alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Leet, Crutchfield, et al., *v.*D. C. Robertson.

Attachment — Payment—Sale to Defraud Creditors.

Where parties agree that the question as to whether the attachment should be sustained shall be submitted to the court .and parol evidence heard on the motion to dissolve, if it was irregular for the court to hear that branch of the case, the irregularity was waived by the agreement.

Payment.

One cannot pay his debts by offering to pay them, in horses at a price fixed on them by himself, and an offer to do so not accepted will not relieve the debtor or his sureties.

Sale to Defraud Creditors.

Where property of an insolvent debtor is sold by him to a creditor for one-third of its value, the fact affords some evidence that the sale was pretended and was to’ defeat his1 creditors.

APPEAL PROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

March 21, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Peters:

The record shows that the question as to whether the attachment should be sustained was by consent submitted to the court, and parol evidence heard on appellants’ motion to discharge it. If it had been otherwise irregular to hear that branch of the case, then that irregularity was waived by consent of the parties.

It certainly did not absolve Crutchfield from his obligation to pay the debt he owed Tichner by offering to pay it in horses at a price fixed on them by himself, or in- other commodities not desired by his creditor, nor did such offer relieve his surety or furnish him with any excuse for placing his effects out of the reach of his creditors.

It is manifest from the evidence that the prices which Saunders claims to have paid for the horse by purchase, and for the wood and lumber Leet claims to have purchased, were little more than one-third of their fair value, and there was no visible change of possession of any or either of the articles after the asserted sale; and it further appears from the evidence that Crutchfield was apprehending trouble on account of the debts for which appellee was his surety, of which Saunders was apprised, as Vanover proves, and circumstances point very strongly to the conclusion that Leet was not ignorant of them.

From the facts as exhibited we cannot doubt that the pretended *639sales were made for the purpose of removing the property from the reach of Crutchfield’s creditors, and especially to protect it from the payment of the debts on which appellee was his surety. 1

*Ray & Walker, for appellants. Owen &*Ellis, *for appellee.*

Judgment *affirmed.*
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

William C. Owens as Chief Executive Officer and President of Owens Financial Group, Inc., the General Partner of Owens Mortgage Investment Fund, a California Limited Partnership (the “Registrant”), and Bryan H. Draper, as Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Owens Financial Group, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:

(1)     the Registrant’s Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with the applicable requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant.

 

/s/ William C. Owens

William C. Owens

Chief Executive Officer and President of Owens Financial Group, Inc., General Partner

May 15, 2007

 

/s/ Bryan H. Draper

Bryan H. Draper

Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Owens Financial Group, Inc., General Partner

May 15, 2007
##### 



Exhibit 12.1
  Doral
    Financial Corporation
    Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
  For thenine month period endedSeptember 30, 2007Including Interest on DepositsEarnings:Pre-tax loss from continuing operations

$
(216,244
)Plus:Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)


335,018Total Earnings

$
118,774Fixed Charges:Interest expensed and capitalized

$
332,562Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized expenses related
    to indebtedness


562An estimate of the interest component within rental expense


1,894Total Fixed Charges

$
335,018Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges


(A
)Excluding Interest on DepositsEarnings:Pre-tax loss from continuing operations

$
(216,244
)Plus:Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)


208,978Total Earnings

$
(7,266
)Fixed Charges:Interest expensed and capitalized

$
206,522Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized expenses related
    to indebtedness


562An estimate of the interest component within rental expense


1,894Total Fixed Charges

$
208,978Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges


(A
)
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Telecom, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Alexander
Vinogradov, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1.
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2.
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
11th day March of 2005. /s/ ALEXANDER VINOGRADOV 
 Alexander Vinogradov
President, Chief Executive Officer and
Director
#### THE STATE ex rel. KENNEDY, Appellant, v. HAWES et al.

In Banc,

November 3, 1903.

The judgment in this case is affirmed upon the authority of State ex rel. Kife v. Hawes, reported at page 360 of this volume.

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — How. *O’Neil By cm,*Judge.

Affirmed.

*Joseph Wheless*for appellant.

*C. W. Bates*and *Wm. F. Woerner*for respondents.

GANTT, J.

Mandamus, $3,741.03, for salary for relator as sergeant and one other as patrolman. Judgment for defendants and relator appealed. Both claimants had fully served whatever terms they were entitled to and were merely holding at the pleasure of the hoard when they were retired. The case, therefore, falls within the rule laid down for officers _ and privates in State ex rel. Rife v. Hawes, reported at page 360 of this volume. The judgment of the circuit court is for the right party and it is affirmed.

All concur.
#### Adoply Endrick *v.*Peter Karlin.

Bill of Sale — Record.

A bill of sale is not required to be recorded and if it is recorded is not notice to tbe public.

Lien.

Tbe lien retained in a bill of sale is good as between tbe vendor and vendee and tbe equity will be protected against tbe claim of any person not possessing a superior right.

Rights of Creditor.

Tbe creditor of one wbo bas executed a bill of sale to another, becoming such creditor after its execution, is of no greater dignity than that of tbe bolder of tbe bill of sale and is inferior in point of time, and where such creditor bas actual notice of tbe senior equity, bis claim is postponed to that of tbe bolder of tbe bill.

APPEAL PROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

December 5, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

Whilst there is no statute requiring or authorizing the recording of a bill of sale of personal property, and whilst the law will not imply notice upon the part of either a purchaser or creditor by reason of such recording of any lien that may be retained to secure the vendor in the payment of the purchase price, yet it seems that actual notice of appellee’s lien had been brought to the appellant before the enforcement of his execution levy.

The lien retained in the bill of sale is good as between the appellee and his debtor. It is an equity that will be protected by the chancellor against the claim of any person who does not possess a superior right. Appellant’s debt was not contracted on the faith of the personal property in contest. It was sold by appellee to the common debtor long after appellant’s debt was created. The sleeping or secret equity cannot, therefore, operate as an actual fraud upon his *819rights. His claim arises out of the levy of his execution. It is of no greater dignity than that of the appellee, and it is inferior in point of time. He had actual notice of the senior equity, and according to the doctrines of the cases of *Halley v. Oldham, et al.,*5 B. Mon. 233; *Righter, et al., v. Forrester, et al.,*1 Bush 278, and *Low & Whitney v. Blinco, et al., 10*Bush 335, he ought not to be allowed to proceed to sell the property under his execution levy.

*James Harrison, for appellant.*

*P. A. Gaertner, L. M. Dembits, for appellee.*

This conclusion obviates the necessity of considering the proof touching the execution of the alleged mortgage.

Judgment *affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOTITLE 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Enzo Biochem, Inc., and
Subsidiaries (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Elazar Rabbani, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |                                                                                                                                                           
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) The Report
 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| |                                                                                                                                                           
| | (2) The
 information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
 respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                          |     |                           
|------------------------- | --- | --------------------------
|Dated: September 4,
 2009 | By: | /s/ Elazar
 Rabbani, Ph.D.
|                          |     |                           
|                          |     | Elazar Rabbani,
 Ph.D.    
|                          |     | Chief Executive
 Officer  

---
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of California CoastalCommunities, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), each of the undersigned, in their respective capacity as anofficer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best oftheir respective knowledge, that:

 

·                  the Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

·                  the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: November 12, 2010 |   |
|------------------------------|--------|
|                         |   |
| /s/  Raymond J. Pacini       |   |
| Raymond  J. Pacini           |   |
| Chief  Executive Officer     |   |
|                         |   |
| /s/  Sandra G. Sciutto       |   |
| Sandra  G. Sciutto           |   |
| Senior  Vice President and   |   |
| Chief  Financial Officer     |   |

 

----
11184.

#### Southern Express Company *v.*Turner.

Stephens, J.

1. While the Carmack amendment to the interstate-commerce act gives a right of action against the initial carrier for loss of or damage to goods in shipment in interstate commerce, whether the loss or damage is caused by the initial or a connecting carrier, a suit may nevertheless be maintained against a connecting carrier where it is shown that the loss or damage is occasioned by its negligence. *Southern Railway Co.*v. *Morris,*147 *Ga.*729 (95 S. E. 284).

2. While in a suit against a connecting carrier it must be alleged that the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant, a petition which alleges that the “ defendant failed and neglected to safely carry and deliver said hog to petitioner at Valdosta, for when said hog reached Tupelo, Mississippi, it died, while in the possession and care of the defendant, and was not delivered to petitioner; . . that by reason of the failure of defendant to safely carry and deliver said property to petitioner, as aforesaid, he has been injured and damaged,” contains, as against a general demurrer, a sufficient allegation that the injury was caused by the negligence of -the defendant. *Cincinnate, Hamiton & Dayton Ry. Co.*v. *Quincey,*19 *Ga. App.*167 (91 S. E. 220).

3. Where the petition sets forth a good common-law action, an allegation that the defendant received the goods “ as in good order ” does not necessarily render the action one brought under the State law as codified in the Civil Code (1910), § 2752. *Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co.*v. *Venable,*117 Ga. 142 (43 S. E. 407).

4. The petition sufficiently set out a common-law action against the *626connecting carrier, and it was not error to allow an amendment thereto amplifying the allegations of negligence. The general demurrer and the motion to dismiss were properly overruled.

Decided August 16, 1920.

Action for damages; from city court of Yaldosta — Judge Cranford. November 14, 1919.

*Robert C. & Philip H. Alston, E. P. S. Denmark, John G. Hart,*for plaintiff in error.

*E. K. Wilcox,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.*
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Clem Schorr, Defendant.

County Court, Chautauqua County,

December —, 1924.

Crimes — bail — petition for refund of deposit in Municipal Court, city of Dunkirk, as bail for defendant’s appearance in said court upon adjourned day —bail ordered forfeited for defendant’s failure to appear — Municipal Court refused to return deposit to defendant — County Court, pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure, § 697, has concurrent jurisdiction with Municipal Court in proceeding to remit deposit and will hot interfere with jurisdiction of Municipal Court —■ application should be for rehearing before Municipal Court.

A County Court, under section 597 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has concurrent jurisdiction with a Municipal Court in a proceeding to remit a forfeiture of an undertaking or deposit.

Accordingly, the County Court of Chautauqua county will not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk and grant defendant’s petition for the refund of a deposit in the said Municipal Court as bail for his appearance in the court on an adjourned day, where the deposit was ordered forfeited by the judge presiding in the said Municipal Court, upon defendant’s failure to appear, and the court has refused, on application, to order the return of the deposit.

*It seems,*that the defendant should .make an application for a rehearing in the Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk.

Petition for refund of deposit in Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk as bail for defendant’s appearance in said court on adjourned day.

*Glenn D. Wooclin, District Attorney,*for the People.

*Thomas H. Larkin,*for the defendant.

Ottaway, J.:

The petitioner, Clem Schoor, presents his petition to the County Court, Chautauqua county, seeking the refund of fifty dollars in money and a fifty-dollar Liberty bond, deposited in the Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk as bail for his appearance in said court upon an adjourned day.

The Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk has entered an order forfeiting said fifty dollars and said Liberty bond for the failure *65of the petitioner to appear as required by the order. It appears from the petition that an effort was made by the petitioner to recover the possession of said money and Liberty bond from the judge of the Municipal Court. While this effort appears to have been informal in character, it appears that the judge of said court refused to return said money to the petitioner. Under these circumstances the County Court, under section 597 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has concurrent jurisdiction with the Municipal Court in a proceeding to remit said moneys and under the authority of *People*v. *Street*(14 N. Y. Supp. 778) this court will not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk. An application should be made to the Municipal Court of the city of Dunkirk for a rehearing, if the petitioner desires a rehearing of the matter.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50747

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

FREDERICK BRANCH,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:91-CR-63-1

Before KING, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Frederick Branch has

moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Branch has not filed a response. Our

independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous

issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 8, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 08-50747 Document: 00511315062 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/08/2010
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1508 

To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to define ‘‘State 

of residence’’ and ‘‘resident’’, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 9, 2023 

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota (for himself, Mr. MCCLINTOCK, Mr. GOSAR, 

Mr. LATURNER, Mr. CRENSHAW, Mr. PERRY, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. BACON, 

Mr. LAMALFA, and Mr. STEWART) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to 

define ‘‘State of residence’’ and ‘‘resident’’, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Traveler’s Gun Rights 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. STATE OF RESIDENCE. 

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 921 of title 18, United 

8 States Code, is amended— 

9 (1) in subsection (a)— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1508 IH

1 (A) by striking ‘‘(a)’’ before ‘‘As used’’; 

2 and 

3 (B) by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(38)(A) The term ‘State of residence’ means— 

5 ‘‘(i) the State in which an individual re6 sides; 

7 ‘‘(ii) in the case of an individual, or spouse 

8 of an individual, who is an active duty member 

9 of the Armed Forces— 

10 ‘‘(I) the State in which the permanent 

11 duty station of the member is located; and 

12 ‘‘(II) the State in which the member 

13 maintains a place of abode from which the 

14 member commutes each day to the perma15 nent duty station of the member; or 

16 ‘‘(iii) in the case of an individual who does 

17 not have a physical residence in any State, the 

18 State in which an individual maintains a private 

19 mailbox or post office box. 

20 ‘‘(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)(i)— 

21 ‘‘(i) an individual resides in a State if the 

22 individual is present in the State with the inten23 tion of making a home in that State; and 

24 ‘‘(ii) an individual who maintains a home 

25 in more than 1 State is a resident of each such 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1508 IH

1 State during the time when the individual is 

2 present in that State. 

3 ‘‘(39) The term ‘resident’, with respect to a 

4 State, means an individual who satisfies clause (i), 

5 (ii), or (iii) of paragraph (38)(A) with respect to 

6 that State.’’; and 

7 (2) by striking subsection (b). 

8 (b) NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND

9 CHECK SYSTEM.—Section 922(t)(1)(D) of title 18, United 

10 States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘transferee con11 taining a photograph of the transferee.’’ and inserting the 

12 following: ‘‘transferee— 

13 ‘‘(i) containing a photograph of the trans14 feree; and 

15 ‘‘(ii) containing— 

16 ‘‘(I) the address of the residence of 

17 the transferee; or 

18 ‘‘(II) the address for a private mail19 box or post office box maintained by the 

20 transferee, if the transferee does not have 

21 a physical residence in any State.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Order entered October 24, 2017

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 17

- 00344

- CV

TONYA TUCKER AND DEB ORAH TUCKER, Appellant s

V.

DALLAS COUNTY, ET AL ., Appellee s

On App eal from the 116th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. TX

- 11

- 30967



### O RDER

Before the Court is a ppellants’ October 2 0 , 2017 unopposed motion to extend time to file

appellants’ brief. We GRANT the motion. Appellants’ brief sha ll be filed by November 22,

2017.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE