UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4678

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

LARRY JAMIE LEWIS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:07-cr-00481-TLW-10) 

Submitted: August 26, 2009 Decided: December 4, 2009 

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, Darlington, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Larry Jamie Lewis pled guilty to conspiracy to possess 

cocaine base with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 

U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West Supp. 2009) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(2006). The district court sentenced Lewis to 120 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. 

His counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), claiming there are no meritorious issues for 

review but questioning whether the district court complied with 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Lewis’s guilty plea. Lewis’s 

pro se supplemental brief presents the additional issues of 

whether his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 

pressuring him to plead guilty, whether the search warrant 

violated the Fourth Amendment, whether the Government committed 

prosecutorial misconduct by refusing to share discovery with the 

defense before trial, and whether Lewis was denied a proper 

arraignment. Lewis also moves this court for appointment of a 

new attorney. 

 Because Lewis did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise raise Rule 11 error, this 

court’s review is for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 

535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). Thus, it is Lewis’s burden to show an 

error that was plain and affected his substantial rights, and 

show that this court should exercise its discretion to notice 

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the error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 529 (4th 

Cir. 2002). The district court, through colloquy with Lewis, 

informed him of the nature of the charge against him, the 

mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and of 

the various rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. In 

addition, the district court determined there was a factual 

basis for the plea. Our review of the transcript reveals full 

compliance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and we 

conclude that Lewis pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily. 

 Turning to Lewis’s claim that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel, such claims are generally not cognizable 

on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th 

Cir. 1997). Instead, ineffective assistance claims are 

appropriately brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 

2009) to allow for adequate development of the factual record. 

See King, 119 F.3d at 295. A defendant may raise an ineffective 

counsel claim on direct appeal only if the record conclusively 

demonstrates that defense counsel did not provide effective 

representation. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 

(4th Cir. 2006). To prove ineffective assistance a defendant 

must show both “that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” and “that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (noting 

that certain types of ineffective assistance warrant a 

presumption of prejudice). We have reviewed the record, and it 

does not conclusively demonstrate that defense counsel did not 

provide effective representation. Accordingly, we decline to 

address this claim on direct appeal. 

 Lewis raises additional issues in his pro se brief 

relating to the search warrant, discovery, and his arraignment. 

However, a valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional 

antecedent defects, including constitutional challenges to the 

pretrial proceedings. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 

n.2 (1975); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

Lewis’s intelligent and voluntary guilty plea established his 

factual guilt, rendering any constitutional violations in the 

pretrial proceedings irrelevant. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Lewis’s conviction and sentence, and deny 

his motion for appointment of new counsel. This court requires 

that counsel inform Lewis, in writing, of the right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Lewis requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

Lewis. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED