NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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Nos. 16-3529 and 18-3811

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ALLIE SPEIGHT, 

a/k/a Allie Speights

a/k/a A.H. Speight

 Allie Speight,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-0641-001)

District Judge: Hon. Juan R. Sánchez

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 13, 2021

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.

(Filed April 28, 2021)

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OPINION

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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Allie Speight pled guilty to crimes related to an eight-year-long fraudulent scheme 

in which he directed co-conspirators to obtain mortgage loans in others’ names and steal 

the proceeds. On appeal, he challenges his sentence and his underlying conviction. We 

will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Speight was indicted for multiple fraud offenses in 2010, including conspiracy to 

commit money laundering by wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) 

and (a)(1)(B)(i). He sought to represent himself, and the District Court conducted a 

colloquy before concluding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 

counsel. The Court permitted him to proceed pro se, with his court-appointed attorney 

acting as standby counsel. On April 5, 2012, he pled guilty to ten charges. 

The District Court held Speight’s first sentencing hearing in 2013, during which 

Speight was represented by an appointed attorney. The government introduced evidence 

of actual loss through the testimony of an FBI agent, who described the mortgage 

amounts and sale records or estimated market values for the fourteen properties targeted

in the fraudulent mortgage scheme. The FBI agent calculated a loss of approximately 

$2.04 million, subtracting recovered amounts from the original loans fraudulently 

obtained by Speight and his co-conspirators. Speight’s attorney objected to the 

calculated loss amount. He also objected to the presentence report’s recommendation of 

a two-level sentencing enhancement for ten or more victims, a four-level sentencing 

enhancement for a leadership role, a two-level enhancement for a crime involving 
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sophisticated means, and a two-level sentencing enhancement for money laundering. The 

Court overruled each objection. 

Arguing for a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Speight’s attorney 

referenced findings from a court-ordered psychological evaluation that concluded Speight 

suffers from anti-social personality disorder. The Court declined to vary from the 

guidelines range. It sentenced Speight to 160 months’ imprisonment, and included 

mental health treatment as a condition of supervised release. Speight appealed, arguing 

that the Court erred in not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation at the time he 

pled guilty. United States v. Speight, 554 F. App’x 119, 122 (3d Cir. 2014). We affirmed 

the conviction and sentence. Id.

In July 2013, the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned Speight’s prior state 

conviction, on which the criminal history category was based when his sentencing range 

in this case was calculated. Speight then successfully moved to vacate his sentence in 

this matter. 

In 2016, the District Court resentenced him. It incorporated the evidence of actual 

loss from the 2013 Sentencing but reduced the estimate to $1,961,116 to account for the 

actual sale price, rather than the estimated market value, of one since-sold property. 

Speight’s new attorney objected to the same sentencing enhancements, which the Court 

again overruled, incorporating its rulings from the 2013 Sentencing. Due to Speight’s 

reduced criminal history category, the Court sentenced him to 146 months’ 
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imprisonment, five years’ supervised release with special conditions of drug treatment 

and mental health programs, and $1,961,116 in restitution. Speight has again appealed.

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II. DISCUSSION2

Speight challenges his sentence and conviction, and once more his arguments fail.

A. The District Court did not clearly err in determining the guidelines loss 

attributable to Speight.

We review the District Court’s loss findings for clear error.3 United States v. 

Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2009). The amount of loss attributed to a defendant 

convicted of a fraud conspiracy largely dictates his guidelines offense level. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1). A loss of more than $1.5 million but and not more than $3.5 million 

results in a 16-level enhancement, as found by the District Court here. Id. (b)(1)(I). 

“[A]ctual loss” is “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the 

offense.” Id. cmt. n.3(A)(i). Loss is based on “relevant conduct[,]” which includes “all 

acts and omissions committed, aided, [or] abetted ... by the defendant[,]” and “in the case 

of a jointly undertaken criminal activity ... all acts and omissions of others that were ...

1 Speight separately appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion seeking 

production of a second transcript. He baselessly argues that the transcript that has been 

produced was tampered with. We consolidated the appeal regarding the transcript with 

this resentencing appeal. 

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

3 The government contends that we should review Speight’s challenge to the 

evidentiary basis for calculating loss for plain error because he failed to object on that 

basis at sentencing. United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2007). We need 

not resolve that issue because Speight’s argument fails under either standard of review.
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reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity[.]” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)-

(B). The sentencing court “need only make a reasonable estimate of loss[.]” Id. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3(C). 

Speight first argues that no “reliable and specific” evidence in the record supports

the loss estimate. (Opening Br. 9-11.) We disagree. The District Court relied on the FBI 

agent’s extensive review of mortgage and sale records to determine actual loss. No error 

occurred because that evidence provided a reasonable estimate of actual loss.

Speight also contends that he should not have been held responsible for the entire 

loss amount, as the losses caused by his co-conspirators were not reasonably foreseeable. 

Speight’s specific admissions at his plea hearing that he directed others to further the 

fraudulent scheme belie that argument.4 The District Court did not clearly err.

B. The District Court did not clearly err in applying the other sentencing 

enhancements.

We review for clear error the District Court’s factual findings related to a

guidelines calculation. United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Speight says that the District Court erred in applying a four-level enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role as a leader or organizer of a conspiracy involving 

five or more participants. But the evidence in the record supports the finding that Speight 

led a conspiracy consisting of five or more participants: Speight admitted at his guilty 

plea to a leadership role and the presentence report and change-of-plea colloquy describe 

at least five other participants, three of whom were prosecuted. 

4 For those reasons, Speight’s challenge to the restitution amount also fails. 
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Next, he argues that the District Court erred in applying a two-level enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense including ten or more victims. A 

“victim” is defined as “any person [or entity] who sustained any part of the actual loss[.]” 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. The testifying FBI agent identified ten victim financial 

institutions and the amount each institution loaned. Speight’s argument is therefore 

without merit.

Speight also contends that the District Court erroneously applied a two-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for committing a money laundering 

offense in conjunction with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956. He argues that he falls under

Note 3(C) of the guideline, which exempts defendants who are “convicted of a 

conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object of that conspiracy was to 

commit an offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1957.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) cmt. 

n.3(C). Speight’s argument fails because the indictment charges him with conspiring

under § 1956(h) to violate § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i)—not § 1957—and he 

admitted to the indicted offense when he pled guilty. 

Again, there was no clear error in the District Court’s decisions on those 

guidelines issues.

C. The District Court did not plainly err in ordering mental health 

treatment as a special condition of supervised release.

We typically review a district court’s imposition of a special condition of 

supervised release for abuse of discretion, but absent an objection, we review for plain 

error. United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). The special condition 
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must be “reasonably related” to statutory sentencing factors and involve no greater 

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve sentencing purposes. 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), (2). Because Speight himself raised questions about his mental 

health during the criminal proceedings, the District Court did not err, much less plainly 

err, in finding that mental health treatment was reasonably related to statutory sentencing 

factors. 

D. We will not consider Speight’s claim that his guilty plea was invalid.

Finally, Speight argues that the District Court violated his right to counsel and that 

his uncounseled guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Those arguments lack merit,

and because they were not raised in the initial direct appeal of his conviction, see Speight, 

554 F. App’x at 119-23, they are forfeited. United States v. Pultrone, 241 F.3d 306, 307-

08 (3d Cir. 2001) (declining to revisit, on appeal of a remand for resentencing only, 

arguments disputing the defendant’s conviction which were not preserved on direct 

appeal).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.