* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 12, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MARY R. BRIDGES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. No. 05-6134 (D.C. No. 04-CV-924-C) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , PORFILIO , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Bridges’ attorney stipulated at the hearing that th e previous application

should not be re-opened and no such request is made on appeal. Further, Bridges (continued...) -2- Claimant Mary R. Bridges appeals from a district co urt order affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s (Commissioner) denia l of her application for disability insurance benefits. Because the Commiss ioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal stand ards were applied, we affirm.
BACKGROUND Bridges filed her first application for disability benefits in October 1995, alleging disability as of July 1995. In May 1999, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her application. In December 2000, Bridges filed her second applicat ion for disability benefits, claiming the same July 1995 disability date. According to her application, she was disabled due to chronic fatigu e syndrome, hypertension, depression, chronic joint pain, shortness of breath , a neck injury, and occasional cognitive difficulties. Following administrative denial of her claim, Bridg es appeared at a hearing before an ALJ in December 2002. In his decision, the ALJ found that her previous application should not be re-opened and th at she was not disabled between May 1999 and December 31, 2000 – the last d ate she was insured for disability benefits. 11 (...continued)

agrees that the last date of her eligibility for di sability benefits was December 31, 2000. -3- The ALJ followed the required five-step sequential evaluation process for disability claims. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). Because Bridges was not engaged in substantial gain ful employment, the ALJ moved to step two and found that her obesity, borde rline intellectual functioning, and depression constituted severe impairments. How ever, at step three, the ALJ found that she had no impairments, singly or in com bination, that met any of the Commissioner’s listing of impairments. Based on the medical record, including Bridges’ tes timony concerning her subjective complaints, the ALJ concluded at step fo ur that she could not perform her past relevant work as an acid cleaner. Nonethe less, at step five, and based on hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert , the ALJ found that because there were a significant number of light jobs that Bridges could perform, she was not disabled. Bridges’ request for review was denied by the Appea ls Council, and the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision . This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the ALJ’s decision “to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the recordand whether the correct legal-4-

standards were applied.” Hamlin v. Barnhart , 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We base our review on the whole record; therefore, “we . . . meticulously examine t he record in order to determine if the evidence supporting the agency’s decision is substantial,” but we “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our di scretion for that of the Commissioner.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
DISCUSSION Bridges argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated he r subjective complaints concerning the impact of her impairments on her abi lity to work and that he failed to consider all of her impairments in finding that she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a reduced rang e of light work. We disagree with both arguments. We use a three-part analysis in reviewing an ALJ’s credibility determination concerning a claimant’s allegations o f disabling pain or impairments. Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1995). First, has th e claimant established a pain-producing impairment byobjective medical evidence; second, if so, is there a loose nexus between the p roven impairment and the claimant’s subjective allegations of pain; and thir d, if so, does all of the evidence, both objective and subjective, establish that the p ain is in fact disabling. Id.2 From May 1999 forward, Bridges’ medical records con sisted of tests that

eliminated certain conditions, a normal pap smear, mild obesity, and treatment for a rash and bronchitis. -5- Moreover, it is “difficult” for a claimant “[t]o es tablish disabling pain without the explicit confirmation of treating physicians.” Id

. In the final analysis, “[c]redibility determination s are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not ups et such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.” Diaz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990). In this case, the ALJ explained his reasons for det ermining that Bridges’ testimony was not wholly credible. The medical rec ords for the relevant time frame did not contain any findings or treatment forany condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the physical symp toms complained of by Bridges. 2 Faced with a dearth of objective evidence concern ing the claimed impairments, the ALJ concluded that the medical records do not reveal conditions that m ight be expected to produce the physical symptoms alleged by the cla imant. The claimant underwent testing in 2000 in response to h er allegations of chest pain. There were no cardiac conditions evide nt to explain her symptoms. There are no other conditions to explainthe claimant’s remaining conditions to the degree alleged. Aplt. App. at 21.-6-

More particularly, Bridges claims that the ALJ impr operly ignored her testimony that chronic fatigue syndrome and resulti ng weakness and muscle and joint pain prevented her from working. The medical record does contain a diagnosis from a physician in September 1995 that s he was unable to return to work for an indefinite period of time. However, al though she continued to complain of fatigue in early 1996, the examining physician noted at that time that it was “not debilitating” and probably related to h er “lack of activity and lifestyle.” Aplt. App. at 275. There is no other evidence in the record of any medical treatment for, or symptoms of, chronic fati gue syndrome between 1996 and December 31, 2000 when her insured status expir ed. In summary, the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in evaluating B ridges’ subjective allegations of her symptoms and his assessment of credibility is s upported by substantial evidence in the record. We also reject Bridges’ argument that the ALJ impro perly failed to consider all of her impairments in assessing her RF C. Although it is less than clear, she apparently argues that the ALJ failed to consider her depression and occasional cognitive difficulties. An ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of ev idence. Instead, “in addition to discussing the evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as-7-

significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996). Here, the ALJ considered and specifically mentionedthe only relevant consultative mental health evaluation in the record . In connection with her first application for disability benefits, a 1998 report noted a marked restriction in her ability to deal with work stresses, along with her obesity, borderline intellectual functioning, and depression. Significantly, the AL J took these limitations into account in his RFC assessment. Moreover, although the ALJ did not specifically mention a second 1998 consultative examination, he was required to do so only if it contained significantly probative evidence contrary to the AL J’s findings – which it did not. In fact, although the ALJ did not mention the secon d evaluation in his decision, it appears that he also considered it in making his RF C determination. As such, the RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence

. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge