IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES N. STRAWSER et al., )

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0424-CG-C

)

LUTHER STRANGE, et al, )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 

(Doc. 76), opposition filed by Defendants Luther Strange (Docs. 78, 99) and Judge

Don Davis (Doc. 90), and Plaintiffs’ reply (Doc. 100). For the reasons explained 

below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification should be 

granted.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move for class certification of a Plaintiff Class and a Defendant 

Class in this matter. The Plaintiff Class is defined as: 

All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage license in order 

to marry a person of the same sex and to have that marriage 

recognized under Alabama law, and who are unable to do so because of 

the enforcement of Alabama’s laws prohibiting the issuance of 

marriage licenses to same-sex couples and barring recognition of their 

marriages.

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The proposed Defendant Class is defined as: “All Alabama county probate judges 

who are enforcing or in the future may enforce Alabama’s laws barring the issuance 

of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and refusing to recognize their marriages.”

Whether to certify a class is a matter within the discretion of the court. 

Moore v. Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 216 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th 

Cir.2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 950 (2001). “The initial burden of proof to establish 

the propriety of class certification rests with the advocate of the class.” Rutstein v. 

Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 

U.S. 919 (2001). Chief among the justifications for class certification is its 

efficiency: adjudication of a properly-constituted class action generally has res 

judicata effect and “saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by 

permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an 

economical fashion.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 

L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). For a district court to certify a class action, the named 

plaintiffs must have standing, and the putative class must satisfy all four of the 

threshold requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and then 

show that the action is maintainable under at least one of the three provisions of 

Rule 23(b). Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14 (1997); Turner v. 

Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir. 2001) ( en banc ), cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 820. The four threshold requirements are (1) numerosity: “the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impractical;” (2) commonality: “there are 

questions of law or fact common to the class;” (3) typicality: the claims or defenses of 

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the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and” (4) 

adequacy: “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Turner, 242 F.3d at 1025 n. 3; Pickett v. 

Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). Rule 23(b) requires a 

party to show that either (1) prosecution by separate actions would create a risk of 

inconsistent results; or (2) defendants have acted in ways generally applicable to 

the class, making declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate; or (3) common 

questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues. Moore, 216 F.3d at 

1241.

A. Rule 23(a)

1. Numerosity

For a class to meet the first requirement of Rule 23(a), it must be “so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 

“[N]o bright-line test for determining numerosity” exists and the “determination 

rests on the Court’s practical judgment in light of the facts of the case.” Wright v. 

Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 537 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (citations omitted). 

However, it has been held that “generally less than twenty-one is inadequate, more 

than forty adequate, with numbers between varying according to other factors.” Cox 

v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); see also

LaBauve v. Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632, 665 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (“Numerosity is 

generally presumed when a proposed class exceeds 40 members.” citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff need not show the precise number of members in the class.” Evans v. 

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U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983). “Estimates as to the 

size of the proposed class are sufficient for a class action to proceed.” Wright, 201 

F.R.D. at 537 (citation omitted). “Furthermore, this Court may make common sense 

assumptions to support a finding of numerosity.” Dujanovic v. MortgageAmerica, 

Inc., 185 F.R.D. 660, 666 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted). “[W]here the numerosity question is a close one, a balance should be 

struck in favor of a finding of numerosity, since the court has the option to decertify 

pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).” Evans, 696 F.2d at 930 (citations omitted).

To support their numerosity claim with regard to the proposed Plaintiff 

Class, Plaintiffs cite to census data from 2010 indicating that Alabama is home to 

approximately 6,582 same-sex couples. (Doc. 76-2). Hundreds of gays and lesbians 

married statewide in Alabama following entry of this Court’s previous orders and 

the experience of other states indicates that when they are allowed to do so, many 

same-sex couples will continue to marry well after their right to do so was first 

recognized. M.V. Lee Badgett & Christy Mallory, The Windsor Effect on Marriages 

by Same-Sex Couples, The Williams Institute, 1 (Dec. 2014), http:bit.ly/1Cx57w6 

(reporting that despite the fact that same-sex marriage had been available in these 

states since at least 2010, in Connecticut there were 668 same-sex marriages in 

2012 and 1355 same-sex marriages in 3013, in New Hampshire there were 389 

same-sex marriages in 2012 and 566 same-sex marriages in 2013, and in Vermont 

there were 472 same-sex marriages in 2012 and 980 same-sex marriages in 2013). 

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When presented with similar evidence the District Court for the Western District of 

Virginia found that numerosity had plainly been met, explaining as follows:

Plaintiffs here ground their good faith estimate on the 2010 United 

States Census, which reported over 15,000 same-sex households in the 

Commonwealth. Br. in Supp. re Mot. to Certify Class, Dkt. No. 27, at 5. 

While defendants question the reliability of the census data cited by 

plaintiffs, there can be little doubt that the numerosity requirement is 

satisfied. Defendants' argument is akin to the one rejected by the 

Court in Thomas v. Louisiana–Pacific Corp., 246 F.R.D. 505 

(D.S.C.2007). “Although Defendants contest numerosity, Defendants in 

substance simply argue Plaintiffs' estimate is incorrect. Even 

assuming the accuracy of Defendants' estimates, the numerosity 

requirement is satisfied[.]” Id. at 509. The same is true in this case. 

Even if the census data is off by an order of magnitude, the numerosity 

requirement is plainly met. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 

Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 425 (4th Cir.2003) (noting with approval the district 

Court's observation that “1400 employees plus their families” “easily” 

satisfied Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement).Recent experience in 

Utah makes this point clear. In an article posted on January 8, 2014, 

CNN reported that “[o]fficials say more than a thousand marriage 

licenses between gay and lesbian couples were issued in the 17 days 

between the initial ruling and the high court's Monday order blocking 

enforcement.” Bill Mears, Utah Will Not Recognize Same–Sex 

Marriages Performed Before High Court Stay, CNN Political Ticker 

(Jan. 8, 2014, 1:17 PM), http:// politica/ ticker. blogs. cnn. com/ 2014/ 

01/ 08/ utah- will- not- recognize- same- sex- marriages- performedbefore- high- court- stay/. The 2010 census data, coupled with the 

actual experience in Utah, amply supports the conclusion that the 

number of same-sex couples in Virginia seeking to be married under 

the laws of the Commonwealth far exceeds any number which would 

be practical for joinder. Plaintiffs' good faith estimate meets the 

numerosity requirement.

Harris v. Rainey, 299 F.R.D. 486, 490 (W.D. Va. 2014). Although the estimated 

number of same-sex households in Alabama is considerably less than in Virginia, 

the number estimated in Alabama still far exceeds the amount needed to satisfy the 

numerosity requirement. The Court is also aware of the considerable confusion that 

followed this Court’s entry of orders finding that Alabama’s laws prohibiting the 

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issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and barring recognition of their 

marriages were unconstitutional. Although hundreds of same-sex couples were 

reportedly able to obtain marriage licenses, there were many more, like the new 

named Plaintiffs in this case, that were denied marriage licenses or did not attempt 

to apply for a license for fear of being turned away or because it was difficult to 

make firm wedding plans not knowing if they could obtain a marriage license. As 

reported above, the number of same-sex couples that sought marriage licenses well 

after the initial allowance of such marriages in Connecticut, New Hampshire and 

Vermont – states with smaller populations than Alabama, far exceeded any number 

that would be practical for joinder. Thus, even if there had been no confusion over 

the issuance of marriage licenses in Alabama, the experience of these other states 

indicates that the number of same-sex couples who would seek marriage licenses in 

the coming years if they were permitted to do so would far exceed the number that

would be practical for joinder. Accordingly, this Court finds that the 2010 census 

data coupled with the actual experience in other states amply supports the 

conclusion that the number of same-sex couples in Alabama seeking to be married 

far exceeds any number which would be practical for joinder.

Defendants contend that the Plaintiff Class is too vague because it is based 

on subjective standards - whether a couple desires a marriage license. However, as 

Plaintiffs point out, probate judges would have no difficulty identifying those 

affected by the requested injunction since any same-sex couples who attempt to 

apply for a marriage license plainly qualify as members of the proposed class. In a 

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similar case, the Western District of Virginia was presented with a similar objection 

to a proposed class and found that the potential plaintiffs’ application for a 

marriage license was observable and objective. Harris, 299 F.R.D. at 496 -497 

(“Here, observable and objective actions determine whether couples fall within the 

class definition by virtue of their application for a marriage license or request for 

recognition of an out-of-state marriage.”). As in Harris, the proposed class 

definition here “will not require any individualized fact-finding, nor is it based on 

unknowable or unascertainable information. As such, it meets the requirement of 

ascertainability.” Id. at 497. 

The fact that the class members “are not specifically identifiable supports 

rather than bars the bringing of a class action, because joinder is impracticable.” 

Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 645 (4th Cir. 1975); see also

Meyer v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank, 106 F.R.D. 356, 360 (M.D. Ga. 1985) 

(“Difficulty in identifying class members makes joinder more impractical and 

certification more desirable.” citing Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. supra and Jack 

v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1974)). Nor is it a 

problem that seeking to obtain a marriage license involves an element of choice. As 

Plaintiff correctly points out, courts have routinely certified classes defined by 

characteristics of choice. See e.g. Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 213 F.3d 

858, 865 (5th Cir. 2000) (class consists of female students who seek to participate in 

varsity intercollegiate athletics); Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 

1970) (class includes all who wish or expect to write for, publish, sell or distribute 

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the newspaper in the future); Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d at 645 

(class consists of persons seeking abortions).

As to the proposed Defendant Class, Plaintiffs seek to certify as defendants, 

all Alabama county probate judges who are enforcing or in the future may enforce 

Alabama’s laws barring the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and 

refusing to recognize their marriages. There are 68 probate judges in Alabama, all 

of which have refused, or may in the future refuse, to issue marriage licenses to 

same-sex couples based on Alabama’s laws. As discussed above, “[n]umerosity is 

generally presumed when a proposed class exceeds 40 members.” LaBauve, 231 

F.R.D. at 665. Although the members of the Defendant Class are readily 

identifiable, the Court finds that joinder of all of them is impractical. As stated 

previously, one of the primary reasons for certifying a class is its efficiency. 

Adjudication of this case as to all 68 probate judges “saves the resources of both the 

courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class 

member] to be litigated in an economical fashion.” Califano, 442 U.S. at 701.

Plaintiffs identify many courts that have certified defendant classes of local or 

county-level official in cases that challenge a law executed at a local level. See e.g.

Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendant class of justices of the 

peace, sheriffs and state troopers); Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) 

(local criminal court judges); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 734 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 

(all State Attorneys), aff’d, 941 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1991); Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 

Health v. Rosen, 110 F.R.D. 576 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (state prosecutors); Harris v. 

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Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (county officials responsible for 

appointing poll officials). Courts in Alabama have even certified the same 

defendant class requested in this case – all Alabama probate judges. See e.g.

Hadnott v. Amos, 295 F.Supp. 1003, 1005 (M.D. Ala. 1968) rev'd on other grds., 394 

U.S. 358, 89 S.Ct. 1101, 22 L.Ed.2d 336 (1969) (certifying a class of defendants 

composed of the Judges of Probate of all counties in Alabama); Sims v. Frink, 208 

F.Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962) aff'd, sub nom., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 

S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (same). The Court finds that while all 68 probate 

judges are known, it is impracticable to join them all and their inclusion in the class 

will serve the interests of judicial economy.

2. Commonality

Commonality requires the presence of questions of law or fact common to the 

class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality requires “that there be at least one 

issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class 

members.” Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 Fed.Appx. 782, 788 

(11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “That common 

contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide 

resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an 

issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal–

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). 

In this case, only same-sex couples who seek a marriage license and to have that 

marriage recognized under Alabama law are included as members of the Plaintiff 

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Class. Judge Davis contends that commonality is not met because some of the 

named plaintiffs have already obtained partial relief in that they were issued 

marriage licenses in Alabama. Judge Davis’s argument seems to be more a 

question of standing, which this Court has previously addressed. Commonality does 

not require that the class have all the same issues in common. “The claims actually 

litigated in the suit must simply be those fairly represented by the named 

plaintiffs.” Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir. 1986).

The validity of the marriage licenses that have been issued to same-sex couples in 

Alabama is still at issue. If probate judges view Plaintiffs’ marriage documents as 

invalid or void, probate Court records could reflect that the Plaintiffs who have 

received marriage licenses are not validly married. Additionally, if probate judges

refuse to recognize same-sex marriages the plaintiffs’ rights will be affected when 

petitioning for adoption or when their estates are being probated. Plaintiffs’ claims 

are based on the same legal theories as those of the absent class members. 

Whatever factual nuances may exist among putative class members, the legal relief 

sought is the same: a declaratory judgment striking down Alabama’s laws banning 

same-sex marriage and an injunction barring their enforcement. Such relief rests 

on identical questions of law and would clearly resolve the claims class-wide and in 

one stroke.

Similarly, there are common questions of law that would be resolved as to all 

of the members of the proposed Defendant Class. The proposed Defendant Class 

consists of 68 probate judges who are enforcing Alabama’s laws barring same-sex 

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couples from marrying. The question common to the entire Defendant Class is 

whether their enforcement of Alabama’s laws barring same-sex couples from 

marriage violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. The resolution of this question will resolve the claims against all of 

members of the class in one stroke. Thus, the Court finds that the Defendant Class 

meets the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). 

3. Typicality

Typicality requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties 

[be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Although 

the issues of commonality and typicality are separate, the proof required for each 

tends to merge. Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 456 (11th Cir.1996) 

(citation omitted). “Traditionally, commonality refers to the group characteristics of 

the class as a whole, while typicality refers to the individual characteristics of the 

named plaintiff in relation to the class.” Piazza v. Ebsco Industries, Inc., 273 F.3d 

1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The claim of a class representative 

is typical if the claims or defenses of the class and the class representative arise 

from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory.” 

Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009). In the 

instant case, Plaintiffs ask this Court to appoint Kristi Ogle and Jennifer Ogle, 

Keith Ingram and Albert Holloway Pigg III, Gary Wayne Wright II and Brandon 

Mabrey as class representatives. The proposed class representatives seek to marry

and have their marriages recognized, but have been refused a marriage license 

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because they are of the same sex. Their inability to be married and have their 

marriages recognized because they are of the same sex is shared by all members of 

the proposed Plaintiff Class and arises from the same event or pattern or practice of 

events. Similarly, the Defendant class representatives have typical defenses to 

those claims. The Defendants all operate under the same statutory framework and 

have the same ministerial duties. Their defenses arise from the same course of 

events and each class member may make the same legal arguments to defend 

against the Plaintiffs’ allegations. Because the injuries, claims and defenses of the 

named Plaintiffs and Defendants in this case are typical of the injuries, claims of 

the entire proposed classes, the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a) is met.

4. Adequacy

Adequacy of representation requires that “the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). The 

adequacy of representation requirement encompasses two inquiries: “(1) whether 

any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and the class; 

and (2) whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action.” Valley 

Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.2003) (citation 

omitted). Defendants do not seriously challenge the assertion that the named 

Plaintiffs and their counsel will vigorously prosecute this action. Additionally, 

because the Court has determined that the named Plaintiffs and the putative class 

share commonality and typicality, it follows, that “the named plaintiff[s'] claim[s] 

and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will 

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be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 n. 5 

(noting that commonality and typicality determinations tend to merge with the 

adequacy-or-representation requirement); see also Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 

620 (“The adequacy-of-representation requirement tends to merge with the 

commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which serve as guideposts for 

determining whether maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the 

named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of 

the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”

citations omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have no substantial conflict of 

interest with the class and that Plaintiffs will adequately prosecute this action on 

behalf of the Plaintiff Class.

As to the Defendant Class adequacy of representation, Defendant Davis 

asserts that he cannot be an effective class representative because there is no 

unified position of the 68 probate judges on the constitutionality of denying 

marriage licenses to same-sex couples and because he has never made public 

statements or taken a public stance on the matter. However, the issuance of 

marriage licenses is a purely ministerial act. See Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama 

Policy Institute, 2015 WL 892752, * 4, 8 (Ala., March 3, 2015) (discussing and 

referring to the probate judges’ “ministerial act of licensing marriages”). None of 

the Defendant Class members are charged with discretion or judgment in carrying 

out this ministerial duty. Whatever their personal positions are on the 

constitutionality of Alabama’s marriage laws, it is their common obligation to carry 

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out their ministerial duties that give rise to a common defense. See Sherman ex rel. 

Sherman v. Township High School Dist., 540 F.Supp.2d 985, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 

(“Whatever the position of any individual school district on the constitutionality of 

the Act, the common obligation to implement it gives rise to a common defense.”); 

see also National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleland, 697 F.Supp. 1204, 1217 (N.D. 

Ga. 1988) (“Because the Fulton County Board has the same duties and 

responsibilities as all other county Superintendents of Elections, the Fulton County 

Board, as class representative, can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 

defendant class of Superintendents.”). “Rule 23(a)(4) does not require a willing 

representative, [but] merely an adequate one.” Cleland, 697 F.Supp at 1217. 

Additionally, “any perceived weaknesses in [Judge Davis’s] status as class 

representative stemming from [his] professed neutrality” “are offset by the inclusion 

of [Attorney General Strange] as a named defendant” who is defending the statutes 

constitutionality. Sherman, 540 F.Supp.2d at 992; see also Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 

F.Supp. 1061, 1066 (D.C. Wis. 1976) (“Not only is defendant Zablocki's interest 

identical to that of the other county clerks, but the attorney representing him is 

from the Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel's office which is experienced in 

conducting federal litigation. Furthermore, the Attorney General of Wisconsin has 

taken an active part in this action, urging that the challenged statute be upheld.”). 

In light of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that each of the four Rule 23(a) 

requirements is satisfied for both the proposed Plaintiff and Defendant Classes.

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B. Rule 23(b)

In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must also 

qualify under one of the three “types” of classes set forth in Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs 

contend certification under both 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) are proper. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) provides for class adjudication 

where there is a risk that inconsistent or varying judgments in separate lawsuits 

“would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 

class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Because the risk that judicial action will create 

incompatible standards of conduct is low when a party seeks compensatory 

damages, only actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief can be certified under 

Rule 23(b)(1)(A). In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th 

Cir.1987). In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not seek compensatory damages and it 

is clear that the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of 

inconsistent and varying adjudications. Defendants’ only real argument against 

certification under 23(b)(1)(a) is that the issues will only really be resolved when the 

United States Supreme Court has the final say on these inconsistencies. This Court

has already considered Defendants’ requests to stay this case pending the Supreme 

Court’s ruling and has denied said requests. A class-wide ruling by this Court

would definitively determine the issues as to all of the Plaintiffs’ claims against all 

68 probate judges in Alabama. This Court is aware that the Supreme Court of the 

United States will ultimately have the final say on these issues, but until that time 

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this Court must consider the claims and rights of the parties before this Court. The 

Court finds certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(1)(A).

The Court also finds that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 

23(b)(2) applies when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 

grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 

corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). “The ‘generally applicable’ language signifies ‘that the 

party opposing the class does not have to act directly against each member of the 

class.’ ” Harris, 299 F.R.D. at 494 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER § 1775). “Instead, 

‘[t]he key is whether the party's actions would affect all persons similarly situated 

so that those acts apply generally to the whole class.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). For 

class certification under 23(b)(2), “[t]wo basic requirements must be met: (1) the 

class members must have been harmed in essentially the same way by the 

defendant's acts; and (2) the common injury may properly be addressed by classwide injunctive or equitable remedies. Williams v. Nat. Sec. Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 

685, 693 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (citing Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 

1155 (11th Cir.1983)). Defendants' alleged conduct is directed against a specific 

class of people, same-sex couples, and is uniform in its application. All Plaintiff 

Class members have been harmed by being denied the ability of obtaining a 

marriage license and their injury can be properly addressed by class-wide injunctive 

relief. Thus, this case falls squarely within the ambit of Rule 23(b)(2).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a Plaintiff Class consisting of all persons in 

Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage license in order to marry a person of the 

same sex and to have that marriage recognized under Alabama law, and who are 

unable to do so because of the enforcement of Alabama’s laws prohibiting the 

issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and barring recognition of their 

marriages is GRANTED.

2. The Court APPOINTS Kristi Ogle and Jennifer Ogle, Keith Ingram and 

Albert Holloway Pigg III, Gary Wayne Wright II and Brandon Mabrey as Lead 

Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class representatives.

3. The Court APPOINTS the National Center for Lesbian Rights, 

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the Southern Poverty Law 

Center, and ACLU Foundation of Alabama as Co-Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiffs 

and the Plaintiff Class.

4. Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a Defendant Class consisting of all Alabama 

county probate judges who are enforcing or in the future may enforce Alabama’s 

laws barring the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and refusing to 

recognize their marriages is GRANTED.

5. The Court APPOINTS Judge Don Davis and Judge Tim Russell as Lead 

Defendants and Defendant Class representatives.

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6. The Court APPOINTS Lee L. Hale, Satterwhite, Druhan, Gaillard & 

Tyler, LLC, and Boardman, Carr, Bennett, Watkins, Hill & Gamble, P.C. as CoLead Counsel for Lead Defendants and the Defendant Class.

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of May, 2015

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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