considered the report a "whitewash" of NBS, and sent a
comprehensive rebuttal of the Battery Additive Committee's
report to Sinclair Weeks. Both the Post Office and the FTC
dropped their cases against Ritchie. (58)

The Kelly Committee was no less concerned with
repairing the damage sustained by the Bureau of Standards
(59), and their report is not lacking in assurances of the
Bureau's overall exceptional quality. And yet the 109 page
evaluation does contain “an open criticism of certain aspects
of the Bureau's operation, and several concrete proposals.

The bulk of the text is devoted to summary appraisals
of the non-ordnance related divisions of the Bureau. The
recommendations for improving the separate divisions are
very similar. In all instances but one (Building Technology
Division), the committee recommended an increase of direct
funding for basic research.

There were, of course, recommendations peculiar to
particular divisions. The Optics and Metrology Division, and
the Metallurgy Division were insufficiently staffed. The

divisions of Organic and Fibrous Materials, Metallurgy, and

58. Both the Jeffries Comm Rept. and Ritchie's
response are in the "Annual Report of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business," Report #1092, U.S.G.P.0.,
March 25, 1954. Ritchie is cited by The New York Times
(Nov.14) as saying that while the Jeffries committee is made
up of honorable men, the report had essentially been written
by the Bureau of Standards itself. In an interesting

adumbration of Ritchie's words of censure, The Washington Post

commented, on July 1, that if the Post Office were to
abolish the fraud order against Ritchie it would constitute
a "whitewash" of AD-X2, as well as a stigmatization of the
Bureau of Standards.

59. The Kelly committee was comprised of scientists
nominated by various institutions. The American Chemical

-45-


The Federation of American Scientists, The Washington
Academy of Sciences, and the Association for Computing
Machinery and Senator Allen Ellender (D-La.) were
among those who petitioned the President for his
intervention. Other
groups and individuals of the scientific and industrial
research communities expressed concern and indignation

through the press. The Christian Science Monitor interviewed

faculty at the University of California at Berkeley,
Rithcie's home area, to sample academics in the West. Not
surprisingly, their objections echoed those of their peers,
both on and off campus, from around the country. (47)
Congressman DeWitt Hyde introduced legislation to
reorganize the
Bureau as the "National Physical Sciences Laboratory,"
removing it from the oversight of the Commerce
Department.(48) Weeks, under siege from time of the Astin
announcement, continued to stonewall until the deadline of

Astin's departure, offering "no comment" to questions on the

47. The Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 1953.
Concerning calls for Eisenhower's involvement, see The
Washington Post, April 16, 1953. Learned societies,
professional organizations, the press, and members of
Congress were already protesting vigorously by mid-April.

48. H.R. 5043, May 6, 1953, "A Bill to establish the
National Physical Sciences Laboratories." As preface to the
introduction of this bill, Hyde made a lengthy address on
April 15. It was a masterful presentation where he first
chronicles the illustrious history of the Bureau, and then
sets forth the elements of the proposal. The appeal

-39-


were not reversed, the Bureau would have no choice but to

make its first reduction in force in 20 years. Senator

Hickenlooper of Iowa challenged Schoeppel, saying "..-I am
not disposed to support the Bureau when it enters into
competition (with private industry) and builds plants to
enable it to do so, and then wants more employes to man the
plants, and more money with which it may seek contracts in

order to keep going plants that are outside the scope of its

normal activities. I do not say that is true; I am merely

suggesting that there is a feeling on the part of many

people." (64, emphasis author's)

The complaint of Jess Ritchie that government
scientists and certain established industries were in league
to prevent the appearance of useful inventions was
provocative in the new administration even before the AD-X2
hearings began.(65) On April 4, Secreatary of Defense
Charles Wilson privately sent an order to the Army, Navy,
Air Force and the Research and Development Board, requiring
that no further research projects be contracted at outside

government agencies on transferred funds without being

64. Congressional Record-Senate, 195

1 ’ 3,
disclocure = york Herald Tribune, March 8
Gf cintins is perceived subterfuge triggered a t
Seema been at ee Other products which had —
esttte alee BI enied the light of day included sparkplu
nickei-cadnimm tae eee development solutions, peng
lubricating oil vaxtendecsTM ES Ramee ERS a

_pp.6221,2.
1953. The

-49-



There were other actions involving both NBS and NBBB
which ring at least
injudicious, if not improper. In one of many communication
between G.W.Vinal and K.B.Willson, concerning a revision of
Letter Circular 302, Vinal mentions his discussing a
proposed revision at a meeting of the Association of
American Battery Manufacturers. In another letter Vinal
tells Willson that NBS does not generally undertake the
testing of a commercial product unless requested to do so by
a Government agency. Therefore, if the "matter" (e.g. AD-X2)
is turned over to the Federal Trade Commission, it is
possible that tests will be conducted. (34) The matter did
indeed proceed to the FTC, though
apparently not as a result of Vinal's untoward suggestion.

The National Better Business Bureau filed a complaint

against Pioneers with the FTC on June 17, 1949. (35)
Subsequent suit was filed with the FTC by the Association of

American Battery Manufacturers in 1950. The Post Office also

a letter to Mr. Willson dated July 24: "...there is no
objection to the use of statements made by this Bureau and
cited by you in your letter, concerning the battery
additive, AD-xX2. It is our understanding that the Bureau's
statements concerning AD-X2 will appear only in your
bulletin Battery Compounds and Solutions." (Hearings,
p.781.)

34. Hearings,pp.771 and 777 respectively. Vinal retired
from NBS in June of 1950 and thereafter did consulting for
both RCA and Electric Storage Battery Co.(Exide). (Hearings,
Pp 250)

35. Technical Information for Congress, 1969, op.cit.
p.26. Vinal's 'suggestion' for FTC action was dated June 22.

=30=



Building Technology all needed the direction of an advisory
committee to help balance research programs. Three divisions
(Electronics, National Applied Mathematics Laboratory, and
Central Radio Propagation Laboratory) were assessed as
having greater needs involving their overall research
agendas, but all three were already facing the prospect of
fundamental change, and so recommendations were held to a
minimum. (60)

Other recommendations transcended division boundaries.
Directly related to the battery additive controversy, the
committee suggested that responsibility for policy and
procedure on commercial product tests be shared by the
Director of the Bureau and the Secretary of Commerce. The
Kelly Committee also found the job of the Director, as then

defined, essentially unworkable. The Director was too

Society's representative was Kenneth Pitzer of the
University of California. Upon accepting the nomination he
telegrammed Sinclair Weeks, saying "we feel that this
committee must consider as part of its evaluation studies
the challenge of the integrity of the bureau and its staff."
(The Evening Star, April 16, 1953)

60. i. The Electronics Division was operating on 98%
transferred funds (primarily Defense), and this would be
fundamentally changed with the loss of ordnance programs
(discussed below).

ii. The Applied Mathematics Advisory Council was

in

the process of deciding whether to sever one of the four
branches of N.A.M.L., the Institute of Numerical Analysis.

iii. The Central Radio Propagation Laboratory had
not yet completed moving the Wash. D.C. personnel involved
to the new facility at Boulder, Colorado. This relocation,
it was felt, would enhance the administration of the
division.

=46 =


Finally, there was the most dramatic proposal of all:
sever all ordnance programs. The Kelly Committee had a
strong argument for removing ordnance work from the Bureau.
As mentioned at the opening of this essay, defense work was
grossly out of balance with basic research. Still, as
reasonable as the proposal may have been, it was a wrenching
one. And the decision to reorganize NBS had its own history.

Form the beginning of its term, the Eisenhower
administration worried about the role and Limitations of
government science. In particular, the stated philosophy was
that government should get out of all services which could
be performed by the private sector. The transfer of the Camp
Detrick facility of the Army Chemical Corps to private
management, and the Commerce Department's investigation of
the United States Weather Bureau represented this policy in
action. (63)

This mindset lurked in Congress as well. Making a plea
for increased operating funds for the Bureau of Standards,
Senator Andrew Schoeppel (R-Kansas) pointed out the very

basic needs NBS met, and that if the proposed funding cuts

63. Reported in Science, vol.118, Nov.13, 1953 p.584,
and The Washington Post, July 12, 1953 respectively. The
Science report also noted that the scientists at Camp
Detrick first learned of the transfer through news releases,
and resignations of certain key investigators had already
occurred. Further, the "likely, but unpredictable, extension
of industrial management to other branches of the Army and
the federal government [had] already led to unrest among
scientists at other centers."

~48-


already-done and judge both the merit of AD-X2, and the
technical competence of the Bureau in this connection. While
this was the direction given by Detlev Bronk, President of
the Academy, Weeks had hoped for another round of
independent tests.

The Additive Committee addressed the question

historically, summarizing the investigations on additives
through the years. It then described the testing done on
AD-X2 by government, commercial and university laboratories,
and systematically eliminated most of the procedures for
technical inadequacy or non-applicability. Of particular
importance were the tests done at MIT, which had been highly
publicized as favorable to AD-X2.(55) The committee
concluded that the testimony of the MIT investigator himself
(that he could not conclude whether the product were good or
bad) along with the technical problem of tests run at
electrical parameters which could not be extrapolated to

conditions of normal use, sufficed to disqualify the MIT

55. The tests, performed by Prof. Harold Weber at the
request of the Senate Small Business Committee, were
interpreted by Keith Laidler (a chemistry professor at
Catholic University, consultant to the Senate Committee, and
former paid consultant to Jess Ritchie) as demonstrating
"beyond a-reasonable doubt that this material is in fact
valuable, and [the tests] give complete support to the
claims of the manufacturer." Despite Weber's disclaimer and
a statement by MIT Provost J.A.Stratton that "our group (did
not[ arrive at any definitive conclusions with respect to
the commercial value of the product," Weber admitted to
using the additive in his own automobile.

MIT Report, "Effect of Battery Additive AD-X2 on Lead
Acid Batteries," April, 1953. NBS Archives, box 682.

-43-


bankruptcy. As a businessman he had had a run-in with the
regulatory power of government when the FTC ordered his
company to cease advertising its pens with a lifetime
guarantee, as the firm was charging a service fee to repair
the pens. This may have contributed to his bias in the
present case, despite the fact that NBS was not involved

with Sheaffer's pens.(42) The New York Herald Tribune

reported that "it was on his (Sheaffer's) recommendation
that Secretary Weeks dismissed Dr.Astin from office." Months

later, after a rapproachment
evolved between Astin and Weeks, and Astin (now reinstated)
and the NBS were placed under the supervision of another
Assistant Secretary of Commerce (for Administration, James
C. Worthy), Sheaffer resigned. He offered no explanation for
leaving. (43)

If the rest of government and the public at large were
surprised by Astin's dismissal, Weeks and Sheaffer were at
least as stunned by the outcry it caused. The manner in
which the dismissal was explained was perhaps the most
damaging part of this action. Weeks appeared as the first
witness in the AD-X2 hearings, accompanied by Sheaffer. It

must be considered a primary function of this immediate

42. The Washington Post, Sept.19, 1953. When
questioned about NBS work on the Sheaffer pen case, Astin
replied he had no knowledge of such work ever being done.
(Hearings, p.272)

43. New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 19, 1953.

=35>


‘the Enemy Perceived

The political atmosphere was already charged when the
new administration took office in January of 1953, and
communists were not the only enemies of the state.
Eisenhower was committed to battling bureaucracies and
advancing the cause of business. Commerce Secretary Sinclair
Weeks and Assistant Secretary (of Commerce for Domestic
Affairs) Craig Sheaffer were frontline ideologues in this
cause.(37) Still, it must have been a vertiginous shock to
the Bureau of Standards to find itself the focus of
attention in a political purge.(38) The Bureau had been a

scientifically conservative organization of experts, having

37. U.S. News and World Report pointed out that after
only one month the new administration could show a decline
of 7,800 on the government payroll. Weeks had trimmed 15
percent off the proposed Commerce Dept. budget for the
following year.By the early spring of 1953 the signs were
clear that government projects, as well as government
controls over business, were being eliminated. Businessmen
were back in power, and reform theorists were replaced by
those with a practical outlook. Weeks, himself a
businessman, was quoted as follows: "'Some tub thumpers and
pundits are sneering because the President has recalled to
public service the 20-year forgotten man. They complain
because the new Administration no longer gives priority to
the theories of foreign Socialists and to...local egg
heads.' This reaction is understandable because a ‘whole
generation has been taught that knowledge of how to meet a
pay roll is a sign of a low I.Q., that honest profit is a
wicked motive and that nothing in business is needed by
Government except its excess-profits and corporate income
taxes.'" (USN&WR, April 24, 1953, pp.15,16,90,93)

38. During questioning, Senator Lester Hunt of Wyoming
asked Allen Astin if he had ever encountered a situation
like this in his 23 years at the Bureau, to which Astin
replied laconically, "This is a most unique experience,

sir." (Hearings, p.326)

SB


investigated Ritchie, and testing of AD-X2 at the National
Bureau of Standards was run at their behest in 1952. Ritchie
was instructed to appear in Washington for hearings on
possible mail fraud in April of 1952. These hearings were
ultimately postponed until October of the same year. In the
mean time, Ritchie began assembling his defense and
prevailed upon the House Committee on Small Business to
obtain another series of tests at NBS in accordance with
procedures Ritchie would specify. After this action, the
House committee was no longer involved, and further action
became the responsibility of the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business.

The NBS tests again showed no merit for AD-X2. Ritchie
took issue with the testing procedure and failed to show up
for the hearing. A decision was reached on February 18,
1953, and a fraud order issued, only to be quickly suspended
by the Postmaster General. On August 20, 1953, the order was

cancelled. (36)

36. Technical Information for Congess, 1969, op.cit.
pp.27-29.-Postmaster General Summerfield suspended the fraud
order (issued Feb.24) on March 2 at the request of Sinclair

Weeks. (Hearings, p.3)

-31-


tests from further consideration.(56) The committee's
evaluation of AD-X2 concurred with NBS: the additive was
without merit. The committee rounded out its report with a
point by point appraisal of the complaints of incompetency
leveled against the Bureau, with especial attention given to
the perceived incompatibility of the results at NBS and MIT.
The committee members closed their report with solid support
for the beleaguered Bureau.
"We conclude from our studies and investigations
that the quality of the work of the National Bureau
of Standards in the field of lead acid storage
battery testing is excellent. This statement is made
without reservations.
"Qur opinion is that the quality of the work of the
Bureau in this field is better now than at any time

in the past..."

Secretary Weeks received the Additive Committee's
report that fall with understandable relief, saying it "is
an assurance to the public and a source of satisfaction to
me and to the Bureau," adding that he would "do all in [his]
power to aid the Bureau in maintaining this high level of

scientific service to the nation."(57) Jess Ritchie

56. Jeffries Comm. Rept., op.cit. pp.22,23.
57. The New York Times, Nov.14, 1953.

=44in


effectiveness of the important services which the
National Bureau of Standards renders to science,

industry and government would be seriously impaired.

"Mr. Sheaffer expressed dissatisfaction by the
Department of the Bureau's handling of the battery
additive question..."(40)
Although most articles of the day on the ouster of
Allen
Astin point directly to Secretary Weeks, and rightly so,
this tends to obscure the role of Craig Sheaffer. It is
significant that during this time Astin tried to discuss the
matter with Weeks, but was consistently denied an
audience.(41) There is no immediate answer as to why Weeks
should have feared a meeting with the accused, though none
of the possibilities speak well for the Secretary. On the
other hand, there was some indication that Sheaffer was much
more than a line-authority message bearer.
Sheaffer had headed the pen menufacturing company which
bears his name prior to coming to Commerce under Eisenhower,
and had soon come to the opinion that the Bureau of

Standards had essentially hounded Jess Ritchie into

40. Press release, "Statement on Resignation by

Dr.A.V.Astin..." NBS Archives, box 202. See N.Y.Times, April
2, 1953.
41. ibid.
23 t=


submitted for his personal review, or that of Deputy
Secretarey of Defense, Roger Kyes.

The "Kyes Order" (it had his signature) was not
described as intentionally hurtful to NBS, but as intended
only to allow Defense to make a closer accounting of its
various projects and to inform possible cost-cutting

measures. But the order was initiated by a letter from

Sinclair Weeks to Secretary Wilson, suggesting he check into
the large expenditures in the Bureau's ertical proximity
fuse program.(66) The Bureau itself quickly realized the
grievous effect this order would have. NBS was informed by
some Defense Department project officers that they would
prefer to have work done elsewhere, rather than process
orders through this new multi-stage review, or not have the
work done at all. In the estimation of the NBS
administration, this would result in staff reductions by
June, 1953.(67) The Kelly Committee also worried for the
Bureau. Lee DuBridge, a member of the Kelly Committee,
described the damage that would accrue to the Bureau of
Standards as two-fold. First would be the reluctance of
agency heads to request research at NBS, and second, those

orders which were submitted "might face months of delay"

66. The Washington Post, April 24 and Mayl, 1953.

67. Summary of minutes of meeting of the Applied
Mathematics Advisory Council, May 12, 1953, p.4. NBS
Archives, box 202.

-50-


Were
battery manufacturers and other business concerns unhappy
with the success of Pioneers, Inc. the "public" for whom
NBBB as petitioning? It is most revealing, in this
connection, to note a pronounced dissention which arose in
the Better Business Bureau itself.

Already in 1948, the Better Business Bureau of
Metropolitan Oakland, Inc. was advocating the case of Jess
Ritchie and Pioneers, Inc. to the Bureau of Standards. The
General Manager of the Oakland branch wrote to George Vinal
at NBS in December of that year to make the point that AD-X2
could not fairly be grouped with all the other battery
"“dopes," and to request further tests to settle the issue.
(28)

Early in 1949, following correspondence with the
National Better Business Bureau, Oakland's Mr. Harris
decided to petition the managers of all the branches in the
Better Business Bureau to desist from their practice of
discrediting AD-X2 by including it in ythe category of

useless additives. To substantiate this position, Harris

basis of the fact that the product has not been approved by
the United States Bureau of Standards (sic).

"The “usual procedure-and the one which we must follow
in this case-is to hold everything in abeyance until the
accused manufacturer has an opportunity to make a statement
in his own behalf.

"In this case the statement would have to be that the
product has been approved by the United States Bureau of
Standards, because in its department it is the Supreme
Court." (Hearings, pp. 119-20)

28. Hearings, p.6l.


the worst possible choice. (44)

Senator Hunt criticized the move unambiguously. He
referred to it as "a strong-arm police state method." He
further commented, "Dr.Astin's reputation is ruined. The
reputation of the Bureau is ruined. If they already had his
resignation, why did Weeks come before the committee to
testify?" Senator Wayne Morse (Ind.-Ore.) urged an

investigation, saying "we are not to enter an era in which

political pressure and intimidation are to be brought to
bear upon the NBS in order to force the Bureau to produce
scientific findings that would justify placing the word
'scientific' in quotation marks." And Senator Bennett
(R-Utah) saw the ouster occuring because "the President
wanted his own man in the job."(45)

The resignation quickly became the topic of news and
commentary in newspapers around the country. The Washington
Post promptly suggested Eisenhower himself investigate the
dismissal, which was bound to hurt the morale of government

scientists, and accused Weeks of "shooting from the hip."

44. Hearings, pp.1-8. In an interesting twist, the
(Washington) Evening Star opined that the only way for Weeks
to gain vindication for Astin's dismissal was to find a
scapegoat, and the most likely candidate was Sheaffer.

45. Federation of American Scientists, press release,
April 4, 1953. NBS Archives, box 202. Morse called for a
"full scale investigation of the Astin case by the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce..." (Congressional Record,
1953, p.A2086)

x


testimony by the Secretary and his Assistant - on the same
day that Astin's resignation was announced - was to
establish a tactical beachhead for the dismissal. But
firing the first shot proved more effective in waking the

enemy, than in disbursing them.

Weeks' battle-plan was to lay out all the 'evidence' as
he saw it, and establish a rhetoric of outrage whereby
republican values were being brutalized by a decadent
bureaucracy. While those bodies with sanctioning power,
namely the Post Office and FTC, were mentioned obliquely,
the dark center of deceit lay in the Bureau of Standards.
Weeks appeared ready to confess the evil perpetrated by a
branch of his own department, wishing only to make
recompense.

Astin's dismissal was not mentioned in prepared
testimony, but only came up in subsequent questioning. When
the issue was broached first by Senator Leverett Saltonstall
(R-Mass.) and then by Lester Hunt (D-Wyo.), neither Weeks
nor Sheaffer could give any clear reason why Astin was being
removed. The additive controvery, they assured the senators,
was just "one factor in a number of reasons." When pressed
to give those reasons, Sheaffer replied: "We are not
prepared to do so now, sir." If a sacrifice were to be made

on the political altar, Astin, it soon became obvious, was

-36-


served the public and government for over 50 years and
generating almost no controversy. It was now being
scrutinized as a seat of hidden interests and
politically-motivated research. (39)

It came as no surprise that Weeks was very sympathetic
to the cause of Jess Ritchie, and it might be inferred,
then, that he would look critically at the evidence
assembled against AD-X2. But no one, besides Weeks and
Sheaffer, could have guessed the Secretary's opening move in
this controversy.

On March 31, the day on which the Senate Committee
hearings commenced, the announcement came that the Director
of the Bureau of Standards, Dr. Allen Astin, would resign,
effective April 18. Craig Sheaffer had requested Astin's

resignation on March 24. In Dr. Astin's own words:

“When Mr.Sheaffer informed me that the Secretary
desired my resignation, I felt I had no alternative
to submitting it. Unless 5the Director of the
National Bureau of Standards has the full support

and cooperation of the Secretary of Commerce, the

39. For example, Congressman Harold Hagen of
Minnesota, in calling for an investigation of the Bureau,
pointed to suggestions of an arrogant bureaucracy and links
between established industries and Government scientists. He
also indicated that Astin's dismissal could not be
attributed to party influence, since Astin had been a
registered Republican in Maryland for more than a decade.
(Congressional Record for 1953, pp.A2333, A2334)

=83%


closely tied to division supervision. The committee
recommended strengthening and expanding the Associate
Director level.(see Appendix E)
Sinclair Weeks warmly received the Kelly report.
"T am in complete accord with the views of the
Evaluation Committee of the high level of importance
to the nation of the Bureau of Standards and of the
need for strengthening the Bureau so that in its
performance it measures up to this level. I shall do
all in my power to aid in the strengthening of the
Bureau so that it can fully discharge its
responsibilities to the nation."(61)
Inr
eality, support for the Bureau was not so generous. A second
evaluation committee, again chaired by Mervin Kelly, made
its report to the Secretary of Commerce (still Weeks) in
March of 1960. It found a serious deficiency in funding
during the intervening years, and recommended increasing the
professional staff by 15% in following years to achieve a

doubling of the 1960 level. (62)

61. Dept. of Commerce, press release, Oct. 16, 1953.
NBS Archives, box 202.

62. "The Role of the Department of Commerce in Science
and Technology: A Report to the Secretary of Commerce by a
Special Advisory Committee of the National Academy of
Sciences," March 2, 1960, pp.5,6, and 92-96. NBS Archives,
Administrative History File, box 1. See Appendix E for
Bureau Organizational Charts for 1953 and 1960, and budget
graphs.

=AT=


there were no additives shown to be of value for improving
the performance and prolonging the life of storage
batteries. The NBBB had produced its own circular, "Battery
Compounds and Solutions-An Important Statement on the
Subject of Battery Additives from the National Bureau of
Standards," which not only quoted from a statement issued by
Edward Condon (1949) on the subject, but pointedly mentioned
that battery guarantees were voided by the introduction of
such additives. Companies such as Exide Batteries,
Globe-Union (another manufacturer) and Atlas Supply were

responding to customer enquiries with this circular. (32)

The NBBB, however, did not consider this a potent
enough message. At NBBB's urging, Edward Condon allowed a
special statement to be made public, wherein the Bureau of
Standards censured AD-X2 by name. The statement refers to
recent testing on AD-X2 which makes it clear that it is not
essentially different from the general sodium sulphate and
magnesium sulphate preparations with which it had been
classed, that bench tests (over a six-month period) showed
no benefit, and that the results of field tests not done at
the Bureau corroborated the negative finding. In sum, the
recent tests showed no reason for the Bureau to alter the

findings in Letter Circular 302. (33)

32. Hearings, pp.86-89.

33. Hearings, pp.549-51. This is part of an updated
circular issued bv NBBB, "Battery Compounds and Solutions,"
issued in August, 1950. The go-ahead was given by Condon in

20


matter. On April 15, Detlev Bronk, President of the National
Academy of Sciences, told Weeks it would be best to retain
Astin, at least until an inquiry could be completed.(49) By
April 17, reports were emerging that approximately 400
scientists and technicians would leave the Bureau of

Standards if Astin's resignation became effective.(50) The

concludes with strong editorials appearing first in
technical journals (Steel, Product Engineering, and Chemical
and Engineering News) and then the popular press (Washington
Post, Washington Evening Star, and New York Times).
(Congressional Record, 1953, pp. A2037-A2041)

Senator Harley Kilgore (D-W.Va.) made a similar
proposal in a public speech given April 29, 1953. (The
Evening Star, April 30.) Kilgore suggested placing the
Bureau under the policy guidance of politically-insulated
scientists from government, industry, and universities. Sen.
Kilgore had also been prominent in the debates to determine
a federal science policy in the mid-40s. His concept of a
National Science Foundation, at that time, called for direct
control by the Executive branch, and a research agenda
designed for the social good. (Kevles, op.cit. pp.343-48)

49. Federation of American Scientists, circular
#A-994,May 22, 1953. NBS Archives, box 202.

50. The Washington Post stated on April 13 that
"{mJore than 50 scientists, many of them key men, have
submitted undated written resignations to their division
chiefs..." pending dramatic action by Secretary Weeks. The
article also reported uneasiness among scientists at the
National Institute of Health, the Naval Research Laboratory
and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. Further,
"[rlepresentatives of an electronics and a chemical firm
have been around the bureau during the past week asking for
a crack at any personnel who might leave. A high Pentagon
official, for whose department the bureau has performed
millions of dollars worth of research and development, said
he has been trying to calm the group down. However, he
added, it is common knowledge that any of the group can
command twice their salary merely by transferring their
research efforts to private industry."

By April 17, The Evening Star reported that a secret
poll conducted by Bureau division chiefs showed about 400
scientists and top technicians would probably leave, with
one Bureau official adding "I would not be surprised if it
were not twice [that] number." Among the effects of such a
massive departure, "[t]he bureau unit working on projects
for the Atomic Energy Commission would be virtually
destroyed."

=40=


Issues and Influences: Consequences for the Bureau

In the spring and summer of 1953 the National Academy
of Sciences assembled two committees (at the request of
Secretary Weeks) to investigate the National Bureau of
Standards. The first, commonly referred to as the Kelly
Committee, was formally the "Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation
of the present Functions and Operations of the National
Bureau of Standards." Organized in April, the Kelly
Committee made its final report to the Secretary of Commerce
on October 15, 1953. The "Committee on Battery Additives,"
received its assignment from the Academy in July "to
consider the work of the Bureau of Standards relating to
Battery AD-X2..." and made its final report on October 30 of
the same year. (54)

These panels of experts provided a needed political
buffer for Weeks, and he made frequent mention that his
decisions would come pending their findings. The Battery
Additives (Jefferies) Committee stated forthrightly in their
report that their assignment was not to conduct a new series

of laboratory tests, but rather to evaluate the many tests

34. "A Report...by the Ad Hoc Committee...",
op.cit.(note 9), hereafter, Kelly Comm.Rept.

"Report of the Committee on Battery Additives of the
National Academy of Sciences," hereafter, Jeffries Comm.
Rept., NBS Archives, box 682.

Mervin J. Kelly, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee was
at the time President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, and
Zay Jeffries, Chairman of the Battery Additives Committee
was a retired vice-president of General Electric Co.

For detail on committee memberships, se Appendix C.

aos


the history of the situation and the merits of those

associated with AD-X2, Harris finally got to the point.

"Here, Ken, is the issue as I see it. In my opinion,
neither you nor the National Better Business Bureau

nor any other organization in God's green earth have

the right to participate in preventing a man from
carrying on free enterprise by direct or indirect
means unless there is a reasonable basis for such an

action..." (30)

Such

passion cannot simply be dismissed as the vitriol of a
frustrated and ambitious bureaucrat. It is obvious on
reading the statements of the many parties enlisted in
Ritchie's crusade that they were truly convinced that this
product had merit, and that there was something akin to a
hideous conspiracy which had combined to hedge up the way of
free enterprise. (31)

Indeed, it was not simply a matter of the National
Better Business Bureau replying to the queries of

individuals that, in the opinion of the Bureau of Standards,

30. Hearings, pp 77-79.

31. This aspect of the controversy is considered more
fully below ( ). Without an appreciation of the
conviction and missionary zeal of the protagonists it is not
possible to fully explain their effect on members of
Congress and the public.

a2


said he had personally interviewed Ritchie, Randall, and
even Dr.F.G.Sawyer, associate editor of Chemical and

Engineering News, and that they all confirmed the unique

action of this additive in storage batteries. He also listed
a number of commercial customers of Pioneers, whom he had
interviewed. In addition, "[n]Jumerous attempts have been
made by Pioneers, Inc., Dr. Merle Randall, Senator William
Knowland, and I (sic), to get the Bureau of Standards
through the Chief of Electro-Chemistry Division, Dr. George
W. Vinal, to give this product a fair test to either prove
or disprove the statements made in this Circular. (ties 302]
In every case, the only courtesy received from the Bureau of
Standards has been a statement that further test is
unnecessary in that the product is admitted by its
manufacturers to contain sodium sulphate and magnesium
sulphate." (29)

Several months later Harris changed his strategy, this
time addressing only the western states branches of the
Better Business Bureau and trying to establish a regional
solidarity which might more effectively influence the
national office. It can be assumed that neither of these
tactics elicited the desired response, for in August of
1949, Harris wrote again to Ken Willson of the national

office. After a long 'introduction.' in which he rehearsed

29. Hearings, p.76.
-27-


The New York Times said the forced resignation had

"mushroomed into one of the most embarrassing political
incidents the Eisenhower Administration [had] yet faced."
The Times also took exception to a part of Weeks' testimony
which would stigmatize the entire Administration, namely
that the Bureau had "not been sufficiently objective,
because they discount entirely the play of the market
place..."(46)

The Washington Post (Sept.27, 1953) considered that
simple catch-phrase, "the play of the marketplace," to be
"the explosive ingredient that set off the chain reaction in
scientific circles." That, in fact, is not simply hyperbole.
The scientific community would likely have strenuously
protested Astin's firing regardless of the language used.
But since Week's never leveled a substantive complaint

(besides the disagreement over AD-X2 and a nebulous

assertion of differences in administrative policy) against
Astin, the real contention was crystallized in this bald
statement. This made it particularly easy for the scientific
community to take an ideological stance against which there
was no defense. Grant Olson, an assistant whom Sheaffer had
brought with him, was the reputed author of the of fending
phrase. He left Commerce with his boss in the fall of '53.

(Wash. Post, Nov.29,1953)

46. Hearings, p.3.

-38-


following day the press announced that Astin would stay on
at NBS until late summer or early fall.(51)

Secretary Weeks appended the postponement announcement
with the observation that there was no question that Astin
would be asked to leave the Bureau, but that it would be
useful to have him continue until the investigation was
completed. Weeks added that he was "authorized to say" Astin
would be offered another comparable position. (52)

Meanwhile, political cartoonists were finding the
‘Astin case' an apt metaphor for broader failings of the new
administration (see Appendix B). On August 22, Weeks
announced, "No further need exists to seek a successor {for
NBS
Director] as Dr.Astin has expressed his willingness and
desire to continue as a key official of this Administration

and as such he is from here on a member of my team."(53)

51. The following situation, involving an unnamed
Bureau scientist called in to meet with Sinclair Weeks
during the controversy, was recounted years later:

"...as he came into the office, the Secretary got up
and came around his desk and greeted him and the first thing
out of his mouth was 'I am so glad you are here, I wanted to
assure you that under no circumstances should the staff of
the Bureau be concerned about the stability of their jobs."
And he [the scientist] said...'Sir, I'm afraid you
misunderstand. It isn't a question of whether the staff is
worried about losing their jobs, but the question now is
whether they still want to work for the Bureau.'" (Oral
History Interview of Dr.A.V.Astin, July 12, 1983, NBS
Archives. The instance was cited by Walter Weinstein.)

52. -While Weeks did not say who had made the
authorization, The Washington Post reported that it was
known that considerable pressure had come from the White
House to back down on the dismissal. Soon afterward,
Eisenhower emphasized in a press conference that he expected
his administration to be fair, just and decent in relations
with career employes, and no dismissals should be made just
to bring in a favored individual.(Post, April 26).

53. The New York Times, Aug.22, 1953.

-41-