In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1825

LOGAN A. OWSLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK E. GORBETT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15-cv-00552-RLY-MJD — Richard L. Young, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 19, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 1, 2020

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Public officials in Bartholomew County, Indiana, believe that Cary Owsley committed 

suicide. His son, Logan, believes that Cary was murdered by 

his wife, Lisa, and her sons DeWayne and Josh. Contending 

that the Sheriff and his deputies have lost or destroyed evidence that would help Cary’s estate to pursue claims against 
2 No. 19-1825

the putative murderers, Logan filed this federal civil-rights 

suit, invoking 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

Logan purported to represent his father’s estate, but except for a brief time he has not been its administrator. Lisa 

Owsley occupied that position, and Indiana’s judiciary denied Logan’s request to replace her. See In re Estate of Owsley, 

No. 03C01-1406-ES-002796 (Ind. Cir. Ct., Feb. 16, 2016). See 

also Owsley v. Gorbett, 87 N.E.3d 44 (Ind. App. 2017) (affirming the denial of Logan’s motion to open a separate estate). 

The estate decided not to pursue litigation, but it did assign 

to Logan “[w]hatever interest the Estate of Cary A. Owsley 

has in the federal lawsuit” (id. at ¶5). The state’s appellate 

court implied that “whatever interest” the estate had is 

worthless but left final determination to the federal court.

The federal court dismissed Logan’s suit for lack of 

standing. Instead of deciding whether the assignment to Logan conferred a valuable interest, the judge wrote that Logan 

has not suffered any personal injury. And because Logan’s 

federal claim failed, the judge dismissed without prejudice 

Logan’s state-law tort claims for infliction of emotional distress. All parties are citizens of Indiana, so only the supplemental jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1367 could support the tort 

claims, and with federal jurisdiction lacking the state-law 

claims also had to go.

Dismissal of the federal claims on jurisdictional grounds 

was a misstep. Logan asserts injury and seeks damages. Decedents’ relatives may have damages claims against tortfeasors, and Logan also has the benefit of the assignment from 

the estate. Federal law permits assignees to sue on assignors’ 

claims. See Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 

554 U.S. 269 (2008). The right to sue as representative of an 
No. 19-1825 3

estate depends on state law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3), and 

the district court properly recognized that the state court’s 

decision to retain Lisa as the estate’s representative is not 

subject to collateral attack. Cf. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 

293 (2006) (discussing the probate exception to federal jurisdiction). Calling Lisa a “conspirator” does not enable a federal court to take over a probate matter. That leaves the assigned claim. The district judge evidently believed that it is 

not worth anything, but that concerns the merits rather than 

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 

(1946). Otherwise every losing suit would be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

Logan contends that, by concealing or destroying evidence that the estate could have used to sue Lisa and her 

children—or perhaps to persuade a state judge to replace 

Lisa as the estate’s administrator—defendants deprived the 

estate of access to the courts, thus violating the Constitution. 

(Logan does not contend, however, that he or his father’s estate had a right to have the Sheriff and police investigate anyone for murder. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 

(2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 

Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).) Like the state court, we have 

doubts about this “access” approach.

Logan does not contend that the defendants did anything 

that blocked the estate from filing a wrongful-death suit. 

Cary’s estate decided not to sue because it believed that he 

committed suicide, not because defendants in this federal 

suit closed the courthouse doors.

Had a suit been filed, the state court could have issued 

discovery orders, and if the objects of those orders concealed 

or destroyed evidence, the state judge could have found 
4 No. 19-1825

them in contempt or imposed other appropriate sanctions. 

Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (listing the sanctions that federal courts use for failure to produce evidence in discovery), 

45(g) (authorizing contempt sanctions against nonparties).

All of this is equally true about the proceedings Logan 

filed in state court seeking to replace Lisa as the administrator. Far from denying him access to the state courts, defendants provided Logan with grounds to litigate there. Which 

he did.

Logan predicts that sanctions in state litigation would 

have been ineffective, but why conduct a stand-alone federal 

suit to assess how state litigation would have proceeded?

Spoliation of evidence all too often requires resolution in the 

course of litigation. We asked at oral argument if Logan’s 

counsel was aware of any decision holding that asserted 

spoliation supplies the basis of an independent federal suit 

under an “access to the courts” rubric. Counsel did not cite 

any such decision, and our own research did not locate one.

Nor could we find a decision holding that potential witnesses’ asserted willingness to lie or otherwise frustrate the progress of a state suit permits independent federal litigation. A 

person can have ample access to the courts, though it will be 

hard to assemble the evidence needed to win.

None of the Supreme Court’s “access to the courts” cases 

hints that a potential discovery problem can be the basis of a 

federal suit, when the state courts are open. Just as a federal 

defense does not allow a federal court to decide a suit 

founded on state law, see Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 

139 S. Ct. 1743, 1748 (2019); Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1983), a poten-
No. 19-1825 5

tial federal issue during discovery in a suit founded on state 

law should not spawn a separate federal suit.

The district court did not consider this subject, and perhaps Logan has a line of argument, not articulated in his appellate briefs, that would overcome our skepticism. The first 

order of business on remand should be to decide whether an 

access-to-courts claim, the only thing covered by the assignment, can be based on an assertion that the defendants 

concealed or destroyed evidence that could have been relevant, had suit been filed in state court.

VACATED AND REMANDED