NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 07a0811n.06 Filed: Nove mber 21, 2007 No. 05-2734 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
BO NI TA McCL ENDONand EL L I OTT McCL ENDON , a minor, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. CI TY OF DETROI T, a Michig an m u n i c i p a l i t y, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
OPI NI ON

Be for e : D AU G HTREY , G ILM AN , a nd C OOK, C ir c uitJudg e s. RONALD LEE GILMAN, Cir cuit Judge. B on ita Mc Cle nd on and he r t e e na g e so n E lli ott sued the City

of De troit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following the war rantless e ntry

into and sear ch of their house by

Detroit Police Off

icer s L inda Gilbert a

n d He rm an Hope . Gilbert and H ope we re
sear chingfor Gilber

t’s teena g e daughter, Cassandr a, who had run aw ay . The district cour t gr anted summary judgme nt in favor of

the City
. On appea l, the McClendons argue that the City should be held liable for

the offic ers’ conduct be cause the City has a n u n co n s t i t u tional custom or policy of permitting w arr antless sea rche s. For the rea sons set forth below, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUNDNo. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 2 - A. F ac tu al b ac kgr ound Offic ers Gilber

t and Hope arr ived at the M cClendons’ home at approxim ately 4:00 a.m. on J une 8, 2002. Gilbert’s teena g e daug hter Cassandra , who was dating B onita McClendon’s other son Evere tt, had run aw ay

from home, a

nd Gilbert believe d that Cassan d ra wa s wi th Evere tt. The office rs, w h o w e r e in

u n if o r m a n d o nd u ty , e n te r e d

th e M c Cl e n d o n s ’ h o me thr o u g ha c lo s e d b ut
un loc ke d s ide do or . T he y did no t ha ve a se arc h w arr ant. Gi lbe rt and Ho pe wo ke up El lio tt M c Cle nd on and a sk e d h im a bo ut t he wh e re a

bo uts of bo th his mother and Cassandr a. Elliott tol d the office rs that his mother was upstairs a nd that he did not know wher e Cassandr a wa s. Gilbert instructed Elli ott to wake up his mother. Elliott complied, and then returned to his bedroom. Af ter be ing a

wake ned by

Elliott , Bonita Mc Clendon met Gilbert and Hope downsta irs and told the offic ers that Cassa ndra w as not at the house a nd that she had no ide a whe r e Ca s s an dr a

c o u ld b e f o u n d
. Wh e nth e o f

f ic e r s a s k e d

f o r p e r mi s s io nto s e ar c hth e b a s e ment of the ho us e , Bo nit a c on se nte d “und e r dur e ss. ” Ca ssa nd ra wa s n ot f ound a t th e Mc Cle nd on s’ ho me (nor wa s Evere tt), and the off icer s left without any

further explanation. L ater that day , Bonita Mc Clendon called t h e p olice to re port the incident. Of fice r Cheri Snow and her partne r, Officer Antonio Trupiano, responded to the report of a br eakingand ente ring at the McClendons’ home . Bonita Mc Clendon informed them that Gilber t and Hope ha d enter ed her house ea rly that morning to searc h for C assandr a Gilber t. Office r Snow took the complaint from Bonita. Ba sed on the e ntry and sea rch of the McClendons’ home, the Way ne County

Prosecutor char g ed both offic ers with the c riminal offe nse of “ en t er i ng without owner’s pe rmission.” TheNo. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 3 - of fi c e rs w e r e a c qu i t t e d

o nN o v e mb e r

4 , 2 0 0 2 f

o l l o w i n g a

b e n c htr i a l i nth e s t a t e d i s tr i c tc o u rt. Detroit Police Interna l Affa irs also investigated the incident a nd deter mined that the offic ers ha d
v i o l a t e d d e p art m e n tp o l i c y. G i l b e rtan d H o p e w e r e b o ths u s p e n d e d f o r s i x m o n th s w i th o u tp ay. B. P r oc e dur al b ac kgr ound Ba sed on the fore g oing fac ts, the McClendons subsequently filed lawsuits in both st ate a nd fede ral c o u rt. T h e s tate
- c o u rt c a s e w a s u lt im a te ly s e tt le d in M ay o f 2 0 0 5
. InN o v e mb e r

o f 2 0 05,
summa ry ju dg me nt w a s g ra

nte d in fa vo r o f a ll the de fe nd ants in t he fe de ra l a c tio n. Th is t ime ly appea l followed. The Mc Clendons challeng e only the g rant of summar

y judgme nt in favor of

the C i ty.
II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review We revie w de novo the di strict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt. Int’l Union v. Cummins , 434 F.3d 478, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Summary judgme nt is proper wher e no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t exi sts and t he moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c)
. I n c on sid e ri nga

mot ion fo r s umm ary judg me nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt mus t c on str

ue a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in f

avor of the nonmoving pa

rty
. Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I

nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The centr al issue is “ whether the evidenc e pre sents a suff icient disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc ., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986))
. B. The City’s liabil ity und er § 1983No. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 4 - The McClendons a

rgue that the City

can be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of (1) an
un c onst itutio na l c us tom

or po lic y of a llo wi ngwa

rr antl e ss s e arc he s, (2 ) i na de qu a te tr a ini ngof its police off icer s, and (3) ratification of Gil bert’s and Hope’ s conduct. B eca use respondeat superior liability is not available a s a mea ns of rec overy under § 1983, Doe v . Cl aib or neCou nty , 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996), the McClendons c annot base their cla ims ag ainst the C i t y solely on the conduct of

Offic ers Gilber

t and Hope. See M

onell v. New Y

ork City Dep’ t of Soc. Servs ., 43 6 U .S. 658, 694 (19 7 8 ) (holding “that a local g overnme nt may

not be sued unde r § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely

by its e mploy ees or ag ents”). The plaintiffs must demonstrate that the City itself was
a wr ong doer. Id. Munic ipa lit ie s an d oth e r b od ie s o f l oc a l g ov e rnme nt m ay be su e d p ur su ant t o 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 98 3 if the y are “ a lle g e d to have c a us e d a c on sti tut ion a l to rt

thr ou g h ‘ a

po lic y stat e me nt, ordinanc e, re g ulation, or dec ision officially adopted a nd promulg ated by

that body ’s offic ers.’ ” City of S t. L ou is v . Pra

pr otn ik, 4 8 5 U. S
. 1 1 2 , 1 2 1 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Mo ne ll , 436 U.S. at 690). Section 19 83 a lso “ a

uth or ize s su it ‘ fo r c on sti tut ion a l de pr iv a t i o n s v i s i t e d

p u r s u a nt t o g o v e rnme nta l “ c us tom ” even thoug h such a c ustom has not rec eived f ormal appr oval throug h the body ’s offic ial decisionmakingchanne ls.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Mo ne ll , 436 U.S. at 690-91). A § 1983 plaintiff mig ht not be able to demonstrate that a written pol icy exis ts, but he or she “may be able to prove the e x istence
o f a w i d e s p r e a d

p r a c t i c e t h a t , a l t h o u g hn o ta u th o r i z e d b y w r i t t e nl aw o r

e x p r e s s mun i c i p a l p o l i c y, is so permane nt and well settled a s to constitute a custom or usag e with the for ce of law.” Id. at 127. (citation and quotation mar ks omitted). Such a plaintiff “ must also show a direc t causa l link betweenNo. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 5 - the custom and the constitutional deprivation.” Doe , 103 F.3d at 508. “This re quirement is nec essar y to avoid defac to r esp on de at s up e rio r l i a b i l i ty e x p l i c i t l y p r o h i b i t e d b y Mo ne ll .” Id. C. Cl aim s o f the M c Cl e ndons Th e Mc Cle nd on s fi rs t argue that “ [t]he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d wh e re the De fe nd ant C ity of De tr oit had a polic y , cu s t om and pra ctice of exercising war

rantless e ntries under

exigent cir cumstance s throug h its poli ce D epar

tment.” This ba ld a ssertion, howeve r, amounts to nothingmore than se tting fo rt h o ne of the ha llm ark

e xce pti on s to the F ourt

h Am e ndme nt w arr ant r e qu ir e me nt. Th e e xig e ntc ir c ums tanc e s e xce pti on

a llows the g ov e rnme nt t o “ ov e rc ome the pr e sumpt ion that a wa rr antl e ss entry is unreasona

ble if it proves that ‘t h e ex i gen ci es of the situation m ake the needs of law
e n f o r c e m e n ts o c o mp e l l i n g t h a ta w ar r an t l e s s s e ar c hi s o b

j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e un d e r th e F ou rt h Amendment.’” United States v. Huffman , 4 6 1 F. 3 d 7 7 7 , 7 8 2 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Br igh am City

v . S tua rt , 126 S. Ct . 1943, 1947 (2006) ( citation and quotation marks omitted)). I n th e ir br ie f, the Mc Cle nd on s’ mos t di re c t e xplanatio n o f t he ir the or y of mun ic ipa l li a

bil ity is a s f oll ow s: By

v i rt u e o f i t s p o l i ce p o we r, th e De fe n d an t C i ty o f D et ro i t , th ro u gh its poli ce o ff

i cers, is vested with statutory authority to enter the homes, such as Plaintiffs-Appellants, wit hout a warra nt. Said entry is gr ounded in exigent c ircumstanc es. He re, D efe ndant police of fi c e rs be lie ve d a

min or wa s in

the Pla int if

fs -A pp e lla nts ho me wi tho ut p e rm iss ion

to b e the re and that the min or may have be e n in so me da ng e r. Ac tin g a s p oli c e of

fi c e rs , v e ste d b y

the De fe nd ant C ity of De tr oit , De fe nd ant of

fi c e rs e nte re d the pr e mis e s w ith out a wa rr ant. Th e wa rr antl e ss e ntr

y int o Pl a int if

fs -A pp e lla nts ho me c on sti tut e s a de pr i v a t i o nb e c a

u s e t h e o f

f i c e r s w e r e e xe r c i s i n g a

p o l i c y , c u s tom , p r a c t i c e o f

D e f e n d an tC i ty o f

D e tr o i t ’ s w ar

r an t l e s s e n tr

y.No. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 6 - The McClendons appear

to be ar g uing that even if O ffice r Gilbert’ s and Hope ’s war rantless e ntry int o th e Mc Cle nd on s’ ho me wa s ju sti fi e d b y e xig e nt c ir c ums tanc e s, the City c ou ld s til l be he ld l ia

ble under § 1983. I n other words, the M cClendons are asking us t o predic ate municipal liability on the basis of a policy

that acc ords with the settled law of war rantless sea

rche s. This we dec line to do. Mo re ov e r, ba se d o n th e dis c ipl ina ry a c tio ns take n by the De tr oit Pol ic e De pa rtme nt a g a ins t Of fi c e rs Gi lbe rt

and Ho pe , th e City

re c og nize d th a t th e ir

c on du c t f

e ll o uts ide of

the e xig e ntc ir c ums tanc e s e xce pti on . The fa c t tha t the of fi c e rs we re dis c ipl ine d f

or the ir un a uth or ize d e ntr

y int o the McClendons’ house thus r efute s any claim that the City has a c ustom or policy

that cause d the
c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n b y the ind ivi du a l of

fi c e rs . Acc ording to the McClendons, howeve r, the off icer s’ ac quittal in the state-cour t criminal proce edingis evidence of “a n established policy , custom and pra ctice.” But the state trial court ap p ar e n tl y

a c qu itte d

th e o f f ic e r s b e c a

u s e th e ir b e h av io r w a s f o un d to f a ll w it h in M ic h igan’s
emer g ency -aid e x ception to the wa rra nt require ment. No conclusion was reac hed by the state c ourt about the customs or policies of the City or the De troit Pol ice De partment. T h e M cC l en d o n s n ex t al l u d e t o t h e p o s s i b i l i ty o f m un i ci p al l i ab i l i ty

fo r i n ad equ at e t ra i n i n g. “[T] here are limit ed cir cumstance s in which an a lleg ation of a ‘ failure to train’ ca n be the ba sis for liability under § 1983.” City of

Can ton v . H

arris , 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). The prese nt case , howeve r, does not fall within those limit ed cir cumstance s. Ha rri s makes c lear

that “the inade quacy of po lic e tr a ini ng may se rv e a s the ba sis fo r § 1983 lia bil ity on ly wh e re the fa ilure to t

ra in a mou nts to de liberate indiffer ence to the rig hts of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. The McClendons of fer no evidenc e of inadequate police tra ining on the pa rt of the City , butNo. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 7 - make only

naked a ssertions that the City “lac ks protocols that, if in place , safe g uard a g ainst abuses of the policy , custom and pr actice of conduc ting wa rra ntless searc hes.” Such a ssertions are inadequate to suppor

t a finding of municipal liability under § 1983 beca use war rantless s ea rches under pr oper e x ige nt circumstanc es ar e indee d constitutional. See H uffman , 461 F.3d at 782. F ina lly , th e Mc Cle nd on s argue that th e City ra tif ie d th e a c tio ns of

Gi lbe rt and Ho pe be c a

us e the punis hme nt m e te d ou t to th e of fi c e rs amou

nte d to “ a me re sla p o n th e ha

nd .” A s ix-m on th suspension without pay , howeve r, can hardly be cla ssified as a me re slap on the hand. Such ac tion by the City prec ludes the McClendons from being able to show “that the municipal a ction was take n with ‘deliberate indiffer ence ’ as to its known or obvious consequenc es.” Bo ar d o f Co un ty Com m’rs of B ry an Cou nty

v . B ro wn , 5 2 0 U. S
. 3 9 7 , 4 0 7 (1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Ha rri s , 489 U.S. at 388). We thus co n c lu d e th a t th e M c Cl e n d o n s h av e f a il e d to me e t th e ir b ur d e n o f p r o v in g that

“ thr ou g h it s deliberate conduct, the [City ] was the ‘moving forc e’ beh i n d t h e inj ury alleg ed.” Id. at 404 (emphasis in orig inal). To the contrary , the appa rent “ moving f

orce ” in the pre sent ca se wa s the misguide d individual decision of Off icer Gilbert to loc ate her runaw ay teena g e daughter whe re sh e su sp e c te d Ca ssa

nd ra c ou ld b e fo un d. Th e un iqu e c ir c ums tanc e s th a t mo tiv a te d th is unconstitutional searc h by the individual office rs is simply not attributable to any unlawful c ustom
o r p o l i c y o f t h e C i t y.
III . C ON CL USI ON For all the re asons stated a

bove, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.No. 05-2734

Mc Cle nd on v . D e tro it

- 8 -