Filed 11/19/20 P. v. Fletes CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RICHARD RANDALL 

FLETES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B302032

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA477983)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed with 

directions.

Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

_____________________________

A jury convicted Richard Randall Fletes of possession of a 

firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29900, subd. (a)(1))1 and 

possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from owning a 

firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)).

2

 Prior to trial Fletes admitted he 

had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within 

the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 

1170.12) and had served two separate prison terms for felonies 

within the meaning of former section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Fletes was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 

seven years four months: the upper term of three years for 

possession of a firearm, doubled under the three strikes law, and 

a consecutive term of eight months for possession of ammunition, 

doubled under the three strikes law. The court did not impose a 

sentence for the prior prison term enhancements.

On appeal Fletes asks that we review the in camera 

proceeding conducted by the trial court to determine whether it 

properly concluded there was no discoverable material to which 

he was legally entitled under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 

1045 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

(Pitchess). We affirm with directions to the trial court to correct 

1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.

2 The jury found Fletes not guilty of battery against a peace 

officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)) and was unable to reach a unanimous 

verdict on a charge of resisting an executive officer (§ 69, 

subd. (a)). The latter charge was ultimately dismissed on the 

prosecutor’s motion.
3

errors in the minute order for the sentencing hearing and the 

abstract of judgment. 

DISCUSSION

1. The Trial Complied with Its Obligations Under Pitchess

Prior to trial Fletes moved for discovery of the personnel 

records of Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputies Ricardo 

Hernandez and Joshua Jones concerning complaints or discipline 

involving “aggressive behavior, violence, excessive force, or 

attempted violence, coercive conduct, violation of constitutional 

rights, fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, fabrication 

of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, illegal 

search/seizure; false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing of false 

police reports, writing of false police reports to cover up the use of 

excessive force, planting of evidence, false or misleading internal 

reports including but not limited to false overtime or medical 

reports, and any other evidence of misconduct amounting to 

moral turpitude.” The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

opposed the motion. The trial court found good cause and 

granted the motion, limited to allegations of writing false reports, 

fabrication of evidence, planting of evidence, excessive force and 

false arrests. 

At an in camera hearing on August 6, 2019 the trial court 

reviewed the requested records in Deputy Hernandez’s and 

Deputy Jones’s files to determine whether there were any 

complaints that fell within the five-year review period allowed 

under Pitchess and were relevant to Fletes’s case. The court 

described each allegation thoroughly for the record (see People v. 

Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229) and found no discoverable 

information.
4

At Fletes’s request, which the Attorney General did not 

oppose, we have reviewed the sealed transcript of the in camera 

proceedings and conclude the trial court satisfied the minimum 

requirements in determining whether there was discoverable 

information. No abuse of discretion occurred. (See People v. 

Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 68; People v. Mooc, supra, 

26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)

2. A Limited Remand Is Necessary for the Trial Court 

To Correct Errors in the Record

a. The October 22, 2019 minute order must be corrected

During the sentencing hearing on October 22, 2019 the 

trial court declined to impose the two one-year sentence 

enhancements for Fletes’s prior prison terms pursuant to former 

section 667.5, subdivision (b),

3 stating, “The court’s not going to 

impose the additional two years at this time.” Because the only 

options for the trial court were to impose the enhancements or 

strike them, we presume from this language the court intended to 

strike the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements.4 (See

3 Former section 667.5, subdivision (b), in effect at the time 

of sentencing, provided for an enhancement of one year for each 

prior separate prison term served for “any felony.” Effective 

January 1, 2020, however, the Legislature amended the statute 

to specify that only sexually violent offenses are subject to this 

enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2019, 

ch. 590, § 1.) 

4 Even if the trial court’s intention was unclear, the 

section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements must be stricken 

because the amendments to section 667.5 are retroactive. (See 

People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 680 [recent 

amendments to section 667.5 apply retroactively to all cases not 
5

People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241 [“[o]nce the prior 

prison term is found true within the meaning of section 667.5(b), 

the trial court may not stay the one-year enhancement, which is 

mandatory unless stricken”]; People v. Brewer (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 98, 104 [“‘[t]he trial court has no authority to 

stay an enhancement, rather than strike it . . . when the only 

basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice’”]; 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.447(b) [while a court may strike an 

enhancement, it may not stay an enhancement unless an 

unlawful sentence results].)

The minute order for the sentencing hearing, however, fails 

to indicate the enhancements were stricken—it does not mention 

the enhancements at all. Accordingly, the minute order for the 

October 22, 2019 sentencing hearing must be modified to state 

the sentences for the two one-year prior prison term 

enhancements pursuant to former section 667.5, subdivision (b),

were stricken. (See People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, 

fn. 2 [record of court’s oral pronouncement controls over clerk’s 

minute order]; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-187 

[appellate court may order correction of clerical errors on its own 

motion or upon application of the parties].)

b. The abstract of judgment must be corrected

Despite having been convicted by a jury for possession of a 

firearm and ammunition, the abstract of judgment indicates 

Fletes pleaded guilty or no contest to the charges. Fletes 

contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we agree, the trial 

yet final as of their effective date]; see also In re Estrada (1965) 

63 Cal.2d 740.) 
6

court must amend the abstract of judgment to state Fletes was 

convicted by a jury.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to 

modify the minute order for the October 22, 2019 hearing and to 

prepare a corrected abstract of judgment in accordance with this 

opinion. The corrected abstract of judgment is to be forwarded to 

the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.