COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Koontz, Willis and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DONALD E. WILLIAMS, 

COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT 

OF MOTOR VEHICLES OF THE 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA OPINION BY 

 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

v. Record No. 0820-94-3 JULY 5, 1995 

 

COOPER BAILEY TERRY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 

David V. Williams, Judge 

 Eric K. G. Fiske, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Ebb H. Williams, III (Ebb H. Williams, III, 

P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 By Order of Revocation and Suspension dated September 8, 

1993, the Department of Motor Vehicles revoked Cooper Bailey 

Terry's motor vehicle operator's license on the basis of his July 

20, 1993 conviction in South Carolina of "driving while intox, 

1st." The order cited as "statutory authority" Code §§ 46.2-389 

and 46.2-434, upon which statutes this case focuses. Terry filed 

in the trial court a Bill of Complaint for Injunction, praying 

that the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (the 

Commissioner) be enjoined from issuing the Order of Revocation 

and Suspension. The trial court ruled that Code § 46.2-389 

governed the case and that Terry's South Carolina conviction did 

not bring him within the operation of that statute. It decreed 

that the Order of Revocation and Suspension be reversed and 
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vacated and that the Commissioner should remove the September 8, 

1993 revocation from Terry's driving record. 

 On appeal, the Commissioner contends (1) that the trial 

court applied the wrong statute in constructing its comparative 

analysis of the Virginia and South Carolina driving while 

intoxicated statutes, and (2) that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the South Carolina statute did not substantially 

parallel and conform to the Virginia statute. We conclude that 

Code § 46.2-434, not § 46.2-389, controls the case. Therefore, 

we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case 

for retrial under the provisions of Code § 46.2-434. 

 On July 2, 1993, Terry was arrested in Marlboro County, 

South Carolina and charged with "D.U.I. 1st." The uniform 

traffic ticket referenced South Carolina Code § 56-5-1520, but 

the parties agree that the correct reference was § 56-5-2930, 

which makes it "unlawful for narcotic users or persons under 

influence of liquor, drugs or like substances, to drive." The 

traffic ticket noted "B.A. level 0-15." The lower left quadrant 

of the ticket contains blanks to be filled and blocks to be 

checked indicating proceedings and disposition at trial. The 

relevant completed portions of this section state that trial was 

held July 20, 1993; Terry did not appear; he forfeited his bond; 

and a fine of $298.25 was imposed. No plea is noted. No 

disposition is set forth. No offense is stated as to which any 

presumed disposition might apply. 
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 Code § 46.2-389 provides, in pertinent part: 

 The Commissioner shall forthwith revoke . . . the 

driver's license of any resident or nonresident on 

receiving a record of his conviction . . . of any 

of the following crimes, committed in violation of 

a state law or a valid county, city or town 

ordinance or law of the United States 

substantially paralleling and substantially 

conforming to a like state law . . . : 

* * * * * * * 

 2. Violation of § 18.2-266, § 18.2-272, 

subsection A of § 46.2-341.24 or violation of a 

valid local ordinance paralleling and 

substantially conforming to § 18.2-266 or § 18.2-

272; . . . . 

 Code § 46.2-434 provides, in pertinent part: 

 The Commissioner shall suspend or revoke the 

license . . . of any resident of the 

Commonwealth upon receiving notice of his 

conviction, in a court of competent jurisdiction 

of the Commonwealth, any other state of the United 

States, the United States, Canada or its provinces 

or any territorial subdivision of such state or 

country, of an offense therein which, if committed 

in the Commonwealth, would be grounds for the 

suspension or revocation of the license granted to 

him . . . . 

 Ruling that Code § 46.2-389 controlled the case, the trial 

court constructed a five point analysis, comparing South Carolina 

Code § 56-5-2930 to Virginia Code § 18.2-266, which, together 

with Code § 46.2-341.24(A), proscribes operation of a motor 

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court 

concluded that the South Carolina statute did not substantially 

parallel and conform to the Virginia statute. It held that 

Terry's South Carolina conviction did not bring him within the 
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operation of Code § 46.2-389. 

 Code § 46.2-389 does not address the case of a Virginia 

resident convicted in the court of a foreign state. Rather, this 

statute requires the Commissioner to revoke motor vehicle 

operating privileges based upon convictions suffered by residents 

or nonresidents within Virginia. A careful reading of the 

statute requires this holding. 

 Code § 46.2-389 requires revocation of the driver's license 

of "any resident or nonresident." Virginia lacks jurisdiction to 

revoke the foreign-issued driver's license of a nonresident 

convicted in another state. 

 Code § 46.2-389 sets forth three jurisdictional categories 

of violation: (1) a state law, (2) a valid county, city, or town 

ordinance, (3) law of the United States. These three categories 

 are followed by the modifying clause "substantially paralleling 

and substantially conforming to a like state law." This 

modifying clause is facially ambiguous. It can be read to modify 

only the third category, law of the United States, to which it is 

immediately attached. It can be read to modify the entire three 

element sequence. However, reading the statute in the context of 

its plain purpose resolves that facial ambiguity. If the term "a 

like state law" is read to embrace the law of any state, the 

statute would operate upon a conviction under a South Carolina 

law that substantially paralleled and conformed to the law of any 

other state. Plainly, that is not the legislature's purpose. We 
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hold, therefore, that the standard defined by the term "state 

law" is the standard of Virginia law, and that the term "state 

law" means a law of this state. Thus, we construe Code 

§ 46.2-389 to control cases involving convictions under (1) a law 

of this state, (2) a valid county, city or town ordinance of this 

state, or (3) a law of the United States substantially 

paralleling and substantially conforming to a like law of this 

state. This case involves no such conviction. 

 Code § 46.2-434 embraces the case of a Virginia resident 

convicted in a foreign jurisdiction. If the conviction suffered 

is such that it would be ground for suspension or revocation of 

license in Virginia, Code § 46.2-434 requires the Commissioner to 

impose such a suspension or revocation. 

 The trial court limited its analysis to the criteria of Code 

§ 46.2-389. It made no determination as to the correctness of 

the Commissioner's action under Code § 46.2-434, the applicable 

statute. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for 

retrial under Code § 46.2-434. 

 The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is 

remanded. 

 Reversed and remanded.