United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 19, 2020

Decided May 19, 2020

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐2721

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

TROY S. RICHTER,   

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:18CR00184‐001

James R. Sweeney II,

Judge.

O R D E R

Troy Richter pleaded guilty to one count of traveling with the intent to engage in

illicit sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), three counts of sexual exploitation of a child,

id. § 2251(a), and one count of possession of child pornography, id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The

district court sentenced him, then 38 years old, to 30 years’ imprisonment to be followed

by 10 years’ supervision. Richter filed a notice of appeal, but his lawyer asserts that the

appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw from representation. See Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Richter has not responded to this motion. See CIR. R. 51(b).

Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that this

kind of appeal might involve. The analysis in counsel’s brief appears thorough, so we

limit our review to the subjects she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776

(7th Cir. 2014).   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19‐2721    Page 2

Counsel informs us that she consulted with Richter and that Richter does not

wish to challenge his guilty plea. Accordingly, counsel properly avoids discussing the

voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United States v.

Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012).   

Counsel first considers whether Richter might challenge his sentence on

procedural grounds but correctly concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous. A

district court commits procedural error by improperly calculating the guidelines range

or by treating the guidelines as mandatory. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007). Here, we would not conclude that the court miscalculated the guidelines range.

As counsel explains, the court accurately calculated an offense level of 43 (including

several enhancements) and a criminal history category of I, yielding a guidelines range

of life imprisonment, and Richter did not object to these calculations. Counsel also

appropriately points to the court’s statements at the sentencing hearing acknowledging

that the guidelines were advisory.   

Counsel next explores challenging the substantive reasonableness of Richter’s

sentence and properly concludes that doing so would be frivolous. A below‐guidelines

sentence, like the one here, is “‘presumptively reasonable against an attack by a

defendant claiming that the sentence is too high.’” United States v. Dewitt, 943 F.3d 1092,

1098 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Solomon, 892 F.3d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 2018)).

Counsel identifies no reason to disturb that presumption, nor do we see one. The

district court appropriately considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the

nature and circumstances of the offenses (of a “heinous” nature, in that one of the minor

victims was Richter’s niece), Richter’s personal history and characteristics (economic

and fertility problems, and alcohol addiction), as well as the need for the sentence to

deter criminal conduct (Richter had possessed child pornography for a decade) and

avoid unwarranted sentence disparities (his conduct was “less egregious” than that of

other defendants convicted of similar charges).   

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.