### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A PR IL23, 200 9 S es sio n JOEY C ONN ER v. C AR MEN CO NN ER

Direc t Appeal fromthe Chancer y Court for Haywood Coun ty No. 11718 GeorgeR. Ellis, Ch ancellor

No. W2008-02254-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Novem ber 9, 2009

After Mother and F ather

divorce d, a par enting plan was e ntere d desig nating Father as the primary
c us tod ian o f t

he pa rt ie s’ min or c hil d. Mo the r fi le d a pet iti on to mod if y , all e g ingse ve ra l g ro un ds , inc lud inge xce ssi ve c or

po ral pu ni sh men t. T he tr ia l c ourt ini tia lly fo un d n o mate ri a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances, but name d Mother primar y custodian, base d on the minor child’s pref ere nce. F ather appea led, and this Court remande d, finding that the cour t’s ruling was pre mature. On re mand, the tr ial cou rt, a g a in, awa

rd e d c us tod

y to M oth e r, fi nd ingthe fo llo wi ngmate ri a l c ha ng e s in circ umstance: 1) Mothe r’s re marria g e and ha ving ha d two other children; 2) Mothe r’s c ompletion of her underg raduate deg ree , her w ork towar ds a Master ’s deg ree , and having a stable job; 3) M o th e r ’ s h av in g le f

t t h e n a ti o n a l gu ar d ; a

n d 4 ) th e mi n o r

c h il d ’ s p r e f

e r e n c e to li v e w it

hM o th e r

. We
a f f i r mt h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s m o d i f

i c a t i o no f c u s t o dy.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the C hancery Court Affir med

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.
Jennifer Twyman King, Jac kson, TN, for A ppellant Felicia Corbin Johnson, Memphis, TN, for Appe llee

OP IN IONT h e tria l c o u rt o rd e re d M o th e r t o p a y $ 2 ,1 3 0 .0 0 to p u rg e h e rs e lf o f c o n te m p t. It fu rth e r o rd e re d M o th e r to 1
pay $50. 00 pe r w ee k i n c hi l d s uppor t , pl us a c l er k’ s f ee of 5% f or a t ot al of

$52. 50 pe r w ee k.

T he part i es agr ee t hat t he J anuary 8, 200 2 Perm anent Par ent i ng Pl an des i gn at ed Fat her as pri m ar y re s i dent i al 2
p a re n t; h o w e v e r, o u r re v ie w o f th e p la n re v e a ls n o e x p re ss in d ic a tio n o f su c h

.

T h is a lleg a tio n w a s la te r d ism isse d

. 3

The par t i es agr ee d t o s ubm i t t o a c us t odi al e val uat i on. W hen M ot her ’ s c ouns el f ai l ed t o a ppea r a t a he ar i ng 4

c o n c e rn in g th e e v a lu a tio n , t h e trial c o u rt se le c te d F a th e r’ s p re fe rr e d p sy c h o lo g ist, D r. K e n n o n
. -2- I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY On September

10, 1998, J oey

Co n n er (“F ather ”) a

nd Carmen Conner

(“Mother ”) w ere divorce d in the Chance ry Court of Hay wood County , Tenne ssee. The parties wer e g ranted joint custody of their minor c hild, Sharron (d.o.b. 7/2/95), wit h Fa t h er beingthe primary custodian. Sharron wa s to reside with Father during the wee k and attend school in Hay wood County , and spend
we e ke nd s w ithMo the r i n Sh e lby County . M oth e r w a s o rd e re d to pa y thi rt y do lla rs pe r w e e k in

c hil d support to Fathe r.
Mother filed a

Petition t o Modify

Custody o n M ar ch 9, 2000, alleg ing that the parties ha d privately ag ree d that when Shar

ron “r eac hed the a g e of f

irst gr ade, that custody

primary , would be g iven to the mother, who would then plac e the c hild i[ n] S helby County Schools.” Father a

nswere d by denying the exis tence of any ag ree ment to transfe r custody to Mother. Alongwith his Answer, F a the r simult ane ou sly fi le d a Pe tit ion to Cite De fe nd ant fo r Con te mpt , a lle g ing that Mo the r w a s in
arrea rs o n h er c hild support pay ments, and had c ontributed nothing towa rds Sharron’ s medical
e xpe ns e s. On

May 25 , 2 00 0, the c ha

nc e ry c ourt e nte re d a

n O rd e r d e nyingMo the r’ s r e qu e st t o modify custody , and finding that Mother had failed to pa y child support as orde red. On J anuar y 8, 1 2002, the cha

ncer y court e ntere d a Perma

nent Pare nting Plan, which provided that F ather would be the primary

residential pa

rent, with Mother ha

ving T hursday

and alter nate we ekend visitation. 2

Father, on November 29, 2004, filed a Petition for Contempt, to Incre ase Child Support and for Modification of Previous Order of t he C ourt. Father alleg ed, among other things, that Mother ’s income had inc rea sed since e ntry of the c hild support Order, a nd that Mother’s p ar am o u rs wer e sp e nd ingthe night whil e Sha rr on wa s p re se nt. 3

On Octobe r 27, 2005, the c h an ce ry co urt order ed the pa rties to submit t o a custodial/psy cholog ical eva luation by Dr. Rober

t Kennon. 4 Ag ain, on J anuar

y 12, 2006, Mother filed a

Petition to modify

custody . Mother alleg ed that bo th F a the r a

nd his c ur re nt w if e , K im Conne r, ha d im

po se d e xce ssi ve c or

po ra l pu nis hme nt i n disciplining Sharr on, and Mother c i t ed t wo s pecif ic incidents: J anuar

y 20, 2005, and Oc tober 17, 2005. As additional g rounds for modific ation, Mother cla imed that beca use of his work sc hedule,Fa t her di d not s ee k a s t ay of t he t r i al c our t ’ s or der

. The chi l d ha s r es i ded w i t h M ot her s i nce J ul y of 2007. 5

In o u r o p in io n , w e e x p la in e d th a t a c h ild ’s c u sto d ia l p re fe re n c e , alo n e , i s in su ff ic ie n t t o w a rr a n t a c h a n g e in 6

cus t ody. W e i ns t r uct ed t hat , on r em and, t he cha nce r y c our t s houl d a ppl y t he l ega l s t an d ard o n m at er i al c hange of ci r cum s t anc es s et f or t h i n Boye r v
. H ei m er m ann , 2 3 8 S .W .3 d 2 4 9 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 7 ).

The O r der r el i ed upon t he pr evi ous t es t i m ony of A ugus t 22, 2006, a nd M ay 8- 9, 2007. The t r ans cr i pt f r om 7 th e A u g u st 2 0 , 2 0 0 8 p ro c e e d in g s w a s a ttac h e d to th e O rd e r a n d in c o rp o ra te d th e re in b y re fe re n c e
. -3- Father spent ve ry

littl e time with Sharron dur ing the wee k, and she a lso claimed that F ather preve nted Sharron f

rom participating in extra-c urricula r ac tiviti es.
A benc h trial was c onducted ove r August 22, 2006, November 27, 2006, a nd May 8-9, 2007. The c hance ry

court e ntere d an Or der on July 23, 2007, fin d i n g t h at alt houg h Mother had not de monst rat e d a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s to mod if y the e xistin g pa

re nti ngpla

n, be c a us e Sharron’ s pref

ere nce was to live with Mothe r, Mother should be named th e p ri m ar y residential pa re nt. Th e c ha

nc e ry c ourt fu rt he r o rd e re d F a the r to p ay

Mo the r $ 54 7. 00 pe r m on th i n c hil d s up po rt

. An Am e nd e d Pe rm ane nt Pare nti ng Pla n Or de r wa s e nte re d on July 23 , 2 00 7, re fl e c tin g the c ourt

o r d e r e d c h an g e i nc u s t o dy. 5

Both F ather

and Moth er ap p ea l ed to this C ourt on J uly 30, 2007 and August 22, 2007, respe ctively

. Ora l argument was heard before this Court on April 22, 2008. An opinion was issued on May 29, 2008, in which we vaca ted the decision of the chanc ery court and re manded f or fur ther proce eding s, finding that the chanc ery court ha d prematurely

ruled o n t h e m odification petition, without allowing F ather

to cro s s -examine Mother or to testify , himself. On re mand, furthe r 6 proce eding s were held on August 2 0 , 2 0 0 8

. There afte r, on September 25, 2008, an Or der w as e nte re d d e sig natin g Mo the r a s th e pr ima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Th e Or de r s tate d, in p art : 7

1. The Court finds that there has bee n a materia l c hang e in circ umstance to wa rra nt a modification of custody and designa t es [ Mother] as the custodial par ent of the minor child with [ Father] having pare nting time w ith the child ever y other we ekend
and the ho lid ay s a s se t out by the sh are d p are nti ngarr ang e me nt.
2. The Court f

inds that the Court ha d conce rn about [Mother] on April 28, 2000, due to the Mo t h er h aving a history of cha ng ing r esidenc es since the parties’ divorce , chang ing jobs, wor

k and scho o l schedules, de mands of military service in the National Gua

rd, and that she had not established a stable lifestyle at that time.
3. The Court finds t h at a chang e in circ umstances a re [sic] that [ Mother] has
re marr ie d, ha s tw o o the r c hil dr e n, ha s c omp le te d h e r un dergra du a te de g re e , is working on her Master’ s deg ree , and has a stable job at V ander bilt Hos p i t al

. T he Court further

finds that [Mot her] has left the N ational Guar d and will no longe r have the demands of

milit ary service upon her.-4-

4

. T h e Co u rt f

u rth e r f in d s th a t t h e c h il d s tate d th a t s h e w an te d

to li v e w it

h[M o th e r ].
On Octobe r 3, 2008, F ather , ag ain, filed a Notice of Appea l to this Court.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED
Father ha s timely

filed h i s n otice of a

ppeal a nd prese nts the following issues f or re view,
summa ri zed a s f oll ow s:
1

. W h et h er t h e t r i a l c o u rt erre d i nfi n d i n g a m at er i al ch an ge i nci rc u m s t an ce wa rr an t i n g a custody modification;

2. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in allowingtes t i m o n y ab o ut statements made by the minor child; and

3. Whe the r a

mod if ic a tio n o f t

he Pe rm ane nt Par e nti ngPla n w a s in the min or

c hil d’ s b e st int e re st.

For the following rea sons, we af firm the cha

ncer y court’s c ustody

modification.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW Although a

ppellate c ou rt s are reluc tant to second-guess custody decisions
w h e ns o m u c hd e p e n d s o nt h e tr i a l c o urt ’ s a s s e s s m e n to f th e w i tn e s s e s ’ c r e d i b i l i ty, Nelson v. Nelson , 66 S.W. 3d 39 6, 90 1 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 1) ; Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), w e will reve rse or modify a t ri al cour

t’s custody decision if we co n cl u d e the decision rests on an e rror of law, or

if the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the finding that there has or ha s not be en a material chang e in the child’s c ircumstance s or that the child’s be st interests will be ser ved by chang ing a

n ex i s t i n g cust ody

arr ang ement. Steen v . Steen , 61 S.W .3d 324, 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Plac e nc ia v . P lac e nc ia , 3 S.W .3d 497, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 99 ); Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Sc of ie ld v. Sc of

ie ld, No. M2006-00350-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 624351, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 28, 2007). On appe al, a tria l court’s fa ctual finding s are presumed to be corr ect, and we will not overturn those fac tual findings u n l ess t he evide nce pr eponder ates a g ainst them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2 00 8) ; Bo

ga n v . Bogan , 60 S .W .3 d 7 21 , 7 27 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . F or the e vid e nc e to p re po nd e rate ag ainst a trial cour

t’s finding of fact, i t must support another findingof fa ct with g reater c onvincing eff ect. Watson v. Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( c i t i n g W alker v . Sidney Gi lre ath & As so cs. , 4 0 S. W.3 d 6 6, 71 (T e nn

. Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc . v. RR W estminster Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999))

. When the trial court make sM o t h er fil ed m o t i o n s t o ex clu d e a n d t o st rike t h e testi m o n y an d rep o rts o f D r. P i ck erin g fo r v ario u s rea so n s; 8

none of w hi ch w as hea r s ay. M ot her ’ s m ot i ons w er e over r ul ed. D r
. Pi cke r i ng’ s r epor t w as e nt er ed i nt o e vi denc e, a nd he al s o t es t i f i ed at t r i al

. W e nee d not det erm i ne t he adm i s s i bi l i t y of D r
. Pi cke r i ng’ s t r i al t es t i m ony c once r ni ng sta te m e n ts m a d e b y S h a rr o n , as h is trial te stim o n y re v e a le d n o th in g o u tsid e o f h is w ritten re p o rt.
-5- no specific finding s of fa ct, we r eview the rec ord to deter mine wher e the pr eponder ance of the evidenc e lies. Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 9 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d

2 9 3 , 2 9 6 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Kemp v. Thurmond , 521 S.W .2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1975)). We r eview a trial court’s conclusions of lawunder a de novo standard upon the rec ord with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d

8 7 , 9 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON A. T esti mony o f t he Mino r Chi

ld On appe al, Fa

ther alleg es that the trial c ourt err ed in allowingwitnesses to testify about statements alleg edly

made by Sharron r eg ardingher c u s t o dial pref ere nce, a s this testi mony

was hear say beca use Sharr on did not testify . We find admissible all refe renc es to statements m ade by Sharron c ontained within the re ports of Drs. K eenon and P icker ing, as neither party raised he arsa

y as an obje ction to the repor ts’ admission into evidence. See Ray v . Ray , No. M2003-01158-COA- 8 R3-CV, 2004 WL 1114578, at *20 n.4 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 18, 2 0 0 4 ) (f

inding he arsa

y objection waived where party failed to timely object to admission of psy cholog ical re port containinghear say ).
We need not conside r the a dmissibi lity of the testimony

o f o t h er w itnesses reg arding Sha rr on ’s state me nts

. Ev e n if we we re to fi nd su c h tes tim ony ina dmi ssi ble , the tr ia l court ha d ampl e evidenc e in the expert re ports from which it could c onsider Sharr on’s custodial pre fer ence

. B. Material C

hange in Circum stance

“ A c us tod

y de c isi on , o nc e fi na l, i s re s ju dic ata up on the fa c ts in e xistence or reas ona bly fore seea b l e wh en the dec ision was made[.]” Sc of ie ld, 2 0 0 7 W L6 2 4 3 5 1 , at* 3 (c i t i n g Y oung v. Sm ith , 2 46 S.W. 2d

93 , 9 5 ( Te nn . 1 95 2) ; Steen , 61 S.W.3 d at 3 27 ; Solima v. Solima , 7 S.W .3d 30, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Long v. Long , 488 S.W .2d 729, 731-32 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1972)). Howe ver, beca use childre n’s and pa

rents’ c ircumstance s chang e, our courts are “empowe red to alter custody
arr ang ements when intervening circ umstances require modific ations.” Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 6- 10 1( a )( 1) ; se e Ma sse ng alev . M as se ng ale , 915 S.W .2d 818, 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995))

. Mo dif ic a tio n o f a

n e xistin g c us tod

y or vis itatio n arr ang e me nt i nv olv e s a tw o- ste p a

na ly sis

. See Boye r , 238 S.W .3d at 255. Fir st, the pare nt attempting to modify t h e ex i s t i n g custody or visitation arrang ement must prove that a materia l chang e in circ umstances has occur red. See Tay lor
v . McK innie , No. W2007-01468-COA-R3-JV, 2008 W L2971767, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 5, 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Kendrick v . Shoemak e , 90 S.W .3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) ). “[N]ot all chang es in the circ umstances of the parties and the child war rant a chang e in custody .” Cosner , 2008 WL 3892024,O ver t he year s , t he T enness ee Sup r em e C ou r t ha[d] consi s t ent l y decl i ned t o r evi ew 9
t h i s co u rt ’s de c ision s h o l d i n g t h at t h e ch an g ed ci rcum st an ces t h at w i l l t ri g g er a

co n si d erat i o n o f a c h a n g e i n cu st o d y m u st i n v o l v e ch an g es i n t h e ch i l d ’s
c irc u m sta n c e s ra th e r t h a n in e ith e r o r b o th o f th e p a re n ts’ c irc u m sta n c e s. St een v. St een , 6 1 S .W .3 d a t 3 2 7 ; H oal cr af t v
. Sm i t hs on , 19 S. W

. 3d at 8 29

. T he C ou r t has
n o w de ci d ed t h at a ch an g e i n ei t h er paren t ’s ci rcum st an ces ca n a lso t ri g g er a ch an g e of

cus t od y i f

t he chang e “ af f ect s t he chi l d’s w el l

- bei ng
. ” K endri ck v. Sh oem ake , 90 S.W

. 3 d at 57 0

. W h i l e a ch a n g e in th e cu st o d i al pa rent’ s ci rcum st an ces nec ess ari l y aff ect s t h e ch i l d , a ch an g e i n t h e n o n cu st o d i al pa rent’ s c irc u m sta n c e s m a y n o t. B e c a u se th e c o u rt d id n o t e x p lic it ly lim it K endri ck v. Sh oem ake t o chang es i n t he cus t od i al par ent ’ s ci r cum s t ances , w e m ust pr es um e t hat t he court now envi s i on s t hat changes i n a non cus t od i al par ent ’ s ci r cum s t ances ca n j us t i fy a c hange of

cu st ody i f

t he non- cus t odi al pa r ent c an dem ons t r at e t hat t he cha nge i n hi s or he r c i r cum s t anc es s om ehow aff ec t s t he chi l d.

O l i ver , 2004 W L 892536, a t *3 n. 3.
-6- at *4. “The re are no hard and fast rules for when there has been a chang e of circ umstances suff icient to justi fy a cha ng e in custody .” Id. (c i t i n g Cranston v. Combs , 106 S.W .3d 641, 644 (Tenn. 2003) ). The de cision turns on the fac ts of eac h case

. Sc of ie ld, 2 00 7 W L 62 43 51 , at *4 . H ow e ve r, to deter mine wh et h er a materia l chang e in circ umstance ha s occur red, the court should consider whether : “(1) the chang e occ urre d afte r the e ntry of the orde r soug ht to be modified; (2) the c hang ed circ umstances we re not re asonably anticipated when the underlying decr ee was entered, and (3) the chang e is one that aff

ects the child’s well-be ing in a meaning ful way .” Cosner , 2008 WL3892024, at * 4 (c i t i n g Kendrick, 9 0 S. W.3 d at 57 0; Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 13 7 (Tenn. 2002) ; Cranston , 1 06 S.W. 3d

a t 64 4)

. “ Th e pr e se nc e of the wo rd ‘m a te ri a l’ ind ic a te s th a t th e c ha ng e mus t 9 be signific ant.” Patterson v. Patterson , No. W1999-01544-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL33774558, at *3 (citing Bla ck' s L aw Dic tionary 991 (7th ed. 1999)). “I f the per son seekingthe cha ng e of c ustody cannot demonstrate that the child’s circumstanc es have chang ed in some mater ial way , the trial cour t should not re-e x amine the c omparative fitness of the pa rents, Caudill v. Foley , 21 S.W .3d 203, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), or enga g e in a ‘best interests of the child’ analy sis. Rather, in the a bsence of pr oo f o f a ma te ri a l cha

ng e in the c hil d’ s cir c ums ta nc e s, the tr ia l court sh ou ld simp ly de c lin e to chang e custody .” Oliver v . Oliver , No. M 2002-02880-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 892536, at *3 (c iting Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W .3d 822, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999))

.
I ncorpor ated into its Order Gra nting Modifica

tion of Custody

is the transcr ipt of the trial
c ourt ’s ru lin g fr om t

he be nc h, wh e re the jud g e state d th a t After hear ing this petition of August the 22 of 2006, May the 8 of 2007, May

the nd th 9 of 2007, and toda

y [August 20, 2008], the Court is convinced that there has bee n th a mater ial chang e in circ umstances ba sed on - - The fir st hearing , the Court had a g reat deal of c oncer

n about [Mother]. The unrefuted proof was that she had a history of cha ng ing r esidenc e si nce the divorce , chang ing jobs, work and school schedule s and that s h e h ad not established a stable lifestyle at that time. This was 4/27/00. Also during the many

hear ings, the Court be came awa re that [Mot her]

. . . had joined the Natio na l Gu ard and that the de mand s of mil ita ry se rv ic e wo uld

pr ov ide a dif fi c ultA lth o u g h th e m in o r c h ild ’s c u sto d ia l p re fe re n c e w a s listed s e p a ra te ly fro m th e m a te ria l ch a n g e s in 10 ci r cum s t ance, i t see m s t he t r i al co urt i nt ended t o i ncl ud e s uch p r ef er ence a m on g t he m at er i al changes i n ci r cum s t ance.

O n a p p e a l, M o th e r p o in ts o n ly to F a th e r’ s a lleg e d a b u se a n d h is re fu sa l t o a llo w S h a rr o n to p a rtic ip a te in 11 b a llet c la sse s a s m a te ria l ch a n g e s in c irc u m sta n c e
. -7- job for beingthe custodial par ent, howeve r, the c hang e o f circ umstances a re that [Mothe r] .

. . is marr ie d and ha s tw o oth e r c hil dr e n, ha s c omp le te d he r u nd e rgra du a te de g re e and

is wo rki ng on he r M a ste r’ s d e g re e and ha s a sta ble job a t V and e rb ilt Hospi tal and that she ha s left the National Guard, a nd so the demands of

milit ary service will no longer

be upon her . One of the conce rns is, g oing on the re cord, that [Mot her] had to leave the United States to serve in Iraq for a period of time, which would absolutely

prec lude her

from takingcar e of this minor child.

I n its Order, the trial court a lso noted Sharron’s e x presse d desire to live with Mother. We note that 10 Mo the r r a ise d the alle g e d a bu se by F a the r a s a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e in h e r p e tit ion to modify custody ; however , the trial cour t did not ex plicitly

find the alleg ed abuse t o be a material chang e. 11

I nitially , a trial wa s conducte d over thre e day s in this m atter. O n rema nd, a four th day of testimony was he ld. T h u s, the trial cour t rec ord conta ins leng thy testimony

conce rningthe modification of custody

. After a thoroug h revie w of the e vidence befor e the tria l court, we find that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding that Mother has pr oved a material chang e in circ umstance.

On remand, the t rial court listed Mother’s re marria g e and he r havinghad two other children as one of sever al materia l c hang es in c ircumstance war ranting a modification of custody . This Court has stated that “ [r] emar

riag e, by itself, is not the s ort of cha ng e in circ umstances that trig g ers areexamination of an exist ing c ustody arr ang ement bec ause remar riag e is such a common occur renc e in c o n te mp o r ar

y s o c ie ty th a t it c an r e a s o n a b ly b e an ti c ip a te d w h e n p a rti e s d ivor ce.” McEvoy v
. Brewer , No. M20 0 1

- 0 2 0 5 4

- CO A

- R3 -CV, 2003 WL22794521, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (c i t i n g Buck

les v. Riggs , 1 06 S.W. 3d

66 8, 67 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 3) ; Sm ith son v. E ath e rly , No. 01A01-9806-CV- 00314, 1999 WL 548586, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999)). In fac t, statisti cs show that seventy -five pe rce nt of divo rc ed p ersons remarr y
. Sm iths on , 1999 WL 548586, at *5 (citing Thomas Espensha de, Marriage T rends i n America: Estimates, Implication, and Underlying Causes , 11 Population & Dev. R. 193 (1985))

. “Howe ver, chang es in the home environme nt broug ht about by a later marria g e may

amount to a m ater ial chang e in circumstances if the y materia lly

aff ect the child or the c hild’s pare nts.” McEvoy , 2003 WL 22794521, at *4 (c it i n g E l der v. Elder , No. M1 99 8- 00 93 5- CO A- R3- CV , 200 1 WL 10 77 96 1, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct . App . Se pt. 14 , 2 00 1) ; McCain v. Gr im , No. 01A01-9711- CH-00634, 1999 WL820216, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1999); Tortori ch v. E

rickson , 675 S.W .2d 190, 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)) . “[D]i vorce d pare nts should not-8-

b e p e r mi tt e d to u

p s e t an e xis ti n g c u s to dy ar r a n g e me n t s im

p ly b e c a u s e o n e o r b o th o f the m have marrie d ag ain or beca

use the custodial pare nt a

nd his or her new spouse have sta rted a new f amily .” Sm iths on , 19 99 WL54 85 86 , at *5 . “ Pare nts se e kin g to a lte r a n e xistin g c us tod

y arr ang e me nt m

us t offe r some specific evidenc e conce rning how the later marria g e or the birth of new c hildren have or wi ll h ave an a dv e rs e a ff

e c t on the c hil d be fo re the c ourt s wi ll un de rt ake a ne w c omp ara

tiv e fi tne ss analy sis.” Id.

Sharron wa s born in J uly

of 1995 whe n Mother wa s eig hteen y ear s old. Mothe r and F ather marrie d in 1997, and wer e divorc ed in 1998. Father marrie d Stepmother in J anuar y of 2000. The parties e ntere d into the pare nting plan at issue in 2002. Under that plan, Father wa s named the primary residential p ar ent, and Mother was a llowed visitation each Thur sday and on alter

nating
wee kends. The pa

rties also alter

nated holiday s, and eve ry two wee ks during the summer.

At tr ia l, M oth e r t e sti fi e d th a t w he n th e pa rt ie s d ivo rc e d in

19 98 , s he wa s li vin g in M e mph is
an d F a t h e r w a s l i v i n g i nB r o w n s v i l l e

. H o w e v e r , i n 2 0 0 0 , M o th e r m o v e d b a c k t o B r o w n s v i l l e

. In J anuar y of 2006, Mother filed he r petition to modify custody . In April of 2006, she r emar ried, a nd in O c tob e r o f 2 00 6, sh e mov e d to Mur fr e e sb or o, a pp are ntl y to take a job a t V and e rb ilt Un ive rs ity Hospital as an a dminist rative a ssistant. At some point s ubsequent to the e ntry of the 2002 pa

renting pla n, Mo the r ha d tw o mor e c hil dr e n. F oll ow ingMo the r’ s mo ve to M ur fr e e sb or o, sh e c on tin ue d to exercise he r visitation with S harr on. Gra ndmother testified that S h a r r o n stay ed with her

on Thursday nigh t s , an d M o t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t o n h e r w e e k e n d s , s h e dr o v e f r o m h e r j o b i n N a s h v ill e to B ro wn sv ill e on

F ri da y a ft e rn oo n a

nd sta y e d in B ro wn sv ill e a t he r p are nts ’ h ome wi th S ha rr on un til Sunday night. Shar

ron then spent Sunday

night with Mother’s pa

rents, who took her

to school on Monday morning

.

The trial c ourt also found, on rema nd, as m ater ial chang es i n circ umstance, that Mother had
c omp le te d h e r u

nd e rgra du a te de g re e , h a d b e g un wo rk ingon

he r M a ste r’ s d e g re e , a

nd ha d a sta ble job at Vande rbilt Hospital. I n its ruling from the bench, the trial court stated “ The unre futed proof was that [Mother] had a history of cha ng ing r esi dence since the divorc e, cha ng ing jobs, wor

k and school schedule s and that she had not e stablished a stable lifestyle at that time. This was 4/27/00.” At trial, Mother stated that she “make s more money than [ she] made [whe n the par enting plan was enter ed],” and that at e ntry of the plan, she “di dn’t have the type of f inance s that [she ha s] now.” Although Mothe r conc eded at trial that she had “ been in c olleg e or some f orm of school since befor e and a ft e r t h[e ] pare nti ngpla

n w a s e nte re d in 20 02 [,]” the re c or d re ve a ls that si nc e e ntr y , s he ha d in fac t completed her underg raduate deg ree , and begun working on an advanc ed degree , which allowe d Mother to ea

rn an inc rea sed income.

T h e t ri al co u rt al s o fo u n d

t h at M o th er ’s h av i n g l ef

tt h e n at i o n al gu ar d

wa s a m at er i al ch an ge in c i r c u m s t an c e

. M o t h e r j o i n e d t h e ar m y n a t i o n a l g u ar d i n 2 0 0 0

. S h e c o n t i nu e d to liv e in B ro wn sv ill e un til F e br

ua ry of 20 03 , w he n s he wa s d e plo y e d to Ira q. Duri ngMo the r’ s d e plo y me nt,G ra n d m o th e r w a s a lso d e p lo y e d to Ira q d u rin g th is ti m e
. 12

M ot her e xpl ai ned t he di f f er enc e bet w ee n t he ar m y na t i onal gua r d a nd t he ar m y r es er ve as t he guar d be i ng 13
sta te a n d th e re se rv e , fe d e ra l.
-9- Sharron r esided with F ather , althoug h Mother’s f at h er , at t imes, visited with S harr on. Mother 12
serve d on active duty

in I raq until J une of 2004, when she r eturne d to Brownsville. Upon returning to Brownsville, Mother beg an commuting to Memphis to work. I n May of 2006, Mot her w as transfe rre d from the a

rmy national g uard to the army rese rve. She explained her re sponsibili ties 13 with the army

rese rve a s attending drill tra ining one wee kend per month, a nd two wee ks per summer in Mill ington, Te nnessee –approximately fifty miles from Br ownsville. Mother testified that during he r t ra ini ng , s he wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to stay ov e rn ig ht. Th e re fo re , s he sta y e d at G ra

ndmot he r’ s h ome in Br ownsville and si mply drove to Mil lington ea ch morning . Howeve r, in May of 2008, Mother’ s eig ht-y ear contra ct ende d, and she left the m ilitary

. Mother claims, and the trial court a g ree d, that her ha ving le ft the military

constituted a mater ial chang e in circ umstances.

The middle sec tion of this C ourt addres s ed a simi lar situation in Sc of ie ld v . Sc of ie ld, No. M2006-00350 -C OA -R3-CV, 2007 WL624351 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 28, 2007). I n Sc ofi e ld , the fathe r wa s a ca

ree r off icer with the United States Army

. Id

. at * 1

. I n 2003, when the pa rties divorce d, the family

resided tog ether

in H untsvill e, Alabama , wher e the father wa s deploy ed at the Redstone Arse nal. Id. I n the par ties’ par enting plan, the mother w as designa t ed as the primary residential pa

rent of the par

ties’ three minor children, a nd the father wa s g rante d standard visitation. Id. I n the springof 2005, the fath er d ec i d ed to retire from the A rmy “so that he c ould make Huntsville his permanent re sidence .” Id. Alleg ing se vera l material c hang es in circ umstance, including his re tirement and a lleg ed excessive corpor al punishment by the mother, the father filed a petition to modify

custody

. Id. The trial c ourt found that althoug h t h e fa t h er’ s impending
re tir e me nt, wh ic h a ff

or de d him a pe rm ane nt r e sid e nc e , c on sti tut e d a c ha ng e in t he fathe r’ s li fe , it

did
n o taf fe ct t h e c h i l dre n ’s we l l -b ei n g i n a m ea n i n gfu l wa y , s u ch th at i t co n s t i tu t ed a m at er i al ch an ge in circumstanc e. Id. a t *4

. I n a ff ir min g the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the fathe r’ s pe tit ion , the mid dle
se c tio n s tate d a s f

oll ow s: He re , Fa ther a sserts a c hang e in his residential situation, wher eby he ca n now pe rm ane ntl y

re sid e in H un tsv ill e . O ur Sup re me Co urt , how e ve r, ha s f ound that a move and improvement in one par ent’s re sidence , with ou t m or e , doe s n ot c on sti tut e a m at er i al chang e of c ircumstance s. Blair , 7 7 S. W.3 d at 15 0- 51 . T he me re fa c t a pare nt s e tt le s d o w nan d

p la n s to r e ma in

in o n e lo c a ti o nd o e s n o t n e c e s s ar il y aff ect the child’s we ll-being in a meaning ful way

. There must be more–mea ning pr oof the ch an ge i nt h e p ar en t ’s l i fe wi l l h av e as u b s t an t i al ef

fe ct o nth e c h i l d ’s we l l -b ei n g. Blair , 77 S.W. 3d

a t 15 0- 51 ; Solima [ v. Solima ] 77 S .W.3d [ 30,] 32 [ (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 9 8 ) ]. Id. (empha sis added).I n hi s br i ef , Fa t her cl ai m s t hat D r
. Pi cke r i ng m ade no s uch s t at em ent ; how eve r , w e not e t hat t hi s s t at em ent 14 is fo u n d in b o th h is trial te stim o n y a s w e ll a s in h is re p o rt.
-10- F ina lly , th e tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t Sh arr on ’s stated pref e re nc e to l ive wi th M oth e r w a s a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e

. I n his r e po rt , D r. Ke nn on sta te d th a t “ [o]n thr e e se pa rate interviews, Shar

ron expressed he r desire to reside with her mother.” D r. Pi ck er i n g re ported that Sharron va cillated conc erningwho she wa nted to live with, but “[m ]ost of the time” state d that she pref err ed to live with Mother. The trial court appare ntly place d g reat weig ht on Sharron’s a lleg ed
ex p re s s edp re fe re n ce

. I ni t s o ra l ru l i n g, th e tri al co urt s t at ed th at “T h e s t at em en t[ t o Dr

. P i ck er i n g] by the littl e g irl, which was so probing , was the fa ct that she fe lt like this was the time in her life that she nee ded to be with the f emale pa rent to help he r with fema le issues that fac e eve ry fema le.” 14

“This Court has pre viously held that the st ated prefe renc e of a child, st andingalone, doe s not constitute a mater ial chang e in circ umstances.” Conn er v. Conner , No. W2007-01711-COA-R3- C V, 2 0 0 8 W L 2 2 1 9 2 5 5 , at * 3 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. M ay 2 9 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Mulke y v. Mulke

y , No. E2004- 00590-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL2412610, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2004)). H oweve r, such pre fe re nc e c ou

ple d w ithoth e r c ir c ums tanc e s, may amou nt t o a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s. Id.

We find that Mother’s re marria g e and having had two other c hildren, Mother’ s completion of her u n d e r g r a d

u a te d e g r e e , w o r

k to w ar d s a

M a s te r ’ s d e g r e e , an d

h av in g a s ta b le jo b , Mother’s havingleft the national guard, and the minor child’s pref ere nce to live w ith Mother, when c onsidered in the aggr egate, support the trial cour t’s finding of a material c hang e in circ umstance since entry of the pa re nti ngpla

n. Mo the r’ s n e wf

ound a bil ity to f ina nc ia lly su pp or t Sh arr on , to pr ov ide a

sta ble home environme nt without threat of deploy ment, and Sharron’ s expressed desire to r eside with her f e m a l e p ar e n td

u r i n g h e r t e e n a g e ye ar s , c o n s t i tu t e c h a n g e s w h i c h

a f f e c t S h ar r o ni na m e an i n g f u l w ay. Havingso found, we ne ed not addr ess M other’s contention that Father’s a lleg ed abuse of Sharr on as we ll as his refusa l to allow he r to participate in extracurr icular a ctivities are a dditional material chang es in circ umstance.

C. B est I nte re st o f t he Chil d I f the pe titioner makes a pr ima fac ie ca se of a materia l chang e in circ umstances then the court must determine whe ther a chang e in custody

is in the best i n t er es t o f t he child. In reJ. C.S. , No. M2 00 8- 02 04 9- CO A- R3- PT, 20 08 WL29 24 98 2, a t *6 (T e nn . Ct . App . Jul y 28 , 2 00 8) . T his deter mination requires c onsideration of a number of fa ctors, includingthose set forth in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 36-6- 1 0 6 t o make a n initial custody

deter mination, and Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 36-6-404 to fa shion a reside ntial schedule. Id.

Neither the trial cour

t’s “Or der G rantingModification of C u s t ody ,” nor its ora l ruling incorpora ted into such, demonstrate that the trial court unde rtook a be st interest ana ly sis. However ,-11-

in t he int e re st of jud ic ia l e c on omy , and to f ur the r p re ve nt f

ur the r d e lay in t his c a se , w e wi ll a dd

re ss wh e the r a mod if ic a tio n o f c us tod

y is i n th e c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.

On appe al, Father c ontends that the statutory fac tors do not support a finding t hat i t is in t he child’s best intere st to modi fy the custody

arr ang ement. We disag ree . After revie wing eac h of the fac tors, we f

in d t h at the evidenc e supports the trial c ourt’s dec ision to name Mother primar y re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Al tho ug h mo st o f t he fa c tor s do no t f

avo r o ne pa

re nt o ve r t

he oth e r, c e rt a in fa c tor s d o f

av o r M o t h e r

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y , S h ar

r o n ’ s p r e f

e r e n c e t o l i v e w i th M o th e r , a l o n g wi th Sha rr on ’s e xpre sse d f

e e lin g s o f “ int imi datio n a nd fe ar” du e to F a the r’ s dis c ipl ina ry sty le , w e ig h in favor of Mother. A ccor dingly , we f ind that a modification of c ustody is in the best interest of the child.

V. C ONCL US I ON

F or the a fo re me nti on e d re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s mod if

ic a tio n o f c us tod

y . Co sts of thi s a pp e a l are ta xed to Ap pe lla nt, Joey Conne r, and

his sure ty , f

or wh ic h e xec uti on

may iss ue if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL ANE. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.