MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 8 ME 31 Docket: Yor

- 17

- 451 Submitted

On	B riefs : February	26,	2018 Decided: March	6,	2018

Panel: ALEXANDER , J.,	and , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.

IN	RE CHILD	OF	HEATHER	W.

PER	CURIAM [¶1] Heather W.	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court (Springvale, Foster,	J. )	terminating	her	parental	rights	to her	daughter pursua nt

to 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4055(1)( A )(1)(a)	 and (B)( 2)(a),	 (b)(i) , (ii ) , (iv) (2017 )

. 1 She challenges	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 court’s	 finding	 of parental	 unfitness	 and	 the	 court’s	 discretionary	 determination	 that
termination	 is	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 child. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)

. Additionally,	 the	 mother	 argues	 that	 the	 Department	 failed	 to	 meet	 its obligation to	 provide	 reunification	 services pursuant	 to 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4041 (2017) .		We	affirm	the	judgment

.

1 The court entered	a	judgment	terminating	the father’s parental	rights	to	the child after	the father consented	 to	 termination. See 22	M.R.S.	 § 4 055(1)(A)(1)(a),	 (B)(1)	 (2017). The father does	 not appeal	from	that	judgment

.2 [¶2 ] Based	on	competent	evidence	in	the	record,	the	court	found	by	clear and	convincing	evidence	that the	mother (1) is unable	to	protect	the	child	from jeopardy	and	these	circumstances	are	unlikely	to	change	within	a	time that is reasonably	 calculat ed	 to	 meet the	 child’s	 needs, (2) is unable	 to	 take responsibility	for	the	child	within	a	time that is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet
the	child’ s	needs,	and	(3) has	failed	to	make	a	good	faith	effort	to	rehabilitate and	 reunify	 with	 the	 child	 pursuant	 to	 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4 041

. See 22	 M.R.S. § 4055(1) (B)(2)(b)(i),	(ii),	(iv) .		The	court	also determined that	termination	of the	 mother’s	 parental	 rights	 is	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest. See	 id. § 4055(1) (B)(2)(a). We	review	the	trial	court’s	factual	findings supporting	the
unfitness	determination	and	the	best	interest	determination for	clear	error , and
we	 review the ultimate	decision to	 terminate	parental	 rights	 for	an	abuse	 of
discretion

. In	re	Anastasia	M

. , 2017	ME	213 ,	¶ 2 , 172 A.3d	922

. [¶3 ] The	court	b ased	its	determinations	on the	following	findings	of	fact. The	mother	was	first	prescribed	opiates	in 2010 following	a gallbladder issue

. She	continued	using	opiates	to	deal	with back pain .		In	2012,	the	mother	was	in a	car	accident	and	was	again prescrib ed	opiates,	which	she used until	after a resulting surgery in January	 2013.	 	 When	 her	 prescription	 expired	 a	 few months	later,	s he began obtaining	unprescribed	opiates	through	other	means.3 [¶4 ] T he	mother sought treatment	for	her	addiction. From May	2013	to August	2014,	she successfully completed	a	methadone	treatment	program

. In the	fall	of	2014, she	experienced	another	injury,	which	required surgery. S he was	prescribed	oxycodone and subsequently	relapsed .		The	mother	continued
to	use	unprescr ibed	opiates	for	the	next	five	months	and soon	began	injecting
heroin. [¶5 ] During	 this	 time,	 the	 mother and	 the	 child	 were	 living	 at	 the
mother’s uncle’s	home. In	April	2015,	the	mother	stole valuable coins	from	her uncle	in	order	to	purchase drugs

. She	was	charged	with	theft, and she and	the
child	were	evicted	from	the	home. [¶6 ] In	May 2015,	the	Department	filed	a	petition	for a child	protection order,	which	 the	court	granted

. The	mother waived	 her	 right	 to	a	 summary preliminary	hearing	and agre ed	to the	entry	of	a	jeopardy	o rder in	which the

c ourt found that	jeopardy	as	to the	mother “ consist s of	her	inability	to	provide adequate	care	for	the	child	and neglect	of	the	child’ s	basic	daily	needs	due	to
the	mother’s long

- standing	opiate	addiction. ” [¶7 ] Visitation	between	the	mother	and	the	child was fully	supervised.
There	were	c oncerns during	some	visits that the	mother appeared	to	be falling asleep	or	“nodding	off” at	times	and	that	sh e	took	extended	bathroom	breaks

.4 These	 concerns contribute d	 to	 the	 Department’ s	 reluctance	 to	 ease	 the requirement	of	full	supervision. There	was	no	visitation	between July	9,	2016 , and August	28,	2016 , when the mother	was	incarcerated for	the	theft	of	coins from	her	uncle.		Upon	her	release,	she “ procrastinated ” in resuming	treatment
and visitation	with	the	chi ld	because	she	had	relapsed	using heroin	combined with	 fentanyl. The	 mother visited with the	 chil d	 a	 couple	 of	 times	 in
December 2016,	but	before	additional	visits were arranged , she	was	arrested in	February	2017 and	incarcerated	for	six	months for	violating her	probation.
As of	the	date	of	trial,	visitation	between	the	mother	and	the	ch ild	had	not	been
reestablished. [¶8 ] The	child is	diagnosed	with	Reactive	Attachment	Disorde r. She	has been	in	three	different	foster	placements	as	well	as	a	trial	placement	with	the father.	 	 She	 has	 also	 been	 hospitalized	 in psychiatric crisis	 centers	 on	 two
different	occasions

. [¶9 ] At the	 time	 of trial,	 the	 mother	 was	 participating	 in another substance	abuse	program , but	she	was	two	weeks	into	a	program	that	can	run
for up	to	fifty

- two	weeks

. She	stated	that	she	would	require	thirty	to	sixty	days
to	 secure	 a	 residence	 that	 could	 accommodate	 the	 child	 and	 would	 be	 in	 a5
po sition	 to	 paren t	 the	 child	 full

- time	 after	 another	 three	 to	 six	 months	 of
reunification services

. The court	ultimately	determined	the	following: [The	mother] is	at	the	very	beginning	of	a	long

- term	process to	achieve	an d	maintain	sobriety. She	has	a	“ long

- standing opia te addiction.” At	 times,	 she	 has	 experienced	 some	 success	 in treatment,	 notably	 from	 May	 of	 2013	 to	 August	 of 2014.	 .	 .	 . However,	she	has	relapsed	repeatedly. She	has	done	so	even	when fully	aware	that	the	return	to	use	of	illegal	drugs	would	subject	her to	incarceration	and	adversely	affect	her	reunification	efforts. [The mother’s] projec ted	timeframe	for	resuming	full

- time	care	of [the child] is	totally	unrea listic	given	the	chronicity	of	her	addiction,	the status	of	her	substance	abuse	treatment,	and	the	period	of	time	that her	 daughter has	 been	 out	 of	 her	 care. It	 is	 unfair,	 and	 totally contradictory	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 Act,	 to	 require [the	 child] to endure the	continued	uncertainty	of	foster	care	while [the	mother] resumes	treatment. Time	is	of	the	essence	in	providing [the	child] with	a	permanent	home	and	the	stability	necessary	to	allow	her	the opportunity	to	work	on	her	own	issues	in a	timely	fashion. [¶1 0 ] Giv en	these	findings	and	the	court’ s	other	specific	findings	of	fact, all	of	which	are	supported	by	competent	evidence	in	the	record,	the	court	did not	err	in	its	finding	of	parental	unfitness,	nor	did	it	err	or	abuse	its	discretion in	 determining that	 termination	 of	 the	 mother’ s	 parental	 rights,	 with	 a permanency	plan of	adoption,	is	in	the	child ’ s	best	interest

. See In	re	Logan	M. , 2017	 ME	 23,	 ¶	 3,	 155	 A.3d	 430 ; In	 re	 Thomas	 H. ,	 2005	 ME	 123,	 ¶¶	 16

- 17,
889 A.2d	297

. [¶1 1 ] The	mother also contends	 that	 the	Department	did	not	meet	its burden	to	provide	reunification	services pursuant	to 22	M.R.S.	§	4041 and	that6 the	court	erred	by	failing	to	consider	the negative effect that the	Department’s
efforts had	on her ability	to	reunify

. However, the	“Department’s compliance
with	its	rehabilitation	and	reun ification	duties	as	outlined	in s ection	4041 does not	constitute	a	discrete	element	requiring	proof	in	termination	proceedings, nor	does	the	failure	of	the	Department	to	comply	with section	4041 preclude findings	of	parental	unfitness. ” In	re	Doris G. ,	2006 ME	142,	¶	17,	912	A.2d	572 ; see	 also 22 M.R.S.	 §	4041 .		Additionally,	contrary	 to	 the	mother’s contention, there	is	ample	evidence	in	 the	 record	 that	 the	Department	made	 reasonable
efforts	to rehabilitate and	reunify	the family

. 2 Despite	these	efforts,	the	mother was	unsuccessful	in	reunifying	with	the	child. The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.

2 These	efforts	include d supporting	the	child	in	a	foster	placement,	supporting	the	child	in	a	trial placement	with	her	father,	conducting	well

- being	checks	of	the	child,	providing	individu al	counseling for	 the	 child,	 p roviding	 individual	 counseling	 for the mother ,	 facilitating	 family	 team	 meetings, facilitating	 contact	 between	 the child	 and	 parents,	 providing	 access	 to an	 intensive	 outpatient p rogram	for	the	mother,	providing	m ethadone	treatment	for	the	mother,	making	a	referral	for	case management	 for	 t he	mother,	providing	 transportation	assistance	 for	 the	mother,	scheduling	drug screens	for	the mother, and	prov iding	other	services.7 Amanda	 E.	 Ramirez,	 Esq.,	 Law	 Office	 of	 Amanda	 E.	 Ra mirez,	 Newfield,	 for appellant	m other Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Hunter C. Umphrey,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Springvale	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2015

- 25 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY