IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CRIMINAL NO. 15-00102-CG-B

DSD SHIPPING, A.S.,

DANIEL PAUL DANCU,

BO GAO,

XIAOBING CHEN, and 

XIN DHONG

 Defendant

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion to suppress filed by 

Defendant DSD Shipping, AS (“DSD Shipping”) (Doc. 63) and the response 

filed by the United States (Doc. 104). DSD Shipping requests suppression of 

two categories of seized evidence: (1) evidence obtained during the 

warrantless inspection of the M/T Stavanger Blossom, and (2) materials from 

mirror images of three hard drives seized pursuant to a warrant. Three other 

Defendants, Daniel Paul Dancu (Doc. 85), Xiaobing Chen (Doc. 66) and Xin 

Dhong (Doc. 70), filed motions to adopt the motion to suppress. The Court 

granted the motions to adopt as to Dancu (Doc. 88), Chen (Doc. 79), and 

Dhong (Doc. 80). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to 

suppress is due to be DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

On April 30, 2015, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment 

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(Doc. 1) against DSD Shipping Co., AS; Daniel Paul Dancu; Bo Gao; Xiaobing 

Chen; and Xin Zhong.1 The indictment charges defendants with various 

offenses relating to the alleged failure to maintain, or intentional falsification 

of, the required Oil Record Book (the “ORB”) on the Vessel, and obstruction of 

the Coast Guard's investigation of unlawful discharges of oily mixtures.

On November 8, 2014, the U.S. Coast Guard received an email from a 

crewmember onboard the M/T Stavanger Blossom alleging that the crew 

installed a bypass pipe on the vessel. (Doc. 63, Exh. 1). The bypass pipe, 

known as a “magic pipe,” allegedly allowed oily-water from the vessel’s bilge 

tank to bypass the Oily-Water Separator (OWS) and discharge overboard.2 Id.

The crewmember, identified as Rolando Babon, wrote that the Second 

Engineer ordered the crew to clean the sludge tank and place the oily waste 

in plastic bags. Babon stated the crew collected at least 90 bags and 

subsequently threw the bags overboard. Id.

On or about November 12, 2014, the M/T Stavanger Blossom docked 

at the Plains Terminal in Mobile, Alabama, a port within the jurisdiction of 

the Southern District of Alabama. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p. 1). Around 7:30 am, the 

 1 DSD Shipping, headquartered in Norway and Singapore, operates a fleet of 

oil tankers, including the M/T Stavanger Blossom. (Doc. 63, p. 2). 

2 “ “Bilge water” is the mixture of oil and water that accumulates in the 

“bilge”—or bottom—of a ship. All of the oil, fuel and other liquids that drip or 

leak from machinery during the ship's normal operation, and any seawater 

that leaks into the ship, ultimately flow downward into the bilge. A ship must 

periodically discharge that bilge water so that it does not rise to a level where 

it endangers the safety of the vessel and its crew.” United States v. Pena, 684 

F.3d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 2012). 

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U.S. Coast Guard boarded the vessel without a warrant and went to the 

ship’s office.3 Id. At the ship’s office, the Coast Guard met the ship’s master 

Laurentiu Florea and Chief Engineer, Defendant Daniel Paul Dancu

(“Dancu”). Id. The Coast Guard informed the two men of the reason for the 

visit and stated that the Coast Guard would need to access the vessel’s log 

equipment and the crew during the exam. Id. 

Coast Guard officers met with Dancu and reviewed the ship’s Oil 

Record Book (ORB). (Doc. 63, Exh. 2) In the initial inspection of the ORB, 

officers found no entries recording any direct discharges of oily-water or 

waste oil overboard without first being processed through the OWS. Id. As 

officers reviewed the records, Dancu explained that Defendant Xin Zhong, the

ship’s fourth engineer, obtained soundings of the vessel’s tanks and entered 

them into an electronic “Daily Sounding Log” on the vessel’s computer.4 Id. 

Dancu printed the vessel’s Daily Sounding Log for August 2014 through 

November 2014 and provided it to the officers. Dancu further explained that 

he reviewed the electronic logs and then recorded tank measurements in the 

ORB. Id.

While the Coast Guard officers reviewed the ORB, a second team of 

Coast Guard officers examined the vessel’s machinery in the Engine Room.

 3 Port State Control examinations are specifically authorized by 33 C.F.R. § 

153.23(a)(3), which allows the Coast Guard to search a vessel. 

4 “A ‘sounding’ is a measurement of the fluid level in a given tank or 

compartment.” United States v. Fleet Mgmt., Ltd., No. CRIM.A. 07-279, 2009 

WL 2581710, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2009). 

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(Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p. 1). Those officers began their engine room inspection at 

the ship’s incinerator. Coast Guard Investigating Officer Shane Hunt 

reported that the area around the incinerator appeared clean and in good 

working order. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p.1). The ship’s Fourth Assistant Engineer 

made several unsuccessful attempts to burn sludge, but the incinerator was 

not at the proper operating temperature of 800 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. While 

waiting for the incinerator to warm, the Coast Guard investigators turned to 

the ship’s OWS system. Id. Investigator Hunt noticed that the discharge 

piping from the OWS had recently been painted, despite all other sections of 

the OWS piping being dirty and untouched. Id.

Shortly after their arrival on the vessel, the whistleblower, Babon, 

passed the Coast Guard investigators a flash drive containing photographs

and video of the alleged oil dumping. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p. 2). Officers 

immediately reviewed the flash drive and found photos of the bypass pipe 

reported by Babon.5 Id. The photos also showed the crew cleaning the vessel’s 

Fuel Oil Sludge Tank, and numerous full plastic bags sitting outside the 

tank. Id. The flash drive also contained a video of the tank’s cleaning process 

and the ship’s radar showing latitude and longitude. Id. After viewing the 

video, Investigator Hunt ordered LTJG Langston and CWO Rushton to 

return to the engine room to attempt to locate the “magic pipe.” Id. 

As other officers searched for the removed pipe, Coast Guard officers 

 5 For the purposes of this order, the terms “magic pipe” and “bypass pipe” are 

used interchangeably. 

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interviewed crewmembers regarding the “magic pipe” and discharges of oil. 

Id. Beginning alphabetically, the Coast Guard first interviewed the 

whistleblower, Rolando Babon. Id.

Babon confirmed that he emailed the Coast Guard prior to the vessel’s 

arrival in Mobile. Babon explained that the crew previously installed a 

bypass pipe on the OWS piping and connected the pipe to the vessel’s 

overboard discharge valve. Id. According to Babon, Defendant Xiaobing Chen 

ordered him to fabricate a new discharge pipe and replace the bypass pipe 

before the vessel came to the United States. Id. Babon stated that he removed 

and replaced the bypass pipe as ordered, and placed the pipe in the vessel’s 

Central Stores. Id. Babon further explained that Engine Room crewmembers 

cleaned out the Fuel Oil Sludge Tank before arriving in the Port of Mobile. 

Babon stated that the crew filled plastic bags with sludge and threw the bags

overboard in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. The Coast Guard also interviewed 

crewmember Keith Enong, who confirmed that he observed crewmembers 

throwing plastic bags of sludge overboard. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p.3). 

With information from Babon, Coast Guard officers returned to the 

engine room and found the bypass pipe in a storage closet. Id. Officers 

observed that the pipe appeared to have oil residue inside. Id. The officers dry 

fit the bypass pipe to the OWS piping and found it fit. Id. Coast Guard 

officers also obtained oil samples from the Engine Room storage tanks, 

including a sample from inside the bypass pipe and a sample from inside the 

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overboard discharge valve.6 Id. The officers sampled this valve and found a 

black liquid substance inside. Id.

After securing evidence in their vehicle, the Coast Guard re-boarded 

the M/T Stavanger Blossom. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p.5). With assistance from the 

vessel’s crewmembers, the Coast Guard removed the overboard discharge 

valve, disassembled it, and took samples from inside the valve. Id. 

Subsequent testing of the samples confirmed that the substance observed in 

the bypass pipe and overboard discharge valve was oil. Id.

Officers also compared the vessel’s ORB to the rough sounding logs 

found in the engine room and the Daily Sounding Logs provided by Dancu. 

Id. An initial inspection of the records found the rough logs and Daily 

Sounding Logs to be consistent. Id. However, both logs were inconsistent with 

the ORB. Coast Guard officers also stated they found incorrect entries for the

Bilge Tank, a tank that stores waste oil generated during vessel operations 

and water that collects in the bilge of the vessel. Id.

Prior to leaving the vessel, Coast Guard officers issued the vessel two 

detainable deficiencies for the inaccurate ORB and the bypass pipe. Officers 

also seized evidence of the violations, including: the computer from the chief 

engineer’s office; the engine room control computer; the vessel’s computer 

server; the ORB, Garbage Record Book, Engine Room alarm logs, and other 

log books and engine room documents; vessel and piping diagrams; the 

 6 The overboard discharge valve connects to the exterior of the vessel and 

allows fluids to discharge from the vessel into the ocean.

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bypass pipe; and the pipe installed to replace the bypass pipe. (Doc. 63, Exh. 

6). 

On November 13, 2014, Coast Guard officers returned to the vessel and 

installed the alleged bypass pipe between the three-way valve and the 

overboard discharge valve. (Doc. 63, Exh. 2, p. 5). The alleged bypass pipe fit

into place. Id. 

On November 14, 2014, agents from the Coast Guard and the Criminal 

Investigations Division for the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA CID”) retrieved materials collected by Investigator Hunt and 

Kira Moody during their boarding of the vessel. (Doc. 63, Exh. 7, p. 1). 

On November 15, 2014, the Coast Guard forensically imaged the M/T 

Stavanger Blossom’s Vessel Bridge server, an HP Prolant with serial number 

CZ114500FD; a Compaq computer, with serial number CZC1970JZN from 

the Chief Engineer’s stateroom; and an HP Compaq computer with serial 

number CZC1470JZN from the vessel’s Engine Control Room. (Doc. 63, Exh.

8). The government then returned the computers to Defendant DSD 

Shipping. (Doc. 104, p. 7). 

On November 25, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge Sonja F. 

Bivins issued a search warrant authorizing the search of the imaged hard 

drives. (case number MJ 14-00105-B; Doc. 63, Exh. 5). Under the heading of 

“identify the person or describe the property to be seized,” the front of the 

warrant stated “see attached affidavit.” Id. The warrant included an affidavit 

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with two attachments, Attachment A described the three hard drives that the 

government requested to search and Attachment B included a description of 

the information sought in the search. Id. Law enforcement officers 

subsequently searched the imaged hard drives for specific items of evidence 

as identified in the warrant. Id. 

In its motion to suppress, Defendants’ arguments center on 

Attachment B, which states: 

Evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the commission of 

felony violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy), 33 U.S.C § 

1908(a) (Knowing Failure to Maintain an Accurate Oil Record 

Book), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Falsification of Records), 18 U.S.C. § 

1505 (Obstruction of Justice). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321 (b)(3) and (5) 

(Discharges of Oil and Failure to Report Discharges of Oil), and 

18 U.S.C. § 2 (Aiding and Abetting), including: 

1. Records, notes, ledgers, documents, and data contained and 

stored in computer memory on the mirror images of 

computers from the M/T STAVANGER BLOSSOM (described 

more particularly in Attachment A and the above paragraphs 

of this attachment) pertaining to: vessel speed, progress, 

schedule; compliance with environmental requirements; 

maintenance and operation of the oily water separator; waste 

oil management, storage and disposal; the contents, levels of, 

and volumes contained within storage tanks on board the 

vessel capable of containing oil (including but not limited to 

records of daily or periodic “soundings” indicating levels or 

volumes of liquids contained within the vessel’s storage 

tanks); pollution prevention requirements and equipment; 

fuel oil management, composition, acquisition, storage and 

consumption; engine condition, operation and maintenance; 

engine room crew assignments and work schedules regarding 

any of the subjects referred to in this paragraph; “diaries,” 

logs, or records of work performed in the engine room or 

engine department regarding any of the subjects referred to 

in this paragraph; communications between crew members 

regarding any of the subjects referred to in this paragraph; 

communications between any crew member and any shoreCase 1:15-cr-00102-CG-B Document 146 Filed 09/02/15 Page 8 of 27
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side company representative regarding any of the subjects 

referred to in this paragraph. 

2. Evidence of user attribution showing who used or owned the 

computer at the time the things described in this warrant 

were created, edited, or deleted, such as logs, phone books, 

saved usernames and passwords, documents, and browsing 

history. 

Exhibit 5 (Attachment B). 

The Court now considers Defendants’ motion to suppress. (Doc. 63). 

II. ANALYSIS 

The issue is whether the Coast Guard's search of the M/T Stavanger 

Blossom violated the Fourth Amendment. Defendants request suppression of 

two categories of seized evidence: (1) evidence obtained during the 

warrantless inspection of the M/T Stavanger Blossom, and (2) data from

three hard drives seized pursuant to a warrant.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 

and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence 

derived from a search that violates the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in 

a criminal trial against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. United 

States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). 

A. The Warrantless Vessel Search 

The Supreme Court has stated, “the Fourth Amendment does not 

protect subjective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise 

illegitimate.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 

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L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). “To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an 

expectation of privacy must be one that society is ‘prepared to recognize as 

legitimate.’ ” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 

3200, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)). The requirement for a justifiable expectation of 

privacy is two-fold. United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632, 635 (11th Cir. 

1985). Defendants must show an actual or subjective expectation of privacy 

in the area searched and the expectation must be one that “society is 

prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3199 (quoting

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 

(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

Privacy interests at sea may be more restrictive than those applicable 

on land. United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1064 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(“At sea, a person's expectation of privacy may be severely restricted 

compared with expectations of privacy on land.”) Often, privacy interests on 

vessels are limited because Coast Guard officers may board a vessel without 

permission to conduct a safety and document search as well as gain access to 

all common areas of a boat. Lopez, 761 F.2d at 635 (“It is not sufficient, for 

example, that a sailor have the right to exclude others from a ship in order to 

have a legitimate expectation of privacy, because a Coast Guard officer may 

board without permission to conduct a safety and document search and gain 

access to all common areas of a boat.”); see also, United States v. Herrera, 

711 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1983). 

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Therefore, courts have held that “neither captain nor crew has a 

legitimate expectation of privacy ... in an area which is subject to the common 

access of those legitimately aboard the vessel.” United States v. Freeman, 660 

F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Such common areas have been held to 

include cargo holds, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); 

ice holds, United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980); and 

engine rooms, United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890 (11th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 1202, 75 L.Ed.2d 444 (1983). 

This does not mean, however, that a sailor lacks an expectation of privacy in 

any area of a ship; living and sleeping quarters of the crew, United States v. 

Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1979), and private spaces such as 

dufflebags and footlockers, United States v. DeWeese, supra, 632 F.2d at 

1271, have been held to be sufficiently private as to confer Fourth 

Amendment standing upon those with dominion over them when they are 

subjected to search.

In the instant case, the Coast Guard confined their search to the ship’s 

office and the engine room, which are common areas. See e.g, StuartCaballero, supra, 686 F.2d at 892. Defendants argue that the Coast Guard 

had no authority to search the storage closet, where they found the alleged 

“magic pipe.” The Court disagrees. Once on board, the Coast Guard has the 

authority to search all common areas of the ship. United States v. DeWeese, 

632 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 102 S.Ct. 358, 

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70 L.Ed.2d 188 (1981). The storage closet, located in the vessel’s Central 

Stores is part of the common area of the vessel. In similar cases, the Eleventh 

Circuit upheld searches of non-personal compartments. See e.g., United 

States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The storage 

compartment searched is unlike a personal knapsack or duffel bag. The 

storage compartment, while below the v-berth mattress, is primarily used to 

hold the boat's equipment, not personal items.”); United States v. StuartCaballero, 686 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir. 1982) (warrantless search of the 

engine room and two forward cargo holds constitutional). Therefore, because 

the Defendants had no expectation of privacy in the storage closet, they lack 

standing to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge. 

Furthermore, even if the foregoing analysis is incorrect and 

Defendants have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, the search 

was consistent with constitutional standards. 

Title 14 U.S.C.A. § 89(a) grants Coast Guard officers broad authority to 

make safety and document inspections without suspicion of criminal 

activity.7 United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 

 7 In its relevant part, the statute states:

The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, 

inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas 

and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the 

prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of 

the United States, For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, 

and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel 

subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the 

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banc); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976). Once on board a 

vessel, a limited search is permissible on a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. Lopez, 761 F.2d at 636 (citations omitted). Courts determine 

reasonable suspicion by considering the totality of the circumstances and 

evaluate whether there is reasonable suspicion based on specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences drawn from 

those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion of criminal activity. United States 

v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1430 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)).

A more expansive “stem to stern” vessel search requires the existence 

of probable cause that a crime has been, or is being, committed. Lopez, 761 

F.2d at 636 (citations omitted). In general, courts determine whether 

probable cause existed by considering whether there were facts and 

circumstances known to law enforcement officials which could have 

warranted their reasonable belief that a crime had been or was being

committed, United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1982), or whether 

viewing such facts in their totality, together with the synthesis of what the 

 

United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the 

ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search 

the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. 

When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it 

appears that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering 

a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any 

person, such person shall be arrested ...

14 U.S.C. § 89(a).

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agents collectively heard, knew and observed, all considered in light of the 

agents’ individual experiences, there was the probability that criminal 

activity was afoot. United States v. Agostino, 608 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1979). 

In addition to § 89(a)’s broad grant of authority to enter a vessel, the 

Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (“APPS”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. also 

provides the Coast Guard with specific authority to investigate potential oil 

pollution. The APPS makes it a crime for any person to knowingly violate the 

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as 

modified by the Protocol of 1978 (“MARPOL”). The United States Coast 

Guard is specifically authorized to examine a vessel and its Oil and Garbage 

Record Books for compliance with MARPOL and APPS. 33 U.S.C. §1907(d); 

33 C.F.R. § 151.23(a)(3) and (c); MARPOL Protocol, Annex V, Regulation 9(5); 

and 33 C.F.R. § 151.61(a) and (c). 

In this case, the Coast Guard received information from a 

whistleblower concerning possible violations of MARPOL. When the M/T 

Stavanger Blossom arrived at port in Mobile, the Coast Guard boarded to 

investigate. After reviewing the ORB, the Coast Guard personnel visited the 

engine room, where they noticed a section of piping around the OWS that had 

been freshly painted. A crewmember and whistleblower, Rolando Babon, then 

gave the Coast Guard a flash drive of photographs and video of the alleged oil 

dumping. Another crewmember, Enong, confirmed that he too saw the crew 

collect plastic bags of sludge and cast the bags overboard. Armed with both 

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the information of the recently painted area near the OWS and that provided 

by two crewmembers, the Coast Guard personnel interviewed the engine 

room staff regarding the questionable activity. Under these circumstances, it 

is evident that the Coast Guard had probable cause to conduct a stem to 

stern search of the M/T Stavanger Blossom. 

In their motion, Defendants suggest that the Supreme Court’s recent 

holding in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2446 

(2015), alters the Coast Guard’s ability to board and search a vessel for 

evidence of marine pollution. In particular, Defendants argue that because 

the Coast Guard’s motive was a criminal investigation that it needed warrant 

to enter the vessel and that Defendants were entitled to a pre-compliance 

review. The Court rejects both of these assertions. 

First, an ulterior motive for entering a vessel does not strip the Coast 

Guard of its broad statutory authority to board a vessel. In United States v. 

Villamonte–Marquez, the Supreme Court held that an otherwise valid 

warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs officials was not rendered invalid 

“because the customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana state 

policeman, and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship 

channel was thought to be carrying marihuana.” 462 U.S. 579, 584, n. 3, 103 

S.Ct. 2573, 2577, n. 3, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). In Whren v. United States, the 

Supreme Court recognized that in Villamonte-Marquez, “[w]e flatly dismissed 

the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal 

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justification.” 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 

(1996).

Second, as to pre-compliance review, Defendants suggest that the 

Supreme Court’s recent holding in City of Los Angeles v. Patel renders the 

Coast Guard’s warrantless search unconstitutional. City of Los Angeles, 

Calif. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2446 (2015). In its extensive argument 

concerning Patel, Defendants skim over a critical difference between their 

situation and that of the hoteliers in Patel. That difference is hotels are in a 

fixed location, ocean-going vessels are not. An ocean-going vessel could leave 

at any moment and these exigent circumstances make the search 

categorically different from Patel. See U.S. v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 947 

(5th Cir. 1978) (stating “there is a substantial distinction between a 

landlocked vehicle and a nautical vessel for Fourth Amendment purposes.”) 

There is a long-held recognition of the differences between the necessity of 

the Coast Guard to make warrantless examinations of vessels. See U.S. v. 

Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the 200 year history of 

the necessity for officials to conduct searches of vessels). Defendants also 

argue that unlike the vessel in Villamonte-Marquez, a case where the

Supreme Court found a Coast Guard search of a vessel 20 miles off shore 

constitutional, the M/T Stavanger Blossom had set anchor in the Port of 

Mobile. (Doc. 63, p. 12 – 13). In this case there are exigent circumstances. 

“[I]t is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to 

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prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an 

otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.” Kentucky v. 

King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853-54, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011). Although the text of 

the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be 

obtained, the Supreme Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be 

secured. A basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is “ ‘that searches and 

seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” 

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 

(2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 

L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004)). However, the Supreme Court also recognizes that this 

presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because “[t]he ultimate 

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ” Brigham City, 

supra, at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 46, 

130 S.Ct. 546, 548, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam). One well-recognized 

exception applies when “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of 

law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 

394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); see also Payton v. New York, 445 

U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)(“[T]he Fourth 

Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent 

exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without 

a warrant”). What is relevant in this case is the exigency “to prevent the 

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imminent destruction of evidence” has long been recognized as a sufficient 

justification for a warrantless search. Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S.Ct. 

1943; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116, n. 6, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 

164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 

109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). A pre-compliance review period in this case might 

have allowed time for the destruction of evidence. 

Notably, the old Fifth Circuit stated that it was not even necessary for 

exigent circumstances to exist for a Coast Guard search: “the practical 

problems that would be created by requiring the Coast Guard to obtain a 

warrant to conduct a search on the high seas ... or by requiring the 

Government to litigate the issue of “exigent circumstances” in every case 

where there is a warrantless search will likely eviscerate the Coast Guard’s 

ability to combat drug smuggling.” U.S. v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087 (5th 

Cir. 1980)8. Rather, that court adopted the aforementioned “reasonable 

suspicion” as the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard by which to judge 

section 89(a) searches of the “private” areas of a vessel. Id. at 1088. As 

mentioned, the Court found probable cause for the search, which exceeds the 

minimum standard required by the law. Thus, without any persuasive 

argument to the contrary, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ suggestion 

that the Patel holding alters the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct warrantless 

 8 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en 

banc), the Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former 

Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

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safety inspections of vessels.

B. The Warrant 

Defendants also attack the validity of the warrant used to search and 

seize data from the hard drives of the M/T Stavanger Blossom’s Vessel 

Bridge server; a Compaq computer, from the Chief Engineer’s stateroom; and 

an HP Compaq computer from the vessel’s Engine Control Room. Defendants 

argue that the warrant was neither sufficiently particular nor carried out in a 

reasonable manner. 

The Fourth Amendment requires that every warrant particularly 

describe two things: “the place to be searched” and the “persons or things to 

be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

First, a warrant must describe the things to be seized with sufficient 

particularity so that the precise language informs officers how to separate 

properly seized items from irrelevant items. Marron v. United States, 275 

U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). However, “elaborate 

specificity is unnecessary.” United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 754 

(11th Cir. 1984). “The description is considered sufficiently particular when it 

enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things 

authorized to be seized.” Id. at 754–55 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). This requirement does not necessitate technical perfection; instead, 

it is applied with “a practical margin of flexibility.” United States v. Bradley, 

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644 F.3d 1213, 1259 (11th Cir. 2011)(quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 

F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982)). Second, the description of the things to be 

seized should be limited to the scope of probable cause established in the 

warrant. Together, these elements forbid agents from obtaining general 

warrants. A general order to search through a person’s belongings is not 

permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 

403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (A warrant is impermissibly overbroad if it 

authorizes “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.”)

Instead, a warrant requires agents to conduct narrow seizures that attempt 

to “minimize[] unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.” Andresen v. Maryland, 

427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).

Where, as here, the property to be searched is a computer hard drive, 

the particularity requirement assumes even greater importance. Not only

does a computer contain a vast storage capability far exceeding any office file 

cabinet, but also an individual’s interaction with the computer may extend to 

all areas of their private life. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 

(10th Cir. 1999)(“Relying on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets 

may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment 

doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.’ ”)

(internal citations omitted). As a result, technology presents unique 

challenges in the application of the Fourth Amendment. With warrants for 

digital searches, there is a difficult balancing act of the warrant being 

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sufficiently particular, while also recognizing that the contents of most files 

will not be revealed until opened and thus, searched. 

In this case, Defendants make three arguments on why the warrant is 

insufficiently particular. First, Defendants argue that Attachment B of the 

warrant failed to include temporal restrictions and thus, renders the entire 

warrant invalid. (Doc. 63). Defendants claim that “relevant dates are 

available, the search warrant must include temporal restrictions.” (Doc. 63, p. 

17). However, Defendants cite no binding precedent to support the assertion 

that temporal restrictions are a mandatory requirement of a digital search.9

 9 Defendants cite four cases in support of their contention that a temporal 

restriction is a mandatory element of a data search. First, Defendants cite 

United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 1999), which states, 

“[f]ailure to limit broad descriptive terms by relevant dates, when such dates 

are available to the police, will render a warrant overbroad.”). The Ford case 

involved the raid of a bingo hall where officers seized paperwork from back 

the mid-80s before the bingo hall owner purchased the business. Second, 

Defendants cite United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995), where 

a warrant authorized the wholesale seizure of all computers, including all 

data, with no parameters whatsoever. Such is not the case here. Third, 

Defendants cite United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1243, wherein 

the District Court found that the warrants sufficiently particular for 

containing a time frame for the data collected. However, at no point does the 

holding state outright that a temporal restriction is a mandatory element, 

but rather the time frame as a factor amongst several reasons. Finally, 

Defendants cite In re Search of 3817 W. West End, First Floor Chicago, 

Illinois 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2004), which states 

“[c]omputer technology affords a variety of methods by which the government 

may tailor a search to target on the documents which evidence the alleged 

criminal activity. These methods include limiting the search by date range; 

doing key word searches; limiting the search to text or files or graphic files; 

and focusing on certain software programs.” (emphasis added). Again, a 

temporal restriction appears to be an element of determining particularity of 

data seized, but the case law cited does not indicate temporal restrictions are 

mandatory requirements. 

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Rather, from the cases cited in Defendants’ motion, courts consider the 

totality of the circumstances and in some cases, find that a temporal 

restriction is part of a series of factors considered rather than a threshold 

requirement. 

Furthermore, the affidavit specifically referenced September to 

November 2014 as the period in which the alleged violations of federal law 

occurred. Warrants may satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment 

through incorporation. United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1351 n.6 

(11th Cir.1982) (finding “We conclude the affidavit may be used to explain an 

ambiguity in the terms of the warrant.”); see also, United States v. 

Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985) (“An affidavit incorporated 

into a warrant by express reference and attached to and accompanying the 

warrant can cure ambiguity in the warrant itself.”) As set forth in United 

States v. Curry, suitable words of reference incorporating [an] affidavit” are 

phrases such as “see attached affidavit” or “as described in the affidavit.” 911 

F.2d 72, 77 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal quotes omitted); accord United States v. 

Tracey, 597 F .3d 140, 147–48 (3rd Cir. 2010) (incorporation must be “clear,” 

using phrases such as “see Exhibit A sealed by Order of the Court” or 

“specified in the annexed affidavit”) (internal quotes omitted). In this case, 

under the heading of “identify the person or describe the property to be 

seized,” the warrant clearly states, “see attached affidavit.” (Doc. 63, Exh. 5). 

The Court concludes that this warrant was sufficiently incorporated by 

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reference and the affidavit does include a temporal restriction for alleged 

violations of federal law. 

In Attachment B, paragraph 2 the Court finds a second temporal 

restriction. Attachment B, paragraph 2, lists the additional items to be 

searched as “[e]vidence of user attribution showing who used or owned the 

computer at the time the things described in this warrant were created, 

edited, or deleted, such as logs, phonebooks, saved usernames and passwords, 

documents, and browsing history.” (Doc. 63, Exh. 5) (emphasis added). 

Defendants argue that this paragraph contained no parameters for the 

search. Yet, paragraph 2’s language states, “at the time the things in this 

warrant were created...” While this parameter does not include an explicit 

date, it does provide a temporal restriction when viewed in context of the 

warrant. Thus, the Court disagrees with Defendants contention that the 

warrant is presumptively invalid for lack of a temporal restriction. 

Second, Defendants claims the warrant lacked parameters on the 

items and individuals to be searched and authorized only the collection of

general categories. The Court disagrees. Here, the exhaustive list contained 

in Attachment B paragraph 1 is as particular as feasible under these 

circumstances. Further, the long-held rule in this Circuit is “the particularity 

requirement must be applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending 

on the type property to be seized, and that description of property will be 

acceptable if it is as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under 

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investigation permit.” United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d. 1343, 1349 (11th 

Cir. 1982). All of the data requested directly relates to the crimes charged in 

the indictment surrounding alleged oil dumping and failure to maintain an 

accurate Oil Record Book. The warrant language is as particular as possible 

under the circumstances without having reviewed the files. 

Defendants also argue Attachment B, paragraph 2, lacked parameters 

concerning “the description of the items to be searched lacks identification of 

the individuals being investigated and provides no means to distinguish data 

and information relevant to the investigation from personal data and 

information pertaining to the various members of the crew.” (Doc. 63, p. 18). 

Attachment B, paragraph 2 lists the additional items to be searched as 

“[e]vidence of user attribution showing who used or owned the computer at 

the time the things described in this warrant were created, edited, or 

deleted, such as logs, phonebooks, saved usernames and passwords, 

documents, and browsing history.” (Doc. 63, Exh. 5) (emphasis added). The 

Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument as the language clearly 

references back to the warrant as a whole. The language of “at the time the 

things in this warrant were created...” relies on the descriptions contained 

within the warrant and is not a parameter-less search as Defendants aver. 

Finally, Defendants argue that the warrant cites statutes too broad to 

provide any limitation. In support of this argument, Defendants cite an 

Eighth Circuit case that found 18 U.S.C. § 371 as “too broad in scope to 

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provide any real limitation on the warrant.” Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 

907, 908-09 (8th Cir. 1987). However, there are critical differences between 

the present case and Rickert. In Rickert, the warrant at issue cited only 

general statutes, the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two 

general tax evasion statutes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7206(2). Rickert v. 

Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1987). Additionally, Rickert warrant 

failed to incorporate the affidavit. Left only with overly broad statutory 

authority, the Eighth Circuit rendered the search warrant invalid. Id. 

Here, however, the warrant properly incorporated the affidavit. 

Attachment B cited a multitude of statutes relating to the falsification of 

records, failure to maintain and accurate record book and discharge of oil and 

failure to report discharges of oil. Section 371 is hardly the only statute 

authorizing the search of the computers and the properly incorporated 

affidavit contained specific limitations on the search. Thus, the Court is not 

persuaded that the warrant was overly broad. 

Even if the foregoing analysis is incorrect, the evidence seized from the 

hard drives would be admissible under the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule. Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence seized as the result 

of an illegal search may not be used by the government in a subsequent 

criminal prosecution.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). The 

good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows admission of evidence 

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obtained by police acting in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant. 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In the ordinary case, an officer 

cannot be expected to question the judge's probable-cause determination or 

his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. “[O]nce 

the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in 

seeking to comply with the law.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) 

(Burger, C. J., concurring). The good faith exception applies in all but four 

circumstances: 

(1) the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 

would have known was false except for his reckless disregard 

of the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly 

abandoned his judicial role . . . ; (3) where the affidavit 

supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable 

cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable; and (4) where, depending upon the 

circumstances of the particular case, a warrant is so facially 

deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be 

searched or the things to be seized—that the executing 

officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

United States v. Cruse, 343 F. App'x 462, 464 (11th Cir. 2009)(citing Martin, 

297 F.3d at 1313). 

Here, none of the circumstances discussed in Leon are present to 

negate the good-faith exception. Based on the record, there is no evidence the 

affidavit in support of the warrant contained false information. Further, 

there is nothing indicating that the magistrate judge failed to act in a neutral 

and detached manner. 

As mentioned, the Court found probable cause arising from a 

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combination of the information provided by a whistleblower, the recently 

repainted sections of the OWS system, and discrepancies between the ORB 

and the sounding logs. (Doc. 63, Exh. 5). Finally, there is no compelling 

evidence whatsoever that the warrant is so facially deficient that an 

executing officer could not reasonably presume the warrant to be valid. The 

warrant at issue incorporated the affidavit, which included an extensive 

attestation to the circumstances surrounding the search. Additionally, the 

two attachments also contained a particularized list of data sought in relation 

to the alleged MARPOL violations. Therefore, the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule would apply to this information as well. 

As a result of the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ motion to suppress 

(Doc. 63) is DENIED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of September, 2015. 

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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