UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 97-4105 LARRY HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (CR-96-349-A) Submitted: January 20, 1998 Decided: February 11, 1998 Before HALL and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Gregory Bruce English, ENGLISH & SMITH, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, James D. Villa, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Larry Harris, a prisoner of the District of Columbia Department ofCorrections at the Lorton Reformatory, appeals his conviction of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). 1 He also appeals the district court's orders denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and refusing to award an acceptance of res ponsibility sentencing reduction. We affirm. Lorton Reformatory Correctional Officers Larry Cox and Steven Starks searched Harris following the completion of Harris's visit with an outside visitor. During the search, Cox observed Harris take an object wrapped in tape from his left sock and place it under the blanket upon which his belongings were being pl aced. Upon seizure and subsequent chemical testing, the officers determined that the objectwas eighteen individually-wrapped packets of marijuana. At the conclusion of his bench trial, the district court convicted Harris of prisoner possession of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and sentenced him to concurrent terms of fifty-one monthsimprisonment and two years supervised release, all to run consecutively to the sentence that Harris was serving at the time of the offense.On appeal, Harris contends that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of Captain Grillo because, he asserts, Grillo's testimony was not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Contrary to Harris's characterization, Grillo did not testify as to whether Harris had an "intent to distribute." Instead, Grillo noted that

_________________________________________________________________ 1 Harris conceded guilt to being a prisoner in possession of marijuana in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West Supp. 1997), assimilating Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-203(6) (Michie 1994), and does not appeal his conviction or sentence for this offense.
2the amount seized, 29.95 grams of marijuana, packaged in a sophisticated "street-type package" of eighteen individually-wrapped packets,was consistent with distribution either inside or outside of a correctional facility. Because Grillo's testimony as to the met hods used by drug traffickers at Lorton Reformatory was admissible, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. 2 Harris also challenges the district court's denial of his motion forjudgment of acquittal. The question here is "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, anyrational trier of facts could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 The testimony during the bench trial provided substantial evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could have found Harris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cox's testimony, in addition to Harris's concession of guilt regarding possession of marijuana, provided ample basis for establishing Harris's possession of the drugs. Grillo's testimony concerning drug practices at Lorton Reformatory similarly supported a finding of intent to distribute. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, the district court's verdict was amply supported. Harris asserts that the district court clearly erred while calculatinghis total offense level when it refused to award him a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of res ponsibility. 4 Harris claims that because he never denied possession of the marijuana, he was entitled to the reduction. We disagree. During the calculation of a defendant's total offense level, he is entitled to a two-level reduction under USSG § 3E1.1 if he clearly demonstrates acceptance of res ponsibility for his offense. Whether or not a defendant has accepted res ponsibility for his crime is a factual question, 5 and such factual determinations are reviewed under the

_________________________________________________________________ 2 See United States v. Gastiaburo , 16 F.3d 582, 587-89 (4th Cir. 1994). 3 United States v. Tresvant , 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). 4 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (1995). 5 See United States v. Curtis , 934 F.2d 553, 557 (4th Cir. 1991).
3clearly erroneous standard. 6 To receive an adjustment under § 3E1.1, the defendant must accept res ponsibility for "`all of his criminal conduct.'" 7 Although Harris admitted possession of the marijuana, he refused to admit an essential element of the offense--his intent to distribute the drugs. We find Harris's uncooperative behavior and his refusal tofully disclose the circumstances surrounding the offense to be inconsistent with the principles of acceptance of res ponsibility. Therefore, Harris was not entitled to the two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance of res ponsibility. 8 In sum, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing expert testimony on the illegal drug distribution practices at Lorton Reformatory or by denying Harris's motion for acquittal. Further, because Harris did not accept res ponsibility for the totalityof his criminal conduct, we find that he was not entitled to the sentencing reduction based on acceptance of res ponsibility. Accordingly, we affirm Harris's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oralargument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

_________________________________________________________________ 6 See United States v. Strandquist , 993 F.2d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 1993).
7 Id. (quoting United States v. Gordon , 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1990)). 8 Harris contends that he should receive at least one point for acceptance of responsibility b ecause he admitted to one of the two crimes for which he was charged, thus lessening the Government's burden at trial. However, the sentencing court looks to whether a defendant admits "theconduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction." USSG 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)). Further, the reduction "is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt." USSG 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). Because Harris denied the essential elements of one of the offenses for which he was convicted, he is not entitled to any adjustment.
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