IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICIA A. REYNOLDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 14-00235-CG-N

)

MEGAN BRENNAN,1 )

United States Postmaster General )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the Amended Complaint (Doc. 28) and 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 30) brought 

under FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 10(b), 12(b)(6), and 41(b). The Plaintiff has timely filed a 

response in opposition to the Motion (Doc. 34) and the Defendant has filed a reply to 

the response in opposition (Doc. 36). Plaintiff and Defendant both filed further 

briefing on the motion, including regarding issues of service (Docs. 37, 38, 39). The 

motion is now under submission and is ripe for adjudication. See Doc. 32. The

present motion has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge for entry of a report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C)

and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(1). Upon consideration, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) be GRANTED.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

 1 Plaintiff sued Patrick Donahoe, the Postmaster General, in his official capacity in May 2014. Doc. 1. 

Megan Brennan was installed as the Postmaster General by the U.S. Postal Service Board of 

Governors effective February 1, 2015.

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In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court construes the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, “accepting all well-pleaded facts that are 

alleged therein to be true.” Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.

2006)). “ ‘To survive . . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” ’ ” Id. (quoting 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). “The plausibility standard ‘calls for enough fact to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the defendant's 

liability.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not 

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but [rather] asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendants liability, it ‘stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). “[W]here the 

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, quoting in part FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) generally sets the benchmark for determining whether 

a complaint’s allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (“Under [Rule] 8(a)(2), a pleading 

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must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ As the Court held in Twombly, . . . the pleading standard Rule 8 

announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than 

an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”).

Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Nor does a complaint suffice 

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); compare Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1381 (“[G]iven 

the pleading standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal, [plaintiff] must do more 

than recite [ ] statutory elements in conclusory fashion. Rather, his allegations 

must proffer enough factual content to ‘raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.’” (emphasis added)), with Robinson v. Correctional Med. Assocs., 

Inc., Civil Action No. 1:09–cv–01509–JOF, 2010 WL 2499994, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 

15, 2010) (“Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but ‘must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that 

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’” (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and emphasis omitted and added))).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it 

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent 

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with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. . . .

[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a 

motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the 

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 

complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 

compare id. at 680 (a plaintiff must nudge his claims “across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.”), with Patel v. Georgia Dep’t BHDD, 485 Fed. App’x 982, 

983 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) (per curiam) (“In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a 

plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,’ rather than merely conceivable.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). In 

addition to the pleading requirements of Rule 8, FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) further 

requires that “[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate 

transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.”

Under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), “a defendant may move to dismiss the action or 

any claim against it” where the “plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order.” Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is 

usually without prejudice. See, e.g., Boazman v. Econ. Lab., Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 213 

(5th Cir. 1976).2 “Dismissal of a lawsuit with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is a severe 

sanction that should only be used in extreme circumstances where lesser sanctions 

 2 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior 

to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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would not serve the best interests of justice.” Castro v. Dir., F.D.I.C., 449 F. App'x 

786, 788 (11th Cir. 2011).

II. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on May 27, 2014, by filing a Complaint with the 

Court alleging a discrimination claim against the Postmaster General. See Doc. 1. It 

was unclear from the face of the Complaint upon what basis she alleges 

discrimination. Id. Plaintiff was ordered to file a supplement to her original 

Complaint “that clearly states the basis for the discrimination she alleges.” Doc. 3 at 

3. Plaintiff responded to this Order with miscellaneous documents, but still failed to 

allege a plain basis for discrimination. See Docs. 5, 6. The undersigned granted

Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. 19) pursuant to FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(e). Docs. 26, 29. On July 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. 

Doc. 28. Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 2015. Doc. 30. 

Plaintiff’s response contends that Defendant’s Motion is moot because it was 

directed at the original Complaint. Doc. 34 at 1. Plaintiff is mistaken. The current 

Motion was filed two weeks after the Amended Complaint and specifically states 

that it is directed at the Amended Complaint. Doc. 30 at 1.

The following factual allegations3 concerning the Plaintiff’s employment with 

the United States Postal Service are accepted as true for purposes of the present 

motion:4

 3 As Defendant points out (Doc. 30 at 9-10), Plaintiff has failed to meet the FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) 

requirement that ““[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction 

or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.” The Amended Complaint is divided into 

numbered paragraphs, but not into separate counts. Doc. 28 generally. However, this requirement 

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Plaintiff was hired [temporarily] in November, 1985 . . . under Leak M. 

Hayes. Under Mrs. Hayes I was belittled, and discussed as if I wasn’t 

even in the office. I was bitten by a dog and threatened by her that if I 

filed a grievance or talked to anyone I would be fired . . . On my last 

day . . . Mrs. Hayes stated that one of “you people is enough in this 

office”. She was talking about myself and David Mc Cants [sic]. Both of 

us are African-American.

Plaintiff was rehired . . . on August 31, 1986 by Rudy Blystrock,, 

Postmaster at the time. He asked at the time if anyone wanted to move 

up or get higher level training we were to write it out and get it 

stamped by a clerk and you will be trained. At the time it was myself 

and two other clerks. They were trained and I remained a clerk-carrier 

. . .

Plaintiff was still denied training as others were hired and trained, 

Carol Barkley, Faye Faircloth, Terry Hastings. Both Faye Faircloth 

and Carol Barkley were trained . . . [Jim Hoobler] stated I’d make 

more money as a carrier than postmaster or supervisor.

Alfonso Russel was later Postmaster and still I was not trained, I was 

continually being told as soon as they train someone else to take my 

place to carry main then I can trained. But as soon as I trained 

someone I found that this person is being groomed to be the next 

supervisor.

Plaintiff was told that I needed more education, more training to 

become supervisor but all these other people were not having to get all 

this education. I went to Mobile to get the on the job training, PEDC 

Test, going to college all at the same time. Graduated from the 

University of Mobile.

 

does not bear on the jurisdiction of the Court (Mech. Contractors Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Mech. 

Contractors Ass’n of N. Cal., Inc., 342 F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1965)) and its enforcement is at the 

discretion of the Court. U.S. v. Jerome, 115 F. Supp. 818, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Where, as here, 

Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court may “construe [the] plaintiffs’ pleadings liberally.” Porter v.

Duval County School Bd., 406 Fed. Appx. 460, 462 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). Consequently, the 

Court does not rigorously enforce the Rule 10(b) requirement here.

4 The Supreme Court has stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)) that:

[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings 

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 

of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

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Returning to Atmore, Jim Hoobler was Postmaster, Plaintiff was called 

Nigger, stupid, ignorant, uneducated, and would never sit behind a 

desk in his office. Plaintiff filed and [sic] EEOC complaint and the 

ruling was in Plaintiff favor . . . Judge [Brevard] Hand dismiss the 

case. [sic]

From that point on the Plaintiff was harassed, retaliated against at 

every hand. I was written up for anything. I was accused of hitting 

stop signs, wrecking every LLV in the office, I had the worst driving 

record in the office. I was the worst liar in the office. No one in the 

office liked me and they had told the Postmaster that they didn’t want 

me as a supervisor in that office.

Plaintiff was sent to Brewton, Alabama . . . I was constantly called to 

come back to Atmore because I was needed to carry mail. When I 

returned to Atmore I found that I was accused of misplacing $8000.00 

worth of stamps. The stamps was [sic] sold to the Court House Clerk 

and the Clerk had not put them in her computer. I was kept off the 

schedule and had to use annyal leave to make a payday.

Plaintiff was harassed, threatened, treated unfairly and called names, 

written up and accused of everything and anything that went wrong. 

Grievances were filed and won by the Plaintiff and the Postmaster and 

Supervisor was aksed to stop but it continued.

Lester Cogolla came in as Supervisor . . . When he came in I asked 

about being trained as a Supervisor and he told me at the time I would 

be trained while he was there. That was not to be . . . Mr. Cogolla 

accused me of posing as a Postmaster when looking into a situation 

between two other carriers. I was stripped of my Shop Steward badge. 

I was constantly followed on my routes, I wasn’t allowed to hand off 

mail if I was overburden [sic] at times but was made to carry more 

mail off other routes He came to my home when I was off to get me to 

come to work. Other carriers were allowed to have my day off. I could 

put in for sick leave and if another carrier wanted those days, they 

were given those days.

Plaintiff was in ICU in June 2006 and Lester Cogolla threatened to 

make me pay back all my sick leave before I could file my FMLA and 

even after I file [sic] he threatened to have me pay it back. He told me . 

. . I was not to take sick leave unless I discussed it with them because 

it would hurt the flow of mail. Monica Fountain . . . became Postmaster 

. . . During the time she was there for 6 months I was constantly 

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harassed, threatened with suspension, followed, written up . . . I filed 

grievance after grievance, eventually it was found that it was the 

scanner that I was using was not working. It took packages but not 

personal information.

Plaintiff was called in on numerous occasions for infractions that I had 

no knowledge of was accused of things that I didn’t do . . . Plaintiff had 

shoulder surgery, came back to work with medical documentation that 

I could work light duty and Lester Cogolla told me I couldn’t but he let 

a white carrier with shoulder injury come back to work on light duty.

EEOC requested a complete investigation of the complaint by the U. S. 

Postal Service and they hired a law firm from De Soto, Texas, headed 

by Ms. Brenda Vonjoe. The report was return [sic] to the National EEO 

Investigative Service of the U.S. Postal Service, Tampa, Florida. The 

investigation went in thePlaintiff’s flavor [sic]. EEOC in Washington, 

D. C. asked the U.S. Postal Service to comply with the order and the 

U.S. Postal Service did not answer, nor did they comply with Nancy A. 

Falanga, Manager Dispute Resolution . . . The U. S. Postal Service did 

not respond to the EEOC before their deadline of September 26, 2013 

nor after. It was six months later . . . that the Director of the EEOC, 

Mr. Robert J. Barnhart decided that there was no wrong doing on the 

part of the Postal Service.

The Arbitrator from Atlanta told me that Mr. Cogolla and I had a 

personal problem instead of trying to settle the issue on the two 

occasion that they came down [sic]. I was told to my job and be 

satisfied with it . . . 

Doc. 28 at 1-5. Based on the preceding factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts in 

her Amended Complaint that the U.S. Postal Service “has discriminated against 

me”. Doc. 28 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that the Postal Service “did willfully and 

maliciously violate Article 25; Article 33; EL Sec. 3 Employment and Placement; 

Sec. 5 Employment Benefits; JCAM ( Joint Contract Administration Manual) Sick 

Leave, FMLA, Handbook EL-312 Sec. 7 Assignment, Reassignment, and Promotion, 

Postal Service Policy on Workplace Harrassment.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that the 

Postal Service “[c]reated a hostile work environment for me to work in and 

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promoted employees that were hired after I, the Plaintiff had trained them to be 

carriers. All the people trained as supervisors are younger than Plaintiff.” Id. 

Plaintiff does not make any more specific legal allegations, nor does she state 

specifically on what basis she has been discriminated. See id.

III. Analysis

A. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 & 12(b)(6) Requirements

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) sets the benchmark for determining whether a 

complaint’s allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a 

pleading contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” American Dental Association, 605 F.3d at

1288 (11th Cir. 2010), quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (1957). Additionally, a 

complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the 

material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” 

Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701, 707 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010), quoting Bryson v. 

Gonzalez, 534 F. 3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to advance any legal theory, state any 

cause of action, or show why she is in entitled to the relief which she seeks (“The 

Plaintiff ask [sic] that she be awarded . . . Postmaster, retroactive, all benefits and 

an additional $750,000.00 for punitive damages” (Doc. 28 at 5)). While her 

complaint mentions the Family Medical Leave Act, she fails to allege the essential 

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elements relating to any cause of action under that piece of legislation. See Doc. 28 

at 1 compare, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2915(a)(1) (stating elements of an FMLA interference 

claim) and 1 Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Fed. Law § 32.75 (stating elements of 

FMLA retaliation claim). Plaintiff alleges that she is African-American (Doc. 28 at 

1) and that many of the other postal employees trained for supervisor positions 

were younger than her. Id. at 1. However, Plaintiff fails to allege that the U.S. 

Postal Service’s employment or promotion decisions were motivated by any 

discriminatory animus. Id. The Amended Complaint alleges that the Postal Service 

violated several of its own handbooks, policies, and manuals. Doc. 28 at 1. Even if 

these allegations are true, the Postal Service’s internal policies do not represent 

actionable law. Thus, those allegations do not constitute a statement that Plaintiff 

is “entitled to relief.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

The Amended Complaint does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiff makes claims, such as that 

younger employees were trained as supervisors (Doc. 28 at 1), which are “merely 

consistent with” the Defendant’s liability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, 

such allegations “stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

‘entitlement to relief.’ See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 

(internal citations omitted). Without any allegation of discriminatory animus, the 

Amended Complaint fails to “ ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 

reveal evidence’ of the defendant’s liability.” See id. Consequently, the Amended 

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id.

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The Plaintiff finds herself in the difficult situation of proceeding pro se.5

However, while the Court may “construe pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings liberally, courts 

may not act as de facto counsel or ‘rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order 

to sustain an action.’ ” Porter v. Duval County School Bd., 406 Fed. Appx. 460, 462 

(11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 

F. 3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds). “[T]he Twombly

pleading standard, even when applied to pro se plaintiffs, simply does not permit a 

Court to ‘reverse-engineer’ a plaintiff’s conclusion that [s]he is entitled to relief. 

Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts and law showing why [s]he is entitled to 

relief. [Sh]e thus must assert non-conclusory allegations supporting the elements of 

[her] claims.” Washington v. CSX Transp. (R.R.), 2009 WL 1289032, *2 (S.D. Ga. 

2009). No “short and plain statement” has come from the Plaintiff detailing how she 

is entitled to the relief sought and the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on 

which relief may plausibly be granted.

B. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) Dismissal

Plaintiff has previously been given the opportunity to amend her complaint. 

Doc. 29. When amending her complaint, Plaintiff was ordered to “state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” Doc. 26 at 9 accord Doc. 29 at 1. Under Rule 8(a)(2), it 

is the Plaintiff’s burden to provide Defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim 

 5 Plaintiff has brought employment discrimination claims against the United States Postal Service 

on two previous occasions. The first action was brought pro se in 1997 alleging discrimination on the 

basis of race. Reynolds v. Runyon, et al, Civil Action No. 97-cv-00790-AH-S. The second action was 

brought through counsel in 2004; it alleged discrimination on the basis of age and race in 

determining whether to train employees for supervisor positions. Reynolds v. Potter, Civil Action No. 

04-cv-00047-CB-C, Doc. 28 at 4. It further alleged retaliation and a hostile work environment. Id. at 

4-5. Both cases were dismissed following motions for summary judgment by the Defendant and both 

dismissals were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

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is and the grounds upon which it rests.” American Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1288 

(11th Cir. 2010) quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The Plaintiff has 

failed to obey the Order of the Court concerning the Amended Complaint and has 

twice failed to satisfy her burden under Rule 8(a)(2). “ ‘Where a more carefully 

drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance 

to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with 

prejudice.’ ” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) quoting Bank v. 

Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991). However, Plaintiff has already been 

given the opportunity to amend her complaint (Doc. 26 at 9 accord Doc. 29 at 1) and 

still fails to state a claim. Plaintiff has brought discrimination actions against the 

United States Postal Service on two previous occasions. Reynolds v. Runyon, et al, 

Civil Action No. 97-cv-00790-AH-S; Reynolds v. Potter, Civil Action No. 04-cv-00047-

CB-C. Both relied on similar facts and were dismissed following motions to dismiss 

or motions for summary judgment. Id. All three cases were deemed to be without 

merit. Id. Because the Plaintiff persists in filing meritless claims while failing to 

abide by Court rules, Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate. Dismissal under Rule 

41(b) is typically without prejudice and dismissal with prejudice remains a “severe 

sanction” Castro, 449 F. App'x at 788. However, the Plaintiff’s continued taxing of 

the Court’s resources through the filing of unmerited actions constitutes “extreme 

circumstances where lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” 

Id. Consequently, dismissal of this action with prejudice is appropriate.

IV. Conclusion

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In accordance with the above-stated analysis, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) be GRANTED

and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve this Order on the Plaintiff by regular and 

certified mail.

V. Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything 

in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. GEN. L.R. 72(c). The parties should note that under 

Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's 

findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge 

on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, 

however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests 

of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

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merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 1st day of February 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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