In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 20-2424

DONALD D. GADDIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRYAN J. DEMATTEI, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 18-CV-01729 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2021 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2022

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Good fences may make good

neighbors, but apparently in this case, a tree had no such

beneficial effect. Donald Gaddis was arrested for disorderly

conduct in Marion, Illinois, following an altercation with his

neighbors over some tree branches. Afterward he filed this

civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted false arrest
2 No. 20-2424

claims against the neighbors, a visiting guest, and the arresting

officers involved (Counts I and II). He also brought a Monell

claim against the City of Marion and requested injunctive relief

against Dawn Tondini, the former Chief of Police for the City

of Marion (Counts III and IV). See Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978). The district court granted the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and Gaddis

appeals. For the reasons described below, we affirm. 

I.

Because we are reviewing a motion for summary judgment,

we accept Gaddis’s version of what transpired as true, noting

discrepancies where relevant. The trouble started on October

20, 2017 with a tree on the property of Gaddis’s next door

neighbor on North Highland Avenue, Dorothy McCombs.

Gaddis cut down a number of limbs and branches from

McCombs’s tree that were extending into his yard. He then

threw the cut branches back into McCombs’s yard. McCombs

asked Gaddis to pick up the branches from her yard, but he, in

his own words “didn’t say a word to her,” and left the

branches in her yard. (Gaddis Dep. at 37.) Charles Winstead,

who lived across the street and was aware of the ongoing tree

dispute, informed McCombs that the branches were still there. 

Upon learning this, Gaddis crossed the street to Winstead’s

home and knocked on the door. Through the glass door he saw

a guest of Winstead’s, Cameron Dunford, who Gaddis had

never met. In Gaddis’s account, he said nothing and turned

back around to return home. While Gaddis was still in the

street, Winstead appeared, carrying a rake, and asked Gaddis

what he wanted. Gaddis told Winstead he needed to mind his
No. 20-2424 3

own business and then returned home. McCombs, who had

been watching the scene unfold from her side of the road, told

Gaddis, Winstead, and Dunford that she had called the police. 

Shortly thereafter, three police officers arrived: Bryan

DeMattei, Logan Spinka, and William Lannom. Officer Spinka

came to Gaddis’s front door and spoke with him through the

screen door about the situation, at which point Gaddis complained that calling the police had been a cowardly thing to do.

Officer Lannom joined them. Gaddis describes talking to the

officers for ten to fifteen minutes and telling them, among

other things, that “people were acting like girls around this

place.” (Gaddis Dep. at 53). Meanwhile, Officer DeMattei went

across the street to hear Winstead and Dunford’s version of

what had happened. As this all transpired, a “bunch” of

neighbors gathered because, as Gaddis explained, “Dorothy

McCombs had stirred them, acting like I’m trying to cut down

a little old lady’s tree.” (Gaddis Dep. at 53). Officer DeMattei

then came over to Gaddis’s porch and told him through the

door that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct. Gaddis

initially refused to come out of his home, but stepped out onto

the porch after Officer Lannom told him he would also be

charged with resisting arrest if he failed to come outside.

Gaddis complied and was arrested for disorderly conduct.

In Dunford’s telling of the event, Gaddis did more than

appear on the porch and knock on the door. Instead he told

Winstead to “come out you coward” after “pounding and

pounding” on his door. He then repeatedly called Winstead

and Dunford “little girls,” and said “you want to go old man?”

to Winstead. (Dunford Dep. at 16–21).
4 No. 20-2424

As Winstead recalls it, Gaddis knocked on his door and

said, “this was none of your business.” When Winstead walked

outside carrying the rake, Gaddis goaded him by repeatedly

saying, “come on, come on,” but eventually went back to his

own house when Winstead turned away. McCombs said the

whole thing started when Gaddis cut her tree limbs “in the

dead of night” and she woke up the next morning and photographed the limbs in her yard. (McCombs Dep. 8). She further

testified that on the day of his arrest, Gaddis was “erratic and

threatening and screaming” and pounding on Winstead’s door

because he “wanted to fight.” She called the police on the basis

of her belief that Gaddis was “out of control.” (McCombs Dep.

19–20). 

The responding officers have a fairly limited recollection of

what transpired. Officer DeMattei recalls speaking to Dunford

when he arrived and deciding to arrest Gaddis for disorderly

conduct based on what he heard about Gaddis coming to

Winstead’s porch. Although Officer Spinka and Officer

Lannom remember very little about the incident, it is undisputed that they were on Gaddis’s porch to make sure he stayed

nearby during the investigation and ensure that he was not

threatening or dangerous. 

In 2018, Gaddis brought this § 1983 action against Officers

DeMattei, Spinka, and Lannom, the city of Marion, Illinois, and

McCombs, Dunford, and Winstead. He asserted claims for

false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, claimed the

city was liable under Monell for failure to properly train its

officers, and sought injunctive relief against former Marion

police chief Dawn Tondini. He also advanced state-law false

arrest claims against McCombs, Dunford, and Winstead. 
No. 20-2424 5

Ultimately the district court denied Gaddis’s motion for

summary judgment as to liability, and granted summary

judgment in favor of the remaining defendants except

Winstead, who the district court allowed Gaddis to dismiss

without prejudice. The district court held that because Officer

DeMattei had probable cause to arrest Gaddis, his false arrest

claims failed against the officers as a matter of law. The court

also rejected Gaddis’s claim that he was unlawfully “seized”

while the officers stood on his porch and spoke with him. With

no underlying viable constitutional claim, Gaddis’s Monell

claim likewise failed. Next the district court entered summary

judgment for McCombs and Dunford after concluding there

was no evidence either of them encouraged or procured

Gaddis’s arrest as required to support a false imprisonment

claim under Illinois law. Finally, the district court granted

Gaddis’s unopposed motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a) to dismiss Winstead without prejudice. Gaddis

appeals only the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

McCombs, Dunford, and Officers DeMattei, Spinka, and

Lannom.

II.

Before addressing the merits, we must confront the jurisdictional dilemma posed by the district court’s dismissal of

Winstead without prejudice. As the district court itself recognized, the plain language of Rule 41(a) envisions the dismissal

of an entire “action,” not a particular claim against a particular

party as occurred here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The district

court nevertheless concluded dismissal of the claim against

Winstead was appropriate under Rule 41(a)(2), which authorizes granting a party’s motion to dismiss “on terms that the
6 No. 20-2424

court considers proper.” Ordinarily such a dismissal without

prejudice does not constitute an appealable final judgment

because the plaintiff could re-file the case against the dismissed

party. Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2001). 

In response to our request for briefing on this issue, Gaddis

essentially argues that Winstead’s dismissal is de facto a

dismissal with prejudice, or should at least be treated as one on

appeal. His logic is as follows: given that he asserted only a

state-law claim of false imprisonment against Winstead,

Gaddis maintains that there is no longer a basis for the district

court’s federal jurisdiction and he thus “can never re-file that

claim in District Court.” Gaddis’s assertion that the district

court would lack jurisdiction over his claim against Winstead

is odd given that he fails to contemplate the possibility that he

would prevail against the other defendants on appeal and

could again attempt to join Winstead to the suit on remand. We

need not, however, consider the merits before deciding

whether we have jurisdiction. 

Taken together, Gaddis’s arguments amount to a request

that we treat the dismissal as one with prejudice. We have long

recognized that a plaintiff may on appeal convert a dismissal

without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice to resolve the

finality problem posed by a dismissal without prejudice. See

JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 776–77

(7th Cir. 1999). Although it may be implicitly, that is precisely

what Gaddis has done here. Specifically, Gaddis provides the

following arguments for finality in his brief: “Because Gaddis

believes that Winstead testified honestly, Gaddis moved to

dismiss him from this case. He seeks no relief against Winstead

in this appeal.” (Appellant’s Br. at 29.) He further insists that
No. 20-2424 7

his case against Winstead “is over insofar as the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Illinois is concerned.”

(Appellant’s Br. at 8). He reiterates that point yet again with his

insistence that the dismissal without prejudice “is final because

Gaddis is now foreclosed from bringing any claims against Mr.

Winstead in the District Court.” (Id. at 9).1

 These and other

statements in Gaddis’s brief amount to an expression of his

willingness to convert the dismissal without prejudice to one

with prejudice to ensure our jurisdiction on appeal.

Turning then to the merits, we review the district court’s

entry of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable

factual inferences in Gaddis’s favor. E.g., Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d

505, 511 (7th Cir. 2021). To prevail on his Fourth Amendment

claims for false arrest, Gaddis must show that he was arrested

without probable cause. See Farnik v. City of Chi., 1 F.4th 535,

545 (7th Cir. 2021). Probable cause for an arrest provides an

absolute defense to a false arrest claim. Id. Probable cause

exists when a reasonable officer could have believed a crime

had been or was being committed. Holmes v. Village of Hoffman

Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). The officer’s belief

1

 The only statement that could plausibly be interpreted to suggest Gaddis

in fact wants to retain the dismissal without prejudice is his assertion in his

brief that “[H]is motion makes clear that he does not believe he has any

claim against Winstead but wants the dismissal to be without prejudice as

a precautionary measure.” (Emphasis added.) We decline to let Winstead have

it both ways, particularly when he has provided no authority for such an

approach. See, e.g., White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021)

(“[T]his court has repeatedly and consistently held that perfunctory and

undeveloped arguments, as well as arguments that are unsupported by

pertinent authority, are waived.”).
8 No. 20-2424

need not be “‘correct or even more likely true than false, so

long as it is reasonable.’” Fleming v. Livingston Cnty., 674 F.3d

874, 879 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953

(7th Cir. 1999)). Disorderly conduct under Illinois law is

described as an individual doing “any act in such unreasonable

manner as to alarm or disturb another and provoke a breach of

the peace.” 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1). 

Although Officer DeMattei himself conceded he did not

have a detailed memory of the events, his uncontested report

from that day provides ample information from which he

could have reasonably believed probable cause existed to

arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct as defined above. Officer

DeMattei documented (1) hearing from McCombs that Gaddis

had been causing a disturbance; (2) hearing from Dunford that

Gaddis had been calling him a coward and attempting to start

a fight; (3) hearing from Winstead that Gaddis’s disruptive

behavior was an “ongoing issue” that had recently been

becoming “more aggressive;” and (4) his own assessment that

Gaddis may pose a risk to others. These facts, taken together

and gleaned firsthand by DeMattei, made it reasonable for him

to believe Gaddis’s behavior alarmed or disturbed others as

described in the Illinois disorderly conduct statute. Cf.

McComas v. Brickley, 673 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable officer could

mistakenly have believed they had probable cause to arrest.”)

(Emphasis in original.). Gaddis’s Fourth Amendment claims

based on false arrest thus fail as a matter of law. See Muhammad

v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2018). Gaddis next

advances several Fourth Amendment claims based on the

timing and location of his arrest. First, he claims his arrest
No. 20-2424 9

violated the well-established rule that the Fourth Amendment

prevents officers from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine arrest.

E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Because it is

undisputed that he opened his front door and walked out onto

the porch before he was officially placed under arrest, he

cannot establish a literal violation of Payton. Presumably

recognizing this problem given the undisputed facts, Gaddis

suggests he was in fact under arrest when Officers Lannom

and Spinka were first on his porch speaking to him. In support

of this claim, Gaddis cites a number of cases considering when

a seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes, relying in

particular on a line of cases establishing that an individual may

be seized without being physically restrained when, given the

totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would have

believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Gaddis argues these cases

apply here given the officers’ deposition testimony agreeing

that they were on Gaddis’s porch at least in part to make sure

“that Gaddis stayed in the vicinity.” (Lannom Dep. at 12);

(Spinka Dep. at 10). This leads Gaddis to the conclusion that he

was already under arrest while inside his home speaking to

Officers Lannom and Spinka through the open screen door.

The mere fact that in addition to gathering information,

Officers Lannom and Spinka wanted to ensure Gaddis stayed

nearby does not transform his entirely consensual interaction

with them into a seizure. It has long been established that the

Fourth Amendment is not implicated when officers approach

a doorway, knock, wait for an answer, and engage in conversation until asked to leave. See e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1,
10 No. 20-2424

8 (2013). Here Officers Lannom and Spinka did exactly that.

Gaddis never asked them to leave and presented no evidence

that he was not free to close the door on them and go about his

business. Their admission that part of their aim in being on the

porch was to prevent Gaddis from leaving the scene does not

transform the consensual interaction into a seizure implicating

the Fourth Amendment. 

Gaddis’s final theory is that officers violated the Fourth

Amendment by coercing him outside to arrest him when they

undisputedly lacked authority to enter his home in order to

effectuate his arrest. Gaddis testified that Officer DeMattei

arrived on his porch and told him to step outside because he

was being arrested for disorderly conduct. He also said that

Officer Lannom claimed that if Gaddis did not come out he

would be arrested for resisting arrest. After Gaddis “thought

about it for a while,” he decided to go outside, where he was

arrested. According to Gaddis, the threat of additional charges

amounted to coercion that left him with no choice but to step

outside his home. For their part, the officers maintain there

was no coercion and that they are in any event entitled to

qualified immunity as to the facts surrounding Gaddis’s arrest. 

Gaddis must make two showings to overcome the officers’

assertion of qualified immunity. First, he must demonstrate

that the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to him,

establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Allin v. City of

Springfield, 845 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2017). He must also show

that their conduct violated “clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because

the second inquiry is often conclusive, we may start our
No. 20-2424 11

analysis there. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

The showing of clearly established law must be specific to the

particular facts of the case. In other words, Gaddis may not rest

on generalities about when coercion may lead to a Fourth

Amendment violation, but must rather point to cases establishing a rule that makes it obvious that raising the possibility of

further charges if Gaddis declined to come out would amount

to unlawful coercion. See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.”) (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)

(“We have repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly

established law at a high level of generality.”). In other words,

the inquiry whether the conduct clearly violates established

law “‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). This precision is particularly important in the context of the Fourth Amendment, where the Court

has recognized that “[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to

determine how the relevant legal doctrine ... will apply to the

factual situation the officer confronts.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.

Gaddis’s argument boils down to a claim that officers

violated—if not the letter, at least the spirit—of the Payton rule

by raising the possibility of further charges if he exercised his

undisputed right to stay inside his home and demand that

officers procure a warrant for his arrest. There are cases

recognizing the possibility that officers may violate Payton by

engaging in behavior to coerce an occupant out of his home.
12 No. 20-2424

Those cases observe that coercive actions by officers accomplish “‘the same thing’ and achieve the same effect as an actual

entry, and therefore trigger Payton’s protections.” See United

States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting United

States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984)). Critically

though, that same line of case law notes that circuits are split

between a narrow reading of Payton requiring actual entry into

the home for a violation and those recognizing the kind of

“legal fiction of constructive or coercive entry” described

above. Allen, 813 F.3d at 81. Notably, our circuit has to date

limited Payton to its literal holding that non-exigent warrantless arrests inside the home violate the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir. 1991)

(relying on Payton for the rule that the Fourth Amendment

“draws a firm line at the entrance to the house”) (internal

quotation and citation omitted). Given this , it is axiomatic that

there is no “clearly established law” in our circuit establishing

what officers may permissibly do to encourage an occupant to

come outside within the limits of the robust Fourth Amendment protections forbidding warrantless routine arrests inside

the home as recognized by Payton and its progeny. See Wilson

v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617–18 (1999) (affirming that government

officials were entitled to qualified immunity where no

“controlling authority in their jurisdiction” clearly established

the rule on which the petitioners sought to rely); Upton v.

Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1217 (7th Cir.1991) (circuit split

indicated the rights at issue were “currently unsettled as a

matter of constitutional law and therefore were not ‘clearly

established’ ”). 
No. 20-2424 13

Because Gaddis cannot identify the required clearly

established law, we need not inquire whether the officers here

violated the constitution. (Although we note that our failure to

reach the issue should in no way be read as sanctioning the use

of threats or deception to “encourage” a suspect to step out of

his home.) It is enough that at the time of Gaddis’s arrest, it

was not clearly established that such a statement, followed by

an ostensibly consensual choice to exit one’s home and face

arrest, would violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on

routine warrantless arrests inside the home. 

That leaves Gaddis’s state-law claims against McCombs

and Dunford. To succeed on his false arrest claim under Illinois

law, Gaddis must show 1) arrest or restraint against his will; 2)

caused or procured by the defendants; and 3) made without

probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe he committed

the offense.As discussed above, Gaddis has failed to show that

the arresting officers here lacked probable cause. Moreover,

private citizens may be liable for false arrest only upon a

showing that they commanded or mounted a campaign against

the police in order to procure the plaintiff’s arrest. See Butler v.

Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1978; Odorizzi v.

A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1971). Gaddis claims he

satisfies this requirement with evidence that both McCombs

and Dunford exaggerated his behavior when describing it to

police (characterizing him as “out of control” and “pounding”

instead of knocking on Winstead’s door). But merely providing

information to police is insufficient to constitute participating

in or procuring an arrest. Odorizzi, 452 F.3d at 232 (“[G]iving

information to police in itself is insufficient to constitute

participation in an arrest.”). In any event, even when viewing
14 No. 20-2424

the facts in the light most favorable to Gaddis, it is not clear

that McCombs or Dunford embellished or falsified facts in

their descriptions to police. Gaddis himself admitted in his

deposition that it was “possible” his behavior could be

perceived as threatening. (Gaddis Dep. at 43) (noting that

when he “corrected” Winstead by telling him to mind his own

business it is “possible” that “he somehow took that as a threat

or something, I guess”). Given the existence of probable cause

for his arrest and the lack of evidence suggesting either

Dunford or McCombs pressured or persuaded officers to arrest

Gaddis, his state-law claims fail as well. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we direct the district court to

convert Winstead’s dismissal without prejudice into one with

prejudice, and we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all remaining defendants.