alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Vassam *v.*Hamilton.

Appeals — Causes Stricken from the Docket.

Parties to a cause which is stricken from the docket upon the order of the court are out of court; the effect of such order is the same as if the appeal had been dismissed.

October 7, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

This case was stricken from the docket at the last term, and that order' is beyond the control of the court; and as we can neither set it aside nor disregard it, the only question raised by the motion of counsel for appellants is whether the order is, in effect, a dismissal of the appeal. Certainly after the order was made the appellees were not bound to take notice of what was being done in court, any more than if the appeal had been dismissed. If, after a case has been stricken from the docket, the court may at a subsequent term order it to be redocketed, and allow the appeal to proceed as if no order, had been made, it would be impossible to say when this power of the court would cease; and parties would never be able to know, in such cases, when their rights were settled. We think it is clear that the parties are out of court, just as if, instead of striking the cause from the docket, the appeal had been dismissed.

Motion *overruled.*
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL NO. 12-00220-CG

REGINALD GARNOR NETTLES

ORDER

On April 2, 2013, following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the court 

found the defendant not guilty only by reason of insanity of the charge of 

assaulting a federal employee by means and use of a pistol, while the 

employee was engaged in the performance of his official duties, a violation of 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 111(a) and (b). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

4243(b), the court ordered that the defendant be examined for a 

determination of whether or not the defendant is suffering from a mental 

disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial 

risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of 

another (Doc. 33). 

Following receipt of the report of examination from the Federal 

Medical Center at Butner, North Carolina, the court held a hearing this date 

pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 4243(c). Because the 

nature of the offense involved substantial risk of involving bodily injury to 

Case 1:12-cr-00220-CG-B Document 40 Filed 11/06/13 Page 1 of 2
2

another person, the defendant had the burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk to 

bodily injury to another person or serious damage of property of another due 

to a present mental disease or defect. The defendant presented his own 

testimony and that of his mother. Both of them were of the opinion that if 

the stays on his medicine and is watched over by his mother, he will not be a 

danger to anyone. The defendant did state, however, that he had not stopped 

taking his medications when the incident occurred that resulted in the 

assault charge.

As stated orally at the conclusion of the hearing, based on the report 

of examination from the federal medical center and the testimony presented, 

the court finds that the defendant has not proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury 

to another person or serious damage of property of another due to the present 

mental disease or defect. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant is committed to the 

custody of the Attorney General pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 

4243(e).

DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 2013.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:12-cr-00220-CG-B Document 40 Filed 11/06/13 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 169 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 169

   To direct the United States Postal Service to designate a single, 
    unique ZIP Code for Fairlawn, Virginia, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 9, 2023

 Mr. Griffith introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To direct the United States Postal Service to designate a single, 
    unique ZIP Code for Fairlawn, Virginia, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ZIP CODE FOR FAIRLAWN, VIRGINIA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Commonwealth of Virginia is the only State in the 
        United States where all cities are independent from their 
        surrounding counties;
            (2) these independent cities are not politically a part of 
        the surrounding counties, even if they are located within their 
        borders;
            (3) in Virginia these independent cities are subject to 
        separate revenue collection and distribution practices related 
        to roads, resources, and sales tax than neighboring counties;
            (4) the sales tax collected from electronic commerce from 
        the unincorporated community of Fairlawn, Virginia, located in 
        Pulaski County, is often misallocated to the independent city 
        of Radford, Virginia, because they share the same ZIP Codes; 
        and
            (5) Fairlawn, Virginia, should be eligible to obtain a 
        separate and unique ZIP Code from the neighboring independent 
        city of Radford, Virginia, for tax purposes.
    (b) ZIP Code Designation.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the United States Postal Service shall 
designate a single, unique ZIP Code applicable to Fairlawn, Virginia.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Company's
interim consolidated financial statements and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-29-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-04-1997
<CASH>                                          36,091
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   33,189
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    139,104
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               222,372
<PP&E>                                         885,215
<DEPRECIATION>                                 428,572
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,122,475
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          186,557
<BONDS>                                        600,209
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           41,031
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           100
<OTHER-SE>                                    (75,029)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,122,475
<SALES>                                      1,797,386
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,797,386
<CGS>                                        1,248,994
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,248,994
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               591,390
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              81,252
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (124,250)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (18,108)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (106,142)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (107,173)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (10.72)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### James Miles *v.*Commonwealth.

Criminal Law — Indictment.

An indictment for executing a forged note is fatally defective, when it fails to allege that the note was not a genuine note, or that the accused knew it to have been a forgery.

APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT.

February 25, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The indictment is fatally defective. There is no allegation or statement that the note executed on September 13, 1871, was not a *386genuine note, or that the accused knew') it to have been a forgery when he exchanged it for the note originally given. It is stated, by way of inducement, etc., that the accused falsely represented the note to be a year issue note, but it nowhere appears by any allegation that it was not such a note as the appellant represented it to be. The facts alleged, if conceded to exist, constitute no public offense, and the motion to arrest the judgment should have been sustained.

*John S. Ducker, for appellant.*

*J. Rodman, for appellee.*

The judgment is *reversed*and cause remanded with directions to award the appellant a new trial, and for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
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ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

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IT IS SO ORDERED



1

Judge’s signature

-


1

(if different from order date) Printed name and title

 Southern District of Alabama

WILSON EDWARD STAMPS, JR. 12-00126-001

12653-003

12-11-2012

Pro Se

✔

✔

87 70 months

12-11-2012

03-30-2015

11-01-2015 United States District Judge

Callie V.S. Granade 

U.S. District Judge

Digitally signed by Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge 

DN: cn=Callie V.S. Granade U.S. District Judge, o=U.S. 

Government, ou=Federal Judiciary, 

email=efile_granade@alsd.uscourts.gov, c=US 

Date: 2015.03.26 12:52:17 -06'00'

Case 1:12-cr-00126-CG-N Document 55 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 1
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CEO PURSUANT TO**

 

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

**As AdoptedPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

Inconnection with the report of Gaiam, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lynn Powers,Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that tomy knowledge:

 

(1)     The Report fully complies with therequirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934; and

 

(2)     The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

Date:  March 12, 2010

 
|   | /s/  Lynn Powers               |
|--------|--------------------------------|
|   | Lynn  Powers                   |
|   | Chief  Executive Officer       |
|   | (Principal  Executive Officer) |

 

----
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RUFUS ENGLISH, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0312-WS-B

 )

CSA EQUIPMENT COMPANY LLC, )

 )

Defendant. )

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered on this date, granting defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. 45), it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that this action be, and the

same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00312-WS-B Document 64 Filed 08/22/06 Page 1 of 1
#### S. H. Sandifer *v.*John H. Williams.

W arranty — Eviction—Recovery.

A grantee under a warranty can only recover where be has been evicted and not then beyond the amount paid by him to secure good title.

*780APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

October 20, 1876.

*L. P. Little, for appellant. McFarland & Tharp, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Cofer :

The cross-petition is fatally defective. The allegation that the appellee was compelled to repurchase from McCain is too vague and uncertain. It is not pretended that the appellee had been evicted by a paramount title, nor that he appellant had no title. One or the other was certainly necessary in order to show a right of action, even if the title was warranted by the appellant. But it is not alleged that he warranted the title, and unless he did so he is not liable, unless he had no title at all, which is not claimed.

The appellee took possession under the appellant, and even if the appellant warranted the title, the appellee, not having been evicted, could not recover beyond the amount paid for the repurchase of the lease. He does not state how much he paid McCain, nor, indeed, that he paid him anything, and unless he did he has no right to recover back any part of the purchase money paid to the appellee.

The facts stated did not warrant a judgment for the alleged failure to build a tobacco barn. The contract as stated was to build a tobacco barn, but it is not stated that any particular description of a barn was to be built, nor what it would have been worth to build such a barn as was contemplated by the parties. If the appellee has a right to recover at all, he is not entitled to what it cost,him to build it, but to what it was reasonably worth.

Judgment *reversed,*and cause remanded, for further proceedings.
#### D. M. Bowman, et al., *v.*McBrayer, Trapnell & Co.

Corporation, Contracts of — Evidence, Admissibility of.

Where a note does not purport to .bind a corporation or point to its funds as the source from which it is to be paid, the use of the personal possessive “we” rebuts the presumption arising from the subsequent descriptive words “president and directors,” and imparts an individual obligation on those signing it.

Evidence, Admissibility of.

In the absence of fraud or mistake the intention of the parties to a written contract must be gathered from the writing, and parol evidence is inadmissible to show that the appellees did not so understand the note.

*16APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT.

June 26, 1874.

*Kyle & Poston, for appellants.*

*J. C. Thompson, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

In the case of *Yowell v. Dodd, et al.,*3 Bush 581, the promise was by the “president and directors” of the corporation. The directors constituted the corporate representatives of the turnpike company, and when they spoke in their corporate capacity, the conclusion was clear that they meant to bind the corporation, and not themselves, and there was nothing in the body of the note to rebut that presumption.

In the note in this case, the use of the personal possessive “we,” rebuts the presumption arising from the subsequent use of the descriptive words, “president and directors,” and necessarily imparts an individual obligation upon the part of each person signing the note.

This note differs from the notes considered in the cases of *Whitney v. Sudduth, et al.,*4 Met. 67, and *Trask v. Roberts,*1 B. Mon. 201, in the fact that in those notes the promise was several, as well as joint, but the reasoning in those cases is clearly applicable here.

The note sued on does not purport to bind the turnpike company, nor does it point to the funds of the company as the source from which it is to be paid. In the absence of fraud or mistake, the intention of parties to a written contract must be gathered from the writing. Hence the averments of the answer to the effect that appellants did not intend to bind themselves individually, and that appellees did not so understand the note, were inadmissible.

The demurrer was properly *sustained.*

Judgment *affirmed.*
**Exhibit 31.1**
***CERTIFICATION***
I, B. Michael Adler, President and Chief Executive Officer of WorldQuestNetworks, Inc. certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of WorldQuestNetworks, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; and  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
 a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared;  b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered bythis report based on such evaluation; and  c. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and
 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):
 a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses inthe design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: April 30, 2004
By:      /s/ B. Michael Adler                    
B. Michael Adler
#### ALBANO v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1153.

United States District Court D. Massachusetts.

June 7, 1951.

Harry Kisloff, Boston, Mass., for libel-lant.

George F. Garrity, U. S. Atty., and Edward O. Gourdin, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Boston, Mass., for respondent.

SWEENEY, Chief Justice.

This is a libel filed with two counts, the first for an alleged injury suffered while employed as a seaman aboard a merchant vessel of the United States, which injury is allegedly covered by the Second Seamen’s War Risk Policy, and the second count is for cure and maintenance.

On June 1, 1943, the libellant was employed as a seaman aboard the SS Joseph H. Hollister on a trip to Scotland and return. He had been a seaman for fifteen years or more. He is now suffering from a disability diagnosed as a psyehoneurosis. He has made various claims as to how *151this condition arose, none of which seems to be too clear, his last contention, when on the stand, being that depth charges which were exploded during the voyage across, and the firing of an eight-inch gun aboard his vessel on three different occasions, caused him to lose consciousness because he was, in his own expression, ■“scared stiff.” His ship was never actually in contact with any enemy and such firing as was done was in the nature of practice. On his return to New York on July 31, 1943, he did not feel well and he came home and stayed at home for three or four weeks, after which he went to the Brighton Marine Hospital where, after hospitalization, the diagnosis of psychoneurosis was made.

As to his first cause of action for injuries suffered aboard ship, I must rule as a matter of law that they are not covered by the policy. Article 12D of the policy provides as follows: “Disability shall not include incapacity directly resulting from bodily or mental infirmity or disease of any kind. Nor shall benefits be paid for dismemberment or loss of function directly resulting from bodily or mental infirmity or disease of any kind.” Even if the policy did not rule his present disability out, I could not find as a matter of fact that his present condition was traceable to anything which occurred aboard the vessel which would be covered by the policy.

From the foregoing I conclude and rule that judgment on the first cause of action must be in favor of the respondent.

As to the second cause of action, I find that the libellant’s disability either arose or, having been latent, was activated while he was in the employ of the vessel, and that he is entitled to be cured and maintained at the expense of the respondent. He has had his treatment without cost at the Marine Hospital, and I find that he was disabled for about six weeks after his discharge from the hospital to the extent that he could not perform his regular duties. On the basis of this, I conclude and rule that the libellant is entitled to judgment .against the respondent in the sum of $252.