[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-14218

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00047-HES-MCR-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WANDA FAYE RATCLIFFE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(April 26, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

The United States moves to dismiss Wanda Faye Ratcliffe’s appeal of her 

sentence based on the appeal waiver in her plea agreement. After careful 

consideration, we conclude the waiver is enforceable and therefore grant the 

government’s motion. 

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I.

A federal grand jury indicted Ratcliffe on charges stemming from an alleged 

conspiracy to illegally structure currency deposits. Pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, Ratcliffe agreed to plead guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Structure 

Financial Transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 5324(a)(1), (3). In exchange, the government agreed to withdraw the remaining 

charges and recommend a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. 

The plea agreement included an appeal waiver. That provision said Ratcliffe 

“expressly waive[d] the right to appeal [her] sentence on any ground, including the 

ground that the Court erred in determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant 

to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground that the sentence 

exceeds the defendant’s applicable guidelines range as determined by the Court

pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the ground that the 

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the 

sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.” The provision also 

said Ratcliffe “is released from h[er] waiver and may appeal the sentence as 

authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)” “if the government exercises its right to appeal 

the sentence imposed.” 

A magistrate judge held a change of plea hearing. The magistrate judge 

confirmed Ratcliffe read the plea agreement, reviewed it with her attorneys, and 

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signed it, and he ensured Ratcliffe understood she was bound by all its terms. The 

magistrate judge specifically reviewed the appeal waiver with Ratcliffe, explaining 

that she “expressly waive[d] [her] right to appeal [her] sentence on any ground, 

including on the ground that the Court may have erred in determining your 

applicable guideline range, pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.” The 

magistrate judge noted there were “three exceptions” to the waiver as outlined in 

the plea agreement and that “[i]t further reads that if the United States appeals, then 

you are released from this waiver. You could also appeal.” Ratcliffe confirmed 

that she accepted the appeal waiver voluntarily, and she confirmed that she had no 

questions about anything covered in her plea agreement. After the magistrate 

judge asked whether Ratcliffe would plead guilty “having heard and understood 

everything [he] said,” Ratcliffe pled guilty. Ultimately, the magistrate judge found 

that Ratcliffe’s decision to plead guilty was freely and intelligently made. 

At sentencing, the district court accepted the plea agreement, calculated 

Ratcliffe’s advisory guideline range as 46 to 57 months, granted her motion for a 

downward departure or variance based on her mental and emotional condition, see

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3, and imposed a 24-month term of incarceration. 

Ratcliffe filed an appeal, arguing that the district court erred in calculating 

her offense level based on the value of the funds involved in her structured 

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transactions. The government moved to dismiss the Ratcliffe’s appeal, asking this 

Court to enforce the appeal waiver. 

II.

Ratcliffe’s sole argument on appeal challenges the district court’s 

determination of her applicable guideline range, an argument foreclosed by the 

appeal waiver. Thus, if the appeal waiver is enforceable, we must dismiss her 

appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (11th Cir. 

1997) (per curiam). 

We review de novo the validity of a sentence appeal waiver, United States v. 

Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008), and we enforce them only when 

they are knowing and voluntary, United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 

(11th Cir. 1993). To establish a waiver was knowing and voluntary, “the 

government must show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned the 

defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver during the [plea] colloquy, or (2) 

it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant otherwise understood the 

full significance of the waiver.” Id. at 1351. 

The appeal waiver is enforceable, because it is manifestly clear from the 

record that Ratcliffe understood the waiver’s full significance. At the change of 

plea hearing, the magistrate judge confirmed that Ratcliffe’s attorney had reviewed 

the plea agreement with her and that Ratcliffe read it herself and signed it. The 

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magistrate judge also specifically discussed the appeal waiver with Ratcliffe and 

affirmed she had voluntarily agreed to it. Ratcliffe then confirmed she had no 

questions about her plea agreement and did not object when the judge asserted she 

had heard and understood all that he said. 

III.

We therefore GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss Ratcliffe’s 

appeal. 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

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