PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4602

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAMINE CAMARA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:17-cr-00001-CMH-1)

Argued: September 28, 2018 Decided: November 6, 2018

Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United 

States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson 

and Judge Osteen joined. 

ARGUED: John Marcus McNichols, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellant. Kellen Sean Dwyer, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, 

Federal Public Defender, Cadence A. Mertz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE 

OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia; Martha C. Kidd, 

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, 

United States Attorney, Nathaniel Smith III, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
2

PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted appellant Lamine Camara of criminal conspiracy for his 

involvement in a scheme to acquire and resell luxury vehicles using stolen identities. Ray 

Ekobena orchestrated this scheme, and Camara’s indictment charged him with conspiring 

“with Ray Ekobena and others, known and unknown,” to violate three different federal 

laws. J.A. 9 (emphasis added). Following Camara’s trial, the district court instructed the 

jury using the same language. During deliberations, however, the jury submitted a written 

question, asking, “Do we need to agree the defendant was conspiring with Ray specifically 

or conspiring in general?” J.A. 617. The district court responded, “[T]he government has 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conspiring specifically with 

Ray or other known or unknown co-conspirators.” J.A. 628 (emphasis added).

Camara identifies two putative constitutional errors based on this supplemental 

instruction. First, he contends it constructively amended the indictment in violation of the 

Fifth Amendment by allowing the jury to convict him of a conspiracy that did not involve 

Ekobena. Second, he argues that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial in a district 

in which the crime took place, on the theory that Ekobena provided the only connection 

between his crime and the district in which the government prosecuted him. In the 

alternative, Camara raises two challenges to the district court’s sentence. 

Finding no error, we affirm both Camara’s conviction and his sentence. 

I.

A.
3

The case against Camara centered on his involvement in Ray Ekobena’s luxury car 

scheme. Ekobena used stolen identities to submit fraudulent loan applications to car 

dealerships. Once a dealership approved his loan applications, Ekobena relied on third 

parties to deliver the vehicles to Washington, D.C. Ekobena then resold those vehicles at 

a steep discount, mostly because he did not have valid title to transfer to a subsequent 

buyer, as is required to register a car and receive vehicle tags. In total, Ekobena 

fraudulently purchased ten vehicles as part of this scheme. 

At trial, the government introduced evidence of Camara’s involvement in five 

transactions within Ekobena’s scheme. Camara purchased two vehicles from Ekobena, 

paying as little as one-tenth of their market value. For the first car Camara purchased, 

Ekobena provided a Virginia title with the name of an identity theft victim. Camara forged 

the identity theft victim’s signature on the title and on the bill of sale in order to submit a 

Maryland title application. For the second, Camara received no title at all from Ekobena. 

Instead, Camara paid an individual named Zambia Jackson $150 for temporary tags – even 

though he knew the state of Maryland charged only $20 for legitimate tags. Camara did 

not know Jackson, and he never attempted to verify that she had the authority to issue 

vehicle tags. The tags Camara eventually received were fraudulent, stating that he 

purchased the vehicle from a dealership that does not exist. 

Camara also facilitated three other transactions involving Ekobena. He introduced 

Ekobena to two friends, each of whom purchased cars from Ekobena. Camara participated 

in the delivery of both vehicles, and Ekobena paid him for his involvement. Because 

neither vehicle came with valid title, Camara ordered temporary tags from Jackson for 
4

each. Finally, Camara connected Ekobena with his local mechanic, who placed an order 

for a car and deposited money in Ekobena’s account. 

Before Ekobena could acquire that last vehicle, he was arrested. Ekobena ultimately

pleaded guilty to seven felonies, three of which involved his use of stolen identities to 

purchase cars. Soon after Ekobena’s arrest, federal authorities arrested Camara. 

B.

A grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Camara. That indictment 

charged Camara, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, with conspiracy to commit three federal crimes: 

(1) knowingly transporting stolen vehicles in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2312; (2) knowingly receiving, possessing, concealing, storing, bartering, selling, and 

disposing of stolen motor vehicles that have crossed state lines, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2313; and (3) committing wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The indictment 

specifically charged Camara with conspiring “with Ray Ekobena and others, known and 

unknown.” J.A. 9 (emphasis added). 

Ekobena, who served as one of the government’s main witnesses, testified at trial to 

Camara’s extensive participation in his scheme. Camara also testified, and he did not deny 

his involvement. Instead, Camara staked his defense on the idea that he was unaware that 

the vehicles involved in Ekobena’s scheme were stolen. 

At the end of the trial, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of 

Camara’s charged offense. The court told the jury that the government alleged that, “in 

the Eastern District of Virginia, the defendant did knowingly, willfully conspire and agree 

together with Ray Ekobena and others, known and unknown,” to commit the three federal 
5

offenses identified in the indictment. J.A. 593–94. During deliberations, the jury 

submitted the following written question: “Do we need to agree the defendant was 

conspiring with Ray specifically or conspiring in general?” J.A. 617. After consulting 

with counsel, the district court responded that “[t]he best answer I can give you is that the 

government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conspiring 

specifically with Ray or other known or unknown co-conspirators.” J.A. 628 (emphasis 

added). A juror immediately asked for clarification: “Did you say ‘and’ or––.” Id. The 

district court re-read its response and concluded, “So, I’ve said ‘or.’” Id. 

The jury returned a guilty verdict the next day. The district court sentenced Camara 

to a 36-month term of imprisonment, and he timely appealed. 

II.

A.

1.

Camara’s challenges to his conviction center on the district court’s supplemental 

instruction.

1

 His first and primary argument is that the district court’s response to the jury’s 

 1 Camara also contests the district court’s decision to give a willful blindness 

instruction. Such an instruction is proper where “the defendant claims lack of guilty 

knowledge in the face of evidence supporting an inference of deliberate ignorance.” United 

States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Abbas, 74 

F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996)). We review the district court’s decision to grant the 

instruction for abuse of discretion, id. at 377, and find none here. 
6

question constructively amended his indictment in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We 

disagree.

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a 

capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 

Jury.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It is therefore “‘the exclusive province of the grand jury’ to 

alter or broaden the charges set out in an indictment.” United States v. Moore, 810 F.3d 

932, 936 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 309 (4th Cir. 

2012)). “[A] court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in 

the indictment against him.” United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 711 (4th Cir. 1994) 

(en banc) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)). A constructive 

amendment violates these principles by “broaden[ing] the possible bases for conviction 

beyond those presented by the grand jury,” id. at 710, through the government’s 

presentation of evidence or the court’s instructions to the jury, United States v. Randall, 

171 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1999).

Here, Camara argues, the district court’s supplemental instruction constructively 

amended the indictment against him, permitting the jury to convict him of a conspiracy 

different than the one charged in the indictment. Because the indictment charged Camara

with conspiring with “Ray Ekobena and others,” J.A. 9 (emphasis added), Camara 

contends, the government was required to prove his involvement in a conspiracy that 

involved Ekobena. But by instead instructing the jury that “[t]he government must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant was conspiring with Ray [Ekobena] or 
7

others,” J.A. 628 (emphasis added), according to Camara, the district court allowed the 

jury to convict him of a conspiracy that did not include Ekobena.

The first problem for Camara’s argument is this: A constructive amendment occurs 

when an indictment is “altered to change the elements of the offense charged,” Randall, 

171 F.3d at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the identity of Camara’s coconspirator or co-conspirators is not an element of the conspiracy offense with which he 

was charged. In other words, whether Camara conspired with Ekobena or with someone 

else, he committed the same offense – perhaps by different means, but the same offense all 

the same. That offense, conspiracy to violate federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 371, has three

elements: an unlawful agreement to commit an offense, the defendant’s knowing and 

willing participation, and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. 

Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 352 (4th Cir. 2017). Crucially, the first element requires only that 

the government establish an agreement between “two or more people.” Id. “The existence 

of the conspiracy, rather than the particular identity of the conspirators, is the essential 

element of the crime.” United States v. Am. Waste Fibers Co., 809 F.2d 1044, 1046 (4th 

Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 851 (11th Cir. 1982)). 

Indeed, the government need not identify any co-conspirators. “While two persons are 

necessary to constitute a conspiracy, ‘one person can be convicted of conspiring with 

persons whose names are unknown.’” Id. (quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 

375 (1951)). In short, even assuming the district court’s supplemental instruction permitted 
8

conviction based on a conspiracy that did not include Ekobena,

2 that instruction did not 

alter the elements of the charged offense. See Randall, 171 F.3d at 203. 

We reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 

2012). There, we found that a jury instruction permitting conviction based on an aiding 

and abetting theory did not constitute a constructive amendment, even though the 

indictment “neither mentioned nor charged that particular theory of liability.” Id. at 720. 

The rule against constructive amendments, we explained, “is focused not on particular 

theories of liability but on the offenses charged in an indictment . . . [and] ‘aiding and 

abetting simply describes the way in which a defendant’s conduct resulted in the violation 

of a particular law.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir. 

2010)). The same logic applies here: When Camara argues that the jury may have 

convicted him based on an agreement with someone other than Ekobena, he does no more 

than describe different ways of committing the same offense.

Our conclusion puts us in agreement with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United 

States v. Behler, 14 F.3d 1264 (1994), a case involving strikingly similar facts. In Behler, 

count one of the indictment charged the defendant with conspiracy to distribute 

 2 We assume for purposes of this opinion that Camara’s interpretation of the 

supplemental instruction is correct. We note, however, that the government takes a 

different view, arguing that the instruction is better read as clarifying only that a conspiracy

conviction requires that there be some specific co-conspirator, and not just “conspiring in 

general.” And indeed, when Camara argued before the district court as it considered its 

response to the jury’s question, he gave no indication that he understood the issue to be the 

particular identity or identities of Camara’s alleged co-conspirators. We need not resolve 

this question, however, because even on Camara’s reading, the instruction did not 

constitute a constructive amendment. 
9

methamphetamine, and further specified that the defendant conspired “with Thomas 

Stephen McRea and others.” Id. at 1267, 1269. During deliberations, the jury submitted a 

question to the court: “Does Thomas Stephen McRea have to be a part of the conspiracy 

to enable a guilty verdict on Count # 1?”; the district court answered “no.” Id. at 1269. 

The Eighth Circuit held that there had been no constructive amendment, reasoning that 

“what was removed from the case” – the identity of the co-conspirator – “was in no way 

essential to the offense on which the jury convicted.” Id. at 1270 (quoting United States v. 

Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 734 (8th Cir. 1986)). 

Our decision also is consistent with United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111 (11th 

Cir. 1990), on which Camara chiefly relies. In Weissman, a case involving charges under 

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the indictment specified 

the one (and only) RICO enterprise in which the defendants allegedly were involved – “to 

wit, a group of individuals associated in fact known as the DeCavalcante Family.” Id. at 

1112. But the trial court, in response to a jury question, instructed that the government did 

not have to prove that “the enterprise was the DeCavalcante Family” if it proved the 

existence of some other enterprise. Id. at 1113. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that 

instruction was improper: Because the government “chose to specify” a named enterprise 

instead of charging in “general language,” the instruction, though it “accurately stated the 

general law,” could not be reconciled with the indictment and constituted a constructive 

amendment. Id. at 1115. Here, by contrast, the government did charge in “general 

language,” id., declining to limit the scope of the conspiracy to Ekobena alone, and instead 

accusing Camara of conspiring with Ekobena “and with others, known and unknown,” J.A. 
10

9. Given that general language, the specific identity of any co-conspirator – unlike the 

identity of the specified enterprise in Weissman – was not “an essential element of the 

crime charged,” 899 F.2d at 1115 (quoting United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 981 

n.15 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Moreover, by charging Camara as it did, the government put Camara on full notice 

of the case against him. Camara was aware, that is, that the government believed other coconspirators were involved in Ekobena’s scheme, and could prepare a defense accordingly. 

The defendants in Weissman, on the other hand, had no reason to expect that they would 

have to defend at trial against claims that they were associated with any enterprise other 

than the specified “DeCavalcante Family.” This is an important distinction; one of the 

central purposes of the indictment is to provide sufficient notice to “allow[] the accused to 

prepare a defense as to every element of the indicted crime.” United States v. Promise, 

255 F.3d 150, 189 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 

and dissenting in the judgment) (citing Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)); see 

also Behler, 14 F.3d at 1270 (rejecting defendant’s constructive amendment argument in 

part because the supplemental instruction did not undermine the defense). 

Here, Camara can point to no way in which his defense was prejudiced by the district 

court’s supplemental instruction. Camara’s trial defense – that he participated in buying 

and selling luxury cars with Ekobena, but was unaware that the cars were stolen – had 

nothing to do with the precise identity of his co-conspirators. As in Behler, Camara’s 

defense “did not rise or fall on a conjunctive reading of the charge.” 14 F.3d at 1270. And 

although the thrust of Camara’s argument is that the “or” in the district court’s instruction 
11

allowed the jury to convict him of a conspiracy that did not include Ekobena, that 

possibility remains entirely hypothetical: Even on appeal, Camara has yet to identify some 

separate and distinct conspiracy, not involving Ekobena, that was proved or even argued 

by the government at trial. On the contrary, the government’s evidence established only 

one conspiracy, with Ekobena at its center, and – presumably for that reason – Camara 

never requested a multiple conspiracy jury instruction. In light of the “arguments of the 

parties and the evidence presented at trial,” Camara’s jury had no reason to think it had 

been given “license to convict” Camara of some distinct conspiracy of which Ekobena was 

not a part. Moore, 810 F.3d at 936 (quoting United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 514–15 

(4th Cir. 2008)). 

In sum, the district court’s supplemental instruction neither altered an element of 

the conspiracy charged by Camara’s indictment nor prejudiced Camara’s defense. 

Accordingly, we hold that the instruction did not constitute a constructive amendment in 

violation of the Fifth Amendment.

2.

Camara next contends that this same supplemental instruction violated his 

constitutional “right to a trial ‘by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 

crime shall have been committed,’” United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 

2000) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (“Unless a statute or

these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where 

the offense was committed.”). Again, we disagree.
12

In a conspiracy case, venue is proper “‘in any district in which any act in furtherance 

of the conspiracy was committed,’ and ‘proof of acts by one co-conspirator can be 

attributed to all members of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 335 

(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1995)). 

Camara argues that Ekobena provided the only link to the Eastern District of Virginia, 

where Camara was tried. Because he believes the district court’s supplemental instruction 

permitted the jury to convict him of a conspiracy that did not involve Ekobena, he contends 

that the instruction permitted the jury to find him guilty of a crime that was not committed 

in the Eastern District of Virginia. 

At the outset, we note that there is a serious question as to whether Camara waived 

his venue challenge by failing to raise the issue when the district court indicated it would 

answer the jury’s question as it ultimately did. See United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d 629, 

633 (4th Cir. 2004) (declining to address defendant’s improper venue claim due to his 

failure to timely object). At trial, Camara lodged only a general objection to the court’s 

supplemental instruction, failing to even mention venue despite offering extended 

argument on the appropriate response to the jury’s question. But even if Camara did not 

waive his venue argument, our review is for plain error only, because Camara failed to 

object specifically on venue grounds. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d); United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). Camara bears the burden of 

establishing plain error, Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, and he cannot carry that burden here. 

The district court instructed the jury that the government was required to establish 

that either “the agreement or an overt act took place in this district.” J.A. 608. The court 
13

later reiterated that it was the government’s burden to establish “that part of the conspiracy 

took place in the Eastern District of Virginia.” Id. Camara does not maintain that these 

instructions were incorrect as a matter of law. Instead, he argues only that the district 

court’s supplemental instruction introduced the possibility that the jury would convict 

without finding venue proper. Yet “[i]t is the almost invariable assumption of the law that 

jurors follow their instructions.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 740 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 

481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)). 

Moreover, the government introduced ample evidence that Camara or one of his coconspirators committed an “act in furtherance of the conspiracy” in the Eastern District of 

Virginia, Smith, 452 F.3d at 335. Ekobena lived and ran the scheme out of his apartment, 

in Alexandria, Virginia, as well as his girlfriend’s home, in Springfield, Virginia. Camara 

and Ekobena were frequently in touch: Over the course of a three-week period, they 

exchanged 166 calls. Camara himself drove one of the stolen vehicles from Washington, 

D.C., to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, in Arlington, Virginia, to drop off 

the third party who delivered the car to D.C. from a dealership in Massachusetts. And the 

evidence suggests that, at Ekobena’s direction, at least two of the stolen vehicles were 

driven through the Eastern District of Virginia before being delivered to their purchasers. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (venue is proper for offenses involving transportation in interstate 

commerce in “any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed”). 

Camara’s only response to these multiple contacts is that many of them involve 

Ekobena, and that under his theory of the case – that the supplemental instructions 

permitted the jury to convict based on a distinct conspiracy in which Ekobena was not 
14

involved – they should not be considered here. But we have held already that Camara has 

failed to identify any separate conspiracy, apart from Ekobena, of which he could have 

been convicted. And, in any event, it was Camara himself who made the drive, in a stolen 

vehicle, to Arlington, Virginia, in furtherance of the conspiracy. Camara’s venue argument 

fails, and we affirm his conviction. 

B.

We turn now to Camara’s challenges to his sentence. At sentencing, the district 

court calculated an offense level of 20 under the Sentencing Guidelines, which translated 

to a Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months in prison. The total offense level reflected a loss 

calculation of $276,331 and a two-point enhancement for “being in the business of 

receiving and selling stolen property,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4). The district court sentenced 

Camara to a 36-month term of imprisonment and a two-year period of supervised release. 

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de 

novo, United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.

Camara first disputes the district court’s loss calculation. “[T]he determination of 

loss attributable to a fraud scheme is a factual issue for resolution by the district court, and 

we review such a finding of fact only for clear error.” United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 

659, 671 (4th Cir. 2001). The district court based its loss calculation on the estimated value 

of the vehicles involved in the five transactions in which Camara participated. Camara 

objects on the ground that the court should have considered only the value of the two cars 

he purchased directly from Ekobena, and not the value of the other three cars, as to which 

he played a more minimal role. That argument is unavailing. The three transactions on 
15

which Camara focuses were indisputably “within the scope” of the conspiracy of which he 

was convicted, and that is enough to make the associated losses attributable to him under 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 

Camara also challenges the district court’s finding that he was in the “business of 

receiving and selling stolen property” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4), resulting in a twopoint enhancement to his offense level. The Sentencing Guidelines adopt a “totality of the 

circumstances” approach to this issue, United States v. White, 77 F. App’x 678, 682 (4th 

Cir. 2003) (per curiam), and provide a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide courts in 

making the determination: (1) the regularity and sophistication of the defendant’s 

activities, (2) the value and size of the inventory of the stolen property, (3) the extent to 

which the defendant’s activities encouraged or facilitated other crimes, and (4) the 

defendant’s past activities in stolen property, United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2B1.1, cmt. n.5 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016). 

The evidence fully supports the district court’s conclusion here. Camara purchased 

two different luxury vehicles at steep discounts and fraudulently registered them using 

different methods. He connected Ekobena with three other interested purchasers, each of 

whom paid Ekobena and two of whom ultimately received stolen vehicles from Ekobena. 

As noted above, the estimated total value of the vehicles involved in these transactions 

exceeded $276,000. Camara also participated in the delivery of the vehicles he did not 

purchase, received payment for his efforts, and helped secure fraudulent tags for those 

vehicles. Under these circumstances, and in light of the guidance provided by the 
16

Sentencing Commission, we find no error in the district court’s finding that Camara was in 

the “business of receiving and selling stolen property” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4). 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED