alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Harrison & Shelby *v.*W. O. Barksdale’s Adm’x.

Partition of Real Estate — Suit to Settle Insolvent Estate.

The fact that an interested party to a partition suit is dissatisfied with the partition as made, and offers to buy the whole at a given price is no ground to set aside the partition.

*278Suit to Settle Insolvent Estate.

Where there are accounts to settle, in a suit to settle an insolvent estate, the case should be referred to a master, and where this is not done the court of appeals will not undertake to enter into an investigation of the items involved.

APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT.

January 5, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

The appellee had a right to have the homestead set apart, unless doing so would materially affect the value of the residue of the tract; and it was incumbent on those who insist that such will be the result to show the fact by satisfactory -evidence, which has not been done. . Nor can we decide upon anything in the record that the two and five-eighths acres laid off to be sold would have been more valuable if it had been laid of on any other part of the tract, or in different shape.

The offer of the appellants to pay $1,200 for the whole tract furnished no reason why the whole should have'been sold, for in the first place, no matter what appellants may have been willing to pay, the actual value, and not their estimate of the value, was the true criterion for the government of the court; and in the next place, there was no guaranty that they would have given what they proffered to give.

We are not satisfied that the administratrix was not legally chargeable with more than she was charged with in the judgment; but we will not reverse on that ground at the instance of these appellants.

In suits to settle insolvent estates, it is peculiarly the. province of the master to ascertain the items and amounts with which personal representatives should be charged; and when it is sought to charge them with more than they have accounted for, it is the.duty of the party seeking to do so to have the case referred; and when, as in this case, this has not been done, we will not undertake to enter into the investigation of a long list of items, and to state an account, in order to ascertain whether there may not be some trifling omissions or inaccuracies in the details of the account.

“The practise of finally hearing causes involving the settlement of accounts,-without the intervention of the master and the aid of his report, is not only burdensome to the lower court, and to this

*279*Petre &*Reeves, *for appellants.*

*G. Terry, for appellees.*

court, but is unsafe to litigants.” *Roberts’ Ex’r v.*Dale, *et al.,*7 B. Mon. 200.

As it was the appellants’ duty to ask such reference, and to haye given the court the aid of a report by the master, and as it is uncertain whether the judgment is not right, we will not reverse it at their instance. . .

Judgment *affirmed.*
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

June 29, 2012

Mr. Jon D. Brooks

Brooks LLP

400 Mann St., Suite 1001

Corpus Christi, TX 78401

Mr. Rene Rodriguez

Law Offices of Rene Rodriguez

433 S. Tancahua St.

Corpus Christi, TX 78401

RE:Case Number:  10-0750

Court of Appeals Number:  13-09-00198-CV

Trial Court Number:  08-62387-4

Style:ROBERT SUTHERLAND, JESUS DE LA GARZA AND SOUTHERN CUSTOMS PAINT AND BODY

v.

ROBERT KEITH SPENCER

Dear Counsel:

Today the Supreme Court of Texas issued an opinion in the above-referenced cause.  You may obtain a copy of the opinion at: http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/recent.asp.  If you would like the opinion by email, please contact Claudia Jenks at claudia.jenks@txcourts.gov or call (512)463-1312 ext. 41367.  

Sincerely,

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

by Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk

Enclosure

**Case No. 10-0750Page 1**
#### Richard F. SMITH and Marine Carriers (USA), Inc., Appellees, v. Raj K. MALLICK, Appellant.

No. 00-7208.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 22, 2001.

Before HENDERSON, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the District Court and on the briefs of the parties. The issues have been accorded full consideration by the Court and occasion no need for a published opinion. *See*D.C. Cik. Rule 36(b). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the District Court’s decision be affirmed. Malhck appeals only the District Court’s denial of relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). We review the District Court’s decision not to vacate or amend its earlier judgment for abuse of discretion, and “an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.” *Browder v. Director, Illinois Dept. of Corrections,*434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). Because Mallick’s arguments address only the merits of the underlying judgment and not the District Judge’s failure to provide Rule 60(b) relief, we affirm.

The clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. *See*D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
                                             
<MULTIPLIER>                                1
<CURRENCY>                                 U.S. Dollars
       
<S>                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>               3-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          May-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-1-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                              1
<CASH>                                       618
<SECURITIES>                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                                270,864
<ALLOWANCES>                                   2,000
<INVENTORY>                                  596,121
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             970,757
<PP&E>                                       498,408
<DEPRECIATION>                               175,737
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             1,819,031
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        650,877
<BONDS>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<COMMON>                                      28,543
<OTHER-SE>                                 1,956,811
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               1,819,031
<SALES>                                      398,078
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             398,078
<CGS>                                        290,112
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                108,317
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               5,763
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             6,950
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (13,064)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (3,266)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (9,798)
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (9,798)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.00
        


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antone Henry POINDEXTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-4531.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 28, 2001.

Decided March 26, 2001.

*59Carl C. Muzi, Richmond, VA, for appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, VA, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Antone Henry Poindexter of conspiracy to acquire firearms through straw purchasers, four counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and four counts of making false statements to a firearms dealer. He appeals his convictions on the grounds that the district court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel, that his due process rights were violated, and that counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Poindexter challenges his convictions, asserting that the district court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. *United States v. DeTemple,*162 F.3d 279, 288 (4th Cir.1998) (stating standard of review and discussing factors court must consider), *cert. denied,*526 U.S. 1137, 119 S.Ct. 1793, 143 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1999).

Next, Poindexter asserts that preindictment delay significantly prejudiced his ability to have a fair trial, in violation of the Due Process Clause. However, Poindexter did not challenge the indictment on this ground before trial, and his failure to do so results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1). Poindexter never sought relief below for his default by showing cause, Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(f), and fails to establish plain error on appeal. *United States v. Lewis,*235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.2000) (stating standard of review on appeal); *United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,*770 F.2d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir.1985) (providing *60standard for claims of preindictment delay).

Finally, Poindexter raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to review these claims on direct appeal because Poindexter failed to show conclusively from the face of the record that counsel provided ineffective representation. *United States v. Richardson,*195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir.1999) (providing standard and noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally should be raised by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), *cert. denied,*528 U.S. 1096, 120 S.Ct. 837, 145 L.Ed.2d 704 (2000).

Accordingly, we affirm Poindexter’s convictions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<PAGE>
                   EXHIBIT 21 - SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT
                   -------------------------------------------



                   SUBSIDIARY                       STATE OF  INCORPORATION
                   ----------                      ------------------------
      Morgan's Creative Restaurant Concepts, Inc.          Ohio
      Morgan's Restaurants of Ohio, Inc.                   Ohio
      Morgan's Restaurants of Pennsylvania, Inc.         Pennsylvania
      Morgan's Restaurants of West Virginia, Inc.         West Virginia
            (fka Morgan's Weirton Foods, Inc.)
      Morgan's Restaurants of New Jersey, Inc.             New Jersey
      Morgan's Foods of Missouri, Inc.                      Missouri
      Morgan's Restaurants of New York, Inc.                New York
      Morgan's Tacos of Pennsylvania, Inc.                Pennsylvania
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clayton Harper WOLFE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-4898.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 20, 2001.

Decided May 14, 2001.

*116James R. Fox, Jory & Smith, Elkins, WV, for appellant.

Melvin W. Kahle, Jr., United States Attorney, Sherry L. Muncy, Assistant United States Attorney, Elkins, WV, for appellee.

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Clayton Harper Wolfe entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000), reserving the right to challenge the district court’s exclusion of an intoxication defense to that charge. On appeal, Wolfe renews his argument that § 922(g)(1) is a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense. We affirm.

Wolfe and the Government agree that in order to establish a § 922(g) violation, the Government had to show that Wolfe knowingly possessed the firearm. *United States v. Langley,*62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (discussing elements of the offense).1 They disagree, however, as to whether the offense is a general intent or specific intent crime. We agree with the Government that a § 922(g) offense is a general intent crime to which intoxication is not a defense.2*E.g., United States v. Bennett,*975 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir.1992). Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Wolfe’s intoxication at the time he committed the instant offense. *United States v. Lancaster,*96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir.1996) (stating standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm Wolfe’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

1

. Wolfe does not challenge the other elements of the offense. *Langley,*62 F.3d at 606.

2

. As support for his argument that § 922(g) is a specific intent crime, Wolfe cites *Wheatley v. United States,*159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir.1946). We find, however, that Wolfe’s reliance on *Wheatley*is misplaced because the statement on which he relies is dicta and conflicts with the overwhelming agreement of the circuit courts that § 922(g) is a general intent crime.
Exhibit 32.1CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002     I, Leonard R. Stein-Sapir, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Morgan’sFoods, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that: (1) The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the period ended February 26,2006, (the “Report”), which this certification accompanies, fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.              /s/ Leonard R. Stein-Sapir   Leonard R. Stein-Sapir, Chairman of the Board and   Chief Executive Officer   June 14, 2006
Job Opportunity: Staff Research Position

Sensor Science Division

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

The Sensor Science Division of NIST is currently seeking a full-time staff researcher for its Low 

Background Infrared (LBIR) Facility. The LBIR Facility carries out research and development

that enables high accuracy measurements of infrared radiation for defense, astronomical remote 

sensing, and materials applications. Our team develops and deploys custom cryogenic 

radiometers for broadband and spectral infrared measurements, carries out calibrations of optical 

systems from DOD and NASA, and develops novel detectors for sensing in the mid- and farinfrared. In particular, we have active research projects focused on superconducting nanowire 

single photon detectors and carbon nanotube thermal detectors.

Details of the Position

The staff researcher will help carry out special calibration projects for federal agencies and 

universities, using the unique infrared measurement capabilities of the LBIR Facility at NIST. In 

addition, they will pursue research on novel infrared detectors, including superconducting 

nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPD) optimized for the mid-infrared.

The LBIR Facility operates multiple cryogenic calibration chambers where entire optical 

experiments can be placed within a volume (up to several cubic meters) that mimics the 

environment of space. In this low infrared radiation background, the researcher will use 

specialized instruments such as a cryogenic Fourier transform spectrometer (FTS), helium 

bolometers, Si:As blocked-impurity-band (BIB) detectors, and vacuum infrared blackbody 

sources to make high-accuracy infrared measurements.

The work location for this position is at the NIST campus in Gaithersburg, Maryland. We have 

multiple collaborations with groups from the NIST campus in Boulder, Colorado who fabricate 

single photon detectors and carbon nanotube bolometers, and travel to NIST Boulder as part of 

these collaborations will be encouraged. Occasional (roughly annual) travel to support 

radiometer deployments to customer facilities will be required.

Qualifications

 PhD (or Master’s with 3 years relevant work experience) in Physics or a related field.

 Demonstrated experience working with cryogenic systems.

 Demonstrated experience working with optical systems, particularly infrared spectrometers and 

radiometers.

 Ability to control, operate and automate scientific test equipment and instrumentation.

 Familiarity with design tools like SolidWorks, Zemax OpticStudio, or similar.

 Familiarity with the programming languages LabVIEW, Python, and Matlab.

 Strong oral and written communication skills.

 U.S. Citizenship is required for this position.

Inquiries for the Position
Qualified candidates should submit a letter of interest describing their research background and a 

CV with complete list of publications to joe.rice@nist.gov and solomon.woods@nist.gov.
Exhibit 32.2




                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Life Energy & Technology  Holdings,
Inc. (the  "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending November 30, 2003, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Salim Ghafari , Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section  906 of the
Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1) the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.




By:/s/Salim Ghafari
-----------------------------------------
Chief Financial Officer (or equivalent thereof)

January 15, 2004
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-6247

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus AMOS CEDRIC DIXON, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (CR-98-520, CA-02-2800-6-24) Submitted: July 22, 2003 Decided: August 25, 2003 Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Amos Cedric Dixon, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Amos Cedric Dixon, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000), based upon Amendment 599 to the Sentencing Guidelines. At the outset, we must determine whether Dixon timely filed his notice of appeal. In criminal cases, the defendant must file his notice of app eal within ten days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); United States v. Alvarez , 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000). With or without a motion, the district court may grant an extension of time to file of up to thirty days upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes , 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1985). Where excusable neglect is apparent from the face of record, we need not remand the case to the district court for such determination. Reyes , 759 F.2d at 354. The district court entered its order on the criminal docket on January 2, 2003, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6); the ten-day appeal period expired on January 16, 2003. Dixon dated his notice of appeal January 28, and it was filed on February 6, 2002. Dixon’s notice of appeal was, therefore, filed beyond the ten-day appeal period but within the excusable neglect period. Because the district court’s order denying relief misinforms Dixon that he had thirty days in which to note his appeal, we find excusable neglect appears on the face of the record. See Reyes , 759 F.2d at 354; see3 also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship , 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (discussing factors relevant in determining whether excusable neglect exists); United States v. Clark , 51 F.3d 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding “Pioneercontrols determinations of excusable neglect under Rule 4(b)”). Thus, we have jurisdiction over Dixon’s appeal. Turning to the merits of Dixon’s appeal, we have reviewed the record and the district court’s order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Dixon v. United States , Nos. CR-98-520, CA-02-2800-6-24 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     (Replace this text with the legend)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         841501
<NAME>                        OWENS MORTGAGE INVESTMENT FUND
<MULTIPLIER>                  1
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                  JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                 1
<CASH>                            4,999,344
<SECURITIES>                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                   160,017,065
<ALLOWANCES>                     (3,250,000)
<INVENTORY>                               0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                161,766,409         
<PP&E>                           12,703,025
<DEPRECIATION>                            0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  174,469,434
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               686,006
<BONDS>                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<COMMON>                                  0
<OTHER-SE>                      173,783,428
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    174,469,434
<SALES>                           4,228,871
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  4,228,871
<CGS>                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                    389,223
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                   3,839,648
<INCOME-TAX>                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>               3,839,648
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                      3,839,648
<EPS-PRIMARY>                     .022
<EPS-DILUTED>                     .022
        


</TABLE>
Electronically FiledIntermediate Court of Appeals3057928-SEP-201005:44 PM