## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 08

- 3433 U NI T ED S TATE SOF A MERI CA, P la intif f-A pp ellee, v. A PE X O IL C OMPAN Y, I NC ., D e f e ndan t

-Appe l l ant
.
A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the S outhernDi stricto f Illino is. No . 05 -24 2-DRH

—David R. H ern don, Chief Ju dge
.
A RG UE D M AY 11, 2009

— D ECI DE D A UGUS T 25, 2009

Befo re C UDAH Y, P OSNER, a nd K ANN E , C ircu it Judges . P OSNER, Cir cu i tJudg e . A p ex O il C om p an y a p p ea ls fr o m t h e g ra n t o f an inju n c tio n, at t h e b eh es t o f th e E n viro nm en ta l Pr ote cti on Agency a nd o n the author i ty of 42 U
. S
. C. § 6 97 3 ( a par t o fthe Re so ur ce Co ns er va ti o n a nd Recove ryA ct o f19 76, 42 U .S.C . §§ 6 901 et seq
. ) , thatr equ i r e s Ape x t o c l e a n up a c o nt a minate d s i t e i n Ha r t f o r d, I l l i noi s. I n a 178- page opi ni on f ol l owing a 17- day be n ch tr i al, the d istri ct j ud ge m ade fi nd i ngs that m i l l i ons of2 N o. 08 –343 3 gal l ons ofoi l, com posi ng a “hydro carbon plum e” tr apped not f aru nd er gr ound, ar e co ntam i nati ng g ro und w ate r and em i tting fum es that ri se to the s urf ace and enter ho us es i n Har tfo r d a nd i n b o thr es pec ts a r e crea ting hazar ds to heal th and the envi ronm ent. The j ud ge d ee m ed i t A p ex ’s le ga l res p on sib ility to ab at e t h is n u isa n c e b ec au se th e p lu m e w as cr ea te d by an oil r efi ne r y o wned b y a c o r po r at e pred ece ss o r o fApex. Apex c ha l l en g es the se fi ndi ng s an d c o nc l us i o n, b utthe chal l enge has no poss ibl e m er i t. T h e p r i n c ip al q u es tio n p re se n te d by th e a p p ea l is unr el at ed to the d ist r i ctj udg e’ s fi ndi ng s an d c o ncl usi ons; it i s whether the g ove rnm ent’ s cl ai m to an inj un ction w as d ischa rged i n ba nk rup tcy an d therefore c an n otb e r en ew ed in a su b se q u en t la w su it

— thi s s uit
. T he ban krup tcy j ud ge’ s confirm ation (ap p roval) of a cl ai m i n a Chapter11 pro ceedi ng d i schar ges the debtor f r o m “ an y de bttha t a r o se befo r e the dat e o f ” co nfi r m at i o n, 11 U
. S. C. § 1 141( d)( 1)(A ), with i m m ate ri alexce pti ons. “De bt ” i s defi ne d a s “l i ab i l ity on a cl ai m , ” § 10 1( 12 ) , a nd “cl ai m ” a s e i thera “r i ght to paym ent, ” § 101( 5) ( A ) , o r

— th e cri ti call anguage i n thi s ca se

— a “ rig h t t o a n eq u ita b le re m edy f orbr each o fper f or m ance i fsuch br each g i ves ri se to a r i ght t o paym ent, w h ether o r not such r i ght t o ane qui tabl e r emedy i s r edu ce d t o j udg m en t, fi xe d, c o nt i ng e nt, ma t ur e d, u nma t ur e d, di s pu t e d, u nd i s pu t e d, secur ed, o r unsecured. ” § 10 1( 5) ( B). T h e cri ti calquesti on is t h e m ea n in g of “ giv es rise to a rig h t t o p ay m en t.” B ec au se A p ex n o lon ge r d oe s refin in g an d as a r e s u lt has no i n-ho use ca pabi l i ty ofcl eani ng up a co ntam i natedN o. 08 –343 3 3 si te , i t woul d ha ve t o h ire ano th erc o m pan y t o do the c l e a n u p in o rd er to co m p ly w ith th e inj u n c tio n . I t e st im ate s that i t would have to p ay s u c h a c om pany $15 0 m i l l i on f orthe j ob, tho ugh i t m ight be abl e t o re cove r so m e o f th e ex pen se f r o m o th er co nt r ibut o r s to th e conta m i na ti o n. The natura l r eadi ng o fthe sta tutor y pr ovi si on that we qu o te d i s th ati f th e h olde r o fa n e qui tabl e cl ai m c an, i n the eve nt thatthe equi ta b le re m edy tur ns o ut to be uno bt ainabl e, o bt ain a mone y j udg m en t i ns tead, the cl ai m i s di schar geabl e. I ff orexam ple yo u have a decr ee ofspeci fi c per f or m ance ( a type o fi nj uncti on a n d ther ef or e a n equi tabl e r em edy) thatyo u can’ t e nfo rce b e c a u s e th e p r o p e r t y th a t th e d e c r e e o r d e r ed th e defe nd an t to sel l yo u w as sol d to som eone el se ( f ro m w hom , f orwh ate verr eas on, yo u cannot re cove r i t) , yo u ar e en ti tl ed to a mone y j udg m en t f o r the v al ue o fthe p ro p er ty , e.g., UFG , L LC v. So ut hwe s tCorp. , 84 8 N
. E.2 d 35 3, 36 3, 36 5 (In d . A p p . 200 6); Vinson v. M arton & A sso cia tes , 764 P .2d 73 6, 73 9-4 0 (A riz . A p p . 198 8 ); Engas s e rv. Jo nes , 19 8 P. 2d 54 6, 549 ( Cal. A pp . 19 48)

— an d y o ur cl ai m to thatval ue i s a cl ai m to a ri ght t o re cei ve paym ent an d i s di schar geabl e in the sel l er ’ s ba nkruptcy. In re D avis , 3 F .3 d 11 3, 11 6 (5 th C ir. 19 93 ); In re Iriza rry, 171 B
. R
. 874, 878-79 (9th Cir. BA P 19 94). I n additi on, so m e eq uit abl e r em edi es, such a s ba ckpay or d er s inem p loy m en t c as es , D o e v. O berw eis D a iry, 45 6 F.3 d 70 4, 71 4 (7 th C ir. 20 06 ); P a l s v . S c h ep e l B u i c k & GMC Truck, Inc. , 220 F .3 d 4 95 , 500 -01 (7t h C ir. 20 00 ); Broad nax v. C ityof N ew Ha ven , 415 F .3 d 2 6 5, 271 an d n. 1 (2d C ir.4 N o. 08 –343 3 2005 ) , and or ders ofequ i tabl e res ti tuti on, 1 Dan B
. Dobbs, La w of R em edies § 4.3 (2d ed. 1 99 3) , a r e o r der s to pa y, a nd so woul d b e di schar g eabl e wer e i t no t f o r s pec i fi c ex c ep tio n s in th e B an kr u p tc y C od e. Se e, e .g., E den v. R o bert A . C ha psk i, Lt d. , 405 F.3d 58 2, 58 6-8 7 (7 th C ir. 20 05 ); B ush v. Tayl or, 9 1 2 F
. 2d 989, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1990) (en ban c). That equi tabl e r em edi es ar e a l w ays o rder s to a c t or not to act, rather th an to pay , i s a m yt h ; e q u ity often orders p ay m en t. Wil li am s E le ctronics G am es, Inc. v. Ga rr ity, 36 6 F.3 d 56 9, 57 6-7 7 (7 t h C ir. 20 04 ); C lairv. Harris Trus t & Savi ngs Bank, 19 0 F
. 3 d 4 9 5 , 4 9 8

- 9 9 ( 7 th C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ; J o h n H. Langb e i n, “ W ha tER I S A M e a ns b y ‘ Equi t a b l e , ’ ” 10 3 C o lum . L. R ev . 1317, 1350-51 (2003). Bu t the Reso urce Conser vati on a nd Reco ver y Act, wh i c h i s th e b a s i s o fth e g o v e r nme nt ’ s e q u i t a b l e c l a i m, does not enti tl e a pla i nti ff to dem and, i n l i eu of a c ti on by the defenda n t that m ay i ncl ud e the hi ring o fano ther fi rm t o perf or m a cl ean up or dered bythe cour t, paym ent o fcl ean- up co sts
. I t doe s no t a ut hor i ze anyf or m o f m onet ar y r el i ef

. 42 U
. S. C. § 6 973( a)
. The A ct’ s co m pan i on p rovisi on au th orizi ng private su its, 42 U
. S. C
. § 6972(a)(2) , h as be en h eld n otto au th or ize m on et ar y re lief, M eghrig v. KFC Wes te rn, Inc. , 516 U .S
. 47 9, 48 3-8 7 (1 99 6); A vond ale Fe de r al Sa vi ngs Bank v
. Am oc o Oil Co. , 1 70 F. 3d 692, 69 4- 95 (7t h C ir. 19 99 ); AM Int ’ l, Inc . v. D at ac ar d Corp. , 10 6 F
. 3d 13 42 , 134 8 (7 th C ir. 1 9 9 7 ); A breu v . U nited Sta tes , 46 8 F
. 3d 20 , 31 (1 st C ir. 20 06 ); S o u t h Ca r o l i n a Dep ’ t o f He a l t h & Envi r onment al Cont r ol v. Com m e r ce & Indu s t r i al Ins . Co. , 37 2 F. 3d 245, 25 6 ( 4th Ci r. 20 04) , and the re l evantl anguage of t h e t w o p ro vis ion s is id en tic al.N o. 08 –343 3 5 T h u s t h e g ov er n m en t ’s e q u ita b le c laim , i f w ell f o unde d, a s th e d istri ctc o ur t r ul ed i t to b e, e nt i tl es the g o ve r nm en t o nl y t o r eq uir e th e defen dan t to c l ea n up the c ontam i nated si te at the defend ant’ s e xpense. Earl i er case s, such a s U ni t e d S t at e s v. Nor the as t e r n Phar m aceutic al & Che m i ca l Co. , 8 10 F
. 2d 72 6, 749

- 50 ( 8th Ci r . 1 98 6) , a nd U ni t e d S t at e s v. Cons e r vat i on Che m i ca l Co. , 61 9 F
. S up p. 16 2, 20 1 ( W
. D. M o . 1 98 5) , whi cha l l o wed a n a war d o fc l ea n- up cos ts on the bas is o fge nera l equi tabl e pr i nci ple s setf or th i n such cas es as M it chel l v. Ro be rtD e M ario Je w el ry, Inc. , 3 6 1 U. S
. 2 8 8 , 2 9 1- 92 ( 19 6 0 ) , a nd Port e rv. War ne rHol di ng Co. , 328 U
. S. 395, 397- 98 ( 1946 ) , are dead a fte r M eghrig, i f we a r e c o r r e c t i n th i n k i n g th att he i denti call anguage i n sec ti ons 6972 ( a) ( 2) and 697 3( a) r equi r es an i den ti ca l c o nc l us i o n wi thr eg ar d t o a pl ainti ff’ s r i ght t o see k a m oneyj ud gm ent. Tha t l ea ve s Apex t o a r g ue tha t th e co sto fc o m pl y i ng w i th an equi tabl e decr ee shoul d be deem ed a m oney c laim , an d h en c e d isc h ar ge ab le. W e rej ec te d th at p ro p os iti o n, whi chdo es no t co m po r t wi ththe l an g ua g e o fthe Ba nk r up t c y Co de

— th e co stt o Apex i s no t a “r i g ht [ofthe pla i nti ff ] to paym ent”

— i n A M Int’l, Inc
. v . D a ta ca rd Corp
. , sup ra , 10 6 F
. 3d at 1348 ; se e a l so In reCMC Heartla nd P a rtners, 966 F.2d 114 3, 1 1 4 5-47 (7th C ir. 1992); In re To rw ico E lect r o n i c s, Inc ., 8 F. 3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 19 93 ); In reCom m onwe al t h Oil Re f i ni ng Co. , 805 F .2d 11 75, 11 8 6

- 8 7 (5 th C ir. 19 86 ); Pen n Te r r a, Lt d. v. D epar t m e ntof Envi r onment al Re s our ce s , 7 33 F.2d 26 7, 278-79 (3d Cir. 19 84 ); U nited Sta tes v. H ubler, 1 17B .R . 160 , 164 an d n . 1 (W .D . P a. 19 90 ); In reChat e auga y Corp. , 112 B.R. 51 3, 52 3- 24 (S. D
. N
. Y
. 1990), affi rm ed , 944 F.2d 997( 2d Cir. 1991).6 N o. 08 –343 3 Almos t ev er y e qui tabl e decree i m po se s a co sto n the defe nd ant, wh etherthe decree r equi re s hi m to d o som eth in g, as in t h i s ca se , or, as is m or e c om m on , to re fra in fro m d oin g s om et h in g. T h e log ic o f A p ex ’s p os itio n is thus thatev er y e quit abl e cl ai m i s di schar geabl e in bankruptcy u n les s there i s a speci fi c exce pti on i n the Code. Th a ti s i nc o ns i s t e ntwi th the Co de ’ s c r e a t i o n i n 1 1 U. S
. C. § 1 0 1 ( 5 ) ( B) o f o nl y a l i mi t e d r i g ht t o the di s c ha r g e o f equ i tabl e cl ai m s. A nd i f“a ny o rderr equi ring the debto r to ex p en d m on ey cr ea te s a d isc h ar ge ab le c l a i m , it is unli ke l y tha tthe s t a t e c o ul d e ffe c t i v e l y e nfo r c e i t s l a w s: vi rtual l y al l enf or cem ent a cti ons i m pose som e co st on th e vi ol ato r. ” In re Torwico E le ctronics, Inc. , sup ra , 8 F
. 3d at 150 n. 4. I t i s tr ue tha t i n O hio v. Kova cs , 4 69 U
. S. 274 ( 19 85 ) , the Suprem e Cour t a l l owed the disc harg e in bankr up tcy of an equi tabl e obl i gat i on t o cl ean up a conta m i nated si te own ed by the debtor

. A n i nj uncti on or deri ng th e c lean up had b ee n i ssued befor e the bank ruptcy. The debto r had faile d to co m plywith the i nj uncti on a nd a re cei ver ha d b ee n a ppo i nt ed to take po ss es si o n o fhi s as se ts a nd obt ai n fro m them the m oneyneeded t o p ay for the cl ean up . The r ecei verthus was se eking m oneyr atherthan an o rderthatthe debtorcl ean up t h e contam i nated si te. T h at w as a c laim to a “r igh t t o p ay m en t.” T h e p lain tiff in our case ( the g ov er n m en t) i s no t s eek i ng a paym ent o f m oneyand the i nj uncti on that i t h as obt ai ned does no t enti tle i t t o paym ent. S ee In re U dell, 18 F. 3d 403, 40 9- 10 (7t h C ir. 19 94 ); In re To rwico Elect ronics, Inc. , sup ra , 8 F. 3d at 15 0; In reChat e auga y Corp. , 9 4 4 F. 2d 997, 1008 ( 2d Cir. 1991 ).N o. 08 –343 3 7 A pex ci tes Johns on v. Hom eSt at eBank, 501 U
. S. 78 (1991), w h ich h eld th at a m o r t g a g e, w h ich is an eq u ita b le in te re st, ca n be d isc h ar ge d in a C h ap te r 13 ba n kr u p tc y. A m or tga ge secur es a l oan, and thu s en tit l es the l ender to f or ce the sa l e o fthe m or tga ged pro perty( the c ollateral f orthe l oan) i n the eve nt the bo rr ower def aul ts, and to col l ect the unpai d porti on o fthe debt fro m the proc ee d s. T h at is a st ra igh tfo rw ar d ca se of an eq u ita b le c laim th a t g i v e s r i s e t o a r i g h t o f p a y me n t t o t he c l a i man t

— na m ely, a s i n Kova cs , th e rig h t t o p ay m en t o f h is debt o ut o fth e procee ds ofa sal e o fpro pertypursuant to a de c r e e ( the e qu i t a b l e r e med y ) tha t the pr o pe r t y b e s o l d. One appell ate case , f actual l y si m i l ar to the prese n t one, U nite d State s v. Whizco, Inc. , 84 1 F.2 d 147, 15 0- 51 ( 6th Cir
. 19 88) , does supp ort Ap ex. But i t ca nnot be squar ed w i th the deci si ons w hi ch hol d that c ostin c u rred i s no t equi va l en t to “ r i g htt o pa y m en t, ” an d i t s et s f o r thno l i m i ti ng pri nci ple that w oul d di sti ngui sh cases un der the Res ourc e Conse rv ati on a nd Reco ver y Act fro m o ther case s in w hi ch co m pli ance w i th an eq u i tabl e decr ee r equi r es e xpe ndi tu r es b y the de fen dan t. T he di st i nc ti o ns th at A pex sugge sts to l i m i t the sc ope o fa posi ti on that i t r eal i zes is u ntenabl e ( that all equ itable cl aim s are d isc h ar ge ab le in ba n kr u p tc y in th e a b s en c e o f a sp ec ific excepti on i n the Code)

—be twe eni nj unc ti o ns t o do a nd inj un ctions n ot to do, betw een i njun ctions that requ ire m aj orexpenditures and thos e that r equi re m inoro nes, b et w ee n inju n c tio n s t h at th e d efe n d an t c an co m p ly w i th i nter nal l y a nd i njuncti ons that i t has to hi re an in d ep en d en t c on tr ac to r in or d er to ac h iev e c om p liance

— ar e a rbi tr ar y.8 N o. 08 –343 3 The ro ot arbi tr ar i ness ofA pex’s po siti on i s that w h et h er a p ollu te r c an cle an u p h is p ollu tio n h im se lf o r ha s to hi r e so m eo ne t o do i t ha s no r el ev an ce t o the po l i c y o fe i the r the Ba nk r up t c y Co de o r the R eso urce Con se r va ti o n a nd Re co ve r y Act
. If ado pte d b y the cou rts, A p ex ’s position w ou ld d iscoura ge p oll ut ers f r o m de ve l o pi nga n int erna l c apabi l i tyo fc l ea ni ngup th eir p oll u t i o n , eve n if h irin g t h ird p ar tie s t o d o it woul d b e m o r e exp en si ve . M o r eo ve r, the c o sto fc l ea ni ng up po l l ut i o n w hen the po l l ut erdo es the c l ea ni ngup hi m sel fis a s re al a co st as the pr i ce pai d to an o utsi der to cl ean i t u p . W hy di sti ngui sh a check w ri tte n to an empl o y ee from a c he ckwri tt ent o a n inde pen den t co ntracto r? The spars i ty of case l aw deal i ng w i th the disc h ar ge o f cl ai m s su cha s Apex’ s, t o g ethe rwith the ne arc o ns en su s o fthe c as es , c i te d abo ve , i n whi chthe i ss ue has a r i se n, sugge sts a gener alundersta nd in g that di schar ge m ust i nd eed be l i m i ted to cas es i n w hi ch the cl ai m gi ves ri se to a r i ght t o paym ent b ecause the equi tabl e decr ee cannot be executed, r atherthan m er el y i m posi ng a cos t on the defendant, as vi rtual l y a l l equi tabl e decr ees do. A pex ar gues that to deny disc harg e i n a case such as th is d iss er ve s t h e g ov er n m en t’s lon g-t er m int er es t in envi ro nm en ta l qual i ty by precl ud i ng, as a pract i cal m at te r, r eo r g an i za ti o n in b an k r upt cy. ( The a r g um en t der i ve s f r o m Do ug l as G. Ba i r d a nd Th o m as H. J acks o n,
“ Kova cs and Toxi c W ast es i n Bankruptcy, ” 3 6 St an. L. Re v. 1199 , 12 02- 03 ( 1984 )
. ) I t s ays thathad i t know n in 1986 w hen i t decl ar ed bankru p tc y th at i t m i ght b e l i abl e forN o. 08 –343 3 9 $150 m i l l i on i n cl ean- u p c osts, i t would have had to liq u id ate

— i t co ul d no t ha ve r eo r g an i ze d wi ths ucha h u ge d eb t o ve rh an gin g it

— an d had i t li qu idat ed there w oul d be no survi vi ng o r success orenti ty to conduct or pay f orthe cl ean up and s o the fullexpense w oul d fa l l o n th e go ver nm ent. But that i s j ust t o saythati n so m e ca ses the g ove rnm ent m ight benefi t fro m the rul e that Ap ex adv o ca te s; i n o th er s no t an d a ppar en tly the g o ve r nm en t bel i eve s, atpres en t a nyw ay

— f o r i th a s t a k e n the Ba i r dJ acks on pos i ti on i n the past, se e U ni t e d Stat e s v. A ce t o A g ricu ltura l C hem ica ls C o rp., 87 2 F
. 2d 1373 , 13 76 (8t h C ir. 19 89 ); U ni t e d S t at e s v. Apex Oil Co. , 43 8 F
. S up p. 2d 94 8, 95 3 n. 6 ( S
. D. I l l

. 20 06 ) ; Offi ce of En f o r ce m en t an d C o mpl i a n c e As s u r a n c e , Un i t e d S t a t e s E n v i r o nm entalPro tect i ve A gency, “Guidance o n the U se of Section 7003 o f R C R A ” p p . 2 2 -2 3 ( O c t. 1997 ), www. e pa . g o v / c o mpl i a nc e / r e s o ur c e s / po l i c i e s / c l e a n u p/ rcr a/ 9710 20. pd f( vi si ted A ug. 11 , 20 09)

— that i t i s be tte r offo n bal ance i fthe cos t o fcl ean up i s no t di schar geabl e. A pex m ake s the unre l ate d argum ent th at the inj unctio n is va gu e ( i t is) an d th at R u le 6 5(d ) of th e c ivil rul es re quir es ( and i t doe s) thatan inj uncti on “ sta te i ts te r m s s p e c i fi c a l l y ” a n d “ d e s c r ib e in r e a s o n a b l e d et ail

— an d no t byr efer r i ngt o the c o m p lai nto r o th erdo cument

— th e act oract s r est ra i ned orr equi re d.” W e hav e insi ste d on st ric t c om p lian c e w i th th es e re q u ire m en ts
. N uxoll ex re l. Nu x o l l v . In d i a n Pra i r i e S c h o o l Di s t
. #2 04 , 523 F. 3d 668, 67 5 (7 th C ir. 20 08 ); C hic ago B o a rd o f E du c a t i o n v . Substa nc e, Inc. , 354 F.3d 62 4, 63 1-3 2 (7 th C ir. 20 03 ); ID S Life Ins. C o. v. Su nAm e r i ca Li

f eIns . Co. , 136 F
. 3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 19 98 ); R eno A ir R a cin g A s s ’ n , Inc. v. M cC o rd, 45 2 F
. 3d10 N o. 08 –343 3 11 26 , 113 2 (9 th C ir. 20 06 ); C o rnin g Inc . v . P icVue E lectro nic s, Lt d. , 36 5 F
. 3d 15 6, 1 58 ( 2d Ci r . 2 00 4) ( perc ur i am)
. The rul e a pp l i es equal l y to a m andator y inj uncti on ( “act s re quir ed”)

— a n i nj un c t i o n tha t, a s i n thi s c a s e , c o mm a nd s that acts be done r atherthan not d one, r atherthan th e m or e c om m o n n eg at ive inju n c tio n . Int e r nat i onal Lo ngs hore m e n’s As s ’ n v . Phi l ade l phi a M ar i neTr adeAs s ’ n, 38 9 U .S. 64 , 74-7 6 (1 96 7); P et re ll o v. White, 53 3 F
. 3d 110, 11 5- 16 ( 2 d C ir. 20 08 ); Gates v. Sh i nn , 98 F
. 3d 46 3, 46 8 ( 9th C ir. 1996 ) ; 13 M oore’s Federal Practic e § 65.60[3] (3d ed

. 2 009). Yet th e inj uncti on co ntai ns such v ague re quir em ents as that A pex have a vapor - contr ol sy stem thathas “adequa te ca pac i ti es an d effi ci en ci es ” an d th at “a l l w ork re quir ed by thi s inju n c ti ve or der s hal l be subj ect to U
. S. EPA o ver si ght a nd approv al, ” which i s not so m uchv ague a s o pen - en ded bec ause i t spe ci fi es no cri ter i a f orthe EPA ’ s a pp ro valo f e ffor ts by A pex to com plywith the decr ee. ButApex ha s no s ug g es ti o ns f o r r ew riti ng the i nj unc ti o n t o make i t l es s va g ue o r o pen -end ed

. The cl ean up ofthe conta m i nated si te i s a huge proj ect

— A pex say s i t wil l ta ke 15 yea rs to co m ple te (th ou gh m aybe i t’ s j ust t ry i ng to fri ghten us, o r to pu sh the cos ts as f ar i nt o th e futur e as i t ca n)
. To spe ci fy th e det ai l s o f th e p roj ec t in th e d ec re e w ou ld eit h er im p os e im p os sib le rigi d ity on the p erform an ce of the c lean u p or, m ore l i kel y, r equi re co nstant re cour se to the dist ri ct j ud ge f ori nter preta ti on o r m odi fi cati on o fthe decree

. The decre e r ese m bl es one oftho se “r egul ato rydecr ees ” th atfede r alc o ur ts i ss ue whenthe y t ak e o ve r theN o. 08 –343 3 11

ru n n in g of a sc h oo l sys te m or o t h e r co m p lex p u b lic in st itu tio n th at h as failed to co m p ly w ith fed er al la w in on e re sp ec t o r an ot h er . E .g., Fre em an v. P it ts , 503 U .S. 4 67, 48 9-9 0 (1 99 2); G autre aux v. Chicago Ho u si n g Au thori ty, 47 5 F .3 d 8 4 5, 85 2 (7 th C ir. 20 07 ); All i anc et o End Rep r e s s i on v. City of Chic ago , 23 7 F.3d 79 9, 79 9-8 00 (7th C ir. 20 01 ); G lo ver v. Johns on , 13 8 F
. 3d 229, 23 2- 33 ( 6th Ci r. 1 99 8). These decree s, o n the i nter preta ti on o fR u le 65(d) advanced by A pex, do notco m plywith the r ule

. The ai m s o fRule 65 ( d) ar e t o m i ni m i ze the o ccasi on f orf ol l ow-on pr oce edi ngs t o the i ssuance o f an inj u n c tio n an d to p ro te c t d e f en d an ts from be in g h eld in conte m pt f orf ai l ure to f ol l ow a dir ec tiv e that was a tr ap b ec au se of its am b igu ity
. Sc hm idt v . L e s s a rd, 41 4 U.S
. 47 3, 47 6-7 7 (1 97 4); D upuy v. Sam uel s , 46 5 F
. 3d 757, 75 9- 60 ( 7th C ir. 20 06 ); CP C Int ’ l, In c. v. Sk ippy Inc . , 21 4 F
. 3d 456, 45 9 (4th C ir . 2 0 0 0 ); 11 Ch arles A

. W right & A rthu r R. M il ler, Fe de r al Pr ac t i cean d Pr o ced ure § 2 9 5 5 , p p. 3 0 8

- 0 9 ( 2 d e d. 1995 )
. B ut the case s that insi st on s tr i ct c om pli ance with an i nflexible i nt erp retation of the ru le m us t be un d erst o o d a s o ne s i n whi chs uch c o m pl i an ce i s fea sibl e an d des i r ab l e. A deg r ee o fa m bi g ui tyi s una vo i dabl e i n a de c r e e o r de r i ng a c o mpl i c a t e d e nv i r o nme nt a l c l e a n up . “[ T]he Rule does not re quir e the i m possib le. There i s a l i m i t to w h at w or ds can co nvey. ” Sc andi a Dow n Corp. v. E uroquil t, Inc. , 7 72 F
. 2d 14 23 , 1 43 1 ( 7th. Cir. 1 98 5)
. The defe nd ant ca n al w ays se ek cl ar i fi cati on o r m od ificat i on of t h e d ec re e f r o m t h e d ist ric t c ou rt, id . at 1 43 2, an d is pr o te ct ed be ca us e i fthe de cr ee r emai ns a m bi g uo us afte r e ff o r ts a t cl ar i fi ca ti o n, o r a fte r b eingmodi fi ed , the d ef en dan t ca nno t be he l d i n co nt empt f o r vi o l at i ng i t. C f.12 N o. 08 –343 3 D . P a tri ck, Inc . v. Fo r d M ot orCo. 8 F
. 3 d 4 5 5 , 4 6 0

- 6 1 ( 7th Cir
. 19 93 ); N B A Propert ie s, Inc. v. Go ld, 89 5 F
. 2d 30, 32 (1s t C ir. 19 90 ); Inm at e s of Al l eghen y C o unty Jai l v. We ch t, 754 F.2d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1985). A n y disputes o verwh etherthe vapor - contr olsy ste m that A pex i nstal l s has “a dequ ate capaci ti es” willbe su bmi tt ed to th e EPA , as i n U ni t e d S t at e s v. Cons e r vat i on Che mic al Co
. , 628 F. Supp. 391, 410- 11 ( W
. D. M o. 19 85) ; se e al so U nite d State s v. Kasz E nte rpr is es, Inc. , 862 F. S up p. 71 7, 72 3-2 4 (D .R .I. 19 94 ); C un nin gh a m v. E ng lish , 1 7 5 F
. S up p. 764, 76 7- 68 ( D.D. C. 1958 ) , and a par ty diss atis fi ed w i th the a gency ’ s r eso l uti on wil l be abl e t o see k re dress fro m the di s t r i c tc o ur t, the u l t i mat e a rb i t e r ( s ubj e c tt o a pp ell ate r evi ew ) o fthe decree ’ s m eani ng. S ee U ni t e d S t ates v. Nor t hl ake, 942 F.2d 11 64 , 116 7-6 8 (7 th C ir. 19 91 ); cf. Loc al 28 of S h e e tMe t a l Wo rk e rs ’In t e r n a t i o n a l A s s ’ n v . E E OC , 478 U
. S. 421 , 481- 82 ( 1986 )
. There i s no i m properdel ega tio n to the EPA ( com pare Un i t e d S t a t e s v . Mi c r o s o f tC o rp. , 147 F. 3d 935, 95 5 ( D.C. Ci r. 19 98) ) , bec ause it s e xerci se o f “ove rs i g hta nd a ppr o va l ” wi l l b e su bj ec t to the cour t’ s o ver ri de. A FFI RMED .

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