alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### W. B. Duncan, et al., *v.*George Griffy, et al.

Transfer of Courses to Federal Court — Security.

Where the conditions exist to authorize the transfer of a cause from the state to federal court, the applicant for transfer must at the time of malting his application, offer good surety that he will enter said cause in the-federal court and file copy of papers as required by the Federal Statutes.

APPEAL FROM HICKMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

February 18, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

This appeal is from an order of the court of common pleas, overruling the motion of the appellants to transfer the cause to the circuit court of the United States- for the district of Kentucky.

The motion was based upon the- provisions of section 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The appellants are citizens and residents of states other than Kentucky; the appellees are citizens and residents of said last named state. It is claimed that the amount, in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars.

In order to have a reversal in such a case, the petitioner must at the time of filing his petition offer in the state court good and sufficient surety for his entering in the circuit court of the United States on the first day of its session copies of the process against him, and of all pleadings, depositions, testimony and other proceedings in the cause, etc. The record before us does not show that appellants offered' any such surety, or in fact any surety at all. This condition precedent not having been complied with, the common pleas judge properly *overruled*the motion for the removal.

Further than this it was necessary that the appellants should malte it appear to the satisfaction of the court that the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum of five hundred dollars. The amended petition of appellees filed at the time the motion was made, showed that the amount in controvers3>- at the time appellants were made parties was less than $400. We have no bill of exceptions showing what evidence the court heard on this subject whilst the motion was pending, and we cannot, therefore, adjudge that it was made to appear that the amount in dispute brought the cause within the provisions of the act of congress.

*611*Steele &*Steele, *for appellants. E. Q. Bullock, for appellees.*

For these reasons, either of which is sufficient, the order overruling the motion for the removal is *affirmed.*
**EXHIBIT      32.1**

**CERTIFICATION      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**Pursuant      to**

**18      U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**As      Adopted pursuant to**

**Section      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

| Date:                June 22, 2006 | By:    | /s/                Zeynep Hakimoglu                                                              |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                               |   | Zeynep                Hakimoglu                                                                  |
|                               |   | President                and Chief Executive Officer(Principal                Executive Officer) |

**A      signed original of the written statement above required by Section 906 of the      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to ClearOne Communications, Inc.      and will be retained by ClearOne Communications, Inc. and furnished to the      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon      request.**
#### Alfonso MENDEZ CORONA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gail LEWIS, Warden; Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 00-55199.

D.C. No. CV-99-06780-GHK.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 14, 2001.*

Decided May 29, 2001.

Before PREGERSON, FERNANDEZ and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, petitioner’s request for oral argument is denied.

MEMORANDUM**

California state prisoner Alfonso Mendez Corona appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 14-year sentence imposed after being found guilty by a jury of one count of assault with a firearm. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. *Dows v. Wood,*211 F.3d 480, 484 (9th Cir.2000). Because the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 applies, *see*28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), Corona must demonstrate that the state court adjudication of the merits of his claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); *Williams v. Taylor,*529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); *Van Tran v. Lindsey,*212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir.2000) (defining “unreasonable application” as involving situations where the state court has committed clear error).

Corona contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it declined to allow him to enter into a plea agreement with the government. This contention lacks merit.

The constitution does not require enforcement of a plea agreement unless and until the agreement is embodied in the judgment of the court. *Mabry v. Johnson,*467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); *see United States v. Osif,*789 F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir.1986) (concluding that when a defendant rejects a plea, he cannot object to the prosecutor’s decision to proceed to trial on the charged counts). Because the record shows that Corona rejected the government’s plea offer before the trial court was given an opportunity to accept the plea, the district court correctly determined that the California Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); *Van Tran,*212 F.3d at 1149.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Abatement Order filed December 10, 2013 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-00888-CR

____________

WILLIAM MARK RHODES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 248th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1259408

ABATEMENT ORDER

The reporter’s record has not been filed in this appeal. The court reporter 

has informed the court that appellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay the 

reporter’s fee to prepare the reporter’s record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c)(2)(A). 

Appellant asserts he is indigent. This court is unaware whether appellant is 

entitled to proceed without the payment of costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 

37.3(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, we enter the following order. See Tex. R. App. P. 

35.3(c).
We ORDER the judge of the 248th District Court to immediately conduct a 

hearing at which appellant, appellant’s counsel, if any, and counsel for the State 

shall participate, either in person or by video teleconference, to determine whether 

appellant desires to prosecute his appeal, and, if so, whether appellant is indigent 

and, thus entitled to a free record and appointed counsel on appeal. The judge may 

appoint appellate counsel for appellant if necessary. The judge shall see that a 

record of the hearing is made, shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

and shall order the trial clerk to forward a record of the hearing and a supplemental 

clerk’s record containing the findings and conclusions. The transcribed record of 

the hearing, the court’s findings and conclusions, and a videotape or compact disc, 

if any, containing a recording of the video teleconference shall be filed with the 

clerk of this court on or before January 9, 2014.

The appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this court’s 

active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this courts active docket when the 

trial court’s findings and recommendations are filed in this court. The court will 

also consider an appropriate motion to reinstate the appeal filed by either party, or 

the court may reinstate the appeal on its own motion. It is the responsibility of any 

party seeking reinstatement to request a hearing date from the trial court and to 

schedule a hearing in compliance with this court’s order. If the parties do not 

request a hearing, the court coordinator of the trial court shall set a hearing date 

and notify the parties of such date.

PER CURIAM
IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	DISTRICT	COURT	FOR	THE

SOUTHERN	DISTRICT	OF	ALABAMA

SOUTHERN	DIVISION

In	Re: )

)

RICHARD	D.	HORNE and	 )

PATRICIA	NELSON	HORNE, )

)

Debtors, )

)

MARY	BETH	MANTIPLY, )

) CIVIL	ACTION	NO.	13-00258-CB-B

Plaintiff/Appellant, )

)

v. )

)

RICHARD	D.	HORNE	and )

PATRICIA	NELSON	HORNE, )

)

Defendants/Appellees. )

ORDER

On	January	9,	2014,	Appellees	filed	a	motion	requesting	this	Court	to	direct	

the	bankruptcy	court	clerk	to	pay	over	the	supersedeas	bond	posted	by	the	

Appellant	in	bankruptcy	court when	Mantiply	filed	the	first	of	two	appeals.	 (Doc.	

56.)		Appellant	filed	an	objection	to	the	motion.	(Doc.	57.) This	Court	does	not	

instruct	the	bankruptcy	court	clerk as	to	payment	of	funds	held	in	the	bankruptcy	

court’s	registry.		That	is	the	function	of	the	bankruptcy	court.1 		Accordingly,	the	

motion	is	DENIED.		

DONE and	ORDERED this	the	8th day	of	April,	2014.

s/Charles	R.	Butler,	Jr.	

Senior	United	States	District	Judge

																																																							 1 Even	this	Clerk	were	inclined	to	issue	direct	orders	to	the	bankruptcy	clerk,	

it	would	not	be	appropriate	here. Appellee’s	motion	is	premised	on	the	mistaken	

belief	that	final	judgment	had	been	entered	with	respect	to	the	first	appeal.			It	had	

not.		The	Court’s	opinion	had	been	entered,	but	the	rules	require	a	separate	

judgment.		See	Fed.	R.	Bankr.	R.	8016(a)	(clerk	of	court	for	district	court	or	

Bankruptcy	Appellate	Panel	prepares	and	signs	judgment).

Case 1:13-cv-00258-CB-B Document 74 Filed 04/08/14 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         385,854
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 4,703
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     60,414
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         921,264
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      3,915,553
<ALLOWANCE>                                     49,344
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,443,609
<DEPOSITS>                                   3,714,012
<SHORT-TERM>                                 1,105,655
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            118,130
<LONG-TERM>                                    876,631
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           326
<OTHER-SE>                                     628,855
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               6,443,609
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 97,193
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               17,272
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               114,465
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              39,908
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              71,274
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           43,191
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    8,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               3,198
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 65,290
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,373
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       4,373
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       518
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .02
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.16
<LOANS-NON>                                     21,659
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 1,041
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                52,161
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    8,141
<RECOVERIES>                                     1,473
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               49,344
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            49,344
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0



</TABLE>
#### T. J. Brent *v.*Peter Sinville.

Liability of Indorser on Note — Release of Indorser by Delay.

When a holder of a note obtains judgment against the principal and delays nearly a month before issuing execution, such delay unaccounted for, will release one who' has assigned the note to the plaintiff.

*782APPEAL PROM NICHOLAS COUNTY COURT.

October 25, 1876.

*Hargis & Norrell, for appellant. Ross & Kennedy, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Elliott :

By this suit appellant seeks a recovery of judgment against appellee on his obligation of assignment to him of a note on R. Cheatam.

The note executed by Cheatam to appellee was due January, 1872, and was assigned to appellant by appellee in July, 1872. Appellant sued Cheatam and obtained judgment at the October term of the circuit court, which was the first term of the court after the assignment of the note. The judgment was obtained on the 6th day of November, 1872, and no execution issued on the judgment till the 10th day of December, next after the rendition of the judgment. This delay of nearly one month after appellant could have had execution on his judgment is unaccounted for in any way. We are of opinion that the delay in ordering execution on said judgment after its rendition, unaccounted for, released the assignee of the debt, appellee, Sinville, from all responsibility, by reason of his assignment; and as the lower court so decided, said judgment is hereby *affirmed.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SAMUEL L. NELSON, :

 :

Petitioner, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0812-KD-M

:

WARDEN OLIVER, :

 :

Respondent. :

JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this action be and

is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. 

DONE this February 26, 2010. 

 s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00812-KD-M Document 5 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America and Kenneth Batson, Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Dennis FAHEY, District Manager, World Savings and Loan, Respondent, Frank Kowalik, Jr. and Karen Kowalik, Intervenors-Appellants. UNITED STATES of America and Kenneth Batson, Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Trudy HAUGSNESS, Vice President, Columbia Savings and Loan, Respondent, Frank Kowalik, Jr. and Karen Kowalik, Intervenors-Appellants. UNITED STATES of America and Kenneth Batson, Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Clarence JOHNSON, Auditor, Central Bank and Trust, Respondent, Frank Kowalik, Jr. and Karen Kowalik, Intervenors-Appellants. UNITED STATES of America and Kenneth Batson, Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, Petitioners-Appellees, v. INCOME REALTY and Bill Riley, President, Respondents, Frank Kowalik, Jr. and Karen Kowalik, Intervenors-Appellants.

Nos. 79-1356 to 79-1358 and 79-1360.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 9, 1979.

Decided Jan. 9, 1980.

Frank Kowalik, Jr., and Karen Kowalik, pro se.

M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Gilbert E. Andrews, Chief, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington. D. C., Joseph F. Dolan, U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for petitioners-appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Before BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

*691After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of these appeals. *See*Ped.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Circuit R. 10(e). Appellants’ motion to transfer these cases from Calendar D to Calendar B is denied and the causes are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

These are appeals from orders of the district court directing enforcement of four summonses issued to third parties by the Internal Revenue Service. The taxpayers instructed the third party defendants to disregard the summonses and intervened in the suits.

The taxpayers argue first that the United States government is without authority under the constitution to bring civil actions against citizens, and that the court therefore lacks jurisdiction to enforce these IRS summonses. This argument, though creative, is frivolous.

The taxpayers’ brief also suggests that the IRS is actually achieving criminal ends in this investigation under the guise of civil processes. This contention also lacks merit. The government established a *prima facie*case that the issuance of these summonses was in furtherance of a valid civil tax determination purpose. The taxpayers offered no proof in contradiction. *See United States v. MacKay,*608 F.2d 830, at 834 (10th Cir. 1979).

AFFIRMED.
EX-10.1:



 






EXHIBIT 10.1



Annual compensation for non-employee directors(4):




	 	 	 	 	 
	Board member annual retainer — cash(1):
	 	$	50,000	 
	Board member annual retainer — value in restricted stock units(2):
	 	$	60,000	 
	Committee Chairperson annual cash retainer(1):
	 	$	15,000	 
	Board member annual stock option grant value(3):
	 	$	60,000	 
	New member one-time stock option grant value (upon election):
	 	$	35,000	 






 









			
	(1)	 	Payable in equal semi-annual installments on the first business day in March and July
each year. Cash may be deferred into The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
Non-employee Directors’ Deferred Compensation Plan (As Amended
and Restated effective December 6, 2005) (the “Plan”). Any cash deferred into
the Dun & Bradstreet common stock fund under the Plan receives a ten
percent premium and may not be reallocated under the Plan for a
period of three years after the initial deferral of such amount.
	 
	(2)	 	Granted in equal semi-annual installments on the first business day in March and July
each year. Represents the right to receive shares of our common stock on the earlier of
the third anniversary of the date of grant and the date on which the director ceases to
perform services as a director. Restricted share units may be deferred pursuant to the
terms of the applicable Restricted Share Unit Award Agreement.
	 
	(3)	 	Vesting requirements are determined by the Board of Directors. Currently, stock
options vest 100 percent one year after the date of grant in accordance with the terms of
the 2000 Dun & Bradstreet Corporation Non-employee Directors’ Stock Incentive Plan.
	 
	(4)	 	Non-employee directors are also provided certain other benefits by us during their
tenure on the Board of Directors, including reimbursement for reasonable Company-related
travel and other expenses, including continuing education courses; travel accident
insurance when traveling on Company business and participation in the Company’s charitable
matching gift program to a maximum of $4,000 per calendar year.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-60107 

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GERALD EDWARD DAVIS,

also known as Gerald E. Davis,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:98-CR-90-ALL-LS

- - - - - - - - - -

June 16, 2000

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Gerald Edward Davis appeals his conviction and sentence

following a jury trial for being a felon in possession of a

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Davis argues that

the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment

of acquittal asserting that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. See United States v.

Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1144

(1998)(this court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for
No. 99-60107

-2-

judgment of acquittal). Specifically, Davis challenges the

conclusion that he possessed the firearms.

An undercover agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms, testified that he purchased several firearms from

Davis, while Davis was working at his wife’s pawn shop. Despite

Davis’ testimony to the contrary, the agent’s testimony supported

the conclusion that Davis possessed the firearms. See United

States v. Guerrero, 169 F.3d 933, 939 (5th Cir. 1999)(holding

that this court must accept the credibility choices that support

the jury’s verdict and will not re-weigh the evidence). 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

BYRON A. YORK, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 09-0623-CG-M 

 : 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, : 

Commissioner of Social Security, : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

JUDGMENT

 It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff’s Application for 

Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act be and is hereby GRANTED and that 

Plaintiff’s attorney, Byron A. Lassiter be and is hereby AWARDED an EAJA fee in the amount 

of $3,968.81. No costs are taxed. 

DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2010. 

 /s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:09-cv-00623-CG-M Document 27 Filed 07/28/10 Page 1 of 1
No.---.

#### Native Village of Tanama *v.*Alaska Department of Health and Social Services.

Motion to direct the Clerk to file a petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 131385(66) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STAT E OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 131385 COA: 256878 Livingston CC: 04-014120-FH DENISE LOUISE POWELL, Defendant-Appellee.

_____________ _______________ ___________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s September 22, 2006 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it doe s not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

C AVANAGH , J., would grant the motion for reconsideration.

K ELLY , J., would grant reconsid eration and, on reconsider ation, would grant leave to appeal for the reasons stated in her dissenting statement in People v Powell , 477 Mich 860 (2006).

d0319 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 26, 2007

Clerk