alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

**FORM      OF AWARD AGREEMENT**

**pursuant      to the**

**2006      INCENTIVE STOCK PLAN OF**

**VINEYARD      NATIONAL BANCORP**

***      * * * ***

**Participant:      **

**Grant      Date:**

**Number      of **

**[Options      inc. type, SARs, Restricted Shares] Granted:**

**[Exercise/Base]      Price (per share): **

**Expiration      Date: _ **
** years      from Grant Date **

**Vesting      Schedule: **

***      * * * ***

**THIS      AWARD AGREEMENT**

**WHEREAS**

**NOW,      THEREFORE**

**1.**
**Incorporation      By Reference; Plan Document Receipt**
**.**

**2.**
**Grant      of Award**
**.**

**3.**
**Vesting**
**.      **

**3.1**

**3.2**

**3.3**

**3.3.1**

**3.3.2**

**3.4**

**4.**
**Non-transferability**
**.**

**5.**
**Entire      Agreement; Amendment**
**.**

**6.**
**Notices**
**.**

**6.1**

**6.2**

**7.**
**Governing      Law**
**.**

**8.**
**Compliance      with Laws.**

**9.**
**Binding      Agreement; Assignment**
**.**

**10.**
**Counterparts**
**.**

**11.**
**Headings**
**.**

**12.**
**Further      Assurances**
**.**

**13.**
**Severability**
**.**

**IN      WITNESS WHEREOF**

**VINEYARD      NATIONAL BANCORP**
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Cordant
Technologies Inc. audited financial statements for the year ended December 31,
1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-30-1999
<CASH>                                              37
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      244
<ALLOWANCES>                                         6
<INVENTORY>                                        262
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   604
<PP&E>                                           1,260
<DEPRECIATION>                                     505
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   2,482
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              540
<BONDS>                                            601
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            41
<OTHER-SE>                                         775
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,482
<SALES>                                          2,513
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,520
<CGS>                                            1,945
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,193
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     4
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  43
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    281
<INCOME-TAX>                                        93
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                164
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       164
<EPS-BASIC>                                       4.49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     4.39


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      770
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   770
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,348,384
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,326
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,348,384
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,423
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              (22,872)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (22,872)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (22,872)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
SCPR-21-0000485 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I
IN RE GREGORY RAYMOND MEYER, Petitioner.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ORDER GRANTING PETITION TO RESIGN AND SURRENDER LICENSE (By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.)

Upon consideration of the petition to resign his license to practice law in the State of Hawai # i, filed by attorney Gregory Raymond Meyer, pursuant to Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai# i (RSCH), but to retain his paper license as a memento, as authorized by RSCH Rule 1.10(b), and the affidavits submitted in support thereof, we conclude that Petitioner Meyer has fully complied with the requirements of RSCH Rule 1.10. Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition to resign is granted. Petitioner Meyer may retain the paper license as a
memento. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to RSCH Rule 1.10(g), that the Petitioner shall comply with the notice, affidavit, and Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCPR-21-0000485 27-SEP-2021 09:27 AM Dkt. 6 OGPrecord requirements of RSCH Rules 2.16(a), (b), (d), and (g). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the name of Petitioner Meyer, attorney number 5631, from the roll of attorneys of the State of Hawai # i, effective with the filing of this order.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, September 27, 2021. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Michael D. Wilson /s/ Todd W. Eddins

2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

OWEN E. McDONNELL, JR., :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-0141-M

 :

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Commission of Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that JUDGMENT be entered in favor 

of Plaintiff Owen E. McDonnell, Jr. and against Defendant 

Carolyn W. Colvin. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff be 

AWARDED an EAJA Attorney’s fee in the amount of $3,901.15.

DONE this 10th day of February, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00141-M Document 22 Filed 02/11/15 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000840826
<NAME> DAKA INTERNATIONAL, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-29-1997
<CASH>                                           7,956
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,070
<ALLOWANCES>                                       452
<INVENTORY>                                     11,343
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                75,115
<PP&E>                                         180,421
<DEPRECIATION>                                  49,072
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 249,299
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           81,780
<BONDS>                                         77,496
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           111
<OTHER-SE>                                      75,514
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   249,299
<SALES>                                        293,193
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               300,816
<CGS>                                          254,749
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  254,749
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,064
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,234)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,910)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,309)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,309)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.66)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.66)
        

</TABLE>
#### People v. John Jones, *alias*John Connor.

*Picking am, empty pocket.*

The fact that there was nothing to take is no defence to a prosecution for an attempt to commit a larceny from the person.

Exceptions before judgment from the DecordePs Court of Detroit.

Submitted June 23.

Decided June 29.

Information for an attempt to commit larceny from the person. Despondent was convicted below. '

Conviction sustained.

Attorney General *Jacob J. Van Riper*for the People.

*Daniel E. Prescott*for respondent.

Conviction for an attempt to commit larceny is erroneous if it did not appear that there was anything to be taken: 1 Bish. Crim. Law § 671; *Reg. v. Collins*1 Leigh. & Cave 471.

Marston, C. J.

The respondent was charged with and convicted of an attempt to commit a larceny from the person, and the proof tended to show that he had put his hand into the outside cloak pocket of Emma Bellair; that there was no property of any kind in the pocket at that time and nothing therefore was taken therefrom. It was claimed that under such circumstances he could not be convicted.

*442We are of a contrary opinion. The charge is of an attempt to commit a crime. In burglary, and many cases of attempts, the intent is gathered from the taking or other act done. But this is not the only way of proving the intent; if it were, in many eases attempts to commit crime would go unpunished.

We fully concur in the views expressed by the Massachusetts court in *Com. v. McDonald*5 Cush. 365. We think this is not only the better, but the only rule of law that could be adopted or recognized with safety to the rights of the public or of individuals.

It must be certified to the Recorder’s Court that we discover no error in the record, and that court is advised tc proceed to judgment.

The other Justices concurred.
#### T. R. Hume *v.*Lee Jake White’s G’d’n.

Sheriff — Liability for Money Collected.

The sheriff and his bondsmen are liable for money collected by virtue of a writ placed in his hands with the penalty for failure provided by the statute, but when he collects money not upon a writ he and his sureties cannot become liable for a penalty by his failure to pay the money over. He is only liable for the money withheld.

APPEAL PROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT.

March 24, 1876.

*A. R. Btirman, for appellant. C. I. Bronston, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

There can be no question but that the sureties of the sheriff are liable for the amount of appellee’s debt and interest, as the sheriff had collected more than the amount from the sale of the attached property. Pie sold the goods in his official capacity, and as such collected the proceeds. Sec. 239 of the Code makes the sheriff liable for the proceeds of attached property collected by him. We are, however, inclined to the opinion that neither the sureties nor the sheriff were liable for the fifteen per cent, and attorney’s fees, upon the facts of this case, for failing to pay over money on demand received by the sheriff on any writ of execution or other process as provided by Sec. 4, of Act 17, General Statutes. The sheriff did not collect this money by virtue of any writ or process in his hands. He had no such writ or any process by which he could have coerced payment in the event the debtor refused to pay.

If the debtor had failed to pay in this case, the sheriff would have been powerless to collect, nor would he have been liable for a failure to collect, as he had no means of enforcing the payment. Although he is liable as sheriff, his position with reference to the debt- and debtor was more in the nature of a receiver than sheriff. The money was not collected under execution nor under the attachment, as that writ had discharged its functions. The fifteen per cent, interest can be added when the sheriff has a writ or other process in his hands by which he is enabled to coerce the payment of money in the event of a refusal to pay, by virtue of which he made the collection. The allowance of fifteen per cent, interest and the attorney’s fee was improper.

The judgment for this reason alone is *reversed,*and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
EXHIBIT 32.2





Certification of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As Adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of The InterGroup Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David T. Nguyen, Treasurer and Controller of the Company, serving as its Principal Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:





·
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





·
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ David T. NguyenDavid T. NguyenTreasurer and Controller(Principal Financial Officer)Date: September 21, 2011





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The InterGroup Corporation and will be retained by The InterGroup Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Miner Hedges v. Wellington Hibbard, John A. Covode et al.

*Bxceptmns ca/rmot rest on general findings or on deductions.*

No question for review arises upon a record brought up as a case made and containing only a statement of the facts found hy the court, and the judgment thereon.

No exception can be taken to a judgment upon a general finding of facts made by the court, where no special findings were asked for or made.

Mere deductions from the evidence, made after judgment as a basis for review, are not part of the record and can not he brought up on error.

Case made from Kent.

Submitted June 30.

Decided October 5.

Assumpsit. Defendants had judgment.

Affirmed.

*Taggart & Wolcott*for plaintiff.

*Simonds & Fletcher, John Patton, Jr.*and *Taggart, Stone & Earle*for defendant.

Graves, J.

This record is brought up as a case made after judgment, but it raises no question. It sets up the pleadings and informs us that the cause was tried by the court without a jury and that on the “ trial the following facts were proven,” and after reciting them it proceeds to say, that “upon the foregoing facts the said cause was submitted to the court, whereupon afterwards, and on the 21st day of December, A. D. 1880, the said court rendered judgment against the said plaintiff and in favor of the said defendants for their costs to be taxed and the said plaintiff did then file his written exception to the said judgment.”

No special findings of any kind were asked for or made. The cause was tried before the judge on general evidence and he decided in accordance with his view of that evidence *552in the same manner in which a jury would have-'decided by general verdict, and his general conclusion on the effect of the evidence was followed by the only judgment which could be given on it. There was no more occasion for an exception than there would have been in case a jury had returned a general verdict for the defendants.

The matters stated in the record as being the “facts proven” are deductions made from the evidence' since the judgment, for the purpose of constructing a cáse for review in this court. They were not constituents of the record when the judgment was given and a writ <of error would not have brought them up, and it would be extravagant to suppose they could be reviewed as though they were the foundation of the judgment. The provisions for deciding-cases on agreed facts have no application: Comp. L. §§ 4947, 6191, and of course the proceeding has no relation to the case where the question is whether there is any evidence on some specified point. The practice has been misconceived. *Chatterton v.*Parrott, at the last June term, *ante*p. 432, is exactly parallel. The irregularity is doubtless of small consequence because no foundation is discovered in what are represented as the “ facts proven ” for any different judgment.

The judgment is affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
Interoperability 

Workshop

Joe WaynertNIOSH/OMSHR Team leader – Electrical Safety and Communications

The findings and conclusions in this presentation have not been formally dissemi

be construed to represent any agency determination or policy.
Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS)

Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC)

National Institute for

Occupational Safety

and Health (NIOSH)

Office of Mine Safety and 

Health Research (OMSHR)

NIOSH / OMSH
OMSHR Role

• MINER Act – implement communications • Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

technology)

• CT (communications and tracking) works• CT tutorial• Internal research• BAA process (limited funds) & specific co

solicitations

– Generally fund demonstration of new o

technology
Measuring Technology Maturit

Technology Readiness 

Actual system “mine proven” thrpilot operationsActual system completed and “mand demonstration System prototype demonstration environmentSystem/subsystem model or prorelevant environment Component and/or breadboard venvironmentComponent and/or breadboard venvironmentAnalytical and experimental criticharacteristic proof-of-conceptTechnology concept and/or applBasic principles observed and re

TRL 9TRL 8TRL 7TRL 6TRL 5TRL 4TRL 3TRL 2TRL 1

MSHA Approval

MSHA Concurrence with Approach

Miner Device & System Operating at Permissible Levels

Technology Development

Demonstration of Off the Shelf “Solutions”

Basic Technology Research
The Communications 

• Manufacturers or distributors of communica• Since passage of MINER Act (2006)

– Tremendous advancement in communic– Numerous systems commercially availab– MSHA approved list

• 73 systems, peripherals, components

• Communications companies forming partne• Distributors handling & combining multiple t• Mine owner/operators combining systems
Goal = Survivable Commun

• The principal challenge for post accident op

survivability

• Survivability has as much to do with the des

installation as it does the technology

– Mine specific design approach

• Survivability is most practically achieved thr

communications paths

– No practical way to harden primary comm

infrastructure to survive any conceivable 

– Ideally – have primary & secondary syste– Ideally - link primary to secondary system
Primary communications 

• leaky feeder • node based• fiber or wiredSecondary communications • medium frequency (MF) • through-the-earth (TTE)

For daily useFor emergency use

Multiple chHigh data r

Single chaLow data 

The Issue
Technology Integration A

• Identify, modify, agree to use, existing sta

– Physical interface– Protocol

• Create new standard(s)• Primary and Secondary manufacturers co

– Open architecture – Cooperative integration

• Industry assimilation

– Form combined product, proprietary in
How might OMSHR or N

• Introduce several primary/seconda

configurations

• Feel free to interrupt / participate

– Identify issues– Gaps in technology– Ask questions

• Ultimately: Path forward
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WAYLON C. CALLAWAY, et al., : 

 : 

Plaintiffs, : 

 : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-00321-B 

 : 

BP, PLC, et al., : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

 

ORDER

This action is before the Court on Defendant Cameron 

International Corporation’s Motion for Extension of Time in Which 

to Respond to the Complaint (Doc. 7) and Defendant Halliburton 

Energy Services, Inc.’s Motion to Stay. (Doc. 20). 

In its motion, Cameron International Corporation (hereinafter 

“Cameron”), asserts that it has been named in over one hundred 

cases arising out of the explosion and fire onboard Transocean=s 

Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 4, 2010, and the ensuing 

oil spill. According to Defendant, in light of the sheer number 

of cases which have been filed in multiple jurisdictions, 

additional time is needed in order to prepare appropriate motions, 

answers or responses. Defendant Cameron requests that the deadline 

for its answers, motions or other responses be extended to August 

16, 2010. Upon consideration, and for good cause shown, the 

motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. The deadline for 

Case 1:10-cv-00321-B Document 23 Filed 07/01/10 Page 1 of 2
2 

Defendant Cameron’s answer, motion or other response is extended 

to July 30, 2010. 

Also pending before the Court is Defendant Halliburton Energy 

Services, Inc.’s Motion to Stay. (Doc. 20). Upon consideration, 

the Motion to Stay is DENIED with leave to re-file after 

responsive pleadings have been filed. See Burke v. BP Corporation 

North America, Inc., et al., No. 10-cv-00195-WS-M (S.D. Ala. May 

25, 2010) (order denying motion for stay (Doc. 41)). 

DONE this 1st day of July, 2010.

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins_____ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:10-cv-00321-B Document 23 Filed 07/01/10 Page 2 of 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0175

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

NATALIE AMANDA RICH,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including October 2, 2020, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 26 2020

08/26/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0175