1

Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, TDOC Policy No. 502.05(VI)(A)(5) (Dec. 30, 1996) (“TDOC Policy”).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 13, 2001

TONY WILLIS, ET AL. v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, ET AL.

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 99-3332-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2000-01397-COA-R3-CV - Filed June 5, 2002

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., dissenting.

The court has constructed its decision in this case using Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115

S. Ct. 2293 (1995) as its foundation. I do not believe that Sandin v. Conner can carry the weight the

court has placed on it. Accordingly, I dissent, not because the prisoner is entitled to judicial relief,

but simply because his petition states a claim upon which the sort of relief available through a

common-law writ of certiorari could be granted.

I.

In mid-1999, Tony Willis and Edward Tharpe were cellmates at the Turney Center in

Hickman County. They were charged with attempted escape, a Class A disciplinary offense,1

 after

a pair of pliers was discovered taped to the bottom of a fan in their cell. The pliers had apparently

been stolen from a maintenance worker. At separate disciplinary hearings conducted in August

1999, both Messrs. Willis and Tharpe were found guilty of attempted escape based on the pliers and

other information provided by a confidential informant. The Class A Disciplinary Board punished

them with punitive segregation, involuntary administrative segregation, and a five dollar fine. The

warden and the Commissioner of Correction later upheld the disciplinary board’s decisions.

On November 18, 1999, Messrs. Willis and Tharpe filed a pro se petition for common-law

writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review and reversal

of their convictions for attempted escape. Their petition alleged, at least as I understand it, that they

were denied a fair hearing in violation of their due process rights and that the disciplinary board had

acted arbitrarily and illegally by failing to follow the Department of Correction’s Uniform
2

The motion simply asserted that the petition should be dismissed “[p]ursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) and

(6).” This motion, like most of the motions filed by the Civil Rights and Claims Division in cases of this sort, fails to

comply with the rudimentary requirements of motion practice under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In terms

that even first-year law students can understand, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7.02(1) requires that motions must “state with

particularity the grounds therefor.” For the purposes of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion, this means that the moving

party must state in its motion why the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We have

repeatedly reminded the Attorney General that including the grounds for a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion in a separate

memorandum of law does not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7.02(1). See, e.g., Hickman v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles,

No. M2000-02846-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1222259, at *1, n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2001) (Tenn. R. App. P. 11

application pending); Pendleton v. Mills, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2000 WL 1089503, at *2, n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001);

Robinson v. Clement, 65 S.W.3d 632, 635 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

3

It is not altogether clear why the Clerk and Master included this memorandum of law in the appellate record

in light of Tenn. R. App. P. 24(a)’s clear admonition that trial briefs and counsel’s memoranda of law are not part of

the record on appeal. Atkins v. Kirkpatrick, 823 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Aclin v. Speight, 611 S.W.2d

54, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). 

4We have repeatedly held that this standard subject-matter jurisdiction argument is without merit because Tenn.

Code Ann. §§ 27-8-104(a), 27-9-102 (2000) clearly give the Chancery Court for Davidson County subject matter

jurisdiction over petitions of this sort. The argument is even more tenuous in this case because there is absolutely no

basis for construing the petition as one seeking a statutory writ of certiorari. The petition’s reference to Tenn. Code

Ann. § 27-9-101, et seq. does not transform the petition into a petition for statutory writ of certiorari because the

procedures in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-9-101, -114 apply equally to common-law and statutory writs of certiorari.

Fentress County Beer Bd. v. Cravens, 209 Tenn. 679, 685-86, 356 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1962).

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Disciplinary Procedures. Specifically, Messrs. Willis and Tharpe asserted (1) that they were not

provided adequate notice of the charges against them and that they “were never told when, where,

what, why or how they were attempting to escape,” (2) that they were prevented from discovering

and presenting relevant, “exculpatory” evidence and witnesses, (3) that they were convicted using

evidence from a confidential informant that was mishandled by the disciplinary board, and (4) that

their punishment was excessive.

Approximately seven weeks after Messrs. Willis and Tharpe filed their petition, the Office

of the Attorney General, on behalf of the Department, filed its customary motion for an extension

of time to respond. Even though the trial court granted an extension to February 22, 2000, the

Attorney General was unable to file his customary conclusory motion to dismiss2 until February 24,

2000. Because the motion was not accompanied by a memorandum of law, the Attorney General

filed an identical motion to dismiss and a memorandum of law on February 25, 2000.

The Attorney General’s memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss is, for some

reason, part of the appellate record.3 From it, we learn that the Attorney General’s motion was

predicated on two grounds. First, the Attorney General asserted that the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the petition because Messrs. Willis and Tharpe could not use a statutory writ

of certiorari to seek judicial review of the disciplinary board’s decision.4 Second, the Attorney

General insisted that the trial court should dismiss the petition “because the disciplinary board

neither acted unlawfully nor exceeded its jurisdiction.” While one would have thought that the latter

assertion would require at least a cursory review of the record of the disciplinary proceedings, the
5

The legal basis for this assertion is Sandin v. Conner and this court’s expansive interpretation of Sandin v.

Conner.

6

Of course there are no facts in the record other than the allegations in the petition which must be taken as true.

Royal Clothing Co. v. Holloway, 208 Tenn. 572, 574, 347 S.W.2d 491, 492 (1961) (holding that in the absence of a

record, the factual statements in a petition for common-law writ of certiorari must be taken as true); White v. Revco

Discount Drug Ctrs., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions require

the courts to presume that a complaint’s factual allegations are true). 

7While both Mr. Willis and Mr. Tharpe filed a notice of appeal, only Mr. Tharpe has filed a brief with this

court. Accordingly, Mr. Willis’s appeal should be dismissed in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 29(c).

8

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.

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Attorney General did not file the record of the disciplinary hearing even though it was readily

available. The Attorney General must have decided that the record would be superfluous in light

of his argument that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because

the “[p]etitioners in this case were not entitled to due process since the imposed sanctions of punitive

segregation, involuntary administrative segregation, and a fine of $5.00 were not atypical in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”5

In its May 5, 2000 memorandum and order, the trial court, citing Sandin v. Conner,

determined that Messrs. Willis and Tharpe had failed to state a claim meriting the sort of relief

available through a common-law writ of certiorari because the punishments they received “are not

atypical in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” The court also concluded based on the

“undisputed facts of record”6 that “the process provided to the petitioners to contest and defend

against disciplinary sanctions was commensurate with the sanctions imposed on themand,therefore,

there was no violation or deprivation of due process.” Mr. Tharpe has appealed.7

II.

The court has determined that Mr. Tharpe’s petition failed to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted solely because the punishment he received was not harsh enough to amount to the

imposition of “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.”8

 The court’s reliance on Sandin v. Conner is flawed in two fundamental ways. First, Sandin

v. Conner does not apply to certiorari proceedings in state court. Second, relief under a common-law

writ of certiorari addresses not just violations of constitutional rights, but also arbitrary and

capricious decisions. 

A.

The United States Supreme Court did not intend to establish some sort of universal rule

governing all federal and state judicial proceedings involving the discipline of prisoners when it

decided Sandin v. Conner. Rather, the Court was simply articulating a test for determining whether

prisoners seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) had alleged a violation of a liberty interest
9

Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be filed in state court. Wimley v. Rudolph, 931 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tenn.

1996); Poling v. Goins, 713 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tenn. 1986). 

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that would entitle them to relief. The holding of Sandin v. Conner is that a prisoner who files a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 suit challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding based on a failure to follow a state

statute, rule, or policy states a claim for relief only if the punishment the prisoner received imposes

a significant hardship that is atypical of the normal incidents of prison life. Thus, Sandin v. Conner

is only directly applicable to actions in state and federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.9

Petitions for a common-law writ of certiorari serve different purposes and provide different

relief than actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A common-law writ of certiorari permits the courts to

examine a lower tribunal’s decision to determine whether the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or

acted illegally. Robinson v. Clement, 65 S.W.3d at 635; Turner v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 993

S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). For the purpose of a common-law writ of certiorari, illegal

actions include decisions that are arbitrary and capricious. Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of

Educ., 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987); Davison v. Carr, 659 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1983); 421

Corp. v. Metropolitan Gov’t, 36 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). What could be more

arbitrary and capricious than a rule-maker refusing to abide by its own rules?

B.

A common-lawwritof certiorari provides judicial relief in more circumstances than an action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the violation of rights

secured by the United States Constitution or federal law. Pendleton v. Mills, ___ S.W.3d at ___,

2001 WL 1089503, at *5; Parks Properties v. Maury County, 70 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001). On the other hand, a common-law writ of certiorari provides a judicial remedy whenever a

lower tribunal exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or has otherwise acted

illegally. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (2000); Robinson v. Clement, 65 S.W.3d at 635; Turner v.

Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 993 S.W.2d at 80. Thus, a common-law writ of certiorari may be used

to grant relief in circumstances that do not warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Franklin v.

Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., No. M2001-00279-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1386089, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Nov. 8, 2001 (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

One of the ways in which a lower tribunal acts illegally is when it follows an unlawful

procedure. Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd., 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980); Nevills v. South Cent. Corr.

Disciplinary Bd., No. M2000-02324-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1117066, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.

25, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); Lafferty v. City of Winchester, 46 S.W.3d 752,

758-59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The Tennessee Supreme Court has specifically approved using a

common-law writ of certiorari to remedy (1) fundamentally illegal rulings, (2) proceedings

inconsistent with essential legal requirements, (3) proceedings that effectively deny a party his or

her day in court, (4) decisions beyond the lower tribunal’s authority, and (5) plain and palpable

abuses of discretion. State v. Willoughby, 594 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tenn. 1980). Accordingly, a
10State v. Womack, 591 S.W.2d 437, 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

11Hoover v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 924 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Brooks v.

Fisher, 705 S.W.2d 135, 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Harless v. City of Kingsport, No. 03A01-9707-CH-00289, 1998

WL 131519, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1998) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

12See Fox v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, No. 01A01-9506-CH-00263, 1995 WL 681135, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Nov. 17, 1995) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that an allegation of failure to provide a right or

benefit to which the claimant is entitled under state law or regulation states a claim for relief through a common-law

writ of certiorari). 

13The court conditioned this conclusion by observing that “[w]e do not imply that a statutory violation cannot

constitute a failure to conform to the essential requirements of the law.” While this statement is undoubtedly correct,

it does not imply that the government’s obligation to follow its own procedures depends on whether these procedures

are mandated by statute, rule, regulation, or policy.

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common-law writ of certiorari can be used to address the denial of procedural rights secured by the

federal and state constitutions,10 state statute,11 or state, federal, or local regulations.12 

This court has been more diffident about whether violations of the Department’s Uniform

Disciplinary Procedures warrant relief under a common-law writ of certiorari. Initially, we

concluded that departures from these procedures could be “so extreme as would compel the trial

court to issue a writ of certiorari.” Wilson v. South Cent. Corr. Facility Disciplinary Bd., No.

M2000-00303-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1425228, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2000) (No Tenn.

R. App. P. 11 application filed). More recently, we held that a failure to adhere to the requirements

of the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures would not amount to a failure to “follow the essential

requirements of the law” unless the punishment imposed an atypical and significant hardship beyond

the ordinary incidents of prison life. Ahkeen v. Campbell, No. M2000-02411-COA-R3-CV, 2001

WL 1346250, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).13

The Department’s Uniform Disciplinary Procedures have not and need not be promulgated

as rules using the rule-making procedures in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Mandela

v. Campbell, 978 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tenn. 1998). However, the policies exist “[t]o provide for the

fair and impartial determination and resolution of all disciplinary charges placed against inmates.”

TDOC Policy No. 502.01(II). The policy is the sole source of the Department’s disciplinary

procedures. While it “is not intended to create any additional due process guarantees for inmates

beyond those which are constitutionally required,” deviations from the policy will warrant dismissal

of the disciplinary offense if the prisoner demonstrates “some prejudice as a result and the error

would have affected the disposition of the case.” TDOC Policy No. 502.01(V).

Accordingly, I would hold that a prisoner seeking judicial review of a prison disciplinary

proceeding states a claim meriting relief under a common-law writ of certiorari if the prisoner’s

complaint alleges facts demonstrating that the failure to follow the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures

affected the disposition of the disciplinary proceeding to the prisoner’s prejudice. Stated in terms

more traditionally associated with a common-law writ of certiorari, a prisoner states a claim

warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review the record of a disciplinary proceeding if his
14We have already questioned the wisdom of the tactic of filing a motion to dismiss or summary judgment

without filing the complete record in cases of this sort. Livingston v. State, No. M1999-01138-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL

747643, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (stating that the court is

“troubled” by the tactic of seeking a summary judgment supported only by carefully selected portions of the record).

I have little doubt that had the Department filed the complete record of the disciplinary hearing in this case, the

information in the record would have provided a sufficient factual basis for declining to grant Mr. Tharpe relief.

15Prisoners are entitled to notice of their disciplinary infraction by receiving written notice of the charges

(usually in the form of a copy of the disciplinary report) at least twenty-four hours before the hearing before the

disciplinary board. TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(A)(3)(c), -(VI)(D)(3)(b). 

16This allegation can reasonably be interpreted to mean either that Messrs. Tharpe and Willis received no notice

of the charges against them or that the notice they received was somehow defective. The former circumstance would

be patently prejudicial, while the prejudicial nature of the latter circumstance would depend on the particular

shortcoming of the challenged notice.

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or her petition contains factual allegations demonstrating that the prisoner was prejudiced (1) by

being effectively denied a hearing, (2) by plain and palpable abuse of the hearing officer’s, the

chairperson’s, or the disciplinary board’s discretion, or (3) by hearing officers, chairpersons, or

boards following an unlawful procedure. 

C.

It is not our prerogative at this stage of the proceedings to analyze the substantive merits of

Mr. Tharpe’s claims because the Department elected to file a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion rather

than the record of the disciplinary hearing.14 Our only task is to review Mr. Tharpe’s petition, taking

its factual allegations as true, to determine whether it states a claim or claims upon which the relief

available through a common-law writ of certiorari can be granted.

Mr. Tharpe’s petition contains factual allegations depicting three departures from the

Department’s Uniform Disciplinary Rules. First, it alleges that Messrs. Tharpe and Willis did not

receive adequate notice of the disciplinary charges. Second, it asserts that Messrs. Tharpe and Willis

were prevented from obtaining and presenting relevant evidence. Finally, it alleges that the

disciplinary board did not independently assess and verify the reliability of the confidential

informant’s evidence. If substantiated, these deviations from the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures,

considered individually or collectively, could have affected the outcome of the disciplinary

proceeding to the prisoners’ prejudice.

The petition states that Messrs. Tharpe and Willis “were not placed on notice prior to their

hearings of the specific charges against which they would have to defend.” If substantiated, the

failure to provide notice would be a violation of the notice requirements in the Uniform Disciplinary

Procedures15 which could very easily have prejudiced the prisoners’ ability to defend themselves.16

In the absence of a record, we must take the allegations in the petition as true and must construe the
17Mr. Tharpe states in his pro se brief that he “was issued disciplinary infraction report no. TC107423/378998

for the alleged offense of ‘Attempted Escape,’” and attached a copy of this report to his brief. This document is not part

of the appellate record because it was not introduced in the trial court. We cannot take judicial notice of materials

appended to briefs that are not properly part of the record on appeal. Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, No. M1998-00929-

COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1216980, at *5, n. 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed);

State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). 

18Prisoners do not have an unqualified right to call witnesses in disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 566-67, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2980 (1974). Accordingly, TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(E)(2 (c) (6) permits

prisoners “to present testimony of relevant witnesses unless allowing a witness to appear would pose a threat to the

institutional safety or order.” Prisoners must comp lete witness request forms in a timely manner, TDOC Policy No.

502.01(VI(E)(2)(d)(1), but the chairperson of the disciplinary board may also use his or her discretion to allow other

prisoners or staff members to testify even in the absence of a timely request. TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(E)(2)(d)(2).

19They assert that this informant was another prisoner who “concocted” the escape story to induce the prison

officials to drop drug possession charges that were pending against him.

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petition as alleging that the prisoners received no notice of the charges prior to the hearing.17 If

substantiated, a failure to give notice of the charges would have been a clear violation of the Uniform

Disciplinary Rules that would have prejudiced the prisoners.

The petition also alleges that the disciplinary board prevented Messrs. Tharpe and Willis

from obtaining and introducing relevant “exculpatory” evidence. If substantiated, this conduct

would likewise be contrary to the prisoners’ qualified right to introduce evidence and call witnesses

in disciplinary proceedings.18 In the absence of a record, we must presume that Messrs. Tharpe and

Willis made timely requests for the witnesses and documents and that permitting them to call their

witnesses would not have jeopardized safety or order in the institution. The evidence they desired

to present involved the chain of custody of the pliers found in their cell. This evidence was certainly

relevant and could have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, at least on its face,

we must presume that refusing to permit Messrs. Tharpe and Willis to present this evidence was

prejudicial.

Finally, Messrs. Tharpe and Willis assert that the disciplinary board did not independently

assess the credibility of a confidential informant whose testimony apparently formed part of the basis

for finding them guilty of attempted escape.19 This allegation, if substantiated, would be a serious

departure from the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures which require the chairperson to independently

“assess and verify the reliability of the informant’s testimony” and, when the information provides

a basis for the board’s decision, “to document the factual basis for the disciplinary hearing

officer’s/chairperson’s finding that the informant’s information was reliable.” TDOC Policy No.

502.01(VI)(E)(2)(e). Compliance with this procedure fosters the reliability of prison disciplinary

proceedings because prisoners can be denied the opportunity to confront and cross-examine their

accusers when prison officials are concerned about reprisals or other security concerns. Williams

v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374-75 (11th Cir. 1996). In the absence of a record, we must presume that

the allegations in the petition are true. Failing to independently verify the credibility of the

confidential informant could easily have prejudiced both Mr. Tharpe and Mr. Willis because it could
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have caused them to be convicted of a serious disciplinary offense based on false or unreliable

evidence. 

III.

The imposition of punishment without a reliable determination of guilt is senseless, even

when the proceeding involves a prisoner in a state correctional institution. Measuring the fairness

of a prison disciplinary proceeding only by its outcome effectively puts the cart before the horse and

gives the Department carte blanche to ignore its own rules as long as the punishment meted out is

not too harsh. Undermining the truth-finding function of a prison disciplinary hearing by ignoring

the very policies designed to assure that the proceedings will be “ fair and impartial” is precisely the

sort of arbitrary and capricious conduct that can be corrected using a common-law writ of certiorari.

Accordingly, I would find that the petition Mr. Tharpe filed in this case states a claim for which

relief can be granted, and I would remand the case to the trial court with directions to issue the writ

of certiorari, direct the Department to file the record, and then address the substance of Mr. Tharpe’s

claims in light of the record of the proceedings.

_____________________________ 

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE