IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ATLANTIC SPECIALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

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Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-458-CG-N

MR. CHARLIE ADVENTURES, LLC 

and KIM P. KORNEGAY,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment (Doc. 37), Defendants’ amended motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44), 

Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 52), 

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 54), 

Plaintiff’s reply in support of its motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 57), 

Defendants’ reply in support of its motion for summary judgment (Doc. 60), 

Plaintiff’s motions to strike testimony of experts David Stegall and Richard Schiehl 

(Docs. 58 & 59), Defendants’ motion for oral argument (Doc. 62), Defendants 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motions to strike (Docs. 65 & 66), and Plaintiff’s reply in 

support of its motions to strike (Doc. 67). After review of the pending motions, the 

court finds that oral argument is not necessary and therefore denies said motion. 

The court further finds that for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion for 

partial summary judgment should be granted and Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.

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FACTS

This case involves an insurance claim for damage to Defendants’ yacht, the 

“Mr. Charlie,” and its contents by a fire that occurred on March 3, 2013. Plaintiff, 

Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (“Atlantic”) filed its complaint seeking a 

declaration that it does not owe coverage for the fire and Defendants asserted 

counterclaims for breach of contract and bad faith. (Docs. 1, 16). 

Atlantic issued a yacht-insurance policy to Mr. Charlie Adventures, LLC 

effective June 15, 2012 to June 15, 2013. (Doc. 36-3). Defendant Kim P. Kornegay is 

named in the policy as additional “Insured Person.” (Doc. 36-3, p. 6). The policy 

covered the yacht up to an agreed value of $800,000 and for personal effects such as 

the contents of the yacht up to $5,000. (Doc. 36-3, p. 3). The policy covered 

“[a]ccidental, direct physical loss of or damage to the insured property” but 

contained an exclusion stating that it would not pay “any loss, damage or expense 

caused by or resulting from:”

1. Wear and tear; gradual deterioration; weathering; bubbling; 

osmosis; blistering; delamination of fiberglass or plywood; 

corrosion; rusting; electrolysis; mold; rot; inherent vice; vermin; 

insects or marine life; 

2. Your failure to maintain the covered yacht in good condition and 

repair;

* * * *

(Doc. 36-3, p. 11). 

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On March 3, 2013, while Mr. Kornegay was operating the yacht, it reportedly 

caught fire and burned to the waterline. (Doc. 16, p. 3). Atlantic was notified of the 

fire the next day and the claim was assigned to Atlantic’s Senior Claims Adjuster, 

Rita Boggan. (Doc. 33-1, p. 182). Ms. Boggan’s supervisor, Joe Gallagher, is 

responsible for making the final decision on whether to pay or deny the claim. (Doc. 

44-2, pp. 3-4). On March 4, 2013, Atlantic hired Guy Plaisance, a marine surveyor, 

to investigate the loss. (Doc. 44-5, p. 3). On March 19, 2013, Atlantic hired Gary 

Jones, a fire investigator, to determine cause and origin of the fire. (Doc. 44-8, p. 3). 

On March 29, 2013, Plaisance wrote to Atlantic stating that he believed the 

starboard main engine severely overheated as a result of the raw water inlet 

strainer on the bottom being heavily impacted with marine growth. (Doc. 44-5, p. 

35). Plaisance further stated that the overheating condition could have created an 

intense exhaust heating which would have melted the neoprene rubber hose 

connecting the fiberglass exhaust tube to the riser and discharge tube. (Doc. 44-5, p. 

36). 

Atlantic retained mechanics Tom Elliot and Ralph Holloway of Middleton 

Marine to examine the engines. (Doc. 33-1, p. 88; Doc. 44-5, p. 9). On April 18, 2013 

Middleton tore down the starboard engine for inspection and found the engine did 

not show signs of overheating. (Doc. 32-5, p. 11; Doc. 44-5, pp. 230-231). The engine 

was later stored at the Dog River Marina outside, exposed to the weather. (Doc. 44-

5, pp. 4-5). On April 20, 2013, Plaisance sent an email to Gary Jones, Tom Elliot 

and Ralph Holloway with a copy going to Rita Boggan asking whether it was 

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possible for the exhaust temperature to get above 257 degrees Fahrenheit with 

limited seawater flow through the engine and the engine not drastically overheat to 

a point of failure, yet the hot exhaust gas start burning the hose and gas pipe. (Doc. 

34-1, pp. 27-31). His email stated that this was his primary question. Plaisance did 

not know if he ever got an answer to his question. (Doc. 34-1, p. 32-33). Plaisance is 

sure somebody concurred, whether in writing or orally, but Gary Jones did not 

respond, there is no record of a response from anyone else and Plaisance does not 

remember whom or if anyone responded. (Doc. 34-1, pp. 32-34). Boggan and 

Gallagher were aware that the engines did not overheat. (Doc. 44-4, p. 9; Doc. 44-2, 

pp. 8-9).

Atlantic retained Dr. Kendall Clarke, a metallurgist, to determine the 

percent reduction in flow area on both the starboard and port seawater intake 

screens. (Doc. 44-9). On June 28, 2013, Gary Jones issued a report classifying the 

fire as undetermined, pending the materials testing to be completed by Dr. Clarke. 

(Doc. 44-8, p. 7). Dr. Clarke determined that the intake screen from the port engine 

had an open area of 3.55 inches squared and the starboard screen had an open area 

of 3.85 inches squared. (Doc.44-9, p. 3). Plaisance relied on an employee of the 

company that manufactures the intake screens to calculate whether the pump 

would flow enough water through the screens. (Doc. 44-10, p. 18). However, 

Plaisance did not know Moran’s qualifications and only spoke to Moran over the 

phone. (Doc. 34-1, pp. 36-38, 57-58). Additionally, Plaisance initially sent Mr. 

Moran the data sheet for a different engine than is at issue here. (Doc. 34-1, pp. 36-

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38). Plaisance later realized the mistake and informed Moran, but Moran did not 

recalculate the flow rate. (Doc. 34-1, p. 44). Jones recommended to Plaisance that 

several items be inspected because they “will provide physical documentation to 

prove or disprove this theory” but Jones did not know if they were ever done. (Doc. 

35-1, pp. 14-18). 

Guy Plaisance and Gary Jones ultimately concluded that the fire originated 

in the engine compartment in the vicinity of the aft end of the starboard engine and 

resulted from the seawater intake screen for the starboard strainer being restricted 

by marine growth. (Docs. 34-2, 35-6). Atlantic denied the insurance claim based on 

the reports of Jones and Plaisance. Atlantic concluded that coverage was excluded 

by the policy because the loss results from “marine life” and/or Defendants’ “failure 

to maintain the covered yacht in good condition and repair.”

Defendants moved to exclude the opinions of Guy Plaisance and Gary Jones 

under Rules 403 and 702. (Docs. 34 & 35). This court granted Defendants’ motions 

to exclude, finding that Plaisance and Jones’ determination of the cause of the fire 

did not stem from a reliable methodology, sufficient factual basis, and reliable 

application of the methodology to the facts. (Doc. 75). 

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall 

be granted: “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court’s 

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function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to 

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the 

non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be 

‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for 

that party.’” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, at 249-250. 

(internal citations omitted).

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is 

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party bears the burden of proving 

that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 

1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the 

court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle 

Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999). “If reasonable minds could differ on 

the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary 

judgment.” Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 

841 (11th Cir. 1985)).

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Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving 

party "must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential 

element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 

at trial." Howard v. BP Oil Company, 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1994)(citing 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Otherwise stated, the nonmovant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that 

precludes summary judgment.” See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 

(11th Cir. 1991). The non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or 

denials in its own pleading; rather, its response .... must be by affidavits or as 

otherwise provided in this rule be set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for 

trial.” Vega v. Invsco Group, Ltd., 2011 WL 2533755, *2 (11th Cir. 2011). “A mere 

‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the [non-moving] party’s position will not suffice; 

there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that 

party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 

“[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the 

record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th 

Cir. 1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact 

to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 at 587 (1986) (internal 

quotation and citation omitted).

B. Motions to Strike the Testimony of David Stegall and Richard Schiehl

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Atlantic moves to strike testimony by marine-surveyor Richard Schiehl 

concerning his opinion of Mr. Plaisance’s handling of the investigation of the fire 

and testimony by insurance expert, David Stegall, concerning Atlantic’s 

interpretation of the exclusion clauses contained in the insurance policy at issue in 

this case. After reviewing the testimony, the court finds that the disposition of 

these motions to strike would have no effect on the court’s decision below to grant 

Atlantic’s motion for partial summary judgment on Defendants’ bad faith claim. 

Nor, would they have any bearing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

their breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the court finds the motions to strike 

(Docs. 58 & 59) are MOOT. 

C. Motions for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment of Defendants’ counterclaim for bad 

faith. (Doc. 37). Defendants have moved for summary judgment on both their 

counterclaim for breach of contract and for bad faith.

1. Counterclaim for Breach of Contract

The elements for a breach of contract claim are: “(1) the existence of a valid 

contract binding the parties in the action, (2) [plaintiff’s] own performance under 

that contract, (3) the defendant’s nonperformance, and (4) damages.” Southern Med. 

Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So.2d 98, 99 (Ala. 1995) (citations omitted). There 

is no dispute that a valid contract existed, that the defendants performed under 

that contract and that defendants sustained damages. The only issue is whether 

Atlantic’s denial of the claim constitutes nonperformance. 

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Atlantic claims it performed under the contract because Defendants’ 

insurance claim was excluded by the policy. Specifically, Atlantic claims it was 

excluded because the loss resulted from “marine life” and/or Defendants’ “failure to 

maintain the covered yacht in good condition and repair.” However, the opinions of 

Atlantic’s experts, Guy Plaisance and Gary Jones, as to the cause of the fire have 

been excluded as unreliable. As such, Atlantic has no reliable evidence as to the 

cause of the fire and cannot support its contention that the fire was caused by 

marine life and/or Defendants’ failure to maintain the yacht. The insurer bears the 

burden of demonstrating that these exclusions apply. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 

832 So.2d 1, 12 (Ala. 2001) (citing Fleming v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. 

Co., 293 Ala. 719, 310 So.2d 200, 202 (1975)). Thus, Atlantic has no evidence to 

counter Defendants’ contention that their fire claim was covered by the policy and is 

due to be paid. Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment should be 

granted in favor of Defendants as to their counterclaim for breach of contract.

2. Counterclaim for Bad Faith

The tort of bad-faith refusal to pay a claim has four elements:

(a) a breach of insurance contract, (b) the refusal to pay claim, (c) the 

absence of arguable reason, (d) the insurer's knowledge of such 

absence—with a conditional fifth element: “(e) if the intentional failure 

to determine the existence of a lawful basis is relied upon, the plaintiff 

must prove the insurer's intentional failure to determine whether 

there is a legitimate or arguable reason to refuse to pay the claim.”

EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Knight, 2014 WL 5020044, *15 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 2014) 

(quoting National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So.2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982)). 

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“The plaintiff asserting a bad-faith claim bears a heavy burden.” Shelter Mut. Ins. 

Co. v. Barton, 822 So.2d 1149, 1154 (Ala. 2001) (citing LeFevre v. Westberry, 590 

So.2d 154, 159 (Ala. 1991)). “[A] finding of bad faith based upon rejection of an 

insurer's legal argument should be reserved for extreme cases.” Id. (quoting Safeco 

Ins. Co. of America v. Sims, 435 So.2d 1219, 1226 (Ala. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring 

specially)). “The right of an insurer to deny a claim on any arguable legal issue is to 

be as zealously guarded as is its right to decline benefits on any debatable issue of 

fact, the test of reasonableness being the same.” Id. (quoting Safeco supra). 

In the instant case, the court determined above that there has been a breach 

of the insurance contract and there is no dispute that Atlantic has refused to pay 

the claim. However, Atlantic contends that it had an arguable reason for denying 

the claim and that it did not intentionally fail to determine whether there was a 

legitimate or arguable reason. Atlantic reports that it diligently investigated the 

claim and relied on the opinions of its experts, Guy Plaisance and Gary Jones. 

Although this court has now excluded those opinions, there is no evidence Atlantic 

knew that the opinions should not be relied upon. “To defeat a bad faith claim, the 

defendant does not have to show that its reason for denial was correct, only that it 

was arguable.” Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 699 So.2d 138, 143 (Ala. 1997). 

Accordingly, at the time of the denial Atlantic appears to have had an arguable 

reason to deny the claim.

Defendants cite three cases to support their contention that Atlantic cannot 

rely on its expert reports as an arguable reason for denial: White v. State Farm & 

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Cas. Co., 953 So.2d 340, 350 (Ala. 2006); Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 738 

So.2d 815, 822-23 (Ala. 1999); and Livingston v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 582 So.2d 

1038, 1042-43 (Ala. 1991). However, this court does not find that these cases apply 

to this case. 

In White, the insurance company denied a portion of a claim for replacing a 

damaged roof based on a notation in the file that the quoted roof was an “upgrade” 

and that that fact had been “confirmed by the contractor.” 953 So.2d at 350. The 

policy in question did not mention “upgrades” but required that damaged property 

be replaced with property “of like kind and quality.” Id. There were no expert 

reports on the issue, in fact little if any investigation was done at all on the issue,

and other evidence in the case indicated that the roof was not an upgrade but was 

in fact a downgrade. Id. However, also at issue in White, unlike the instant case, 

was the fact that two insurance agents had allegedly told the insured that the claim 

would be paid the next day and that the insured could proceed with the quoted 

repairs. Id. The insured was never told that there was any question whether the 

claim would be paid and the insured signed a contract to have the roof repaired and 

the work began a few days later. Id. at 344. When the insured did not receive the 

check he tried to contact the insurance agent, but could never reach her. Id. The 

insured finally spoke to the agent’s team leader and was told that the agent had not 

done a good job on the claim and that she did not normally handle that type of 

claim. Id. Ultimately, the insured learned that the insurance company would only 

pay a portion of the claim. Id. The White Court discussed the circumstances, but 

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merely found that further proceedings were necessary before it could be determined 

whether the insurance company breached its contract with the insured and whether 

it was in bad faith. Id. at 351. The White case is not analogous to the instant case 

as the insurance company did not rely on the opinion of an expert, but on a notation 

by its agent who the insurance company knew had done a poor job. Additionally, in 

this case there is no allegation that Atlantic told Defendants it would pay the claim 

in full and then delayed payment before it ultimately denied Defendants’ claim. 

Moreover, the White Court did not determine whether it was proper for the 

insurance company to rely on the notation, but merely found that the case should 

proceed further.

In Thomas, the insurance company denied a claim for coverage of a house 

that was damaged by Hurricane Opal. 738 So.2d 815. The insurance company 

asserted that it had an arguable basis for denying coverage because when it sent its 

agent and an adjuster to investigate the claim, they found no damage. Id. at 822. 

However, there was evidence that the agent and the adjuster “stayed at the home 

for only a few minutes; made no attempt to see if [the insured] was at home or to 

discuss with her the reported damage; took some pictures of the residence; did not 

walk around the entire house; and made no attempt to inspect the roof.” Id. at 819. 

Additionally, a neighbor testified that the damage to the roof, the siding, and the 

outbuilding was obvious. Id. The Thomas Court found that there was sufficient 

evidence for the claim to go to the jury. Id. at 822. In the instant case, unlike 

Thomas, a determination of whether the claim should be paid was not made on 

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evidence that was open and obvious to the insurance agent. The insurance agent in 

Thomas did not rely on any expert report. In this case, Atlantic agreed that there 

was damage but could not determine whether the damage was covered by the policy 

without relying on experts to determine the cause of the fire. There has been no 

suggestion that Atlantic’s agents were knowledgeable about yacht engines or fire 

investigation. There is no evidence in this case that the agents had reason to 

disbelieve the final conclusions of the experts. 

In Livingston, the insured’s house was destroyed by fire. 582 So.2d at 1039. 

The insurance company hired an independent adjuster, an appraiser, and a fire 

investigator to investigate the claim and the cause of the fire. Id. There was 

evidence that the fire was incendiary but the insureds were not living in the house 

at the time of the fire and the insurance company was unable to uncover any real

evidence that the insureds were responsible for the fire. Id. at 1039-40. The 

adjuster, the fire investigator and the state fire marshal completed their 

investigations and found no evidence that could remotely tie the insureds to the 

setting of the fire Id. A month after all the reports were complete, the insurance 

company had still not paid the claim and the insureds sued for breach of contract, 

misrepresentation and bad faith failure to pay. Id. a 1040. The Livingston Court 

held that the Insurance company’s investigation was protracted and that its delay 

was unwarranted and amounted to a denial of the claim. Id. at 1042. The court 

further found that mere suspicion and speculation that new evidence will present 

itself at some future date is not reasonable grounds upon which to deny a claim. Id.

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at 1043 (citing Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981)). 

The insurance company in Livingston did not rely on their expert reports, in fact if 

it had, it would have paid the claim promptly. The Livingston case is not analogous 

to the instant case because there is no allegation that after the experts completed 

their investigation and found no reason to deny the claim, Atlantic denied it 

anyway. Nor did Atlantic unreasonably delay the status of the claim hoping that 

some defensive matter could possibly emerge.

Defendants also contend that Atlantic intentionally failed to determine the 

existence of a lawful basis to deny the claim by (1) intentionally or recklessly failing 

to investigate, (2) intentionally or recklessly failing to properly subject the claim to 

cognitive evaluation or review, (3) creating its own debatable reason for denying the 

claim and (4) relying on an ambiguous portion of the policy as a lawful basis to deny 

the claim. However, since the court has found that Atlantic had an arguable reason 

to deny the claim, it is questionable whether an intentional failure to determine 

whether there is a legitimate or arguable reason is even relevant. As the U.S. 

District Court for the Middle District of Alabama has explained:

Although the insured can use the intentional failure to determine 

whether or not there was any lawful basis for refusal of the claim (i.e., 

tier two of the Chavers test) as evidence that no lawful basis for refusal 

ever existed, the fact remains that in order for the insureds to recover 

on the tort of bad faith, no lawful basis must exist for the insurer's 

denial of the claim. See Barnes, 405 So.2d at 924; and Lavoie, 470 

So.2d at 1082 (Torbert, C.J., dissenting). In other words, an insurer's 

intentional, reckless or negligent failure to investigate or evaluate a 

claim is only an element by which the insured may prove that no 

lawful basis for refusal existed. The insurer's “subpar” investigation 

cannot in and of itself sustain a tort action for bad faith.

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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Balmer, 672 F.Supp. 1395, 1405 (M.D. Ala. 1987).

“No matter how badly the insurer acted in investigating and evaluating the claim, if 

there was a debatable reason for refusing to pay the claim, when payment was 

refused, the insured was not entitled to prompt payment.” Id. at 1406 (italics and 

citation omitted). “The lack of proper investigation and evaluation is significant in 

proving [the crucial] element of the tort, namely knowledge by the insurer of the 

lack of a debatable reason.” Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, looking at the 

case in the light most favorable to Defendants, the court finds that the evidence 

does not show that Atlantic knew there was no debatable reason.

Although the agents knew the initial investigation left the cause of the fire 

undetermined and that the engine was found to have not overheated, there is no 

evidence that Atlantic or its claim agents had any reason to disbelieve the experts 

when they ultimately opined that the cause of the fire was marine growth on the 

screens. As previously mentioned, there is no evidence that the agents were 

knowledgeable on yacht engines or fire investigation. Nor is there any evidence 

that Atlantic had any notice that the experts’ reports should not have been relied 

upon.

Defendants also point to the language of the policy, contending that the 

provision relied upon to deny the claim is ambiguous. However, even if the policy 

provisions were found to be ambiguous, Atlantic can rely on any arguable reason for 

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denial. Thus, their interpretation of the policy need only be arguable, not the 

correct and only possible interpretation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment (Doc. 37), is GRANTED and summary judgment is hereby granted 

in favor of Plaintiff as to Defendants’ counterclaim for bad faith. 

Defendants’ amended motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44), is GRANTED in 

part and DENIED in part, to the extent that summary judgment is granted 

in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim for breach of contract and 

Defendants’ motion for summary is denied as to their counterclaim for bad 

faith. Plaintiff’s motions to strike the testimony of experts David Stegall and 

Richard Schiehl (Docs. 58 & 59) have been found to be MOOT. And lastly, 

Defendants’ motion for oral argument (Doc. 62) is DENIED.

Although the parties did not actually move for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment, the above rulings appear to conclude that 

claim as well. The parties are ORDERED to submit a proposed judgment on or 

before November 21, 2014 and to advise the court of any remaining issues. The 

Pretrial Conference scheduled for Monday, November 10, 2014 is hereby 

CANCELLED.

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2014.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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