alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### W. P. Cundiff, et al., *v.*W. B. Cundiff, et al.

Wills — Resisting Probate of Wills — Expenses Incurred.

An ©xecutor wbo bas in good faitb attempted to sustain a will is entitled to bis costs out of tbe estate.

*692APPEAL PROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT.

April 29, 1876.

*R. J. Megler, for appellants. W. R. Thompson, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Cofer :

The order discharging the. rule against the appellees to bring into court the watches and chains referred to is not a final order, and the circuit court still has power to inquire through its commissioner or in such other manner as it may think best into the question whether the watches and chains are worth more than the amount at which they were estimated by the appraisers, and to charge the orders with such sum as it shall ascertain the several articles to be worth.

Counsel concedes the general rule to be that an executor who has in good faith attempted to sustain a will is entitled to his cost out of the estate, but claims that the effort to sustain the will of J. B. Cundiff was not in good faith and therefore that the nominated executrix had no right to be reimbursed her expenses.

The will was probated in the county court and upon full hearing on appeal to the circuit court it was sustained by the verdict of a jury and the judgment of the court. Those facts are sufficient to show that there was sufficient evidence of the genuineness and validity of the will to make it the duty of the executrix named therein to make an effort to have it probated, and as such was her duty she is entitled to her cost in that behalf, legal and extraordinary. That she was more interested than any other person in sustaining the will does not lessen her right to her costs; something is due as well to the testator as to the devisee, and the nominated executor owes it not only to himself but to the other beneficiaries and to the testator when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the will can be sustained, to make the effort.

We will not therefore look into the evidence heard on the trial of the issue of will or no will, but accept the result of the trial in the circuit court as sufficient to entitle the nominated executrix to her costs. Judgment *affirmed.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-1-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       2,657,665
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,023,875
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  5,669,220
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,532,304
<PP&E>                                      81,776,927
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,002,129
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              97,055,773
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       29,624,057
<BONDS>                                      9,040,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    37,001,043
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,190,701
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                97,055,773
<SALES>                                     35,685,294
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                       16,200,408
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               23,656,678
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,974,418
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              9,054,198
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          9,054,198
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 9,054,198
<EPS-BASIC>                                       2.09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.94


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1687 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 1687

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 6444 San Fernando Road in Glendale, California, as the ``Paul 
                        Ignatius Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PAUL IGNATIUS POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 6444 San Fernando Road in Glendale, California, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Paul Ignatius Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Paul 
Ignatius Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 3, 2024.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 1687

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 6444 San Fernando Road in Glendale, California, as the ``Paul 
                        Ignatius Post Office''.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1997
<CASH>                                         111,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,431,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   199,000
<INVENTORY>                                  3,165,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,735,000
<PP&E>                                       5,934,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,790,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              18,459,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,077,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    13,927,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 (4,923,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                18,459,000
<SALES>                                     10,770,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,770,000
<CGS>                                        7,889,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               11,737,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              87,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,054,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,054,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,054,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT LAWRENCE NOUWEN, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 12-0269-WS-C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0492-WS-C

Respondent.

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the order entered on this date, it is hereby ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, and DECREED that petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his 

sentence (Doc. 41) is due to be, and hereby is, SUMMARILY DISMISSED. Nouwen is 

not entitled to a certificate of appealability and, therefore, he is not entitled to appeal in 

forma pauperis.

DONE this 4th day of May, 2015.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:12-cr-00269-WS-C Document 45 Filed 05/04/15 Page 1 of 1
#### McClellan Manzey, et al., *v.*William H. Girvin, et al.

Decedents’ Estates — Property Set Off to Widow.

Wliere a decedent left suviving him children by a former marriage, also a widow and children by her, and during the life of the widow-certain personal property was set oft to her as exempt, and the widow-then died, the children of her body alone were entitled to such property.

APPEAL FROM McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT.

February 19, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

Shelton Manzey died, leaving a widow and two infant children residing with her, and also three adult children by a former marriage. Certain articles of property, belonging to the estate of the deceased husband, were set apart by the appraisers as exempt from distribution; and the widow having died shortly thereafter without having disposed of the property, leaving her two infant children surviving her, and the oldest, a daughter, having married since her mother’s death, she and her husband, and all of the daughters of Shelton Manzey by his first marriage, brought this suit against the other infant child of Mrs. Manzejr, and the other children of said Shelton, for a partition of the property which had been set apart by the appraisers of his estate.

*371/. *C. Jonson, for appellants.*

The circuit court being of opinion that the property should be treated as a part of the estate of' Shelton Manzey, adjudged that his five children were each entitled to an equal share thereof, and from that judgment the infant has appealed, and his counsel insists that the other child, who was an infant at the death of her mother, having married, he is now entitled to the whole of the property.

Both Manzey and his widow died before the General Statutes went into effect, and the rights of the parties in this case must be governed by the provisions of the Revised Statutes, and the amendments thereto. By the provisions of Sec. 11, of Chap. 30, of the Revised Statutes, the property directed to be set apart to the widow of an intestate vested in her, for the use and benefit of herself and the infant children of the intestate residing with her.

Being vested with the title to the property for the use and benefit of herself and infant children, Mrs. Manzey, no doubt, had authority to dispose of it, but not having done so, it vested at her death in the two children for whose benefit she held it, and should be divided between them to the exclusion of the other children of her husband.

Wherefore the judgment is *reversed,*and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the petition so far as J. T. Girvin and wife are concerned, and to divide the property set apart by the appraisers of the estate of Shelton Manzey, which remained in possession of the widow at her death, equally between the plaintiffs, W. H. Girvin and wife, and the defendant, McClellan Manzey.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,000,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          226,944
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     773,056
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,000,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,919,556
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,968,652
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          (13,040,209)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             288,157
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             12,702,956
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         12,702,956
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                12,702,956
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   247.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   247.40
        

</TABLE>
#### Henry D. Goetchius v. Elisha Calkins.

*Joint note*— Suretyship—Oontribution.

B. and G-. gave a joint note to 0., Gr. signing as B.’s surety. O. indorsed it to P. wlio afterwards released it, taking instead a joint note given by CJ-. with O. as surety. *Meld,*that on the original note Gr. was the debtor of C. and would have had recourse oniy to B., and that on paying the second note he could not claim, contribution from O. who was virtually his surety in both cases.

Error to Macomb.

Submitted June 16.

Decided June 22.

Assumpsit. Plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

*W. W. & M. N. Stickney*for plaintiff in error.

"When subsequent sureties become bound for the performance of the same act as the former ones, and especially by the same contracts, the right of contribution” is created in favor of the former: *Keith v. Goodwin*31 Vt. 276; Brandt on Surety-ship, §§ 221, 222; and it is immaterial that they signed at *329different times: *Warner v. Morrison*3 Allen 566; *Chaffee v. Jones*19 Pick. 268; *Monson v. Drakeley*40 Conn. 552; if two co-sureties are bound for a debt and one gives his note for it in payment, he can at once sue the other for contribution : Brandt on Suretyship, § 249; *Ralston v. Wood*15 Ill. 159; *Pinkston v. Taliaferro*9 Ala. 547; *Anthony v. Percifull*8 Ark. 494; *Robertson v. Maxcey*6 Dana 101; *Doolittle v. Dwight*2 Met. 561.

*Irving D. Hanscom*and *James B. Eldredge*for defendant in error.

Sureties must occupy the same relations to the princijsal to make them subject to contribution: Brandt on Suretyship, § 224; *Wells v. Miller*66 N. Y. 258.

Campbell, J.

Goetchius sues Calkins to recover contribution for his alleged excess of payment on a joint note executed by the two to William Park, on the 2d of February, 1878. The consideration of this note was the release ■and extension of time of a former note which Goetchius and •one Brown had formerly executed to Calkins, on which Goetchius was surety and Brown principal. Calkins was the nominal payee and held it in trust for other parties; and it had been transferred to Park to raise money for their benefit.

We think there is no foundation for any such claim. Goetchius was the debtor of Calkins, and was bound to pay him or his indorsee the whole of the old note, having recourse only to Brown for re-imbursement. Calkins owed him nothing, and there is no consideration whatever which would make it equitable to compel him to assume half of a debt which would have been due to himself in case he and not Goetchius had paid Park. He, in other words, is on the present note as to Goetchius as he was on the old note which he indorsed, not an original co-debtor, but a surety for Goetchius as principal debtor. When Goetchius paid the note he paid no more than as between the two he was bound to pay.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT C ARLOS G. FLORES-PAC HEC O, Pe titione r, v. ER IC H. HOLDER , Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R

e sponde nt . No. 13-70733 Age n c y No. A075-251-422 M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Subm itte d

Nove m b e r 18, 2014 ** B e fore : LEAVY, FISHER , a nd N.R . SM ITH, C irc uit Judge s. C arlos G. Flore s-Pa c h e c o, a native and c itiz e n of El Sa l va dor, pe t itions for re vie w of the B oa

rd of Im m igration Appe a ls’ orde r dism issing his a p pe a l from

an im m igration judge ’ s (“ IJ” ) de c ision de ny ing his a pplic ation for a sy lum and withholding of rem o v a l. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 8 U.S.C . § 1252. W e re vie w 

# FIL ED DEC 4 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).for substa

ntia l e v ide nc e the a ge nc y ’ s fa c tua l findings. Ze haty ev . Gonzale s , 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th C ir. 2006). W e de ny the pe tition for re vie w. Flore s-Pa c he c o c onte nds the a ge nc y e rre d in finding he did not ha

ve an obje c tive ba sis to fe ar pe rse c ution ba se d on his fa t he r’ s pa st politic a l a c tivity . Substa ntia l e v i de nc e supports the IJ’ s de te rm ination tha

t Flore s-Pa c h e c o fa ile d to e sta

blish a we ll-founde d fe ar of pe rse c ution on a c c ount of a prote c te d ground. Se e Molina-Estrada v. IN S , 293 F.3d 1089, 1095-96 (9th C ir. 2002) (insuffic ie nt e vide nc e to show re a s ona ble fe ar of future pe rse c ution); se ealso Parussimov

a v . Muk ase y , 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th C ir. 2009) (theREAL ID Ac t

“ re quire s tha

t a prote c te d ground repre se nt ‘ one c e ntra l re a son’ for an a sy lum a pplic ant’ s pe rse c ution” ); Ze tino v . Holde r , 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th C ir. 2010) (“ [a ] n a lie n’ s de sire to be fre e from ha ra ssm e nt by

c rim ina ls m otiva

te d by the ft or random viole nc e by

ga ng m e m be rs be ars no ne xus to a prote c t e d ground” ). Thus, Flore s -Pa c h e c o’ s a s y lum

c la im fa ils. B e c a use Flore s-Pa c he c o fa ile d to m e e t the lowe r sta nda rd of proof for a sy lum , his c la im for withholding of rem ova l ne c e ssa rily fa ils. Se e Ze haty e , 453 F.3d at 1190. PE T IT IO N FO R RE V IE WDE NIE D.

1 3 - 7 0 7 3 3 2
11723.

#### First State Bank of Oklahoma City *v.*Herrington *et al.*

Decided December 15, 1920.

Broyles, C. J.

1. Where a promissory note payable one day after date is brought by a third person after it is due, the buyer does not occupy the position of an innocent purchaser, but takes the note subject to all the equities between the original parties. Civil Code, (1910), § 4287; *Beall*v. *Leverett,*32 *Ga.*105 (79 Am. Dec. 298).

2. Under the above ruling and all the particular facts of the instant case, the oourt did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*

*36Complaint; from city court of Atlanta — Judge Reid. May 26, 1920.

*Anderson & Slale, J. L. Anderson,*for plaintiff.

*Hines, Ilardwiclc & Jordan,*for defendants.
11626.

#### Wilson *v.*Clark.

Jenkins, P. J.

1. The failure of the trial judge to charge the law as to contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and as to diminution of damages on account of such negligence, was not error,, under the facts of this case, in the absence of a timely and proper written request *304to charge on the subject. *Ala. &c. R. Co.*v. *Brown,*138 *Ga.*328(6, 7) (75 S. E. 330) ; *Savannah Electric Co.*v. *Crawford,*130 *Ga.*421(1), 424 (60 S. E. 1056).

Decided February 15, 1921.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court- — Judge Bell. March 35, 1930.

*Paul L. Lindsay,*for plaintiff in error.

*Branch & Howard, Bond Almand,*contra.

2. An assignment of error that a charge was not such “as the law and facts of the ease at bar called, for ” is too vague, general, and indefinite to present any question for the determination of this court. *Paulk*v. *Speer,*143 *Ga.*621(2) (85 S. E. 361) ; *Odum*v. *Rutledge,*16 *Ga. App.*350 (85 S. E. 361) ; *Davidson*v. *Waxelbaum,*2 *Ga. App.*432(3) (58 S. E. 687) ; *Chatman*v. *State,*8 *Ga. App.*842, 843(3) (70 S. E. 188).

3. Refusal to direct a verdict is not reversible error, and no direct exception lies therefrom, since such evidential questions merge in the motion for a new trial. *Bennett*v. *Patten,*148 *Ga.*66(3 b) (95 S. E. 690); *Smith*v. *Leverett,*22 *Ga. App.*289, 291 (96 S. E. 8).

4. Whether or not, under the application of settled rules of practice, this court on its own motion should refuse to consider the assignments of-error in this case (see, in this connection, *Holcomb*v. *Finch,*25 *Ga. App.*261, 103 S. E. 38; *Green*v. *Patterson,*25 *Ga. App.*374, 103 S. E. 437; *Louisville & Nashville R. Co.*v. *Lovelace,*26 *Ga. App.*286, 106 S. E. 6; *Lyndon*v. *Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co.,*129 *Ga.*353, 58 S. E. 1047; *Wakefield*v. *Lee,*18 *Ga. App.*648, 90 S. E. 224), this court cannot say, after an examination of the record, that there was not some evidence, however conflicting, to support the verdict and judgment; and the judge of the superior court did not err in overruling the certiorari.

*Judgment affvrmed.*

*Stephens and Hill, JJ., concur.*