UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4599

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

LYNDON B. LARSON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Glen E. Conrad, Chief

District Judge. (3:11-cr-00021-GEC-1)

Submitted: December 17, 2012 Decided: January 3, 2013

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Andrea L. Harris, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Megan M. Coker, OFFICE OF THE 

PUBLIC FEDERAL DEFENDER, Christine Madeleine Lee, Research and 

Writing Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Ronald M. Huber, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant 

Attorney General, John D. Buretta, Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, David M. Lieberman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lyndon B. Larson appeals his conviction and 

twelve-month sentence imposed following his conditional guilty 

plea to possessing a firearm while subject to a court order that 

restrained him from harassing, stalking, or threatening his 

intimate partner in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006). 

Larson contends that the state court order to which he was 

subject did not satisfy § 922(g)(8), that § 922(g)(8) was 

applied to him in violation of his due process rights, and that 

§ 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Larson. 

We affirm.

This court reviews de novo Larson’s constitutional and 

purely legal challenges to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(8) (2006). United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 316 

(4th Cir. 2012). Section 922(g)(8) provides that it shall be 

unlawful for any person to possess a firearm: 

(8) who is subject to a court order that -

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such 

person received actual notice, and at which 

such person had an opportunity to 

participate; 

(B) restrains such person from harassing, 

stalking, or threatening an intimate partner 

of such person or child of such intimate 

partner or person, or engaging in other 

conduct that would place an intimate partner 

in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the 

partner or child; and 
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(C)(i) includes a finding that such person 

represents a credible threat to the physical 

safety of such intimate partner or child; or 

(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against such intimate partner 

or child that would reasonably be expected 

to cause bodily injury;

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006). We conclude that Larson’s state 

court order, which prohibited him from harassing, stalking, or 

threatening his intimate partner, was sufficient under 

§ 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) to evidence the state court’s finding that he 

represented a credible threat to his intimate 

partner. See United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722 (4th 

Cir. 1999). Further, because this state court order was entered 

at a hearing that Larson had notice of and at which he had an 

opportunity to participate, we conclude that his due process 

rights were not violated. See United States v. Calor, 340 F.3d 

428, 431 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that actual notice was 

satisfied by a summons and the opportunity to participate by a 

hearing where the defendant could argue against the court’s 

finding that he was a credible threat); Unites States v. Young, 

458 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The statute does not 

require notice of the fact that a restraining order would issue, 

nor does it require any other form of ‘advance’ 

notice.”); Bostic, 168 F.3d at 722 (holding that a person 

subject to a civil order “cannot reasonably expect to be free 
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from regulation when possessing a firearm” and therefore they 

are not entitled to actual notice that possessing a firearm is 

illegal while under the order.).

Larson also contends that his prosecution violates the 

Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has identified an 

individual right to keep and bear arms protected by the Second 

Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 

(2008). The Court has held that this right is qualified, 

“[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment 

is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. The primary limitations 

recognized by the Heller Court are “longstanding prohibitions on 

the possession of firearms by felons,” such as § 922(g)(1), and 

other presumptively lawful regulatory measures. Id. at 626-27. 

In response to Heller, this court established a two-prong test 

for assessing a Second Amendment challenge to a criminal 

statute. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 

2010). The first prong requires an evaluation of whether Second 

Amendment rights are “burden[ed] or regulat[ed]” by the statute 

in question. Id. at 680. If so, under the second prong, the 

statute must pass constitutional muster in accordance with the 

appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Id.

We find it unnecessary to decide whether the conduct 

regulated by § 922(g)(8) implicates the Second Amendment. For 

the purposes of this case we assume that it does, and proceed to 
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assess the statute under intermediate scrutiny. See United 

States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining 

to decide whether the Second Amendment applies to conduct under 

922(g)(8)); United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 

2012) (“As in Chapman, we may apply intermediate scrutiny to 

. . . Mahin’s § 922(g)(8) conviction”). To pass muster under 

intermediate scrutiny, “the government bears the burden of 

establishing a reasonable fit between the challenged statute and 

a substantial governmental objective.” Chapman, 666 F.3d at 226 

(citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 683). In Chapman, this court 

recognized that reducing domestic gun violence is a valid 

substantial governmental objective. 666 F.3d at 226. Chapman

also held that a reasonable fit existed because § 922(g)(8) was 

aimed at an exceedingly narrow class of persons who were likely 

to commit domestic gun violence. See id. at 228-29. Larson 

argues that he is outside this class. We disagree. Because 

Larson’s state court order satisfies § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), we 

conclude that he is within the admittedly narrow category of 

individuals whose Second Amendment rights may be primarily 

burdened, and that, therefore, the Second Amendment does not bar 

his prosecution.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED