alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Unaudited.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         263,551
<SECURITIES>                                 1,029,389
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,910
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (39,200)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               681,588
<PP&E>                                      16,090,591
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,135,292
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,666,276
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,082,207
<BONDS>                                     12,888,368
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,666,276
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,131,186
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,046,672
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               450,659
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             852,725
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (218,870)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (22.37)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
NVL-03.31.2015-10K-EX10.50 RetentionLetter Parrette



July 1, 2014
Leslie Parrette


EXHIBIT 10.50
Dear Leslie,


Your contributions to Novelis are very important. In recognition of this, the Company has put in place an enhancement to the existing LTI program. This “Bridge” plan was developed to supplement the LTIP while the new Novelis portion of the Plan matures. This program will provide you with a cash incentive in addition to your other compensation such as your base salary, annual bonus opportunity and long-term incentive opportunity.


The Bridge plan is in place for FY2015 and will be reviewed annually. 


You will receive three payments in the total amount of    $75,000 


First Payment in December 2014    $37,500
  Second Payment in December 2015    $18,750
Third Payment in December 2016    $18,750


Because this opportunity is designed to enhance our LTIP as a retention incentive, in the event that you voluntarily terminate your employment prior to December 31, 2016, or are terminated for cause, you will be required to repay any payments made under the Bridge plan in the previous 12 months, less applicable taxes, and any you will not be entitled to any other payments thereafter. If you are terminated involuntarily without cause, any unpaid cash installments will be immediately cancelled but you will not be required to repay any cash payments you have received.


Your acceptance of any payments under this award shall constitute your acceptance of the terms and conditions set forth above.


I am very pleased that we are able to offer you this opportunity and I look forward to you continuing to be a key member of the team as we focus on building an even more successful Novelis.
Sincerely, 






Phil Martens
President and Chief Executive Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>      1,000

<S>               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                           MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                     46,474
<SECURITIES>                                  120
<RECEIVABLES>                               4,552
<ALLOWANCES>                                   25
<INVENTORY>                                24,205
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                          153,119
<PP&E>                                      8,996
<DEPRECIATION>                              1,159
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                            177,608
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       6,221
<BONDS>                                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           0
<PREFERRED>                                     0
<COMMON>                                       45
<OTHER-SE>                                171,225
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>              177,608
<SALES>                                    39,931
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           39,931
<CGS>                                      32,685
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              32,685
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           81,978
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (7)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          (72,062)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      (72,062)
<DISCONTINUED>                                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 0
<CHANGES>                                       0
<NET-INCOME>                             (72,062)
<EPS-BASIC>                                (2.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                              (2.65)


</TABLE>
#### M. Keeper *v.*Mary Henderson.

Promissory Note — Collector.

A person, having the possession of a promissory note for the purpose of collection, has no authority to make a contract on behalf of the owner ta surrender it to another.

Attorney at Law.

The mere possession of a note by an attorney at law does not import more than that he has authority to collect.

APPEAL PROM HENDERSON COURT OP COMMON PLEAS.

December 2, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

The paper executed by Anderson shows that the appellant then understood that he held the note for collection; and the appellant was bound to know that, having it for that purpose, he had no right to make any contract on behalf of the appellee to surrender the note *553to him. And he seems then to have so understood the matter, because he took from Anderson an agreement to endeavor to raise the money to- pay it over to the appellee.

*Vance & Merritt, for appellant. M.*Yeaman, *for appellee.*

He does not allege that he then supposed Anderson-was the owner of the note; but says it was placed in his hands, and that Anderson “represented to him that he had full power, right and authority to collect, control, or dispose of it.” He must, therefore, have known that the note did not belong to Anderson, and that he held it for the appellee. Knowing this fact, it was his duty to- learn what authority Anderson had in the premises; and having trusted to his statement, he cannot now escape liability without showing that Anderson had the authority which he claimed.

If Anderson had claimed to be the owner of the note, and the appellant, trusting to that statement, had dealt with him in the manner in which he did, it may be that the appellee, having indorsed her name on the note, and thereby put it in Anderson’s power to deceive him, the appellee would be compelled to look to Anderson. But as the appellant knew that the note did not belong to- Anderson, he dealt with him at his peril. The mere possession of a note by an attorney at law does not import more than that he has authority to collect it; and if the obligor deals with him beyond the ordinary mode of making payment, he is in precisely the same situation as any other person dealing with an agent whose powers are limited.

Judgment *affirmed.*
Exhibit 32

Section 1350 Certifications

Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Beckman
Coulter, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(i) the accompanying
quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended March 31, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the
Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or
after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.



|                  |  |                                 
|----------------- |  | --------------------------------
|Date: May 5, 2010 |  | /s/ Scott Garrett               
|                  |  | Scott Garrett                   
|                  |  | Chairman of the Board, President
|                  |  | and Chief Executive Officer     



---

Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Beckman
Coulter, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(i) the accompanying
quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended March 31, 2010 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the
Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or
after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.



|                  |  |                        
|----------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 5, 2010 |  | /s/ Charles P. Slacik  
|                  |  | Charles P. Slacik      
|                  |  | Senior Vice President &
|                  |  | Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, George O. Deehan, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual
Report of Paragon Financial Corporation on Form 10-K for the year ended December
31, 2003, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual
Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of Paragon Financial Corporation.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


Date: April 1, 2004              By: /s/ George O. Deehan
                                 ------------------------
                                 Name: George O. Deehan
                                 Title: Chief Executive Officer
11786.

#### Markovitz *v.*Blake.

Hill, J.

1. A petition to recover damages for false imprisonment, wMcli alleges that the plaintiff was quietly and peaceably in her own home when arrested by the defendant and a police officer, and that the arrest and imprisonment were made without any warrant, makes out a prima facie case of false imprisonment. The exceptions in the statute which permit the arrest of a person without a warrant are matters of defense. There was no error in overruling the special demurrer on the ground that the petition failed to allege not only that the arrest was without a lawful warrant, but that the plaintiff, at the time of the arrest, was not committing any offense in the presence of the arresting officer or endeavoring to escape, or there was not likely to be for other cause a failure- of justice for the want of an officer to issue a warrant.

2. The charge of the court that “the illegal- laying of hands upon her (meaning the plaintiff) by a police officer of the city would be an illegal arrest,” taken alone, would be an erroneous statement as to the law, but where the charge preceding and following this statement fully and specifically instructed the jury as to the code definition of false imprisonment, and stated that to constitute such imprisonment the plaintiff must have been deprived of her personal liberty, the jury could not have been misled by the instructions excepted to. In addition to this, the evi*154dence for tlie plaintiff showed that the officer, in the presence of the defendant and in compliance with his request, not only illegally laid his hands upon the plaintiff, but that he did not take them off her until he had forcibly taken her from her home to the police station, where she was incarcerated for several hours.

Decided January 20, 1921.

Action for false imprisonment; from city court of Savannah— Judge Freeman. July *27,*1920.

*Shelby Myriclc,*for plaintiff in error.

*E. Ormonde Hunter,*contra.

3. There is no merit in any of the assignments of error, and the verdict, if not demanded, is amply supported by the evidence.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkms, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
10997.

#### Sheppard *v.*The State.

Decided January 28, 1921.

Indictment for misdemeanor; from Tattnall superior court — Judge Sheppard. September 11, 1919.

*Elders & DeLoach,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. Saxton Daniel,.solicitor-general,*contra.

Broyles, C. J.

1. “ In an indictment under the Penal Code, § 329, which declares: ‘ If any person, informing or prosecuting under pretense of any penal law, shall compound with the offender, or direct the suit or information to be discontinued, unless it be by leave of the court where the same is pending, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, ’ it is not necessary to allege the essential elements of the pretended offense. ”

2. “ Evidence that the defendant caused one to be arrested by an officer under pretense of his having committed an offense, and compounded with such person for a consideration without any proceeding in court, is insufficient to support a conviction under the statute quoted in the preceding note.” *Sheppard*v. *State*(this case), 151 *Ga.*(105 S. E. 601).

3. Under these rulings, the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the indictment; but the court did err in overruling the motion for a new trial, since the verdict was unauthorized by the evidence. The case being controlled by this ruling, it is unnecessary to consider the amendment to the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Luke and Bloodworth, JJ., concur.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONTA RUSSELL-EL, # 192899, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0120-WS-N

WARDEN CULLIVER, et al., :

Defendants. :

ORDER

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to

the issues raised, and a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and

Recommendation to which objection is made, the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of

this Court. It is ORDERED that this action be and is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice,

prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send to the Commissioner of the Alabama Department

of Corrections a copy of the Report and Recommendation recommending the dismissal of

this action, this Order adopting the Report and Recommendation, and the Judgment

dismissing this action. 

DONE this 6th day of May, 2010.

s/WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00120-WS-N Document 13 Filed 05/06/10 Page 1 of 1
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, June 24, 2020. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, June 24, 2020 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A20I0229. FREDRICK JOINER v. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT. Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 17CV11306
12087.

#### Martin *v.*The State.

Bloodworth, J.

1. *“*All evidence is admitted as of course, unless a valid ground of objection is interposed, the burden being on the objecting party to state at the time some specific reason why it should not be admitted. A failure to make such objection will be treated as a waiver, and prevent the court, on a motion for a new trial, from inquiring as to the competency of the evidence.” *Andrews*v. *State,*118 *Ga.*1 (43 S. E. 852). “It is a well established rule of practice that a ground of a motion for new trial based upon the admission of evidence should state the objection made to the evidence, and that such objection was urged at the time objection was made; otherwise no question is raised for determination.” *City of Rome*v. *McWilliams,*145 *Ga.*191(2) (88 S. E. 931), and cases cited. See also *Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.*v. *Stovall-Pace Co.,*24 *Ga. App.*248(3), 249(3), and cases cited. Under these rulings no question for determination by this court is raised by the first ground of the amendment to the motion for a uew trial.

*606Decided April 12, 1921.

Conviction of assault with intent to rape; from Richmond superior court —■ Judge Henry C. Hammond. December 18, 1930.

The ground referred to in the first divison of the decision was that “the court, upon motion of defendant’s counsel, refused to rule out the following testimony of Beatrice White, the prosecutrix: [set out]. Said evidence was prejudicial to the defendant, in that it tended to show that he was seeking a compromise, conscious of his guilt;” it was hearsay, and it impaired defendant’s right to have a fair, legal trial.

*Q. A.*Picquel, for plaintiff in error.

*A. L. Franklin, solicitor-general, John M. Graham,*contra.

2. “ Prejudicial remarks of the court in the presence and. hearing of the jury are not ground for a new trial unless a motion to declare a mistrial on that ground has been made and refused.” *Harrison*v. *State,*20 *Ga. App.*157(6), 160(6) (92 S. E. 970, 971), and eases cited. This ruling disposes of grounds 2 and 3 of the amendment to the motion for a new trial.

3. It was insisted thát the allegata and probata did not agree, because *“*the indictment alleges the assault to have been made upon ‘ Beatrice White,’ and the proved fact was that the assault was made on Beatrice White Toland.” Thei-e is no merit in this contention, because the evi- ' dence shows that the person alleged to have been assaulted was sometimes called Beatrice White and at other times Beatrice White Toland; and she testified: “ I go by both names.” *Pittman*v. *State*22 *Ga. App.*255(3), 256(3) (95 S. E. 940) ; *Walker*v. *State,*14 *Ga. App.*587 (81 S. E. 797).

4. There was ample evidence to authorize the verdict; it is approved by the presiding judge, and the judgment is

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles, O. J., and Luloe, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         154,125
<SECURITIES>                                    78,863
<RECEIVABLES>                                   28,733
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,323
<INVENTORY>                                     15,515
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               281,588
<PP&E>                                          23,247
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,114
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 307,025
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           45,233
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       307,142
<OTHER-SE>                                     (46,870)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   307,025
<SALES>                                        109,582
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               109,582
<CGS>                                           40,083
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   40,083
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                86,780
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 355
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (9,240)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       413
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (9,653)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (9,653)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.32)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.32)


</TABLE>
**Exhibit
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Annual Report of
      Score One, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31,
      2006 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), we,
      Hoi-ho Kiu, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Lai Ming Lau, Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S. C. Section 1350,
      as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)  or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented
      and the consolidated result of operations of the Company for the periods
      presented.









/s/
      Hoi-ho Kiu


Hoi-ho
      Kiu


Chief
      Executive Officer


September
      14, 2007





/s/
          Lai Ming Lau
 Chief
        Financial Officer
 September
        14, 2007