alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In re: Juan Carlos OCASIO Debtor. Juan Carlos Ocasio, Appellant-Appellant, v. County of San Francisco, Appellee-Appellee.

No. 99-17577.

BAP No. NC-99-01299-RKP.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.*

Decided May 25, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Juan Carlos Ocasio appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his adversary proceeding which sought to discharge his child support debt and alleged a violation of his civil rights in connection with that debt. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We independently review the bankruptcy court’s rulings on appeal from the BAP. *Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization (In re Cool Fuel, Inc.),*210 F.3d 999, 1001-02 (9th Cir.2000). We may affirm on any basis which the record supports. *Branson v. Nott,*62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir.1995).

Because Ocasio’s adversary complaint sought to relitigate the merits of a prior *532state court decision, the bankruptcy court did not err by dismissing the adversary proceeding. *See id.*at 291-92.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         321,869
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  589,262
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (6,464)
<INVENTORY>                                    509,312
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,458,579
<PP&E>                                         1,686,072
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (1,100,384)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,370,365
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,031,326
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1,781,782
<OTHER-SE>                                     (958,310)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,370,365
<SALES>                                        1,228,737
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1,228,737
<CGS>                                          826,596
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  826,596
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               413,171
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2,118
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (11,029)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (6,203)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (4,826)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,826)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.00
        

</TABLE>
#### B. P. Mitchell *v.*James Woodlington, et al.

Principal and Surety — Indemnity of Surety.

Where the surety takes a mortgage to indemnify him against loss .by reason of being surety he can give no cause of action against his principal before paying the debt unless his indemnity is insufficient or it becomes necessary to sue to prevent mortgaged property from being removed, disposed of, or injured.

*476APPEAL PROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT.

June 15, 1875.

*George W. Duvall, for appellant. James R. Hulett, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

A surety may maintain an action against his principal to compel him to discharge the debt or liability for which the surety is bound, after the same has become due, and in certain contingencies may sue to obtain indemnity before the debt or liability becomes due. But where, as in this case, he takes a mortgage by way of indemnity, at the time the liability is incurred, he can have no cause of action against his principal, unless his indemnity is insufficient, or unless it is necessary to sue to prevent the mortgaged property from being removed, disposed of, or injured, until he discharges the debt or liability for which he is bound.

The warrant and statement in this case shows that Woodlington held an indemnity. There is no suggestion that it was not amply sufficient to secure him. It also shows that he had paid nothing on account of his suretyship, and no reason whatever was assigned for asking the interposition of a court of equity. When his attachment was discharged, he was left in court without even an apparent right of action against Mitchell,

The fact that he paid the debt, or a portion of the debt, after the institution of the action, could not authorize a judgment in his favor without an amendment to his statement setting up the fact of payment; and this amendment would not have been made after the court had properly determined that the order of attachment was wrongfully sued out, Proof of this subsequent payment was inadmissible, as the case stood at the time of the trial. Judgment *reversed,*and cause remanded with instructions to dismiss appellees’ warrant, without prejudice.
<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the annual report of American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sunjun Liu, Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


By: /s/  Shujun Liu
    ------------------------------------
    SHUJUN LIU
    CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHAIRMAN

DATED: MAY 6, 2005
EXHIBIT 32


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the report of Activeworlds Corp. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sean
Deson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




                             /s/ Sean Deson
                             ---------------------------------------------------
                             Sean Deson
                             Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
                             Date:  August 5, 2005


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### DANCSECZ v. CARNEGIE-ILLINOIS STEEL CORP. et al.

Civ. A. 9248.

District Court of the United States W. D. Pennsylvania.

July 5, 1951.

Chad L. John, Strong and Strong, of Un-iontown, Pa., for plaintiff Joseph Dan-csecz.

H. E. McCamey, Dickie, McGamey, Chil-cote, Reif & Robinson, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation.

H. Fred Mercer, Jr., Mercer & Buckley, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc., Mike Bernot, and Joseph Comito.

BURNS, District Judge.

Plaintiff concedes that Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation must be eliminated as a party defendant, since both plaintiff and that corporation are citizens of New Jersey and federal jurisdiction here is asserted on the basis of diversity of citizenship.

*613After filing the instant complaint in this district, plaintiff now seeks a change of venue to New Jersey, where he resides and where the accident occurred. The defendants still in the case oppose the motion. I shall not attempt to decide the question left unanswered in Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 3 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 111, 115, certiorari denied 1951, 340 U.S. 953, 71 S. Ct. 572, viz., whether the removal provisions of the Code give this Court power to order transfer of this case to New Jersey, when the individual defendants are not subject to service in that state and are objecting to such removal. It is sufficient to note that the convenience to plaintiff in trying the suit in New Jersey is balanced by the convenience to the individual defendants in having the proceedings near their homes and witnesses, and that plaintiff already has a similar action pending against defendant Atlantic Freight Lines in the federal district court of New Jersey. Plaintiff has shown no adequate reason for imposing the additional burden of a distant forum on the individual defendants whom, after all, he elected to sue in this Court.
EXHIBIT 10.3

**SECONDEXTENSION AND MODIFICATIONOFEMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**

             THIS SECOND EXTENSION ANDMODIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the "Extension") is enteredinto as of April 30, 2001 by and between California Coastal Communities,Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Employer"), and SANDRA G. SCIUTTO("Executive").

WITNESSETH:

             WHEREAS, Executive and Employerhave entered into an Employment Agreement dated as of May 1, 1998 andExtension and Modification of Employment Agreement dated December 7, 1999(collectively, the "Employment Agreement") through which Executivehas provided various executive capacities to Employer and Employer has obtainedvarious executive services by Executive; and

             WHEREAS, Employer desires to obtainthe benefit of continued service from Executive by extending the EmploymentAgreement, and Executive desires to render continued services to Employer byextending the Employment Agreement pursuant to the terms and conditions of thisExtension;

             NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration ofthe foregoing recitals and the mutual promises and covenants herein contained,the parties agree as follows:

             SECTION 1.     CONTINUING EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.  Except to the extent of any modificationmade pursuant to the terms of this Extension, the Employment Agreement shallcontinue to remain in full force and effect following the date hereof.

             SECTION 2.     EXTENSION OF TERM. Employer and Executive hereby agree to extend the term of the EmploymentAgreement until April 30, 2003.

             SECTION 3.     BASE SALARY.  Fromthe date hereof and until the expiration of the term set forth inSection 2 above, Employer agrees to pay Executive a base salary of atleast One Hundred and Sixty-Five Thousand Dollars ($165,000) per year in semi–monthlyinstallments on the same dates the other senior officers of Employer are paid.

             SECTION 4.     BONUS.  From thedate hereof and until the expiration of the term set forth in Section 2above, Employer agrees to provide Executive with the opportunity to earn anincentive bonus of up to Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000), based uponthe amounts for each performance target which will be mutually agreed upon andset forth on Schedule A attached hereto.

 

             IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partieshave executed this Extension as of the date first above written.

| "EMPLOYER"                                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMUNITIES, INC.                                    |
| By                                                                      | /s/   RAYMOND J. PACINI |
|                                                                    | Raymond J. Pacini |
|                                                                    | Chief Executive Officer |
|                                                                    |   |
| "EXECUTIVE"                                                   |
|          /s/  SANDRA G. SCIUTTO |
| Sandra  G. Sciutto                                                      |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BEVERLY JO JONES :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION: 14-0059-WS-C 

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., :

Defendants. :

JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff Beverly Jo Jones’

action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. 

DONE this 8th day of July, 2015.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Case 1:14-cv-00059-WS-C Document 19 Filed 07/08/15 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>

                                  [LETTERHEAD]



                         Consent of Independent Auditors


We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report (Form 10-K)
of Nash Finch Company and subsidiaries of our report dated February 19, 1997,
included in the 1996 Annual Report to Shareholders of Nash Finch Company and
subsidiaries.

Our audits also included the financial statement schedule of Nash Finch 
Company and subsidiaries listed in Item 14(a).  This schedule is the 
responsibility of the Company's management.  Our responsibility is to express 
an opinion based on our audits. In our opinion, the financial statement 
schedule referred to above, when considered in relation to the basic 
financial statements taken as a whole, presents fairly in all material 
respects the information set forth therein.

We also consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement 
Number 33-64313 and Registration Statement Number 33-54478 on Form S-8 of 
Nash Finch Company and subsidiaries and in the related Prospectuses of our 
report dated February 19, 1997, with respect to the consolidated financial 
statements incorporated herein by reference, and our report included in the 
preceding paragraph with respect to the financial statement schedule included 
in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Nash Finch Company and subsidiaries.

                                                /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Minneapolis, Minnesota
March 28, 1997
<PAGE>


                                                                      EXHIBIT 12

BAY VIEW CAPITAL CORPORATION
COMPUTATION OF RATIOS OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                            6/30/99          6/30/98
<S>                                                         <C>               <C>
Earnings:
         Earnings before income tax expenses               $ 27,613          $ 20,144
         Add:
         Interest on advances and other borrowings           56,600            45,538
         Interest component of rental expense                   958             1,076
                                                           --------          --------
         Earnings before fixed charges excluding
          interest on customer deposits                      85,171            66,758
         Interest on customer deposits                       67,077            78,597
                                                           --------          --------
         Earnings before fixed charges                     $152,248          $145,355
                                                           ========          ========

Fixed charges:
         Interest on advances and other borrowings         $ 56,600          $ 45,538
         Interest component of rental expense                   958             1,076
                                                           --------          --------
         Fixed charges excluding interest on
          customer deposits                                  57,558            46,614
         Interest on customer deposits                       67,077            78,597
                                                           --------          --------
         Total fixed charges                               $124,635          $125,211
                                                           ========          ========

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges including interest
 on customer deposits                                          1.22              1.16

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges excluding interest
 on customer deposits                                          1.48              1.43

</TABLE>
#### Anderson Dudley *v.*Commonwealth.

Criminal Law — Homicide—Instructions.

Where three persons are jointly indicted for murder, and in the separate trial of one it is shown that he was present at the killing, and called on one of the others to kill the deceased, and struck him himself, even though the blow of the other perhaps was fatal, he is guilty as a principal and the court correctly refused to instruct the .jury that the guilt or innocence of the defendant was to be determined by that of the other who struck the fatal blow.

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.

February 8, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

Appellant having been indicted with Plenty Henderson and Ki West for the murder of Patrick Riley, was in a separate trial found guilty of manslaughter by a jury, and his punishment fixed at fifteen years confinement in the state prison. The court below having overruled his motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment in conformity to the verdict of the jury, he has appealed to this court.

The learned attorneys for appellant insist that the court below, ■ in instructing the jury, erred in failing to state to them in clear and explicit language that the guilt or innocence of appellant was to be determined by that of Plenderson, who was, according to their theory, the principal.

All three of the persons named were indicted as principals, and it is clearly and satisfactorily shown by the evidence that appellant was present and actively participated in the combat. He not only called on Henderson, who perhaps struck the fatal blow, to kill Riley, but struck him with a stone on the head or neck himself, so that if the mortal wound was not inflicted by appellant’s own hand, it was done with his avowed approval, and in anticipation of his own purpose. Instruction No. 3, given by the court on that point, was as favorable to appellant as he was entitled to have it. And after a *357careful examination of the instructions given and refused by the court below, we have been unable to find any error prejudicial to appellant, and as no other grounds are relied upon for reversal except the refusal of instructions asked by appellant, and the giving of some objected to by him, the judgment must be *affirmed.*

*Morton & Parker, Buford, for appellant.*

*J. W. Rodman, for appellee.*
Program Plan 

 Identifying use cases to:

 Address communication range expectations 

 Management of adhoc and hybrid networks

 Baseline simulation and development hardware capabilities

 Extending the existing range of ProSe.

 Improving co-existence of ProSe with network operations.

 Adhoc network management

 Simulated and physical testing

 Dissemination of project outcomes

Direct communication is a cardinal requirement of public safety communication systems

 Used by First Responders in network coverage for tactical situations 

 Provides communication services for out of coverage situations as an adhoc communication capability 

ProSe and particularly its Public Safety modes have not been vetted

 To match or exceed the capabilities of existing LMR direct mode (P25 CAI)

 To manage devices that operate and transition between cellular networks and mobile adhoc networks

 While providing users with a predictable, reliable communication experience

ProSe Management 

 Ease of operation for users and administrators

 Link life cycle management

 Co-existence of on network and off network devices

 Cellular extension and adhoc coverage extension relays

 Continuity of on/ off network transitions

 Hybrid communications groups: cellular and adhoc members

 Airlink scheduling and resource allocations 

ProSe Range Limitations 

 Range is a significant issue with legacy LMR operations

 ProSe range is more limited than LMR P25

 Intensive data applications further reduce range

Results 

 Achievable range extension

 Tradeoffs for greater range 

P25, 1

H P-U E, 0.1 H P-U E, 0.29

U E, 0.05 U E, 0.11

15

20

25

30

35

40

Effective Radiated Power (dBm)

Existing Legacy LMR and ProSe Range

Data Voice Serivces

Outcome 

A next generation direct communication capability that:

 Extends legacy range • Supplies ease of use and administration

 Supports data services • Provides continuity of network and adhoc communications 

Award Range Extension MANET Dissemination

Results 

 Mobile adhoc network for public safety

 Simplified use and management

 Integration of on/ off network and relay operation