alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________________

Nos. 17

- 1107, 17

- 1109, 17

- 1110, 17

- 1111

_________________

PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT

*National Association of Broadcasters

**Cox Media Group LLC,

Intervenors

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Prometheus Radio Project and Media Mobilizing Project,

Petitioners in No. 17

- 1107

Multicultural Media, Telecom and Internet Counsel and

National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, Inc.,

Petitioners in 17

- 1109

The Scranton Times, L.P.,

Petitioners in 17

- 1110

Bonneville International Corporation,

Petitioners in 17

- 111

* Prometheus Radio Project, Media Mobilizing Project,

Benton Foundation, Common Cause, Media Alliance,

Media Council Hawaii, National Association of Broadcasters

Employees and Technicians Communications Workers of

America, National Organization for Woman Foundation,

Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ Inc.,

Intervenors

*(Pursuant to the Clerk’s Order date 1/18/17)

** (Pursuant to the Clerk’s Order dated 2/7/17)

_________________2 Nos. 18

- 1092, 18

- 1669, 18

- 1670, 18

- 1671, 18

- 2943 & 18

- 3335

_________________

PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT;

MEDIA MOBILIZING PROJECT,

Petitioners (No. 18

- 1092, 18

- 2943)

INDEPENDENT TELEVISION GROUP,

Petitioners (No. 18

- 1669)

MULTICULTURAL MEDIA, TELECOM AND INTERNET COUNCIL, INC.;

NATIONAL SSOCIATION OF BLACK

- OWNED BROADCASTERS,

Petitioners (No. 18

- 1670, 18

- 3335)

FREE PRESS;

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION, INC. OF THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST;

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCAST EMPLOYEES AND

TECHNICIANS

- COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA;

COMMON CAUSE,

Petitioners (No. 18

- 1671)

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_________________

On Petition for Review of An Order of

the Federal Communications Commission

(FCC Nos. FCC

- 1: FCC

- 16

- 107; FCC

- 17

- 156; FCC

- 18

- 114)

_________________

Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and FUENTES

, Circuit Judges3 JUDGMENT ORDER

By opinion entered on September 23, 2019 and amended judgment entered

on September 27, 2019, this Court vacated and remanded the Reconsideration Order and

the Incubator Order in their entirety, and vacated and remanded the 2016 Report and

Order as to its d efinition of eligible entities. The Federal Communications Commission

and interested industry parties filed petitions for writs of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme

Court, which were granted. On April 1, 2021, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment

of th is Court and remanded for further proceedings.

On consideration whereof, it is now hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

all petitions for review and requests for relief are denied. This Court’s prior opinion and

amended judgment are hereby VACATED. This C ourt and panel do not retain

jurisdiction. The parties to bear their own costs. The Clerk is directed to issue the

mandate.

By the Court,

s/ Thomas L. Ambro

Circuit Judge

Dated: May 7, 2021
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6262
ORVILLE W. DAVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus OLAV H. ALVIG, Doctor; DIRCK BRENLINGER, Doctor; TIEN D. NGUYEN, Doctor Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virgi nia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Chief District Judge. (CA-95-686-R) Submitted: June 20, 1996 Decided: July 1, 1996 Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Orville W. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Anthony John Trenga, John E. Coffey, HAZEL & THOMAS, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Davis v. Alvig , No. CA-95-686-R (W.D. Va. Feb. 12, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 08-00204-KD

) (Civil Action No. 09-00734-KD-N)

DANIEL STUART ADDISON, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This action is before the Court on a motion (doc. 87) filed by the defendant, Daniel

Stuart Addison, for an order requiring his appointed trial counsel to send him a copy of

his entire case file. Addison contends that he is “incarcerated and is unable to pay for a

copy of the entire case file.” Consequently, Addison is asking this Court to provide him

with his case file at the government’s expense but has failed to state any reason or

particularized need for that record.

Upon consideration of the motion, together with Addison’s pending motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docs. 65-66), the

undersigned concludes and it is, therefore, ORDERED that this motion is due to be and

is hereby DENIED. “A federal prisoner is not entitled to obtain copies of Court records

at the Government's expense to search for possible defects merely because he is indigent.”

United States v. Johnson, 2006 WL 1699433, * 1-2 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2006), quoting,

Case 1:08-cr-00204-KD-N Document 91 Filed 02/04/10 Page 1 of 2
1

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc) the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

2

Campbell v. United States, 538 F.2d 692, 693 (5th Cir.1976).1 See also, United States v.

Byrd, 2007 WL 4521531, * 1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007)(“It is well settled that a federal

prisoner is not entitled to obtain court records at government expense to search for

possible defects merely because he is indigent.”), citing, United States v. Herrera, 474

F.2d 1049 (5th Cir.1973).

Done this 3rd day of February, 2010.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:08-cr-00204-KD-N Document 91 Filed 02/04/10 Page 2 of 2
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#### The State *v.*Saxon.

*Costs.—Bill of*Exceptions.—To present to the Supreme Court any question arising upon a motion to tax costs, a bill of exceptions must have been filed.

APPEAL from the Grant Common Pleas.

y. *L. Custer*and y. *C. Denny,*Attorney General, for the State.

*G. W. Harvey,*for appellee.

Pettit, J.

There is no question in this case properly presented by the transcript for our consideration. The only one attempted to be raised or presented is as to the taxation of costs. The entry of the clerk shows that a motion was made for that purpose and ruled upon by the court. Time was given to file a bill of exceptions, but none was filed, which was essential to present the question of the proper or improper action of the court below on the motion to this court. *Urton*v. *Luckey,*17 Ind. 213; *Smawley*v. *Stark,*16 Ind. 371; *Conner v. Winton,*10 Ind. 25.

The judgment is affirmed.*

*

Petition for a rehearing overruled.
11222.

#### WRIGHT *v.*THE STATE.

Decided April 13, 1920.

The ’evidence did not authorize a finding that the accused had intoxicating liquor in his possession or control, and the conviction must be set aside.

Indictment for misdemeanor; from Wilkes superior court — Judge Walker. December 13, 1919,

*177
      *Clement E. Sutton,*for plaintiff in error.

*R. C. Norman, solicitor-general,*contra.

Luke, J.

The accused was indicted for possessing intoxicating liquors. The sheriff testified that he found *“a*still" (and it may be assumed, for present purposes, that it was a whisky still) on another person’s land, from which a well-beaten path led to the home of the accused; that on approaching the house of the accused, who was a negro, he saw an unknown white man run from it, that on entering it the witness found that the accused was away from home, but his sister and another woman were present; that on searching the house he found a small quantity of whisky concealed between the mattresses on a bed, and “also found in an old tub, with some water in it, a suit of overalls, which had smut on them and stains that looked like they were caused by some one working around a still.” The sister of the accused testified to the name of the white man and to his flight upon the sheriff’s approach, and that he had come to the house only a few minutes before the sheriff came, during her brother’s absence from home, and had brought the whisky with him, and was about to make himself a toddy, when, seeing the sheriff approach, he hid the whisky where the sheriff found it, and then ran.

The testimony of the State’s witness, standing alone, did not demand a conviction. But the testimony of the defendant’s witness, who was unimpeached, and whose testimony was uncontradicted and was corroborated in material particulars by the testimony of the State’s witness, did, when considered alone, demand an acquittal. The evidence did not authorize the defendant’s conviction. Penal Code (1910), § 1010; *Smith*v. *Atlanta,*12 *Ga. App.*816 (78 S. E. 472); *A. C. L. R. Co.*v. *Drake,*21 *Ga. App.*81 (4) (94 S. E. 65).

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, C, J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-1623

DONALD J. STRABLE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(CA-04-717-6-25AK)

Submitted: July 29, 2004 Decided: August 3, 2004

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donald J. Strable, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Donald J. Strable appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See

Strable v. South Carolina, No. CA-04-717-6-25AK (D.S.C. Mar. 12,

2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Thomas Dixon, et al., *v.*Robert Wallace, et al.

Statute of Limitations — Non-Residence of Defendant.

Where fifteen years and one month have elapsed from the date of the last credit on a note and a plea of the statute of limitations is set up, the burden is on the plaintiff to avoid the operation of the statute.

*277Non-Residence of Defendant.

Where a suit is brought on a note more than fifteen years after the date of the last payment on it, and where the defendant a part of the time resided out of the state, but made frequent visits back home, where plaintiff might have sued her, her removal from the state did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations.

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

December 19, 1874.

*W. H. Card, for appellants.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

From the date of the last credit on the note sued on, up to the institution of this action, there was a period of fifteen years, one month and a few days.

Mrs. Wallace lived out of this state for about seven years, but she frequently visited Flemingburg, and her visits were open and known to the appellant, Dixon. He might have sued her on any of these visits, if he had chosen to do so. Her removal from the state did not, as matter of fact, obstruct him in coercing the payment of the debt by legal proceedings, and did not, therefore, suspend the running of the statute. *Ridgeley v. Price,*16 B. Mon. 409. Dixon swears that Mrs. Wallace frequently promised to pay the note within fifteen years next preceding the institution of the action; but she deposes that she did not make such promises, and that she did not even know that the note was outstanding. Upon this question the testimony is equipoised.

The lapse of time presents, *prima facie,*a bar to the action. The onus was upon appellants to avoid the operation of the statute. They failed to do so. Hence the judgment dismissing their petition is correct.

Judgment *affirmed.*
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#### OROAMERICA INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D & W JEWELRY CO., INC., a New York corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 01-55142.

D.C. No. CV-00-10661-HM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.1

Decided May 21, 2001.

*517Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and WARD LAW, Circuit Judges.

1

. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM2

This appeal from the denial of a request for a preliminary injunction comes to us under Ninth Circuit Rule 3-3.3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.4

Oroamerica, Inc. alleges that D & W Jewelry, Inc.’s sale of certain jewelry chains infringes upon Oroamerica’s copyright in two jewelry chain designs. Oroamerica requested, and the district court denied, a preliminary injunction.

Our inquiry is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the request for the preliminary injunction or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or an clearly erroneous findings of fact. *Does 1-5 v. Chandler,*83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1996).

We are aware of no authority to support Oroamerica’s contention that the district court was not entitled to consider the issuance of a design patent covering D & W Jewelry’s gold chain as a relevant factor in evaluating whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. Nor can we say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding, in a balanced order based on findings derived only from the “current record,” that Oroamerica had not demonstrated either probable success on the merits or a balance of hardships tipping sharply in Oroamerica’s favor. *See id.*

We therefore affirm, noting that “[b]e-cause of the limited scope of our review of the law applied by the district court and because the fully developed factual record may be materially different from that initially before the district court, our disposition ... may provide little guidance as to the appropriate disposition on the merits.” *Sports Form v. United Press Int’l,*686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir.1982).

AFFIRMED.

2

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

3

. We DENY as moot Oroamerica’s motion to expedite the appeal.

4

. We GRANT Oroamerica's motion to take judicial notice of (1) United States Copyright Office supplemental copyright registration certificate VA 1-041-249; and (2) the file history of U.S. Design Patent 428,822, Kahan, issued to Charm Link, Inc.

We also GRANT D & W’s motion to take judicial notice of (1) Information Disclosure Statement by Applicant regarding Kahan design patent application number 29/127,078, United States Patent and Trademark Office Forms PTO-1449 and PTO-892; (2) Notice of Allowance of Kahan design patent application number 29/127,078; and (3) Notice of Allowability of Kahan design patent application number 29/127,078.