alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
VOTING TRUST AGREEMENT

 This Agreement is entered into this 30th day of June 1998, by and between John
V. Winfield  ("Winfield") and The Intergroup Corporation, a Delaware
corporation ("InterGroup" or the "Company").

 WHEREAS, Winfield is the President, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of InterGroup; and the record and beneficial owner of 49,400 shares
of Common Stock, $.10 par value (the "Common Stock"), of Santa Fe Financial
Corporation ("Santa Fe"); and

	WHEREAS, InterGroup is also a substantial shareholder of Santa Fe; and

	WHEREAS, the parties believe that it is in the best interests of the Company
that InterGroup have voting control over the shares of Common Stock in order
to effectuate a consolidation of Santa Fe and InterGroup for financial
reporting purposes;

	NOW THEREFORE, for valuable consideration and the mutual covenants and
conditions set forth herein, Winfield and InterGroup agree as follows:

	1.  Voting Rights.  Winfield grants to InterGroup the exclusive right to vote
the Common Stock, in any and all matters, for such period of time as Winfield
owns said shares.  Said grant of voting rights shall not be deemed a 
transfer of any ownership rights in the Common Stock.

	2.  Right of First Refusal.   Before selling or transferring any of the Common
Stock, Winfield must first offer the shares to InterGroup, in the following
manner:

	(a)	Winfield shall mail or personally deliver a copy of any written offer
received by him to sell the Common stock, or a notice of intent to sell if
there is no written offer, to the Secretary of the Company, stating the 
number of Common Shares and the price, terms, and conditions of the proposed
sale or transfer, including the name of any proposed outside buyer.  
The Company shall then have the right to purchase any or all of those shares
at the price and on the terms and conditions stated in the offer, or at the
current market price if there is no written offer, by giving written notice
of its election to purchase a specified number of shares. This notice shall be
given by mail or personal delivery within two (2) business days after the
date of receipt of any written offer to purchase or  notice of 
intent to sell in the open market.

	(b)	If the Company fails to give notice of its election to purchase within the
prescribed period, or if it elects to purchase fewer than all of the shares
being offered, than Winfield shall be free to sell or transfer the balance 
of the Common Stock according to the terms of the written offer or on the
open market.
                                             THE INTERGROUP CORPORATION
____________________________  		        by   __________________________________
JOHN V. WINFIELD			                     		    GREGORY C. McPHERSON
                                  							     Executive Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM IMTEK OFFICE
SOLUTIONS, INC. DECEMBER 31, 1997 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         262,362
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  857,400
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,000
<INVENTORY>                                    752,325
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,213,544
<PP&E>                                         347,515
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,215
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,327,816
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,576,451
<BONDS>                                        329,584
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       792,422
<OTHER-SE>                                     275,710
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,327,816
<SALES>                                      6,590,531
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,590,531
<CGS>                                        4,919,164
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,086,473
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                504,058
<INCOME-TAX>                                   210,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            294,058
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   294,058
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01
        

</TABLE>
11715.

#### Dunson & Brothers Co. *v.*Smith Seed Co.

Luke, J.

1. A contract is not unilateral where it consists of a written and signed order for specified goods at stated prices and of the addressee’s written and signed acceptance of the order. See Park’s Ann. Code, § 4230, with annotations under the catchword “Unilateral.”

2. Where a promissory note recites no consideration except in the words “for value received,” and suit is brought thereon by the payee against the maker,'the real consideration of the note may be inquired into as far as may be necessary to the defense pleaded. '

3. But in a suit by the payee against the maker of a promissory note reciting that it was given “ for value received,” a contemporaneous parol *586agreement cannot be engrafted thereon by the defendant by testimony to the effect that, while the defendant, at the time of executing the note, actually received from the plaintiff the principal sum thereof, yet the defendant had a prior cause of action against the plaintiff, “ and said note was to be a set off against the demands of said [defendant] against said [plaintiff] in this case, and was so understood at the time of the execution and delivery of said note.” Civil Code (1910), §§ 4268, 578S, 5791; *Chamberlin*v. *Beck,*68 *Ga.*346(5). The alleged parol agreement being inconsistent with the unambiguous terms of the note sued on, the portion of the plea above indicated set forth no defense.

Decided April 13, 1921.

Complaint; from Muscogee superior court — Judge Howard. May 14, 1920.

*M. U. Mooty, Love & Fort,*for plaintiff.

*McGutchen & Bowden,*for defendant.

4. The remainder of the plea being a cross-action upon a contract, and not an action for a breach thereof, to recover the entire purchase-price of goods which the plaintiff had bought from the defendant but had refused to take and pay for, and it being nowhere alleged that the defendant had stored or retained the property for the vendee, in accordance with the terms of § 4131 of the Civil Code (1910), the plea as a whole set forth no valid defense, and was subject to the motion to dismiss presented at the trial of the case. *Oklahoma Vinegar Co.*v. *Carter,*116 *Ga.*140 (42 S. E. 378, 59 L. R. A. 122, 94 Am. St. Rep. 112).

5. The court having erred in failing to strike the defendant’s plea on motion, all the subsequent proceedings in'th'e case were nugatory.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Bloodworth, J.,- concur.*
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 21

- 1818

_____________________________
B RIAN A. E VERETT , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Meredith Charbula , Judge

. September 15, 2021

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R AY , J AY , and T ANENBAUM , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Brian A. Everett, pro se
, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
11562.

#### THOMPSON *v.*THE STATE.

Where one charged with an assault with intent to murder is convicted of that offense and given the minimum punishment by the jury, failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury, even in the absence of a request, that, if they found the defendant guilty as charged, they could recommend, if they saw lit, that he be punished as for a misdemeanor, is reversible error.

Decided April 13, 1921.

Indictment for assault with intent to murder; from Forsyth superior court — Judge Blair. April 24, 1920.

*J. P. Brooke,*for plaintiff in error.

*John T. Dorsey, solicitor-general, William Butt,*contra.

Luke, J.

The defendant was charged with the offense of assault with intent to murder, and was convicted of that offense by the jury, who, under the “indeterminate-sentence act” (Ga. L. 1919, p. 387), fixed his sentence at not less than two years nor more than two years. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, on various grounds, one of which complained that the court failed _ to charge the jury that they might recommend that the defendant be punished as for a misdemeanor. The motion was overruled and the defendant excepted, and this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court (25 *Ga. App.*483, 103 S. E. 731). Hpon certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court, and held that the trial judge committed reversible error when he failed to instruct the jury, even without a request, that in the event they convicted the defendant of an assault with intent to murder they could recommend, if they saw fit, that he be punished as for a misdemeanor. It is therefore ordered that the former judgment of this court in this case be vacated; and the judgment of the trial court, overruling the motion for a 'new trial, is reversed solely on the above ground. The exception to the overruling of the demurrer to the indictment, not having been preserved by exceptions pendente lite, cannot be considered; the other special grounds of the motion for a new trial are without substantial merit; and.the verdict was authorized by the evidence.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, O. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
No. 87-1352.

#### Board of Trustees of the University of Arkansas et al. *v.*Legrand et al.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PAMELA SPAIN, individually and 

on behalf of a class of others

similarly situated,

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0326-CG-N

)

RJM ACQUISITIONS, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This cause is before the court on the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay Litigation 

Pending 11th Circuit Decision (Doc. 8), in which the parties move to stay this case 

pending the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision on the application for 

rehearing pending in Stanley Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, et al. (Case No. 13-

12389-E).

Upon due consideration, the court finds that the interests of justice are best 

served by granting the stay; therefore, the joint motion to stay is GRANTED, and 

this action is hereby STAYED pending the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 

decision on the application for rehearing pending in Crawford.

In the event that the application for rehearing is denied, the parties are 

ORDERED to notify this court in the form of a written status report within seven 

(7) days of the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, after which the stay will be lifted, the 

defendant will be required to file its responsive pleading within fourteen (14) days 

Case 1:14-cv-00326-CG-N Document 9 Filed 09/03/14 Page 1 of 2
2

of the date the stay is lifted, and a preliminary scheduling order will be entered.

In the event that the application for rehearing is granted, the parties are 

ORDERED to notify this court of such within seven (7) days of the Eleventh 

Circuit’s ruling in the form of a written status report, and the parties will be 

required to file a status report every ninety (90) days thereafter until the Eleventh 

Circuit issues its final decision on the Crawford case.

DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of September, 2014.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00326-CG-N Document 9 Filed 09/03/14 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 13.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the annual report of Internet Gold – Golden Lines Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Doron Turgeman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




/s/ Doron Turgeman*


Doron Turgeman


Deputy Chief Executive Officer and


Chief Financial Officer




June 30, 2010




*           The originally executed copy of this Certification will be maintained at the Company’s offices and will be made available for inspection upon request.
#### R. H. Field *v.*J. F. Smith.

Judgment — Error in Judgment — How Corrected.

An error of tlie clerk in entering a judgment may be corrected by tbe court at a subsequent term when there is anything in the record to go by, but when there is nothing in the record to amend by such judgment cannot be corrected upon the mere recollection of witnesses as to what took place in the court.

APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT.

December 15, 1876.

OpinioN by

Judge Cofer :

An error of the clerk in entering a judgment or order may be corrected by the court at a subsequent term, when there is anything in the record to amend by. *Hopkins v. Alvis,*2 A. K. Marsh 374.

But when, as in this case, there is nothing in the record to amend by, it would be extremely hazardous to allow a record to be amended *822upon the mere recollection of witnesses as to what took place in court. Under such a practice the rights of parties would depend, not upon the records of the county, but upon the memory of men. There would be no security in relying upon the solemn judgments of courts, and the records of their proceedings, from being the highest grade of evidence known to the law, would be reduced to the lowest and most unreliable. ■■

*R. H.*Field, *for appellant. R. T.*Meyler, *for appellee.*

If the proposed amendment could be made, it would follow that after an adjudication by the circuit court, a reversal by this court, and a second adjudication by the circuit court, a change would be made which, if it is to have any effect whatever, reopens the entire subject of litigation, would authorize a new appeal to this court, the reversal of a judgment entered in pursuance to its mandate, and a direction to re-enter a judgment once reversed. We cannot approve a practice fraught with such consequences, and must *affirm*the order of the circuit court.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Ronald J. Ivans,
Chief Financial Officer of the managing owner, Prudential Securities Futures Management Inc. (the Managing Owner), of World Monitor Trust IISeries E (Series E), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | Series Es Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Annual Report),
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Series E.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                            
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Ronald J. Ivans                                                         
|                                                                            
|Ronald J. Ivans Chief Financial Officer of the Managing Owner March 30,
2004
#### William H. READING and Beverly S. Reading, Petitioners-Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 79-1466.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 10, 1980.

Decided Jan. 21, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 11, 1980.

William H. Reading, III, pro se.

M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews, Wynette J. Hewett, and Stanley S. Shaw, Jr., Attys., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent-appellee.

Before HEANEY, ROSS and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Taxpayers brought suit in the United States Tax Court contesting a deficiency assessment of $2,486.45 by the Commissioner for their 1975 federal income taxes. The deficiency assessment was based on (1) disallowing itemized deductions for housing, food, schooling, and medical expenses (not otherwise deductible under *26*U.S.C. § 213) because those expenses were nondeductible personal living or family expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 262, and (2) a determination that taxpayers owed self-employment taxes on reported self-employment income.

Before the Tax Court taxpayers conceded the disallowed deductions were for living or *160family expenses but they contended that by disallowing deductions for those expenses Congress exceeded its authority to lay and collect income taxes under the sixteenth amendment, and that income means the gain or income received less the expense of living. The Tax Court rejected taxpayers’ claims but redetermined the deficiency to be $2,468.29, and on January 25, 1979, the court entered its decision for the Commissioner. On appeal taxpayers claim they had no income, for income tax purposes, and on appeal they challenge the constitutionality of the tax laws and Tax Court.

The standard of review on appeal from the Tax Court is whether the Tax Court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous *(see, e. g., Commissioner v. Duberstein,*363 U.S. 278, 291, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960); *Smith v. Commissioner,*608 F.2d 321, at 322 (8th Cir. 1979)), and “findings of fact are not clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” *Smith v. Commissioner, supra,*608 F.2d 321, at 323, *citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,*333 U.S. 364, 394-95, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746, *rehearing denied,*333 U.S. 869, 68 S.Ct. 788, 92 L.Ed. 1147 (1948). The findings of the Tax Court that all except $781 of the claimed deductions were not expressly deductible under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and were thus nondeductible under 26 U.S.C. § 262, and that taxpayers owed self-employment income tax on their self-employment income was correct. We have repeatedly rejected attacks on the constitutionality of the income tax laws; taxpayers claims of unconstitutionality are without-merit, and thus we adopt the well reasoned decision of the Tax Court filed August 21, 1978.

It is so ordered.

1

. $78 for state- gasoline tax was not otherwise claimed as a deduction and was held by the Tax Court to be deductible as a tax expense under 26 U.S.C. § 164.
EXHIBIT 32.1




SELECTICA, INC.




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the annual report of Selectica, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jason Stern, President and Chief Operating Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




Date: June 29, 2010





/s/ JASON STERNJason SternPresident and Chief Operating Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERRY WHITE, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. :

 : CIVIL ACTION 14-0341-M

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Social Security Commissioner, :

 :

Defendant. :

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that JUDGMENT be entered in favor 

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin and against Plaintiff Terry White.

DONE this 9th day of March, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00341-M Document 23 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 1
**EXHIBIT 32**

**SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS**

Theundersigned hereby certify that the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A-1 ofMedis Technologies Ltd. (the “Registrant”) for the year ended December 31,2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

Dated:May 28, 2004
|   |   | /s/  ROBERT  K. LIFTON    |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
|   |   | Robert K. Lifton                              |
|   |   | Chairman and Chief  Executive Officer         |

 
|   |   | /s/  ISRAEL  FISHER             |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | Israel Fisher                                       |
|   |   | Senior Vice President  and  Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

----
12172.

#### Rice *v.*The State.

Decided April 13, 1921.

Indictment for making liquor; from Campbell superior court — Judge Hutcheson. January 25, 1921.

*Parker & Parker,*for plaintiff in error.

*A. M. Brand, solicitor-general, George M. Napier,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

The bill of exceptions and the record in this case show that the motion for a new trial was overruled on the 25th day of September-; the certificate to the bill of exceptions is dated October 23, 1920, and the bill of exceptions shows that it was tendered on that date to the judge who tried the case. This being a criminal case and the bill of exceptions having been tendered more than 20 days from the date of the judgment complained of, the writ of error must be

*Dismissed.*

*Broyles, O. J., and Lulce, J., concur.*