IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM S. COWART,

Plaintiff,

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vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-00197-WS-C

:

BALDWIN COUNTY 

CORRECTIOMAL CENTER

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, et al.

Defendants.

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Report and Recommendation

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the 

undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is 

now before the undersigned on the motion for summary judgment of 

Defendants, Baldwin County Correctional Center Medical Department, Dr. 

Charles D. Sherman, and Carla Wasdin (docs. 14-15, 17-18), and Plaintiff’s 

opposition thereto (doc. 23). For the reasons stated below, it is recommended 

that the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Baldwin County 

Correctional Center Medical Department, Dr. Sherman, and Wasdin be granted 

and that Plaintiff’s action against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Factual Allegations

From its review of the record, the Court summaries the parties’ allegations 

that are material to the issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. 

Plaintiff Cowart suffers from several medical conditions including cirrhosis of 

the liver, Hepatitis C, and pain due to previous leg and hip injuries, which have 

left him with an 18 inch rod in his leg and screws in his hip. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 15 

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at 2). On March 11, 2014, Cowart was transferred from Perry County Jail to 

Baldwin County Correctional Center (“BCCC”) where the BCCC medical staff 

was alerted to Plaintiff’s medical status. (Doc. 15 at 2). The medications and 

treatment plan Cowart was previously receiving arrived by mail on March 13, 

2014, and Dr. Sherman, the physician at BCCC continued Cowart on his regime 

of 15 mg of Remeron for depression, 600 mg of Ibuprofen for pain, and 20 mg of 

Prilosec for acid reflux or gastrointestinal complaints. (Id.). Almost immediately 

upon being booked into BCCC, Cowart began filing medical requests; nearly all 

requests were for medication modifications:

On March 13, 2014, Cowart requested his Ibuprofen medication be 

changed to Tylenol due to stomach irritation. (Doc. 15-4 at 28). Dr. 

Sherman granted this request the same day he received it. (Id.).

On March 16, 2014, Cowart requested his Ibuprofen medication be 

changed to Tylenol 650 mg three times a day, that the Prilosec 

medication be decreased, and that the Remeron medication be 

increased. (Doc. 15-4 at 29). Dr. Sherman granted these requests, 

with the exception of only prescribing 500 mg of Tylenol three 

times a day. (Id.). 

On March 19 and 20, 2014, Cowart requested that his Tylenol 

prescription be doubled. (Doc. 15-4 at 30, 31). Dr. Sherman 

requested to examine Cowart before granting this request. (Id.).

On March 23, 2014, Cowart requested Gabapentin (or Neurontin) 

for pain instead of Tylenol or Ibuprofen and an appointment was 

scheduled with the doctor for Plaintiff to be examined. (Doc. 15-4 

at 32). Dr. Sherman saw Cowart on March 25, 2014, and prescribed 

Gabapentin 400 mg four times a day for pain, as well as a depomedrol shot for Cowart’s sinus complaints. (Doc. 15 at 4).

On March 27, 2014, Cowart requested a vegetarian diet due to 

stomach problems. (Doc. 15-4 at 34). After a review of Cowart’s 

commissary purchases of meat sticks and hot sauce on March 25, 

2014, the medical staff determined a special diet was not indicated.1 

(Id.). 

 1 Prior to submitting the dietary request change to the medical department, 

Cowart filed a grievance on March 22 asking to be “put on a no meat diet;” Cowart 

maintained cirrhosis of the liver and acid reflux made it difficult to digest meat 

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On March 31, 2014, Cowart complained of sinus problems despite

the previous steroid shot and requested a decongestant, and an 

appointment was scheduled for Cowart to see the doctor. (Doc. 15-

4 at 35). However, Cowart refused the appointment scheduled for 

him on April 22, 2014 to evaluate his concerns. (Doc. 15 at 6). 

On April 6, 2014, Cowart notified the medical staff that his 

Remeron prescribed was due to expire and requested that it be 

continued. (Doc. 15-4 at 36). Dr. Sherman renewed the 

prescription. (Id.). 

On April 13, 2014, Cowart requested that his prescription of 

Gabapentin be increased, and Dr. Sherman increased the pain 

medication. (Doc. 15-4 at 37).

The medical staff discovered on April 15, 2014, that Cowart filed a 

grievance and federal lawsuit against them on April 14, 2014, for “denial of 

medial treatment for cirrhosis of the liver and Hep C,” denial of “referral to liver 

specialist,” and denial of “Interferon treatment and the medication” Tramadol, 

prescribed by his family doctor. (Doc. 15 at 5; Doc. 25-1 at 24). After learning of 

Cowart’s complaints and desires, a referral request for Cowart to be examined by 

a gastroenterologist was submitted on April 15, 2014, and approved two days 

later. (Doc. 15-8 at 44, 46). 

On May 28, 2014, Cowart received an evaluation by Dr. Jorge Herrera, a 

gastroenterologist, for his established conditions of Hepatitis C and cirrhosis of 

the liver. (Doc. 15-6 at 63-64). The specialist made no prescription or treatment 

changes at the appointment; rather, he ordered laboratory tests and the past 

medical records for Cowart. (Id. at 67). Cowart received a follow-up 

 products. (Doc. 25-1 at 20). He was advised to notify the medical unit of his request. 

(Id.). After being denied the dietary change on March 27, Cowart filed a grievance 

stating he had converted his religion from Baptist to Seventh Day Adventist and 

requested that he receive a vegetarian tray in compliance with the ordinances of his new 

faith. (Id.). Cowart filed approximately 13 grievances regarding his dietary needs from 

March 22 to June 3. (See Doc. 25-1 at 5-7, 18-21, 28, 33). 

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appointment with the gastroenterologist on July 21, 2014; at which time, Dr. 

Herrera diagnosed Cowart with “Chronic Hepatitis C Virus” but prescribed no 

medication or treatment plan; rather, he noted that Hepatitis A and B 

vaccinations should be considered, recommended routine blood work be done 

every three months, and Cowart was “cleared to take low doses of Tramadol.” 

(Id. at 68). 

Plaintiff Cowart filed this action on April 18, 20132 for alleged 

constitutional violations that occurred from his arrival at BCCC on March 11, 

2014 until April 18, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 3, 7). Cowart was transferred from the 

custody of BCCC in August of 2014. (Court docket entry dated August 27, 2014). 

II. Procedural History

Cowart filed this action seeking a referral to a liver and orthopedic 

specialist, Interferon treatment, and medication based on the recommendation of 

specialists. (Id. at 6). Defendants answered the suit and filed special reports, 

which moved for the special reports to be considered a motion for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 14-15, 17-18). The Court converted the special reports of Dr. 

Sherman and Nurse Wasdin, as well as the answer of Baldwin County 

Correctional Center into a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 21). Cowart 

responded to the motion seeking additional relief of monetary damages in the 

amount of $846.00, $350.00 to cover the filing fee of the lawsuit and $496 for pain 

 2 Cowart’s petition bore a signature date of April 18, 2014, and was received by the 

Clerk's Office on April 30, 2014. (Doc. 1) Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court 

assumes that the petition was delivered to prison authorities for mailing on the day that 

Cowart signed it. See Washington v. U.S., 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Under 

the "mailbox rule," "a prisoner's pro se § complaint is deemed filed the date it is 

delivered to prison authorities for mailing." Id. 

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and suffering and admitted that the original demands of his suit had been met.3 

(Doc. 23 at 3). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, along with Plaintiff’s 

objection thereto, is now before the Court for consideration. 

III. Summary Judgment Standard

In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment, the Court 

begins with these basic principles. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant 

this Court authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of law” to a 

party who moves for summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) 

provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986), the Supreme Court held that summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact. . . .” However, all of the evidence and factual inferences reasonably 

 3 Beyond the demand to be seen by a gastroenterologist for treatment of Hepatitis 

C and cirrhosis of the liver, which appears to be central to Cowart’s complaint, he also 

asks to be examined by an orthopedic physician. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). Cowart received such 

an evaluation on June 18, 2014. (Doc. 15-7 at 57). 

After falling in the shower and injuring his right hand on June 15, 2014, Cowart 

was taken to the local emergency room. (Id. at 63-69; Doc. 15-8 at 59). He received an xray of his wrist which revealed no fracture. (Doc. 15-7 at 60). Cowart was then 

examined by an orthopedic surgeon for the injury on June 18, where an additional x-ray 

of his was conducted but revealed no fracture or dislocation. (Id. at 61; Doc. 15-8 at 69). 

A splint was prescribed for Cowart to wear for two weeks and he was placed in N block 

in a handicapped cell due to his injury. (Doc. 25-1 at 12). As soon as June 22, however, 

Cowart submitted a medical request seeking clearance from N block to return to O 

Block. (Doc. 15-4 at 41). He stated, “ I have not worn the splint all weekend” and “I 

have not had any pain in my hand. . . . there is no reason for me to be housed in the 

handicapped cell anymore. Please move me back to O-block and retrieve this hand 

splint.” (Id.). When the nursing staff continued to follow the orthopedic doctor’s orders 

and refused to release Cowart, Cowart signed a medical refusal form on June 26, 2014 

stating he no longer needed the splint for his injury, he was released from receiving the 

medical treatment, and released from N block. (Doc. 15-5 at 54; Doc. 25-1 at 12-14). 

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drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Jackson 

v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). 

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting 

evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact or by pointing out to the 

district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support 

of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 

322-25.

Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to 

the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See

Stabler v. Fla. Van Lines, Inc., No. 11-0103-WS-N, 2012 WL 32660, *5 (S.D. Ala. 

Jan. 6, 2012) (citing Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 

1991)). Summary judgment is proper when, “after an adequate time for 

discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 

an essential element of that party’s case.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 

1288 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is 

no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely 

colorable, . . . or is not significantly probative, . . . summary judgment may be 

granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal 

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citations omitted). “After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for 

summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” AGSouth Genetics, LLC v. Cunningham, No. 09-745-C, 2011 WL 

1833016, *2 (S.D. Ala. May 13, 2011).

IV. Analysis

A. Claim against Medical Defendants Dr. Sherman and Nurse Wasdin

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 

failing to provide proper medical treatment for his chronic conditions. Cowart

states in his complaint:

I am in constant severe pain in hip and knee, swelling of the left 

knee, swelling in liver with constant pain in right stomach area, 

vomiting [sic], nausea, fatigue, dehydration. I am in desperate 

need of Interferon treatment, proper medications such as 6 months 

daily injections, 6 month oral tablets. I’m in need of nausea 

medication, nonnarcotic pain medication (Tramadol) 100 mg-3x a 

day, (Protonix-1x a day)(Phenergan-3x a day) This is the 

medications that my family doctor prescribes that hel[s with all my 

symptoms. The Doctor at Baldwin County Corrections 

Center(Doctor Charles D. Sherman) will not prescribe these 

medications or refer me to liver specialist or orthopedic specialist. 

The only medications he will prescribe are only causing more liver 

damage, Tylenol and Ibuprofen.

(Doc. 1 at 3-4). 

The Eighth Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 

inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of 

cruel and unusual punishments prohibits prison officials from exhibiting 

deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.” Campbell v. Sikes, 

169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976)). In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit 

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delineated the objective and subjective portions of an Eighth Amendment claim 

as follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two components, an 

objective component, which inquires whether the alleged 

wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a 

constitutional violation, and a subjective component, which 

inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind.

Sims, 25 F.3d at 983 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). To meet 

the objective element required to demonstrate a denial of medical care in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff first must demonstrate the 

existence of an “objectively serious medical need.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 

1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is “‘one that has been 

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that 

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” 

Id. (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 

1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n. 9 

(2002)). “In either of these situations, the medical need must be one that, if left 

unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

In order to meet the subjective requirement of an Eighth Amendment 

denial of medical care claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” 

to a serious medical need. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. “Deliberate indifference” 

entails more than mere negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 

The Supreme Court clarified the “deliberate indifference” standard 

in Farmer by holding that a prison official cannot be found 

deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment “unless the 

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

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safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (emphasis added). In interpreting Farmer and 

Estelle, this Court explained in McElligott that “deliberate 

indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a 

risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is 

more than mere negligence.” McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255; Taylor,

221 F.3d at 1258 (stating that defendant must have subjective 

awareness of an “objectively serious need” and that his response 

must constitute “an objectively insufficient response to that need”).

Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46. 

The undersigned finds that while Cowart’s chronic Hepatitis C virus and 

related cirrhosis of the liver constitute serious medical conditions, the record is 

devoid of any evidence that demonstrates that Dr. Sherman or Wasdin were 

indifferent to Cowart's medical needs. To the contrary, Cowart's medical 

records reflect that he was provided medical treatment at BCCC on a regular and 

consistent basis. (Docs. 15-2; 15-3; 15-4, 15-5; 15-6, 15-7; 15-8, 15-9).

To survive summary judgment, Cowart must produce evidence that 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff Cowart 

alleges that between March 11 and April 14, he “made several medical requests 

and grievances concerning medical issues and symptoms and the Medical 

Department was not providing Plaintiff with proper medication or referrals only 

Ibuprofen and Tylenol, which are not recommended with liver disease. These 

medications only cause more damage to the liver.” (Doc. 23 at 2). Contrary to 

his allegation, Dr. Sherman and Nurse Wasdin contend that Cowart never 

requested the treatment of Tramadol or Interferon, nor did he request to be 

examined by a specialist prior to the filing of his April 13, grievance and 

subsequent lawsuit. (Doc. 15 at 5; Doc. 17 at 3). A review of the record belies 

Cowart’s claim. 

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Cowart submitted no less than nine medical requests in one month, from 

March 13 to April 13. (See Doc. 15-4). One request was for a vegetarian tray, one 

for sinusitis issues, and seven of the requests were medication modifications. 

(Doc. 15-4 at 28-37). Each of these requests was responded to quickly, either the 

same day or the following day, and, other than the dietary change, every request 

was honored. (Id.). Notably, not a single request or grievance prior to the filing 

of his April 14 grievance and the filing of this complaint details a medical 

concern other than general pain. Specifically, Cowart never mentions to 

Defendants, or anyone at BCCC, his desire to see a specialist, for Interferon 

treatment, or for a Tramadol prescription. Cowart does not disclose the previous 

methods of successful treatment prescribed by his family physician that are 

detailed in this § 1983 action. And, Cowart fails to state that any of his 

conditions are changing or worsening during the time in question. Moreover, 

Cowart never complains of jaundice, fatigue, itchy skin, swelling of abdomen, 

nausea, or vomiting which are telltale signs that cirrhosis is progressing and 

would have alerted Defendants to deterioration of Plaintiff’s health or the need 

for a different treatment plan. See Hepatitis Health Center, 

http://www.webmd.com/hepatitis/liver-symptoms, (February 4, 2015); 

Hepatits C, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/hepatitis-c/expert-answers/hepatitis-c/FAQ-20058533 (February 4, 

2015).

Rather than demonstrating deliberate inference, these undisputed facts 

reveal that Cowart was provided medical treatment and that Defendants tended 

to each complaint and need with which Cowart presented. The facts of the 

record are undisputed and do not evidence a genuine issue for trial. Anderson 

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v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (“[T]here is no issue for trial 

unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to 

return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not 

significantly probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.”) (internal 

citations omitted). 

The allegations of the complaint suggest that Cowart disagreed with the 

medical treatment provided by Defendants. However, a disagreement over the 

course of medical care, alone, does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference

and cannot support a § 1983 claim. See Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th 

Cir. 1995) (whether defendants "should have employed additional diagnostic 

techniques or forms of treatment 'is a classic example of a matter for medical 

judgment' and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding" 

constitutional liability); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(explaining that a difference in medical opinion between the prison's medical 

staff and the inmate about the inmate's course of treatment will not support a 

claim of cruel and unusual punishment); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 

1030, 1035 (11th Cir. 1989) ("When a prison inmate has received medical care, 

courts hesitate to find an Eighth Amendment violation."). The bottom line is that 

while Cowart is entitled to treatment for his serious medical needs, he is not 

entitled to direct the course of treatment that he receives. Accordingly, the fact 

that Cowart was not provided Interferon treatment, Tramadol, or specialist 

referrals immediately upon his arrival at BCCC does not evidence that 

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, particularly when the record is 

void of any medical complaints indicating a different or more aggressive 

treatment plan was needed. The Court further notes that as soon as Defendants 

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became aware that Cowart desired such extensive medical treatment, Cowart 

was immediately referred to a specialist. (Doc. 15-8 at 44). This too refutes the 

allegation of deliberate indifference. 

Assuming arguendo that Cowart asserts a claim of delay of treatment

constituting an Eighth Amendment violation, the undersigned finds that Cowart

has failed to demonstrate such unreasonable delay in medical treatment as to 

hold Defendants liable. 

“Delay in access to medical attention can violate the Eighth Amendment . 

. . when it is tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hill, 40 

F.3d at 1187 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Cases stating a 

constitutional claim for immediate or emergency medical attention have 

concerned medical needs that are obvious even to a layperson because they 

involve life-threatening conditions or situations where it is apparent that delay 

would detrimentally exacerbate the medical problem.” Id. 

The “seriousness” of an inmate’s medical needs also may be 

decided by reference to the effect of delay in treatment. Where the 

delay results in an inmate’s suffering “a life-long handicap or 

permanent loss, the medical need is considered serious.” An 

inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a 

constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in 

the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical 

treatment to succeed. Further, we have held that “[t]he tolerable 

length of delay in providing medical attention depends on the 

nature of the medical need and the reason for the delay.” 

Consequently, delay in medical treatment must be interpreted in 

the context of the seriousness of the medical need, deciding 

whether the delay worsened the medical condition, and 

considering the reason for delay.

Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188-89 (internal citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 

With respect to any alleged delay, there is no evidence that there was an 

unreasonable delay in providing medical treatment to Cowart, or that there was 

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any detrimental effect from any alleged delay in treatment. As noted supra, the 

record is replete with documentation of the regular and consistent medical 

treatment that was provided to Cowart during his placement at BCCC.

4 (Docs. 

15-2; 15-3; 15-4; 15-5; 15-6; 15-7; 15-8; 15-9). The records reflect that for the time 

period Cowart complains, all nine of Cowart’s medical requests were responded 

to expeditiously, and Dr. Sherman granted every medication request. 

Furthermore, once a gastroenterologist examined Cowart, no changes were 

prescribed to his medication or treatment plan evidencing there was no harm or 

detriment to Plaintiff in any delay that may have arguably occurred in his 

referral to a specialist. (Doc. 15-6 at 67-68). In light of such, Cowart's claims 

against Defendants Dr. Sherman and Wasdin are due to be dismissed. 

B. Claim against Baldwin County Correctional Center Medical 

Department

Plaintiff Cowart lists “Baldwin Count[y] Corr. Center (Medical Dept.)” as 

a defendant in the style or case name of his complaint. (Doc. 1 at 1). However, 

Cowart fails to identify the same defendant as a party in section III of the 

complaint or make any specific allegations against the medical department. (Id. 

at 4). Courts are to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) ("A 

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

 4 Although Cowart has limited the scope of his allegations to March 11 through 

April 18, 2014 (doc. 1 at 3), the Court notes that Cowart continued to receive proper 

medical treatment and care subsequent to the filing of this suit. He was seen by a 

gastroenterologist twice (doc. 15-6 at 67-68), an orthopedic physician twice after injuring 

his hand, where multiple x-rays were performed and a splint was prescribed (doc. 15-5 

at 21-22; Doc. 15-7 at 63-69), and Dr. Sherman continued to respond to Cowart’s medical 

requests and make necessary or desired medication alterations. (Doc. 15-4 at 39-43). 

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pleadings drafted by lawyers...") (citation and quotations omitted). Nevertheless, 

"a court may not 'serve as de facto counsel for a party' or 'rewrite an otherwise 

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.'" Muhammad v. Bethel, 430 F. 

App'x 750, 752 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 

132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, see Randall v. 

Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)). While "[t]here is no burden upon the 

district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon 

the materials before it on summary judgment,” Resolution Trust Corp. v. 

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal citation 

omitted), the Court will consider the general allegations made in Cowart’s 

complaint and response to the motion for summary judgment regarding his lack 

of referrals to specialists and denial of Interferon treatment and Tramadol as 

claims against the BCCC medical department. 

The medical staff at BCCC, however, is not a legal entity capable of being 

sued. Simrin v. Correctional Med. Servs., No. Civ. 05-2223 RBK, 2006 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 10555, 2006 WL 469677, at *3 -*4 (D. N.J. 2006) (unpublished) (collecting 

cases holding that a prison medical staff is not a legal entity subject to suit); 

Merrell v. Dukes, No. 85-2556, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14155, 1985 WL 3566, at * 1 

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1985) (unpublished) (ruling that a prison medical staff is not a 

suable entity); cf. Murphy v. Clarke Cnty. Jail, CA No. 09-0660-WS-C, 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 37037, 2010 WL 1487872, at * 2 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (unpublished) 

(finding that the Clarke County Jail's nurses department and medical staff were 

not entities subject to being sued, nor are they are "persons" for § 1983 purposes); 

Bey v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 98 F. Supp. 2d 650, 657 & n. 21 (E.D.Pa. 2000) 

(dismissing the medical staff because it was a component of a state institution 

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entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and, therefore, was not capable of 

being sued, and was not a "person" for § 1983 purposes); Johnson v. Sheahan, 94 

C 618, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12724, 1994 WL 494803, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1994) 

(unpublished) (holding that the jail medical staff is "neither a person or entity 

subject to suit because of the lack of a legal existence"); Jefferys v. Dep’t of Corrs., 

No. 94 CIV 2942(VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17913, 1994 WL 702752, at *1 

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1994) (unpublished) (finding the jail's medical staff was a 

vague and ambiguous term, and is not a legal entity capable of being served or 

sued).

After an examination of federal law and Alabama state law, the Court 

concludes that defendant Baldwin County Correctional Center Medical Staff is 

not an entity capable of being sued, nor is it a "person" for § 1983 purposes. Thus, 

a claim against this defendant is due to be dismissed.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the motion for summary 

judgment of Defendants Dr. Charles Sherman, Nurse Carla Wasdin, and the 

Baldwin County Correctional Center Medical Department be granted and that 

Plaintiff’s action against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or 

anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this 

document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(B); S.D. ALA. L.R.72.4. The parties should 

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note that under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “the failure to object limits the scope 

of [] appellate review to plain error review of the magistrate judge’s factual 

findings.” Dupree v. Warden, Attorney Gen., State of Ala., 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 

(11th Cir. 2011). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this 10th day of February 2015. 

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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