Filed 10/19/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v.

GAVIN MICHAEL HAHN,

 Defendant and Respondent. 

2d Crim. No. B279344

(Super. Ct. No. 2010006420)

(Ventura County)

In 2010, Gavin Michael Hahn was charged with 

possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 11377, subd. (a).) Six years and 22 appearances later, the trial 

court terminated Hahn’s probation and ordered him to serve 120 

days in jail. Even though Hahn had failed to appear at seven 

prior mandatory hearings, the court granted his request to report 

at a later date to serve his jail term. Once again, Hahn failed to 

appear. Following his arrest, the court determined it lacked 

jurisdiction to order Hahn to serve the 120-day sentence. The 

People appeal. We reverse with directions to order the sentence 

executed. 
2

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2010, Hahn pled guilty to felony possession of a 

controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and 

was placed on deferred entry of judgment for 24 months. Two 

years later, deferred entry of judgment was revoked and Hahn 

was placed on formal probation for a period of 36 months. 

On April 14, 2015, the trial court granted Hahn’s 

petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.1 

and reduced his conviction to a misdemeanor. On the same day, 

Hahn admitted a violation of probation. The court terminated 

Hahn’s probation as unsuccessful and ordered him to serve 120 

days in jail. At Hahn’s request, and notwithstanding his history 

of failing to appear at scheduled hearings, the court permitted 

him to be screened for work furlough and to report on May 4, 

2015, to serve his jail term. 

In addition, Hahn pled guilty in another case to 

misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. 

Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Hahn to 120 

days in jail, to be served concurrently with the 120 days ordered 

in this case. 

Having sought and received the trial court’s 

consideration in the hope that he would reform his behavior, 

Hahn once again failed to comply with the court’s orders. He did 

not report to serve his stayed jail term. On July 27, 2016, Hahn 

was arrested on a warrant and brought to court. Hahn objected 

when the court instructed him to serve the time previously 

ordered. He claimed that because probation had been 

terminated, the court was without power to remand him and 

order that he serve his jail time. The court agreed, deleted the 

jail time and discharged him from custody. The court stated: 
3

“[Hahn’s] probations were terminated in court on April [14, 

2015]. He failed to appear or failed to remand in May. The Court 

has no jurisdiction. He is discharged on both cases.” 

DISCUSSION

When the trial court terminated probation and 

ordered Hahn to serve 120 days in jail, it stayed execution of the 

sentence to allow Hahn time to be screened for work furlough. As 

the People point out, “The court does not lose jurisdiction while a 

stay is in effect, even where the sentence has been entered in the 

minutes.” (People v. Gooch (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1007.) 

Because “the execution of a judgment of conviction is the process 

of carrying the judgment into effect” (People v. Karaman (1992) 

4 Cal.4th 335, 344), a temporary stay of that execution does not 

deprive the court of the ability to enforce the judgment. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(4) 

is instructive.1 It provides that every court shall have the power 

to “‘compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process.’”

“This statute has codified the principle of ‘[t]he inherent power of 

the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before 

it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice 

and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued . . . .’ [Citation.]” 

(Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 

1021; see Code Civ. Proc., § 177, subd. (2) [a judge has the power 

“[t]o compel obedience to his [or her] lawful orders”].) To carry 

 

1 Code of Civil Procedure section 128 has been applied to 

criminal as well as civil cases. (See People v. Superior Court 

(Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 261, fn. 4, superseded by statute on 

other grounds as stated in Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 

Cal.4th 368, 416.)

 
4

out this judicial power, “any suitable process or mode of 

proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable 

to the spirit of this Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.)2

Here, the trial court believed it had no power to 

enforce the sentence because probation had terminated. The 

termination of probation, however, did not affect the court’s 

power to enforce its lawful orders. That Hahn was not on 

probation is irrelevant. The jail sentence was not imposed as a 

term of probation, and the court was not asked to adjudge him to 

be in violation of probation or to create or modify a probation 

term. (See In re Bakke (1986) 42 Cal.3d 84, 89 [generally “a 

probation order may be revoked or modified only during the

period of probation”].) The court was only asked to enforce a 

prior lawful sentencing order. Hahn should have been required 

to serve the 120-day sentence. 

As stated in In re Clark (1925) 70 Cal.App. 643, 647, 

“‘It would be strange if, under such circumstances, the [trial] 

court had no power to enforce the sentence.’” If that were the 

case, the court, “‘after having, at [Hahn’s] request, stayed 

proceedings . . . would be powerless to carry the judgment into 

effect. The law does not contemplate any such absurdity.’” 

(Ibid.) 

Indeed, if we were to uphold the trial court’s decision, 

then a court may never grant a defendant’s request for a later 

remand date without (1) imposing the additional burden of 

retaining the defendant on probation or (2) creating an 

 

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 187 also applies to 

criminal cases. (People v. Walker (1948) 33 Cal.2d 250, 265-266; 

People v. Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.97, 101; People v. Palermo Land 

and Water Co. (1907) 4 Cal.App. 717, 722.) 
5

unenforceable order. As the People explain, “Returning a 

recalcitrant defendant to probation yields no beneficial outcomes. 

The defendant is subjected to additional terms, disobedience to 

which will result in further violations and penalties. Court 

resources will be tasked with reviewing the defendant’s 

performance and adjudicating violations. The other alternative, 

unenforceable orders, fosters gamesmanship and disrespect for 

judicial orders.” We agree that neither of these options serves the 

interests of justice. 

We also conclude that Hahn waived the right to 

object to the trial court’s enforcement of the 120-day jail term 

given that he requested that the sentence be stayed until May 4, 

2015, and then failed to appear as scheduled. Hahn’s case is 

similar to People v. Ham (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 288, 294, in which 

a probationer who appeared for a probation revocation hearing 

requested a continuance to a date beyond the expiration of the 

probation period. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court 

retained the power to conduct the hearing and to revoke 

probation as the probationer was estopped to complain that the 

period had expired. (Ibid; accord In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 

343, 347; see In re Bakke, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 86 [trial court 

retained jurisdiction to enforce jail term imposed as a condition of 

probation because the defendant, in seeking a stay of the term

pending appeal, waived the right to object to its execution after 

the probationary period had expired].) As in Ham, Griffin and

Bakke, Hahn is estopped to complain about the trial court’s 

purported lack of jurisdiction given that his actions caused the 

delay in enforcement of his sentence. (See Civ. Code, § 3517 [“No 

one can take advantage of his own wrong”].) 
6

DISPOSITION

The order deleting Hahn’s 120-day jail sentence and 

discharging him from custody is reversed. The matter is 

remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate and 

execute the 120-day jail sentence. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

TANGEMAN, J. 
7

Ferdinand D. Inumerable, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Gregory D. Totten, District Attorney, and Michelle J. 

Contois, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Todd A. Howeth, Public Defender, and Russell L. 

Baker, Senior Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and 

Respondent.