worth more than an

amount equal to or more than $100,000 because Plaintiff must exhaust 

the benefits of the first two of her policies to claim any of the third 

policy of $50,000.

(Doc. 14 at 5, ¶ 2-3). Defendant notes that “stacking” of uninsured motorist policies 

in a claim as Plaintiff has done is a common acceptable legal practice.2 

In reply, Plaintiff maintains that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff has pointed out the 

maximum amount of coverage that would possibly be available to her is $150,000, 

does not automatically mean her claim is worth at least $100,000.” (Doc. 17 at 1-2, 

¶ 2). Specifically, Plaintiff argues:

Obviously, just because there is available insurance coverage does not 

automatically mean a plaintiff’s claim is valued at two-thirds of the 

available coverage. The simple truth is that at the time Defendant 

removed this case there is no way to know what Plaintiff[‘]s case is 

 2 Pursuant to § 32-7-23(c), Ala. Code, 1975, Plaintiff can stack the UM coverages up to three coverages 

on one policy. There is no limit to the number of policies an insured may stack. State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Ins. Co. v. Fox., 541 So. 2d 1070 (Ala. 1989). (Doc. 14 at 5.2).

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potentially worth. If there were three separate $500,000 policies could 

it automatically make the Plaintiff[‘]s claim worth at least $1,000,000? 

A removing defendant cannot satisfy its burden of establishing federal 

jurisdiction by making a conclusory allegation in the notice of removal 

that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without setting forth the 

underlying facts supporting the assertion. Williams v. Best buy Co., 

Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-1320 (11th Cir. 2001). There has simply been 

no facts, or actual evidence, put forth by Defendant in support of its 

allegation that Plaintiff’s compensatory damages for UM benefits 

equals $75,000, much less $100,000.

(Id. at 2, ¶ 3)(internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s assertion that the availability 

of insurance coverage does not automatically attach a value to claims presented by 

any plaintiff is correct. Rather, Plaintiff’s claims create an inference as to the 

amount in controversy. Defendant notes that in order to attain any amount of 

recovery from the third policy Plaintiff would necessarily have to exhaust the first 

two policies and Plaintiff continues to claim that she is seeking to recover from all 

three policies. By demanding payment from all three of the policies, Plaintiff is 

seeking to recover more than $100,000. The fact that Plaintiff’s demand for 

recovery was made in this manner, is evidence that she seeks more than the 

required jurisdiction threshold. 

If a defendant alleges that removability is apparent from the face of 

the complaint, the district court must evaluate whether the complaint 

itself satisfies the defendant's jurisdictional burden. In making this 

determination, the district court is not bound by the plaintiff's 

representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the 

plaintiff is in the best position to evaluate the amount of damages 

sought. Indeed, in some cases, the defendant or the court itself may be 

better-situated to accurately assess the amount in controversy.

Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district courts to make reasonable 

deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations 

from the pleadings to determine whether it is facially apparent that a 

case is removable. Put simply, a district court need not suspend reality 

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or shelve common sense in determining whether the face of a 

complaint ... establishes the jurisdictional amount.” Instead, courts 

may use their judicial experience and common sense in determining 

whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional 

requirements.

Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-62 (citations and quotation omitted).

Generally, “events occurring after removal which may reduce the damages 

recoverable below the amount in controversy requirement do not oust the district 

court's jurisdiction.” Poore v. Am.–Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th 

Cir. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized by Alvarez v. Uniroyal 

Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639, 641 (11th Cir. 2007). Accord One Buckhead Loop Condo. 

Ass'n, Inc. v. Pew, 484 F. App'x 331, 334 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Thus, 

“[w]here...‘the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment 

of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount, this does not deprive 

the district court of jurisdiction.’ ” Bankhead v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 529 F. 

Supp. 2d 1329, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red 

Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292 (1938)). See also Davison v. Lefever, Civil Action No. 13-

00157-N, 2013 WL 4012654, at *2-3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2013) (“In determining its 

subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court is not concerned with the plaintiffs' present 

or future intentions; the critical point in time is, instead, when the case was 

removed.)

That said, it is not true that “post-removal facts must never be considered in 

evaluating removal jurisdiction. Rather, the law is clear that post-removal 

developments are properly weighed where they shed light on the amount in 

controversy at the time of removal.” Land Clearing Co., LLC v. Navistar, Inc., Civil 

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Action No. 11–0645–WS–M, 2012 WL 206171, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2012) 

(Steele, J.) (emphasis in original) (citing Pretka, 608 F.3d at 772–73; and Sierminski 

v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000)). Accord Davison, 2013 

WL 4012654, at *3. 

“[W]hat is prohibited are post-removal changes in the amount in 

controversy, not post-removal clarifications of the amount that was in 

controversy at the moment of removal.” Jackson v. Select Portfolio 

Servicing, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (S.D. Ala. 2009). Thus, if a 

plaintiff comes forward after removal and clarifies (as opposed to 

altering) facts bearing on the amount in controversy, courts in this 

Circuit routinely accept such evidence in determining whether § 1332 

jurisdiction existed at the moment of removal.

Land Clearing, 2012 WL 206171, at *3.

Plaintiff has made no offering of evidence to rebut the claims made by 

Defendant. Although there is no requirement for such, the only “clarification” 

offered by Plaintiff goes to the amount owed to Medicaid.3 Moreover, Plaintiff has 

not stipulated or clarified that she seeks $75,000 or less. The Defendant has met its

burden in proving beyond a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 

controversy requirement is met.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Defendant has 

satisfied its burden of showing the existence of the jurisdictional amount by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, removal was proper and federal subject 

 3 Plaintiff states that only $7,104.46 in medical payments are due to be reimbursed 

to Medicaid. 

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matter jurisdiction properly lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Remand (Doc. 12) is DENIED.

DONE this the 30th day of March 2015.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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