alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Foundry Networks, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Bobby
R. Johnson Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Timothy D.
Heffner, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                                                   |  |  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  | 
|/s/ Bobby
      R. Johnson, Jr.                                                    |  |  | 
|                                                                                   |  |  | 
|Bobby R.
      Johnson, Jr.Chief Executive Officer and
      PresidentJune 4, 2003 |  |  | 



|                                                                                                                   |  |  | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |  |  | 
|/s/ Timothy D. Heffner                                                                                             |  |  | 
|                                                                                                                   |  |  | 
|Timothy D.
      HeffnerVice President, Finance
      andAdministration, Chief Financial
      OfficerJune 4, 2003 |  |  | 

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EXHIBIT
32.2



Certification
of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to

18
U.S.C. Section 1350,

As
Adopted Pursuant to

Section
906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002



In
connection with the Annual Report of The InterGroup Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2023, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ann Marie Blair, Corporate
Controller of the Company, serving as its Principal Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



| | ● | The
    Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                    
| | - | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |   |                                                                                                                                                             
| | ● | The
    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
    of the Company.



|/s/
    Ann Marie Blair         | 
|------------------------------- | 
|Ann
    Marie Blair             | 
|Principal
    Financial Officer | 



Date:
October 13, 2023



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to The InterGroup Corporation and will be retained
by The InterGroup Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
No. 16,490.

#### Ogle et al. *v.*Manlove et al.

Filed December 14, 1892.

*Appeal.*— Dismissal of.— *Violation of Rule of Supreme Court.*— Insufficiency *of Brief.*— Where an appellant, in his brief, cites no authority and attempts no argument in support of his assignment of errors, there is such a violation of a rule of this court as will work a dismissal of the appeal.

From the Tipton Circuit Court.

*G. H. Gifford*and *J. M. Fippen,*for appellants.

*W. R. Oglebay,*for appellees.

Coffey, J,

This was an action in the Circuit Court by the appellants against the appellees, to enjoin the latter from opening a certain public highway in Tipton County, established by the board' of commissioners. To certain answers filed by the appellees the court overruled a demurrer, to which ruling the appellants excepted. This ruling is assigned as error.

No brief is filed by the appellants, except what is called a *supersedeas*brief. In this so-called brief no authority is cited, nor is any argument attempted. There is no attempt to point out any error in the ruling of the Circuit Court.

This is not a compliance with rule twenty of this court.

The appeal should be dismissed on account of the failure of the appellants to comply with the terms of this rule. *City of Anderson*v. *Neal,*88 Ind. 317; *Louisville, etc., R. W. Co.*v. *Grantham,*104 Ind. 353.

Appeal dismissed.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULES 13a-14 AND 15d-14,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Charles G. Cooper, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Bay View Capital Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and we have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared; b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants
board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting. Date: August 13, 2004 /s/ Charles G. CooperCharles G. CooperPresident and ChiefExecutive Officer
#### John W. Hazelrigg, et al., *v.*James H. McGuire.

Contract to Rebuild a Mill — Rents—Condemnation of Mill property by the State.

Where the owners of mill property agree that a third person may rebuild and repair a mill and reimburse himself out of the rents and use of the mill, and after it is rebuilt the state condemns it and takes it, the person rebuilding it is entitled to participate in the money due from the state on account of such condemnation.

APPEAL, PROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT.

September 24, 1874.

*75
      *John W. Hazelrigg, for appellants.*

*J. J. W. Rodman, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The proof does not establish a contract upon the part of Hazelrigg, and Barber’s heirs and representatives to pay McGuire in money for the erection of the new mill; but it does tend very strongly to show that they agreed that if he would rebuild the mill lie might hold, use and control it until he was repaid the expense incurred, out of the accruing rents.

There can be no doubt that Barber’s representatives were willing and anxious to have the mill built on this condition; and although Hazelrigg absolutely refused to advance any money, and insisted that if McGuire built the mill he-must do it at his own risk, the circumstances proven all show that he approved the steps taken by McGuire, advised with him as to changes made in the new mill, and pointed out necessary repairs. It is not to be presumed that a sane man would build an expensive structure upon the lands of another, without some arrangement for compensation. The proof in this case justified the court below in concluding that the owners of the realty accepted McGuire’s proposition to look to the use of the mill for compensation.

The idea of holding McGuire responsible for the burning of the old mill is evidently an afterthought, and the proof wholly fails to show any culpable negligence on his part.

The condemnation, by the state, of the mill seat, deprived McGuire of the opportunity of running the mill until the rents reimbursed him -his outlay. It in effect terminated his lease. To that extent it was the taking for public use of his property. He was interested with Hazelrigg and Barber’s heirs in the property to the extent of his unsatisfied claim, and was to that extent entitled to participation with them in the amount paid for the water power by the state. The attempt to distinguish between McGuire’s claim upon the mill houses and the water power is too finely drawn to be seriously regarded in a court of equity.

The conflicting accounts between the parties, growing out of the side issues introduced, seem to have been correctly settled, and as the sum allowed McGuire is not too great, the judgment in his favor must be *affirmed.*
Exhibit 99.2   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Simon J. Anderson, certify that:  1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Buffalo Gold Ltd.;2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.The companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc)Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting;5.The companys other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the audit committee of the companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over financial reporting.  Date:  June 28, 2007  /s/ Simon Anderson ________________________________ Simon Anderson, Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 21.1


ASHFORD.COM, INC.
SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
NAME OF SUBSIDIARY                         JURISDICTION OF INCORPORATION    PERCENT OWNED
------------------                         -----------------------------    -------------
<S>                                      <C>
Ashford Buying Company, Inc.                          Delaware                   100%

Ashford Corporate Gifts                               Delaware                   100%

Ashford Domain Name Company                           Delaware                   100%

Ashford-Guild Art Corporation                         Delaware                   100%

Ashford-Jasmin Fragrance Corporation                  Delaware                   100%

Ashford-Watchnetwork Company                          Delaware                   100%
</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32
                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection with the Quarterly Report of AEI Real Estate  Fund
XVIII  Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") on Form  10-Q  for
the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the
undersigned, Robert P. Johnson, President of AEI Fund  Management
XVIII, Inc., the Managing General Partner of the Partnership, and
Patrick  W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer of AEI Fund Management
XVIII,  Inc.,  each  certify, pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  1350,  as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of
2002, that:

     1.   The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     2.   The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Partnership.


                          /s/ ROBERT P JOHNSON
                              Robert P. Johnson, President
                              AEI Fund Management XVIII, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              December 30, 2008


                          /s/ PATRICK W KEENE
                              Patrick W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer
                              AEI Fund Management XVIII, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              December 30, 2008
#### Isaac Gibson *v.*Martha Marples.

Attachment — Ownership of Property.

Where goods are attached by creditorsi of a person, the wife of the debtor may defeat the attachment by showing that the property attached is hers.

Parties to an Appeal.

When property attached is shown- to belong to another and the attachment is discharged for that reason, the attaching creditor by appealing from such judgment not making the debtor a party to the appeal, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to inquire into the action of the court in discharging the order of attachment.

APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT.

October 1, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

Gibson sued Elmore Marples, and took out an order of attachment against him, and garnisheed certain of his alleged1 debtors. Martha C. Marples, his wife, interpleaded, and claimed that she was the owner of the dioses in action, which had been thus attached. Pending-the litigation she was divorced from her husband.

Upon hearing, the orders of attachment were discharged, and Mrs. Marples held to be the owner of the attached notes. Gibson *498appeals from this judgment, but prosecutes his appeal against Mrs. Marples alone.

*Hill &*Alcorn, *for appellant. James E.*Hays, *for appellee.*

Elmore Marples, the debtor, not being an appellee, we cannot inquire into the propriety of the action of the court below in discharging the order of attachment. To this extent, therefore, the judgment cannot be reversed. Gibson has no claim to1 the debts adjudged to Mrs. Marples, except such as grew out of his attachments. This claim was terminated by the order discharging them, and as we cannot revive it, we can afford him no relief on this appeal.

Judgment *affirmed.*
#### Belknap & Co. *v.*John C. Robinson, et al.

Sheriff — Duty—Presumption of Law.

The law presumes that the sheriff, in setting aside a defendant’s homestead as an exemption, did his duty, and the burden is on one charging failure of duty to establish such charge.

APPEAL PROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT;

January 6, 1875.

*Vanwinkle & Rodes, for appellants.*

*C. H. May, for appellees.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The qualification to the first section of the homestead act, to the effect that the exemption’should not apply to debts or ’ liabilities existing prior to the purchase of the land sought to be sold, does not apply in a case where the land has been acquired by devise. Taking realty under a will is, technically speaking, acquiring the title by purchase; but when the reason of the qualification is considered, it is evident that the legislature intended the term “purchase” to receive its general, and not its technical legal signification. The object was to prevent debtors -front converting means that ought to be applied to the payment of existing debts, into realty that would be exempted therefrom, under the act in question. It was not necessary that appellant should make proof that he was a bona fide housekeeper with a family. The sheriff, in the discharge of his-duty under appellant’s executions, had set apart to him the lots and buildings. This suit was instituted to set aside, or rather to disregard, the act of the sheriff. The presumption of law is that the sheriff acted according-to the provisions of the statute. The onus is upon appellants to overcome this presumption by proof.

They failed to offer any proof on the subject, and the chancellor properly adjudged in favor of the regularity of the sheriff’s action.

Judgment *affirmed.*
Exhibit 99.1

Certifications Pursuant to 18 United States Code § 1350

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies that to his knowledge the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the fiscal period ended March 31,
2003 of Allstate Life Insurance Company of New York filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Allstate Life Insurance Company of New
York. This certification accompanies this quarterly report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required
by such Act, be deemed filed by Allstate Life Insurance Company of New York for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

Date:
May 13, 2003

| |  |  |  | /s/CASEY J. SYLLACasey J. Sylla Chairman of the Board and
President           
| |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  |  |  | /s/STEVEN E. SHEBIKSteven E. Shebik Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

28

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-8059

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HENRY ALLEN STANLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District

Judge. (7:04-cr-00109-SGW; 7:06-cv-00240-SGW)

Submitted: March 29, 2007 Decided: April 5, 2007

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henry Allen Stanley, Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Andrew Bassford,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Henry Allen Stanley seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Stanley has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED