[Cite as State v. Briskey, 2012-Ohio-5340.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) CASE NO. 12 MA 63 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

) 

VS. ) O P I N I O N 

) 

RAYMOND BRISKEY, ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Youngstown 

Municipal Court, Case No. 11TRD3059. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; 

Remanded. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Dana Lantz 

Prosecuting Attorney 

26 South Phelps Street 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney John Ams 

134 Westchester Drive 

Youngstown, Ohio 44515 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Dated: November 14, 2012 
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VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Raymond Briskey appeals from the sentences 

entered in two misdemeanor cases. First, he argues that because the court is 

explicitly precluded from imposing jail for an unclassified misdemeanor, the court was 

not permitted to impose probation either because the main remedy for a probation 

violation is jail time. However, the statutes defining the offenses specifically order the 

sentencing court to apply certain sentencing statutes, which contain the option of 

probation, and jail is not the only option for a future probation violation. Consequently, 

the court was permitted to impose probation as part of its sentence. 

{¶2} Next, appellant contends that the court erred by setting a show cause 

hearing merely in order to ascertain if he was performing the court-ordered community 

service. He posits that if the court erred in setting the hearing, then the court’s setting 

of bond in the form of electronic monitoring house arrest (EMHA) was also erroneous. 

We conclude that the setting of a status hearing to ensure compliance with the 

sentence was permissible, but labeling it a show cause hearing in order to impose 

EMHA bond was not. 

{¶3} In accordance, the imposition of probation is affirmed. However, the 

portion of the sentencing entry setting the case for a show cause hearing is reversed, 

and the case is remanded for the trial court to relabel the contempt hearing as a status 

hearing and to eliminate the EMHA bond as it represents security for a contempt 

hearing set in the absence of any charge of contempt. On remand, the trial court may 

consider whether it wishes to impose EMHA as part of appellant’s sentence pursuant 

to R.C. 2929.27(A)(2). 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶4} In case number 11TRD3059, appellant was charged with driving under 

suspension (DUS) and impeding the flow of traffic. On March 21, 2012, appellant pled 

no contest to DUS (financial responsibility) in violation of R.C. 4510.16, and the state 

dismissed the other charge. The court imposed a $100 fine and $100 as 

reimbursement for community control supervision. The court stated that the financial 

sanctions were to be paid by community service, as had been requested by appellant 
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at sentencing. Eighty hours of community service were required. The court then 

imposed two years of probation, making it a reporting probation until the sanctions 

were paid and appellant produced a valid driver’s license. Additionally, the court set 

the matter for a May 18, 2012 show cause hearing to determine appellant’s progress 

toward his community service obligation and imposed electronic monitoring house 

arrest (EMHA) as bond. (Tr. 11). 

{¶5} In case number 12TRD689, appellant was charged with DUS, a seatbelt 

violation, and a traffic control signal violation. On March 21, 2012, appellant pled no 

contest to DUS (failure to reinstate) in violation of R.C. 4510.21, and the state 

dismissed the other two charges. The court imposed the same sentence in this case 

as it imposed in the other DUS case. 

{¶6} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, attaching both sentencing 

entries. His sentence has been stayed pending appeal. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

{¶7} Appellant sets forth two assignments of error, the first of which provides: 

{¶8} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO 

A PERIOD OF PROBATION FOR VIOLATIONS OF UNCLASSIFIED 

MISDEMEANORS UNDER REVISED CODE SECTIONS 4510.16 AND 4510.21.” 

{¶9} The sentencing court stated that both of appellant’s DUS offenses were 

unclassified misdemeanors. See R.C. 4510.16(D)(1); 4510.21(C)(1). Both statutes 

contain the following sentencing provisions: 

{¶10} “When the offense is an unclassified misdemeanor, the offender shall be 

sentenced pursuant to sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, except that 

the offender shall not be sentenced to a jail term; the offender shall not be sentenced 

to a community residential sanction pursuant to section 2929.26 of the Revised Code; 

notwithstanding division (A)(2)(a) of section 2929.28 of the Revised Code, the offender 

may be fined up to one thousand dollars; and, notwithstanding division (A)(3) of 

section 2929.27 of the Revised Code, the offender may be ordered pursuant to 

division (C) of that section to serve a term of community service of up to five hundred 

hours. The failure of an offender to complete a term of community service imposed by 

the court may be punished as indirect criminal contempt under division (A) of section 
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2705.02 of the Revised Code that may be filed in the underlying case.” R.C. 4510.16 

(D)(1); 4510.21(C)(1). 

{¶11} Appellant argues that the maximum sentence for these unclassified 

misdemeanors is 500 hours of community service plus a $1,000 fine. He reasons that 

since jail time is not permitted, probation is necessarily not permitted because the 

court would be unable to impose the final sanction of jail time in the case of probation 

violations. See R.C. 2929.25(D)(2) (court options upon probation violation), (a) (longer 

term of probation), (b) (more restrictive terms), or (c) (a combination of sanctions 

including jail time), (D)(3) (if jail is imposed, the total time cannot exceed the maximum 

available jail term for the offense). He notes that the failure to complete community 

service can be remedied by indirect contempt as permitted by the aforequoted statutes 

and that any failure to pay a fine can be enforced as a judgment under R.C. 

2929.28(D). 

{¶12} The statutes defining these offenses and characterizing them as 

unclassified misdemeanors specifically provide that the court “shall” sentence the 

offender pursuant to R.C. 2929.21 through 2929.28. See R.C. 4510.16(D)(1); 

4510.21(C)(1). Those cited statutes explicitly contain probation as a permissible 

sentencing option for all misdemeanors except minor misdemeanors. For instance, 

R.C. 2929.27 lists probation as one of the nonresidential sanctions that a sentencing 

court can impose. R.C. 2929.27(A)(5)-(6). 

{¶13} Moreover, R.C. 2929.25, provides that in sentencing for a misdemeanor, 

other than a minor misdemeanor, the court may impose community control or it may 

impose a suspended jail sentence with community control. R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a)-(b). 

Merely because the second option is eliminated by the unclassified misdemeanor 

statutes pertinent to this case does not eliminate the first option. 

{¶14} Similarly, upon a probation violation, the court may choose to impose a 

longer probation term, make the terms more restrictive, or impose a combination of 

sanctions including jail. R.C. 2929.15(A)(3)(a)-(c), (D)(2)(a)-(c). Merely because a 

court is unable to exercise all of the parts of the third option upon a probation violation 

would not eliminate the court’s discretion to impose probation. The court still has 
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power, upon a probation violation, to impose a longer term of probation or to impose 

more restrictive terms. R.C. 2929.25(D)(2)(a)-(b). 

{¶15} In fact, the sentencing court is expressly provided with the discretion to 

determine the most effective ways to achieve the purposes and principles of 

misdemeanor sentencing by imposing any sanction provided in R.C. 2929.14 through 

2929.28, unless a sanction is specifically required or specifically precluded from being 

imposed by the section setting forth the offense. R.C. 2929.21(A). The statute setting 

forth the offenses here provides certain exceptions to the sentencing provisions of 

R.C. 2929.21 through R.C. 2929.28. R.C. 4510.16(D)(1); 4510.21(C)(1). For 

example, the statutes eliminate any right to impose jail and community residential 

sanctions. Id. However, they do not eliminate the right to impose probation. As other 

sentencing options are specifically excluded, we cannot infer that probation is implicitly 

excluded. 

{¶16} In fact, the statute cited by appellant in support of his argument that the 

court has options besides probation for ensuring his compliance, clearly explains that 

the collection remedy for unpaid fines is a supplemental civil remedy that does not 

preclude enforcement of the criminal sanctions. R.C. 2929.28(E). In any event, the 

fact that there is a collection procedure or the fact that the statutes defining the 

offenses provide a contempt remedy for failing to complete community service does 

not correlate with the argument that probation is unavailable. 

{¶17} And, contrary to appellant’s suggestion, the court did not impose two 

years of probation merely to ensure that he completes his community service/pays his 

fine; rather, it was made reporting until he finished his service and produced a valid 

driver’s license. Moreover, the statute’s reference to 500 hours of community service 

and a $1,000 fine are listed merely as exceptions to the standard statutory provisions 

that typically allow these amounts only for first degree misdemeanors. See R.C. 

2929.27(A)(1)(3) (500 hours for M1, 200 hours for others); R.C. 2929.28(A)(2)(a)(1) 

($1,000 fine for M1). Allowing such punishment for these unclassified misdemeanors 

does not set the parameters of the entire sentence but merely allows punishment 

equivalent to a first degree misdemeanor in these specified categories of sanctions. 
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{¶18} Finally, as aforementioned, these amounts are expressly set forth as 

exceptions to the general sentencing statutes, and the sentencing court “shall” apply 

the general sentencing statutes (which contain the option of probation) to these 

unclassified misdemeanors. R.C. 4510.16(D)(1); R.C. 4510.21(C)(1); R.C. 

2929.22(A), (C); R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a); R.C. 2929.27(A)(5)-(6). Accordingly, this 

assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

{¶19} Appellant’s second assignment of error provides: 

{¶20} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT PLACED APPELLANT ON 

EMHA BOND AND SET A SHOW CAUSE HEARING WHERE APPELLANT HAD NOT 

VIOLATED ANY COURT ORDER.” 

{¶21} The trial court explained at the sentencing hearing that the matter was 

being set for a show cause hearing to make sure appellant complies with his sentence. 

Defense counsel queried, “just so I am clear, this is a show cause in case he doesn’t 

complete the community service[?]” The court responded, “We are going to come 

back and see if he has done what he is supposed to, if not, he is facing additional 

contempt which could means 30 more days in each of the cases. Do you understand 

that.” (Tr. 11). 

{¶22} The reference to “additional contempt” dealt with the fact that while out 

on his bond for the first offense, he violated EMHA and was held in contempt. As he 

was sentenced to thirty days in jail on that contempt, the current show cause hearing 

and EMHA bond is not related to that prior contempt. Rather, the sentencing entries 

for the DUS offenses both contain the order that the case would be set for a show 

cause hearing and that his bond pending that hearing would be EMHA. 

{¶23} Appellant points out that a show cause hearing is held to ascertain the 

validity of a claim that someone is in contempt. See R.C. 2705.03. Appellant argues 

that the sentencing court’s setting of a show cause hearing was premature and 

improper where there was no allegation that he was in contempt of the sentencing 

order. See R.C. 2705.02 (listing the acts that could result in contempt, such as 

disobedience of a court order). Appellant states that he is being preemptively 

punished with bond in the form of EMHA merely because the court is concerned that 
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he may not complete the community service that was ordered that very day. He 

concludes that there was no justification for a show cause hearing and thus there was 

no justification for bond after sentencing. 

{¶24} Appellant’s argument has merit. Appellant is not alleged to have 

disobeyed a court order. See R.C. 2705.02(A)(1). Even if he had, a charge in writing 

must be filed with the clerk before he can be ordered to appear for the hearing on the 

alleged contempt and bond set. See R.C. 2705.03 (charge is filed in writing); R.C. 

2705.04 (court can set bond on contempt charge). Here, the court is preemptively 

using the contempt framework to ascertain compliance with a sentence. 

{¶25} As aforementioned, the court can use indirect criminal contempt under 

R.C. 2705.02(A) to punish for failure to complete community service for these 

unclassified misdemeanors. R.C. 4510.16(D)(1); R.C. 4510.21(C)(1). Thus, the court 

may be permitted to set a future compliance or status hearing to ensure that the 

community service sentence was completed. However, unless there is an allegation 

and a charge of contempt, the court cannot call the future hearing a show cause 

hearing in order to impose bond pending that hearing. This was the day of sentencing; 

no contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the sentence could have yet 

occurred and was not alleged in any event. 

{¶26} The sentencing court could have imposed EMHA as part of his sentence. 

See R.C. 2929.27(A)(2). But, it did not do so. Instead it used EMHA as bond pending 

a mislabeled “show cause” hearing to ensure compliance with a sentence (without any 

allegation of non-compliance). 

{¶27} “Bail is security for the appearance of an accused to appear and answer 

to a specific criminal or quasi-criminal charge in any court * * *.” (Emphasis 

added). R.C. 2937.22(A). Crim.R. 46(H) provides that the same bond continues until 

the verdict or guilty plea and furthers provides: “In the discretion of the court, the 

same bond may also continue pending sentence or disposition of the case on review. 

Any provision of a bond or similar instrument that is contrary to this rule is void.” 

Crim.R. 46(H). 

{¶28} This was not a continuation of bond as the prior bond had been revoked, 

and appellant had been incarcerated at the time of his sentencing. (Tr. 9). Moreover, 
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a final order of sentence was entered, and the bond was not continued for purposes of 

disposition of the case on (appellate) review. After sentencing, there was no “specific 

criminal or quasi-criminal charge” pending. See R.C. 2937.22(A). Had a contempt 

citation issued for failure to complete community service, bond could have been 

required to answer for that quasi-criminal charge. R.C. 2705.04; R.C. 2937.22(A). 

{¶29} However, there was no allegation of contempt here. Thus, the setting of 

a status hearing was permissible, but labeling it a show cause hearing was not. The 

labeling error may at first appear harmless in some cases, but the scheduling of a 

“show cause” hearing places a false allegation on one’s record, especially where the 

court set EMHA bond pending that “show cause” hearing. 

{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, the imposition of probation is affirmed. 

However, the portion of the sentence setting the case for a show cause hearing is 

reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to relabel the contempt hearing 

as a status hearing and eliminate the EMHA bond as it represents security for a 

contempt hearing that had been set in the absence of any charge of contempt. On 

remand, the trial court may consider whether it wishes to impose EMHA as part of 

appellant’s sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.27(A)(2). 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Waite, P.J., concurs.