alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In re Gonzalo GOMEZ-OLIVAS, also known as Anthony M. Flores, Petitioner. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gonzalo Gomez-Olivas, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 00-8082, 00-8094.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

March 22, 2001.

*668Before BRORBY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir.R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

In case No. 00-8082, petitioner asks this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to hear and decide his motion filed in that court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In case No. 00-8094, petitioner seeks review on direct appeal from an order of the district court granting the government an extension of time in which to respond to his § 2255 motion. In the interest of judicial efficiency, we have combined these two matters.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and a petitioner must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to such relief. *Weston v. Mann (In re Weston),*18 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir.1994). With regard to this petition, we note that the § 2255 matter has been pending in the district court for less than six months, an insufficient delay to warrant mandamus relief. *Cf. Johnson v. Rogers,*917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir.1990). The petition for mandamus is therefore DENIED.

Turning to case No. 00-8094, Mr. Gomez-Olivas asks us to review an order of the district court extending the time in *669which the government could respond to his § 2255 motion. The jurisdiction of this court to review decisions of the district court in actions brought under § 2255 is limited—with exceptions not relevant here—to “final decisions” of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; *United States v. Blackwell,*127 F.3d 947, 950-51 (10th Cir.1997). A “final” decision is one that “ ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,*437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (quoting *Catlin v. United States,*324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). Under this standard, it is clear that the order appealed from is not a final decision. Mr. Gomez-Olivas’ motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is GRANTED. This appeal is DISMISSED.

*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir.R. 36.3.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re: )

 )

JAMES EDWARD BAGLEY, ) Bankr. Case No. 05-15195-MAM-7)

 )

Debtor. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0676-WS-B

 )

ORDER

On November 7, 2005, the debtor filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s

order denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The appeal was docketed by the Clerk of

the District Court on November 21, 2005 pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8007. The following day,

the Clerk sent notice to the debtor that the appeal had been docketed. The notice included the

following warning:

All parties are respectfully reminded that their briefs will be due 

within the time schedule set forth by Bankruptcy Rule 8009. Failure to 

comply with the schedule for filing briefs imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 

8009 may result in the imposition of sanctions, up to and including 

dismissal of the appeal.

(Doc. 2). 

“The appellant shall serve and file a brief within 15 days after entry of the appeal on the

docket pursuant to Rule 8007.” Bankr. Rule 8009(a)(1). Thus, the debtor’s brief was due on or

before December 7, 2005. The debtor has not filed a brief. His only effort to prosecute his

appeal is the untimely filing of a written request for transcript, which was an exercise in futility

as no proceedings had been transcribed and none were requested in the filing. (Bankr. Case No.

05-15195-MAM, Doc. 14).

Although the timely filing of an appellate brief is not jurisdictional, dismissal is

appropriate in the event of “bad faith, negligence or indifference.” In re: Beverly Manufacturing

Corp., 778 F.2d 666, 667 (11th Cir. 1985). Dismissal is especially appropriate when there has

been a “complete failure to take any steps other than the mere filing of a notice of appeal.” Id. 

Because the debtor was apprised of the filing requirement, his failure to comply with it for a

period exceeding two months cannot be construed as anything other than negligence or

indifference. His failure to pay the $250 filing fee for the appeal or even to seek relief from that

Case 1:05-cv-00676-WS-B Document 3 Filed 02/03/06 Page 1 of 2
-2-

requirement, even after being notified of the requirement by the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court

in November 2005, (Doc. 1, part 2), suggests indifference as the more likely cause and fully

supports dismissal of the appeal. Cf. In re: Davis, 2001 WL 34113856 (M.D. Fla. 2001)

(dismissing appeal on similar facts). 

For the reasons set forth above, the debtor’s appeal is dismissed.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of February, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00676-WS-B Document 3 Filed 02/03/06 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1555 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1555

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 2300 Sylvan Avenue in Modesto, California, as the ``Corporal Michael 
                D. Anderson Jr. Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 10, 2023

Mr. McClintock (for himself, Mr. Duarte, Mr. Panetta, Mrs. Napolitano, 
Mr. Kiley, Mr. Peters, and Ms. Brownley) introduced the following bill; 
  which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 2300 Sylvan Avenue in Modesto, California, as the ``Corporal Michael 
                D. Anderson Jr. Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CORPORAL MICHAEL D. ANDERSON JR. POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 2300 Sylvan Avenue in Modesto, California, shall be known 
and designated as the ``Corporal Michael D. Anderson Jr. Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Corporal 
Michael D. Anderson Jr. Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20-0576V

UNPUBLISHED

JOHN McFARLAND,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: August 24, 2021

Special Processing Unit (SPU); 

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA)

Jonathan Svitak, Shannon Law Group, Woodbridge, IL, for Petitioner.

Kyle Pozza, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On May 8, 2020, John McFarland filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine 

administration (SIRVA) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine received on October 2, 

2018. Petition at ¶¶ 2, 19. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the 

Office of Special Masters.

On August 24, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 

1. Specifically, it is Respondent’s position that Petitioner had no history of pain, 

inflammation, or dysfunction in his left shoulder; Petitioner’s pain and reduced range of 

1 Because this unpublished Ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required 

to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act 

of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government 

Services). This means the Ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance 

with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, 

the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that 

the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease 

of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa 

(2012).
2

motion occurred within 48 hours of receipt of an intramuscular vaccination; Petitioner’s 

symptoms were limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was administered; and no 

other condition or abnormality has been identified to explain his symptoms. Id. at 4. 

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
##### 



Doral Financial Corporation
Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
 For the year endedMarch 31, 2007Including Interest on DepositsEarnings:Pre-tax income from continuing operations
    
    $
    (31,415
    )Plus:Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)
    
    
    119,879Total Earnings
    
    $
    88,464Fixed Charges:Interest expensed and capitalized
    
    $
    118,905Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
expenses related to indebtedness
    
    
    179An estimate of the interest component within rental expense
    
    
    795Total Fixed Charges
    
    $
    119,879Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
    
    
    (A
    )Excluding Interest on DepositsEarnings:Pre-tax income from continuing operations
    
    $
    (31,415
    )Plus:Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)
    
    
    77,091Total Earnings
    
    $
    45,676Fixed Charges:Interest expensed and capitalized
    
    $
    76,117Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized
expenses related to indebtedness
    
    
    179An estimate of the interest component within rental expense
    
    
    795Total Fixed Charges
    
    $
    77,091Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
    
    
    (A
    )
 
 (A)
    
    Due to the Companys pre-tax loss the ratio coverage was less than 1:1.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**GEORGE WILLIAM CARSON,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 351 MAL 2016** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 28th day of September, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of** 

**Appeal is** DENIED

**.**
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               1
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        257
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     275
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                            190
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             2
<OTHER-SE>                                           5
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       275
<SALES>                                             18
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    25
<CGS>                                               15
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       22
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     1
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  19
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (22)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (22)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (22)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.46)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, Thomas P. Kealy, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of BTU International, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe registrant and we have:a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presentedin this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrols over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: August 16, 2006       /s/ Thomas P. Kealy Thomas P. Kealy    Vice President, Corporate Controller andChief Accounting Officer (principal financial and accountingofficer)
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 183 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 183

 To promote accountability and transparency in future executive orders.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 9, 2023

   Mr. Mann introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To promote accountability and transparency in future executive orders.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NOTIFICATION RESPECTING CERTAIN EXECUTIVE ORDERS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days before issuing a qualifying 
executive order, the President shall transmit to the Congress, and make 
publicly available, a notification with respect to such executive 
order. Such notification shall contain--
            (1) the text of the executive order;
            (2) the Federal law or laws affected by the executive order 
        that is the subject of the notification;
            (3) how the President is working within the parameters 
        specified in Federal law and the Constitution;
            (4) the means by which the executive order will be 
        accomplished, including through any related Federal agencies or 
        departments; and
            (5) a comprehensive list of organizations, businesses, and 
        other parties or entities the President, or the President's 
        designee, engaged with prior to the issuance of such executive 
        order.
    (b) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the President 
shall submit to the Congress a report on the outcome of each qualifying 
executive order issued during the period covered by the report.
    (c) Qualifying Executive Order.--The term ``qualifying executive 
order'' means any executive order (including an executive order that 
revokes or nullifies a previous executive order) issued on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, relating to any policy with respect 
to immigration into the United States.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 13.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the annual report of Internet Gold-Golden Lines Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Doron Turgeman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/ Doron Turgeman


Doron Turgeman


Deputy Chief Executive Officer and


Chief Financial Officer




June 30, 2011




*           The originally executed copy of this Certification will be maintained at the Company’s offices and will be made available for inspection upon request.
#### Oscar R. Looker v. Ada H. Looker.

*Despositions in dirnree suits must be signed.*

Testimony in a divorce suit, taken out of court before a circuit court commissioner, should be read over to the witnesses for correction and authentication by their signatures ; and this precaution should not be waived unless in cases of absolute necessity.

Appeal from Wayne.

Submitted Apr. 6.

Decided Apr. 27.

Bill for divorce. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

*69Wilkinson, *Post & Wilkinson*for complainant.

*B. T. Prentis*and *H. F. Chipman*for defendant.

Marston, C. J.

The complainant obtained the right for an examination of the witnesses in this case in open court. No evidence was introduced on the part of defendant. Some of complainant’s witnesses were sworn and examined in a room adjoining the court room but not in the presence •or hearing of the judge. Defendant’s solicitor assented to this testimony being so taken, while her counsel objected and neither appeared nor cross-examined these witnesses. One witness was examined before the circuit court commissioner, and the signing of the testimony so taken was orally waived by the respective parties. All the above testimony is now •objected to by counsel for defendant.

Where witnesses are examined before a commissioner the testimony should be read over to them for correction and authentication by the signature of the witness. This is a safeguard against mistakes in reducing the testimony to writing that should not be waived to suit the convenience of counsel or witnesses, but only in cases of absolute necessity. In cases of conflict between witnesses, where the depositions are not signed, the court cannot be sure that the evidence would not have been corrected or been different if read over to the witness, corrected and signed, or that the conflict is not caused by ■the mistake of the commissioner in reducing the testimony as given. We should not however reject such evidence, but must receive it with very great caution, and where it is in conflict with other evidence properly authenticated, we must give the latter a controlling effect: *Godfrey v. White*43 Mich. 171.

Even if we strike out the testimony not taken before the commissioner and not in the presence or hearing of the judge, which we are inclined to think should be done, there is still enough left upon which the relief prayed for should be granted.

The decree will be affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.