alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., )

)

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 05-00344-BH-B

JEREMIAH HARRIS d/b/a ANADORA, )

)

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

ELLSWORTH CORPORATION, et al., )

)

Third-Party Defendants. )

ORDER

This action is now before the Court on a motion (Doc. 64) filed by Jeremiah J.

Harris, the defendant herein, to modify the Court’s dismissal order dated March 20, 2006,

in such a manner as to “leave pending only Harris’ third party complaint against Mike

Turley, individually and d/b/a Mobile Tech.” Upon review of the record, however, the

Court finds that, prior to the settlement of this action which resulted in the order now at

issue, Harris’ motion (Doc. 48) for leave to file a third party complaint against Mike

Turley had not been granted by the Court and Harris’ attempts (Docs. 53, 60 and 61) to

nonetheless perfect service on Mike Turley were unsuccessful. 

Although the Court’s failure to address Harris’ motion for leave to file a thirdparty complaint was inadvertent, a present review of the claims sought to be asserted by

Harris against Mike Turley, namely fraud, money had and received, conversion, and

conspiracy, leads to the unescapable conclusion that they do not constitute appropriate

Case 1:05-cv-00344-BH-B Document 65 Filed 04/24/06 Page 1 of 2
1

As stated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a), a proper third-party claim is one asserted against “a

person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part

of the plaintiff’s claim against the third-party plaintiff.” As applied to this action, Harris has

failed to demonstrate in his proposed complaint how Mike Turley d/b/a Mobile Tech could be

liable to Harris for any part of the insurance coverage at issue in this declaratory judgment

action. Whatever liability Turley may have to Harris, it does not relate to the insurance at issue

in this litigation.

2

third party claims relative to the insurance coverage questions which were at issue in this

action.1

 Consequently, it would not have been and is not now appropriate to permit the

filing of Harris’third-party complaint. 

The Court therefore concludes and it is thus ORDERED that Harris’ motion (Doc.

48) for leave to file a third party complaint against Mike Turley is due to be and is hereby

DENIED and Harris’ motion (Doc. 64) to modify the dismissal order of March 20, 2006,

is due to be and is also hereby DENIED.

DONE this 24th day of April, 2006.

 s/ W. B. Hand 

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00344-BH-B Document 65 Filed 04/24/06 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM S. COWART, :

(AIS # 00011179),

:

Plaintiff, 

: 

vs. Civil Action No: 14-0197-WS-C

:

BALDWIN COUNTY CORRECTIONS 

CENTER MEDICAL DEP’T, et al. :

Defendants. :

JUDGMENT

It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff William S. Cowart 

recover nothing and the claims made against Defendants Baldwin County Corrections 

Center Medical Department, Dr. Charles D. Sherman, and Nurse Carla Wasdin are

hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 

DONE this 23rd day of March, 2015.

 s/WILLIAM H. STEELE 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Case 1:14-cv-00197-WS-C Document 29 Filed 03/23/15 Page 1 of 1
Doral Financial Corporation
Computation of Ratio of Earnings (Losses) to Fixed Charges
 For the nine month period endedSeptember 30, 2010Including Interest on DepositsEarnings
(Losses):Pre-tax loss from continuing operations
    
    $
    (244,914
    )Plus:Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)
    
    
    187,947Total
Earnings (Losses)
    
    $
    (56,967
    )Fixed Charges:Interest expensed and capitalized
    
    $
    185,825Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized expenses related to indebtedness
    
    
    366An estimate of the interest component within rental expense
    
    
    1,756Total Fixed Charges
    
    $
    187,947Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
    
    
    (A
    )Excluding Interest on DepositsEarnings
(Losses):Pre-tax loss from continuing operations
    
    $
    (244,914
    )Plus:Fixed Charges (excluding capitalized interest)
    
    
    104,740Total
Earnings (Losses)
    
    $
    (140,174
    )Fixed Charges:Interest expensed and capitalized
    
    $
    102,618Amortized premiums, discounts, and capitalized expenses related to indebtedness
    
    
    366An estimate of the interest component within rental expense
    
    
    1,756Total Fixed Charges
    
    $
    104,740Ratio of
Earnings (Losses) to Fixed Charges
    
    
    (A
    )
 
 (A)
    
    Due to the Companys pre-tax loss for the nine month period ended September 30,
2010 the ratio coverage was less than 1:1. The Company would have to generate additional earnings
of $244.9 million to achieve a ratio of 1:1 during the nine month period ended September 30, 2010. 121
#### Sam Johnson, et al., *v.*Clifton Rodes, et al.

Misjoinder of Actions.

If no objections are made in the court below on account of misjoinder of actions, no objection thereto can be made in this court.

Setting Aside Judgment.

Where in a cause process was served and a judgment rendered, a motion to set such judgment aside, made nearly three years after its entry, will be denied. If relief is sought against such a judgment it must be by a new action.

Record on Appeal.

Where in the trial court a party offers to file a pleading, which is denied by the court, such pleading does not become a part of the record on appeal, unless made so by bill of exceptions.

APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT.

October 21, 1875.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The mortgagee executed to Thomas and Bedlow passed the entire estate of Johnson and wife, including the homestead exemption. The petition of Thomas & Bedlow certainly presented a cause of action and a right of recovery in each of the plaintiffs. If there was a misjoinder of actions, a question we do not decide, it was not objected to in the court below, and cannot, therefore, be taken advantage of here.

Johnson and wife were regularly served with process, and judg*847ment rendered against them by confession. Nearly three years afterwards Mrs. Johnson moved to have the judgment set aside, and to be allowed to file an answer. The court below had no power to set the judgment aside upon motion. If there exists any reason why the judgment shall be modified or vacated as to her, she must by an original proceeding apply for such relief in the mode prescribed by Sec. 581, Civil Code of Practice.

Thompsons, *for appellants. Durham &*Jacob, *for appellees.*

Further than this, Mrs. Johnson cannot, so long as the judgment remains in force, have the question as to her fight to a homestead or its value retried. But if this were not so, she 'could have no relief upon this appeal. The record shows that she and her husband offered to file answers, and that their motions to file were overruled. These answers, therefore, did not become parts of the record. They have not been made so by bill of exceptions or otherwise. The bill of exceptions was offered and rejected by the court, but such answers are neither incorporated in the bill, nor identified by it.

We have no evidence that the papers copied by the clerk were the answers offered, except his statement that such is the fact. It has been repeatedly decided that the clerk cannot certify a paper that has not been made part of the record.

We need not pass upon the plea of limitation. The indorsement on this record makes Clifton Rodes an appellee. The record does not show that he has any connection with the cause. The two sales were properly set aside. It was the fault of the appellees that the mistake occurred in the first sale, and the commissioner should have awaited direction from the chancellor before selling the second time.

Judgment *affirmed*on original and cross-appeal.
11648.

#### WHITE *et al. v.*THE STATE.

Decided July 28, 1920.

A verdict supported by any evidence and approved by the trial judge can not be set aside by this court because of conflicting evidence or alleged insufficiency of evidence.

A conviction of manslaughter was authorized by the evidence.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Jackson superior court — Judge Cobb. May 3, 1920.

P. *Cooley,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. O. Dean, solicitor-general,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

As the motion for new trial in this case contains no special grounds, the only question to be determined by this court is whether or not there is any evidence to support the verdict. In passing on the facts in a motion for a new trial, the judge of the trial court has some discretion, but where he has exercised that discretion, this court is powerless to interfere. Our Supreme Court has said; “This court has always recognized that the greatest weight and consideration should be paid to the verdicts of juries, and in many cases has held that while the verdict was different from what the judges would have rendered as men, the court would not interfere. So, too, where the evidence was conflicting, it would not disturb the finding, although it might think that the preponderance was in favor of the losing party. In testing the sufficiency of evidence this court cannot consider the credibility of witnesses, that being a matter exclusively for the jury, who note their manner of testifying and consider the thousand and one things transpiring during a trial, which cannot be photographed or transcribed and transmitted to this court as a part of the record. ” *Patton*v. *State,*117 *Ga.*234 (43 S. E. 534). “This court by the constitutional amendment creating it, is limited in jurisdiction to the correction of errors in law alone, and therefore has no power to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is strongly contrary to the weight of evidence, if there is any evidence at all to support it.” *Collins*v. *Brown,*21 *Ga. App.*420 (1) (94 S. E. 645), and cit. Applying the foregoing rulings to the facts as they appear in the present record, the judgment overruling the motion for new trial must be

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles, C. J., and Luke, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1799 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1799

  To amend title 38, United States Code, to expand eligibility for a 
certain program of job counseling, training, and placement service for 
                               veterans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 24, 2023

Mr. Van Orden introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 38, United States Code, to expand eligibility for a 
certain program of job counseling, training, and placement service for 
                               veterans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ensure Military Personnel Learn 
Opportunities Yielding Vocations that Employ Transitioning 
Servicemembers Act'' or the ``EMPLOY VETS Act''.

SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR A CERTAIN PROGRAM OF JOB 
              COUNSELING, TRAINING, AND PLACEMENT SERVICE FOR VETERANS.

    (a) Definition.--Section 4101 of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended in paragraph (5)--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking the comma at the end 
        and inserting a semicolon;
            (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``power, or'' and 
        inserting ``power;''
            (3) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; or''; and
            (4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(D) a member of the Armed Forces eligible for the 
                Transition Assistance Program under sections 1142 and 
                1144 of title 10.''.
    (b) Outreach.--Section 4103A(a)(1) of such title is amended--
            (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting 
        ``and certain eligible persons'' after ``eligible veterans'';
            (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); 
        and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
        subparagraph (C):
            ``(C) Eligible persons described in paragraph (5)(D) of 
        section 4101 of this chapter.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Eugene R. Jarvis, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Erie County,

March 16, 1925.

Wills — execution — testator signed name on first page of will and then in presence of subscribing witnesses signed and acknowledged his name in attestation clause and requested witnesses to sign — instrument expresses intention of testator and should be admitted to probate.

Testator’s will should be admitted to probate, although after signing his name on the first page of the instrument he again affixed his signature on the second page in the attestation clause in the presence of two subscribing witnesses to whom he acknowledged his signature, published the will, and requested them to sign as subscribing witnesses, since the instrument expresses the intention of the testator and there is ample evidence of due execution.

Proceeding for probate of will.

*Lewis & Carroll,*for the proponent.

*Stein & Barber,*for the respondent.

Hart, S.:

The testator, Eugene R. Jarvis, a member of the Buffalo fire department, procured a blank will, wrote in the spaces prefacing the instrument reciting its testamentary character, followed by two. *564paragraphs in his own handwriting containing legacies, and a third containing a residuary and forfeiture clause as to prospective contestants. He then signed [his name on the 1st page of the instrument. The 2d page of the printed blank, providing for the appointment of an executor, is also written in by the testator. The attestation clause follows and the signature of the testator appears again.

The proponent does not rely upon the signature appearing on the 1st page. *(Matter of Van Tuyl,*99 Misc. 618.)

The subscribing witnesses are disinterested and, before signing their names, raised the question as to the necessity of testator signing in their presence. At this time he signed his name in the attestation clause. He acknowledged his signature, published the will and requested the witnesses to sign his will as witnesses. *(Matter of De Hart,*67 Misc. 13.)

A superficial examination of the will would indicate that it was incomplete and unsigned, that probate should be denied. *(Matter of Keeffe,*155 App. Div. 575; *Matter of Rudolph,*180 id. 486.)

This case can easily be distinguished and should be considered on the broader equitable principles embodied in *Matter of Field*(204 N. Y. 448). There can be no possible doubt that the document expresses the intention of the testator, that he intended the instrument to be a will, that at the time of signing his name in the attestation clause in the presence of the witnesses it was intended by him to be his signature to his will and was so expressed and acknowledged before witnesses who signed their names at the end of the will.

Decree of probate may be entered.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEC FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
                        
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-1998                           
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUL-31-1997
<CASH>                                          4,179
<SECURITIES>                                    3,889
<RECEIVABLES>                                   6,429
<ALLOWANCES>                                      292
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               15,192
<PP&E>                                          7,496
<DEPRECIATION>                                  4,943
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 19,143
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           5,996
<BONDS>                                             0
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<SALES>                                         6,123
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                8,638
<CGS>                                           1,450
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   2,065
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                4,554
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (78)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  1
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (7,778)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,778)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0   
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,778)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.60)
        


</TABLE>
#### James Cate *v.*James A. Rouse.

Bankruptcy — Appeals by Bankrupts.

After one has been declared a bankrupt, he cannot prosecute an appeal from a judgment against him in the circuit court. The assignee in bankruptcy in such a case is the real party in interest.

Discharge in Bankruptcy.

A discharge in bankruptcy relieves a debtor against all claims that might have been proved against his estate in the bankrupt proceeding, but to be available the discharge must be pleaded.

APPEAL PROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

October 19, 1876.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

After Cate had filed his petition in the bankrupt court, and at a time when he had no personal interest in the matter, he prosecuted to this court an appeal from the judgment against him in the Daviess circuit court in favor of Rouse. He did not make his assignee, who, as the representative of his creditors, was the real party in interest, a party appellant, nor suggest to this court that the appeal was prosecuted in behalf, of his assignee. He appeared in this court as a party litigating for himself. He succeeded in reversing a judgment, against which the proceeding in bankruptcy would have protected him.

The judgment of this court was his judgment. The mandate issued and sent to the court below was his mandate. The judgment he is now seeking to enjoin was and is the direct and necessary result of his voluntary action in this court. Said judgment was reversed subsequent to the date of his application for a discharge in bankruptcy, and is not affected by such discharge.

It is time that a discharge in bankruptcy in general relieves a debtor against all claims that might have been proved against his estate in the bankrupt proceedings. But it is also true that to make a discharge available it must be pleaded, and if, as in this case, the bank*777nipt chooses to pursue a line of conduct that deprives him of the right and power to plead his discharge, he must submit to the consequences.

*W. H.*Sweeney, *for appellant.*

*C. S.*Walker, *G. W.*Ray, *for appellee.*

The judgment against appellant remains unreversed. The ground upon which he seeks to enjoin its enforcement has neither arisen, nor been discovered since it was rendered. There is no reason for the interference of the chancellor.

Judgment *affirmed.*
May
7, 2015


 


Amendment
to Purchase Agreement between


Accelera Innovations Inc 


And





Grace
Home Health Care Inc


Dated November 25, 2015


 


That
Paragraph 3A of the Purchase Agreement provided for a closing date for the transaction stated above of January 15, 2015 and made
provision for an additional extension.


 


That
the Parties herein agree to amend the closing date to June 30, 2015.


 


	Accelera
    Innovations Inc.	 	Grace
    Home Health Care Inc.
	 	 	 
		 	 





 


Accelera
Innovations Inc. 20511 Abbey Drive, Frankfort, IL 60423 - 866.920.0758
**Exhibit 23.01**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-113914, 333-104711, 333-64552, 333-59842, 333-55822, 333-35730, 333-32460, 333-93591, 333-92159 and 333-87505) of Kana Software, Inc. of our report (which contains an explanatory paragraph relating tothe Company’s ability to continue as a going concern as described in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements) dated June 15, 2006 relating to the consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31,2005, which appears in this Form 10-K. 

/s/ Burr, Pilger, & Mayer LLP 

Palo Alto, California 

July 5, 2006
#### John G. Wills *v.*W. S. Franklin.

Will — Rule of Construction.

Where there is a devise over in the event of the death of the preceding devisee, it refers to the event happening during the life of the testator.

APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT.

October 28, 1874.

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The proper construction of the clause of the will in controversy is that if one of the devisees should die in the lifetime of the testator, his children, if any, should take his property, and if not, it should pass to the surviving devisees. The rule is that Where there is a devise over in the event of the death of the preceding devisee, it refers to the event happening during the life of the testator, and this rule must prevail here, as there is no other period to which the language of the will refers. If the testator had said in the event of the death of the devisee without children, it would have referred to or the contingency would depend on the death of the devisee without children. There is no such language, however, in the will, and as some time must be fixed in determining the devisee’s interest, it is plain that the period of time referred to at which the event was to happen in order to defeat the claim of the appellant, was his death during the life of the devisor.

The appellant, therefore, had a complete title to the land ex*186changed with appellee, so far as it could have been conferred upon him by the devisor.

/. *Simpson, for appellant.*

*Hughes v. Hughes,*12 B. Mon. 115. The judgment of the court below is *reversed*and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.