alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1797 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1797

   To require the Consumer Product Safety Commission to promulgate a 
 consumer product safety standard with respect to rechargeable lithium-
  ion batteries used in micromobility devices, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 24, 2023

 Mr. Torres of New York (for himself, Mr. Garbarino, Ms. Clarke of New 
  York, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Bowman, Mr. D'Esposito, Mr. Espaillat, and Mr. 
Goldman of New York) introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To require the Consumer Product Safety Commission to promulgate a 
 consumer product safety standard with respect to rechargeable lithium-
  ion batteries used in micromobility devices, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Setting Consumer Standards for 
Lithium-Ion Batteries Act''.

SEC. 2. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARD FOR CERTAIN BATTERIES.

    (a) Consumer Product Safety Standard Required.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission shall promulgate, under section 553 of title 5, 
United States Code, a final consumer product safety standard for 
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries used in micromobility devices within 
the jurisdiction of the Commission, including electric bicycles and 
electric scooters, to protect against the risk of fires caused by such 
batteries.
    (b) CPSC Determination of Scope.--The Consumer Product Safety 
Commission shall specify the types of rechargeable lithium-ion 
batteries and the types of micromobility devices within the 
jurisdiction of the Commission that are within the scope of subsection 
(a) as part of a standard promulgated under this section, as reasonably 
necessary to protect against the risk of fires caused by rechargeable 
lithium-ion batteries in consumer products.
    (c) Treatment of Standard.--A consumer product safety standard 
promulgated under subsection (a) shall be treated as a consumer product 
safety rule promulgated under section 9 of the Consumer Product Safety 
Act (15 U.S.C. 2058).
                                 <all>
```
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   878,989
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<EPS-BASIC>                                           .20
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</TABLE>
#### Jacob W. Funk *v.*Silas Miller.

Principal and Agent — Disavowal of Unauthorized Acts of Agent.

When an agent compromises his principal’s claim against a debtor, the principal, to avoid such a settlement, must disavow his agent’s acts within a reasonable time after learning thereof.

Reasonable Time.

A principal’s repudiation of the acts of his agent is not within a reasonable time when not made for more than five months after he learned of such acts and more than a year after they were taken.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

October 3, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

According to Funk’s own testimony, he was notified in March, 1868, that Shroett & Bush had compromised with Miller. About *122the middle of the summer of 1868 he ascertained the terms and conditions of the compromise. Whether he obtained this information before or after the proceedings against Schroett & Bush to coerce from these the amount paid by Miller, does not appear. It is certain, however, that he did not notify Miller of his intention to repudiate the action of his agent in making the compromise until January, 1869, when the suit to set aside the order dismissing his action was instituted.

*J. B. Cochran, for appellant.*

*Thompson & Booth, for appellee.*

Conceding, then, that Funk’s letter did not authorize Shroett to compromise for less than $1,500, and that he was not apprised of Schroett’s violation of instructions when he was attempting to compel him to pay over the money, one thing is clear, that with full information as to all the facts, he remained silent from about the 15th of July, 1868, until January, 1869. Up to the last named date, Miller had received no intimation that Funk was dissatisfied with a compromise that had been fully consummated more than eight months before.

A party is bound to disavow the unauthorized acts of his agent as soon as he reasonably can after they come to his knowledge; otherwise his assent or ratification will be presumed. If he neglects for an unreasonable tim,e to repudiate them, he makes the acts his own, and is bound by them to the same extent that he would have been if the agent had had previous authority. Here the principal failed to disavow his agent’s contract for five and one-half months after acquiring full knowledge of all its conditions.

Considering the fact that the contract was consummated more than a year before appellant received this information, it was a case demanding prompt and immediate repudiation and notice, thereof to Miller, if he did not intend to ratify it. Under such circumstances, a delay of more than five months was unexcusable; and the court would have been bound to tell the jury that, as matter of law, appellant’s ratification must be presumed.

It is not error, therefore, to instruct peremptorily in favor of appellee.

Judgment *affirmed.*
Ionizing Radiation Division Quality Manual Updates Archive

Document Section Date Initiated Status Date Completed New Version No.

Procedure 4 Appendices A & B 9/12/06 complete 9/19/06 3.00

NIST QMI 2.2, 4.1.1, 4.4.5, 4.6.2, 5.5.2 4/12/06 complete 4/12/06 3.00

IRDQMII 4.2.3.2.4, 5.7.2, App. E 11/1/05 complete 12/12/05 5.00

Procedure 11 Editorial 11/1/05 complete 12/12/05 3.10

Procedure 12 Editorial 11/1/05 complete 12/12/05 3.01

Procedure 13 Editorial 11/1/05 complete 11/15/05 3.00

Procedure 14 Time Calibration, Uncertainties 11/1/05 complete 12/12/05 2.00

Procedure 15 Substantial revision 11/1/05 complete 11/30/05 2.00

Procedure 16 Editorial 11/1/05 complete 11/30/05 2.00

Guide 01 Part 2 11/1/05 complete 11/15/05 1.10

NIST QMI 4.5.2 5/9/2005 complete 5/9/2005 2.20

IRD QMII 4.2.3.2.1, 5.2, 5.2.4, App. E 9/12/2005 complete 9/14/2005 4.10

Procedures 15-16 New 1/1/2005 complete 5/1/2005 1.00

IRD QMII 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2, 3, 4.3.2, 4.5.2, Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.4.2, 5.7, App. E 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 4.00

Guide 1 Editorial 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 1.01

Guide 4 Definitions, Protocol 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 3.00

Guide 14 Editorial 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 1.10

Guide 13 Protocol 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 2.00

Procedure 12 4.1.3.1, 6.1, 6.2, Uncertainty, References, Records, App. F 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 3.00

Procedure 11 Procedures, Records, App. B 1/1/2005 complete 4/1/2005 3.00

IRD QMII 4.3 10/5/2004 complete 10/22/2004 3.10

Guide 13 All 10/5/2004 complete 10/22/2004 1.00

Procedure 7 Environmental 8/25/2004 complete 9/3/2004 2.10

NIST QMI 3, 4.3.2, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 5/28/2004 complete 6/15/2004 2.10

IRD QMII 1.1, 4.2.3.2.1, 4.2.3.2.2, 4.3.4.2, 4.3.4.3,4.3.4.4, 4.5.2, 5.1, 5.2.1, 

5.5, 5.6.1.1,5.6.1.2, 5.6.1.3, 5.10.1, 5.10.2, App. A, App. E 

 5/1/2004 complete 6/1/2004 3.00

Procedures 1 - 13 Substantial 5/1/2004 complete 6/1/2004 2.00

Guide 4 Definitions, Appendix 5/1/2004 complete 6/1/2004 2.00

Guide 11 QS Training Section 1 5/1/2004 complete 6/1/2004 2.00

Guide 12 Section 5 5/1/2004 complete 6/1/2004 2.00

IRD QMII 4.1.3.1, 4.1.3.2, 4.2.2.5, 5.1, 5.2.1, 5.9.1, 5.10.2 1/22/2004 complete 1/30/2004 2.00
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1759 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1759

    To prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from implementing a 
    congestion pricing program until an economic impact analysis is 
  completed and made available to the public, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 23, 2023

    Ms. Malliotakis (for herself and Mr. Gottheimer) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 
                           and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from implementing a 
    congestion pricing program until an economic impact analysis is 
  completed and made available to the public, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Economic Impact of Tolling Act''.

SEC. 2. RESTRICTION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CONGESTION PRICING PROGRAM.

    The Secretary of Transportation may not implement, or authorize the 
implementation of, a congestion pricing program for any toll road, 
bridge, or tunnel until the date on which an economic impact analysis 
is completed and such analysis is made available to the public.
                                 <all>
```
15,909.

#### Weigold *v.*Pross.

*Ejectment.*— Answer *to Denial.*— Proof *of Defendant’s Possession Dispensed With.*— In an action of ejectment, where the defendant appears and joins issue, under which he can make a defence, proof on the part of the plaintiff of defendant’s possession is dispensed with by section 1056, R. S. 1881. The fact that he admits title in the plaintiff does not make such proof necessary, for he still has the right under his answer in denial to make any other defence he may have.

From the Tippecanoe Superior Court.

*J. Park,*for appellant.

*T. H. Wrepers*and *T. H. Adams,*for appellee.

Olds, J.

— This is an action of ejectment, and there was a finding and judgment for the plaintiff.

The only question presented relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellant appeared and made a defence, and filed an answer in denial of the complaint. Upon the trial the appellant admitted that the appellee was the owner of the real estate, but there was no withdrawal of the answer.

When the defendant appears and joins issue under which he can make a defence, there is no necessity of the plaintiff making proof of defendant’s possession. Such proof is expressly dispensed with by section 1056, R. S. 1881.

Under an answer in denial in an ejectment case, a defendant is permitted to give in evidence every defence to the action that he may have, either legal or equitable. And when *88the defendant appears and answers by denial, the evidence of his possession is dispensed with, and the fact that he admits title in the plaintiff does not make such proof necessary, for he still has the right to make any other defence he may have.

Filed May 24, 1892.

The joining of the issue fixes the proof necessary to be made by the plaintiff, and the fact that the defendant admits one fact which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, does not add to the facts necessary to be proven, any more than if the plaintiff had proven the fact independent of an admission.

The appellant in this case appeared and answered by denial, taking such steps as were necessary to give in evidence every defence he may have had.

He availed himself of the right to give in evidence all of his defences. Under this state of the issues, the appellee was not required to prove appellant in possession. By appearing and pleading to the action,the defendant admits his possession. *Holman*v. *Elliott,*86 Ind. 231; *Carver*v. *Carver,*97 Ind. 497.

There is no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### Henry Mays *v.*William C. Beatty.

Real Estate — Possession Under Preemption Claim — Bill of Exceptions.

While it may be true that the occupant of real estate under preemption entry has no such title that he may transfer the same by sale, he can legally pass his possession to another.

*47Bill of Exceptions.

Where there are numerous blanks In a bill of exceptions, the court of appeals cannot determine which instructions were given or which refused.

APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT.

September 12, 1874.

*Garnett & Stuart, for appellant.*

*A. J. James, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

It is stated in the *caveat*that Beatty was in the actual possession of the two tracts of land, at the time appellant caused the-same to be surveyed, and that he was claiming a pre-emption right to each of them, the fifty-acre tract by virtue of his own actual occupancy, and the one-hundred-acre tract by virtue of his purchase from Hicks. It is true Hicks had not procured a plat and certificate of survey; but it is averred that he actually appropriated the land, and that he turned his possession over to Beatty’s tenant. It is further averred that appellant obtained the possession by buying out such tenant.

It may be true that until a plat and certificate of survey have been procured, the occupant has no such title as he can transfer by bargain and sale; but he can certainly pass his possession to another, who will have the right to convert the amount under which the occupant claims, into a patent, by making the entry, and by procuring plat and certificate of survey. It is further alleged that appellant had notice of all these facts; and that he fraudulently attempted to procure title to the land, by means of his warrant, entry and survey.

Upon the trial of the action evidence was introduced by both parties. The bill of exceptions fails to show that it contains all the testimony. There are numerous blanks, intended to have been filled by the insertion of exhibits and depositions, but which have never been filled. We have no means of ascertaining which instructions were given or refused. There are blanks in the bill of exceptions that were intended to be filled by the insertion of certain instructions given, and others asked for and refused, but they were never inserted. Following the bill of exceptions are certain papers, purporting on their face to be exhibits, depositions and instructions, but we cannot determine from anything before us that they constitute any part of this record.

Under such circumstances this court cannot consider these papers. We must, therefore, *affirm*the judgment of the circuit court.
In re Michael

McCrumAppellant/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 21, 2014

No. 04-14-00047-CR

IN RE Michael MCCRUM

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

On January 17, 2014, relator filed a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition.

Relator then filed a supplemental petition and motion for emergency stay on January 21, 2014.

This court is of the opinion that a serious question concerning the mandamus relief sought

requires further consideration. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(b). The respondent and the real party

in interest may file a response to the petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition in this

court no later than January 28, 2014. Any such response must conform to Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 52.4.

Relator’s request for emergency stay is GRANTED. Further proceedings in Cause Nos.

2011-CR-11074 and 2011-CR-11075 concerning the State’s motion for contempt and hearing on

the court’s order to show cause are temporarily stayed pending final resolution of the petition

filed in this court.

It is so ORDERED on January 21st, 2014. PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO: _____________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2011CR11074; 2011CR11075, styled The State of Texas v. Taylor

Rosenbusch, pending in the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Dick Alcala

presiding.

FILE COPY
#### THE STATE ex rel. GUTGESELL v. HAWES et al., Appellants.

In Banc,

November 3, 1903.

The judgment in this case is reversed on the authority of State ex rel. Rife v. Hawes, reported at page 360 of this volume.

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court *.*— Hon. *S. P. Spencer,*Judge.

Reversed.

*C. W. Bates*and *Wm. F. Woerner*for appellants.

*Joseph Wheless*for respondent.

GANTT, J.

Mandamus by relator to recover salary as policeman by relator for himself, and five *410others, whom it is alleged assigned their claim to him, aggregating $11,552.58. Relator and said five alleged assignors had fully served their appointed terms, and were merely holdovers when they were dropped. This case, therefore, falls within the rule laid down in State ex rel. Rife v. Hawes, reported at page 360 of this volume. The judgment of the circuit court in favor of relator is erroneous,' and it is reversed, and the writ quashed.

All concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000067383
<NAME> MICRO GENERAL CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         318,845
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  113,364
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (16,141)
<INVENTORY>                                    853,033
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,543,071
<PP&E>                                       1,145,773
<DEPRECIATION>                               (936,422)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,839,537
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,223,358
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        97,483
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,231,304)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,839,537
<SALES>                                      1,774,051
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,774,051
<CGS>                                        1,526,342
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,526,342
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,586,197
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 6,305
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             192,377
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,524,560)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,525,360)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,525,360)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.78)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.78)


</TABLE>
#### Zouker *v.*Wiest.

New *Trial.—Newly-Discovered*Evidence.—The discovery of new evidence which is merely cumulative is not a good cause for a new trial.

Cumulative Evidence.—Definition.—Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same kind and to the same point as that already or previously given.

APPEAL from the DeKalb Circuit Court.

Downey, J.

This is a complaint by the appellant against the appellee, under section 356, 2 G. & H. 215, for a new trial.

There was a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained by the court, and final judgment rendered for the defendant. The sustaining of the demurrer is the error assigned. The complaint is sworn to by the plaintiff. It sets up as a cause for a new trial the discovery of new and material evidence after the former trial, and is accompanied by the affidavits of the newly-discovered witnesses. We are not furnished with any brief from the appellee, and do not therefore know what the objection urged in the circuit court to the complaint was. The newly-discovered evidence is evidence to prove admissions made by the appellee relating to the *170matter in difference between the parties. If the ground of objection to the complaint was that the new evidence was only cumulative, we think the objection was well taken. The appellant, himself, according to the complaint, testifies to admissions made by the appellee, as to the amount which he had paid on the contract, and this is the point to which the newly-discovered evidence relates. The discovery of new evidence which is merely cumulative, is not a good cause for a new trial. *Fox*v. *Reynolds,*24 Ind. 46. There are many more cases to the same effect.

*y. y. Best*and *C. A. 0. McClellan,*for appellant.

*y. Morris,*for appellee.

Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same kind, and to the same point, as that already or previously given in the cause. 1 Greenl. Ev. 4, sec. 2.

We think it doubtful, at least, whether there is such surprise shown on account of the testimony of the appellee on the trial, as would justify the granting of a new trial in order to admit newly-discovered evidence in opposition to his statements. As it appears that payments had been made on the contract, it would seem but reasonable that the appellant should have anticipated evidence on that subject, and been prepared to meet it. The showing in the complaint of diligence in getting or attempting to get evidence on the point is not very satisfactory. There would scarcely be any end to litigation, if parties were not held to a reasonably strict rule with reference to the preparation of causes and the production of the evidence at the trial. We can not say that there was any error in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.