UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

LUIS EMANUEL NEGRONHERNANDEZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 23-2153 

(D.C. No. 2:23-CR-00727-MIS-1) 

(D.N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Luis Negron-Hernandez appeals his 24-month prison sentence for violating a 

condition of his supervised release. Because the district court adequately explained 

its sentence and did not otherwise abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of this 

length, we affirm. 

Background 

In April 2023, deputies with the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Office conducted a 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 5, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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traffic stop in Lordsburg, New Mexico, on a vehicle being driven by NegronHernandez; a woman named Irene Martinez was in the front passenger seat, and two 

other individuals in the vehicle were unlawfully present in the United States. The 

deputies called border-patrol agents for assistance, and the agents arrested NegronHernandez. In a later interview, Negron-Hernandez told the agents that he had agreed 

with another individual to transport the undocumented noncitizens from Lordsburg to 

Phoenix, Arizona, in exchange for an undisclosed amount of money. Based on these 

facts, the government charged Negron-Hernandez with conspiring to transport 

undocumented noncitizens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(I). 

Negron-Hernandez pleaded guilty the next month.1

 The presentence 

investigation report (PSR) set his sentencing range under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or the Guidelines) at either 6 to 12 months or zero 

to six months, depending on whether the district court applied forthcoming 

retroactive amendments to the Guidelines. The PSR also noted that despite having no 

prior convictions, Negron-Hernandez had criminal charges pending in two separate 

state-court cases. In September 2022, Maryland charged him with driving on a 

suspended license and later issued an arrest warrant for failure to appear. And in 

March 2023, Indiana charged him with committing domestic battery against 

1

 In the intervening weeks, Negron-Hernandez had briefly been released on 

bond to live at a residential-reentry center. But after Negron-Hernandez attempted 

suicide, he was returned to federal custody, where he remained until sentencing. 

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Martinez, ordered him to have no further contact with Martinez, and later issued an 

arrest warrant for failure to appear.2

 

In an addendum, the PSR discussed where Negron-Hernandez might serve any 

term of supervised release. It disapproved Negron-Hernandez’s preferred location in 

Lordsburg, explaining that the woman occupying the proposed residence was under 

pretrial supervision for a state charge. Moreover, the PSR relayed that the woman had 

never met Negron-Hernandez in person; instead, she had agreed to take him in to 

help Martinez. Finally, the PSR noted that a residential program at a facility called 

Victory Ministry in Las Cruces, New Mexico, had space available and that NegronHernandez was on the waiting list for two other residential-reentry facilities. 

At sentencing for the conspiring-to-transport charge, the district court accepted 

the PSR, decided to vary downward based on the forthcoming Guidelines 

amendment, and set Negron-Hernandez’s Guidelines range at zero to six months in 

prison. Agreeing with the parties’ recommendations, it sentenced him to time served 

and two years of supervised release. For that term of supervised release, the district 

court declined to allow Negron-Hernandez to live in Lordsburg and instead directed 

him to Victory Ministry. In so doing, the district court specifically cautioned NegronHernandez against absconding, expressing concern about how he had failed to appear 

on the pending charge in Maryland and shortly thereafter been charged with a crime 

2

 Negron-Hernandez’s failure to appear in Indiana seems to stem from his 

arrest for the conspiring-to-transport charge underlying this appeal. 

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in Indiana. It additionally ordered Negron-Hernandez to participate in a mentalhealth treatment program and take prescribed mental-health medications as directed. 

Less than two weeks into his term of supervised release, Negron-Hernandez 

absconded from Victory Ministry. And four days later, Lordsburg law enforcement 

arrested him and charged him with aggravated battery against a household member, 

interference with communications, and violation of a restraining order. In particular, 

the state criminal complaint alleged that Negron-Hernandez strangled Martinez, 

threw her to the ground, and—when she tried to call 911—seized her phone and 

threatened to kill her. 

Based on Negron-Hernandez absconding from Victory Ministry, the 

government sought to revoke Negron-Hernandez’s supervised release.3

 At his 

revocation hearing, Negron-Hernandez admitted to absconding but said that another 

resident had threatened to assault him if he did not leave. The probation officer 

confirmed that Negron-Hernandez had reported this threat to her and said that she 

discussed it with the pastor at Victory Ministry, who reported that there had been a 

disagreement and that Negron-Hernandez had later refused to accept the other 

resident’s apology. Negron-Hernandez then told the district court that he had 

accepted the apology and further explained that the other resident threatened him 

again the next day. He said he had reported this second threat to the pastor but had 

3

 The government also filed an amended petition charging a second violation 

for committing a new crime, but it ultimately chose not to pursue that second 

violation because the state charges remained pending. 

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not been able to reach his probation officer. He also said that he did not call his 

probation officer after arriving in Lordsburg because he had lost her card and did not 

remember her phone number. 

In deciding what sentence to impose for this admitted absconding violation, 

the district court began by noting that because it had “some concerns about [NegronHernandez’s] behavior and . . . record,” it “might consider a variance” from the 

applicable advisory range of three to nine months. R. vol. 3, 14; see also U.S.S.G. 

§ 7B1.4(a) (providing relevant range). The government asked the district court to 

impose “at least six months’ confinement,” emphasizing that despite his lenient timeserved sentence for conspiring to transport, Negron-Hernandez quickly left Victory 

Ministry, just like he had absconded from Maryland, and was only discovered 

because he was arrested for other alleged crimes; the government also noted that he 

had violated the Indiana protection order. R. vol. 3, 14. Defense counsel requested 

four months, highlighting that Negron-Hernandez needed mental-health treatment 

and would perhaps do better in a more regulated residential program. The probation 

officer echoed the four-month request. In so doing, she noted that Negron-Hernandez 

had failed to avail himself of mental-health treatment at Victory Ministry and “was 

more interested in getting back to” Martinez, the victim in both the new domesticviolence case and the prior Indiana domestic-violence case. Id. at 19. 

The district court ultimately followed through on its inclination to vary upward 

and imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months in prison plus one year of 

supervised release, citing Negron-Hernandez’s “history and how quickly he’s 

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violating all the [c]ourt’s orders.” Id. at 25; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). After 

discussing some of the sentencing factors supporting its decision—including NegronHernandez’s history and characteristics, the nature of circumstances of the offense, 

deterrence, protecting the public, and the need to provide Negron-Hernandez with 

treatment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(C)—the district court asked defense 

counsel if he “request[ed] any further explanation for any aspects of the sentence 

imposed,” R. vol. 3, 31. Defense counsel confirmed the district court’s method for 

calculating the one-year term of supervised release, and the district court then asked 

again if defense counsel had “any other objections to the way the sentence was 

imposed or [needed] any further explanation . . . as to any aspect of the sentence.” Id. 

at 31–32. Defense counsel replied affirmatively, emphasizing that neither probation 

nor the government requested such a long sentence and stating that the sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. The district court responded that it had considered the 

parties’ recommendations but decided to vary upward based on the relevant § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors. 

Negron-Hernandez now appeals. 

Analysis 

Negron-Hernandez challenges his revocation sentence. When a defendant 

violates a condition of supervised release, the district court “may revoke the term of 

supervised release and impose prison time.” United States v. Vigil, 696 F.3d 997, 

1002 (10th Cir. 2012). In so doing, the district court must consider a subset of the 

sentencing factors in § 3553(a), as well as the policy statements in Chapter 7 of the 

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Guidelines. United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2006). The 

Chapter 7 policy statements include suggested sentencing ranges for revocations of 

supervised release, but these ranges “are not mandatory and [are] even less 

compelling than established Guidelines.” Vigil, 696 F.3d at 1003; see also U.S.S.G. 

Ch. 7, pt. A (noting that Sentencing Commission issued only “policy statements 

applicable to the revocation of . . . supervised release,” not formal Guidelines). 

We typically review sentences, including those imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release, for procedural and substantive reasonableness, and NegronHernandez advances arguments on both fronts. See Vigil, 696 F.3d at 1003. 

“[P]rocedural reasonableness focuses on whether the district court committed any 

error in calculating or explaining the sentence.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 

1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009). By contrast, “[r]eview for substantive reasonableness 

focuses on ‘whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the 

circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a).’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 

2008)). In either instance, review is generally for abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Maldonado-Passage, 56 F.4th 830, 842 (10th Cir. 2022). 

I. Procedural Reasonableness 

Negron-Hernandez argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing 

to adequately explain the upward variance. When a district court imposes a 

revocation sentence outside the range provided by the Guidelines policy statement, 

the district “court must state ‘the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence.’” 

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United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

§ 3553(c)(2)). Nevertheless, a district court “‘is not required to consider individually 

each factor listed in § 3553(a),’ nor is it required to ‘recite any magic words to show 

us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has 

instructed it to consider’ before issuing a sentence.” Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1189 

(quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Quintanilla, 442 F.3d 1254, 1258–59 (10th Cir. 

2006)). 

At the outset, the government argues that we should decline to review this 

failure-to-explain argument because Negron-Hernandez affirmatively waived it. See 

United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining 

that we will not review intentionally relinquished arguments). We disagree. When the 

district court asked defense counsel if he had any further objections, he responded in 

the affirmative and indicated that the sentence was significantly longer than what the 

parties had discussed or requested. To be sure, defense counsel used the phrase 

“substantively unreasonable” in his answer and did not explicitly ask for additional 

explanation. But he told the district court that he did have a further objection and 

then emphasized the extent of the variance compared to the parties’ proposed 

sentences. We do not construe this as an affirmative waiver of Negron-Hernandez’s 

appellate argument that the district court procedurally erred by failing to provide 

adequate explanation for its variance, so we turn to the merits of that argument.4 Cf. 

4

 In so doing, we decline to resolve the government’s alternative argument that 

Negron-Hernandez forfeited his procedural-reasonableness arguments by failing to 

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United States v. Diequez, 824 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding affirmative 

waiver of argument for additional explanation where defense counsel answered “no” 

to district court’s question about additional explanation). 

Negron-Hernandez asserts that the district court erred by failing to explain the 

extent of its variance—that is, “why a term higher than [nine] months but less than 24 

was not sufficient.” Aplt. Br. 10. He relatedly faults the district court for failing to 

explain why the parties’ proposed sentences or some other hybrid sentence 

combining a prison term with a stay at a residential reentry center would not have 

been appropriate here. In support, Negron-Hernandez emphasizes the general 

principle that prison sentences must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” 

§ 3553(a). But as the government responds, there is no requirement that a district 

court consider and reject on the record all other possible sentences before imposing 

its chosen sentence. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th 

Cir. 2006) (noting “that there is inevitably a range of sentences that could be held 

reasonable”). On the contrary, “discussions of applicable sentences before a district 

court following the revocation of supervised release should be grounded in the 

common understanding that the district court may impose any sentence within the 

statutory maximum.” Vigil, 696 F.3d at 1002 (quoting United States v. Burdex, 100 

F.3d 882, 885 (10th Cir. 1996)). And those discussions require no magic words or 

make them below—application of the resulting plain-error review would not change 

the result in this case. See Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d at 1272 (explaining that we 

review forfeited arguments for plain error). 

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specific discussions of various possible sentences. See Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1189. So 

we discern no error in the district court’s failure to discuss and reject other possible 

sentences. 

Negron-Hernandez next argues that the district court’s explanation was 

inadequate because it focused too much on his pattern of absconding and not enough 

on his need for mental-health treatment. To be sure, the district court’s § 3553(a) 

discussion noted that the nature and circumstances of the offense involved NegronHernandez quickly absconding from Victory Ministry, failing to report both his 

reason for leaving and his new location to his probation officer, and ultimately being 

discovered due to an unrelated arrest involving alleged domestic violence.5 See 

§ 3553(a)(1). The district court then additionally noted, as to Negron-Hernandez’s 

characteristics, that this conduct “fits [his] pattern of behaviors with the courts,” 

including absconding from Maryland. R. vol. 3, 26; see also § 3553(a)(1). 

Yet it mischaracterizes the record to say, as Negron-Hernandez does, that 

“[t]he district court focused almost exclusively on ‘absconding’ to justify an onerous 

imprisonment term.” Aplt. Br. 15. The district court certainly relied on the pattern of 

absconding, but it also emphasized that Negron-Hernandez had violated the terms of 

the Indiana protection order at least twice, by being in the vehicle with Martinez 

when initially arrested for the underlying transporting offense and when later arrested 

5

 The district court explained that it was “not considering the allegations of the 

crime in Lordsburg as conclusive” and was “not sentencing based on that, but [it was] 

considering the nature of [Negron-Hernandez’s] behavior, his history and 

characteristics, and the circumstances of this violation.” R. vol. 3, 27. 

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for alleged domestic-violence. The district court also noted that Negron-Hernandez 

had not been deterred by his previous lenient sentences and that a longer sentence 

was needed to protect the public. See § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C). Additionally, although 

Negron-Hernandez seeks to highlight that he absconded because of threats and went 

to a known address, this attempt to downplay his conduct overlooks the district 

court’s reasonable focus on his failure to report either the relevant threat or his new 

address to his probation officer. Last, the district court did not ignore NegronHernandez’s need for mental-health treatment; it specifically explained that the 

original time-served sentence provided an opportunity for such treatment, but 

Negron-Hernandez failed to avail himself of it. See § 3553(a)(2)(D). So we reject 

Negron-Hernandez’s argument that the district court’s explanation was inadequate on 

these bases.6

 

Negron-Hernandez also contends that the district court procedurally erred by 

failing to address the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. In support, he 

cites statistics purporting to show that offenders with similar criminal-history 

categories who abscond typically receive revocation sentences no longer than 18 

months, as well as a list of other offenders and their various original and revocation 

sentences. But district courts are directed to avoid unwarranted disparities “among 

6

 Negron-Hernandez also highlights that the district court imposed a lenient, 

time-served sentence in the first instance, despite knowing at that point about his 

previous absconding. But the district court imposed the initial lenient sentence 

notwithstanding its express concerns that Negron-Hernandez would abscond again. 

So when Negron-Hernandez in fact absconded again, the district court was free to 

reevaluate. 

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defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 

§ 3553(a)(6). And on the whole, the comparisons Negron-Hernandez provides do not 

show this level of similarity. More critically, these comparisons do not account for 

the district court’s determination that the facts of this case justified any sentencing 

disparity. For these reasons, we reject any disparity-related error and conclude 

overall that the district court did not procedurally err. 

II. Substantive Reasonableness 

Negron-Hernandez next asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

When considering such a challenge, we ask “whether the length of the sentence is 

reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 

. . . § 3553(a).” Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d at 1215 (quoting United States v. 

Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007)). 

As the government highlights, much of Negron-Hernandez’s substantivereasonableness argument overlaps with his procedural-reasonableness argument. For 

instance, Negron-Hernandez asserts again that the district court focused too much on 

his history of absconding and not enough on his need for mental-health treatment. 

But we have already detailed the district court’s thorough assessment of the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors, and this argument essentially asks us to reweigh the sentencing 

factors, which we will not do. See United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1305 (10th 

Cir. 2022). Negron-Hernandez additionally returns to his disparity argument, 

comparing the length of his sentence to the sentences of supposedly similarly situated 

defendants. But we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rationale that the 

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specifics of Negron-Hernandez’s conduct—including multiple instances of 

absconding, violating a protective order, and alleged domestic violence—warranted a 

longer sentence. Negron-Hernandez relatedly emphasizes the extent of the variance 

from the sentencing range in the Chapter 7 policy statement, but when assessing 

substantive reasonableness, we do not apply “a rigid mathematical formula that uses 

the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the 

justifications required for a specific sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 

(2007). Moreover, “a court does not need to find severe or exceptional circumstances 

to impose a sentence above the range suggested in the Chapter 7 policy statements, 

which are not mandatory and even less compelling than established Guidelines.” 

Vigil, 696 F.3d at 1002–03. 

In the end, “the balance struck by the district court among the factors set out in 

§ 3553(a) [wa]s not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States 

v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008). We must therefore defer to its 

decision to impose a 24-month revocation sentence, “even if we would not have 

struck the same balance in the first instance.” Id. 

Conclusion 

Because the district court adequately explained Negron-Hernandez’s 24-month 

 

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revocation sentence and did not otherwise abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence 

of this length, we affirm. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

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