[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 242 (Wednesday, December 17, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75147-75149]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29543]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL14-37-000]


PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.; Supplemental Notice of Technical 
Conference

    As announced in a Notice issued on October 31, 2014, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) will hold a technical 
conference on Wednesday, January 7, 2015. The technical conference will 
explore whether: 1) PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.'s (PJM) Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTR) forfeiture rule as it applies to Up-to 
Congestion (UTC) transactions and virtual (INC/DEC) transactions is 
just and reasonable; and 2) PJM's current uplift allocation associated 
with UTC transactions and INCs/DECs is just and reasonable. The 
technical conference will commence at 9:00 a.m. and conclude at 4:30 
p.m. and be held at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. This technical conference is free of 
charge and open to the public. Commission members may participate in 
the technical conference.
    The agenda and a list of participants for this technical conference 
are attached.
    Those who plan to attend the technical conference are encouraged to 
complete the registration form located at: https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/registration/01-07-15-form.asp. There is no registration deadline.
    The technical conference will be transcribed. Transcripts of the 
technical conference will be available for a fee from Ace-Federal 
Reporters, Inc. (202-347-3700 or 1-800-336-6646). Additionally, there 
will be a free

[[Page 75148]]

Webcast of the technical conference. The webcast will allow persons to 
listen to the technical conference but not participate. Anyone with 
Internet access who wants to listen to the technical conference can do 
so by navigating to the Calendar of Events at www.ferc.gov, locating 
the technical conference in the Calendar, and clicking on the webcast 
link. The Capitol Connection provides technical support for the Webcast 
and offers the option of listening to the meeting via phone-bridge for 
a fee. If you have any questions, visit www.CapitolConnection.org or 
call 703-993-3100.
    While this technical conference is not for the purpose of 
discussing specific cases, the technical conference may address matters 
at issue in the following, related Commission proceeding that is 
pending: ER13-1654-001.
    Commission technical conferences are accessible under section 508 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For accessibility accommodations, 
please send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#761715151305051f141f1a1f020f361013041558111900"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d7b6b4b4b2a4a4beb5bebbbea3ae97b1b2a5b4f9b0b8a1">[email protected]</span></a> or call toll free (866) 
208-3372 (voice) or (202) 502-8659 (TTY), or send a fax to (202) 208-
2106 with the requested accommodations.
    For more information about the technical conference, please 
contact:
    Sarah McKinley (Logistical Information), Office of External 
Affairs, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8368, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3d4e5c4f5c5513505e5654535158447d5b584f5e135a524b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c4b7a5b6a5aceaa9a7afadaaa8a1bd84a2a1b6a7eaa3abb2">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Carmen Gastilo Machuga (Legal Information), Office of the General 
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8657, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1c7f7d6e717972327b7d6f687570735c7a796e7f327b736a"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="f89b998a959d96d69f998b8c919497b89e9d8a9bd69f978e">[email protected]</span></a>.
    William Sauer (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and 
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6639, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a3d4cacfcfcac2ce8dd0c2d6c6d1e3c5c6d1c08dc4ccd5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6d1a040101040c00431e0c18081f2d0b081f0e430a021b">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Cathleen Colbert (Technical Information), Office of Enforcement, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, 
DC 20426, (202) 502-8997, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ceadafbaa6a2ababa0e0ada1a2acabbcba8ea8abbcade0a9a1b8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="91f2f0e5f9fdf4f4ffbff2fefdf3f4e3e5d1f7f4e3f2bff6fee7">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: December 10, 2014.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN17DE14.014

Docket No. EL14-37-000

January 7, 2015

Agenda

    The technical conference will explore whether: (1) PJM's FTR 
forfeiture rule as it applies to UTC transactions and INCs/DECs is just 
and reasonable; and (2) PJM's current uplift allocation associated with 
UTC transactions and INCs/DECs is just and reasonable. Presentations 
will be allowed at the beginning of each Panel. Any presentations 
should be narrowly confined to the topics discussed in this agenda and 
should be no longer than five minutes. Presentations should primarily 
focus on factual background. Presentations and discussions should be 
confined to proposals for addressing these issues within PJM.

9:00am-9:15am Welcome and Opening Remarks

9:15am-12:00pm Panel 1: FTR Forfeiture Rule Goals and Designs (with a 
15 minute break)

    Panel 1 will explore PJM's FTR forfeiture rule as it applies to 
INCs/DECs and UTC transactions. In the context of applying the rule to 
these products, the Panel will discuss: (1) the goals of the FTR 
forfeiture rule; and (2) different ways of structuring the FTR 
forfeiture rule's design.
    During the discussion on goals, Panelists should be prepared to 
address the following:
    <bullet> The FTR forfeiture rule was intended to address potential 
market abuse.\1\ The market abuse in question was trading to create 
artificial congestion in the day-ahead market that influenced the value 
of FTRs, conduct which may be a violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule 
after its implementation in 2006. INCs/DECs and UTC transactions may 
provide value to the system by improving price convergence. Given these 
two priorities, is it possible to design an effective rule that 
addresses market abuse yet does not discourage legitimate virtual 
trading that can contribute to price convergence?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ December 22, 2000 filing of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 
Docket No. ER01-773-000 at 2 (``The purpose of the modifications is 
to address concerns . . . that an entity can purchase FTRs in the 
monthly FTR auction and then enter Increment and Decrement Bids in 
the Day-ahead Market so as to create congestion and artificially 
(continued . . .) increase the value of its FTRs.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    <bullet> Examples of how INCs/DECs and UTC transactions influence 
the value of FTRs
    <bullet> Behaviors to be discouraged or encouraged through the FTR 
forfeiture rule

During the discussion on different ways of structuring the FTR 
forfeiture rule design, Panelists should be prepared to address the 
structural components of an effective rule, including:
    <bullet> In which way, if at all, should transactions be aggregated 
to determine the effect on congestion? In determining the effect on 
congestion, should the FTR forfeiture rule consider each market 
participant's portfolio of transactions? If so, is this approach 
technically feasible?
    <bullet> In which way, if at all, should the FTR forfeiture rule 
assess INCs/DECs and UTC transactions that are intended to relieve 
congestion to benefit the value of counter-flow FTRs?
    <bullet> At what threshold should the flow impact on a transmission 
constraint's limit trigger the forfeiture? What are the possible 
implications of implementing an overly strict rule versus a rule that 
may fail to identify all instances of potentially manipulative 
behavior?
    <bullet> How, if at all, should the rule treat INCs/DECs and UTC 
transactions

[[Page 75149]]

differently under various rule designs? For instance, should different 
injection/withdrawal points be utilized? Should different forfeiture 
thresholds be used?

Panelists:

    <bullet> Andrew Hartshorn, Boston Energy Trading and Marketing
    <bullet> Noha Sidhom, Inertia Power, LP
    <bullet> Harry Singh, J. Aron & Company
    <bullet> Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics
    <bullet> Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

12:00pm-1:00pm Lunch

1:00pm-4:15pm Panel 2: Uplift Causation and Allocation (with a 15 
minute break)

    Panel 2 will explore the circumstances under which INCs/DECs and 
UTC transactions may cause uplift in PJM and, if so, how INCs/DECs and 
UTC transactions should be allocated uplift charges. In the context of 
assessing PJM's uplift allocation, the Panel will discuss: (1) the 
extent to which uplift may be caused by INCs/DECs and UTC transactions; 
and (2) different ways to potentially allocate uplift to INCs/DECs and 
UTC transactions.
    During the discussion on uplift causation, Panelists should be 
prepared to address the following:
    <bullet> How, if at all, do INCs/DECs and UTC transactions cause 
uplift?
    <bullet> In which way, if at all, is uplift caused by INCs/DECs and 
UTC transactions associated with congestion, divergences between day-
ahead and real-time physical energy requirements, or other positions 
held by each market participant?
    <bullet> Are there methods available to accurately and dynamically 
determine any uplift that may be caused by INCs/DECs and UTC 
transactions?

During the discussion on uplift allocation, Panelists should be 
prepared to address the following:
    <bullet> The status of PJM's Energy Market Uplift Senior Task 
Force.
    <bullet> What principle(s) should be followed if and when 
allocating uplift to INCs/DECs and UTC transactions? For instance, one 
potential solution is that uplift costs should be strictly allocated 
based on cost causation determinations. Other potential solutions may 
be guided by simplicity, predictability, or multiple objectives. What 
new, if any, uplift allocation rules should be implemented based on 
this principle(s)?
    <bullet> Under which, if any, circumstances should INCs/DECs and 
UTC transactions be offset by other transactions to limit uplift 
allocation exposure?

Panelists:
    <bullet> Abram Klein, Appian Way Energy Partners
    <bullet> William Hogan, Harvard University, speaking on behalf of 
Financial Marketers Coalition
    <bullet> Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics
    <bullet> Adam Keech, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
    <bullet> David Patton, Potomac Economics, Ltd.
    <bullet> Wesley Allen, Red Wolf Energy Trading, L.L.C.
    <bullet> Stephanie Staska, Twin Cities Power Holdings, L.L.C.
    <bullet> Michael McNair, Yes Energy

4:15pm-4:30pm Closing

[FR Doc. 2014-29543 Filed 12-16-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>