1

Certiorari Denied, November 16, 2010, No. 32,640

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2011-NMCA-017

Filing Date: September 9, 2010 

Docket No. 30,549

FRED A. DANTONIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. CROWDER, PHILIP M. CROWDER,

CHARLES LORNE CROWDER, ORLANDO

CERVANTES, and BERNARD R. GIVEN,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY

Robert E. Robles, District Judge

Jane B. Yohalem

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Cervantes Law Firm, P.C.

K. Joseph Cervantes

Las Cruces, NM

L. Helen Bennett, P.C.

L. Helen Bennett

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellees

OPINION

CASTILLO, Judge.
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{1} The opinion filed on July 8, 2010 is withdrawn, and the following opinion is

substituted in its place. The motion for rehearing is otherwise denied.

{2} In this case we consider the effect of a reversionary clause in a deed which is the

subject of a settlement agreement. We hold that the grantee failed to comply with the

requirements of the clause and, thus, reversion was warranted. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Appellant Fred A. Dantonio appeals entry of an order granting title to a 52.8-acre

tract (the Fifty-two Acres) in favor of Appellee Orlando Cervantes. The case began in

January 1992 when Charles and Phyllis Crowder (the Crowders) conveyed the Fifty-two

Acres to the nonprofit organization Southwest Regional High School, Inc. (SWRHS). The

deed contained a reversionary condition that limited the use of the property to educational

facilities only and required that SWRHS commence construction of the educational facilities

prior to January 16, 1994.

{4} In 1994, questions arose regarding whether SWRHS complied with the condition and

whether SWRHS’s alleged non-compliance effected an automatic reversion of the Fifty-two

Acres to the Crowders. To resolve these questions, SWRHS filed a quiet title action in

district court and the Crowders filed counterclaims.

{5} In March 1995, the Crowders and SWRHS executed a written settlement agreement

resolving all claims arising from the 1994 quiet title action. The terms of that settlement

agreement established a schedule for the construction of the educational facilities that set

forth specific dates for the commencement and completion of construction of the ninth,

tenth, eleventh, and twelfth-grade classroom buildings as well as the dates by which those

classrooms would open with students. The settlement agreement directed that the Fifty-two

Acres would automatically revert to the Crowders if SWRHS: (1) failed to operate a high

school on the land after August 1996 or (2) failed to obtain accreditation for the high school

and maintain that accreditation after the twelfth grade was constructed and twelfth-grade

students matriculated. Finally, the settlement agreement provided that once the

“requirements” of the construction schedule were satisfied and “accreditation of the high

school” was initially secured, the Crowders would execute a waiver of “those requirements.”

{6} SWRHS completed construction of the ninth-grade classroom building, matriculated

students for the ninth grade, and obtained accreditation for the ninth-grade class within the

time required under the settlement agreement. The ninth-grade classroom, however,

operated for only a single year. SWRHS failed to construct classrooms for the tenth,

eleventh, and twelfth grades. SWRHS never received accreditation as a high school and

abandoned all but twelve acres of the parcel (the Twelve Acres).

{7} As a result of bankruptcy and other proceedings immaterial to this appeal, the

Crowders’ interest in the Fifty-two Acres was transferred to Cervantes. In July 2002,
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SWRHS attempted to convey its interest in the Twelve Acres to Dantonio by quitclaim deed.

Dantonio is a former member of SWRHS’s board of directors and contributed money to

SWRHS.

{8} On January 15, 2003, Dantonio filed suit to quiet title to the Twelve Acres. In

response, Cervantes filed an answer, counterclaim, and cross-claim asking that the court

quiet title in his favor to the full Fifty-two Acres. Three months later, Cervantes filed a

motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that Dantonio had no interest in the

property because the Twelve Acres, which is part of the Fifty-two Acres, had already

automatically reverted pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.

{9} The district court originally denied Cervantes’ motion. In concluding that the

reversionary condition had been terminated as to the Twelve Acres, the district court

determined the following: the waiver language in the settlement agreement is ambiguous,

forfeiture provisions are not favored, the settlement agreement created a divisible condition

subsequent, and partial reversion was preferable. The court also concluded that the

remainder of the Fifty-two Acres continued to be subject to the reversionary clause and

reverted.

{10} In January 2007, Cervantes filed a timely motion for reconsideration challenging the

district court’s conclusion that the settlement agreement created a divisible condition

subsequent. Cervantes argued that the terms of the settlement agreement required SWRHS

to construct and continuously operate a four-year high school and that Dantonio was not

entitled to a waiver of the reversionary condition merely because SWRHS constructed a

ninth-grade classroom and operated a ninth-grade class for a single year. Finally, Cervantes

asserted that the doctrine of partial reversion was inapplicable.

{11} Reversing its previous ruling, the court granted the motion to reconsider. It

concluded that the doctrine of partial reversion was not applicable; that the Fifty-two Acres

reverted; and, consequently, that it erred in quieting title to the Twelve Acres in favor of

Dantonio. The district court quieted title to the Fifty-two Acres as to any and all adverse

claims in favor of Cervantes. Dantonio appeals from this decision.

II. DISCUSSION

{12} Dantonio makes four arguments in support of reversal. He first asserts that the

settlement agreement superseded the deed. Alternatively, he contends that a reversion was

not triggered. Second, Dantonio argues that the settlement agreement established a divisible

contract. Third, Dantonio claims the doctrine of partial reversion is applicable in this matter.

Fourth, Dantonio claims that principles of equity prohibit reversion. We address each in

turn.

A. Standard of Review
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{13} This case comes to us from the district court’s order granting Cervantes’ motion for

partial summary judgment. “Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Roth v. Thompson,

113 N.M. 331, 334, 825 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1992). “The applicable standard of review of an

appeal on summary judgment is de novo, and this Court need not defer to the trial court’s

analysis of the record and its conclusions of law.” Vill. of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust,

2003-NMCA-035, ¶ 57, 133 N.M. 373, 62 P.3d 1255 (filed 2002). To the extent that the

issues on review require an expanded discussion of the standard of review, we do so in the

context of each issue addressed.

B. Deed and Settlement Agreement

{14} Dantonio does little to explain the significance of his contention that the settlement

agreement “superseded” the deed. The settlement agreement arose out of the Crowders’ and

SWRHS’s dispute as to whether the reversionary condition in the deed had been violated.

In our view and under these circumstances, the settlement agreement affected a forbearance

of the reversionary condition in the deed. That forbearance was conditioned upon SWRHS’s

compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, Dantonio’s assertion

that the settlement agreement superseded the deed is accurate but only in the sense that the

terms of the settlement agreement now take primacy as to the conditions under which

automatic reversion is triggered. The settlement agreement did not, however, render the

deed a nullity. Title to the property is affected by both documents.

{15} In the alternative, Dantonio contends that a reversion was not triggered. To address

the party’s argument, we examine both the reversionary language in the deed and the

pertinent provisions of the settlement agreement.

{16} The 1992 deed states as follows:

[The Crowders] for consideration paid, quitclaim to [SWRHS] . . . the [Fiftytwo Acres] . . .

Provided, however, this property shall be used only for

educational facilities. This restriction shall apply to the

Grantee, its successors or assigns, and shall run with land.

The [Fifty-two acre parcel] shall revert to Grantors if not used

for educational facilities. Grantee, its successors or assigns,

shall commence construction of these educational facilities

prior to January 16, 1994[,] or title to this property shall

automatically and without exception revert to the Grantors or

their successors or assigns.

There are three pertinent provisions in the settlement agreement. Paragraph two establishes

a specific construction schedule:
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2. SWRHS further agrees that it will at a minimum complete the actual

physical construction of the following permanent classroom buildings:

A. Ninth grade: will commence actual physical construction by

October 2, 1995, and will complete construction (issuance of a

Certificate of Occupancy) by July 30, 1996[,] and will open ninth

grade with students in August 1996.

B. Tenth grade: will commence actual physical construction by

October 2, 1996, and will complete construction (issuance of a

Certificate of Occupancy) by July 30, 1997[,] and will open tenth

grade with students in August 1997.

C. Eleventh grade: will commence actual physical construction

by October 2, 1997, and will complete construction (issuance of a

Certificate of Occupancy) by July 30, 1998[,] and will open eleventh

grade with students in August 1998.

D. Twelfth grade: will commence actual physical construction

by October 2, 1998, and will complete construction (issuance of a

Certificate of Occupancy) by July 30, 1999[,] and will open twelfth

grade with students in August 1999.

Paragraph five of the settlement agreement establishes the conditions under which an

automatic reversion is triggered and under what circumstances SWRHS was entitled to a

waiver.

SWRHS agrees that should the Land fail to be used for the continuous

operation after August 1996 of a co-educational high school . . . or fail to be

accredited without delay after the matriculation and start of the first twelfthgrade class, and to remain accredited thereafter, the title to the Land shall

automatically revert back to [the Crowders] or to their order. However, upon

the satisfaction of the requirements of ¶ 2 . . . of this Agreement by SWRHS

and upon obtaining of accreditation of the high school, the Crowders . . .

agree to execute a recordable waiver of those requirements, and deliver such

to SWRHS for recordation. Conversely, . . . should the Land ever fail to be

used as set forth in this paragraph, or, after having become accredited, cease

to be accredited, SWRHS shall execute a recordable instrument

acknowledging that the Land has reverted to [the Crowders].

Paragraph six is similar in many respects to paragraph five.

SWRHS agrees that if any of the deadlines set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 .

. . are not met, or the terms and conditions described in paragraphs 3 through
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5 herein are not met, title to the Land shall revert automatically back to [the

Crowders]. . . . However, upon the satisfaction of the requirements of

[paragraph] 2 . . . of this Agreement by SWRHS and upon the obtaining of

accreditation of the high school, the Crowders . . . agree to execute a

recordable waiver of those requirements, and deliver such to SWRHS for

recordation. Conversely, . . . should the deadlines set forth in paragraphs 1

and 2 . . . and conditions set forth in paragraphs 3 through 5 herein not be

met, SWRHS shall execute a recordable instrument acknowledging that the

Land has reverted to [the Crowders.]

{17} As described above, the settlement agreement controls as to the conditions under

which an automatic reversion is triggered. Paragraphs five and six of the settlement

agreement set out those conditions. The first sentence of paragraph five states that the Fiftytwo Acres automatically revert to the Crowders (1) if SWRHS fails to continuously operate

a coeducational high school after August 1996 or (2) if SWRHS fails to obtain accreditation

of a high school and maintain that accreditation after the twelfth-grade classroom is

constructed and twelfth-grade students matriculate.

{18} The second sentence of paragraph five provides the conditions under which SWRHS

was entitled to a waiver of the automatic reversionary condition and the scope of that waiver.

SWRHS was entitled to a waiver upon satisfaction of the requirements of paragraph two, i.e.,

full compliance with the construction schedule of all building for grades ninth through

twelfth, and upon obtaining accreditation of the high school. Neither of these requirements

were satisfied. Accordingly, SWRHS was not entitled to a waiver. As such, we need not

address the issue of the scope of that waiver.

{19} The effect of paragraph five under the present circumstances is clear. SWRHS was

required to build and operate a four-year high school. It was also required to obtain and

maintain accreditation for that high school. Neither of these requirements was fulfilled. The

consequence of nonoccurrence was automatic reversion of the Fifty-two Acres to the

Crowders.

C. Divisible Contract

{20} Dantonio’s basic argument is that the revisionary conditions of paragraphs five and

six of the settlement agreement are unclear, and the resulting ambiguity must be construed

against the grantor to avoid forfeiture. Dantonio also directs us to the deposition testimony

of Brian O’Hare, former president of SWRHS who was involved with the negotiations of the

settlement agreement. O’Hare stated that at the time he undertook the negotiation and

execution of the settlement agreement, it was his understanding that there would be no

forfeiture of the ninth-grade building so long as the building was completed within the time

frame required under paragraph two irrespective of whether the other three classroom

buildings were completed. Dantonio does not argue that the issues regarding ambiguity

should be decided by a fact finder. Rather, Dantonio contends that O’Hare’s testimony
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supports the conclusion that the settlement agreement is ambiguous and should be

interpreted to create a divisible contract. Thus, according to Dantonio, the settlement

agreement established a divisible contract, and the reversionary clause was waived as to the

ninth-grade classroom building and the Twelve Acres. Cervantes counters that the

settlement agreement is unambiguous and does not establish a divisible contract. We agree

with Cervantes.

{21} We first look to the terms of the settlement agreement. Whether a contract is entire

or divisible depends upon its language and subject matter. Walters v. United States Fid. &

Guar. Co., 35 N.M. 4, 7, 288 P. 1044, 1046 (1930). “It is largely a question of construction

in each case.” Id. Dantonio argues that the ambiguity in the contract supports a conclusion

that it is divisible. The question of ambiguity is one of law, which we review de novo.

Envtl. Control, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 2002-NMCA-003, ¶ 14, 131 N.M. 450, 38 P.3d 891

(filed 2001).

{22} The law governing divisible contracts is well settled. “A severable or divisible

contract has been defined as one under which the whole performance is divided into two sets

of partial performances, each part of each set being the agreed exchange for a corresponding

part of the set of performances to be rendered by the other promisor.” Arrow Gas Co. of Dell

City, Tex. v. Lewis, 71 N.M. 232, 239, 377 P.2d 655, 659 (1963). It is generally held that the

determinative factor in deciding whether or not a contract is divisible is the intent of the

parties as revealed by the terms of the contract. 15 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts

§ 45:5, at 279 (4th ed. 2000). Accordingly, we must examine whether the language of the

settlement agreement demonstrates that the parties intended “to have performance of the

contract in parts and have the performance of a part on one side the price or exchange of a

corresponding part on the other.” Arrow Gas Co. of Dell City, Tex., 71 N.M. at 239, 377

P.2d at 659. “There is a presumption against finding a contract divisible, unless divisibility

is expressly stated in the contract itself, or the intent of the parties to treat the contract as

divisible is otherwise clearly manifested.” 15 Lord, supra § 45:4, at 275.

{23} Dantonio claims that the settlement agreement pairs the completion of the building

requirements of paragraph two with waiver of the reversionary condition. As evidence of

this claim, he cites language from paragraph five of the settlement agreement. We discussed

paragraph five at length in paragraphs 6-9 of this opinion.

{24} Under the terms of paragraph five, reversion is automatically triggered if SWRHS

fails to use the Fifty-two Acres for a high school after 1996 or if SWRHS fails to obtain and

maintain accreditation of a high school after matriculation of the initial twelfth-grade class.

SWRHS was entitled to a waiver upon construction of all four grades together with obtaining

accreditation of the high school. Reversion remained automatic if SWRHS thereafter failed

to maintain accreditation.

{25} We see no ambiguity in the language. There is nothing in paragraph five that

indicates the parties intended a divisible contract which would provide for a complete waiver
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of the reversionary condition upon the completion of the construction and accreditation of

each of the four grades. Indeed, in his brief-in-chief, Dantonio appears to all but concede

that the language of the settlement agreement does not support this argument. There, he

acknowledges that the settlement agreement does not explicitly provide for separate waivers

of the reversionary conditions for each building.

{26} Dantonio next asserts that the assignment of separate deadlines for the construction

of each classroom building suggests the parties intended a divisible contract. This assertion

ignores the fact that paragraph five requires SWRHS to complete all four of the classroom

buildings and obtain accreditation before an entitlement to a waiver is triggered.

{27} Dantonio points to the parties’ decision to use the word “land” in the settlement

agreement as evidence that the parties intended divisibility. According to Dantonio, the

parties' use of the term “land” indicates that they did not intend for any buildings constructed

to revert. We disagree with this assessment. The parties’ decision to use the broadest term

to specify the interest subject to the reversion proves that the land and any improvements on

it would automatically revert if the required conditions were not met.

{28} We now turn to the evidence provided by O’Hare. While we agree that Mark V, Inc.

v. Mellekas, 114 N.M. 778, 781, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (1993), and C.R. Anthony Co. v.

Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 508-09, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (1991), allow the

district court to consider extrinsic evidence when determining whether a contract is

ambiguous, in this case, the extrinsic evidence fails to establish ambiguity. O’Hare testified

to his intent about the terms of the settlement agreement. However, he provided no

testimony as to how and to whom he communicated his understanding of the agreement.

Accordingly, his testimony is no more than his subjective and personal thoughts about the

agreement. “A party’s statement of unilateral subjective intent, without more, is insufficient

to establish ambiguity in light of clear contractual language.” Envtl. Control, Inc.,

2002-NMCA-003, ¶ 15. As we explained above, the language in paragraphs five and six is

clear: it required the construction of buildings for all four grades as well as high school

accreditation before any recordable waiver was to be executed. O’Hare’s private

interpretation regarding the effect of the completion of construction for the ninth-grade

building did not create an ambiguity. Id. (“As a matter of law, one party’s subjective

impressions, innermost thoughts, or private intentions do not create ambiguity.”).

{29} Lastly, Dantonio questions reliance on the contract language. He cites the

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 240 (1981) as authority for the assertion that the intent

of the parties as represented in the contract is not the key factor in deciding whether a

contract is divisible. This claim is inconsistent with our law. As discussed above, the

governing principle in determining whether a contract is divisible is the manifested intention

of the parties. Arrow Gas Co. of Dell City, Tex., 71 N.M. at 239, 377 P.2d at 659.

{30} Nevertheless, after reviewing the section of the Restatement cited by Dantonio, we
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see nothing in it which calls into question our conclusion that the settlement agreement is

not divisible. The Restatement indicates that “[w]hether it is proper to regard the parts of

each pair as agreed equivalents will usually depend on considerations of fairness.”

Restatement, supra, cmt. e. We see no basis on which to conclude that the settlement

agreement is divisible where the unambiguous language of the agreement reflects that it was

intended to be treated as entire. See United Props. Ltd. v. Walgreen Props., Inc., 2003-

NMCA-140, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 725, 82 P.3d 535 (“[C]ourts may not rewrite obligations that

the parties have freely bargained for themselves . . . [i]n the absence of fraud,

unconscionability, or other grossly inequitable conduct.” (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{31} Having considered Dantonio’s arguments, we hold that the settlement agreement is

not divisible.

D. Partial Reversion

{32} Dantonio argues that the doctrine of partial reversion should have been applied in this

case to prevent SWRHS from having to completely forfeit its interest in the Fifty-two Acres.

The doctrine of partial reversion, however, is not applicable under the circumstances of this

case. There are two cases in New Mexico discussing the doctrine of partial reversion,

Thomas v. City of Santa Fe, 112 N.M. 456, 816 P.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1991), and Maloof v.

Prieskorn, 2004-NMCA-126, 136 N.M. 516, 101 P.3d 327. We first adopted the doctrine

in Thomas where we explained that “[t]he doctrine of partial reversion is based on the court’s

desire to avoid forfeiture whenever possible and should only be applied when no other

means of avoiding a forfeiture are possible.” Thomas, 112 N.M. at 460, 816 P.2d at 529

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Maloof, 2004-

NMCA-126, ¶ 8 (“The guiding force behind the doctrine is the principle that reversionary

language will be strictly construed so as to avoid forfeiture.”). We further explained in

Maloof that our discussion of partial reversion in Thomas supported the conclusion that

“where there is a partial failure to comply with a reversionary clause, the judicial desire to

avoid forfeiture will either lead to no forfeiture or will limit reversion to the affected

property only.” Maloof, 2004-NMCA-126, ¶ 10. Crucially, however, we concluded in both

cases that a partial reversion is only permissible where “the intent underlying the

reversionary language” indicates that the parties intended to allow a partial reversion. Id.

¶ 8; Thomas, 112 N.M. at 461, 816 P.2d at 530.

{33} Dantonio conflates the doctrines of divisibility and partial reversion and appears to

be arguing that we may deem a contract divisible in order to avoid a complete forfeiture and

to effect a partial reversion. As previously discussed, whether a contract is divisible is a

question of contract law. Walters, 35 N.M. at 7, 288 P. at 1046. We have concluded, under

principles of contract, that the settlement agreement in the present matter did not create a

divisible contract. Whether the doctrine of partial reversion is applicable in this matter is

a wholly separate inquiry. For the two reasons explained below, we disagree the doctrine

is applicable here.
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{34} First, Dantonio acknowledges that whether the parties expressed an intent to allow

a partial reversion is the controlling inquiry to determine whether the doctrine is applicable.

Maloof, 2004-NMCA-126, ¶ 8; Thomas, 112 N.M. at 461, 816 P.2d at 530. Yet, he has

failed to demonstrate that the parties expressed such an intent. Dantonio instead relies

primarily on the presumption that “partial reversion is favored” and then argues that this

presumption shall prevail absent “a clear statement of intent to prohibit [a partial reversion].”

Dantonio misreads the law.

{35} Dantonio’s contention that partial reversion is applicable here because the parties did

not express an intent to prohibit it is the converse of our law. The doctrine of partial

reversion is applicable where the parties intended for it to apply. Maloof, 2004-NMCA-126,

¶ 8; Thomas, 112 N.M. at 461, 816 P.2d at 530. Furthermore, while it is settled law that

conditions which work complete forfeitures are disfavored, it is equally settled that “[e]ach

party to a contract has a duty to read and familiarize himself with its contents before he signs

and delivers it, and if the contract is plain and unequivocal in its terms, each is ordinarily

bound thereby.” Smith v. Price’s Creameries, 98 N.M. 541, 545, 650 P.2d 825, 829 (1982).

Accordingly, our Supreme Court said in Berger v. Santa Fe College, 28 N.M. 545, 549, 215

P. 825, 826 (1923), that while “[i]t may be said that conditions which, if enforced, work a

forfeiture of the estate are not favored in the law, and are to be construed strictly and most

strongly against the grantor[,] . . . where the language is plain, the condition will ordinarily

be enforced.” (Citation omitted.) We find nothing which indicates a partial reversion is

allowable under the settlement agreement. To the contrary, allowing a partial reversion in

this case would frustrate the plain terms of that agreement.

{36} Second, both Thomas and Maloof are distinguishable from the present matter. In

both Thomas and Maloof, a partial reversion was sought by the grantors. Maloof, 2004-

NMCA-126, ¶¶ 2-7; Thomas, 112 N.M. at 458, 816 P.2d at 527. In both cases, the allegation

was that the grantees were only partially complying with the reversionary conditions at issue

in those cases. Maloof, 2004-NMCA-126, ¶¶ 10-12; Thomas, 112 N.M. at 458, 816 P.2d

at 527. In both cases, portions of the land subject to the reversionary condition were being

used in compliance with the condition. Maloof, 2004-NMCA-126, ¶ 11; Thomas, 112 N.M.

at 458, 816 P.2d at 527.

{37} The present matter is nothing like these cases. Dantonio, the grantee, is seeking to

apply the doctrine of partial reversion. There is no dispute that the reversionary condition

has been violated in toto. No portion of the land is being used in compliance with the

condition. In fact, the majority of the land subject to the reversionary condition was

previously abandoned. Thus, what we said in Maloof, 2004-NMCA-126, ¶ 10—the judicial

desire to avoid forfeiture will lead to either no forfeiture or partial forfeiture where there is

only partial compliance with the reversionary condition—is inapplicable here where partial

compliance has not been shown and the grantee completely failed to abide by the condition.

These distinctions are significant and serve as a basis to conclude that the doctrine of partial

reversion, as it has been developed and applied in Maloof and Thomas, is inapplicable here

.
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V. Equity

{38} Finally, Dantonio argues that principles of equity apply and prevent the forfeiture of

the Twelve Acres. “Equity denotes a spirit of fairness and justness between parties whose

rights or claims are in conflict.” Albuquerque Nat’l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates,

Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982), rejected on other grounds by J.R. Hale Contracting

Co., Inc. v. United N.M. Bank, 110 N.M. 712, 717 n.1, 799 P.2d 581, 586 n.1 (1990).

“Although equity abhors forfeitures, the decision whether under the existing facts and

equitable factors present before the court a forfeiture or termination should be permitted is

a matter for determination by the trial judge.” Id. The district court’s determination to grant

equitable relief is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum

Corp., 1997-NMCA-069, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560.

{39} The district court considered Dantonio’s equitable arguments and nevertheless

quieted title in favor of Cervantes. We cannot say this was an abuse of discretion. The

terms of the settlement agreement included reversion as an automatic consequence for noncompliance.

CONCLUSION

{40} For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision is affirmed.

{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

____________________________________

RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

Topic Index for Dantonio v. Crowder, Docket No. 27,800 and Docket No. 30, 549

AE APPEAL AND ERROR

AE-SR Standard of Review 

CN CONTRACTS

CN-IN Interpretation
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CP CIVIL PROCEDURE

CP-SE Settlement Agreement

CP-SJ Summary Judgment

JM JUDGMENT

JM-ST Settlements

PR PROPERTY

PR-DD Deed

PR-PA Partition

PR-QT Quiet Title

PR-RE Real Estate Contract

PR-RR Reversion

RE REMEDIES

RE-EQ Equity