SIXTH DIVISION                                                                March 14, 1997No. 1-95-3568In re MARRIAGE OF:                      )                                        )MICHELLE DEL GIUDICE,                   )                                        )     Petitioner,                        )                                        )          and                           )                                        )         Appeal fromGERARD DEL GIUDICE,                     )      the Circuit Court                                        )       of Cook County.     Respondent.                        )                                        )                                        )GERARD R. DEL GIUDICE, JR., and         )RITA DEL GIUDICE,                       )                                        )       No.  89-D-13805     Third-Party Defendants-Appellees,  )                                        )          and                           )                                        )TERRY CULLERTON, a/k/a TERRY CULLERTON  )BROWN, BRIAN M. KIMBALL, and FRANKIE    )          HonorableSPORTS, LTD.,                           )       Ronald W. Olson,                                        )       Judge Presiding.     Third-Party Defendants,            )                                        )          v.                            )                                        )JOHN C. SANTEE and ILENE M. WOLF,       )                                        )     Judgment Creditors-Appellants.     )     JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:     In this appeal we are asked to decide whether the retitling ofmarital property from joint tenancy to tenancy in the entirety can bea fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.  740ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 1994).  We find that it can and remand forfurther proceedings.     This action arises out of a dissolution of marriage proceeding. In the post-judgment decree, third-party defendant, Gerard R. DelGiudice, guaranteed the payment of attorney fees arising from hisson's divorce action.  On November 23, 1994, the court enteredjudgment against Del Giudice in the amount of $40,000.  On December21, 1994, a direction to levy was filed against Del Giudice's maritalhome, which Del Giudice and his wife held as joint tenants.      On February 15, 1995, the judgment creditors sent a notice ofsheriff's sale set for April 18, 1995, to Del Giudice.  However, onFebruary 28, 1995, Del Giudice and his wife executed a warranty deedretitling their home from joint tenancy to tenancy by the entirety. The deed was recorded on March 8, 1995.  Although Del Giudice'sattorney had several conversations with the creditors between Januaryand April of 1995, the creditors were not made aware of the retitlinguntil Del Giudice filed an emergency petition to restrain the levysale of his home.  Del Giudice's emergency petition was based upon thestatutory exemption from sale to satisfy a judgment entered againstonly one of the tenants of real estate held in tenancy by theentirety.       The creditors filed a motion to strike Del Giudice's petition. The trial court relied on E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory, 268 Ill. App.3d 383, 643 N.E.2d 1370 (1994), and denied the creditors' motion.  Thetrial court granted the emergency petition, issuing a permanentinjunction restraining the levy sale of Del Giudice's home.  Thecreditors filed a timely notice of appeal and we reverse.     On appeal, the creditors argue that:  (1) retitling the homeconstituted a fraudulent transfer under the Illinois UniformFraudulent Transfer Act (Transfer Act) (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West1994)); (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider whether DelGiudice should have been equitably estopped from obtaining injunctiverelief enjoining the sheriff's sale; and (3) the trial court erred infailing to consider whether the third-party defendants should havebeen barred form obtaining injunctive relief on the basis of theequitable doctrine of laches and unclean hands.  Because we find thatDel Giudice's transfer could have violated the Transfer Act, we neednot address the creditors' other arguments.     The trial court initially found that the Del Giudices' home wasprotected under section 12-112 of the Illinois Code of CivilProcedure, which provides that:          "Any real property held in tenancy by the entirety          shall not be liable to be sold upon judgment          entered on or after October 1, 1990 against only          one of the tenants."  735 ILCS 5/12-112 (West          1994).  Unlike joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety is available only tomarried couples and their homestead property.  The tenancy by theentirety statute provides:               "Whenever a devise, conveyance, assignment, or          other transfer of homestead property maintained ***          as a homestead by both husband and wife together          during coverture shall be made and the instrument          *** expressly declares that the devise or          conveyance is made to persons *** not as joint          tenants or tenants in common but as tenants by the          entirety, the estate created shall be deemed to be          in tenancy by the entirety."  765 ILCS 1005/1c          (West 1994).        The creditors argued that the Transfer Act may be applied to DelGiudice's retitling of his marital home.  See 740 ILCS 160/1 et seq.(West 1994).  Section 5(a)(1) of the Transfer Act provides that:               "(a)  A transfer made or obligation incurred          by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether          the creditor's claim arose before or after the          transfer was made or the obligation was incurred,          if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the          obligation:               (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or          defraud any creditor ***." 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1)          (West 1994).  Section 5(b) of the Transfer Act lists 11 criteria for determiningactual intent.       The trial court refused to apply the Transfer Act.  The trialcourt relied upon the reasoning of the court in E.J. McKernan Co. v.Gregory, 268 Ill. App. 3d 383, 643 N.E.2d 1370 (1994), which statedthat "intent is irrelevant in a tenancy by the entirety conveyancebecause it simply cannot be fraudulent to engage in conduct that isspecifically and unambiguously sanctioned by statute."  E.J. McKernan,268 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 643 N.E.2d at 1374-75.     We respectfully disagree with the McKernan court.  We find thepurpose of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is to invalidateotherwise sanctioned transactions made with a fraudulent intent. Courts have found that other transactions, which were otherwiselawful, violated the Transfer Act.  Kennedy v. Four Boys LaborServices, Inc., 279 Ill. App. 3d 361, 664 N.E.2d 1088 (1996).  Forexample, in Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Machinery Co., 66 Ill. App.3d 766, 384 N.E.2d 141 (1978), this court found that transfers madefor the purpose of shielding assets from creditors which aresanctioned by statute, such as the transfer of an individual's assetsto a limited liability corporation, can constitute a fraudulentconveyance if the property is transferred after a judgment is renderedagainst the individual.  Johnson, 66 Ill. App. 3d 766, 384 N.E.2d 141. See also Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Industries, Inc., 278 Ill. App.3d 241, 662 N.E.2d 595 (1996).      Similarly, we find that even though the tenancy by the entiretystatute permits married couples to convey marital property to thatestate, such transfers may still be fraudulent.  We acknowledge thatthe legislature found it appropriate to enable married couples toshield their marital home from the creditors of one spouse.  However,there is no indication from either the plain language of the statutenor the legislative history that the legislature intended to includefraudulent conduct within the scope of the afforded protections.  765ILCS 1005/1c (West 1994).     Alternatively, Del Giudice argues that the retitling of theproperty cannot constitute a transfer under the Transfer Act.  DelGiudice claims that he and his wife were merely rearranging theownership of the property as authorized under the tenancy by theentirety statute.  The Transfer Act defines a transfer as "every mode,direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary,of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset,and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lienor other encumbrance."  740 ILCS 160/2(l) (West 1994).  We find thatthe Del Giudices' retitling of their property satisfies thisdefinition.     Historically, husbands and wives were required to convey theirjoint tenancy interests to a strawman, who would then convey theproperty back to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. Cunningham, Stoebuck & Whitman, The Law of Property �5.5, at 212-13(1984).  While the current tenancy by the entirety statute no longerrequires the use of a strawman, we find that the statute'ssimplification of this process did not change the nature of thetransaction.  See 765 ILCS 1005/1c (West 1994).  Rather, retitlingproperty from joint tenancy to tenancy of the entirety is still aconveyance and therefore satisfies the requirements of the TransferAct.  See Cunningham, Stoebuck & Whitman, The Law of Property �5.5, at212-13 (1984).     We find that the trial court erred in holding that Del Giudice'sretitling of the property could not be fraudulent under the TransferAct.  Therefore, we remand for further proceedings consistent withthis opinion.     Reversed and remanded.     O'BRIEN, J., concurs.     CAHILL, J., dissents.     JUSTICE CAHILL, dissenting:     I respectfully dissent.  The reasoning in McKernan v. Gregory,rejected by the majority, is grounded in the only  public policy thatcould have inspired the legislature to enact Pub. Act 86-966: toshield a primary residence from the creditors of one spouse.  We neednot appeal to Dickensian tales of small children hurled into thewinter night by the rapacious creditors of one profligate parent tolend weight to legislative intent.  It is enough that the legislaturethought it was good idea.  I would follow McKernan and affirm thetrial court.