alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Cedric BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Captain GREGORY, Correctional Officer; Sergeant Everton, Supervisor of C Platoon, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-6561.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted May 17, 2001.

Decided May 29, 2001.

Cedric Boyd, pro se.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Cedric Boyd appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Boyd v. Gregory,*No. CA-01-204-2 (E.D.Va. Mar. 29, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit 10.16


 


AMENDMENT
#4 TO JOINT DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT


 


WHEREAS, CDx, Inc. ("CDX")
and Next Dimension Technologies, Inc. ("NDT") are parties to a Joint Development Agreement executed by the parties on
November 1, 2013, as modified by Amendment #1, Amendment, #2, and Amendment #3 to the Joint Development Agreement executed by the
parties on April 21, 2014, July 1, 2015, and March 13, 2015, respectively (the "Agreement"); and


 


WHEREAS, pursuant to Paragraph 11.3
of the Agreement, both parties now desire to further modify and amend the Agreement;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration
of the mutual undertakings of the parties as set forth below as well as other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, CDX and NDT do hereby mutually agree as follows:


 


1.     With respect to Exhibit
B, Paragraph 4, NDT agrees to extend, at no additional cost, the license agreement negotiation period beyond ninety (90) days
to no later than May 19, 2015.


 


2.     All remaining terms and conditions of
Agreement remain in full force and effect, as modified and amended hereby and are hereby ratified by the parties.


 


3.     After full execution of this
Amendment #4, the Agreement shall be deemed to include the modifications and amendments herein.


 


IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment #4 to be executed by their authorized representatives as of the respective dates
written below.


 


	CDX,
    Inc.	 	Next
    Dimension Technologies, Inc.
	 	 	 
	By:	/s/
    Daniel Yazbeck	 	By:	/s/
    William Royea
	Name:
                                         

        
	Daniel
    Yazbeck	 	Name:	William
    Royea
	Title:	President	 	Title:	President
	 	 	 	 	 
	Date:
    	May
    19, 2015		Date:
    	May
19, 2015
Exhibit 10.7 - Director Compensation Summary Q4 F15




Exhibit 10.7


Director Compensation Summary


The members of the Lionsgate’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) who are not employees of Lionsgate (the “Non-Employee Directors”) receive an annual retainer of $50,000, an award of restricted share units with a grant date value of $50,000 granted annually on the date of the Lionsgate’s Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, and a fee of $1,400 for each meeting of a committee on which a Non-Employee Director is a member and attends, in person or via teleconference or videoconference. The restricted share units vest in annual installments over three years following the date of grant and are paid upon vesting in an equivalent number of Lionsgate common shares (the “Shares”).  Additionally, the non-employee Chairman of the Board receives an additional annual retainer of $52,000, the Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Board receives an additional annual retainer of $15,000, and the Chairman of the Compensation Committee of the Board, the Chairman of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee of the Board, and the Chairman of the Strategic Advisory Committee of the Board each receive an additional annual retainer of $10,000. 


The retainers and fees for the Non-Employee Directors are paid, at the director’s election, either 50% in cash and 50% in the form of Shares, or 100% in the form of Shares. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Board retains discretion to provide for the retainers for one or more directors to be paid in a different mix of cash and Shares (including payment of the entire retainer in cash) as it determines appropriate. Retainers are paid in two installments each year, with the number of Shares to be delivered in payment of any retainer to be determined by dividing the dollar amount of the retainer to be paid in the form of Shares by the average closing price of Shares for the previous five business days prior to payment. 


Lionsgate requires that Non-Employee Directors maintain an ownership position in Lionsgate of at least $150,000 of Shares; provided, however, that new directors shall have three years from their initial election to the Board to reach this ownership threshold. Pursuant to Lionsgate’s policies, directors are also reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-106113, 333-75994, 333-61694, 333-116619, 333-116618, and 333-135235) of Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc. of our report, dated February 26, 2009, relating to the consolidated financial statements,financial statement schedule, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc., which appears in this Form 10-K. 

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 

McLean, Virginia 

February 26, 2009
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ABEL GAMEZ-PEREZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 15-71141

Agency No. A200-699-267

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 14, 2016** 

Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Jose Abel Gamez-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for cancellation of

removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo

FILED

JUN 20 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005).

We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Gamez-Perez’s unexhausted contentions

that the IJ erred and violated due process by relying on his criminal history in the

hardship analysis. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (we

lack jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative

proceedings before the BIA). 

Accordingly, Gamez-Perez’s contention that the BIA erred in failing to

address these claims is without merit, where he failed to raise them to the BIA. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

2 15-71141
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Shelter
Properties I Limited Partnership 1997 Third Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000316220
<NAME> SHELTER PROPERTIES I LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           1,906
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       16
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          19,742
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,417
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   9,967
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         11,494
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (2,114)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     9,967
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,776
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,265
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 721
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       511
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    33.73<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH
31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          21,444
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          97,476
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               144,358
<TRADING-ASSETS>                             1,002,957
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    143,442
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       1,482,409
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         1,455,585
<LOANS>                                      1,572,329
<ALLOWANCE>                                      6,863
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,791,466
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,087,346
<SHORT-TERM>                                 2,065,587
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            141,694
<LONG-TERM>                                  1,097,803
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,495
<COMMON>                                        42,419
<OTHER-SE>                                     355,122
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               4,791,466
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 24,431
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               41,843
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 5,230
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                71,504
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              13,104
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              47,442
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           10,958
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      848
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                              28,362
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 24,438
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 22,593
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      22,593
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    20,276
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.46
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.45
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    1.03
<LOANS-NON>                                      7,637
<LOANS-PAST>                                    70,995
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 6,136
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      158
<RECOVERIES>                                        37
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                6,863
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             6,863
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-93,754-01

EX PARTE KWAMAE LADON NEWBY, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. W17-75404-K(A) IN THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT # 4

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Applicant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and was sentenced to thirty years’

imprisonment. Applicant did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ

of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends, among other things, that his plea was involuntary because trial counsel

failed to investigate his background and incorrectly advised him on his ability to be placed on

community supervision. Further, Applicant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

file a motion for new trial and for failing to file a notice of appeal. Applicant has alleged facts that,

if true, might entitle him to relief. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Ex parte Argent, 393
2

S.W.3d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court

is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial

court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claims. Trial counsel’s response should

include whether Applicant requested trial counsel file a motion for new trial and notice of appeal,

whether trial counsel investigated Applicant’s background, and what trial counsel told Applicant

regarding his ability to be placed on community supervision. In developing the record, the trial court

may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall

determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by

counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this

Court of counsel’s name.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant’s

plea was involuntary and whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient. The trial court may

make anyother findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant’s claims.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from

the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s

findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things,

affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from

hearings and depositions. See TEX.R.APP.P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested

by the trial court and obtained from this Court.

Filed: June 22, 2022

Do not publish
**EXHIBIT 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

William C. Owens as Chief Executive Officer and President of Owens Financial Group, Inc., the General Partner of Owens Mortgage Investment Fund, a California Limited Partnership (the “Registrant”), and Bryan H. Draper, as Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Owens Financial Group, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:

(1)      the Registrant’s Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”) fully complies with the applicable requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Registrant at the dates and for the periods indicated.

 

/s/ William C. Owens

William C. Owens

Chief Executive Officer and President of Owens Financial Group, Inc., General Partner

November 14, 2006

 

/s/ Bryan H. Draper

Bryan H. Draper

Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Owens Financial Group, Inc., General Partner

November 14, 2006
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
                     906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Telecom, Inc. ("the Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Alexander
Vinogradov, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; as
                  amended; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
12th day March 2004.

/s/ ALEXANDER VINOGRADOV
-----------------------------------------
Alexander Vinogradov
President, Chief Executive Officer and
Director
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Victor E. Grijalva, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of WQN, Inc. certify that:
 1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of WQN, Inc.; and  2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report.         Date: April 29, 2005          By: /s/ Victor E. Grijalva                Victor E. Grijalva,
#### In the Matter of the Petition of Emma F. Condon to Prove a Certain Lost Instrument as the Last Will and Testament of John Condon, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Kings County,

March 19, 1925.

Wills — lost will — probate — evidence shows that will was left with attorney and was not again in testator’s possession — will admitted to probate under Surrogate’s Court Act, § 143.

The will of the testator was properly admitted to probate as a lost will under section 143 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, since it appears that the will was executed by the testator and left in the possession of Ms attorney and was not again in the possession of the testator; that a careful, exhaustive search was . made for the will but it could not be found, and that while the attorney with whom the will was left purported to have no recollection, the evidence, including declarations by the testator, to wMch no objection was made, shows that the attorney had the possession of the will and that it was not thereafter in the possession of the testator.

Proceeding for probate of lost will.

*John H. Donlan,*for the petitioner.

*Isidor F. Greene,*for the contestants.

*James H. McCabe,*special guardian."

Wingate, S.:

Section 143 of the Surrogate’s Court Act permits the probate of a lost or destroyed will “ only in case the will was in existence at the time of the testator’s death, or was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime * *

Failure to find a will after careful and exhaustive search raises a presumption that the decedent destroyed it with the intention of revolting it. *(Knapp*v. *Knapp,*10 N. Y. 276; *Collyer*v. *Collyer,*110 id. 481; *Matter of Kennedy,*167 id. 163; *Matter of Cunnion,*201 id. 123; *Matter of Sheldon,*158 App. Div. 843; *Matter of Ascheim,*75 Misc. 434.) This presumption would be rebutted by proof that upon the execution of the will it was deposited by the testator with a custodian, and that the testator did not thereafter have it in his possession or have access to it. *(Schultz*v. *Schultz,*35 N. Y. 653.)

It is urged that the proofs submitted upon the hearing, consisting partly of declarations of the testator, show that the will was left with the attorney who drew it, and that it was lost by the latter in the decedent’s lifetime, such loss being equivalent to a fraudulent destruction as to the testator within the meaning of the statute. *(Schultz*v. *Schultz, supra.)*

*846No objection was made on the trial to the evidence of declarations of the testator, and no exception was taken to its admission. These declarations being evidence in the case, must be considered and given the weight to which they are entitled. *(Voorhis*v. *Voorhis,*50 Barb. 119, 125; affd., 39 N. Y. 463, see p. 466.) They outweigh the lack of recollection of the attorney, and it is found that the original will was left with the attorney after it was executed, was not thereafter in testator’s possession, and he did not have access to it.

The will is admitted to probate.

Let a decision and decree be settled accordingly.
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 412 -CR

G e r ar do Le yv a , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 97- 832- K2 6 , HO NORAB LE B ILLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D UM O P I N I O N
On Marc h 11, 1998, Ger ardo L ey va wa s convicted of ag g ravated sexual assault in the above Wil liamson County cause . The conviction was aff irmed by this Court. L eyva v . S ta te , No. 03-09-412- CR (Tex. App.—Austi n 1999, no pet.) (not de signated for publication).

On May 7 , 2009, L ey

va filed his pro se “motion to enter notice of appe al nunc pr o tun c ” in t he dis tr ic t c ourt . In the mot ion , L e y va c on te nd s that he wa s d e nie d th e op po rt un ity to f ile
a pe tit ion fo r d isc re tio na

ry re vie w a nd a sk s th e c ourt

to “ a llo w the re c or ds to s ho w his e lig ibi lity to file his petition for discre tionary revie w.” The dist rict clerk t reated t he mot ion as a notice of appe al and for war ded it to this C ourt. SeeTex. R. App. P . 25.2(e)
. I t is too l ate to per fec t an appe al from the 1998 c onvi ct i o n an d, in any event, the conviction was pr eviously appea led and a ffirme d. The prope r p ro cedur e for establishing L ey

va’s2

en t i t l em en tt o an o u t -o f- t i m e d i s cr et i o n ary re v i ew i s a p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ab ea s co rp u s p ro ce ed i n g. SeeTex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West Supp. 2008).

The a ppeal is dismissed.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: September

17, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh