alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### KIRKSEY v. BEAUCHESNE et al.

Civ. No. 51-178.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 8, 1951.

Max S. Ginsberg, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Michael T. Prendergast, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

FORD, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Más-sachusetts, brings this action for damages for personal injuries allegedly received in a motor vehicle collision in Winchester, Massachusetts. Defendants are a citizen of New Hampshire and a corporation alleged to be doing business in New Hampshire. Service of process was made on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in accordance with the provisions of Mass. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) Ch. 90, §§ 3A, 3B; F.R.Civ. P., Rule 4(d) (7), 28 U.S.C.A.

Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that neither of the defendants has been served with process in Massachusetts and that neither of them is subject to service here. They rely on Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 1 Cir., 183 F.2d 53 as holding that a non-resident of Massachusetts cannot be sued in this district without his consent. But the Martin case recognized that the Supreme Court has held in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091, a case dealing with the very Massachusetts statute under which service was made in this case, that a non-resident motorist can be required, by extraterritorial service of process, to answer within the state claims arising from the operation of his motor vehicle within the state.

The Martin case was concerned solely with the question of proper venue in the federal courts. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), provides that “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise pro*149vided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.” In the Martin case, the action was brought in the District of Massachusetts by a Connecticut plaintiff against an Ohio corporation. Clearly the venue was improper unless the defendant waived its objection and consented to be sued in this district. The Martin case held only that although by statute a nonresident motorist operating a vehicle in Massachusetts is deemed to have appointed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles his agent for service of process this does not amount to a voluntary waiver of objections to improper venue in the federal courts.

In the present case, the plaintiff brings his action in the District of Massachusetts in which he resides. The venue requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is satisfied, and there is no necessity for consent or waiver on the part of the defendants.

Motions to dismiss are denied.
#### Louisville & Nashville R. Co. *v.*John M. May.

Damages — Negligence—Instructions—Weight of Evidence.

Where, in a suit for damages resulting from the negligent acts of the defendant, the court charges the jury that it should consider all the facts and circumstances proven in the case, it was authorized to take into consideration the condition of the drawhead; and the court did not err in refusing to give an instruction as to the condition of such drawhead.

Weight of the Evidence.

Where there have been two concurring verdicts, the court of appeals will not reverse a judgment on the weight of the evidence.

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT.

October 3, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The court did not err in refusing instruction No. 8, asked by appellant. The appellee was bound to use ordinary care, and the *117jury were so instructed, and in determining whether he did use such care, the jury were told by instruction No. 14 that they should consider all the facts and circumstances proven in the case. This authorized them to take into consideration the condition of the draw-head; to have called special attention to the drawhead, as was intended to be done by the refused instruction, would have been to give its condition undue importance. Instruction No. 12, given on motion of appellee, is not subject to the criticism in which counsel indulge. The adjectives “gross” and “willful” apply to and qualify “carelessness” as well as “negligence,” and this fact must have been palpable to the jury.

*Hines & Porter, for appellant.*

*I. A. Mitchell, for appellee.*

We cannot reverse this judgment upon the facts. Appellant proves more than mere inadvertance upon the part of the fireman, who was operating the engine at the time of the accident. If the speed of the locomotive was suddenly increased, when the two cars to be coupled were in a few inches of each other, it was an act of gross negligence, if not of positive recklessness.

The fact of the increase of speed is disputed by two or more witnesses ; it was for the jury to determine the question.

They accepted and acted on the version given by appellee, and as this is the second finding in his favor we do not feel authorized to interfere.

Judgment *affirmed.*
#### W. B. Hosick *v.*Elizabeth Trabue.

Limitations — Statute of Limitations a Defense — Pleading.

The statute of limitations is a matter of defense and if relied upon must be pleaded by tbe defendant, and unless tbe petition shows on its face not only that the, action is barred by him but that the defendant is not within any of the exceptions mentioned in the statute, a demurrer will not be sustained to it.

APPEAL PROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT.

November 28, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Elliott:

The deed, the execution of which it is alleged was procured by the fraud of appellee, was executed and delivered in 1864, and this suit was not brought till 1875; and as more than ten years have elapsed since the deed was executed, and as this appears on the face of ap*806pellant’s petition, it is contended that the petition did not show a subsisting cause of action; and it was the duty of the court to sustain a demurrer thereto, which was done and the action dismissed. In the case of *Board v. Jolly,*5 Bush 86, this court held that the statute of limitations is a matter of strict defense, and must, if relied on, be pleaded by the defendant in all actions, unless the petition shows that the action is not only barred by time, but that the defendant is' not within any of the exceptions mentioned in the statute, when any exceptions are contained in the statute which prescribes the limitation. See also, *Chiles v. Drake,*2 Met. 146; *Rankin v. Turney,*2 Bush 555.

*Bush & Hendrick, for appellant.*

*I. H. Trabue, Hord & Trabue, for appellee.*

It is true, as appellee contends, that the chancellors of England sustained demurrers when the complainant by his own bill shows that he had been guilty of great laches in bringing his suit, or when it was an old stale claim that a court of equity, on complainant’s own showing, would not enforce; but this was not enforcing any statute of limitations; it was a refusal to investigate the merits of an old stale demand.

The defense in this suit as indicated by appellee is that no suit was brought to set aside the deed for fraud within ten years of its execution and delivery to appellee, H. A. Trabue, which is purely a statute of limitations of the legislature of our own state. Mr. Chitty in his work on pleadings says that the statute of limitations is a matter of defense, which must always be pleaded; and when the party sued does not rely on it, it is the duty of the court to render judgment against him.

But so far as this state is concerned, the law has long since been settled by adjudications that the defense of the statute of limitations must be made by plea or answer, and not by demurrer. Wherefore the judgment is *reversed*and cause remanded with directions to overrule the appellee’s demurrer, and for further proceedings consistent herewith.
#### John W. Finnell *v.*Simon VanArsdall.

Damages — Personal Injury — Pleading Defense — Recovery.

In a suit for damages on account of assault and battery, where the defendant raised no issue by his answer except the amount of damages, it was not error for the court to refuse an instruction except as to the measure of damages.

Recovery.

A party may recover exemplary damages without averring malice, in an action for an unlawful injury to the person.

APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT.

March 8, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The answer filed by appellant, and upon which he went to trial, presented no defenses to the action, and raised no issue except as *417to the measure of damages. It contains no statement that at the time he struck appellee, he had unlawfully set upon him, nor that he had then and there threatened violence, and exhibited an intention to set upon him, having a present ability to carry the threat into execution. If appellant merely used force to repel force, he knew the fact to exist from the beginning, and should have pleaded it.

*Kyle & Poston, for appellant.*

*J. B. & P. B. Thompson, T. C. Bell, for appellee.*

The court did not abuse a sound discretion, in refusing to allow the amendment to be filed. It recites no circumstance that was not known to appellant when he answered, and no excuse was offered for the delay in setting up the circumstances therein detailed.. Besides, the amendment violates the rules of pleading, by giving a history of the difficulty between the parties from its inception, instead of setting up the facts constituting, or supposed to constitute grounds for defense.

The instructions given the court could not have prejudiced appellant. His guilt stood confessed, and he had no right to ask instructions except as to the measure of damages. The law upon this subject was correctly given to the jury. A party may recover exemplary damages without averring malice, in an action for an unlawful injury to the person. The circumstances under tyhich it was inflicted may go to the jury, and be considered in fixing the amount of the recovery.

We see no reversible error in the case before us.

Judgment *affirmed.*
UNITED STATES
                SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                     WASHINGTON, D.C.  20549

                           FORM 10-Q

            QUARTERLY REPORT UNDER SECTION 13 OR 15(d)
              OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934


           For the Quarter ended September 30, 1997

              Commission file number     33-24537


            CENTURY PACIFIC TAX CREDIT HOUSING FUND II
      (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)


          CALIFORNIA                       95-4178283
(State of other jurisdiction of            (IRS Employer
incorporation of organization)             Identification Number)


1925 Century Park East, Suite 1760
Los Angeles, CA                            90067
(Address of principal executive offices)   (Zip Code)


Registrant's telephone number, including area code:
(800) 262-8242


No Change
(Former name, former address and former fiscal year if changed
since last report)


Indicate by a check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed
all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months
(or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to
file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing
requirements for the past 90 days.


Yes  [x]          No  [ ]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-7175
In Re: ROBERT WILLIAM PUCKETT,
Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-98-12) Submitted: November 24, 2003 Decided: February 4, 2004 Before WIDENER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert William Puckett, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert W. Puckett petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to act on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. Our review of the district court docket sheet in that action reveals that the district court entered a final order on April 22, 2003, denying relief on Puckett’s § 2255 motion. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the mandamus petition as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION OF CFO PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the report of Gaiam, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Stephen J. Thomas, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge: 

(1) The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Date:March 11, 2011
#### N. E. Vaughan and Wife *v.*H. C. Melone.

Principal and Agent — Duty of Agent — Adverse Interests.

An agent must look after the interests of his principal. It is inconsistent with his duties to purchase his principal’s property for his own, benefit.

Duty of Agent.

Nothing short of fraud by the principal or imperative necessity will justify an agent in placing himself in an attitude hostile to his principal’s interests.

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT.

June 30, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

Melone neither alleges nor proves that he was induced to enter into the contract with appellants by reason of their assurance that Bates, had agreed “to wait on them two years for the debt,” nor does he allege or prove that Bates had not so agreed.

Whilst it is no doubt true that Melone intended to befriend Vaughan and wife, it is nevertheless true that by his contract with them he became their agent, charged with the duty of renting out the mortgaged property and of collecting and applying for their benefit, and in satisfaction of their debts, the accruing rents.

He was not bound to protect the mortgaged property by paying Bates judgment; but it was inconsistent with his duties as agent to purchase the property for his own benefit. By doing so he antagonized his interest to that of his principal; and there is nothing in the record tending to show that he was compelled to make the purchase in order to protect himself. His claim against appellants was only about thirteen hundred dollars ($1,300), according to his own showing; and in the absence of proof to the contrary, we may well assume that the one hundred seventeen (117) acres of land was ample indemnity to him, even if he had let the livery stable prop*22erty go; nothing short of fraud by the principal or imperative necessity will justify an agent, who is a *quasi*trustee, in placing himself in an attitude hostile to the interest of his constituent.

*Jeff BrownJ A. G.*Roberts, *for appellants.*

Harwood, *for appellee.*

Neither fraud nor imperative necessity is shown in this case; Me-lone has a lien upon the livery stable property for the amount paid on the Bates judgment, also the amount paid in satisfaction of the vendor’s lien, and for such balance as may be due him: after the account for debts paid .under the contract evidenced by the mortgage, and the rents received on the mortgaged property, shall be settled; and if the livery stable property fails to satisfy any portion of the last mentioned claim, these appellants’ interest in the 117 acres of land may be subjected to such judgment and also the judgment of reasonable compensation to Melone for his services as agent.

Judgment *reversed*and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
#### Shafer *v.*Bronenburg et al.

Supreme Court.—Evidence.—The Supreme Court will not weigh the evidence given on the trial below, in order to determine the preponderance.

APPEAL from the Madison Circuit Court.

Downev, J.

Suit by the appellees, as indorsees, against the appellant, as maker, of a promissory note. Among the paragraphs of the answer, the sixth set up as a defence, that the consideration of the note was illegal, it having been given as the consideration for compounding a larceny; and the eighth alleged a want of consideration. The cause having been, by agreement of the parties, tried by the court, there was a finding for the plaintiffs, a motion for a new trial overruled, and judgment for the plaintiffs.

The errors assigned call in question the correctness of the action of the court in refusing to grant a new trial, and it is urged by counsel for the appellant that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of their client. But we cannot weigh the evidence. In such cases, the matter must remain as decided in the court below.

*596
      *W. R. Pierse*and *IT. D. Thompson,*for appellant.

y. *W.*Sansbury, for appellees.

An attempt was made to save and present a question relating to the admissibility of part o£ the evidence of a witness for the plaintiff; but the question is not presented by the bill of exceptions, as it should have been, to enable us to decide it.

The judgment is affirmed, with two per cent, damages and costs.
#### J. Boone, et al., *v.*J. N. B. Hardwicke’s Adm’r. J. Boone, et al., *v.*T. C. Barn’s Adm’r.

Suit on Injunction Bond — Recovery.

A requirement in an injunction bond that the obligors would pay and satisfy any modified judgment that might be rendered is mere surplusage, since the judgments were not enjoined. The only obligation on said bond was to pay all costs and damages that might be awarded in case the injunction should be dissolved.

Measure of Damages.

Only such damages caused by the delay in selling the land may be recovered on a bond given for an injunction against such sale and the recovery can then only be had unless assessed at the time the injunction was dissolved as required by the statute.

APPEAL PROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT.

March 20, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The petition upon which Barzella Grooms obtained the order of injunction, restraining appellees from proceeding to sell the tract of land adjudged to be sold in satisfaction of their claims against Madison Grooms, shows that she did not ask that they, or either of them, should be restrained from proceeding to enforce their judgments as against their debtor.

The prayer of the petition is that they shall be restrained “from selling said land.” The order of injunction is not copied in the record, but we must presume that it was such an order as was asked for, and that, notwithstanding its existence, the appellees were free to pursue their personal remedies against their debtor, being restrained only from selling the tract of land. The bonds required by the clerk were not such as he ought to have taken. There was no necessity for the appellant and her sureties to stipulate that they would satisfy the judgments in favor of appellees against the third party, Madison Grooms, nor that they would satisfy any modified judgment that might be rendered. As these judgments were not enjoined, these stipulations were mere surplusage. Covenants resting on.no consideration are not authorized or required by law. The only enforceable stipulation in the bond is the agreement to pay all costs and damages that might be awarded in case the injunction should be dissolved. Sec. 307, Civil Code of Practice.

Appellees, therefore, have no right to recover on these bonds more *457than they were damaged by being delayed in selling the land, and not that amount, unless it was assessed as required by Sec. 325 of the Civil Code of Practice, at the time the injunction was dissolved, and by the court rendering the judgment dissolving it.

*Apperson & Reid, for appellants. H. C. Lilly, for appellees.*

The judgments are *reversed*and the causes remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
United States Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Certificate of Metrological Traceability For:

Washington

2024 to 2025

This laboratory has demonstrated evidence of an unbroken chain of metrological traceability of its standards to the international 

system of units (SI), maintains a documented calibration program, documented measurement uncertainties, uses documented 

measurement procedures, successfully completed training and proficiency tests, submitted a quality management system, and 

has demonstrated suitable measurement assurance for the Scope listed on this certificate.

The Office of Weights and Measures Program assesses laboratories to NIST Handbook 143 - Program Handbook for State 

Weights and Measures Laboratories and ISO/IEC 17025:2017. 

Scope

Mass Echelon I

20 kg to 1 mg

50 lb to 0.001 lb

Mass Echelon II

25 kg to 1 mg

1000 lb to 0.001 lb

4 oz to 0.03125 oz

Mass Echelon III

25 kg to 1 mg

4000 lb to 0.001 lb

4 oz to 0.03125 oz

Weight Carts 

4000 lb to 3000 lb

Volume Gravimetric, I

5 gal 

Volume Transfer, II

1000 gal to 5 gal

Volume Transfer, II LPG

200 gal to 19 gal

Time

Stopwatches, Timers

 24 h

_____________________________________

Katrice Lippa, Chief

NIST Office of Weights and Measures

(Rev.: September 2021)

Effective Dates: 2024-02-01 to 2026-01-31