IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JERONE YOUNG, )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-00586

 ) 

CITY OF MOBILE, et al. )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Samuel Jones’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Defendant Michael Williams’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant 

City of Mobile’s Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting briefs (Docs. 85-86, 89-

90, and 93-94), Plaintiff Jerone Young’s Responses (Docs. 103-105), and the 

Defendants’ replies (Docs. 106-108). 

I. Procedural History

On November 27, 2013, Plaintiff Jerone Young (“Young”) commenced this 

action by filing a complaint against the City of Mobile (“the City”), Police Chief Michael 

T. Williams (“Williams”), Mayor Samuel L. Jones (“Jones”), and Mayor Sandy Stimpson

(“Stimpson”). (Doc. 1). The complaint alleged that the Defendants had violated his due 

process rights as well as the protections of the Equal Protection clause under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts One and Four), 

violated his due process rights under the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Article 1, § § 6, 

13, and 22 (Count Two), and violated his liberty interest possessed in his good name and 

reputation (Count Three). (Doc. 1 at 6-13). Williams answered the complaint on 

December 30, 2013 (Doc. 18). Jones and the City answered the complaint on January 16, 

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2014 (Docs. 21 and 22). On January 16, 2014, Stimpson filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint (Doc. 23) and an answer to the complaint. (Doc. 23). On February 5, 2014, 

Young filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Stimpson. (Doc. 27). On February 6, 2014

Young’s motion was granted and Stimpson was dismissed as a party. (Doc. 28). 

On August 15, 2014, all Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims

(Docs. 85, 89, and 93). Young’s responses and the Defendants’ replies were timely filed, 

and the motions are now ripe for consideration. 

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (Dec. 2010). Rule 56(c) provides as follows:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be 

or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion 

only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce 

admissible evidence to support the fact.

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A 

party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot 

be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, 

but it may consider other materials in the record.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support 

or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts 

that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or 

declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. 

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FED.R.CIV.P. Rule 56(c) (Dec. 2010). The party seeking summary judgment bears the 

“initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 

608 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the 

nonmoving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 

with respect to which she has the burden of proof,” the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “In reviewing whether the nonmoving 

party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making 

credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 

Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998-999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted).

III. Factual Background1

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff Jerone Young (“Young”) has been a

“classified merit system employee” of the Police Department of Defendant City of 

Mobile (“the City”). (Doc. 1 at 3). Young was employed by the Mobile Police 

Department as a building maintenance supervisor. (Doc. 105-1 at 31-32) In September 

2011, he was charged with conduct unbecoming an employee and failure to be truthful 

during an investigation. (Id.)

																																																							 1 At the summary judgment stage, the facts are taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Tipton 

v. Bergrohr GMBH–Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–999 (11th Cir. 1992). The “facts, as accepted at the 

summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the actual facts of the case.” Priester v. City of 

Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2000).

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On October 31, 2011, Young received a pre-disciplinary hearing notice from the 

City. (Doc. 105-1 at 30). The notice advised him of the charges against him and the 

hearing date on November 9, 2011. (Id.) A hearing took place on November 9, 2011 and 

in a letter dated November 10, 2011, Young was suspended and demoted from his 

position effective December 12, 2011. (Doc. 105-1 at 36). 

The City operates under a merit system created by state statute and administered 

by the Mobile County Personnel Board (MCPB). (Doc. 88-1 at 2-5). The state law 

establishing the merit system, as well as the rules adopted by the MCPB, have certain 

procedures by which any employee may appeal an adverse employment decision through 

the independent board which then has full authority to affirm, increase, decrease, or 

completely reverse any disciplinary action. (Id.). The MCPB rules require that a predisciplinary hearing be held within seven (7) days after written notice to the employee

(Doc. 105-2 at 3; Doc 105-3 at 17). 2

On December 2, 2011, Young filed a timely notice of appeal based on the 

procedural violations of Rule 14.3(a), arguing that his hearing did not take place within 

seven days of written notice. Young received notice of the hearing on October 31, 2011 

and the hearing occurred on November 9, 2011, which was not within seven days of 

																																																							 2 MCPB Rule 14.3(a) states: Before any permanent employee is dismissed, suspended or demoted for 

cause, the Appointing Authority or his designated representative shall afford the employee due process in 

the form of a pre-disciplinary hearing. Written notice of the reasons for termination, suspension or 

demotion must be given the employee at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the pre-disciplinary hearing, 

at which time the employee must be given the opportunity to respond orally and/or in writing to the charges 

made before the official, or the designated representative of the official, charged with the responsibility of 

making the disciplinary decision. The pre-disciplinary hearing must be held within seven (7) days after 

written notice to the employee. The determination as a result of the pre-disciplinary hearing must be 

communicated to the employee in writing within fourteen (14) days of the hearing. Circumstances that 

prevent adherence to these timeframes must have approval of the Director. The dismissal, suspension or 

demotion of an employee by an Appointing Authority without having first accorded the employee a predisciplinary hearing in accordance with this Rule shall be void and of no force and effect, and shall not be 

recognized by the Board, except in extraordinary situations as hereinafter specified.

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October 31, 2011. On February 28, 2012, the MCPB heard oral arguments on the matter 

and on March 13, 2012, the board reversed the City’s decision to demote and suspend 

Young, based on violations of the procedural guidelines of Rule 14.3(a). (Doc. 105-2 at 

3-4). Pursuant to a written decision from the MCPB, Young was restored to his position 

and granted back pay for time missed. (Id.)

On November 27, 2013, Young filed this complaint against the City of Mobile, 

former Mayor Samuel L. Jones, former Chief of Police Michael T. Williams, and current 

Mayor Sandy Stimpson.3 Young seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, punitive 

damages, $2,500 in attorneys fees incurred as a result of the MCPB hearing, attorneys 

fees, costs, and expenses resulting from this action, permanent injunction, and any other 

relief the Court finds appropriate. (Doc. 1 at 14-1 5). 

IV. Discussion

A. Motion to Strike

Before turning to its summary judgment analysis, the Court will first address the 

City’s motion to strike the contents of an affidavit (Doc. 105-1) that Young submitted 

with his reply to the City’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 109). Though Young 

included the affidavit with his response to each of the Defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment, only the City has moved to strike. (Doc. 109). 

The City contends that the affidavit’s contents are improper pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). (Doc. 109 at 1). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), “An affidavit or declaration 

used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts 

that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent 

																																																							 3 On February 5, 2014, Young filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Stimpson as a party. (Doc. 27). The 

motion was granted on February 6, 2014. (Doc. 28). 

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to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The City argues that the affidavit 

contains statements that are not based on Young’s personal knowledge and would not be 

admissible into evidence. (Doc 109 at 1). The City’s motion to strike is MOOT as the 

contents of the affidavit were not considered relevant to the decision.

B. Counts One and Four: Violations of the Due Process and Equal 

Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments45

Young alleges violations of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to Section 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of 

Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall 

be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order “[t]o sustain a cause of action based on section 1983, [a 

plaintiff] must establish two elements: (1) that [he] suffered a deprivation of rights, 

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 

(2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting 

under color of law.” Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 

																																																							 4 The complaint does not specify whether the alleged violations were based on procedural or substantive 

due process. However, the right to continued public employment is not a fundamental right protected by 

substantive due process. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Holding that 

public employment law “remain[s] largely outside the scope of substantive due process jurisprudence” and 

“areas in which substantive rights are created only by state law (as is the case with tort law and 

employment law) are not subject to substantive due process protection under the Due Process Clause 

because ‘substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution.’”). Accordingly, any 

substantive due process claims under § 1983 are due to be dismissed. 5 The Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, however, “[t]he Fifth Amendment's 

Due Process Clause has an equal protection component akin to the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). As discussed 

later in this order, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government.

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1032 (11th Cir.1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The complaint alleges 

that Young suffered a deprivation of Constitutional rights when the defendants 

“demot[ed] and suspend[ed] Plaintiff without following mandatory and nondiscretionary 

Mobile County Merit System procedure.” (Doc. 1 at 6). As discussed below, Young has 

not suffered any deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 

States, and therefore cannot establish a claim under § 1983 for violations of either the 

Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Fifth Amendment Claims

a. Count One Due Process Claim

“The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution restrains the federal 

government, and the fourteenth amendment, section 1, restrains the states, from depriving 

any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Buxton v. City of 

Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037, 1041 (11th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Amendment's due 

process clause applies only to the federal government. Bartkus v. State of Illinois, 359 

U.S. 121, 124 (1959). Because Young has alleged no federal actors, his claims predicated 

on the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause are dismissed. Bates v. Alabama, 4:11-CV2183-KOB, 2012 WL 2154180 (N.D. Ala. June 13, 2012). 

b. Count Four Equal Protection Claim

Young also alleges that he was retaliated against6 in violation of his equal 

protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. Although “the Fifth Amendment contains 

																																																							 6 It is not clear from the complaint what the allegation of retaliation stems from but from what the Court 

gathers from the filings, Young had previously been disciplined by the City and had successfully appealed 

those actions. His complaint simply states, “Plaintiff has been forced to appeal other employment actions in 

the past. Defendants retilated (sic) against him for having moved to protect his civil rights.” (Doc. 1 at 5). 

It appears that he alleges that the suspension and demotion of October-November 2011was in retaliation of 

his prior appeals.

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no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be 

violative of due process.’” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975) 

quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 

U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (Also held that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be 

violative of due process”). “The [Supreme] Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal 

protection claims is the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted).7 As there is no equal protection clause in the Fifth 

Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to the 

federal government, the Defendant’s motions for summary judgment on both of Young’s 

Fifth Amendment claims (Counts One and Four) are GRANTED. 

2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

a. Count One Due Process Claim

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent a 

property interest exists in continued public employment, such interest cannot be taken 

without complying with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. See Mack v. Ala. 

Dep't of Human Res., 201 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1210 (M.D.Ala.2002) (citing Bd. of Regents 

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Because of Young’s status 

as a state merit system employee, he is vested with a protected property interest in 

continued employment. Best v. Boswell, 696 F. 2d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 1983). Young 

contends that his Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated 

“[b]y demoting and suspending [Young] without following mandatory and nondiscretionary Mobile County Merit System procedures.” (Doc. 1 at 6). 

																																																							 7 As discussed later, Young’s equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Four) also 

fails.

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It is undisputed that the City did not comply with the notice requirements of 

MCPB Rule 14.3(a) with regard to the proper amount of notice for his hearing. Young 

appealed to the MCPB on these grounds and prevailed on this issue. The MCPB reversed 

the City’s determination, restored Young to his previous position, awarded him full back

pay, and held that the City’s original determination was “void and of no force and effect.” 

“Where a state provides procedures which govern the taking of property, and those 

procedures are not fundamentally unfair on their face, and state law provides an adequate 

remedy to correct alleged errors in the application of these procedures to a plaintiff, no 

deprivation without due process can occur because the state has provided all the process 

required by the Constitution.” Baxter v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Authority, 764 F. Supp. 

1510, 1519 (N.D. Ga. 1991)(citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Lee v. Hutson, 

810 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987). Such is the case with Young. Young was afforded notice

and an opportunity to be heard. He further appealed his suspension and demotion to the 

MCPB. Therefore, “it is relatively easy to demonstrate that [Young] did receive 

procedural due process; even if that process was not in perfect accord with the City’s 

rules and policies.” Vincent v. City of Talladega, Ala., 980 F. Supp. 410, 412 (N.D. Ala. 

1997). “The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s gloss on it, are the 

measures of procedural due process, not the particular procedural rules of a particular 

governmental entity.” Id. The procedures afforded Young in this case satisfied the 

Fourteenth Amendment. There are no facts to support a claim that Young suffered a 

constitutional violation. Accordingly, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on 

Count One as it pertains to the Fourteenth Amendment are GRANTED. 

b. Count Four Equal Protection Claim

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Young’s complaint states that the defendants

have violated equal protection principles through their illegal 

employment discrimination against Plaintiff because he is a black 

male and has sought to protect his rights wherein the Defendants 

have retaliated against him. As such, the suspension and demotion

violated the equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

(Doc. 1 at 13). “To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a 

violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a 

person acting under color of state law. The first inquiry in any § 1983 lawsuit ... is 

whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.” 

Holt v. Glenn, 361 F. App’x. 75, 77 (11th Cir. 2010) (not selected for publication) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “The Equal Protection Clause ensures a right 

to be free from intentional discrimination based upon race.” Williams v. Consol. City of 

Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003)

A claim of race discrimination based on § 1983 is analyzed using the same 

standard for analyzing claims under Title VII. See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 

n. 20 (11th Cir. 2009). To establish this cause of action, Young must either have direct 

evidence of discriminatory intent in the employment action or establish a prima facie case 

as established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Direct evidence is 

“evidence which, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference or 

presumption.” Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 

2002) (internal citations omitted). “‘Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be 

nothing other than to discriminate on the [protected classification]’ are direct evidence of 

discrimination.” Id. (citing Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 

1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999). To constitute direct evidence, “the remark must indicate that 

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the employment decision in question was motivated by race.” Id. Young has not shown

direct evidence of discrimination and is thus required to proceed under the shifting 

framework established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.

In order to establish a prima facie case for discrimination under this framework, 

Young must show that he (1) was a member of a protected group, (here, African 

American) (2) was subjected to adverse employment action, (3) that similarly situated 

employees were treated more favorably, and (4) he was qualified to do the job. See 

McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2008). An adverse employment action has 

been defined by the Eleventh Circuit as “a serious and material change in the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment” as “viewed by a reasonable person in the 

circumstances.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 254 F.3d 1232, 1239 -40 (11th Cir. 2001). 

“The employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s 

action is not controlling.” Id. 

Young has not established a prima facie case under the McDonnell shifting 

framework in that he was not subjected to adverse employment action in contrast with 

similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Young can point to no similarly 

situated person or persons who were treated more favorably or a replacement who was 

outside his protected class.8 In order to determine whether employees are similarly 

situated to Young, the individuals must be similarly situated in all relevant respects 

besides race, since different treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate 

civil rights laws.” Jackson v. Bell South Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1273-74 

(11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotation omitted). 

																																																							 8 In his deposition, Young notes that he was replaced by John Russell, an African American male, for the 

time he was away from work on suspension. (Doc. 94-2 at 6-7, Dep. Young at 91-92).

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However, “establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, 

and never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary 

judgment motion in an employment discrimination case.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin 

Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). To create a triable issue of fact, Young 

must come forward with “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would 

allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (footnote and 

citation omitted). He has not done so.

With regard to Young’s retaliation claim, as Jones correctly points out (Doc. 86 at 

22), “no established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from 

retaliation.” Ratliff v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 62 F.3d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1995).

Consequently, Young’s retaliation claims found in Count Four are due to be dismissed. 

C. Count Two: State Law Claim

Young alleges that he was unlawfully deprived of his due process rights 

“guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Article 1, §§ 6, 13, 22, among 

other applicable sections, including the provisions of the Mobile County Merit System 

Act, the Rules of the Mobile County Personnel Board, and well-settled case law 

decisions.” (Doc. 1 at 11). These violations stem from the same suspension and demotion 

discussed in more detail previously. 

As noted in Jones’ brief in support of his motion for summary judgment, there is 

no private cause of action for monetary damages based on violation of provisions of the 

Alabama Constitution. Matthews v. Alabama A & M Univ., 787 So. 2d 691, 698 (Ala. 

2000). Accordingly, no claims for monetary damages based on alleged violations of the 

Alabama Constitution will stand. Additionally, any claims for non-monetary relief are 

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also due to be dismissed. The Supreme Court of Alabama “has consistently interpreted 

the due process guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution to be coextensive with the 

due process guaranteed under the United States Constitution.” Lee v. City of Marion, 

Ala., CIV.A.209-0301-KD-N, 2010 WL 2104181 (S.D. Ala. May 25, 2010)(citing

Alabama Dept. of Public Safety v. Prince, 2009 WL 3161829, 8 n. 2 (Ala. Civ. App.

2009) quoting Vista Land & Equip., L.L.C. v. Computer Programs & Sys., Inc., 953 

So.2d 1170, 1174 (Ala. 2006)). As with Young’s claims based the due process guarantees 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, Young has suffered no deprivation of due process. He was 

successful in his appeal, reinstated and awarded full back pay. He cannot establish a due 

process violation under the U.S. Constitution or the Alabama Constitution of 1901. The 

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Young’s state law claims are 

GRANTED. 

D. Count Three: Liberty Interest

Young alleges that he has suffered a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 

liberty interest in his good name and reputation. (Doc. 1 at 12-13). He alleges that the 

suspension and demotion were made public and the Defendants have failed to expunge 

his personnel file. (Doc. 1 at 12-13). 

To establish a deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law, a 

plaintiff is required to prove “(1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) 

attending a governmental employee’s discharge (4) made public (5) by the government 

employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing.” Buxton v. 

City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (11th Cir. 1989). Young has not 

presented facts to establish the sixth element of his claim. Rather, it is undisputed that he 

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was provided a meaningful opportunity for name clearing; Young appealed his 

suspension to the MCPB and the discipline was reversed. As noted in the MCPB’s 

reversal decision,

Therefore, after giving careful and deliberate consideration to all of 

the positions put forth by the parties, it is the decision, finding and 

order of the Board that the action of suspension and demotion 

heretofore imposed on the employee, Jerone Young, be and the 

same is hereby in all things void and of no force and effect. The 

employee is to be restored to his former position and is granted 

back pay for time missed. 

(Doc. 103-2 at 4). Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to 

Count Three of the complaint are GRANTED. 

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants City of Mobile, Williams, and 

Jones’ Motions for Summary Judgment on all claims (Docs. 85, 89, and 93) are 

GRANTED.

A Final Judgment consistent with the terms of this Order shall be entered by 

separate document as required by Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DONE and ORDERED this the 29th day of October 2014.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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