alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John T. White *v.*G. Hayden’s Adm’r.

J udgment — Fraud.

Fraud to vitiate a judgment must relate to the manner in which it was obtained and not to the foundation upon which it rests.

APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT.

October 5, 1875.

*A. J.*James, *for appellant.*

Opinion by

Judge Cofer:

The agreement alleged to have been made in regard to a credit for commissions was entered into, if at all, at the time the note, which was the basis of the judgment, was given, and any defense the appellant had on account of that agreement, arose before the judgment sought to be enjoined was rendered. The case, therefore, falls directly within the provisions of Sec. 14, Civil Code.

The allegation, that the judgment was obtained by fraud seems to be based alone on the alleged fact that the appellee sued and took a judgment for more than was due him. This is no ground for vacating a judgment. It is not enough that the claim sued upon was false. Fraud to vitiate a judgment must relate to the manner in which it was obtained, and not to the foundation upon which it rests.

Judgment *affirmed.*
#### Jno. K. Tomlinson *v.*Daniel W. Phoenix.

Reward for Arrest.

Where two persons actively participate in causing the arrest of a person for whose arrest a reward is offered, the one disclosing where the offender was and having a warrant issued for his arrest, and the other acting under the warrant making the arrest, each is entitled to one-half of the reward.

*548APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT,

December 1, 1875.

*W. E.*Selecman, *for appellant.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

Both of the parties to this controversy were instrumental in securing the arrest of the party for whose apprehension the reward was offered. The one disclosed the locality where the offender lived, and had a warrant issued for his arrest, and although this warrant was for a trivial offense, it was issued for the sole purpose of having the party arrested and placed in custody, that he might be remanded to Kentucky and tried for the greater offense. The other, acting under the warrant, and at the peril of his own life, with a knowledge of the purpose for which it was issued, made the arrest and lodged the accused in jail. They were both active participants in causing the arrest, and the one as much entitled to the reward as the other.

The judgment is, therefore, *reversed*and the cause remanded with directions *to the*court below to adjudge that the appellant and appellee are each entitled to one-half of the reward (two hundred and fifty dollars). The same will be certified to the auditor of public accounts as required by Sec. 5 of Chap. 1, General Statutes.
#### William Witt *v.*May Willison.

Married Women — Judgments—Jurisdiction.

Judgments against married women and infants when they are before the court by virtue of process in cases over which the court has jurisdiction are not void, hut are binding, though erroneous, until reversed; but such married women or infants may appeal from such judgments within one year after the removal of the disability.

*608APPEAL PROM CAMPBELL CHANCERY COURT.

February 16, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The appellee, together with her husband, was made a defendant to the action instituted by Vaughan in the year 1846, and actually served with process. The object of that action was to compel the husband and wife, together with the other defendants, to convey to him the land in controversy. The court rendered a judgment in that action granting the relief, and requiring the parties to make the conveyance. Upon their failure to convey, the commissioner of the court was ordered to malee to Vaughan a deed passing to the latter all the title of the appellee and the other defendants, which was done. Vaughan and his vendees have been in the possession of this land since 1843, or upwards of thirty years. This action was not instituted until January, 1874, and whilst the statute of limitations might not have affected the rights of the married woman, still the judgment of the court was binding until reversed, and her only remedy was by an appeal to correct the erroneous judgment or by bill of review instituted within proper time. The judgment was not void, as the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. *Dawson v. Litsey,*10 Bush 408; *Bourne and Wife v. Simpson,*9 B. Mon. 454; *Downing's Heirs v. Ford, Sallee, et al.,*9 Dana 391.

Judgments against infants and *femes covert*when they are before the court by virtue of process in cases over which the court has jurisdiction, are not void, but are binding until reversed. An appeal must be taken within three years next after the rendition of the judgment, unless the party appealing was an infant married woman, or of unsound mind at the time of its rendition; then they may appeal within one year after the removal of the disability, although the three years may have lapsed. Civil Code, Sec. 884. By the Revised Statutes a writ of error should be sued out within three years after judgments, and1 if the party was laboring under a disability he had two years after its removal in which to prosecute the writ. It has been adjudged that a writ of error and a bill of review for errors apparent on the record are equivalent remedies, and that a bill of review is barred when the right to a writ of error is lost. *Mitchell, et*al., *v. Berry, et al.,*1 Met. 602. The appellee’s disability was removed in January, 1871, and this action, if it is to be taken as a bill of review, was not instituted until January, 1874. Her right to a writ of error or bill of review was then barred.

*609
      *E. W. Hankins, for appellant.*

*W. S. Albert, J. R. Hallem, for appellee.*

The judgment is *reversed*and cause remanded1 with directions to dismiss the petition.
#### James W. Culver *et al.*plaintiffs, *vs.*David W. Felt, defendant.

1. A cause not upon the calendar cannot be moved on for trial, and a party not finding the cause on the calendar of the term for which he has received notice of trial, is not bound to examine, from term to term, thereafter, to ascertain if the cause is in a condition to be called up for trial.

2. Formerly, a notice of trial and a note of issue were both required for each term of the court; the alteration in that respect, in the first judicial district, merely requires one notice and one note of issue, but does not relieve parties from the necessity of placing their causes upon the calendar for the same term for which the trials are noticed.

3. If the cause is not placed upon the calendar at the term for which notice of trial is given, an inquest cannot be taken at a subsequent term, noon that notice.

(Before Mohem,, J. at special term,

April, 1866.)
#### John Tomerlin *v.*G. Terry, et al.

Conveyance of Real Estate — Liability of Grantor.

While there may be an implied agreement upon the part of a grantor who received the price to refund to the grantee the amount overpaid under the contract of sale, this obligation does not embrace a nominal grantor who joins in the deed but receives no part of the purchase-price.

APPEAL PROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT.

March 10, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The deed from Blakey & Terry shows upon its face that Terry was only a nominal vendor, and that he merely joined in the conveyance to pass the legal title out of himself. It shows that Blakey conveyed in his character of trustee for Mrs. Bibb. There is no complaint of a breach of warranty of title. The complaint is that there is a deficit in the quantity of land conveyed.

*630*Perkins & Perkins, for appellant. Terry & Kennedy, for appellees.*

There may be an implied agreement upon the part of those who sold the land and received the price paid therefor, to refund the amount overpaid, under the terms of the contract of sale, but as Terry neither did nor could have received any portion of this excess, and as Blakey received nothing as an individual, there could have been no implied undertaking upon their part, or upon the part of either of them, to refund to appellants.

As Blakey was sued as an individual, and as Terry was not liable in any capacity, the court properly dismissed appellant’s petition.

Judgment *affirmed.*
#### J. G. Arnold, et al., *v.*William Maxwell, et al.

Usury — Usury Under the Form of Commissions.

Interest in excess of ten per cent is usurious and cannot be recovered.

Usury Under the Form of Commissions.

Where the borrower receives less than the face of the loan, and is charged commissions and attorney’s fees for negotiating the loan by the loanor, and for extensions of time, and it is made to appear that some of such charges are in fact collected as interest, they will be treated as usurious and cannot be recovered.

APPEAL PROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT.

February 6, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

Conceding that the money loaned was Arnold’s, and that by the contract with Foot he was entitled to 2 per cent, on the amount for negotiating the loan, still it is obvious that a greater rate of interest than 10 per cent, per annum was charged for the loan for the first and second year, and by Sec. 5 of an act entitled “An Act to amend Chap. 53 of the Revised Statutes, Title, Interest and Usury, approved March 14, 1871, 1 Sess. Acts, 1871, p. 62,” the whole interest was forfeited.

The first note executed for the money borrowed was for $1,300, bearing 6 per cent, on its face, when it is admitted that appellees got only $1,222. So they paid interest on $78 that they did not get. And if the 2 per cent, claimed by Foot for negotiating the loan be allowed as proper, still they paid $52, as interest, and by paying that sum in advance, it exceeded the 10 per cent, which might have been legalfy charged.

The mortgage stipulated for the payment of an attorney’s fee in case suit was brought for a foreclosure. In a few days after the first note matured, suit was brought to foreclose the mortgage, as was to be expected from the stipulation to pay the bounty for that service, and the fee was claimed therefor. Then a second charge is made for negotiating an extension of time for payment with Arnold, and a fee of $25 was paid to Foot for an abstract of appellee’s title to the mortgaged propertjL The transaction presents the appearance of a device to procure the payment of interest at a *356rate greatly in excess of io per cent per annum, and, to say the least of it, bears the impress of hardship and oppression.

*J. G.*Carlisle, *for appellants.*

*Simmons & Sclvmidt, Roberts, for appellees.*

The judgment must, therefore, be *affirmed.*
Exhibit 11.1

                                CORCOM, INC.
               COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE (UNAUDITED)
                      (In Thousands, except Share Data)




                                             -----Thirteen Weeks Ended------
                                             March 29, 1997    March 30, 1996
                                             --------------    --------------
Net earnings per common and common equiva-
lent share:

Average shares outstanding                          3,826           3,751

Additional shares assuming exercise of dilu-
tive stock options based on the treasury 
stock method using average market price               145            189

AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMMON AND COMMON 
EQUIVALENT SHARES                                   3,971          3,940

Net earnings                                         $741         $1,264

Net earnings per common and common equiva-
lent share                                          $ .19          $ .32



Net earnings per common and common equiva-
lent share assuming full dilution:

Average shares outstanding                          3,826          3,751

Additional shares assuming exercise of dilu-
tive stock options based on the treasury 
stock method using the period end price if 
higher than the average market price                  172            189

FULLY DILUTED AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMMON AND 
COMMON EQUIVALENT SHARES                            3,998          3,940

Net earnings                                         $741         $1,264

Net earnings per common and common equiva-
lent share                                          $ .19          $ .32
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 3.11

                           CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                      TO

                           CERTIFICATE OF FORMATION

                                      OF

                          HUNTSMAN ICI CHEMICALS LLC

                       Pursuant to Section 18-202 of the
                    Delaware Limited Liability Company Act


     1.   The name of the limited liability company is Huntsman ICI Chemicals
LLC (the "Company").
          -------

     2.   The Certificate of Formation is hereby amended to change the name of
the Company to Huntsman International LLC.

     3.   Accordingly, Article 1 of the Certificate of Formation shall, as
amended, read as follows:

            "1. The name of the limited liability company is Huntsman
            International LLC."

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned authorized person has executed this
Certificate of Amendment this 7/th/ day of December 2000.

                                             HUNTSMAN ICI CHEMICALS LLC

                                             By:   \s\ Samuel D. Scruggs
                                                -----------------------------
                                             Name: Samuel D. Scruggs
                                             Its:  Authorized Person
#### H. G. Petree *v.*G. Terry.

Husband and Wife.

The husband is entitled to the earnings of his wife and to the products of her lands, in the absence of any ante-nuptial contract.

APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT.

December 18, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Peters:

It does not appear that the tobacco wTas not grown on the land of Mrs. Wiaters, to the products of which her husband was entitled. It does appear that dower has not been assigned her out of the real estate of her former husband, and as it is proved that she is acting as guardian for her children, all of whom are minors, it may be attributed to her own delinquency that the land of her wards has not been set apart to them. The husband is entitled to the earnings of his wife, and in this case he is entitled to the product of her lands, as she has not a separate estate in them. The children of the former marriage lived in the family, and if they labored, and their services were worth more than their support, they or their guardian must look to him for whom their services were rendered for compensation.

There is no evidence of an ante-nuptial contract, nor of any contract sufficient to protect the earnings of the wife or the products of her land from the liabilities of the husband. Nor does there appear to have been any efforts in that way until troubles come; and then come the earnest appeals to the courts for relief, which they have no power to give, but which the parties themselves could once so easily have secured. If married women desire to managé their *270own affairs as femes sole, the statute points out the mode for them to pursue. That right was Mrs. Waters’s, but she has not possessed herself of it.

*H. G. Petree, G.*Terry, *for appellant.*

*J. & T. W.*Rodman, *for appellee.*

The judgment must be *affirmed.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

OWEN E. McDONNELL, JR., :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. :

 : CIVIL ACTION 14-0141-M

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

Social Security Commissioner, :

 :

Defendant. :

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that JUDGMENT be entered in favor 

of Plaintiff Owen E. McDonnell, Jr. and against Defendant 

Carolyn W. Colvin.

DONE this 8th day of October, 2014.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00141-M Document 18 Filed 10/08/14 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

                            ReliaStar Financial Corp.
                        Computation of Per Share Earnings
                     (in millions, except per share amounts)


                                                   Three Months
                                                  Ended March 31
                                                --------------------
                                                  1998        1997
                                                --------    --------
NUMERATOR - BASIC AND DILUTED

Net Income                                      $   64.6    $   51.3
                                                ========    ========

DENOMINATOR

Weighted Average Common Shares Outstanding
  During the Period (Basic)                         91.0        80.2
Dilutive Effect of Stock Options                     1.8         1.2
                                                --------    --------
   Weighted Average Common Shares During
      the Period (Diluted)                          92.8        81.4
                                                ========    ========


NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE

Basic                                           $   0.71    $   0.64
                                                ========    ========

Diluted                                         $   0.70    $   0.63
                                                ========    ========
EXHIBIT 21.1

SUBSIDIARIES OF FOUNDRY NETWORKS, INC.

|Name                                 |  |  |  | Jurisdiction of Registration
|------------------------------------ |  |  |  | ----------------------------
|Foundry
Networks International Inc.  |  |  |  | Barbados                    
|Foundry
Networks Ltd.                |  |  |  | United
Kingdom              
|Foundry
Networks GmbH                |  |  |  | Germany                     
|Foundry
Networks France SARL         |  |  |  | France                      
|Foundry
Networks Singapore, PTE Ltd. |  |  |  | Singapore                   
|Foundry
Networks Nederland BV        |  |  |  | Netherlands                 
|Foundry
Networks Canada Co.          |  |  |  | Canada                      
|Foundry
Networks Italia Srl.         |  |  |  | Italy                       
|Foundry
Networks Japan KK            |  |  |  | Japan                       
|Foundry
Networks do Brasil Ltda.     |  |  |  | Brazil                      
|Foundry
Networks Holding Co.         |  |  |  | Delaware,
U.S.A             
|Foundry
Networks Japan-US., LLC.     |  |  |  | Delaware,
U.S.A             

---
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JACKELIN ANTONIA GUERREROHERNANDEZ; et al.,

 Petitioners,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-70463

Agency Nos. A099-675-928

A099-675-929

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 16, 2010** 

Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

Jackelin Antonia Guerrero-Hernandez and her son, natives and citizens of El

Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

dismissing their appeal from the immigration judge’s decision denying their

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

FILED

NOV 22 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-70463

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We review de novo the BIA’s legal conclusions and review for substantial

evidence factual findings. Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 2009). 

We deny the petition for review.

Guerrero-Hernandez does not challenge the BIA’s rejection of her proposed

social group. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that

Guerrero-Hernandez failed to establish the extortion demands and threats from

gang members were on account of a protected ground. See id. at 856 (evidence

supported conclusion that gang victimized the petitioner for economic and personal

reasons rather than on account of a protected ground); see also Parussimova v.

Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[t]he REAL ID Act requires that a

protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s

persecution”). Accordingly, because Guerrero-Hernandez failed to demonstrate

she was persecuted or fears persecution on account of a protected ground, we deny

the petition as to petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims. See

Barrios, 581 F.3d at 856; see Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“Asylum generally is not available to victims of civil strife, unless they are singled

out on account of a protected ground.”).
3 09-70463

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because

petitioners did not establish a likelihood of being tortured in El Salvador. See

Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747-48 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
EXHIBIT 32.1


              CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


 In connection with the Quarterly Report of First Cash Financial Services,
 Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the quarterly period ended March 31,
 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
 hereof (the "Report"), I, Phillip E. Powell and R. Douglas Orr certify,
 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:

      (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
           or 15(d) of the Securities Act of 1934, as amended; and

      (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
           all material respects, the financial condition and results
           of operations of the Company.

 Date: October 8, 2004


 /s/ PHILLIP E. POWELL
 ---------------------
 Phillip E. Powell
 Chief Executive Officer


 /s/ R. DOUGLAS ORR
 ------------------
 R. Douglas Orr
 Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 10.9



 Exhibit 10.9 

Summary Translation of 

Loan Agreement for Working Capital 

Lender: Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd 
 Borrower:
Shandong Taiying Technology Co., Ltd 
  

	1.	Purpose of loan agreement. 

 The purpose of the loan agreement is to allow the Borrower
to finance its working capital needs (including equipment purchases). 
  

	2.	Amount of loan. 

 RMB 10,000,000 

 

	3.	Loan term. 

 The loan term is twelve months, from July 17, 2014 to July 17,
2015. 
  

	4.	Interest rate and method of payment. 

 Interest shall be paid monthly, bearing interest
at 9% per annum. 
  

	5.	Repayment Date. 

 The Borrower shall repay all loan proceeds in a lump sum on the
maturity date. 
  

	6.	Prepayment. 

 In the event the Borrower wants to prepay the loan before the maturity
date, the prepay amount shall not be less than RMB 100,000. 
  

	6.	Guarantee. 

 The loan is guaranteed by Gary Wang and Taian Hongze Investment and
Guarantee Co., Ltd. 
  

	7.	Liability of breach of contract. 

 If there is a breach of the terms of the agreement,
there are liquidated damages in the amount of 5% on the loan principal. 
  

	8.	Non-Material terms. 

 The loan agreement contains terms concerning the following
non-material matters, which have been omitted from this summary: 
  

	 	•	 	Opening and managing the account; 

  

	 	•	 	Withdrawal; 

  

	 	•	 	Payment Supervision; 

  

	 	•	 	Debt proof; 

  

	 	•	 	Deduction terms; 

  

	 	•	 	Notification and delivery; and 

  

	 	•	 	Statements and promises.