RENDERED: MAY 17, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1270-MR

J.A., PARENT, AND ON BEHALF

OF MINOR, JOHN DOE APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00267

MCCRACKEN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

AND BOARD OF EDUCATION; WILLIAM

MICHAEL CEGLINSKI; AND BRIAN

HARPER APPELLEES

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: J.A., parent, and on behalf of minor, John Doe, appeal a

memorandum and order entered by the McCracken Circuit Court on October 3, 

2022, granting summary judgment and dismissing various negligence and outrage 
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claims asserted against appellees William Michael Ceglinski and Brian Harper, on 

the basis of qualified official immunity. For the reasons stated, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The genesis of the complaint in this action, filed on March 19, 2020, 

arises from allegations of sexual assault against a minor by a coach of the bass 

fishing team at McCracken County High School during the period of 2018-2019. 

The complaint asserted various negligence and outrageous conduct claims against 

Ceglinski, then principal of McCracken County High School, and Harper, who was 

Superintendent of the McCracken County School District.1 The underlying events 

and relevant facts were thoroughly summarized by the circuit court as follows:

From 2015 until he was arrested on February 14, 2019,

John Parks was the McCracken County High School 

Bass Fishing Coach. He was hired as the coach in 2015 

but transitioned to volunteer position. Parks was also the 

owner [of] a fishing supply store located near Kentucky 

Lake and Lake Barkley. 

As a freshman high school student, in 2017, Doe 

joined the Fishing Team. About six months after he 

joined the team, Parks began sending sexually explicit 

texts and making unwanted sexual advances toward Doe. 

The complaint alleges, “Parks systematically began to 

groom Minor for a sexual relationship.”

1 The complaint also asserted claims against the McCracken County School District and its 

Board of Education for whom summary judgment was granted by the circuit court based on 

governmental immunity. Appellants assert no error on appeal regarding this ruling and thus have 

waived review by this Court. See Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Ky. 2000). 
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According to Doe, Parks required Doe to sit next 

to him at team meetings. At those meetings, he touched 

and groped Doe’s buttocks. Parks was a former 

McCracken County Sheriff’s Deputy. On at least two 

occasions, Parks pretended to place handcuffs on Doe.

When they ate together at dinners after team events,

Parks touched and groped Doe’s inner thigh. Parks sent 

voluminous sexually explicit text messages to Doe. 

At the time Parks was making unwanted sexual 

advances toward Doe, Harper was the McCracken 

County High School Superintendent. Ceglinski was the 

McCracken County High School Principal. Neither 

school official witnessed Parks’ actions or viewed Parks’

text messages while Doe was a student at McCracken 

County High School. 

Doe testified he told J.A., his mother, about Parks’

text messages on January 19, 2019[,] and showed her one 

screen of Parks’ texts. At that time, Doe and J.A. agreed 

Doe would report Parks’ texting and touching to the 

principal, Ceglinski.

A week later, on January 24, 2019, Doe met with 

Ceglinski in Ceglinski’s office at the McCracken County 

High School. Doe testified he told Ceglinski that Parks 

had touched him on his inner thigh at Fishing Team 

meetings. He also told Ceglinski that Parks was sending 

voluminous text messages and that he wanted them to 

stop. 

Ceglinski testified to a slightly different version of 

the meeting. Ceglinski testified that Doe told him Parks 

touched him at Fishing Team activities in a way that 

made him “uncomfortable.” Doe said the volume of 

Parks’ texts also made him “uncomfortable”, and he 

wanted them to stop. In the meeting, Doe told Ceglinski 

he no longer wanted to be on the Fishing Team.
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In his deposition, Ceglinski admitted he did not 

question Doe further as to how or where Parks had 

touched him. He admitted he did not question him 

concerning the nature of the texts or ask to see Doe’s

phone. Ceglinski testified he did not press Doe for more 

details because he did not want to make him feel 

uncomfortable while disclosing the texting and touching. 

At the conclusion of the meeting, Ceglinski told Doe he 

would call J.A. Ceglinski called J.A. after the meeting 

and advised her he would meet with Parks concerning 

Doe’s allegations.

On February 7, 2019, McCracken County School 

Board member Melanie Burkeen e-mailed Ceglinski and 

Harper that she heard rumors from her son that there was 

something going on with the Bass Fishing Team. She 

wanted to know if her son was involved.

On February 8, 2019, J.A. e-mailed Ceglinski and 

asked about the progress of the investigation of Parks. 

Ceglinski responded that he was “still gathering some 

information.” That evening, at a high school basketball 

game, Ceglinski and Harper briefly discussed Doe’s 

allegations and the e-mail from Burkeen.

According to plaintiffs, on February 8, Ceglinski 

met with Parks in his office. In his deposition, Ceglinski 

testified his interview with Parks occurred between 

February 8 and February 12.

In the meeting, Ceglinski testified that he told 

Parks that Doe had complained about Parks texting and 

touching him at Fishing Team activities. Specifically,

Doe felt uncomfortable with the amount of text messages 

that Parks was sending him. Doe was uncomfortable that 

Parks had touched him. Ceglinski told Parks the texting 

and touching needed to stop.

Parks responded that he was a family friend, that 

he was invited by Doe and J.A. to family events, and that 
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Doe was mistaken as to his motivation when they 

wrestled and hugged. Ceglinski admitted he did not ask 

to view the text messages on Parks’ phone. 

On February 12, Ceglinski e-mailed J.A. that he 

had met with Parks and “feel it would be best if we could 

get together. Would you be willing to meet with myself 

and John? Just want you to hear his side of the 

situation.” The next day, Ceglinski sent a second e-mail 

to J.A. that Parks felt there was a misunderstanding and 

Parks wanted to clear it up.

Doe told J.A. that he had tried unsuccessfully to 

meet with Ceglinski on February 12 to show him the text 

messages. On February 13, J.A. e-mailed Ceglinski that 

she had now read Parks’ text messages to her son. J.A.

told Ceglinski the text messages were disgusting, and that 

he would agree if he saw them. J.A.’s e-mail stated she 

would contact Ceglinski to set up a meeting. Ceglinski 

replied, “ok. I will get with Doe and look at what he has.

Thank you for letting me know.”

On February 13, Doe and J.A. met a counselor 

from the Purchase Area Sexual Assault Center. After 

reviewing the text messages, the counselor called the 

Kentucky State Police. The Kentucky State Police 

referred the complaint to the McCracken County 

Sheriff’s Department. On February 14, Doe and J.A.

were interviewed by Sheriff’s Detectives. That day,

Parks was charged with First-Degree Sexual Abuse and 

multiple counts of Unlawful Use of an Electronic 

Communication System to Induce a Minor to Engage in 

Sexual or Other Prohibited Activities.

Doe quit the Fishing Team after his meeting with 

Ceglinski. Parks stopped texting and seeing Doe. After 

January 30, Doe stopped attending classes at McCracken 

County High School. Doe saw Parks once in the 

cafeteria at a Fishing Team meeting that he did not 

attend. McCracken County High School sent a teacher to 
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provide home instruction to Doe. J.A. and Doe 

subsequently moved into the Marshall County School 

District. Doe transferred to Marshall County High 

School. He completed his junior and senior years of high 

school and graduated from Marshall County High 

School.

On February 19, 2019, criminal charges were filed 

against Ceglinski and Brian Bowland, the McCracken 

County Director of Pupil Personnel. Ceglinski and 

Bowland were charged with Second-Degree Official 

Misconduct. Ceglinski was also charged with Failure to 

Report Child Dependent Neglect/Abuse. The charges 

concerned their failure as school officials to report sexual 

abuse allegations involving Doe and Princekumar Joshi,

an eighteen-year-old student who had recorded a sexual 

encounter with a seventeen-year-old female student.

Those charges were subsequently dismissed by the 

county attorney.

On February 20, 2020, Parks plead[ed] guilty to 

Attempted First-Degree Sexual Abuse and one count of 

Possession of Matter Portraying a Sexual Performance by 

a Minor. The Commonwealth recommended an 

eighteen-month sentence. On June 29, 2020, this Court 

issued a bench warrant for Parks’ arrest based upon the 

investigating detective’s affidavit that Parks was

attempting to procure false identification and flee the 

jurisdiction before his sentencing. On June 29, 2020,

Parks was shot and killed by a McCracken County 

Sheriff’s Deputy who attempted to serve the warrant.

October 3, 2022, Memorandum and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion For 

Summary Judgment at 1-6.

After substantial discovery was taken, Ceglinski and Harper filed 

motions for summary judgment in August of 2022, seeking dismissal of the claims 
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against them. By memorandum and order entered October 3, 2022, the summary 

judgment motions were granted and the claims against Ceglinski and Harper were 

dismissed, on the basis of their having qualified official immunity. This appeal 

follows.

ISSUE

Based upon our review of the record below, the primary issue in this 

appeal is whether Ceglinski as principal, and Harper as superintendent, were 

entitled to qualified official immunity as a defense and bar to the various claims 

asserted by appellants in the action below. Our review proceeds accordingly.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review on appeal of a summary judgment granted by a circuit 

court below has been succinctly stated by this Court on many occasions and can be 

summarized as follows:

Summary judgment is a device utilized by the 

courts to expedite litigation. Ross v. Powell, 206 S.W.3d 

327, 330 (Ky. 2006). It is deemed to be a “delicate 

matter” because it “takes the case away from the trier of 

fact before the evidence is actually heard.” Steelvest, Inc. 

v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482

(Ky. 1991). In Kentucky, the movant must prove no 

genuine issue of material fact exists, and he “should not 

succeed unless his right to judgment is shown with such 

clarity that there is no room left for controversy.” Id. 

The trial court must view the evidence in favor of the 

non-moving party. City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 

S.W.3d 387, 390 (Ky. 2001). The non-moving party 

must present “at least some affirmative evidence showing 
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the existence of a genuine issue of material fact[.]” Id. 

On appeal, our standard of review is “whether the trial 

court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as 

to any material fact and that the moving party was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 

916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). . . .

Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Ky. App. 

2013). 

However, as specifically applies to this appeal, the issue of whether a 

school official is entitled to qualified official immunity as a defense to the claims 

asserted is a question of law which we review de novo. Ritchie v. Turner, 559 

S.W.3d 822, 830 (Ky. 2018). 

ANALYSIS

The crux of the claims asserted by appellants against Ceglinski and 

Harper look to negligence and outrageous conduct in the performance of their 

supervisory duties as school officials. The complaint alleges specific violations of 

appellees’ respective duties under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 620.030(1) 

and to the extent their duties were discretionary, both acted in bad faith in the 

performance of those duties.

In Kentucky, a public official sued in his individual capacity for 

negligence may be entitled to the shield of qualified official immunity. To be 

entitled to qualified official immunity, the public official must have engaged in a 

discretionary act as opposed to a ministerial act. A ministerial act is generally “one 
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that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer’s duty is 

absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act 

arising from fixed and designated facts.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 

(Ky. 2001) (citation omitted). Conversely, a discretionary act is one “involving the 

exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and 

judgment[.]” Id. at 522. When the public official performs a discretionary act, the 

official is entitled to qualified official immunity if such act was carried out within 

the scope of his or her employment and in good faith. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. 

As most acts are neither purely discretionary nor purely ministerial, it is the 

“dominant nature of the act” that controls. Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240 

(Ky. 2010).

Turning to KRS 620.030(1), the statute mandates that:

Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to 

believe that a child is dependent, neglected, or abused 

shall immediately cause an oral or written report to be 

made to a local law enforcement agency or to the 

Department of Kentucky State Police, the [C]abinet or its 

designated representative, the Commonwealth’s attorney, 

or the county attorney[.] 

As noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court, “[a] careful examination of KRS 

620.030 makes clear that its framework for reporting cases of suspected child 

abuse includes elements of both ministerial and discretionary conduct.” Ritchie, 

559 S.W.3d at 837. Citing Haney, 311 S.W.3d 235, the Ritchie Court again 
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emphasized that our analysis considers the dominant nature of the act to determine 

if the actions in question are ministerial or discretionary. Id. 

In this case, where the alleged abuse was not actually observed by the 

officials who allegedly failed to report such conduct, “KRS 620.030 first requires a 

baseline determination” as to whether “reasonable cause” exists “to believe abuse 

has occurred or [was] occurring[.]” Ritchie, 559 S.W.3d at 838. “To make that 

decision, the official must do some investigation after a potential issue of abuse is 

brought to his or her attention; the requirement to investigate, to ascertain the facts, 

is plainly a ministerial function.” Id. On the other hand, “[a]ssessing the 

information gathered from the investigation and making the actual determination 

of whether reasonable cause exists to believe abuse is occurring or has 

occurred . . . requires personal judgment, a discretionary function.” Id. As a 

result, “[t]he dominant act in cases where the alleged abuse is not actually 

observed (or otherwise known with reasonable certainty) and an investigation is 

required to determine reasonable cause is discretionary.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Thus, the actions of Ceglinski and Harper at issue in this case are clearly 

discretionary.

There is no dispute in this case that the actions of Ceglinski and 

Harper occurred within the scope of their employment. Once it has been 

established that the public official has acted within the scope of his/her 
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discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by direct or 

circumstantial evidence that the discretionary act was performed in bad faith. 

Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 481 (Ky. 2006). Bad faith occurs when a 

public official violates a causally related constitutional, statutory, or other right that 

someone in the official’s position should have been aware of; or when the public 

official willfully or maliciously harms the plaintiff or acts with a corrupt motive. 

Ritchie, 559 S.W.3d at 843-44. Accordingly, our focus is on the alleged bad faith 

conduct of Ceglinski and Harper as concerns their defense of qualified official 

immunity. 

As concerns Ceglinski, the crux of appellants’ argument alleges a 

flawed investigation by Ceglinski as concerns Parks’ alleged abuse of Doe. 

Specifically, appellants argue that Ceglinski’s investigation was not promptly 

conducted which equates to bad faith with the intent to not report the alleged abuse 

to law enforcement. We simply cannot agree with this argument. 

KRS 620.030 clearly contemplates that a public official must conduct 

an investigation after the alleged abuse is brought to his or her attention to 

ascertain if reasonable cause exists to believe the abuse has occurred. Ritchie, 559 

S.W.3d at 838. On January 24, 2019, Doe advised Ceglinski at a meeting in his 

office at school that he was “uncomfortable” with Parks’ conduct, which included 

excessive texting to Doe and alleged inappropriate touching. Principal Ceglinski
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contacted Doe’s mother, J.A., after the meeting and indicated he would meet with 

Parks concerning the allegation. Ceglinski met with Parks between February 8 and 

February 12. Parks denied the allegations. Ceglinski then emailed J.A. regarding 

his meeting with Parks and suggested the three of them meet so she could hear 

Parks’ position. On February 13, 2019, J.A. emailed Ceglinski and for the first 

time indicated she had read Parks’ text messages to Doe which she found to be 

disgusting. Clearly, Ceglinski had not completed his investigation when J.A. and 

Doe then elected to immediately meet with a counselor at the Purchase Area

Sexual Assault Center later in the day on February 13, 2019. Parks was charged 

with sexual abuse the following day by the McCracken County Sheriff’s Office.

Based on our thorough review of the record below, we must agree 

with the circuit court that there was no basis to conclude that Ceglinski acted in 

bad faith during the conduct of his investigation, which had not been completed 

when J.A. sought another course of action. Certainly, one can second guess or 

disagree with the steps taken by Ceglinski in the course of his investigation, but 

that is not the function of this Court. Nothing in KRS 620.030 mandates how an 

investigation is to be conducted. And, part of the discretionary nature of the 

investigation is the public official deciding how to investigate and determining 

when he had enough information to conclude the investigation. See Ritchie, 559 

S.W.3d at 840. There is no evidence in the record before this Court that Ceglinski
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violated any of Doe’s rights or that he intended to cause him harm. There being no 

evidence of bad faith, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment 

dismissing appellants’ claim against Ceglinski.

As concerns Harper, by law he has general supervisory authority over 

the school district and the management of the district’s business affairs. KRS 

160.370(1). Like Ceglinski, his supervisory authority is also discretionary. See 

Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 299 (Ky. 2014). A superintendent has 

general duties rather than a specific duty, which require him to act in a 

discretionary manner by devising school procedures, assigning specific tasks to 

other employees, and providing general supervision of those policies. Based on 

our review, Harper was entitled to qualified official immunity unless J.A. and Doe 

adduced evidence that he performed his discretionary duties in bad faith. Here, as 

superintendent, Harper did not directly supervise Parks. He had no personal 

knowledge of Doe’s allegations. Upon being notified of Burkeen’s thirdhand 

account of Doe’s allegations on February 7, 2019, he was assured by Principal 

Ceglinski that the matter was being investigated. While Harper could have chosen 

to take an active role in the investigation, he was not required to do so, and had the 

discretion to rely upon Ceglinski to perform that task. No bad faith is evident in 

this regard. Accordingly, Harper was entitled to qualified official immunity and 

the circuit court did not err in granting Harper’s motion for summary judgment.
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Finally, appellants raise two cursory arguments in their brief alleging 

that appellees negligently failed to train or supervise Parks and that they 

outrageously attempted to conceal Parks’ abuse of Doe. Having previously 

concluded that neither Ceglinski nor Harper acted in bad faith in the performance 

of their duties as concerns the allegations of abuse by Parks, these arguments have 

no merit. Appellees’ qualified official immunity clearly extends to their alleged

negligent conduct in addressing the purported abuse of Doe by Parks. Likewise, 

we find there is no evidence in the record to support these allegations.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons and grounds stated, the memorandum and order 

entered by the McCracken Circuit Court granting summary judgment and 

dismissing the complaint against both William Michael Ceglinski and Brian 

Harper is affirmed. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:

Donna Thornton-Green

Paducah, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Michael A. Owsley

Bowling Green, Kentucky