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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Movants Eugene P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser, and 

Anthony D. Givens (collectively, “Movants”) submit this motion 

asking the Court to reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and Order 

adopting Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s Report and 

Recommendation (“R. & R.”) and granting Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. See Movants’ Mot. Recons., ECF No. 48.1 Upon careful 

consideration of the motion, opposition, and reply thereto, the 

applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court hereby 

DENIES Movants’ motion.

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of 

the filed documents.

EVA MAE GIVENS,

Plaintiff,

 

v.

MURIEL BOWSER, in her official 

capacity as Mayor, Washington, 

D.C., et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-307

(EGS/ZMF)
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II. Background

A. Factual

The background of this dispute was set forth in the Court’s 

prior opinion and will not be repeated here. See Givens v. 

Bowser, No. CV 20-307 (EGS/ZMF), 2022 WL 4598576 (D.D.C. Sept. 

30, 2022). In short, Eva Mae Givens (“Ms. Givens” or 

“Plaintiff”) was a nursing home resident who applied for 

Medicaid benefits on February 26, 2019 to pay for her medical 

expenses, including her nursing home care. Am. Compl., ECF No. 

16 ¶¶ 1, 24. Along with her application, she submitted copies of 

unpaid medical bills totaling $40,184 and argued that these 

unpaid bills qualified for a PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 25. 

On May 17, 2019, the District of Columbia (the “District”) 

determined that Ms. Givens was eligible for Medicaid benefits 

but did not provide an appropriate PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 26. 

Consequently, beginning February 1, 2019, she was required to 

pay $2,044 per month for her nursing home care, and she was 

unable to use that money to pay off the $40,183.93 in unpaid 

bills. Id.

On June 6, 2019, Ms. Givens filed a request with the 

District’s Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) for a fair 

hearing to address the District’s failure to approve her request 

for a PEME deduction. Id. ¶ 28. OAH called the hearing nine 

months after Ms. Givens filed her request and eventually 
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dismissed the case with prejudice in December 2020. See Notice 

of Suppl. Authority, ECF No. 24-1 at 3.

B. Procedural

Ms. Givens filed this Section 1983 suit against Defendants 

on February 5, 2020, see generally Compl., ECF No. 1; and 

amended her Complaint on June 3, 2020, see generally Am. Compl., 

ECF No. 16. On July 1, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to 

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mot. 

Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 18. Ms. Givens filed her 

opposition, see Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. 

Compl., ECF No. 20; and Defendants filed a reply thereto, see

Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl., 

ECF No. 22. The Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge 

Faruqui for full case management, see Minute Order (Oct. 13, 

2020); who, on May 3, 2021, issued his R. & R. recommending that 

the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, see R. & R., ECF 

No. 28 at 15.

Before Magistrate Judge Faruqui issued his R. & R., Ms. 

Givens died. See Suggestion of Death, ECF No. 26. On May 16, 

2021, Ms. Givens’ three children—Movants here—moved to be 

substituted as plaintiffs, to file a second amended complaint, 

and to object to the R. & R. See generally ECF No. 29.

Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted their motion to substitute as 
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plaintiffs for the limited purpose of objecting to the R. & R. 

See Minute Order (June 16, 2021).

Movants raised several objections to the R. & R, see 

generally Objs. by Eugene P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and 

Anthony D. Givens to Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s May 3. 

2021 R. & R., ECF No. 33; to which Defendants responded, see

Defs.’ Resp. Objs. Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui’s R. & R., 

ECF No. 36. The Court then issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order 

adopting the R. & R. and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

See Givens, 2022 WL 4598576, at *8; Order, ECF No. 46. 

On October 28, 2022, Movants filed this Motion for 

Reconsideration. See Movants’ Mot. Recons., ECF No. 48; Eugene 

P. Givens, Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and Anthony D. Givens’ Mem. of 

Law in Supp. of Mot. Recons. (“Movants’ Mot.”), ECF No. 48-1. 

Defendants filed their opposition on November 17, 2022, see

Defs.’ Opp’n Movants’ Mot. Recons. (“Defs.’ Opp’n), ECF No. 50; 

and Movants replied on November 25, 2022, see Eugene P. Givens, 

Jr., Deborah R. Bowser and Anthony D. Givens’ Reply Mem. of Law 

in Further Supp. of Mot. Recons. (“Movants’ Reply”), ECF No. 51. 

The motion is now ripe and ready for adjudication.

III. Legal Standard

A. Motion for Reconsideration

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly 

address motions for reconsideration. See Sieverding v. U.S. 
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Dep’t of Just., No. CV 09-562 (JDB), 2010 WL 11667910, at *1 

(D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2010) (citing Lance v. United Mine Workers of 

Am. 1974 Pension Tr., 400 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 2005)).

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) permits district courts to construe 

motions for reconsideration as motions to alter or amend the 

judgment under Rule 59(e). See Emory v. Sec’y of Navy, 819 F.2d 

291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (explaining that “[s]uch

treatment is appropriate even though the movant does not specify 

under which rule relief is sought”).

Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or 

amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of that 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions are 

“discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court 

finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, 

the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear 

error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 

F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). These motions are 

“disfavored,” and the moving party bears the burden of 

establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief 

from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F. 

Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 

F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Rule 59(e) does not provide a 
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vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or 

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry 

of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 

(2008) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).

B. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party 

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has 

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A 

district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended 

disposition.” Id. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)

(“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge.”). A district court “must determine de novo 

any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been 

properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “If, however, 

the party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply 

reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the [R. & 

R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 

86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). “Under the clearly 

erroneous standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled 

to great deference and is clearly erroneous only if on the 

entire evidence the court is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of 
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Columbia, No. CV 16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 12, 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the 

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made 

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections 

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the 

magistrate judge are not properly objected to and are therefore 

not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991 F. Supp. 

2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Court reviewed Movants’ objections de novo.

IV. Analysis

A. Movants Have Standing to Move for Reconsideration of the 

Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order

Courts have routinely held that only parties have standing 

to bring motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). See, 

e.g., In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 184 F.R.D. 506, 

511 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that non-party had no standing to 

bring Rule 59(e) motion after having been denied intervention).

The parties do not dispute this principle. See generally Defs.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 8-9; Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 2-3. 

Instead, they disagree whether Movants are parties within the 

meaning of the rule. 

Defendants assert that Movants are non-parties because: (1) 

Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted their motion to be substituted 
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as plaintiffs only “‘for the limited purpose of objecting to the 

[R. & R.],’ and nothing else”; and (2) Movants never moved to 

intervene in the case pursuant to Rule 24. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 

50 at 9 (quoting Minute Order (June 16, 2021)). In reply, 

Movants argue that Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s Minute Order 

permitting them to be substituted as plaintiffs for the purpose 

of objecting to the R. & R. “plainly encompasses” a motion for 

reconsideration of this Court’s ruling on those objections.

Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 3. They further contend that 

Defendants are too late to object to the Minute Order, id.

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)); and that their failure to move 

to intervene “is irrelevant,” id.

The Court is persuaded that Movants are parties for 

purposes of this motion. In the Minute Order at issue, 

Magistrate Judge Faruqui granted Movants’ motion to be 

substituted as plaintiffs “for the limited purpose of objecting 

to the [R. & R.].” Minute Order (June 16, 2021). In other words, 

with respect to their objections to the R. & R., Movants are 

plaintiffs in the case. There is no reason why Movants should 

lose that status now because they ask the Court to take a second 

look at their objections to the R. & R. See Cobell v. Jewell, 29 

F. Supp. 3d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that “the typical 

motion for reconsideration . . . asks a court to take a second 

look at an issue that was previously raised and ruled upon”), 
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aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

The Court therefore concludes that Movants are parties for 

purposes of this Motion for Reconsideration and have standing to 

file a Rule 59(e) motion.

B. The Court Will Not Amend Its Prior Memorandum Opinion or 

Order

Movants argue that the Court’s Memorandum Opinion adopting 

the R. & R. and granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be 

amended for two reasons. See Movants’ Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 4-6.

First, they argue that it was “clear error” to dismiss the case 

with prejudice and “ignore[]” their pending motion for leave to 

file a Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 5. Second, they assert 

that “reconsideration is necessary to prevent the manifest 

injustice” of Defendants’ continuing failure to make timely 

decisions following Medicaid hearings. Id. at 6. For the reasons 

below, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion for Reconsideration.

1. The Court Did Not Clearly Err in Dismissing the First 

Amended Complaint with Prejudice

Movants first argue that the Memorandum Opinion is clearly 

erroneous because it dismissed the First Amended Complaint with 

prejudice despite the pending motion for leave to file a second 

amended complaint. See id. at 4-6. For support, they cite D.C. 

Circuit authority that “dismissal with prejudice is warranted 

only when a trial court determines that the allegation of other 

facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly 
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cure the deficiency.” Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1209). They 

contend that their proposed second amended complaint “contain[s]

allegations that clearly allege that Defendants have a pattern 

or practice of failing to decide Medicaid Fair Hearings within 

the required time frames” and “therefore satisf[ies] the 

inherently transitory exception to the mootness doctrine.” Id.

at 5. Moreover, they continue, they did not unduly delay in 

moving for leave to file the new complaint and have not 

“‘repeatedly failed’ to cure deficiencies.” Id.

Defendants respond by distinguishing D.C. Circuit 

precedent. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 9-11. First, they 

clarify the holding in Belizan, explaining that the Belizan

court held that dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate 

because the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs’ 

motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at 10 (citing 

Belizan, 434 F.3d at 583). Defendants argue that Belizan does 

not control the outcome here because Movants are not plaintiffs 

and cannot be plaintiffs unless and until the Court grants their 

motion to be substituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 10-11. For 

additional support, they cite other D.C. Circuit precedent

holding that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate “[w]hen a 

plaintiff fails to seek leave from the District Court to amend 

its complaint.” City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 
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589 F.3d 1292, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Gov’t of Guam v. 

Am. President Lines, 28 F.3d 142, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Drake 

v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 50 at 10. 

The Court is persuaded that it did not clearly err in 

dismissing the First Amended Complaint with prejudice. D.C. 

Circuit authority makes clear that dismissal with prejudice is 

inappropriate when: (1) the plaintiff has moved for leave to 

amend her complaint; and (2) the court “determines that the 

allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” Belizan, 434 

F.3d at 583. Movants have not satisfied the first prong. They

are not plaintiffs, cf. Minute Order (June 16, 2021) (granting 

motion to substitute as plaintiffs “for the limited purpose of 

objecting to the [R. & R.]”); and only a party may move to amend 

the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Movants argue that 

they did “everything possible” to be substituted as plaintiffs 

and to amend the First Amended Complaint. Movants’ Reply, ECF 

No. 51 at 4. However, this argument ignores Movants’ failure to 

object to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s order granting their 

substitution motion in part, staying briefing on their motion 

for leave to amend the complaint, and withholding consideration 

of their substitution motion for all other purposes. See Docket 

for Civ. Action No. 20-307; see also LCvR 72.2(b) (requiring 
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that parties object to rulings by a magistrate judge within 14 

days). Thus, because no plaintiff had a pending motion to amend 

the complaint at the time of dismissal, the Court did not 

clearly err in dismissing the First Amended Complaint with 

prejudice.2

2. Reconsideration is Not Necessary to Prevent Manifest 

Injustice

Movants also argue that “reconsideration is necessary to 

prevent the manifest injustice of the Defendants’ continuing 

pattern of violations of the [timeline] requirements.” Movants’ 

Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 6. They do not expand on this statement in 

either their opening memorandum or reply brief. See generally

id. at 1-6; Movants’ Reply, ECF No. 51 at 1-13.

In their opposition briefing, Defendants concede that

“‘courts have not precisely defined what constitutes manifest 

injustice.’” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 50 at 12 (quoting Piper v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Just., 312 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2004), as 

amended (May 13, 2004)). Even so, they contend that Movants’ 

argument is insufficient, reasoning that the manifest injustice 

standard would be met in every case if a movant could simply 

argue that she did not receive the relief she sought. Id.

2 Because Movants are not plaintiffs with a pending motion to 

amend their complaint, the Court need not address their 

remaining arguments that their proposed second amended complaint 

cures the deficiencies of the First Amended Complaint. See

Movants’ Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 5-6.
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Although the caselaw does not define the term, courts 

regularly make clear that “manifest injustice is an 

exceptionally narrow concept in the context of a Rule 59(e) 

motion.” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 

48, 78 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 

782 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). “[A] manifest injustice does not 

result merely because a harm may go unremedied.” Slate v. Am. 

Broad. Companies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2013)

(citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State. 

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983)). Rather, 

manifest injustice “must entail a clear and certain prejudice to 

the moving party” and “also a result that is fundamentally 

unfair in light of governing law.” Id. at 35-36.

The Court concludes that Movants have not met this high 

bar. They argue that manifest injustice will result because they 

cannot maintain their class fair hearing claim. See Movants’ 

Mot., ECF No. 48-1 at 6. They do not explain how dismissal here 

prejudices them, nor do they account for how dismissal “is 

fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.” Slate, 12 F. 

Supp. 3d at 35-36. Stated differently, Movants have not met 

their burden to demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” that 

warrant relief. Niedermeier, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Accordingly, 

the Court does not need to amend its earlier Memorandum Opinion 

and Order to prevent manifest injustice. 
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V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion 

for Reconsideration, ECF No. 48.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

March 26, 2023