IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CEDRIC GOODLOE, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 13-0605-WS-C

 )

DAPHNE UTILITIES, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the following pretrial motions: Defendant’s First 

Motion in Limine Regarding Other Claims (doc. 133), Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine

Regarding Injuries and Medical Treatment (doc. 134), Defendant’s Third Motion in Limine 

Regarding Punishment (doc. 135), Defendant’s Fourth Motion in Limine Regarding Insurance 

(doc. 136), Defendant’s Fifth Motion in Limine Regarding Settlement (doc. 137), Defendant’s 

Sixth Motion in Limine Regarding Unsigned Letters (doc. 138), and Defendant’s Motion to 

Amend Pretrial Document (doc. 129) as Supplemented (doc. 139). All of these Motions have 

been briefed and are now ripe for disposition.

I. Motion in Limine Regarding Other Claims.

In its first Motion in Limine, defendant, Daphne Utilities, seeks an order excluding any 

testimony or argument at plaintiff Cedric Goodloe’s trial that might make “the jury aware that 

any other EEOC charges, complaints, lawsuits or allegations related to discrimination or 

retaliation have been lodged against Daphne Utilities.” (Doc. 133, at 3.) As grounds for this 

Motion, Daphne Utilities observes that Goodloe’s sole remaining claim for trial sounds in a 

theory of retaliation. In light of the dismissal of Goodloe’s race discrimination claim on 

summary judgment, Daphne Utilities reasons, any evidence or accusations of racially disparate 

treatment against any employee would be “irrelevant to his remaining claim of retaliation.” (Id.

at 2.) Movant also objects to such evidence under Rules 403 and 801 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, asserting that it “would only confuse the jury” and “is hearsay.” (Id.)

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As plaintiff correctly points out in his Response (doc. 140), the relevance objection is 

unavailing. It is true enough, of course, that Goodloe’s only claim for trial is a retaliation cause 

of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that neither Goodloe’s race discrimination claims (which 

were dismissed on summary judgment) nor those of any other Daphne Utilities employee will be 

tried here. However, Daphne Utilities has emphatically staked itself to a litigation position that 

Goodloe’s retaliation claim fails for want of statutorily protected activity. On summary 

judgment, Daphne Utilities posited that Goodloe’s retaliation claim should be rejected as a 

matter of law because “he cannot show an objectively reasonable perception he was opposing an 

unlawful employment practice.” (Doc. 81, at 28.) This theme carries over into the Joint PreTrial Document, wherein Daphne Utilities recites as “Defenses” each of the following questions: 

(i) “Did Plaintiff Goodloe have a good faith reasonable belief that the actions he was opposing 

would be unlawful under the statute at issue?”; (ii) “Did Goodloe have a subjective belief he was 

being discriminated against?”; and (iii) “Was Goodloe’s belief objectively reasonable in light of 

the facts and record presented?” (Doc. 127, at 2.)1

Having asserted this defense of no subjective or objectively reasonable belief of race 

discrimination, Daphne Utilities cannot utilize Rules 401 or 403 to handcuff Goodloe from 

rebutting that defense. Given defendant’s contention that his complaints were not made in good 

faith (such that they were not statutorily protected activity), plaintiff bears the burden of 

demonstrating to the jury that he harbored a subjective and objectively reasonable belief that 

Daphne Utilities was engaging in racially discriminatory conduct (whether towards Goodloe or 

anyone else) at the time of his internal complaints. To meet that burden, plaintiff must present 

evidence identifying, among other things, (a) what information Goodloe possessed at the time he 

complained internally of alleged race discrimination by Daphne Utilities; (b) what basis Goodloe 

had for deeming that information to be reliable; and (c) how that information supported and 

informed the specific complaints that Goodloe voiced to Daphne Utilities officials. This is 

exactly the kind of evidence that defendant now seeks to exclude. Simply put, Daphne Utilities 

 1 The law requires a plaintiff asserting a § 1981 retaliation claim, as Goodloe is, to 

show “that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful 

employment practices.” Dixon v. The Hallmark Companies, Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 

2010). Thus, these “defenses” interposed by Daphne Utilities appear legally proper in the 

context of the specific retaliation claim presented by Goodloe for trial.

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cannot challenge whether Goodloe possessed a subjective and objectively reasonable belief that 

Daphne Utilities was engaging in racially discriminatory conduct towards its employees, on the 

one hand, then block Goodloe from presenting evidence of such a subjective and objectively 

reasonable belief, on the other. Evidence of racially discriminatory practices by Daphne Utilities 

is obviously relevant, and indeed vital, to Goodloe’s mandatory “good faith” showing; therefore, 

defendant’s objections to this line of evidence under Rules 401 and 403 are overruled.

Similarly, Daphne Utilities’ Rule 801 objection to this “good faith” evidence appears 

misplaced. If the Court understands plaintiff’s intentions properly, such evidence would appear 

not to be offered for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that Daphne Utilities systematically 

discriminated against black employees) but rather to show Goodloe’s state of mind (i.e., his good 

faith belief that Daphne Utilities had done so). Introduced for this limited purpose, the 

challenged evidence would not be inadmissible under the hearsay rule.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s First Motion in Limine Regarding Other 

Claims (doc. 133) is denied.

2

 2 Notwithstanding this ruling, there is a caveat. This is not a race discrimination 

case. Plaintiff is not being granted a license to pack into his case in chief every allegation of race 

discrimination by Daphne Utilities that has ever been voiced by anyone at any time. Rather, the 

evidence of race discrimination will only be admissible for the purpose of establishing Goodloe’s 

good faith (or lack thereof) in his complaints to company officials. Thus, for example, facts or 

allegations of which Goodloe was unaware at the time of his complaints, that postdated his 

complaints, or that are otherwise unrelated to his complaints, are neither relevant nor admissible. 

Moreover, in allowing such evidence, the Court expects the parties to remain mindful of Rule 

403’s restriction on cumulative presentations. The issue of “good faith” (which is significant 

here only as it relates to Goodloe’s retaliation claim) will not be allowed to hijack the trial by 

effectively transforming it into one about race discrimination. To that end, the Court will 

entertain any trial objection that the volume and magnitude of plaintiff’s “good faith” evidence is 

excessive and repetitive, and hence inadmissible under Rule 403. Also, to the extent that 

Goodloe has announced his intent to rely on the “me too” principles articulated in Goldsmith v. 

Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 2008), such reliance is unwarranted for 

the reasons identified in defendant’s Reply (doc. 149). The Court is not aware of any evidence 

that the same Daphne Utilities decision maker(s) who fired Goodloe also fired other employees

in retaliation for engaging in statutorily protected activity. In the absence of such evidence, this 

case does not appear to fit the “me too” paradigm. Certainly, plaintiff has proffered no authority 

holding that evidence of one decision maker’s racially discriminatory treatment of others can be 

“me too” evidence probative of another decision maker’s retaliatory (not discriminatory) intent 

in firing the plaintiff for engaging in protected activity. This kind of apples-to-oranges 

comparison is unhelpful and improper, even in the context of a “me too” theory.

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II. Motion in Limine Regarding Injuries and Medical Treatment.

Daphne Utilities’ second Motion in Limine seeks an order excluding plaintiff Goodloe 

from offering evidence or argument at trial “concerning the alleged injuries or treatment of 

Plaintiff Cedric Goodloe in this case.” (Doc. 134, at 1.) Defendant maintains that, while 

Goodloe testified in his deposition that he suffers from cardiovascular disease and takes 

Lisinopril for hypertension, Goodloe never disclosed medical testimony to provide a diagnosis or 

to establish medical causation for these alleged injuries. In the absence of this necessary factual 

predicate, Daphne Utilities maintains, any such evidence of Goodloe’s medical issues is 

inadmissible.

Defendant misapprehends the nature of Goodloe’s anticipated testimony. The deposition 

excerpt appended to the Motion in Limine reflects the following: (i) Goodloe was diagnosed with 

a medical condition pursuant to which he was prescribed Lisinopril; (ii) after Daphne Utilities 

fired him, Goodloe became uninsured and could no longer afford this prescription medication; 

(iii) without his medication, Goodloe experienced “physical discomfort” in the form of “very 

strong heart palpitations which created an inability to sleep.” (Doc. 134, Exh. A at 94-95.) As 

plaintiff states in his Response (doc. 142), his testimony on this issue will simply be to describe 

“how he feels when on his medication as oppose[d] to how he feels when he is off of his 

medication.” (Doc. 142, at 1.) Such testimony falls squarely within the boundaries of 

admissibility under Rule 701, Fed.R.Evid., and does not require a foundation of expert 

testimony. Thus, the Second Motion in Limine Regarding Injuries and Medical Treatment (doc. 

134) is denied.

3

 3 The reasoning and result would be different if Goodloe were arguing that the 

absence of medication caused him to have a newly diagnosed medical problem for which he 

seeks compensation in this lawsuit. The Court’s understanding, however, is that Goodloe simply 

wants to testify that he was taking medication for a previously diagnosed medical condition, that 

he could not afford that medication after he was fired and lost his health insurance, and that he 

experienced specified physical discomfort (for which he seeks compensatory damages) when he 

stopped taking his medication. All of that testimony is rationally based on Goodloe’s own 

perception, is helpful to determining a fact in issue, and does not require scientific, technical or 

other specialized knowledge; therefore, it is admissible as a lay opinion under Rule 701. If 

Daphne Utilities wishes to attack Goodloe’s lay opinion as lacking medical corroboration, then 

its recourse is cross-examination, not exclusion of the lay opinion itself.

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III. Motion in Limine Regarding Punishment.

The third Motion in Limine filed by Daphne Utilities seeks to bar plaintiff Goodloe and 

his lawyer from arguing that the jury needs to “send a message” to Daphne Utilities, take 

decisive action to jar Daphne Utilities into correcting its personnel practices, or otherwise 

“punish the Defendant.” (Doc. 135, at 1.) Movant theorizes that any such arguments by 

Goodloe would serve only to inflame the passions of the jury, and are improper in the context of 

plaintiff’s claims, which do not encompass punitive damages.

In his Response (doc. 141), plaintiff disclaims any intention of arguing to the jury that it 

should award damages against Daphne Utilities as punishment. Given this statement, it is 

unclear exactly what Daphne Utilities’ concern is, or upon what legal footing any such concern 

rests. It is also unclear exactly what plaintiff’s counsel intends to argue about damages at trial. 

Surely, plaintiff’s proposed arguments encouraging the jury to “hold[ ] Defendant accountable 

for the wayward behavior of its managers by a favorable verdict for the Plaintiff” (doc. 141, at 1) 

would not be improper. Rather than engaging in the unproductive hypothetical exercise of 

attempting to anticipate exactly how plaintiff’s closing argument will be framed, the Court will 

address any objections to plaintiff’s counsel’s arguments concerning damages in context at the 

time they are made.4 Because Daphne Utilities has not identified any specific objectionable 

damages-related arguments that Goodloe intends to assert at trial, Defendant’s Third Motion in 

Limine Regarding Punishment (doc. 135) is denied.

5

 4 To guide the parties’ trial preparations, the Court strongly encourages them to 

review the damages instruction found at Eleventh Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instructions § 4.9 

(2013 ed.), as referenced in § 4.21. Because that legal statement of the permissible components 

of a damage award will govern here, the parties should refrain from making any damages-related 

arguments that diverge from the legal principles set forth therein. The parties are also reminded 

that, as a general rule, “an attorney is to be given a good deal of leeway in his argument to the 

jury, and a trial judge has wide discretion in regulating the scope of the argument.” Commercial 

Credit Equipment Corp. v. L & A Contracting Co., 549 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1977). While 

arguments that misstate the law, misrepresent the facts, or encourage jurors to render a verdict 

based on emotion are improper, a vast range of permissible arguments is available to a plaintiff 

during closing arguments. This Court will not erect artificial boundaries to curtail that broad 

spectrum.

5 In a Reply (doc. 148) filed on May 5, 2015, Daphne Utilities submits additional 

argument and authority for the proposition that plaintiff’s counsel should be precluded from 

asking the jury to “send a message or punish the Defendant through a favorable verdict.” (Doc. 

148, ¶ 5.) Perhaps, but plaintiff has never intimated that he intends to make such requests or use 

(Continued)

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IV. Motion in Limine Regarding Insurance.

Daphne Utilities’ fourth Motion in Limine seeks to preclude plaintiff Goodloe from 

presenting any evidence or argument to the jury that Daphne Utilities had insurance during the 

relevant time period, that an insurance claim was made concerning Goodloe’s allegations, or that 

an insurance company may foot the bill for any award that the jury may make. As support for 

this Motion, Daphne Utilities argues that such evidence would impermissibly prejudice and 

confuse the jury. In Response (doc. 143), plaintiff indicates that he does not oppose this Motion 

in Limine; thus, it appears that plaintiff does not intend to offer any such insurance-related 

evidence or argument at trial. Because the Fourth Motion in Limine Regarding Insurance (doc. 

136) is unopposed, it is granted. Plaintiff is not to present any evidence or argument to the jury

relating to Daphne Utilities’ insurance status, the presence or absence of insurance coverage for 

Goodloe’s claims, or whether defendant filed a claim with any insurance company as a result of 

Goodloe’s lawsuit.

V. Motion in Limine Regarding Settlement.

The fifth defense Motion in Limine simply asks the Court to enforce the Federal Rules of 

Evidence as they relate to “any settlement negotiations or settlement discussions in this case.” 

(Doc. 137, at 1.) Defendant does not identify any prohibited evidence or argument that Goodloe 

might seek to introduce, and indeed does not come forward with any suggestion that Goodloe 

will seek to place evidence of settlement negotiations or discussions before the jury. Be that as it 

may, Goodloe has indicated that he does not oppose this Motion. (See doc. 143.) Accordingly, 

the Fifth Motion in Limine Regarding Settlement (doc. 137) is granted. Plaintiff is not to 

present any testimony or argument relating to settlement negotiations in this case.

VI. Motion in Limine Regarding Unsigned Letters.

As its sixth Motion in Limine, Daphne Utilities seeks a ruling that excludes Goodloe 

from introducing into evidence or otherwise referencing Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11, which consists of 

two unsigned letters. The first such letter purportedly “complains about the alleged pay disparity 

 

such language to the jury. This kind of speculative exercise of quarreling about phrases and 

arguments that plaintiff’s counsel has never professed any intention to present is not 

constructive. In lieu of such an endeavor, the Court will take up any objections to plaintiff’s 

closing argument in context, subject to the guidelines and provisions identified in footnote 4, 

supra.

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between Caucasian and African American employees” at Daphne Utilities, while the second 

purportedly accuses “upper level managers [of] misappropriating funds.” (Doc. 138, at 2.) The 

crux of the Motion in Limine is that these letters are irrelevant to Goodloe’s claims, would be 

unfairly prejudicial, and constitute inadmissible hearsay.

Plaintiff’s Response (doc. 147) reflects that he does not oppose this Motion in Limine. 

On that basis, the Sixth Motion in Limine Regarding Unsigned Letters (doc. 138) is granted. 

Plaintiff may not rely on, reference, elicit testimony concerning, or offer into evidence the two 

letters found at Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11.

VII. Motion to Amend Pretrial Document.

Finally, Daphne Utilities has moved to amend the Joint Pretrial Document as to Cedric 

Goodloe (doc. 127) that the parties submitted on April 8, 2015. In particular, Daphne Utilities 

contemplates amending the Pretrial Document to add six new documents to its exhibit list as 

Exhibits 44 through 49. These documents are described as “reconciliation documents,” meaning 

that they are portions of ledger reports that related to Goodloe’s work for Daphne Utilities. 

According to defendant, Goodloe’s job duties included payroll and benefits reconciliation, and 

these new Exhibits 44 through 49 demonstrate inadequacies in Goodloe’s performance of that 

particular duty.

For his part, Goodloe objects that the proposed supplementation is improper on 

timeliness grounds. (See docs. 130, 144.) In particular, plaintiff asserts that Exhibits 44 through 

49 were neither provided nor mentioned “during Defendant’s initial disclosures, during 

discovery, or during its compliance with rules relating to pre-trial disclosures,” and states that he 

would incur prejudice if Daphne Utilities were allowed to inject these exhibits into this case on 

the eve of trial. (Doc. 130, at 1.) According to Goodloe, Daphne Utilities is attempting to 

achieve an impermissible “trial by ambush” through these exhibits.

Several observations are germane here. First, to the extent that Goodloe’s objection rests 

on Daphne Utilities’ failure to reference these exhibits in its initial disclosures, it is unpersuasive. 

Of course, applicable rules require a litigant to make initial disclosures including “a copy – or a 

description by category and location – of all documents ... that the disclosing party has in its 

possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses.” Rule 

26(a)(1)(A)(ii), Fed.R.Civ.P. Daphne Utilities did not describe these reconciliation documents to 

Goodloe in its initial disclosures, and indeed did not disclose them at all until April 10, 2015. To 

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explain this delay, defendant submits an affidavit from its General Manager specifying that he 

“was not unaware of these ledger reports ... until immediately prior to the time that Daphne 

Utilities moved to supplement the pretrial document with these exhibits on April 10, 2015.” 

(Lyndall Aff. (doc. 139, Exh. A), ¶ 2.) Goodloe fires back that this explanation is unsatisfactory 

and that Daphne Utilities was obliged to investigate its case fully and comprehensively prior to

the time of its original disclosures. This contention overstates the initial disclosure requirement 

by a substantial margin. In fact, Rule 26 requires only that a party must make initial disclosures 

“based on the information then reasonably available to it.” Rule 26(a)(1)(E). And the official 

commentary clarifies that “[t]he rule does not demand an exhaustive investigation at this stage of 

the case, but one that is reasonable under the circumstances.” Rule 26, Fed.R.Civ.P., Advisory 

Committee Notes (1993). The Court has no information and no reason to believe that Daphne 

Utilities did not perform an investigation that was “reasonable under the circumstances” when it 

submitted its initial disclosures; therefore, it is far from clear that a violation of Rule 26(a)(1) 

occurred here.

Second, while Daphne Utilities was under an obligation to supplement its initial 

disclosures “in a timely manner,” no such supplementation is required “if the additional or 

corrective information has ... otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 

discovery process.” Rule 26(e)(1)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff contends that Daphne Utilities 

never mentioned performance issues as a factor in the decision to terminate Goodloe’s 

employment until after the summary judgment process had concluded. (Doc. 144, at 1-3.) This 

assertion is demonstrably inaccurate. In interrogatory responses, Daphne Utilities stated as the 

reasons for Goodloe’s discharge that, among other things, he “was only marginally effective in 

his payroll and benefits duties” and displayed “mediocre performance.” (Interrogatory Response 

#5.) In a summary judgment affidavit, Daphne Utilities’ General Manager said exactly the same 

thing. (Lyndall Aff. (doc. 82, Exh. 3), ¶ 4.) Plaintiff cannot reasonably be heard to complain 

now that he was not on notice that Daphne Utilities was claiming a performance-based reason for 

his termination. Having such notice relatively early in the discovery process, plaintiff could have 

followed up with appropriate inquiries about the specifics of the alleged performance 

shortcomings and requested copies of documentation that might substantiate same. Plaintiff’s 

failure to do so vitiates much of the equitable force of his present cries of “trial by ambush.” The 

point is that there is a credible argument that Daphne Utilities did not violate Rule 26(e)’s 

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supplementation requirement because Goodloe was reasonably made aware of the existence of a 

performance justification for the challenged personnel action during the discovery process, and 

several months before trial, yet he did not follow up in any discernable manner.

Third, assuming (without deciding) that Daphne Utilities violated the Rule 26 disclosure 

requirements by not disclosing Exhibits 44 through 49 at an earlier date, exclusion is not an 

appropriate remedy in this case. After all, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that 

where a party fails to provide timely disclosure or supplementation as required under Rule 26, 

“the party is not allowed to use that information ... at a trial, unless the failure was substantially 

justified or is harmless.” Rule 37(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. Here, the facts before the Court 

unequivocally establish that the delayed disclosure of Exhibits 44 through 49 was harmless.

As indicated previously, plaintiff was on notice from defendant’s interrogatory responses 

and summary judgment submissions that there was a performance component to Daphne 

Utilities’ stated justifications for terminating Goodloe’s employment. Notwithstanding such 

notice, Goodloe did not press Daphne Utilities for details about the alleged performance 

shortcomings via deposition questioning, supplemental interrogatories, requests for production of 

documents, or even requests to reopen discovery during the summary judgment proceedings. 

Given plaintiff’s track record in this litigation, there is no reason to believe that Goodloe would 

have done anything with these exhibits had their existence been disclosed to him at the outset of 

the case. Besides, Goodloe has never specified what steps he would have taken had this 

information been disclosed to him earlier or how it might have affected his discovery plan or trial 

preparations, particularly given his failure to take any discovery about performance issues even 

after they were brought to his attention as a ground for discharge.

6

 The conclusory allegation of 

“prejudice” does not appear to be substantiated by facts. Finally, as plaintiff himself recognizes, 

the utility of Exhibits 44 through 49 for defendant’s case at trial is modest, at best. These do not 

appear to be significant, game-changing documents; to the contrary, Danny Lyndall, the Daphne 

 6 On that point, it bears emphasis that Daphne Utilities disclosed and furnished 

Exhibits 44 through 49 to Goodloe’s counsel on April 10, 2015, some 46 days before the jury 

trial setting in this case. Had Goodloe requested limited reopener of discovery (formally or 

informally) to enable him to investigate what defendant’s witnesses might have to say about 

these reconciliation statements, there would have been ample time to accommodate such a 

request and alleviate any attendant prejudice, all without jeopardizing the trial date. No such 

request was made.

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Utilities decision maker who fired Goodloe, has signed a sworn Affidavit confirming that he 

“was not aware of these ledger reports” until April 10, 2015, more than two years after the 

subject termination decision. Also, certain of those exhibits appear to predate Daphne Utilities’

decision to hire Goodloe as a full-time employee, suggesting that defendant did not view this as a 

serious performance problem. Plaintiff is thus well-positioned to cross-examine Lyndall about 

those exhibits (which Lyndall admittedly had never seen and was not even aware of when he 

fired Goodloe) and their role, if any, in the termination decision.7 The evidentiary value of these 

records appears limited, thus attenuating any prejudice that might otherwise accrue to Goodloe.

Given plaintiff’s failure to utilize available discovery tools to explore defendant’s 

allegation that Goodloe had been fired for, among other things, “mediocre performance,” and the 

fact that the reconciliation documents do not appear to have significant evidentiary value in 

establishing grounds for his discharge, the Court readily concludes that any violation by Daphne 

Utilities of its Rule 26 disclosure obligations as to those documents is harmless. As such, 

Exhibits 44 through 49 will not be excluded. Defendant’s Motion to Amend Pretrial Document 

(doc. 129) is granted pursuant to Rule 16(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Joint Pretrial Document (doc. 

127) filed by the parties on April 8, 2015 is amended to include Exhibits 44 through 49 in 

defendant’s exhibit list, with the content of such exhibits to be as specified in the body of the 

Motion to Amend.

VIII. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Defendant’s First Motion in Limine Regarding Other Claims (doc. 133), 

Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine Regarding Injuries and Medical Treatment 

(doc. 134), and Defendant’s Third Motion in Limine Regarding Punishment (doc. 

135) are denied;

 7 That is not to say, however, that Exhibits 44 through 49 are irrelevant. 

Defendant’s evidence is that Daphne Utilities Finance Manager Teresa Logiotatos had 

previously “mentioned” to Lyndall “that there were deficiencies in Cedric Goodloe’s work 

regarding the payroll and benefits reconciliation.” (Lyndall Aff. (doc. 139, Exh. A), ¶ 2.) These 

exhibits apparently corroborate Logiotatos’s statement to Lyndall, even if Lyndall never saw 

them or knew they existed. If Lyndall relied on the Logiotatos remark to justify firing Goodloe, 

then the reconciliation documents would be relevant to corroborate that remark.

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2. Defendant’s Fourth Motion in Limine Regarding Insurance (doc. 136), 

Defendant’s Fifth Motion in Limine Regarding Settlement (doc. 137), and 

Defendant’s Sixth Motion in Limine Regarding Unsigned Letters (doc. 138) are 

granted; and

3. Defendant’s Motion to Amend Pretrial Document (doc. 129) is granted, such that 

the Joint Pretrial Document (doc. 127) is amended to include Defendant’s 

Exhibits 44 through 49.

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of May, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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