IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SUELLEN SHAW, )

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Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Action No. 14-0111-CG-B

MOBILE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL 

SYSTEM,

Defendant.

ORDER

This case concerns a claim of discriminatory hiring practices within the 

Mobile County Public School System. Suellen Shaw (“Plaintiff”) alleges the 

Mobile County Public School System (“Defendant”) hires male driver’s 

education teachers so they can coach football or other male sports. As a 

result, Plaintiff contends Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her 

based on her gender when she applied for certain driver’s education positions. 

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) 

and supporting materials (Docs. 36 – 39), Plaintiff’s response in opposition to 

the motion (Doc. 44) and supporting materials (Docs. 45 – 51), and 

Defendant’s reply. (Doc. 52). Upon careful consideration and for the reasons 

set forth herein, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is due to be 

denied.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

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Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 16, 2013. (Doc. 1, p. 3). 

After the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter (Doc. 1, Exh. 1, p. 1), Plaintiff 

filed her complaint on March 11, 2014. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff initially sued 

the Mobile County Board of School Commissioners in their individual and 

official capacities, but the parties agreed to dismiss the individual

defendants. (Docs. 10, 12, 13, 17). Plaintiff maintains her claim against the 

Mobile County Public School System. 

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant unlawfully discriminated 

against her based on her gender, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1

(Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff specifically alleged “Defendant has engaged in a 

pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex,” and “Plaintiff was 

rejected for the position of Driver’s Education Teacher by Defendant based on 

her sex.” (Doc. 1, p. 8). This caused Plaintiff to suffer mental anguish, loss of 

dignity, embarrassment, humiliation, severe emotional distress, and other 

injuries. (Doc. 1, p. 9). Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to redress this 

alleged discrimination. (Doc. 1, p. 8).

Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment 

arguing (1) Plaintiff “may only recover for discrete acts of discrimination that 

occurred on or after June 16, 2013” (Doc. 37, p. 5), (2) Plaintiff cannot show 

she suffered an adverse employment action (Doc. 37, p. 4), and (3) even if 

Plaintiff timely filed her EEOC complaint and suffered an adverse 

employment action, Defendant has presented legitimate non-discriminatory 

 1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 

“because of sex” or “on the basis of sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 

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reasons for its hiring decisions. (Doc. 37, p. 7; Doc. 52, pp. 2 – 5). Plaintiff 

responded to the motion, stating she need only “demonstrate that gender was 

a motivating factor for the employment practice, even though other factors 

also motivated the practice.” (Doc. 44, p. 1). Plaintiff also argues that she 

suffered an adverse employment action because the duties and 

responsibilities of the desired positions were materially different than the 

position she held. (Doc. 44, p. 8). Plaintiff contends there are disputed issues 

of material fact that prohibit granting Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 44, p. 20). 

II. Standard of Review

The court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(c) governs 

procedures and provides that a party seeking summary judgment bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion. This 

includes “identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The mere 

existence of a factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial; 

rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary 

judgment. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 

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809 (11th Cir. 2004). 

 The substantive law of the plaintiff’s cause of action determines 

which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If a non-moving party fails to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of its case on which it has the 

burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 323. In reviewing whether a non-moving party has met its 

burden, the Court must stop short of weighing the evidence and determining 

credibility. Instead, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of 

the non-moving party. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 –

99 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus the 

inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require 

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail 

as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

III. Facts2

Plaintiff is certified to teach physical education, driver’s education, and 

act as a school counselor. (Doc. 36, p. 1). Plaintiff currently works as a 

physical education teacher at Baker High School.3 (Doc. 36, pp. 1 – 2). Baker 

High School is located in Mobile County, Alabama, as are each of the high 

 2 At the summary judgment stage, the facts are taken in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant. Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998–99. The “facts, as 

accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the 

actual facts of the case.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 

n. 3 (11th Cir. 2000).

3 As a physical education teacher, Plaintiff also teaches some driver’s 

education classes. (Doc. 38, Exh. 1, p. 3). 

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schools discussed in this case. Prior to working at Baker, Plaintiff worked as 

a driver’s education teacher at Satsuma High School. (Doc. 45, p. 3). Plaintiff 

transferred to Satsuma in 2011 through Defendant’s mandatory transfer 

process. (Doc. 45, p. 3; Doc. 46, Exh. 1, pp. 1 – 2). While teaching driver’s 

education at Satsuma, Plaintiff received state recognition for her work. (Doc. 

44, p. 6; Doc. 46, Exh. 1, p. 2). Before working at Satsuma, Plaintiff worked at 

B.C. Rain High School from 2000 to 2011. (Doc. 45, p. 3). B.C. Rain classified 

Plaintiff as a driver’s education teacher, but she also coached girls’ sports and 

taught physical education courses there. (Doc. 45, p. 3). Plaintiff alleges she 

could not return to B.C. Rain after working at Satsuma because B.C. Rain 

“needed a slot for a football coach,” so “they waited for somebody to get 

certified” to teach driver’s education. (Doc. 45, p. 3; Doc. 46, Exh. 8, p. 3).

On May 15, 2012, Plaintiff asked Defendant about available driver’s 

education positions, observing “since Feb. 6th you and HR knew you needed 

to place me in a Driver Education position due to the Satsuma split. Since 

that time, a ‘hiring freeze’ has been put into place yet two (2) Driver 

Education positions, Blount and Baker, have been filled with hires from 

outside the system.” (Doc. 48, Exh. 12, p. 2). John Powell, Personnel 

Administrator with the Mobile County Pubic Schools, replied to Plaintiff’s 

inquiry and stated, “As I said previously I will try to find you a position to 

your liking. As you have been a coach during your career you understand the 

need to bring in coaches. That is what happened this semester.” (Doc. 48, 

Exh. 12, p. 1). 

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Ultimately, Plaintiff did not obtain a driver’s education position in 

2012. Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge in December 2012 asserting gender 

discrimination by Defendant. (Doc. 45, p. 12). Defendant responded to the 

charge and reported to the EEOC that it had no driver’s education vacancies 

in 2012 when Plaintiff herself transferred. (Doc. 45, p. 12; Doc. 49, Exh. 11, p.

2). Plaintiff’s 2012 EEOC charge did not proceed. (Doc. 45, pp. 11 – 12). 

Despite Defendant’s statement regarding vacancies (Doc. 49, Exh. 11, 

pp. 1 – 2),4 Plaintiff documents schools that hired or assigned male employees 

to teach driver’s education in 2012. Baker High School hired Carlton Everett 

around March 1, 2012 to teach driver’s education and coach football. (Doc. 45, 

p. 5).5 Around May 1, 2012, Blount High School hired Mark Hurt to teach 

 4 Defendant provides affidavits and depositions showing a high school 

principal can adjust the schedules of teachers with multiple certifications, for 

example, by adding a class to a teacher’s schedule in a different subject in 

which that teacher is also certified. (Doc. 38, Exh. 5, pp. 8 – 9). 

5 The record shows Baker High School may have initially hired Everett 

to teach Social Studies. (Doc. 46, Ex. 5, pp. 25 – 26). Everett, however, did not 

teach Social Studies. (Doc. 45, p. 7). 

Q So if Mr. Richardson hired a driver’s ed teacher in a social studies 

spot and never intended for him to teach social studies, that would be 

improper procedures; is that correct?

A I would say he was putting one over on us and trying to get around 

the mandatory transfer stuff.

Q And he would be --

A I would say that is wrong, yeah, I would say he’s wrong that he did 

that.

...

Q Were you aware that Clem Richardson indicated to Ms. Shaw that 

he didn’t have any vacancies?

A There he’s saying he doesn’t have any driver’s ed vacancies. I wasn't 

aware of this email exchange. I wasn’t aware that he did that. Like I 

said, some of our principals are more aggressive in trying to get who 

they want. Clem does a good job. I mean, every year he takes people on 

mandatory transfer. He takes people on the mandatory transfer list 

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physical education and coach football, and then reassigned him to driver’s 

education. (Doc. 45, pp. 5 – 6). In the summer of 2012, Mary G. Montgomery 

High School assigned Joseph Touchstone to teach driver’s education and 

coach football. (Doc. 45, p. 7). 

In 2013, Plaintiff applied and interviewed for driver’s education 

positions at Murphy High School and Citronelle High School. (Doc. 36, p. 2; 

Doc. 45, pp. 8 – 9). Plaintiff did not get either job; instead, the two schools 

selected male applicants to teach the driver’s education classes. (Doc. 36, p. 

2). One male applicant coached football and boys soccer (Doc. 47, Exh. 15, pp. 

2, 8), and the other male applicant coached baseball. (Doc. 50, pp. 3, 19). At 

the time the job offers were made, one of the male applicants was not 

certified to teach driver’s education. (Doc 45, p. 8). Currently, all of the 

driver’s education teachers at both high schools are men who coach male 

sports. (Doc. 45, pp. 6 n. 6, 8 – 9). 

Plaintiff notes there are thirty-one driver’s education teachers in 

Mobile County, and two are female. (Doc. 45, p. 11). Of those thirty-one 

teachers, thirteen are full-time and one of the full-time teachers is female. 

(Doc. 45, p. 11). Since 2005, only males who coach sports have been hired or 

placed in full-time driver’s education positions. (Doc. 45, p. 11). Plaintiff 

further asserts males who coach sports are routinely hired as driver’s 

education teachers even though those positions are not posted and advertised 

 

without a complaint. But, you know, this doesn’t look like he did the 

right thing on there.

(Dep. of Bryan Hack, Executive Manager of Human Resources, Mobile 

County Public School System, Doc. 46, Ex. 5, pp. 25 – 26).

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as required under Defendant’s policies and state law. (Doc. 45, pp. 1, 8 – 10). 

In her response, Plaintiff documents specific violations of hiring procedures, 

such as the failure to interview three candidates for job openings, the absence 

of interview control forms in the files of newly hired driver’s education 

teachers, and being informed during an interview for a driver’s education 

position that the school had already selected a male applicant for the job. 

(Doc. 44, pp. 2 n. 1, 13 – 16). 

On December 16, 2013, Plaintiff again filed an EEOC charge based on 

gender discrimination. (Doc. 37, p. 2). The EEOC issued to Plaintiff a rightto-sue letter on December 26, 2013. (Doc. 1, Exh. 1). Plaintiff initiated this 

lawsuit on March 11, 2014, claiming Defendant discriminated against her 

because of her sex. (Doc. 1).

IV. Analysis

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may be 

found liable for unlawful sex discrimination under any one of three separate 

theories: pattern and practice discrimination, disparate treatment 

discrimination, or disparate impact discrimination. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 

F.2d 1516, 1522, 1526 – 28 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing disparate impact 

theory, disparate treatment theory, and pattern or practice analysis). In this 

case, Plaintiff raises two of the three theories, pattern and practice 

discrimination and disparate treatment discrimination.6 (Doc. 1, p. 8). A

 6 Pleadings must state a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that a pleader is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). In her complaint, Plaintiff stated “[t]his is a 

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private litigant, however, cannot maintain a pattern or practice claim unless 

it is brought as a class action and a class is certified. Davis v. Coca-Cola 

Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 969 (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, Plaintiff may only 

proceed under a disparate treatment theory. 

The primary issue in a gender based disparate treatment claim is 

whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee 

because of her gender. See U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 

460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff bears 

the ultimate burden of proving that the employment action at issue was 

taken because of the plaintiff’s sex. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 

1564–65 (11th Cir. 1997). To meet this burden, plaintiffs must show 

discriminatory intent through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See

U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors, 460 U.S. at 714 n. 3. 

When a plaintiff lacks direct evidence and must prove discrimination 

circumstantially, the claim is evaluated using the McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden shifting framework. Under this 

framework, the Title VII plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a 

prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. The defendant can rebut the 

 

claim to redress unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of 

Title VII,” “Plaintiff was rejected for the position of Driver’s Education 

Teacher by Defendant based on her sex,” and “Defendant has engaged in a 

pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex.” (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff 

also provided factual allegations in support of her claim (Doc. 1, pp. 3 – 8), 

which may entitle her to relief. See id. at 679 (“When there are well-pleaded 

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). Plaintiff has 

sufficiently stated a gender discrimination claim under a disparate treatment 

theory. (Doc. 52, p. 5).

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disparate treatment claim if it can articulate a non-discriminatory reason for 

its employment action, as explained further below. Plaintiff can then argue 

the rationale provided by the defendant is a pretext. Id. at 804.

Before examining Plaintiff’s prima facie discrimination case, the Court 

must first determine whether Plaintiff timely filed her EEOC charge. If 

Plaintiff timely filed her EEOC charge, then the Court must consider 

whether she suffered an adverse employment action. If Plaintiff clears these 

two hurdles, the Court will analyze her discrimination claim. 

a. Filing an EEOC Charge

At the outset, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff properly

filed her EEOC charge. “Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, governs the filing of charges of discrimination 

with the EEOC.” Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 112 (2002). In 

order to assert a claim of gender discrimination under Title VII, a claimant 

must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged 

discriminatory practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).7 This 180-day period 

“begins to run from the time that the complainant knows or reasonably 

should know that the challenged act has occurred.” Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 

665 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The plaintiff also must 

file her complaint within 90 days of exhausting her administrative remedies 

and receiving her “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

 7 If the complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or local 

agency, the filing period is extended to 300 days or 30 days after the denial of 

relief by the agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). Because the 180–day period 

applies to this case, that figure will be used throughout. 

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5(f)(1); Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233 – 34 (11th Cir. 

2002). 

Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of 

transfer, or refusal to hire may start the 180-day clock for discrimination 

claims. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse 

employment decision constitutes a separate actionable “unlawful employment 

practice.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). 

“The timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a 

charge within a certain number of days after the unlawful practice 

happened.” Id. at 117.8

Here, Plaintiff filed the EEOC charge in question on December 16, 

2013. (Doc. 45, p. 12). Plaintiff relies on two discrete acts that occurred in the 

summer of 2013 for her EEOC complaint. The first discrete act occurred 

when a driver’s education teacher retired at Murphy High School, creating an 

 8 The Court recognizes that the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (“the 

Act”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. PUB. LAW NO. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).

The Act applies to discrimination cases concerning equal pay, which is not 

raised as an issue here, but it helps explain when an EEOC charge should be 

filed. The Act expressly overturned the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ledbetter 

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). In that case, the 

Supreme Court found the employee must “file charges year by year, each 

time Goodyear failed to increase her salary commensurate with the salaries 

of male peers.” As a result, “[a]ny annual pay decision not contested 

immediately (within 180 days)” became “grandfathered, a fait accompli 

beyond the province of Title VII ever to repair.” Id. at 644. (Ginsburg, J., 

dissenting). The law now provides each discriminatory paycheck (rather than 

simply the original decision to discriminate) resets the 180-day limit to file a 

claim. This is analogous to a discrete act that triggers or “resets” the 180-day 

limit. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113 (“Each discrete 

discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.”).

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opening for the position. The Principal of Murphy High School recommended 

a man who also coaches male sports for the position. (Doc. 45, p. 8). The male 

coach ultimately got the job in August 2013. (Doc. 50, pp. 7 – 8). This discrete 

act falls within the 180-day window for Plaintiff’s EEOC charge. The second 

discrete act took place when Citronelle High School had a vacancy for a 

driver’s education teacher in May 2013. On or about August 14, 2013, 

Citronelle hired a man who also coaches male sports for the position. (Doc. 

45, p. 9). These two discrete acts, which can be considered a refusal to hire or 

a denial of transfer, occurred less than 180 days before Plaintiff filed her 

EEOC charge in December 2013. Plaintiff timely filed her EEOC charge.

Defendant, however, argues that the “EEOC has no jurisdiction to 

consider claims based” on facts that “occurred before the date” Plaintiff filed 

her charge. (Doc. 37, p. 5). Defendant further argues the claims in a federal 

action cannot extend beyond those claims over which the EEOC had 

jurisdiction. (Doc. 37, p. 5). These arguments misconstrue the law, and 

require clarification. 

First, this Court can certainly consider claims based on facts that fall 

within the 180-day timeframe for filing an EEOC charge. And Plaintiff can 

cite anecdotal or statistical evidence beyond that timeframe to help prove 

discrimination.9 Second, “the scope of an EEOC complaint should not be 

 9 To be sure, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time 

barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113. The Supreme Court makes clear, 

however, that the “existence of past acts and the employee’s prior knowledge 

of their occurrence . . . does not bar employees from filing charges about 

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strictly interpreted.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 

1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 

Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that allegations in a judicial 

complaint filed pursuant to Title VII may encompass any kind of 

discrimination related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge). 

Here, the judicial complaint plainly encompasses the allegations contained in 

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge: gender discrimination specific to driver’s education 

teacher hiring in Mobile County. Finally, the requirement that a claimant file 

“a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of 

limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. 

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). In light of these 

considerations, the Court finds Plaintiff timely filed her EEOC charge in 

December 2013, and the scope of the EEOC charge concerns discriminatory 

driver’s education teacher hiring in Mobile County. 

b. Adverse Employment Action

Plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employment action to 

proceed in her discrimination claim. Defendant argues Plaintiff sought a 

purely lateral transfer, and therefore she did not suffer an adverse 

employment action when she did not get hired for the driver’s education 

 

related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and 

charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the 

statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in 

support of a timely claim.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiff’s pattern or practice 

evidence is not irrelevant simply because she cannot bring such a claim as a 

private litigant. Davis v. Coca-Cola, 516 F.3d at 970 n. 33. 

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positions at Murphy High School or Citronelle High School. (Doc. 37, pp. 6 –

7). “Whether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon 

the circumstances of the particular case, and should be judged from the 

perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all 

the circumstances.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

71 (2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Generally, an adverse employment action is a “tangible employment 

action [that] constitutes a significant change in employment status such as 

hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 

responsibilities or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (citations 

omitted). To prove an adverse employment action occurred, an employee 

must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, title, 

prestige, or privileges of employment. Davis v. Town of Lake Park Fla., 245 

F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of 

the significant adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling. Id. at 

1239; see also Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 – 54 (11th 

Cir. 1998) (discussing transfers that amount to adverse employment action, 

and advising district court it should explain why it believes that a reasonable 

person in plaintiff’s position would or would not have found the transfer to 

have been an adverse employment action). A “bruised ego” is not enough. 

Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff articulates reasons why teaching driver’s education is not 

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merely a lateral transfer and could be considered a better job than her 

current one as a physical education teacher at Baker High School. (Doc. 44, p. 

8). Plaintiff contends the driver’s education positions involve a change of 

duties and responsibilities, and a change of job classification. (Doc. 44, p. 8). 

Driver’s education teachers oversee fewer students at any given time than 

physical education teachers, and the jobs are generally less demanding. (Doc. 

44, p. 9). Additionally the driver’s education positions provide more free time

than other teaching jobs, which allows driver’s education teachers to pursue 

coaching opportunities and thus increase their overall salaries. (Doc. 44, p. 8). 

The principal at Citronelle High School stated that the driver’s education 

placement is considered “moving up.” (Doc. 44, p. 8; Doc. 46, Exh. 4, p. 4). 

Based on this record and considering all of the circumstances, a jury could

reasonably conclude that the failure to hire or transfer an employee from 

physical education to driver’s education would have been materially adverse 

to a reasonable employee.

c. Establishing a Prima Facie Gender Discrimination Case

Plaintiff first argues she has direct evidence of discrimination (Doc. 44, 

p. 2), but also states Defendant’s actions imply a discriminatory intent. (Doc. 

44, p. 4). Plaintiff then proceeds with a burden shifting analysis. (Doc. 44, p. 

4). The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s evidence of 

discrimination is circumstantial. (Doc. 52, pp. 1 – 2). Therefore, the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. Wilson v. B/E 

Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

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Under this framework, the burden is first on plaintiff to establish a prima 

facie case. To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title 

VII, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she 

was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated 

similarly situated employees who are not members of the plaintiff’s class 

more favorably; and (4) she was qualified for the job. Rice-Lamar v. City of 

Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 842 – 43 (11th Cir. 2000). “The burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Texas 

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff, a female, is a member of 

a protected class. See B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d at 1089. She applied for 

positions as a driver’s education teacher, and the positions were given to 

men. Plaintiff presents substantial evidence that she was qualified for the 

job. Plaintiff has thus satisfied the four factors needed for a prima facie 

discrimination case. 

d. Burden shifting after establishing prima facie case

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, 

the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. See id. If the employer 

meets this burden of production, the plaintiff must then establish that the 

defendant’s proffered reasons for the employee’s rejection were pretextual. 

Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). An employer’s 

deviation from its own standard procedures may serve as evidence of pretext. 

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Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 

2006); see also Bass v. Bd. of Cnty Com’rs, Orange Cnty, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 

1108 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that employer’s violation of its own hiring 

procedure could be evidence of pretext) overruled in part on other grounds by

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008).

Defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 

hiring decisions.10 (Doc. 37, p. 7). Defendant states the male employees hired 

at Murphy High School and Citronelle High School had good working 

relationships with the administrators at each school, and the Principals 

making the decisions held each of the employees in high esteem. (Doc. 37, p. 

7). Plaintiff argues this reasoning is pretext because neither position was 

posted, nor were interview procedures followed. (Doc. 44, p. 13). Plaintiff 

further states Defendant’s willingness to bend or break rules for the 

placement of male coaches in driver’s education is ample evidence of pretext. 

(Doc. 44, p. 14). The Court agrees. Thus Plaintiff has created an issue of fact 

as to whether the Defendant’s reason was untrue and discrimination 

occurred. As a result, Plaintiff has satisfied her pretext burden.

V. Conclusion

The Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated there are genuine disputes 

 10 Defendant, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), states it can “escape all 

liability for damages on the Title VII claim if [it] can establish that the same 

decision would have been made for non-discriminatory reasons.” (Doc. 37, p. 

4). Plaintiff may nevertheless obtain declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and 

attorney’s fees and costs if she proves Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. §2000e2(m) (employer using impermissible motivating factor). See 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). 

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of material facts underlying her discrimination claim. As a result, there are 

allegations in this case that a fact-finder must decide, and Defendant’s 

arguments cannot be decided as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of February, 2015. 

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00111-CG-B Document 53 Filed 02/02/15 Page 18 of 18