1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

2 Appellant was represented by counsel in the proceedings below.

However, sometime after the district court's detention order was

entered, counsel moved to withdraw citing irreconcilable

differences between him and his client. Appellant requested that

the district court grant the motion to withdraw and allow her to

proceed with this appeal pro se. The district court granted the

request.

3 Appellant's trial has been set for October 2, 1995.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the Fifth Circuit

_____________________________________

No. 95-10612

Summary Calendar

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

LESLIEDAWN CLARK,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Dallas

(3:95 CR 183 H)

______________________________________________________

August 29, 1995

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Pro se2 Appellant Lesliedawn Clark appeals from the district

court's order retaining her in the custody of the Attorney General

pending trial.3 We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant and seven co-defendants have been charged in a

sixteen count indictment with: (1) conspiracy to defraud the

United States through the violation of various tax laws, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (b) aiding, procuring, counseling

and advising in the filing of false and fraudulent "Employee

Withholding Allowance Certificates" (form W-4), in violation of 26

U.S.C. § 7206(2).

The government moved to detain Appellant pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 1342(f)(2)(B), based on belief that Appellant presented a serious

risk of obstructing, threatening or injuring prospective witnesses.

After hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that Appellant

represented a danger to Internal Revenue agents and witnesses, and

ordered Appellant detained. The district court, after holding a

hearing and conducting a de novo review, affirmed the detention

order of the magistrate. Specifically, the district court found:

From clear and convincing evidence the Court finds, after

considering the standards set out in 18 U.S.C. §

3142(f)(2)(B) and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §

3142(g) as follows:

There is a serious risk that, unless detained,

Defendant Clark will obstruct or attempt to

obstruct justice, or threaten, injure or

intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or

intimidate, prospective witnesses.

Release of Defendant Clark might pose a danger

to potential witnesses, agents of the Internal

Revenue Service, and to the community.

No condition or combination of conditions of

release could be set to reasonably assure the

safety of witnesses, any other persons, and

the community.
3

II. ANALYSIS

We will affirm the district court's pretrial detention order

if "`if it is supported by the proceedings below,' a deferential

standard of review that we equate to the abuse-of-discretion

standard." United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir.

1989). Appellant asserts five discernable grounds for relief: (a)

that the district court improperly found that she was a danger to

the community; (b) that the district court improperly based its

decision on hearsay, in violation of the confrontation clause; (c)

that her detention violates equal protection because her codefendants were released; (d) that she is being retained without

charges in violation of her right to due process and in violation

of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments; and (e) that her detention

violates her first amendment rights.

A. Danger to the Community

Pretrial detention is appropriate where one of the six factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) is implicated and a judicial officer

finds, after a hearing, that no condition or combination of

conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as

required and the safety of the community. See United States v.

Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992). Where Appellant's charged

offense is not a violent crime, Appellant may still be retained if

the government proves a nexus between one or more of the six §

3142(f) factors and the offense charged. See id. at 110. In the

instant case, the government proved a nexus between the charged

conspiracy to defraud the government and § 3142(f)(2)(B) which
4

provides that detention may be ordered where there exists "a

serious risk that the person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct

justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to

threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror."

At the hearing before the district court, the government

provided testimony showing, inter alia, that

(1) According to a confidential informant, Appellant had

stated "she would blow away any agent that came into her

residence;"

(2) Appellant had purchased seven assault rifles, three

automatic pistols and approximately 3000 rounds of

ammunition between October 23, 1992 and November 21,

1992, from the "Ammo Depot" in Mesquite, Texas;

(3) According to the owner of the "Ammo Depot,"

Appellant had made statements about overthrowing the

United States government and, in particular, the Internal

Revenue Service; and

(4) At the time of her arrest, Appellant had a sign on

the front door of her residence that stated, in essence,

"Beware Public Servant...don't contact me in person. You

have to mail any correspondence that you have to me. If

not, survivors will be prosecuted." 

Despite Appellant's attempts to account for the firearms, and the

numerous character witnesses that testified at the hearing before

the district court or provided affidavits on her behalf, we find

the record supports the district judge's determination that

Appellant presents a danger to the community. The remainder of

Appellant's arguments are easily disposed.

B. Hearsay Testimony

Appellant's contention that the district court improperly

admitted hearsay testimony is without merit. As we have stated

previously, hearsay testimony is admissible in a detention hearing.
5

See United States v. Trosper, 809 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1987);

see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ("The rules concerning admissibility

of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and

consideration of information at the hearing."). The district

court, as trier of fact at a detention hearing, is entitled to make

credibility choices that we will not disturb unless clearly

erroneous. See United States v. Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir.

1990). 

C. Equal Protection Claim

Appellant has made no showing that any of her co-defendants

made threats against government agents, acquired large quantities

of assault weapons and ammunition, advocated the overthrow of the

United States government or posted warnings to "public servants" on

their residences. She has not shown any disparity in treatment.

D. Held Without Charges

Appellant is being detaining pursuant to an indictment

returned by the Grand Jury. Appellant claim is without foundation.

E. First Amendment Claim

Appellant has not briefed her First Amendment claim, and

therefore it is deemed abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Abner, 813 F.2d

744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). 

III. CONCLUSION

The detention order of the district court is supported by the

record below. For the reasons above, we AFFIRM.