IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0682

Filed August 17, 2022

IN THE INTEREST OF K.R. and K.R.,

Minor Children,

S.R., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner, 

District Associate Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two 

children. AFFIRMED. 

David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State. 

Rebecca Williams, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two 

children, born in 2013 and 2018.1 The juvenile court ordered termination under 

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (as to the older child) and (h) (as to the younger 

child) (2021). The mother argues the children could have been returned to her 

care at the time of the termination trial or, in the alternative, that she should be 

given additional time to work toward reunification before a permanency decision is 

made. She asserts that termination of her parental rights is not in the children’s 

best interests and the bond she shares with the children precludes termination. 

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 

706 (Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is 

clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code 

section 232.116.” Id. 

Here, for the juvenile court to properly terminate the mother’s parental rights 

under section 232.116(1)(f) and (h), proof of several elements, including that the 

children could not be returned to parental custody at the time of the termination 

trial, had to be established. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); see also 

D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (applying “at the present time” to mean “at the time of 

the termination hearing”). Here on appeal, the mother concedes all elements but 

the return-to-parental-custody element. The court concluded the mother continued 

to use methamphetamine, which prevented the children from being safely returned 

to the mother’s care; the mother challenges this conclusion. 

1 The parental rights of each child’s father were also terminated; neither father 

appeals. 
3

Initially, concerns over the mother’s alleged heroin use led to the Iowa 

Department of Human Services’s (DHS) involvement with this family. After 

learning the mother was using methamphetamine while caring for the children, 

DHS removed the children from the mother’s care in January 2021. By the 

mother’s own admission, she used methamphetamine daily from March to June 

15, 2021. Then, according to the mother’s testimony, she “just quit cold turkey” on 

June 15, 2021. Yet the mother had seven sweat-patch tests that were positive for 

methamphetamine between July 16, 2021, and the termination trial in February 

2022.

2

 As she did to the juvenile court, the mother claims those tests are

unreliable; she pointed to urinalysis tests she completed during the same time

frame that were negative for all illegal substances. To explain these results, she

asked the juvenile court to consider a scientific study that states external 

contamination of sweat patches is possible. See David A. Kidwell & Frederick P. 

Smith, Susceptibility of PharmChek Drugs of Abuse Patch to Environmental 

Contamination, available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/195986.pdf (last 

visited Aug. 4, 2022). 

But the scientific study the mother offers supports the conclusion that she 

was ingesting methamphetamine rather than having positive sweat-patch tests 

due to exposure and external contamination. As we understand it, the mother

maintained that her continued positive results were due to her sweaty skin touching 

clients—whom she presumes use methamphetamine—at the strip club where she 

was employed. The scientific study the mother introduced to support this claim

2

It is of note that the mother only completed eighteen of fifty-nine drug tests 

offered.
4

characterizes this as “prior presence of drugs on the exterior of the skin, not 

removed by the cleaning process (external contamination from within, under the 

patch, CFWI).” Id. at 2. The study references a number of experiments and 

concludes that having methamphetamine on one’s skin before the sweat patch is 

placed on, and then “exercise and active sweating” after application of the patch, 

can result in a sweat patch test that is positive for methamphetamine—even when 

no methamphetamine is ingested. Id. at 13. However, in these instances, “[n]o 

conversion of methamphetamine to amphetamine was observed.” Id. They 

concluded: “This experiment shows that CFWI appears in the patch rapidly when 

the individual actively sweats. . . . Methamphetamine did not decompose or be 

metabolized into amphetamine. Alcohol swab ‘cleansing’ removed some, but not 

all, of the drug contamination.” Id. at 14. Additionally, the researchers opined:

The laboratory studies show that the potential for external 

contamination of skin (CFWI) . . . can occur and generate false 

positive results. . . .

To the extent that drugs must pass through the human body 

to produce metabolites, metabolites can increase the reliability of a 

positive result. . . . [A]mphetamine is the major metabolite of 

methamphetamine . . . . [M]ethamphetamine is relatively stable and 

thus the presence of amphetamine may be a marker that the drug 

excreted from the human body rather than entered the patch from 

the outside. 

Id. at 17–18.

While the study the mother offered states that outside contamination—i.e. 

positive sweat patch tests for methamphetamine without ingesting the drug—is 

possible, it also states that in the experiments where that occurred, no 

amphetamine was found in the test results. In fact, it suggests that the presence 

of amphetamine, as the major metabolite of methamphetamine, may actually be 
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“a marker that the drug excreted from the human body” and was not the result of 

external contamination. Id. at 18. Here, the mother had seven sweat patches that 

were positive for methamphetamine between July 16, 2021 and February 8, 2022, 

and each of those seven patches also had amphetamine present. According to 

the study relied upon by the mother, the presence of amphetamine supports the 

conclusion that she was ingesting the methamphetamine rather than receiving a 

positive result due to external contamination. In spite of the mother’s claims 

otherwise, we agree with the district court that the mother continued to use 

methamphetamine up until the time of the termination trial and that her use of the 

drug prevents her from being able to safely parent the children. See, e.g., In re 

J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“A parent’s 

methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.”). 

The State proved the grounds for termination under 232.116(1)(f) and (h).

In passing, the mother mentions that she should be given more time to work 

toward reunification with her children. Section 232.104(2)(b) allows the court to 

give a parent a six-month extension before permanency is established if there are 

specific “factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that “comprise the 

basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child[ren] . . . will no 

longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” We cannot make such 

findings. At the time of the termination trial, the mother continued to use 

methamphetamine—notwithstanding her claims about unreliable drug tests. 

Additionally, she had recently married a man who was in jail after reporting him for 

domestic violence against her. According to the mother’s testimony, her nowhusband provided her with methamphetamine, is “violent” and a “thief,” and is not 
6

safe or appropriate for the children to be around. Yet the mother remained in 

contact with the husband in violation of a no-contact order between the two and, 

due to this continued contact, both the husband and mother had to serve jail 

sentences. The mother claimed she was trying to divorce the husband, but she 

also admitted talking to the husband on the first day of the termination trial because 

he knew it was “an important day for [her].” Based on these facts, we cannot say 

the mother will be able to safely parent the children in six months, so an extension 

is not warranted. And for the same reasons, we conclude termination of the 

mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2); see also In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) 

(concluding termination was in the children’s best interests because “the children 

need a safe and permanent home”). 

Finally, the mother argues her rights should not be terminated “due to the 

bond between the children and their mother.” We understand her to be invoking 

the exception to termination in section 232.116(3)(c). See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c) (allowing the court to forego termination when “[t]here is clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the 

time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). The parent bears the 

burden to prove an exception to termination is warranted. See In re A.S., 906 

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). Other than broadly testifying3that she believes 

termination of parental rights “destroys people,” the mother did not offer any 

3 The mother’s attorney asked if she felt “[her] kids would be damaged” by 

termination, and the mother responded: “Yes. I know what it’s like. I know a lot of 

other foster kids too. It destroys people.” 
7

evidence to establish why the exception should be applied here. Like the juvenile 

court, we decline to apply it. 

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to both children.

AFFIRMED.