IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: THE MATTER OF TAIRA )

LYNN LIMITED NO. 7, etc., et al., )

PRAYING FOR EXONERATION ) CIVIL ACTION 13-0318-WS-C

FROM OR LIMITATION OF )

LIABILITY ) 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Paul Jones to 

dismiss. (Doc. 348). The interested parties have filed briefs in support of their 

respective positions, (Docs. 349, 356, 357, 370), and the motion is ripe for 

resolution.

Two sets of claimants (the Tyson and Benoit claimants and the Bordelon 

claimants) filed amended claims that for the first time included claims against 

Jones. (Docs. 284, 295). The only allegations as to Jones are that he is the (or an) 

owner and/or manager of defendants Oil Recovery Company, Inc. of Alabama 

(“ORC”) and ORCA, Inc. (“ORCA”) and that, at the time of the subject incident,

he “was operating a tank barge cleaning and degassing facility on property leased 

to ORC by ORCA, on property owned by ORCA.” Jones moves to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to satisfy the pleading standards of Rule 8(a). 

To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must first satisfy the 

pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ....” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 establishes a regime of “notice pleading.” 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 513-14 (2002). It does not, 

however, eliminate all pleading requirements. 

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First, the complaint must address all the elements that must be shown in 

order to support recovery under one or more causes of action. “At a minimum, 

notice pleading requires that a complaint contain inferential allegations from 

which we can identify each of the material elements necessary to sustain a 

recovery under some viable legal theory.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555

F.3d 949, 960 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis and internal quotes omitted). 

Pleading elements is necessary, but it is not enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). 

The rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do” to satisfy that rule. Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. There must in addition be a pleading of facts. Though they need not 

be detailed, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level ....” Id. That is, the complaint must allege “enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard ... asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully,” and 

“[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). A complaint lacking 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face” will not “survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. But so long as 

the plausibility standard is met, the complaint “may proceed even if it strikes a 

savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is 

very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotes omitted).

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The claimants admit they do not assert that Jones is vicariously liable for 

the wrongs of the corporate entities. (Doc. 356 at 1-2).1 Instead, they seek to hold 

him liable for wrongs he personally committed. (Id. at 2). The only allegations 

mentioning Jones, however, say nothing about him having personally committed 

any wrong; rather, they allege only that, as owner and/or manager of ORC and 

ORCA, he operated a tank barge cleaning and degassing facility. That is a 

perfectly neutral allegation.

The claimants respond that their claims assert that “ORC and Mr. Paul 

Jones was [sic] operating” the facility, on land owned and leased by ORCA, which 

they argue means they have alleged that Jones was “jointly operating” the facility 

with ORC and ORCA. (Doc. 356 at 9). They then point out that their claims

“allege a number of specific things that ORC and ORCA did wrong.” (Id.). 

Without so stating, they apparently take the position that, whatever they allege the 

entities did wrong, they also allege that Jones did wrong. That simply does not 

follow. Asserting that multiple persons or entities engaged in a common business, 

in the course of which one of them committed a wrong, does not and cannot 

constitute an allegation that another of them committed a wrong.2 Certainly the 

claimants have not offered to show the contrary. Insisting that Jones must know 

what they intend to sue him for, (id. at 10), is no substitute for allegations that set 

forth his wrongdoing.

Because the claimants have failed to allege a cause of action against Jones, 

he is entitled to dismissal. The claimants seek leave under Rule 15(a) to file an 

amended claim against Jones. (Doc. 356 at 10-11). However, since the claimants 

 1 The Bordelon claimants merely “adopt and incorporate” the briefing of the other 

claimants. (Doc. 357 at 1). Accordingly, all citations are to the brief filed by the Tyson 

and Benoit claimants.

2 Suppose a complaint alleges that a husband and wife jointly operate a business 

and that the husband has defrauded a customer. Has the complaint thereby alleged that 

the wife defrauded the customer? Obviously not. The wife may in fact have defrauded 

the customer, but the complaint does not so allege. Or the wife may be vicariously liable 

for her husband’s fraud, but the claimants here deny reliance on any such theory.

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sought leave to file their current, amended claims, the deadline established by the 

Rule 16(b) scheduling order for filing motions to amend the pleadings has passed. 

(Doc. 227). To avoid that deadline, the claimants must satisfy the “good cause” 

standard of Rule 16(b)(4), a burden they have neither acknowledged nor attempted 

to shoulder. 

For the reasons set forth above, Jones’ motion to dismiss is granted. All 

claims brought against him, or attempted to be brought against him, by the Tyson, 

Benoit and Bordelon claimants are dismissed. The claimants’ requests for leave 

to file amended claims, construed as motions for such relief, are denied without 

prejudice to the claimants’ ability to file properly supported motions addressing 

Rule 16(b) as well as Rule 15(a).

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of February, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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